
I.B.TAURIS
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state, institutions and governance in lebanon, syria and palestine
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This book is dedicated to my father, Mahmoud,
who died on 3 December 2019, whom I had not seen, forcibly, for more than a decade

My father suddenly dried up and stiffened like an obsolete tree,

He died there . . . , They buried him there on the hill overlooking the collapsed scene of his life

*Forgive me, Dad! for I have not begot you a grandson, who could have done to me what I have done to you.**

*. From Mahmoud Darrwish poem mourning his father

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Abbreviations

AB	Arab Barometer
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
FsQCA	Fuzzy Sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GFPA	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
GT Index	Generalized Trust Index
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
OHR	High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PA	The Palestinian Authority
PLO	The Palestinian Liberation Organisation
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QoG	Quality of Government Institute
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats in Bosnia
Ta'if	Document of National Understanding in Lebanon
(UCDP/ PRIO)	The Uppsala Conflict Data Program at Peace Research Institute Oslo
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	The UN agency for Refugees
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy Institute
WVS	World Value Survey

PREFACE

When the Ta'if agreement was signed between the Lebanese factions, the world thought that division had ended, and when Hamas and Fatah signed many reconciliation agreements, the Palestinians thought division had ended. Indeed, the killings ended but not the division. Now, I know that wars and divisions do not end, and that institutions within those societies were built to not be changed and for division to continue, leading to divided societies that lack trust between each other. I learnt that wars strip affected people of their human agency, in addition to their rights and their capacity to make choices. I learnt that war is contagious, exactly like trust. If you care about other people as human beings, then you will be affected by their feelings, while suffering is a transmittable virus. Exactly like trust, it is a contagious feeling, and it is transmittable as man is expecting the other to behave the same as he or she does. My experiences reveal that war, conflict, institutions and trust are all linked together. This book is about the story of trust between people in divided societies, and how institutions affect it. Trust and distrust are linked to conflict, and conflict is tied to institutions and its reconfigurations.

Writing this book has brought me pain at some points. It has pushed me to listen to people's sufferings and cries through texts or face to face. This book is a result of my experiences in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was born and raised in Gaza. In Gaza, I had witnessed the life under Fatah movement as well as the start of the short-lived civil war between Hamas and Fatah. I had experienced the siege on Gaza, witnessed corruption within the Palestinian Authority and also witnessed the malaise of the Palestinian youth, which forced them to seek haven anywhere except Gaza. After the catastrophic political division and Hamas' control over the Gaza Strip, I kept in close contact with my family, friends and the daily news coming from there. I started to see things differently. In Lebanon, I lived and worked with both Lebanese and Syrian populations. In addition, I had close connections with both societies in Lebanon and Syria. During my work as a researcher, I had a chance to be part of the Lebanese society, and had the opportunity to see critical issues differently.

My decision to study wars and post-conflict areas at postgraduate and post-doctoral level was miscalculated. I always thought about how I could handle the emotional and psychological consequences of stories about human beings that I encounter during my work. I had to study every detail of societies and individuals I met. I had to walk around and visualize the effect of the war. I had to meet not only living people but also the dead ones who had stories to tell, where they had influenced the next generation for dozens of years to come. During my work, I always remembered the trauma of the conflict back at home in Palestine.

My work as a researcher taught me, in the hardest way ever, that people who suffer wars, genocides, mass death and siege have lengthy and heart-breaking stories. Each story has dozen other stories that include love, sadness, joy, colour and sometimes laughter. In studying the institutions of any regime, one has to look at individual stories too. You will not know the faces of these individuals, but you will know their stories. Such stories affect us deeply, as researchers and human beings in the first place.

Through my work, I learnt one important thing: wars start but never end. I learnt that wars keep their flames in the hearts of people who lost their loved ones, their homes and their dignity. Wars remain alive in the minds of the next generation. Between Sarajevo, Skopje, Aleppo, Beirut, Gaza, Diyar Bakr, Baghdad, Ramallah and Gaza there are divisions, with vulnerable people paying the price now and forever.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Why do certain divided societies lack trust between their composite members more than others? Why are divided societies more prone to the collapse of social trusts than others? Why do Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and many other Middle Eastern countries have low levels of generalized trust?

Return, a novel written by the Bosnian novelist Snježana Mulić, tells the story of five Bosnians from the three different ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina who returned home after the end of the war. It provides a snapshot of hundreds of thousands of stories from people in divided societies and, in particular, those in post-conflict areas. Trapped in the heaviness of bureaucracy and lost in transition as they search for a reason to continue living, the five Bosnians struggle with the unfairness of political and bureaucratic institutions that leads to frustration, tension and hopelessness, forcing many of them to permanently leave their home country. Mulić ends her novel with the observation that 'seventy per cent of households in Scandinavia and North America were using the internet daily, the rich were buying places in space . . . only our heroes are stuck in 1992'[1]. Here, she was referring to the inequality that was rampant in the country where the rich and elite live in luxury while the poor are stuck in the past; a society-wide, war-induced fragmentation. These stories are found in almost every divided society, whether that society is divided politically or ethno-religiously. Conflict and post-conflict issues (including the idea of 'returning home') are common throughout almost all societies that experience war and division.

Returning to the opening questions: Why do certain societies in a post-conflict state have low levels of trust? When societies try to navigate through the aftermath of a conflict, or during conflicts of the elite, trust is the main focus and the catalyst for rebuilding societies, nations, economies and democracies. Mulić's novel focuses on trust in institutions; specifically, on the reconfiguration and reengineering of individuals' lives by these institutions that result in frustration, distrust and hopelessness.

This book contributes to the debate around generalized trust and political institutions. The literature on generalized trust appears to be significantly dominated by the cultural theory and the social networks theory (or, the

associational explanation). Many scholars have partially accepted that it is very difficult to assess sources of generalized trust in societies. It is particularly problematic when it comes to divided societies that have experienced ethnic conflict or deep political mobilization or polarization in recent decades. As divided societies, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria can be considered empirical case studies, which show how politics, ethnicity and violence have a severe impact on trust levels. As will be discussed thoroughly in the first chapters, the underlying assumptions and different theories (e.g. cultural, institutional and associational) show that there is a need for empirical or case study research on divided societies in order to examine the relationship between institutions and generalized trust. There is also a need for such studies for academics, policymakers and members of the international community who work in the areas of peace, conflict and development in war-torn or divided societies.

In this book, I focus on the impact of institutions on trust, analysing different aspects of political and societal institutions and institutional conditions. From a theoretical perspective, the focus is on the application of theoretical insights and empirical methods. Empirically, the focus is on using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to compare different policies and to determine which policy combinations have a greater impact on the level of generalized trust in the selected case studies. Moreover, statistical methods are used to measure the degree to which institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust in Lebanon and Palestine. Research around the Syrian conflict and post-conflict partially benefits from QCA analysis, which provides a guide to selecting specific institutions to test and offers a more comprehensive context-based analysis.

Generalized trust and divided societies

Trust in divided societies is a sensitive yet intriguing topic that researchers have studied in an attempt to understand why one might trust strangers in a society in which multiple ethnicities and cultures exist, often in conflict with one another. The analysis of variations in the level of generalized trust in divided societies can provide a complex and detailed understanding of the possible connections between institutions, context and cultural factors, on the one hand, and generalized trust, on the other. The term 'generalized trust' is understood as trust given to strangers without the giver having a prior relationship with or experience of the recipient (Hardin, 2001). Despite its importance and the role it plays in various social contexts, there is no consensus among social scientists on the definition of generalized trust (Barber, 1983).

In divided societies, the discussion is much more complex when it come to generalized trust. Divided societies are challenged by history, culture, tradition, war, and social and political fragmentation, which create a low level of generalized trust and, consequently, a low level of social capital. The management of divided societies is characterized by complexities caused by the aspirations of the various ethnic groups to have their own political, cultural and societal institutions. Often,

these aspirations are in conflict with each other and may lead to a decrease in trust under unequal, unfair institutions, and institutional outcomes, such as preferential public administration, biased public officers or particularistic public services. These institutional conditions favour specific ethnicities or groups of people, which leads to an inequality in services, opportunities and the provision of other public goods.

Trust is a key element not only at an individual level but also at a community level: trust is important to sustain peace and also works as a trigger to end conflicts. It facilitates social coordination and interaction between individuals who have had no previous social interaction (Gambetta, 1988). Despite the fact that this type of interaction is uncertain in that one cannot know its consequences, trust that leads to this kind of new interaction can effectively build bridges and be a catalyst for the acquisition of knowledge about the society and its surrounding. This kind of interaction is vital in post-conflict reconciliation processes where different ethnicities and groups need to interact in order to create a public sphere and debate as to which institutions and what kind of political systems are wanted. Generalized trust is also considered a coercive method of control over social behaviour (Coleman, 1990). Social capital, of which generalized trust is considered to form a significant portion, is believed to play a key role in the development of democratic institutions (Foley, Putnam, and Edwards, 2001). Additionally, social capital and trust contribute to peace-building as well as to the hindering of conflict in divided societies (Michaelene Cox, 2008).

Maintaining a constant level of generalized trust among people in divided societies throughout the reconciliation process becomes necessary. The reconciliation process, as a civil society activist from Lebanon told me, begins with the building of fair institutions – particularly that of a judicial system. When taking historical, cultural and societal factors into consideration, institutions (both formal and informal) become the focus of the reconciliation process in divided societies. Institutions become the source of power and resources for divided parties, and groups are mobilized to design and control these institutions in order to benefit from them. However, these institutions, despite being part of 'the cake' (a metaphor pertaining to resources and power) should be viable and built to function.

There is, therefore, a consensus among social scientists that institutions are crucial to state-building in the aftermath of civil war or internal violence (Schindler, 2010). Civil war and ethnic violence can destroy not only communities but also institutions, leaving whole societies in ruins. Once conflict ceases, there is always a need to establish and redesign institutions to accommodate new realities and meet the requirements of the conflicting parties, based on the conflict-ending agreements (e.g. the Ta'if agreement in Lebanon, the Dayton agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Mecca agreements in Palestine).[2] Attention is often given to the crucial element of trust by advocating that these institutions are designed to work transparently and effectively, with the aim of boosting social trust between the different hostile groups (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2011). A large number of studies focus on institution-building as well as reconfigurations necessary to adapt to the new state of a war-torn and divided society.

There is evidence to suggest that institutions are crucial to the creation of generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Generalized trust is positively associated with well-functioning institutions, public policies and the quality of governments (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Peyrefitte, 1996; Putnam, 1993). The relevance of generalized trust to institutions is its capacity and ability to resolve problems of collective action, such as the provision of various forms of public goods, and to avoid a situation known as a 'social trap', in which short-term benefits for some groups of society have longer-term and often negative consequences for other groups or for the society as a whole (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). Moreover, the equality and fairness of formal institutions in divided societies can serve as a link between trust and institutions. Therefore, institutions are important mechanisms when it comes to influencing the creation or destruction of generalized trust.

Measuring generalized trust in relation to institutional–societal factors will guide policymakers and researchers towards a wider understanding of the mechanisms of maintaining or destroying generalized trust. I examine the impact of specific institutional and societal conditions (including informal institutions such as corruption) on generalized trust to help the purpose of this book very carefully. For example, common bureaucratic practices may have a greater effect on the level of generalized trust than power-sharing institutions or institutional factors in a divided society. This is because individuals recognize inequality and unfairness in their daily encounters with bureaucracy in local administrative procedures.

In comparison with the extensive attention that has been paid to studies on democratic mixed societies, there has been very little discussion around the applicability of these theories to non-democratic and/or divided societies. Furthermore, despite the extensive research on social capital and generalized trust undertaken in the last three decades, there are still some important gaps in understanding the sources of generalized trust, particularly the relationship between institutions and trust (Farrell, 2005). This requires a diversity of studies and work from different research fields and geographical areas. Although some comparative research on generalized trust in divided societies from an institutional perspective exists, it is still not common. Existing studies argue that there is a direct link between institutions and generalized trust, although few give empirical and comparative evidence to support their arguments (Levi, 1997; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).

Over the course of previous conversations and academic work on this topic, two important unresolved issues were identified. First, there are few studies examining the link between generalized trust and institutions in divided societies. Second, although experts acknowledge, empirically and philosophically, the fact that institutions have an impact on generalized trust, very few attempts have been made to examine specific policies, informal institutions or institutional conditions, especially in divided societies and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

In this book, I propose that a major source of generalized trust in divided societies can be found in state machinery; namely, in administrative and legal institutions of the state represented by public policies and practices, such as informal institutions. My intent is to fill the gap in the discourse of generalized

trust and institutions, thereby providing empirical evidence that institutions do have various levels of influence on generalized trust.

In order to gain an insight into generalized trust in divided societies, I undertook a comparative cross-case study, using QCA and statistical methods. I then refined the data with single case studies that focus on Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. The primary findings on the effects of institutions on generalized trust were derived using a cross-case study analysis in eight societies – Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Turkey, Macedonia, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq – using QCA and Simultaneous Equation Modelling (SEM). I then undertook an examination of three case studies: Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.

In line with previous studies, my hypothesis is that institutions could be empirically modelled as determinants of generating or destroying generalized trust. In other words, trust is associated with three main factors. The first of these factors is institutional conditions (unbiased public administration, equality in providing public services, the universality of public goods, the feeling of safety and security, perception of corruption and policymaking decentralization). The second is that of societal institutional conditions (public deliberation, activation and the creation of a civil society, which includes freedom of expression). The last factor is that of governmental design (monopoly of power and the judicial system). These factors reflect how individual experiences are shaped when interacting with institutions.

To maintain a sharp focus on the question at hand, I concentrate on the issues of generalized trust within divided societies from the MENA. Throughout the book, I subject generalized trust theories to analysis in both politically and ethno-religiously divided societies in relation to the institutional theory of trust. Given the particularity of the topic, it is important that I use other cases studies from outside the MENA region, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, South Africa and Kyrgyzstan. In this book, it is important not to assume that there is one universal 'theory' that gives us the origin of trust and how it is destroyed. My purpose is not simply to correct or propose a 'theory'. Rather, my main aim is to serve traditional and classic academic goals, providing a comprehensive explanation of the specific phenomena being studied – which is, in this case, generalized trust in divided societies. I contribute to the ongoing conversations on the topic.

I address the following key question: Under which institutions is generalized trust in a divided society maintained or destroyed, and how does this happen? This question is important for several reasons. If they knew which institutions (formal and informal) influence generalized trust to a greater degree, policymakers would put more effort into those institutions and their design as policy tools. As a result, these institutions will inspire an elevated level of trust, making societies less vulnerable to internal conflict, which is costly in both the short and long term.

From Beirut to Gaza through Damascus: Division and distrust

Along the road from Rafic Hariri International Airport to Beirut, one can clearly see the deeply divided nature of Lebanese society. Flags, pictures of political and

religious figures and military checkpoints colour the landscape between different neighbourhoods where various religious groups live, such as Trqiq Jdedia, Hadath and Achrafieh, Beka'a. This division can be seen further in the different shapes and level of modernity of the buildings on either side of the road – a demonstration of inequality, corruption and political/administrative arbitrariness in the country.

In October 2019, protests erupted in Lebanon as a result of the high levels of distrust and dissatisfaction in the political regime in power at the time. The Lebanese people adopted the slogan 'All of them means all', which means that they wanted all of the contemporary political elites removed – and that they wanted the regime removed even more (Azhari, 2019). One of the main demands of the protesters was that corruption, which has impacted every detail of the lives of the Lebanese and people living in Lebanon, be ended (Aljazeera, 2019). For many months, the economy of Lebanon had been decelerating, which affected millions of Lebanese people. They were unable to withdraw cash from their banks, which obliged the banks to enforce unprecedented measures, dividing the Lebanese people based on their wealth (Al-Awsat, 2019). In June 2018, social media triggered a wave of protests and criticism towards one of the crucial municipalities in the Beirut governorate. George Aoun, the major of Al Hadath municipality, issued a decree that banned Muslims from renting property in his municipality (Al-Hayat, 2019). Although the decree was illegal, according to the minister of interior and municipalities, there is no evidence that the major's policy has yet been abandoned.

A speech by Lebanese Christian foreign minister, Gibran Bassil, in which he denounced the parliament's Shi'a spokesperson, was leaked to the media. His words triggered a reactionary wave of hate accompanied by the mobilization of the two main political parties along religious lines: Christian Maronite (free patriotic movement) versus Shi'a (Amal Movement). The main streets in Lebanon were closed, rubber tyres were set on fire and huge placards reading 'We are waiting for a sign from you' were displayed (meaning that the supporters of the Amal Movement were waiting for a sign to act). In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections in Lebanon in May 2018, the demonstrations of Hizbullah supporters and the loss of the Sunni Harri in the election triggered a wave of fear and hate speech in the city of Beirut. This was not the beginning but a continuation of the electoral campaign in which all Ethno-religious groups used fear-mongering as a method by which to gain more votes.

In Palestine, the political fracture between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Front for Liberation of Palestine and Fatah, as well as the political division between Fatah and Hamas, has loomed over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Each authority prevents the flags of the other political factions from being displayed and sometime exchanges fire over this issue; for example, in 2008 and 2009, gunfire was exchanged in Gaza over the issues of flags and public spaces. These incidents are also related to the lack of trust between these factions and their composite members. Each group believes that the other is trying to eliminate them from the public sphere. From talking to youths in the Gaza Strip, it is clear that safety, unemployment, a lack of freedom of expression and restrictions of movement

have contributed to many social diseases, causing people to be more vulnerable to exploitation. The level of distrust, therefore, is generally higher than before political division. Interestingly, the Palestinian national flag that represents all of these groups is usually absent in partisan events or national calibrations. The visual presence is a tool of assertiveness; religious and ethnic symbols are used in order to reflect and confirm the 'otherness' and presence of a group.

Demographic change, unjust policies, elitism and fear-mongering are all practices that are common in divided societies – whether that division is political, ethnic or religious. Otherness affects all individuals within the society equally and is accompanied by fear-mongering by political elites, which results in further divisive and hazardous consequences, such as a lack of trust.

The Syrian case is unique: it is an ongoing struggle for life and livelihood. The ongoing civil war has taken the lives of more than 400,000 and has displaced 7 million internally as well as 5 million Syrians to neighbouring countries. The war has not only affected the people themselves but also, as of 2016, brought about a new mechanism of demographic change, which began in 2014 when a truce was brokered between rebels and the Syrian army. The Syrian regime and its allies have tried to change the demographics of areas inhabited by the poor. Sunnis were sent to rural areas, such as Idlib.

Homs offers a clear example: following a two-year siege, opposition fighters were transferred from the rebel-held neighbourhoods of Khalidiya, Bab Sebaa, Bab Hood, Jouret Shiah and al-Qusur to the northern countryside of Homs, which remains under siege.[3]

In addition, the Syrian government in Damascus issued a new decree in April 2018 that gave the local administration the legal power to manage the properties of individuals. The decree stated that when creating new regulatory areas, a list of all the properties owners must be presented to the local authorities within thirty days. This means that millions of internally displaced people and refugees may not be able to present any evidence in the given timeframe – or at all, as the majority of people's official papers have either been destroyed or have been left at their homes.[4] Those who fail to comply have their properties liquidated and auctioned off.

When I asked Syrian refugees in Turkey and Sweden about the aforementioned decree, it triggered conversation around the issue of trust between different sects within Syrian society. In Syria, division is multi-layered; it exists politically, ethnically and religiously. Many Syrians consider that the regime and Ba'ath are the sole cause of the current situation. 'They have destroyed the society', Jamal from Istanbul claims. Slueiman, from Aleppo and currently a refugee in Beirut, says that 'the regime has always created this kind of division between Syrians to stay superior and have the upper hand'.

Between 2016 and 2017, I visited Iraq twice and met with dozens of Iraqis from different parts of the country. The level of fragmentation between the Iraqi Kurds and other sects is deep, especially in the city of Kirkuk, where Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens live, alongside other sects. The division has been deepened by the political will of the central government in Baghdad and the political aspirations of the Kurds. One thing that strikes me is the nostalgia for the pre-2003 Iraq. Most

Iraqis expressed their desire to return to the 'old days', and one can understand their desire for strong democratic, transparent and accountable institutions. In the pre-2003 era, there were strong institutions that enforced the law, allowing a tribal system to work within the boundaries of the formal institutions. However, after 2003, tribes became fragmented, weakened by the formal institutions (intra-relations between tribes); personal safety was undermined and corruption increased. As one Iraqi told me, 'We were with one big corrupt dictator; now, we have hundreds.' In different areas of Iraq, flags of different political parties and religions, including Shiite, Kurdish and Turkmen, can be seen across different areas of a single city.

While there are no deep ethnic or religious factions in Egypt, society is politically divided, which has been the case mainly since 2013. In 2011, more than 55 per cent of Egyptians said that they trusted their fellow citizens. This dropped to 19 per cent in 2013. Although the level of trust has increased slightly in recent years (from 2016 to 2019), the level of distrust was still high in 2018, at 66.3 per cent. The case of Egypt shows how political institutions have had a powerful impact on destroying levels of trust, particularly after the 2013 military coup and the imposition of martial law (a state of emergency in the country).

Using Mulić's novel as a starting point for this book has provided me with an important direction. It begins with division and goes on to discuss policies, political practices, institutions, corruption within institutions and how they both affect and influence the trust between people who are looking for hope to overcome the past and achieve a better life. It is not a book about history, politics, sociology or anthropology. It is a book about the people in these societies and how they are affected by the bureaucratic machine, by history and by politics that inflict sectarianism and inequality and spread corruption. The book examines these institutions and the impact they have on the level of generalized trust. In doing so, it examines what institutions have an influence on the levels of trust within a society.

Book structure

This book is structured into ten chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 introduces generalized trust, its concepts, different theories and my position on these issues. In this chapter, trust and its sub-categories as a sociological concept are defined, as well as the different theories that explain the origins of trust. Within this chapter, it is argued that generalized trust has a central role in society as a major catalyst for cooperation and development. The main theories of generalized trust are also laid out in the second chapter, including institutional theory, cultural theory and civil society theory. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of generalized trust in divided societies, with race and identity being considered, as well as a general framework setting out how institutions within divided societies affect trust. The concept of trust in a time of violence is discussed in this chapter, as well as in the post-conflict period, including people's interest in how the post-war reconfiguration of institutions can affect trust.

Based on the existing literature and the book's introduction, in which the general framework of the book is set out, institutional conditions that affect the level of trust are examined based on cross-case study using a QCA in Chapter 4. Using nine case studies from both inside and outside the MENA region, the definition of institutional determinants that affect the level of trust in divided societies is given. In the fourth chapter, the bigger picture of institutions that affect trust, particularly those that relate to inequality, public administration arbitrariness and others, is captured. This chapter is important as, within it, I provide empirical evidence at a broader level (geographically and institutionally), which could help to navigate the rest of the book using individual-level data.

Following the determination of which institutions affect the level of trust, the effect of informal institutions (mainly corruption) on trust is then examined in Chapter 4. To investigate the effect of informal institutions on the level of trust, I examine the effect of corruption as an informal institute on the level of trust in the MENA region. Since 2011 in general and in 2019 in particular, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria and Sudan, the MENA region has been in political turmoil. Societies have been divided at various levels. These protests are in response to inequality, corruption and a lack of transparent and democratic institutions. Using data from more than 24,300 respondents from 10 countries in the MENA region (Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunisia, Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon), it is argued in this chapter that corruption is a strong predictor of both generalized trust and institutional trust. From the analysis, it is suggested that generalized trust and institutional trust are interconnected and work as a mechanical wheel, 'moving' each other. The findings also suggest that trust is affected by the experience with corruption. A person tends to have less trust in their fellow citizens and in political institutions if they are engaged with or have had experience of corruption, and vice versa.

In Chapter 6, the Lebanese case study and how institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust are discussed in detail. The informality of the sectarian political system in Lebanon has reached such an extent that the country did not have a president for over two years (2014 to 2016). In this context, I aim in Chapter 6 to examine the influence of institutional conditions on the level of generalized trust in a divided society, such as that of Lebanon, by conducting statistical analyses of Arab Barometer (AB) Survey data, as well as personal observations and interviews. I argue that institutions, as well as perceived living conditions (including inequality, the feeling of safety and the sense of insecurity), in divided societies are an important source of generalized trust in the long term. However, institutions can also easily destroy generalized trust in such societies if they are ineffectively designed and consequently prove to be unfair and unequal. In this chapter, I therefore conclude that equal and fair public institutions and services are crucial in order to maintain a high level of generalized trust.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the Palestinian case study and the effect that the political division between Fatah and Hamas has on the level of generalized trust. It is argued that the level of trust in Palestinian society has continued to be shaped and influenced since 2007 by the ongoing political division. As the level of trust

has been declining since that time, this research suggests that distrust in the political system, deteriorated healthcare and education services, high levels of unemployment and corruption, and the violation of human rights in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have led to a decline in the level of generalized trust. I also discuss statistical test results to support this case. Data from the AB in 2007, 2011, 2014, 2017 and 2019 are used to examine how institutional and contextual factors affect the level of generalized trust in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. First, an historical background on the political division among the Palestinians is provided; the current political division between Hamas and Fatah is then examined; and, later, the institutional and contextual factors that affect the level of generalized trust are discussed. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the results; mainly, around how creating a hybrid society has contributed to the low level of trust.

In Chapter 8, I examine the impact of the Syrian civil war on the level of trust among Syrians, both inside and outside of Syria. The Syrian crisis, which has taken the lives of more than 400,000 people, has resulted in one of the most severe trajedies in recent history. Since 2011, millions have been displaced internally, to neighbouring countries as refugees, and to other countries across the globe. Research has shown that conflict and misery result in the loss of trust and social capital in conflict zones. In the Middle East in general (and in Syria as a divided society in particular), where communities are either politically or ethno-religiously divided, trust has declined over time – and continues to do so. Analysing the different aspects of social relations, prior to and following the civil war, I provide in this chapter an exploration of trust in Syria, considering the intensity of destruction and causalities. Political oppression, the feeling of insecurity and the lack of public engagement are the main reasons for the declining level of trust. Therefore, in this chapter, I provide a timely discussion on an ongoing crisis requiring scientific evidence as to how to restore trust among Syrians as a means by which reconstruction and reconciliation can take place.

In Chapter 9, the social trust between the Lebanese population and the Syrian refugees in Lebanon is discussed. Based on fieldwork and personal experience, in this chapter I explore the concept of social trust between Syrian refugees and the Lebanese population as a host community. I examine how personal connections, family members and relatives across the two borders, as well as the different intervention mechanisms by international organizations, have played a role in contributing, both negatively and positively, to the level of social cohesion between Lebanese and Syrian refugees. This chapter is based on personal experience in Lebanon between 2015 and 2018. The chapter focuses on three main regions of Lebanon: Biq'a, North Lebanon and Beirut. The primary argument is that the lack of physical and social connectivity, the lack of communication, the media and the politicization of Syrian refugees have contributed to the decline in social cohesion, and therefore to the decline in levels of social trust.

Finally, in Chapter 10 I draw together the key research findings and translate them into implications for both theory and practice. I also acknowledge the limitations of this research and indicate directions for future research.

A note on sources and methods

In this study, I have drawn upon a wide range of academic writings, theories and research methods in the fields of political science, sociology and social psychology. In addition to relevant academic literature, I have considered a wide range of observations, newspaper articles, reports and key informative interviews with activists, workers and personnel engaged in the public sphere. My fluency in Arabic and English has enabled me to read, observe and conduct interviews and consult primary sources, as well as to closely observe the fabric and situations in those societies studied. All this has helped me to establish the findings presented in this book.

In addition, I have spent over two years in Lebanon, where I conducted field research and observation. During that period, I met dozens of Syrian refugees and key figures and attended dozens of meetings with Syrian activists as well as researchers who have studied the Syrian case. Besides that, my work in Lebanon in international NGOs has allowed me to travel extensively to North Lebanon, Bekaa and Beirut. I have learnt a lot from 'off the record' talks and debates with Syrian and Lebanese people.

Prior to conducting interviews, pilot interviews were conducted in two societies (Turkey and Lebanon). One interview was conducted via Skype and the other face to face. The questions were mainly presented in a 'yes or no' format, which then led to more open-ended questions, such as, 'Do you think having policies (later changed to "institutions") that facilitate more civil society intra-ethnic groups increases trust?' The interviewees would answer 'yes' or 'no', which would then be followed by questions aimed at determining why and how they came to their answer. Upon completion of these pilot interviews, interview questions and formats were developed, providing clear guidelines for semi-structured interviews.

The interviewees were selected from the different case studies on the basis of their knowledge, experience and work in the field of dialogue, policymaking and inter-community activities. This generally included academics, professionals, individuals who work in NGOs and religious leaders who have knowledge of, or have encountered events associated with, war and reconciliation, and had the capacity to be interviewed (mostly in terms of language). They were also selected on the basis of having knowledge regarding trust, policies and division in society. All interviews were arranged either through personal contacts or through an institutional capacity, such as V-Dem. The research and its purpose were explained to the interviewees. During the interviews, confidentiality was ensured in accordance with the preference of the interviewee.

Interviewees were carefully selected based on three criteria. First, the interviewees were from different sects, groups or political parties. Second, they had to be experts with in-depth knowledge of their societies, which required them to have undertaken thorough research in their field. Third, they had to have been engaged with the people through social work and field research for at least five years. All interviewees were locals and had been living in their society for

the previous five years. Interviewees were academics, social workers, researchers, civil society workers and professionals who worked for INGOs (international non-governmental organizations).

All interview data were recorded by note-taking. Digital recording was not used because most interviewees refused this method. Some respondents were unable to talk comfortably and felt reluctant to speak, especially about sectarianism and division in society with regard to formal policies. However, all have agreed to publish and include their arguments in this research.

In addition to this, because I am a Palestinian engaged scholar I was able to consult activists and engage in social media debate as well as to observe the development in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. My long involvement and knowledge of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian politics and societies helped me to assess what was most important for inclusion in this book, and what was less so. Therefore, my personal perspective has greatly contributed to the formulation and writing of this book.

The methods used are a combination of a qualitative method (QCA) comparing the different cases (MENA and non-MENA, in Chapter 4), simultaneous equation modelling (Chapter 5) and a statistical model (logistic regression) in a single case study (Chapters 6 and 7). One major analysis in this book (Chapter 4) is based on the application of the crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) (Ragin, 2007). CsQCA is a case-oriented approach ideally suited for a small to medium number of cases. QCA was used to find the combination of variables that affect the level of generalized trust. I conducted a set of interviews with experts and policymakers from different case studies. The influence of the institutional conditions, as derived from the QCA analysis of these interviews, was then used to quantitatively analyse their effect on generalized trust levels in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.

This combination of QCA and case study methods (including statistical analysis) allows for a more solid and comprehensive understanding of, and investigation into, the research question. This facilitates the research, as it provides the researcher with the chance to see which institutions have a greater or lesser impact, meaning that less effort need be exerted and less time spent when studying the most influential institutions. As it is a mixed-methods approach, qualitative research is performed and the case study method is applied with regard to policies in divided societies. Mixing qualitative methods with statistical analysis expands the scope and enhances the validity of the research (Creswell, 2013: 131). Therefore, in the chapter in which the effect of corruption on trust is examined, a statistical model based on in-depth qualitative research was used for the Lebanese and Palestinian case studies to test the results of the QCA analysis and to support the main argument in this book.

Besides that, two waves – the fourth and fifth waves – of the AB were used. The fourth wave was used for the regression analyses in Lebanon and Palestine, and the fifth wave was used in Chapter 5 since the fifth wave did not ask the same questions (mainly about equality and living conditions) that I am interested in examining

in this book. However, I added a new regression analysis for both Lebanon and Palestine using the fifth wave with different variables.

The use of logistic regression (logit) is a necessary step to check the effect of combinations of variables and single conditions from the analysis. By selecting a set of variables that represent the set of conditions used in QCA, this study assessed which conditions had more influence on generalized trust than others. Logistic regression is used to explain the effect of institutional conditions on generalized trust as a dependent variable. As generalized trust is binary, the regressions show the degree of change as either more trust or less trust. In order to ensure that the analysis was conducted correctly, a number of models were integrated, with each one including different variables, and the last model including all of the variables.

Logistical regressing is one of the most commonly used statistical methods to assess the probability of trust in a society as a result of a set of variables. Logistic regression models test the relationship between a set of independent variables and the dependent variable; in this case, either trusting or distrusting others. For practicality and a binary outcome, this study uses logit regression and is modelled using STATA 14.

The methodology for this research encompasses data collection and a description of the different case studies; an inductive data-analysis approach is also used. Generally, the careful selection of a qualitative case study and the use of a QCA of case studies provide the best method by which to study the effects of institutions on generalized trust in divided societies for the following reasons:

- Focusing on generalized trust and a limited number of survey values (a measurement of the dependent variable – generalized trust) simply provides too few observations for statistical analysis. Alternatively, a collection of single case studies, including in-depth research in one or two cases, suits both QCA and the aims of this book.
- The focus of this book is the level of generalized trust and how specific institutions and institutional conditions influence that; this necessitates a qualitative assessment, categorizing these institutional factors and how they can be coded.
- In this book, I focus more on case-specific pathways than the average effect of policies on the level of trust. This requires a case-based approach for the thorough examination of the complexity of interaction between the different variables.
- I put more focus on an in-depth examination of the effect of specific institutions or interacting institutions, which needs a case-based approach. QCA will help to decide whether a combination of interactions or one particular institution has a greater impact; it will allow for a deeper examination of the case studies.
- QCA can be applied empirically to policy analysis.
- QCA allows for a more informed discussion between policymakers and the researcher or the policy analyst since one of its most important characteristics is transparency. I approach the analysis with a clear method, which allows for

clear-cut decisions to be made during the research period (Benoît Rihoux and Grimm, 2006).

- QCA allows for the use of different types of data (quantitative or qualitative) and I can then choose different ways to put them into operation. In this book, therefore, I have used data from more than one source in order to fit the purpose of the research.
- This method uses a case-based research and analysis process, which is followed in the book.
- This method can be applied on different levels; national, subnational, cities and regional.'
- The results are presented in a manner to provide policymakers and practitioners with clear recommendations to meet the needs of these societies in terms of policy and institutional reform priorities.

Chapter 2

Between Social Capital and Trust

Institutions, History and Cultures

> The importance of trust pervades the most diverse situations where cooperation is at one and the same time a vital and fragile commodity: from marriage to economic development, from buying a second-hand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the continuation of life on earth. (Gambetta, 1988: ii)

Generalized trust refers to trust between strangers and unspecified people. This kind of trust is not based on self-interest but on the personal belief that most people can be trusted, without fearing that they may cause harm. Despite the attention this notion has been given by sociologists and political scientists, few studies have examined the concept of generalized trust thoroughly from an institutional perspective. Although many studies had a very interesting conclusion, they have seldom examined generalized trust and its source in institutions from the different analytical levels of an interdisciplinary approach. There is more of a focus on generalized trust and its research by sociologists than by political scientists. However, in the past few decades, more interdisciplinary studies have examined generalized trust. Welch et al. argue that generalized trust is necessary for meaningful social relations, and it reflects the functioning heart of a healthy society, democracy and politics (Welch et al., 2005).

What is trust?

For Misztal, trust is the belief that one's intended actions will not harm us and will be seen as acceptable (Misztal, 1996). This idea of trust is backed by the fact that individuals in any given society will react towards others based on the amount of perceived good intent, or 'trust' they have in the society or the other individual (Hardin, 2001). Other scholars define trust through the lens of complexity. For example, Luhmann argues that trust is equal to the reduction of complexity (Luhmann, 1979). The reduction of complexity is meant to allow societies to cope with uncertainties and the complexities of modern societies (Lewis and Weigert, 1985).

In this book, generalized trust is associated with concurrent uncertainty and complexity. The uncertainty centres on the reaction of the other individual or society in general. In divided societies, one does not see individuals only, but rather a whole group, sect or different ethnicity and therefore, with the exception of their close friends, this group of individuals is seen as a single person. Complexity refers to the complexity of beliefs. Individuals react based on their belief or knowledge of others. Sometimes, an individual may have knowledge of another individual from a certain ethnicity or sect having had a bad experience with this individual. This knowledge or experience will be reflected in his trust, or lack thereof, in them. Simultaneously, the others will react to his (dis)trust with distrust. In summary, this explains how trust is the expectation that others' actions are not harmful.

There are differences in how generalized trust is defined, largely because economists see generalized trust as a commodity. For example, Hardin examines trust as a commodity (Hardin, 2004), and Misztal treats it as a public good necessary for the economy (Misztal, 1996). Both argue that trust is necessary as it works as a lubricant facilitating various types of economic exchange (Krishna, 2001). From an economic perspective, trust encourages cooperation between people, enhancing interpersonal relations, which promotes cooperation (Arrow and Kenneth, 2000; Krishna, 2001; Putnam, 2000) and boosts the market machinery.

The sociological perspective sees generalized trust as a means of strengthening and building social relations. For sociologists, generalized trust is used to rebuild struggling or weak communities and to promote growth in strong societies (Wilson, 1997). Thus, generalized trust increases the security of a society and stabilizes social relations, increasing the stock of social capital (Misztal, 1996).

The dilemma of social capital and generalized trust

When we argue about trust in society, we speak about the concept of 'generalized trust' or 'social trust'. Individuals usually do things for good, not because they know each other or are rewarded on an individual basis, but because they trust that their actions will be rewarded by them having a positive impact on the community. In a society, we need trust when we deal with strangers outside the family and close circle of friends. Therefore, in order to leave the sphere of familiarity for an unpredictable and complex environment, trust is needed (Luhmann, 2000). On the micro level, individual choices in daily life produce mutual trust, reciprocity and higher trust on the macro level that become an integrative value among groups of strangers (Coleman, 1988). Moreover, trust requires an intense social network and participation in different kinds of voluntary associations. As Seligman argues,

> The emphasis in modern societies on consensus (is) based on interconnected networks of trust – among citizens, families, voluntary organizations, religious denominations, civic associations, and the like. Similarly the very 'legitimation' of modern societies is founded on the 'trust' of authority and governments as generalizations. (Hausman and Seligman, 1998)

Generalized trust creates the basis for 'brave reciprocity',[1] social networks and associations that are meant to be consistent and contribute to the development of the society. Generalized trust eases exchange without a need for enforcement and thus reduces the cost of transaction. This is the basis of cognitive social capital, which has been argued to be important in a country's institutional and economic development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Other scholars suggest that social capital is a form of generalized trust, and therefore, its contribution to economic and agricultural development is always equal (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001).

Trust and social capital can be so tightly connected as to prevent the ending of relationships when they are practically created in a society. In ethnically diverse societies, however, generalized trust appears to be low compared to homogenous societies. Studies by Alesina and La Ferrara find that racially diverse societies have lower levels of generalized trust than homogenous ones, which, according to them, reduces the efficiency of public services (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). This book suggests the opposite mechanism, in that public policies and institutions impact the level of generalized trust. Trust plays an important role, particularly when considering multiethnic groups living in the same society. Yet what, more precisely, is generalized trust?

As scientists continue to debate the definition, source, usage, measurement and emergence of social capital, there continues to be disagreement of its role in social, political and economic life. Scholars also try to falsify or find theoretical issues in the existing definition of social capital. As John Field discusses, social capital started as a simple concept and developed very rapidly to a more complex concept that focuses on people, their relationships and networks. As he argues, from that point, debates have been intense among scientists, which, he asserts, 'is why the concept of social capital is limited, and may be defective' (Field, 2003). Other scientists have taken radical positions by saying that social capital is not a concept. According to Leender, social capital assumes that actors will obtain access to resources, as they participate in the community where these resources exist. For them, social capital theory focuses only on social resources in society and relationships among individuals. It is therefore an approach to study success and failure in a given society (Leenders, 1999).

Other scholars consider social capital as a pattern to explain trust and cooperation in society. Paldam argues that many patterns explain how and why people build trust with one another and why they form social networks. He finds theories that explain cooperative behaviour in all social science and economics fields and describes social capital as the glue that binds them all together. He categorizes the definition of social capital into three types: trust, cooperation and networks. He argues that trust facilitates voluntary cooperation between individuals, creating a strong correlation between social networks and trust. This chapter will follow these categories as many other researchers and scholars have done in the past two decades (Leenders, 1999). Other scholars consider social capital as an approach developed to understand the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Moser, 1999). Other researchers consider

social capital to be a mechanism to understand social and economic problems (Durlauf, 2002).

The social psychology approach, which explains the origin of social capital, examines and explains social capital as a type of social psychological capital, or cultural and traditional societal norms. As Welzel argues, social capital includes the culture of tolerance and trust that appears in the broader social networks of any society as a consequence of increasing activism in voluntary associations (Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch, 2005). According to this approach, networks are a product of trust between people more than trust is a product of association. They argue that, as people trust each other more, they tend to interact more and form associations such as sport teams, music groups and other forms of associations, leading to an intensifying and increasing level of trust among themselves. Rose asserts that this group explains social capital as a set of cultural and traditional norms, whereby voluntary association/networks appear or increase as a result of existing trust (Rose, 2000). At the very least, trust and social capital are either the same or they are equal.

The centrality of generalized trust

The centrality of generalized trust has been touched upon by Fukuyama, who describes social capital as the 'capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in a certain part of it' (Fukuyama, 1995). He argues that trust is embodied in the smallest social groups, through individuals, to the largest community patterns, through bonds of family and relatives. Fukuyama distinguished between two types of trust: the first is familial trust, which builds bonds around family members; and the second is non-kin trust, namely, the trust between strangers. Non-kin trust is created among strangers to meet the virtue of modernity. According to Fukuyama, the trait of trusting strangers spontaneously in organizations, associations or society is the reason that high-trust societies are economically more successful.

Theories on generalized trust approach the questions of the generation of trust and its relationship with institutions from two distinct viewpoints: cultural and institutional. They follow the same theories that explain social capital. It is argued that cultural and institutional theories 'share a fundamental assumption that trust is learned and linked to some level of experience' (Mishler and Rose, 2001), yet they differ significantly with regard to when this learning takes place and what kinds of experiences are critical. While cultural theories assume that trust is learnt in cultural socialization with closest kin and friends and has a long-lasting effect on an individual, institutional theories emphasize that the learning of trust occurs later in life and is closely affiliated with the rational evaluation of institutional performance. The following sections present the definition and different theories of generalized trust.

Despite the ongoing and previous research on the origin of trust, few questions have yet to be answered, such as the following: Which institutions affect trust the

most and which institutional conditions or combination thereof can influence the level of generalized trust? This book intends to answer these questions using data from a variety of sources, contributing to the studies of trust, and institutions in a setting that is worrisomely neglected within the trust and social capital literature. It explores the role of institutions in building trust in diverse societies, selecting a few institutional factors important to ethnically diverse societies and examining their effect on the level of trust within different time frames.

The argument of this book is based on theories that stress institutions are crucial to the creation of generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). According to this perspective, generalized trust is positively associated with well-functioning institutions, public policies and quality of governments (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Peyrefitte, 1996; Putnam, 1993).

A number of institutional, political and societal variables may have an influence on the level of generalized trust in any given society. Yet, institutional variables are mostly associated with good governance determinants (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Thus, it is important to consider institutions, their conditions, the political context and the effects of interaction between these factors in a serious manner.

There are two types of trust: generalized trust and particularistic trust. Generalized trust is directed at people in general in the community, while particularistic trust is linked to identifiable people such as friends, family members and neighbours. Generalized trust comprises the main and essential component of social capital. As Putnam argues, 'features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, networks, can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions' (Putnam, 1993).

There is also a difference between knowledge-based trust and generalized trust. The former is directed towards particular objects, individuals and organizations (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Moreover, Newton differentiates between thick trust and thin trust. Thick trust develops between people of the same tribe, class or ethnicity through frequent interactions. Thin trust develops between people with different backgrounds through intermittent interactions (Newton, 2001). The former is based on strong ties, whereas the latter is characterized by weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Thick trust is another name for particularized trust, whereas thin trust equates to generalized trust.

Sztompka noted that there could be a distinct divergence between various types of trust, particularly with primary trust and secondary trust. Primary trust depends on the trustworthiness of the objects of trust. Deciding who to trust is based on trustworthiness, reputation, performance and the properties of the objects of trust. Secondary trust is dependent on the surrounding context; the location in which objects of trust exist as well as how they behave. Primary trust is related to particularized trust, whereas secondary trust is associated with generalized trust (Sztompka, 1996). This definition of trust does not depend on the characteristics of the object, individual or organization. It depends instead on how it behaves.

From another perspective, Delhey categorizes generalized trust based on two schools of thought: trust as individual property and trust as social system

property. The first maintains that trust is associated with individual personality and characteristics, social classes and demographic features. The second argues that trust is the property of the social system. According to the latter, the study of generalized trust and its origins requires an examination of the institutions of these societies and their properties (Delhey and Newton, 2003).

The origins of generalized trust

Nannestad identifies four types of origins of generalized trust after reviewing the literature on generalized trust. He describes these four types as the following: the civil society explanation, the institutional explanation, the cultural explanation and the social structure explanation (Nannestad, 2008). Table 2.1 shows the theoretical arguments of these theories.

The civil society explanation of generalized trust relies on the idea of the virtue of trust, cooperation and reciprocity in voluntary associations (Nannestad, 2008). The argument is that through interactions in voluntary associations, cooperation increases, which leads to higher trust. Many scholars have examined the relationship between civil society (civil engagement) and trust. The outcomes of these studies were mixed. Brehm and Rahn examined the reciprocal relationships between social trust, trust in government and civic engagement in the United States at the individual level. They found a strong relationship between civic engagement and generalized trust, as well as a strong relationship between trust in government and generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Other research has indicated a weak relationship between generalized trust and membership in voluntary associations (Claibourn and Martin, 2000; Uslaner, 2004; Whiteley, 2000).

However, the civil society explanation of social trust is not strong enough to hold, as the subsequent chapters will show. As Levi and Tarrow have argued, membership in voluntary associations can have a spillover effect where one can trust in one context while not trust in another context (Levi, 1997; Tarrow, 1996). In this case, trust can be context-based. How one can explain the variance where trust at a national level is weak, while membership of voluntary associations is high? In other examples, charity organizations in divided societies (politically/ethnically) have a high level of active memberships, but the level of generalized trust remains low, such as in Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan and Lebanon. The idea of civic engagement as a source of trust is weak because the membership itself can have negative effects

Table 2.1 Four theories of trust and their related arguments

Explanation	Variables
Civil society	Membership of voluntary organizations
Institutional	Satisfaction with democratic values, political freedom, public safety
Cultural	Optimism, personal variables
Social structure	Satisfaction with the community, ethnic diversity

if members exploit the system, circle or the context itself. Besides that, in societies with a high level of generalized trust, voluntary associations take up little time for the active individuals, which cannot explain the high level of trust (Newton, 2001).

The second explanation relies on the institutional theory of generalized trust. It argues that that generalized trust is a result of the institutional machinery of the state, including the satisfaction with the democratic values, freedom, equality and public safety. Many scholars argue that good institutions provide incentives for people to trust each other (Farrell, 2005; Levi, 1997; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). For instance, if X expects that Y is not going to betray the trust invested in him, betrayal must be sanctioned by good and sound institutions (Levi, 1997). Thus the rationale is that these institutions work as a lubricant for maintaining the level of trust in the society, where Y is aware that to risk losing the trust of X in the community will not go unsanctioned. This mechanism works perfectly in some tribal societies, where the tribal penal code is very severe, and trust is an honourable virtue where everyone's word is sacred. Therefore, losing trust between tribesmen may lead to either severe sanctions or disturbance in the tribal interrelations.

Other scholars have argued that the bureaucratic experience of heedless citizens affects the level of generalized trust. If X deals with the bureaucratic machine and finds that it is necessary to engage in bribery to make things happen, they will infer that corruption is the norm and they will distrust institutions, which will be subsequently reflected in the belief that all citizens act the same way, and therefore they will distrust other members in the society (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).

Other studies emphasized the role of fairness and equality in institutional accessibility. As Knight argues, without institutional fairness, underprivileged groups will infer that privileged groups exploit the system and that the institutions serve only a specific group (Knight, 2001). The idea that institutional fairness boosts the level of generalized trust is very relevant to this book. As most of the MENA region's countries are divided, mobilized and polarized, the roots of low level of generalized trust can be traced back to the inequality and unfairness between different social and ethnic groups.

Although I agree that institutions have a very decisive role in determining the level of generalized trust, it seems to me that institutions can work as a recipe for the rapid destruction of generalized trust. In other words, institutions can continue slowly to build trust, but can very easily destroy trust, as we will see in the following chapters.

The third explanation of the origin of generalized trust relies mostly on Uslaner's study, which claims that the level of trust is inherited and based on moral values (Uslaner, 2000, 2011). According to this explanation, generalized trust is related to the general appearance of the individual and the community to the world, with a strong connection to religious values. However, the empirical studies that hold this explanation rely on Western society and Christian communities, where trust is determined by cultural values produced and strengthened by the degrees of socialization and social interaction. This explanation cannot be expounded to other societies, and if we empirically examine other societies, such as Muslim societies,

we would find a weak link. For example, more than 80 per cent of individuals in thirteen Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East indicate that one must be careful when dealing with others if they hold strong religious beliefs (if they read the Quran daily), according to the data from the 2018 AB.

This explanation has also included income inequality as part of the cultural norms, as well as optimism. One could argue that income inequality is related more to institutional corruption, nepotism and the unfair distribution of resources (As chapter five and 6 will show). Besides that, the level of trust may not be directly related to income inequality but rather to the general perception of egalitarianism and equality against the state's institutions in one society, which leads us again to lend weight to the institutional explanation.

The fourth explanation of the origin of generalized trust is the social structure and satisfaction within the community, as well as safety. The meaning of social structure here is the social distance between the citizens of one society. This explanation argues that ethnic heterogeneity has an impact on the level of trust. The explanation holds that ethnically diverse societies have low trust because ethnic diversity strengthens intra-ethnic trust between while weakening inter-ethnic trust (Delhey and Newton, 2005: 312). This book will discuss ethnic diversity and generalized trust at length in other sections. The main focus of the book is to examine trust in divided societies which are not heterogeneous.

