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

ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Palestinian Resistance

Organization of a Nationalist Movement

John W. Amos II

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Note on Transliteration

Arabic words are usually transliterated in accordance with the Cambridge University system. There are some exceptions to this, however:

1. Terms which occur in translations are rendered as they are transliterated.
2. Authors' names are spelled as set out in titles of books or articles.
3. Geographical terms are usually spelled as they are customarily spelled in English.
4. Arabic proper nouns are capitalized.

List of Abbreviations

AASO	Arab Armed Struggle Organization
ACO	Arab Communist Organization
AGLP	Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine
AHC	Arab Higher Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement
ANYLP	Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine
ASLP	Arab Socialist Labor Party
ASO	Arab Sinai Organization
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BSO	Black September Organization
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ETA	Basque Homeland and Liberty
Fatah	Palestine National Liberation Movement
FLN	National Liberation Front (Algeria)
FLQ	Quebec Liberation Front
FROLINAT	Front for the Liberation of Chad
INF	Iranian National Front
IRA	Irish Republican Army
OCAL	Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon
OLS	Organization of Lebanese Socialists
OSL	Organization of Socialist Lebanon
PAO	Palestine Arab Organization
PASC	Palestine Armed Struggle Command
PDF	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
PFLOAG	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP, GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLF	Palestine Liberation Forces of the PLA
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PNF	Palestine National Fund
PNLF	Palestine National Liberation Front
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Sequia el-Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab
POLP	Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRCS	Palestinian Red Crescent Society
PRFLP	Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PSF	Popular Struggle Front
SRO	Socialist Revolutionary Organization in Lebanon
TPLA	Turkish People's Liberation Army
TPLF	Turkish People's Liberation Front
TPLP	Turkish People's Liberation Party
URA	United Red Army (Japan)

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Introduction: An Overview

The Palestine conflict is a consequence of the emergence of Arab and Jewish nationalism in the nineteenth century, of one too many peoples claiming the right of self-determination in Palestine. After 63 years, the problem created by the Balfour Declaration remains: how to reconcile the creation of a Jewish national home with the rights of the indigenous Palestinian population? The war of 1948 which resulted in the establishment of an enlarged state of Israel also caused the emigration of the bulk of the Palestinian residents. For a variety of reasons, outlined below, these refugees have remained in international limbo. The government of Israel refuses to allow them to return, arguing that this would create an enormous security problem. Arab governments, with the exception of Jordan, have been both unwilling and unable to absorb them. Nor have the Palestinians themselves been willing to assimilate and thus abandon their identity, either social or political. The existence of this refugee population is the chief source of over 30 years of continuous conflict in the area. As such, this refugee problem is the most emotional and apparently unsolvable of all national conflicts.

However, the issues and emotions involved have become far more complicated and intractable than a simple dispute over refugees. The Arab-Israeli dispute, as it has been styled until recently, resembles an iceberg. On the surface there is a clash between Israeli and Palestinian claims to self-determination in Palestine. Both claimants have strong cases, but the matter should in theory be susceptible to some rational agreement on specific questions concerning borders, refugees, or the implementation of United Nations resolutions.(1) For example, the refugees could be allowed to return, and a binational state – either wholly integrated or organized along the lines of Cyprus – could be set up; this is the Arab position. Alternatively, a population exchange patterned after the Greek-Turkish agreements of the 1920s could be worked out; this is the Israeli position. Indeed, Jewish populations in

Arab countries were expelled in reaction to the displacement, or exodus, of the Palestinians. Alternatively again, some form of Israeli compensation could be worked out for expropriated Palestinian properties. A UN commission has been set up to determine their value. All these solutions therefore, seem, on the surface to be plausible. The numbers of people on both sides are very small: there are fewer Jews in Israel than there are in some other countries; the Palestinian refugee population is miniscule compared with that of the Arab Middle East. Binational states are not uncommon; refugees have been resettled.(2)

Beneath the surface of political demands, however, lies a far deeper psychological conflict involving much wider populations of Arabs and Jews. Here the issues involve the basic question of personal and national identity; images of self and of others; reactions of personal and national identity; images of self and of others; reactions to traumatic experiences collectively suffered. These other populations share a sense of solidarity with those Israelis and Palestinians who are in direct confrontation. Zionism posits the essential shared identity of all Jews everywhere, and Arabism ('urubah) expresses the unity of all Arabs everywhere. Given this insertion of the Palestine problem into the affairs of Arabs and Jews outside the immediate bounds of Palestine, its solution is made that much more complex. In one sense, all the experiences, fears, and aspirations of diaspora Jewry must be taken into account; all the frustrations and tensions of Arabs throughout the area must be considered. This political and emotional linkage between the Palestine conflict and other conflicts has added a dimension which makes otherwise pragmatic diplomatic solutions extremely difficult to achieve.

In addition to the linkage problem, there is an emotional and perceptual context which further complicates solution. The profound depth and intensity of emotional commitment on the part of both Arabs and Jews cannot be overstressed. For them, the issue is quite literally one of survival as persons and as a people. No solution to the conflict which does not address itself to this feeling has any chance of success. A Quaker-sponsored study group which spent almost two years in the area concluded a survey of the problem with these comments:

> As we review what we have written, we are struck by a major deficiency which we do not know how to correct: we have been incapable of communicating the depth of human anguish experienced on both sides.
>
> Non-Jews probably cannot understand the desperate, "here-we-stand" stubborness of many Israelis. The trauma of the years of the Hitlerite holocaust has seared the souls of all Jews of middle age and older. It is mainly the people of this older generation who govern Israel today. They identify the strength of Israel with their personal safety and with the survival of the Jewish people. Any proposed change in policy which can be interpreted as

> weakening the defensive capacity of Israel is resisted by many Israelis as an invitation to suicide.
>
> Anyone who visits the Palestinians in their refugee camps, talks with the young commandos in their camouflage uniforms, listens to responsible officials of UN or other international voluntary agencies or Arab governmental organizations is bound to be struck by the complex and tragic nature of the problems which beset the Palestinian refugees. He quickly discovers that no government needs to "whip up" bitterness and hatred among the refugees toward Israel. Most of all, he discovers that the overwhelming passion of the Arab refugees is "to go home."
>
> Moreover, the outsider needs no extensive research to discover that the Palestinians are deeply distrustful of all suggestions that the Jews are willing to limit the size of their state, to refrain from further conquest of Arab lands, and to live at peace with their Arab neighbors.(3)

Solutions, therefore, have so far proven impossible because of (a) the character of both national claims which rule out any alternative claim; (b) the intensity of emotion involved; and (c) the brutal legacy of years of border warfare. Both sides have experienced national traumas, and consequently see any compromise as a compromise of their national survival. Over the course of time, both sides have produced vast bodies of literature to buttress their positions. At issue are the "facts" of the conflict, conceptions of "self" and "other," and prescriptions for settlement of the conflict. The psychological gap between both sides is so great that heretofore little or no communication has been possible.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE CARPET OF THE WIND: MOVEMENT AND SYSTEM

The emergence of the Resistance is an extraordinarily complex event in an area already known for the complexity of its politics. Because of the nature of the Palestinian diaspora, the Resistance as a political movement was (and is) "open," that is to say, vulnerable to penetration by political and ideological trends in the Arab world. The title "Revolution of the Carpet of the Wind" was apparently coined by 'Arafat, and it aptly refers to political and geographical fluidity of the Resistance. Three major variables intersect to produce Resistance politics: (a) the impact of the flow of events and the political reactions to them in the larger Arab system as a whole; (b) the sense of "Palestinian-ness", the cultural dimension of identity that permeates the Palestinian community; and (c) the interplay between the geographical and social fragmentation of the Palestinian diaspora and Palestinian attempts at organization building.

The Resistance originated as a number of small groups of refugees in the middle 1950s. By the 1970s it had grown in political, if not military, importance to the point where it had become one of the key factors in determining the issues of peace or war in the Middle East. Indeed, the Resistance had come to be of such significance that by 1979 the United States had found it necessary to take Palestinian political demands into account as a component of a Middle East peace agreement, although as of this writing these demands were to be worked into the Camp David framework.

Usually the Resistance is analyzed or dealt with in connection with its impact either on Israel or on those Arab states with sizable Palestinian populations. In this respect, its history can be quickly summarized. The Resistance emerged as a major factor in Middle Eastern politics following the June 1967 war. For a variety of reasons (examined below) Resistance leadership was able to capitalize on the wave of despair which swept the Arab world, and to project itself into the forefront of Arab politics. From the battle of al-Karamah (March 1968) onward, the Resistance appeared to be gathering both political and military force, and began to threaten the stability of Jordan and Lebanon in particular and the Middle East in general. Arab leaders were forced to take the Resistance into account as a serious political factor. By 1968 or 1969, Resistance leaders had taken over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an erstwhile product of inter-Arab rivalries, and converted it from an uneasy client of its Arab creators into a vehicle for Palestine national aspirations.

Tension increased in both Jordan and Lebanon as Resistance groups aggressively built up states within states in both countries. Localized fighting between Palestinians and either Lebanese or Jordanian forces became an endemic phenomena. In September 1970 the confrontation in Jordan escalated into a full-scale civil war, a war won at great cost by the Jordanian army. The Resistance then moved its organizational locus out of Jordan and into Syria and Lebanon, with Syria becoming the key staging and training area. Thrown into disorder by the defeat in Jordan, the Resistance underwent an organizational and leadership crisis. More "moderate" leaders were forced (or possibly saw no other alternative) to opt for international terrorism on an extended scale. And the years between 1971 and 1973 saw Resistance groups extending terrorist activity throughout the world.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war, October 1973, again altered Resistance fortunes. Some Resistance leaders were co-opted into the Egyptian-Syrian plan of attack, and the price of this co-optation was an apparent commitment by these powers to back Palestinian political aspirations. As a consequence, Palestinian demands became linked with the demands of Arab confrontation states and became enmeshed in the Egyptian-Saudi strategy of using Arab oil as a weapon to force political and territorial concessions.

At the Rabat Summit of 1974, Arab leaders formally recognized the PLO as the spokesman of Palestinian national interests. This recognition was followed by increasing international recognition of the PLO, including admission to observer status at the United Nations. With the beginning of an apparent possibility of a peace

settlement, Resistance leadership was again split over the goals and strategy of the Resistance. A rump faction (really never wholly integrated into the PLO) withdrew from the PLO and styled itself the Rejection Front, meaning a rejection of all peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israel issue.

While Palestinian leadership was badly split with the Resistance, a second cadre of leaders emerged as the consequence of Israeli-sponsored elections held in the West Bank. These leaders were drawn into (if they were not already a part of) intra-Resistance conflicts. But the fact of their emergence is probably even more important than their political involvements. Most of these leaders were identified with local West Bank politics, posing the possibility of an alternative, West Bank-based leadership as opposed to that of the Resistance per se.

In a subsequent series of events, the Resistance was drawn into a second civil war, this time in Lebanon. During the late winter of 1975 and early spring of 1976, the Resistance and its Muslim Lebanese allies appeared on the verge of a complete victory over their Christian Lebanese opponents. This trend was abruptly reversed by direct Syrian intervention in June 1976, and the Resistance was again badly defeated.

Nevertheless, in spite of its obvious military weakness, the Resistance was able to influence events. The al-Sadat peace initiative which started with his historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 was brought to a halt by an Israeli invasion of Lebanon in March 1978, an invasion triggered by a Fatah raid on Israel which was designed to generate an Israeli military response. In addition, the Resistance was able, even from its reduced position, to retain sufficient political leverage among influential Arab states to make the issue of Palestinian participation a critical one in any proposed Arab-Israeli peace talks. Indeed, in an effort to avoid coming to grips with this issue at the outset, President Carter was forced to resort to personal diplomacy in the form of the Camp David Summit, a twelve-day marathon meeting between himself, President al-Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. Even here, the potential success of the Camp David Formula rested in large part on the ability of these parties to secure Palestinian cooperation.

The importance of this cooperation was underscored in two ways following Camp David: first, by the virtual isolation of Egypt in the Arab World, an isolation agreed upon at the Baghdad Summit of November 1978, when previously opposed coalitions of Arab states joined forces to assert Arab rejection of any peace treaty which did not address the Palestinian issue. Perhaps even more significant was the willingness of Saudi Arabia, up to then a staunch supporter of the United States, to break with it over this issue, and align itself with the anti-Sadat coalition. Second, the collapse of the Shah's pro-Western regime in February 1979 dramatically added a new source of support for the Palestinians. The newly installed Khumayni government reversed the Shah's pro-Western and moderate pro-Israeli foreign policy, and committed itself to supporting the Resistance. Thus not only was the balance between pro- and anti-Western forces in the Middle East altered, but the Palestinian issue had been tied in ever more closely with the issue of Western access to oil.

Though the Resistance had become a factor, which clearly seems to require being taken into account, its political nature, importance, and

ultimate impact on the Middle East have remained unclear. On a number of levels, the Resistance has remained a nebulous force. Organizationally, those groups which make up what might be called the "Resistance proper" are themselves divided among inter-leadership factions. These factions are themselves products of the political and sociological fragmentation of the Palestinians after 1948. But they were systematically exacerbated by their incorporation into a whole series of divisions. These divisions occur at a number of points: clashes between sets of leaders claiming to speak and act for the Resistance; extreme differences over political and military strategy, tactics, and goals; and conflicts over the role of the Resistance in relation to Israel, the Arab World, and the International System. The level of inter- and intra-organizational conflict brought about by these divisions is extremely high. Open warfare between groups has been a continuing phenomenon of the Resistance. The consequence of this factionalism has been to give Resistance leadership the appearance of great instability and, in some senses, the reality of being unable to articulate a coherent policy on major issues. Additionally, the Palestinian population as a whole has alternative leadership outside the Resistance itself. Questions therefore arise as to whether Resistance leadership, even if it would articulate a policy, could in fact speak for a major of the Palestinians.

Aside from leadership issues per se, the Resistance is enmeshed in the complexities of Arab politics. Various Resistance groups have formed what are, in effect, patron-client relationships with a variety of Arab states. The groups in question are not only supported by states which themselves are engaged in still other areas of conflict, but also function as operational agents of their patrons. The upshot of these relationships is that the already complex pattern of Resistance politics is even further convoluted.

In terms of its political aspect, then, the Resistance presents great difficulties for analysts, especially if the aim is to assess its potential role in some form of peace settlement. But further, the Resistance has an intellectual impact of great potential importance as a vehicle of ideological change in the Arab World. Palestinian nationalism draws on many preexisting trends of Arab thought (some of which will be dealt with in detail below), but the overall effect of this nationalism has been to articulate (or more accurately to re-articulate) a type of local nationalism, a nationalism heretofore rejected by Arab ideological systems which stressed pan-Arab definitions of national political communities. The wave of local nationalisms, Egyptian-first nationalism, Christian nationalism in Lebanon and elsewhere, for example, are in part the consequence of the failure of pan-Arab ideologies of the 1950s and 1960s; but they are also a response to the intellectual stimulus of Palestinian ideologies. In retrospect, it may be possible to argue that the emergence of local nationalisms in the Arab World was in large measure due to the catalytic effects of Palestinian efforts to define themselves intellectually and politically as a distinct national grouping.

ASSESSMENT: PROBLEMS WITHOUT SOLUTIONS

In 1969 an early and perceptive analysis of the importance of this movement concluded that:

> Perhaps even more significant [than the resistance's growing political impact] , however, has been the resurrection of a Palestinian political identity on a more modern base than was the case before 1948. The Palestinians are developing a political community – a sense of national consciousness, and rudimentary political and administrative structures. Their new influence on the Middle Eastern scene has had at least one salutary effect: it has drawn attention back to the long-neglected root of the Palestine problem: the Palestine Arabs, alone among the people of the area do not have a national home of their own. . . . They may lack the power to achieve their solution to the Middle East crisis – the eradication of Zionism in Palestine – but if there is to be any solution it would seem both necessary and desirable that they be a party to it. Indeed, it is conceivable that the Palestinian resistance movement – its militant rhetoric notwithstanding – may hold the key to a just peace in the Middle East.(4)

But it was one thing to point to the significance of the Resistance, quite another to discover how this significance might be translated into a peace settlement. In 1975, six years and one war later, a Brookings study group considered the problem of reaching an acceptable and potentially stable resolution of the Palestinian conflict, and reached five conclusions: (a) the U.S. had, for a variety of reasons, an imperative interest in a Middle Eastern peace agreement; (b) given the pattern of repeated escalation in the area, an effort to mitigate the conflict must be undertaken at once; (c) this mitigation should take the form of a comprehensive negotiated settlement; (d) the settlement should include both guarantees for the security of all parties involved and a provision for Palestinian self-determination; and (e) the U.S. must be prepared to play a major role in brokering this settlement. Parenthetically, these conclusions were not radically different from others already advanced.(5)

The crucial premise upon which the Brookings, and all other, proposals rested was that some form of meaningful Palestinian representation could be found. However, as Y. Harkabi stressed much earlier, Palestinian leadership always found it extremely difficult to achieve even minimal political consensus among the various groups which comprised the Resistance:

> Although – or perhaps because – the so-called Palestinian resistance movements, organized both within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and outside it, have been driven by personal and ideological divergences, repeated efforts have been made to coordinate their activities.(6)

Harkabi stressed that Resistance leaders had at best only limited points of agreement on the basic issue of a political statements, and that the scope of Resistance consensus was limited to a number of political generalities: (a) that the PLO should constitute the broad framework of national unity; (b) that armed struggle was the key mechanism by which Palestinian goals were to be achieved; (c) the Palestinian and Arab political concerns were linked; and (d) that the aim of the Resistance was the liberation of all of Palestine and the creation of a Palestinian state. Outside of these generalizations, there was little in the way of concrete agreement. And, indeed, as Harkabi pointed out, most of the provisions of the National Covenant were compromise formulations moving uneasily between Fatah on the one hand and the several popular fronts on the other.

The problem of bringing the Palestinians into any meaningful peace negotiations has so far proven unsolvable. Before the Palestinians as such could be involved, a number of critical questions would have to be answered: (a) Who would speak authoritatively on their behalf? Could these spokesmen commit the Palestinians as a whole to a negotiated settlement; could they guarantee the permanency of these commitments? (b) Given the territorial fragmentation of the Palestinian population, where could the authoritative leadership be found, and how could it be legitimated? What sort of political and psychological links could be created to tie together Palestinian elite and mass? (c) Assuming that a stable and representative leadership was in existence, what sort of territorial definitions of a Palestinian homeland could be arrived at? Could Palestinian nationalism be sufficiently disentangled from the more diffuse pan-Arabism to permit the drawing of lines on a map? (d) And ultimately, could any Palestinian leadership be persuaded to accept the existence of Israel? Unless and until these questions are satisfactorily answered, other parties concerned with a peace settlement will continue to be faced with a negotiating vacuum.

Identifying, and perhaps even encouraging, such leadership is no easy task. The Brookings group enumerated the political complications of such an endeavor:

> Accomplishment of these essential aspects of a settlement is complicated by disagreement and uncertainty as to who can negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians . . . While the Arab states at the Rabat meeting in 1974 accepted the PLO as representing the Palestinians, and many other states have also done so, its claim is not unchallenged. Many Jordanians continue to believe that Jordan has a better right to this representation. It is not clear to what extent the PLO can negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians in the West Bank, in Gaza, or in Jordan. The PLO has not publicly recognized Israel's right to exist. Israel has not recognized the PLO or agreed to accept the establishment of a Palestine state.(7)

This, then, is only a brief overview of the multifaceted nature of the Resistance. In the study that follows, a number of questions concerning the nature and potential role of the Resistance will be discussed, with special reference to possible Resistance impact on peace prospects. The Resistance will be looked at from a number of different perspectives; (a) as a nationalist movement with extensive linkages to ongoing patterns of Arab political thought and action; (b) as an intellectual movement with a complex infrastructure designed to instill its beliefs on Palestinians and others; (c) as an organizational phenomenon, with its own internal dynamics; (d) as a military factor either within the Middle East or in terms of its impact on international stability; and finally (e) as an actor capable of playing a role for either stability or instability in the Middle East.

A note on terminology

A number of different terms have been used to describe members of the Resistance, terms which have varying emotional and moral connotations. The Israelis, for example, consistently and understandably refer to them as "terrorists." The Palestinians refer to themselves, also understandably, as either "commandos" (a term usually used in English translations originating in the Arab World) or "fida'iyin." Western writers use the term "guerrilla" or "insurgent" in addition. Each of these terms has a meaning which is in turn bound up with both a conception of the nature of the conflict over Palestine and an attitude toward that conflict on the part of the user of the term.

"Terrorist," for example, generally means someone who uses violence or threats of violence to coerce others to do his will. As such, the term is pejorative, near synonymous with "criminal." "Commando," by contrast, has a much more positive connotation, suggesting a soldier who engages in daring operations. "Fida'iyin" (classical, fida'iyun; singular, fida'i) means those who sacrifice themselves, originally in the defense of Islam, now in defense of their nation. Originally this term was applied to members of certain Shi'a schismatic sects after the seventh century. Later it became identified with the agents of the Fatamid dynasty in Egypt in the tenth century. Still later it became generalized to designate warriors stationed along the borders of Islamic states whose duty it was to defend the Islamic community from hostile invaders. As such, it is a term of great honor. "Guerrilla" is a Spanish term, one popularized after the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, although it is much older, dating to the early 1800s. It denotes a member of an irregular band fighting (usually in the context of a revolution or civil war) against an existing government. "Insurgent" is the modern version of a guerrilla, with the exception that the connotation here is that the insurgent is a breakaway, a rebel against a legitimate government.(8)

Since, therefore, the exclusive use of any one of these terms would lead to some unavoidable inference, they are used interchangeably, with one exception: the term "terrorist" is usually reserved for Palestinian (and other) individuals who attack targets (installations or persons) on

the territory of states not directly involved in the Palestinian conflict, or for those who attack targets which are obviously civilian in nature.(9)

1 The Problem of Palestine: History and Conflict

In their complexity and explosiveness, Middle Eastern politics resemble those of the Balkans at the turn of this century. Because of the pervasive involvement of outside powers, the escalatory potential of Middle Eastern conflicts, again like those of the Balkans, extends beyond the immediate geographical area. Four Middle Eastern wars have been fought in less than three decades. Each has brought an ever greater confrontation between Western patrons of Middle Eastern opponents. In 1948 European states supplied arms to Arab and Jewish communities fighting in Palestine. In 1956 France and Britain committed troops to the Suez war. In 1967 the U.S. backed Israel diplomatically, while the USSR resupplied Egypt and Syria. In 1973 both superpowers undertook massive arms transfers to the combatants, and at the war's close, a USSR threat of direct intervention along the canal precipitated a U.S. nuclear alert. Since 1973, both superpowers have supplied their clients with increasingly sophisticated military hardware.(1) In terms of global impact and military destructiveness, Middle Eastern conflicts have, therefore, become an increasing threat to international stability.

In what is perhaps an irony of history, the most explosive conflict, that over Palestine, was itself the product of Western intervention: cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism, and political penetration in the form of imperialist rule, together created the parameters of the Palestine problem.

THE NATIONALIST CONTEXT

In its historical dimension, the conflict is an outgrowth of the emergence of competing Arab and Jewish nationalisms in the nineteenth century. The two populations were motivated by the same idea: that their national existences required a geographical reference point and that the territory of Palestine was that point, a territory central both

historically and religiously to the definition of both national identities. Both the notion of territory and the time sequence are important. If either of these nascent Arab or Jewish identities had been conceived in other terms, religious or communal, the conflict could have taken another form, if it would have occured at all. If the sequence had been different, with one nationalism appearing at a substantially later time, the conflict would have taken on quite different characteristics.

The fortunes of both national movements became enmeshed with European politics. Both Arab and Jewish leaders sought the backing of Britain. Both received conflicting assurances of British support. Both, in turn, ultimately rejected British interference. But, after over half a century, the problem inherent in one of these assurances, the Balfour Declaration, remains: how to reconcile the creation of a Jewish National Home with the rights of the indigenous Palestine-Arab population. This declaration of November 2, 1917 put Great Britain on record as favoring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine – but with the caveat that the rights of existing "non-Jewish" communities be respected:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.(2)

The tensions thus generated ultimately led to the war of 1948, which resulted in the establishment of Israel and the dislocation of most of the Arab residents of Palestine. For several reasons these Palestinians have remained in international limbo. The government of Israel has refused to repatriate them, arguing that to do so would create an enormous security problem. Arab governments, with the exception of Jordan, have been unwilling to absorb them, and the Palestinians have not been willing to assimilate. The existence of this displaced population is the chief source of over 30 years of continuous conflict in the area.(3)

Political Zionism and Arab nationalism were intellectual and emotional responses to the disruption of Jewish communities in Europe and Arab communities in the Middle East.(4) Partly, also, they arose as defenses to threats to the political survival of these communities – eastern and central European nationalism in the case of Jewish communities, imperialism in the case of Arabs. In both cases, the effect of nationalism was to replace religious and kinship ties with ideological ties based on the linkage of a special people with a special territory. Both nationalisms appeared at roughly the same time; both reached the peak of their territorial aspirations in the twentieth century; both made Palestine the focal point of their national renaissances.

Political Zionism sprang up in the 1880s as a response to European, especially Russian, persecution of Jews. The Zionist solution to the "problem of the Jews" was to "normalize" their situation by the creation of a separate Jewish state. Traditional religious-historical links to Palestine ultimately made it the only acceptable territory.(5) Zionist leaders eventually succeeded in getting British sponsorship of Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Arab nationalism arose among Christian Arab populations in Syria and the Levant at roughly the same time that political Zionism appeared in Europe. These Christians were caught between two conflicting foci of communal identifications: a religious one which alienated them from the dominant Muslim society, and an ethnic/linguistic one which drew them toward their fellow Arabs. In turn, they also attempted to "normalize" their position by making Arabism, rather than Islam, the basic criterion of identity. This early, Christian, Arab-sponsored nationalism rapidly spread to Muslim elites, who saw it both as an alternative to Ottomanism(6) and as a vehicle for the defense of Islam against Western encroachment. After 1908 political Arabism spread among successively wider groups in the Arab/Muslim population. Its political popularity was intensified as Arabs reacted negatively to Ottoman attempts to impress a distinctively Turkish administration and culture on Arab parts of the empire.(7)

This new Arab nationalism, however, remained politically ineffective until the negotiation of an alliance between these Levantine nationalists, a conservative Meccan elite headed by the Sharif of Mecca, and the British. The conclusion of this alliance set the stage for the Arab Revolt of 1916, which triggered, in turn, an explosion of nationalism. During the course of the negotiations, partly carried out by exchanges of letters between British officials in Cairo and the Sharif of Mecca, the British committed themselves to sponsoring Arab nationalist aspirations:(8)

> As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter: (1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize the support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca. (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability. (3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories. (4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British. (5) With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad

> and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interest of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.(9)

Both the Balfour Declaration and the McMahon pledge were and are objects of endless debate. Both were vague in order to give the British government maximum freedom of action. Both were only limited guarantees. Jewish immigration was limited by the "Civil and Religious rights of non-Jewish communities"; the Arab homeland was limited by the exclusion of territories "West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." Arab spokesmen contend that the Declaration was an imperialist stratagem to plant a European colony in an Arab country, thus ensuring British control; that the Declaration was directly contrary to an agreement made with the Arabs in the course of the Husayn-McMahon exchanges. Zionist spokesmen counter by arguing that Palestine was specifically excluded from any postwar independent Arab state; that Arab leaders accepted the Declaration and subsequent British mandate over Palestine, after Trans-Jordan had been excluded from the national home provision.(10)

In any event, the Declaration was embodied in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine of 1922. Under its terms, the Mandatory power was to facilitate the creation of a Jewish national home:

> Art. 2: The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
>
> Art. 6: The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.(11)

POLARIZATION OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT

During the Mandate, Jewish immigration and land acquisition triggered increasingly violent Arab responses. The two communities, never really in any meaningful contact because of cultural, linguistic, and educational differences, became completely polarized:

> Arab opposition to Jewish aspirations during the Mandate was not a new or transient phenomenon as it has been thought. In fact it has been there from the beginning, while its strength and range have been steadily increasing with the rising nationalism throughout the Arab East. The desire for independence and self-determination among the Arabs of Palestine gained ground year by year. After ten years of the Mandate, the national aspirations of the two communities were far from complementary and, in fact, contradictory where the success of the one meant the inevitable obliteration of the other.(12)

Britain tried unsuccessfully to mitigate the conflict, using the formula of "absorptive capacity" as a rationale for limiting Jewish immigration.(13) Zionist leadership consistently opposed any limitation; Arab leadership vacillated. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, the Palestinian elite was split among several factions, factions based on kinship and clan relationships and organized around families of "notables," factions more or less coalesced around the al-Husaynis and the Nashashibis, and split into six parties. This elite faced a twofold problem. On the one hand, the goal of ejecting the British logically required a policy of confrontation. On the other hand, the goal of limiting Jewish immigration required the converse, cooperation with the British. As a result, Palestinian leadership was never able to work out a consistent and effective policy to accomplish either goal.(14)

Because of its preoccupation with intra-elite conflicts, this leadership was almost completely out of touch with sentiments of the rest of the Palestinians. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 burst upon them as a surprise. Initially, the revolt was a peasant reaction to Jewish immigration and land alienation, and it was triggered by widespread fear among Arab farmers that Jewish immigrants would drive them off their land. Its leadership came largely from rural 'ulama' and its ideology was a strident Islamic fundamentalism.(15) Palestinian leaders hastily created a coalition, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which called for a general strike (which in turn exceeded all expectations), and then converted the uprising into an urban guerrilla conflict, altering its character completely.

The al-Husayni faction of the AHC was primarily responsible for the change. Where the original uprising aimed at forcing the British to cut back on Jewish immigration, latter policy strove to create a pan-Arabized civil war. This shift of emphasis had a number of unforeseen consequences. Militarily, the revolt exhausted the resources of the Palestinian community and set the stage for its later collapse. Politically, it set the stage for intervention by bordering Arabs in 1948, and thus determined the pan-Arab character of the conflict for the next three decades. Ultimately, the revolt failed because its leadership failed to solve the same problems the PLO faces at present:

> The revolt in Palestine of 1936-1939 was, in size, intensity, and logevity, the most serious uprising against foreign domination in

> the Arab World between the wars. But in retrospect, we can see that it was doomed to failure. Neither the internal evolution of the Palestinian Arab community, the enfeeblement of the imperial power, or international conditions had developed to the point where revolt could have liberated Palestine. In a predominately agricultural society still compartmentalized on pre-modern lines, in which nationalist concepts and nationalist goals had taken hold with only a small segment of the population, there were crucial gaps between the various elements. The urban leadership was quite limited in both the aims and its willingness to commit itself wholeheartedly . . . The rural peasantry was continually divided against itself by local and factional rivalries stemming from traditional ties.(16)

In response to the revolt, the British government issued a White Paper in 1939. This envisioned a settlement based on a binational Palestine with a permanent Arab majority. To accomplish this solution, Jewish immigration was to be limited to no more than 1,250 persons per month, 15,000 per year, or 75,000 in five years. This proposal was unacceptable to the Zionists, the more so because of the increasingly desperate situation of European Jewry. As a consequence, the Zionists began to organize a means of clandestine immigration and to expand an independent Jewish communal defense force, the Haganah.(17)

The Holocaust, however, had added a new dimension to the conflict. In the years following Hitler's rise to power, the number of Jewish immigrants per year had dramatically risen:

year	immigrants
1930	4,944
1931	4,075
1932	9,553
1933	30,327
1934	42,359
1935	61,864(18)
1936	29,727

This sudden surge of immigrants intensified pressures which triggered the revolt. The number of immigrants in 1933 was triple that of the preceding year. Thereafter, the rate of immigration continued to rise, a fact clearly perceptible to the already sensitive and hostile Palestinians.

After World War II, survivors of German atrocities flooded into Palestine. The internal situation declined into anarchy as both sides organized for insurgent operations. Jewish forces were composed of the Haganah and its elite force, the Palmach, and two radical groups, the Irgun and the Stern Gang.(19) In 1945 these groups organized into a loose coalition and declared the formation of an active resistance against British occupation. Arab forces, by contrast, were disorganized,

being made up of two para-military units and a home guard in Arab towns and villages.(20)

As the fighting increased in scope and intensity, both sides targeted British forces. Unwilling to sustain continued casualties, beset by internal political and economic instability in the aftermath of the war, and pressured by the U.S. to accede to Zionist demands, the British turned the problem over to the United Nations. In turn, the UN recommended partition.(21) Under the terms of UN Resolution 181, (II), November 1947, Palestine was to be divided into separate Arab and Jewish states. The UN plan was enthusiastically endorsed by Zionists as an international recognition of their claims. It was bitterly rejected by Palestinian Arabs as a violation of their rights of self-determination, as direct contravention of the UN's charter, and as another Western giveaway of Arab lands.(22)

PALESTINIAN EXODUS, I AND II

In May 1948, Britain terminated the Mandate, Ben Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel, and surrounding Arab states intervened on behalf of the Palestinians. During the ensuing fighting, Jewish forces occupied about 30 percent more territory than had been originally assigned to the proposed Jewish state. Roughly 70 percent of the Palestinian Arab population was displaced. The original number of Palestinian refugees is subject to dispute: Israelis say 500,000; Arabs claim 900,000;(23) United Nations sources give a figure of 726,000.(24) Approximately 160,000-170,000 Arabs remained in Israel.(25)

In addition, enormous amounts of Arab-owned property were abandoned. As one source puts it:

> More than 80 percent of Israel's total area of some 20,000 square kilometers represented land abandoned by the Arab refugees . . . The refugees left whole cities, including Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramleh, Baysan, and Majdal; 388 towns and villages and large parts of 94 other cities and towns, containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel at the time. Ten thousand Arab shops, businesses, and stores were left in Jewish hands.(26)

These properties were ultimately absorbed by the new State of Israel and contributed greatly to its economic viability.

The responsibility for the flight of the Palestinians is also vigorously debated. Each side categorically denies any responsibility. The Israeli position is that Arab leaders called upon their followers to evacuate in order to allow invading Arab armies free mobility. If the Arabs had accepted the UN partition and not attacked, there would be no refugee problem. Therefore, the responsibility lies solely with the Arab governments.(27) Arab spokesmen argue that Palestinians were driven from their homes by fear of Israeli atrocities. Israeli psychological warfare specialists exploited the massacre of the Arabs of Dayr Yasin in order

to create panic among Arab communities. Arab radios, by contrast, repeatedly appealed to the Palestinians to stay put. Therefore, it is the Israeli government that is fully responsible.(28)

The causes of the exodus are probably more complex than either side suggests. Random terrorism escalated as the date set for British withdrawal neared. Armed bands of Arabs and Jews attacked each other; buildings and homes were dynamited. In consequence, many of the Palestinian elite (possibly some 30,000 people)(29) left the country for sanctuaries elsewhere, depriving the Arab community of its leadership, and contributing to its disorganization. The fact of the conflict, the breakdown of ordinary governmental services, the escalation of random violence, and the spread of stories of atrocities were probably the basic reasons that completed the Arab political-military collapse:(30)

> Reports of incidents, both true and false, spread like wildfire through the Palestine Arab community, and many thousands of villagers fled without ever seeing an Israeli soldier. Furthermore, many notables of the Palestinian Arab community were already absent, leaving most of the common people without leadership . . . with no effective leadership present; and with widely circulated stories of Jewish atrocities prevailing in the Arab community the atmosphere was conducive to flight . . . Strong impetus was given to flight psychology after the Deir Yaseen incident spread through the whole Arab World greatly exacerbating the fears of the villagers and townsmen and speeding up their hasty departure for more secure regions.(31)

The refugees fled toward the nearest safe border. Those in northern Palestine, from Acre, Haifa, Safad, and Galilee, crossed into Lebanon and Syria. Those in the south, from Jaffa, Beersheba, and Gaza, concentrated into the Gaza Strip (some 200,000 refugees). The populations from coastal areas, including the areas around Ramlah and Jerusalem, some 500,000 persons, took refuge in West Bank territories. Smaller groups of Palestinians made their way into Iraq (5,000) and Egypt (6,000), and others migrated to Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and the Trucial States.(32)

Political considerations aside, there is considerable variation in refugee statistics. Initially this was due to the suddenness, size, and complexity of the mass migration. UN and other officials could do little more than make educated guesses as to numbers. Today, the exact size of the refugee population is a matter of conjecture for a number of reasons (see Table 1.1). The criterion of "refugee" used by the UN Works and Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has varied over time. Refugee deaths tend not to be registered because to do so would mean loss of ration cards and subsequent hardship for remaining family members. UNRWA officials have countered this practice by either systematically dropping names from ration rolls, or by simply not adding new names for specified time

Table 1.1

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIANS(33)

I.	Palestine Arab Population at the End of Mandate (1947):			1,320,000
II.	Distribution in May 1967:			
	Non-Refugee:		1,000,000	1,000,000
	Refugee:	Jordan	723,000	
		Gaza	317,000	
		Lebanon	161,000	
		Syria	144,000	1,345,000
	Arabs in Israel:		300,000	300,000
				2,645,000
III.	Distribution in 1977:			
	Palestinians under Israel Control:			
	West Bank		750,000	
	Gaza		410,000	
	Israel Proper		380,000	1,540,000
	Palestinians in Arab Countries:*			
	Jordan		1,100,000	
	Lebanon		260,000(34)	
	Syria		180,000	
	Kuwayt		170,000	
	Egypt		37,000	
	Iraq		16,000	
	Gulf States		18,000(35)	
	Saudi Arabia		25,000**	
	Libya		7,000	
				1,824,000
				3,364,000***(36)

*Palestinian populations in the US were estimated at some 25,000, in West Germany at 17,000, and in Latin America at 6,000.

**By 1979 some sources were estimating that about 110,000 Palestinians were working in the oil fields. John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979), pp. 1017-1034.

***Including the US, West Germany and Latin America the total is 3,412,000.

periods. Nevertheless, the total number has steadily increased, if for no other reason than the fact that the refugees are demographically a "young" population with a very high birth rate.

The June 1967 war produced another mass migration. Some 250,000-300,000 more Palestinians fled their homes and camps, many of them for the second time. In addition, large numbers of Egyptians and Syrians left their lands. An estimated 100,000 Syrians left the Golan Heights and 60,000 Egyptians were evacuated from cities, towns, and villages in the Canal Zone. These groups added to an already extensive refugee population and created a second issue: that of the status of Palestinians remaining in Israeli-occupied territories. The position of this population was even more anomalous, both as refugees under the control of an unfriendly belligerent and in effect as hostages in lieu of a settlement.(37)

THE SETTING AND PSYCHOLOGY OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT

The combined effect of the exodus of Palestinians and the entrance of regular Arab armies marked a watershed in the Palestine conflict. Instead of being articulated as a struggle between two coexistent communities within a single territory, the conflict became structured in terms of the Armistice Agreements of 1949. These agreements, negotiated under the "Rhodes formula" whereby UN mediators shuttled between Arab and Israeli delegations, provided for only temporary cessation of armed hostilities. Concerned with territorial issues between Israel and neighboring Arab states, the negotiations injected their own complexities into the preexistent conflict and produced a continuous cycle of attack and reprisal.

The Lebanese-Israeli border remained relatively quiet prior to 1967. The Lebanese government moved refugees away from the border and made special efforts to discourage incidents. On the Syrian-Israeli border, however, the demilitarized areas (three separate zones between Lakes Huleh and Tiberias) were particularly tense. Both sides contested control over these zones. UN Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) were able to do little more than register the literally thousands of incidents.

Along the Jordan-Israel border there were constant raids led by dispossessed Palestinian farmers. Under the terms of the Shuna Agreement of March 1949, Jordan agreed to pull back an average of two miles along its frontier. This separated Palestinian villages located in the hills from their lands in the plain below. The fact that Palestinians could see Israelis working their old lands led to constant raiding.(38) Originally, these were private affairs designed either to recover movable property or to get revenge on the usurpers. After 1954, however, many of these raids were organized by the Egyptian and Syrian governments.(39) In turn, Israel countered with a policy of "massive retaliation" – selective destruction of Arab military and civilian targets.(40)

Over time, the border situation developed a certain deadly logic of its own. For Israelis, the policy of massive retaliation was morally justified by the necessities of national security; many small Arab attacks would be answered by one overwhelming blow which would administer biblical fourfold or even tenfold punishment. The goal of this policy was to make the Arabs realize the prohibitive price of continued hostility. Its rationale lay in an image of Arab character and intentions which Michael Brecher describes as "Ben Gurionism":

> This image, which stands at the other extreme of the spectrum, may be defined thus: we Jews have been persecuted for two thousand years; at last we have recovered this notch of territory in our historic homeland; the Arabs should have received us warmly as cousins; instead they are trying to create another ghetto by blockade, boycott, etc. First Haman, then Eichmann, now Nasser and Shukairy – they are out to destroy us; and we will not permit it. The core of "Ben Gurionism" or "the little notch" image is the belief that "the Arabs" are incapable of accepting peaceful coexistence at this time. Thus Israel must show her fist and display it often.(41)

For bordering Arab populations, the border warfare likewise became enmeshed in imagery; in their case, a combination of cultural and religious attitudinal responses. Deaths or injuries to members of tribes or kin-groups as a result of border exchanges led to the entrance of still further Arab combatants to avenge their kinsmen, following the classic pattern of the blood feud. Thus each Israeli reprisal generated still further "eye for an eye" and "tooth for a tooth" sentiment among bordering Arab populations.(42)

The Israeli government, in keeping with its view that the Palestinians were indistinguishable from other Arabs, insisted that the raids were the responsibility of Arab governments.(43) If these governments did not act to stop raiding, they would be considered liable for any retaliatory measures Israel might choose to take in its defense. Arab leaders, in turn, insisted that they could not control the activities of the Palestinians for three reasons. First, control of the Palestinians was difficult if not impossible to accomplish in a military sense, since open conflict with Palestinian organizations would raise the possibility of civil war. Second, it was politically impossible, because of the widespread support given the Palestinians, internally and externally, to crack down and risk overthrow at home or invasion from abroad. Third, it was morally wrong to prevent Palestinians from regaining what the Arab world conceived to be their rights; to do so would be to aid the Israelis in retaining Palestinian lands.

Thus the imagery of endless conflict was articulated by a dialogue of force. The Israelis operated in terms of Western-oriented deterrence theory, the notion that rational men will cease and desist from hostile acts if the threat of retaliation is sufficiently grave and credible. Israeli military logic was the logic of calculation, of rationalism.

Arabs, especially Palestinians, were motivated by quite different considerations, considerations which were only marginally affected by a calculus of loss. Honor and revenge were the driving impulse behind Arab military operations. Arab logic was the logic of emotion, of status considerations, of face and the desire to undo a perceived wrong. The border conflict was thus an asymmetrical dialogue in which there were no real points of communication on any level; a dialogue in which the constant violence, protracted over time, operated to brutalize both sets of combatants; a violence that extended to ever wider circles of innocent victims.

No basis for mutual accommodation of the displaced population existed in 1948, or for the next 20 years, because one of the key parties, the Palestinians, had no voice. A number of Arab governments, primarily the Egyptians and Syrians, presumed to speak for the Palestinians. Jordan annexed the remaining Palestinian territory in the West Bank in 1950 and Jordanian officials claimed the right to act as Palestinian spokesmen. Some Israelis, notably the followers of Martin Buber and Judah Magnes,(44) attempted to engage the Palestinians in a dialogue, but without much success.

THE "REFUGEE" ISSUE

The terms of the conflict itself were transmitted to the language of humanitarian concern rather than politics. UN Resolution 194, which dealt with the exodus, phrased the matter as that of refugees wishing to return:

> . . . Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property.(45)

Successive UN statements, notably Resolutions 242 and 338, have couched any solution in the framework of a "just settlement of the refugee problem." This language was not altered until the passage of Resolution 3236 in November 1974, which spoke of the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to Palestine."

A number of factors coalesced to reinforce the use of "refugee" terminology. First, the international juridical status of the Palestinians was clouded. As a consequence of history, the Palestinians had no clear claim to any legal status as individual nationals, that is, as persons possessing a recognized citizenship, or as collective members of a sovereign Palestinian state.(46) Legal rights that the Palestinians possessed were largely derived from other sources. In the Ottoman Empire, Palestinian status was the same as the Arab millet, a melange of rights and duties whose applicability was defined by religious rather than national criteria.(47) During the Mandate, Palestinians were citi-

zens of the Mandate, but not British citizens. When the Mandate ended in 1948, the Palestinians were left without citizenship.(48) As a consequence, Palestinian spokesmen have had to argue de novo, falling back on assertions of general political rights rather than arguments for concrete citizenship.(49) In addition, because none of the "normal" sources of international status have been available to the Palestinians, their leadership has been in sense driven by legal necessity to engage in violence, in order to acquire legal status as a recognized belligerent. (Hence there are legal as well as emotional reasons for the Israeli insistence on categorizing Palestinian guerrillas as "terrorists.")

In lieu of anything resembling a Palestinian citizenship, Palestinians acquired a melange of legal statuses in several Arab countries. Jordan granted its Palestinian population citizenship after 1950. Other Arab states granted combinations of full or partial citizenship on a selective basis.(50) Decisions to grant or withhold citizenship were the products of a complicated set of factors, both inter-Arab and domestic. In the context of inter-Arab rivalries, there was systemic impulse to keep the Palestinian issue alive, to use it as a counter in the calculus of political advantage. This impulse was reinforced by local considerations, considerations basically derived from Arab establishments' estimates of the disruptive potential of a massive influx of Palestinians.

In Jordan, the decision to grant Palestinians citizenship flowed from the necessity of legitimizing Jordan's claim to the West Bank, even at the cost of risking enormous social unrest. The Egyptians chose not to integrate the Palestinian population in Gaza with that of metropolitan Egypt. Only a few Palestinians were permitted to acquire Egyptian citizenship, and Palestinian political activity in Egypt, where not controlled by the government, was dealt with by swift deportation of the individuals involved. Aside from politics, the logic here was simple: there were already too many Egyptian mouths to feed, another 300,000-400,000 Palestinians would be an intolerable burden on a strained economy.

Religion was the critical factor in Lebanon. The Palestinians were predominantly Muslim, but the Lebanese political system rested on a fragile balance between Christians and Muslims. A balance worked out in the National Covenant of 1943 made the existing demographic ratio of six Christians to five Muslims the numerical quota for filling all governmental offices. The injection of 160,000 Muslim Palestinians would have shattered this framework. Syria and Iraq were likewise faced with the problem of religious and ethnic minorities. Added to these were problems of unemployment; the addition of Palestinians to existing large pools of unemployed surely would have worsened an already difficult situation. Moreover, there was the danger that Palestinians would work for lower wages than Syrians or Iraqis and thus depress the entire standard of living, as well as creating enormous resentment.(51)

As a result, Palestinians did not have a stable legal status independent of that given them by the states in which they resided. As late as 1970, an American scholar summed up the legal situation of the Palestinians as the U.S. saw it:

> The United States regards the Palestinian Arabs as Jordanian citizens or as citizens of other appropriate Arab countries. This is admittedly a simplistic but nonetheless adequate working answer . . . There has been no international legal recognition of a Palestinian personality or nationality as a separate legal concept; the issue has been treated as a political problem.(52)

The legal nonexistence of Palestinians was accentuated by political considerations, both Arab and Israeli. Arab leaders, for reasons of their own, sought to incorporate the conflict over Palestine into a much broader framework, to assert the Arab rather than the Palestinian dimension, to co-opt it into the ideological categories of Arab nationalism. In the Arab nationalist formulation, political unity of the Arab world was the necessary precondition to any solution in Palestine itself. The dominant slogan and strategy of the 1950s and 1960s was "Arab Unity the Way to Palestine."

Therefore, between 1948 and 1967 the specific problem of what to do about displaced Palestinians was subordinated to pan-Arab issues. Chief contenders for leadership in the Arab world, Egypt, and Syria, vied for control of the Palestinians. To counter Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, the Egyptians promoted the idea of a Palestinian-Arab government located in Gaza, but claiming sovereignty over all Palestine. Militarily, they sponsored commando raids from Gaza. The Syrians responded by pushing for a war of national liberation in Palestine and aiding Fatah to develop its military arm, al-'Asifah. Even the creation of the PLO, an organization designed to represent Palestinian interests, was the product of inter-Arab contentions.(53)

The Israelis, for their part, insisted that there was no such thing as a separate Palestinian people.(54) They argued instead that the Palestinians were basically Arabs from South Syria, and hence indistinguishable from surrounding populations. This argument was buttressed by a second one – that what had occurred was in fact a population exchange: an Arab population had left Palestine; a Jewish population of roughly the same size, 500,000-600,000 persons, had been forced to leave several Arab countries. The Jews had been settled in the Jewish State of Israel; the Palestinian Arabs should, therefore, be settled among surrounding Arab communities.(55)

THE "LOGIC" OF THE SITUATION

The consequences of this complex and protracted conflict was the emergence of a self-perpetuating pattern of behavior on all sides, a system of Arab-Israeli interaction which by its logic foreclosed consideration of policy alternatives aimed at settlement. In the absence of other means of communication, force or threat of force functioned as the chief medium of communication. The system of conflict relationships was expressed in a system of threats. In such a situation, the perceived risks of trusting an opponent, risks required if diplomacy was

to be tried, were considered greater than those of continued conflict (a situation known in game theory as "prisoner's dilemma" where each side is held prisoner by the unforeseeability of his opponent's probable response(56)):

> It is fashionable in some circles, after describing the tragedies and complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict to public audiences, to profess to see light at the end of the tunnel. I see none. What I have tried to suggest is that the hard-line political strategies predominantly pursued by both sides over the past two generations have been continuously reinforced by the accretion of psychologically comforting but politically destructive self-justifications and distorted perceptions of the adversary, culminating in a spirit in each camp of rigid self-righteousness. The prospects for settlement would be dim enough were God thought to be a partisan of either protagonist; but alas, he has emerged as the ally of both.(57)

Arab leaders, in particular, were trapped in this logic of distrust. To preserve themselves, they had to opt for the hardest possible line, to outbid their opponents on the Palestine question:

> The Arab leadership is not free to do as it wishes without limitations, however. One difficulty lies in the fact that as long as change does not encompass all the Arab states, a retreat by one would be exploited by its rivals to attack it; Arab leaders are vulnerable to each other, for criticism in one Arab country is liable to influence public opinion in another. From the political point of view there is no Arab union but where inter-Arab abuse is concerned, the Arab world is united in what is almost a single system.(58)

At the Arab-Israeli level, then, the multiplicity of actors and the confusion of the original issues with later issues arising out of the wars of 1956 through 1973, created a situation where no diplomatic movement was possible. Secretary Kissinger described the diplomatic problem:

> The intractibility of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate.(59)

At the Palestinian level, the expatriates became and remained a marginal population – a population lacking a distinctive political community, a legitimate leadership capable of speaking for the Palestinians as a whole, and a territorial framework for their nationalist ambitions. The remnants of the AHC were both discredited and bitterly divided among themselves. Palestinian political organization was frag-

mented along sociological lines: clans, villages, and primordial identifications.(60) Although the Palestinians were Arabs, they remained a distinct, if amorphous, community set within other Arab communities:

> There was another important consideration which was often overlooked. Although the Palestinians were Arabs, it did not follow that they would have been equally happy to settle anywhere within the Arab world. Not only had they developed a strong Palestine national consciousness, but they would have found the economic, social, and political situation in many Arab states, as well as the customs, and spoken Arabic dialect, considerably different from their own.(61)

The Palestinians, alienated from their heritage and their environment, were politically restive and prone to support extremist causes – the catalyst, in short, of three subsequent wars.

> As we began to "wander" away, there was however a rejection, a self-hating phase of alienation from our reality as a people without a homeland, of alienation from the Arab world, alienation from our father's generation, alienation from the code of ethics and ideology that governed our affairs and the affairs of other people around us, alienation from our Palestinianness and refugeeism.(62)

2 Growth of the Resistance: Nationalism, Collective Behavior and Organization

One of the basic points of contention between the Israelis and the Palestinians and Arabs is whether there is such a thing as a Palestinian nation.(1) Israeli spokesmen have consistently argued until recently that the Palestinians were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically related to other Arabs in states surrounding Israel. Indeed, there was political and military as well as ethnographic logic to this insistence: if the Palestinians were to be granted a national identity apart from that of the surrounding Arab populations, then the Israeli national claim to be the sole legitimate occupiers of Palestine would be called into question. If the Palestinians were considered part of the surrounding demography, and if the leaders of government ruling this encircling population aided and abetted their Palestinian kinsmen, then they could in turn be held responsible for Palestinian acts of violence directed at Israel. Therefore, the logic of self-defense required Israeli punitive expeditions against these leaders, territories, and populations.(2)

In both senses, the Israeli argument is at least partially correct. While Arab nationalism per se developed at about the same time as did Zionism, a distinct Palestinian nationalism is much more recent. Originally, Palestinian nationalism was indistinguishable from Arab nationalism elsewhere. But the difficult political problem of dealing with both the British and the Zionists in Palestine forced Palestinian leaders to separate themselves ideologically, if not necessarily politically, from other Arab leaderships. In 1919 the first Arab congress of Palestinians meeting in Jerusalem resolved that Palestine was nothing more than "Southern Syria," that the way to defeat Zionism lay in Arab unity. By 1920, a second theory had emerged. The slogan of "Arab unity" was replaced by that of "Filastin": a Palestine separate from other Arab states.

These contrasting theories were in turn worked into intra-AHC conflicts.(3) The Nashashibis and al-Husaynis were at odds over the issue. The Nashashibis opted for a Palestinian orientation and favored

the tactic of cooperation with the British. The al-Husaynis, by contrast, adopted a pan-Arab ideology and advocated confrontation politics. This original division, it might be added, is reflected in the contemporary split between Fatah and PFLP; between the PLO and the Rejection Front. Fatah takes roughly the same position as the Nashashibis faction, that Palestine is a local issue to be dealt with by Palestinians. The PFLP takes an opposite tack, that Palestine should be a pan-Arab issue, dealt with in terms of an area-wide solution.

Additionally, it is fairly self-evident that Arab states surrounding Israel have supplied, trained, and even made target selections for various Palestinian groups. And, at least according to most definitions of the law of self-defense, the Israelis were correct in responding to Palestinian attacks by military reprisals against host Arab countries. Whether the scope of these reprisals falls outside of the legally permissable scope of self-defense is another issue.

Palestinian spokesmen argue, of course, that there is a Palestinian nation, although the relationship between this nation and the larger Arab world is a matter of some debate, and this debate in turn has split the Resistance. In a strictly military sense, the distinction between Palestinians and other Arabs has been demonstrated in a sort of converse of the Israeli military logic. The editors of the Arab Press Service once pointed out that Arab armies and police forces had inflicted more casualties on the Palestinians than had the Israelis. According to them, these Arab forces were in effect acting as agents of the Israelis: the Israelis would launch a small-scale reprisal attack, and the Arab governments would respond by much larger attacks on the Palestinians.(4) Whatever the accuracy of this analysis, the fact that Arab states undertook their own punitive operations against Palestinian populations indicated a sense of difference, and even a distinct hostility.

In the sense that a specific Palestinian nationalism occurs later in time than either Zionism or Arab nationalism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is asymmetrical. Palestinian nationalism is, therefore, both newer and considerably more undeveloped as a discrete political phenomenon than is Zionism. And it is this asymmetrical quality that has led to the debate over whether there is such a thing as Palestinian nationalism or a Palestinian nation.

Clearly, the emergence of a modern (that is to say, post-1948) Palestinian nationalism is connected with the appearance and growth of the Palestinian Resistance Movement(5), as it is known in the Arab world. In this sense, the Resistance is usually analyzed in terms of its catalytic effect in the generation of a larger national movement. Usually, the emergence of the Resistance is dated from the events which escalated into the war(6) of June 1967, and the war is in turn usually analyzed as the catalyst which brought forth the Resistance. This is true, but it is also an oversimplification; the organizational, ideological, and emotional roots of the Resistance antedate the 1967 war by anywhere from 20 to 40 years. This extended pre-1967 nucleus of Resistance thought and action is of critical importance to the later

development of the Resistance, and indeed to any assessment of its present or future role in the Middle East.

On closer inspection, for example, there are a cluster of dates before and after June 1967, dates all connected with the buildup and aftermath of the war, which when sorted out, however, illustrate both the importance of the Resistance's antecedent existence and the interplay of Palestinian and Arab psychology and politics.

1. In January 1964, Arab states meeting at the Cairo Summit of "Kings and Presidents" laid the organizational foundation for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The political context was that of inter-Arab rivalries over leadership of the struggle against Israel, and of the Arab world itself as a consequence of this leadership. But the impetus to this conference was Arab recognition of the growing political and organizational importance of the Palestinians themselves. 1964, therefore, marks both the creation of a potential organizational umbrella for the Resistance and also one of the events which led up to the 1967 war.

2. The June 1967 war itself destroyed the legitimacy of most, if not all, existing Arab leaderships. Equally, it led to a reversal of thinking among Palestinian leaders concerning the ability of regular Arab governments to do anything about the Palestinian condition. The conjunction of a growing legitimacy vacuum in the Arab system and a growing belief among Palestinians that only they could successfully reverse the disaster of 1948 in turn generated the "go it alone" thesis among Palestinians and the conditions in the Arab system which would allow such a thesis to be successfully (initially, at least) promulgated.

3. The battle of al-Karamah in March 1968 galvanized the latent Palestinian sense of communal identity and solidarity, a sense that had theretofore been expressed in other than Palestinian political terms, and gave them a straightforward nationalist expression. From al-Karamah onward, the idea of a Palestinian entity, which had before been an elite ideology, became a belief held by an increasing number of Palestinians.

Therefore, while the logic of the Palestine conflict seemed frozen and unalterable, its larger Arab world context was not. And although it was possible to block out the various rhetorical, ideological, and military arguments on either side of the Palestinian nationalism question, its underlying reality was tremendously complex. The transformation of Turki's disorganized and alienated mass of refugees into a relatively cohesive nationalist movement would be a complicated subject for analysis in any case. However, the emergence and development of a distinctively Palestinian nationalist movement was not and is not occurring in a vacuum. The parameters of Palestinian nationalism are shaped by the interplay between the protracted conflict characterizing Arab-Israeli relations and an ongoing process of social and political change in the Arab world. Some time ago, Tom Little concisely expressed the multifaceted and fluid aspect of this system of linked conflicts between Arabs, Israelis, and Palestinians:

> The Arab-Israeli conflict is superimposed on a process of political and social change in the Middle East which has often been called the Arab revolution. Ever since Israel came into existence in 1948, the Arabs have been unable to decide whether the struggle to recover Palestine did or did not take precedence over the revolutionary purpose enshrined in their national ideology. This doubt has undergone dynamic change as a result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 by making the recovery of Palestine a primary objective for the vast majority of Arabs, but they are not clear in their minds whether the revolutionary purpose should be fulfilled within the "war of liberation" or await its outcome.(7)

Little's notion of interlocking revolutions expresses the basic historical parameters within which this nascent Palestinian nationalism arises. The use of the term "revolution," as in Arab revolution or Palestinian revolution, which is widely used by Arab writers to describe the social and political dynamics of the Middle East,(8) reflects a deep-seated sense of dislocation, of strain between what ought to be and what actually is.(9) It is this sense of strain that sets the backdrop and provides the emotional and behavioral impetus to both Arab nationalism and Palestinian nationalism.(10)

STRAIN AND THE ARAB SYSTEM: CULTURE AND STRUCTURE

In his incisive work on revolution, Chalmers Johnson argues that the major source of large-scale and violent change (which is basically what the more politicized Arab writers mean by "revolution") is a process of systemic breakdown in which the major institutions of a social order no longer function, or more importantly, no longer appear to function to produce a stable and predictable environment.(11) As a consequence, the populations affected withdraw their allegiance to and identification with these institutions.(12) The extent and severity of this lack of stability, of perceptions that the social order can no longer adequately meet the needs of its members, defines the extent of the revolutionary situation.

In the Arab world, two distinct but interrelated levels of strain, or sources of dysfunction (to use Johnson's terminology), can be distinguished: at the level of ultimate values, of Arab/Islamic culture itself; and at the lesser level of political institutions.

Cultural Strain: The Loss of Authority

Here the source of strain has been the perceived inability of Arab/Islamic institutions to stand up to Western culture. At a system-to-system level, the concern of a widening number of Arab/Muslim leaders

and intellectuals has been an analysis of the causes of the "decline" of either the Arab world conceived as a system of power, or of Islam conceived as a system of values. As Gustave von Grunebaum noted in his magistral treatment of modern Islamic culture, the bulk of Arab world literature concerning Arab/Western relations has concerned itself with what might be called cultural defense.(13) Strategies advanced to deal with this Western cultural threat have generally fallen into one of three categories: those advocating a complete rejection of everything Western and a return to pure Islam (the Wahhabis, the Muslim Brethren, al-Qadhdhafi's third force, and now Khumayni's Islamic revolution); those advocating some mixture of Arab/Islamic and Western cultural traits in a combination which would allow the use of Western organization and technology (military and political modernizers from Mehmet 'Ali to al-Sadat); and those advocating a complete abandonment of traditional Arab/Islamic values in favor of a thoroughgoing secularism (the neo-Ba'th in Syria, and Arab Communists).

The consequence of this perception of Western threat and the inability of the Arab world to withstand it has generated what Lucian Pye has called an "authority crisis":

> An authority crisis arises when the cultural and psychological basis for the legitimacy of political power is radically undermined by the development process. This can occur, in the first instance, when the traditional political forms of authority prove manifestly incapable of coping with the problems and demands of modernization. Legitimacy always needs competence; nothing so shatters the mystique of authority as helplessness. But beyond the question of the legitimacy of political institutions, the authority crisis gains depth and pervasiveness as other structures of society lose their capacities to command easy compliance.(14)

Politically, this adds up to a questioning of all relationships of authority (here defined as the generalized acceptance of any leadership's decisions). Socially, it reinforces an existing cultural trend toward individualistic and nonsubmissive behavior (see below). The result is that Arab leaderships face a continual questioning of their authority as it relates to their ability to deal with this perceived threat to the Arab cultural system. Most Arab leaders, it may be noted, are acutely sensitive to this, and the politics of Arab worldwide leadership revolve around this touchstone.

Structural Strain: Legitimacy and Clique Politics

Where the crisis over the nature and role of authority concerns the Arab world as a system qua system, the crisis over legitimacy is located at a lesser level, the level of Arab leaderships themselves. The sources of this strain (dysfunction) are not in a perceived threat from the West, but rather in an increasing perception that Arab governments are not

meeting the needs of their populations. This "gap" between perceived needs (or rising expectations) and perceived governmental ability to perform has been analyzed at some length by Samuel Huntington(15) and by Lucian Pye:

> We shall therefore define a legitimacy crisis as a breakdown in the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out of differences over the proper nature of authority for the system. A legitimacy crisis can thus take the form of a change in the fundamental structure or character of a government, a change in the source from which it claims to derive its ultimate authority, or a change in the ideals it professes to represent. Basic to a legitimacy crisis is a change in the way governmental authority is conceived or itself acts.(16)

In the Arab world specifically, the legitimacy crisis has been generated by what Binder once called the "transfer of legitimacy" problem: the problem of moving from a traditional, and very narrowly based set of units of political loyalty to units which have the ability to command the allegiance of most of the members of any given territorial unit.(17) More specifically, this transfer problem is that of moving from loyalty patterns which focused on cliques or factions, or local groupings, to some larger and more encompassing political units.

The historical roots of this problem are extremely complex, involving an historical separation and polarization of two foci of loyalty: Islam defined as a community of believers, and various traditional political orders or governments which commanded only the self-serving and cynical identification of those in their employ. The result was gradual withdrawal of identification and affect, the creation of a political situation in which Middle Eastern governments were basically "non-legitimate."(18) Historically, this resulted in a bifurcated pattern of belief and action. The Islamic system as it evolved consisted of an ever-arching religious belief system which was more or less linked with another system of extremely parochial loyalties. This combination of a generalized value system (the cultural system threatened by the West) and a cluster of local identifications (or local legitimacies) was extremely stable in a society not characterized by territorial units, or more precisely, by territorial units no larger than classes, villages, or tribes. Here, both political identity and political action were characterized by a limited structural format: the clique, faction, or cadre.

The Arab world unit of political action has been the clique, the cadre, the small group of friends who can trust each other by virtue of their long-time association. Behind the more overtly Western and political formats of organization and ideology, this clique structure supplies the real dynamics of politics. Consider, for example, the 1952 Egyptian Revolutionary Council; this was in practice some 11 or more close personal friends of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. Alternatively, the theoretically highly politicized and abstractly ideological Ba'thist group that took power in Iraq in 1968 was led by a relatively small group of

men who came from Takrit, a small town outside of Baghdad. The rival Ba'thist faction which took over Syria in 1966 was dominated by a clique drawn from Islamic minorities, and heavily overlaid with kinship ties, in this case the relatives of President Hafiz al-Asad. Among the Palestinians, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) is essentially a series of loosely coordinated cliques or cadres.

These cliques tended to be informally organized, highly fluid in their creation and dispersion, and characterized by an absence of any formal ideology. Clique politics in the Arab world consisted of a series of shifting alliances, chains of relationships, which cut across other social organizations. The political style involved was one which revolved around twin foci of insistance on strict loyalty against an outsider, however defined, and extreme individualism, a demand for equality within the clique itself. The result was a political process characterized by seemingly endless factionalism, by discontinuities, and by abrupt schisms and re-combinations.

Since these cliques were essentially personal, rather than territorially based, they traditionally tended to operate across an undefined area. Not only were there chains of clientelist relationships with geographical extensions, there was also a series of intermediaries – brokers who operated in the political and geographical interstices of cliques and functioned as mediators among them. (The Prophet himself was asked to broker between two warring cliques.) Ideologically, traditional clique politics was either purely personal and pragmatic, meaning no overt ideological framework, or clothed in some general Islamic orientation. With the advent of nationalism, clique politics took on ideological trappings that reflected their nonterritorial attributes. Clique ideological statements tended to be either extremely general and diffuse, defining the relevant political community in pan-terminology – either pan-Arab or pan-Islamic (as with Nasirism, Ba'th Socialism, the Muslim Brethren) – or they tended to go to the other extreme and define political community parochially, in terms of the personal following of some leader, a cult of personality (as with the Syrian National Socialists or some Lebanese groups).

The point of this is, however, that these clique units, despite their pervasiveness,(19) have only limited legitimacy insofar as wider populations of Arabs are concerned: Clique legitimacy is basically elitist; it is restricted to the upper echelons of Arab politics. In a situation of social change, the ability of these cliques to engender wider beliefs in their appropriateness to rule has become the central problem of contemporary Arab politics.(20)

PROCESS: SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL METASTASIS

The concept of social mobilization is the key explanatory device used in contemporary theories of nationalism and revolution. Conceptually, it summarizes a series of social and psychological changes which give rise

to a propensity on the part of a given population to be open to ideological appeals. Intellectually it is rooted in Emile Durkheim's analyses of social solidarity and its breakdown, and has as a consequence an intellectual kinship with theories of collective behavior, one of which is used below. But where collective-behavior theory focuses on specific factors which give rise to social movements, the concept of social mobilization is usually used in connection with nationalist or other relatively permanent political movements.

Briefly stated, the process of social mobilization is: (a) a series of social changes (the "social"), changes in urbanization patterns, occupational roles, life styles, and educational, especially literacy, levels. These changes add up to a major transformation of the social environment of affected populations. (b) Resulting psychological changes (the "mobilization") are a combination of sense of dislocation (which in an extreme form would be anomie, or normlessness, described by Durkheim) and a drive to perceptually restructure an uncertain and unpredictable environment – hence a willingness to listen and to adopt ideological systems which seem to promise such restructuring.(21)

Social mobilization itself, however, only provides the beginning point in an explanatory scheme of nationalist movements. What is needed is yet another element (an intervening variable) in the chain of theoretical causation. Here analysis has diverged. Deutsch, for example, adds a sophisticated application of learning theory: the notion that the shape and direction of nationalist movements is determined by a process of social learning, a process of belief formation based on perceptions of the political environment. Huntington prefers to utilize a variant of frustration-aggression theory to focus on the interplay between social mobilization and more or less standard economic and political variables. Ernst Haas relates social mobilization to the character of those affected, and argues that different forms of nationalism will occur depending on the type and sequence of group or class mobilization.(22) The dynamic in all of these approaches is supplied by the relationship between the rate of social mobilization and the rate of reintegration, however it is defined.

The original Deutsch approach focused on the cognitive processes of nationalism: nationalism was the product of a sequence of self-reinforcing responses (perceptions) to a given set of governmental actions. This was a more than adequate analysis to deal with most nationalist movements. But in the Arab world, the communications aspect of these perceptions is intensified by inter-Arab systematic characteristics which magnify the cross-border impact of events and the perceptual responses to them. Here nationalism is, as much as anything, a response to the ebb and flow of history. Great events and personalities are perhaps more determinative of the shape of nationalist movements than any specific governmental image or policy. The political and emotional impact of these extend across boundaries and affect entire populations. Therefore, there is a two-tier process: (a) on the sociological level, there is an ongoing process of social mobilization, a process which produces the latent psychological conditions

necessary for the emergence of nationalism; (b) at the level of history, however, there is a discontinuous sequence of historical accidents, the products of human action and reaction.(23) These provide the specific stimuli for political mobilization, the crystallization of latent nationalistic awareness into collective political belief and action. The interplay between these two levels determines the nature and sequence of the emergence of nationalist ideologies, ideologies which are in sense gestalt-like responses to stimulus and environment.

Here the notion of a "political generation" might help clarify the process. A political generation is not a generation in the chronological sense; not a sequence of like age groups roughly twenty years apart. It is instead a generation whose political consciousness has been defined by some great event, a generation whose shared ideological outlook has been shaped by a shared reaction to this event. In terms of the Arab world, there are successive waves of Arabs (both young and old, because the test is experience or perception of the event, not age) who become "open" to political stimuli via social mobilization, and then are politicized by the catalyst of the event.(24)

Along these lines one can discern: (a) the generation of the Arab revolt and its aftermath, a generation whose level of social mobilization was relatively limited, whose political consciousness was triggered by the events of World War I and the peace settlement in the Middle East, a generation which responded in terms which were basically Islamic; (b) the generation of World War II and the creation of Israel (the Nasir generation), a generation whose social mobilization was more extensive than its predecessor, and which responded in terms of pan-ideologies, ideologies which mixed Islam, Arabism, and some secularism; (c) the generation of 1967 and (for the Palestinians, al-Karamah) a generation whose social mobilization was extensive, one which responded in terms of a series of ideologies which added a component of localism (the post-Nasir generation).

The interplay between these generations is complex, and the time line between them varies by country. There appears to be a systematic displacement of the leaders of earlier by later generations. Each succeeding generation ideologically and politically rejected its predecessor, and the vagaries of power were such that the supersession process was not only extremely uneven, but several generations can have co-existed together over time in an uneasy synthesis. The phenomena of generational overlap, with leaders of different generations existing and, more important, promoting their own ideological appeals, at the same time, produce an enormously complex politics. In such politics, cross-generational linkages, intellectual, political, or organizational, create conflict situations wherein the conflicts of an earlier generation are carried over into the politics of the next. In the Palestinian case, for example, the conflict between the al-Husaynis and Nashashibis is carried over into the current struggle between the PLO/Fatah and West Bank/pro-Jordan leaders over control of the West Bank.(25) The point, however, is that this process of change summed up in the notion of social mobilization extends both the scope and the

intensity of existing strains within the Arab world. Social mobilization functions here to metastasize these strains,(26) to ramify them throughout the system as population after population becomes socially mobilized and at the same time alienated.

ACCELERATOR: SUCCESSIVE ARAB DEFEATS FROM 1948 TO 1967

The strains and tensions at all levels of Arab society and culture produced the background dysfunctions which would have, in time, produced major upheavals in the Arab world. However, the impact of these dysfunctions was dramatically and suddenly multiplied by the series of Arab/Israeli wars from 1948 onward. Johnson uses the term "accelerator" to describe the impact of major events (such as wars) which are "particularly intense sources of dysfunction that make their effects felt suddenly and powerfully, and typically constitute the final aggregate in a growing burden of dysfunctional conditions."(27) The successive impact of each of these wars was in turn magnified by both the proceeding war and by the ever-widening process of social mobilization in the area.

The war of 1948 affected only small groups of Arabs, mostly those groups already politicized, officers and members of various radical political parties. In the self-searching that followed the "disaster" (al-Nakba), as it is known in the Arab world, three general lines of explanation emerged. On the extreme right, the right of the Muslim Brethren and other conservative Islamic groups, the loss in 1948 was conceived as being the consequence of a prior loss of Islamic faith, a weakening of Islamic values.(28) Among conservative parties and writers, 1948 was typified as an example of the failure of Arab institutions to match those of the West, and the various strands of thought here branched out into different proposals for solving this civilizational gap.(29) On the radical left, the theory was much crisper: simply that Arab governments of the day were, for a variety of reasons, corrupt and incompetent; that they had in effect "stabbed the Arab military in the back."(30) Whatever the theory used, the consequence was the same: a series of localized coups, originally in Syria and Egypt, but extending into other countries by the late 1950s. The point to be made, however, is that these coups were the product of intra-elite conflicts; they did not involve extensive participation by masses of the population. Therefore, while these coups may have generated extensive change over time, their original personnel were few in number and their ideologies relatively moderate in terms of goals.

The Suez war of 1956 was likewise limited in its impact, although less so than the 1948 war. Here the war's relatively short duration, the surprise nature of the Israeli attack, the confusing involvement of British and French forces, and the swiftness of the eventual Israeli withdrawal all operated to obfuscate the issues. Any of the foregoing theories could be applied to explain 1956, but the open involvement of European powers made these unnecessary. For the Arabs, 1956 was

preeminently a war fought against imperialists, a war in which Arab arms could not really have been expected to win. Nevertheless, the trends generated by the 1948 war were accelerated. There were coups in Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, an attempted coup in Jordan, and a civil war in Lebanon.

The 1967 war, however, with the stunning defeat of Arab forces, was quite different in its consequences. To begin with, the June war took place in the aftermath of these earlier wars, in a context in which increasing numbers of Arabs had become highly politicized as a consequence of them. Moreover, a communications revolution had taken place in the Arab world between 1948 and 1967. Arab populations were partially socially mobilized as a consequence of increasingly sophisticated communications, first radio and then television, communications vehicles used with great effect by Arab governments. Where the issues and actions of 1948 and 1956 might be blurred or not well-known, those of 1967 were persistently articulated and exposed in Arab media.

In addition, the June defeat came as an apocalyptic climax to a steadily increasing pattern of political and propagandistic escalation. As the June crisis built up, Arab propaganda broadcasts became more strident. Indeed, Arab media per se contributed greatly to the escalatory process, making it virtually impossible for any Arab leader to counsel moderation.(31) This intense media coverage stressed the inevitable triumph of the Arabs, and these exaggerated expectations were dashed when details of the defeat were finally released. The sudden, unexpected, and sharp contrast between dizzying confidence and the depths of defeat produced an intense crisis within Arab culture, a collective loss of honor on a grand scale. The resulting sense of depression and hopelessness was summed up in the term "al-qalaq" ("the anguish"), and a literature of despair grew up following the war.(32) Politically and intellectually, Arab governments and leaders were alienated from their populaces; the legitimacy of all Arab governments was seriously weakened;(33) and the old heroes of Arab nationalism were heroes no longer.

EMERGENCE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM: ELITE MOBILIZATION AND LINKAGE POLITICS

Ernst Haas, in his brilliant study, divided nationalist movements into two major historical types: those that occurred within the context of an existing territorial and administrative framework and those that occurred outside of these frameworks.(34) State-first movements, therefore, were at least bounded by territorial definitions, and had existing, territorially locatable political symbols to draw upon as a basis for definitions of the relevant political community.(35) Nation-first movements, by contrast, lacked both a stable territorial referent and clearly defined national symbols. In the case of the Palestinians, there was neither a stable territory nor a coherent symbol system. The problem for Palestinian elites was not only to define both but also to work these

definitions into an organizational structure which possessed at least three critical elements: (a) an effective control over the behavior of the Palestinian community; (b) a defined locus of decision making; and (c) an ability to create and maintain the loyalty of the Palestinians.(36) In this context, the political problems of organizing nascent Palestinian nationalism were akin to those in the larger Arab environment: they were the problems of transferring legitimacy from traditional, communal, and kinship structures to those of a centralized state.(37) To this extent, Palestinian politics and strategies were not essentially different from those of other Arab elites.

Hudson(38) and others(39) have pointed out that the Palestinian elite underwent a two-stage mobilization: first in 1948, when they were originally dispersed, and later in 1967, as a consequence of the events of the June war. The sketchy biographical data available on this elite (some of which is summarized in following chapters) indicates that it possesses both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous character.(40)

On one hand, the group of "historic leaders," as this elite is known, are characterized by an intensely politicized outlook. Most, if not all, were involved in the 1948 war and its aftermath, and most were quite actively involved in politics from a very young age (a characteristic that appears to be shared by most of the top Arab leadership in general). In addition, most of these Palestinians were highly educated and were involved in various journalistic activities. In this sense they are prototypical of Manfred Halpern's definition of the new middle class, a class which is sociologically connected with communications activities. This latter characteristic is of some importance insofar as the Palestinians are a natural communications elite and have thus been able to exert an influence on Arab perceptions out of keeping with their actual numbers (see Chapter 11 for the implications of this).

Equally, this nascent Palestinian elite was characterized by an intense sense of their own marginality, as the excerpt from Turki illustrates.(41) They referred to themselves as the "generation of revenge" in contrast to the older leaders, the "generation of the desert." This sense of marginality and of a generational role in Arab history has, in turn, been worked into the various Palestinian ideologies discussed below. But in addition, there was also the aspiration for a return to Palestine, an aspiration expressed as "the Vision of the Return" in a variety of ways – as in this excerpt from the poetry of Mahmud Darwish, and the communique below from the al-'Asifah forces:

A thorn in the heart are your eyes,
Lacerating, yet adorable,
I shield it from the storm
And pierce it deep through night and pain,
The wound illuminates thousands of stars,
Transforms my present into a future
Dearer than my being
And I forget as our eyes meet
That once we were twins behind the gate . . .

I saw you last on the quay,
A lonely voyager without a bag,
I ran to you like an orphan searching
For an answer among ancestral wisdom.
How could an orchard be banished to a quay
And yet remain as ever green . . .

Palestinian are your eyes,
Palestinian is your name,
Palestinian your thought, your clothes,
Your feet, your form,
Palestinian the words,
Palestinian the voice,
Palestinian you live,
Palestinian you will die . . . (42)

> From among our steadfast people, waiting at the borders, our revolutionary vanguard has issued forth, in the belief that armed revolution is our only path to Palestine and freedom. Let the imperialists and Zionists know that the people of Palestine are still in the field of battle and shall never be swept away. . . . We hereby declare to the whole world that we are bound indissolubly to the soil of our homeland. Our moving force is our own faith that this is the only means which can reactivate our problem which has been dormant for so long. But we must also inform the world that we are bound, by our destiny and our struggle, to the Arab nation which will help us, both materially and morally.(43)

While this Palestinian elite was clearly united in terms of its sociological status and perceptual outlook (in general), it was also badly fragmented. As one perceptive Arab reporter noted:

> One who tries to cover news of the Palestinians finds himself inadvertently covering the news of all the Arab countries. The nature of the Palestinian question, the multiplicity of places where Palestinians reside and the multiplicity of political currents among them are making their congresses, in spite of their Palestinian identity, appear to be national congresses or congresses of the League of Arab Nations.(44)

This fragmentation in turn was the consequence of this elite's function as a linkage phenomenon. A linkage, in the sense used by James Rosenau, is "any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."(45) In this case, the Palestinians, by virtue of their geographical and sociological scattering, formed linkage networks on a multitude of dimensions.

Geographical Dispersion and Strategic Linkages

Here the issue is much more complicated than just the physical displacement of Palestinians away from Palestine. The fact of the political scattering of the Palestinian community, the events of its initial diaspora, and the strategic position (geographically and politically) of Palestine itself in the Arab World combined to enmesh Palestinians in larger Arab rivalries. Not only were the Palestinians themselves the living symbols of a succession of traumatic Arab defeats, but they were also a linkage group with members in most Arab states. Hence, given the cross-border character of inter-Arab politics, it was a strategic necessity for Arab states to attempt to manipulate the Palestinians, if for no other reason than the fact that Palestinians within their own borders would be the targets of outside influences.(46)

Not surprisingly, Resistance leaders themselves have been quite cognizant of Arab attempts to utilize Palestinians in general, and Resistance groups in particular, for their own ends. Nayif Hawatimah expressed what is probably a widely shared view of Arab influence strategies:

> The first and more important reason lies in this actual situation consisting of meddling in Palestinian internal affairs by various Arab parties. Because we are in Algeria, I am going to allow myself to make a comparison between the Algerian and the Palestinian revolutions. The Algerian people have fabulous potentialities. They are developed in a no less fabulous geographic area. Finally, when the Algerian revolution began, it was united under the leadership of the National Liberation Front. It had armed forces that were no less united. Under these conditions, it was in a position to stop any Arab meddling at the borders of Algeria.
>
> The conditions of our struggle are different. Our homeland is occupied and over half of our people are exiled in neighboring Arab countries. The Palestinian issue is the common concern of all Arab peoples and countries and all the problems, all parts of the Middle East are strongly influenced by this issue. Therefore, Arab meddling in our internal affairs on behalf of these common concerns and of defense of the Palestinian cause objectively or subjectively is observed. Political, material and organizational interference. Some Palestinian organizations are deeply infiltrated by Arab governments. Others undergo strong political influence by Arab regimes. Likewise, the situation of our people, half of whom are undergoing colonialism and the other half is governed by Arab laws and is controlled by Arab organizations and governments, leaves the door open to these meddlings.
>
> Since the beginning of the 20th century, these Arab interferences have been causing serious detriment to our people, our national cause and our revolution. Everyone remembers the 1936 revolution in Palestine, which lasted 3 years and ended to our

> disadvantage, owing to lack of a decision by the Arab regimes. The same was true in 1948, when the encirclement of the Palestinian Army was achieved, owing to the entrance of reactionary Arab armed forces into the struggle, in order to implement the plans prepared by imperialism that found expression in the partition of Palestine between Israel and the Arab reactionaries.
>
> This desire to meddle still exists. Although it is true that our people's coming into political awareness is tending to weaken and eliminate these interferences, the influences are still present and they still are an important factor in hindering unification.(47)

Political Fragmentation and Clique Linkages

The failure of Palestinian leadership in the 1920s and 1930s left the Palestinian without a political identity articulated in terms of a Palestinian people and nation, and without a coherent and legitimate leadership cadre. The defeat and exodus of 1948 amplified this failure. Palestinian leadership, such as it was, was discredited and badly divided among itself. What Palestinian social structure that remained was split by feuding factions, clans, and families.(48) In this vacuum, a politics of cliques developed. Local leaders operated solely within narrowly prescribed limits of self-interest, refusing to cooperate with outside groups, a situation that seems to have been even more extreme in the refugee camps. A study of West Bank camps described the situation:

> The refugees then are not organized by descent groups or by village of origin. There is no inter-camp organization of this kind, and not even the co-villagers living together in the same refugee camp form such groups. Instead, relationships with former co-villagers take the form of personal networks, tying together relatives and people of the same area of origin.(49)

Ideological Linkages

In addition to being scattered politically and geographically, the Palestinians were also divided by the ideologocial and intellectual currents in the Arab World. Here the divisions more or less paralleled the several intellectual responses to the original defeat in Palestine.

Organizational Decentralization

Quandt makes the point that Palestinian cultural conceptions of authority operate to produce a spectrum of clique-like coalitions around the

personalities of leaders; that individualism in the sense of a rejection of hierarchy and routine are the norm.(50) This pattern is a variation of the traditional localism of non-Resistance leaderships, but here it is translated into and augmented by organizational rivalries. Hawatimah explains it as follows:

> The second reason concerns the narrowness of vision that some branches of the resistance movement have on the matter of unification. They take into account first of all their own interests, instead of a national, overall view. . . . Since 1969, the Democratic Front has submitted four unification plans to the Palestinian National Council. We proposed a political, military, organizational, diplomatic and informal unity. They were shelved, after long, ineffectual discussions.(51)

Thus the movement is fragmented along a number of dimensions among competing definitions of nationhood: Marxist-Leninist, Palestinian nationalist, Islamic, and pan-Arab. Quandt, for example, identified at least five major clusters: (a) The sociological heirs of the Arab Higher Committee – the Palestinian familial and clan leaders, the descendants of the Nashashibis and al-Husaynis – have controlled the West Bank and to a much lesser extent, Gaza. (b) The Islamic right, the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamic nationalist offshoots, dominate Fatah. (c) The intellectual descendants of Christian nationalists in the Levant are split into two segments: the ANM, the socialist expression of greater Syrian and pan-Arab unity which is organized now in the PFLP and its several offshoots; and the al-Ard movement which is more closely aligned with the stratum that produced Arab Communist parties, yet with a distinctive Palestinian orientation. (d) Lastly, the secular military tradition of colonial military establishments is embodied in the PLA Officer Corps.(52) (The organizational geneology contained in Appendix 13 graphically illustrates this.)

These ideological and historical divisions reflect in microcosm the divisions within the Arab World itself. And they go far toward the explanation of alliances and conflicts between Palestinians and Arab governments which might seem unexplainable by more straightforward analysis. The leftists are akin to their brethren who control the governments of Syria and Iraq; splits within this ideological tradition are basically intra-family affairs, doctrinal nuances in a mainstream of nationalist ideology. Like other intra-family splits, these are characterized by fanatic hostility: to oppose is to negate entirely; hence the particularly schismatic tendency of the ANM, PFLP and PDF. At the other extreme, Fatah and the conservatives are expressions of the same religious and political attitudes held by the Saudis and the Egyptians. This shared religiosity explains both Fatah's consistent unwillingness to interfere in the affairs of conservative states and these states' willingness to tolerate Fatah activities. The al-'Ard strain is currently expressed in the resurgence of communist activity within the Palestinian community – in the PNF and its pan-Arab colleague, the Front for

Participation in the Palestinian Revolution. The Militarists, professional soldiers, find a certain kinship with USSR advisors, with professional officers from all Arab countries. Each of these has its own cadre of supporters within the movement, and each of these cadres has developed its own organizational response to the problem of generating an effective resistance. Resistance organizational politics, therefore, revolve around the process of building coalitions of otherwise desperate and sometimes ideologically antagonistic groups:

> The political style that emerged in the process of trying to create a Palestinian movement parallels that described for other segmented societies in which clear lines of authority are lacking. In the absence of a recognized central authority, and in the presence of many competing groups, there is likely to be considerable instability in alliances and some movement of personnel from one group to another. Alliance arrangements are flexible, which predisposes each group toward defensive maneuvers to protect against a sudden shift in the balance of power. Friends may become enemies, and enemies may eventually become useful allies.(53)

AL-KARAMAH: COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND THE ARAB SYSTEM

Although the Palestinian elite was mobilized, the rest of the Palestinian population was not equally mobilized. In fact, such Palestinian guerrilla groups as were organized between 1948 and 1967 remained small. Recruitment was difficult: Arab regimes were hostile unless it was to their perceived advantage to support such groups, and the groups themselves tended to have very short life spans. Most of these organizations were little more than cliques, and had extremely simple organizational formats; more sophisticated and elaborate organizational structures were developed only after 1968.(54) In addition, these groups fought among themselves as much as they fought against any Israelis.