Although we have several explanations of the origin of generalized trust at hand, all of them are based on empirical studies and data from Western societies. Therefore, generalization of their conclusions cannot be upheld to other societies outside their own context. I argue that generalized trust has multiple sources and can be described as being like intertwined spaghetti, where one strengthens the other, but at different levels and in specific contexts. For example, the cultural theory which argues that culture and religion play a major role in determining the level of trust cannot be considered the only or main source of trust in Muslim-majority countries. Institutions can be, therefore, a determining source of trust, and religion a secondary factor, such as in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

In the next section, I will focus on three different theories of generalized trust: the institutional theory, the association/civil society theory and the cultural theory.

The institutional theory of generalized trust

The institutional theory of generalized trust is the main theory that I rely on in this book. According to this theory, generalized trust cannot exist independently from politics and the state's institutions in the presence of civil society. Institutions create, change and influence the level of generalized trust (Levi, 1997; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Tarrow, 1996).

When people face institutions and policies that cannot protect them and their rights, they lose trust in these institutions. This causes people to think that others are resorting to methods that violate the law, such as bribery. This assumption leads them to question whether they can really trust others, and one's level of

generalized trust decreases. Rothstein and Kumlin use game theory to prove that good governance increases the level of generalized trust in society (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). They argue that people expect representational institutions to act fairly. They see elected members of these institutions as persons chosen to deliver their services. However, they have little personal and daily contact with them, which means there is less chance to develop generalized trust between people and elected institutions. Thus, it is the implementation of public services, such as the police and courts, health and education, that must be perceived as trustworthy in order to build generalized trust. Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that countries with a high level of trust have, for the most part, lower levels of corruption, better functioning bureaucracies, more effective legal systems, lower rates of theft and 'better government'. They also find a link between generalized trust and how institutions are able to effectively protect property and rights (Knack and Keefer, 1997).

The formation of the divided society of different ethnicities affects the conduct of public policy and has various measurements of institutional conditions, which in turn affect the level of generalized trust. For example, in Iraq, the lack of professional civil service, unfair distribution of resources and inequality of economic and societal opportunities in some provinces, accompanied with the history of the country, can present strong support for the preceding argument.

In Lebanon, there is a high level of nepotism and patrimonialism in public services due to the power-sharing mechanism between more than five large sects and more than ten ethnic minorities within the government. This has led to a very low level of trust between the politicians themselves, between the people and the politicians and between the people themselves. Moreover, people lack the ability to elect their president directly, making Lebanon one of the very few countries that has not had a president for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, there are few judicial and legislative constraints on politicians, political parties and members of parliament. This has led the people to question if they can trust others who are endangering the political landscape and reopening the doors to violence.

In Palestine, there is a high level of corruption, nepotism and neopatrimonialism among the political elites, not only from the two big politically divided parties but also among other smaller parties that are under the hegemony of either Fatah or Hamas. Perhaps the lack of proper public services, the unfair treatment of citizens in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the creation of New Political Elites and Neu Middle Class have led to the creation of a multi-class within an already-divided society.

In Syria, the security apparatus that maintains tough restrictions on citizens, employing only trusted and loyalists members of society, giving Alwaite sects the priority in senior positions, with the absence of judicial consultations or access to justice for both men and women, leading to not only distrust among citizens but also fear that their fellow citizens will harm them.

This is illustrated by the following graphs derived from the V-Dem dataset that show the executive corruption index and judicial corruption index as well as media corruption index and legislative and political corruption indices in selected MENA countries.



Figure 2.1 Executive corruption index in MENA.

V-Dem measures the aforesaid indicator as the possibility that members of the executive or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements, as well as how often they steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use.

According to V-Dem:

> The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

In the three mentioned cases, there is a considerable level of media corruption, which is the ability of journalists and publishers to alter news in exchange for payments or for the broadcaster to work for a political agency. In Syria, the data shows that the media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage. In Lebanon, it is common, but



Figure 2.2 Legislatures abuse for financial gain by politicians.



Figure 2.3 Political corruption index in MENA.



Figure 2.4 Media corruption in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine.

not routine, for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments. However, the Palestinian case shows two sides. In the West Bank it is rare but in Gaza it is common.

Chapter four examines eight case studies of divided societies relying on QCA methodology. These countries are Lebanon, Iraq, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa and Kyrgyzstan. I argue that institutions influence the level of generalized trust. These societies all consist of one or more ethnicity or sect and have societal, religious and political disparities and hostilities.

Civil society/association theory of generalized trust

The association-based theory of generalized trust emphasizes the importance of voluntary associations and other networks in the community in the process of producing generalized trust. Building on Tocqueville's early work on American democracy, the networks-based approach highlights the role of civil society in generating faith in fellow citizens (Skocpol, 1997).

Putnam argues that a dense network of voluntary associations generates social capital by cultivating norms of reciprocity and trust and providing networks of social interaction for civic action, which ultimately contributes to the effective performance of democratic institutions. Putnam relates civil society and association to democratic governance through social capital, with generalized trust being

the essential component (Putnam, 1993a). According to this theory, generalized trust is generated by face-to-face interaction between members of voluntary associations. The more face-to-face interaction there is between individuals, the higher chance there is that they will build bridges and trust one another, as well as transfer this trust to the wider community.

Many scholars argue that the mechanism of how particularized trust among members of these associations can be translated into generalized trust is ambiguous. There is no reason to expect that interpersonal trust between members extends to non-members. Moreover, it is not yet understood which type of voluntary associations and activities are linked to the production of generalized trust. Within the framework of this research, I found no casual mechanism between membership in associations (charity, voluntary or religious) and generalized trust in chapter 5, 6 and 7. This book is not focused on variables of association, therefore no analysis was conducted on this topic.

Associations are a very important form of social interaction and reciprocity. According to Putnam, associations

> Increase the potential costs to a defector in any individual transaction . . . foster norms of reciprocity . . . facilitate communication and improve the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals. . . . Associations embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a culturally-defined template for future collaboration. (Putnam, 1993b)

Associations are crucial not only for building cooperation but also for initiating the necessary platform for interaction, cooperation and building trust. This is clear in Iraqi and Lebanese societies, for example, where, despite millions of dollars having been devoted to supporting such activities over long periods of time, the level of generalized trust either remains the same or has decreased. International funds for civil society organizations are usually poured into ethnocentric or sect-centric organizations, whose activities benefit only one sect or work mostly in areas which have a majority population of one sect. In this case, the argument that associations can build trust among different ethnic groups is made void as there is only one group targeted; therefore, only intra-group benefits from such activities. In many cases, these organizations belong to or are managed by the sectarian political elites or their political parties, which, instead of building trust between ethnicities, destroys trust as they mobilize for their own ethnicity or provide services for their own members only.

Cultural theory of generalized trust

The cultural-centric theory of generalized trust argues that generalized trust is more related to general world views. Uslaner, the most well-known researcher who supports the cultural-centric theory, considers trust to reflect an optimistic world view. He posits two different types of trust: strategic and generalized trust.

According to Uslaner, generalized trust stems from the family and is inherited from the parental environment. He argues that 'generalised trust stems from an optimistic view of the world that we initially learn from our parents' and a 'mixture of values people learned as children and ideals they took up later in life' (Uslaner, 2003). For Uslaner, optimism is the most notable cultural value. He argues that the main component of optimism is the view of a shared future or a better shared future in the society. Uslaner believes that optimism is 'a view that the future will be better than the past and the belief that we can control our environment so as to make it better'. For him, optimists in any society see the future differently; they see their surroundings as a good place to be and the society around them as comprising of good people. They do not worry about other people exploiting or cheating them. Therefore, they tend to trust strangers or at least do not doubt them. They focus more on the future and see developing long-term relationships with others as a priority (Moss et al., 1958).

The cultural-based theory of generalized trust supports the argument that when people are more socialized and optimistic, they tend to trust others more. They believe that unfamiliar people can be trusted. It is argued in this theory that trust is inherited from parents at an early age. Proponents argue that trust is static and cannot be changed, as it is not based on experience and interaction with other individuals within the society. Furthermore, it is maintained in this theory that optimistic individuals and families have a higher level of generalized trust than pessimists. Therefore, pessimistic families try to isolate their children from the outside world, leading to a lack of interaction and maintenance of a low level of trust. In summary, this theory argues that at no time do institutions and the state have any link or causality with the level of generalized trust.

Although this theory focuses on the values and attitudes of pessimism and optimism, and probabilities of being exploited, history, and the oral history in particular, plays a role in advocating for distrust, through preaching of nationalism and stronger identity politics. For example, many Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) call Bosniak Turks or Ottomans due to the history of that region, which divided the society more deeply. The cultural theory in general has not dealt with history, nationalism and identity as an important factor that may have or may contribute (hostile history can be awakened) to increase distrust. In this book, I use different cases where nationalism and identity have played major role in their trust patterns, such as BiH, Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia in the QCA analysis.

Trust and judicial system

Over the past several decades, there has been a great deal of literature that links generalized trust to institutional trust. The legitimacy and efficiency of the state's institutions have come to light in the last decade, especially in the Middle East following the 2011 uprisings. One of the most important institutions that concerns us in this book is the legal and judicial system.

Table 2.2 Trust in courts and legal system 2018 in MENA region

		AB Wave V – 2018											
		Trust: Courts and legal system											
		Country											
Category	**Total**	**Algeria**	**Egypt**	**Iraq**	**Jordan**	**Kuwait**	**Lebanon**	**Libya**	**Morocco**	**Palestine**	**Sudan**	**Tunisia**	**Yemen**
A great deal of trust	17.7%	4.10%	39.0%	9.7%	25.1%	30.5%	2.1%	9.6%	29.2%	7.0%	15.8%	14.7%	29.1%
Quite a lot of trust	34.4%	43.9%	40.1%	28.1%	39.4%	48.2%	23.0%	27.8%	31.4%	34.2%	36.2%	33.4%	32.5%
Not very much trust	24.1%	31.7%	11.7%	22.30%	15.1%	12.7%	40.9%	25.0%	22.1%	31.8%	30.9%	19.4%	22.6%
No trust at all	21.4%	18.8%	7.5%	36.6%	16.9%	7.3%	34.0%	34.0%	15.1%	24.2%	15.4%	26.1%	14.5%
Don't know	2.5%	1.5%	1.7%	3.2%	3.5%	1.3%	0.0%	3.7%	2.2%	2.8%	1.7%	6.4%	1.2%
	26,721	2,330	2,389	2,456	2,399	1,368	2,399	1,956	2,394	2,485	1,754	2,397	2,394
(N)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

Data source: Arab Barometer.

Although there are different efforts to explain and study the impact of institutional trust on the level of generalized trust, there are few practical recommendations on how to face low and declining levels of trust, especially in divided societies. Trust in the judicial system can be a good indicator of the level of generalized trust (see the Lebanese case study). The judicial system and courts facilitate and contribute to the resolution of conflicts. The judicial system works as the institution that enforces agreed shared norms in society, and therefore, the more trustworthy the judicial system and courts, the more people trust one another as they recognize the ability of the courts to legally protect their rights.

Usually, members of the society rely on social pressure mechanisms to enforce verbal agreements. However, when trust is lost, they turn to written agreements and law. In other words, when a person is unable to enforce their agreement, they rely on the judicial system and the courts. Indeed, when a person knows that there is a powerful and trustworthy judicial system, they continue to trust others in their day-to-day lives.

In most MENA countries, there is a concept called *Wasta*, which is mediation through a third party. It can also be an indicator of the nepotism that occurs within social networks (Cunningham and Yasin Sarayrah, 1993). *Wasta* allows trust to emerge where there is a perceived deficit in formal law, and, therefore, Middle Eastern societies tend to rely on informal mechanisms such as *Wasta*. *Wasta*, as a means of solving disputes, is a mechanism of trust-building in tribal societies rooted in the cultural narrative, as an informal institutional mechanism. Similar to a powerful formal judicial system, *Wasta* is led by a tribe or a person who has the structural power to attain resources and rebuild trust through mediating and solving problems. This argument is in line with what Knack and Keefer have developed. According to them, members of the society depend less on formal institutions as an enforcing mechanism. In their opinion, people with high levels of trust do not need government-backed and property rights contract enforcement mechanisms (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Putnam stressed the role of the judicial system and courts in building social capital. He argues, 'Formal contracts, courts, litigation, adjudication, and enforcement by the state . . . one alternative to generalized reciprocity and socially embedded honesty' (Putnam, 2000: 144–5).

The existence of effective, efficient and trustworthy judicial system and courts (of high quality) signals to the general public that they have a strong formal institution and enforcing mechanisms that they can use in case of a breach in the social structure. Indeed, the level of trust usually helps citizens to identify the people or communities who keep their word. Verbal contracts are absolute and binding.

In the next chapter, I will discuss generalized trust and institutions with divided societies, taking into consideration race and identity as an influencing factor. Besides that, I will discuss the generalized trust in conflict/post-conflict times.

Chapter 3

BROKEN WINDOWS

TRUST IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES

> The cascade of problems stemming from bad policy is a driving force behind the low level of generalized trust, and diversity.
>
> Lebanese Civil Society Activists (2015)

Expressions like 'divided societies', 'contested societies', 'multiethnic societies' and 'polarized societies' must be used with clear definitions to avoid misinterpretation and confusion. Each one of these definitions is rooted in different urban contexts and emphasizes a different dimension of fragmented societies (Haklai, 2013). Moreover, some terms are used to describe different environments. For example, the term 'divided societies' can be used to describe deeply politically divided societies; yet in other cases, it alludes to ethnic or racial divisions such as those existing in some cities in the United States. The nature of the division can vary across time in the same society. If conflict increases as a result of violence, division increases. Violence can be attributed to the desire to hold political power, as has occurred in Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine (Hamas and Fatah in Gaza), Egypt (2013 massacre)[1] and Macedonia. In other cases, it can be explained as a consequence of economic elements (material gain) such as in Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. In some other cases (e.g. South Africa), it is motivated by a mix of factors (economic, social and political).

Societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey have experienced ethnic conflict and violence associated with political differences. In cases like Lebanon and Iraq, the conflict over power is the focal point and has been the magnet for unresolved ethnic issues. In other cases, such as Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, the competing interests over resources, as well as economic and cultural inequality, are the source of conflict between ethnic groups. In cases such as Turkey, the conflict over territorial sovereignty and land is the key catalyst for tensions related to ethnicities. However, ethnical or ethno-religious divisions can be a cover for a class division resulted from inequalities and informal institutions such as corruption. This book in general and this chapter in particular pay close attention to such kinds of divisions created as a result of inequality, yet encapsulated (for political reasons)

as ethnical or ethno-religious divisions. Therefore, deeply divided societies are not merely divided, but have multi-layered defining lines of divisions that result from the institutional fragmentation, inequality, corruption, absence of rule of law and public administration arbitrariness.

The argument is made that heterogeneous societies have low generalized trust because of the mixture of different ethnic groups. The argument can stand correct, to a degree, if one group or another is oppressed, marginalized or isolated from the society. The marginalized group and its members will no longer trust the rest of their society as their voice is not heard and they do not expect others to give them the platform to represent themselves and their needs. This may be true in some societies, yet ethnicity or political ideology is not always a decisive factor in creating or maintaining generalized trust. Formal institutions in divided societies can reinforce the feeling of marginalization, inequality and partiality within the society. When one ethnic group receives better services, more benefits (either legally or illegally, such as clientelism) at the expense of another, the feeling of marginalization and exploitation of wealth becomes a driver of mistrust. This is based on a scenario where one ethnicity takes what is rightfully that of other citizens within the society. This is also true when one political group oppresses another minority or political group. The sense of marginalization, oppression and inequality widens the gap between the two groups to the extent where it affects pro-social behaviours, as well as the practice of religiosity in some cases. For instance, in Gaza, mosques are interspersed and categorized between Hamas and other groups (Islamic Jihad and Salfi). Members of Fatah rarely make their ways to mosques of Hamas for several reasons, including the high level of inequality, oppression and also the abuse of power against opposition in the Gaza Strip. This divergence of religious practices appeared after 2007 and has remained high among many – to show resistance to political Islam as well as to express their distrust in Hamas.

In Syria, this has created multi-level identities and rifts among Syrians. In addition, the groupism of Syrians based on their political affiliations/beliefs have created societies of groups rather than societies of ethnicities or classes. In each group, there are several different identities, but all share the privileges provided by either the regime itself or the political elite or group's leader.

It is common in divided societies for members of sects or ethnicities to desire power and superiority over others. This is also true of the desire to have better services such as education, health services, roads and higher quality of life. As Ms Nabhan explains, 'In Lebanon, members of sects feel proud of the service they receive from their own hospital and educational institutions. They always talk of how clean and organised their districts are too.'[2] Therefore, ethnic or sectarian division over political power or economic wealth is present and reflected in services and formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions here could be corruption, tribal relations and also connections within the ethnic/religious group.

In divided societies, the legitimacy, political structure, decision-making process and institutions are strongly contested among different ethnic groups. The governance process is fought over as a way of seeking power, opportunities in economy/land or an autonomous political system. Therefore, socially divided societies can become, at some point, politically divided societies, and vice

versa. The wider the societal gap is, the harder to bridge it, and the greater the political autonomy. The clearest example here is the Gaza Strip, where societal fragmentation made it easy for political fragmentation.

In this book, the types of societies being examined are prone to intense ethnic and political conflict and violence, reflecting ethnic or nationalistic fractures. In such societies, ethnicity and nationalism create pressure on group rights, autonomy or even territorial separation (Bollen, 2007). Societies such as Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey have experienced ethnic conflict and violence associated with political differences. It is important to stress that divided societies without a violent conflict (such as a civil war) and a high number of casualties can still erode the possibility of creating generalized trust. The mechanism is not only about the death toll or the intensity of the fight but also about the sense of inequality and societal tension among the various groups.

Institutions and trust in divided societies

The importance of generalized trust that many social scientists and scholars recognize is that it leads to better governmental performance and a happier public. However, others argue that it may be that good governance makes people more likely to trust each other. Both may be true. In this research, I examine this aspect and argue that institutions and good governance make people more likely to trust each other.

Although most of these findings are based on democratic societies, there are many other findings that suggest that the same mechanism applies to non-democratic societies. The main difference between democratic and non-democratic society is institutions. In non-democratic societies, institutions are poorly designed, administered and suffer from arbitrariness and corruption, unlike in Western democratic institutions. In the wake of the absence of good governance, there is a high probability that formal institutions will be distrusted by the people, turning to their closer communities, groups, ethnic groups and tribes. In that case, divisions and splitting lines between different groups and ethnicities/religions will appear and sharpen. If society slides into violent conflict, it means that the institutions (which worked as a glue) are being destroyed, and, therefore, generalized trust is being eroded. In other words, when violence erupts in a society (e.g. civil war), formal institutions become weak and perhaps have a very marginal effect (or in the worst case are completely destroyed). Generalized trust is simultaneously easily destroyed as these institutions worked as a bonding mechanism.

Levi argues that a state and its institutions can create generalized trust (Levi, 1997), and that a state, and particularly a democratic state, can produce trust in people. Furthermore, she argues that states build trust through

> the use of coercion and that democratic states may be even better at producing generalized trust than are nondemocratic institutions . . . because they are better

> at restricting the use of coercion to tasks that enhance rather than undermine trust. (Levi 1998: 87)

Democratic states, with a restricted use of coercion, have a higher level of generalized trust because they design and use institutions for advancing the level of generalized trust within the society rather than destroying it. A state with institutions that distribute power equally, provide equal access to public goods and services and do not marginalize or exclude an entire ethnicity or sect will enjoy a higher level of generalized trust. For example, Northern Ireland, although it witnessed civil war, has a higher level of generalized trust than Iraq or Lebanon. The various political and economic institutions in Northern Ireland are completely different from those of Lebanon or Iraq.

Imposing an institution (through public policies and policy tools) on an ethnicity or a part of the population that provides preferential treatment and services for other ethnicities or the majority will have negative consequences on generalized trust. Individual satisfaction in institutions and equality in front of law and public services will have a positive impact on generalized trust. As Rothstein demonstrates,

> If people believe that the institutions that are responsible for handling 'treacherous' behavior act in a fair, just and effective manner, and if they also believe that other people think the same of these institutions, then they will also trust other people. (Rothstein, 2001)

In comparison, Levi argues, 'The trustworthiness of the state influences its capacity to generate interpersonal trust' (Levi, 1998: 9).

Kumlin and Rothstein elaborate on this linkage:

> If you think . . . that these . . . institutions [of law and order] do what they are supposed to do in a fair and effective manner, then you also have reason to believe that the chance people of getting away with such treacherous behaviour is small. If so, you will believe that people will have very good reason to refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and you will therefore believe that 'most people can be trusted'. (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005: 322)

Generally speaking, a state's institutions will impact generalized trust in any society. If an individual believes that others will behave similarly to how he or she is behaving, by not breaking the law and receiving the same treatment, services and opportunities, he or she will not behave in a treacherous manner that may harm others. This, in turn, leads to a high level of trust in others. Strong state institutions and impartial public administrations restrict unlawful behaviour on an individual basis, and by extension, collective unlawful behaviour, resulting in a law-abiding society where trust prevails.

In divided societies, the role of institutions is seen as particularly important and necessary. Stolle suggests that the negative relationship between social capital

or trust and heterogeneity is caused by segregation rather than the diversity itself (Stolle and Harell, 2013). The level of generalized trust in many divided societies, such as in Ireland and Belgium, is not low but other divided societies have a very low level of generalized trust, such as in Lebanon and Iraq. Trust is low when one minority feels that it is not recognized, or if the majority or a particular group monopolizes power and/or wealth based on the institutional framework or institutional gaps. Institutional gaps are usually the undefined regulations that distribute political, societal or economic rights to individuals or social groups. These gaps are usually abused in the favour of one of the sects or ethnic groups. When formal institutions stigmatize a specific social or ethnic group (in terms of their rights, jobs, mobility, linguistic rights etc.), it becomes a burden for the members of that group, and when it exceeds certain threshold (when members of such groups become unable to cope with the level of stigmatization) they respond by either enforcing their ethnic/group identity or decreasing it. This will increase the level of distrust because the stigmatized group feels threatened by those who administer the institutions, and although they may decrease/increase their identification with their group, they will continue to see others as a possible threat who may want to exploit them.

Stolle argues that ethnic conflicts are caused by structural frameworks, such as social mobility, linguistic and educational constraints or unjust distribution of power between the groups (Stolle, 2002). He also argues that modifying institutional constraints to groups by adopting politics of recognition and minority rights may reduce segregation and resentment, opening up the possibility of developing social capital. Consider, then, the different cases in the Middle East, including Israel (not included in this book); it is clear that the unfair distribution of power, educational inequality, linguistic constrains and segregations are recognizable manifestations of political, social and economic institutions. The more such structural frameworks continue to exist, the higher the probability of lower generalized trust being present in a society. It is important to stress another factor as being a major player in destroying trust – the length and intensity of such structural frameworks. Consider the Palestinian case following 2007. The more the political division is maintained, the more impact there is on such structural frameworks, such as services provision, resources distribution and social mobility. In turn, such changes become embedded in the political and social insertions and require modifying institutions to make constraints on a bigger scale to reduce division. In Lebanon, sectarian institutions' intensification process in the last ten years has led to a higher polarization among the different Lebanese groups, which resulted in a low level of trust that dropped dramatically after 2007 up until 2018.

The bulk of empirical research on generalized trust in mixed societies considers local areas to be places of interaction where generalized trust is either generated or decreases. By defining the place and context as narrowly as possible, it is easier to draw theories about where generalized trust can be enhanced or diminished based on the contact between people and institutions or conflict. Therefore, local areas have the potential for maintaining the level of generalized trust. Moreover, institutions in local areas are crucial to generalized trust. This is because the two

primary elements in generating generalized trust are the level of interaction in terms of contact between people and institutions, and whether or not they protect individuals' and groups' rights fairly and equitably. Therefore, according to the AB 2018, in rural areas, the level of generalized trust (92% distrust) is lower than in urban areas (84% distrust) and in refugee camps (86% distrust). In Lebanon, 100 per cent of people who live in rural areas show distrust in other people, while 94 per cent of people who live in urban areas show distrust in others. This can be explained by the level of intensity of interaction of people with the institutions and also with strangers, considering that in rural areas people interact less with strangers as they tend only to see their family and other villagers.

Therefore, the mechanism can be presented as follows:

Diversity -> (society) interaction + institutions -> generalized trust erosion/generation

Depending on this mechanism, the more known the research setting/society (for the researcher), the more credible the findings on the relationship between generalized trust and institutions in divided societies will be. While I emphasize the local place as a key element in understanding the link between generalized trust and ethnicities from an institutional perspective, a state or country's role should not be dismissed. In reality, a state's institutions are reflected in the village or on the local scale.

It is necessary to understand the impact of different institutions that affect generalized trust. Many divided societies adopt ethnically or ideologically diverse institutions while others adopt the opposite. In ethnically mixed societies, there is much discussion about diversity, division and the formulation of the institutions that are designed to manage diversity and public resources. If the state's institutions are accommodative, universal and fair, then we can expect a high level of generalized trust.

Ineffective institutions in divided societies

Irrespective of how divided the society is, there is a general consensus in the case studies that governments must provide a more effective governance scheme, and design highly responsive institutions to the needs of their citizens. Citizens in divided societies desire their needs to be met effectively, especially when they feel that other ethnicities may be exploiting public administration (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). When needs are met effectively and efficiently without delay, the sense of inequality and arbitrariness in public administration decreases.

Central government(s) generally try to improve public services for their citizens unless sectarianism prevails and political elites evade public pressure, as in the instance of Lebanon and Iraq, where high rates of sectarianism and sectarian politics affect the capacities of the governments. Political and sectarian leaders prefer to keep the status quo, as it is beneficial to them, sustaining their

leadership in highly sectarian and divided societies. By providing services based on clientelism, they give the impression to their sects that they are the ones who can provide services for them, defend them or retain the balance of power.

Yet, in other cases, the aim of these transformational changes in institutions is to maintain regime legitimacy, such as in the case of the central government of Kyrgyzstan, which increased the education and health budget for its southern areas, where the Uzbek minority lives.[3] Moreover, many governments in divided societies are moving towards a more Weberian style of bureaucracy to empower different education and health programmes by being neutral and equal in terms of the different ethnicities and regions of the countries.

Furthermore, a movement towards more effective institutions includes de-personalization of the security; military, ministerial and legal systems in divided societies are needed. In Lebanon, South Africa and Bosnian and Herzegovina, many security and civil servants are sectarian-based employees, depending on the position and location of the service. For instance, the Shiite sect in Lebanon informally manage the The security of Rafic Hariri Airport (Beirut) where almost all high-ranking security officers and the security chief are Shiite, while the port of Beirut is managed and controlled by the Christian Maronites.[4]

Generalized trust, institutions and institutional conditions

The causal mechanism between generalized trust and institutions has been a matter of debate among scholars. The debate focuses on the institutional sources of generalized trust and which institutions are more related to creating and maintaining generalized trust. In the ongoing dialogue, there have been some missing links concerning the inference of causality between generalized trust and governmental institutions. The missing links are related to the specificity of institutions and the strength of influence. The missing links stem from the 'theoretical gap between the cooperative capacity of the community and the production of collective good by the political institutions' (Breuskin, 2012). Putnam has not provided a connection between societal and formal institutions. To fill the empirical gap in the institutional theory of generalized trust, many scholars provide studies that explain more fully these missing connections. They argue that government institutions could be the source of generalized trust, providing a space with benefits to encourage trust and reciprocity (Levi, 1998; Tarrow, 1996). These institutions not only facilitate but also maintain existing generalized trust.

The institutional approach suggests that the state's institutions facilitate the development and creation of generalized trust. In this sphere, Rothstein and Stolle argue that trust among citizens is intertwined with institutions. They emphasize that generalized trust is connected to 'generalised attitudes about the fairness and impartiality of institutions' (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Table 3.1 explains the different institutions and their impact on generalized trust.

Rothstein and Stolle found two main links between institutions and the generation of generalized trust: attitudinal and institutional links. The attitudinal argument suggests that there is a link between the political system and the generalized trust (trust in strangers). The institutional link suggests that there is institutional and political trust and generalized trust. However, in the same paper, three main problems arise: there are no specific institutions, it lacks definition of trust in government and there is no mechanism to explain the trust between people and the political system. The institutional theory states that institutions facilitate the creation and maintenance of generalized trust by encouraging connections between citizens, enforcing laws, integrating people in the political system and providing public goods to all people.

According to Stolle and Rothstein, impartial and fair policies can increase generalized trust. Their findings suggest that there are three factors that can influence the degree of correlation between policy and trust. First, citizens derive trustworthiness from their experience of institutional impartiality. Second, individuals usually monitor and evaluate how fellow citizens behave in institutions, and whether they abuse them or not. The third factor is the degree of general discrimination in society, which may lead to distrust. This is where I base the selection of institutional and societal factors in this research. This chapter selects conditions that can measure impartiality, inequality and inefficiency within formal institutions.

Rothstein and Stolle have three main categories of questions, which they link to the maintenance of generalized trust. The representational dimension of political institutions tends to engage people more actively, increasing confidence in the political institutions. It follows that one who is represented in the political and societal fabric has more confidence in the institutions and other people. The implementation dimension of political institutions tends to actively engage people, leading to higher levels of trust among them. The implementation dimension argues that impartial institutions and effective rule of law (punishing those who

Table 3.1 Different categories of institutions and generalized trust

Characteristics of institutions	Mostly universalistic institutions programmes	Means-tested programmes	Means-tested and universal
Social divisions	No social division	Single out who deserves benefits	Singled out based on groups (privileged or not-privileged)
Corruption	No easy rules	Desire to cheat to get into the programme, as it will be tested	Cheating is desired
Impartiality	Everyone receives same treatment	Very different treatment	Very different treatment
Generalized trust	High trust between people	Those who do not receive the same treatment will trust less	Less trust in the privileged group

break the law) increase trust. Rothstein and Stolle found two main factors that maintain trust: the perceived level of corruption and the perceived level of bias and inequality.

Based on their argument, the more effective and universal the institutions, with no particular spending based on ethnicities and sects, the more the debate will move away from singling out 'the others' in order to find more common ground between the different sects. As Stolle and Rothstein argue, such institutions provide inclusiveness to the society where everyone is treated equally and has equal opportunities compared to the rest of society (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).

Lowndes and Wilson examine the institutional design of states and how it affects social network formation. They argue that institutions can extend/constrain the formation of associations and their scale of influence on policymaking (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). The protection of freedom of expression, the existence of and participation in civil society and freedom of associations all offer universal facilities and educational programmes that shape associational life. A higher degree of associational life between individuals in a society results in greater generalized trust.

Uslaner underlines the importance of institutions, mainly governmental policies, in generating generalized trust. He examines generalized trust and concludes that the implementation of redistribution policies is highly linked to the level of generalized trust (Uslaner 2003). As Uslaner points out, when individuals trust strangers, they begin to treat them honestly, because they do not think they will be exploited. However, when we distrust strangers, we believe that they will cheat us and aim to benefit from any corrupt institution or corruption in general, even at the expense of others. In this book, I take Uslaner's argument the other way; the more we treat other people in an honest way, and think that they are not going to exploit us, by relying on the corrupt and ineffective institutions, the more we will trust them. But when we see the strangers as cheaters, benefiting from existing corruption mechanisms, then we have less trust in them.

Uslaner's argument is that corruption stems from inequality, mainly economic and cultural inequality. However, for me, economic inequality is not the only condition of corruption. Political and societal inequalities also lead to corruption. For example, given the fact that a high-ranking politician in Lebanon or Turkey can secure job opportunities for their sect/ethnic group, expedite an application or handle a process at a governmental office is a manifestation of corruption and prejudicial trade between the two individuals who belong to the same sect or ethnic group. Therefore, inequality leads to clientelism where sectarian and ethnic leaders present themselves as the only benefit providers for their own sect/ethnic group.

Institutions can facilitate and encourage a community's participation in decision-making and deliberations through civil society organizations. In the same scholarly camp, Kriesi and Baglioni argue that political institutions are able to generate higher social activism in divided communities (Kriesi and Baglioni, 2003). The easier it is to enter or leave civil society organizations, the greater the probability that citizens from different ethnic groups will participate in the community's activities and interact more frequently.

As we can see, the institutional approach suggests that the state plays a role as a facilitator in generating/destroying generalized trust/social capital. Considering that some of these studies have been conducted in homogenous societies, while others were conducted in divided societies, there is unclear causal mechanism linking social capital and political institutions with a focus on specific institutions. This book will contribute to the literature on trust, providing a connection between institutions and generalized trust. Using multiple institutional conditions/factors, it examines how they affect the level of generalized trust, drawing on specific case studies of divided societies.

The book contributes to the studies of trust and institutions in a setting that is worrisomely neglected within the trust and social capital literature: diverse societies in MENA region and the broader MENA region. It explores the role of institutions in building trust in diverse and divided societies. Although there are few cases that are not from MENA, they have not been studied thoroughly before, and have a very strong connection to MENA and in some respects are used for comparative purposes. For example, Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina share very similar variables that affect the level of trust. Simultaneously, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey show similar environments. Besides that, including more cases (in QCA analyses) would allow us to draw out a consistent and clearer results and hence conclusions that would be bifacial for policymakers.

How do institutions generate or destroy trust?

The question that remains is how institutions generate or destroy, directly or indirectly, generalized trust in divided societies. The argument is found in how impartial and fair these institutions are in practice. It is argued that impartial, fair, universal institutions allow all sects and ethnicities in the society to have equal access to education, health, public goods and equality before the legal system (one legal system). Figure 3.1 explains the causal mechanism of institutions and generalized trust.

The main argument of this book is that institutions maintain and destroy the level of generalized trust. They do that through three main mechanisms, and each one affects the individual as a member of the society at a personal level either through daily observation (does not affect them personally) or through personal experience. The three mechanisms are impartiality, equality and exclusion. They can be also replaced, in other words, by corruption (political and economic). First, higher level of trust is maintained when institutions are impartial and bureaucratic engineering enforce impartiality. In other words, treating all citizens equally, where services are provided for all, without discrimination based on sect, religion, colour, political affiliation or region of inhabitant. Impartiality and arbitrariness in public administration do not mean only the daily bureaucratic practices and the behaviour of officials and officers in public administration but also the political institution in general. Public administration arbitrariness represents a policy of one sect or group (at particular institution or several institutions) to exclude and

provide inequal services to other sects. Public power monopoly by one group/sect (power over one political institution or more), centralized policymaking by central figures within each sect who use their power to influence bureaucratic process, the absence of public deliberation and marginalization of civil society are all part of the public administration arbitrariness that lead to exclusion of particular sect/group.

Equality, according to this book, plays a major role in influencing the level of generalized trust. Previously, Uslaner and Rothstein have found that equality in Western democracies has a big say in determining the level of generalized trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). As the following chapters confirm, equality can destroy generalized trust easily while contributing to its fostering gradually. In this chapter, I consider universalistic policies and particularistic spending as two crucial policy tools that present equality and exclusion of institutions in any given society. Universalistic policies are less bureaucratic, cumbersome and more market conforming (Mkandawire, 2005). Although universalistic policies are mainly present and developed in Western countries, there has been a shift in other developing countries to reduce poverty. Universalistic policy tools can be used also to foster equality within a country, especially in developing countries (and divided societies). They do not have to be on the same scale and depth of Nordic welfare policies, but they can borrow the main characteristic of these tools, mainly a low degree of selectivity, coverage of social protection and publicly provided services for all members of the society (Kuivalainen and Niemelä, 2010).

Particularistic spending is also a crucial policy tool that has been used enormously in divided societies, such as Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Turkey. Some spending can target particular social, political groups, but also class. While distribution of benefits is the essence of politics (Fromm, 1937), particularistic spending is the essence of loyalty buying in divided and polarized societies. This means often that sectarian leaders would target distributive spending on their sects or group. Particularistic spending is generally thought of as important tool for politicians and sectarian leaders to remain in power, either through elections or through the charismatic influence over centres of power in the society. These spendings are usually at the expense of other locales, regions or the general population to benefit particular sect or group of people. They are usually targeted at the preferred locale or community of a certain politician (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981).

In a given society where particularistic policy tools are widespread and targeted distribution of benefits is accepted to maintain the power or politician or sectarian leaders, the general public will feel marginalized, betrayed by that community, which would create a social gap and dissatisfaction with that community's behaviour. Communities who are deprived of their rights to obtain services, and spending as policy tools in public service, would expect that the other communities who benefit from particularistic spending would exploit them at individual level as much as they would expect to exploit and receive benefits at others' communities' level.

Individuals in divided societies rely on daily bureaucratic encounters to obtain a sense of how fair and equal institutions are. In street-level bureaucracies, they may

have different experiences, depending on which programmes, or which benefits they enjoy from the bureaucratic system. In almost all governmental institutions in welfare states, policies or programmes are categorized into three different types of social policies. These categories are universal, selective and conservative (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Each one of these categories has its own characteristics such as to whom the policy is directed towards, whether it requires a test for entry to enjoy benefits, whether it is exclusive and whether the government or public administration officer is able to manipulate the policy. These characteristics may decide how equal and fair policies and programmes are, and how they affect the level of trust.

In means-tested programmes and particularistic spending institutions, the purpose of the institutions becomes a means to identify a group of people and single them out of the group of beneficiaries. Although at the core of these institutions there is a mechanism to separate those who deserve the service from those who do not, it does not end the debate as to where and how to decide the conditions that allow access to the benefits. This not only is costly in divided societies but also is a financial burden, as each ethnicity or sect will have their own agency in a mixed society, providing more benefits for their own sect or ethnicity, or providing a higher quality service to their sects over others. This moves the society from the debate on how to be equal with other sects to focusing on providing only the bare necessities for these others rather than providing them the full package of benefits. These services are usually provided by sectarian institutions or by formal institutions led by sectarian administrations.

Moreover, such unequal institutions provide opportunity for individuals to commit fraud in order to enjoy the benefits of a certain group. This is because local officers abuse their authority. People who work at the administrative level will assist people from their own sect to access programmes, even if they do not qualify for the programme. For instance, a Turkish public administrative officer



Figure 3.1 The causal mechanism of institutions and generalized trust.

working in a social security department in a mixed city with a Kurdish majority may allow another Turk to access the social security means-tested programme even though he does not qualify for it. This is very common practice in divided societies in the Middle East with means-tested programmes, such as in Lebanon and Iraq.[5]

The arbitrariness in public administration and partial, unequal treatment of citizens from different sects, where public administration officers are not held accountable, creates a norm of corruption and clientelism. This is especially true when the mechanism to oversee these agencies, programmes or, on a broader scale, the local governments is lacking. Therefore, we can see a higher level of administrative and political corruption in divided societies with unfair and unequal institutions in democracies.

Inequalities negatively impact honesty and trust in homogenous societies. In divided societies, it is far worse. They destroy the level of trust among different sects and ethnic groups, but also within the members of each ethnic group. They give individuals the sense that the whole system is exploited, where one ethnicity or set of ethnic leaders provides better service to their sect, and this creates a sense of pessimism for the future, as individuals grow dependent on sectarianism and sectarian leaders.

The distribution of resources equally provides a sense of shared fundamental values and destiny among individuals in any society (Uslaner, 2003). When political resources, such as political power, and economic resources are equally distributed, people are more likely to feel that they are equal with their fellow citizens and will trust them. Conversely, in divided societies, where inequality is high, people will always stick to their sects, especially to sectarian leaders to benefit from whatever they can provide in terms of resources or advantages. This brings to mind the Roman proverb 'divide and conquer', where sectarian leaders cause division in their own sects in order to sustain their leadership. They sow distrust among different members of the sect by providing unequal services as well. For example, in Pakistan, the Punjabi political ethnic leadership has a norm of being the head of a tribe, where they provide different services such as appointing heads of families. In some cases, they appoint two heads for one big family in order to sustain their leadership. At the same time, trust between the members of the big family declines as they begin to seek services and compete to have more services from the sectarian leadership.[6] As Boix and Ponser argue, the more the people feel injustice, the more they have negative stereotypes of other sects, destroying trust among them (Boix and Posner, 1998).

In divided societies, institutions are the daily arena where citizens encounter partiality or impartiality. Yet, there is another arena where individuals can find impartiality, which complicates the mosaic of the political and societal composite with respect to institutions and generalized trust. The political system itself is a factor that fosters competition among people, exploited by the sectarian elites and politicians. Citizens personally experience sects and sectarian leaders who plant fear of the other in an attempt to sustain their leadership and personal benefits from sectarianism.[7] Individuals experience fear-mongering in a divided society,

from the law, police and institutions where monopolies of power exist, or from public offices which are held by one dominant sect, allowing sectarian leaders to have more access to provide services to same-sect individuals as they see fit. If citizens perceive that the political system, legal system and institutions are not corrupt and impartial, they will be more inclined to obey the law, will not think that others are trying to exploit the system and will accept decisions by centralized or decentralized authorities (Levi, 1998).

Expectations of fair treatment are also extended to the level of civil society entry and exit. When a sect or an ethnic group is denied the formation of a sectarian bloc, in comparison to others, then there is impartial treatment and unequal access to civil society and the official public sphere. Facilitating the entry and exit of civil society organizations allows individuals to be members of voluntary associations, interacting with other people from different sects. The closure of civil society organizations, in general, or for specific sects will impede the process of interaction by allowing prejudice against others, and decreasing trust in institutions, as they will be labelled as partial and unfair.

The question then is, how these institutions help societies build trust in divided societies? Based on the Rothstein and Stolle argument, this book argues that generalized trust in others and attitudes towards impartiality and fairness are intertwined in divided societies. The link between generalized trust and institutions comes through in two ways. First, the experience of individuals in the political system and the dissemination of information and how they perceive others influence others who live in the same system. Second, the political system itself influences the experience and behaviour of individuals directly, how they deal with others and whether they trust them or not.

The causal connection between generalized trust and institutions is based on cognitive inference (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). People in divided societies form generalized trust from their experience and encounters with institutions, especially street-level bureaucracy. For instance, a Lebanese Sunni will not trust the Lebanese legal system or its courts because they perceive it to be corrupt and under the influence of other sects in the society. A person's own experience is public and is extended and felt by many others from the same sect or other sects. If the legal system, courts, judges and politicians are corrupt and other sects and ethnicities are exploiting the system as a whole, an individual citizen would be disinclined to be honest or trust others as they manipulate the system and try to harm society in general or another sect in particular.

If the experience of an individual is that their sectarian leader or local bureaucrat from the same sect does not act honestly, does not abide by the law or acts partially and unfairly, they will not trust others, as they will think other sects have this kind of clientelism and corruption as a norm. Those universal policies – non-particularistic spending and impartial public administration – are less likely to exhibit corruption and clientelism. This way, individuals from different sects build their knowledge of other fellow citizens from different sects, especially considering that sectarian leaders influence their sectarian constituencies, setting an example for the people.

If individuals observe their fellow citizens from different sects cheating the political system and abusing it, this sends a signal to the acceptable society about the behaviour of other people. In divided societies, this suggests to some that each sect acts in that manner. Furthermore, the abuse of the system by political and sectarian leaders tells the rest of society that they all are cheating and abusing the system. Such corrupt systems and institutions do not inspire people to trust others, as they are highly likely to cheat. The only one way to make people feel that 'most people can be trusted' is if they behave well and refrain from cheating and misusing the institutions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).

I argue that an individual's own experience can affect how they think of others and whether they will trust them or not. For example, if sects/parties and ethnic groups are labelled as a problem in a given society, which is normal in all divided societies that have experienced violent conflicts, there is a higher probability that individuals from other sects to distrust them. If a sect or a group of people is excluded from political power and society and their voice become unheard, then why would they trust others? How can a whole ethnicity or sect trust the majority or another group if they are excluded from an institution or from political power?

The primary argument here is that the causality goes from how individuals perceive the impartiality and fairness of the political system and others' behaviour in relation to the political system to generalized trust. The exact mechanism progresses from (1) the political system design in general, where an ethnic group is excluded, (2) the behaviour of sectarian leaders and public administration officers and (3) an individual's experiences in society, considering the effect of media and neighbourhood.

There are other factors, such as family history and the experience of parents and same-sect or same-ethnicity experience. This also can affect how fragmented the society is.

This book in general and this chapter in particular do not argue that the only and major source of generalized trust comes from institutions; rather it argues that institutions contribute greatly to the creation and maintenance of trust in divided societies. Therefore, I argue that generalized trust has different sources, yet institutions greatly determine its level in divided societies.

Generalized trust, identity and race

Two years ago, I attended a conference that discussed the well-being of academics in the Middle East and North Africa. A colleague from Algeria angrily raised the point that he is Amazigh, and the conference should acknowledge the different identities in the Arab World. His remark was in reaction to a comment that spoke of the Arab World as one ethnic group. While talking with me outside of the official meetings, he informed me that his identity is not problematic for him in Algeria. He said that he does not need to stress it in most places, and it does not matter, but he needed to make a point to outsiders. While living in Lebanon for a few years, I

found that asking a Lebanese person where they are from (i.e. which city or village) would trigger the questions, 'Why do you want to know my sect?' As far as they are concerned, they are Lebanese; however, when abroad, many try to differentiate themselves – mainly those who live in France. Similarly, Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqis, despite being fragmented and polarized in their home countries, identify themselves as Palestinian, Syrian and Iraqi while overseas. Yet, in their home countries, they maintain ethnic, religious and political borders. The Kurds are the only case that I have consistently encountered, especially in my extensive fieldwork in Iraq and Turkey, where people identify themselves with their ethnic affiliation of Kurdish, without mentioning Iraq, Turkey or Syria. Of course, the Kurds are a special case where a strong identity and association with the ethnic group itself has a political and societal meaning for outsiders. These incidents raised the question of identity and how many contextualize their own identity based on where they are and to whom they express.

Many Middle Eastern countries in general, and divided societies in particular, are confronted with severe economic, social and political difficulties. Amid these difficulties, many identities come to the surface, especially in societies with



Figure 3.2 The most important challenge facing MENA countries today.
Source: Arab Barometer 2018.

weak institutions. Members of ethnic, political and religious groups turn to their groups and strongly identify themselves with the particular group to benefit from its protection mechanism, for solidarity, and also for economic benefits. When members identify strongly with a particular group, the possibility of an intergroup bias increases (Hinkle and Brown, 1990; Leach et al., 2008).

A common finding in studies of generalized trust is that there are significant differences in people's ability to trust, especially in societies that have different races. An explanation for this is that there are ranges of individualistic and communal characteristics, which vary by race and influence trusting behaviour. For instance, people's willingness to trust is found to increase significantly as their education and income increase; and the opposite trend is also true. For example, a recent study showed that education is associated with a negative level of generalized trust in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (Spierings, 2019). Although the author argues that highly educated people have developed a more independent and critical mindset, I would argue that the reasons are more related to the negative experience of highly educated people. Highly educated people experience a higher level of socio-economic pressure in the region as a result of the high level of unemployment, oppression and an inability to express themselves. In that regard, identity, social group, ethnicity and religion do not matter. In most Arab countries, the economic situation and financial and administrative corruption were the most important challenges according to the 2018 AB data (Figure 3.2). This perception increases dramatically when the countries are ethnically, politically or religiously divided as in Lebanon.

Most recently, multi-layered identities in the Middle East have become more intense than in the past. Indeed, members of many Middle East/divided societies associate themselves with lots of different identities. For instance, Palestinians from Gaza could identify themselves as Muslim, Gazan or a refugee, Fatah or Hamas; and refugees are likely to identify themselves as being from their village or city of origin. These identities act as a combination of emotional knowledge and an awareness of the self and the society one lives in. Identity in such divided societies (especially politically divided) provide significance and self-esteem for the members. As Tajfel argues, 'social identity is "part of an individual's self-concept" that derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with that value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel, 1978: 63).

In mixed, ethnically or politically divided societies, some groups are more disadvantaged than others and more likely to live in poor, racially segregated and neglected neighbourhoods. This compounds with factors fuelled by unequal economic and societal opportunities and institutionalized by government policies, all of which may undermine the level of trust. As studies on Palestine, Lebanon and Syria show, inequality and the feeling of insecurity compared to other members of the society are decisive factors in determining the level of trust.

A key explanation for this persistence is that individuals who are members of a discriminated against or disadvantaged group are less likely to trust individuals from another group because of the discriminatory or prejudicial treatment they

have received in the past (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Past experiences therefore may influence expectations of trusting behaviour, not just for the individuals directly affected but also their children. In almost all cases of divided societies that have experienced violence, the past still has an impact, yet not a major impact compared to the role of formal institutions. For instance, Lebanese-Syrian history, particularly the Syrian military presence in Lebanon for more than two decades, has influenced the perception of many Lebanese (who were victims of the Syrian regime) towards Syria in general and Syrian refugees in particular. In Palestine, the history of the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah, when they tortured Hamas activists from 1994 until 2000, has negatively affected Hamas–Fatah relations. Fatah activists now threaten Hamas members with the return of that period, while Hamas activists take steps to ensure that such a period will never return. Such historical events work as the seeds of distrust.

In ethnically divided and politically fragmented societies, individuals join groups for several reasons; mainly to reduce uncertainty in society, enhance self-esteem and mitigate the feeling of insecurity and the threat to the group (that is in line with or closest to their opinions) from other groups. This is in line with the social identity theory, in which it is argued that members of societies (and here I stress divided societies) need to be categorized and identified as part of a group to achieve self-esteem, feel protected and reduce uncertainty by expecting the same behaviour from other members of the same group, including intra-group trust. For instance, the religious identity of Hizbullah and Hamas became a means by which these organizations have used to deepen their hegemony with their populations (Shi'a in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine) (Daher, 2016: 36).

When members of a certain group view their group more positively and feel associated with them, viewing other groups as a threat or competition for resources will lead to an increase of the gap between them, disintegrate the society and increase the level of distrust. Many studies have found that intergroup salience contributes to bias and negative attitudes towards other groups (Mullen, Brown, and Smith, 1992). Other studies have found that a strong social identity in a divided society may result in conflict, hatred and prejudice between the different groups (Klein et al., 2010; Terry et al., 1999).

Social identity is based on the idea that members of certain groups behave in the same way, which somehow decreases the perception of risk of members of the same group if they coordinate their actions, directly or indirectly. This is evident in cases of political division such as the Palestinian case. Trust towards other groups decreases (in this case Hamas) to the extent where marriage between the two groups reduces and divorce increases. In other cases, where different ethnic and class groups exist, members of one group can change their groups based on their preference and potential for benefit, as has been the case in Syria.

Identity can play crucial role in conflict, where people become able to identify themselves distinctly from others. Conflict between different groups shows that trust and cooperation are also linked to conflict. In that case, members who hold the same social identity develop a kind of particularistic trust, which strengthens social identity and works in conjunction with conflict. The result is a low level

of generalized trust between different ethnic groups. Therefore, identity interacts deeply with the conflict–trust dynamics in divided societies. This means that pro-own-group trust is associated with anti-other-groups distrust between ethnic and social groups (John, 2014).

Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, South Africa and Iraq offer a particularly interesting context to explore race differences as they feature a long history of segregation and systematic discrimination. For example, *Baasskap* in South Africa, Sunnis in Iraq and Turks in Turkey have long occupied an economically advantageous position in society. Although the apartheid system ended in South Africa in 1994, the legacy of apartheid persists today with regard to access to education and employment. In Iraq, even though Saddam's regime ended in 2003, segregation persists as the Shiites took over the country, giving greater economic and societal opportunities to Shiites and depriving Sunnis of their rights. In Iraq, residential segregation is still informally enforced as the militias of both sides continue to grow, murdering members of the opposite faction. In South Africa, residential segregation along race lines is no longer enforced, yet this segregation largely continues, at least in part because of sustained differences in socio-economic status. The same applies to the Kurds in Turkey.

The segregation is based on not only ethnic or religious lines but also class and socio-economic lines. In Beirut, different neighbourhoods represent different classes. The October and November 2019 uprising in Lebanon consisted of opposition to class and sectarian politics, from electoral to personal status law as well as economic law. Such segregation has contributed to the high level of distrust in Lebanese society. A determinant factor in the equilibrium of trust/distrust in a sectarian system is the creation and recreation, as well as maintenance, of ethnic and ethno-religious identity. As Ussama Makdisi argued, 'To be Lebanese meant to be defined according to religious affiliation' (Makdisi, 1996).

The group conflict between classes seems to have a positive impact on the level of trust in divided societies in times of conflict where the oppressed and crushed class show a high level of solidarity and trust as they fight against the upper class (the rich). However, such trust reduces dramatically if the uprising/conflict of class fails. For instance, in 2015, Lebanon witnessed protests in response to the government failure to find solutions for the waste crisis. The level of trust just before the protests was 11 per cent (87% distrust), but after the failure of the movement, and the feeling that there was no capacity to change, the level of trust between the members of the society dropped sharply to reach 4 per cent (trust) and 96 per cent (distrust).

In Palestine, during the most recent surveys by the AB after the onset of the political division in 2007, the data shows that the level of trust dropped sharply after the failure of political agreements between Hamas and Fatah, while it showed a slight development (as a result of optimism) in 2012–13 after the signing of the Cairo agreement in May 2012. In 2012, the level of trust was 29 per cent. However, it dropped to 19 per cent in 2016 and 14 per cent in 2018–19.

In Iraq, the level of trust from 2011 to 2013 developed positively from 26 per cent to 43 per cent after the official announcement of the end of the war; there was a sense

of optimism for better economic and political institutions, mainly in the wake of the preparation for general elections. At end of 2013, the protests in the Sunni regions in Iraq and the failure to fight corruption, as well as the severe political deadlocks and scandals, saw the level of trust drop to 9 per cent in 2018–19.

Generalized trust in a time of conflict and polarization is not a static value, but variable to a limited extent under certain conditions where optimism is high. We can see that divided societies can protect, somehow, the level of trust, if there is potential for positive change. At the same time, pessimism and the intensity of political/ethnic divisions can destroy trust.

Trust, divided societies and post-conflict era

Although there is significant debate and much literature on ethnicity, trust and conflict, the major questions remain unanswered. How much do institutions affect trust in the post-conflict era in a divided society? What makes a society more trusting after civil wars? Civil wars not only undermine the fabric of the society but also disintegrate the political and economic structure of the society (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). A series of conflicts leads loss of institutions, which need to be rebuilt after the conflict. The importance of such institutions in terms of their strength and capacity needs to be rebuilt. Institutions are the 'most important but least understood of all wars' impact' (Blattman and Migul, 2010), and therefore, they are the legacy of social and political conflict. Trust is, therefore, one of these social legacies that is hit by conflict (Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt, 2013).

It is harder to maintain a high level of trust in a society after the civil war, especially if none of the parties achieve a major military victory, and the sense of the victimhood remains high. The post-conflict period comes after an informal agreement, interstate agreement or a decisive military victory. A conflict that ends with a formal agreement is perhaps the most likely to result in lasting peace because it entails political commitment that can be costly if violated at various levels (Fortna, 2008; Maoz, 1948). Yet, civil wars that include identity conflicts and ethnic/religious divisions are intractable (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). In both cases, I argue that trust is not a value that can come through any agreement. Rather, formal agreements may heighten the level of distrust between individuals, for fear of being politically and economically exploited. Besides that, the higher the death toll, the harder it is to recover trust. There are empirical studies that suggest that the more costly wars are, the more likely they are to restart, and that places that have had wars with higher death tolls are also more likely to cause a return to a state of war, and peace is harder to maintain (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Similarly, it would be too costly in terms of the time and configuration of institutions to rebuild the level of generalized trust after the end of any conflict. Indeed, it may take decades to rebuild trust again after the end of a civil (or other) war.

Although Palestine is not ethnically divided, the political division and polarization were affected by the death toll of the internal conflict in 2017, as well

as the level of persecution. In regions where families lost more family members, conflicts with Hamas resumed several times. Most importantly, these regions and families continue to distrust members of Hamas and wider society. As explained by one of the families' chiefs, 'No one stood with us from the society when Hamas attacked us, why should we trust them again.'

In Lebanon, although regions are not divided on sectarian lines, one sees that sectarian elites live and work in their area of origin, similar to cantons. In addition to that, areas that witnessed horrific massacres during the civil war (1975–90) still carry the memories and vestiges of the conflict. In 2019, a Christian mayor of Hadath municipality asked Muslims to leave the neighbourhood because they were Muslims (BBC, 2019). Although the civil war in Lebanon ended more than eighteen years ago, the behaviour of the mayor is a strong indicator that there is little trust within this society. Indeed, the AB 2019 indicates that around 95 per cent of Lebanese people do not trust each other.

In Syria, the case is worse, where overlapping identities, very high death toll and displacement play a major role. The high death toll means that the vestiges of distrust and disintegration of the society remain. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war was facilitated by the low level of trust, and the war has widened the gap between Syrians as well as reduced the level of trust among them.

The more deadly the war and the more deeply divided the society, the harder it is to maintain and increase the level of trust. A high death toll appears to fuel hatred and hostility, not only between ethnically divided groups but also between politically divided parties, such as in Palestine.

Cassar et al.'s empirical study on the Tajik civil war and its effect on trust and market development suggest that conflict and violence negatively affect the level of generalized trust (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii, 2014; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013a,b). Their study is in line with previous studies on trade and inter-ethnic relations. However, there are studies that show a positive effect in post-conflict times where pro-social elements increase (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009). Although these are recent studies, they are not necessarily about generalized trust per se, but rather a pro-social element.

Findings from Cassar and his colleagues suggest that there is a consistent relationship between violence and interpersonal trust. They also found a 40 per cent decrease in the level of generalized trust when victimization increased. The most negative effect of violence on trust was found in areas where opposing groups live, and their allegiances were, and still are split, along ethnic lines. Tajik's study of civil war also suggests that people affected by violence are less willing to participate in local markets, and turn to kinship-based norms. The effects of conflict and division along with the impact of violence on trust is determined by specificity and the wartime divide (Cassar et al., 2013). These findings are consistent with the observations in Palestine, Lebanon, Bosnia, Egypt and Syria. The effect of violence and political/ethnic division on trust is more noticeable in areas where violence and a sense of victimhood are high, and more specifically in intermixed political allegiances. The different cases presented in detail in this book are consistent with these findings and others that suggest ethnic conflict hinders social cohesion

(Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo, 2011; Rohner et al., 2013a). In Lebanon, although the war ended in 1990, political and ethnic allegiances are found to be stronger in mixed areas, where the visual presence of flags and photos of leaders declares the political and ethnic orientation of the area. In Palestine, there has been a reduction in pro-social activities and values in areas where there are intense Hamas–Fatah communities, such as in Shejaia, which witnessed a high rate of violence in 2008 after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. It is observed in the Palestinian and Syrian case studies that victims of violence who live or lived in areas that witnessed high levels of violence seem to have less trust in their fellow members of the society. Besides that, and according to the analysis of all the five waves of the AB in Palestine and Lebanon, age, gender, education and association membership have a robust effect on the level of generalized trust. The effect of political division on trust remains robust in Palestine among the younger generation who were between six and ten years old at the onset of the political division.

In post-conflict societies/times, although the reconfigurations and reengineering of the formal institutions, political division and mobilization continue, it splits members of societies along political/ethnic lines. Victims and members of sub-societies (or ethnic groups) who are/were subjected to a high level of violence turn to the closer members of the society that they are closer to, such as tribes, kinship associations and those with familial ties.

The reengineering of formal institutions continues to split members into two divisions, such as in Palestine, or more, such as in Lebanon, Syria and Bosnia, as part of the reconciliation and rebuilding of society. Although the process is theoretically for good and aims to accelerate and apply the transitional justice mechanism, it can be harmful and exploited by the political elites for their benefit. Formal institutions, instead of defining the members of the society as simply members (victims and non-victims) and seeking justice for them, split them into ethnic and political groups. This re-produces the same division that contributes to the decrease of the level of trust through inequality, feelings of insecurity and a lack of safety, as well as fostering the civil society organizations (CSOs) that are affiliated with and under the authority of the elites.

In post-conflict times, some societies may witness a high level of sociopolitical involvement, including CSO activity. However, this does not reflect the reality of a low/decreasing level of generalized trust because trust here amounts to the level of willingness to cooperate with others in the society, knowing that there is some risk, while sociopolitical involvement occurs in the presence of exclusion, inequality and distrust.

One explanation is the intensity of CSO efforts to gain a place in the society with the help of international and regional funds. The great majority of these CSOs are associations and NGOs that focus on reconciliation and peace-building. Although many of the projects and activities of these organizations aim to bring different sects and members of the society together, especially in mixed areas, they miss the main point, which is the long-term sustainability and cooperation of these projects. Besides that, these memberships are based on benefits from the activities. As one of the leading NGOs' leaders put it, 'It was like homework for them. To

come, play, meet us and then go home. They spent time together, but the fraction kept being there.' Another explanation is the elitist CSO which flourishes, such as in Lebanon post-1990, Palestine post-1994 and Syria post-2012. These CSOs are usually dependent on foreign funds, and focus on a particular group of people (tribe, ethnicity, political group), while excluding others. They work as a patronage of an ethnic or political leader, where members are also affiliated to that specific leader.

Another explanation is that the effects of conflict on pro-social activities and behaviour depend on the society's ethnic structure and the level, intensity and geographical spread of violence (Costalli, Moretti, and Pischedda, 2017).

In this book, building on recent findings regarding ethnicity, generalized trust, social capital and violent conflicts, I argue that wars and violence destroy the level of generalized trust, especially in highly mobilized/fractionalized societies, particularly where the number of victims and the death toll are high.

Conclusion

For the purpose of my argument, the institutional theory of generalized trust is accepted, and followed. This does not mean that other theories are falsified or rejected. Rather, I provide a new, empirical evidence and mechanism of how such institutions, and why the presence of some policies, may affect the level of generalized trust more than another set of policies or institutions.

Levels of generalized trust are most likely affected through more than one causal mechanism, which is reflected in the theories discussed in the chapter. Each theory only explains a certain proportion of the generalized trust present in a country, considering its historical and political context.

While a number of variables have been defined and will be investigated, it is likely that others still need to be identified to explain more fully levels of generalized trust in the case studies, particularly given unusual post-socialist and post-conflict contexts.

In an empirical study, Alesina and Ferrara stressed the link between generalized trust and marginalized groups. They found a strong association with low trust in divided societies, in societies that have a recent history of trauma and violence, in groups that felt discriminated against and marginalized, groups that were economically challenged and groups living in a racially mixed community with a high degree of inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000).

What are the important dimensions in the context of divided societies that are necessary for the maintenance and development of generalized trust? Based on comparative case studies, a variety of actors and elements are of high importance, at both the local and national scale, for generalized trust in divided societies. Through the review of the literature on social capital, generalized trust and institutions, we find the following factors to be of considerable importance in relation to institutions and generalized trust:

- The socio-economic resources of the country and economic inequality that is institutionally initiated among the different groups may greatly influence the level of generalized trust (Rose, 2000; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).
- Fair and equal institutions in local and central government lead to increased trust. The more universal they are, consulting different ethnic groups, the higher the trust among individuals themselves and also between individuals and institutions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).
- Social interaction, both formal and informal, in densely populated areas. When a society is homogenous, this is positively associated with trust. When local governments provide more space for interaction, such as sports clubs, hospitals and educational facilities, more interaction occurs, and higher levels of trust are achieved. In this matter, a comprehensive and neutral civil society in these dense areas becomes of great importance, as they are the third party and facilitators of interaction between people.
- Individuals who have had personal and direct experiences with others of different racial backgrounds are more trusting than those who have not had such experiences (Marschall and Stolle, 2004).

In the next chapter, I will discuss the institutional determinants that have influence on the level of trust. It will use case studies form MENA and non-MENA region with the aim to capture the institutional determinants in divided societies, irrespective of their location, history or culture.

Chapter 4

TRUST BEYOND MENA

DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER?

Introduction

To capture which institutions affect the level of generalized trust in MENA, a broader selection of case studies from non-MENA countries is needed. In this chapter, institutions that encourage people to express high generalized trust or distrust are looked into in order to operationalize them at different cases to test their validity in MENA countries, empirically. This chapter examines eight case studies from MENA region as well as other cases from outside the region. The goal is to draw common trajectories of the nature of institutions that affect the level of trust, comparing cases from within MENA and outside MENA. Cases studied in this chapter from MENA are Lebanon and Iraq, and Pakistan from MENA broader region.

This chapter discusses different institutional conditions that influence the level of generalized trust, explaining why they have been selected, and their relevance to the question of trust and institutions in divided societies. Drawing on data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), Quality of Government Institute (QoG) and World Value Survey (WVS), I will identify the combination of variables with the necessary and sufficient (institutional conditions) which contribute to the maintenance of higher generalized trust.

At its core, this chapter studies eight cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Macedonia, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and South Africa. The Bosnian, Lebanese, South African and Iraqi case studies are typical examples of divided societies. This study focus on Bosnia and Macedonia after the Balkan War, South Africa, prior to and following the fall of the apartheid regime, Iraq following the collapse of Saddam's regime and Lebanon since the Lebanese civil war started in 1974. The ethno-national and sectarian division in politics and daily life is deep within these societies.

The selection of eight case studies and their examination using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) allows for a degree of probabilistic generality. However, each case can still have its own unique contextual factors.

The method used is a combination of medium number of cases, and N=1 case study. While a large N does provide great benefits in its clarity, theoretical elegance

and parsimony, it does not give an in-depth qualitative analysis such as in smaller N cases (B. G. Peters, 1998). However, this comes at the expenses of richness and depth of study in the context derived from national, subnational or regional case studies (Landman, 2000). Therefore, using eight case studies is beneficial to provide both analytical framework and in-depth examination of the research question. I have therefore chosen to adopt a multi-case mixed method, with the research unit defined as a divided society.

The case studies are mostly non-democratic or transitional countries. The main explanatory issue here is that different divided societies that share the same element of violent conflict and post-conflict reconciliation have various levels of generalized trust. My selection covers a range of cases: one from the former Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan), two from the Arab World (Lebanon and Iraq), two from the Balkans (BiH and Macedonia), one from Africa (South Africa), and two from semi-democratic and democratic countries (Turkey and Pakistan).

The scope of these case studies is that they are states that have experienced an internal (armed or non-armed) conflict and political instability as a result of ethnic conflict between at least two groups. According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, any country that has experienced internal armed conflict between the government of the state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states (Type 3 in the dataset) is defined as a divided society.[1] Therefore, these case studies are countries which have experienced a Type 3 conflict in the last thirty years where the consequences, such as political instability or division, are ongoing.[2] The selected cases are detailed in Table 4.1. The main aim is to measure generalized trust, compare it among these divided societies and examine how different policies increase or decrease generalized trust. The cases come from small populations of ethnically divided societies. Each case fits the criteria of having experienced a conflict between at least two ethnic groups, some featuring an extreme amount of violence with over 1,000 fatalities.[3]

The chapter also examines the differences within the cases themselves. Each case is represented by two or more timeframes that are aimed at capturing the difference in institutional conditions and the level of generalized trust. Each case study is represented by two phases in the analysis, with the exception of Turkey and Pakistan. The rationale behind this is to capture first how changes in institutions

Table 4.1 Cases and selection criteria

Country	Organized conflict index 2014/ the last thirty years	No. of ethnic groups/sects
South Africa	4/5	4
Lebanon	4/5	18
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2/5	3
Macedonia	2/5	6
Pakistan	4/5	5
Turkey	2/5	2
Iraq	5/5	5
Kyrgyzstan	4/4	3

occurred directly after the end of the civil war or conflict and again after five or ten years post-conflict. It is beneficial to do so as generalized trust does not change significantly over short periods of time.

For example, in QCA, the Lebanese case number 1 examines the period directly after the withdrawal of the Syrian army, while the second time frame examines the institutions and the level of trust as of 2014. In Iraq, the first phase examines institutions directly after the fall of the Iraqi Ba'ath state led by Saddam Hussain, while the second looks at the situation over five years later. Turkey and Pakistan are the exceptions as they have gone through several significant institutional and political reforms over the last two decades, making it necessary to include the changes in institutions and the level of generalized trust.

Despite the fact that there are many divided societies that have experienced violence, the scope of existing research is limited, with only a few cases that have continuous data on generalized trust and accurate data on policy tools. Therefore, I was constrained in the case selection. In selecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Iraq, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan, I have chosen to examine the level of generalized trust in post-conflict eras, or in other words, during the reconciliation process. In Turkey, Pakistan and South Africa, I examine the level of generalized trust influenced by institutions across many years, during both reconciliation and stability times.

This chapter uses two major sources of data; the first is in collaboration with the V-Dem project, where I assisted in collecting primary data and used the AB for the regression analysis of Lebanon and Palestine as case studies; the second is interviews and observations. V-Dem data will be used in QCA analysis, while interviews will be used in a case study analysis that focuses on specific institutions and policy tools.

I use V-Dem dataset for the majority of the independent variables, as it is a collection of data on more than 300 indicators measuring different dimensions of democracy from 1900 to 2019. With the help of multiple experts, this dataset codes each variable to provide measurement on various indicators (Coppedge et al., 2018). Experts' ratings are aggregated through a Bayesian item response theory model (Pemstein, Tzelgov, and Wang, 2015). This model takes into account that coders may make mistakes. There are also bridging experts who code different surveys and provide data based on their knowledge but are not from the country in question.

The data and the method by which the indicators selected from V-Dem were collected and coded are shown in Appendix A. A secondary dataset used is the QoG datasets from Gothenburg University. Given the objectives of the research and the complexity of the field, the coded datasets alone are insufficient. Therefore, an in-depth approach is needed to complement the research, and this is achieved by the inclusion of interviews. Indeed, V-Dem data analysis using the QCA method will lead to specific results and allow the researcher to focus on certain policy tools, yet interviews examine these institutions and how they influence the level of generalized trust. The AB provides highly reliable scientific data that measures politically relevant attitudes in the Arab World. It has Four time frames and covers fourteen countries including Lebanon and Iraq.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted during the research, which allowed more flexibility to raise questions during the interview which were conducted either face to face, on Skype, or by telephone or through email. Considering that this research focuses on divided societies, examining generalized trust and how institutions influence it, new questions may arise or the area of the focus of the interviews may be expanded a little to allow for a more in-depth analysis. Moreover, observations of daily life in Lebanon, BiH and Iraq provide for a deeper understanding of the society and how institutions interact with ethnicities and sectarian politics. Given the diverse case studies, translation was needed in some cases, but this book primarily interviewed policymakers, academics and community leaders who speak English in order to avoid the back-translation method for cross-cultural research.

This book analyses the cases both individually and comparatively to provide a careful investigation of the question. The combination of the two approaches can help to counteract information-processing bias. This also prevents arriving at false research conclusions and findings (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Researching generalized trust

Cross-case analysis is very beneficial when it comes to examining complex and compounding factors. It identifies the combination of actors that have contributed to the outcome of the given case as well as giving an explanation as to why this outcome is different from another by taking into account the present conditions. Furthermore, cross-case analysis provides clarity with regard to hypotheses, concepts and theories that are discovered from one case or a combination of cases (Khan and VanWynsberghe, 2008). It also enhances the researcher's capacity to ask more questions and discover relationships that may exist between the compared cases (Ragin, 1997).

One tactic in cross-case analysis is to select a group of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between them. However, in this chapter, policies that influence the level of generalized trust will be grouped together. In addition to cross-case analysis, a second phase of data analysis is carried out in examining these institutions within a single case study in depth.

This juxtaposition of similar institutions can go beyond simplistic governmental framework, finding more nuanced similarities between different cases, which then leads to a higher level of understanding of the research question.

To do a cross-case analysis, this chapter uses QCA as the main method of multi-case analysis, which is followed by pure qualitative research, based on interviews and secondary data analysis. FsQCA is a research approach that is case-oriented and suited to small to medium N, N being the number of cases. This method examines the specific combination of conditions under which an outcome, in this case generalized trust, occurs, but does not give a numerical estimate of the effect of these conditions on the outcome (Mahoney, 2010).

In QCA, causation is expressed in terms of sufficiency and necessity, which are currently receiving much attention among political scientists and sociologists. Therefore, many theories and hypothesis are tested and formalized using the concept of necessity and sufficiency (Goertz, 2003). The QCA method enables both in-depth and information-rich study of individual cases and the scientific comparison of cases to reveal complex links that are typical of cross-case research (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). QCA is based on the idea that the configurations of the variables or conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. Necessary conditions must be present for an outcome to occur. However, their presence cannot make the outcome occur every time. On the other hand, sufficient conditions always lead to the outcome, but the outcome can also occur in their absence.

Fuzzy sets provide QCA with a novel tool that transforms categorical concepts into measurable conditions. Its explanation is that each case holds a degree of membership in one or more sets.

Institutions and operationalization of the analysis

North argues that 'institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction' (North, 2005). Institutions are the norms and values that constrain and manage interactions between people in complex ways. These institutions can be both formal or informal. Moreover, institutions are the mechanism that may enable or constrain the political, administrative, economic and social interaction in the society (Uphoff, 1992). Institutions provide incentives and disincentives for people to act in certain ways, in which they try to reduce uncertainties in the society, establish common shared values, enhance efficiency and strengthen government performance, especially in the economy (North, 1991). These institutions range from providing services to people to punishing those who violate the law, or commonly agreed-upon laws. In complex societies, such as a divided society, there is also a need to have institutions, which are able to formulate policies and implement them wisely to avoid conflicts over resources.[4]

Institutions are studied in relation to social capital from two perspectives: perceptions and assessment of public institutions, especially welfare policies (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Rothstein and Stolle argue that there are two sets of measurements of institutions in social science; the first measurements are of governance quality, corruption levels, efficiency and regulatory burdens while the second are of legal protection of property rights and law enforcement.

By bringing institutions into the heart of the picture, generalized trust can be examined from a different perspective. Governments need to choose which institutions are selected out of the toolbox in order to design and implement effective public institutions. In divided societies, this task is more complicated. Institutions must be effective, meeting the demands of different ethnic groups and

political parties, while simultaneously achieving policy goals. Despite the wide array of institutional conditions and their provisions, this book focuses on a few that are available and that reflect the status quo of public service provisions.

This research has coded several institutional conditions (political and societal) extracted from the V-Dem data and QoG at Gothenburg University. The selection comprises a variety of institutional conditions which meet the requirement for proper scope conditions for the nine cases. In Table 4.2, I summarize the raw data of the institutional conditions that are used in the analysis, and the corresponding theory that it is relied upon in this study.

Explanantes and explanandum of trust and institutions

I code eleven explanatory conditions, each with a score from 0 (absence of the explanatory property) to 1 (presence of the explanatory property) after reviewing the most relevant policies from both V-Dem and QoG to a state's institutions that have a theoretical background or hypothesis which indicates an impact on the level of generalized trust. In the explanation model, only eight conditions were coded as Public Arbitrariness, Particularistic Spending, while Universality of Public Policies or Social Programmes represent equality within society. The independent variables have been coded 0 or 1 based on the medium score. Zero meant lower while 1 meant higher. For example, if the public arbitrariness is coded close 0 or 1, then the code is 0, while it will get code 1 in case the actual code is 3 or 4.

The explanatory conditions that represent the institutional measurements and conditions which are borrowed from V-Dem and QoG are:

<Equality>,<equ>

Equality means ensuring that individual and groups are treated equally in the eyes of the law, and this applies to public administration and its officers as well. This means they must be treated fairly regardless of race, religion, region or political affiliation. Rothstein, Uslaner and Stolle argue that trust relies on equitable distribution and equality of opportunity. Universal policies and public expenditures, in addition to the absence of arbitrariness in public administration, reinforce equality in society. This explanation is measured by the following three major conditions:

Particularistic spending

Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted to a specific corporation, sector, social group, regional party or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as 'pork', 'clientelistic', or 'private goods'. Public goods are intended to benefit all communities within a society, though they may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy or otherwise underprivileged constituencies. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-tested criteria are allowed to receive the benefit. The value of this question considers the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending.

Universalistic policies

A means-tested programme targets poor, needy or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programmes are normally means-tested. A universal programme potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes and retirement programmes. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programmes, but the essential point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is to evaluate the quality of state institutions on cash-based or social institutions–based programmes.

Public administration arbitrariness

This indicator focuses on the extent to which public officials obey the law and treat like cases alike despite the ethnic origins, geographical area or racial group. This indicator shows if the public administration is characterized by arbitrariness, nepotism, cronyism or discrimination.

<Political Power Monopoly>, <ppw>
A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, religion or some combination thereof. Social group identities are also likely to intersect, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, that is, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time, there are social groups within a society that are understood by those residing within that society to be different in ways that may be politically relevant.

<Decentralized Policy making>, <asg>
For different geographic or ethnic groups to become independent or autonomous, decentralized institutions should be initiated where the state is divided based on ethnicities or other factors into different autonomous regions. Autonomous regions are not the same as provinces or counties. This variable indicates autonomy if it explicitly mentions regions, areas or districts that have a self-governing body that proposes bills and regulations outside of the centralized government.

<Public Deliberation>, <png>
The public has more effective participation in decision-making when institutions provide a space for debate and discussion of the decision-making process. This indicator refers to deliberation as manifesting in discussion, debate and other public forums such as popular media. The presence of this indicator is based on when important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent public deliberations are in practice.

<Entry and Exit of Civil Society>, <eec>
This condition refers to what extent the government achieves control over entry and exit of CSOs into public life.

<Civil Society Consultation>, <csc>
This condition concerns the level to which CSOs are consulted when certain institutions are designed or implemented. This refers to the presence of a large civil society that has effective and efficient influence in society. The higher the CSO consultation is, the higher the engagement of citizens in the policymaking process, as enabled by this consultation.

<Accountability Authority>, <ec>

> According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner:
>
> Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that superordinate's and subordinates be able to recognise when decision-processes have been 'properly' concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken. (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975: 121)

Operationally, this variable refers to 'the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities'. Any 'accountability groups may impose such limitations'. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state, councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, the military in coup-prone polities and in states that priorities the rule of law, a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is, therefore, with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.

<Fractionalized Index>,<efr>
Restricting attention to groups that were at least 1 per cent of the country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnicaland 'ethno-religious' groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

Given this operationalization, and on the basis of the data matrix, a csQCA analysis was performed for the whole model as follows:

equ* asg * png* eec * csc * ec * efr -> high GT
The asterisks indicate the joint presence of the causal properties, while the headed arrow represents the sufficient causation of the joint properties to the outcome. The label high GT is operationalized using the WVS's dataset. The WVS is the only reliable worldwide survey that measures generalized trust. The standard question ('Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?'), introduced by Rosenberg, is used to measure generalized trust. In contrast to the binary measure used in the WVS and the Arab Barometer, the European Social

Table 4.2 Raw data from V-Dem, QoG and WVS

.	Year	equ	ppw	asg	png	eec	csc	Ec	efr	GT
KGZ	1999–2004	0	2	0	2	2	1	4	.67	34
KGZ	1910–2014	1	3	0	2	3	0	2	.67	77
IRQ	1999–2004	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	.54	95
IRQ	1910–2014	1	2	0	1	3	1	4	.54	66
LBN	1908–2010	0	1	0	4	3	1	7	.77	24
LBN	1910–2014	0	1	0	2	3	1	7	.77	30
ZAF	1990–1993	0	0	0	3	2	1	2	.87	59
ZAF	1999–2004	0	2	0	4	4	1	7	.87	26
ZAF	1910–2014	0	2	0	4	4	1	7	.87	47
PAK	1994–1998	0	1	1	2	3	1	6	.53	41
PAK	1999–2004	1	1	1	4	2	1	2	.53	65
PAK	1910–2014	1	1	1	3	3	1	6	.53	48
BIH	1994–1998	0	1	0	2	2	0	2	.53	54
BIH	1999–2004	1	1	1	3	3	0	2	.68	51
MKD	1995–1999	0	2	0	1	2	1	2	.70	23
MKD	1999–2004	1	2	0	2	3	1	2	.70	64
TUK	1994–1998	0	2	0	3	2	1	7	.29	13
TUK	1999–2004	0	2	0	4	2	1	7	.29	39
TUK	1910–2014	0	2	0	2	2	0	7	.29	29

Survey features an 11-point response scale, where 0 indicates the lowest level and 10 the highest level of trust. Before generalized trust measurements can be used as fuzzy sets to gauge the outcome, they have to go through further transformation: 'raw scores' to form the degree of membership. Generalized trust as an index was developed to meet the calibration process as follows:

Trust index = 100 + (% Most people can be trusted) − (% Can't be too careful)

Based on the index, I found the mean of the values for the countries and the time frame, which is 42. Cases with a GT index value higher than 42 will be equal to (1): higher generalized trust, while less than 42 will be equal to (0): less generalized trust.

Table 4.3 contains the nine conditions that I used during QCA and their respective operationalization. Whenever valid data was available in other datasets, I used this as a base for our coding. The outcome calibration was based on the threshold of 55, as Table 4.2 shows.

Analysis

Table 4.4 shows the ten variables in a data matrix as explanatory variables and generalized trust as an outcome variable. The outcome variable shows either a high level of trust (1) or a low level of trust (0). A variable of 1 indicates a presence of trust while 0 denotes an absence of trust (Table 4.5). As a reminder, QCA aims at identifying the different configuration of the path that leads to the presence or absence of an outcome.

Table 4.3 Explanans of institutional conditions that affect trust

Theory	Determinants/conditions	Hypothesis
Civil society	Entry and Exit of CSO CSO consultation	The more CSO is able to work freely, free from division, providing space for the individual to interact, the more trust will be built (Putnam, Knack and Keefer).
Associations	Public deliberations	
Institutions theory	Particularistic spending Public administration Arbitrariness Universalistic policies Accountable authority Political power monopoly Decentralized policy-making	These conditions/factors measure impartiality and fairness in the political system. The more inequality and arbitrariness, the less GT exists or grows (Rothstein and Stolle, Levi). - The first three measurements were coded in one index called equality, since it deal with equality in public administration in general.
History and population	Fractionalized index	

Table 4.4 Data matrix of QCA

case_id	UNI	PG	PA	PPW	ASG	PNG	EEC	CSC	EC	EFR	Outcome	O
KGZ9904	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	34
KGZ1014	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	77
IRQ9904	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	95
IRQ1014	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	66
LBN0810	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	24
LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	30
ZAF8993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	59
ZAF9904	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	26
PAK9498	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	41
PAK9904	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	65
PAK1014	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	48
BIH9498	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	45
BIH9904	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	61
MKD9599	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	23
MKD9904	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	64
TUK9498	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	13
TUK9904	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	39
TUK1014	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	29

Necessity and sufficiency

The causal relationship of necessity and sufficiency is defined theoretically as a set: necessity is supported when it can be demonstrated that instances of an outcome constitute a subset of instances of a causal condition. Sufficiency is supported when a set of cases with the condition is perfectly included in the set of cases displaying

Table 4.5 Explanandum of trust

Variable	Operationalization	Model
Trust index	Dichotomized {0,1}	csQCA

the outcome (B. Rihoux and Marx, 2013). Consistency represents the extent to which a causal combination leads to an outcome. It also depicts the strength of the causal relation, calculated as the sum of the membership scores that cases have to the intersect out of the sum of the scores of the alleged subsets.

$$\text{N. Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xiyi)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(yi)}$$

$$\text{S. Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xiyi)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xi)}$$

Coverage represents how many cases with the outcome are represented by a particular causal condition. Coverage is calculated as the sum of the membership scores of the cases to the intersection out of the sum of the score to the alleged superset.

$$\text{N. Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xiyi)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xi)}$$

$$\text{S. Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(xiyi)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(yi)}$$

It is important to keep in mind that QCA does not assume linearity of causation.

The institutions as a determinant of generalized trust

The findings of institutional conditions show that institutional determinants have an impact on the level of trust. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, these institutional determinants are reflections of broader state's institutions (formal and informal institutions). For example, equality determinant (condition) represents three major formal institutions and policy implementations in the state.

The results of QCA for accounting for the existence of generalized trust appear in Table 4.6. Five causal models describe sufficient and consistent conditions leading to higher level of generalized trust (coverage=1, consistency=1.00). Model 1 represents the presence of equality and fractionalized society, the absence of political power monopoly, the absence of entry and exit of civil society, the absence of decentralized policymaking, the absence of public deliberation, and the absence of accountability authority as a set of conditions that results in the occurrence of generalized trust. According to the results, equality is a necessary condition for a high level of generalized trust.

According to the results, Model 1 is not the only causal model for achieving generalized trust. There are alternatives paths (Model 2–Model 5) that explain the configuration of antecedents for predicting a desired outcome, which is higher level of generalized trust (GT). Different from symmetrical analyses, the role of antecedents depends on the attributes of other ingredients in the causal model. For example, equality positively contributes in the prediction of GT in Model 1–5 resulting in higher level of trust. Model 2 indicates that the presence of equality, political power monopoly, the entry and exit of civil society, a highly fractionalized society, the absence of decentralized policy-making, the absence accountability over executives and the absence of public deliberation lead to higher GT (see Model 2 in Table 4.6). These results confirm the hypothesis that one institutional condition cannot improve the level of GT and that a combination of institutional is necessary to have a greater effect on GT. It also shows that equality is a necessary condition to account for a high level of GT.

Casual conditions for accounting for a low score of GT are presented in Table 4.7 Results from the QCA revealed that eight consistent and sufficient conditions indicate a negation of GT which means low level of trust (coverage=1, consistency=1.00). Model 1 describes a condition with presence of political power monopoly and accountability authority, and absence of equality, absence of decentralized policymaking, absence of public deliberation, absence of entry

Table 4.6 Causal recipes for simulating high score of generalized trust

Model: gntrst = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)	**Raw coverage**	**Unique coverage**
Causal Model		
M1: equ*~ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*~ec*efr	0.285714	0.285714
M2: equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*~ec*efr	0.285714	0.142857
M3: equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*csc*efr	0.285714	0.142857
M4: equ*~ppw*asg*~png*eec*~csc*~ec*efr	0.142857	0.142857
M5: equ*~ppw*asg*png*~eec*csc*~ec*efr	0.142857	0.142857
Solution coverage: 1.000000		
Solution consistency: 1.000000		

Note: equ: equality, ppw: political power monopoly, asg: decentralized policy-making, png: public deliberation, eec: entry and exist of civil society, csc, civil society consultation, ec: accountability authority, efr: fractionalized index, gntrst: GT.

Table 4.7 Causal recipes for simulating low score of generalized trust

Model: ~gntrst = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)	**Raw coverage**	**Unique coverage**
Causal model		
M1: ~equ*ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*ec*~efr	0.181818	0.090909
M2: ~equ*ppw*~asg*~eec*csc*ec*~efr	0.181818	0.090909
M3: ~ppw*asg*~png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.090909
M4: ~equ*~asg*png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.090909
M5: ~equ*~asg*png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.090909
M6: ~equ*ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*csc*~ec*efr	0.090909	0.090909
M7:~equ*~ppw*~png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.000000
M8: ~equ*~ppw*~asg*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.000000
Solution coverage: 1.000000		
Solution consistency: 1.000000		

Note: equ: equality, ppw: political power monopoly, asg: decentralized policy-making, png: public deliberation, eec: entry and exist of civil society, csc, civil society consultation, ec: accountability authority, efr: fractionalized index, gntrst: GT.

and exit of civil society and low level of fractionalized society which results in the negation of trust.

In Model 2, the absence of equality, the absence of decentralized policymaking and the absence of entry and exit of civil society, the presence of civil society consultation, the presence political power monopoly and the presence accountability authority represent conditions for a low level of GT (Table 4.7). Interestingly, the absence of equality is a feature in all models resulting in the low level of GT. In this regard, all causal antecedents contribute to the negation of trust in all models, which suggests that equality plays a key role in accounting for the negation of GT. The implications of these results are discussed in the next section.

Equality as a necessity

The analysis suggests that there is a need for combined conditions to have a positive impact on GT (outcome =1). In the comparison, there is no set of combined conditions that produces a truth table without contradictions. This indicates that a deeper understanding and research on the subject is required.

Building on the theories and previous literature, the research identified three important conditions that might influence the level of GT. The first is equality, which includes public administration arbitrariness, particularistic spending and universal policies.

The analysis showed that a higher fractionalized society did not have much influence at the level of GT. With regard to the theoretical implications, the analysis shows that fractionalization in divided societies is not a condition in lessening the level of GT. The presence of high fractionalization in the society did not deter a higher level of GT. This finding supports the institutional theory of GT and other theories which argue that GT sources are not just limited to the

societal and cultural fabric of a society. The level of GT is not solely determined by society and culture in divided societies, but rather is a variety of sources, mainly institutions. Arguably, this finding supports the argument of Rothstein, Stolle, Levi and Uslaner that institutions play a key role, especially everyday experience with bureaucratic institutions and the legal system, in influencing the level of GT. As part of the equality index, public administration arbitrariness measures to what extent public officials obey the law and treat like cases alike despite ethnic origins, geographical area or racial group. It exposes the inequality in the system, especially with respect to access to public services or means-tested programmes. As a result, the connections of ethnicity and trust, polarization and trust, social division and trust are questionable according to these findings. Knack and Keefer argue that countries with ethnically homogenous societies show a higher level of GT within the same ethnicity, as cooperation norms are strengthened, but trust with other groups is weakened (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Perhaps their arguments are valid, but according to the findings, it does not hold that ethnicities are important, which back my definition that deeply divided societies (defined by index) have more class division represented by economic and institutional inequalities. Different ethnicities play no role in influencing the level of GT, as sectarian and ethnic leaders sustain their position using informal institutions such as corruption and providing clientelist services to their sect in order to maintain a leadership role over them. In ethnically and religiously divided societies, leaders have the goal of sustaining their power over their citizens by planting fear within their own sects towards other sects. They also provide a variety of clientelist services to their own sects (corruption), for the purpose of dividing their own sects in order to keep their leadership role. This does not necessarily intensify or increase a spirit of cooperation among the members of the group, but rather increases the division which is normal in divided societies.

The reason why ethnicity or the presence of high levels of fractionalization may not influence the level of GT in many cases of divided societies is that there is structure of informal institutions that wok as a binding contract between these ethnic groups, especially in countries with a tribal system. For example, ethnicity in Pakistan is identified on the basis of language. It is mostly an ethno-linguistic population, which is internally subdivided into clans and tribes. The respective languages and the embedded sociocultural fabric is the major binding force. A clan settled in two different areas in Pakistan may speak two different languages or dialects and may be more strongly bonded with people of other tribes/clans in the same area on the basis of language as compared to their own tribe/clan settled in another area of Pakistan. Besides, there is also diversity among the races, clans and tribes; for instance, the Pathans speak the Pushto language, and among themselves, there are Afridis, Yusafzais, Aurekzaies, Kakakhels and so on. Similarly, among the Punjabis, there are Rajputs, Mughals, Janjuas, Jats, Araiens and so on, all of whom speak the Punjabi language with varied dialects.[5] This means that in Pakistan, a divided society is not seen by the members of these ethnicities as a reason to distrust others since they belong to the same clan and abide by the same tribal rules. Ethnicity is like clanism

in Muslim-majority countries, where informal tribal rules prevail over formal institutional rules (including rule of law), where members of a tribe or clan must obey the informal code of behaviour, a breach of which can be shameful for the whole tribe. Therefore, ethnic divisions in these societies are irrelevant to trust. For example, buying lands in tribal societies such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Iraq is done based on trust between tribes and members of tribes with local witnesses. In the majority of cases, contracts are not registered or signed in official and formal institutions until needed and perhaps after many years. This is because a code of conduct and tribal institutions are strongly present in both cases where formal institutions are strong or weak.

In Turkey, ethnic division in divided or mixed cities is not affected solely by the existence of other ethnicities. Kurds in Eastern Turkey live in a mixed city with Turks, Turkman and other small ethnicities such as Assyrians, yet they do not trust a mayor from the capital city of Turkey over someone from the same city. The coexistence of the Kurds and Turks is not problematic unless there is a formal intensification of the conflict. Kurds see the Turkish state rather than the Turks as an ethnicity as the oppressor. In Turkey, the low level of GT has to do more with political factors at the national level than with individual ethnicity (Ekmekci, 2010). In the WVS 2004–08, Turkey had the second lowest level of GT, which changed in the 2010–14 WVS when the level was higher after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) initiated reform measures concerning the Kurdish status, especially allowing them to have a TV station and appointing Kurdish mayors in many Kurdish-majority cities.

With regard to policy implications, the necessary absence of inequality and unfair treatment in public offices and in accessibility to the services of the state's institutions are very important in maintaining a higher level of GT. In all the sets of combinations of low GT, only inequality was present in all contexts. This is further proof that GT can be destroyed much more easily than maintained based on the absence or presence of the analysed conditions. The absence of decentralized policymaking is reflected in seven of the models out of eight, which have low levels of GT. This supports the argument that there may be a need for decentralized policymaking in divided societies whenever there are deep divisions and deeply unequal and unfair institutions.

The findings show that accountability of authority – the degree of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives in these cases – is irrelevant. They are neither necessary nor sufficient. The cases show that civil society consultation and entry and exit of civil society are more important (as their absence might lead to a low level of GT), as long as there is a presence of inequality. This suggests that destroying trust can be easier in the absence of civil society or an effective role for civil society.

In the Tables 4.6 and 4.7, civil society entry and exit condition and civil society consultation are not necessary to obtain an outcome of low GT. However, when looking at individual cases, timeframes do matter. Absence of entry and exit of civil society is not sufficient to bring down GT.

In summary, based on both the preliminary and the intermediate results, this research finds that there is not one definitive path that leads to a positive outcome of higher GT. However, an alternative path is to consider combinations of institutional conditions that are necessary to achieving a higher GT. Equality, political power sharing among many ethnic/social groups and civil society consultation on major policy change are necessary conditions for a higher GT. The presence of these conditions implies: (a) both institutional conditions that represent equality, fairness and a role in the policymaking process are needed, jointly, to work hand in hand to create a political and societal environment that leads to higher GT; (b) the presence of equality (no particularistic expenditures and no public administration arbitrariness) is important to achieve a higher GT; and (c) each society has a preference for institutions which leads to higher GT. For example, in Iraq and South Africa, after war and apartheid, civil society consultation and entry and exit were perhaps more important than Public spendings and public administration inequality, as there was a process of national reformation of the political system and reconfigurations of the political institutions. In Macedonia, Iraq and Kyrgyzstan after the end of violent conflicts of five years or more (2000–04, 2010–14,1999–2004, respectively), equality and fairness of institutions and power sharing among the different ethnicities were more important for creating higher GT.

However, taking into account limited empirical diversity and the additive influence of individual cases and conditions, I am very cautious when seeking to draw a generalized conclusion. This will be clearer with an in-depth single case study of specific conditions, which I will present in the following chapters, dedicating one chapter to examining informal institutions' impact on the level of trust (corruption).

Moreover, upon examining the level of GT before and after a conflict/war (as well as time elapsed), it appears that cases like Iraq, South Africa and Lebanon face a decline in GT in the absence of public deliberation, civil society consultation and entry and exit of civil society. These same institutions eventually become less important, with equality, fairness in public administration and power sharing becoming more important. During the time of reconfiguration of institutions, the public is more interested in being part of the reconstruction of these institutions. They put more weight on civil society, local participation, consultations and deliberations. In the aftermath of the reconfiguration of state institutions, the public becomes more interested in implementing these institutions.

In general, the research suggests that institutions have a higher capacity to destroy GT than to build it, which supports the argument of Rothstein and Stolle (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). This reinforces both theories: the institutional theory of GT and the cultural-centric approach of GT. Building GT is a complexity that needs not only institutions but also cultural background and societal history to contribute to its creation. That being said, it seems that poor institutions that are built upon segregation bias and discrimination against specific social/ethnical groups or institutions that ignore the public have a strong impact in destroying or lowering GT in divided societies.

However, the results do not provide us with neat groups of cases that share similar structural characteristics and follow similar trajectories. Instead, cases are characterized by individual sets of solution terms, preventing us from constructing a clear and meaningful taxonomy of cases.

Conclusion

GT in divided societies is becoming an important topic in social science, and is increasingly present in political science, sociology, and peace and conflict studies. From a political science perspective, researchers look for different sources of GT in divided societies, mainly institutional sources. There have been a few studies, which focus on institutions and their influence on GT. The main argument of institutional theory is that institutions are reflected in the daily life of individuals, especially in the bureaucratic machinery. If this bureaucratic machinery is unfair and unequal for a specific group of people, then, based on cognitive inference, they will feel excluded, ignored and isolated from the whole. This in turn influences their level of trust of other groups, and simultaneously within the group itself, as the sectarian and ethnical leaders will be more assertive in their role which is based on sustained clientelism and corruption, under the strategy of 'divide and conquer'.

This chapter has analysed, for a number of divided societies, the conditions under which they are likely to have a high GT. Considering the different models under which GT scored low and high, results indicate that GT is destroyed more easily than it is maintained or created. The findings also suggest that the fractionalization factor is not relevant when it comes to maintaining a high level of GT, but it works negatively in tandem with other conditions in creating a low level of GT.

The analysis has several implications with regard to divided societies. As shown in the previous sections, the absence of equality and fairness in formal institutions and the absence of public deliberation and consultation, including civil society, have a greater negative impact on GT in divided societies. Conversely, findings suggest that the absence of equality within formal institutions, including particularistic expenditure, is necessary in cases with a high level of GT. However, this cannot guarantee an increase in the level of GT when present. This paradox suggests that deeper investigation is needed in each society to gain a more thorough understanding. Further investigation of individual conditions in each country from the case studies is being conducted. This paper's findings support previous research in this area, yet a more general approach has not examined specific institutions in terms of institutional theory (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).

The results also highlight the nature of GT during political transition and suggest the importance of a shared destiny, collective political struggle and common identity in divided societies. For instance, in BiH, strong societal links were built on ethnicities, but after the war, these societal links became more firmly based on nation building. These links acted as a break, slowing down the eruption of ethnic

hatred or ethnic competition over power. This explains why GT was higher in the period of the reconfiguration of state institutions, then dropped significantly (the same applies to Iraq and South Africa).

This chapter suggests that a combination of institutions is proven to be an effective tool in increasing GT. Moreover, it stresses that there are challenges in assessing the level of GT in divided society from a comparative perspective, especially in developing countries where data is rare and insufficient to undergo in-depth research.

Institutions are integral to a stable society, and their links to GT through the causal mechanism of inequality, fairness, consultation of civil society and public deliberations suggest that reform of institutions in divided societies in post-war reconciliation time is more than an exercise in political engineering. Some societies are much better than other societies because of international intervention and monitoring. Political and institutional reengineering, such as effective and professional legislatures, more public goods than particularistic and equal distribution of financial subsidies in local governments, may represent avenues to achieve higher level of GT and therefore a society less prone to conflict and war.

The next chapter provides a large N case study, analysing how corruption within institutions affects the level of GT. This chapter uses conditions and sufficient/necessary logic; however, the next chapter will use statistical analysis to provide how different institutional determinants affect the level of trust.

Chapter 5

THE FAILURE

INSTITUTIONS, CORRUPTION AND TRUST

> The tyrant does not fear all the sciences, but only those which broaden the minds and teach man what he is and what his rights are, whether he is oppressed, and how to demand and to keep his rights; such are, for instance, pure and mental philosophy, the study of the rights of nations, politics, history and rhetoric. But he does not fear the theological sciences because he believes that they do not lift the veil of ignorance but are only a pastime for those who are enthusiastic for science. Should anyone shine in these subjects and gain fame among the people.
>
> *Abdulrahman Alkawakbi*

Introduction

This chapter lends support to the previous chapter, providing a large N cases (more than 24,000 surveys) analysis which argues that institutional corruption and perception of corruption as a result of corruption practices within the formal institutions, arbitrariness in the public administration and inequality affects the level of generalized trust and institutional trust.

It is not surprising that the many societies in the Middle East have taken to the streets, protesting against the societal, economic and political malaise. Since 2011, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain witnessed the beginning of waves of protests that later hit Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Jordan and Iraq. The protests were a result of citizens' dissatisfaction of the governmental policies and practices. Corruption, nepotism and patrimonialism were among the main reasons of the protests in many of these countries, especially after corruption became clearly visible in many countries. Corruption has become a common practice in political, societal and economical lives of most of the countries in the region (Khairallah, 2014: 73). The protests from 2011 until today (2020) are a real expression of the frustration and anger towards the mismanagement of public administration and a need for a real reform in the bureaucratic machine as well as the regime itself.

The Middle Eastern countries that have high level of corruption usually have weak political, judicial, economical and administrative institutions. Therefore, the absence of strong and fair institutions leads to corrupt practices. Besides that, civil wars and instability provide a fertile ground for corruption and nepotism, especially blackmail and illegal payments to rebels, groups and militias. With the absence of security and presence of weak formal institutions that could protect the lives and properties of the members of the community, individuals feel strongly about their small communities, groups and tribes, amid losing trust in the formal institutions and trust among the members of the society (Khairallah, 2014: 57). The presence of corruption and nepotism amid conflict and division increases the difficulties for hostile and divided parties to overcome the challenges of development and stability (Seligson, 2002).