After 1967, the number of these groups increased, and immediately after the war, a small-scale armed resistance was organized in the newly occupied territories.(55) This, however, collapsed because of a combination of Israeli counterinsurgent activities and a lack of any sort of organization: for example, groups operating in the West Bank which were the predecessors of the PFLP and the GC did not cooperate with the larger forces of Fatah.(56) This early noncooperation, especially between the nascent PFLP cadres and Fatah, foreshadowed latter divisions between the two groups.

Where Palestinian elites had been mobilized by the events of 1948 and 1967, Palestinian mass mobilization was both slower and more discontinuous. After 1948, Palestinians in refugee camps underwent a process of uprooting and mobilization but even after 1967, many Palestinians in the West Bank were still largely unmobilized. These became politicized only as a consequence of changes occurring under

the Israeli occupation (see chapter six below), and then only as late as the second half of the 1970s. The consequence was, on one hand, to bifurcate the Palestinian community into the politically active refugee and displaced population and the largely politically inactive West Bank population. On the other hand, this bifurcation also split Palestinian leadership into two major and competing sets of elites: those of the Resistance and those of the West Bank.

Even after al-Karamah, these divisions remained significant enough so that a West Bank (or West Bank/Jordanian) political community was considered by some non-Palestinian statesmen as an alternative to the Resistance. Although the Rabat Summit of 1974 seemed to have foreclosed this option, the intensive bargaining between the Resistance (and its PLO extension, the PNF), the Jordanians, and a coalition of West Bank mayors (loosely organized as the "National Guidance Council") especially after 1978, indicates that the issue of the ultimate status of the West Bank (assuming an Israeli withdrawal) is by no means settled.

As far as the Resistance itself was concerned, the battle of al-Karamah abruptly reversed its fortunes. Here the area-wide symbolism is critical. The Arabs had just suffered an enormous and well-publicized defeat, and all Arab establishments in varying degrees were held responsible. The Israeli attack on al-Karamah was widely rumored before the event (apparently fostered in part by the Israelis in an effort to dramatize the blow). Actual battle reports of Israeli forces crossing the Jordan, driving back any resistance, and surrounding al-Karamah itself produced hysterical headlines, and there were hysterical reactions among Arab populations who appeared to believe that the Israelis were about to restart the 1967 campaign and add to their already considerable conquests. This mood of despair and desparation, especially in the confrontation states, deepened as the fighting went on. Jordanian news broadcasts spoke of continual Israeli advances, advances that were now beginning to meet fierce resistance with "white weapons" (naked steel), that is, hand-to-hand fighting. Finally, the mood changed: the Israelis were withdrawing, and withdrawing with considerable casualties; hysteria and despair were now replaced with euphoria. (In Cairo that night, an Italian opera company totally unconnected with Middle Eastern politics delivered a brilliant performance of Don Giovanni, presumably because its members were overjoyed at still being alive. In Cairo the next morning, however, the streets were plastered with posters calling for the support of guerrilla action against Israel.)(57)

What happened also as a consequence was a dramatic change in the self-perceptions of the mass of the Palestinians and in the perception of the Palestinians on the part of the rest of the Arabs. In Neil Smelser's terms, al-Karamah triggered the emergence of a "value oriented movement," a movement which is "a collective attempt to restore, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief."(58) While value-oriented movements range from purely religious to purely secular movements, they have in common the same ultimate characteristic, that of a psychological and behavioral gestalt: the sudden and explosive

formation of a theretofore disjointed reality into a perceptually coherent whole. In short, these movements represent an explosion of built-up energy which is then translated into political behavior, and in some cases, long-term political organization.

The pre-existing elements of the Palestinian environment (what Smelser calls "structural conduciveness") had set the stage whereby some dramatic event could transform Palestinian self-perceptions. Structurally, the Palestinians were outside of the normal social bonds of Arab society: They either existed in refugee camps or lived as a very special class of second-class citizens, in a series of Palestinian ghettos in non-Palestinian states. Culturally, the literature of the "Return" had both articulated and made common a value system which stressed Palestinian uniqueness. Psychologically, the marginality of their situation translated into alienation. All of these factors were expressed prior to al-Karamah in the notion of the ghurbah: literally "exile" or "banishment from one's homeland;" a concept that in the Palestinian context paralleled the Marxist notion of alienation (a theme which not surprisingly runs through the ideologies of the Marxist groups.) Many of these values and perceptions were inculcated by UNWRA schools, run by Palestinian staffs, in the refugee camps. Because of the battle of al-Karamah, the sense of Palestinianness which had been heretofore politically articulated only by an elite was now part of the perceptions and behavior of the mass of Palestinians. The dwellers in the ghurbah were now Palestinians:

> Increasingly, "Palestinian" is identified with the guerrilla warrior rather than with the downtrodden displaced person. This is evident among Arab students, intellectuals, professionals, and the man in the street, from Casablanca to Kuwait. While much guerrilla activity is exaggerated if not entirely fictitious, there is sufficient substance to their achievements to have created a guerrilla mystique. The daily radio bulletins and pronouncements by guerrilla leaders; and the Arabic press – all have created in the Arab consciousness the image of a new Palestinian who, unlike the traditional and now aging military leadership, is young, vigorous, intelligent, self-sacrificing, intensely patriotic, and single-mindedly dedicated to the reestablishment of Arab Palestine. This image pervades even the thinking of guerrilla critics such as Lebanese and Jordanian officials.(59)

The upshot was an explosion of organizations (by some estimates as high as 70 new guerrilla groups were created in the immediate aftermath of al-Karamah) and a flood of recruits (both Palestinian and non-Palestinian) and money. According to a report in al-Ahram, Fatah officials claimed to have had as many as 100,000 requests to joint it.(60) In fact, the plethora of organizations (some clearly no more than paper creations) became so great that Arab spokesmen began warning against the dangers of too many competing groups.(61)

THE PLO: ARAB STRATEGY AND PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION

The circumstances surrounding the creation of the PLO and the subsequent pattern of coalition-building politics within it illustrates the problems posed by the pre-Resistance environment. Because of the nature of its creation as a by-product of inter-Arab conflict strategies, the PLO lacked any semblance of legitimacy. Because of the nature of its organizational format – basically an umbrella organization or holding company for various Palestinian-cum-external Arab factions and interests – it was faced with the same problems of integrating conflicting cliques or factions as was the AHC. As a consequence, the PLO has tended from the first to be an arena of clique patterns of cohesion and conflict, an arena wherein the organizational strategies of various Resistance groups produce shifting coalitions. However, where the AHC was driven by factionalism based on kinship differences or the politics of local personalities, PLO politics is a politics of organized cliques.

In Graham Allison's use of the term, the PLO resembles a system of "bureaucratic politics."(62) The essence of the original Allisonian conception is that policy outcomes are the product of bargaining behavior, behavior carried on by different sets of personnel occupying different positions in a decision-making structure. This would be the case in a formally organized and routinized bureaucratic system. In the case of the PLO, however, the "positions" are cliques, and the bargaining behavior is carried on in a situation in which the bureaucratic norms are neither adequately articulated nor accepted as binding rules of behavior. Hence PLO politics is dominated by conflicts of clique interests and goals, and at the same time by conflicts over the nature of the authority and decision-making framework itself. Hence, there is the potential (and the reality) of a number of interlocking "bureaucratic" games, and the result is a most complex pattern of decision making.(63)

Since the Arab summit meeting of January 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization has been the body designated to represent the Palestine people as a whole and to serve as the official link between them, the Arab governments, and the Arab League. The impetus for the creation of the PLO grew out of a complex pattern of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts: conflicts between rival Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi claims to leadership of the radical-revolutionary camp on the one hand, and the response of conservative or moderate regimes such as Jordan, Kuwayt, and Saudi Arabia to the radicals on the other hand.(64) These conflicts were accentuated by the emergence of Palestinian insurgents whose actions, if completely unchecked, had the potential of triggering a military confrontation of unknown and uncalculated dimensions with Israel.(65)

The immediate issue which served to precipitate the creation of the PLO was not the activity of the Palestinians, however, but the completion of an Israeli project to divert the Jordan River waters. As long as the Israeli project was under construction and not in actual operation, Arab governments concerned could content themselves with

relatively safe expressions of hostility toward it and its creator. Indeed, these expressions served as low-risk tactics designed to demonstrate the unswerving anti-Israel posture of the Arab government which originated them. Successive unstable Syrian regimes especially utilized this tactic in an attempt to bolster their positions domestically and externally.(66)

By late 1963, however, the question of countering this Israeli move had assumed an ominous and pressing character for at least two of the Arab governments involved, Jordan and Egypt. Leaders of both governments were acutely aware of the possibilities of disaster implicit in any action against the diversion works which might generate an Israeli military response. For King Husayn such a response could have meant the loss of his territory west of the Jordan River. For President 'Abd al-Nasir the prospect was that of losing prestige, no matter what action he took: if he opted for war, he faced the very real possibility of a humiliating defeat; if he stood aside, then the shame of doing nothing would equally fall upon his head.(67) Thus for Husayn and 'Abd al-Nasir, at least, some formula had to be found which would allow them to give the appearance of combating construction activities while at the same time preventing any Arab action which might provoke an Israeli reprisal.(68)

In December 1963 'Abd al-Nasir called for a meeting of Arab kings and presidents to confer and decide on a joint strategy to counter the Israeli project. This, the first of a series of summits, met in Cairo the following January and took a number of decisions including one to create a "Palestine entity" which would mobilize Palestinians for the day of the "liberation of Palestine."(69) The Palestine Liberation Organization, as this entity came to be known, was to be its organizational embodiment and was to be supported financially and militarily by all participants in the summit.

For all intents and purposes this new "Palestinian" entity was completely under the control of its sponsors. It was headed by a middle-aged Palestinian lawyer, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, and staffed by a relatively older generation of Palestinian leaders.

> Among these leaders were Yahya Hamouda, a lawer with one-time communist connections who replaced Shukayri at the head of the PLA in 1968; Abd al-Khalig Yaghmur, and Khalid al-Fahum; Wajih al-Madani, officer of the PLO forces in Syria; and Bahjat Abu Garbiyya, former Baath party member in Syria.(70)

> Moreover, its offices in Arab countries were dependent on the good will of the ruling groups therein. Its military arm, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), was likewise organized as an integral part of regular national Arab forces (see Chapter 9).(71) As a consequence, the PLO was widely regarded by Palestinians as a fraud and a cynical attempt by Arab governments, the UAR in particular, to divert Palestinian energies from any confrontation with Israel.(72)

Al-Shuqayri's own pro-Egyptian sympathies, and his evident willingness to follow the policy lines laid down by the Arab League, added to the general impression that the PLO was a captive of non-Palestinian interests. Al-Shuqayri was appointed as the representative of Palestine at the Arab League. In this capacity he was to operate as a liaison between the various governments' delegates to the UN, but resigned when asked to oppose Egypt over the Yemen war controversy.(73) However, as Hudson points out, al-Shuqayri did manage to exploit the PLO's quasi-diplomatic status to the extent that he was able to organize a series of Palestine national councils. These, while politically limited in terms of inter-Arab political considerations, did at least provide for (a) some symbolic focal point for Palestinian loyalties, albeit a very weak one, and (b) an organizational format for reintegrating the fragmented Palestinian elite.(74)

What organizational integration the PLO initially possessed was of a negative nature, much like that of the Arab League at its inception. Guerrilla groups making up the PLO's membership were held together only by their shared anti-Israeli attitudes and their common problems in securing adequate organizational resources. In this sense, the PLO was little more than an institutionalized version of more or less common Arab patterns of antagonistic cooperation, alliances built on necessities of mutual defense, rather than in terms of securing some positive goals.

However, the PLO from the first had a form of international status, a status which dramatically increased in stature after the Rabat summit of 1974. Since then, it has received varying degrees of international recognition from over 100 states, and has been accorded some status within the UN as an observer and as a member of several UN agencies. This prospect of international recognition has been coupled with a systematic extension of PLO services to its members on a variety of levels from general health and welfare institutions to those designed to mediate conflicts among Resistance groups themselves. Theoretically, therefore, the PLO had the potential of becoming the nucleus of a Palestinian government in exile along the lines of Algeria's FLN.

Indeed, just such a suggestion was made by Egypt's President al-Sadat on the occasion of the second anniversary of 'Abd-al-Nasir's death, in September 1972 (immediately after the Munich massacre).(75) The reaction from the commando leadership was varied, but generally hostile to this proposal. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine quickly rejected the idea, calling it "an attempt to involve the resistance in capitulative settlements," a view which became the position of the Rejection Front and then the Steadfastness Front. Fatah's response was similar, but slower and more cautious. A split had developed within this organization over the advisability of opting for some sort of government-in-exile scheme at least a year prior to President al-Sadat's speech, with one faction attempting to persuade their colleagues of the benefits of such a course of action. For the most part, however, Fatah's leadership took the position that any such move would make the resistance movement more vulnerable to control by

outside "host" countries, and thus reduce its claim to autonomy and representativeness.(76) But after 1974, this position has been the subject of bitter and divisive debate within Fatah.

Jordan and Israel, the two states most directly affected, have consistently opposed any suggestion of a government-in-exile scheme. The Israelis have done so because they felt it would both weaken any claim to control over the Palestinian inhabited areas occupied after the 1967 war and would create still another Arab political entity with which the Israeli government would have to deal. King Husayn and his advisors likewise appeared to have felt that a Palestinian government with internationally recognized status would substantially threaten Jordan's sovereignty over its Palestinian majority.

This weak legitimacy was all but destroyed in the wake of the June war. Even before 1967, as early as 1965 when Fatah first began its raids, an increasingly intense hostility had developed between it and the PLO. As far as the younger militants among the Palestinians were concerned, Fatah was doing the fighting while the older "notables" in the PLO were doing the talking. At the end of 1967, Fatah redoubled its pressure for the removal of Shuqayri, and after a series of personnel shuffles, he was ultimately replaced by Yahya Hammuda. With Shuqayri gone, Fatah leadership decided to work within the PLO. As one of the leaders of Fatah put it:

> Fatah's joining the PLO was dependent upon the liberation of the will of the PLO from Arab tutelage. We are confident that by taking part in the PLO we have broken the yoke that bound it to everything connected with the Arab summit meetings and have made popular legitimacy, which we have gained through armed struggle, prevail over official legitimacy.(77)

The mechanism by which this was accomplished was a reorganization of the PLO structure itself, and in particular a 1968 expansion of the Palestine National Council whereby Fatah received 40 seats out of a total of 105. This de facto domination was symbolically institutionalized in 1969 when 'Arafat was elected chairman of the executive committee.

STRUCTURAL ELABORATION: THE DRIVE FOR CONTROL

Hudson has noted that, unlike some other Arab elites, the Palestinians have self-consciously attempted to organize most aspects of the Palestinian community (see Chapter 4 for details):

> To a large extent the guerrilla groups did not simply penetrate a national elite but actually reconstituted it. Fatah had a network of political and military branches that appeared to engage all sectors of the Palestinian community: refugees, villagers and peasants, urban proletariate outside camps, middle-class profes-

sionals and business people, and the well-to-do commercial elite.(78)

The PLO structure, as it was proliferated, embodied the same strategy. The supreme authority in the PLO for drafting policy is the Palestine National Council, and the conduct of the PLO's affairs when the PNC is not sitting is undertaken by its executive committee. Originally the PNC numbered some 105 seats, but its membership has been progressively increased to a current (1980) total of 291. Both the size of the PNC and the distribution of seats within it (the numerical representation of different groups) has been a major source of conflict and bargaining among the groups. Theoretically, the PNC is supposed to meet every six months to formulate basic PLO policy; between these meetings no major policy decisions can (again theoretically) be made. In practice this is a concession to the necessities of creating a working coalition of guerrilla groups and to the fragility of any consensus among these groups.

The executive committee of the PLO elected in February 1969 with 'Arafat as Chairman consisted of eleven members – four from Fatah, two from al-Sa'iqah, and five independents, reflecting the relative strength of these groups. Before the end of the year the Popular Democratic Front became the first leftist organization to join the committee. The committee itself controlled the PLO's armed forces, its information center, research center, planning center, the Palestine National Fund, and the other administrative departments. As with the PNC itself, the executive committee has been expanded: in March 1977, its membership consisted of 15 seats, many of which were occupied by "independents" from the West Bank (see Appendix 14).

The seventh session of the PNC, meeting in Cairo in May and June of 1970, introduced basic changes. Since the major guerrilla organizations for the first time had agreed to take part in the PNC, the membership was enlarged from 105 to 112. Eight seats were to be allotted to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. But the PFLP, maintaining that it should have equal representation with Fatah, sent only one official delegate. After heated discussions, the PNC voted to form a central committee as a top-level coordinating body for the guerrilla organizations. This central committee was to consist of: the twelve members of the executive committee; one member representing each of the major guerrilla organizations; the speaker of the PNC; the commander of the Palestine Liberation Army; and three independents to be chosen by the executive committee of the PLO, making 27 members in all. By March 1977 the central council had been expanded to 41 seats, and by Spring 1980 it had been increased again to 55 seats.

DECISION-MAKING: CONFLICT OVER THE ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY

The continual expansion and proliferation of decision-making bodies within the PLO indicates a severe authority crisis within the PLO itself.

Creating some sort of unified and acceptable authority structure in this situation has been one of the Resistance's chief problems and one of its chief failings to date. Two models of guerrilla organization were considered by the Palestinian leaders: the Algerian FLN and the Vietnamese NLF. These were polar opposites. The FLN was a loose coalition of individuals, guerrilla chieftains each with his own following. These personalities were held together by a common purpose, but no more. FLN ideology was aimed at the lowest common denominator of aggregation: armed struggle and common participation in collective violence. The NLF, by contrast, was a closely knit cadre of revolutionaries. These were bound together by an articulated ideology, organized in a single party; the command structure was a unified hierarchy. Where the FLN was anarchic, the NLF was semi-bureaucratized. The Palestinians were split between the two models: Fatah opted for the Vietnamese Model; the PFLP chose the Algerian.

At the March 1971 session of the PNC, three plans for command unity were presented. One, submitted by 'Arafat, called for complete unity of all command groups within the framework of the PLO. A second, put forth by the PLFP, sought a revision of the National Charter, the creation of a clear-cut political and military program, with each commando group maintaining its separate ideological and organizational identity. A third plan, presented by the PLO planning board, recommended a bureaucratic solution: either full merger of the theretofore separate groups, or in lieu of that, the creation of a central military command.(79) The planning board solution was too extreme to be politically acceptable (it was acceptable only to PLA officers), and the leadership split over the Fatah and PFLP plans.

In an interview given prior to the PNC meeting, 'Arafat was asked about his proposals to create a unified movement and about the nature of commando financing. His answers defined both the problem and Fatah's proposed solution: "If I want to hold back financial aid from a small organization [i.e., to control its activities] this group might go to a certain Arab government and obtain help from there."(80) In other words, most commando organizations had sources of support such that the PLO leadership could not control them even if they tried. The small organization in question had asked 'Arafat for 1,000 dinars to defray expenses. 'Arafat had to travel before he could give an answer. When he returned, the group had already obtained 9,000 dinars from elsewhere. As a consequence, the only viable alternative was to adopt the NLF approach:

> We have found two models of commando unity, one provided by the Algerian revolution, and the other by the Vietnamese revolution. We have chosen the Vietnamese model because it suits our situation. We have started applying military unity in more than one sector, and as a result, Fatah is now undertaking the financing of all the fighters in Jordan.(81)

Although this may have been 'Arafat's preferred organizational format, his attempts to create this unified and centralized decision structure have been vigorously resisted, especially by the PFLP and a cluster of other organizations around it which broke away from the PLO in 1974 to form the Rejection Front (see Chapter 11).

3 Resistance Organizations I: Fatah

Because the Resistance reflects in microcosm the larger divisions within the Arab world, it is currently divided into a number of organizations, the more important of which are dealt with in this book. Organizationally speaking, these are loosely integrated units, crosscut by a variety of ties: kinship and tribal linkages, local political clientage patterns, and clusters of followers around strong personalities. The Resistance as a whole resembles a kaleidoscope of shifting factions and coalitions. Its intraorganizational dynamics combine extremely doctrinaire, ideological politics with those of traditional clique-style alliances. The consequence is, as Hudson put it, a constant process of "fission and fusion."(1)

This situation is, however, made even more complex by the relationships which have developed over time between the several guerrilla groups and established Arab governments. These relationships have historically been shaped by the interplay of three factors: the dependence of the Palestinian groups on Arab regimes for necessary financing and supplies; the ability of the resistance as a whole to garner popular support from the citizens of these countries; and complexities of inter-Arab politics per se.(2) In respect to these relationships, the leadership of each organization had to make a basic set of choices. It could choose an organizationally maximizing strategy involving the acquisition of the greatest possible amount of personnel and material resources – a la Fatah – or it could move in the direction of a minimalist approach, focusing on quality and dedication rather than sheer size, as do the Popular Fronts. Each of these choices had its advantages and drawbacks.

Fatah's approach facilitated its becoming the largest and therefore most important of the guerrilla units, but it did so at the cost of ideological ambiguity, uneven quality of personnel, and unclear relationships with various Arab regimes. By diversifying its sources of support, Fatah assured itself of preeminence within the movement, but

at the price of restraints in dealing with Arab governments and with other potentially disruptive (from Fatah's viewpoint) guerrilla groups. This necessity for toleration of division and diversity within the movement, which was a logical consequence of Fatah's strategy, has so far proven to be the chief stumbling block for any Fatah-sponsored unification plans. There is a variant of this maximizing strategy which is employed by two other large organizations, al-Sa'iqah and the ALF. For these organizations, the choice is to build a relatively large organization that gets its resources from a single governmental source, Syria and Iraq, respectively. This has the advantage of assuring the group in question a stable source of supply, but at the cost of enforced ideological conformity with the Syrian or Iraqi ruling elite.(3)

Alternatively, the minimalist strategy of the popular fronts has allowed them to maintain a high degree of ideological cohesiveness, membership dedication, and political autonomy from both the Arab governments and the larger guerrilla groups. But, here again, this dedication and autonomy is achieved at the cost of remaining small and weak. These popular fronts have relatively meager resources, and their supply sources are unstable. As a result, they are limited in their choice of military strategy and tactics.

The various organizations can be divided into several categories: Fatah and the nationalist cluster, the ANM/PFLP and a series of successor and splinter groups, independent groups, Arab-sponsored groups, and Communist-allied or Communist-dominated groups. However, because of the intra-leadership connections that existed prior to the 1967 war, many of these groups have some interrelationships.

These interrelationships may take the form of a common organizational ancestor – a shared genealogical descent from earlier Palestinian or Arab groups. The cluster of groups that sprang from the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) is an example here. Alternatively, the PLA has roots in Syrian army cadres. Moreover, there is a persistent process of exchange of personnel from group to group on a tactical basis, a process that apparently crosses seemingly impenetrable ideological divisions. Some of the more specifically terrorist organizations, such as the BSO and its offshoots, are dealt with later.

PALESTINE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (FATAH) (4)

The Palestine National Liberation Movement, known generally by its acronym Fatah, is the oldest, largest, and most influential of the resistance groups. It is, in a sense, the historical heir to the AHC. Because of its size, its policy of recruiting from all segments of Palestinian society, and its self-proclaimed mission of embodying Palestinian national aspirations, Fatah's membership contains a spectrum of ideological and social orientations. Although Fatah as a whole is conservative in relation to other commando organizations, and is heavily representative of the Islamic Arab nationalist orientation, it also has a powerful socialist, secularist wing.

The consequence is a certain amount of ideological confusion and inconsistency. Although Fatah stresses its secular character, Muslims form the majority of its Palestinian recruitment base, and Muslim religious motivations are clearly more apparent in Fatah than in some of the other guerrilla groups. Fatah, therefore uses Islamic slogans, and has even sought the help of Muslim 'ulama' in the form of a call or a jihad against the Israeli occupiers of Islamic lands and shrines. For example, Fatah media generally contain a heavy religious content. Sawt al-'Asifah usually opens its broadcasts with a verse from the Qur'an, most often from Sura 48 (Fatah):

> In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Verily We have granted thee a manifest victory. That God may forgive thee, Thy faults of the past. And those to follow; Fulfill His favour to thee; And Guide thee, On the straight way.(5)

This confusion has been exploited by Fatah's opponents within and without the Arab World. 'Arafat at one point declared that Fatah was being simultaneously accused of being a tool of the Muslim Brethren, of being pro-Peking, or being subservient to 'Abd al-Nasir, and of being a Saudi Arabian satellite.(6) These accusations obviously cancel each other out, but they illustrate the problem facing Fatah leaders.

Part of this confusion stems from the fact that two contrasting Arab ideological movements influenced Fatah's development and structure: the Islamic right – the Muslim Brethren represented in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the Arab nationalist left – including the Algerian FLN and the Syrian Ba'th. While the Muslim Brethren dominated the first decade of Fatah, the 1950s, the Algerians and Syrians provided the concrete military and organizational capability for Fatah operations in the 1960s. In this sense, Fatah itself represents in microcosm the tensions and conflicts which are currently wracking the Middle East; for example, the conflict of Western secular values and their organizational output versus Islamic values and their organizational consequences. It is probably no accident therefore that the Muslim Brethren model, which itself is a syncretism of Western and Islamic cultural components, was adopted by Fatah leadership. The later struggle between rightist and leftist factions within Fatah stems from its bifurcated intellectual parentage. This organizational split personality is also one source of Fatah's proclaimed nonideological, nonpolitical stance, an attitude of noninterference in the affairs of Arab governments, left or right. It is also the reason for Fatah's reluctance to move beyond a general statement of its goals with respect to a Palestinian state. To be more specific would exacerbate divisions with Fatah itself.

This tie with the Brethren is a critical factor insofar as Fatah is concerned on a number of levels. (a) The Brethren function as a linkage between Fatah and other non-Palestinian groups which, however, have the same Islamic outlook as the Brethren. In this aspect, the Brethren operate to extend the organizational capabilities of Fatah outside the Palestinian community – in much the same way that the Arab National-

ist Movement supports the PFLP and its offshoots (see chapters 4 and 10). (b) Brethren ties with some conservative Arab regimes, notably Saudi Arabia, have been a factor in predisposing these regimes to support Fatah (and PLO) objectives. (c) Brethren influence in Fatah politics and ideology has projected the Palestinian cause in terms compatible with the upsurge of religious revivalism in the Middle East. Hence, for example, Palestinian links with the Khumayni supporters in Iran were facilitated by a commonality of religious outlooks, a commonality which overshadowed otherwise divisive Sunni/Shi'a differences.

The Brethren were, and are, an organization dedicated to the eradication of foreign political and religious influences in the Arab/Muslim world. Its doctrine called for a return to pure Islam, coupled with the creation of a theocratic state based on the principles of government laid down in the Qur'an. Ideally, this political reorientation would be accompanied by direct action. Therefore, the Brethren presented an internal threat to many Arab and some non-Arab, but Muslim, states.(7) The Brethren's main strength was in Egypt, but its branches spread to the Levant and it developed contacts with similar groups in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and North Africa.(8) The group's primary financial supporter was Saudi Arabia, and most of the Brethren's leadership – exiled from Egypt in the 1950s – was located there.(9)

The Brethren were banned in Egypt as a result of an attempt to assassinate Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in 1954. In the aftermath, 500 leading members of the Brethren were arrested and Brethren headquarters were raided and sacked. Some 4,000 alleged members were imprisoned, and six top leaders were executed. As a consequence, the Brethren became the implacable foe of Nasir.(10) In late 1964 the Brethren attempted to strike again, and thousands more were arrested, some 6,000 in two years.(11) In both 1968 and 1969 the Brethren joined other opponents of Nasir in massive street demonstrations and riots. Following Nasir's death, they became the relentless foe of al-Sadat – despite his having been closely associated with them. (There are charges that he was a member during his early days in Nasir's Free Officers' organization). In 1974 and again in 1976, Brethren were implicated in attempts to overthrow the regime.(12)

Brethren and Egyptian influence is particularly heavy in several groups that are accounted the precursors to Fatah. Remnants of the Palestinian People's Militia, al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (the Holy Struggle), fought alongside Egyptian recruits in an anti-British insurgency in the Canal Zone, 1951-1953.(13) Many of these Egyptians, in addition to being drawn from the Brethren and other right-wing organizations, notably the Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) of Ahmad Husayn, were recruited directly from the students at Fu'ad I University. This student recruitment coincides with the time that some Fatah leaders were at the university.(14)

In addition to their activities in the Canal Zone, the Brethren convened an Islamic Council for the Palestine Question in 1953, at which Brethren spokesmen argued for an extension of Canal Zone

tactics toward Israel. Some observers credit the formation of Fatah, or at least the idea of Fatah's formation, to Hajj Amin al-Husyani himself.(15)

Two years later, in April 1955, a Palestinian commando unit was established in Gaza (its first raid was in August 1955). This unit, numbering 700 men, apparently included some Palestinians who had fought in the Canal Zone, possibly 'Arafat himself. Although primarily organized to reply to the Israeli attack on an Egyptian army post in Gaza, the unit was also designed to assert Egyptian control over the individual activities of Palestinians, such as those of Khalil al-Wazir, which triggered the Israeli attack.(16) Previously, Egyptian intelligence had used Palestinians in small numbers only as information gatherers, but after April, these were given commando training by the Egyptian army. They were paid regular wages, including bonuses for successful crossings, and additional sums for successfully completing their assigned missions.(17) This Gaza unit, or at least the Palestinians in it, became in turn the original cadre of Fatah's military arm, al-'Asifah.

Fatah's links with the Brethren are, however, more direct than ideological and organizational ties. Many of Fatah's leaders appear to have been Brethren, including 'Arafat. Christopher Dobson, author of a controversial series of articles in the Sunday Telegraph, suggests that there is an interlocking relationship between Fatah, the Brethren, and the al-Husayni clan:

> Yasir Arafat, leader of Al Fatah, parent organization of Black September, not only was a member of the Moslem Brotherhood but also belongs to the Mufti's large and powerful clan, his father having been a cousin by marriage of the Mufti. Arafat served as an aide to Abdel Kader el Husseini, the Mufti's nephew and leader of the Arab forces in the war of 1948 until he was killed at the battle of Castel. Another member of the clan, Ghazi Abdel Kadel el Husseini, is one of the leaders of both Fatah and Black September. Yet another, Ziad el Husseini, leader of a guerrilla group in Gaza, committed suicide in the house of the Mayor of Gaza as he was about to be arrested by Israeli security forces. Ali Hassan Salameh, one of the fiercest of Black September's chieftains, is married to an el Husseini.(18)

In any event, Fatah's early recruits were heavily representative of the Brethren.(19)

Moreover (and paradoxically enough), a number of Syrian National Socialists (SNSP) members also joined Fatah. The SNSP, basically an ultraconservative (to the point of being protofascist) Greek Orthodox party, was hostile to the more radical Arab regimes – especially Syria – and therefore tactically, if not religiously, in the same camp as the Brethren. This SNSP-Fatah link, like that between Fatah and the Brethren, has persisted: in the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976, SNSP units fought alongside those of Fatah.(20)

FATAH LEADERSHIP

Fatah was founded principally by four men: Yasir 'Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, and Faruz al-Qaddumi, in order of their importance in the leadership structure (although some commentators now describe al-Wazir as second in command). This leadership is collegial, and only during the past several years has the identity of the principal figures been revealed. Yasir 'Arafat (Abu 'Ammar),(21) the head of Fatah, originally bore only the title of official spokesman for the organization.

These men have remained as leaders since Fatah's inception, although their dominance has been challenged from time to time. To a surprising extent, they shared the same sociological, educational, and career backgrounds. All were Sunni Muslims, usually quite religious; all (with the possible exception of al-Wazir) came from middle-class or better Palestinian families; all experienced the War of 1948 and became refugees; all were educated or resided in Cairo at one point in their career and later migrated to Kuwayt and the Arabian Peninsula; and all were apparently associated with each other for some years before the creation of Fatah. These shared experiences (all were actively involved in either student politics or insurgent activities) have produced a cohesiveness that has remained intact, despite considerable differences in personality and political orientation. Indeed, in comparison to the splits in other organizations, Fatah's core leadership has remained remarkably stable.(22)

'Arafat is Fatah's titular leader, the equivalent to a secretary general, and chairman of the PLO. Khalaf apparently has responsibility for both Fatah and PLO security. Al-Wazir is in charge of the planning and execution of day-to-day military activities. Al-Qaddumi is Fatah's diplomatist, its foreign minister, and at one point headed the PLO's UN delegation. 'Arafat and Khalaf were the originators of Fatah, forming secret cells in Cairo. Later they were joined by al-Wazir, and after 1956 by al-Qaddumi.(23) While 'Arafat was studying in Stuttgart, he met and co-opted Hani al-Hasan. During the period of organizing in Kuwayt, Khalid al-Hasan, Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar, and Kamal 'Udwan joined the core leadership.(24) Therefore, by 1958, the date of Fatah's official emergence, the core leadership had been established.

Yasir 'Arafat

Among the top leadership, 'Arafat and the al-Hasan brothers are most representative of Fatah's conservative orientation. Yasir 'Arafat ('Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Ra'uf 'Arafat) was born in or near Jerusalem (some sources say near the Wailing Wall, in an area bulldozed later by the Israelis)(25) in 1929 to a family reportedly linked with Palestinian notables ('Arafat's mother was from the al-Husayni clan). According to differing accounts, his early life was spent either in Cairo or in Jerusalem until 1948. Moreover, it is said that the family at one time owned valuable property in Cairo, but that they were deprived of it in a

complex legal tangle. As a result, the 'Arafat's were described as being anti-Egyptian.

In 1947 his father and older brother were active in al-Jihad al-Muqaddas.(26) 'Arafat himself fought in the 1948 wars. At 17 he became the personal secretary of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, and reportedly acted as a gunrunner for Palestinian organizations. After the war 'Arafat ended up in Gaza, where the suffering of the refugees made a lasting emotional impression on him (as was the case with other resistance leaders).

'Arafat attended Fu'ad I University (later renamed the University of Cairo), where he majored in civil engineering and also became politically active. During this period 'Arafat was said to have been connected with the Muslim Brethren, although his affiliation with that organization may predate his stay in Cairo. He organized Palestinian students and developed ties with the other founders of Fatah. He founded the Union of Palestinian Students (which ultimately evolved into the General Union of Palestinian Students), and was elected president of the GUPS from 1952 to 1957. Concurrently, he took up the study of guerrilla tactics, and soon became an organizer and trainer of Palestinian and Egyptian guerrillas who fought British forces in the Canal Zone between 1951 and 1952. 'Arafat apparently also personally took part in the Canal Zone fighting.(27) Due to the Brethren's influence and his own battlefield experiences, 'Arafat and his colleagues decided to establish a guerrilla unit which would launch its own raids into Israel. 'Arafat's efforts coincided with Egyptian policy at the time, and the consequence was the Egyptian-sponsored commando force described above.

Following his graduation from college, 'Arafat attended the Egyptian Military Academy, and received training in the use of explosives. He was commissioned a lieutenant in the Egyptian Army, and fought with Egyptian forces in 1956, serving as a demolitions expert in both Port Said and Abu Kabir. In 1957 he was deported from Egypt, reportedly because of his connections with the Brethren, which had recently been banned in Egypt.

'Arafat went to West Germany, where he studied engineering for a time at Stuttgart University and then moved to Kuwayt, where he set up a contracting firm. There he joined with other leaders in creating the organizational nucleus of Fatah.

In 1964 he went to Algeria (along with Wazir), and there met with FLN leaders whose doctrines and tactics were to heavily influence the development of Fatah. In particular, 'Arafat was encouraged by Muhammad Khider, former Secretary of the FLN. Khider and his associates had close links with the Brethren, and on the basis of these shared ties, Khider ordered that 'Arafat be given all the assistance he needed. 'Arafat was ultimately set up in a building in Algiers, where he was supplied with training facilities. When Khider was ousted by Ahmad Ben Bella, however, Fatah continued to receive support.(28)

Later, the Algerians introduced 'Arafat to the newly installed Syrian Ba'thist leadership, a meeting that was to result in Syrian sponsorship of

Fatah's military arm, al-'Asifah. Although Syrian intelligence helped train and equip al-'Asifah, a falling-out between 'Arafat and the Syrian government saw 'Arafat imprisoned for some six weeks in Mazzah prison. It is said that this experience was the genesis of a habit of secrecy which 'Arafat has maintained to this day.(29)

'Arafat takes extreme precautions to keep his movements and whereabouts concealed: it is said that he never sleeps more than two nights at the same place, and often changes his travel plans at the last moment. In addition, he is said to be in the habit of announcing his intention of going to one place, and then going to another instead. This caution has paid off on at least two occasions: in July 1970 and October 1971, when he was the target of assassins. Because of this selectiveness, his movements have a "will o' the wisp" quality. It is said that he has even been able to slip in and out of Israel on several occasions.

Because of his Sunni Muslim orientation, 'Arafat, like 'Abd al-Nasir, has been able to articulate the attributes and aspirations of Fatah's members. Physically unprepossessing, short, paunchy, and balding, 'Arafat does not look the part of either a dashing revolutionary figure or a charismatic political leader.(30) Nevertheless, he is extremely dedicated to the Palestinian cause, so much so that he has remained a bachelor (married, as he puts it, "to a woman called Palestine"), and has eschewed the normal comforts of family life.

His political style is one of moderation and flexibility, a style geared to preserving and stabilizing both Fatah and the PLO, rather than advocating some ideological point of view. This flexibility and skill at creating coalitions of diverse groups or cliques is probably, more than anything else, the secret of his success in maintaining his position as titular leader of the Resistance. But this very success has created detractors. He has been accused, especially after the debacle in Jordan, of creating a "cult of personality" around himself. Alternatively, it has been suggested that he has become an armchair guerrilla, a functionary more interested in preserving an income than anything else.(31)

In his dual role as Secretary General of Fatah and Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, 'Arafat has maintained a centrist position, acting as a broker between rival factions. In this respect, he has intervened on a number of occasions to mediate both intergroup and intragroup conflicts. For example, when the PDF split off from the PFLP, 'Arafat moved to end open hostilities between the two groups. Later, he prevented the PFLP from attempting to kill breakaway PFLP personnel. (His role in smoothing over conflicts within the PLA is detailed below.)(32)

This same ability to mediate marks 'Arafat's approach to relations with Arab regimes. He has been able to maintain more or less amicable relations with Arab governments that are hostile to each other, Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt on one hand, Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen on the other. Partly this is out of necessity, driven by the organizational requirements of Fatah and the PLO. However, it is also due to a single-mindedness of purpose and a refusal to become sidetracked by inter-Arab issues. The Palestinian involvement in both Jordan and Lebanon

are obvious exceptions, but the policy chosen was in reaction to other factors, rather than a deliberate course of action.(33)

'Arafat's links with the Islamic right are reinforced by other leaders in the core leadership, particularly the al-Hasan brothers, Hani and Khalid (Abu Sayyid). Hani is the political advisor to 'Arafat in his role as Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. Khalid is usually identified as the leader of the conservative faction within Fatah, and is considered to have connections with the Egyptians. Moreover, Khalid (as well as some other Fatah leaders) is said to receive a salary from the Kuwayti government.(34)

Salah Khalaf

The Arab nationalist left is represented by a number of leaders. Titular spokesmen for the left-wing trend in Fatah is Salah Khalaf. Khalaf is considered the most intransigent of Fatah leaders; in this, he has been outspoken in his insistence that only revolutionary violence will bring an end to the depressed state of the Palestinians, including a defense of the Black September Organization (BSO):

> What has been done by the commandos of Black September might be terrorism, as some people call it, or revolutionary terror, as it is called by others. But the important thing is that it is the result of the oppression suffered by the Palestinian. No force in the world can put an end to the revolutionary violence as long as the main cause, that of the Palestinian people, remains on the margin of events.(35)

Although Khalaf has been a close colleague of 'Arafat's for many years, there are still differences between them over issues of strategy. On a number of occasions, Khalaf has publicly attacked 'Arafat for what he (Khalaf) considered to be strategic mistakes. Al-Hayah described the differences between 'Arafat and Khalaf:

> Khalaf has charged that 'Arafat has been soft with the Lebanese authorities and also with King Husayn; he has accused 'Arafat of going too far in his association with the Chinese and failing to go far enough in his relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time Khalaf has urged the Fatah executive to extend the war against Israel in the same way as the Popular Front has done, attacking Israeli property, aircraft, and interests wherever they may be. In fact, Khalaf's attack on 'Arafat is almost identical with the accusations made by Habash (of the Popular Front) and Hawatimah (of the Popular Democratic Front), according to al-Hayah; but there is one important difference: Khalaf is a nationalist, not a Marxist, and the writer in al-Hayah concludes that a split in Fatah leadership is almost unavoidable.(36)

Khalaf (Abu Iyad) was born in Jaffa in 1933 and fled to Gaza in 1948. As was the case with other Resistance leaders, Khalaf was emotionally scarred by the events in Palestine during the war and the subsequent exodus:

> The boat had just set sail [from Syria to Gaza] when we heard the wailing of a woman. She had just realized that one of her four children was not aboard. . . . Since we were under heavy fire from Jewish positions, it was difficult to turn back and jeopardize the lives of 200 to 300 persons . . . Suddenly, she lost her head and threw herself into the sea. Her husband, who was unable to restrain her, jumped into the sea after her . . . soon the angry waves pulled them down under our very eyes.(37)

He later attended Cairo University and there met 'Arafat. Like 'Arafat, he became active in student politics and was 'Arafat's assistant in the Palestine Students Union. After 1956 Khalaf left Cairo for Kuwayt, where he taught in a Kuwayt High School. During his stay in Kuwayt, he participated in the creation of Fatah cells. Immediately after the outbreak of the 1967 war, he left Kuwayt for Damascus, to devote his full time to Fatah. He and other Fatah leaders organized cells in the West Bank and Gaza. Later he functioned as Fatah's emissary to a number of Arab governments, among them Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya.

In September 1970, Khalaf, along with al-Qaddumi, was arrested by the Jordanians and sentenced to be executed. The execution was stayed as the result of intense Arab, especially Egyptian, pressure. Khalaf and al-Qaddumi were allowed to leave Jordan, but the experience left Khalaf with a permanent hatred for the Jordanian regime. He thereafter publicly declared his determination to work for its overthrow, and became associated with the BSO.

In October 1974 Khalaf was implicated in a purported plot to kill King Husayn while he was attending the Rabat Summit. The plot reportedly involved between 14 and 20 members of Fatah, was aimed at four other Arab leaders in addition to Husayn, and was financed by the Libyans. Moroccan authorities broke up the plot and arrested 14 of the conspirators, who were later released. In defending his role in the affair, Khalaf said:

> If the accusations leveled against us is that we aimed to kill Husayn, then we are proud of it. And if the assassination operation at Rabat has failed, we shall not give up. We will continue to carry out other attempts, because we are carrying out the decision of the Fatah Revolutionary Council which calls for toppling of the Jordanian regime. . . . The question of Jordan is a matter of life and death. If certain Arab rulers have forgotten [the events in Jordan], the Palestinian people will not, and it refuses the Arab solidarity based on evil and at its expense.(38)

Because of his extensive travels and also his position as chief of PLO security (1968-1970) and head of intelligence (1970 on), Khalaf has been able to develop an extensive series of contacts, including ties with rejection front leaders. In the Lebanese crises of 1974-1976, Khalaf was a key figure in Resistance dealings with Lebanese parties. Khalaf is said to be unflappable, and in control of both his actions and emotions. He apparently lives in a relatively Spartan manner, but is married and has an active family life.

Khalil al-Wazir

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was the point of contact between Fatah and the Algerians, and through the Algerians between Fatah, the Syrians, the Chinese, the North Koreans, North Vietnamese, and the USSR. Al-Wazir is the least known of all Fatah leaders; he shuns publicity, and is referred to within the Resistance as the "calm, silent man."(39) Born in 1936, al-Wazir lived for some time in Gaza. After the 1948 war he became involved in guerrilla activities, and was arrested at one point by the Egyptians to prevent his carrying out unauthorized raids from Gaza. (There is a story to the effect that his raids were one of the causes behind the Israeli attack on the Egyptians in Gaza.) He apparently met 'Arafat for the first time in Cairo, and later spent time with him at Stuttgart University.

Al-Wazir's early training and career were in journalism, and he became the first editor of Filastinuna, Fatah's initial publication. His real forte was military operations, however, and from 1964 onward he was the principal organizer of Fatah's military training, organization, and tactical doctrine. Because of his Algerian connections, all of these were modeled after those of the FLN, and most of Fatah's early training was done in Algeria.(40) In 1965 he was placed in charge of communications and clandestine operations. Al-Wazir is currently commander of al-'Asifah, is Fatah's foremost military tactician, and is said to have planned a number of BSO operations. In this connection, al-Wazir's views on the scope of military action parallel those stated by the PFLP's George Habash. When asked at one point whether he objected to commando attacks outside the immediate area of Palestine, he replied:

> No, if this activity is directed against Israel and its interests. Israel has taken the whole world as its arena, so why don't we strike at it everywhere?(41)

In a later interview, he expanded on this comment:

> Are we not everywhere? The fida'iyin carry out even the boldest operations, they carried a fairly large missile into the heart of Jerusalem and it is impossible for one to imagine how many control points there are everywhere. . . . The fida'iyin respect

human life and feel sorry for the victims of this dirty war that was imposed upon us by the imperialists. We are not the ones who started the war. Now the only goal of our operations is to make our presence felt everywhere.(42)

Faruq al-Qaddumi

Ba'thist ideological influence (as distinct from Syrian military influence) is represented to some extent in Fatah's leadership by Faruq al-Qaddumi. In al-Qaddumi's case, the strand of Ba'thist thinking articulated is that of the original founders of the party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, rather than the more radical orientation espoused by the "neo-Bathists" who presently govern Syria.

Al-Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) was born in Nablus in 1931 to an upper middle-class, land-owning family. While very young, his family moved to Haifa, and there al-Qaddumi received both elementary and high school education. After the 1948 war, the family returned to Nablus. In 1948, al-Qaddumi joined the Ba'th party, and remained a member until 1958. From 1952 to 1954, al-Qaddumi worked in Saudi Arabia as director of public relations and personnel affairs for ARAMCO. At this time, he became politically active, joining with other young Arabs and Palestinians in political discussions.

In 1954 he was denied a student visa to study at Cornell University, and instead went to the American University in Cairo, specializing in economics. While in Cairo, he met 'Arafat, Khalaf, and al-Wazir. After the completion of his studies, Qaddumi worked for a year in Libya, then went to Saudi Arabia and then Kuwayt, where he remained from 1960 to 1965. During this time, he was active in building up Fatah's organizational structure. Because of this activity he was expelled from Kuwayt at the end of 1965, and moved to Damascus to continue his efforts.

After the June 1967 war, al-Qaddumi was the liaison between Fatah and the Egyptians. He developed a rapport with them and a special respect for 'Abd al-Nasir, and once said: "Nasir was a unique leader, one without equal. He had an immense impact on the Palestinian revolution." This special relationship with the Egyptians and 'Abd al-Nasir later saved al-Qaddumi's life: Nasir personally intervened to rescue him (and Khalaf) from the Jordanians in September 1970.

In 1969 al-Qaddumi became head of the Popular Organization's department of the PLO, and in 1973 became head of the Political Department (succeeding Khalid al-Hasan). In this office, he functions as the PLO's "foreign minister," and as a consequence, plays a critical role in representing the PLO to the world. In 1974 al-Qaddumi was one of the moving forces behind the Rabat Summit resolution which put Arab leaders on record as recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. He is also the official head of the Palestinian delegation to the UN. At the same time, he supervises the foreign affairs and mobilization and organization sections for Fatah.

Al-Qaddumi is married and considered one of the most affable and humane men in the Resistance. He is an avid reader with extensive travel experience. He is known for his diplomatic skills, and his tolerance and flexibility, but is equally firm in his principles, with an ability to stand fast in difficult situations.(43)

In addition to these major right-left Arab world ideological orientations, there is some Communist influence in lower leadership echelons. However, this is accounted as being a very weak force in Fatah internal politics (just as Arab Communist parties are a relatively minor political force in the Arab world as a whole):

> The Communist threat is very weak in our society. The Arab Communists are not dangerous. We can face the problem, if it exists, after we have liberated Palestine. But believe me, I don't worry about it all, because the social reality of Palestine is so utterly alien to the models provided by the old Marxist theories. The exodus of the Arabs from Palestine has generated a new class unknown to Marx or Lenin: the class of refugees. Our social revolution is founded on his harmony between the middle and working classes. It is based on the fact that the rich and the poor are both living the tragedy of having lost everything.
>
> When I walk through a refugee camp, I can not yell, "Comrades, feudalism and capitalism are your enemies!" They would look at me uncomprehendingly and answer, "What in the world are you talking about, Abu Lutf? Zionism is my enemy!"(44)

Other Leaders

Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar was, at the time of his assassination, head of the special operations section of Fatah intelligence, and active in the BSO. He was born in 1929 and had been politically active by the time he was 19: in 1948 he helped organize the Rafah (Gaza) refugee camp; in 1955 he led demonstrations to protest against a plan to settle refugees in Northern Sinai. Because of these activities, he was arrested by the Egyptians and spent two years in an Egyptian prison. After his release, he emigrated to Qatar where he came in contact with the existing Fatah leadership. Al-Najjar later became a commander in the al-'Asifah forces.

Kamal 'Udwan was reportedly the head of Fatah intelligence, and commander of the Western sector, (a position that included responsibility for attacks carried out within Israel and the occupied territories). He was born in Gaza in 1925, and formed Resistance cells in 1956. Like al-Najjar, 'Udwan was also arrested for his political activities. He was educated in Cairo, and later moved to Qatar. In 1964 he attended the original PNC session, where he attracted some attention by calling for a popular war of liberation. 'Udwan became formally active in the Resistance in 1968, and became deputy director of Fatah information.

He fought in the Jordanian civil war of 1970 and assumed command of the Western Sector in 1972.(45)

FOUNDING, GROWTH, AND ORGANIZATION

The official founding of Fatah is usually dated from the beginning publication of Filastinuna ("Our Palestine") in 1959. Filastinuna originally was banned by all Arab states, and therefore circulated underground. Its editorial thrust was a call for the revival of a Palestinian entity:

> The Palestinian entity is one of the basic demands of we Palestine Arabs. It is our legitimate right and stems from the conscience of our people . . . Our people reject all kinds of guardianship, whether by the Arab states or others. The Palestinian people believe in the revival of this free entity, which is nonsubservient, non-subjugated, and non-oriented.(46)

Filastinuna also advocated the thesis that armed struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine, and that the slogan "Arab unity is the way to Palestine" should be replaced by the formulation "Palestine is the road to Arab unity."(47)

These views were eventually spelled out in a short syllogism which defined Fatah's goals:

(1) Revolutionary violence is the only way to liberate this homeland.
(2) This violence must be exercised by the popular masses.
(3) This revolutionary violence has as its goal the liquidation of the Zionist identity in all the occupied territory of Palestine, in its political, economic, and military forms.
(4) This revolutionary action must be independent of any control by parties or states.
(5) This revolutionary action will be of long duration.
(6) This revolution is Palestinian in origin and Arab in development.(48)

These aims were spelled out in greater detail by the Palestine National Council when it met in Cairo in July 1968, and have remained more or less unchanged since then.(49)

Al-'Asifah, Fatah's military arm, was organized about five years later, although some Fatah sources trace its origins to the Gaza commandos. The creation of al-'Asifah coincides with a period of extensive Syrian influence on Fatah, and the Syrians are generally considered to be the prime movers behind the development of Fatah's military capability. More specifically, Syrian military intelligence began to organize, train, and plan missions for Fatah sometime in 1963. The head of Syrian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd al-Karim al-

Jundi, was directly involved in these operations.(50) This Syrian-Fatah cooperation was the result of a coalescence of interests. The Syrians wanted to realize their commitment to a war of popular liberation without directly risking Israeli reprisals. Fatah, on the other hand, wanted a jumping-off point for raids into Israel.(51) But even here, Syrian factionalism was worked into the pattern of support for Fatah. Al-Jundi's predecessor as head of intelligence, Ahmad Suwaydani, was a consistent promoter of Fatah, and remained so after his appointment to chief of staff. Al-Jundi, by contrast, preferred to aid the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) led by Ahmad Jibril (see Chapter 5).

Much of the targeting was apparently done by the Syrians. Al-'Asifah's first attack, for example, was on the Israeli national water-carrier complex, a target militarily and ideologically suited to the Syrian thesis that these Israeli water-diversion projects were acts of aggression and should be dealt with as such. Some operational intelligence was supplied by members of al-'Ard, an organization composed of Palestinians living in Israel.(52) The name al-'Asifah ("the Storm") was chosen as the result of a compromise within Fatah leadership over the issue of whether to start military operations or not. The majority, including 'Arafat, felt that some action should be begun at once. Others felt that Fatah was still too weak to risk both Israeli and possibly Arab reprisals as a consequence of guerrilla attacks. The majority carried the day, but adopted the practice of identifying its guerrillas as members of al-'Asifah forces to avoid open links with Fatah.(53)

Membership of al-'Asifah was limited to Palestinians between 20 and 30 years of age. Each was required to take an oath that he would: be on alert 24 hours a day; maintain the organization's secrecy; and never discuss a mission with anyone. To keep this strict secrecy intact, al-'Asifah was organized as a series of cells, with only the cell leader having contact with one member of the next higher echelon.(54) After the June war, and especially after al-Karamah, these rigid requirements were relaxed to some extent to facilitate a rapid increase in size.

Originally, the numbers involved in both Fatah and al-'Asifah were extremely small. According to al-Qaddumi, al-'Asifah had only 26 men when it began operations in January 1965.(55) Later that year, its strength had risen to an estimated 200 commandos,(56) and by late 1966 the number had risen to around 500.(57) The membership remained relatively stable at this figure prior to the battle of al-Karamah. According to the late 'Ali Hasan Salamah, there were only 722 men in Fatah at that time. Afterwards, however, the membership rose dramatically by "thousands of combatants, in imposing itself on the Arab world, in obliging Israel to take account of its existence, in beginning to mobilize the Palestinian people."(58)

Published estimates of current Fatah strength vary greatly from source to source. Among those contained in Western sources, a July 1970 estimate cited in Fortune gave a maximum of 25,000 armed men, of whom perhaps 10,000 were trained guerrillas and the rest militia. This would have probably amounted to about 60 to 70 percent of the total for the guerrillas.(59) The following month, the Christian Science

Monitor gave a figure of 15,000 men.(60) Four years later, Time published a figure of 6,700.(61) The 25,000 figure was probably too high at the time, and more than likely was an estimate of the Resistance as a whole. The 6,700 estimate by contrast reflected the precipitous decline in membership as a consequence of the Jordanian civil war. A reasonable figure would be somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000, with the lower Time figure representing a relatively stable permanent membership. Some Arab world sources, circa 1980, give an estimate of 10,000 to 12,000 for 'Asifah forces, with another 15,000 militia mobilizable within 48 hours. However, it should be noted that not all of Fatah's members are combatants; probably only 20 to 30 percent are actually engaged in military operations. The rest are either in training or in various noncombat support activities.

Part of the problem in regard to numerical estimates (aside from that of simply getting any data at all) is that of definition. Fatah members participate in the organization's activities in varying degrees, from sporadic contributions of money, to full-time work in Fatah offices, to actual combat. Moreover, there appears to be considerable flux in the individual makeup of the membership (although the numerical totals may stay the same). There is a core of leaders and followers which has remained constant over time, but at the lower levels of the organization there are individuals who join Fatah, stay for varying periods of time, and then move on. Apropos of this shifting membership, Faruq al-Qaddumi, when asked how many commandos were in Fatah, replied, perhaps ingenuously, but with an answer which indicated that Fatah itself was having troubles identifying its membership:

> Honestly, we don't know. I'd say several tens of thousands at the armed bases in Jordan and Lebanon. Then you'd have to add all those who are active in the occupied territories and those who help the struggle without actively participating. And those who will soon become involved. Among these, one should include the armed men at the refugee camps.(62)

Salah Khalaf, describing Fatah recruitment in the late 1960s, also alluded to the problems posed by Fatah's loose organization and lack of clearly defined categories of membership:

> Well, would you be surprised if I told you that there are no professional military men or commanders in Fatah? All combatants in Fatah at all levels were originally university students, engineers, patriotic scholars, or workers. We have no traditional militarists. From one point of view this was regarded by some as a shortcoming for which we were blamed. For example, our first dispute with some of our brothers in the PLO's Liberation Army concerned this very point. They used to ask us, "Where are the officers? The lieutenants? The captains? The majors?" etc. We would say to them that we are waging a war of liberation, and that the men and the leaders are learning how to make war by actually making war.(63)

Fatah organization, as it has evolved, is based on a combination of cells and committees. This organizational pattern has become the more or less standard model for other commando groups, whose own organizational features replicate those of Fatah. At the base is a system of cells (the first were created in Kuwayt and West Germany) – cells in all refugee camps, in universities (including universities abroad with Arab student populations), and among workers. The cells are then linked to the next higher echelon by an infrastructure of refugee, student, and worker committees. At the top or regional level (a region is a geographical area) is the regional committee which controls all activities within its area. Regions are, in effect, self-contained, and duplicate all the political, military information, and social functions found in the parent structure. Regional commanders generally combine political and military authority in their offices.(64)

Superimposed on this regional structure are a series of coordinating bodies. In theory, the supreme authority of Fatah flows from the National Congress which elects the Central Committee to act as its executive. In practice, the Central Committee is made up of both elected and appointed members. It functions as the chief policy-making and coordinating body, and elects from its membership the personnel who make up the General Command of the al-'Asifah Forces.(65)

Immediately below the Central Committee is the Revolutionary Council. Elected at the same time as the Central Committee, the council includes representatives from regional committees and from the Military Council (a body with an unspecified number of members, whose function is to coordinate military policy). The Revolutionary Council is supposed to operate as a sort of politburo, discussing matters put before it by the Central Committee. It is usually by-passed, however, and deals only with extraordinary matters which require a greater degree of organizational consensus.

The executive is divided into a number of departments, both regional and functional. Among the regional units are the Western sector (geographically pre-1948 Palestine), and the Jordanian Affairs department. Fatah units elsewhere are coordinated by the Foreign Relations Department. Functionally, there are departments of Information, Intelligence, Mobilization and Organization, Supply and Finance.(66)

INTERNAL POLITICS

The organizational structure just described bears a strong resemblance to that of both the PLO and the Algerian FLN. This is so partially because the FLN provided the model for both Fatah and the PLO, and partially because the problems of coalition building and legitimatizing a leadership were similar for all three organizations. As with the PLO, Fatah leaders have had to engage in a coalition strategy based on achieving a minimal consensus. Although Fatah leaders would clearly like to create a more hierarchical organizational structure, the con-

straints under which they have had to operate have limited any success. The price for putting together any form of coalition has been that of according considerable autonomy to different ideological factions or regional interests – institutionalizing, in effect, clique politics.

At the same time, some of this decentralization has been the product of the tactical environment in which Fatah operates. The requirements of guerrilla war alone would require the creation of organizational units able to function with a minimum of central direction. The need for secrecy and mobility necessitates a set of operational units, relatively self-contained, able to act and sustain themselves independently of each other (an organizational imperative which was carried to its logical conclusion in the modus operandi of the BSO).

Equally, this decentralization enabled Fatah to carry out its goal of absorbing all segments of the Palestinian population. Fatah, in implementing its programs of mobilizing Palestinians, was able to establish branches in various countries, both Arab and non-Arab, where Palestinians or people of Palestinian descent lived. Within a year of al-Karamah, there were said to be members of Fatah in some 80 countries, from Asia and Africa to South and North America.(67) However, the cost of being able to expand rapidly, as Fatah did after the battle of al-Karamah, has been that of the loss of its original organizational cohesiveness. Prior to al-Karamah, in 1967, Fatah leadership was characterized by political homogeneity and an exclusive focus on the military task of confronting the Israelis. By August 1968, the leadership was split over the issue of how to deal with Jordan. And by October of that year, following a Fatah Congress (held in September) there were vocal criticisms of 'Arafat's leadership. More specifically, charges that 'Arafat had utilized the elections of Central Committee members to maintain himself in power reportedly split Fatah leadership into right, left, and center.(68) These differences were fought out with intense emotion. By late 1971 there were reports of at least one attempt on 'Arafat's life connected with internal Fatah opposition to his leadership.

The context of organizational expansion and subsequent structural discontinuity provided the setting for intra-Fatah politics. Basically, several distinct clusters of interests have emerged. First, at the level of the top leadership, several points of view have appeared with regard to Fatah's appropriate organizational strategy in dealing with its Arab and international environment. These are organized around a number of Fatah's original founders, and find support in a number of interested Arab establishments. Second, there are cliques based on the figures of second-echelon leaders, cliques oriented to, and in some cases actively sponsored by, various Arab governments. Third, there appears to be a growing generational cleavage, with younger members of Fatah increasingly restive over what they see as excessive domination of the organization by its "historic" (and by definition, older) leaders. The upshot is an extremely complex set of both shifting and interlocking political positions and alliances. The alliances seem to be fairly pragmatic and limited in nature, and they shift according to the issue at hand.(69)

With the growth of Fatah and its takeover of the PLO, the issue of how to relate to Arab governments assumed preeminence. The organizational survival of Fatah depended on whether it could acquire needed financial and other support. The major sources of this support were obviously Arab governments, but more particularly the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and the Trucial Shaykhdoms (United Arab Emirates). In addition, there was the factor of so-called independent Palestinians – Palestinians who were not affiliated with any of the Resistance organizations, but who nevertheless, by virtue of their wealth or position, were able to play a significant role in either fund-raising or public-relations activities.

Alternatively, there were a number of Arab governments and political parties who, while not having the financial weight of the Arabian Peninsula states, could provide pan-Arab and even international linkages. These, in theory at least, could either exert direct government-to-government pressure in support of policies favorable to the resistance, or, in the case of the parties, could generate local domestic opposition to any government moves against the fida'iyin.

Since the financial resources generally came from the right and the political linkages from the left, the issue separated out as basically a right-left confrontation. Within Fatah the rightist position was usually attributed to a faction headed by the al-Hasan brothers. These two, along with the late Kamal 'Udwan and Yusuf al-Najjar (although the latter were probably more pragmatic than ideological about political ties), generally took the position that Fatah should pursue a pragmatic policy in dealing with Arab regimes – it should avoid "classifying" regimes into categories of friends and enemies, and should especially strive to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The left is equally identified with Salah Khalaf, Nimr Salih, and perhaps even more to the left, Hamdan 'Ashur, one-time Fatah representative in Lebanon. Also included with the left are the followers of the late Abu 'Ali Iyad (no relation to Khalaf) in Jordan; these were later to make up the nucleus of the BSO. These argued that Fatah should deepen its relations with leftists throughout the Arab world. The slogan of noninterference, while tactically correct, was strategically wrong in that it deprived Fatah of the ability to mobilize popular support. This led to "regionalism" and isolation. Because of this, the regime in Jordan had been able to split Fatah off from its natural allies, and thus deal with Fatah piecemeal. Political activities should therefore take precedence over military considerations.

Both right and left were held together in Fatah by a centrist group, men concerned predominantly with Fatah's survival as an organization. Among these were 'Arafat, the late Kamal Nasir, al-Wazir, and al-Qaddumi. These men were able to use their organizational control of Fatah, to some extent their ability to enlist the aid of the PLA, and the considerable prestige of 'Arafat, to mediate between the two factions. Moreover, they were aided by the fact that the right and left were but loose coalitions that tended to split off and recombine in response to political changes in the external Arab environment.(70)

Several specific policy issues divided the left and the right: whether or not to attempt a reconciliation with King Husayn; whether to attempt to control BSO activities; and later, whether to accommodate Fatah to Egyptian/Saudi peace making efforts. All of these issues involved overlapping consequences and ramifications, both organizationally and in terms of larger Fatah relations with other commando groups and ultimately with the Arab world itself.

The Jordanian reconciliation was pushed by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia almost immediately after the fighting was brought to an end. (In addition, the Egyptians began advocating the creation of a Palestinian government-in-exile.) The joint mediation effort was the consequence of a rapprochement between Egypt and the Saudis made possible by newly installed Egyptian President al-Sadat's ('Abd al-Nasir died in September 1970) political moderation and religious conservatism. The goals of this coalition were to stabilize the area, particularly in terms of reducing the possibility that the Palestinians (and Libyans) might provoke an Israeli preemptive strike, and to link Arab military and economic power in a strategy that had a chance of altering the post-1967 stalemate.

Khalid al-Hasan and his followers argued that Fatah should accommodate itself to this new axis. The Resistance should accept that fait accompli of Egyptian-Saudi policies and attempt to maneuver within this framework (an argument that was pressed in a slightly different context by al-Sa'iqah's Zuhayr Muhsin in 1973, and by Fatah conservatives in May 1974). Abu Iyad and the left opposed this by reasserting their objections to any dealings with Husayn, and that any Arab coalition which Fatah should deal with ought to be made up of radical states – principally Syria and Iraq.(71)

The problem of Jordan was fought out in a series of Fatah Central Committee meetings (also PNC meetings). At one point, it was brought to an explosive pitch by the activities of Khalid al-Hasan, who apparently began negotiating with the Jordanians without any formal Fatah approval. When these attempts were abandoned in the face of leftist opposition (Khalid was also ejected from the PLO Central Committee), a second attempt was made, this time in the form of a proposed Palestine conference which would include West Bank leaders as well as commando figures. (The conference was also to deal with the political implications of the Israeli plan to hold elections in the West Bank.) Under intense left-wing pressure, any ideas about negotiating with the Jordanians were dropped, and the conference adjourned with a statement calling for a proposed national Jordanian front.(72) Although the PLO was forced into an accommodation of sorts with the Jordanians in September 1973, relations between the two remained tense. With the possibility of some peace negotiations however, these hostilities (and their intra-Fatah effect) probably increased, especially so, when the idea of a PLP/Jordan rapprochement was resurrected in early 1980, now in the context of a joint West Bank-Jordanian political entity.

Left and right are also at odds over the desirability of international terrorist operations. After the March 1, 1973 Khartum attack, the right

vigorously condemned such acts on the grounds that they endangered Fatah resources by alienating Saudi Arabia. The left also disapproved, but for quite different reasons. The Khartum action had cost the resistance any goodwill that it might have accrued as the result of the Israeli shooting down of a Libyan airliner in February 1973. Here the concern was not with alienating conservative Arab states, but with alienating U.S. liberals.

These major, and to some extent permanent, divisions in Fatah's top leadership are complicated by a shifting pattern of bargaining relationships that grew out of Fatah's decentralized organizational structure. While Fatah's FLN-like structure had permitted it both to expand very rapidly and to absorb a number of smaller groups (especially after 1970), it also allowed local leaders to build up power bases independent of the central leadership. In this sense, Fatah has a control problem similar to that faced by the FLN when it had to deal with local wilayah commanders. In addition, groups that originally co-opted into Fatah appear to have retained their organizational integrity. The PSF, for example, which was said to have merged with Fatah in 1971, broke off in 1973. Other groups, such as AGLP, seem to be operating as special-interest lobbies (in this case a pro-Egyptian lobby) within Fatah. In this connection, there are a number of such lobbies: a pro-Egyptian group, a pro-Iraqi group, and a pro-Saudi group, whose partisans receive varying amounts of outside support. One such faction, the pro-Iraqi group led by Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) was able to defy Fatah leadership from its sanctuary in Baghdad, and to form in effect a rump Fatah/BSO organization.(73)

At least two local commanders have mounted what are, in effect, mutinies. Hamdan 'Ashur utilized his position in Lebanon to build up a private army. With internal support from the Fatah left and external support from Syria, he was able to function as a warlord of sorts in the Biqa' valley. He and his men were only marginally subdued after considerable fighting in October 1972.(74) At the same time, an unconnected revolt broke out, led by the Fatah military commander for eastern Lebanon, Abu Yusuf al-Kayid. Here too, the revolt was ultimately put down. Overall military commander for Lebanon, 'Atallah 'Atallah was ordered in to capture the rebels; after a period of inconclusive fighting, al-Kayid was persuaded to transfer to Fatah's Algerian office.(75)

The politics surrounding these revolts was extraordinarily complex, and illustrates the bargaining and coalition-forming pattern within Fatah. 'Ashur, for example, was part of the left, and therefore objected to any sort of compromise vis-a-vis Jordan. More specifically, he had accused 'Arafat of preparing to assent to the creation of a Palestinian government-in-exile, and of following a policy of retreat. Yet at the same time, 'Ashur was said to be receiving political assistance from the leader of the right, Khalid al-Hasan, who joined with 'Ashur in opposing 'Arafat. Al-Hasan's opposition to 'Arafat was based, exotically enough, on the fact that 'Arafat seemed to have given in to the left!(76)

The whole problem of organizational control was made more complex (if possible) by a generation gap, a gap that ultimately led to the creation of the BSO as a temporizing measure. As early as 1971, a group of younger Fatah members, styling themselves the "Free Officers of al-'Asifah Forces," distributed communiques attacking the "historic" leadership as having lost touch with the bulk of Fatah members. In addition, 'Arafat himself was accused of creating a "cult of personality" around himself.(77) This revolt intensified following 1971, and seems to have been connected with the left wing and its leaders. Even here, however, the political linkages are not clear. Hani al-Hasan, for example, claimed at one point to speak for the BSO, a claim that seems out of character given his reputation as a right-winger and the BSO's reputation as a leftwing organization.

In the period following the October 1973 war, these divisions and especially the questioning of 'Arafat's leadership intensified. There were a number of policy issues involved: what sort of political strategy Fatah and the Resistance should follow in connection with Egyptian/Saudi peace moves; how the Resistance should operate militarily in the post-October situation (should it opt for regular guerrilla tactics or continue international terrorism); what would be the character of Palestinian territorial demands, assuming some sort of Palestinian state was to be negotiated. These questions split the Resistance as a whole, and they also split Fatah as a separate organization.

Central to the divisions that wracked (and continue to wrack) Fatah was the intense debate over the relatively "soft line" chosen by 'Arafat. On all of these issues, 'Arafat moved in the direction of policies designed to preserve the organizational existence of the PLO and Fatah. On the question of peace settlements, 'Arafat sent out a consistent stream of signals and trial balloons indicating at least some willingness to negotiate.(78) On the question of a Palestinian "entity," Fatah along with several other groups published a working paper which argued for the acceptance of such an entity. On the issue of international terrorism, 'Arafat ordered a stoppage of terrorist operations and a subsequent crackdown on dissident terrorists. The thrust of all of these moves taken together was not a sudden moderation of policy goals (as some apologists for the Resistance have argued); rather it was an extension of the pragmatic approach that characterized 'Arafat's leadership from the beginning.

These divisions deepened in late 1976 and 1977, as reports of a shake-up within Fatah began to circulate. In particular, a "self-criticism" campaign was said to have been initiated by 'Arafat, a campaign whose named targets were, significantly enough, al-Qaddumi and the Fatah representatives in London (Sa'id Hammami) and Paris ('Izz al-Din Qalaq). Reading between the lines, this was apparently an attempt by 'Arafat to assuage opposition to his policies of negotiation, since London and Paris were the sites of Palestinian/Israeli contacts, and Hammami especially was outspoken in his insistence that some form of negotiated settlement between the PLO and Israel was necessary.(79)

Nevertheless, these policies served to further divide Fatah, especially in the wake of the disastrous involvement in the Lebanese civil war. The loss of prestige, not only for Fatah but for the Resistance as a whole, was so great following the Syrian intervention that many Resistance organizations were split again as they had been in the aftermath of the Jordanian civil war. In Fatah's case, this loss was intensified by the acquiescence in, first, the Syrian suppression of the Resistance, and second, the follow-on control exercised by the Arab Deterrence Force. In this context, 'Arafat's acceptance of the terms of the Shatura Agreement (June 1977) which called for a series of restrictions on Fida'iyin forces in Lebanon was the catalyst which completely split Fatah's leadership. At least five factions vied for control of the organization: (a) the moderates, consisting of 'Arafat, al-Wazir and most of the military council, along with the al-Hasan brothers, Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid, and others representing a conservative, pro-Saudi, pro-Egyptian and (in some cases) pro-Syrian orientation; (b) the left, consisting of Salah Khalaf, who was said to have created his own "army" within Fatah; (c) Nimr Salih and some BSO members (supported by Libya); (d) Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah and members of the Revolutionary Council; and (e) Sabri al-Banna and a pro-Iraqi faction.(80)

In the in-fighting which ensued, a number of linkages developed between these factions: Da'ud's group linked up with al-Banna's Baghdad-based following. This mini-coalition was in turn supported by Khalaf and Nimr Salih, while the conservatives around Khalid al-Hasan tended to move toward a stance independent of that of the 'Arafat group (or "Arafat Gang," as its opponents styled it). Aside from tactics, the issues were complex: the inter-Arab orientation of Fatah between the emergent Steadfastness Front on one hand or the Arab Entente on the other; Fatah (and PLO) positions on contacts with the Israelis; and the proper military tactics to be followed.(81)

Particularly virulent opposition came from the pro-Iraqi faction, now centered around Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah, but drawing its main support from Abu Nidal's Baghdad-based group; and from Salah Khalaf's leftist faction. Khalaf extended his original criticism of 'Arafat's policies, arguing that 'Arafat had "devitalized" the Resistance and that he had become "too submissive" to surrounding Arab governments (Syria in particular). The only solution, according to Khalaf, was to completely restructure the PLO, to end its bureaucratic impetus and reassert its original revolutionary drive.(82)

Two issues, that of recognition of Israel and that of accepting a cease-fire in Lebanon, ultimately split Fatah leadership to the point of open conflict. The question of recognizing Israel was brought to the fore by what appeared to be a series of trial balloons floated by PLO spokesmen in Europe and in the UN delegation in New York. Foremost among these was Sa'id Hammami, PLO London representative, who had for some time openly and consistently advocated a policy of co-existence with and recognition of Israel. Hammami was one of the major points of contact (along with Isam Sartawi and 'Izz al-Din Qalaq)

between the Resistance and Israeli citizens. These contacts were, of course, violently opposed by the Rejection Front. Hammami was killed in London in January 1978, allegedly by Abu Nidal's men, an assassination which set off a "spook war" within the Resistance itself (see Chapter 10).

However, both PLO Paris representative al-Qalaq and UN delegation head Zuhdi al-Tarazi continued to press for some modus vivendi with Israel. In May 1978 both apparently issued statements to the effect that the PLO was prepared to recognize the de facto existence of Israel.(83) These statements created a storm within the Resistance as a whole and Fatah in particular. Abu Hatim of Fatah rejected the statements out of hand:

> What has been stated by al-Tarazi and al-Qalaq does not represent Fatah's position and policy, which emanate from Fatah's principles, methods and goals that the movement has defined from its inception. . . . These statements do not represent the positions and policy of the PLO, which emanate from the PLO's national charter and from the resolutions of its national councils.(84)

Al-Qaddumi was able to smooth things over temporarily by arguing that the statements had been misinterpreted, or not made at all. Nevertheless, the division was bitter. Abu Da'ud, after his release from Fatah arrest, uttered this threat:

> One day this statement was issued, a statement that "the power structure" proposed recognition of Israel. Quickly the parrots of "the power structure" got hold of this statement and it was repeated by al-Tarazi in New York and by al-Qalaq in Paris. But there is one fact that "the power structure" must not forget: if al-Sadat has behaved shamelessly on the Arab scene and has endorsed recognition of Israel, the question on the Palestinian scene is completely different. On the Palestinian scene no spokesman will be allowed to make any statements about recognition of Israel. Any spokesman who speaks on the subject will, I think, lose a great deal. He will lose the most important thing he has: he will lose his head.(85)

Qalaq was later murdered in Paris in August 1978, again allegedly by Abu Nidal's group. While tensions over a possible recognition of Israel were building up, the final blow came, insofar as 'Arafat's opponents were concerned, when 'Arafat promised UN Secretary General Waldheim that the PLO would declare a moratorium on raids into Israel from South Lebanon, following the Israeli intervention of March 15, 1978 (an intervention which, in turn, was triggered by the March 11 Fatah raid designed in part to restore Fatah's position within the Resistance and to end conflicts within Fatah's leadership. This agreement (April 18, 1978) was probably designed to facilitate both UN and U.S. pressure on

Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.(86) If so, it was a sophisticated political move.(87) However, it split Fatah into two opposing coalitions. Salah Khalaf, Nimr Salih, Majid Abu Shararah, Naji 'Allush, and Abu Da'ud, along with a number of military commanders, vehemently opposed the arrangement. 'Arafat, al-Wazir, Brig. Sa'd Sayil, Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid, and the rest of the military command were in favor of it. Al-Qaddumi vainly attempted to mediate between both sides.(88) The 'Arafat coalition finally won out, after persuading Nimr Salih to come over to their side.(89) Thus reinforced, the 'Arafat-al-Wazir faction moved to suppress the remaining dissidents, and to implement the agreement with Waldheim. Al-Wazir and 'Atallah 'Atallah were ordered to use force. Fighting broke out and a number were killed.(90) Some 123 guerrillas, self-styled "suicide squads," were arrested. Most of these were associated with Abu Da'ud, were members of Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council, and had been infiltrated into Lebanon from Iraq via Europe.(91)

The arrests were followed up by purges of Abu Da'ud and Naji 'Allush, among others.(92) ('Allush later took over Abu Nidal's organization in late April or early May 1979).(93) This was followed by a sweeping internal reorganization in May 1978, designed to ensure 'Arafat's control, basically a centralization of Fatah's military and security organizations under the military department headed by al-Wazir. Among other changes, 'Arafat, in his role as PLO Chairman, was given the powers of a military prosecutor in a newly established revolutionary military court. This court then ordered the execution of two arrested dissidents.(94) In July and August, Fatah units attacked a number of Rejection Front organizations, attacks apparently designed to extend 'Arafat's control over the Resistance as a whole.(95) However, considerable opposition to 'Arafat remains, and his ability to commit either Fatah or the PLO to any negotiated peace framework is subject to challenge both within and without Fatah.

4 Resistance Organizations II: The Arab Nationalist Cluster

If Fatah can be said to be the Palestinian representative of Islamic Arab nationalism, the Resistance groups which split off from ANM are representative of secular Arab nationalism.(1) More than that, the ANM is a diverse collection of strands of pan-Arab thought, an organizational umbrella under which a wide variety of viewpoints are loosely united.(2)

However, the importance of the ANM insofar as the Resistance is concerned is that it provides an infrastructure of political and logistic support which extends throughout the Arab world. Thus, specifically Palestinian organizations which are connected with the ANM, such as the PFLP, PDF, and PRF, can take advantage of these contacts. While ANM financial resources are not great, its political resources are, and these function to expand the scope of political and military action for otherwise small Palestinian groups. It is probably no accident, therefore, that the several fronts have tended to specialize in international terrorism, since their ANM contacts give them a ready-made source of external bases. On the other hand, the political weaknesses of the ANM – its lack of mass support – tend to reinforce the narrow political bases of the fronts.(3)

The ANM itself is a movement which at first glance appears extremely amorphous, one that is hard to pin down in terms of its concrete political clout (much like the Muslim Brethren). Nevertheless, it is clearly a factor in the politics of the area. It consists of a hard core of militants (but militants divided among themselves), organized in a weakly structured movement. Its politics are characterized by extreme ideological rigidity, and therefore extreme fissiparousness. Its several regional cadres are often at loggerheads, and are therefore vulnerable to attempts by Arab regimes to both penetrate its organization and split off competing factions. It is banned in almost all Arab countries, but appears to be a viable political force in most of these countries.

Its essential elitist and restrictive character was built into the organization from the first. The original leaders of the ANM came from highly educated university students. Along with Habash and Wadi Haddad, Ahmad al-Khatib (a Kuwayti) and Hani al-Hindi (a Syrian) were the original ANM nucleus.(4) Many of these early leaders are still active: Ahmad al-Khatib is the ANM head in Kuwayt; al-Hindi, along with Jihad Dahi, is head of the Syrian branch; Muhsin Ibrahim is the owner of the ANM's weekly in Beirut, al-Hurriyah 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il led the ANM in South Yemen; and both Habash and Haddad for a time led the ANM in Jordan. Later the ANM spread to other universities, notably in Baghdad and Damascus. However, its recruitment base did not change. It attracted only a small stratum of doctors, lawyers, and technocrats, and consistently failed to build any sort of popular following.(5)

ANM organizational structure reflected this limited recruitment. Essentially it was a cadre party, organized along the lines of the older Ba'th Party, a series of regional branches, only weakly linked, each headed by a local leadership in each Arab country. The whole structure was then capped at the top by a higher, pan-Arab leadership. Like the Ba'th, this decentralized structure institutionalized clique-type politics. There was no defined structure of authority, no defined scope of decision making, no formal chains of command or bureaucratic hierarchy. The consequence was the lack of organizational control, the extension of informal linkages, and the politics of clientelism.(6)

In spite of this organizational hodgepodge, the ANM succeeded in extending its branches into a number of Arab states; among them, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwayt, and the Arabian Peninsula states.(7) Part of this success was due to the vagueness of ANM ideology (but a vagueness that was tenaciously defended in practice). As Kazziha points out, the organizational imperative for holding together such a fragile structure of cadres was the avoidance of ideologically generated conflict. The ANM, in this sense, suffered from much the same problem as Fatah, and its ideology, although much to Fatah's left in content, paralleled Fatah's deliberate imprecision(8) but with the reverse effect on its organizational integration.

Its basic ideological tenet was the argument that Arab unity must be achieved at all costs. This unity was necessary for two quite distinct reasons. On one hand, unity was required to defeat Israel (and unlike some later, specifically Palestinian thought, the ANM did not distinguish between Zionism and Judaism).(9) On the other hand, unity was the mechanism by which the Arab nation could finally be brought back into existence. But unity was blocked by a variety of opponents. Existing political and economic divisions between Arab nations were caused by Zionism, imperialism, and the vested interests of ruling elites.

Therefore, from the outset, the ANM tended to be hostile toward conservative Arab regimes although it approved of various conservatively oriented unity attempts – such as a proposed Syrian-Iraqi union in 1954 and the Jordanian-Iraqi Hashemite Federation of 1958. But while

it opposed conservative groups, it also rejected Communism (although engaging in tactically necessitated cooperation with Communist parties at different times). Here the ANM noted that a basic contradiction existed between Communism with its "class" orientation and Arab nationalism which was "nation" oriented. Moreover, the local Communist parties were seen as pawns of the USSR and historically subservient to Soviet interests in the Middle East.

Externally, however, the very vagueness of the ANM ideology allowed it to create working alliances with a number of diverse political groups (much as the PFLP operates currently). In this case, the ANM apparently received aid from a variety of sources. In Syria, prior to 1958, it was aided by the head of Syrian intelligence, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj. In the Arabian Peninsula, the ANM combined forces with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) – later shortened to PFLO, Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman). Elsewhere, the Egyptians seem to have given the ANM considerable support in the form of covert assistance, passports, and privileged treatment for ANM leaders. In one instance, Habash was said to have conferred personally with 'Abd al-Nasir concerning the wisdom of beginning military operations against Israel in 1966 (Nasir advised Habash to wait). And when the ANM's military grouping did go into action, it received operational intelligence from yet another source, al-'Ard.(10)

Internally, however, the lack of a defined ideology contributed to rather than ameliorated intraorganizational conflict. And here the differences between the ANM (and its offshoots) and Fatah suggest an explanation: Fatah has a relatively cohesive leadership; ideological ambiguity can be utilized by this leadership for its own, centrally directed purposes. The ANM, on the other hand, lacked just this central direction. Here, an undefined ideology functioned to permit, even encourage, divisive political stances. Clearly, if there were no defined organizational and ideological parameters – and no strong leadership – there could be no standards of organizational discipline nor means to enforce them.

Indeed, Mertz goes much further and argues that not only was the lack of leadership cohesion a factor, but the very quality of the leadership itself contributed to the ANM's weakness. In particular, he asserts that ANM leadership was recruited mainly from middle-class intellectuals; men who were lacking in the visionary and charismatic qualities that characterized the Ba'th's Michel Aflaq or the SNSP's Anton Sa'adah. Even the ANM's leading intellectual spokesmen such as Muhsin Ibrahim, al-Hakim Darwaza, or the late Ghassan Kanafani were "chroniclers rather than philosophers." As a result, the ANM failed to develop any organizational dynamics, and its national chapters tended to drift along without cohesive policy.(11)

This lack of organizational integration was one of the factors leading to the creation of several specifically Palestinian organizations, the PFLP and its offshoots. The relationship of the PFLP to the ANM is in some ways parallel to that between Fatah and the Muslim Brethren.

The leaderships of both the PFLP and Fatah were members of the ANM and the Brethren prior to organization of their own groups. In addition, both PFLP and Fatah organizational structure and ideological policy are shaped by those of their predecessors.(12) But the similarities end there. Where Fatah's leadership was more or less collectively identified with the Brethren, the PFLP leadership included the founders and dominating figures in the ANM.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)

The PFLP is a major organizational alternative to Fatah within the Resistance movement. It is the leader of the Rejection Front. Should the PLO split up or Fatah lose its preeminence, the PFLP would emerge as the strongest claimant to leadership of the Palestinians. The PFLP is a middle-sized group, about 3,000-plus men (comparable to al-Sa'iqah in numbers), but it lacks the resources of either al-Sa'iqah or Fatah. The PFLP has opted for a strategy of international terrorism externally, and opposition to Fatah internally within the Resistance movement.

Doctrinally, the PFLP rejects Fatah's somewhat undefined nationalist approach to the Palestine issue (see Chapter 7) in favor of a class-oriented analysis. Politically, it eschews any attempt to reach a compromise solution; that is, some form of Palestinian state or entity suggested by Fatah. Additionally, and in sharp contrast to Fatah, the PFLP has stressed a thoroughgoing secularism and antitraditionalism. It opposes the role of religion in Arab society and espouses a theory of revolutionary change, especially change in traditional social customs.