According to Transparency International, four of the most corrupt states, namely Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, are from the MENA region. Table 5.1 shows the scores and ranks of many of the Middle Eastern countries. Although many countries from the gulf region have higher scores, this chapter will focus on countries that have relevant data on the topic (generalized trust). Having said that, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain will not be discussed in this chapter.

Based on the data from Transparency International, it is apparent that countries of protests (Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Yemen and Bahrain) had a higher corruption score. With the high influence of corruption, the consequences are economic recession and inequality (Mohamed, 2006). Other arguments are that some oil-rich countries (Iraq, Algeria) and secondary rentier state (Lebanon and Egypt) are corrupt because of the effect of rentierism (Adly, 2019). As we can see, Libya scores 17/100 in 2018, while it scores 2.5/10 in 2009. Tunisia scores did

Table 5.1 Transparency International corruption index MENA region scores 2018

Score	Country	Rank
70	United Arab Emirates	23
62	Qatar	33
52	Oman	53
49	Jordan	58
49	Saudi Arabia	58
43	Morocco	73
43	Tunisia	73
41	Kuwait	78
36	Bahrain	99
35	Algeria	105
35	Egypt	105
28	Lebanon	138
18	Iraq	168
17	Libya	170
14	Yemen	176
13	Syria	178

not change at all; hence 4.2/10 in 2009 and 43/100 in 2018. Yemen from 2.1/10 in 2009 to 14/100 in 2018.

Comparing the level of corruption based on their scores and the level of distrust among citizens, it is apparent that the sustainability of corruption will result in a higher level of distrust among the citizens. Despite the fact that many cases of the countries in Table 5.2 had same level of corruption, there is an increasing level of distrust. This is strikingly clear in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq and Lebanon.

The Middle East offers an excellent case for the study of corruption and its effect on the level of generalized trust, especially in a divided society (politically/ethnically). Since the beginning of the protests and the political turmoil in the region, the increase of corruption level as well as the pervasiveness of nepotism and mismanagement of public administration came to be widely published, and shared. Most recently, an Egyptian contractor Mohamed Ali started to live-stream information about the widespread corruption within the Egyptian state and its armed forces (Wintour, 2019). Iraq, in what has been dubbed the most enormous rubbering operation in the history, lost US$425 billion between 2003 and 2015 and hundreds of thousands of ghost soldiers were discovered (Kanaan et al., 2017: 80–1).

According to V-Dem,[1] regime corruption index in the region is among the highest in the world. Regime corruption indicates higher executive embezzlement, executive bribes and higher judicial corruption (Figure 5.1). Higher scores of corruption regime means that politicians and public officers use their offices for private and public gains. Besides that, public corruption index (Figure 5.2), which measures whether public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use, indicates three types of change since 2011 in the MENA region. In Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Yemen there is an increase of public corruption. In Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait, the level of public corruption remains stable. Interestingly, Tunisia is facing difficulties in maintaining higher score. Since 2015, Tunisia has been experiencing higher level of public corruption despite having achieved better scores after 2011 revolution. Iraq is the only country that is experiencing a very marginal decrease in the level of public corruption, from 0.8 to 0.7.

The executive corruption index (Figure 5.3) indicates that most MENA regions are above 0.5 point (from 1.0) with the exception of Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco, which have has a lower score of executive corruption. Executive corruption focuses on the corruption of members of the senior executive positions and their agents. It measures whether they grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements and how often they do that. Although Jordan and Morocco indicate low level of executive corruption in this indicator, they do not necessarily reflect the reality in Jordan, which is a tribal society which grants favours for loyalties rather than bribes and kickbacks (Al-Ramahi, 2008).

Measuring different kinds of corruption at all levels and all field shows that MENA countries have high level of corruption. V-Dem political corruption (Figure 5.4) index, which measures 'petty' and 'grand' corruption, such as bribery, theft and embezzlement, influencing law making and affecting

Table 5.2 Corruption index score and the level of distrust in selected MENA countries

Country	(Dis) trust %	2009	2010	2011	(Dis) trust %	2012	2013	(Dis) trust %	2014	2015	2016	(Dis) trust %	2017	2018	(Dis) trust %
Algeria	72	2.8	2.9	2.9	85	34	36	74	36	36	35	78	33	35	85
Bahrain	56	5.1	4.9	5.1		51	48		49	51	43		36	36	
Egypt	81	2.8	3.1	2.9	44	32	32	79	37	36	34	71	32	35	65
Iraq	56	1.5	1.5	1.8	72	18	16	53	16	16	17		18	18	91
Jordan	64	5.0	4.7	4.5	74	48	45	75	49	53	48	83	48	48	90
Kuwait		4.1	4.5	4.6		44	43	67	44	49	41		39	41	82
Lebanon	82	2.5	2.5	2.5	80	30	28	85	27	28	28	88	28	28	95
Libya		2.5	2.2	2		21	15	70	18	16	14		17	17	93
Morocco	79	3.3	3.4	3.4		37	37	82	39	36	37	87	40	43	77
Sudan		1.5	1.6	1.6	74	13	11	62	11	12	14		16	16	84
Tunisia		4.2	4.3	3.8	62	41	41	77	40	38	41	80	42	43	91
Yemen	54	2.1	2.2	2.1	59	23	18	57	19	18	14		16	14	60

Source: Transparency International Index
The Arab Barometer 2007–2019
World Value Survey



Figure 5.1 Regime corruption in MENA region 1995–2018.



Figure 5.2 Public corruption index in MENA region 1994–2018.



Figure 5.3 Executive corruption index for MENA region 1995–2018.



Figure 5.4 Political corruption in MENA 1995–2018.

implementation of policies and regulations, indicates that Tunisia is the only country that has achieved better results, getting rid of corruption at many levels when compared to pre-revolution years (2011).

As generalized trust can influence the political behaviour of individuals, many studies had examined how trust can be influenced. As shown in Chapters 1 and 3, generalized trust along civic engagement may be considered as a crucial element in economic development, political participation and effective democratic institutions (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, many studies argue that generalized trust is a product and a result of institutional configurations and performance. According to this group of researchers, political institutions shape and form to a great extent the level of generalized trust (Levi, 1997; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). This suggests that institutions and institutional performance influence the level of generalized trust, as well as that generalized trust is shaped by the trust in the political institutions.

The relationship between generalized trust, institutional trust and corruption goes through vicious circle, where systematic and institutional corruption will not be easily fixed. Generalized trust is therefore a cause and a result of political corruption. The lack of trust in political institutions will result in lack of trust between each other as the previous chapter explained, which in turn will provide a degree of tolerance towards executive embezzlement and public sector corruption. As we have seen in Table 5.2 the consistency of corruption will result in decaying of the level of generalized trust. This suggests that, although corruption level might not increase (stable), the level of trust will decrease as a result of the continuity of corruption.

Following the discussion on corruption and generalized trust, and exploring the different mutual causality, this chapter examines perception of corruption and trust in political institutions in MENA region. The following section examines the general perception of corruption at national and local level and trust. It also tests the factors that influence the level of trust as well as the perception of corruption (local and national). The rest of the chapter discusses the findings and their results.

This chapter expects to find a correlation between perception of corruption and trust in political institutions and generalized trust.

Trust and corruption

The causal mechanism between trust and corruption is interwound. It is a two-way street. As established in the previous chapter, inequality and public administration arbitrariness have a negative impact on trust, and it has been empirically proven that these forms of bureaucratic configurations, policy tools and programmes lead to higher probabilities of corrupt activities (You, 2005). For the last two decades, there have been many studies that have identified corruption as a result of lack of trust and vice versa. Most scholars who share such views argue that the lack of universalistic policies, widespread particularistic spending and inequality trigger a negative behaviour from the members of the society towards each other. In such society, cooperation becomes rare, risking consequences of such behaviour.

Trust is about expectations, and when the society tolerates corrupt activities and practices, members would feel that other fellow members would exploit them, which leads to fostering same behaviour (participating in corrupt practices). Many studies have found that higher level of mistrust in society will increase the level of the perception of corruption, which results in providing a justification to practise and support corruption (R. La Porta et al., 1997; Moreno, 2002; Xin and Rudel, 2004). For instance, La Porta finds that societies with higher level of distrust tend to have higher level of corruptions. Similarly, Moreno found that societies that have higher level of distrust tend to be tolerant to corruption practices. In Nicaragua, Seligson identifies interpersonal trust as a predictor of corruption in the society.

Other scholars argue that institutional trust tends to be more related to the perception of corruption. In their views, the individual evaluation and expectations of government's performance is a determinant of how people perceive corruption in this government. As La Pota argues, that lack of confidence in the government will lead to rising perception of corruption and citizens will tolerate bribes as a way to seek access to services and protection by elites or informal institutions (D. della Porta, 2000: 205). Brixi, Lust and Woolcock (2015) found, 'the low satisfaction with public services, perceived corruption and nepotism, and, indirectly, unresponsive institutions appear to erode citizens' trust in public institutions in many MENA countries' (Brixi, Lust, and Woolcock, 2015: 10). Besides that, there are many other evidences from Latin America that suggest that lack of trust in institutions results in the spread of corruption, nepotism and clientelism (Cleary and Stokes, 2009; Morris and Klesner, 2010). Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri found a robust correlation between trust and corruption globally (Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri, 2011).

Other researchers examine the opposite causal mechanisms where they argue that corruption leads to lower level of generalized trust. Many empirical studies have found that higher the perception of corruption among members of a society, lower the tendency to support good governance and democratic institutions and perceive negatively civil officials. This is in line with the data of the AB, where 91 per cent of individuals who perceive 'all official are corrupt' have no trust on fellow members of the society, while 63 per cent of them have no trust in government at all.

Corruption undermines the trust in political institutions because of its ineffectiveness and inequality, which work as an indicator of corruption for the whole system. Once an individual has an experience of corruption in a public sector, they would perceive institution as corrupt, and increase the probability to see the whole political system as corrupt unless his own experience fixed somehow. Besides that, there are many studies that examine mismanagement, corruption and how it shapes public attitudes towards officials and political institutions. Most of these studies conclude that corruption, nepotism, neopatrimonialism and mismanagement of public posts work as a trust-eroding factor (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004; J. G. Peters and Welch, 1980).

Institutional trust, generalized trust and corruption

Based on the literature on the relationship between corruption and trust, the findings suggest a contextual difference between each case (including Chapter 4). However, there is a common agreement that corruption has an influence on generalized trust on both individual level and societal level. Given the nature of data I have (AB Individual Survey), it is appealing to focus on the individual level of analysis. This way, I could examine, empirically, how corruption, perception of corruption and experience of corruption influence the level of generalized trust and trust in political institutions. Based on the previous chapter, there are different variables that affect and influence the level of trust. In other words, institutional conditions that influence level of trust are different for each country. Yet, many cases suggest that inequality, arbitrariness in public administration and particularistic spending affect the level of trust. Despite the possible variability in cases from the Middle East, it seems there is a common effect of the institutions of inequality on the level of trust. Therefore, the model presented in this chapter does reflect the findings of Chapter 4 as well as of the literature on the relationship between trust and perception of corruption.

The focus will be on cases from the countries of Middle East and North Africa that have experienced protests from 2011 onwards using data from the AB. The AB surveys from the fifth wave have questions that prove and give very interesting results which allow us to explore the corruption at national, subnational and municipality level. They also ask about the personal experience of corruption (such as bribery to accelerate bureaucratic process) and experiences related to (surrounding environment) corrupt practices. The fifth wave of the AB contains an array of questions related to personal trust, and institutional trust too, that can be usefully used in the analysis. The countries that are used in the analysis are Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Sudan (Arab-Barometer, 2019). As the Algerian survey lacks important questions in this round, it was omitted from the main analysis, despite being presented in the descriptive statistics. The data were collected between September 2018 and June 2019.[2] Using probability proportional to size method, and systematic skip interval of households with random starting point, the survey interviewed 26,755 Arab nationals of the respective countries. After dropping Algeria out of the analysis, 24,432 entries were left for the analysis.

As noted in the previous section, the Middle East and Arab countries have long history of corruption, and high level of perception of corruption among citizens. According to the AB 2018–19, 55 per cent of the respondent perceived corruption as present to a large extent, while 29 per cent to medium extent. Yemen has the lowest percentage of perception of corruption (to a large extent) of 33 per cent while Libya had the highest at 77 per cent (Table 5.3). In the AB, given the opportunity to rate trust in the elected councils, governments, local governments, CSOs and judicial system, 50 per cent said they do not trust the elected councils at all, while 25 per cent said that they do not trust them very much (Figure 5.5).

Table 5.3 Perception of corruption in MENA 2018–19

Category (extent)	Country											
	Total %	**Egypt %**	**Iraq %**	**Jordan %**	**Kuwait %**	**Lebanon %**	**Libya %**	**Morocco %**	**Palestine %**	**Sudan %**	**Tunisia %**	**Yemen %**
Large	54.6	42.7	74.3	58.2	43.1	59.3	77.2	41.6	48.2	45.8	73.7	32.6
Medium	29.3	36.5	18.8	31.2	39.4	31.8	15.0	29.5	34.9	31.9	16.2	39.6
Small	11.2	13.5	3.8	6.1	12.8	7.9	4.7	20.6	12.9	15.7	3.0	23.2
Not at all	2.6	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.7	0.8	2.3	4.1	1.5	3.9	3.0	3.6
Don't know	2.4	4.9	1.1	2.3	2.0	0.2	0.9	4.3	2.5	2.5	4.2	1.0
Total	24,389	2,392	2,454	2,395	1,372	2,400	1,960	2,388	2,485	1,751	2,399	2,393



Figure 5.5 Trust in the elected council of representatives (the parliament) 2018–19.

In term of perception of corruption at local/municipal level, 40 per cent of correspondents said that not a lot of officials are corrupt, compared to 16 per cent who said that all of them are corrupt. In Iraq, 29 per cent said that almost everyone is corrupt, and in Kuwait it was only 4 per cent. These variations related to the nature of public institutions (e.g. Kuwait has very high number of expats as public servants in municipalities and local governments). The answers are found to be more balanced as most answers range between 'not all official are corrupt' and 'most officials are corrupt'. The perception of national-level corruption compared to local can be examined through the familial relations and connectedness to those officials who can be reached easily by members of the society and have daily contacts.

In term of actual participation in corruption, more than half of the respondents admitted that they or their relatives (or they know about someone) has gotten a job using *Wasta* with the highest score in Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan and Libya. Similarly, 18 per cent of respondents said that it is necessary to pay bribes to receive a better health care, while 28.2 per cent said it is somewhat necessary. Slightly more than 17 per cent of respondents said that it is necessary to pay bribe to have better education (highest in Iraq and Egypt at 34% and 26 %, respectively), while 24.8 per cent said that is somewhat necessary (highest in Lebanon, Egypt and Algeria at 39%, 34% and 34%, respectively).

More than 83 per cent of residents of these countries expect their fellow citizens to take advantage of them. As Figure 5.6 shows, Lebanon scored the highest (95%) and Yemen the lowest (65%). Although Yemen is still at war, education quality is



Figure 5.6 Generalized trust in MENA region 2018–19.

low, access to high quality health care is absent, and high numbers of causalities (HRW, 2019), Yemeni have the highest level of trust in the survey. This is due to the nature of society and the settlements of residency. For instance, almost 70 per cent of Yemeni respondents who trust their fellow citizens live in rural areas.

Given the nature of the residency, strong familial and tribal bonds, and distance to central government and their bureaucratic machines, it is understandable to have trust in the community, as it is not only a generalized trust, but can be described as a particularistic trust, but with wide network (that includes the whole tribe). When it comes to trust, one main aspect of assessing generalized trust is expectations from others in the society (also risking behaviour), and also people's expectations from the political institutions (Hetherington, 1998). The AB suggests that such normative expectations are high, as well as well-understanding of the meaning of corruption. Of the respondents, 89 per cent, for instance, said that buying something knowing that it was stolen is a form of corruption. Strangely, only 83 per cent of respondents considered a government official providing *Wasta* for relatives is a form of corruption. Between 9% to 22% – depend on the country of the respondents said it was not corruption with Algeria the max at 22% and Iraq the minimum 9%. When asked if paying a small side payment to speed up a government service, 87.7 per cent of respondents considered it as corruption while the rest 10.7 per cent considered it normal behaviour. This indicates that most individuals disapprove corrupt,

unethical and illegal practices. When asked if their governments are working on cracking down corruption in their respective countries, the respondents seem to be unhappy as more than 50 per cent agree that the governments are either not doing anything at all or doing something to a small extent.

Although there is a high percentage of perception of corruption, low level of generalized trust and high level of normative expectations, there is a lack of trust in political institutions such as government, police and parliament (Appendix D).

For our analysis, I use the perception of corruption which is measured based on the direct question asked in the survey: 'To what extent do you think that there is corruption within the national state agencies and institutions in your country?' Participation or experience of corruption has been normalized using question about their individuals experience with *Wasta*. The question goes, 'Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are personally aware of, do you think that obtaining employment through *Wasta* happens?' Our definition of institutional trust follows Chang and Chu and it is index based on the answers provided as categorical variables from great trust to no trust at all (Chang and Chu, 2006).

The interpersonal trust questions people's behaviour and expectations. The answers are binary which indicates 'Most people can be trusted' [1] or 'that you must be very careful in dealing with people' [0].'

Given the endogeneity between corruption and trust, we need a model that allows for analysis of endogeneity. As the endogenous variable exists, using OLS regression will produce residuals that will violate the main assumption of OLS. Following Chang and Chu (used in Morris and Klenser), I use Simultaneous Equation Models (SEM). I create four SEMs, each a two-equation multiple equations model to explore the relationship of (1) generalized trust and experience of corruption, (2) generalized trust and perception of corruption, (3)institutional trust and experience of corruption and (4) institutional trust and the perception of corruption. The models are estimated through three-stage least square (3SLS) regression.

Independent variables used to predict the perception of corruption and participation in corruption (experience) include institutional trust, generalized trust, tolerance towards corruption, socio-economic evaluation and civil society engagement to measure social capital and education.

Independent variables used to predict generalized and institutional trust include experience with corruption, perception of corruption, tolerance towards corruption, socio-economic evaluation, community engagement to measure social capital and education. The measure tolerance towards corruption is based on the response to the question: 'Is making a small side payment to speed up a government service a kind of corruption?' The answer no means they are tolerant to corruption and willing to participate in it. Socio-economic evaluation is used as a control in the models because of the overall feeling (negative or positive) towards the state's policies. Personal security and safety are found to be significantly linked to trust as Chapters 6 and 7 will show. Therefore, I added it as a control variable too. The membership of associations is used to measure social capital, and because we expect people who are involved in their community to develop higher level of generalized trust, I use sex and age as exogenous variables in the first stage of 3SLS.

The corruption and trust in MENA

The analysis, using simple OLS log regression, to examine the relationship between generalized trust, experience with participation and perception of corruption suggests that perception of corruption, experience with corruption, as well as tolerance towards corruption can predict the level of generalized trust. When the SEM estimation in which generalized trust is a dependent variable, many independent variables showed significance, including perception of corruption (Table 5.4a and 5.4b). In line with the case of Lebanon and Palestine (in this book), socio-economic evaluation and personal safety are significant predictors. Most importantly, both perception of corruption and institutional trust seemed to have significant values and a predictor on the level of generalized trust. Therefore, I conclude that in the Middle East and North African context, generalized trust is predicable by corruption and institutional trust in a significant way. Without adding personal safety and security as a control variable, the significance between generalized trust and perception of corruption remains; however, other variables lose their significance. Based on the results of SEM to test the interrelation between generalized trust and perception of corruption, it seems that perception of corruption works as predictor of the level of generalized trust, while the opposite does not hold (generalized trust cannot predict perception of corruption).

Trust in institutions and perception of corruption seems to have strong two-way impact. Tables 5.5a and 5.5b report the results of SEM 3SLS with perception of corruption and institutional trust as the dependent variables. The results suggest a strong interrelationship between institutional trust and perception of corruption. These results support the existence of endogenous relationship between perception of corruption and institutional trust in the Middle East and North Africa. Besides that, the results support hypothesis which indicates the higher perception of corruption is represented by a low institutional trust (political trust). I also accept the hypothesis which suggests that higher the political trust, the less people will

Table 5.4a Simultaneous equations model of generalized trust and perception of corruption

	B	z	P>z
Predicting generalized trust			
Institutional trust in government	**–0.04**	–4.55	0.00
Perception of corruption	**0.34**	7.94	0.00
Experience with corruption	**–0.00**	–1.77	0.00
Tolerance towards corruption	**0.10**	0.00	0.00
Civil Society involvement	**0.02**	3.07	0.00
Personal safety and security	**0.10**	10.96	0.00
Socio-economic evaluation	**0.05**	6.51	0.00
Education	–0.01	2.59	0.1
Gender	**0.27**	2.59	0.01
Intercept	–0.85	0.17	0.00
P		<0.00	

Table 5.4b Simultaneous equations model of perception of corruption and generalized trust

	B	z	P>z
Predicting perception of corruption			
Generalized trust	0.04	0.49	0.62
Institutional trust in government	**0.17**	27.55	0.00
Experience with corruption	**0.09**	18.40	0.00
Tolerance towards corruption	**0.13**	15.89	0.00
Civil Society involvement	0.02	1.58	0.11
Personal safety and security	**0.16**	16.46	0.00
Socio-economic evaluation	**0.15**	17.14	0.00
Education	**–0.13**	–4.93	0.00
Gender	**1.16**	6.48	0.00
Intercept	0.24	0.78	0.43
P		<0.00	

N = 24,349. Endogenous variables: perception of corruption, generalized trust; exogenous variables: institutional trust, experience with corruption, tolerance of corruption, civil society involvement, socio-economic evaluation, gender and education. Figures in bold are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 5.5a Simultaneous equations model of perception of corruption and institutional trust

	B	z	P>z
Predicting perception of corruption			
Institutional trust in government	**1.13**	14.46	0.00
Generalized trust	**0.02**	3.26	0.00
Experience with corruption	**0.03**	5.41	0.00
Tolerance towards corruption	**0.04**	4.93	0.00
Civil society involvement	0.01	1.78	0.07
Personal safety and security	–0.12	–5.54	0.00
Socio-economic evaluation	0.02	1.97	0.04
Education	**–0.05**	–3.85	0.00
Gender	**0.54**	3.65	0.00
Intercept	**–3.3**	–3.85	0.00
P		<0.00	

say there is corruption in the political institutions. Omitting and adding more instruments and exogenous variables, perception of trust and institutional trust kept holding to have strong interrelationship and affect each other. They work as predictor for each other. As tables 5.5a and 5.5b shows, a 10 per cent increase in the index of institutional trust would be matched by 13 per cent decrease in the perception of corruption, whereas a 10 per cent increase in perception of corruption would be matched by 8 per cent decrease in institutional trust.

From the results here, generalized trust, experience with corruption, tolerance towards corruption, education and gender seem to be predictor of perception of corruption. Those who have low level of generalized trust tend to have higher perception of corruption with significance. This indicates that institutional trust

Table 5.5b Simultaneous equations model of institutional trust and perception of corruption

	B	z	P>z
Predicting institutional trust			
Perception of corruption	**0.86**	14.42	0.00
Generalized trust	–0.00	–1.05	0.29
Experience with corruption	–0.00	–1.12	0.26
Tolerance towards corruption	–0.01	–1.12	0.26
Civil society involvement	–0.00	–0.83	0.40
Personal safety and security	–0.00	–0.79	0.43
Socio-economic evaluation	–0.02	–1.12	0.26
Education	0.01	1.07	0.28
Gender	**–0.14**	–1.09	0.27
Intercept	2.4	11.67	0.00
P	<0.00		

N = 24,349. Endogenous variables: perception of corruption, institutional trust; exogenous variables: generalized trust, experience with corruption, tolerance of corruption, civil society involvement, socio-economic evaluation, gender and education. Figures in bold are statistically significant at the .05 level.

can affect the level of trust. When running a SEM model to examine generalized trust and institutional trust and their endogeneity, the results approve that both are the only variables who have significance in the model (none of the other variables has significance). Education seems to be predictor of perception of corruption. The highly educated individual seems to have lower level of perception of corruption. This is in line with other studies' findings in other countries such as Mexico (Morris and Klesner, 2010). Tolerance towards corruption seems to be significant too and a predictor of the perception of corruption. Experience with corruption is also significant, where more the person (or their relatives) has experience with corruption (*Wasta*, *Rashwa* or witnessed that), the higher the perception of corruption, which is understandable and logical. These are in line with other studies such as Morris and Seligson in Latin America (Morris and Klesner, 2010; Seligson, 2002).

However, membership in associations and CSOs seems not to be significant along with personal security and safety, and socio-economic evaluation, although they were significant in the first-stage equation. This is explainable in that perception of corruption predictors are more determined through personal experience and the daily bureaucratic contacts, which are explained in Chapters 3 and 4.

Tables 5.6a and 5.6b report the results of the model that takes experience with corruption and the institutional trust as dependent variable. In this model, I follow Morris and Klesner by omitting perception of corruption, as there is strong assumption that there is also an endogenous relationship between two populations who are believed to have experienced corruption and who have high level of perception of corruption.

Here we see that all variables seem to be significant and work as predictor for both experience with corruption and institutional trust (which I have discussed/

Table 5.6a Simultaneous equations model of experience with corruption and institutional trust

	B	z	P>z
Predicting experience with corruption			
Institutional trust in government	**0.71**	8.78	0.00
Generalized trust	**0.07**	6.95	0.00
Tolerance towards corruption	**0.11**	9.06	0.00
Civil society involvement	**0.08**	5.61	0.00
Personal safety and security	**0.07**	0.01	0.00
Socio-economic evaluation	**0.09**	8.05	0.00
Education	**–0.14**	–6.08	0.00
Gender	**1.44**	4.89	0.00
Intercept	–0.34	–0.94	0.34
P		<0.00	

Table 5.6b Simultaneous equations model of institutional trust and experience with corruption

	B	z	P>z
Predicting institutional trust			
Experience with corruption	1.3	8.92	0.00
Generalized trust	–0.08	–3.91	0.00
Tolerance towards corruption	–0.13	–3.87	0.00
Civil society involvement	–0.09	–3.53	0.00
Personal safety and security	–0.08	–4.30	0.00
Socio-economic evaluation	–0.13	–5.22	0.00
Education	0.15	3.13	0.00
Gender	–1.6	–4.04	0.00
Intercept	0.13	0.23	0.82
P		<0.00	

N = 24,349. Endogenous variables: experience with corruption, institutional trust; exogenous variables: generalized trust, experience with corruption, tolerance of corruption, civil society involvement, socio-economic evaluation, gender, and education. Figures in bold are statistically significant at the .05 level.

modelled before). The higher level of generalized trust and institutional trust, the higher probability of no experience with corruption. As we can see that 10 per cent increase in institutional trust will be matched with an increase of almost 7 per cent decrease in index of participating or experiencing corruption. Those who have bad evaluation of their economy, personal safety and security are more likely to experience corruption. The survey question did not capture if they have themselves been willing to participate in corruption activities, and therefore, we assume that they have experienced as they have heard or as any of their relatives experienced corruption (*Wasta* or *Rashwa*).

In general, it seems that institutional trust and experience with corruption determine each other. A 10 per cent increase in experience with corruption leads to a decrease of 13 per cent in institutional trust.

How corruption destroys trust

Generalized trust, institutional trust and corruption are interrelated and there is a causal mechanism where all corruption-related indicators have an effect on trust (social and institutional). As stressed in other chapters, trust and institutions are connected, and they can destroy generalized trust easily if they are unequal. With the presence of corruption, it seems to be a more difficult case. In MENA region, where corruption and perception of corruption are high, and trust in institutions, along generalized trust, is low, they form an ongoing endless circle. However, it seems that perception of corruption is being much higher than the reality. For instance, despite the better score for Tunisia since 2011 on corruption, and embezzlement (according to V-Dem data), perception of corruption continues to be high. This can be explained through (1) freedom of expression and possibility to talk about political corruption compared to pre-2011 time, or (2) real increase of corruption that is not captured by international research centres and experts. According to Amak Qurami, corruption has increased after 2011 because of the political and administrative chaos, where each politician continues to employ and mismanage their positions because they were selected based on their political affiliations and loyalty. Corruption increases as the number of changes and new politicians in the executive increase (Khairallah, 2014: 240).

The problem of corruption cannot be managed through a single government policy that tackles the issues of corruption by establishing anti-corruption commissions. Related to this subject, empirical findings suggest that corruption has a big impact on both the level of generalized trust and institutional trust. This means that corruption not only becomes a political problem but also a societal one, meaning that people will become less trustful of their fellow citizens, and of their political institutions. Low level of generalized trust will result in low level of social capital, which is a pre-requisite to build democratic institutions, economic development and most importantly shutting down conflicts and tensions in societies, mainly divided societies.

Besides that, when a government fails to fight corruption for longer period, and when the opposition fails to tackle corruption after they assume power, trust in political institutions under the leadership of almost all political parties lowers, which means that generalized trust will follow and be low. In that regard, any anti-corruption trial, programme or initiative will be seen as a whitewashing effort that has no outcomes, and that the political system cannot effectively face and fix the problem of corruption. As Wesberry (cited in Morris and Klesner) argues, in such cases where institutional trust is low and there is a high level of perception of corruption, there is a tendency that people would believe that persecuting corrupt elites is a political tactic (Morris and Klesner, 2010). Precisely as the case of Lebanon in November 2019. When the general attorney of Lebanon called for investigation on the wealth of a former Lebanese prime minister (Sanioira), majority of the protesters as well as the analysts have claimed that this is manoeuvring move by the regime to suppress the anti-corruption and anti-sectarian protests (MEMO, 2019). In Palestine, mainly in the Gaza Strip, corruption in Hamas de-facto government

administration, exploitation of power, nepotism and patrimonialism have led to the creation of a gap within the society to the extent that young Palestinians post on social media Hamas's 2006 electoral slogans (Alijla, 2018 and personal observations). Mohamed Harakat (cited in Khairallah 2017) argues that when the opposition (Islamists) assume power, they do not act against corruption, despite winning elections and the hearts of people using anti-corruption slogans. The opposition in the region use anti-corruption slogans to win, and after winning, they would raise the slogan of 'the Past has gone', which hinders anti-corruption efforts, and increases distrust in political parties, political institutions and judicial system (Khairallah, 2014: 209).

Besides that, corruption, which undermines institutional trust, and results in lack of trust may affect the level of people's engagement and cooperation with others in the societies, such as writing appeals, participating in protests and in deliberations. Having said that, it is necessary to have high level of engagement and participation to maintain higher level of generalized trust. With corruption, there is a higher possibility that frustration, political persecution and hopelessness affect people's choices to participate in politics and give them the feeling that they have no influence in politics (Olsson, 2014). According to the AB, political participation in political protests has gone down over the years from 2007 until 2019. In Algeria, the number of people who have never participated increased from 78 per cent in 2007 to 80 per cent in 2019; in Palestine from 68 per cent in 2007 to 69 per cent in 2018; in Iraq, from 82 per cent in 2011 to 85.5 per cent in 2019; in Jordan from 89 per cent in 2007 to 93 per cent in 2019; in Libya from 66 per cent in 2013 to 81 per cent in 2019; in Tunisia from 85 per cent in 2013 to 88 per cent in 2019; in Yemen from 50 per cent in 2013 to almost 60 per cent in 2019. In other countries such as Morocco, Egypt and Sudan, there is a change in the participation for better, which can be explained by the political context and protests.

In general, political participation is very crucial to create a minimal degree of generalized trust among citizens, to be able to mobilize people to participate in anti-corruption initiatives and increase political and institutional trust.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the relationship between corruption, generalized trust and institutional trust. The empirical findings suggest that corruption in MENA countries breeds distrust in institutions and leads to a low level of generalized trust, which in turn feeds and breeds corruption. These findings lend support to the previous findings which suggest that inequality and insecurity and lack of safety lead to low level of generalized trust. By using data from 2018–19 AB survey, we find that the MENA region has a very high level of perception of corruption which matches the level of distrust in political institutions and low level of generalized trust. The results of SEM regression analysis show that perception of corruption predicts both the level of generalized trust and trust in

political institutions. However, the results show that generalized trust has a weak influence on the perception of corruption. The analysis suggests that generalized trust and institutional trust predict each other's, which explains why they work as a mechanical wheel. In other words, both are connected to each other and affecting each other. Besides that, the results suggest that experience of corruption affects the level of trust in political institutions and perception of corruption, and vice versa. If one has an experience with corruption, they will see almost all political institutions as corrupt, and they will be more willing to engage in corrupt activities at wider levels.

The current protests in Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Jordan and Kuwait (2019), and before in Palestine, Egypt and Sudan (2018–19) are connected not only to the level of inequality, sectarianism and abuse of power but also to the level of political corruption. Although such protests suggest high level of political participation, they usually shrink dramatically after the euphoria of revolutionism, which increases the level of perception of corruption, which in turn affects the level of institutional trust and generalized trust. The naturalization of corruption feeds distrust in politicians, political institutions and the entire political regime.

Chapter 6

Lebanon Gone Wrong

Inequality and Trust in Lebanon

Introduction

'Today ended the civil war in Lebanon.' These were the words of academic and engaged scholar Ali Mourad on his social media account describing the protests that swept Lebanon's streets from south to north. The protesters that continue to take to the streets of Lebanon (while writing these words) since October 2019 are an indication of the deep anger and frustration among the Lebanese towards their sectarian system. The protests have allowed one, for the first time in a long period (probably 1950s), to re-imagine Lebanon as a nation beyond the top-down sectarian system (Salloukh, 2019). This chapter focuses on Lebanon, a country that experienced substantial sectarian violence during the civil war of the 1970s and is still facing political unrest during the post-war era today. The present study looks into the determinants of trust among Lebanese people with a more specific aim of understanding the institutional determinants that have influenced the level of generalized trust in Lebanon.

The 2019–2020 protests are one of the long series of protests that hit Lebanon. In 2015, a wave of protests erupted in Lebanon, which marked a new threshold of violence in the long-term political instability in the country. The informality of the sectarian political system in Lebanon has reached the extent that the country has not had a president for more than two years. In the same year, the mismanagement of garbage collection led to large protest movements. It was and is still common for the political system to be blamed for the crisis (Yahya, 2015). Walking the streets of Beirut, one can notice the political messages on many walls of the city. One reads on one of the walls, 'Why is there poverty in Lebanon? Because of the sectarian political system.' According to Traboulsi, Lebanon is a sectarian country where the political classes are also sectarian. The country is so divided that the state recognized eighteen official ethnic groups within its political system, which are recognized in the Lebanese constitution based on their religious affiliation (Traboulsi, 2016).

Sectarianism in Lebanon is a multifaceted dilemma where differences between people are interpreted by the distance of religious ideologies between them

(Berkley Center, 2013). Trust among the different groups has become a serious concern (Salloukh et al., 2015). Distrust of the political system is usually linked to the political fragmentation of the Lebanese society caused, in part, by the fifteen-year civil war.

Lebanon is a fitting case study to be examined because of its deeply divided society, low reported levels of generalized trust and high levels of political corruption (Sofia, 2012). According to the AB, alarming levels of low generalized trust were reported in Lebanon (82% in 2007, 79% in 2011, 84% in 2013, 86.6% in 2016 and 95% in 2018), indicating a very exclusive trust circle among the Lebanese population in a highly politicized society (Maktabi, 1999). Exclusive trust means that there is very limited trust among a group of people, which is limited to family and friends.

Not only was groupism/ Sectarianism a main fuel for the Lebanese civil war, but even the Ta'if peace agreement that ended the war and instated a power-sharing model was highly debated as to the role of different sects and the distribution of wealth among them.[1] Moreover, the agreement has called for gradual abolishment of the confessionalism, which never came to reality. Since that time there has been a high level of competition among sects to promote their superiority and gain control over political institutions (Traboulsi, 2016). Different sects opened their own independent schools, expanded the use of alternative languages, taught their own version of Lebanese history and culture, and asserted their religious traditions.[2] In this fractionalized context it is not surprising that generalized trust is decreasing or being destroyed.

It is important to mention here that generalized trust is different than institutional trust. Indeed, as I argued previously, institutional trust and social trust are interconnected, and the more the citizens distrust the institutions, the higher the probability to foresee a decline in the level of generalized trust. Although it is not clear which leads to which, there is a strong evidence (as discussed previously and will be discussed here) that generalized trust and institutional trust work as a cogwheel machine where both lead to the advancement of the other.

The trap of the Lebanese society

In 1860, a civil war in Mount Lebanon ended with a victory for the Druze community, but not long afterwards, the Druze were weakened with the decline of the feudal system. Christians, mainly Maronites, formed a self-rule in Mount Lebanon where they were the majority. In 1891, the Ottomans initiated the *Mutasarrifate* (governorate) system governed by two-level elected councils, with twelve seats distributed among the officially six recognized sects and with the majority of seats being for Christians (Khater, 2001). The division was increased due to the privileged access of Christians to education and to the religious schools of the foreign missionaries, which were established in 1736 at the Synod of Al Luwayzah (Salibi, 1990).

After independence from the French mandate, which had been established after the Ottoman pullback after the First World War, inequality and sectarianism intensified in the society. Privileges for Maronite Christians manifested in access to key positions in the political and economic scenes, such as the head of the military, the head of the state, the head of the intelligence services, the governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, the minister of defence and the minister of finance. Educational inequality also existed in favour of the Maronites, supported by certain European countries such as France, and by foreign missionaries, while a decline was manifested in state-owned educational centres. Moreover, there was a growing gap in economic and societal development between the centre and the South and North regions in terms of access to resources, state services and health, coupled with disproportionate distribution of public goods and wealth. This geographical and ethnically based distribution of wealth deepened divisions within the society, with trust becoming almost non-existent in many historical/political instances among the different ethnicities in the Lebanese society (Traboulsi, 2016).

Dubar (1982) examined the relationship between sects and social classes in Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s. His findings assert that Christian Maronites formed the majority of the high and middle class in Lebanon, whereas Muslims and Shiite in particular formed the majority of the rural classes. Despite the fact that this study is fifty years old, certain findings can still be seen today, especially with regard to access to international universities, scholarships to Europe and the United States for the majority of the Lebanese middle class in both urban and rural areas. Many studies maintain that inequalities in access to education are one of the clearest evidence of sectarian–social discrimination (Dubar, Claude, and Nasr, 1982).

Lebanese sectarianism can be understood to arise from the unequal access to many of the political and socio-economic rights between the Druze community and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon. The upper classes belonged to the Druze land-owning families, whereas merchants, moneylenders, artisans, farmers and low-class workers were Christians. A deeper division between the two classes took place upon the introduction of a trade route for silk in Mount Lebanon in the 1700s, which mainly favoured the Christian communities (Map 6.1).

Sectarianism/Groupism is part of the Lebanese political system and society. It is institutionalized and has become, in the past decades, a legal obligation for individuals, where individuals need to be part of sectarian system, forcibly (Dubar et al., 1982). A Lebanese, as a member of the society, has their political, educational and social rights defined in the framework of their sect and ethnic group rather than as a Lebanese citizen. Their rights are part of their ethnic and sectarian identity as opposed to their Lebanese identity. It is important to emphasize that the sects' leaders manifest control over the individuals of their sects. The control and command tactics increased during the civil war and were reinforced in post-war times, strengthening the hegemony of the sects' leaders over the different groups in the society, and maintaining the society as institutionally divided (Traboulsi, 2016).



Map 6.1 Lebanon religious groups distribution.

Lebanon: A society of distrust

Lebanese society has a high level of distrust and misperception among its different sects (Salloukh et al., 2015; Haddad, 2002). Using survey data Haddad collected for the purpose of measuring cultural differences and trust among different sects, Haddad found that legal violations and corruption in Lebanon are considered to have resulted in a low level of trust among the Lebanese people. In each sect, there is also a lack of a Lebanese national identity and a feeling of separate political identity or community. Divisions and distrust have been exacerbated by the utter

failure to integrate and reconcile the diverse groups and cultures into one political community, resulting instead in a reality where each group attempts to impose its own aspirations on the rest of the Lebanese society. The Lebanese case study fits within Beetham's argument that societies that are divided and defined by antagonistic cultural groups will have difficulty sustaining democracy, whether the groups are defined by ethnicity, religion, historical memory or anything that gives the people a sense of common identity (Beetham, 1994). Although Beetham's theory arises from the African context, it can be expanded and generalized, since divisions in Lebanon are multi-layered, where one sectarian group has different sub-sects, and the political and ideologies are also considered a different layer within the same sect. In this book, it is argued that low levels of generalized trust can be explained not only by historical and inherited distrust but also by institutional determinants in post-war time.

During the daily observations in the capital, Beirut, I received two sentiments from the taxi drivers I encountered; first, 'I do not trust anyone, especially those who defend their sects, religions, and distrust others.'[3] The second taxi driver, a Christian, stated, 'I do trust people from other ethnicities [generalized trust] and religions more than I trust my Christian friends, Maronite or Catholic [particularistic trust].'[4] One of them argued that since the Ta'if agreement, the Sunni prime ministers have poured money to their own cities, Hariri to Saida and Mikati to Tripoli. Another also asserted that public expenditures are not fairly distributed and do not reach ethnic minorities, but rather end up in the pockets of the political elites, who legalize, according to him, corruption and maintain their position to benefit from the political system. He, therefore, did not trust politicians and the political system, including programmes to assist people, such as social security and unemployment financial assistance (personal communication, November 2016).

Another taxi driver argued,

> The issue is not with my fellow citizens, for they are like me and you. I trust them when they are friends and colleagues only, but not strangers. I have to have had experience with them before knowing if I can trust them or not.

However, he maintained that he did not trust political institutions at all:

> I cannot trust the politicians, the government, and political institutions. They consider Lebanon as a cake and everyone has to have their piece, making arbitrary regulations, most of the time not for the benefit of the people.

Another driver observed, 'politicians are using policies to frighten citizens and make them distrust each other in order to sustain their power'. A Maronite policeman in Baabda argued that he must be careful when dealing with people in Lebanon, 'when I see people violate the law, exploiting others because they consider themselves above the law, then I must watch out'.

He added,

> if a colleague asks me for a thousand US dollars, I will not lend him the money. If I was confident that the law and governmental institutions would protect me if I complained, then I would lend him the money and trust everyone in the society.

Building on these observations, it is possible to deduce that past experience plays a role in building trust. The long-term interaction between individuals builds and develops a sense of trust and a present orientation concerning the future behaviour of the other (Offe, 1999). However, Offe argues that 'past experience is not the only basis from which actors derive their present (trusting) orientation concerning the future behaviour of some other person'. Yet, it is evidenced from the foregoing observations that law enforcement and feeling of security can be a driving force for anticipating behaviours.

The recognition of other confessional (religious groups) groups/sects in a society has mostly decreased the divisions and diffused violent conflict in the society, but this issue is very complex and may result in severe and opposite consequences. For example, Lebanon facilitated the integration of ethnic groups through institutions and other arrangements (e.g. constitutionalism in 1989) but twenty years later, some of these groups were politically isolated. In other words, instead of diffusing conflict and maintaining trust between citizens, the new regime has exploited its



Figure 6.1 The level of distrust (the opposite of generalized trust) in Lebanon over twelve years.



Figure 6.2 Level of Trust across different regions in Lebanon.
Source: Arab Barometer 2019.

power and has brought about many negative consequences such as corruption, nepotism and patrimonialism, creating a corrupted political elite and increasing protest movements and public opposition to the existing system (Bahout, 2016).

Policies that favour one ethnic minority group over others are dangerous manifestations of a corrupt regime and lead to a high level of distrust among ethnic groups. This is not due to nepotism but rather due to an inherent distrust between individuals. As long as individuals remain connected to their ethnic group, a societal division will remain, leading to an unhealthy political system that spreads hatred and distrust (Maalouf, 2004). Trust between individuals will decrease first within the same ethnicity, and then among different ethnicities. According to Maalouf, one solution to this problem is for citizens to be treated as individuals not based on their ethnicity. Figure 6.1 shows the level of distrust (the opposite of generalized trust) in Lebanon across ten years. Figure 6.2 shows the level of trust across different regions in Lebanon.

Generalized trust and institutions in Lebanon

Building on Chapter 4, this chapter tries to capture clearly the main factors that have an effect on the level of trust statistically. The variables used in the case of Lebanon, and Palestine (Chapter 7), are primarily derived from the findings of Chapter 4 to check their validity at national level using case study. Logistic regression was

used to explain the effect of institutional determinants on generalized trust as a dependent variable. Because generalized trust is binary, the regressions showed the degree of change to either more trust or less trust. To ensure the analysis was properly conducted, a number of models were integrated into the model, with each including different variables and with the final model including all the variables.

The data used in this chapter are based on nationally representative samples of adults aged eighteen years and older. The study was administered in Lebanon from 3 July to 26 July 2013. The total sample size was 1,220 cases. The fifth wave was administered from 21 September 2018 to 19 October 2018 with total sample of 2,400. The survey was first stratified by the six governorates of Lebanon: Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the North, Beqaa, the South and Nabatieh. Additionally, the survey was stratified by socio-economic status and religious identity: Shia, Sunni, Druze and Christian. Within each stratum, the sample was further divided by the 571 official populated districts, which are similar to municipalities and their surrounding areas. Interviews were distributed proportional to population size. Districts were further divided into statistical blocks containing 100 to 150 households. These statistical blocks served as the primary sampling units. Households were randomly selected in clusters of ten. A total of 1,060 respondents were interviewed in urban areas and 140 in rural areas. Responses were weighted for probability of selection and for age and gender after stratification.

The model illustrates the institutional determinants and examines its impact on the level of generalized trust. Based on the logit model, the proposed model is expressed as follows:

Gtrust = f (equality determinants, institutional trust determinants, civil society determinants)

Trust is measured as a dichotomous variable and can take either 0 (trust) or 1 (distrust). Equality determinants were presented in four variables: (1) living conditions compared to fellow citizens, (2) a feeling of security and safety in the society, (3) equality in receiving public services compared to other citizens and (4) access to justice by the ability to file a complaint in case of violation of rights (see Appendix A). Institutional determinants contain three other determinants: (1) performance of judiciary and elected representatives, (2) experiences with corruption and clientelism are presented in the clientelism determinant and (3) how much trust there is in the performance of civil society organizations. The construction of the variables is described in Appendix F. The models tried to capture the extent to which the different variables influence the level of generalized trust in Lebanese society. Models were clustered base on the theories that examine the source of generalized trust. The first model includes the equality dimension, while the second represents the trust in institutional model. The third model combines both inequality and the institutional model, while the fourth includes the trust in civil society model. The models were clustered in such a way to see which models have a greater influence on the level of generalized trust.

In this chapter, I test two corresponding hypotheses to the contention that an invariable and inverse relationship exists between institutional determinants, which represent institutions and the level of generalized trust. These hypotheses examine the invariability with regard to (1) the role of equality in the form of institutional determinants on the level of generalized trust, and (2) the effect of past experiences and feeling towards the institutions on the level of generalized trust.

$H_{\text{-static}}$ institutional determinants have no influence on the level of generalized trust

$H_{\text{-Dynamic}}$ Institutional determinants have influence on the level of generalized trust

Results from the logit model are shown in Table 6.1. Model 1, which focuses on equality in society, shows that the feelings of personal and family security and safety are significant and positively correlated with generalized trust. This implies that the less safe and secure a person feels in a society, the more likely he or she is to distrust people. The other variables in model 1 is also correlated to the level of generalized trust, although not to the extent as one's feeling of safety and security. As argued earlier, institutional determinants and trust in institutions also influence the level of generalized trust.

Running model 2 reveals that the performance of the judiciary is positively correlated to generalized trust. The more an individual perceives the performance of judiciary as being poor, the less trust he or she will have in fellow citizens. The model shows that distrust in the legal system affects the level of generalized trust; if one has no faith that their rights are protected by the legal system, then they will see others as abusing the legal system. A weak judiciary and court performance will decrease a citizen's trust in his or her fellow citizens. Model 3 intends to control the first two determinants in addition to other institutional and equality determinants. It concludes with the same results obtained in model 2.

The findings of the models provide evidence of the theories of generalized trust, where ineffective formal and informal institutions that do not provide feelings of security and enforce the rule of law, and do not hold the judicial system accountable for its actions, and a CSO that is inefficient leads to less generalized trust among citizens.

Model 4 examines whether trust changes when trust in the performance of civil society is added. Model 4 reveals the most significant results among the four mentioned models. It shows that all the variables considered influence the level of generalized trust with a significant *p* value. This indicates that the trust in civil society, its presence and effectiveness are determinants of generalized trust along with inequality in society. The four models, particularly model 4, therefore support the argument that citizens in divided societies are less trusting when subjected to inequality, discrimination and a feeling of insecurity and distrust in the legal system and in the civil society. Model 4, which includes all variables, could be a representative of all theories on generalized trust. It includes institutional, civil

Table 6.1 Four Models of Generalised Trust and Institutions Determinant: Lebanon

Predictor	(1) Equality Model	(2) Institutions Model	(3) Institutions + Equality	(4) Institutions + Equality +CSO	Model (4) Based on 2019 Arab Barometer Dataset
Living conditions compared to others	-.063		-.045	-.03	X
	(.10)		(.10)	(.07)	
Feeling of safety and security	.49*		.42***	.42***	.85 ***
	(.11)		(.11)	(.11)	(.19)
Equality in country	-.09		-.107	-.15*	X
	(.07)		(.07)	(.07)	
Access to defend/enforce one's rights	-.07		-.12	.22**	-.00
	(.07)		(.07)	(.08)	(.00)
Corruption		1.28	1.3	1.3	-.005
		(.74)	(.74)	(.75)	(0.8)
Trust in representatives		.13	10	.07	.63***
		(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.13)
Performance of the judiciary		.30**	.27**	.21	-.00
		(.08)	(.11)	(.09)	(.03)
Clientelism		.19	.24	.26	-.02***
		(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.00)
Trust in civil society				.45***	030
				(.09)	(05)
Constant	1.17	.14	-.14	-.24	-.62
	(2.14)	(.44)	(.66)	(.51)	(.56)
Observations	1146	1146	1146	1146	2366
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.17	.08

Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses underneath
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
X: Not asked in 2018 Arab Barometer Data

society and associational determinants. This also suggests that institutional and societal determinants have an influence on generalized trust, even if the influence is weak in some variables, such as the correlation of corruption with generalized trust.