These wide-ranging differences are perhaps the tip of much more fundamental sociological differences in leadership composition and recruitment base. Not only are there distinct differences in social origins of their respective leaderships – Fatah's being Muslim, the PFLP's being more heavily Christian(13) – but their educational and career patterns also differ. Fatah's leadership was educated in Egypt, an indigenously Muslim/Arab political environment; the PFLP's was educated in the Levant, a much more cosmopolitan and acculturated environment. In terms of recruitment, Fatah appears to draw from rural populations, the PFLP from urban centers. Where Fatah recruits tend to have a relatively low level of education, PFLP cadres tend to be overrepresentative of professionals, teachers, doctors, lawyers, and engineers, many of whom were educated in Europe or the United States.

Some of these differences merely reflect larger sociological differences between middle and lower classes, or between Muslims and Christians. By and large, middle-class and Christian populations tend to be better educated, more urban, and more concentrated in business and the professions than their lower-class and/or Muslim counterparts. However, it also reflects a self-conscious organizational strategy on the part of the PFLP. Instead of attempting to attract the largest number

of possible recruits, the PFLP has instead striven for "quality" – small numbers of highly trained and fanatically dedicated members. This emphasis on quality is carried over into the PFLP's ideology and its efforts to create an organizational infrastructure.(14)

In its revolutionary ideological attitude and its stress on the pan-Arab characters of its goals, the PFLP is an intellectual heir to the original Christian Arab nationalists of the Levant. As such, it is the natural political enemy of the Ba'th party, especially the Syrian version of the Ba'th. Both the PFLP (including its parent organization, the Arab Nationalist Movement) and the Ba'th are basically minority nationalist ideologies: The ANM/PFLP stem from a Christian Arab base; the Syrian Ba'th from a Shi'a Muslim Arab base. Both attempt to recruit from the same sociological base – minority groups within the Arab world or relatively secularized Sunni Muslims. As a consequence, both are extremely concerned with their legitimacy in the eyes of the larger Sunni Muslim community, and both are extremely sensitive to charges that they do not represent the major stream of Arab/Islamic political thought. And equally, they are politically hostile to one another. The Syrians arrested and imprisoned Habash from March until November 1968, when he was released by PFLP commandos. Habash returned the favor later by allegedly cooperating with the ACO which attacked Syrian businesses. In addition, the PFLP has been allied with the Ba'th faction in Iraq, chief rival to the Syrian Ba'th for control of the party.

Partially because of this political marginality, partially because of the doctrinaire nature of ANM/PFLP politics themselves, PFLP leadership has been extremely schismatic. Unlike Fatah leadership which has held together in spite of political and personal differences, PFLP leadership has shown a marked tendency to splinter into a series of personal followings. At least six separate groups have broken away from the PFLP: the General Commands A and B, the PDF, the Victory Battalions, POLP, and the PRF. This schismatic tendency was in effect institutionalized in the PFLP from the beginning. Where Fatah was created sui generis, the PFLP came into being as the result of (a) the evolution of a special unit within an existing organization – the ANM (which was itself operationally decentralized into politically independent cadres), and (b) a coalition of previously existing groups, each with its own leadership structure and resource base.

George Habash and Wadi' Haddad

In essence, however, the PFLP has been the product of two men, George Habash and Wadi' Haddad. Although there are others involved, the PFLP has been dominated by these two figures, though in quite different ways. Habash has become one of the most articulate spokesmen for a secularist and Marxist alternative to Fatah ideology. Haddad, before his death in March 1978, was one of the architects of an international terrorist organization that liked Palestinian cadres with other Asian and European groups.(15)

George Habash

George Habash was born in Lydda in 1926 to a Greek Orthodox Christian, middle-class family (his father was a wealthy merchant). He received primary education at the Greek Orthodox School in Jaffa. As a youth he was noted for his participation in school plays and for his singing voice. Unlike some other resistance leaders, Habash was not politically active as a youth. Until he was twenty or twenty-one, he had few interests outside of his studies. He went to school in Jerusalem at the Greek Orthodox College during the last days of the Mandate, and observed the tactics of both the Stern gang and Irgun Zvai Leumi, tactics which, to some extent, he has incorporated into the PFLP's own tactics. Habash continued his education at the American University of Beirut, studying medicine. There Habash was considered one of the most brilliant students in the medical school. While at the AUB, Habash became president of al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa (the Firm Tie), a student political club which had origins in nationalist student groups as early as 1936.(16) The al-'Urwah group eventually became one of the main sources of recruitment for the ANM.

In 1946 Habash interrupted his studies and hurriedly returned to Lydda, where he accompanied a column of refugees as part of a medical team in 1948. As a result of this experience, Habash determined to devote himself to working for the return of the Arabs to Palestine: "I was absorbed by sports and student life then . . . Then we suffered a profound shock, seeing people driven out by force. The scenes at the time were indescribable . . . people were shot in the streets."(17) Upon his return to the AUB, Habash associated with other young men who had been scarred by the 1948 war and who were consumed with the idea of revenge, revenge on Britain and those Arab leaders who were responsible for the defeat in Palestine.

Habash appears to have believed that all that was necessary to rectify things was to assassinate the leaders in question. As a consequence, he was not interested in forming any political organization, but rather believed that armed violence alone was sufficient. With this is mind, he organized the Kata'ib al-Fida'i, a clandestine group structured along the lines of the earlier proto-fascist Egyptian group, Misr al-Fatat. The Kata'ib engaged in considerable plotting to kidnap various Iraqi, Syrian, and Jordanian officials (including, it is said, King Abdullah, Glubb Pasha, Nuri al-Sa'id and Adib al-Shishakli), and it apparently did assassinate a British official in Damascus.(18)

Habash, however, left the Kata'ib to form yet another organization, still secret and terrorist, but more political in nature, the Committee for Resisting Peace with Israel.(19) The committee published a periodical, al-Tha'r ("Revenge"), and became popularly identified with that name. Among its members were men who were later to create the PFLP: Habash, Wadi' Haddad, Ahmad al-Yamani, and Abd al-Karim Hamad (Abu Adnan). These men became extremely active in organizing the refugee camps.(20) Al-Tha'r remained in operation for about two years, roughly from 1952 to 1954, and its activities extended to Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

Sometime in 1952, Habash and Wadi' Haddad went to Amman where they opened a clinic (dubbed the "Peoples' Clinic") which gave free medical treatment to refugee camp dwellers. While in Amman, Habash and Haddad actively engaged in anti-regime activities, joining forces with both Palestinians and Jordanians, notably (among the Jordanians) Sulayman al-Nabulsi, head of a leftist coalition, the National Front. In addition, Habash started a small weekly, al-Ra'y ("The Opinion") which attacked Jordan's dependence on British military and economic aid.(21) Through their Jordanian activities, Habash and Haddad were able to recruit a number of adherents to what was to become the Arab Nationalist Movement. By 1955 recruitment had proceeded to such an extent that Habash was able to formally turn al-Tha'r into a full-fledged political party, the ANM. The slogan of the new party was to be "Unity, Liberation, Revenge," a motto which indicated its commitment to direct political action.(22) For their activities in this regard, Habash was forced to flee Jordan and Haddad was temporarily imprisoned. Habash and Haddad remained with the ANM until December 1967, when they joined with others in creating the PFLP.

This gradual transformation from leading purely political organizations to leading one of the more aggressive guerrilla organizations is paralleled by a change in Habash's ideological orientation. From a relatively apolitical student in the 1940s, he was galvanized into political awareness by the events of 1948. His first reaction was to move in a basically right-wing direction, emulating right-wing groups and stressing the primacy of revenge (a traditional Arab notion) and pragmatic direct action. Interestingly, Habash is still being accused of being a right-winger by some of his opponents within and without the ANM structure.(23) Still later, Habash gravitated toward the relatively conservative nationalism of the early Nasirists. At that time, he believed that the return to Palestine must be indissolubly linked with a "leftist" revolutionary movement operating against "reactionary" forces throughout the Arab world.

He even accepted the Nasirist formula that Arab unity must precede the liberation of Palestine, and that resolving social issues would merely postpone this unity. Therefore, Habvash, and the early ANM, argued that any ideological considerations should give way to building a coalition of nationalist forces. When Syria and Egypt united to form the UAR in 1958, Habash thought that this was the first step to such a coalition. But the break up of the UAR in 1961 dashed these hopes, and Habash began to be disillusioned with Nasirist theory. The 1967 defeat completed this disillusionment (along with an increasingly socialist trend of thinking inside the ANM itself), and Habash began to swing to the left. He reversed the Nasirist formula, and now argues that the liberation of Palestine must precede Arab unity and that a sweeping social revolution is necessary throughout the Arab world.

He has since taken to calling himself an "Asian-Marxist-Leninist" instead of first and foremost an Arab nationalist. (At one point, Habash was referred to as the "Mao" of the Resistance, and PFLP members took to wearing "Mao" buttons.) Advocating a complete transformation of Palestinian and Arab society, he now foresees:

> . . . a future state in Palestine . . . run after liberation on Marxist-Leninist principles. There will be a Marxist-Leninist party and the PFLP will be the leader of the revolution. The fight for the liberation of Palestine will take another 20 or 30 years, and after victory everything will be different. Not only will Palestine be free of Zionism, but Lebanon and Jordan will be free of reaction and Syria and Iraq of the petty bourgeoisie. They will have become truly Socialist and united; Palestine will be part of a Marxist-Leninist Arabia.(24)

Habash, however, is nowhere near being a Communist of the orthodox variety. He has in fact been critical of the USSR and Arab Communist parties, though his attitude towards these parties has become more friendly of late. Habash takes as his political models Communist China, North Vietnam, and Cuba.

In spite of this political shift, Habash has retained his uncompromising stance on the subject of Palestine. As late as 1975, he delivered this ultimatum to the PLO:

> We say it clearly: Let the PLO leadership halt its gradual fall into participation in the settlement. Let it halt its subservience to the Arab reactionary and capitulationist regimes. Let it stop its secret and unsecret contacts with the imperialist enemy . . . Let it take a nationalist, revolutionary stand that rejects the liquidationist settlement and relies on the masses and revolutionary force, then it will find us . . . under the banner of this nationalist revolutionary stand . . . But if the PLO leadership continues in its current capitulationist course, it will not only find us outside it, but also against it.(25)

In personal terms, Habash can be apparently a man of considerable wit and charm when he chooses. Chaliand thinks that he is clearly the foremost thinker in the Resistance. (PFLP publications do seem to have a precision and logic lacking in other publications.) But while Habash may be able to analyze and theorize brilliantly, his ability as organizational tactician is probably not as great as that of 'Arafat.(26) So far, Habash has failed to put together a coalition strong enough to counter the forces of 'Arafat. The Rejection Front is his major attempt to date, but its members are held together by a commonality of negative interests – a shared refusal to accept PLO/Fatah polity – rather than by any positive political goals of their own.

Habash, like other Resistance leaders, lives in secrecy, moving about frequently and concealing his whereabouts.(27) This secretiveness was intensified after a series of attempted and successful assassinations of Resistance leaders; for example, the assassination of Ghassan Kanafani, PFLP spokesman, and an attempt on Haddad, attempts allegedly made by both Israelis and Jordanians. PFLP sources claim, for example, that the Jordan government has put a price on Habash's head. Even so, Habash himself was very nearly the victim of an Israeli

hijack/kidnap operation on August 10, 1973: an MEA airliner on which Habash and two colleagues were booked was forced to land at an Israeli military airfield; Habash had changed his plans just prior to takeoff.(28)

Currently, Habash is in poor health. In 1973 he had a heart attack and went to the USSR for treatment. In addition, the assassination of Kanafani, a close friend, shook him badly. His ability to weather further challenges to his leadership may therefore be in question (although the same thing has been said about 'Arafat).

Wadi' Haddad

Wadi' Elias Haddad was born in Safad in 1929 or 1930 to a Greek Orthodox family. He spent much of his youth in Jerusalem, however. His family converted from Greek Orthodoxy to Presbyterianism, and Haddad's father became head of St. Lukes School in Haifa, where young Haddad received his early education. He was said to have been a rather shy student, but a good athlete. From Haifa he went to the AUB to study medicine, where he met and became friends with George Habash. Unlike Habash, Haddad was already politicized by the time he got to the AUB. Moreover, he was an enthusiastic Nasirist.

The two friends began their political association at the AUB, and it has continued until 1972 or 1973, when the two apparently disagreed over the issue of international terrorism as a PFLP strategy. Subsequently, Haddad has been identified with the PRF, but the extent of his actual separation from the PFLP is not entirely clear.

With the creation of the PFLP, Haddad had become its chief military strategist and the organizer of its operations (he parallels Fatah's Khalil al-Wazir and the GC's Jibril in this respect). He is credited with the planning of the PFLP's first skyjacking in July 1968 and the coordination of the multiple skyjackings of September 1970. After the Jordanian defeat, Haddad was said to have been the moving force behind the extension of the PFLP's strategy of global attacks. For example, he was one of the planners of Entebbe. As the result of his activities, Haddad built up a series of contacts with other revolutionaries such as the BSO, the URA, and the Baader Meinhof group, among others.(29)

Creation of the PFLP

The emergence of the PFLP was due to a split within the ranks of the ANM. After the breakup of the UAR, a number of younger ANM members (most of them located in the Lebanese branch) had become increasingly disenchanted with Nasirism as a pan-Arab strategy and increasingly Marxist in outlook. They began to argue with increasing vehemence that the ANM must move toward a class interpretation of political events, that the creation of Israel, the existence of Arab reactionary regimes, and the fact of neo-imperialism were all linked. What was necessary was a Marxist and revolutionary strategy to counter these trends.(30)

This burgeoning conflict was papreed over for a time; Habash opted for a strategy of moving in the direction of the radicals in order to contain them. However, by 1963 the split was serious enough to warrant full-scale debate at an ANM Congress. In one camp were a group of non-Palestinians who wanted to continue the Egyptian alliance and move in the direction of socialism. These were opposed by Palestinians (some of whom were ideologically with the socialists) who wanted to break away from the Nasirist ties and refocus the ANM's energies on the struggle for Palestine. (Some of the anti-Nasirist sentiment was independent of the Palestine issue: it was a reaction to an Egyptian attempt to incorporate the ANM into the Egyptian-sponsored Arab Socialist Union.)(31) As a compromise formula, the 1964 congress decided to set up a special organization, the "Palestine Region of the ANM," to be headed by Habash, Haddad, Ahmad al-Yamani, and 'Abd al-Karim Hamad (Abu Adnan). This organization was to prepare for armed struggle in Israel. Alternatively, the conference adopted the principle of scientific socialism as a guideline for ANM policy.(32)

This military grouping, as the new organization came to be known, originally focused only on intelligence gathering and the creation of a clandestine intrastructure complete with arms caches. By November 1966 it had taken the name Heroes of the Return (Abtal al-'Awdah), and had become associated with the PLA in the person of PLA Commander Wajih al-Mandani. At about the same time, circa 1965, Nayif Hawatimah and another group of Palestinian ANM members formed their own group, the Vengeance Youth (presumably because they objected to the conservative implications of the Heroes' association with the PLA).(33)

The June defeat further deepened the existing disillusions that Habash, in particular, had concerning the role of Arab regimes in securing Palestinian goals. In a bitter commentary published by al-Hadaf, Habash exclaimed:

> The Arab armies have failed the Palestinians three times now: in 1936 they gave us hollow promises; in 1948 they entered the war against Israel and lost half of Palestine; and in 1967 they again entered the war against Israel and lost the other half of Palestine.(34)

In any event, the Heroes merged with Jibril's PLF and Hawatimah's Vengeance Youth to form the PFLP. The PFLP started its military operations in October 1967, and issued its first communique in December:

> The only language which the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence. Armed struggle is the basic course which can turn our land into an arena for struggle against occupation and against efforts to liquidate our question . . . Fighting against the enemy is the historical course which we must follow in order to reach the stage when we can open the widest front against the enemy, so Palestinian land may be

turned into an inferno where invaders will burn. Armed struggle has no limits.(35)

And from its inception, the PFLP specialized in small-scale but carefully planned operations. In this regard, it is credited with beginning the modern trend toward international terrorism. This newly created enlarged organization, however, proved to be extremely unstable. Partially this was due to the aforementioned built-in schisms carried over from the ANM. Partially, however, it was due to the PFLP's vulnerability to outside Arab pressure. As a small organization, chronically short of funds and other organizational resources, the PFLP was forced to rely on a variety of sources, basically ANM cadres in a number of Arab countries, and on selected Arab governments themselves, notably Kuwayt, the Peoples Republic of South Yemen, Iraq, and Egypt. In addition to being exposed to the leverage this reliance gave the donor cadres or countries, the PFLP was also exposed to persistent Syrian and Jordanian attempts to control PFLP activities in their territories. Syrian influence, either directly or via the PLA, apparently has been especially instrumental in encouraging challenges to Habash's authority. In any event, a number of groups almost immediately broke off from the PFLP: first Jibril took his PLF followers out; then Hawatimah left with a leftist faction; and finally a series of smaller groups splintered off, almost like a series of after-shocks following an organizational earthquake. Details on some of these groups are included below.

The remaining PFLP, however, is still characterized by intra-elite tensions. There are said to be at least three factions: a military wing headed by Mustafa Zibdi and Abu 'Ali, which favors pragmatic attention to military matters and tactical cooperation with Fatah; a radical wing, originally associated with Wadi' Haddad (sometimes also identified as the right-wing), which wants increased international terrorism; an international wing (sometimes also called the left wing) headed originally by the late Ghassan Kanafani, which pushes in the direction of increased ties with the international left; and a centrist group composed of Habash and a small circle of lieutenants who play roughly the same role as the center in Fatah.(36)

In terms of inter-Resistance politics, the PFLP has usually opposed Fatah, and especially so in terms of any attempts by Fatah to unify the Resistance. Although some negotiations aimed at a PFLP/Fatah merger were carried on in 1973; these failed, and moreover led to further splits in the PFLP. However, organizational politics aside, the PFLP has had an influence on Resistance ideology and military strategy. PFLP views about the necessity for an Arab worldwide revolution and the need to engage in military operations suited to the limited manpower base of the Resistance have forced Fatah to rethink some of its earlier positions: for example, the PFLP argument that hit-and-run tactics were the only possible choice, given the Resistance's military weakness. Fatah acceptance of this argument is one of the elements which led to attempts to attack Israel by sea (see Chapter 9).

POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDF)

The PDF was the first major split which resulted from the increasing tension between the older, more conservative Habash faction and a younger, more radical group. The PDF was created after this group of leftists (styling themselves the "progressive revolutionary wing of the PFLP") decided that it could not continue to operate within the ANM-PFLP framework. The quarrel, which dates from August 1968, degenerated into shooting by early 1969, whereupon Fatah intervened to calm the two sides down. Late in February the left wing declared its independence under the name of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Although there were doctrinal differences between the PFLP and the PDF, personal differences between Habash and Hawatimah played a role in the split. While in one sense these personality differences sprang from the radically differing backgrounds of the two (Habash the physician from a middle-class background versus Hawatimah from a working-class East Bank family), in another sense they are generational in nature. Hawatimah is 12 years younger than Habash, and belongs to that generation of Arabs who were politicized by the wars of 1956 and 1967. Moreover, Habash belongs to the generation involved in the 1948 defeat, while Hawatimah is of the generation whose political situation is structured by the consequences of 1948. Some of Hawatimah's colleagues in the collective leadership of the PDF are about his age, while others are considerably younger. Among the more prominent of these colleagues are Muhammad Kishli (who is associated with the leftist Organization of Lebanese Socialists), Jalal Kishk, and Muhsin Ibrahim.

Hawatimah was born in Salt in 1935 of Greek Orthodox parentage. He was educated in Amman, then studied at Cairo University and the AUB. He joined the ANM in 1954, and led the left wing until he split with Habash in 1969. However, Hawatimah still has a following in the old ANM. As a young man, he was active politically. At one point in 1957, he was imprisoned and then exiled from Jordan for his political activities. Later he spent some time in Iraq, where he was reportedly also imprisoned for a time, an experience that left a legacy of ill feeling between Hawatimah and the government of Iraq. Following this, he spent some time in Beirut, then after the 1967 war, some time in South Yemen as an advisor to the ANM-dominated leadership.

Hawatimah is a bitter rival of Habash, and threatens the latter's standing as the chief alternative to 'Arafat. Hawatimah's relations with 'Arafat, were reasonably good until the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976. Until then, Hawatimah agreed with 'Arafat's major policy positions on most issues, but afterward he broke with 'Arafat over the latter's policy of rapprochement with Arab governments. Initially hostile to the USSR, Hawatimah has come full circle, is now considered to be the USSR's man in the Resistance. Since 1970, Hawatimah has been spending most of his time in Lebanon. Like other leaders,

Hawatimah has published. His largest work to date is a book, The Crisis of the South Yemen Revolution.(37)

The secession of the PDF, however, split ANM branches in the West Bank, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and apparently also ANM cadres among Arab student groups in Europe and the United States.(38) It might be added that some of these "progressives" remained in the PFLP and later split off to form the PRFLP.

From its inception, the PDF was marked by its stress on political activity, and rapidly succeeded in establishing a reputation as one of the most "far left" of the Resistance organizations. And to this end, the PDF has been extremely active, not only in establishing links with a number of international revolutionary movements, such as European Trotskyites, but also in establishing at least two satellite parties: the Organization of Lebanese Socialists (OLS) and the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL).

The OLS was established almost immediately after the PDF, and consisted of a rump faction of the ANM branch in Lebanon (the remainder of the Lebanese ANM appears to have stayed loyal to Habash, and formed an affiliate of the PFLP known as the Arab Socialist Labor Party, ASLP). The OLS (led by Muhsin Ibrahim, an original ANM leader) promptly proclaimed itself to be a Marxist alternative to the regular Lebanese Communist Party:

> The Lebanese Communist Party has lost its ability to be a vanguard party. . . . The ideological and organizational deviation in the party structure and in the exercise of its policy is not a mere passing deviation in which revolutionary parties sometimes fall. Rather, it is a deviation embedded in the party roots. . . . Because the Lebanese Communist Party has lost its ability to be a vanguard party, the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist has to forge his way ahead outside of the framework of the Lebanese Communist Party.(39)

Later, the OLS merged with a small Communist group, the Organization of Socialist Lebanon (OSL), a pro-Peking splinter. The resulting group, the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), announced its intension to revolutionize Lebanese politics. In addition, OCAL recruited heavily among the Shi'a population of South Lebanon, giving the PDF some leverage with Shi'as who have become increasingly anti-Fatah as a consequence of the fighting in Lebanon.(40)

Originally, the PDF was extremely critical of the USSR, and of Arab Communist parties as well (hence the formation of a radical alternative, OCAL). Early PDF literature called on the USSR and "other socialist forces" to:

> . . . correct their stand toward international liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America so that we will be able to turn these forces into an international revolutionary movement that would obliterate imperialism and Zionism. . . . It [the

> USSR] is urged more than any other country to reconsider the wrong bureaucratic Stalinist stand toward the Palestine case and adopt, instead, a correct Marxist-Leninist stand, which is based on the principle of self-determination for all peoples.(41)

This opposition was founded on both ideological and political bases. Ideologically, the PDF argued that the Arab Communists were not radical enough; politically, it felt that the USSR/Communist line on Palestine was not sufficiently supportive of either Arab or Palestinian goals. Nevertheless, the PDF seemed gradually to have switched over to a close cooperation with both Arab Communists and the USSR. It apparently established ties with the Iraqi Communist Party, which had begun (or at least advocated) a low-level insurgency in southern Iraq.

Following the October war, however, the PDF became closely linked with the USSR. Hawatimah was part of a Resistance delegation to Moscow in November 1973, and as a consequence appears to have emerged as a favored ally of Moscow – so much so that it is said that he was asked to assist in forming a Palestinian Communist Party in the West Bank. Moreover, the PDF was allowed to organize Arab students studying in Soviet universities, and appears to have been permitted to open a branch office in the Ukraine. From there, the PDF is said to be organizing a new front which will represent all Resistance forces and all revolutionary forces (a strategy the USSR seems to be pursuing in connection with other groups as well). The payoff for PDF efforts on behalf of the USSR has been the transfer of advanced weaponry to the PDF, including both SA-7s and heavy artillery.(42)

Partially as a result of its political extremism and partially because of its insistence on ideological conformity and dedication from its members, the PDF remained a very small organization for some time. Its early strength was estimated at between 500 and 1,000 men. However, in the wake of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty, the PDF has tripled or even quadrupled in size to possibly 4,000-5,000 men.(43)

Militarily, the PDF has usually followed the conservative and confrontation strategy espoused by Fatah. It adopted Fatah's position that guerrilla raids are necessary to force any Israeli concessions, but that international terrorism was harmful to the long-range political goals of the Resistance (see Chapter 10). The PDF has, however, engaged at least indirectly in international terrorism: A PDF member was one of the Eagles of the Palestine Revolution, an al-Sa'iqah group which attacked the Jewish emigration camp at Schoenau, Austria in September 1973. The PDF was also responsible for the massacre at Ma'alot in May 1974.

Its recruitment base was originally in refugee camps and villages in northern Jordan. In some of these, the PDF has made special efforts to win support, establishing both elective councils and, in the case of some villages, agricultural cooperatives. Although its rank and file are drawn from the poorer strata of Palestinians, it also attracts students and young intellectuals.

Chaliand thinks that the PDF is perhaps the most sophisticated of all the Resistance organizations in terms of its ideological formulations: "The political level of the cadres and the base is high, and it has the advantage of not being abstract. Work with the masses, already undertaken, will be reinforced during the course of 1970."(44) In Chaliand's view, the PDF is the only genuine revolutionary organization in the Resistance movement; the only one that in words and deeds is Marxist-Leninist; and the only one that breaks away from parochial Arab and Palestinian nationalism (he may hold this view because the doctrines of the PDF coincide more closely with his own than do those of any of the other guerrilla groups). Although Habash of the PFLP also calls himself a Marxist-Leninist, the PDF brands him as a right-winger and an opportunist (Habash in turn accuses the PDF of opportunism).(45) Hawatimah's group holds that Arab nationalism, while it succeeded in the 1950s and 1960s in eradicating the old imperialism in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Southern Yemen, has now become unable to stand its ground against the new imperialism. What is required is a proletarian structure similar to that which exists in Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. Even the Arab Communist parties with their Stalinist policy cannot succeed.

In the forefront of the enemies of Arab nationalism, according to Hawatimah's group, is the United States, which is trying to encircle the Arab world and crush all attempts at Arab liberation. As an economic power the United States has allied itself with Arab reactionaries and is maintaining Israel as a military base to be used to thwart all Arab national liberation movements. Arab nationalism, in order to defend itself against this new imperialism, must mobilize the masses and build an economy based on frugality and preparation for a long war. The masses must be taught the Marxist-Leninist approach and must gain full political awareness. The present objective is the establishment of a national alliance on a basis broad enough to include the circles and sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. Who should lead such an alliance? In the past, national movements led by the working class have stood up to the threat of the new imperialism, as has been demonstrated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (See Chapter 4 for a comparison of Fatah, PFLP and PDF ideology.)(46)

At the PNC meeting of September 19469 the PDF presented a detailed proposal for a Palestinian national front. Although the proposal was not adopted by the PNC, it serves as a good exposition of the views of the PDF. Among its salient points are:

(1) Rejection of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 or any similar proposal for a peaceful settlement. . . .

(2) Promotion of the PDF struggle as a "national Palestinian-Jordanian force" on both banks. . . .

(3) Defining the arena of conflict as the Palestinian homeland and all the areas where there are concentrations of refugees and the borders of the occupied territory. . . .

(4) Recognition of the fact that the Jews of Palestine were long subjected to oppression with the primary responsibility resting on European capitalism and that the solution of the crisis of oppression of the Jews lies in the solution of the crisis of European and capitalist society rather than in the oppression and expulsion of the Arab people of Palestine.

(5) A future Palestinian state that will abolish racial discrimination and national oppression on the basis of a democratic society with coexistence for the Arab and Jewish peoples.

(6) Formation of independent organizations or workers, peasants, students, women, youth, and professionals on both banks and among all the concentrations of Palestinians abroad.

(7) Each organization to preserve its organizational, military, and doctrinal independence and its right to take independent political positions while continuing to be bound by the program and decisions of the front.

(8) The national front to be given the right by virtue of its struggle to intervene and express its views regarding the existing Arab regimes insofar as they bear on the Palestinian problem.

(9) Rejection of the attempts of Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon to impose conditions on the resistance and its operations.

(10) The United States public enemy No. 1.

(11) No inundating of the masses with promises and hopes not based on reality.

(12) Need for the Palestinian national forces to rely on themselves and the masses.(47)

The relatively moderate attitude toward Jews revealed in some of the passages given above is borne out by the fact that the PDF has done more than any of the other guerrilla organizations to get in touch with anti-Zionists, Marxists, and other leftists inside Israel. Its aim is to come to an understanding and to work out a joint program for a new type of state in Palestine. In particular, it has established ties with the Israeli anti-Zionist left, among these the Israel Socialist Organization (MATZPEN) and the "Red Front."(48)

The PDF, small though it was initially, has managed to acquire a respectable standing for itself within the Resistance. Hawatimah has been able to maneuver adroitly in the organizational politics of the PLO, and has succeeded in keeping the PDF relatively independent of some of the larger groups in the PLO and the Rejection Front. In this, the PDF's ties with the USSR and some Arab Communist parties have been critical. Currently, the PDF operates independently of both the PLO (Fatah in particular) and the Rejection Front, but maintains links with both: on the one hand, PDF personnel sit on the PLO executive committee and other PLO bodies; on the other hand, the PDF cooperates with Rejection Front organizations. As a consequence of this independence, the PDF has been able to expand its recruitment base, and according to some sources is overtaking the PFLP and possibly even Fatah in size.(49)

Although the policies which have led to the PDF's emergence as an important group in its own right have shifted on an issue-by-issue basis, there remain two policy goals which have remained constant: (a) concern for the continued independence of the Resistance as a whole, and (b) a consistent opposition to any accommodation with Jordan. Along the lines of the former, it tended to support the cause of guerrilla unity, even though some of its more radical members felt that it was compromising its principles by doing so:

> The conditions of our people and our revolution motivated us to present unionist organizational solutions to secure and develop all forms of national unity and to solve the organizational problems among the revolution factions and the broad popular organizations within the framework of the Liberation Organization.
>
> On this path, our front has presented the national unity plans compatible with every phase. Since the first moments of its inception, the front joined the framework of the Liberation Organization and the Joint Military Coordination Council and has rejected all policies advocating division and self-seclusion. It has struggled alongside the allied factions to urge the organizations that have adopted the policy of self-seclusion to join the joint establishments within the framework of the Liberation Organization.(50)

The PDF, in particular, insists that both banks of the Jordan must be united on a "nationalist and democratic basis," meaning that the Hashemite regime must be dismantled. And the PDF has since vigorously opposed any dialogue between the PLO and Jordan.(51) As a consequence, the PDF began to move from Fatah, especially after 1975, opposing 'Arafat's policy of attempting to cooperate with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the wake of al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 Hawatimah bluntly accused 'Arafat of "selling out" Palestinian rights to full independence by accommodating himself to

the Egyptian initiative.(52) After the Camp David agreements, the PDF allied itself with the Rejection Front, and, in particular, what appeared to be an emerging Iraqi-Syrian alliance, to force 'Arafat to adopt the rejectionist position. Since then, the PDF has joined with other groups in calling for a revamping of PLO leadership, in the direction of a more "collegial" leadership, meaning in practice a reduction of Fatah's numerical domination of key PLO institutions, especially the executive committee.(53)

POPULAR ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (POLP)

First mentioned in February 1970, the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine is perhaps the most obscure of the commando organizations. It joined the United Command in February 1970, and later signed the unity formula in May 1970. It is not clear whether POLP was ever represented on the PNC or the PLO Central Committee. Other than the fact that it recruited from refugee camps in Syria,(54) nothing much is known about POLP, its leadership, or its ideological orientation. Early in 1969 it was rumored that Yahya Hammudah, Ahmad al-Shuqayri's immediate successor as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was one of the leaders of the POLP and that the POLP was leftist in character.(55) Nevertheless, POLP appears to have been another of a series of short-lived, Syrian-backed organizations, and its membership has most probably been absorbed by al-Sa'iqah.

Organizationally, POLP was one outcome of a complicated set of splits which took place in the PFLP while George Habash was imprisoned in Syria from April to November 1968. These splits were encouraged by the Syrians as part of a campaign to take over control of the Resistance movement. Insofar as the PFLP was concerned, the Syrians appeared to have aimed at either replacing Habash and his supporters with a leadership more amenable to Syrian control or, failing this, at splitting up the PFLP. Syrian intervention effectively exacerbated existing divisions within PFLP leadership – in this case between the Habash faction on one hand, the militants who followed Hawatimah and the military group led by Ahmad Za'rur, Ahmad Jibril, and Tahir Dablan, on the other. Dablan's group formed one of the nuclei of POLP, either directly as POL's military wing or indirectly as a consequence of surviving members joining the POLP.(56)

Dablan himself was an ex-Syrian army officer who had also served in the PLA and had some connections with Jibril.(57) From the start, Dablan's group had Syrian backing; its original name was al-Sa'iqah, indicating a link with a much earlier (1957) group he had organized. (Kadi gives a different version, stating that Dablan was actually working for Jordanian intelligence.(58) While utilizing this name, Dablan's men kidnapped Druze leader Hasan al-Atrash and transported him from Jordan to Damascus, an act which seemed to be part of a Syrian

campaign to infiltrate Druzes in both Syria and southern Lebanon. The Syrians were acutely conscious of the separatist tendencies of the Druzes; tendencies which the Jordanians had encouraged. The Druzes in and around the al-Suwayda region had been particularly troublesome, and had fought a series of skirmishes with Syrian police and military. In early September 1966, a number of Druze officers (with Jordanian backing) attempted to overthrow the regime. The government responded by purging some 4,000 Druzes from the Syrian military and police, and bombarding Druze villages in south Syria. (However, the threat of a more general Druze uprising was one of the destabilizing factors within Syria that contributed to the escalation of May/June 1967.) These actions led to a local Druze revolt, led by Sultan al-Atrash. As a riposte, the kidnapping struck at both the Jordanians and the al-Atrashes.(59)

In October 1968, Dablan changed his group's name to the Battalions of Victory (Kata'ib al-Nasir), possibly to avoid confusion with the official Syrian al-Sa'iqah.(60) From the beginning, both the Kata'ib and POLP were dedicated to the overthrow of King Husayn. The Kata'ib was extremely small, numbering between 30 and 100 men and specialized in Mafia-style extortion and urban terrorism, particularly in Amman. By October, its activities created a crisis between the Jordanians and the Resistance as a whole over the issue of uncontrolled Palestinian lawlessness. (Kadi argues that this was a Jordanian plot to create the conditions giving them an excuse to dismantle the Resistance.(61) In the first week of November, Husayn's security forces moved against the Kata'ib and arrested or killed some 70 of its members. Dablan was arrested, imprisoned, and later died in prison in 1972.(62) Other commando groups refused to aid the Kata'ib, and the PLO formally disassociated itself from it.(63)

Immediately after the breakup of Kata'ib, the Syrians went out of their way to deny any connection. Al-Thawrah gave the Syrian version of Dablan's activities:

> Contrary to what is published by some Beirut papers, and in an attempt to clarify things, the General Command of al-Sa'iqah Forces announces that it has no connection whatsoever with Tahir Dablan allegedly connected with al-Sa'iqah. The person in question used to be affiliated with the PLF, which actually expelled Dablan when it reached an agreement with the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War and the joint group was called al-Sa'iqah Forces.
>
> Tahir Dablan personally announced his detachment from al-Sa'iqah and formed with some of his friends Kata'ib al-Nasir. Al-Sa'iqah Forces emphasize that the so-called Tahir Dablan is connected with some suspicious elements who are opposed to commando activity and to the Palestine question and that he is now being used as a tool in the hands of these suspicious elements to harm the Palestine revolution.(64)

POLP itself, whatever its connections with the Kata'ib, disappeared as a separate organization in late 1970, a casualty of both intraorganizational politics and Arab/Resistance tensions.

POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PRFLP)

An obscure organization, the PRF was a minor splinter off the PFLP until it was thrust into prominence by its part in the Entebbe hijacking. One of its leaders and founders, Fayiz al-Jabir, was killed by the Israeli rescue party.(65) Although the PRF officially broke away from the PFLP in March 1972, it appears to have retained some links with both its parent organization and with ANM cadres in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen (The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Nevertheless, the PRF appears to be a very small group; although its exact strength is unknown, it is estimated to number about 500 men.

The origins of the split lie in the existing tensions within the PFLP; in this case, primarily between a group of military officers who felt that PFLP policy should be geared to achieving military success, and a group of ideologues who felt that ideological concerns should be primary. The conflict first emerged in November 1970, at a PFLP Central Committee meeting. It broke into the open in May 1971 when a flurry of fighting broke out between what was described as a "nationalist wing" led by al-Jabir and an "internationalist wing" led by Hasin 'Ali Muhsin. The internationalists ordered the arrest of the nationalists on the pretext that their right-wing orientations hampered the PFLP politically. Each faction then began arresting the other's members until Habash finally stepped in to smooth over the dispute.(66)

The issues involved were complex, having to do with the PFLP's stance on (a) whether or not to merge with other guerrilla groups, notably Fatah; (b) how to relate to various Arab states, especially Jordan, Syria, and Iraq; (c) what sort of military tactics should be stressed, Fatah-type operations or international terrorism.

Ultimately, the event which triggered the break was a dispute over the value of hijacking as a military tactic. A meeting of PFLP leaders in February 1972 adopted the views of the leftists, and elected a new PFLP leadership: Abu Shihab, Abu Khalid, and Abu al-Fawz. Habash was present and was not reelected. He and his followers promptly called a national congress of the PFLP in March, and succeeded in having himself reelected as Secretary General. During the course of this meeting, Habash delivered an extensive report on the ideological differences within the PFLP:

> A basic dispute between us and the break-away group is over the attitude toward the Arab Nationalist Movement and what it represents. . . . The first dispute within the PFLP started over the attitude to be taken toward the Jordanian Arab regimes,

> particularly the Syrian regime at that time. The Front's plans called for building up its military presence in the Syrian field as well as in Jordan. In fact it launched most of its activity from Syrian territory. The result was that the Syrian regime took a hostile attitude and arrested some of its leaders on the charge of exercising political activity in the country . . . There was also dispute over organizational matters such as the relation between military and political action, and the connection of the military command with fighting units.(67)

Two days later, a number of PFLP leaders announced their breakaway. Among them were: Abu Shihab, political command member; Salim Darduni, military director of PFLP forces; Abu al-Fawz, director for Syria; Abu al-Yasir, military director for Lebanon; and Abu Riyad, member of the Beirut area command.(68)

The PRF itself, however, proved no more stable than the PFLP. Immediately following its appearance, the PRF received aid from the PDF and Syria. Almost at once, however, the PFLP leadership succeeded in winning back a substantial number of the PRF's original adherents. Later, the remaining leadership was racked by internecine conflicts; some joined the PDF, others the CC. Nor was the PRF able to garner any really substantial support. It quickly came to blows with the PDF, and fighting between the two groups has been a persistent phenomenon. Its relations with Syria have waxed and waned. At one point, it attempted a coalition with al-Sa'iqah and the General Command (GC), under the aegis of al-Sa'iqah, but failed because of the personal objections of GC leader Jibril to any cooperation with it. Following the October war, it received some assistance from Libya and Iraq, as a function of these countries' opposition to Egyptian moves in the direction of a negotiated settlement. (The Egyptians responded by arresting Abu Shihab and Abu al-Fawz when they appeared in Cairo to attend a PNC meeting.) Ultimately, the PRF appear to have become the vehicle of Wadi' Haddad followers, and little more than a holding company for a collection of international terrorists from other organizations.(69)

5 Resistance Organizations III: Independent and Arab Sponsored Groups

The following groups function as linkage, entities which operate in the organizational interstices of the Resistance to transmit ideology, personnel, and policy inputs into the Resistance system. These linkage groups fall into two categories, independents and those sponsored by Arab governments. Irrespective of their classification, however, these groups illustrate the clique pattern of politics which underlies Resistance organization. Here there is not only a process of factionalization, of fission and fusion, but also a linkage process (in Rosenau's terms, a process of fused linkages) whereby personnel from one organization transfer to another, yet retain some political identity as a distinct clique within the receiving organization.(1)

INDEPENDENT GROUPS

These are universally small groups, and their origins are usually found in a complex series of splits and amalgamations. The classification as independents is in one sense arbitrary, since these groups could just as easily be labeled either splinters or Arab-sponsored groups: all of them have at one point in their organizational careers been affiliated with larger groups; all of them have substantial connections with one or more Arab countries. For example, the AGLP is sometimes identified as an organizational "stalking horse" for Fatah because it appeared to operate as an ersatz spokesman for Fatah.(2) Equally, the AGLP as well as the PAO are described as advocates of the Nasirist position, and are said to be vehicles for Egyptian penetration of other Resistance organizations.

The Popular Liberation Front of the early 1960s provides one nucleus of these groups. In fact, the PLF could be viewed as a third major source of groups, in addition to Fatah and the ANM. Yet the PLF itself was apparently the product of an amalgamation of still other

groups, in this case groups led by Ahmad Jibril and Tahir Dablan. However, on closer inspection, both Jibril's and Dablan's organizations had Syrian backing, and can be seen as basically Syrian-originated.

Alternatively, any of these groups could be identified as splinters: the General Command (GC), which is the organizational successor to the PLF, for example, can also be identified as a splinter of the PLFP with which it was affiliated for a time. Perhaps the key differentiation is whether these groups had a continuing nucleus of leadership that remained essentially intact and independent through a variety of organizational metamorphoses.(3)

General Command of the PFLP (GC)

The General Command is a small group; its strength is estimated at around 400 to 500 men; but it has a reputation for being perhaps the toughest of all guerrilla groups. In particular, the GC has made a name for itself as a practitioner of international terrorism. Its first action in this respect was to blow up a Swissair jet en route to Tel Aviv in February 1970.(4) In May of the same year, the GC attacked a school bus in the Qiryat Shmoneh area, killing some 12 persons, including eight children. Its most spectacular act to date, however, was a suicide raid on Qiryat Shmoneh itself by three GC commandos on April 11, 1974; over 20 people including the raiders were killed.

In a series of statements released after the Qiryat Shmoneh attack, GC officials spelled out in detail the military philosophy of the GC. Ahmad Jibril, in an interview in al-Dustur explained that the purpose of attack was:

> . . . to lift resistance out of its ebb, and to show that to make us abandon our guns is not an easy job, and our people are more firmly hanging onto its land to the point of suicide.
>
> The three men chosen for the operations were a Palestinian, a Syrian, and an Iraqi in order to:
>
> . . . symbolize the unity of the struggle, unity of sacrifice and unity of combat which exist in our people.

The suicide mission was necessary because:

> In the past we told our combatants to fight within the limits that would ensure your return safely. We never told them to fight and die. But as far as the Qiryat Shmoneh operation was concerned, the instructions were quite clear. They were told to fight and die. The trio accepted the instructions quite willingly; this is the point in the Palestine case. It is the big challenge in the face of liquidative schemes in the region. It shows there is a people ready to fight and die rather than surrender.(5)

GC spokesman Abu 'Abd al-'Abbas gave an almost Clausewitzian explanation of GC strategic doctrine:

> The military operation is dictated by the political situation. Any military operation is the result of a certain political trend. We in the General Command have defined the political objective for which we have been fighting right from the first day. . . . The method chosen is not totally new because there is constant myrmidon in the commando action. . . . It is not easy to find people who would willingly accept an order to die under the conditions of revolutionary relaxation. At the same time it is not easy to find the leadership that would give an order to die under the same conditions.(6)

According to its own account, the GC was established in 1961 (some non-GC sources say 1959) as the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). At the time, it recruited mainly from Palestinians living in Syria, some of these being Palestinians serving with the Syrian military. The PLF was supported and trained by the Syrian government (most probably by Syrian military intelligence).(7)

Originally, the PLF was strictly clandestine. It specialized in military rather than political training, and aimed at preparing its members to take part in a war of popular liberation against Israel. By 1965, its organization had grown to the point where PLF cells were in operation in Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, Israel proper, and Lebanon. However, it did not plan to begin military operations much before 1970.