The models are in line with the main arguments of this study and the institutional theory of generalized trust. The partiality of institutions, the feeling of inequality in front of legal institutions and the feeling of being excluded from society may lead to less trust among individuals. Because trust is cognitive (Corgnet et al., 2014), these determinants are important; they show that they are significant in every model even when more institutional variables are added. Attesting to the present study, a study by Foster (1965) also confirmed that the daily struggle and the feelings of insecurity within a society negatively affect trust. Also, partiality and arbitrariness in public administration and the feeling of exclusion in a society lead to inequality and the inability of an individual to complain to formal institutions for fear that their complaint will not be taken seriously. These institutional determinants indicate that when there are groups from different sects and a specific sect is singled out from other groups, a sense of 'otherness' is created.

The factors that contribute to a norm of corruption and clientelism are (1) arbitrariness in public administration and (2) impartial, unequal treatment of citizens who believe that public administration officers will not be held accountable. In 2019, it is clear that feeling safety and personal security, trust in representatives (Lebanon had elections in 2016) and clientelism (*Wasta*) have the highest probable impact on the level of trust. Of course, the context and the political debate in the country have been changing since 2015–16 leading to more dissatisfaction towards the parliament, as well as feelings of insecurity because of the political and economic turmoil (see figure 6.3).

Surprisingly, corruption was not found to be significantly correlated to the level of generalized trust. According to the data, citizens in Lebanon are more concerned with economic conditions and equality. Financial and administrative corruption lies behind other concerns for the survey respondents. Only 11 per cent of respondents found corruption to be of most importance, compared to 21.3 per cent of respondents who prioritized any of the following factors: sectarianism, a politicalized judiciary, sectarian and political oppression, stability and security, and politicized sects. Almost 50 per cent of the Lebanese believed that their main priorities were mostly related to equality. Therefore, inequality leads to corruption (Gal and Uslaner, 2016), and inequality leads to low generalized trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).

Based on these results, considering the most relevant and impactful determinants, the Lebanese model of divided society would be:

Inequality + CSO bad performance + distrust in judiciary → low generalized trust

These findings of the logistic regression and models 1–4 are relevant to policymakers and international agencies who work to strengthen the fragility of peace in divided

societies. Considering the issues of equality, safety and civil society, activism is a high priority for citizens because it significantly influences trust.

These results suggest that the arbitrariness of public administration, the feeling of insecurity within a society, and unjust and inefficient judicial systems are risky for the society and decrease trust in already-divided societies. Therefore, institutions and policies should be designed and complemented carefully in order to increase trust among people. Institutions are an important source of trust. Establishing nonpartisan, nonsectarian civil society organizations is essential to decrease the distrust in the performance of the civil society. Notably in Lebanon, as a divided society, a sectarian civil society is linked to a low level of trust.

Further discussions of the precise programmes that show inequality and discrimination and specifically which CSOs are distrusted by citizens are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the results indicate that inequality, arbitrariness and ineffective and biased judiciaries are areas that can be potentially improved to have a positive effect on trust, which can, in turn, be used to create a balance between historical hostilities and fragmentation in divided societies.

The results suggest that generalized trust in Lebanon is low for citizens who feel inequality and who have worse living conditions compared to others, as well



Figure 6.3 Figure illustrate corruption in Lebanon and how impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) vs jobs are only available to qualified candidates.



Figure 6.4 Generalized Trust and Institutional Determinants in Lebanon.

as for those who experience issues of insecurity and a lack of safety in the society. The findings also suggest that trust in a civil society and in the legal system and judiciary is linked to generalized trust. Figure 6.4 shows that lower the level of generalized trust in civil society, higher the level of insecurity and the higher the sense of inequality. These factors will be further analysed to explain how the determinants affect trust.

The institutional determinants of trust in Lebanon

In this section, I examine correlated variables that emerge from the previous analysis. As these variables are significantly related to the level of generalized trust, in-depth investigation is required to understand more fully how, at the micro level, these variables influence the level of generalized trust, specifically the day-to-day or street-level bureaucracy. The section is divided into three subsections: inequality, institutional framework and civil society. The following section is representative of the mentioned variables within the model.

Inequality

Even though inequality in Lebanon is high in every public sector such as education, healthcare and infrastructure (Kukrety and Sarah, 2016), this section will focus on education as a representative of expenditure on public goods. Education was selected since it is more related to youth and current generation and would be in line with the quantitative analysis where a high number of correspondents are young.

Education was chosen as an indicator and representative of public institutions' quality/equality for several reasons. First, education in Lebanon is an experience that every Lebanese has to go through. Second, the majority of universities in Lebanon are private, and each is clearly influenced by different ideology (hospitals to less extent). Third, high quality and equal educational programmes may give a sense of optimism for better future. Fourth, Rothstein and Uslaner argue that 'there are good reasons to believe that education may hold a special place when it comes to explaining trust', which explains why Scandinavians who spend great deal of public money on education equality and quality have the highest level of generalized trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).

Expenditure on public universities

Sectarianism in Lebanon is not based on geography, as different sects live in every region in Lebanon. However, there is a classical geographical concentration of sects in specific areas. For instance, Druze are concentrated around Mount Lebanon, and Sunni are mainly residents of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida and Akkar. These are among the biggest cities in Lebanon. Shiite are concentrated in the South and the Bekaa, especially in Tyre and Hermel.

Expenditure on public universities in Lebanon remains particularistic based on the concentration of certain sects in certain districts. This book argues that this ethno-geographic distribution of funding occurs for three main reasons: (1) to buy loyalty of a sect or sectarian political party, (2) to postpone a public administration issue by funding short-term programmes without resolving the core issues and (3) to allocate a larger particularistic fund to another region or ethno-geographical area.

Educational institutions can explain such inequality and sectarian expenditures. In Lebanon, there are more than fifty colleges and universities, which are mostly private. Each religious and ethnic sect sees public universities as a budget-consuming entity and attempts to dismantle or decrease the budgetary allocation for public education, the aim being to undermine public educational institutions while strengthening private, ethnically owned institutions (Thaer, 2017). The Lebanese University is the largest university in Lebanon. The Shiite have control over a large portion of the key positions, including rectors, student unions and management (Ibrahim, 2016).

The Lebanese University is known as 'The University of the Poor' because it is less expensive than private universities. In 2017, the Lebanese University faced a wave of criticism and a challenge when the board of trustees decided to appoint a Sunni professor as head of Zahle area campus. Although the appointed professor is well-qualified and a reputed academic, students of the campus protested the decision, closing the gates of the campus (Ali, 2017).

Public expenditure distribution affects generalized trust heavily, especially when certain ethno-geographical areas are favoured over others because of sectarian ties. In Lebanon, sectarian leaders who are also part of the public administration institutions tend to concentrate the expenditures in cities or areas affiliated to themselves, creating an imbalance in the distribution of public expenditure. Sunni

leaders, for example, tend to concentrate expenditures in cities where the majority of inhabitants are Sunni. As spending becomes particularistic on an ethno-geographical basis, the distrust between citizens of these areas becomes generalized. For example, the inhabitants of Tyre and Saida have less trust among each other because each of these two cities is inhabited by different sects and is represented independently in the government and the political system.[5] Also, for example, Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, is from the southern Shiite areas. Many private and public companies run under his sectarian party, whereas the Druze Walid Jumblatt controls other private and public companies in his area as well (Al-Akhbar, 2015). In 2015, facing the garbage crisis, the government failed to efficiently solve the issue at hand because of the deep sectarian divisions in the cabinet, fuelled by the clientelist and power-seeking attitude of each of the sects (Marwa, 2016).

One of the main driving forces of distrust in any society is the distrust of people in the political system and the political elites as well (Newton, 2001). This has been confirmed in chapter five. In times of crisis or during elections, ethnicity and sectarian belonging are stronger than national belonging in Lebanon, driving citizens to follow and support their politicians and political elites from the same sect despite the perceived corruption. In 2016, at the peak of the presidential crisis and polarization, most Lebanese who participated in the AB survey identified themselves with their religious sect despite the possibility to refuse the answer. In 2018, after the presidential elections of more than two years, and after the parliamentarian elections, around 40 per cent of the surveyed Lebanese in the AB IV wave refused to answer the same question.

The sudden proliferation of higher education institutions originated from the need of each sect to have their own academic institutions as a source of investment for the sects' leaders. These leaders are usually the owners of the institutions. In 1974, there were only five universities, while in 2015, Lebanon has twenty-four universities and nineteen higher education institutions (Martine, 2016). The privileges would benefit the students affiliated to the sect. In 2015, three universities were established as part of a sectarian division or belonging to political elites/leaders: (1) *Al-Hadara* University, belonging to Hizbullah, the Shiite party; (2) Phoenicia University, owned by Randa Berri, the wife of the speaker of the parliament, a Shiite, and the head of Amal Movement; and (3) *AZM* University, owned by Nagib Miqati, a Sunni leader and former prime minister. Although the same sectarian leaders establish new institutions, they remain part of the sectarian elite mechanism to have greater power within the society.

According to Traboulsi (2016), policies that facilitated cash-based subsidies and educational expenditures on private academic institutions allowed the political sects and elites to divide the society and empowered the leaders to control the different groups in society. This led to dismantled and weakened student unions and university-based social movements. He argues that such tools are dividing the society and decreasing the trust among citizens in general (Traboulsi, 2016).

In education, quotas are applied for different sects where a number of seats in certain universities are allocated to different sects in an informal manner. One

applicant to a university claimed that in 2003, she was accepted because she was a Sunni and in that year the quota for Sunni had not yet been reached.[6] Reference to personal communications with a number of university students attested some cases where grades were manipulated by certain professors to the advantage of students from the same sect. In the Lebanese University, for instance, Shiites control the faculty of law while Sunnis dominate other campuses. This is thought to increase favouritism of students who belong to the same sectarian group and to the sects interfering with academic promotions and employment opportunities.

According to a university student, trust among different sects and ethnicities in Lebanon is weak because institutions do not provide the same treatment to all parties.[7] An official document that needs to be obtained would be expedited for a specific person if a sectarian tie exists. In other words, *Wasta* nepotism is based on sectarianism. It is clear that universities and educational institutions in Lebanon mirror the outer society and the state–society relationship. A 2009 *New York Times* article states the following on the student council elections in a private university in Lebanon, the Saint Joseph University:

> Once again, the university has become a reflection in miniature of the country's fiercely divided political scene. [Student council election] results are seen as crucial indexes of a party's overall popularity and routinely make the front pages of national newspapers. (Worth, 2009)

The unequal distribution of services, public goods and resources has deprived low-income and poor people of their rights to have access to health care, proper public education and other infrastructure services. Sects have pushed inequality further as they maintain their right to distribute resources to their own members. This inequality and inaccessibility to justice have created a sense of vulnerability and frustration among citizens, eventually leading to distrust in others, who may seek benefits and would accept injustice and inequality (E. M. Uslaner, 2005).

Sectarianism in the labour market and in business

As a sectarian political system grew more entrenched in Lebanon in the aftermath of the civil war, the sects' leaders initiated policies that organized sectarian arrangements in the labour market, such as the informal institution of sectarian bias, where positions are allocated based on sects in the state's agencies and public sector. This informal law became a normal act and was extended to include the private sector. This is clear in light of the preference of employers and corporate owners to recruit members of their own sect or ethnicity. This kind of discrimination also appears in salaries, promotions and allocation of high executive powers. Traboulsi (2016) argued that not only senior positions but also low-level positions are distributed to maintain sectarian balance among staff members (Traboulsi, 2016). This policy is not very different from what was

applied during the civil war. Companies and institutions during the civil war relied on members of their sects, from low-class workers to holders of senior positions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

The sectarian game that divided the Lebanese institutionally also provided room for corruption and nepotism to grow in the business and private sectors, increasing the level of inequality. For more than two decades, the Sunni and Christian elites have taken over the political economy of Lebanon, which based on their policies led to increasing prevalence of poverty and inequality in key Sunni and Christian areas (Daher, 2016: 75). What deepened the divisions in the Lebanese society have been (1) competition between different sects over public service provisions in an attempt to monopolize specific sectors; and (2) the benefit regionally/ethnically obtained from their inherent services. This includes the distribution of state public contracts on a sectarian basis to maintain balance among the different sects.

In the early 2000s, for instance, there was a conflict between the Sunni prime minister, Rafik Hariri (assassinated in 2005), and the Maronite president, Emile Lahoud, over the privatization of mobile phone companies. The president insisted that the mobile networks remain public, whereas the prime minister demanded that they be privatized.

More recently in 2013, a dispute erupted between two major sectarian blocs over contracts of daily workers in the state-owned electricity company. The minister of energy, Gebran Bassil, refused to sign the contracts on the grounds that the majority of them are of the Shiite sect (Daher, 2016: 146). Gebran argued that the company was not in need of such a huge workforce. Gebran Bassil insisted that he would not sign the contacts because he was not prepared to license more financial losses in the company. However, many argue that the problem is political rather than related to financial issues (AlModon, 2013).

In the same context, a dispute developed between different sectarian blocs over the contracting of Turkish electric power ships to address the shortage of electric power in Lebanon. The different sects agreed to commission the minister of energy (Shiite and Maronite bloc) and the former president of the Engineers' Syndicate (Sunni) to negotiate with the Turkish companies. The deal was sealed, but the contractors failed to meet the agreement's conditions. One of the ships did not arrive and one could operate fully. This scandal was then covered up, as the deal was principally a sectarian one (Al-Akhbar, 2015).

The quota system between the different sects has led to a more sectarian division over resources and differences in the level of services for the different sects. As the substantive policies of cash-based state expenditures increased along with a desire to distribute the expenses, a privatization wave was initiated in the 1990s and 2000s. The privatization was sect-based in that the companies were indirectly or directly linked, or owned, by different sects. The main companies included the post service (Liban Post), the public transportation company, the garbage collection service, the security services, the energy sector services, the public health sector, and the education and higher education sector (Traboulsi, 2016).

A sectarian legal system

According to the law in Lebanon, the Lebanese are recognized according to their confession or sect, which makes it difficult to find a consensus among the Lebanese sects on judicial rules. Therefore, the two sources of judicial power are the Lebanese parliament and the confessional authorities. Religious confessions are free to issue legislations on matters relating to the personal status of their communities.[8] The various sources of legislation lead to different courts, different charges, contradicting entities and rules being differently interpreted by the various sects. The plurality of laws undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and its public law, affecting the relations among judges, policymakers and the sectarian elites.

According to the Lebanese constitution, the courts of different levels and jurisdictions assume their authority to be under one system and represented as part of the unilateral system of judicial power (Salloukh et al., 2015). Seven types of courts are found in Lebanon for distinct purposes: the constitutional courts, the political courts, the judicial courts, the administrative courts, the financial courts, the military courts and the extraordinary courts. These courts were designed and ratified by the Lebanese sects or parties and the constitutional council in 1993.

The state of the judiciary in the post-war Ta'if agreement was amended and updated, stating that the judiciary must be autonomous, and members of the Higher Judicial Council must be elected by the judicial body. However, this instruction was poorly applied. The appointment of judges remained either sectarian or based on the balance of power and consensus among the different sects.

Among the exceptional courts, military courts have become a common resort during recent years. The military courts have alarmingly been used against the youth protesting against corruption, sectarianism and the monopoly of power in Lebanon. A temporary law was issued in 1958 upon the start of the armed conflict that gave more legal instruments for the military courts to detain and arrest civilians. This law is still in force today. Other exceptional courts include religious and spiritual courts, which violate the core principles of the constitution. There are other judicial bodies as well, such as commissions of appropriation, commissions of taxation and special commissions to examine financial bodies and matters, such as banks.

In Lebanon, sectarian elites interfere with the appointment of judges and members of the Higher Judicial Council. This is considered a violation of the principles of the declaration of independence and the constitution (Personal communication, 2016). By giving room to the political power to appoint, form and exercise its influence over judicial bodies, the latter falls under the hegemony of the sectarian political power. The courts are then abused by the political and sectarian elites for political gain, and economic and social advantages.

If citizens feel that governmental institutions treat them unequally and unfairly, including the judicial institutions, such as the courts, they will come to have no faith in the legal system (Uslaner, 2003). The legal system is important for two main reasons: (1) the system protects citizens from the abuse of power by politicians or other prominent figures, and (2) the legal system, and the courts specifically,

are presumed neutral and external to the partisan political system. If the judiciary system fails to meet these needs, that is, to protect ordinary citizens and their wealth, people will have no faith in the system nor in the law in general and will therefore start to disobey the law. When Michel Samaha (a Christian Orthodox Lebanese MP) was caught with explosive devices in his car in Lebanon, he was then released by the courts in 2016. This created a violent reaction among the Lebanese, with many expressing their distrust in the national courts and in the legal system.[9] In the same timeframe, a number of youth activists were arrested for expressing their opinions against the government. Since the main pillar of trust is equality in front of all governmental institutions, especially courts, these instances in the Lebanese judicial systems manifest the link between inequality, corruption and low trust.

A sectarian civil society

As the results show in the analysis section, there is a correlation between civil society and the level of generalized trust among Lebanese. This section discusses, briefly, the state of the Lebanese civil society, its links to sectarianism and the sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization. In general, the Lebanese CSOs after the end of the civil war can be seen as a 'Multi-layered associations and voluntary organisations' (Fontana, 2010). CSOs in Lebanon constitute a 'hegemonic apparatus . . . a complex set of institutions, ideologies, practices and agents' (Thomas, 2009: 225). In such cases, most of the Lebanese sectarian elites (such as Hizbullah) were/are able to intervene in the work and engage in their opponents through NGOs (Daher, 2016: 93).

Civil society has gained a huge influence in the third world after the third wave of democratization. Civil society was considered to be an agent of social change and the school of civil virtue that democratization in the third world must go through (Kopecký, 2003). However, other scholars argue that democratization, especially in the Arab World, must rather go through the reform of public institutions in the Arab World (Heydemann, 2008). The latter theory is more accurate in the Arab World; hence, the regimes have manipulated and used civil society. Regimes worked intensively to de-radicalize and de-politicize the civil societies in the Arab World (Scott et al., 2007). Indeed, in many cases CSOs have produced and reproduced undemocratic norms in the Arab World because of their proximities with the regimes (Scott et al., 2007). Similarly, Lebanon's civil society has been studied intensively in the past two decades, emphasizing the link between sectarian and political elites and civil society (Clark and Salloukh, 2013).

Lebanese civil society is an aggregate of individual and communal groups, each linked to their associations and structures of mobilization within the Lebanese society. Towards the end of the civil war in 1990, many NGOs were established and dozens of initiatives set up to sustain peace and begin reconciliation among the different sects in the society (Ghosn and Khoury, 2011). In post-war Lebanon, the number of CSOs and associations has grown exponentially with 250 new NGOs registered every year (Kingston, 2013). After the civil war, the state and its

institutions were weakened, leading charity organizations and the civil society to have a prominent role in providing public services to the communities. During this time, civil society became a powerful tool for influential political elites (Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi, 2013). These organizations provided some basic services to address the economic and socio-economic situation that faces Lebanese, filling the vacuum left by weak state institutions.

According to Salloukh et al., the Lebanese sectarian elites have put much effort into the proliferation of NGOs, and the NGO-ization of politics and initiatives as a tactic to divest opposition and oppositions' efforts that are not affiliated with any sect or sectarian elite (Salloukh et al., 2015).

Following the end of the civil war, the Lebanese civil society tried to adapt to the changes, seeking increased funds from external donors and changing their missions and modus operandi to fit donor agendas (democratization, reconciliation etc.). Yet, CSOs had to fit the clientelist state institutions to facilitate their work too (Salloukh et al., 2015). Many of these CSOs were funded externally and adhered to the agendas of foreign donors, focusing more on environmental issues, democratization, human rights and women empowerment. Volunteers ran almost all of the pre-1990s CSOs. Many had political reform and abolishment of sectarianism in Lebanon as part of their objectives. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Election (LADE) was one of the biggest initiatives of the civil society that pressed towards institutional reform and local elections. However, after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, most of the CSOs, including LADE, allied with one party against the other (Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi, 2013). One side opposed the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, while the other side accused the Syrians of assassinating Hariri and called on the international community for the establishment of the special tribunal for Lebanon. Moreover, external funding has shifted the work and visions of many NGOs, such as LADE. LADE has become occupied with projects imposed by donors. This de-radicalized its discourse and shifted the organization away from their original mission, effectively 'incorporating them into the clientelist political economy of the sectarian system' (Salloukh et al., 2015). Besides that, many Lebanese civil society leaders have and continue to use their organizations to assume prominent official positions. For example, one of the Lebanese Transparency Association founders accepted an official position related to the prime minister. Moreover, LADE executives assumed many other official positions (Salloukh et al., 2015) which are perceived by many of the public as being affiliated to the prime minister and his political allies.

In Lebanon's post-war time, CSOs allowed sectarian elites to appropriate their organizations, such as the Lebanese Council for Women (LCW). LCW is the biggest women rights organization in Lebanon. LCW is a representation of the clientelist sectarian system that infiltrated CSOs in Lebanon. The general assembly, which is the body that serves as the leadership of LCW, is colonized by sectarian associations. LCW is a CSO that should represent all Lebanese women, defend their rights and struggle against violations of women rights; however, it hosts a large number of religious and sectarian associations that

violate women rights, and is headed by sectarian elites[10] (Salloukh et al., 2015). Moreover, LWC's electoral system is based on sectarian representation. For instance, presidency circulates between Muslims and Christians every four years (Osseiran, 2006).

Civil fragmentation within the staff and elites of Lebanese civil society organizations has also played a major role in decreasing trust among Lebanese in CSOs. The polarization of politics between the two main camps in Lebanon after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 affected organizations in general. The two main sides in the dispute are called the 8th of March group and the 14th of March group. Some of these NGOs, although not sectarian or confessional, allied with one camp or the other. NGOs that had views similar to the 14th of March group were considered to be against Hizbullah, while the ones that shared the same views as Hizbullah are considered to be in the 8th of March group (Salloukh et al., 2015).

In Lebanon, neither the state nor the civil society provides an arena for the public to express their concerns on public issues. The state does not consult the civil society when it comes to policy change or public deliberation on political and societal issues due to the sectarian networks and ties that deny citizens political participation. A number of factors have led the public to distrust civil society: the failure of the Lebanese civil society to hold sectarian leaders accountable, to put pressure on the state and the sectarian elites to refrain from exploiting and abusing the system, and to ensure the participation of individuals in the consultation process. The Lebanese civil society has been unable to break free from its sectarian ties and from the hegemony of the sectarian elites. It has become, therefore, an agent of sectarianism in the society, reinforcing clientelism and the power of political and sectarian elites (Dyala Badran, 2014).

Lebanese CSOs usually recruit activists and volunteers on sectarian basis or those already partisans of their ideology (Ghosn and Khoury, 2011). This has widened the gap between the different sects and the CSOs themselves. The Lebanese civil society could not, at least for now, convince the wider Lebanese population that the society is independent of any political party, sect, ideology or international donors. As one former ambassador in Lebanon said, 'Before asking someone which NGO he/she works for, one should ask where the NGO gets its funding and to which sect it belongs.' In Lebanon, it has become a common practice for sects and political parties to find NGOs that represent their ideologies.

The belief that each CSO belongs to a sect or is affiliated with a political sectarian party has given the impression that one has no chance to be listened to, and that if they have different views, the organization will not be representing their views. Each organization is, therefore, perceived as a sectarian reserve. Losing trust in a civil society implies losing trust in a wider society. CSOs diverge from their main purpose, which is to represent the Lebanese people in general, and to act as a third monitoring party separate from the state, in case of violations of individual and communal rights.

What is behind low trust?

Of all the issues related to generalized trust and its origins in Lebanon, according to the previous discussions, inequality is probably the most complex and the most elusive. Confusion is present at every level of the discussion on the real source of generalized trust. Here too posing the following argument could expand discussion: 'Other variables and conditions are the real source and not the institutions themselves.' This is real issue, which is addressed on different levels. (1) This chapter does not claim that these institutions are the only factors that influence the level of generalized trust; other conditions, such as personal experiences (e.g. psychological), can influence generalized trust. (2) This chapter is part of the broader research, which argues that each society has different ways of generating and maintaining high generalized trust, and therefore, there could be other factors that have not been taken into consideration. (3) Institutional influence on generalized trust in Lebanon is related to sectarian leaders and the whole system that grants sectarian leaders full.

The term 'divided society' describes those societies in which one group attempts to deny others equal access to the same rights and privileges they benefit from. These rights can be housing, employment, education and protection. Each group tries to ensure these rights for themselves and not for the other groups. In societies where wealth and foreign factors are present, sects can be manipulated through the resources gained or provided to them by their sectarian leaders/elites. This is harmful in two ways: first it allows the sectarian elites/leaders to have a total monopoly on resources from foreign agents, such as money and benefits (e.g. scholarships for university students), which allows them to use these resources as a tool to sustain their power within their sects. This allows them to distribute these resources unequally among their sects, generating a feeling of insecurity, clientelism and corruption, all of which lead to low generalized trust. The second factor is an unequal amount and form of funds from foreign agents. One group can have much greater and varieties of resources, while others are limited. This will create a gap between the different sects themselves and the members of each sect too. This mechanism can be harmful, as the members of the sects will insist on holding governmental institutions accountable, but not their leaders who are part of these institutions, a scenario that eventually will run the whole society into a cycle that does not lead to any change in these institutions. This means that institutions are controlled by the sectarian leaders/elites who tend not to initiate reform against sectarianism, arbitrariness and inequality.

Having sound, efficient and effective, equal institutions in Lebanese society means no sectarian leaders/elites or any politicians who can evade accountability measures, leading to a point where sectarian leaders lose power over their sects and their benefits from the whole system. This Lebanese model explains why the country has a low level of generalized trust. Shiites receive funds from Iran, Sunnis from Saudi Arabia and Christians through foundations and CSOs from some European countries and the United States.[11]

In this way, sectarian leaders and foreign funds can contribute to the complexity of institutions that influence the level of generalized trust. As Figure 6.5 shows, sectarian leaders, empowered by foreign resources, influence the unequal distribution of resources through formal and informal institutions. Clientelism and corruption of elites widen the gap of inequality between sects and members of the sects, which in turn results in arbitrariness of public administration and sometimes particularistic spending, especially through the office of the Sunni prime minister, and ministers who represent different sects.

The institutional conditions in the statistical model on Lebanon do not merely stand by themselves; rather, sectarian elites and ethnic leaders are the ones who shape these institutions to reflect current form and efficiency. The ability of sectarian leaders to extend their terms four times without elections, and a situation where it takes two years for a president to be elected because of sectarian leaders having foreign and regional agendas, is evidence that sectarian leaders influence not only formal institutions concerning public administration but also the whole political system.

As seen in the statistical model earlier, demographic variables such as religion, education, gender and employment status do not influence trust in strangers in general. Yet, if the question is related to inequality and living conditions compared to others and clientelism, there seems to be more of a correlation. With a system where a sectarian leader, the head of a political party (sect-based) and a businessman can be a minister, spokesperson of parliament or the prime minister, institutions will be shaped and formed along sectarian lines and not in the national interest of all.[12]



Figure 6.5 Generalized Trust in Lebanon: Causal Mechanism.

Conclusion

According to the AB, generalized trust is low in Lebanon and has further decreased in recent years. This comes as no surprise to researchers because Lebanon is still suffering from political unrest, fragmentation and deep polarization even so many years after the end of the fifteen-year long civil war.

This chapter examines the impact of a number of institutional determinants on the level of generalized trust in Lebanon as a divided society. The chapter provided a historical background of the Lebanese society and its embedded sectarianism. After the analysis and the results, the chapter looks closely at the most significant determinants that are related to the level of generalized trust. The feeling of insecurity and the lack of safety, the conditions of well-being compared to others, the equality of services in a society, the trust in judicial performance and the trust in the civil society were all found to impact the level of generalized trust. People who feel insecure and unsafe in a society and those who have poor socio-economic conditions are more likely to distrust others. High levels of trust were found to persist among the groups of individuals who have more trust in CSOs and in the performance of the judicial institutions. These findings are in line with previous theories that correlate higher generalized trust with trust in civil society.

In conclusion, this chapter attests the direct relationship between generalized trust and the perceived performance of institutions. The more unfair, unequal, corrupt institutions are perceived, the less likely people are to trust each other. The main argument maintains that trust is based on the cognitive feeling of threat to personal safety within a society and loss of faith in the judiciary, which leads to more distrust within the society. The more unequal the services offered by the institutions and the higher the decimation (including clientelism), the higher distrust will be in the society.

There are some categories of institutions that contribute to distrust among people, such as governmental sectarian institutions with a high budget of particularistic expenditures. Examples of this are the Council of the South for the Shiite, the Council of Development and Construction for Sunni and the Ministry of the Displaced Lebanese, which was created in the post-war era and is controlled by the Druze. Each of these semi-governmental institutions usually appoints employees from one sectarian group where service provision becomes particularistic and public administration becomes arbitrary for other sects. This generates a level of distrust with the employees from the different sects, and this distrust is generalized. Distrust thus spreads to other members of the sect.

Chapter 7

Creating Hybrid Society

Trust in Palestine

Introduction

On a summer day in September 2007, I came back home around seven in the evening. The house was silent, and my family was making many frantic calls. A relative who joined Hamas just shot his father and brother after a verbal confrontation about their ideological differences. His brother who was a professional soccer goalkeeper could not use his hands anymore. Two years later, a group of Hamas de-facto security forces invaded my brother-in-law's house, who happened to work for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. The group of Hamas militants who acted as police forces were masked. They arrested him at around four in the morning. After his release, he told me that he knew the identities of the Hamas members who stormed the house and partially destroyed it. They were his neighbours and were known to him by name.

These two incidents are small compared to what occurred (semi-civil war and political division) in Gaza and the West Bank, which no doubt fractured the trust in the society, especially between Hamas members and affiliates and Fatah and its affiliates. The centrality of this chapter is that human rights abuse, economic deprivation and inequality, as a result of political polarization and division, negatively affect the level of generalized trust, undermining the social fabric, and creating a hybrid society.

In June 2006, the PA organized the second parliamentary elections in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which, surprisingly, resulted in a sweeping victory for the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (S. Wilson, 2006). It was the first time that an Islamist movement, opposing the Oslo Accords and the peace process, had won the majority of parliament seats. However, the results of the elections were not met with respect from many parties: local, regional and international. The United States, EU and other Western countries boycotted the Palestinian government forces formed by Hamas' leader, Ismael Haniya. At the same time, the Gaza Strip, which has been suffering from severe security chaos and instability, where killing a person in the daylight by militia or tribesmen was the norm, witnessed few clashes between Hamas members and Fatah activists. While Hamas

was democratically elected in fair elections, many Fatah leaders, who were heads of security apparatuses agencies refused to receive commands from the appointed minister (Saed Siam).[1] This forced Hamas' minister to use his party forces under the name *Al-Qwa Al Tanfiziya* (the executive forces), which are paramilitary units, borrowed mostly from *Al-Qassam* Brigades (PalInfo, 2006). The executive forces were formed to ensure that the minister had powerful units which are loyal to him to face the new challenges and obstacles that were institutionalized to bypass Hamas' new minister by Fatah leaders and the security generals. This was the first time that a minister officially violated the law by forming a new paramilitary police unit without an official decree from either the president or the parliament.

Since then, the clashes between Hamas forces, including *Al-Qasam* brigades on the one side and PA's forces and part of Fatah forces on the other, escalated with hundreds of individuals losing their lives or wounded. In June 2007, almost one and a half years after the elections and more than a decade of Fatah and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) dominated rule in the Gaza Strip, Hamas consolidated its power and took control over the Gaza Strip by force, routing Fatah



Figure 7.1 Trust in Palestine (2007–18).

and PLO security forces loyal to President Abbas and Fatah strongman Mohamad Dahlan. June 2007 was the last of many violent episodes in the Palestinian political and ideological division that continues to affect the social, political and economic lives of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It has been dubbed the most serious issue that undermines the capability of the Palestinians to have an independent state, that also served as a catalyst to make the Palestinian question in general a marginal issue among the Arab nations, mainly after the Arab Spring (Alijla, 2014). The societal and political division within the Palestinians was clear from the beginning, not only between activists of both parties but also between intellectuals, academics, writers and processionals. For instance, pro-Hamas and the military takeover named the military action as *Alhasm*, which means termination, while pro-PLO and Fatah dubbed it as *Alinqilabb* which means coup d'etat. *Alhasm* is meant to represent the end of the security chaos and the harassment of the Hamas' activists and members. For a long time, the security apparatuses of the PA were accused of murdering, torturing and imprisoning Hamas' members and activists. Therefore, *Alhasm*, for them is using force to end the presence of these conditions. For Fatah and their loyalist, coup d'etat represents a military takeover by force from the legitimate rulers, which for them was President Abbas and the security forces, and institutions that ruled Gaza since 1993. After that, the majority of employees in civil and security institutions were asked to stay home, leaving the room for Hamas to bear the responsibility over all issues, with exception of education and health, with the PA continuing to pay the salaries of teachers and employees, sending medical supplies, and paying health sector employees' salaries despite Hamas' policies against those loyal to the PA and PLO in the health and education sector. Between 2007 and 2009, Hamas built parallel governmental institutions, comprised mainly of their members, paying their salaries within a defined hierarchy, marginalizing the previous employees. This created two categories of employees: one that receive salaries from the PA in Ramallah while not working at all, and the other which are Hamas affiliates who received salaries from Hamas de-facto government. This created a social tension between the two populations, namely high-ranking employees and also strong tribes that used to have high social and political power in the society, and suddenly small families and low-ranking young officers who took power and had more influence, which was not acceptable for Fatah and PLO affiliates.

In September 2007, the Palestinian centre for policy and survey research conducted a poll among more than 1,000 Palestinians. The findings show that Hamas' military coup in the Gaza Strip was not supported by majority of the Palestinians. Only 22 per cent of the Palestinians supported Hamas' takeover of Gaza, while 73 per cent opposed it. Support for Hamas' actions increased in the Gaza Strip (31%) compared to the 17 per cent in the West Bank (PSR, 2007).

Since the beginning of the Palestinian question (colonization and occupation) more than a century ago, the Palestinians had common motivations such as clinging to their land and fighting tirelessly, but they were in conflict over who would govern and control Palestine. This issue divided them. That was the only difference between them. They adopted different agendas and mechanisms, but

that was one of the main reasons why they could not achieve what they demanded. This resulted in painful consequences that hindered Palestinian society to a great extent, for example, resulting in divorce and marriage based on political affiliations.

Hamas' electoral victory and the political changes in the Gaza Strip provided Israel with a pretext to tighten its siege on the Gaza Strip, imposing entire closure, allowing only basic needs such as food and medical needs to enter the Strip. This siege, accompanied by political divisions in Palestinian society, which witnessed the increased violation of human rights, killing and harassment, led to hazardous consequences, such as a high rate of suicide.

This chapter seeks to understand the change in social trust among Palestinians throughout the years of the ongoing political division. It tries to examine how the political division, directly or indirectly, leads to the current low level of trust that left remarkable changes in the society and deep polarization.

It is important to differentiate between ethnic division and political division. In ethnically divided societies, there are two or more ethnic groups living in one society which may have experienced violent past such as in Iraq (Kurds, Turkman and Arabs), And Algeria (Arab and Amazigh). In politically divided societies, the division occurs as a result of a deeply polarized society as a result of radical and extreme mobilization or due to violent events led by one party against the other such as in Gaza (2007) and Egypt (2013). In the Middle East, all countries that are ethnically divided are also politically divided. Therefore, every ethnically divided society is politically divided, but not the opposite. The Palestinian case is a case of political division at institutional level mostly. As the next section examines, the Palestinian society comprises Arabs and a Muslim Sunni majority population without any sectarian or ethnic divisions. Yet, the political division between Hamas as an Islamist political party and Fatah as a secular national political party facilitates the manipulation of institutions to favour each of them without sectarian/ethical considerations. Therefore, institutional political division can have a stronger effect on the level of generalized trust.

Despite the fact that Palestinians are not composed of different sects like Lebanon or Syria, and they share the same, strong, national identity, they have a multi-layered personal, communal, regional and tribal identity. A Palestinian refugee from Syria would identify himself as a Palestinian Syrian. In Palestine, they identify themselves based on region, village or origin. For instance, a native Gazan would identify himself as *Gazawi* and a native from Khan Younes would identify themselves as *Qlai'i*, while someone from Bethlehem would say *Talhami* and so on. Refugees would identify themselves by their original village pre-1948 Palestine, more than being from the city they were born in or subsequently. Moreover, and until recent years, intermarriage between refugees from urban cities and rural areas or refugees and native people was not acceptable for certain families. In the 1980s, a new identity emerged as an alternative to the failure of pan-Arabism, which is Islamic identity, which overlaps with political Islam. Miari argues that Israeli colonization and occupation, especially after the Oslo Accord, contributed to these fragmented identities (Miarai, 2008). Abu Rahma argues that internal Palestinian division has created a distorted Palestinian

identity and has created more fragmentation and a new sectarian political identity (Abu Rahma, 2017).

The Palestinian case, as opposed to the Lebanese case study in the previous chapter, does not fit within Beetham's argument that divided societies, which are defined by antagonistic cultural groups, will have difficulty sustaining democracy, whether the groups are defined by ethnicity, religion, historical memory or anything else that gives the people a sense of common identity (Beetham, 1994). First, the Palestinians are not a nation state yet, but a semi-autonomous and limited statehood area. And second the Palestinians have failed to develop democratic institutions due to the continuous Israeli occupation and the internal division and most importantly, the Palestinian society is not composed is an antagonistic cultural groups.

The Palestinians divided[2]

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the League of Nations imposed a mandate over the property of the empire that included Palestine. The British mandate was imposed in 1920. Since then, many political, societal, economic and intellectual movements emerged to stand against British policies that favoured the non-indigenous people of Palestine, and the immigration of Jews en masse.

Considering the complexity of the Palestinian political situation, and in light of the emerging political parties that have different goals, a political division within the Palestinian leadership emerged. At the start, the conflict was between two families who had links to the Ottoman Empire as bourgeoisie, egalitarian families. The political and social conflicts began to rise between the *Husayni* and *Nashashibi* families as the crisis broke out over the leadership of *Dar Al-Ifta* and the Islamic Supreme Council. The early stages of the Palestinian division greatly contributed to both the loss of historic Palestine and the loss of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which put the rest of the Palestine (West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip) under Egyptian and Jordanian administrations.

The PLO emerged to reflect the Palestinian's aspirations, in a troubling time and region. The PLO tried to gather all the Palestinian factions and movements, maintaining a united national movement even within a limited framework. However, it left a margin of manoeuvring and freedom for all factions to exercise their will according to their objectives, regional and international allies, and ideologies. Despite this, many conflicts and divisions emerged within the PLO itself and other parties, which ended either in violent conflict or the formation of new parties.

After the defeat of 1967, and the fall of all of Palestine under the Israeli occupation, and the 1982 Beirut siege, the Islamic movement emerged with the establishment of the Islamic Jihad movement and then Hamas, which is considered to be the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine. Since then, a conflict has arisen between Hamas – representing the Islamic movement, and Fatah – representing the secular and socialist movements under the PLO. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, the internal Palestinian conflict emerged in the form of

divisions that affected the Palestinian political system. Therefore, the transformation of the Palestinian national movements into a semi-state entity has contributed to the emergence of the real and tangible Palestinian division which began after the signing of the Oslo Accords, which was rejected by many Palestinians.

In 2006, Hamas decided to join Fatah on the political formal political apparatus, by participating in parliamentary elections for the first time, gaining a sweeping majority and forming the tenth government of the PA. Several challenges and disagreements emerged in the Palestinian political system, leading to internal conflict that turned violent, taking the lives of hundreds, and ending with full military control of Hamas' forces over the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, the Palestinian national movement was brought to its most dangerous turning point in recent history. After 2011, and the Arab uprisings, the Palestinian cause has been losing grounds amid regional and international tensions that negatively contributed and encouraged both Fatah and Hamas to sustain the status quo of division.

Old wine, new bottles

One of the most prominent reasons behind the Palestinian division during the British mandate was the social structure of the Palestinian society, which was divided into three social strata: the urban population, the Bedouin and the peasantry. However, peasants working in agriculture dominated the Palestinian society where villages formed the socio-economic basis for the majority of Palestinians. The feudal class predominantly controlled the society and the peasantry were subjugated by the powerful urban families in villages and rural areas. That period witnessed remarkable power of the bourgeoisie and their extended families in Palestine, and the Levantine in general that dominated political and economic life. The powerful families managed to control the political and economic spheres through working in governmental jobs which they secured through their educations abroad, in Turkey or Europe. The power of these families was crystalized during the fall of the Ottoman Empire in major Palestinian cities such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Hebron and Gaza (Alijla and ElMasri, 2019).

Tribal extremism developed among Palestinians, which were essentially a gathering of Arab ethnic nomadic families led by a Sheikh. They were subjected to various complications and divisions, the most prominent of which was the intervention of Ottoman military forces to settle the conflict between different tribes and the urban population. This conflict led to social alienation and division among tribes and urban families (Abdelhadi, 2012). The most known example is the *Husayni* and *Nashashibi* conflict. The competition between *Husayni* and *Nashashibi* families has led to conflict and division among the Palestinian elites, which can be described as the most notable division during that period. It reached all aspects of managerial and governmental positions and it was called 'the Conflict of Interests and Influence' (Khela, 1974: 355).

In 1964, the PLO was established to represent the Palestinians and their national aspirations in international forums. It included few political parties and movements, where the chairman of PLO would be the president of the Palestinians and the president of Palestine in any part of Palestine. This move came in force after the Palestinians were mostly represented by the Arab League since 1945 despite being under the British mandate since 1920. At the first Arab Summit in 1964, which was called by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the PLO was established to express the will of the Palestinian people and to be an official body demanding their right to self-determination. The summit called on the Palestinian representative, Ahmed al-Shuqairi, to contact Palestinians and write a report to be submitted to the next summit. Subsequently, al-Shuqairi toured the Arab countries and communicated with Palestinians. During his tour, the drafts of the National Charter and the Statutes of the PLO were agreed upon and it was decided that a general Palestinian conference would be held (As'ad, 1987).

The establishment of the PLO and Al-Shuqairi correspondences for the national conference triggered different reactions among the Palestinian parties. Despite the participation of some leaders of the parties in the first national conference, Al-Shuqairi asserted that the leaders' participation in the conference was personal. The establishment of the PLO encountered differing reactions: on one side was support for the PLO with many seeing the PLO as a representing body of the Palestinians and their aspirations, while on the other included many who criticized the formation of the PLO. The Arab Higher Committee opposed the declaration of the newly established PLO because Haj Amin Husayni considered himself the historical leader and the most deserving representative of Palestine. He believed that there was no need to establish any organization in the presence of the Arab Higher Committee. In addition, the Palestinian national liberation movement 'Fatah', argued that the PLO should be revolutionary and a base for the armed struggle. The military organization should be the basis of the Palestinian entity. The Ba'ath Party of Palestine stated that the PLO is not the struggling body that bears the burden of the battle for the liberation of Palestine. The Arab Nationalist Movement, in a joint statement with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Students Union and the Palestinian Arab Youth in Lebanon, called for free and fair elections to form the Palestinian entity which was the same idea as the Arab Higher Committee.

Later, Fatah led the PLO and made a political change in its organizational structure where it became an umbrella for movements, organizations, societies and individuals. The armed factions, led by Fatah, began to take decisive political decisions within the PLO including those which encouraged the fundamentals of Palestinian unity. This put the dialogue among the Palestinian factions at the forefront whenever the Palestinian arena faced a new turning point. The factions tended to tackle national unity through consensus without linking it to social powers. Accordingly, achieving national unity was through the agreement of concerned parties not on the social and popular level, which would also lead to national unity. This went beyond understanding the nature of relations between political parties

and society. Thus, privileges were maximized or minimized according to the roles of the independent political and social parties (Moneer, 2007).

The national unity of the Palestinians and the Palestinian political parties were not about commitment to specific agreement in the strict sense of the word, or adherence to the minimum programme (*Barnamij al-Hadd al-Adna*) similar to Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq or Vietnam. This means that there was a unity and a division at the same time. None of the parties were allowed to go beyond or violate its programme. The Palestinian division was the result of the nature of the Palestinians in diaspora, Arab disintegration, and Arab and international influences among the Palestinian political parties. The emergence of the Islamic movements in Palestine was the direct result of various factors nationally and regionally. Few of these groups employed religious ideology in their mobilization efforts and to promote national and religious identity (Albarghouti, 2009: 301–305).

This coincided with the decline of the national idea in general, and the disagreement of the Arabs, especially after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the Camp David agreement with Israel. It coincided with the failure of almost all projects proposed and adopted by the PLO. Finally, it also coincided with the ending of the Palestinian military existence in Beirut.

The division between Islamic movements themselves and between islamists from one side, and Nationalists and communists on the other side emerged right after their evolution in Gaza (Interview with Majdi , 2020, Gaza). The clashes between nationalists and Islamists started directly after the establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza in late 1970s. Besides that, there was and still a division between Islamic parties in Palestine. The dispute between the Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood is not based on ideological factors, but on what can be called the 'right understanding' of Islam, and how to deal with it and act under its guidance. It is important to note that the disagreements between both movements emerged as they had disputes over issues related to the details of major objectives and the ways to achieve them.

Historically, the conflicts and clashes between the two sides were concentrated in areas where there was heavyweight for both movements. Thus, they were not at the sector level; rather, the issue was relative and some of the differences between the two movements were reflected at mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For example, banners were found in front of mosques, some of them green banners of Hamas, others black for the jihad movement; mosques, then, were divided, and known to be a mosque of Hamas or for the jihad movement.

According to the charter of Hamas, it respects the Palestinian national movement and the PLO, and appreciates their efforts. However, Hamas rejects the idea of secularism because it believes that this will not lead to liberation. Hamas stressed the rule of national unity, the inviolability of Palestinian blood and the avoidance of any Palestinian in fighting. When the PLO asked Hamas to join its ranks, Hamas had some conditions, such as rejecting political solutions, refusing to recognize Israel and UN resolutions and demanding 40 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly. The PLO refused these conditions, as Fatah and other political parties thought that Hamas was planning to take over PLO, while its

representation among the Palestinians does not account to 40 per cent (Nofal, 1996: 145).

After the establishment of the PA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PLO initiated a dialogue in 1996. The first official meeting between the PA and Hamas after the decision of the council of ministers was on 2 November 1996, and it was held in the office of General Amin al-Hindi, head of the General Intelligence Service, and under the chairmanship of the secretary general of the presidency Tayeb Abdel Rahim. The meeting led to the first direct understanding between Hamas and the PLO, in which Hamas agreed to freeze its military struggle against Israel and control the imprisoning of Hamas activists by the PA. In 1997, both parties agreed to develop a working mechanism for the secretariat of the dialogue.

These dialogue sessions resulted in organizing the National Unity Conference on 20 July 1997 in Gaza. The conference discussed several key issues, including negotiations about the Israeli occupation, the issue of political prisoners, the consolidation of the concept of national unity as a practice on the ground, the promotion of the concept of resistance, accountability of the corrupted and the promotion of democracy (Kanafani, 2007).

In 2006, Hamas won the parliamentary elections, and in 2007 took over the Gaza Strip, routing Fatah and PLO forces. Ibrahim Ibrash, an academic and writer, observed that the roots of the division are a series of differences. He argues that the main differences began with the establishment of Hamas in late 1987 and gradually deepened until it was possible to undermine the pillars of national liberation (Ibraash, 2009).

Historically, the parties have not been able to reach an agreement in both the early 1980s and in the era of the First Intifada. The beginning of the era of the PA has witnessed some dialogues, and when the PA was able to tighten its security grip on matters after the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the situation changed. After many dialogues, the two parties reached a series of agreements in Cairo, Yemen, Mecca, Gaza, Algeria and others. However, the division continues to affect the Palestinians who live in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

A broken society

The internal divisions and conflicts between Palestinians have created two political entities that were already fragmented geographically by the Israeli occupation. These two entities have their own ideological, administrative and bureaucrat differences. The most recent division has affected the 'Palestinian Project' that was adopted by PLO in 1974 which entailed the establishment of the Palestinian state in any part of Palestine (Gresh and Berrett, 1988: 18–48). The 2007 military control by Hamas in the Gaza Strip created two political entities that included two ministries with two prime ministers, disabling the work of the parliament. While Hamas claimed its legitimacy from the parliamentary elections, the Palestinian president and Fatah turned to the PLO charter and the central council of the POL to legitimize their authority.



Map 7.1 Gaza Strip and the West Bank: Separated geographically.

Source: Juaidi et al. (2016). 'An Overview of Renewable Energy Potential in Palestine.' Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 65: 943–60.

The consequences of the Palestinian political division had a direct impact on the society and its relation to the state's institutions. One major gap is the absence of the legislative authority that oversees the work of the government, and the work of the security agencies. This led to severe violations of law and human rights (ILBU, 2016).

Many scholars have tried to examine the causes and consequences of the political division on Palestinian society. Ibrahim Abrash argues that the division between Fatah and Hamas is catastrophic that led to not only political but also societal, cultural and financial issues, as well as burying any hope for a geographical unification between Gaza and the West Bank. He examined the intersections between the siege on Gaza, political division and the reconciliation process and how it influences the Palestinian society in Gaza. He also suggested that the current political division will continue, affecting all aspects of politics and society (Abrash, 2015).

Alijla has published an article on the impact of the political division between Hamas and Fatah on the understanding of democracy and democratic values. The findings suggest that the youth has a distorted understanding of democracy, where it changed in 2007 from being mainly related to elections and the performance of the government to the provision of basic foods and freedom of movements in 2017 (Alijla, 2018a).

Azzam Shaath studied the roots of the Palestinian division, paying special attention to the ideological differences between the Hamas and Fatah, and the barriers towards reconciliation. He concluded that the 2006–7 clashes have caused great harm to the Palestinians and destroyed the trust between Fatah and Hamas and their members (Shaath, 2013). The majority of scholarly work among the Palestinians focused on the relationship between Fatah and Hamas, the causes of the political division and the barriers towards achieving a meaningful and serious reconciliation. With the exception of a few analyses and papers, there is little literature written on the impact of the political division on the Palestinians.

The first report that examines the effect of the political division on families and familiar relationships was researched by the Women Affairs Center in Gaza. It provided shocking testimonies by Palestinian women of how the division affected the relationships between families that in many cases heightened the violence against women as well as the divorce rate (WCF, 2008).

In his master's thesis, Ouda Awad examined the effect of the political division on social relations among the Palestinians. He argues that the division severely affected the relationship between individuals in the society, especially within the families that lost one of their members. He asserts that the division had undermined the social resilience of the families, which became part of political mobilization. His argument stresses that the cracks within social relations lead to high rate of violence, especially against women and among youth (Awad, 2011). While Awad examined the impact of the political division, he did not provide a clear mechanism of how the division affects these relations.

Not only academics but also policymakers have expressed their fears from the negative consequences of the division. For instance, Nasser Eddin al Saher, Hamas member and a former minister of education said back in 2008, 'The ongoing political division has catastrophic consequences . . . the society is collapsing, and the Palestinian political parties has become a burden on the society, and the regime is becoming more authoritarian' (Aljazeera, 2009).

In the same interview, former member of the legislative council Hussam Khader asserted that political division had affected all aspects of political, social and economic life, expressing his fear that the continuation of the political division, by creating two political entities, separated geographically, socially and culturally, would lead to the end of the Palestinian society from within.

Maher Abu Zant, a political sociologist from Al-Najah University in the West Bank, argues that while the focus is on the political side of the division, the actual effect is on the social fabric of Palestinian society. For Abu Zant, the result of the political division is brain drain, immigration and violence which is clear within the society. Raed Naerat from Nablus agrees with Abu Zant, yet he asserts that the political division deepened the social tensions, which decreases the resilience and social cohesion of the society.

Batniji's analysis and exploration clarify how the political division extended to affect the social structure of the society in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He explains how the political division increased violence among families and created a tribal–political division where some tribes and families cut the relationships with others because of political orientation. Moreover, there was an increased phenomenon of marriage based on political affiliations as well as the divorce wave that hit the Palestinian society after 2007. He argues,

> The relation between society and the political system, and between social structures and political institutions is an inevitable and irreversible, because the political reality is composed of a set of elements that depend on each other for a social reality and that the other society is not isolated. Some of them to others, and that our reading of reality requires the study of political sociology. (Batniji, 2010)

Batniji argues that political division has a negative influence on two main structures in the Palestinian society: school and family. One of the main augments in Batnjini equilibrium is the tribal sectarian nature of the Palestinian society that has not been developed politically or culturally to form a lobbying force over politicians to ensure good governance, rule of law and that politicians abide the constitutions. According to him, the Palestinian society has not succeeded to bring about the structural and comprehensive changes that build modern and law-based social and political institutions.

After the creation of the PA in 1994, the chairman of the PLO and president of PA, Yasser Arafat, used his power to create a network of loyalists from different tribes and classes from the society in the Gaza Strip (Alijla, 2013). In such a way, he directly created a competition between the different tribes and families to gain more

privileges and high-ranking positions. Moreover, Marwan Kanafani, the special adviser to Arafat, noted that security forces were also fragmented along sectarian and tribal lines: regionalism, tribalism, refugees and natives, rural versus urban and most recently the returnees (Kanafani, 2007). The returnees are the group of Palestinians who accompanied Arafat in 1994 to Gaza. They were more privileged than the rest of the Palestinians as they mostly worked in senior positions and had easy access to the president's office, which facilitated nepotism and corrupt practices through formal and informal networks. Interestingly, Kanafani explores the lines where security apparatuses were formed. He argues that specific security agencies were mostly from refugees (the preventive security), while *Mukhabarat* (Intelligence) were led by *Mowatnin* and were native Gazans.

Besides that, many studies examined the effect of political division on women. These studies confirmed the severe negative consequences on women in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The study's findings suggested that there were structural differences between the level of negative impact on women in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, mainly the level of violence against women (Muftah, 2017).

Other studies examined the effect of the political division on the provision of public services. These studies emphasize that the lack of coordination mechanism and two administrative and bureaucratic apparatuses led to a lack of efficiency and effectivity in delivering public services, and in many cases contradictions in administrative decrees that resulted in the total shutdown of specific bureaucratic agencies (OCHA, 2015).

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, thousands of civil and security employees (more than 67,000) were either forced by the PA in Ramallah to stop working or were prevented by the Hamas de-facto government from working. However, the PA in Ramallah allowed around 9,000 employees in education and health sectors to work, leaving more than 50,000 unemployed but paid by the PA in Ramallah until early 2018 (AlIqtisadiya, 2014). To fill the gap of employee shortages, Hamas' de-facto government appointed thousands of their loyalists in both security and civil services. Their numbers were more than 40,000. Since 2013, Hamas has been unable to run the Gaza Strip, and pay their employees as a result of the closure of the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which were a major financial resource due to taxation (SasaPost, 2012). In addition, the Syrian crisis which Hamas allied itself with the rebels against Iran-backed Syrian regime affected negatively Hamas financing. The Syrian regime and Iran funded Hamas since 2007 financially that kept them running the Gaza Strip without the need of other resources (Reuters, 2017b). When Hamas leadership expressed their support for the Syrian rebels and their armed militants, Iran and Syria halted their financial support to Hamas in Gaza.

According to OCHA,

> These factors have severely weakened the capacity of public institutions to deliver basic services, including in areas such as housing, health, education, water and sanitation, and electricity supply. The lack of salary payments to those

> employed by the Gaza authorities since 2007 has had a direct impact on the living conditions of these families. (OCHA, 2015)

In general, the political division and the creation of new informal institutions within the society, as a result of distrust in political parties, institutions and also between themselves, required a new social contract. Most of the scholars agree that there is a serious structural and functional crisis affecting the social and political structures, relations, concepts and forms of work prevailing in Palestinian politics.

Social capital and trust in Palestine

There have been several studies that examine social capital in Palestine. These studies explore the relationship between social capital and different social phenomena such as public health, democracy and employability. Abu-Qare's work assesses the effects of social capital, which according to the study, is composed of networks among individuals and institutions, which is based on trust and civil engagement on health programmes. He concludes that social capital has a high impact on health in Palestine, and that successful NGOs that work in the health sector depend on social capital as a mechanism to heighten their impact (Abu-Qare, 2011).

Rita Giacama et al.'s study on social capital among the youth in Palestine reveals a low level of social capital among Palestinian youth, asserting that the youth's feelings of exclusion is one of the primary reasons. Their study demonstrates deep-seated lack of trust, and understandable disappointment with the Palestinian leadership. They note that the 'generally vulnerable situation of most Palestinian communities make for a painful living reality characterised by increasing loss of trust and hope for reducing the suffering which Palestinians endure' (Giacaman, 2017).

Other studies examine the relationship between social capital and trust as related to the employability of Palestinian university graduates. They confirm the link between a higher probability of employment and social capital yet suggest that particularistic trust plays a major role in the employability of recent graduates (Al-Sharabati, 2015).

In 2007, Naser and Hilal conducted a social capital survey which examined many variables including trust in political institutions and political parties. They found that more than 75 per cent of the sample in the West Bank and Jerusalem lack trust in other people in general. They found that trust is higher in towns than in the countryside, while businessmen have higher levels of generalized trust than others in the society. The survey indicated varying levels of trust in clan members, neighbours and religious and political leaders. In camps, trust in the tribes was highest and in politicians the least. Trust in religious leaders, politicians and work colleagues falls as the education level of respondents rises (Nasr and Hilal, 2007).

Amaney Jamal examined the effect of social capital and interpersonal trust on democracy and democratic attitudes. Using data from 2007, and following Putnam's

making democracy flagship work, she examined the role of civil engagement, interpersonal trust and support for institutions among association members in the West Bank. Jamal's analysis focused only on the West Bank, and not the Gaza Strip. She offers an insight into how and when social capital aids democratic institutions (Scott et al., 2007). However, her analysis did not examine the Gaza Strip, and did not seek any explanation for the effect of political institutions/division on the level of generalized trust.

Luca Andriani examined the relationship between social capital and Palestinian attitude towards corruption using the AB survey in 2007. His findings suggest that aversion to corruption is lower for Palestinians involved in associated activities. He explains that by building an argument around the possibility that

> individuals that are more involved in voluntary activities might also be more aware about the dysfunctional characteristics of the public institutions and hence more willing to pursue their social goals through the participation to associations. (Andriani, 2014)

Nadia Abu-Zaher explored the relationship between social capital and democracy in Palestine and Egypt. Her findings reinforce Jamal's initial argument that stresses the positive relationship between social capital and democracy (Abu-Zaher, 2013).

None of these researchers examined generalized trust as a significant part of social capital. The majority of these studies focused on social capital associational and civil engagement components, which, as was discussed in the first, second and third chapters, can have a negative effect on trust and social capital, since not all members of any association would have a positive impact on the society. Besides that, none of these studies examined the effect of political division on the level of trust between people.

Despite the lack of studies that examine trust in the Palestinian society, interviews and other literature stress the sandwich situation that compresses the Palestinian society; the first is occupation, and its siege on the Gaza Strip, and the second is the Palestinian division. The consequences are frustration, hopelessness, distrust in the system and between each other, and extremism (Alijla, 2015).

The data from the Arab Barometer show great decline in the level of social trust. Between 2007 and 2016, distrust between people increased by almost 20 per cent. In 2007, 59 per cent of people said that most people were not trustworthy. In 2011, it increased to 76 per cent. While 2013 witnessed an increase in the level of trust, it showed a sharp increase in distrust in 2016 to reach 80 per cent. The increase in trust in the third wave of the AB coincided with the reconciliation agreement signed between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo at the end of May 2012, and the survey that was conducted by the end of the year (Alaraby, 2015).

According to the Palestinian centre of policy and survey research, in March 2012, 46 per cent of Palestinians believed that reconciliation will succeed and 49 per cent believed it will not succeed (PCPSR, 2012). However, in September 2012, which was right after the signing of the Cairo agreement, 42 per cent believed that unity will not achieved, 14 per cent thought it would return soon and 40 per



Figure 7.2 Trust in Palestine by region (2018).

cent thought it would return but only after a long time (PCPSR, 2012). The hope that Palestinians had in the aftermath of the reconciliation agreement increased the level of trust. The trust in political parties, the feeling of security and safety, and the ability to end human rights violations among the Palestinians increased. Celebrations where Fatah and Hamas members participated in jointly evidenced emotional moments which led to the belief that reconciliation was underway. The shock came afterwards where trust dropped sharply to reach 80 per cent in 2018-2019 of distrust as Figure 7.2.

Political division and trust

In this chapter, I argue that the low level of generalized trust can be explained not only by historical and inherited distrust but also by institutional factors such as political division that undermines societal and political practices.

I use four different waves of the AB data in this chapter. The AB is used to obtain data on political and societal attitudes of citizens in Palestine.[3] Besides that, semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect information about study subjects' personal feelings about other sects and about the impact of formal institutions on the relationship between individuals from different sects.

The first wave of the data comes from 2007 right after the internal division, and the last survey was conducted in February 2016. The fifth wave was conducted in October 2018 with a sample of 2,493 including Jerusalem. The AB survey was based on nationally representative samples of adults aged eighteen years

and older. Study participants were distributed proportionally to the population size. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted in Arabic using a complex sample design, which included stratification and clustering. The survey was stratified by the West Bank and Gaza and then by provinces within each region. The sample was further divided by type of settlement (urban, rural and refugee camp). Interviews were distributed proportional to population. Census blocks, which comprise approximately 150 residential units, represent the primary sampling unit (PSU). Households were randomly selected in clusters of ten. Within each household, a Kish grid was used to select the final respondent. A total of 820 respondents were interviewed in urban areas, 220 in rural areas and 160 in refugee camps.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with academic civil service professionals and non-political public figures. Observations made during conversations with taxi drivers and shopkeepers were recorded where it is applicable. Interview data were collected and analysed.

Logistic regression was used to explain the effect of political division on generalized trust as a dependent variable. As generalized trust is binary, the regressions showed the degree of change to be either more trust or less trust. To ensure the analysis was properly conducted, data were gleaned from records that have missing data. As opposed to the Lebanese case study, the Palestinian model has picked up the most relevant independent variables, as well as the demographic data.

The model illustrates the various determinants and examines its impact on the level of generalized trust. Based on the literature review and observations of the Palestinian society for the last eleven years, the model will check how satisfaction on the performance of the governments, violations of human rights, the concern of the political leaders on public issues and the presence of corruption impact the level of trust in Palestinian society.

Trust is measured as a dichotomous variable and can take either 0 (trust) or 1 (distrust). Government performance was presented in three variables: (1) the feeling of security and safety in the society, (2) the level of satisfaction with the education system and (3) the performance of government in creating employment opportunities (see appendix F). Institutional determinants contain four other determinants: (1) violation of human rights, (2) presence of corruption, (3) participation in informal education and (4) trust in courts and legal system. Another variable is the perception of survey participants on the performance of political leaders. The models tried to capture the extent to which the different variables influence the level of generalized trust in Palestinian society. Each of these variables has a direct relation with the political division in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The violation of human rights, where people are arrested based on their political affiliations, corruption and the poor performance in public institutions amid the bureaucratic division have intensified the Palestinian political division.

In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that political division has an influence on generalized trust. This hypothesis examines the invariability with regard to (1) the role of governmental performance in the form of institutional determinants on the

Table 7.1 Statistical models: Generalized trust in Palestine

Predictor	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4)[1] Model 4
Feeling of safety and security		–.01	–.01	.47***
		(.01)	(.01)	(.09)
Participation in non-formal activities		.13	.10	.30***
		(.19)	(.19)	(.08)
Quality of educational system	.22**	.23**	.23*	.42***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.08)
Gov. performance in creating jobs		–01	–.01	.02
		(.007)	(.007)	(.01)
Corruption	–.07*	.02*	.02*	–.00
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.003)
Political leaders are concerned about needs		–005	–.005	.003
		(.005)	(.005)	(.00)
Trust in of the courts and legal system	.29***	.30***	.29***	–.002
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.00)
Violation of human rights	–.3*	–.28*	–.29*	Y
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	
Employment status			.18	–.00
			(.18)	(.00)
Education level			–06	.01
			(.6)	(.02)
Gender			02	.02
			(.17)	(.12)
Constant	.66		.52	–1.0
	(.44)		(.65)	(.35)
Observations	1,107		1,145	2,489
Pseudo R^2	0.034		0.046	0.048

Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses underneath
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
[1] Based on the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer 2018–19
Y: Not asked in 2018–19 wave

level of generalized trust and (2) the effect of corruption and violation of human rights on the level of generalized trust.

$H_{\text{-Static}}$ political divisions have no influence on the level of generalized trust
$H_{\text{-Dynamic}}$ political determinants have influence on the level of generalized trust

Results from the logit model are shown in Table 7.1. Model 1 includes variables which represent the most important factors that were observed during KIIs and personal observations. These variables represent the presence of human rights violations, the trust in courts and legal system, corruption and the government performance in education system. This model shows that trust in courts and the legal system is significant and positively correlated with generalized trust. The higher

the lack of trust in courts and legal system, the more people tend to believe that people are untrustworthy. Based on the data, the majority of people who answered that they trust the courts and legal system (40%) said that anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble. Yet, we have to consider that only 9 per cent have great deal of trust in the courts and legal system, and 31 per cent have quite a lot of trust. In Gaza, 54 per cent of surveyed individual said that they have no trust at all in courts and the legal system, which was 61 per cent in the West Bank.

Other variables are the presence of corruption in Palestine. It shows that the belief that corruption is present in the government is significantly linked to generalized trust as showed in chapter five. This implies that the more individuals assert the presence of corruption, the more likely he or she is to distrust people. Moreover, the presence of human rights violations also shows a significant correlation with generalized trust. The interpretation of such findings is complicated and would not be easily understood without understanding the Palestinian society, its politics and the anthropology of the Palestinian society. In this model, I find that human rights violations are negatively correlated with trust. This means that anyone who believes that there are no human rights violations being committed, the more highly they are going to trust others. Of course, anyone who has affiliations with the ruler would say that there are no human rights violations. What is clear is that more than 70 per cent of Palestinians believe that there are human rights violations. Any individual who would say that there is a high level of human rights violations committed would have higher probability to distrust others, too, at a significant level. More than 75 per cent of Palestinians believe that there are human rights violations in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The last variable is the evaluation of public services, which is represented here by the educational system. It implies that the more a person is dissatisfied, the high probability he or she will distrust other people. More than 50 per cent are dissatisfied with the public services provided by the governments in both areas.

I develop model 2 by adding two more variables to it which are the feelings of security and safety for self and family, and the participation in non-formal activities in the society. In model 2, feelings of security and safety are negatively correlated with the level of generalized trust. The more a person is feeling secure, the higher they would trust others. Moreover, the more individuals participate in extra and non-formal activities, the higher they would trust other individuals in the society.

Model 3 adds other demographic variables, trying to control how they would affect the first two models. These demographic variables are employment status, gender and education level. The absence of age in the dataset of the AB have been a challenge to include in the analysis. The model shows that the demographic variables have no significant impact on the level of trust.

The three models provide empirical evidences that political division, which is characterized by corruption, poor public services, partisan courts and legal system as well as human rights violations, will have an impact on the level of trust. Moreover, it shows that the feeling of insecurity and safety for self and for family members and the absence of participation in extra-curricular and non-formal education programmes would result in less trust within the community.

The findings of the logistic regression are very relevant to the current situation in Palestine, where hopelessness, frustration and insecurity are prevailing, especially in the Gaza Strip. Trust, which is a very crucial part in any society, has been collapsing, contributing negatively to any effort in maintaining or shutting down any conflict. Considering issues such as security and safety, human rights violations and quality of public services would increase fragility of peace in any society, and the Palestinian society is at greater risk of conflict, considering the military occupation and oppression it is facing.

These results suggest that ending the political division, integrating bureaucratic systems, ending human rights violations and advancing courts and the legal system are necessary to retain trust in the long term. Moreover, institutions and their bureaucratic mechanism should not be partisan or politically divided between any parties in a consociational mechanism.

The creation of hybrid society

As the analysis shows, the trust has been affected by the political division. However, the indirect results of the political division are the main cause of the declining level of trust and not the political division per se. As Karim Abu Ross argues,

> the absence of accountability in the formal institutions, which have become partisan. Not for everyone. The absence of social justice and equality, rule of law. Also the violation of human rights and arbitrary arrests of whomever criticize the rulers. These are results of the division, and they affect trust.[4]

In the same way, Abedalsalam Al Hayek, a Palestinian activist, stresses the fact that the absence of accountability and transparency and the growth of privileged class of people from the main two parties lead to less trust between people. He says, 'The political and economic instability, which resulted in a huge gaps in the living conditions, that marginalised huge bulk of the society contributed to less trust.'[5] Aziz Almasri, a Palestinian historian, observes the societal aspect of the political division.

He argues,

> The political division played a major role in destroying the trust between people, but we shall consider that the Palestinian society is tribal one. But after division, tribalism overlapped with political parties' affiliations, which caused a very hateful atmosphere between families. We have reached, in Gaza, that families do not marry from others because of political affiliation.[6]

Yet, he stresses that the political division created new class that are affiliate with Hamas and its de-facto government.

In the West Bank, answers were not different from their counterparts in Gaza. An interviewee argued that the level of oppression and arbitrary arrest by the police and security apparatuses in the West Bank intensified the division and doubt

between people. Another one said, 'I am graduate from university, but because of my political affiliation, I was not hired despite my high scores and passing the main interviews and written texts.'[7] *Al-Salama AL Amniya* is a mechanism to single out potential public service employees who are not affiliated with the ruling party. This policy was initially adapted in 1995 by the PA and continues till today (Al Habil and Ghazali, 2017).

However, there are contrasting accounts of the effect of political division on trust by region. As the data show, trust in the West Bank is less than in the Gaza Strip. This is explainable since Gaza is greatly affected by tribal values and norms. There are informal institutions that govern the locals based on their tribes and their affiliations, which does not exist at the same level and size as in the West Bank. Abu Ross says that in the West Bank the division had less consequences. It remained under the same bureaucratic mechanism and security agencies. In Gaza, the period between 2006 and 2008 witnessed high number of causalities where in some cases dozens were killed from the same tribe or family in clashes with Hamas. Besides that, the Israeli siege imposed on the Gaza Strip since 2006 pressured the economy and society to greater level.

AlMassri stresses that in the West Bank, and mainly after the political division, Gaza was marginalized and West Bankers looked to Gazans as inferiors (which all interviewees from Gaza agreed upon). Besides that, the carelessness of the West Bankers concerning the sufferings of the Gazans have contributed to loss of trust between them.

Yet, Al-Hayek and Hamayel have argued that the political division between Hamas and Fatah has the same consequences on both parts of the population. They note that 'The two governments and rulers exercised their authoritarian rules over the people and the corruption is widespread in both governments'.[8]

The political division provided an opportunity for certain people to create a new class that are more privileged than the rest of the Palestinians. They acted and worked against the will of the people, serving their own personal whims. This is also true when certain political affiliates are excluded and singled out socially, politically and harassed economically. The Hamas–Fatah split created a crack within the Palestinian families, which suffered considerably in the last eleven years. A report by the Women Affairs Center has documented dozens of stories of families that have been torn apart, weddings which were cancelled and incidences of violence within the society (Belbisi, 2008).

The political division led to less trust in political parties, mainly between Hamas and Fatah, which in return de-legitimized them among the youth in particular who see political parties as a main factor in their misery. Yet, one important factor is the taming of the Palestinians who believe that a unification has become a deeply buried dream. From 2006 to 2018, more than ten agreements were either signed or declared to be implemented, but the results were always more fragmentation and division with intensified media hostilities between the Hamas and Fatah. The routine of signing a reconciliation agreement and providing a fake promise and hopes to the people led to more distrust towards both parties, and increased hopelessness, frustration and political alienation among the Palestinians, especially within the younger generation.

The decreasing level of trust between the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the change in their understanding of the principles of democracy and democratic values, has led to the creation of a hybrid society (Alijla, 2018a). The hybrid society is a result of a deep polarization among the Palestinians, mainly of the youth. 'Hybrid society' is a term borrowed from cultural studies in Homi Bhabha's famous study on identities (Bhabha, 1988). Hybridity in society can be discussed through the framework of psychological analysis, which refers to determining hybridity through defining the other or the otherness of a group different in political or cultural affiliation, yet within a homogeneous ethnic or religious group, which creates a high level and quick alternation in opinions under internal and external effects, and not from an individual's own beliefs. Hybridity gets its strength from its ability to impact emotions, opinions and behaviours, through comprising unauthentic opinions and emotions, presenting it as one block to the outside. Therefore, in a hybrid society, opinions are not presented as authentic or new, but through its strength as unprecedented. Moreover, hybridity leads to new phenomena and discourse within the society, as it spread mainly through social media. This provides wider space for a new wave of negotiation, manoeuvring and alienation on issues such as legitimacy, representation and the meaning of specific social phenomena.

The decreasing level of generalized trust in Palestinian society has created space for political polarization to intensify the creation of hybrid society, where members of the society would be affected by their political affiliations as well as by their eagerness for new opinions that play on their emotions and cultural values.

In almost every controversial public issue, the Palestinian society changes its opinions and positions, proving to have a cultural hybridity. This can be measured through social media debate, which I have been following for the last decade as an active social media user and also as a scholar. In general, social media discussions are not only representations of the general political and societal atmosphere in Palestine but also a force that affects the general public opinion. Despite the absence of an academic definition of hybrid society, Jonathan Rutherford and Homi Bhabha, in their definition of hybridity, which is borrowed from the negotiation politics field in plural societies, argue that hybridity can be found when a new form of coalition or changes of force push an individual or a group to alter and rethink their main and authentic opinions that fit within a specific context. The new formulated opinions may oppose their authentic values and norms (Rutherford, 1990: 36). This is considered a negotiation technique to serve powerful political elites in the society, assisting in ensuring their dominance or upholding their power.

The connection between generalized trust and hybridity in the community is that low trust facilitates the mechanism of otherness. It also accelerates alternation and change in opinions that reflects the will of the political elites/parties. The complexity of hybrid society is that its members accept contrasting opinions, within a very short period of time that support the position of political elites. However, this hybridity works to alter the public opinion by distracting the public from the

core issue being debated. In such a way, it serves a specific party by re-routing the direction of the debate to secondary topics that do not hold condemnation of elites of a party. In many cases, secondary topics that are brought up as a manoeuvring mechanism are more related to religious issues or cultural traditions, which make it easy to mobilize people, shifting their opinions away from criticizing the regime and its practices. In many cases, centralized mechanisms are used by elites of political parties to influence public opinions.

The Palestinian society suffers from deep polarization that resulted in decreasing level of trust and the distortion of democratic values as a result of the political division between Hamas and Fatah; it also shows a confusing perception towards serious issues related to the governance structure. This is a stronger manifestation of the hybridity of the society. According to the Arab Barometer, which published data from 2016 polls, there are many contrasting opinions (Barometer, 2016). For instance, almost 40 per cent of Palestinians agree that religious clerics should have influence over the decision of the government, while 56 per cent oppose that, and 42 per cent says that democracy is always preferable as a political system. At the same poll 72 per cent say that religious leaders should not interfere in politics, especially voter choices, and almost 41 per cent said that laws of the country should be entirely based on Sharia and around 9 per cent agreed that laws should be mostly from Sharia. Only 36 per cent said that laws should be mix between Sharia and the will of the people, while 9 per cent said that it should be only based on the will of the people. In the same poll, 68 per cent said that they prefer a religious political party, while less than 20 per cent said they prefer a non-religions political party. In the same poll, and against Sharia's inheritance principles, more than 90 per cent agreed that women should be equal when it comes to inheritance.

Concerning women rights, almost 64 per cent said that they strongly agree or agree that woman can be president or prime minister of a Muslim country, while only 35 per cent opposed that. However, in the same poll, 71 per cent said that men are better political leaders than women. In the same poll, more than 86 per cent said that they strongly agree or agree that a married woman can work outside the home if she wishes, while 13 per cent opposed that. Shockingly, in the same poll, 51 per cent said that husbands should always have the final say in all decisions concerning the family, and only 50 per cent opposed that. These kinds of data show the high level of confusion or alternation in opinions based on trends of effects of media or contextual narratives. When discussing this data with a researcher from Gaza, he explained the findings by saying, 'They [Who show support of women issues]want to look cool when it comes to women issues, because if a person opposes that, he would seem to be regressive and conservative.[9]'

As we have seen, hybridity in opinions can also affect opinions and perceptions on certain and crucial issues. Therefore, hybridity can be seen in many divided societies, including Palestine as a politically divided society. In the recent decade, the Palestinian political and societal conditions were unhealthy and unsatisfying for the general public. There were accusations that writers, intellectuals and activists were foreign spies and implementing foreign agendas or were supported by one party or another. Not only that, but in many cases, Hamas put Palestinians from



Figure 7.3 Trust in political parties in Palestine (2015–16).

Gaza on trial, and their felony/crime was 'spying for Ramallah' (Abu Sahamallah, 2014). In 2017, following intensified calls for halting the security coordination between Israel and the PA, many called for demonstration in Ramallah, against a Fatah-backed security apparatus. Many women participated in the protest. Security forces attacked the protesters brutally, causing huge condemnation across the Palestinian society and international human rights organizations (Amnesty, 2017). To divert the public opinions, Fatah's official Facebook page shared a picture of two women, smoking cigarettes away from the demonstration, quoting 'is this what the Palestinian society want?' This incident opened a new and complicated debate in social media that diverted the public opinion towards debating a secondary issue, leaving the condemnation of Fatah forces and the PA security apparatus' treatment of the protesters. Fatah, the party that triggered this debate, is a socialist and secular party that advocates for women's participation and engagement in the struggle against the occupation. By doing this, they are trying to divert the public opinion, although it opposes the beliefs and mottos of the political party they are active within and mobilize for.

The manifestations and signs of a hybrid society are the result of decreasing generalized trust, corruption and political alienation of the youth which is due to deep political polarization. Political parties, mainly Hamas and Fatah, are engaged within the public in a hidden and intangible, invisible quasi-negotiation process through laying down a number of sensitive issues that matter to the public to mobilize them or create a third sphere where the two main contrasting and extreme opinions remain as the focal points which both Hamas and Fatah succeeded to gather people around. This is usually the end of any public opinion issue that condemns either Fatah or Hamas. Without doubt, the use of public

opinion diversion, through the creation of hybrid society (attitudes and culturally) has very serious and hazardous consequences on the society and mainly on youth. It empowers the authority of both Hamas and Fatah, as authoritarian and divided parties who control the two main segments of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the use of paid activists to influence and alter the public opinion through creating a hybrid society may create a chaotic and confusing environment for the majority of Palestinians assisting in spreading extremist opinions. All of this would lead to hazardous consequences. First, an increase in the alienation of the youth and higher level of apathy towards any public issues – political, economic or societal. For the public, mainly youth who are not affiliated with one party, the engagement in such discussions is costly, mentally, psychologically, perhaps socially and more extreme economically, such as suspension of their salaries by the PA in Ramallah or detention by Hamas/PA forces. This includes academics, civil society activists, writers and theorists on both sides in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Second, the creation of a hybrid society will provide greater space for the de-facto authorities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to exercise their whims over the will of the people. They will continue human rights violations, detentions, security coordination with the Israeli occupation, corruption, absence of accountability and turning a deaf ear to the demands of people.

In general, the hybrid society is usually the first step in de-structuring and re-structuring the attitudes and perceptions on crucial issues that are needed for a healthy society. The absence of trust between citizens usually creates a space for political parties to influence people through corrupt channels. The absence of trust leads to a hybrid society that has no public consultation on serious issues as well as lack of democratic process within the political parties that present the general governance pattern that both Fatah and Hamas are using to govern the society.

The decreasing level of generalized trust among the Palestinians led to a decreasing level of trust on political parties, as well as political institutions. As Figure 7.3 here shows there is a decreasing level of trust in all political institutions. The low level of generalized trust is sadly accompanied by low levels of trust in the political institutions, especially in divided societies.

Conclusion

The data available from the AB show that the level of generalized trust in Palestine is declining since the first wave in 2007. The declining level of generalized trust has not yet attracted researchers to examine the impact of political division on social capital and trust in particular. This chapter examines the impact of political division on the level of trust. It employs quantitative methods and qualitative data based on interviews and personal observations of the researcher on the political division since the beginning in 2006.

The chapter provides a historical background on the Palestinian society and division since the beginning of 1900s. Based on the literature review that mostly focuses on the impact of the political division on the society, the quantitative

analysis variables were selected to represent the different arguments that were presented in chapter three and four. After the analysis, this chapter examines the severe consequences of the political division and declining trust by presenting the concept of 'hybrid society'.

The trust in courts and the legal system, the perception of corruption, the quality of public services, violations of human rights committed by the two governments, the feeling of insecurity and lack of safety, and the lack of extra-curricular, non-formal education were all found to have an impact on the level of generalized trust. People who feel insecure and unsafe in a society, and those who have not participated in non-formal education, are more likely to distrust others. High levels of trust were found to persist among the groups of individuals who are satisfied with the legal system and courts and satisfied with the performance of the two governments in creating job opportunities. One interesting finding is that individuals who think that politicians are concerned about the needs of the public are more likely to trust others in the society. Moreover, the analysis showed that the same level of trust is common in the two regions, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In conclusion, this chapter provides an examination of the hybrid society that was created as a result of the political division in Palestine. It also attests to the relationship between trust and the political division that created different parallel institutions and bureaucratic mechanisms that complicated the lives of the Palestinian people. Most importantly, the increasing level of human rights violation committed by both Hamas and Fatah has contributed to the feelings of insecurity and distrust. The main argument maintains that trust is based on the cognitive feeling of threat to personal safety within a society and loss of faith in the legal system, courts, political parties and political system in general, which leads to more distrust within the society.

Chapter 8

DOOMED AFTER, DOOMED BEFORE:

TRUST IN SYRIA

Cartoon representing the Syrian Uprising without sectarianism © Syria Untold

> If tyranny was a man and wanted to talk about himself, he would say: I am evil, my father is injustice, my mother is offense, my brother is treachery, my sister is misery, my father's brother is harm, my mother's brother is humiliation, my son is poverty, my daughter is unemployment, my homeland is ruin, and my clan is ignorance, my country is destruction. As for my religion, honor and life they are money, money, money. (Al-Kawakibi, 2013: 64)

Introduction

In 2011, the Syrian uprising began in the city of Dera'a near the Jordanian border. Soon, the uprisings that overtook the whole country, including part of Damascus, were facing strong resistance from the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime's arrest and torture of Dera'a children for painting anti-government graffiti did not

consider the tribal nature of the city and the region. The outrage over the arrests of the children provided a solid ground for the youth to mobilize the masses against the regime (Sterling, 2012).

One of Dera'a activists who had left Syria for Turkey informed me that Syrians perceived this situation as an opportunity to call for political reform and that the arrests of the children was an opportunity to mobilize the people in Dera'a.

In 2014, I met a group of Syrian refugees at Milan Centrale Station who were on their way to Germany. I was volunteering at a local NGO that provided food and other basic needs to Syrian refugees. The refugees arrived in groups. I asked each group where they came from and everyone within each group usually came from the same city. Each group was separate and functioned in distinct ways on their way to Northern Europe. Having spent some time with them, on a daily basis, I learnt that there is a competition between each group, and within each group itself based on basic assistance and the ability to reach Germany before the other. There would be no offer from one group to help another. Ahmed from Deir Azzur told me of his interactions with other groups: 'If I tell them the way I will take to Europe, they will go first and leave me'. Another refugee misunderstood and believed that I had the decision to provide financial assistance to the refugees, informing me, 'That guy has a lot of money, he does not need, while those two guys [his cousins] have nothing and their home was destroyed.' This raised the issue of trust in my mind, in particular why there was a division in these people with a similar state of vulnerability where solidarity should be the norm and would be more helpful to their plight. I was curious to see the Palestinian-Syrian group and to find out about the dynamics between them in this situation. I asked one individual if it was true that the Palestinians enjoyed equality with Syrians in Syria better than the Palestinians in Lebanon. He said, 'yes, we were equal in oppression, dictatorship and injustice. The worst police branch is the Palestine Branch, equally for Syrian and Palestinians'. In many contexts, everyone was showing signals of distrust towards the other. They were sceptical towards me as well as I was a Palestinian. The Syrian and Kurds thought I might be favouring the Palestinians, while the Palestinians believed I was there to gather information about them. These beliefs were a reflection of the Syrian society and was an indication that Syria was facing not only a political dilemma but also a disintegration of the whole society.

Speaking of Syria's revolution and its end, in 2013, the Syrian author Al-Haj Saleh sees from miles away that the Syrian society was disintegrating as an entity, collapsing as a state and dissolving as an entity (Al-Haj Saleh, 2017). In his book, he not only examined the different ethnical or religious groups in Syria but also created a new way of examining the Syrian crisis from the lenses of different 'Syrias'. He argued that the Syria of al-Assad (Syria's president) is one of four or five different Syrias.[1] The first is Syria the revolution, which after two years seems to be confused and distracted in its politics, vision and self-awareness, and second the Salafist Syria that seemed to be controlling the broader Syria at that time, in addition to parts of southern and northern Syria. This Syria has two pillars, ISIS and Jabhat AL-Nusra (Al Nusra Front) which is the Al Qaeda branch in Syria.

The last Syria is the Kurdish Syria. Each of the Syrias that Al-Haj Saleh described is disconnected with the other, managed by either warlords or corrupt militants, where the inhabitants of these areas were never consulted nor have agreed to be controlled by any of their rulers. However, in Saleh's ideas, Syria's al-Assad is the main pillar of Syria's dissolution, deconstruction and disintegration. For him, the main factor that led to the current dissolution and destruction of the Syrian society is the state's institutions.

These different Syrias are also divided on ethno-religious lines. The Alwaite, Sunni, Kurds, Assyrian, Shia, Druze and others form the multiethnic and religious groups that comprise the population of Syria. This creates a multi-layered and political, ethnic and societal division. Therefore, I consider the current civil war or Syrian crisis as a semi-sectarian conflict and not a sectarian conflict because it employs class, religion, ethnicity, ideology, non-state and sub-state actors in the crisis. By saying that the current conflict is semi-sectarian, the primary argument is revived that Syria's institutions were the main reasons behind the current conflict, which resulted in low social capital and trust and paved the way towards the dissolution of the Syrian society. The situation in Syria is distinct from Lebanon and Palestine as the ruling group, used sectarianism as a political tool to sustain its rule. Moreover, the neoliberal economy that began around 2003 created a new way of capitalism in Syria. This kind of capitalism and neoliberal economy was linked to the Alwaites and the close circle of the al-Assad family. The sum of such political, economic and societal factors mentioned earlier led to the fall of the state as a social and political framework for freethinking, transparency, equality and national identity.

The failure of the Syrian state to provide minorities and other vulnerable groups with equal rights based on the concept of citizenship transformed the pluralistic society of Syria into a divisive Syrian society and state. In general, minorities such as Kurds, Assyrian and Turkman were not treated equally in Syria, which created a very special relationship between the regime and these minorities, where their relation to the regime was perceived from security perspective. In this sense, authoritarian regimes and dictatorships arguably fail to create the national identity through citizenship, freedom, political participation and consultation. In Syria, fuelling tribal and sectarian narratives is a political tool to provide a safety net and a base for the Syrian regime and leadership (Galioun, 2015).

The 2011 uprising in Syria showed a very distinctive society in Syria. Prior to 2011 the Syrian society found itself divided into three major components: loyalist, opponents and the swinging groups who did not affiliate with any group, but yet were affected by contexts. The opposition which formed the base for the Syrian revolution were mostly from the rural areas of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, Deir Azzur, Dara'a and the vulnerable suburbs of Damascus such as Hajar Aswad, Tadamun and Daf al-Shauk. The loyalists were mostly economic, financial and industrial elites in Damascus and Aleppo, religious minorities and limited middle-class populations that were created after 2003 (25% of the population). The swinging group was mostly from a wide class from Lattkia, Idlib, Deir Azzur and Hama. Kurds took the opportunity of the situation in post-2011 Syria to design

and implement their own political agenda which has a social base of around 10 per cent of the whole population in Syria (Mohammed, 2017). In 2011, the majority of Syrians, who are Sunni, did not mobilize themselves along ethnic and ethno-religious lines, but rather along class, economic, political, rural, urban and social lines. The rural areas in Syria were the base for the 2011 uprising, which started in Dera'a. The conflict that continues to take the lives of Syrians after more than seven years has not only affected the rural areas but has also caused destruction within the society inside Syria and abroad, especially among Syrian refugees in Europe and elsewhere.

The acceleration of the Syrian revolution to a civil war has led to unprecedented divisions within the Syrian population. Despite that, the impact of the crisis varied across the country. The destruction and the level of hostilities also varied from one city to another. Raqqa is the most affected region, then followed by Idlib, Hasaka, Deir Ezzur and Aleppo. Each of these regions experienced large-scale displacement and military operations that led to the destruction of the infrastructure, the city and also the social fabric of the local societies. The impact caused severe degradation of social relations. On the other hand, few cities that remained under the control of the Syrian regime witnessed the least destruction, such as Tartus, Damascus, Lattkia and Sweida (Sheena, 2018). Therefore, the level of sectarianism and hostilities can be matched with the level of destruction and the intensity of fight between the different groups. In 2018 new initiatives in the northern part of Syria were established to strengthen trust between Syrians. This includes formation of new political parties, such as 'Syria's Future' in Qamshli (ANHA, 2018). Based on that, this chapter explores the impact of the civil war and the intensity of hostilities on the level of generalized trust between Syrians.

This chapter discusses how the political institutions in Syria for long time created a society of distrust, playing on its nerves by dividing them onto classes that also overlaps with other several identities. The main argument of this chapter is that political institutions: monopoly of power, oppression of civil society, and securitization of the society lower the level of generalized trust. The following sections examine closely the effect of these institutions on the level of generalized trust.

This chapter will not discuss the institutions themselves, but rather the manifestations of these institutions on the society, considering that the QCA method in Chapter 4 has examined these institutions and the way they affect the level of generalized trust.

The political institutions in Syria and the engineering and configurations of the institutions for many decades have been put to serve a particular group. These institutions denied CSOs entry and participation, and used sectarianism as a political tool to empower that particular group (Ba'athist). Arbitrary public administration, inequality, political corruption and clientelism are institutions that, beside oppression and securitization (from security) of the society, have undermined the level of generalized trust.

Sectarian or divided society

Is Syria a divided society or sectarian society or both? In early 2011, and two months after the beginning of the Syrian uprisings, thousands of posters were seen across the streets of the main cities in Syria with phrases such as 'No to Sectarianism'. As response, Syrians organized the weekly protest in the end of April 2011 under the slogan 'No to Sectarianism' (Tlawy, 2011). These protests were suppressed by the iron fist of the government and with live ammunition, killing dozens. In one of the famous photos in the city of Saraqib, protesters hold enormous placards upon which the names of different ethnic and religious groups were written, depicting national unity in the face of sectarianism or the effort of sectarianizing the protests. Many activists from Yarmouk Camp and Damascus who I met in Germany and Sweden informed me that the regime was pushing towards sectarianizing the protests. In the first weeks of the protests, the adviser of the Syrian president, Bouthina Shaaban, told the Syrian news agency that the protests were sectarian and that they targeted the Alawite minorities. It was clear from the beginning that the sectarian narrative was better for the regime than the depiction the protests as being political (AlRiyad, 2011). In the same way, and for the first few years of the uprisings, according to Gayath Aljundi, the regime worked hard to sectarianize the conflict using different tools such as leaking videos that contained sectarian contents (Alwaite torturing Sunni) to incite rebel forces to target Alawite. In this way, the regime would ensure that the Alawite sect is loyal and supportive (Al Jundi, 2015).

Sectarianizing the protests was arguably encouraged by the regime itself and its agency. Many activists believe that sectarian slogans that were raised during protests were chanted by infiltrators loyalist to the regime and not from the protesters. Indeed, every Syrian activist I met in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Europe confirmed that sectarian slogans were never part of the protests until the protests grew in size and control over them was impossible.

These activists suggest that there were some people deliberately inciting sectarianism. This provided the regime with a fertile environment to call protesters sectarianist and islamists. After the militarization of the uprising, Syrians were trapped in the sectarian narrative, where both the regime and the opposition used the sectarian narrative. For instance, the regime started to use the word *Takfiri* and many from the opposition started to use *Alwaite* and *Shiaa*, particularly when the Hizbullah and the Iran backed the Syrian regime. The expansion of the war to include regional actors provided the crisis with its imaginary sectarian framework. It became a civil war and a sectarian war for both the regime and the militant opposition. The creation and usage of this narrative created imaginary sectarian borders where the political aspect was absent, and coexistence became a narrowing possibility (Hanafi, 2016).

The sectarian narrative intensified in the media where public figures, militants and activists were identified by their sect as a primary identity rather than their political identification. This became part of the media where satellite channels

and newspapers became the primary tool of sectarianism and the civil war. These media outlets also borrowed historical concepts that illustrated deep, hostile and religious influences such as *Khawarij*, *Al Nawasib*, 'The Shi'a Crescent', '*Takfiri*', *Wahabi*, *Rafida*, *Majoos* and other terms that incited violence and sectarianism. In reality, the usage of specific terms in the media has transformed such words and concepts into sectarian missile launchers against political opponents. However, it appears that everyone was forgetting that the struggle against the Syrian regime is political and not sectarian. In the early months of the uprisings, Riyad Darar, a Syrian leader in the general coordination committee of the opposition, asserted,

> The conflict in Syria is not sectarian. It is a struggle against a regime that stole the state and killed its core political values. The conflict fell under the impact of historical misguided narratives and religious Fatawas, where the regime exploited it and used sectarianism as a cover to protect the whole regime at the account of the Syrians. (Telilo, 2014)

Rima Majed, a Lebanese researcher, explained that

> Sectarianism is an invented concept that is created using historical, economic and cultural material for the purposes of political mobilisation. The usage of such a sectarian discourse, especially in times of heightened violence and instability, helps crystallise sectarian identities and serves to recruit more individuals into those very political battles that are framed under religious terms. (Majed, 2013)

In addition to that, pan-Arab nationalism has decreased over the recent years, with a new sectarian trend of self-identification as Phoenicians or 'Only Syrians'. However, this trend is not an institutionalized and regime-backed trend, but rather a minority that does not have any societal or political base. Pan-Arabism remains the main and crucial self-identification of both the regime and the opposition, which reflects the 90 per cent of the Syrian population who are Arabs.

As of August 2018, there has not been an entirely sectarian group since 2011 that has fought in the Syrian civil war. What we have witnessed and are still witnessing are political groups that have their own fragmented and contradictory agendas using violence as a tool to achieve their goals. However, their goals are limited to certain geographical areas in many cases, which creates a set of small enclaves within Syria that is governed by such groups. These groups are politically affiliated and backed by regional and international actors. As Haj Saleh asserts, the sectarianism in Syria, despite all the destruction, is still not deeply rooted within the fragmented Syrian society (Al-Haj Saleh, 2017).

In my opinion, the Syrian sectarianism can be described based on Rogers Brubaker definition where he examined groups as an imaginable ethnicity.

> Although participants' rhetoric and common-sense accounts treat ethnic groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief protagonists of most ethnic

> conflict – and a fortiori of most ethnic violence – are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organisations, broadly understood and their empowered and authorized incumbents. Some of these organisations may represent themselves, or may be seen by others, as organisations of and for particular ethnic groups. (Brubaker, 2004: 14)

Therefore, the current Syrian conflict is not a sectarian rather sects are one of its crucial components that cannot be ignored when discussing the Syrian political system. For many Syrians, the issue is with authoritarianism and dictatorship that violate human rights, oppress people and have a monopoly over the power in the country. Sixty-four per cent of the country are Sunni Arab, Syria's largest ethno-sectarian group, which mostly support the opposition, having been marginalized under the al-Assads. Syria's other non-Sunni Arab religious groups, the Christians (9%), Druze (3%), Shia (1%) and others (1%) back the regime, fearing discrimination under Sunni Arab majority rule. The population, which has been presented in a binary polarization in Syria, has other divisions. For example, geographically, the Syrian population is either urban or rural, which creates a type of identity. According to Trading Economic website, 41 per cent of the Syrian population is rural, and more than 34 per cent is urban (2017). In addition to this, there is the division between the tribal Syrian society and urban and modern society. Ethnically, there are the Kurds who form almost 10 per cent of the total population, Assyrian, Turkmani and also other minorities. Religiously, there are also Ismaili and Alawite (Aljazeera, 2017).

Despite these very complex ethnical, religious and geographical lines of division, there were three main cultural and societal components within the Syrian population that has led to the dramatic and unbearable violence in Syria over the last seven years, which disintegrated the entire society. the first component is the Ba'athist pan-Arabist model, which founded the grounds for eliminating the differences and accommodating other ethnic and religious groups. The Ba'ath party manifesto says that 'Syria is part of the Arab world which is considered one united nation in language and culture, whilst other differences are marginal and abandonable'.

Based on this, many minorities including the Kurdish minorities have been Arabanized and forced to learn the Arabic culture and language. Indeed, Kurds were given some political rights, but were deprived of their cultural rights, yet Arabs were given cultural rights as a majority, but deprived from of their political rights (Al-Haj Saleh, 2017). Anyone who criticized or allied themselves outside the Ba'ath manifesto would be silenced using different tools of power, including assassinations.

The second component is sectarianism. Since the early 1970s when Hafez al-Assad took over in Syria, it was clear that the regime was strengthening its institutions based on ethnic lines.

The whole society and different political parties were seen as threats and therefore there was continuous surveillance and inflation of the security apparatus. senior jobs and high military and security ranks were entrusted to the al-Assad family; for example, al-Assad's brother was the head of the defence unit, and Adnan



Map 8.1 Syria's ethnic and religious group. (Dr Michael Izady, Gulf/2000 Program at Columbia University, N.Y.)

Makhlouf, the head of the presidential guard. The political and social movements were forced to halt in Syria, and civil society was abandoned as it was seen as a security threat. Indeed, lack of political openness and participation would lead to a higher degree of sectarianism in a multiethnic society; The Syrian regime has used ethnic cleavages in the political and social sphere to create a set of loyalists that support the regime to an incomprehensible extent. We can see members of one ethnic group, such as Sunni or Kurd (from one dimension), are also members of different groups (middle class, bourgeoise). These groups have competing interest, but they usually undercut their primary allegiances to benefit from the other dimension that have more social, economic and political interests. Cross-cutting cleavages and the freezing theory are perhaps the best-known explanations of such phenomena (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

Therefore, there have been many incidents where minorities were seen as passive components and loyal to the regime. For example, the regime would always approach minorities with the question: 'Why do you support the opposition, we are protecting you from the Takfiri and the Arabs' (Iyad and Hallaq, 2017).

The political system that continued to use sectarianism as a tool to ensure its power has led to a very serious destruction in trust at all levels. The feelings of fear and scepticism from each other have become a norm. They would only trust their own family members and at best their sect. As Haj Saleh argues, 'The Syrian People have lost their social trust. This means that the Syrian people do not exist, but only sects.'

The third component within the hierarchy of the different divisions is the new upper middle class. This group is formed from the families of senior leaders and state personalities as well as the new billionaires who are close to the regime. The new upper middle class that was created as part of the modernization philosophy of al-Assad's 2003 plan had three major characteristics (Al-Haj Saleh, 2017). The first is the absence of values, social justice, equality and freedom. The modernity reform plan of al-Assad created a new class at the account of the people. Second, it neglected societal problems relating to poverty, unemployment, literacy, women and equity. The third is the conservative attitudes of the new economic and financial elites, which is closely affiliated to the regime.

The intersection of class, the new upper middle class and the sectarianism of the regime has created divisive lines within the whole society. As divisions were created, and racism also increased, the value of life also decreased, and oppression increased at all levels. This strengthened ethnic and religious identities on account of the Syrian identity. This was to strip the power and authority from the Syrian population, as a whole. Moreover, the lack of political participation and oppression of civil society organization also weakened the national identity of Syrians.

The Syrian society therefore appears to be scattered. It was subject to war, violence, displacement and refugees that created tension and hatred, primarily in areas where violence and destruction are tremendous, and that have been inhabited by different sects and ethnic groups such as in Aleppo, Homs, and rural Aleppo. This led to a huge change in the nature of the Syrians, now and for the coming generations. In addition to that, the ongoing demographic change

in Syria as a political tool has had harmful consequences on the Syrian society (Istefo, 2016). The Syrian society is therefore an example of a divided society which have internal and external factors that fuel this division. The regime monopoly of power, oppression and the stripping of basic rights from Syrians, in addition to the use of sectarianism as a political tool by the regime and the opposition groups, the international interference in the Syrian civil war and severe violence and destruction, have led to creating a semi-sectarian society and a civil war galvanized as a sectarian war.