Nevertheless, in 1965 when Fatah began to launch its own attacks, the PLF went into action. Among its claimed military successes was the blowing up of the Jerusalem railway in 1966.(8) Militarily, it cooperated with Fatah for a short period from the middle of 1965 to 1966, and unified with it. But, as the GC account puts it, "subsequent contradictions and events led to the breakup of the union and the Front resumed its independent activity."(9) When the Syrian Ba'thists founded a guerrilla organization in opposition to al-'Asifah during the latter part of 1966, Jibril became its head.(10)

Towards the end of 1967 Jibril's group united with other groups(11) to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine under the political leadership of George Habash of the Arab National Movement. Jibril and Ahmad Za'rur commanded the PFLP's forces in the field.(12) Jibril, however, became vexed over the controversy between Habash and Nayif Hawatimah and over what he regarded as an attempt by doctrinaire members of the ANM, some of whom had been trained in China, to dominate the PFLP. There were, apparently, also personal differences between Jibril and Habash. When it was charged that arms from the Soviet Union and China were being diverted to caches in Iraq and Lebanon, Jibril criticized the policy of undermining Arab governments instead of attacking Israel.

The split, however, was much a product of the tensions between the PFLP and Syria as much as anything else. Following the arrest of

Habash, the Hawatimah faction using the PFLP's name attacked the Syrian Ba'th. Jibril, at the time operating out of Damascus, issued a counterstatement denying that the Hawatimah group spoke for the Front. Ultimately, the Hawatimah group announced in October 1968 that the leaders of the PLF constituted a "right-wing" tendency within the PFLP, and declared that they were forthwith dismissed – among them, Ahmad Jibril, Ahmad Za'rur, Adnan al-Qasim, Ahmad Jabir, and 'Ali al-Kalamuni. Both Jibril and Za'rur then broke away from the PFLP, and for a time attempted to lead a single group, but personal rivalry between the two led them to establish separate organizations, known for a time as General Command A (or Wing A) and General Command B (or Wing B) of the PFLP.(13) Za'rur's group later took the name of the Palestine Arab Organization. For a short period Jibril's group identified itself as the al-Aqsa Fida'iyin Front, but then reverted to its former title, General Command.

Ahmad Jibril is the founder, leader, and driving force behind the GC and its pragmatic and ruthless orientation toward violence. He was born in the village of Yazur, near Jaffa, in 1936. His family became refugees in 1948 and migrated to Syria. Jibril ultimately entered the Syrian Military Academy, where he majored in engineering. Upon graduation, he was given a commission in the Syrian army, in the Corps of Engineers.(14) In 1958, he was dismissed from the army because of his political activities and purported communist sympathies, some of which related to his activities in forming Palestinian Resistance organizations. In 1961 he formed the (PLF) under the aegis of the Syrian government. Subsequently, Jibril has been the subject of persistent rumors concerning his connections with the Syrian government (and it is said that he currently has personal ties with the Syrian President al-Asad).

Within the Resistance, Jibril has never been particularly political; rather he is seen as being concerned with the details of military operations, and has become known for his ability for planning in meticulous detail. He is occasionally referred to as Abu Jihad, and his reputation for expertise in guerrilla operations is widespread. He is reported to personally train members of the GC, and in this respect he is extremely hard-driving and tends to be quarrelsome. In 1966, for example, he branded Yasir 'Arafat as an Egyptian agent who slavishly obeyed the orders of Cairo. Unlike other commando leaders, Jibril rarely gives out public statements.(15)

In a recent interview in Algiers, however, Jibril did spell out some of his views which paralleled those of the other Fronts:

> We believe that it is time to embark on an operation of natural sifting inside the body of this nation to determine who are enemies and who are friends. This is because we believe that since 1967 our Arab people have observed a truce with reaction because of the defeat, and that Arab reaction has regained its breath and is now engaged in waging a fierce attack on all patriotic and progressive positions inside this nation. The settle-

ment plots which we are witnesses in the east are but a part of this attack.(16)

Although Jibril shuns publicity for himself, he nevertheless acquired a publication for presenting the view of the GC. Nasib Nimr, a former member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Lebanon, had left the party because of what he called its subservience to Moscow. In 1966 he founded a weekly called Ila al-Amam ("Forward March"). He announced that he would stay neutral in the Moscow-Peking schism, but when he began publishing as much Chinese news as Soviet, his paper came to be looked upon as the voice of the pro-Chinese splinter group of Lebanese Communists. The Lebanese government suspended the paper for a long period, but in April 1970 it reappeared with an editorial by Nimr in which he said that he had offered it to the GC without conditions and that henceforth its policy would be "for the Palestinian revolution and against its liquidation." Fatah, however, had a different explanation: al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyah suggested that Ila al-Amam was being brought out in order to discredit Fatah, saying that 100,000 Lebanese pounds had been put up by an unidentified source to finance the revival of the journal.(17) (Ila al-Amam's current editor is Fadlu Shruru, a member of the GC's politburo.)

In May 1974 Ila al-Amam published the text of a political program approved by a general congress of the GC which was held in August 1973. The program called for a broad front of revolutionary forces which would then rid the Arab world of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. As such it seemed to be a blend of communist, PFLP and even Fatah doctrines, but with pragmatic emphasis on creating a coalition of all forces with the same goal; that is, defeating the enemies of the Arabs. Among other things, it detailed what was described as "urgent national talks":

(1) All human forces in every Arab country should unit in a strategic, revolutionary, democratic alliance in order to realize the national tasks. These forces should work for the emergence of broad national fronts, including all classes of and forces which have the joint interest of struggling collectively for these tasks and in accordance with a joint program of struggle . . .

(2) All revolutionary organizations in the Arab region should struggle for their meeting in an Arab revolutionary front that would lead the Arab national struggle against imperialism, Zionism, reaction and class oppression, and work for the emergence of a broad national front that would ensure the unity of all factions of the Arab national liberation movement, regardless of their ideological resources, for the realization of their joint tasks and in a manner that would preserve the ideological and organizational independence of the revolutionary forces within this alliance . . .

(3) The broad Arab national front is required to struggle, by using all methods and forms, the most important of which is armed struggle, for the liquidation of the imperialist pockets which remain in the Arab homeland, and for liquidating the imperialist interviews in the regions of the Arab homeland, destroying them and ousting imperialism, in all its forms, from our homeland . . .

(4) It is also called upon to strengthen and support and take part with the Palestinian people in their armed struggle against Zionism and its colonialist entity in order to liquidate all organizations of this entity which constitute the government regime in Israel, liquidate the State of Israel and replace it with a secular, democratic state that does not discriminate between religions . . .

(5) It is urged to stregthen its relations with the socialist states and the national liberation movements of the world as well as with the working class in imperialist countries and unify their efforts for fulfilling the tasks of struggle against imperialism, Zionism and local reaction.(18)

The GC's relationships with other organizations, including the PLO itself, have always been marked by friction. It joined the Palestine Armed Struggle Command in October 1969 and the Unified Command in February 1970. It signed the Unity Formula of May 6, 1970, took part in the Palestine National Council from May 30 to June 4, and received one seat on the new Central Committee. But all this has not prevented the GC from exchanging recriminations with Fatah. Jibril publicly found fault with Fatah's conduct of the battle of al-'Arqub in May 1970, and Fatah responded by condemning the "military illiteracy" of certain guerrillas, asserting that the 18 men of the GC who took part in the battle represented half of the GC's total force.(19) When Fatah expressed disapproval of the GC's attack on an Israeli school bus, the GC rejected Fatah's efforts to secure "tutelage" over the Resistance movement.(20)

Even so, the GC generally operates alone. Since this early gesture in the direction of cooperation, the GC has remained independent of other groups. It does not consider itself bound by the PLO Executive Committee's decisions, and in 1972 it refused to stop its activities in south Lebanon. Moreover, it has repudiated all PLO decisions concerning Palestinian national unity, and has consistently refused to merge its military, political, or informational apparatus with other groups.(21) The GC has also been outspokenly critical of other groups' relations with Arab governments. Its leaders have frequently asserted that the Resistance movement has been reduced to a mere "testing ground for the various Arab regimes."(22)

Yet the GC received considerable aid from both Syria and Libya, a fact which exacerbated existing tensions within the GC leadership and

ultimately led to open fighting between two factions. After 1974, Syria and Libya opposed each other over the issue of peace negotiations; Syria favored negotiations; the Libyans opposed any peace talks. Ultimately these views brought the two countries into an armed collision in Lebanon. The GC, as the recipient of aid from both sides, was placed under tremendous political and financial pressure, and for a while its leadership apparently tried to split the difference, joining the rejection front on one hand and tacitly supporting Syrian moves in Lebanon on the other.

In the aftermath of the Jordanian war, the GC's leadership, like that of other groups, began to split. Rumors of a conflict within the GC began to circulate in 1971. The issue was apparently that of Jibril's personality and political style as a leader plus his Syrian connection and sympathies. By 1974 the conflict was out into the open, this time as a consequence of Jibril's acceptance of the PNC's ten-point program issued in June 1974. The rebel faction, subsequently identified with Abu 'Abd al-'Abbas and said to be pro-Iraq, demanded that Jibril come to Beirut from his headquarters in Damascus to defend his actions. Jibril refused, and the rebels took over several GC offices in refugee camps in Beirut and elsewhere as well as the offices of Ila al-Amam, using the publication to mount a violent press campaign against the PNC. The confrontation ultimately escalated into the murder of several GC officials and open fighting between the rebels and the PDF (whom they blamed for the murders). It was ended only with a massive intervention by Fatah forces.(23)

The 1976 fighting was triggered again by what the 'Abd al-'Abbas faction saw as Jibril's softness – in this case, his acquiescence to the Syrian plan for a Lebanese settlement. On February 15, Jibril and a GC delegation met with Syrian President al-Asad, after which Jibril announced his support for Syrian policy.(24) The same day, fighting broke out within the GC, and by the time it was stopped, some 60 commandos had been killed.(25)

The pro-Syrian forces of Jibril managed to come out on top; the pro-Iraqi faction of al-'Abbas defected to Fatah; and al-'Abbas (who had led GC forces in fighting Syrian regulars in Lebanon) temporarily disappeared.(26) By April 1977, however, al-'Abbas's group had reorganized and taken the GC's original name, the Palestine Liberation Front. The newly emergent PLF allied itself with the Rejection Front (it was admitted to the Rejection Front in May 1977, the same month that the GC was expelled) and, more specifically, with Iraq – since Iraq was Syria's major opponent among the Arab states. Subsequently the PLF has become one of the hardest-line groups opposing any peace negotiations. As a consequence, PLF members have fought with both the GC and with Fatah, and have attempted to disrupt the operations of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon: in July 1978 the PLF kidnapped some 40 UNIFIL troops, who were released only after Fatah forcefully intervened. The PLF was also active in the "spook war" that developed between the PLO and Iraq, a war involving the assassination of several PLO and Iraqi officials (for details see Chapter 10). In an apparent reprisal for the

PLF's role in this, an entire apartment house containing PLF headquarters was blown up in August 1978, with casualties running at over 100 dead.(27)

Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

The origins of this group are not entirely clear. According to one account, the PSF was originally formed prior to the 1967 war by a major in the Jordanian army. This officer, known only by the code name "Khalid," was said to have been killed in 1968 by Israeli forces.(28) Quandt puts the date of its founding in early 1968, and identifies Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah as its founder.(29) Still other sources suggest that the PSF had some links either with the ANM or with the PFLP, and that it had split off from that organization in 1969. In any event, the PSF's first major act, a grenade attack against the Athens offices of El Al, took place in November 1969.(30)

The PSF is one of the smaller groups, numbering between 150 and 200 men. Its present leaders are Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, a West Bank landowner, and Dr. Samir Ghawshaw. Abu Gharbiyah is a much older man and has been in semi-retirement for some time. Ghawshaw is both younger and currently much more aggressive in terms of the PSF's political and military orientation. Not much information is available on either man. What little there is concerns Gharbiyah. He is a Jerusalemite, an ex-Ba'thist, and was at one time a member of Sulayman al-Nabulsi's National Front in Jordan. His early career was spent as a school teacher in Hebron. He fought in the 1948 war, during which his two brothers were killed and he himself was injured, and for which he has become something of a Palestinian hero.(31) In 1964 he and PSF co-leader Ghawshaw were delegates to the 1964 PLO Congress. But he later left the PLO in 1969 after Fatah took it over.(32)

The PSF itself has had a checkered career. It was, apparently, originally a Jordanian-based group and one that recruited from Jordanians and non-Palestinians as well as Palestinians. The members of the party that attacked the El Al offices included an Armenian from Amman and a Circassian from the West Bank (this might also indicate that the PSF is representative of Christians as well).(33) It apparently received support from a variety of sources: some of its equipment came from China; other sources appear to have been Egypt and Iraq.(34) Its modus operandi paralleled that of the PFLP, in that its military doctrine stressed the notion that Israeli interests should be attacked on a world-wide level.

At the sixth session of the PNC, the PSF was given two seats; the same month (September 1969), it joined PASC. In July 1971, in the wake of the Jordanian war, the PSF joined Fatah. However, it split off late in 1973, and later joined the Rejection Front in 1974. On July 5, 1975 the PSF kidnapped U.S. Army Col. Ernest Morgan (the most spectacular of a series of kidnappings in Lebanon undertaken by the PSF). In this instance, the PSF used the name of a fictitious Lebanese group, the

Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization – a name close enough to that of another group to cause considerable confusion. Ultimately, the PSF was persuaded to hand Morgan over to 'Abd al-'Abbas of the GC, but the whole affair seriously hindered PLO attempts to reach some modus vivendi with the U.S.(35) In 1976, it allied with the PFLP and ALF in opposing Syrian Christian forces in Lebanon.

Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine (AGLP)

The Action Group(36) for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by Dr. Isam Sartawi (a surgeon) broke away from Fatah in May 1969. Sartawi had originally attempted to work within the Fatah framework, but he found that difficult for a variety of reasons as yet unclear, then apparently moved to join the ALF, and finally formed his own group.(37) From the beginning, however, the AGLP was considered to be closely identified with the Egyptians, even to the extent that it was considered an Egyptian-sponsored group.(38)

The AGLP was an extremely small group, numbering at best some 50-odd commandos. Nevertheless, it appears to have had a political importance out of proportion to its numbers. It joined the Unified Command in February 1970 and signed the Unity Formula of May 6, 1970. Although the AGLP was allotted only one seat in the Palestine National Council which met from May 30 to June 4, Sartawi was included as one of the six members of the secretariat established by the Central Committee in June.

Although the AGLP favored extremist measures such as attacking El Al aircraft outside the borders of Israel,(39) Sartawi in June 1970 criticized the PFLP for holding foreigners as hostages, on the grounds that they are "guests in our country."(40) However, like the PSF and other small groups, the exigencies of organizational survival required that it engage in "spectaculars." In this connection, the AGLP had the reputation of being an extremely virile group, perhaps tougher than any other group with the possible exception of the GC. Interestingly enough, its adherents became known as the "Phantoms of the Jordan Valley" because of their practice of utilizing exotic camouflage.

After the Jordanian war, the AGLP apparently fell victim to a concerted effort by Fatah to end the existence of a number of independents. The incident which triggered a Fatah crackdown was the murder of a Fatah member in early January 1971. Three AGLP members were held responsible, and Fatah arrested two of them at once. Sartawi, who was in Beirut at the time of the murder, was also seized and later deported to Damascus.(41) Later, Salah Khalaf reported that the AGLP had been dissolved.(42) Nevertheless, by 1976 Sartawi had become one of 'Arafat's top aides, and was acting as the PLO's ambassador without portfolio in western Europe. In this capacity, Saratawi headed a PLO delegation (which included the late Sa'id Hammami and 'Izz al-Din Qalaq) that held talks with Israeli public figures beginning in 1976. However, Sartawi apparently broke with

'Arafat in early 1980 because of the latter's insistence that Sartawi return a peace prize that he had been given as a result of these activities.

Palestine Arab Organization (PAO)

Major Ahmad Za'rur, a Jordanian who had been one of the two military chiefs of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, seceded along with Ahmad Jibril, and set up his own organization. Initially Za'rur's group identified itself as the PFLP General Command B. It joined the Palestine Armed Struggle Command in August 1969, more than two months ahead of Jibril's group, and the Unified Command in February 1970. Under the name of the Palestine Arab Organization (or Arab Palestine Organization),(43) Za'rur's group signed the Unity Formula of May 6, 1970, attended the meetings of the Palestine National Council from May 30 to June 4, and received one seat on the new Central Committee.

Politically, Za'rur was said to be in the camp of President 'Abd al-Nasir of the UAR.(44) Like Jibril's General Command, the PAO was a small group (about 100 men) which concentrated on military activity. But unlike the GC, it did not engage in headline-catching exploits, and its influence was limited. The PAO was absorbed by Fatah in 1971.(45)

ARAB-SPONSORED ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to selectively supporting different Palestinian organizations, some Arab governments have created their own guerrilla organizations. Originally, a number of governments opted for this strategy: Jordan (the PNLF) Syria, (at least seven or eight groups) Iraq, Egypt, and possibly even Saudi Arabia (Fatah Islam).(46) Most of these organizations were short-lived, ultimately disappearing or being absorbed by some of the larger Palestinian groups. Currently, only two such sponsored organizations remain active, al-Sa'iqah (Syria) and the Arab Liberation Front (Iraq). An Egyptian group, Arab Sinai Organization, was formed at about the same time as al-Sa'iqah and the ALF, but it has either been disbanded or absorbed into the regular Egyptian military structure.

Historically, these groups are part of the political pattern existing since 1948 whereby Arab governments have sought to defuse potential Palestinian political alienation by either: (a) organizing Palestinian militants and thus controlling their activities by essentially bureaucratic techniques; or (b) sponsoring Palestinian groups as "showpieces" of Arab concern over the Palestinian issue. Most of these groups therefore operate to further the national interests of the states involved, and their direction and control apparently comes from very high levels of the governments concerned.

There is, indeed, a good deal of cynicism and manipulation in the creation of these groups. But this is tempered by an element of genuine partisanship on the side of the Palestinians, and by the political constraints posed by the necessity of securing the cooperation of Palestinian recruits: when an Arab-sponsored organization (such as al-Sa'iqah in 1976) appears to be acting contrary to the perceived interests of the Palestinians, it risks mass defection from its ranks.(47) In addition, if such a group becomes perceived as solely the surrogate of an Arab government, it loses any political leverage in intra-Resistance politics that it might otherwise have.

Al-Sa'iqah (48) (Vanguards of the War of Popular Liberation)

Al-Sa'iqah is the current Syrian-sponsored guerrilla organization. Its strength in 1974 was estimated at around 2,000 men, and it is probably much larger at present. In the wake of the 1975-1976 war in Lebanon, al-Sa'iqah has emerged as a major factor in Resistance politics: its previous Secretary General, Zuhayr Muhsin, was Syria's candidate to replace 'Arafat as head of the PLO.(49)

Al-Sa'iqah is, technically speaking, the military wing of the Vanguards of the Popular War of Liberation, and in this sense occupies the same relationship to the Vanguards that al-'Asifah does to Fatah. The Vanguards, in turn, is an offshoot of the Syrian Ba'th Party. It was established just after the June 1967 War, and consisted of Palestinian cadres drawn from the Syrian Ba'th ranks. Some of these recruits fought in the Golan Heights during the war.(50) Prior to this time, the Syrians had backed Fatah, and at one point had promoted the ANM. In line with the general Syrian strategy of encouraging a war of popular liberation with Israel, the Syrians had created or backed a number of commando organizations.

The strategy of operating through a series of Palestinian front organizations had its origins in the activities of Syrian intelligence in the late 1950s. This clandestine orientation was reinforced by the agreements of the 1964 and later Arab summits. The thrust of these summit decisions was to prohibit any Arab state to move openly against Israel. Hence the Syrians were bound by Arab policy (and by common sense) not to attack Israel. Instead, the Ba'thist regime, which needed to present the picture of unending intransigence toward Israel, as much for its own ideological orientation as for its claims to legitimacy, opted for other tactics. In early 1965 the Syrians launched an organization called the "Palestinian Crescent" whose members were described as an underground organization with headquarters at Beirut. At the same time, the Syrians publicly proclaimed their support for this organization. This activity, in turn, drew heavy criticism from Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, all of which were extremely concerned about the probability of Israeli reprisals. Consequently the "Palestine Crescent" scheme was quickly dropped and Syrian resources were put in the service of Fatah.(51)

Following the war, a series of Ba'th congresses were convened to consider a strategy for coping with the military and political consequences of the Israeli victory. The ninth Ba'th Congress, held in Damascus in September 1967, opted for a strategy propounded by the more radical members of the neo-Ba'th, that of continuing a guerrilla campaign against Israel. The upshot was the creation of the Vanguards, whose mission was to educate the masses, and to organize and mobilize them for the ultimate "destiny-shaping battle."(52)

In May 1968, following the dramatic increase in Fatah popularity after the battle of al-Karamah and the coalescence of the PFLP, Syrian-dominated Palestinian Ba'thist organizations from Kuwayt, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Syria itself were called together in a Palestinian preparatory congress. This congress created an alternative organization to both Fatah and the PFLP: the United Palestinian Organization of the Ba'th Party, which metamorphosed into al-Sa'iqah.(53)

The political program of the Vanguards, and later al-Sa'iqah, revolved around a number of assertions:

1. The Palestinian revolution is an integral part of the Arab revolution.
2. The destiny of Palestine is historically decided along with the future of conditions surrounding Palestine.
3. The non-nationalist nature of the Palestinian-Jordanian bourgeoisie has made it a direct ally of the forces of colonialism and imperialism.
4. The organization believes that the nature and depth of the battle will create the revolutionary conditions necessary for the birth of an Arab liberation movement that will cover the whole Arab region through a popular liberation war which would herald the birth of the new Arab and the liberated Arab socialist society.
5. The condemnation and repudiation of all "capitulationist" and "liquidationist" settlements of the Palestine problem, because they all call for the acceptance and recognition of the Zionist entity in Palestine.(54)

The decision to create al-Sa'iqah, however, was not entirely the product of concern to counter Palestinian organizations; it was also the outcome (as was the creation of the ALF) of local Syrian politics. In this case, the ruling faction of the Ba'th found itself confronting an alienated population. Ba'th leadership was drawn preeminently from minority groups in Syria, more specifically from Shi'a Muslims. The Shi'as were considered on the verge of being heretics by the majority of orthodox, Sunni Muslims. Tensions between majority and minority communities had existed for some time, and had in fact greatly contributed to the complexity of factors which led to the escalation of 1967.(55) With the less than spectacular showing of Syrian forces during the war, the already weak legitimacy of the Ba'th government was eroded to almost a nullity.

The need to create some external diversion, especially one that seemed to bolster the regime's image of doing something about the defeat, therefore became a political imperative. In addition, the Ba'th leadership itself was badly split over the issues of responsibility for the defeat and the policies which should be followed in its wake. One faction, the military professionals, was dominated by Minister of Defense and Air Force Commander, Lt. General Hafiz al-Asad and his associate, Army Chief of Staff Major General Mustafa Talas. The other, composed of civilian ideologues of the Ba'th hierarchy, was led by Ba'th Assistant Secretary General, Major General Salah Jadid.(56) The two groups were at loggerheads over a number of issues. Al-Asad and Talas, who had consistently pulled for a stronger Syrian armed forces, wanted to keep the military out of internal politics. At the same time, al-Asad favored cooperation with Egypt and other Arab states in the war against Israel, especially in terms of a military alliance which would create an "eastern front" of Arab forces and bolster Syria's strategic position. Jadid inclined more toward a go-it-alone policy as far as the other Arab states were concerned. He advocated giving priority to ideological politics, especially to confronting Iraqi Ba'th opponents.

This intra-elite conflict remained behind closed doors until February 1969, when al-Asad and the military began openly pressing for military cooperation with Iraq as part of the eastern-front alliance. Despite the extreme opposition of the political wing, al-Asad's forces won, and succeeded in getting Iraqi forces stationed in Syria itself. To regain lost ground Jadid and his followers sought to bolster the fighting strength of al-Sa'iqah and to utilize it to counter the regular military establishment.(57)

Not surprisingly, this led to a tug of war with al-Sa'iqah in the middle. Al-Sa'iqah itself was technically under the control of the Ba'th civilians, but the military acted to counter this by bringing the training, arms supplies, and operational planning under the command of the military. However, in courting the favor of al-Sa'iqah, both al-Asad and Jadid helped to expand its size and improve its quality. Some elements in al-Sa'iqah, however, were said to be independent of both factions, and determined to devote the full energy of the organization to operations against Israel.

The ill-concealed leadership crisis came to open conflict between September and November 1970. As the fighting in Jordan escalated and appeared to be moving steadily in favor of the Jordanian army and against the Resistance, the civilian faction intensified its pressure on the Syrian military to intervene. Even though al-Asad and his colleagues bitterly resisted, the Jadid group managed to win over sufficient support to dispatch between 200 and 300 tanks to northern Jordan. However, al-Asad, using his position as Air Force Commander, withheld air support for the Syrian armor (which was disguised as PLA units). The upshot of this split was that the full weight of Syrian power was not thrown into battle; the armor committed was exposed to Jordanian air attacks; and the Syrian offensive ultimately collapsed with substantial

loss of men and equipment.(58) In the aftermath of this debacle, al-Asad's men staged a bloodless coup in November 1970, and al-Sa'iqah was brought firmly under the control of al-Asad and the Syrian military.

The coup reduced any possibility of al-Sa'iqah's political independence (and thus threat to the Syrian government), but it did not dramatically alter al-Sa'iqah's military role. From the first, al-Sa'iqah had been one of the more aggressive Resistance organizations in terms of the intensity and quantity of its military activities. And in this respect, al-Sa'iqah's military exploits have always been rather calculated extensions of general Syrian policy vis-a-vis Israel.

The Syrian government at first encouraged al-Sa'iqah to launch its operations from Jordan or Lebanon rather than from Syria itself. Although Syria was the only Arab country bordering on Israel which rejected the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, Syria's cease-fire lines long remained quieter than those of Jordan or Egypt. In the early months of 1970, with the advocates of a combative policy towards Israel having gained the upper hand, Syrian military activity escalated. In February Syrian aircraft overflew Haifa, and early in April Syrian and Israeli forces fought a ground and air battle lasting seven or eight hours, during which the Syrians for the first time shot down an F-4 (Phantom). This escalation by Syrian regular forces was coupled with stepped-up al-Sa'iqah operations, this time from Syria as well as from the neighboring countries.

Al-Sa'iqah's first publicized attack occurred on September 13, 1968: on the night of September 13, al-Sa'iqah commandos attacked and destroyed the military police headquarters of a newly established Israeli kibbutz near the town of Baniyas in the Golan Heights. This initial attack established, it might be added, a pattern of Syrian response to any Israeli activities which appeared to be aimed at colonizing the Heights.(59)

In September 1969 al-Sa'iqah officials held a press conference at which they described the structure and goals of al-Sa'iqah:

> Al-Sa'iqah is the organization of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Its fundamental mission is to exercise war of popular liberation. The place for this is Palestine. The organization is a nucleus for developing the current commando operations into a war of popular liberation.
>
> The organization's nature is Palestinian. It exercises its activity through the joint Palestinian action along with the other commando organizations. Al-Sa'iqah's goal is the liberation of usurped Arab territory, and also to pursue the socialist course to the end. This is because the left alone is able to confront the forces of imperialism and Zionism.
>
> Al-Sa'iqah's forces are spread out in all the areas surrounding the occupied territory. It has forces also inside the occupied territory itself.

> The organization has a general but mobile command. This command could be in Jordan for a while, and in Syria for another period. Its mobility is due to the nature of commando activity.
>
> The group has a local leadership, and has political wings in the Arab countries. These wings functions are to support the commando operations and to raise funds for Saiqa. Their purpose is not to play a political role in the Arab countries where they are stationed.(60)

Al-Sa'iqah originally operated in cooperation with some smaller organizations, most notably the Palestine Popular Liberation Front (which may or may not have been the same as the PLF) and the Galilee Organization, and in general utilized conventional guerrilla tactics following the strategic and tactical dictums of Chief of Staff (later Defense Minister) Mustafa Talas – that guerrilla forces should operate as auxiliaries to regular troops. In these, it often cooperated with Fatah.

It made an incursion into international terrorism in 1973. But it did so in an extremely cautious and circumspect manner, one calculated to minimize the risk of direct Israeli reprisal against Syria. On September 28, 1973 two fida'iyin styling themselves the "Eagles of the Palestine Revolution" hijacked a train carrying Jews from the USSR to transit facilities at Schoenau, Austria. Al-Sa'iqah's officials later admitted that the "Eagles" were actually an al-Sa'iqah unit. The fida'iyin took three emigres and an Austrian customs official hostage, releasing them only after Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky promised to discontinue transit facilities for Soviet Jews and close the Schoenau Camp itself.(61) Zuhayr Muhsin himself officially declared that the "Eagles" were, in fact, part of al-Sa'iqah, and declared that the raid was the first "computerized" international attack.(62)

The decision to mount this sort of attack was probably the consequence of a multitude of factors. The most prevalent current interpretation is that the attack was a sophisticated piece of diversion, a ploy to direct Israeli intelligence activities in the direction of further attacks on Israeli interests in Europe, away from the massing of Syrian and Egyptian troops in preparation for the attack on October 6.(63) Still there are other possible motives. The attack could be considered an attempt by Syrian leadership to divert domestic attention from the dramatic Israeli defeat of Syrian Air Force jets on September 13, 1973,(64) a defeat which paralleled the outcome of a similar air battle in April 1967, an outcome that cost the Syrian government so much prestige that it feared an overthrow. Or the attack could be seen as a Syrian attempt to escalate tensions in the area to a point where the likelihood of an Israeli preemptive strike became so great as to justify the impending Arab attack.

The Eagles were used again in July 1979. On July 13, a four-man squad seized the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, took a number of hostages, and issued the following demands:

(1) Turkey should sever its relationships with Egypt.
(2) Turkey should recognize the rights of the Palestinian people.
(3) Turkey should ask Egypt to release two Palestinian prisoners who were Eagles members .(65)

This time, however, there was a riposte directly against al-Sa'iqah: On July 24, al-Sa'iqah head Zuhayr Muhsin was shot while visiting Cannes, France. According to rumors in the Arab World, the assassins were from either Egyptian or Israeli intelligence, or both in combination(66) (see Chapter 10).

The Egyptian version is that the Eagle's attack in Ankara was the last of a series of attacks on Egyptian targets; that the Eagles had been reactivated by Syrian intelligence in January 1979, and had carried out a number of bombings, including attacks on the Cairo Sheraton and the Mena House. Consequently, the Egyptians had warned the Syrians to desist. In April 1979, Interior Minister Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il bluntly stated: "We have our means and methods, but it will not be in the same inhuman and cheap way you [Syrians] have planned against the Egyptian people."(67) (Muhsin himself had called for al-Sadat's assassination in November 1977, following al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.)

According to Quandt, al-Sa'iqah is more hierarchically organized than most groups, reflecting possibly its close connections with the Syrian military. Its members are believed to be mainly Palestinians (though one estimate places the proportion of Palestinians in al-Sa'iqah's ranks at about 60 percent). There are reports that many members, especially among the officers, are Syrians. It is also reported that members of the Ba'th in Syria are required to serve one month with al-Sa'iqah. In addition, members of groups affiliated with the party, and especially members of student groups, were asked to join al'Sa'iqah training courses. Observers who have seen al-Sa'iqah firsthand have been impressed by its size, standard of training, efficiency, and discipline. Some even consider its men to be even better trained than those of Fatah,(68) no doubt due to the participation of the Syrian army in the training program.

Al-Sa'iqah's original leaders appear to have been Dafi al-Jum'ani, a Jordanian from an East Bank Bedouin tribe, and Mahmud al-Ma'ayitah, also a Jordanian of Bedouin origin. Jum'ani was said to be the commander of al Sa'iqah forces in Jordan, and Ma'ayitah to be its overall political leader. In the course of the conflict between Jadid and al-Asad, however, these and other leaders lost their positions, were demoted, or were dismissed. At one point, al-Asad's forces arrested a number of al-Sa'iqah leaders thought to be pro-Jadid, and at the same time a number of al-Sa'iqah camps were placed under direct military control. As a consequence of this leadership shake-up (which extended into the middle of 1971), Zuhayr Muhsin emerged as al-Sa'iqah's commander. Muhsin himself apparently played a key role in expelling Jadid's followers from al-Sa'iqah. It is said that consequently he enjoyed the backing of a number of high Syrian military and political leaders,

including both Rif'at al-Asad, the President's brother and grey eminence behind the throne, and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam.(69)

Muhsin was born in Tulkarm in 1936 to a middle-class family. He remained in Tulkarm until the war of 1948, and then moved to Amman. He graduated from Amman Teachers College and taught mathematics in Jordanian high schools for several years. Muhsin joined the Ba'th party in 1953, and has remained politically active since then. He was arrested by the Jordanian government in 1957, again in 1959, and was ultimately expelled from Jordan. He went to Qatar, taught school there, but was again expelled in 1960 for his political activities. For the next eight years, between 1960 and 1968, Muhsin lived and taught in Kuwayt. While there, he met some of the founders of Fatah, and reportedly expressed his willingness to become a devoted worker for the Palestinian cause. In 1968 he moved to Damascus, became extremely active in Ba'thist politics, aligned himself with the al-Asad faction of the Syrian Ba'th, and joined the newly formed al-Sa'iqah. Between 1968 and 1971 Muhsin held a number of positions in the PLO and al-Sa'iqah. By 1971 he was appointed Secretary General of al-Sa'iqah. Later he was appointed head of the PLO's military department.

Muhsin, therefore, occupied a critical position in the Resistance in that he could establish contacts between a variety of factions. His relationship to the Syrian government was very close: he was privy to al-Asad's thinking (Muhsin was one of the few who were informed about the date of the October war). Because of his position, Muhsin was frequently mentioned as a potential replacement to 'Arafat.(70) The sensitivity of his role insofar as the Syrians were concerned was demonstrated by his replacements. Muhsin's previously consolidated positions were split up among four replacements: Mahmud al-'Azzam was given his PLO posts; Sami al-'Attari was named secretary general of al-Sa'iqah itself; Col. Salah Mu'ani was named head of al-Sa'iqah's military department; and Majid Muhsin (Zuhayr's brother) was made secretary of the al-Sa'iqah branch in Lebanon.(71) In addition to preventing any possible recombination of the powers that Muhsin held, these appointments appear to be geared to tie al-Sa'iqah even more firmly into al-Asad's faction within the Syrian government. Al-'Azzam for example, was a former assistant to Air Force Commander Naji Jamil, and the Syrian Air Force was considered the mainstream of the al-Asad regime. Al-'Azzam's appointment therefore represented a tactic to both ensure the loyalty of al-Sa'iqah itself and continue direct Syrian control of the PLO military department.

From its inception, al-Sa'iqah has been used aggressively by the Syrian government as its instrument. In Lebanon, al-Sa'iqah units triggered several crises between the commandos and the Lebanese army, beginning as early as April 1969 when al-Sa'iqah personnel took over a series of border police posts. The tactics used by the Syrians then have been used with variations up to the Syrian intervention in 1976: al-Sa'iqah forces would move in on Lebanese positions, with or without the cooperation of other commando groups; the Syrian government would then either use its ability to disrupt the Lebanese economy

by closing the Lebanese-Syrian borders, or threaten to send in PLA units to back up the commandos.(72)

This Syrian tactic was generally successful in getting the Lebanese government to back off and make concessions to the Resistance. In May 1973, this pressure was intensified by the threat of both Syrian and Israeli military action. As a consequence of fighting between Palestinians and Lebanese army units following the Israeli assassination of these Resistance leaders, Israel and Syria mobilized, and appeared about to invade. In 1976, when the oft-threatened Syrian intervention became a reality, al-Sa'iqah units served as the "point" for invading PLA and Syrian troops: al-Sa'iqah initially apparently moved into areas contiguous to opposing Resistance forces, and served as a buffer while other Syrian forces moved in behind it.

In Jordan, al-Sa'iqah leaders were said to have begun efforts to overthrow the Jordanian government early in 1969. Organizations directly affiliated with al-Sa'iqah or indirectly supported by the Syrian government contributed to the generally increasing anarchy that crescendoed in the civil war of 1970.

In relation to the PLO, al-Sa'iqah (especially since 1970) has served as an advocate of Syrian policies. Syrian strategy has been to pressure the Resistance on a multiplicity of fronts by using Syrian domination of the PLA, using Syrian control of the geographical locus of main Resistance base camps, and using al-Sa'iqah's political leverage to build anti-Fatah and anti-PFLP coalitions (such as a coalition of al-Sa'iqah, the GC, and the PRFLP).(73) Here al-Sa'iqah has been utilized to exploit differences between commando groups and Fatah, to take advantage of the existing tensions caused by Fatah attempts to exert control over Resistance activities. Equally, it has also been used to exploit divisions within the PFLP and to provide support for PFLP splinter groups.

Muhsin himself played a critical role in getting the PLO to accept the Syrian plan to establish an eastern front against Israel. During the course of an executive council meeting held in late September 1973, Muhsin argued that it would be fruitless for the PLO to defy the combined power of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan; that the PLO leadership should be guided by an accurate assessment of the realities of Arab politics and not by emotions:

> Husayn of 1973 is that of 1970, but Jordan of 1973 is not necessarily that of 1970 . . . we are not calling on the people to forget the September (1970) tragedy. When presidents al-Asad and al-Sadat met Husayn, I do not believe they did so. Rulers are not guided by their personal feelings but by their political responsibilities. Al-Asad and al-Sadat meet Husayn or others because they are in need of Jordanian territory and Jordan's support.(74)

Later, in connection with the Lebanese fighting, Muhsin was said to have utilized his role as head of the PLO military department to

influence the extent of Palestinian involvement in the fighting. He apparently was the central contact on the Palestinian side for talks with Syrian leaders concerning the Lebanese situation. In this respect, some sources suggested that prior to his death Muhsin had become the dominating figure in the PLO, and that 'Arafat had been reduced to a "rubber stamp."(75)

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

The ALF is the Iraqi Ba'th party's answer to al-Sa'iqah. As such, its politics are determined more by Syrian-Iraqi tensions than anything else. These tensions (or, more accurately, rivalry) for control of the Ba'th movement as a whole have their origins in a complicated set of changes and splits inside the Syrian Ba'th in the middle 1960s. Basically, the Syrian section of the internationalist wing of the party was overthrown in 1966 by a much more local, "Syria first"-oriented faction. Many of the leaders of the internationalist wing, including at one point one of the founders of the Ba'th, Michel Aflaq, ended up in Baghdad.(76) The divisions thus created have remained unabated.(77)

In addition the ALF is also a response to legitimacy problems. After 1967, the situation in Iraq was as unstable as that existing in any state which had actually been defeated, more so in fact since the resulting wave of widespread alienation from the regime occurred in a political context in which the basic legitimacy of the government had never really been established. The political and social tensions left over from the early years of the 'Abd al-Karim Qasim regime had never been resolved; in 1958 and 1959, major segments of the Iraqi society, most of the existing political elite and much of its middle-level technical and managerial strata had been destroyed by incredible outbursts of planned and unplanned mob violence.

The result was a situation where a series of successor governments, beginning in 1963, ruled by force over a hostile population. When the Iraqi section of the Ba'th took over in 1968, its members found themselves in a very difficult political situation, to say the least. In fact, a sort of paranoia seemed to have taken hold of them; all groups in the society became suspect. Therefore, the activities of the Resistance, an organized force with outside contacts and sources of support, must have seemed especially dangerous.(78)

In January 1969 the Iraqi Pan Arab (Ba'th) Command established the ALF, and at the same time moved to restrict the activities of other guerrilla organizations operating in the Iraqi territory. In February the Iraqi government forbade the members of these organizations to circulate in towns while in uniform and under arms, and ordered them to move their camps to the area next to the Jordanian border. The government also decreed that the guerrilla organizations should channel all their communications with it through the ALF. 'Arafat, and later Habash, visited Baghdad and succeeded in temporarily smoothing over the resultant crisis, and the Iraqi Minister of the Interior at one point

declared, "We are with Fatah forever."(79) The Iraqi government has, however, continued to show special favor to the ALF and crack down on the other organizations.(80)

The official reason given for the creation of the ALF was that of "Arabizing" the Palestinian movement. In its first statement, the ALF command detailed its raison d'etre:

> The two years that have elapsed since the defeat have underlined the need of the commando movement for a new leap to continue the glorious march started by heroes of this nation who have chosen the path of armed struggle and to make the resistance movement stronger in the face of the dangers of isolating and surrounding the Arab revolution in Palestine. Such dangers are especially clear in the attempt to keep within its regional (Palestinian) limits and to sever the artery which links it to the springs of ability and power of the Arab masses in the hope that the day would come when the revolution in Palestine could be cut down.(81)

The ALF has never been one of the larger groups. Its strength is estimated at something over 1,000 men, but this figure is subject to fluctuation because of the Iraqi government's tactic (in Lebanon) of disguising regular army units as ALF forces.(82) Part of its small size is no doubt due to the reluctance of the Iraqi government to enlarge an organization which might conceivably turn against it. Part is also due to the fact that the ALF recruits mostly non-Palestinians – mostly Iraqis, Lebanese, and Jordanians – and consequently does not have any real source of recruitment in the refugee camps.(83)

In addition, the ALF has been faced with a deployment problem. After the expulsion of the guerrillas from Jordan, Syria became the main base. But due to Syrian-Iraqi hostilities, Syrian bases were closed to the ALF. Even before the Jordanian suppression of the Palestinians in 1969, the Syrians arrested the later-expelled ALF members, and the Syrians have periodically confiscated arms being transferred across Syrian territory to ALF units. The fighting in Lebanon in 1975/1976, which found ALF forces opposing Syrian-backed forces, simply intensified these problems.(84)

Until the Lebanese war, ALF units were therefore largely restricted to south Lebanon. Even here, however, there was an anomalous command situation: the bases themselves were said to be under the control of the pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party in Lebanon, but operational decisions were made by an independent military leadership.(85)

As a consequence, the ALF has not been especially active in a military sense – although it cooperated with Fatah on some occasions, and after 1974 cooperated with the PFLP. After an attack on the Israeli settlement of Kfar Yuval on June 15, 1975, the ALF released a statement indicating its intention to oppose all peace settlements:

> We, members of the martyr Muhammad Jabir Nabhan, 'Abd al-Adib, group, which is one of the ALF groups operating inside the occupied lands, are staging this revolutionary operation, since our Front, which is one of the factions of steadfastness, within the Palestinian revolution, is committed to struggling against all schemes of surrender and capitulation, which aim at sanctioning the racist and fascist entity on our Arab land and on the ruins of our national people.(86)

Although restricted in deployment, the ALF has apparently had some small success in penetrating into the West Bank. In November 1976 Israeli security forces arrested some 40 persons suspected of belonging to a number of Resistance organizations, among them the ALF.(87) On April 7, 1980, an ALF unit attacked a kibbutz school at Misgav Aam, in a raid which appeared to have the same goal as the 1975 attack, but in addition demonstrated some ability to mount attacks within Israel.