Trust in Syria

In the early half of 2018, there have been few reports on rebuilding trust in northern Syria, under the control of the Kurdish group, the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). Imad Hasso, a local journalist, confirmed that trust between Kurds and Arab in northern Syria is developing. The reasons behind that is the new model of governance where Arabs from Deir Ezzur, Raqqa, Ein Issa and Tabaqa create a new model of governance where Arabs and Kurds share the responsibility, creating local councils to govern their cities and oversee public affairs. These councils only employ the younger generation who have not worked before for any political party, the regime or in the opposition parties. However, for the new model of governance that aims at engaging the new generation of Kurds and Arabs, building trust between them raises enormous challenges, primarily from outside. The Turks, the Syrian regime and Iran try to mobilize Arabs against the Kurds, arguing that self-governance model is a model for Kurdish hegemony over the Arabs in Syria. Despite that, and according to many reports, the areas which are under the control of SDF are more secured and stable than regions and cities under the control of the regime or other forces (Rashid, 2018). According to Hikmat Habib, an Arab member of the self-governing Democratic Syria entity, and a tribal elite, 'The position and perception of Arabs towards Kurds have changed since 2011. We need to form a coalition with the Kurds and be able to coexist, and avoid tension' (Dawood and Al-Kamya, 2018).

The issue of trust between Syrians has been affected intensely by the civil war (Figure 8.1). The distrust is not only between Syrians who were displaced outside Syria, such as the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, but also Syrians who remained inside Syria. Indeed, the Syrian social trust that was present before the crisis was due to familial, tribal, ethnic and sectarian factors. The traditional bonds of the Syrian society, especially in tribal regions, such as Hassaka, Raqqa and Sweida'a, present a very crucial component of social trust in such a society. In addition, intermarriage between families and tribes, economic partnerships and the informal tribal institutions that substitute the weak rule of law have strengthened the level of trust that existed before the crisis. The familial and tribal societal structure led to higher corruption and nepotism, as well as a complex system of relationships between the regime and tribes (Hinnebusch, 2012).



Figure 8.1 Trust among Syrian before and after the civil war.
Source: Population Survey 2014, and calculations of SCPR.

According to the only available survey in Syria conducted by the Syria Center for Policy Research, social trust has significantly reduced. In addition, the data show variations in the decrease in social trust before and after the civil war. Distrust was huge in areas that were subject to the siege, destruction and heavy battles, with high numbers of displaced people and causalities. The most affected areas are Raqqa, Hasakah, Idlib and Deir Ezzur (SCPR, 2017).

The report indicates factors that led to the deterioration of trust among individuals inside Syria. These factors, according to the report, are a high number of internally displaced people in big cities under regime control such as Lattkia and Damascus; the feeling of insecurity and safety; political polarization and widespread crimes; and finally the role of militarism. The report tries to avoid naming factors scientifically as the centre attempts to avoid clashes with the government and the opposition, which may lead to an impact on the functionality of the centre. I believe that the main reasons for the decrease in the level of generalized trust in Syria is militarism and oppression, sectarianism as a political tool, and feelings of insecurity and safety. These factors resulted in destruction of huge parts of Syria, which forced people to move, with millions of Syrians being displaced internally or becoming refugees in other countries. This means new people from rural areas and wealthy families move from the periphery of cities or urban areas to main cities which are safer. The newcomers were seen as different and hence class and regional sectarianism prevailed. One interviewee, who worked in Syrian regime TV channel, told me that she moved her family from Deir Ezzur to Lattkia because they perceived it would be a safe place to live, but they have been subject to harassment from the locals, especially Alawite gangs that

ask for pizzo. This has been a practice by groups who are close to the government military and operate in areas under the state's authority. According to the United Nations, there are more than 6.2 million people who are internally displaced within Syria, and more than 5.5 million refugees, which means that more than half of Syria's population are either refugees or internally displaced (IDMC, 2018). This number does not include the hundreds of thousands of Syrians from different ethnic groups or affiliates to the regime who moved from all over Syria to Lattkia, Tartus and Damascus, looking for protection and safety. An interviewee informed me that almost all pro-government figures, businessmen and tribal leaders moved their families to cities under the control of the regime. The arrival of IDPs and new population to cities, mainly cities where the majority is particularly an ethno-religious group, caused them to be viewed with suspicion as the 'other', particularly those people who moved to cities such as Damascus, Lattkia and Tartus from rural areas or other sects, such as the Kurds. This created a degree of distrust and fear of new faces that filled the main cities, raised prices of rents and flooded the market with cheap labour.

It is important to note that all cities and regions in Syria were affected, yet with variations. Even cities that have not witnessed clashes or violence such as Tartus and Lattkia have witnessed a decrease in the level of social trust. This is reflected in the main argument of this book, that distrust is a cognitive science and can spread widely within any community that faces such challenges as in Syria. The deterioration of trust in Idlib, Qamshli, Damascus, Raqqa and Der Ezzur affects the level of trust in Tartus and Lattkia. They are connected as there are familial and tribal relations between these communities. Any community that witnesses oppression, destruction and sectarianism would be susceptible to low levels of trust, and can easily transmit this distrust to neighbouring communities through tribal and familiar connections.

Moreover, one of the main factors of the civil war is the absence of the rule of law, and the weak state's institutions as law enforcement agencies. The weak formal institutions, which are severely affected by the civil war have resulted in a gap, which informal institutions were required to fill. Dispute and conflict resolution between persons and families increased, yet its resolution was far from the state's institutions. According to the Syrian Center for Policy Studies, prominent community leaders, clerics and head of extended families (tribes) have resolved more than 56 per cent of disputes between Syrians, while the government institutions solved less than 33 per cent. As discussed in the case of Lebanon, trust in states' judicial system and institutions is crucial to increasing the level of generalized trust and protecting it from destruction. With the available data from Syria, this indicates that individuals would try to protect themselves from others, who would exploit them in any way, as there is no strong formal judicial and state system to punish misbehaving and protect individual rights. As a merchant from Damascus whom I met in Beirut told me, 'I am super careful when dealing with people now. Before the crisis, I used to give people goods in debt, and they would pay me back. Now, I would never do that. What if they do not pay me? No one would protect me.'

Table 8.1 Dispute resolution mechanisms in Syria during the civil war

	No one	Security officials	Prominent community figures	Clerics	Heads of extended families	Judiciary	Sharia courts	Armed groups leaders	YPG
Damascus	1.24%	32.23%	24.18%	3.65%	4.21%	30.46%	4.03%	0.00%	0.00%
Aleppo	2.87%	15.22%	25.60%	22.55%	13.10%	11.09%	8.70%	0.88%	0.00%
Rural Damascus	000%	16.50%	31.72%	18.31%	1342%	10.97%	8.99%	0.10%	0.00%
Homs	0.00%	28.97%	25.97%	14.86%	6.35%	22.51%	1.34%	0.00%	0.00%
Hama	0.00%	26.22%	26.98%	10.12%	14.30%	22 38%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Lattkia	0.00%	27.58%	17.66%	9.89%	14.10%	30.47%	0.15%	0.15%	0.00%
Idlib	0.00%	7.63%	30.16%	27.23%	10.52%	7.08%	17.38%	0.00%	0.00%
Hasakah	0.00%	3.19%	27.06%	9.91%	14.76%	3.24%	21.96%	6.56%	13.32%
Deir ez-Zor	0.00%	3.56%	32.20%	27.79%	29.33%	2.49%	4.64%	0.00%	0.00%
Tartus	0.00%	32.32%	20.53%	6.98%	13.49%	25.19%	1.48%	0.00%	0.00%
Raqqa	0.00%	0.00%	19.34%	26.65%	0.00%	0.00%	54.01%	0.00%	0.00%
Daraa	0.00%	16.28%	35.08%	19.29%	17.91%	9.54%	1.80%	0.10%	0.00%
Sweida	0.00%	21.08%	28.76%	14.63%	23.86%	10.57%	1.09%	0.00%	0.00%
Ounatra	0.00%	4.35%	33.33%	15.19%	28.98%	18.15%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Syria	0.61%	18 29%	26.91%	16.30%	13.24%	14.99%	8.01%	0.67%	0.99%

Source: Population Survey 2014, and calculations of SCPR.

An actress from Damascus argues that 'before 2011, one had the will to go and report some misbehaving and misconduct, but now impossible. If I go and report someone, the officer, would misbehave and expect something in exchange'. This huge mistrust in institutions, especially the judicial system, and rule enforcing agencies has made it difficult for people to trust each other as there is no public guardian for their rights, which had previously existed at certain level.

Besides that, the increased level of political killing, siege, destruction and the monopolization of resources by both the government and the opposition militants was met with apathy (from the regime and the groups) amid huge needs from the population and communities. The shortage of basic necessities also resulted in a high level of exploitation as well as demands for exchanges, amid intimidation. The competition over services and needs has therefore impacted the communal solidarity between people, which also affects the level of trust. Besides that, the displacement of families, cutting familial ties as well as deep political polarization had resulted in low level of trust, and weakened the bonds between families.

As the report of SCPS observed,

> The spread of communal fanaticism, the politicization of humanitarian aid, and forced displacement have all weakened the bonds of trust among individuals and incited the emergence of conflict-related opportunistic groups that throw their power around with the use of weaponry and monopolisation. (SCPR, 2017)

Moreover, social relations, including family relations, have become weaker for many Syrians, or were totally cut off, especially wanted Syrians (e.g. Syrians who are active against the government, or expressed different opinions on social media). For example, political polarization was so rooted among Syrians that they created social media groups that spread sectarian narratives and hate speech. In some instances, for example, engaging vigorously in sectarian and political debate with family members resulted in cutting ties, completely.

One major factor that affects the level of generalized trust, which is present in the case of Lebanon and Palestine, as well as the other case studies from divided societies is the feeling of security and safety.

According to the findings of the report, there is a rising feeling of insecurity among Syrians which has increased significantly, where more than 90 per cent expressed that they feel insecure and unsafe in their neighbourhood. The importance of this question is that it includes the feeling of security and safety from political killing, bombings, theft, violence, kidnapping and other means of intimidation.

According to SCPR:

> The findings indicate that the overall national feeling secured indicator has dropped significantly from 0.93 before the crisis to 0.38 during (Figure 8.2). The prevalent sense of insecurity is attributed to many causes, including bombings, killings, destruction, forced displacement, poverty, repressive practices, a lack of



Figure 8.2 Feeling of security among Syrians inside Syria in 2014.
Source: Population Survey 2014, and calculations of SCPR.

> humanitarian protection, corruption, and the inefficiency of official institutions. The findings also show that the governorates which are most subjected to insecurity are, respectively, Raqqa, Aleppo, Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Idlib. On the other hand, the governorates that have not been exposed to a great deal of fighting or destruction are characterised by a higher sense of security, despite a significant decline when compared to the pre-crisis rates. (SCPR, 2017)

An unpublished study by Rima Ramadan of Damascus University aimed at analysing university students' motivations for using Facebook for academic purposes during the Syrian crisis, where higher education in Syria has been affected by the civil war, suggests that students were unable to safely commute during the civil war. As a result, some students were reluctant to attend regular classes, especially for courses where attendance was not obligatory, while others were inclined to find alternative ways for obtaining course-related information through means other than the formal web-based services at Damascus University which was already unable to deliver quality services to students.

Moreover, roughly 120,000–140,000 internally displaced people are students currently enrolled in higher education unable to pursue their studies, thus, resulting in a lost generation of students. In Deir Ezzur and al-Hassaka, ISIS took over the city in January 2014. Consequently, it imposed specific conditions on the university and its faculties. Women and men were separated in classes, and women had to wear veils and Islamic dress. Furthermore, curricula were changed to align

with ISIS ideology, which means imposing Islamic studies as a compulsory for every student (Salam, 2015).

In the same set, Anbtawi and Al Amad, in their research among Syrian in Jordan, found that Syrian women tend to distrust others, which resulted in low level of social capital. According to their findings, and despite the large existence of Syrian refugees in Al-Mafraq city in Jordan, women showed that they suffer from fear and unsafety in the Jordan. As one of the participants of their research indicated, 'feeling insecure pushes us not to socialise with locals, we always feel that people may exploit our need . . . we prefer to stay far from problems' (Anbtawi and Al Amad, 2017).

Communities usually feel insecure when they face uncertainties and ambiguity in the future. The effect of these uncertainties can develop to form a risk, and such a risk can negatively affect trust, if the whole community was unaware of the type and magnitude of such risks and how to face them. It also depends on the resilience of the societies, formation and political regime and its institutions. As discussed in the previous chapters, feelings of insecurity and unsafety would decrease the capacity of people to participate in political life, and to build social networks. Therefore, fear and insecurity as a result of the absence of strong formal institutions will force members of the communities to turn to their main and primary identity such as family, tribe, sect or ethnic group. The higher level of repression, rising level of poverty, displacement and stereotyping of many Syrians as the newcomers have led to high level of crime. The feeling of insecurity and risk is higher as such crimes increase. Trust also plays a reverse role as well. It reduces uncertainties and risk in the society, in exactly the same way it works in the market (Gambetta, 1988). Therefore, if there is a low level of trust, uncertainty would increase, and it will lead to the further deterioration of trust.

The data provided in SCPR that violence in Syria has a negative impact on structural and cognitive social capital and trust. In the report, they considered social capital as a component consisting of trust, social networks and other measures, such as omen participation in political life. In this book, social capital and trust are almost the same (see Chapters 2 and 3). As Map 8.2 and 8.3 shows, the disparities and difference are linked to the level of violence in each governorate in Syria.

As explained in previous chapters, one of the main factors that foster social trust is shared public space, political participation in decision-making and also in civil society organizations as volunteers. This is obvious in Putnam's discussion on social capital, yet, as I discussed previously, volunteerism and social networks, including political participation, can be negatively associated with trust, as agents (actors/individuals) may exploit and cheat as part of the social network or as volunteers.

Despite different theories with regards to the main components of social capital, this chapter considers social networks, volunteerism and political participation in any form, as part of social capital, but also as a fostering mechanism to trust. As discussed in Chapter three, public space and common places provide a surge to building trust between members of the community.



Map 8.2 Social trust before the civil war by governorate.
Source: SCPR



Map 8.3 Social trust after the civil war by governorate.
Source: SCPR

In Syria, and since the start of the crisis in 2011, political participation, volunteerism and social networks decreased significantly. Based on the data from V-Dem, CSO repression has increased (Figure 8.3). The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively end them if they are not affiliated with the government/opposition parties.

More importantly, political participation has been the same for decades. This means that the absence of active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. This is an indicator that a crucial factor in building social capital and trust is absent, which explains why social capital, and hence trust, is low in Syria (even prior to the crisis). The data also show that there is no consultation. A very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own. Besides that, the graph shows that there are very low civil society participation activities. In Syria, citizens organized in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals are absent or not allowed to exert their rights in political life. Civil society in Syria does not exist. There is no CSO in Syria that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals.

The survey of SCPR shows that the participation in decision-making (which was already low) declined from almost 60 per cent to 44 per cent. In the same set, it also shows variations within governorates and regions before and during the crisis. The findings of the report show that high level of participation in decision-making process is found in Sweida'a and Raqqa. These two areas are characterized by their tribal culture (Batatu, 1999: 105–10). Moreover, the report indicates a very important issue about political participation in the Hasaka governorate. Hasaka as an ethnically mixed governorate has the lowest level of participation in decision-



Figure 8.3 Political Oppression in Syria 1940-2016.
Source: V-Dem institute.

making in the country. This is related to the fact that Kurds and Arabs had different visions and views of the form of political institutions they aspire towards (Al-Haj Saleh, 2017).

Although the data gathered by SCPR is collected from almost all governorates and regions of Syria, one may expect to have a better trust under rebel-controlled areas. The institutions that were established under rebel control are an extension of the same institutions that the regime had established. The rebels were reflecting the same institutions of the regime, mainly municipalities and local councils. These institutions were established by the rebels, operating in part with resources from the central government in Damascus. Indeed, the Syrian government continued to pay some civil servants in rebel-held areas. This secured some connection between parts of divided cities (such as Aleppo) where employees in education and public services had to go to regime-held areas to pick up their salaries (Baczko and Quesnay, 2013). This means that the same institutions and institutional practices continued across the whole country in Syria.

Demographic change and trust

The idea of leaving the place of one's birth and home town as a result of civil war, and against their will, knowing that someone else from another ethnic group is going to replace them is a tragic and very traumatic experience (Derrick, 1999). In early 2016, President Bashar Al Assar used the term 'useful Syria', which included the most important and connected governorates under the regime control. The evacuation of the Sunni majority areas from the areas surrounding the main cities, such as Daraya, according to many sources, had forced its 8,000 Sunni to leave the area in 2016 (Ghaddar, 2016). There was accusation that the Kurdish militias in Hassaka were enforcing demographic changes against Arabs and Turkmani, especially in Tal Abbyad. Most of the areas that witnessed demographic changes also experienced heavy fighting between the different groups, with some having to flee the areas, and many not allowed to return (Bader Khan, 2015). In addition, the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels had forced thousands of Kurds to leave their villages and hometowns in Afrin city. The rebels replaced the Kurdish inhabitants with Arabs who were displaced from other regions, mainly those that fall under the regime control. Not only that, but they also changed the Kurdish names of streets and public places, replacing them with Arabic names (Rudaw, 2018).

The demographic change reflects the decline or increase in the population as the result of killing, forced displacement, emigration out of the governorates, seeking refuge and the granting of citizenship to Shiites and Alawites arriving in Syria from Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and other countries, based on the lowest estimates related to refugees, asylum seekers and those who were killed (Qutrib, 2017). Table 8.2 summarizes the demographic change in Syria by comparing population numbers in several governorates in 'Useful Syria' at the end of 2011 and at the end of 2016.

Table 8.2 Estimated population distribution in terms of religion or sect in 2016 compared with 2011 in the six governorates of 'Useful Syria' (all figures in thousands).

Year	Population Group	Damascus	Rif Dimashq	Homs	Hama	Lattkia	Tartus	Total
	Sunnis	1583	2460	1154	1093	372	140	6802
	Alawites	82	114	455	274	580	550	2055
Population	Shiites	24	26	38	2	2	0	92
in 2011	Ismailis	2	3	3	168	2	58	236
	Duruz	5	94	0	0	0	0	99
	Christians	58	139	153	91	52	49	542
Total		1754	2836	1803	1628	1008	797	9826
	Sunnis	1867	783	221	7S7	221	101	3950
	Alawites	85	97	394	234	532	501	1843
Population	Shiites	271	350	299	16	40	40	1016
in 2016	Ismailis	2	3	3	154	2	60	224
	Duruz	5	82	0	0	0	0	87
	Christians	62	122	135	82	55	49	505
Total		2292	1437	1052	1243	850	751	7625

Source: Qutrib 2017.

Research on the relationship between trust and displaced/immigrants shows that people are affected by the level of trust in the destination communities. The research indicates that once the individuals become part of specific community, they adapt to the level of social trust of that community (Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2012). In reality, the recent survey of 300 Syrian refugees in Lebanon showed that more than 75 per cent of Syrians distrust members of their communities.

Internally being displaced and seeking asylum and protection is in all respects an extreme situation for the individual and communities that are part of the demographic change. The decision to leave their hometown, community and the birthplace is a harsh experience, mentally and physically. The journey is usually hard and includes dangerous near-death situations. When they arrive at their new destination in new communities, where they may or may not have relatives, it is a new experience, and a new place. They require control over their livelihood, securing a place to live in and also basic needs for the family. This means, their trust will be lowered through two connected mechanisms. The first is that such a challenging experience of displacement and refugeeism in new areas where they had no prior relation to, with a community that also had low social trust, is by all means a catalyst to increase the level of scepticism, risk, uncertainty and therefore trust (Uslaner, 2003). This means that trust will be lower among Syrians who are under severe circumstances, psychological pressure and the stressful situation of adapting to the new situation (Esaiasson, Sohlberg, and Andersson, 2017).

Second, the feelings of betrayal and anger towards the other sects increase as a result of the hard experience, and their acceptance to replace them in their homes. Many internally displaced people informed me that

> 'the other sects are happy to do that. They would feel protected by the regime as they will be far from the other sects. It is all about fear mongering by the regime and the opposition and the people are paying the price'.
>
> Interview with Syrian journalist in Beirut 2019.

Such feelings not only generate anger towards the others but also affect the trust towards them, the local institutions and the whole community.

Trust in non-homogenous Syria

The starting point of discussing the non-homogenous Syria, ethnically and politically, means that we accept the fact of divided Syria, at some point. Syria has been divided between different forces, with limited statehood governance mechanism such as areas under the rebels, under ISIS control, and others under the control of Kurdish forces. The civil war in Syrian created dysfunctional institutions within rebel-held areas and weakened the regime's institutions in areas under its control. Rebels who are mainly militants established semi-militant councils, usually local councils that were headed by local elites selected by the militants, with limited experiences. Observations in Syrian rebel-held areas

suggest that many local councils succeeded, partially to deliver public services such as electricity, water and trash collection (Mampilly, 2013). However, many of these areas did not have the financial and human capacity to competently operate these areas, especially in critical sectors such as health and education. Therefore, many international organizations substitute formal institutions in the provision of public services. Besides that, the fight along limited statehood areas (such as those under rebel control) is costly. Usually rebels fight each other over resources, which results in poor and ineffective services, and increases the cost of administering the areas under their control (Aljazeera, 2016).

Building trust under the control of weak institutions, where trust assists in overcoming communal problems and stabilizes cooperation in the absence of a state's formal institutions and legitimate leaders, is challenging in limited statehood areas, where governance patterns are unclear, and institutions are dysfunctioning (Börzel and Risse, 2016). In times of conflict and shortage of resources, such as in Syria, the provision of public good and services effectively requires a high level of trust between people from one side and between people and the institutions of the rebels. However, in Syria, political polarization and the fragmentation of the Syrian rebels led in many cases to low trust in these rebels, which had negative consequences on the perception of Syrians towards the leadership of the opposition leaders (Sayegh, 2013).

The sense of solidarity, which has diminished in Syria in many ways, and the low level of volunteerism and political participation have had a shrinking effect on social trust. Yet, efforts of rebels to create a society-driven initiative to build trust, such as initiatives in Hasaka, would mostly work in homogeneous groups and communities. This means that in time of hostilities, political polarization and ethnic divisions, society-driven initiatives to increase trust would not work either at a national level or at a local level (where a homogeneous group may exist). The effective administration of public good by the rebels requires a high level of social trust between citizens (which means no competition over services, and equal provision to the entire population); however, this is hard to achieve in Syria where groups are tightly knit.

Adding to that, areas of limited statehood in Syria are prone to corruption, clientelism, rent-seeking which often creates hostility towards other groups and between each other (Yassin, 2016). In other words, its consequences are low trust.

As shown in the chapters 4 and 5, generalized trust and institutional trust work as a cogwheel machine. Precisely, the Syrian suggests that institutional problems prior to the conflict (corruption, absence of rule of law, inequality, oppression) have presented a long-lasting obstacle in developing trust between citizens and formal institutions. As Figure 8.4 indicates, the Syria prior to 2011 suffered from lack of rule of law, inequality, oppression, inaccessibility to justice, inability to have access to state's opportunities by specific social/ethnic groups and marginal civil society and civil engagement in CSO (which is controlled/banned by the regime).

All of these factors have produced, as shown earlier, low level of generalized trust, which enforced the high level of distrust in the institutions. The low level of generalized trust, as a product and a result of the state's machinery, has played a major role in enforcing ethnic fractions, and accelerated the tone of the civil war to



Figure 8.4 Equality, oppression and rule of law in Syria 1950–2019.

be more violent. However, this does not mean that it is the only factor, but it is one among others. After the break of the civil war, the level of trust has been destroyed severely as shown earlier. In general, this chapter argues that generalized trust and state's institutions have played a major role in the eruption and manufacturing of the death path that hit Syrians for many years.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the disintegration and fragmentation of Syrian society, which resulted in low levels of generalized trust, ultimately transforming Syrian society. The chapter discussed two main questions, sectarianism in Syria and social trust between Syrians. The different layers of groupism and division within the Syrian society were discussed, arguing that divisions and political polarization have been galvanized in a sectarian frame by the regime and the opposition in order to score political points, which resulted in a semi-sectarian civil war, reshaping the Syrian society that will take time to discern. The chapter further argues that the current Syrian society is characterized by low social trust, and hence low social capital, which is a requirement for reconciliation and peace-building. The lack of trust in a divided society will have a severe impact on Syrians and Syria's future.

The chapter illustrates that several reasons have led to such low level of trust, based on data collected by Syrian Center for Policy Research in 2014, the Arab Barometer 2016, and personal interviews and observations among Syrians

who live in Syria and abroad. First, the long decades of political oppression, lack of political participation and absence of public consultation, in addition to securitization of the public sphere, produced a society of distrust; between the members of the society and in institutions. This chapter shows that the feeling of insecurity and safety, political oppression, extreme violence, spread of negative phenomena, weak states and rebel institutions, as well as demographic changes have led to a declining level of social trust. It is apparent that intensive oppression, displacement and refugeeism, as well as the severe fights, had resulted in variations of the levels of social trust across the different Syrian governorates. The data show that areas that witnessed high levels of violence, displacement and demographic changes have the highest level of distrust.

In summary, the Syrian society is defined by declining level of trust which was not only a result of the civil war but also due to a lengthy period of political oppression and discrimination against minorities, and fear-mongering from the majority. There is clear evidence, as provided by V-Dem data, that the lack of public consultation, and concentration of power in the hands of a few people, with high level of oppression against civil society organizations, had led to exclusion of the majority of the population from the public life, enforcing scepticism and distrust. In the end, the chapter argues that demographic change within Syria in major cities from north to south had major negative consequences on the level of trust. Syria therefore provides a live case study of how civil war can destroy trust in an accelerated manner, when it uses sectarian narratives as a political tool.

Chapter 9

Refugees in divided societies

Syrians in Lebanon

Ralph Ellison's classic *Invisible Man* is of an individual who is excluded. A talented individual with many skills finds himself in a closed society. Because of that, he leaves the society and takes a new path where he can live his life invisibly, unnoticed by the surrounding society. In current days, those who are invisible are the poor, vulnerable and marginalized communities who have the necessary skills and talents to contribute to the societies in which they live. In Lebanon, this represents mostly Syrian refugees. They find the doors of Lebanese institutions mostly closed in their faces.

This chapter identifies three major sources of tension and distrust between the Syrian refugees and their host communities in Lebanon: first, the lack of interaction between both populations; second, the media narrative of the Syrians in Lebanon which stereotypes Syrians as posing security and criminal threats; third, the feeling of inequality of the host communities, when services and assistance only target Syrian, which according to the Lebanese, adds to the economic strain, affecting their livelihood and economic opportunities.

This chapter aims to enrich the debate on the relationship between Syrian refugees and their host communities in Lebanon. The ongoing Syrian crisis has forced a large number of people to leave their homes and seek refuge in foreign countries. According to the United Nations, there are 6.1 million internally displaced people, and almost 4.9 million refugees currently hosted in neighbouring countries. A total of 2.8 million are currently living in Turkey, more than 1 million in Lebanon, 656,000 in Jordan, 231,000 in Iraq and 100,000 in Egypt.

Hosting such a huge number of people for an undetermined period of time has put significant pressure on host economies and the public finances of local authorities. In the spring of 2011, Lebanon was the first country to host Syrian refugees fleeing violent clashes in the Homs governorate. With one in five residents being a refugee, Lebanon currently hosts the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. Over the past seven years, Lebanon's population has increased by about 30 per cent as a result of this influx of people. A large number of refugees have been resettled in already impoverished Biqa' and 'Akkar thus causing strain on public services and the economies of the local communities.

International efforts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the neighbouring countries have been crippled by insufficient coordination and by the absence of a national legal framework capable of regulating the influx of refugees. In fact, the Lebanese government has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or protocol, an aspect that dramatically impedes the management of the crisis (Bidinger et al., 2015).

Any thorough analysis of the present situation must take into account the historical and socio-economic context of the Syrian migration in Lebanon. Since the 1990s, freedom of movement between Syria and Lebanon was regulated by a series of bilateral agreements and, prior to the beginning of the current crisis, around 300,000 Syrians were living and working in Lebanon. As Chalcraft argues, due to liberal migration laws between the two countries, and a lower cost of living in Syria, the majority of guest workers returned to Syria after completing periods of work in Lebanon. The revolving door mechanism (guest workers) that allowed Syrian labourers' easy entry and exit to and from Lebanon made permanent settlement in Lebanon unlikely (Abboud, 2011). This indicates that the number of Syrian workers in Lebanon before 2011 is likely to be higher than the number estimated or provided by official organizations. Currently, there are more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

While Lebanon has historically counted on Syrian workers to meet its demand for cheap labour, it is also true that the available supply was enough to fill Lebanon's workforce gaps (Janmyr, 2016). In 2014, in an attempt to reduce the unprecedented influx of refugees, the Lebanese government issued a decree limiting the freedom of movement between the two countries. As of 5 January 2015, a visa is required to enter Lebanon from Syria (Amnesty, 2015). While this measure had the effect of stabilizing the number of refugees, it also caused hundreds of thousands of Syrians to lose their legal status of residency, freedom of movement and access to assistance, including health services and capacity-building programmes.

According to the UNHCR's Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017, the population living in Lebanon is 5.9 million. This number includes 1.5 million Syrian and 287,000 Palestinian refugees. In other words, 30 per cent of the total population in Lebanon are refugees. Among the 5.9 million residents living in Lebanon in 2016, 1.03 million Lebanese, 1,050,000 Syrians and 183,470 Palestinians are considered vulnerable; 42,189 Palestinian refugees coming from Syria also live under the poverty line (UNHCR, 2016). However, in 2018, the number of registered Syrian refugees has declined. According to UNHCR in Lebanon, the total number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon is 976,065, with the majority of them between ages eighteen and fifty-nine. More than 351,000 are in Biqa', while more than 255,000 are in the Beirut area, and 251,000 in North Lebanon. The remainder live in other areas of Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018b). Due to their proximity to Syria, the areas of 'Akkar, Hermel and Biqa' are the most affected by the humanitarian crisis and most of the 251 socio-economically vulnerable sites in Lebanon are also located in these areas (NA & UNHCR, 2015) (Map 9.1).

Based on individual experience and observation in Lebanon between 2015 and the beginning of 2018, this chapter examines the concept of social trust between



Map 9.1 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon (June 2018).

the Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees. Interviews were conducted between January and March 2018.

An overview

Research conducted by WVS and AB in the years 2010–13 estimates unemployment in Lebanon to be about 30–32 per cent with 'Akkar and Biqa' being the most vulnerable areas (rates between 30 per cent and 35 per cent). In 2017, the poverty rate among Syrian refugees in Lebanon has reached more than 70 per cent (Kukrety & Sarah, 2016). In 2017, a UN report indicated that the poverty line among Syrian refugees has jumped to 76 per cent. In the same report, it mentioned that the poverty rate among the Lebanese population has reached 30 per cent where almost 1.5 million Lebanese live on US$4 per day. The highest rate was in Biqa' valley at

83 per cent, followed by the north at 6 per cent. The least was in Beirut at a rate of 16 per cent (UNHCR, 2018a).

Characterized by dense population, low literacy and high dependency ratio ʻAkkar is one of the most vulnerable regions in Lebanon. In 1998, ʻAkkar was hosting 12.5 per cent of the poorest segments of the Lebanese population and 63.3 per cent of its citizens were living in poverty (UNDP, 2015). In 2018, the same regions still suffered from poor services, low quality of public constitutions and infrastructure, as well as high levels of poverty and unemployment. According to the Arab Barometer, 2016–17, the unemployment rate reached more than 39 per cent. The Biqa' unemployment rate reached 45 per cent, the north 42 per cent and Beirut 40 per cent. ʻAkkar is one of the poorest areas in Lebanon that suffers from a shortage of efficient infrastructures, proper electricity, shortage of clean water, sanitation systems, lack of educational institutes and underdeveloped health institutes (UNDP, 2017a).

The source of income in the north and Biqa' is very limited, largely depending on agriculture and public service jobs opportunities. In Beirut, as a historical and political centre in the region, diversity of institutions and the enormous focus and concentration of post-war reconstruction efforts have succeeded in creating more jobs for Lebanese or Lebanese youth who moved from rural areas to the capital. In contrast to Beirut and Mount Lebanon, rural areas suffered from the negligence of the government intervention programmes, as well as the lack of supporting programmes by civil society organizations. This led to the high level of poverty as well as a reliance on low level and public jobs. As one official from ʻAkkar informed me, the ʻAkkar region was neglected for a long time, and the Syrian crisis was an addition to the suffering of ʻAkkar.

Another added that the lack of infrastructure and the support from the government had led to a high level of poverty and the abandonment of important sectors such as agriculture. According to them, the government did not pay attention to the development of ʻAkkar and rural areas in the north because it perceived them as a repository for the army and police personnel with low salaries, who sought secure income with lifelong medical insurance. After 2011 and the influx of the Syrian refugees increased the total population, the sharing of resources and pressure on the host communities. For example, in ʻAkkar alone, the number of Syrian refugees in 2015 was 110,000, while the number of the host community 400,000. In Biqa', the Lebanese communities suffer from poor infrastructure, low quality of education and health services and limited sources of income. For instance, the town of Gazze shows the effects of how the influx of Syrian refugees has put unprecedented pressure on already fragile services and public infrastructures. The mayor of Gazze told me that the infrastructure was designed to serve only 20,000 by the end of 2030. However, in 2015, Gazze was accommodating 45,000 individuals.

Hosting around 70 per cent of the informal settlements in Lebanon, the Biqa' region has received the highest number of Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis. More than 361,000 refugees from Syria have been registered in the Biqa' region, thus causing a population increase of 67 per cent over the past four years

alone (UNHCR, 2017). According to OCHA, in West Biqa' 41 per cent of the Syrian refugees are considered to be severely vulnerable and 35 per cent highly vulnerable (OCHA, 2014). Syrian refugees who live in Beirut and surrounding areas are urban refugees, which means they live among the Lebanese communities, and have an income. One Syrian refugee from Beirut, who works as a building keeper, told me that the majority of Syrians in Beirut and its surrounding areas are employed in one way or another. They work as delivery persons, in restaurants, cleaners and building housekeepers. However, a great number of Syrian professionals live and work in Beirut, albeit with a one-month visa that is renewed every month. Many of these Syrians work with civil society organizations, educational institutes or have other part-time jobs.

The vulnerability of Syrian refugees is depicted in the arrangements of their accommodation. The slow response to the crisis has led the majority of refugees to find shelter in informal settlements. These settlements, rented out by Lebanese landowners, are often self-managed by the refugees themselves with the help of the Shawish. The Shawish (in military Arabic jargon means 'sergeant') acts as the 'chief of the camp' and also as informal intermediary between the refugee community, the local authorities and non-governmental organizations. Prior to 2011, the Shawish was the supplier of Syrian workers to Lebanese farmers or landowners. In exchange for a fee, he would provide accommodation for the workers from Syria and ensure competitive wages. Being the refugee's first contact with the outside world of the camp, the Shawish plays a crucial role in their livelihood as well as managing the external communication with the host communities.

According to OCHA, 54.5 per cent of Syrian refugees live in substandard shelters while 39.8 per cent of Syrians live in 1,424 informal settlements (OCHA, 2017). In 'Akkar, there are 145 informal settlements hosting around 40 per cent of the total refugees (OCHA, 2016). Since the majority of these settlements are located on fertile land, their use has raised questions about their sustainability (Fawaz, Saghiyeh, and Nammour, 2014). Since these informal settlements were set up privately, their inhabitants have not been granted a legal residency in Lebanon, which has affected their mobility. Moreover, the security conditions around these areas was intensified by the presence of the army and security apparatuses in the areas, which affected the livelihood and freedom of movement of the Syrians, where in many cases, they have been evicted from their settlements without other locations to go to afterwards (Reuters, 2017a). The pattern of organization of informal tented settlements follows local, privately driven systems of organization that result in unsustainable land use and servicing patterns. The ability to service such settlements and the potential costs incurred by servicing them make it imperative to guide and regulate their organization.

Many Lebanese argue that the presence of Syrian refugees resulted in fewer economic opportunities and lower salaries. The argument is that securing a stable income for a Lebanese labourer has become difficult because of the Syrian refugees. This argument, as I will discuss later, has decreased social trust between the two communities. As a matter of fact, Syrians often find employment as blacksmiths, carpenters and bakers violating the law, which entitle them to work only in the

agriculture, environmental (cleaning) and construction sectors. According to many sources, the main reasons behind hiring Syrian refugees are the low cost of the Syrian labour force – an opportunity that many Lebanese business owners find too attractive to miss – the relatively high quality and productivity of the Syrian workers and the declining interest among the Lebanese workforce for certain types of low-skilled jobs such as cleaning (Ianchocichina and Maros Ivanic, 2014).

However, there is another economic side to this story. According to the World Bank, the 'influxes of refugees into Lebanon, have boosted consumption, investments and labor supply, and therefore, the size of these refugee-receiving economies'. Yet, the collective income has not increased enough to offset the overall impact of the Syrian crisis on the Lebanese standard of living, which indeed has declined by a significant 11 per cent (Ianchocichina and Maros Ivanic, 2014). The economic competition between Lebanese and Syrians affects the social cohesion and trust in the two communities. In this chapter, that perceived economic competition will be discussed as a contributing factor to the instability in the relationship between Syrians and Lebanese (Issa, 2016).

Breaking the boundaries: Social cohesion between Lebanese and Syrian

The definition of social cohesion poses a significant problem for the research in the field (Oxoby, 2009). However, social inclusion, cohesion, trust and capital have very common characteristics. Social cohesion means that individuals in the community (who all live in the same geographical community) have access to resources and institutions. The accessibility to these resources and institutions can be equal or almost equal, but these institutions must be for the benefit of the members of the society. This is why Arrow argued that shifting to study social interactions rather than definitions and terminologies will be more robust and productive (Arrow, 2000). Yet, the definitions of social inclusion/exclusion include two main directions. The first is the access to rights and resources; and second the presence of obstacles to social institutions without defining the rights/institutions in question (Dragana, 2002).

The definition and the criteria mentioned appear to have an important role of people's perception and beliefs in determining if they are included or excluded. These perceptions include dissatisfaction and self-esteem (Atkinson, 1998). Dayton-Johnson has defined social capital and social cohesion. According to him, social capital is a personal scarifier made in an effort to promote cooperation with others. These scarifiers can be efforts, time and consumption. While he defined social cohesion as the characteristic of society which depends on the accumulation of social capital (Dayton-Johnson, 2003), for Dayton, social capital is an investment and social cohesion is the stock where these investments serve the members of the community. In defining cohesiveness in any society, Friedkin notes that 'groups are cohesive when they possess group level structural conditions that produce positive membership attitudes and behaviours and when group members' interpersonal interactions maintain these group level structural conditions' (Friedkin, 2004).

Based on the foregoing definition, social cohesion is a condition of a certain group that affects the decision-making faced by the whole society. Based on the foregoing description, I argue that social trust affects the condition of social cohesion. It also affects how much time others would be willing to invest in their society, the degree of positive attitude towards others in the society. In this chapter, I argue that social cohesion and trust develop one another. The more trust there is, the higher the level of social cohesion, and vice versa. They work as mechanical wheels that affect one another. Therefore, social cohesion works as an incentive that pushes people to invest to a greater degree into social interactions, building greater trust and reducing associated certainties within communities. Considering that this chapter focuses on social capital, trust and cohesion, I consider social capital as both the flow and the stock of trust within the community which is affected by social condition of social cohesion. The decline in social cohesion has very severe consequences on the society. As Janmaat argues, social cohesion is the glue that holds society together, and 'the property that keeps society from falling apart' (Janmaat, 2011).

In line with these ideas, social cohesion between the Lebanese and Syrians is low. One reason is that the Lebanese society itself (see Chapter 6) is declining. Distrust between Lebanese themselves reached 84 per cent, which is very high. Therefore, a society that has no trust would be unlikely to accept another group invading its space, sharing its resources and requiring social and political protection. In the case of Lebanon, history plays a major role for this situation. The presence of the Syrian Army in Lebanon until 2005, as well as the domination of the Syrian regime over Lebanon's politics (Winslow, 1996: 261), has caused a negative perception of Syrians. According to the AB, 85 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon had no trust in 2015–16. This is almost same level of the Lebanese society.

The Syrians refugees and their presence in Lebanon have therefore been perceived negatively. In the last survey of the AB 300 refugee respondents showed that more than 77 per cent did not trust the whole community (Figure 9.1). This is less than their Lebanese counterparts which account for 84 per cent. This is explained by the fact that the majority of Syrian refugees live in informal settlements, where they share many resources and food and also interact with their family members or extended family members. In addition, in 2016, the AB data show that 95 per cent of those who answered the question, 'What are the two most important challenges your country is facing?' indicated that Syrian refugees are perceived to be the second most important challenge the country faces. Survey results from Search For Common Ground Organisation in Lebanon in 2017 show that 86 per cent of the Syrian youth and 75 per cent of the Lebanese youth surveyed stated that there are tensions in their communities, with higher levels of tension for intergroup than intra-group tensions (SFCG, 2017).

Based on personal research and observation, the reasons behind the low social cohesion and trust between Syrian and Lebanese are the following: (1) the low level of trust among Lebanese themselves (see Chapter 6), (2) the historical narrative against the Syrians where Syrians fell victim to anti-Syrian regime practices during the period of the Lebanese civil war until 2005, (3) the improper management of



Figure 9.1 Generalized trust among Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2016.

the Syrian crisis in the Lebanese areas that accommodate Syrian refugees, (4) the politicization of the refugee crisis in Lebanon and (5) the politicized and polarized media in Lebanon. In the next section, I will discuss these factors, providing a general overview.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, it was perceived as being a humanitarian crisis with its long-term duration not taken into sufficient consideration by INGOs and the Lebanese government. Having said that, the Lebanese government responded to the Syrian crisis through a security lens and imposed a strictly securitarian framework (Al-Masri and Abla, 2017). The first plan to manage the Syrian crisis was set by the government in early 2013, which came after lobbying efforts by many NGOs (Herbert, 2013).

The first national plan in cooperation with the UN agencies was developed and in cooperation with the Lebanese government was adapted in 2014, with another in 2016 and most recently a 2017–18 Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP). The LCRP provides the framework for the cooperation between the Lebanese government and international agencies to stabilize economy, by addressing the resilience of Lebanese vulnerable populations.

One of the main priorities of the LCRP 2015–16 was to create economic opportunities for the vulnerable population in Lebanon with the aim of stabilizing the areas where Syrians live, and lessening the possibility of social tensions. Despite pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the implementation of the LCRP, there has been scepticism that the plan has not achieved significant results. During my fieldwork in Lebanon, I met dozens of Lebanese and international workers who have been working in the refugee sector for many years. The majority stressed the fact that there are many areas that need to be developed so that LCRP achieve its minimum objectives. Such areas include the coordination between different INGOs, and between local NGOs, as well as between the local municipal

institutions and INGOs. In Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP 2016–17), the creation of economic opportunities has expanded and now includes 65,557 individuals, thus becoming the fourth most important sector after basic assistance ($571 m), food security ($507 m), health ($308 m), water ($280 m) and education ($372 m). This focus meant that livelihood activities and paying attention to the host communities have become a focus of INGOs and the government. Before 2014, services and assistance to the host communities were at its lowest levels, which created inequalities within the communities.

According to UN agencies, prioritizing economic development programmes contributes significantly to the stability of the society, as it provides employment opportunities and helps strengthen local economies (UNDP, 2017b). According to many members of local NGOs and councils, creating economic opportunities for both Lebanese youth and Syrian refugees is crucial for the stability of the communities. Microeconomic activities that provide assistance to the local economy, enhancing the market's ability to absorb more labour and exchange commodities, can lead to more jobs in family businesses and small and medium enterprises. In such way, the local community will benefit economically, and lessen the pressure of the Syrian refugees. In a report published by Coordinamento delle Organizzazioni per il Servizio (COSV) and written by the author, a local economic adviser for UNDP explained, '[livelihood projects] protect the created job opportunities and help them withstand shocks as businesses are usually a semi-family affair in this context.' An NGO livelihood officer in 'Akkar concurred: 'these programs support the local economy by decreasing unemployment and increasing purchase power.'

In the context of the Syrian crisis, economic activities increase social cohesion through two main mechanisms: (1) By providing economic relief aimed at promoting the idea that Syrian refugees do not impart a burden on society, but rather represent economic resources. This entails stimulating local economic development while providing more job opportunities and enhancing employment chances through soft and life skills training courses targeting both Syrian and Lebanese youths. Moreover, the establishment of micro-grant schemes will facilitate the creation of start-ups and strengthen the resilience of existing MSMEs. Ideally, this mechanism would shift the perception of the Syrian refugee population from an element with the potential to lead to instability, as the catalyst for much-needed resources in historically underdeveloped areas. (2) By implementing joint activities with both Syrian and Lebanese individuals, with the goal of creating a common space between the two communities which, otherwise, appear to be increasingly divided by mutual, negative perceptions.

Through observations for more than a year, the author has seen consistent evidence through conversations with policymakers, refugees and Lebanese citizens that creating economic opportunities that bring Lebanese and Syrian together would make a big difference to the society. The removal of social barriers must also be adopted through non-formal education programmes and extra-curricular activities in areas where Lebanese and Syrians share the same resources. Sharing space is crucial to building trust. According to Rothentaub and Ijla, public spaces

provide an opportunity for people to interact in their spatial environment, where they live (Rosentraub and Ijla, 2008). Therefore, public spaces, that includes schools, parks, sport activities and gatherings, work as catalysts that allow people to build a community, to interact and to commit to each other, reducing uncertainties and also fostering the social fabric.

This kind of interaction can occur between strangers in public spaces that can foster social trust through fleeting relationships. According to Lofland, these fleeting relations are the most representative of public space associations. They develop between persons who are strangers and share nothing between them, except the space (Lofland, 1998: 60). Individuals encounter one another for a brief duration and hence develop an invisible connection as if they share the same attitude towards the space. This particularly occurs in spaces like parks, specific corners of markets or shopping malls. The silent exchange between strangers, which is fleeting, can be a brief exchange of inquiry or eye contact.

Participating in the same activities, be they at the workplace, school or any other shared environment, will inevitably increase the number of opportunities where Syrians and Lebanese can build a mutual sense of trust and common cause among themselves. In my experience and observations, Syrian and Lebanese youth who did not befriend someone from the other group were more likely to have a negative perception towards them. In many cases, where I have encountered Lebanese who perceive Syrian refugees negatively, the usual accusation is that they take their jobs, and live as freeloaders; however, none of them have befriended a Syrian refugee or a Syrian family. According to a SFCG report in 2017, youth who did not interact with someone from the other community did not have the opportunity to do so. In the same survey, 20 per cent indicated that the negative influence of the media was the reason why they did not communicate or interact with Syrian refugees (Figure 9.2).

On the other hand, most Syrians derive their negative perception of the Lebanese community from family members and close acquaintances or from personal experience. Many who reported the presence of tension between the



Figure 9.2 The main topics in the press coverage of the Syrian and Palestinian issues with a negative tone.
Source: Sadaka and Nader (2015).

host community and Syrian refugees indicated that they based their statements on friends or family members' accounts. Around 20 per cent reported that they witnessed such conflict or tension.

However, the level of tension and perception varies from one place to another and also from one individual to another. For example, in the north, where the majority of the Lebanese population are Sunni Muslim, Syrian refugees were welcomed in the beginning and also enjoyed less pressure than other places in Lebanon. The reason behind that is the family connections and the long history of trade and work in the north. The intermarriage between Syrian and Lebanese in the north is higher than in any other place in Lebanon, as well as the number of Syrian workers who previously worked in construction and agriculture sectors. In Biqa' which is a mixture of different religious groups, there was a very hostile perception towards Syrians as an occupying force, with Syrian refugees here suffering more than other Syrians in 'Akkar or the north. For instance, in Zahle in 2017, the governor issued a decree that asked Syrian refugees to leave the city.

According to Human Rights Watch, more than 3,664 Syrian refugees were evicted from 13 municipalities from 2016 until the beginning of 2018. The report confirmed that

> at least 3,664 Syrian nationals have been evicted from at least 13 municipalities from the beginning of 2016 through the first quarter of 2018 and almost 42,000 Syrian refugees remained at risk of eviction in 2017, according to the UN refugee agency. The Lebanese army evicted another 7,524 in the vicinity of the Rayak air base in the Biqa' Valley in 2017 and 15,126 more Syrians near the air base have pending eviction orders, according to Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs. (HRW, 2018)

Moreover, the perception towards Syrians is different based on individual experiences. For example, in Gazze, many Lebanese youth indicated that they suffer from huge pressure and would love to see Syrians leave the area as soon as possible. For instance, one told me, 'We need them to go away. We do not need them'. Yet, another one told me, 'Syrians and we are brothers'. However, these variations depend on many factors such as intermarriage with Syrians, economic connections and also job stability.

According to a SFCG report, 97 per cent of the surveyed youth stated that their community has changed since the refugee arrival in Lebanon. They attribute the change to various factors; yet, the highest one is competition over the job market. .

Adding to the chart, the perception towards Syrian refugees has worsened as time passes for various reasons. From the Lebanese side, they think that Syrians who enjoy free food, accommodation and health care from INGOs are taking their jobs and competing against them by accepting lower salaries. Moreover, the pressure over natural resources such as water, electricity and sanitation system has worsened the perception towards Syrian refugees. Besides that, the recent security and military campaigns against the Syrian refugees in many informal settlements increased scepticism and distrust in Lebanese society by Syrians. One Syrian

family informed me that sometimes Lebanese call the local police just to show that they have power.

From the Syrian side, and in many focus group discussion, interviews and personal observations, the perception of Syrians towards Lebanese is much positive, with Syrians generally being willing to befriend Lebanese. However, many Syrians reported exploitation by Lebanese employers or someone who hired them as manual workers. Moreover, in many cases, the tension and attacks against Syrian refugees have increased negative perception towards the Lebanese population and have resulted in a decline in trust. More important, the lack of legal papers and residency of many Syrian refugees restricts their movements from one area to another, as they fear eviction to Syria or jail in Lebanon. Therefore, many Syrians told me they could not report attacks or abuse against them because if they do, the police would not listen to them and would just focus on their legal status and residency.