Because of the high percentage of non-Palestinians in its membership, and corresponding suspicion that it was totally an instrument of Iraqi interests, the ALF has had an uneasy relationship with other Resistance groups. The ALF joined the Palestine Armed Struggle Command in 1969 and the Unified Command in February 1970, and it signed the Unity Formula of May 6, 1970. Unlike al-Sa'iqah, however, it had no representative listed in the Palestinian delegation that went to the Soviet Union in February 1970, and it was reported to have been represented at the Palestine National Congress from May 30 to June 4 only by an observer, on the basis that there were non-Palestinians among its leaders and members. In spite of these attempts to coalesce with other groups, the ALF was seriously hampered by Iraqi policy per se. During the fighting in Jordan in 1970, some 12,000 Iraqi troops remained inactive, in a situation where their intervention could have been a crucial turning point for the Palestinians. (The decision to remain inactive later split the Iraqi government.) Moreover, the ALF's creditability was weakened still further by the outspoken attitude of ALF leader Munir al-Razzaz who advocated a rapprochement with King Husayn.(88) In any event, the ALf joined the Rejection Front in 1974, thus placing itself in opposition to Fatah and the PLO.

The ALF's current secretary general is 'Abd al-Rahman Ahmad, who apparently took over from 'Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali in early 1977. The dominating figure in the ALF, however, throughout most of its existence has been al-Kayyali, who himself took over from the first ALF Secretary General Zayd Haydar in a shake-up following the Jordanian civil war. Like a number of other Resistance leaders, al-Kayyali is highly educated and a prolific writer: he has published a number of books on the Palestine issue, as well as numerous articles. Al-Kayyali was born in 1939, either in Haifa or Jaffa, to a middle-class family. He went to the American University of Beirut, and took a B.A. and an M.A. Later he studied at the University of London, where he took a Ph.D. in history.

Politically, al-Kayyali has been a Ba'thist for a number of years. When the ALF was formed, he joined it almost immediately, and ultimately rose to the position of secretary general. He is known for his hard line on negotiations, being emphatically opposed to any negotiations with Israel. At a rally held in Tripoli (Libya) on May 15, 1974, al-Kayyali stated the ALF's position on any future peace negotiations:

> In the October war, the Arab people destroyed the wall of despair and surrender and regained their self-confidence and their determination to realize liberation. But despite the triumphs realized in the war, it was followed by certain concessions made by some Arab regimes. Our stand in the face of these concessions is as follows:
>
> 1. The basic stand of rejecting all bargains and rejecting the recognition of the Zionist enemy . . .
> 2. Rejecting the inevitability of the settlement which is refused by the masses . . .
> 3. Rejecting the Geneva conference and refusing to have negotiations with the Zionist enemy, which should be the common stand of all groups.(89)

Arab Sinai Organization (ASO)

Egypt has also sponsored its own guerrilla group, the Arab Sinai Organization. Although the date of the formal establishment of the ASO is not certain,(90) its roots go back to late June 1967 when infiltrators with a knowledge of the terrain began penetrating by twos and threes into Sinai territory occupied by Israel in order to salvage weapons discarded or stockpiled during the war. The ASO, since its establishment, rapidly grew in numbers, introduced a training program, and secured better equipment. According to its communiques, it made frequent crossings of the Suez Canal to attack the Israeli garrisons in the Bar Lev Line and to range through the peninsula for hundreds of kilometers, as far north as al-'Arish and as far south as Sharm al-Shaykh.

Although the ASO issued many communiques on its military operations, effective secrecy was maintained with respect to the composition of its membership and its organizational structure. Israeli sources have alleged that its officers are Egyptians and that its rank and file are made up of Egyptians, Palestinians, and natives of the Sinai. But an Arabic source maintained that the roster was restricted to men from the peninsula.(91) This category includes Bedouins from tribes such as the Huwaytat, mountain people such as the Jabaliyah, and villagers from the oases. Egyptian officers took part in training the guerrillas and in operations.

During the "war of attrition" along the canal, 1968-1970, the Egyptian press gave extensive coverage to the activities of the ASO.

The reason for this appeared to be twofold: to bolster Egyptian morale at home by giving the appearance of taking the offensive against the Israelis in the Sinai; and to counter the growing popularity of the Palestinians. This latter concern became particularly acute after the battle of al-Karamah, when the Egyptian government was finally forced to recognize the Palestinians as a force in the Arab world. Even so, Egyptian spokesmen also went out of their way to downgrade the ultimate military effectiveness of guerrilla-type tactics in general.

'Abd al-Nasir himself had argued that such small-scale attacks could serve no real purpose except to trigger an unacceptably large Israeli "massive retaliation." Other Egyptian officials pointed out that guerrilla attacks alone were not militarily sufficient to compel an Israeli withdrawal; that the Sinai, in particular, lacked requisite cover for guerrilla operations. This Egyptian concern with the uncontrollable consequences of guerrilla activity was intensified by their assumption that any Israeli military response would be out of proportion to the original Arab military action. The combination of these twin concerns led to the genesis of the October 1973 strategy: on the one hand, containing Palestinian activities in terms of an eastern military front; on the other, attacking with conventional forces all along the canal on the largest possible scale.(92)

Egyptian armed forces also have regular commando units, the Special Forces (al-Sa'iqah). These have been active in the Sinai since 1956, and played a critical role in intelligence gathering during the period preceding the October war. In particular, these units brought back descriptions of Israeli Sinai defenses which allowed the Egyptians to build detailed models of the Bar Lev Line fortifications.(93) Whether or not the ASO took part in these operations is not known. But very probably, ASO missions paralleled those of the Special Forces, and it may be that ASO units took part in the extensive Egyptian sorties behind Israeli lines during the October war.

Shortly after the official announcement of the existence of the ASO (December 1968), al-Ahram published a detailed description of its tactics: After gaining access to the Sinai, the commandos set up hideouts where they stayed for considerable lengths of time, coming out only to launch attacks. Carrying no military equipment or explosives, they picked these up from caches already buried in the desert. Engagements with Israeli forces were generally avoided; the preferred tactic was to plant mines and explosives. Target areas included, but were not limited to, al-'Arish, Bir al-'Abd and Rummanah in the north, al-Shatt, Sadr al-Hitan, Abu Rudays, Ras Sadr, Wadi Firan and al-Tur in the west, Sharm al-Shaykh and Dahb in the south, and Qasima in the east.(94)

Palestine National Liberation Front (PNLF)

Almost nothing is known about this group except that it appears to have been a Jordanian-sponsored group. It apparently was formed sometime

in 1968, presumably after the battle of al-Karamah. Its size, recruitment base, and leadership, however, are not clear. In June 1971 the PNLF declared that it was ending its merger with Fatah and terminating what it described as a "blood pact" with the larger organization. This act of defiance was given some prominence by Jordanian media. However, in 1973 the PNLF again merged with Fatah.(95)

Other than these incomplete facts, the only other item of interest about the PNLF was the fact that one of its members, Salih 'Abd Allah Sariyah, a Palestinian (with an Iraqi passport) was identified as the ring leader of an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, as part of a raid on the Egyptian Military Technical Academy in Heliopolis, April 18, 1974. The plot was said (by the Egyptians) to have been organized by a combination of Muslim Brethren and Libyan officials. Sariyah was also said to have been a member of both the Muslim Brethren and the Jordanian Communist Party (unlikely as that may seem) as well as the PNLF.(96)

6 Resistance Organizations IV: Communist and Communist Affiliate Groups

Communist groups play a role in Resistance politics similar to that of the independents and Arab-sponsored groups, but with a difference: where the independents and Arab groups are either linkages or surrogates, or both, for Arab political actors, communist groups are the uneasy agents of a non-Arab power, the USSR.(1) Therefore, to the extent that these groups have any influence, it is an extension of USSR influence on the Resistance. Even though the influence on the Resistance is not especially strong, there are four organizations with varying degrees of communist participation: the now defunct Partisans, the ACO, the PNF, and the Front for Participation in the Palestinian Revolution. The first two are directly related to Arab Communist parties; the PNF is a nationalist-communist coalition, and the Front for Participation is an even broader alliance of communists and leftists.

The role of Communist parties on the Resistance has been limited by roughly the same factors which have curtailed communist political influence in the Arab world in general: (a) the ideological unattractiveness of communism per se, in the sense that communism is perceived throughout the Arab world as antithetical to Islam.(2) This perception is carried over into Palestinian politics. (b) In a specifically ideological context, communism as a call to action has been preempted on the left by radical Arab nationalism, and has been blocked on the right by political Islam of the Muslim Brethren. In the Resistance itself, communism is in competition with the nationalism of Fatah and the "Marxisms" of the ANM and its Palestinian offshoots. (c) The "natural" target groups for communist appeals are numerically small: socially mobilized and alienated populations, intellectuals, professionals, students, and some minorities. These groups, of course, are also targets for other political appeals. Insofar as the Resistance is concerned, these groups have largely been co-opted by indigenous Palestinian organizations. (d) Communist parties have consistently had to contend with the problems posed by USSR policies in the area, specifically the often

uneasy relationship between the USSR and Arab states. Communist influence in the Resistance has been sharply reduced by the USSR's caution in dealing with the issue of Palestine. Finally, Communist parties are badly split among themselves, and these splits are carried over into the communist-Palestinian relationships.(3) As with other sponsored groups, Communist Palestinian organizations have a built-in tension between the demands of Communist ideology and Palestinian nationalism. Perhaps even more than Arab-sponsored groups, communist organizations suffer from this tension because the difference between Communism as an imported ideology and Palestinian nationalist concepts is sharper and more obvious than between Palestinian and other Arab ideologies. In any event, communist groups tend to have little staying power per se in the Resistance. As a consequence, communist strategists have shown an increasing tendency to operate in terms of national fronts, where the specifically Communist component is clothed in nationalist trappings.

PARTISAN FORCES (AL-ANSAR)

The creation of an Arab Communist-sponsored commando organization in November 1968 marks USSR recognition of the potential importance of the Resistance. Since then, pro-Moscow Arab Communist parties have moved to penetrate that Resistance, either by directly creating their own version of a Palestinian commando group or by moving to take control of Palestinian political organizations such as the PNF in the occupied territories. Arab Communist parties have also become very active in supporting the Front for Participation in the Palestine Revolution; several members of Arab Communist party central committees have seats in its Executive Council.

Prior to 1970, pro-Soviet Communist parties faithfully reflected the USSR's ambivalent line toward the Palestinians. On one hand, they strongly supported UN Resolution 242, this in line with a general USSR attempt to create the impression that it was wholeheartedly backing the Arab cause. But at the same time, they warned against adventurism in the Resistance, this again in consonance with USSR worries about an uncontrolled escalation into another Arab-Israeli war. After a meeting in July 1968, Arab Communist parties issued a statement in which they spoke of dangerous trends in the Arab national-liberation movement. The first of these was, in an obvious reference to Fatah, "the romantic and reckless course advocated by progressive national patriotic elements of the petty bourgeoisie."(4)

A Jordanian Communist, writing something over a year later, became more specific. He regarded the commandos as reckless because "neither in Jordan nor in any other Arab country are conditions ripe for guerrilla activity in or outside the occupied territories."(5) In commenting on the resistance, he was particularly critical of Fatah:

> Some leaders, especially of Fatah, come from the reactionary Moslem Brotherhood and are still under its influence.

> . . . The support of the guerrillas by Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt, the collections of funds by Saudi princes and influential figures in Kuwayt, and the support of Fatah (especially by Saudi Arabia) are a clear indication of the ties that some of the Fatah leaders maintain with those two countries and of why Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt encourage the guerrillas.(6)

This writer went on to say, however, that the Arab Communists nevertheless would continue their dialogue with the leaders and members of commando organizations – thus, in effect, leaving the option open as to future relationships between Communists and Palestinians.

As the Soviet government gradually shifted qualified support toward the Palestinian Resistance, the Arab Communist parties kept in step. In November 1969 the parties in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq formed an organization under the name of the Partisan Forces. Veteran Communist leaders such as Khalid Bakdash of Syria, Fu'ad Nasir of Jordan, Nicola Shawi of Lebanon, and 'Aziz Muhammad of Iraq were responsible for this reversal of policy. One of their main objectives was to halt the gains in popular support being made by pro-Peking splinter groups which stood on the side of the commandos without reservations.

Nevertheless, the Partisans were not readily accepted by Resistance leaders, as a number of issues remained between them. First and foremost of these were decided differences over the interpretation of Resolution 242. The USSR and its affiliate parties took the position that Israel was here to stay; that Resolution 242 meant only an Israeli withdrawal to some unspecified territorial boundary. The Palestinians, on the other hand, were committed to the replacement of Israel by some form of democratic, secular state in Palestine. To avoid open confrontation over this issue, the first statement of the Partisans, published on March 3, 1970, simply neglected to mention 242. As a consequence, the Partisans were split from the Resistance from the start, and consistently found themselves in the position of having to defend USSR policy.

In the course of an interview with al-Sayyad in June 1970, a spokesman for the Partisans was at some pains to refute criticism of the USSR, particularly criticism which suggested that the U.S. and USSR were following the same policy: that neither was interested in a genuine solution to the Palestine problem.

> The Palestinian Arab people and all of the Arab peoples in general, in their struggle for their legitimate rights, future and progress, and in their bitter and hard fight against the forces of imperialism, reaction and Zionism find on their side the forces of peace and socialism, led by the Soviet Union, giving them every assistance and support, politically, economically and militarily . . . From this, one could rest assured and secure with regard to the efforts and stands of the forces of peace and socialism, our friends. It is neither wise nor in our interest to be trapped in the imperialist-Zionist propaganda which equates between friend

and foe, or between the stands of the Soviet Union and the United States.(7)

After the establishment of the Unified Command in February 1970, the Partisan Forces applied for membership, and the group has also repeatedly sought to be included in the Palestine National Council. Fatah, despite its growing rapprochement with the USSR, was most instrumental in keeping the Partisans out of the PLO structure. Ostensibly, Fatah opposition was based on the fact that Arab Communists had not abandoned their tacit acceptance of UN Resolution 242, and that they had not demonstrated any great willingness to engage the Israelis in battle. More germane to this opposition, however, was another factor: the heavy Muslim Brethren component in Fatah membership. The Brethren were ideologically (although not tactically) opposed to Arab Communists, seeing them as forces of atheism inimical to Islam. In addition, Fatah received most of its operating funds from Saudi Arabia, whose king at the time, Faysal, was unalterably opposed to Communism in the Arab World. A working alliance with the Partisans, therefore, would have had serious consequences on Fatah-Saudi relationships.

By contrast, leftist Palestinian organizations were more inclined to bring the Partisan Forces into the fold. In an interview on June 11, 1970, George Habash hailed the Communist organization as "revolutionary, progressive, anti-imperialist, and anti-Zionist" and said that it would add "a new force" to the Resistance. But at the same time, he indicated that the Partisan Forces should prove themselves in combat action against Israel.(8)

Nor did the Partisans serve the goal of preventing further schisms in the communist camp. The whole structure of Arab Communist Party organization appeared on the verge of complete fragmentation between the middle 1960s and 1974. The Egyptian party had dissolved itself; its members worked within the Egyptian single party, the ASU, as private individuals. Major splits occurred in the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Syrian parties. In addition, certain dissident factions began to link themselves directly with Palestinian groups. The situation was most critical in Lebanon. In 1970, Nasib Nimr's Maoist faction established links with the General Command; in 1971, leftists and commandos merged to form the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL) under the sponsorship of the PDF;(9) in 1972, the ACO emerged.

Militarily, the Partisans were not impressive either. Some observers in Jordan immediately prior to the September war noted that the Partisans' chief contribution to the struggle against Israel was wall posters. Although when the battles between the Jordanians and Palestinians broke out, Partisan Forces are said to have fought valiantly alongside Fatah. As a consequence of this, Fu'ad Nasir, who personally took part, was later invited to join the PNC. In any event, the Partisans' fortunes improved after Jordan. Fatah and al-Sa'iqah units in Lebanon began to cooperate more closely with the Partisans. Both Fatah and al-Sa'iqah channeled USSR arms to the Partisans.(10)

Even so, the Partisans remained a small organization, its active membership around fifty.(11) In this, it probably reflects the small size of Arab Communist parties in general (with the exception of the Iraqi party), which draw their cadres from a limited stratus of the Arab population. Early in 1972, its four sponsoring parties decided to break up the organization. Its members mostly joined Fatah in Lebanon, forming militia units militarily under Fatah command, but politically following the pro-Moscow Lebanese Communist Party. Others joined the PFLP, also in Lebanon.

With the demise of the Partisans, communist activity has increasingly concentrated on building a political base in the occupied territories. Both the regular Jordanian Communist Party and Rakah, the Israeli Arab Communist Party, have begun proselytizing. In addition, a Palestine Communist party, apparently independent from either Rakah or the JCP, began operations in December 1974. All of these communist factions are incorporated into the PNF.(12) The JCP was one of the first to push for the establishment of a Palestinian national authority, well before the PLO formally committed itself to this goal in June 1974.

ARAB COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (ACO)

Although little is known about this group, it appears to be an Arab version of either the Tupamaros or the SLA. Its tactics resemble those of both organizations. In June 1975, the ACO applied SLA tactics. After setting off two explosions, at Spinney's Centre, a Beirut supermarket, the ACO sent Spinney's a letter ordering it to distribute food to poor families in the immediate vicinity, on pain of further bombings. Spinney's apparently complied with the demand. The ACO's reported connections with other groups are suggestive, but obscure. While it has links with Palestinian individuals, it has no official links with Palestinian organizations.

The ACO's first known operations began in August 1974: it claimed credit for the bombing of the offices of the American Life Insurance offices in Sidon and then an explosion in the U.S. pavillion at the Damascus International Fair. Since then, it carried out a series of bombings in Lebanon and Syria, and ACO members were said to have taken part in antigovernment riots in Cairo in January 1975. In Lebanon and Kuwayt, its targets were mainly U.S. businesses and installations; in Syria, these varied to include attacks on the Egyptian and Jordanian embassies.

In July 1975, Syrian, Lebanese, and Kuwayti security forces arrested a number of ACO members. Syrian police identified one of those arrested, a Palestinian, 'Ali al-Ghadban, as the ACO's leader. But its membership was composed of Arabs from a number of states, and among them were a number of women. According to Lebanese military intelligence, the group's members were relatively well educated, with a number of university graduates. They were trained in Tupamaro tactics

and urban guerrilla warfare; their operations, hold-ups, and bombings were conducted with professional dispatch. They were armed with a variety of automatic weapons, pistols, hand grenades and explosives.(13) The group arrested in Syria attempted to shoot it out with police, much like the SLA did in Los Angeles. The members were equipped with false passports, mostly Iraqi, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian. In addition, the ACO possessed a number of cars registered in several Arab countries; some of these were used only on bombing missions; others were utilized for reconnaissance. Members moved around continually to avoid detection, changing their apartments and districts every forty-five days or so.(14)

The ACO was founded some years prior to its August attack. Its original aim was apparently to replace Arab Communist parties, which its founders considered both "defiant" and "revisionist." Its ideology called for terrorist violence from the outset, but it did not attempt to put this view into practice prior to 1974. According to one Arab source, the shift from theorizing about violence to its actual use took place directly after the ACO's amalgamation with the SRO (the Socialist Revolutionary Organization in Lebanon).(15)

The SRO, in turn, had been actively engaged in terrorism since 1970, and allegedly had contacts with both Fatah and the PLF. This group specialized in bank robberies, although their doctrines called for revolutionary action aimed at overthrowing Arab regimes. But it also planted explosives at the Institute for Arab Studies at Shumlan and at the Capitole Cinema (which was, ironically enough, showing the film Che Guevara at the time). The SRO's most famous raid took place at the height of the October 1973 war, when it attempted to hold up the Beirut branch of the Bank of America. Lebanese police rapidly moved in on the SRO, and its organization was dismantled; the surviving members then joined the ACO.(16)

The combined ACO-SRO then began to set up cells in a number of Arab countries, chief among them Lebanon, Syria, and Kuwayt. The organization, however, appeared to have been infiltrated by Iraqi intelligence,(17) and in turn utilized by the Iraqis to foment disturbances inside Syria. The Iraqi Ba'thist party has never really accepted its Syrian rival, and reportedly had even established links with al-Asad's opponents within the Syrian Ba'th, some of them the followers of ex-Secretary General Salah Jadid whom al-Asad overthrew in November 1970. This ideological tension had been aggravated for some time by Syrian plans to divert the Euphrates River, a diversion the Iraqis feared would deny them badly needed water. At one point the two countries were close to war over the issue, and Syrian and Iraqi troops were concentrated on their mutual border throughout 1975.

The matter became more complicated by the alleged involvement of the PFLP. In the course of their investigation of the ACO, the Syrians arrested three PFLP members. The arrests triggered a series of interchanges between the PFLP and al-Sa'iqah: the PFLP accused Syria of attempting to liquidate elements opposed to a peace settlement; al-Sa'iqah charged that the PFLP was not only on the Iraqi payroll, but

actively working to undermine Syrian steadfastness against Israel. Al-Sa'iqah attacks were joined by those of the Syrian Communist Party whose deputy secretary, Yusuf Faysal, issued a statement disclaiming all communist connections with the ACO and declaring that it was a PFLP front. Habash himself obliquely replied: "The PFLP is the PFLP, and the Arab Communist Organization is the Arab Communist Organization."(18)

The ACO, therefore, remains something of a mystery. Its exact membership figure is unknown: Some estimates place the number of ACO adherents at about 70; others suggest there are almost 1,200 activists.(19) Questions remain as to how Communist the ACO really is: regular Arab Communist parties have vehemently disavowed any connections with the ACO. Still other issues revolve around the ACO's purported connections with other radical groups. The ACO is said to have links with international terrorists operating out of Paris, with the late Muhammad Budiyah and with the South American terrorist known as "Carlos." Again, the ACO is reported to have Libyan backing (in addition to Iraqi). Egyptian spokesmen have consistently asserted that the ACO, as well as other unspecified "Communist" organizations, were responsible for the series of urban disorders that swept Egypt in the wake of the October 1973 war.(20)

Whatever the truth of these allegations, the ACO represents one aspect of the proliferation of independent terrorist groups which have mushroomed throughout the Middle East in the 1970s. The ACO's checkered career, its involvement in the internal and external politics of at least five states – Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwayt and Iraq – and its relations with Palestinian groups, illustrate the extreme complexity of Middle Eastern politics. Not only that, but the ACO exemplifies the interpenetration of the Palestinian issue into other areas that are far removed from the original Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It also illustrates the tendency for terror tactics to ramify outward from their originators and to become, in effect, a standard modus operandi for all political dissidents.

PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT (PNF) (21)

Officially proclaimed in August 1973, the PNF operates and recruits in the occupied territories. Unlike commando organizations, however, the PNF is dedicated to political action rather than armed struggle. Its membership is a composite of West Bank and Gaza residents and Israeli Arabs. As a consequence, it can function as an organizational link between two Palestinian communities separated since the creation of Israel. In addition, its leaders are represented on the PNC, the Central Committee, and the Executive Council. Three of the PNF's founders hold important PLO offices: 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar is PLO spokesman; Walid Qamhawi is head of the National Fund; and 'Abd al-Jawad Salih is head of the Office for Affairs of the Occupied Territories.

The PNF's emergence was due to the concurrence of two factors: first, a belated recognition by PLO leadership that some form of political base in the occupied territories was necessary, especially so if a diplomatic settlement somehow became politically possible (this recognition led to the adoption of PLO policies designed to forge ties with political cadres in the occupied territories); second, an ongoing process of social change, accelerated by the fact of Israeli occupation, which created a potential political alternative to an older elite of Palestinian leaders.

During intra-leadership debate following the Jordanian civil war, one of the major issues was that of the failure of the Resistance to engender popular support. On one hand, it was argued that commando groups had alienated the civilian population by their high-handed actions. On the other, it was said that PLO leadership was too narrowly based, that leaders from outside groups should be brought into the PLO. This demand that PLO leadership be restructured was insistently pressed by old-line PLO figures and by the PLA.(22) The issue was provisionally dealt with by inviting 100 independent personalities, including Jordanians, to attend the PNC session of February 1971.

The upshot was the adoption of a three-pronged strategy designed to broaden the PLO political base: the creation of a Palestine National Front involving populations on both sides of the Jordan; the promotion of an Arab front supporting the Palestinian revolution; and the development of an international base of support for Palestinian aims. As for the national front, Faruq al-Qaddumi described its importance:

> The Palestine National Front is very important. The creation of a cohesive and strong national front is considered to be a basic and decisive factor in our struggle . . . This means unity of action, common objectives, a common plan and unification of the popular base.(23)

Even before the PLO policy shift, a complex process of social change in the West Bank culminated in a sharp division between an older, traditional Palestinian elite, the literal and intellectual descents of the AHC, and a much younger group of Palestinian intellectuals. This younger group was, sociologically speaking, a local counterpart of an Arab worldwide phenomenon, the emergence of a new political stratum of lawyers, professionals of all sorts, and journalists. These, as a group, were Westernized in terms of their occupations and skilled in the use of mass-communication techniques.(24)

While the day-to-day politics varied, the points at issue between the two strata were constant. First, there was a generalization conflict. The younger Palestinians demanded increasing access to positions of prestige and power as a consequence of their modern skills. The older elite sought to block these demands by slowing down social change, by emphasizing traditional values and status considerations. Second, there was a political conflict: younger Palestinians identified with Arab nationalist aspirations; their elders opted for the values of Arab

conservatism. The younger group controlled the press and the street; the traditionals dominated local governments. Ultimately, both conflicted and coalesced around the single issue of Palestinian/Jordanian relations.

Following the Israeli raid on the village of al-Samu' in November 1966, large-scale rioting broke out in the West Bank. Fighting between Palestinians and Jordanian Army units continued for about two weeks.(25) During the fighting, the traditional leadership denounced the rioters; the younger group supported them. Positions thus taken remained unchanged: the traditionals supported King Husayn's regime; younger nationalists opposed it. After the Israeli occupation, the traditionals chose to operate as caretakers of Jordanian interests, espousing a policy of coexistence with the israelis until such time as the territory was returned to Jordan.(26)

Immediately after the June 1967 war, a series of Palestinian groups sprung up in the occupied territories. The impetus for their formation came from Fatah, the Ba'th, the ANM, and RAKAH, the newly formed (1965) Israeli Arab Communist Party. The idea was to form a front to resist Israeli pacification tactics. Originally composed of younger activists, these groups were later expanded to include even some older West Bank leaders and former Jordanian officials. Because of Israeli military restrictions, the activities of these committees did not go beyond organizing strikes, demonstrations, local business shut-downs, and school closures.(27)

However, this early movement collapsed within a short time due to a number of factors. First, the efficiency of Israeli countermeasures created a risk of deportation for those Palestinians involved. This, in turn, led to a marked unwillingness of major West Bank leaders to commit themselves to supporting such resistance. Second, Israeli policies designed to integrate the economies of the West Bank and Israel raised the standard of living for Palestinians in the occupied areas, and made them even more reluctant to risk joining Resistance committees. Third, Dayan's policy of "open bridges" encouraged economic interchange with Jordan and played down flagrant displays of Israeli military control.(28)

The many Israeli policies which so successfully blocked Palestinian attempts to organize a resistance in the short run, however, had long-term negative consequences. The integration of the economies of Israel and the occupied territories hastened the decline of traditional Palestinian leadership and created the mass social base for a nationalist movement. Under the economic impetus supplied by Israel, the originally rural and agrarian Palestinian population became progressively more urbanized, more socially mobilized, more politicized. In addition, Palestinians in the occupied territories came in contact with Israeli Arabs.

In particular, they came in contact with remnants of the al-Ard movement. Al-Ard, whose organizational existence dates from 1958 to 1964 or 1965, is generally dismissed in Western sources as a short-term aberration.(29) But its appearance is an extremely important event in the political consciousness of Israeli Arabs, and its influence on the

PNF is considerable. Intellectually, and to some extent organizationally, the PNF is the descendant of al-Ard. Both al-Ard and the PNF were originally sponsored by the Arab faction of the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI); both were concerned with the preservation of a Palestinian cultural and political identity.

Al-Ard (the earth) was the outcome of efforts by the Israeli Communist Party to establish an organization linking the Communists with Arab nationalists.(30) In July 1958, MAKI elements joined with nationalists to form an Arab Front, later renamed the Popular Front. The Front attempted to mobilize popular opinion, but abruptly split up as a consequence of differences between its nationalist and communist elements. The nationalists then formed al-Ard, named for its short-lived weekly.

Al-Ard's leadership was composed of intellectuals and journalists. Its recruitment and other activities centered in the "Little Triangle" (Umm al-Fahm) area northeast of Tel Aviv along the Israel/Jordan border. The aim of al-Ard's leadership was to speak for the Arab population of Israel, to work for a solution to the Palestine problem which would restore to the Palestinians their lost political identity and enable them to decide their own future. Along these lines, al-Ard opposed any Israeli measures which appeared to threaten Palestinian society or culture. It also opposed traditional Palestinian leaders, feeling that these leaders were willing to make accommodations with the Israelis.

Its publications attacked Israeli military administration of Arab areas and Israeli expropriations of Arab land. Al-Ard developed links with both Fatah and the PLO. It was declared illegal in 1964. In an unsuccessful attempt to appeal this ban, al-Ard submitted a resume of its objectives to the Israeli Supreme Court:

1. To raise the educational, health, economic and political standards of all its members.
2. To achieve complete equality and social justice for all classes of people in Israel.
3. To find a just solution for the Palestine problem as a whole, and as an indivisible unit; that is to say, a just solution to all aspects of the Palestine problem seen as a complete unity.
4. To support liberation, unionist and socialist movements in the Arab World by all legitimate means.
5. To work for peace in the Middle East in particular, and the world in general.
6. To support all progressive movements in all parts of the world, to oppose imperialism and to support peoples who wish to liberate themselves from it.(31)

Implementation of the proposed national-front strategy was delayed because of more immediate PLO concern with military reorganization. In early 1972, however, the PLO began a drive to organize in the territories. The impetus for this renewed effort was supplied by a fear

that the Israelis and Jordanians, either separately or in concert, were moving toward the creation of a puppet Palestinian state, along the lines advocated by Yigal Allon, behind a string of Israeli-fortified settlements. In what seemed to be the political prelude to such a move, the Israelis proposed to hold municipal elections in the West Bank in May 1972. The elections were held under heavy Israeli security; the turnout was large, but the results were inconclusive.(32) In March 1972, however, King Husayn proposed the creation of a United Arab Kingdom, a federal state composed of both East and West Banks, a move that was variously interpreted either as evidence of collusion with the Israelis or as an attempt to preempt them.(33)

A series of emergency meetings were held to discuss an appropriate PLO response, and in April 1972 the PNC meeting in Cairo issued a communique calling for a unified front to combat both:

> The present tasks of the Palestinian and Jordanian masses in the two banks must be determined on the basis of the restoration of the unity of the two banks, which has been shattered by the subservient regime, and the renewal of that unity within the framework of a nationalist democratic regime.(34)

The June 1972 PNC Political Program was even more explicit. Among other measures, it called for:

> Consolidating the bonds of national unity and the struggle amongst the masses of our people inside the land occupied in 1948, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as outside the occupied territory.
>
> Resisting the policy of evacuating the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories and forcefully confronting the policy of building settlements and Judaizing parts of the occupied land.
>
> Mobilizing the masses in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as in all the occupied parts of Palestine, and supplying them with arms to help them develop their fighting potentials and continuing the struggle against the Zionist settler-like imperialism.(35)

The immediate catalyst for the creation of the PNF, however, was a massive demonstration of theretofore latent Palestinian nationalism. The Israeli assassination of PLO leaders in April 1973 triggered demonstrations throughout many parts of the Arab world. In the West Bank these took the form of a symbolic funeral procession, paralleling the actual funeral held in Beirut.(36) This nationalist outpouring was repeated in May in a march opposing the Israeli military parade in Jerusalem, and in June in a general strike on the anniversary of the June war. Seizing the opportunity to take advantage of this ground swell, both nationalist and communist leaders joined in forming the PNF:

> After deliberating the exchanging views, they decided to form the Palestine National Front in the occupied land as being the only way to mobilize and unify the struggle potentials of our people and in response to the call of the PNC which met in Cairo early this year [1973]. The PNF is thus an integral part of the Palestine national liberation movement represented by the PLO which is a part of the Arab liberation movement.(37)

The October war and the apparent success of Arab arms and oil embargo, produced an even greater upsurge of Palestinian nationalism. This feeling ultimately rebounded to the benefit of the PLO as a consequence of two critical decisions by international bodies. The Arab Summit at Rabat recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thus legitimizing its quasi-governmental status and rejecting any Jordanian claims.(38) The Rabat Communique committed Arab leaders "to affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.(39) Immediately thereafter, the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the PLO, giving it in effect international recognition. In the occupied territories, the impact of these events was enormous, solidifying PLO support.

In an effort both to take advantage of the political benefits of increasing international recognition and to demonstrate its popularity in the West Bank, the PLO called for a general strike. The PNF, operating as its political arm, organized the strike. The strike, in turn, triggered a series of Israeli reprisals which further alienated the Palestinians, and in effect began a cycle of demonstration and reprisal which set the stage for a series of electoral victories by PNF and allied leaders.(40) This cycle of Palestinian political activism, coupled in some cases with mass violence and even selected terrorism, and an Israeli military response in terms of demolitions, arrests, deportation and curfews has intensified, rather than diminished. By early 1980, groups of both Palestinians and Jewish settlers were rampaging in the West Bank, notably around Hebron, presenting the Israeli government with a major security and political dilemma. On one hand there was increasing pressure from Jewish militants to be allowed to settle in the West Bank; on the other hand such settlements triggered increasing Palestinian violence.

Growing Palestinian opposition to Israeli control was evidenced more dramatically by the election of PNF candidates. In December 1975 Tawfiq Zayyad was elected Mayor of Nazareth. Zayyad ran on a coalition ticket which polled 67 percent of the vote and won 11 out of 17 seats on the Nazareth Municipal Council.(41) The following April, PNF supporters scored landslide victories in local elections held in the aftermath of widespread demonstrations protesting Israeli decisions to sequester Arab land in Galilee, allow Jewish settlers to remain near Nablus, and permit Jews to pray on the Temple Mount.(42) PNF candidates exploited the unrest by running on the slogan "For the land,

the People, and the Palestinian cause" and by using the Palestinian national colors, red, white, and green, on their campaign posters.(43) Some 148 new councilmen were elected in 11 out of 20 races.(44) Arab observers estimated that 75 to 80 percent of all successful candidates were PNF members or supporters.(45)

The net effect of the two elections was to demonstrate both the political power of the younger Palestinian leadership and the growing appeal of Palestinian nationalism, first in Israel itself and then in the occupied territories. Newly elected mayor of Ramallah, Karim Khalaf, summed up the PNF victory: "Could the message be more clear? The vote shows the whole world that the West Bankers are Palestinians who want to establish their own national identity and put an end to Israeli occupation."(46)

While it has utilized confrontation tactics, PNF leadership has so far remained extremely cautious in its politics. This circumspection is partly due to the constraints of Israeli occupation; partly to the problems of coalition building among several distinct ideological factions; partly to the equivocal position of its West Bank, Gaza, and Israeli Arab constituencies. In this respect, the PNF suffers from the same problem as the Resistance: that of articulating a Palestinian identity. All elements are agreed on a common denominator of "Palestinianness," but more specific political arrangements designed to structure this identity remain at issue.(47)

Prior to the October war, the PNF published a political program that harked back to al-'Ard's stress on preserving the political and cultural independence of the Palestinians. Among its stated aims were:

1. Resisting Zionist occupation and struggling for the Liberation of Palestinian lands.
2. Securing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, especially the right of self-determination.
3. Defending Arab lands against confiscation and acts of Judaization.
4. Protecting Arab culture and history.
5. Reviving Palestinian popular heritage and resistance literature which consecrate the attachment of Palestinians to their land and their heroic struggle for its defense. (Full text is in an appendix.)

After the war, the PNF altered this program to express strong support for the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Article 11, which had originally spoken only of Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation in the common struggle, was amended to state "the right of the Palestinian people to establish their own independent state provided this state is tied to Jordan by relations of participation, cooperation and joint destiny."(48)

At the Palestinian summit in May 1974, the PNF along with other representatives from the West Bank and Gaza, were one of the factors which led to the victory of the moderates within the PLO. As a consequence of their efforts, the argument that it was necessary to establish some "national authority" in those territories relinquished by

Israel won out. This was over the vehement objection of the PFLP. But even here, PFLP members from within the territories repudiated their own leadership, aligning themselves with the PNF and demanding that Habash adopt the Fatah-PDF-al-Sa'iqah position.(49)

One of the leaders of the PNF, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, sat on the committee which drafted the ten-point program later adopted as the PLO's official position in June 1974. In addition, the PNF sent a message to the PNC declaring its wholehearted backing for the moderate approach: "The PNF supports the step-by-step program approved by the council . . . i.e., the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on all lands wrested from Israeli occupation."(50)

Insofar as PNF leadership reflects the opinion of emerging West Bank and Gaza elites, it articulates a theretofore submerged viewpoint. To the extent that it can mobilize popular support around this viewpoint, it can demonstrate the necessity of taking its view into consideration. The increasing importance of this view, and of the PNF, is evidenced by the increased number of PNF and other West Bank-Gaza leaders taking part in PLO policymaking. The PNF may, therefore, become the critical social and political tie between the two halves of the Palestinian diaspora. If this is the case, the problem of "who speaks for the Palestinians" may be resolved more easily than previously expected.

ARAB FRONT FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION

Not really a Palestinian organization per se, the Front probably more than anything else represents a Soviet follow-up response to the failure of the Ansar. Here, rather than attempting to directly influence Resistance politics by a communist-led resistance group, the strategy is one of creating a coalition of forces which would (a) tie the Palestine issue into broader Soviet strategic concerns without, however, directly involving the USSR itself, and (b) modify Palestinian intransigent rejection of policies (for example, the acceptance of UN Resolution 242) to which the USSR and its Arab allies had agreed.(51)

The Front was officially created by the action of a conference of Arab leftists and "progressive movements" meeting in Beirut in November 1972. Organizationally, the Front was to have a 12-member secretariat and a 46-man central committee. The late Kamal Junblatt was elected secretary general, and assistant secretaries were to be drawn from the Egyptian ASU, the Ba'th Parties of Syria and Iraq, and the Progressive Forces in Morocco. In addition, Fatah and officials of Arab Communist parties were to be represented on the secretariat.(52)

The extent of its political influence is not known. Presumably its political potential has declined following the death of Junblatt.(53) However, the circumstances of its creation illustrate two trends in respect to the Resistance that may be of considerable importance: a trend in the direction of increased USSR involvement in Resistance

politics – involvement carried out via the mechanism of either Arab Communist Parties themselves, or via front groups with Soviet connections; and a trend toward the development of increased linkages between revolutionary forces throughout the Middle East and other parts of the Third World – more particularly, those forces engaged in some form of insurgency or international terrorism.

In respect to these trends, the membership list of the conference which created the Front is instructive. The participants were heavily representative of Soviet and pro-Soviet organizations, in addition to Arab delegates. Among the Soviet bloc personnel attending were officials from the USSR itself, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In addition, there were representatives from the Popular Front in Uruguay (Tupamaros), the Vietcong, and the ELF. There were also representatives from a number of Western European Communist Parties. The former trend has found expression in the creation of the PNF, some of whose policy statements parallel those of the Front, the latter by the ACO and its connections.

The Front's political program was a compromise between Palestinian and communist positions on Palestine and on UN Resolution 242. Palestinian delegates wanted a complete rejection of 242; communist representatives opposed this, and succeeded in getting references to 242 expunged. Conversely, the Palestinian line on Israel which called for an end to the "Zionist entity" in Palestine was incorporated, although the communist (basically the USSR's) position called for an acceptance of the existence of Israel.(54)

Among its other points, the program called for the accomplishment of a number of objectives:

(1) Fighting all plans for liquidation that are based on sanctifying the Zionist entity and recognizing the State of Israel within what is called the secure boundaries. . . .

(2) Direct participation in the various forms of the struggle of the Palestinian people. . . .

(3) Ensuring the freedom of the resistance and the military and political presence of the Palestinian revolution in all Arab countries, particularly the confrontation countries.

(4) Fighting and exposing the attempts which are made to isolate the resistance from the people's movement, and solidifying the cohesion between the resistance and the Arab liberation movement.

(5) Backing the efforts aimed at setting up a national democratic struggle to overthrow the hireling regime in Jordan. . . .

(6) Ensuring financial backing for the Palestinian revolution.

(7) Ensuring the political backing, and support from information media, for the Palestinian revolution on the regional and pan-Arab levels.

(8) Strengthening the co-operation and the unity of action between the various Palestinian groups with the object of establishing a united national liberation front on firm political, ideological and democratic foundations.

(9) Promoting the cause of the Palestinian revolution with the international progressive circles, which are opposed to imperialism and Zionism. . . .

(10) Liquidating the imperialist presence, and the imperialist strategic and economic ambitions – particularly oil – in the Arab homeland.

(11) Resisting imperialist and reactionary forces in the Arabian Peninsula. . . . (55)

This strategy of creating a broad, anti-imperialist front to strike at Western interests was again pushed by the USSR following the October 1973 war. In this case, however, instead of a generalized attack, the focus was concentrated on isolating Egypt and any other Arab country that sought to accommodate itself to postwar U.S. policy.(56)

7 Resistance Ideologies: Definitions of Political Action

In the abstract, an ideology is basically a system of ideas which have behavioral consequences.(1) In respect to a nationalist movement, an ideology is an operational statement of the core nationalist values, an articulation in policy terms of the goals and strategies by which the nation will achieve its destiny.(2) In respect to an organization, an ideology defines the rules of behavior and supplies the motivation for following these rules. In any event, an ideological system consists of a definition of a given situation and a prescription for either maintaining or changing it.(3)

In the Palestinian context, ideologies express the same sense of alienation and loss of identity as expressed in the excerpt from Fawaz Turki. These ideologies, however, go further. Where Palestinian poets and writers articulated the emotions of the Palestinians, Palestinian ideologies function in a much more Freudian fashion: they serve as vehicles to project Palestinian frustrations and tensions outward onto a defined universe of enemies. The theories of protracted war examined below legitimate and focus the expression of decades of pent-up hostilities. To be sure, the expression is differently put by different organizations. Fatah articulates the loss of identity theme; there the stress is on regaining a lost honor (identity) by the cleansing force of violence. The fronts accentuate the alienation theme, the notion that the whole world is an enemy, and that only a major revolution can restore a lost solidarity. The "Algerian strategy," as described below, is the logical and emotional extension of the Palestinian grievance toward other Arabs, the strategic response to Arab political and social discrimination and Arab military failure to aid the Palestinians.

An ideology can be analyzed from two complementary perspectives: from the viewpoint of its effect on the individuals who believe and act in its terms; or from the perspective of its impact on the shape of group behavior, its definition of communal relationships.(4) In individual terms, Palestinian ideologies function to fill a variety of personal

needs. For the individual Palestinian, whether commando, camp dweller, villager, or displaced intellectual, ideology defines his personal identity and provides emotional sustenance. The erstwhile unperson is no longer a cipher; he is part of the Resistance, a commando, a fighter, a fida'i, a man who lives with honor. For the politicially conscious, ideology provides a perceptual framework; it articulates the nature of his political environment, gives shape and content to a Palestinian society and political community, stabilizes a heretofore unstable world. At the group level, ideology provides a framework for reconstituting a social order; defines the goals of mass political and social action; locates and legitimates leadership; and provides guidelines for policy-making.(5) Ideology, therefore plays a critical role in the process of transferring Palestinian loyalties from cliques, factions or other sub-national groupings to the institutional structure of a nationalist movement.