Another important and noteworthy variable is the presence of particularly biased local media coverage of the refugee crisis that contributes to the creation of anti-refugee views and stereotypes among the Lebanese population (Sadaka and Nader, 2015). The memory of the violations inflicted by the Syrian army and *Mukhabarat* (secret services) during the 1976–2005 occupation is still vivid in the minds of many Lebanese. In a highly polarized and securitized context, several politically affiliated Lebanese media outlets still make full use of this discourse to draw links between the presence of Syrian refugees and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. As *Sadaka* and Nader found in a report published by multiple NGOs, most of the Lebanese news coverage has focused on the securitization of the refugee crisis, reporting raids, security operations as well as crimes committed by the Syrians and the Palestinians.

One of the most widespread clichés depicts Syrians as competing with the Lebanese for jobs and economic opportunities. On a personal level, experiences of individuals and their families of hostile or racist behaviour such as harassment or economic exploitations drive the Syrian refugees to have a negative perception of the Lebanese. However, the majority of the Lebanese youth in FGDs and structured interviews denied any negative encounters with Syrian refugees.

The findings indicate that while most Lebanese base their negative perceptions of Syrian refugees on stereotypes reinforced by the media, the Syrians' perception of the Lebanese appears to be based on personal experiences.

A positive interaction between both populations is extremely difficult to achieve. In this regard, the increasing and developing local economy in 'Akkar and West Biqa' and other affected areas such as Beirut urban refugee areas could be an efficient catalyst for opportunities in impoverished areas, in addition to fostering social cohesion and peaceful inter-community relations (Darity, 2003). Given the widespread perception of Syrian refugees as an economic burden, offering support for the local economy through joint activities and job opportunities would be a very crucial factor in reducing tensions between the two communities. The host community's institutions could play a prominent role in this approach as the vast majority of business owners, beneficiaries, NGO

staff and trainers are Lebanese. The cooperation of local stakeholders is crucial in overcoming biases and clichés.

Extra-curricular programmes are a perfect example of how they can foster social cohesion. In many cases, I have been informed by Syrian and Lebanese women in rural areas that they have met other individuals from the other community through non-formal education such as training courses (knitting, homemade food and other courses). They befriended each other and gradually started to visit each other when many other women joined their circle. This circle expanded to include their husbands and children, creating a community and a network of people who know each other that started with a shared space. Therefore, this chapter argues that joint activities that bring refugees and host communities together is a powerful means to foster social cohesion and hence trust and reduce the tensions within the community.

In addition, local authorities and NGOs have the responsibly in responding to heightened tension in the community. A crucial reason for misunderstanding and mistrust between INGOs, donors and local institutions is the disagreement over funding projects in specific areas, and direct them towards specific communities. In many cases, NGOs have a defined time-framework and specific previously designed projects and programmes. However, local authorities need direct cash payments. Besides that, the lack of cooperation and central cooperation between local councils, municipalities, local NGOs and international NGOs has created competition between local councils that resulted in distrust towards NGOs. As many councils in vulnerable regions that host refugees depend on family and tribal relations, they seek to prove that they have the capacity to raise funds and channel money to their constituencies, therefore, not succeeding to channel fund will be considered failure by the population, which will affect their political career. The tension is therefore a result of instrumentally using the crisis for local political gains (Al-Masri and Abla, 2017). This tension hinders the ability to coordinate and work closely with local authorities when it comes to the implementation of livelihood activities.

There are other factors that affect the trust between Syrians themselves. The feeling of insecurity and living in a divided and non-trusting society is major reason to undermine trust; however, Syrians themselves as a vulnerable group in Lebanon also suffered from distrust between each other. According to a report published by *Forced Migration*,

> As refugees came to regard each other as direct competitors rather than potential supporters, their ability and/or willingness to share information and jointly benefit from opportunities disappeared. We noticed this phenomenon in Biqa' and Hebbariyeh among particularly impoverished refugee households. In all cases the breakdown patterns looked similar – the efforts required to meet essential needs resulted in the gradual decline of social connections and, with it, the disappearance of social security. (Uzelac et al., 2018)

These observations were made not only in Lebanon but also in Iraq, Turkey and Jordan, as well as among the Palestinian refugees. In such cases, where vulnerability

increases and need for assistance is immediate, refugees do not look for future benefits, but rather current needs. Syrian refugees outweigh their needs on account of their social networks and collective benefits. The competition between Syrian refugees themselves for tangible assistance, such as food and gas and other resources, leads to higher level of distrust between themselves.

In Lebanon, in general, and 'Akkar and West Biqa' in particular, there are inefficient public institutions and infrastructure, as well as poor management of agricultural and industrial sectors. The agriculture sector, which the majority of inhabitants in 'Akkar and Biqa' rely upon as a livelihood suffers from tremendous obstacles and negligence from the central government. Therefore, the sectors that have the most potential probabilities for growth are the ones where Syrians are allowed to work, but these are not developing or advancing, which creates more tension in the communities. Therefore, without an efficient two-way coordination (top-down and bottom-up), in the form of government policies, individual initiatives from local businessmen and farmers can hardly bring about significant socio-economic improvement at the local level.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an insight into social cohesion between Syrian refugees and host communities in vulnerable areas of Lebanon. It explores the most relevant challenges that face social cohesion and trust in the society. As the great majority of Syrian refugees are often hosted in already impoverished areas, the economic conditions and vulnerability of both refugees and host community have worsened considerably over the past few years.

This economic tension places an increasing pressure on the host communities, where almost all socio-economic sectors have been adversely affected. The worsening economic situation is likely to aggravate the tension. In this context, this research concludes that advancing development-led strategies that generate economic opportunities for both refugees and host communities is instrumental in fostering social cohesion between the two communities.

Moreover, the scale and nature of the Syrian crisis initiated a complex mechanism of response from the beginning, for Lebanon itself as well as the surrounding countries, which means that governments as well as local and international NGOs were required to be engaged and collaborate at different levels in various sectors. The chapter identifies several challenges that face the development and implementation of livelihood activities. An important challenge is the lack of close cooperation between international NGOs, especially donor agencies, which results in the unsustainability of economic development activities comprising mainly short-term projects, the duplication of activities and an intense competition between NGOs over funds, which results in tension and mistrust between them, including local councils and municipalities.

Chapter 10

CONCLUSION

THE MISSING VIRTUE

Generalized trust is crucial to any society that aspires to have a higher level of social capital, which is crucial to economic development, political stability and a viable society. Studies have noted that without trust it is difficult to have a cooperative and interactive society, two societal characteristics that structure, create and sustain the norms and values of a society. Generalized trust is a pillar to the building of a lively community whose composite members engage and cooperate for the sake of the whole society. However, the foundation and continuation of high level of generalized trust require a specific environment in which it can operate at a higher level. Many theories and observations have found that culture and history are sources of generalized trust. Authors of research to the contrary argue that trust comes from civil engagement, while others have empirically found that institutions are the main source of generalized trust.

In this book, I have examined institutions as a source of generalized trust in societies in general and divided societies in particular. I have also tried to analyse what particular conditions and factors can be used to explain the different levels of generalized trust in divided societies and whether certain paths lead to higher or lower levels of generalized trust. The main argument presented in this book is that institutions play a crucial role in determining the level of generalized trust in divided societies. In this regard, the term 'institutions' refers to both formal institutions and informal institutions (which, in many cases, are established in answer to the perceived weaknesses of existing formal institutions), such as corruption.

Institutions and generalized trust

Over the past two decades, fiscal and administrative institutions have emerged in research as key influential institutions in relation to generalized trust in developed countries. However, in divided societies, administrative and some critical political institutions have been ignored as more researchers have focused on peace and development questions within these societies, from the perspective

of international relations theories and reconciliation processes. A research agenda with a focus on generalized trust in divided societies requires a much more thorough consideration of models of institutions and governance than I am able to focus on in this book but, by drawing attention to the need for an explanation as to how institutions destroy or maintain trust, demonstrating the linkages between generalized trust and formal and informal institutions and by sketching several hypotheses as to what these explanations might be, I hope to have contributed further to this research paradigm. Although I focus on institutions via their institutional determinants, I do not discuss, for example, electoral institutions, as I believe that electoral institutions do not play a major role in generalized trust. However, considering the sensitivity of the topic, electoral institutions do need further study and examination beyond this book.

Each country is unique and has its own political, social, ethnic, cultural and linguistic divisions. Each country has its own history and response to history and, within each country, every sect has its own version of that history. Each society establishes its institutions with certain limitations: well-being of the state, economic resources, levels of polarization and ethnic division, traumatization, displacement and international and regional pressures. Institutional redesign and reconfiguration (particularly in post-war times) would simply be empty rhetoric should these measures fail to confront the specific and complex needs of different groups, and the limited resources available. Instead, they need to facilitate the entry of civil society, provide a fertile environment for more equal and impartial public administration and allow for deliberation or consultation on policy issues. In post-conflict and divided societies, generalized trust is influenced not only by institutions but also by the policy tools that are initiated by these institutions (including the tools of international institutions), as they are the first points of interaction for members of that society.

Deeply divided societies seem to have multiple layers of division, yet neither ethnic nor ethno-religious issues are the main causes of societal division. Rather, elitism and class divisions that result from inequalities and informal institutions, such as corruption, are the most defining lines of division in these deeply divided societies. In this regard, I find that institutions in deeply divided societies are major defining factors of the level of generalized trust.

The different paths apparent in the process of maintaining or destroying generalized trust show that each country has a different level of wealth and a different set of economic resources, each of which plays a significant role in increasing division and inequality among its citizens. Economic resources are, therefore, an influential factor in designing institutions that affect generalized trust. In a setting with shrinking economic resources, a state's institutions would not be able to offer effective policy tools to meet the resignation or reconfiguration of formal institutions. Another important resource is leadership; different sectarian leaders can exploit a divided society that lacks a charismatic leader, leading to greater vulnerability to division between institutions, which in turn leads to higher levels of corruption, nepotism and patrimonialism. This can have a direct impact on the level of generalized trust – as the Palestinian case indicates.

As societies have various characteristics, what may have worked in destroying or maintaining generalized trust in one society may not work in another, and what did not work or was not successful in one society may work well in another. The trajectory has to be channelled to the particular society and its context. For instance, there have been many studies that focus on the role of civic participation in advancing the level of trust; however, Amaney Jammal found that such a hypothesis does not hold in the case of Palestine. Variations in institutional conditions and in the levels of generalized trust (as discussed in Chapter 4) suggest that ethnic or sectarian divisions are not the only relevant contributing factors. The uniqueness of each society means that local experts and institutional designers are the only experts in their own situation and that their judgement is the only assessment that will be relevant to their society.

Comparative research on generalized trust in divided societies is still rare and does not explain why the degree of generalized trust varies across these societies, despite the fact that they have very similar societal contexts. In this book, I have analysed the level of generalized trust and the changes evident in specific institutions (both formal and informal) in the MENA region and across eight other divided societies. I have also examined the question explored in the book in depth, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.

In this book, I suggest that oversimplifying the source of generalized trust and limiting it to only one source is not entirely accurate or well-proven. Rather, there are several sources of generalized trust, which include institutions, civil society, associations and the history and pattern of the population in society.

It is illustrated in the findings that different institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust in a divided society and that each society has a different mechanism for maintaining or destroying the level of generalized trust. The findings empirically prove that informal institutions, such as corruption, affect both generalized trust and institutional trust, as a result of weak policy tools and weak institutions. From the findings, I suggest that the process of maintaining generalized trust is multi-causal and complex, and that they show that civil war and political division operate as a catalyst in destroying generalized trust between citizens, even in homogeneous societies, such as in Palestine or among the same sects.

The source of generalized trust

From the analysis, my main finding is that different levels of generalized trust are attributed to various paths, based on the political, economic and social characteristics of each country. It is shown in the results that the absence of inequality is key to a higher level of generalized trust in divided societies. This finding supports the institutional theory of social trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). High levels of generalized trust reveal that the level of fractionalization in a society has no value in accounting for a high level of generalized trust. Entry and exit of civil society, which indicates that the government allows people to form

their own community organizations, participate politically and engage in society have an impact on trust in divided societies. This means that CSOs are important to countries in post-conflict times, mainly because they open the doors for public deliberation and bring people together. However, membership of a CSO does not necessarily have consistent results, as memberships can negatively affect trust if the members attempt to exploit the CSO vision or mission or exploit the space in favour of a specific political elite.

In Chapters 4 and 5, the reader is provided with an empirical finding, which suggests that while generalized trust is easily destroyed, its maintenance is more difficult. This means that destroying or maintaining the level of generalized trust requires more effort, the engagement of institutions and a readjustment of policy tools in order to bring it to a higher level. Although institutions appear to be an important source of trust, the findings suggest that institutions should work collectively and simultaneously to produce a higher level of trust. This is because one institution (or one policy tool that fosters equality – for example, housing or access to clean water) may not work to advance the level of trust. Yet, equality seems to be a crucial institution in the maintenance of higher levels of trust. One major outcome and result of this book is that equality maintains trust, while inequality destroys trust.

I found that insecurity, safety and inequality are major causal factors to the undermining of trust in societies that are divided ethnically, religiously and/or politically. The findings suggest that political institutions, their design and administrative mechanics have a very high impact on trust. Political division that creates multiple bureaucratic machines in Palestine, for example, has led to negative impacts on democratic values among Palestinian people, who experience high levels of political polarization, frustration and hopelessness that have severe impacts on generalized trust. In Lebanon, sectarian institutions with a highly divided media lead to inequalities between people, as well as intensifying their feelings of insecurity and safety, which resulted in a lower level of trust. Moreover, the presence of Syrian people, as displaced refugees, in a divided society has increased the hardship that Syrian people experience. The experiences of displacement and of being a refugee are extremely difficult and, when accompanied by isolation and further restrictions by Lebanese institutions, it leads to potentially hazardous consequences, such as low levels of trust.

In(equality), trust in CSO and generalized trust

Trust in civil society performance, equality in receiving public services, the capacity to complain in cases of rights violations and a feeling of safety and security in society have a strong impact on the level of generalized trust. My analysis supports the original theory from Rothstein and Stolle, in which they argue that equality and fairness are linked to generalized trust from an institutional perspective. As generalized trust is gained by cognitive inference, two major channels influence it: experience and observation.

When each member of a society feels that they have received equal treatment from formal institutions, people feel secure, are able to complain against violations of basic rights and receive the same benefits as others in society, they will expect others to behave as they do and will not try to exploit the different institutions. The results show that trust in civil society performance is also a strong indicator of generalized trust. This is because civil society, for example, in Lebanon reflects sectarianism. As CSOs are politically and religiously affiliated with different sects and do not defend the rights of people or encourage participation in political and societal life, each is crucial in determining whether or not a person trusts other institutions. The rationale behind this is that civil society is a third party in society, working as a link between people and formal institutions. If these institutions begin to show loyalty to one particular sect by, for example, providing services exclusively to that sect, this increases gaps, divisions and inequality within a society. This leads to a lower level of trust in people and other sects, as individuals expect that others are not only exploiting the system but also supporting it at the expense of others. The more an individual feels insecure and has unequal access to public services compared to others, the less trust they have in civil society and its representatives (or sectarian leaders) and, if they are unable to file a complaint against rights violations, they will be more prone to distrusting others.

The political division and the violent political polarization in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have led to low levels of generalized trust. The lack of trust in courts and the legal system, the increased perception of corruption and nepotism, low quality of public services and the violations of human rights by both ruling governments in the two divided areas have led to political alienation, hopelessness and frustration among Palestinian people. The cumulative pressure on the Palestinian people by the continued Israeli siege, restriction of movement and a high percentage of unemployment have contributed to the diminishing level of trust. I argue that low levels of trust, accompanied by deep ethnic and political polarization, would lead to a hybrid society. In hybrid societies, public opinions become a 'prisoner' in the hands of the divided people's or sects' political machine, which are then exploited by the divisionist, generating a distorted public opinion that is far from the real topics that need to be debated as core issues in the society.

From the Syrian case study, it is clear that Syrian society lacked trust as a result of political institutions – and not as a result of civil war. Civil war is a result of authoritarian institutions that implanted distrust between the different sects in Syria. Therefore, I argue in this book that the Syrian civil war is not sectarian, but rather is semi-sectarian. Semi-sectarianism in this instance was the result of a combination of long-term policies by the Syrian regime and the creation of a police state, where citizens were seen as objects under continuous surveillance by their fellow citizens. It also shows that a lack of political participation, a feeling of insecurity and unsafety, the absence of civil society, political oppression and the securitization of the public space have led to a low level of trust. As a result of this low level of trust, the initiation of the semi-sectarian civil war was easier for the regime and foreign powers to facilitate, whereby the already low level of trust among Syrian people has collapsed almost entirely. The findings show that

the level of trust matches the level of destruction and intensity of conflict. The more destruction that exists and the higher the number of casualties, the less trust exists between people within a society. Besides this, I assert that demographic changes, the harsh experiences of displacement and refugeeism have contributed to the low level of trust, where solidarity between people has disappeared because Syrian refugees see one another as competitors for basic needs amid a shortage of resources and insecurity in their livelihoods.

The Syrian case study provides an example of how the use of sectarianism as a political tool has resulted in negative consequences. Therefore, in any reconciliation process, the first task for a divided society is to establish functioning and effective institutions in order to generate trust between different groups. These institutions should start with a legislature to prescribe the rules by which the society and other governmental institutions will be governed and an administrative bureaucracy with the capability of enforcing rules and providing essential public goods and services (such as education, health, housing and a judicial system) on the basis of equality. Without these requirements, it would be very difficult to generate or maintain generalized trust.

The Syrian case study makes clear that long-term persecution and political oppression created a semi-sectarian society in which its composite members did not feel safe or secure. The result of the lack of political participation and absence of public consultation, as well as restrictions on CSO, resulted in a low level of trust among Syrian people, who had experienced a police regime in which they felt they were constantly under surveillance. The Syrian civil war provides a live example of how 'the war machine' can undermine trust by displacing and/or killing people and destroying homes and livelihoods, as well as demographic political change. In general, the case studies confirm that political institutions have an impact on trust.

Generalized trust between Lebanese and Syrian people in Lebanon provides evidence that social trust can be transferred. This is clear from the level of social trust among Syrian people, which is slightly higher than that of the Lebanese people. In other words, the level of trust between Syrian people in Lebanon correlates with the level of trust in Syria (particularly in areas those Syrian people originate from prior to the war). I also assert the importance of public spaces in building trust, as well as the role of international organizations, as their aid and assistance can work as a catalyst to build trust between host communities and refugees.

From this perspective, the improving of effective democratic institutions requires a high level of both generalized and institutional trust. It is useful to think of mechanisms and policy tools that could develop and enhance those levels of trust in order to root out the perception of high levels of corruption in MENA countries. This is most important in the case of Tunisia, which has a higher level of distrust as well as perception of corruption. In 2011, only 64 per cent of Tunisian people said that most people are not trustworthy, compared to 91 per cent in 2018. In 2011, 69 per cent of Tunisian people said that there is corruption within state institutions, compared to 74 per cent in 2018.

Informal institutions and trust

Clearly, corruption (measured by perception of corruption) and experience with corruption reduce both the level of generalized trust and that of institutional trust in the MENA region. The findings laid out in Chapter 5 provide an important insight into the equilibrium of corruption, generalized trust and institutional trust. Hence, the findings suggest that the nexus of corruption and trust in the MENA region are not an exception to the rest of the world. The MENA region analysis also provides a clear result; that institutional trust impacts the level of generalized trust, while the opposite is slightly significant.

The result of the analysis shows that there is a vicious cycle between corruption and institutional trust, which affects the level of generalized trust. The analyses show that the effect of corruption on levels of generalized and institutional trust is endogenous. Most interestingly, the findings also suggest that generalized and institutional trust are both endogenous and that they feed into each other. Moreover, the findings provide an insight into the equilibrium of trust and experience of corruption. It is not surprising that those who have experienced corruption have low levels of trust in their fellow citizens and in the political institutions – and vice versa.

Outlook

Comparative analysis points to the following generalization concerning generalized trust:

1. Incremental and predictable

Generalized trust in divided and polarized societies is predictable in the long term. It is an incremental and slow process in which the realization of low generalized trust manifests itself in many ways, resulting in violence and possibly physical partitions of societies. In the societies examined, low generalized trust continues as long as institutions remain ineffective, and the exploitation of formal institutions by ethnic and sect leadership and high levels of corruption continue. The violence either stops completely, such as in South Africa, or intensifies, such as in the case of Iraq. However, in some cases, violence does not completely cease, and tensions continue to smoulder; for example, in Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan. There are small but noticeable events that show the destruction of generalized trust as a result of institutional failure. These events occur as a result of ill-performing institutions, high rates of arrests, and crimes in specific ethnic groups (or, 'insecurity'), ineffective and politically affiliated civil society, arbitrariness in public administration, abuse of power sharing (in central or local governance), particularistic allocation of expenditures, corruption and widespread bribery. These are present in many cases, such as in Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Pakistan and South Africa.

2. Generalized trust is context-dependent

Generalized trust is not an unchanging mechanism that is maintained or destroyed. Low generalized trust is not always the result of violence or conflict; rather, other events act as catalysts. Destabilizing circumstances combined with unjust institutions and policies can result in the destruction of generalized trust. While the scale and nature of institutions are different within each society, culture and tradition influence the level of trust in certain societies in times of war or other crises.

Moreover, a context-dependent view considers historical events that have an impact on the shape of societies and always places generalized trust at risk. Such historical events in Lebanon include the Occupation of Palestine in 1948, which changed the demographic shape of Lebanon, the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006. In Iraq, those significant historical events include Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the American invasion in 2003. Kyrgyzstan, the fall of the Soviet Union was an historically impactful event, while for Bosnia and Herzegovina it was the end of the Cold War, the Bosnia Referendum and the foreign affairs crisis. As in the Syrian case study, we see that the level of trust has been affected more in areas that witnessed intense conflict and destruction. For instance, main cities such as Tartus and Damascus have not been affected in the same way that Aleppo or Deir Azzur has been, which is why an unequal level of trust can be found there.

3. Institutional deprivation and corruption

Inter-ethnic violence in divided societies usually coincides with a low generalized trust between the different groups. Besides that, deeply polarized societies have a low level of trust generally. Divided societies also coincide with relative deprivation at the institutional level, such as legal restrictions on employment and building homes, inequality of services, absence of consultation in decision-making processes, monopoly of power, and education and health inequality. Typical cases of exclusion include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, where there are policies that disqualify certain ages, ethnic sects or groups from participating in political life. For instance, in Lebanon, some educational services are not accessible to all groups. Moreover, institutions provide room for sectarian employment and marginalization and the prevention of other sects from accessing private companies under the pretext of retaining a sectarian balance. Inequality in resource allocation, with limited accessibility to information and awareness of injustice in societies, will always result in lower generalized trust, which, in turn, makes the society more vulnerable to violence. Additionally, ethnic violence, inequality and badly designed institutions lead to corruption, which breeds low levels of generalized and institutional trust. It continues in a vicious cycle, with the one feeding the other.

4. Territorial segregation or division

Low generalized trust in divided societies is the result of inequality on the part of institutions and is reflected in policies that distribute resources in a disproportionate way. This eventually leads to deeper segregation between ethnic groups, where people prefer to live closer to others of the same ethnicity. This pattern is easily demonstrated with the vast wave of immigration from violent areas in Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Bosnia and Pakistan. The movement of immigrants from rural areas to urban areas acts to increase the immigrants' segregation, as they prefer to live close to each other, which creates isolated areas within a city (the phenomenon of 'physical partition'). This is also fuelled by the sectarian decentralization of local municipalities and local authorities, which provide the means to prohibit individuals from non-similar ethnic backgrounds from renting from one another or owning land. Such trends generate a feeling of insecurity among native residents of the city from different ethnic groups, which then results in a political push to use formal institutions to deprive the new immigrants of resources, a move that ultimately results in low levels of generalized trust. The long-term effect of such institutions is hazardous and can lead to the corrosion of generalized trust and the eruption of violence. Demographic change in Syria is an example of territorial segregation and division.

5. Long-term harm

Studying trust in divided societies exposes the long-term impact of unnoticed institutional failures, which are both negative and continue to harm the level of generalized trust among residents, even in cases where a reconciliation process is enforced. It is encouraging that the results of institutional failure in societies divided among ethnic lines can be predicted. The value of such a model is particularly high in light of the fact that the world appears to be on a trajectory towards societies divided similarly to those studied in this book. This is even more important as the world witnesses more inter-ethnic and intra-state conflicts, and cities and societies are becoming more politically, ethnically and religiously divided. The list of cases includes societies from the Middle East to Latin America, South East Asia, Central Asia, Europe and North America (where African American people, white people and Latino people are divided on many levels within the society).

Final words

This book empirically supports the theory that political and societal institutions have an impact on the level of social trust in divided societies. I argue that institutions have a high impact on trust, and that civil wars and ethnic violence are manifestations from the same causal factors that lead to low levels of generalized

trust. I emphasize the need for effective institutions to keep the peace among different sects. Weak and ineffective institutions allow powerful parties to prey on weaker groups or individuals without deterrent, which then increases inequality and decreases generalized trust between groups. These institutions must enforce the law across both public and private entities.

I also demonstrate that informal institutions (such as corruption) may have a high impact on levels of social trust, and demonstrate the importance of mixed methods in examining sensitive questions with an interdisciplinary approach.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Variables borrowed and adopted from V-Dem and QoG

Variable	Description	Raw coding rules
v2dlencmps	Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how 'particularistic' or 'public goods' are most expenditure?	0. Almost all of social and infrastructure expenditure are particularistic. 1. Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic but a significant portion is public good. 2. Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public goods programmes. 3. Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public goods but a significant portion is particularistic. 4. Almost all social and infrastructure expenditure are public goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.
VCLRSPCT	Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties (in regard to ethnicities)?	0. Public officials do not respect the law. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law rampant. 1. The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law widespread. 2. The law is modestly by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law moderate. 3. The law is most respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
V2PEPWRSOC	Is political power distributed according to social group?	0. Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized. Not subject to frequent change. 1. Several social groups comprising a minority of the population monopolize political power. This monopoly is institutionalized, that is, not subject to frequent change. 2. Several social groups comprising the majority of the population monopolize political power. This monopoly is institutionalized, that is, not subject to frequent change. 3. Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others, or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

Variable	Description	Raw coding rules
Fe_etfra	To what extent the population of the country is ethnically fractionalized?	0. Perfectly homogenous. 1. Highly fragmented.
dpi_auton	Authority of subnational governments on taxation	0. No authority. 1. Subnational governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.
v2lgotovst	Oversight and regulation: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavourable decision or report?	1. Extremely unlikely. 2. Unlikely. 3. Very uncertain. 4. Likely. 5. Certain or nearly certain
v2dlengage	When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?	0. Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 1. Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2. Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue areas. 4. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue areas. 5. Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

v2cseeorgs	To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by CSOs into public life?	0. Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1. Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2. Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3. Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4. Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.
v2cscnsult	Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?	0. No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1. To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2. Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Variable	Description	Raw coding rules
V2dlunivl	Is there a means-tested or universal social policies?	0. There is no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, unemployment, poverty programmes). 1. Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested. 2. Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion is universalistic and potentially benefit everyone in the population. 3. The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic. 4. Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion is means-tested. 5. Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only small portion is means-tested.
p_xconst	Executive Constraints	0. Unlimited authority. 1. Intermediate Category. 2. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority. 3. Substantial limitations on executive authority. 4. Executive parity or subordination.

Clarification of the variables

V2DLENCMPS: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted towards specific corporation, sector, social group, region party or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as 'pork', 'clientelistic' or 'private goods'. Public goods are intended to benefits all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituencies. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-tested are allowed to receive the benefit. The value of this question considers the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending.

VCLRSPCT: This indicator focuses on the extent to which public officials abide the law and treat like cases alike despite the ethnic origins or geographical area or racial group. This indicator shows if the public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and if it can be characterized by nepotism, cronyism or discrimination.

V2PEPWRSOC: a social group is differentiated with a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, religion, or some combination. Social group identity is also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, that is, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood – by those residing within that society – to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Fe_etfra: Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 per cent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnical and 'ethno-religious' groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

p_xconst: According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: 'Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognise when decision processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken' (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 121). Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Any 'accountability groups' may impose such limitations. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.

V2dlunivl: A means-tested programme targets poor, needy or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programmes are normally means-tested. A universal programme potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education national health care schemes, and retirement programmes. Granted, some may benefit more than other from these programmes. The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is to evaluate the quality of the state policies on cash-based or social policies–based programmes that exist.

Note: Data on Macedonia have been extracted from different sources and transformed into the measurement model based on the surrounding countries for the fractionalization of the country, Delphi Method for the dpi_auton and p_xconstant.

Appendix B

Interview questions

Contextual factors
(To explore the ethnicity and legal framework)

- To what extent are ethnical differences considered within the *legal bureaucratic framework* and administrative policies?
- Is there a different treatment of such policies (administrative politics, for example, power sharing, expenditures for specific region or ethnical-majority areas, facilitation of civil society establishment/political parties) directly legalized? Indirectly facilitated?
- To what extent does ethnical conflict/diversity affect the level of trust in society?
- Do the legal framework and policies affect the trust between different ethnical groups? How?

(To explore policy outcomes and generalized trust)

- What is the geographical distribution of spending and services (equal, biased)? How does it affect the level of generalized trust?
- To what extent do local policies intensify conflict among ethnical groups?
- In what circumstances does policy increase/lessen generalized trust?

(To explore procedural policies and generalized trust)

- Is there public deliberation when it comes to policy change? To what extent does it increase the trust among the different ethnical groups?
- To what extent does the governmental control over civil society (inter-ethnical or intra-ethnical groups) affect the trust in the society?
- Is the government consulting civil society organization on policy change and initiations, will that affect the trust among the different ethnical groups?

(To explore the substantive policies and generalized trust)

- Are particularistic spending (social services, education, health)/expenditure by central government or local government affect the trust among ethnical groups? Citizens? How?
- To what extent does public officials' discrimination (if it exists) against ethnical groups affect trust among ethnical groups and citizens? How?
- When greater autonomy (e.g. shared political power or decentralized policymaking), how does the level of trust change? Does that facilitate policymaking intra and inter-ethnical groups?

(Policy change and generalized trust)

- How have changes in policies, if any, affected the level and nature of generalized trust in a divided society?

(To examine the institutional differentiation)

- Is there ethnic-based differentiation of society's institutions or organizations?
- Are there formal or informal efforts to integrate competing ethnical groups?

(To examine basic values)

- In the society is there any conflicting/shared values concerning policy issues across the participation in policy designation, administrative issues and planning? (Any example?)
- Does the conflicting value cause less trust between the ethnical groups?
- How can you describe the trust in general between the different ethnical groups?

Policy issues and goals

(To explore ethnical issues in policies)

- What is the major policy manifestation of ethnical conflict? Is it possible to classify different policy areas based on their degree of conflict (e.g. civil society, expenditure, power)?
- To what degree do development goals and objectives differ between ethnic/racial communities?

(To examine citizen's participation)

- What is the degree and quality of citizen participation in policymaking?
- Are there intergroup collaborative policy processes used?
- What are the characteristics of community organizations within contested urban environments?

Generalized trust and policies

(To explore generalized trust and policy agenda setting in general)

- How inclusive is the identification of alternative policies that might increase the level of generalized trust and further inter-community objectives?
- To what extent ideological and ethnic ideologies factors limit local and regional policy setting?

(To explore decision-making rules)

- What decision-making criteria are used to allocate public goods? Functional-technical? Ethnical? Partisan? Equity?
- In any way does such criteria affect the trust among citizens or different ethnic groups?

Appendix C

QCA analysis results

```
**********
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********

File:  E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
Model: outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

 Rows:     18


 Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
     True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

                                raw      unique
                           coverage    coverage   consistency
                          ---------- ---------- ----------
equ*~ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*~ec*efr       0.285714   0.285714    1.000000
equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*~ec*efr         0.285714   0.142857    1.000000
equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*csc*efr         0.285714   0.142857    1.000000
equ*~ppw*asg*~png*eec*~csc*~ec*efr    0.142857   0.142857    1.000000
equ*~ppw*asg*png*~eec*csc*~ec*efr     0.142857   0.142857    1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000



**********
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********

File:  E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
Model: outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

 Rows:     18


 Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
     True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
```

... 2

```
            raw       unique
           coverage   coverage   consistency
          ---------- ---------- ----------
equ*~ec     0.857143   0.285714   1.000000
equ*~asg    0.714286   0.142857   1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000



**********
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********

File:  E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
Model: outcome = f(efr, ec, csc, eec, png, asg, ppw, equ)

 Rows:      8



 Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
     True: 1
  0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
Assumptions:

                              raw       unique
                             coverage   coverage   consistency
                            ---------- ---------- ----------
efr*~ec*~eec*~png*~asg*~ppw*equ      0.285714   0.285714   1.000000
efr*~ec*eec*~png*~asg*ppw*equ        0.285714   0.142857   1.000000
efr*csc*eec*~png*~asg*ppw*equ        0.285714   0.142857   1.000000
efr*~ec*~csc*eec*~png*asg*~ppw*equ   0.142857   0.142857   1.000000
efr*~ec*csc*~eec*png*asg*~ppw*equ    0.142857   0.142857   1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000
```

Number and information of cases for causal model for predicting generalized trust

No.	id	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
1	KGZ9904	0	0	0	0	0
2	KGZ1014	0	**1**	0	0	0
3	IRQ9904	**1**	0	0	0	0
4	IRQ1014	0	0	**1**	0	0
5	LBN0810	0	0	0	0	0
6	LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0
7	ZAF8993	0	0	0	0	0
8	ZAF9904	0	0	0	0	0
9	PAK9498	0	0	0	0	0
10	PAK9904	0	0	0	0	**1**
11	PAK1014	0	0	0	0	0
12	BIH9498	0	0	0	0	0
13	BIH9904	0	0	0	**1**	0
14	MKD9599	0	0	0	0	0
15	MKD9904	0	0	0	0	0
16	TUK9498	0	0	0	0	0
17	TUK9904	0	0	0	0	0
18	TUK1014	0	0	0	0	0
Number of cases		**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**

Number and information of cases for causal model for predicting absence of generalized trust

No.	id	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M 7	M 8
1	KGZ9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	KGZ1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	IRQ9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	IRQ1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	LBN0810	0	0	0	**1**	**1**	0	0	0
6	LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	ZAF8993	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
8	ZAF9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	PAK9498	0	0	**1**	0	0	0	0	0
10	PAK9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
11	PAK1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	BIH9498	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	BIH9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	MKD9599	0	0	0	0	0	**1**0	**1**	0
15	MKD9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	TUK9498	**1**	**1**	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	TUK9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	TUK1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of cases		**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**

Appendix D

Trust in public institutions in MENA.

Category	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Palestine	Sudan	Tunisia	Yemen
Trust in the government (%)												
High	NA	66	19.20	38.1	47.60	19	10.50	28.60	33.40	32.8	19.80	57.40
Medium	NA	17.2	16.2	24.1	26.2	33.8	22.1	28.0	30.5	35.2	16.0	22.7
Low	NA	15.2	62.2	35.9	23.2	46.8	64.2	38.9	32.9	28.3	58.3	17.8
Don't know	NA	1.6	2.3	1.9	3.0	0.3	3.3	4.4	3.2	3.7	5.9	2.1
Trust in courts and legal system (%)												
High	48	79.10	37.80	64.50	78.70	25.10	37.40	60.60	41.20	52	48.10	61.60
Medium	31.7	11.7	22.3	15.1	12.7	40.9	25.0	22.1	31.8	30.9	19.4	22.6
Low	18.8	7.5	36.6	16.9	7.3	34.0	34.0	15.1	24.2	15.4	26.1	14.5
Don't know	1.5	1.7	3.2	3.5	1.3	0.0	3.7	2.2	2.8	1.7	6.4	1.2
Trust in the elected council of representatives (the parliament) (%)												
High	NA	30.50	12.60	13.70	32.40	17.50	8.60	21.40	16.60	29.50	13.70	31.80
Medium	NA	32.4	13.2	15.7	26.2	33.6	18.1	25.7	31.5	36.0	13.5	30.5
Low	NA	32.6	72.6	68.5	38.2	48.7	70.3	45.9	34.7	31.7	65.4	35.2
Don't know	NA	4.5	1.6	2.1	3.3	0.1	3.1	6.9	7.3	3.7	7.5	2.5
Trust in local government (%)												
High	NA	45.70	27.20	37.10	NA	30.70	22.90	34.60	26.90	35.30	32.50	59.70
Medium	NA	31.6	18.0	26.4	NA	36.4	22.8	26.0	24.4	37.7	20.9	21.2
Low	NA	19.6	52.9	34.8	NA	32.8	51.0	35.0	42.1	24.8	38.2	17.2
Don't know	NA	3.1	1.9	1.6	NA	0.1	3.4	4.4	6.1	2.1	8.4	1.9
Trust in the police (%)												
High	49.80	72.60	68.80	89.70	85.30	56	45.70	65.90	51.80	48.90	61.60	66.50
Medium	30.5	11.9	14.4	5.2	9.8	36.3	25.3	19.4	28.1	33.1	17.1	19.5
Low	18.6	14.5	16.0	5.0	4.1	15.7	27.4	13.0	18.6	17.3	19.2	13.5
Don't know	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.0	1.5	1.7	1.5	0.8	2.0	0.6

Category	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Palestine	Sudan	Tunisia	Yemen
Trust in the armed forces (%)												
High	NA	84.30	84.10	94.90	NA	87.50	59.20	78.80	37	64.60	90.20	70
Medium	NA	7.5	8.2	2.6	NA	7.9	15.5	12.5	27.8	21.8	4.8	18.0
Low	NA	8.0	7.0	2.1	NA	4.3	23.8	6.4	28.7	12.7	3.8	11.9
Don't know	NA	0.2	0.6	0.4	NA	0.3	1.5	2.3	6.5	1.0	1.3	0.2
Trust in political parties (%)												
High	NA	21.60	6.20	6.70	NA	18.90	4.40	18.40	13.50	15.20	9.30	30.90
Medium	NA	32.6	12.7	9.2	NA	34.2	8.8	30.1	30.0	28.9	12.1	31.0
Low	NA	33.6	77.7	70.3	NA	46.6	80.7	47.2	53.0	51.3	72.1	36.8
Don't know	NA	12.2	3.5	13.8	NA	0.3	6.2	4.4	3.5	4.7	6.5	1.2

Source: The Arab Barometer. Wave V. 2019.

Institution	Low %	Medium %	High %	Do not know %	Total %
Armed forces	10.7	12.5	75.3		
Government	39	24.5	42.7	2.8	100
Police	15.4	20.9	62.7	1.0	100
Parliament	50	24.9	21.2	3.9	100
Political parties	56.4	23.6	14.7	5.6	100
Local government	34.9	26.3	35.5	3.3	100
Courts and legal system	21.4	24.1	52.1	2.5	100

Appendix E

Political participation in the MENA region from 2007 to 2019

		Year				
Category	**Total**	**2007**	**2011**	**2013**	**2016**	**2019**
Country			**Algeria**			
Once	6.2%	9.3%	6.1%	4.6%	2.0%	7.7%
More than once	8.9%	12.3%	11.3%	3.2%	3.3%	11.8%
I have never participated	84.9%	78.4%	82.6%	92.3%	94.6%	80.5%
(N)	7,096	1,205	1,185	1,209	1,183	2,315
Country			**Palestine**			
Once	9.1%	7.2%	7.3%	10.7%	10.4%	9.6%
More than once	20.3%	24.2%	16.2%	19.2%	20.8%	20.5%
I have never participated	70.6%	68.6%	76.4%	70.1%	68.8%	69.8%
(N)	7,244	1,232	1,176	1,163	1,189	2,484
Country			**Iraq**			
Once	6.8%	-	9.3%	5.9%	-	6.1%
More than once	8.6%	-	7.9%	9.6%	-	8.5%
I have never participated	84.6%	-	82.8%	84.5%	-	85.5%
(N)	4,836		1,210	1,173		2,453
Country			**Jordan**			
Once	3.0%	6.4%	2.9%	1.0%	0.7%	3.9%
More than once	3.2%	4.3%	4.9%	3.1%	2.0%	2.7%
I have never participated	93.8%	89.2%	92.3%	95.9%	97.3%	93.4%
(N)	7,624 (100%)	1,107 (100%)	1,152 (100%)	1,776 (100%)	1,195 (100%)	2,394 (100%)

Category	Total	Year				
		2007	2011	2013	2016	2019
Country			**Kuwait**			
Once	7.0%	-	-	7.0%	-	-
More than once	11.8%	-	-	11.8%	-	-
I have never participated	81.2%	-	-	81.2%	-	-
(N)	1,007	-	-	1,007	-	-
Country			**Lebanon**			
Once	8.0%	14.2%	7.0%	6.3%	6.7%	7.0%
More than once	14.1%	30.4%	14.2%	14.7%	8.7%	8.6%
I have never participated	77.9%	55.4%	78.8%	78.9%	84.7%	84.4%
(N)	7,313	1,153	1,381	1,185	1,199	2,394
Country			**Libya**			
Once	9.7%	-	-	10.6%	-	9.2%
More than once	14.8%	-	-	22.8%	-	9.8%
I have never participated	75.5%	-	-	66 7%	-	81.0%
(N)	3,179	-	-	1,230	-	1,949
Country			**Morocco**			
Once	8.9%	6.8%	-	5.6%	9.3%	11.3%
More than once	13.5%	12.5%	-	9.4%	10.4%	17.4%
I have never participated	77.6%	80.7%	-	85.0%	80.3%	71.3%
(N)	5,885	1,236	-	1,087	1,194	2,368
Country			**Sudan**			
Once	11.6%	-	12.3%	8.6%	-	13.0%
More than once	14.8%	-	16.9%	12.9%	-	14.3%
I have never participated	73.6%	-	70.8%	78.5%	-	72.7%
(N)	4,380	-	1,486	1,154	-	1,740

Country			**Tunisia**			
Once	4.3%	-	-	4.0%	4.4%	4.4%
More than once	8.9%	-	-	10.7%	10.0%	7.4%
I have never participated	86.8%	-	-	85.2%	85.6%	88.1%
(N)	4,769	-	-	1,171	1,200	2,398
Country			Egypt			
Once	6.1%	-	-	4.5%	1.6%	9.3%
More than once	5.0%	-	-	6.5%	1.9%	5.8%
I have never participated	88.9%	-	-	89.0%	96.5%	84.9%
(N)	4,688	-	-	1,167	1,200	2,321
Country			Yemen			
Once	12.7%	13.1%	12.1%	9.5%	-	14.4%
More than once	26.9%	14.1%	21.0%	41.3%	-	26.1%
I have never participated	60.5%	72.8%	67.0%	49.2%	-	59.5%
(N)	5,403	664	1,163	1,191	-	2,385

Source: Arab Barometer.

Appendix F

Variables used in the statistical analysis

Lebanon		
Variable	**Expected sign**	**Explanation**
Gtrust	**Depended**	Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not? 0. Most people are trustworthy. 1. Most people are not trustworthy
Living conditions compared to others	+	Generally speaking, how would you compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens? 1. Much worse 2. Worse 3. Similar 4. Better 5. Much better
Feeling of safety and security	+	Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are ensured or not? 1. Fully ensured 2. Ensured 3. Not ensured 4. Absolutely not ensured
Equality in country	+	To what extent do you feel that you are being treated equally compared to other citizens in your country? 1. To a great extent 2. To a medium extent 3. To a limited extent 4. Not at all
Access to complaint of rights against others	+	Access the relevant official to file a complaint when you feel that your rights have been violated. 1. Very Easy 2. Easy 3. Difficult 4. Very Difficult 5. I have not tried
Corruption	+	Do you think that there is corruption within the state's institutions and agencies? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Trust in representatives	+	To what extent do you trust the elected council of representatives? 1. I trust to a great extent 2. I trust to a medium extent 3. I trust it to a limited extent 4. I absolutely do not trust them

Performance of the judiciary	+	Generally speaking, how would you evaluate the performance of the judiciary in carrying out its tasks and duties? 1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Bad 5. Very bad
Clientelism	+	Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to obtain a job without connections, while others say that jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on recent experience(s) you are personally aware of, do you think that: 1. Obtaining employment through connections is extremely widespread? 2. Employment is sometimes obtained through connections? 3. Employment is obtained without connections? 4. I do not know of any relevant experiences. 8. I don't know (have not read).
Trust in civil society	+	To what extent do you trust civil society institutions? 1. I trust them to a great extent 2. I trust them to a medium extent 3. I trust them to a limited extent 4. I absolutely do not trust them

Source of Data is the Arab Barometer, third wave 2013 and fifth wave 2019.

Palestine		
Variable	**Expected sign**	**Explanation**
Gtrust	**Depended**	Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not? 0. Most people are trustworthy. 1. Most people are not trustworthy
Government performance on education system	+	How satisfied are you with the educational system in our country? 1. Definitely satisfied 2. Satisfied 3. Dissatisfied 4. Definitely dissatisfied 5. Don't know (Do not read)
Feeling of safety and security	+	Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are ensured or not? 1. Fully ensured 2. Ensured 3. Not ensured 4. Absolutely not ensured

Palestine		
Variable	**Expected sign**	**Explanation**
Corruption	+	To what extent do you think that there is corruption within the state agencies and institutions in your country? 1. To a large extent 2. To a medium extent 3. To a small extent 4. Not at all 98. I don't know
Employment	+	How would you evaluate the current government's performance on Creating employment opportunities: 1. Very Good 2. Good 3. Bad 4. Very Bad 5. Not the government's responsibility 6. I don't know
Non-formal activities	+	Over the past five years, have you or someone in your family (members of the same household) participated in a youth educational programme (for youth aged twelve to eighteen years) outside of the formal? 1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know (Do not read) 4. Declined to answer (Do not read)
Political leaders	+	Do you agree or disagree that political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens? 1. I strongly agree 2. I agree 3. I disagree 4. I strongly disagree 5. I don't know
Violation of human rights	-	Do you think there is any type of human rights violations committed by the government? 1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know (Do not read) 4. Declined to answer (Do not read)
Legal system	+	How much do you trust the courts and the legal system? 1. A great deal of trust 2. Quite a lot of trust 3. Not very much trust 4. No trust at all 5. I don't know

Source of Data is the Arab Barometer, fourth wave 2016 and fifth wave 2019.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1 Snježana Mulić (2013), 'Return', Connectun Sarajevo,.
2 The Altaif (*Taif*) agreement is the Lebanese National Agreement between the conflicting parties that was signed in Saudi Arabia to end the Lebanese civil war. It was signed in 1989.
3 The Day After, 'Local truces and forced demographic change in Syria' (Istanbul 2017).
4 *Daily Sabah*, 'Syria's Decree 10 land regulation amounts to "forced eviction": HRW', 29 May 2019. Retrieved 3 June 2018: https://bit.ly/2sCFb23

Chapter 2

1 Brave reciprocity is a concept borrowed from game theory. It means that individuals (as players in a game) yields total payoff for all participants in the game.

Chapter 3

1 In August 2013, Egyptian security and army raided camps of protesters who supported president Morsi in Cairo. The squares were occupied by supporters of President Mohamed Morsi, who had been removed from office by the military a month earlier in the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état. According to Human Rights Watch, a more than 904 people were killed.
2 Interview, M. Nabhan 2016, Beirut.
3 Interview, Gulnaz I. 2016.
4 Interview, Rodine M. 2016.
5 Interview, Luay K. 2015, Baghdad.
6 Interview, Pakistani Academic, Pakistan, 2015.
7 Interview, Medhat T. Istanbul, 2016.

Chapter 4

1 For more info: http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/3-2005b/
2 For more info: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2014
3 Uppsala Conflict Barometer 2013.
4 Interview, Rabea D. 2016.

5 Personal Communication Asma K. 2016.

Chapter 5

1 Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Agnes Cornell, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Valeriya Mechkova, Johannes von Römer, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. 'V-Dem Codebook v9' Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
2 For complete details of the technical report: https://bit.ly/2QHGRVD

Chapter 6

1 The Taif agreement ended the Lebanese civil war in 1990. It will be explained further in subsequent sections.
2 Personal communication, Fadi D. 2017.
3 Personal communication, 20 October 2015.
4 Personal communication, 25 October 2015.
5 Personal communication, Beirut, November 2016.
6 Personal communication, Beirut, April 2016.
7 Personal communication, Beirut, April 2016.
8 Personal communication, 2016.
9 For more info about this incident: https://www.annahar.com/article/301805-قحامس-لاشيم-حارس-قالطاب-قددنم-لعف-دودر
10 For example, the al-Makassed Association, the Druze Charity Association, Islamic Charity Association, Friends of Dar al-'Ajaza al Islamiya, the Islamic Martyr Charity Association, Zahrat al-Ihsan, al-Zahra' Charity Association, Amal Handicapped Association, Relief Maronite Association for the Poor and Women, the Greek Orthodox Association, the Cross Association to support Armenians, al-Sader Association and al-Hariri Alumni Foundation. Amal, Hizbullah, the Phalange Party, PSP and the SSNP's women committees are active members in the LCW and have gained decision-making powers. See the LCW manuscript *Al-Jam'iyat al-Moundawiya Tahta al-Majles al-Nisa'i* (Beirut: n.p., 2004).
11 (S. Aboud, personal communication 2016).
12 (O. Kassa, personal communication 2016).

Chapter 7

1 The author lived and worked in Gaza Strip until 2007. He was directly involved and witnessed the elections (as head of a polling station, as well as a researcher and activist). He was also the vice president of Fatah general assembly in East Gaza Strip (Shejaia) from 2005 to 2007.

2 I would like to thank Aziz Al Masri for his help in this part of the chapter.
3 For more information: http://www.arabbarometer.org
4 Interview (Gaza, June 2018)
5 Interview (Gaza, June 2018)
6 Interview (Gaza, June 2018)
7 Interview (Nablus, June 2018)
8 Interview (Ramallah, Gaza: June 2018)
9 Interview, Aziz Masri (Gaza June 2018)

Chapter 8

1 The name 'Syria's Alassad' is a term used by the pro-Syrian regime groups and individuals, which literally means Syria that belongs to Al Assad as a ruler and president. It is a counter-slogan of 'Free Syria' adopted in early 2011 and 2012.

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