At bottom, however, Palestinian ideological formulations all had to contend with and supply answers to the problems facing the Arab Higher Committee years before. What sort of relationship did the Palestinian identity have with the more inclusive Arab identity of the surrounding Arab states? What symbolic foci should serve as the referrent for mobilizing the political loyalties of the Palestinian population? What sort of territorial demands or accommodations should be made vis-a-vis the Israelis? What should be the proper definition of a Palestinian state? In short, how should the issues concerning the nature of authority, legitimacy and political identity which convulsed the Arab World be dealt with by Palestinians?

Answers supplied to these questions differed in terms of organizational requirements and of the Palestinian situation and the proper means to alleviate it. The Resistance is split between the nationalists of Fatah and the Marxists of the PFLP and PDF. Here it should be noted that categorizing the Fatah as nationalist and the Fronts as Marxist is a simplification for convenience sake; there is considerable overlap in viewpoints.(6) Generally speaking, however, Fatah spokesmen operate in communal categories. Fatah ideology is usually expressed in terms compatible with traditional Arab conceptions of honor or vengeance. Front spokesmen use class terminology. Front ideologies express the aspirations of those Palestinians who believe extensive social engineering is necessary in order to solve the problem of Palestine.(7) Although at times these ideologies appear to sound the same, there are profound differences. Fatah's ideology incorporates existing Palestinian/Arab values and symbols, and defines its legitimacy in their terms. The Fronts, alternatively, import most of their concepts from Western thinkers and attempt a full-scale resocialization, defining their behavior models in Western terms.

Both camps, however, are extremely eclectic in their programmatic formulations, but the Marxists tend toward a more rigorous and doctrinaire stance. As for other organizations, al-Sa'iqah and the ALF, these reflect the ideologies of their parent governments, and are not therefore especially Palestinian in outlook. The several independents

tend to be non-programmatic in their policy statements. All sides draw on a variety of writers: Lenin, Mao, Giap, Fanon, Debray, and "Che." The dominant influence in Fatah's thinking is that of Frantz Fanon and the Algerian FLN; in that of the fronts, the influence of Mao and Asian Marxism is increasingly prominent.

The major goal of Fatah leadership is the creation of a sense of national identity among a population disorganized and dispirited by two exoduses.(8) Of necessity, it has had to appeal to the lowest common denominator, that of "Palestinianness." It has, therefore, to a large degree adopted the FLN strategy of using a guerrilla war to build up solidarity and identity among a fragmented Palestinian people; hence the emphasis on "Fanonism," the mystique of violence which pervades Fatah ideology. The two Popular Fronts, in contrast, draw their leadership from a much younger and narrower stratum of militants. In this respect, they are akin to the Arab Communist parties in their relatively small size, doctrinaire outlook, and recruitment from a small social base.

REJECTION OF NON-PALESTINIAN CONTROL

The starting point for all groups is the conclusion that the Palestinian people must "go it alone." Both Fatah and the Fronts begin with an analysis of the failure of non-Palestinian Arab regimes to alter in any way the situation of the Palestinians. Fatah conceives of both their failure and the Arab-Israeli conflict in nationalistic terms. The original struggle was between two competing nationalisms, Palestinian and Jewish. However, this clash of nationalisms was absorbed into a more complex and, therefore, more intractible Arab-Israeli framework. As Fatah spokesmen put it, "We have to confirm the Palestinian identity of our struggle or else the world will not accept our movement as a national liberation movement."(9)

The Fronts start with a class analysis. Instead of a limited confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians, they see the problem as a general class war between the forces of imperialism, international Zionism, and Arab reaction and those of the "toiling Arab masses." In the words of the PFLP:

> As to the association between the proletariat revolution and liberation, we say that this is an axiom and not opportunism . . . With regard to the class struggle, this is inevitable and not accidental. The present conditions should confirm the need for class definition rather than cancel it.(10)

For Fatah the loss of Palestine was in large part the result of the loss of control of Palestinian destiny to non-Palestinian Arab leaders. This was chiefly the fault of Hajj Amin and the Arab Higher Committee. It was further compounded by the failure of Palestinian leadership to retain independent control over those parts of Palestine remaining in

Arab hands after the 1948 war. Subsequently, Palestinians were situated far from their lands and homes, unable to act independently. They were put in a situation where they were dependent on others, waiting for everybody else to act on their behalf(11) and waiting for people who would never summon the interest or courage to act.

While the Palestinians were thus in suspension they were, as individuals and as a people, subject to enormous oppression. This situation in Fatah's analysis is akin to that in Algeria described by Frantz Fanon. Speaking of the structure of colonial control in Algeria, Fanon likened it to a Manichean world where the native Algerian was stripped of his humanity:

> It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. . . . The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values . . . He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him.(12)

Because this exercise of force strips the native of his manhood, he can recover it only by use of force against the person and culture of his oppressors. "At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."(13)

Palestinians had also begun to feel that they had no place in the world. As Fatah puts it, this led to a spiritual and psychological sickness.(14) The liberation of Palestine from the human point of view would bring back to the Palestinian his freedom, integrity and pride.(15) For Fatah, as for Fanon, violence became the necessary element in the resurrection of a lost Palestinian entity. The Palestinians would be bound together by the fact of armed struggle; differences would be submerged in the solidarity of violence.(16)

The fronts see this issue in class terms. Here the oppression is not the product of psychology, but of class interests. The Palestinians as a class have been oppressed because their interests conflicted with the vested interests of Arab ruling classes. Thus the Palestinians are not altogether different from other oppressed Arab classes. The situation of the Palestinians is a consequence of a general failure both of feudalist and big bourgeoisie nationalist regimes and of small bourgeoisie revolutionary regimes. The statement of strategy issued by the PFLP and published in al-Hadaf puts it as follows. The leadership of the national liberation movement was usurped by "feudalists and large bourgeois aristocratic families represented by Hajj Amin Husseini . . . Shukri Kuwatli and the national party in Syria and similar leaderships in other Arab countries." With the creation of Israel "the reality of these superficially independent regimes was exposed to the masses."(17)

Subsequently, they were toppled and replaced by national military and political organizations whose members came largely from the small bourgeoisie.

But the main interest of this new ruling class was to retain its own privileges; therefore, it advocated confrontation with Israel and its allied imperialism in terms of conventional military tactics. But a real war of popular liberation was avoided because "such a war of popular liberation would require that this class should abandon its privileges and start to live in the same manner as the commandos today are living, if it wanted to retain its leadership."(18) Thus both sets of Arab regimes, the feudal and large bourgeois and the newer military-civilian coalitions, are rejected.

The PDF goes further. Not only is it critical of Arab reaction, but of small bourgeois regimes in general and of Nasir in particular. Whereas the PFLP is at least willing to count some small bourgeois among the forces of the revolution, the PDF, at least theoretically, is not. Pointing out that the Arab small bourgeois class is in itself a consumer class, and therefore incapable of diverting resources toward development, the PDF concludes in general: "The Arab small bourgeois has led the liberation struggle of the Arab nation to a dead end, and has exposed its utter incapability to accomplish the aims of democratic bourgeois revolution."(19)

Irrespective of the theoretical route, the conclusion reached by all groups is that Arab regimes must no longer be allowed to control the destiny of the Palestinians. Palestinian autonomy is a constantly asserted theme. The PNC statement of September 1969 put it thus: "The Council emphasized in all of its discussions and debates the independence of Palestinian action and rejected all attempts to impose on it restrictions, domination or tutelage."(20) The Unity Agreement of May 1970 stated more forcefully: "The commando action declares its independence from all Arab regimes, and rejects all attempts at encircling, containing it, or imposing subservience or tutelage on it."(21)

But, while there was agreement as to the necessity of assuring Palestinian independence, there was no consensus on how this was to be achieved. This issue wracked the Resistance in the wake of the Jordanian defeat, and surfaced even more divisively in the spring of 1974. In a series of conferences leading up to and including the 12th PNC session of June 1974, commando leaders debated the problem of assuring Palestinian autonomy in the context of projected Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. The issue posed was whether the Resistance should modify its goals in order to get Arab and international support, or should "go it alone" and avoid the possibility of being forced into an unacceptable compromise.

In a position paper published in February 1974, Fatah, al-Sa'iqah, and the PDF put forward a phased program for achieving the liberation of Palestine. Central to this strategy was the recognition that the Palestinians must take part in the proposed Geneva conference. As PNC speaker Khalid al-Fahum pointed out, the critical issue was to prevent

the conference from utilizing an Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242. Instead, the conference should discuss the settlement in terms of Palestinian rights as defined by the PLO.(22) To facilitate this, the PLO should adopt a policy of:

> . . . carrying out immediate contacts at the highest levels with the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, so as to abide by this phased program and to collaborate with the PLO for its implementation, to draw up a united Palestinian-Arab framework for creating unity of the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian attitudes on this basis.(23)

This proffered strategy was vigorously attacked in a PFLP position paper released in April. Rather than negotiating, the PFLP argued, the Palestinians should continue fighting. The Resistance should maintain its independence and integrity, and remain outside the framework of any settlement.

> [If the PLO goes to Geneva]numerous sides will try to drag the resistance movement to the negotiating table and the swamp of capitulation. This is liable to abort the revolutinary states which the Palestinian resistance represents on the level of the whole Arab region and to deprive it of its revolutionary context.(24)

Speaking at the Tall al-Za'tar camp in May of the following year, Habash himself again denounced any proposed settlement as a sellout of Palestinian rights:

> The schemes of the enemy and the forces hostile to our revolution run along the following lines in the present phase. The attempt to contain the revolution politically, prior to aborting it, by means of inviting it to participate in the bargaining at Geneva. The Palestinian state plan is nothing but an imperialist plan to give the defeatist leaderships 20 percent of the land of Palestine in return for the legitimate recognition of Israel and ensuring the security of its borders.(25)

PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION

The chief consequence of the conclusion that the Palestinians must go it alone has been the development of a set of doctrines with a specifically Palestinian orientation. Fatah goes perhaps furthest along these lines, insisting on the distinctiveness of the Palestinian personality and the primacy of the Palestinian revolution. At the heart of this insistence is the concept of the Palestinians as a special people. The Statement of the January 1968 National Assembly makes this clear: "The Palestinian personality is an intrinsic and inseparable attribute passed on from generation to generation." (Article 4), "The Palestinian

personality is not the same as the Arab personality." (Article 12) The National Covenant of 1969 reiterates it: "The Palestinian identity is a permanent and enduring trait that passes from father on. Israeli occupation, and the Palestinian people . . . cannot deprive the Palestinian people of its Palestinian personality and identity."(Article 4)(26)

Fatah's conception of the Palestinian revolution is therefore primarily psychological. It is a revolution in behavior which will in turn lead to a revolution in identity. In its stress on the psychological consequences of political action, Fatah has therefore adopted the theoretical perspective and categories of Fanon:

> The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny and of a collective history. In the same way the second phase, that of the building up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of this cement which has been mixed with blood and anger.(27)

The Palestinian revolution means that "we have turned the Palestinians into a people that stand in line not to beg for its rations but to receive its weapon to fight for its usurped homes and country."(28) Or, as 'Ali Hasan Salamah (Abu Hasan) put it in a Beirut lecture, "We are a movement which has been compelled to wash away the shame of the past 20 years and start anew."(29)

As to the relationship between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab revolution, Fatah reversed the traditional formulation "Arab Unity, the way to liberate Palestine"; Instead, Fatah took the line, "The liberation of Palestine is the road to Arab unity." This insistence on the uniqueness and primacy of the Palestinian revolution drew immediate and hostile criticism. Pan-Arab spokesmen accused Fatah of advocating "regionalism" (iqlimiyah), of arguing that narrowly conceived Palestinian interests should supersede Arab nationalist goals.(30)

As a consequence, a compromise formulation was worked out. The National Covenant shifts uneasily between the Palestinian and Arab viewpoint. Article 12 declares that the "Arab Palestinian people believe in Arab unity, and in order to participate in its fulfillment, they must preserve their Palestinian personality." Article 13 declares: "Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives in the sense that one prepares the ground for the fulfillment of the other. Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity." But despite this even-handed approach, the primacy of Palestine is again reasserted in Article 15: "The fate of the Arab nation, or even Arab existence itself, is dependent on the fate of the Palestine case."(31)

The role of the Palestinians in general, and of Fatah in particular, as the leaders of a new force in the Arab world, is already implicit in their rejection of Arab tutelage. But a Fatah spokesman was quite explicit: "We are neither an Arab left nor an Arab right. We are the new Arab progressive movement. We have been able to transcend the Arab left

and the Arab right."(32) When Yasir 'Arafat speaks of Fatah as being a revolutionary organization, he apparently means it in this sense. This self-image of being the new force is echoed by the PFLP, and its use of women commandos on raids is apparently intended to demonstrate that it is producing a new breed of Palestinian.(33) The implications of this self-image are further worked out in the concepts used in defining guerrilla doctrines of wars of popular liberation, armed struggle.

Fatah's conception of the psychology of revolutionary action, its own self-image as being above faction, and its goal of unifying all possible social groups, have led it to adopt Debray's notion that a political party is useless, that the Resistance itself is a party in gestation.(34) 'Arafat himself constantly declares that Fatah is not a party; that the solidarity of common struggle, rather than political organization, is to hold the movement together.(35)

The Fronts operate with a more conventional set of Marxist-Leninist definitions. As their names suggest, their conceptions of revolution are articulated in terms of an alliance (Popular Front) of different classes of Palestinians and Arabs. In this, they specifically reject Fatah's stress on the unity of all Palestinians. The PFLP, in commenting on Fatah's stance, noted:

> The resistance movement in all its factions had made a mistake with regard to the question of Palestinian national unity both on the theoretical level of day-to-day practices. . . . In view of its political, ideological and class composition, the resistance movement has failed to uncover the true identification and qualifications of the various classes of the Palestinian people throughout the past 50 years. By following wrong and reactionary practices, the movement has placed reactionary leaderships at the head of the resistance movement.(36)

The PFLP proposes to remedy this situation by the creation of a broad national front of all classes of the revolution: workers, farmers, and small bourgeoisie. Although this latter group must not be allowed to reach positions of leadership, it is made clear that farmers and workers are the real backbone of the movement. This is both a narrower and a broader concept of revolution than that used by Fatah. It is narrower in the sense that certain classes of Palestinians are excluded from revolutionary action; broader in that the revolutionary classes include all Arabs, not just Palestinians. It follows to some extent current Soviet thinking, in that the small bourgeois, or national bourgeoisie, are acceptable as allies during the stage of the national democratic liberation, but that it is not a basic source of strength for the revolution.(37)

The PDF calls for the creation of a United National Liberation Front whose role would consist of:

> Establishing internal relationships (among the members) and external relationships (with the masses) on the basis of central

> ized democracy on ideological as well as political levels, by exposing everything to the masses and preserving the right of the minority to express its views before the masses.(38)

The Fronts' versions of the Palestinian revolution therefore differ from Fatah's by the fact of their articulation in Marxist categories and by their pan-Arab content. However, it should be noted that while the Fronts stress the pan-Arab nature of their revolutions, they are no more willing than Fatah to submerge their Palestinian identity into a pan-Arab one. In this, they occupy an uncomfortable middle ground between Fatah and the Ba'thist Palestinian groups which operate in strictly pan-Arab categories. The ALF, for example, was founded by the Iraqi Ba'th for the express purpose of giving the Palestinian liberation struggle a pan-Arab orientation.

> Ever since the birth of commando action, attempts have been made by several quarters to prevent the Palestinian revolution from publicly associating itself with Arab unity. The enemies realize very well and are aware of the dangers to their interests as a result of the association between the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity.(39)

Strategic necessity supplies the link between Palestinian and Arab revolutions, insofar as both the PFLP and PDF are concerned. They argue that the Palestinians cannot alone defeat Israel, world Zionism, and imperialism, and therefore that all revolutionary forces in the Arab world must be mobilized. As the PFLP puts it:

> It is only through this kind of mobilization [of revolutionary forces on the Arab and international level]that we would be able to ensure the force which could confront Israel, Zionism, international imperialism, and Arab reaction. The Palestinian revolution, merged with the Arab revolution and allied with the international revolution, can alone achieve victory. Confining the Palestinian revolution within the limits of the Palestinian people means failure, especially when we remember the nature of the alliance which we are confronting.(40)

The forces to be mobilized are defined in terms of compatible or contradictory class interests. In distinguishing between friends and enemies, the PFLP noted:

> Arab capitalism and feudalism are still the ruling force in some Arab countries whose interests are linked to those of international imperialism led by the United States. Despite the partial and superficial contradictions which appear to exist between these [Arab] regimes and Israel, this contradiction is overshadowed by an objective agreement between these regimes and international imperialism. Therefore, the present Palestinian

> armed struggle, and the future Arab armed struggle, have a relationship of confrontation with these regimes despite the tactical positions which are imposed on either of the two sides by temporary considerations.(41)

However, this analysis of objective agreement raises a second problem, namely that of the PFLP's relationships with Arab nationalist governments. In dealing with these regimes, the PFLP originally adopted a cautious line. The key to its attitude toward these regimes was to be their stance on the issue of Palestine. On the one hand:

> Any historical evaluation of these regimes during the 1950s and until the June War of 1967 should not overlook the great accomplishments that have been made by these regimes, especially that of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. . . . [But] any daring and revolutionary evaluation of these regimes must be centered on the June (1967) defeat and its consequences and meaning. . . .
>
> Therefore, the June defeat, in our opinion, is not merely a military defeat, but actually a defeat for these regimes and their programs. It reveals the incapacity of these regimes to effect any political, military, economic or ideological mobilization that could ensure steadfastness and victory over neo-imperialism, its alliances and plans in our homeland.(42)

In short, the option to cooperate or confront is always to be left open, and always to be determined by an assessment of "objective" factors. This analysis was applied to the PLO itself in September 1974. Detailing the reasons for withdrawing from the PLO Executive Committee, the PFLP asserted:

> The PFLP declares the decision to suspend its membership in the Executive Committee of the PLO. We do this so as not to shoulder responsibility of the historical deviation followed by the leadership of the PLO, and to continue our struggle among the masses in order to correct this deviation, to express the will of the masses and impose the correct revolutionary political line on the leaderships that have become subservient to the reactionary and capitulationist regimes.(43)

The PDF adopts a much broader concept of revolution, in this case utilizing a straight Maoist notion.

> The task of the vanguards has two faces, one negative and the other positive. It is impossible to build something new before we destroy what is already existing. This means the destruction of all the heritage of the small bourgeois movement, including dictatorial relations, chauvinist ideologies and superficial socialist policies.(44)

Syria is to be a special target of this revolutionary action. In Syria, the "toiling masses" are required to "crush the small bourgeois state and establish the state of the proletariat."(45) Nor was Nasir himself to be exempt: "The Nasserite regime continued to rule after the 5th of June on the basis of a program which it is unable to carry out, namely, the elimination of the consequences of aggression."(46)

The positive side of this total revolution is to be a Maoist cultural revolution:

> A proletariat cultural revolution that would embrace all the cadres of the movement is a basic task for acquiring the Marxist-Leninist ideology. . . . The only security to prevent the cultural revolution from becoming an intellectual luxury . . . is to carry the revolution out by political practice against everything that exists in the society.(47)

In diametric contrast to Fatah, both fronts take the position that party and ideology are necessary preconditions to action. The PFLP adopts a more orthodox Leninist position concerning the need for a highly indoctrinated cadre to lead the movement. The PDF utilizes the Maoist doctrine of a party linked to the proletariat by democratic centralism and carrying out the cultural revolution.

The Fronts differ with Fatah also in the conclusions they draw concerning the commando movement's relationship with Arab establishments. Fatah, because of its narrow, nationalist definition of the scope of the Palestinian leadership, adopted the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other Arab states.(48) This, of course, is subject to the qualification that these states allow the Palestinians complete freedom of action. It is further qualified by Fatah's doctrine of the war of popular liberation. The thesis of noninterference had the tactical advantage of allowing Fatah to govern its relations with Arab states on the basis of pragmatic considerations; that is, how much they are willing to contribute to the movement.

The PFLP, because of its conception of the merger of the Palestinian and Arab revolutions, is ideologically committed to the overthrow of "Arab reaction." Its attitude toward "progressive" regimes is, ideologically speaking, ambivalent, as already noted. However, the PFLP has not made the interference in the affairs of even "reactionary" regimes a positive duty. Its position is rather that of verbal hostility and refusal to accept any aid from them – in the unlikely event that it is offered. The PDF originally took the position that it had a duty to interfere with other Arab governments. Its argument was that the conditions prevailing in those countries, especially in those immediately surrounding Israel, as well as events happening therein, have always had a bearing on the Palestine case. Therefore, the front would of necessity have the right to interfere in and express its views on developments in the other Arab states. Following the Jordanian civil war, the PDF modified this extreme stance in recognition of the tactical necessity for cooperating with certain Arab regimes.

POPULAR WAR OF LIBERATION (ARMED STRUGGLE)

For both nationalists and Marxists, the doctrine of the popular war of liberation forms the ideological and behavioral link between the Palestine Liberation Movement and the revolution. The highly politicized, armed, revolutionary vanguard creates the revolution by mobilizing the masses via the war of liberation. Most guerrilla groups operate on the basis of Mao's pronouncement that "the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them."(49) But Fatah, in particular, utilizes a number of concepts drawn from other sources; here again, the influence of Fanon, whose writings are heavily permeated with specifically Arab cultural influences, is the basic source.

The doctrine of the popular war also represents a reversal of traditional Palestinian thought on the subject of Palestine. Originally it was argued that Palestine would be liberated by a short, intense, conventional war. This theory has now been rejected in favor of a theory of protracted war, a war lasting over generations if necessary. Fatah strategists utilize a theory of stages of a guerrilla war during which the Resistance movement will be gradually able to neutralize Israeli technological advantages. The essence of this conception is time. A long series of small battles is to be fought during which the movement will avoid direct military engagements with superior Israeli forces.

> The current guerrilla war has not reached the stage where it could deal a crucial blow to the army of the enemy because it is still in its infant stage. It would be a fatal mistake to deploy now all these growing forces for the achievement of the ultimate objective. The basic objective now is to achieve superiority over the enemy but not to destroy him. The achievement of superiority requires that losing battles with the enemy should be avoided.(50)

This protracted war appears to have two goals: that of wearing down the enemy and that of broadening the "grievance community." The assumption is that sooner or later Israeli aircraft will broaden their target areas to include larger portions of surrounding Arab territory. In turn, this would generate popular dissatisfactionwith Arab governments that would be unable to protect their populations. Internal contradictions would become more sharply articulated and the counterrevolutionary forces more clearly differentiated from the revolutionary elements. As a consequence, the masses would move closer to the Resistance.

A companion concept to the notion of protracted war, actually implicit in it, is the idea of mobilizing the masses. Where previous stress was on Arab governments, the new source of strength is to be the Arab masses. Fatah's ten-point program for action stresses:

> . . . [the] need to establish the widest and organized relationships with masses of the Palestinian people inside Palestine and in host Arab countries and foreign countries, in order to escalate the resistance against the Zionist occupation and fulfill participation by the masses and at the largest scale in all forms of resistance.(51)

Great faith was put in the masses. Abu Iyad noted that "had our masses in the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights been armed, it would not have been possible for the Israeli Army to enter these areas."(52) Even to the point of overthrowing their governments to aid the Palestinians, "rulers can protect their treaties, but their people will protect us. We depend on the Arab people."(53)

The bond between mass and leadership is the outgrowth of armed struggle:

> Every revolution is composed of a leadership and a base. The leadership is represented by the revolutionary vanguard and the base by the masses of the people. The mutual relations between the leadership and the base must be continued by means of practical experiences. . . . Any movement allowing itself to lose the factor of action loses the direct link with the masses and becomes isolated from there.(54)

Armed struggle has three functions insofar as Fatah is concerned. First, in the military sense, it is a strategy, a method of total war, a foco strategy along the line advocated by Che Guevara. Article 9 of the Covenant states: "The armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine; it is, therefore, a strategy and not a tactic." Second, armed struggle provides the movement with social solidarity. As 'Arafat stated, "I say this and I emphasize it, that we do not want unity of offices but rather a unity that springs from the battlefield."(55) Third, armed struggle restores a lost personal and national identity, an identity taken away by force which can only be restored by force. "Palestine had been taken away by fire and steel, and it will be recovered by fire and steel."(56)

The Fronts, naturally enough, diverge from this doctrine of popular liberation war. While the PFLP advocates a protracted war, it does not utilize either the notion of mobilizing the masses or that of the primacy of action. The PFLP's protracted war is to be carried out by an elite of highly policized and trained members. Moreover, it rejects any thought of mobilizing the "masses" per se:

> So who are our friends? The political thought behind any revolution starts by asking this question and trying to answer it. It must be admitted that the masses of our Palestinian people have not answered this question clearly. . . . We must define the forces of the revolution on the Palestinian level from the point of view of classes of the Palestinian people. To say that the

> entire Palestinian people is in the same revolutionary position vis-a-vis Israel and that all classes of the Palestinian people have the same revolutionary potentials just because they live outside their homeland is only theoretical and not scientific. . . . Therefore, the source of strength of the Palestinian revolution comprises the workers, farmers, and dispossessed bourgeoisie.(57)

The PFLP, therefore, rejects Fatah's concept of action as the primary unifying force. Instead, it emphasizes the necessity of both political organization and "scientific socialist theory." Moreover, the PFLP's concept of armed struggle is largely political-military in content, in contrast to Fatah's psychological orientation. Armed struggle is primarily the use of violence against an enemy to bring about a specific political goal.

The PDF occupies a position midway between Fatah and the PFLP. On the one hand, it insists that the "war of liberation is a popular war far removed from individual acts of heroism," thus refuting the PFLP.(58) But, while it speaks of the necessity for the unity of all national forces and classes, it rejects any association with bourgeois classes in favor of mobilizing the revolutionary classes of workers and poor farmers.(59) Again, as with Fatah, the PDF puts special emphasis on the necessity of armed struggle. "The Front commits itself to the popular armed struggle as a basic form of the national struggle for national liberation and the defeat of Zionism and imperialism"(60) But it also stresses the necessity of a Marxist-Leninist party to link the masses to the vanguard on the basis of centralized democracy.

BLACK SEPTEMBER: APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE

In the wake of the defeat in September 1970, all the foregoing doctrines underwent scathing analysis. The erstwhile confident assertions that armed struggle would inevitably prevail, that recalcitrant Arab regimes would fall before a revolutionary uprising, had proven wrong. Mao's thesis that power flowed from the barrel of a gun had been demonstrated with a vengeance by King Husayn's Bedouin troops. The Resistance was militarily shattered, its leadership in disarray. Sharp disagreements arose over the causes of the failure.(61)

An analysis published by the Palestine Research Center lashed out at the mistakes leading up to the Jordanian civil war. Heavily criticized were Fatah's insistence on the primacy of the Palestine element, and its foco strategy of armed struggle:

> The sympathy which the Jordanian masses on the East Bank gave to the resistance movement did not actually mean that these masses were consciously and politically supporting the movement. It was a kind of spontaneous sympathy and an overwhelming national feeling and enthusiasm . . . What should have been done by the resistance movement was to deepen this

sympathy and transform it from merely a spontaneous feeling into one of conscious and determined support. . . .

The Jordanian masses had actually seen an example of what they should be expecting in the case of continued military action against the Israeli enemy, and that was when Israeli air raids on the Jordan valley became a daily affair and forced the inhabitants of the valley to evacuate. . . . Therefore, transforming this sympathy from the level of spontaneity to the level of conscious support was rather difficult without making the masses aware of the basic changes the future would have for them if they tied up the resistance movement. . . .

Instead of doing just that, some of the commando groups, headed by Fatah, sought to emphasize the Palestinian entity and went in that course to the extent that made East Bank Jordanians apprehensive of the resistance. This, in addition to practical actions . . . brought about a complete break between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples.

The PDF was ravaged for having needlessly escalated the conflict; for playing directly into the hands of the Jordanian hawks:

One of the obvious manifestations of this break was the formation of purely Palestinian popular organizations . . . These practices created two rival trends on the same Jordanian soil . . . It was neutral that as the Palestinian authority continued to assert itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the Jordanian authority automatically became the recognized representative of the Jordanian people . . . The matter became worse when some of the commando groups, such as the PDFLP, raised the slogan that "authority is for the resistance" . . . Thus it appeared to the Jordanian masses that those who advocated the slogan sought to seize power in the country and make the East Bank Jordanians subordinate to the Palestinian authority.(62)

The PFLP was scourged for having consistently refused to cooperate with the PLO leadership:

The experience of the PFLP in the Palestinian field is a lone one, but it has always failed to respond to any unionist attempt or call . . . Then there was the problem of the hijackings. The hijacked planes were landed in Jordan. The Central Committee had to interfere, but the PFLP refused the decisions passed by the Committee despite the fact that there was a joint program of action . . . Suddenly the Jordanian regime raised arms against us and moved its tanks . . . Fatah has always tried to concentrate Palestinian action in the battle against the enemy . . . But some organizations used to give the (Jordanian) regime a pretext for its battles against us.(63)

Ultimately, three trends emerged from the debate, trends that cross-cut organizational differences and split almost all Resistance groups. The Palestinian right adopted the position that some tactical accommodation with Arab regimes was necessary; that the movement should return to its original purity and stick to military action. The left argued that political action was the key to victory; that Arab regimes should be bypassed in favor of contacts with revolutionary groups within and without the Arab world.(64) A third trend, one that caught the imagination of disillusioned members of all groups, was that expressed by the BSO: total terror for its own sake, terror which had as its goal the forceful revitalization of the movement, terror which would create, in the slogan of Regis Debray, a "revolution in the revolution."

The BSO's sudden and immense popularity was due to its role as an expression of the emotions of a generation of young, highly politicized commandos. It functioned as a cathartic outlet for the feelings of utter helplessness which followed the sudden and unexpected defeat in Jordan. The context in which the BSO appeared strongly resembles that of Arab defeat in 1967, but in microcosm – a dramatic and total defeat and humiliation hard on the heels of a prolonged period of rising expectations.

In the months before the September confrontation, Resistance organizations had steadily built up an image of themselves as the new, invincible force in the Arab world. Whether this view was actually believed by the Palestinian elite is open to question. There is no question, however, but that it was most emphatically believed by the Palestinian rank and file. The contrast between the inflated claims prior to the war and the total disarray which followed produced an enormous emotional and perceptual dislocation for this rank and file; the seemingly solid and defined universe, the ideological framework of action, was shattered. BSO actions and ideology provided the vehicle for a displacement of the tensions produced by this extreme cognitive dissonance.(65)

In the context of this despair, the activities of the BSO sparked the imagination of Palestinians. After the attack on Israeli athletes in Munich, hundreds of young men tried to locate BSO offices to join its ranks. The general upsurge in enthusiasm, the "new spirit" of the BSO, was likened to the burst of sentiment following the battle of al-Karamah. The BSO became, for a short time, the idol of Palestinian youth. BSO ideology as expressed in a series of communiques was a blend of Fatah and the PFLP: Fatah's insistence on the psychological necessity of physically confronting the enemy; the PFLP's thesis that terror was basically a communications technique.

The similarities stop there, however, for the BSO carried both Fatah and PFLP doctrines to their ruthlessly logical conclusions, the logic of total violence, the calculations of total terror. Unlike its intellectual predecessors, the BSO did not recognize any theoretical or strategic limits to the conflict. All Arab populations were ultimately to be involved; the entire world was to be made a battlefield. The themes of despair, violence, and death recur in the BSO's few statements. In its

rejection of any limits on the scope and methods of warfare, its willingness to destroy itself along with the enemy, the BSO represented a quantum leap in the level of conflict.

Like other commando organizations before it, the BSO started with an analysis of the failure of previous leaders. In this case, the failures were due to intra-commando schisms, schisms which absorbed the Palestinian energies which should have been directed toward confrontation with Israel. A BSO member interviewed by a correspondent for al-Usbu' al-'Arabi, even as the PNC was debating policy, remarked:

> What are they fighting about? Their place is not here if they really want to liberate their land. We will not be quiet if they [PNC members] don't work for our cause. Our patience is running out. We shall operate more actively and at a wider scale. Instead of us going to them [the PNC], they will come to us to ask for help . . . We shall operate everywhere, beginning with our land, Palestine, but also on every territory where plotters against us exist, regardless of their nationality. Our forthcoming operations shall shake the world from one end to the other.(66)

In view of the BSO, what was needed was a shock to jolt career revolutionaries and guerrillas out of their complacency, a shock which would force them to reevaluate their ways and return to the original concepts and goals of Palestinian action.

> The significance of this operation was that it has restored to the Palestinians their struggling identity . . . Palestinian action has been attempting to affirm its Palestinianism by every method except true revolutionary achievement. A "no" had to be said to the Palestinians of political, bureaucratic and traditional military action. The spirit of the revolution had to be regained.(67)

These concepts and goals entailed the assertion of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians had, in the view of BSO, spent too long asking others for help, a view harked back to Fatah's original analysis:

> We are not murderers or highwaymen. We are an oppressed people who have no land or home, no identity card or passport, and nothing to fear for or fear from. We have maintained silence as refugees for more than eighteen years. We have begged for mercy, pity and sympathy. And all that they gave us was the relief for those who are held to be weak, and summer and winter aid. As to the land and as to the home, they are for the enemy to come and go. Until we carried our guns and said that we are people.(68)

Therefore, the only solution is action, strength as displayed in continual attack upon the enemy:

> Only the strong enjoy the respect of the world. We shall not be strong by words, announcements and information. We shall be strong only when we regard death as we regard life, and turn the honor of commitment into the honor of practice, thus giving our slogans a content of practical struggle, that would make our enemies doubt their ability to confront us, and make them eventually believe that they have no alternative but to meet our just demands.(69)

Out of this combat will come the resurgence of the Palestinian identity:

> One of the objectives of our operation was to guide the Palestinian, anew, to the sources of his strength, not only against the enemy, but against the regimes as well . . . What do we, the Palestinians, have? Others have money, weapons, armies, legitimacy, and international weight. But what do we have, and who are we? The opposition came to tell the Palestinian that you have nothing except what you can make with your own heroism. Your wealth and your strength are what you accomplish in the arena of sacrifice. No regime is stronger than you, if you are ready for sacrifice; any regime is stronger than you if you search for a presence outside the revolution and outside heroism.(70)

BSO operations, however, were aimed at more than changing just Palestinian behavior. They aimed at involving the entire Arab world in a long-term struggle. If necessary, Arab targets were to be attacked to force Arabs to action:

> Involvement. Yet, involvement in the noble sense of the word, as used by Fatah when it first began its operations . . . To involve the Arab governments and people in the battle, not to involve them immediately in a losing battle, but to force them to act in light of the standing danger . . . There is no hope of victory, unless the masses of every Arab country involve their regimes in the war.(71)

The West had created the problem of Palestine, and it is attempting to impose its solution. According to the BSO, this could not be allowed to continue; any western diplomatic solution must be blocked. The battle and its conclusion must be conducted on Palestinian terms; pro-Western Arab figures must be destroyed:

> Our action has driven a wedge, which is necessary in our view, between the Arab regimes and the West. In the recent period, the barriers were falling between Arab regimes and Western countries . . . The efforts in trips and meetings with Western officials were aimed at solving the issue in Western style and according to Western formula. The Arabs almost forgot that between them and the West is a chronic and difficult problem which the West created and then complicated.(72)

For the BSO, operations such as Munich and Khartum served not only to prevent the imposition of Western solutions, but also to dramatize the Palestinian's cause. In a statement closely paralleling the words of George Habash, the BSO described the propaganda effects of its actions:

> In our assessment, and in the light of the result, we have made one of the best achievements of Palestinian commando action. A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have produced the far-reaching echo to every man in the world as the operation of Black September in Munich. The Olympiad arouses the people's interest and attention more than anything in the world. The choice of the Olympiad, from a purely propagandist viewpoint was successful 100 percent. It was like painting the name of Palestine on the top of a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth.(73)

Nevertheless, the desperation of the struggle required a willingness to sacrifice. The "Will" of the Munich guerrillas concluded with the BSO's apocalyptic vision of unending bloodshed:

> We are an integral part of the armed Palestinian revolution which is part of the Arab Liberation movement. Therefore, we urge that Palestinian rifles should not be laid down, regardless of conspiracies, the oppressions and the difficulties of the path. We also urge the Arab nation to activate its guns and activate its men. . . . For the land will not be liberated, without fighting, and fighting alone; without death, and death alone; without blood, and blood alone.(74)

POPULAR LIBERATION WAR AND ARAB REGIMES

All of the foregoing doctrines – the rejection of outside direction, the vision of the Palestinian revolution, and the theory of armed struggle – combine to orient guerrilla attitudes and policies toward surrounding Arab states. In the calculations of both nationalists and Marxists, Arab states can support the Palestinian struggle in two ways: as hinterlands of guerrilla action, as Arab "Hanois" playing the same role for the Palestinian Resistance that surrounding Arab states played for the Algerian FLN; or as the major sources of manpower, arms, and finances. In many ways this model of the Algerian revolution influences Palestinian thinking on the topic of Palestinian-Arab relationships.

From their analysis of Arab failures and the consequent decision to control their own destiny, the Palestinians have drawn a twofold conclusion respecting Arab establishments. First, these establishments have a negative duty not to interfere in the Palestinians' conduct of military activities against Israel. The National Covenant makes this clear in Article 29:

> The Palestinian Arab people possess the prior and original right in liberation and restoring its homeland and will define its position with reference to all states and powers on the basis of their positions with reference to the issue of Palestine and extent of their support for the Palestinian Arab people in its revolution to realize its aims.

Subsequent Resistance spokesmen have reiterated essentially the same position, although it has been modified since the Jordanian civil war of September-October 1970. This fierce assertion of Palestinian independence may assure paramount political importance.

Second, Arab governments have a positive duty to allow the commandos to use their territories, and to furnish support where necessary. In dealing with Lebanese objections to commando operations from its territory, 'Ali Hasan Salamah put the matter bluntly: "We cannot but have a base in Lebanon. We cannot afford to give up such a base or our presence in Lebanon. We reject the argument that Lebanon has a special status. Lebanon is part of the Arab world."(75) Or as the Unity Agreement puts it,

> The commando action considers Arab territory surrounding Israel as a legitimate field of the Palestine struggle. Any attempts aimed at closing any Arab country in the way of the Palestinian resistance is tantamount to betrayal of the aims of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation in the liberation of Palestine.(76)

In addition, the doctrine of popular liberation war, with its emphasis on mobilizing the Arab masses, would seem to relegate Arab establishments to a secondary role, or even to a position where their own populations are to be mobilized against them. BSO ideology carried this hostility to its ultimate conclusion.

These ideological orientations, combined with the guerrilla's use of Algeria as a model, lead to what might be called the "Algerian strategy." The Algerians utilized guerrilla action to provoke the French into making reprisals against heretofore uninvolved populations. The idea was that if these populations suffered some loss, they would in turn become mobilized into the struggle on the side of the guerrillas. As was noted above, the Palestinians accept this view of the uses of the protracted war. However, the Palestinians have enlarged the scope of this strategy to include surrounding Arab states. In the most extreme form, this doctrine takes the position that it is desirable for the Israelis to occupy even more Arab territory: "The resistance leaders seem almost eager to see Israel expand, for the more Israel holds the more it has to defend, and the broader the target areas for the guerrillas. Moreover, people, when they begin to feel the harsh yoke of occupation, inescapably turn from observers into participants."(77)

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE LARGER CONTEXT: IDEOLOGY AND NATION

Most Western and some Arab writers have been extremely critical of Palestinian ideological statements. Chaliand feels that Fatah ideology in particular lacks precision and clarity of thought, and that commando intellectual level in general is not especially high.(78) Quandt, taking a somewhat more charitable approach in general, nevertheless points to the obvious discrepancies between Palestinian ideology and military or political capability:

> The irony of the PFLP-PDFLP viewpoint is that in some ways it is more realistic concerning the balance of forces than Fatah's, and yet conclusions drawn are far beyond the capabilities of the relatively small and poorly financed radical fedayeen groups. Indeed, their militancy ensures that these groups will remain small, since no existing Arab regime can fully agree with their objectives. By contrast, Fatah, with its much greater resources and capabilities, is more modest in its goals, and yet less self-critical and more apologetic in its propaganda than either the PFLP or the PDFLP. Like many radical movements, the PFLP and the PDFLP may count less for their armed strength than for the few well-argued and courageous ideas that they have managed to introduce into the political arena.(79)

Palestinian ideologies are indeed at times inarticulate, mutually contradictory, and vague by Western standards. But to dismiss them out of hand for these failings would be to miss the point. The function of Palestinian ideology is sociological, not intellectual. It is to provide a world view, a cognitive frame of reference of sufficient emotional power to move a population from one level of moral and political existence to another, to provide a vehicle of transition from a state of refugee mentality to a state of national awareness.(80)

From this perspective, Palestinian ideologies must be looked at in terms of their consequences on two levels: (a) the level of collective action – in Smelser's terms, as attempts at a "reconstitution of values, a redefinition of norms, a reorganization of the motivation of individuals, and a redefinition of situational facilities."(81); and (b) on the level of organizational legitimacy, in the sense that these ideologies and functions of authority within the Palestinian community, to provide answers to the Palestinian authority crisis. And the consequences of Palestinian ideologies are mixed, and in some ways contradictory, for each level.

Insofar as this definition of collective action is concerned, Palestinian ideologists, as with Palestinian political and military strategists, are constrained by a number of factors, factors which account for much of the seeming intellectual weaknesses of Palestinian political thought. On a cultural level, Palestinian ideologies must wrestle with the relationship of specifically Palestinian values to the larger Arab value

search, the overarching questions of reconstitution authority and community which have split the Arab world in the 20th century. But in a cultural sense also, Palestinian ideologies are the political expression of the "vision of the return," a vision that is now articulated in political and strategic categories; a vision, however, that is specifically Palestinian in its focus and latently anti-pan Arab in its sense of alienation (a theme Arab critics of Palestinian "localism" have been quick to perceive).

On the political level, Palestinian ideologies are confronted with the very practical problem of justifying themselves in the context of competing claims to the leadership of the Resistance. Therefore, considerable propagandistic energy is expended in defending and attacking given political positions and personalities. On an organizational level, there is the problem of organizational survival, the problem of recruiting personnel and then inculcating their loyalty. This requires a set of appeals which are essentially operationalized in terms of the lowest common denominator of the target population. For the larger organizations, especially Fatah, this in turn means that ideological precision must be eschewed in favor of a deliberately vague but socially inclusive set of membership categories. The consequence, as Quandt puts it, is ideological confusion:

> In view of the organizational fragmentation and lack of utility among Palestinian leaders, consensus among Palestinians on current policies and long-term objectives should not be expected. Indeed, it would be an error to assume that carefully formulated programs and consistent ideological analysis can exist within a society that is physically divided and undergoing very rapid social change.(82)

Here, the notion of "Palestinianness," the Palestinian identity, serves as the common reference point, a reference point which includes lesser religious and sociological differences. Palestinianism plays the same integrative role for Palestinian nationalism that Arabism plays for Arab nationalism.(83)

Still, there is a communications problem, that of articulating ideological appeals in terms which will be meaningful to Palestinians. Here the issue of symbol selection becomes critical. The absence of a clearly defined territorial framework, the emergence of a nationalist leadership operating outside of any defined geographical entity, has created a situation in which there are no stable reference points by which to define the nature and territorial limnits of the Palestinian political community. This lack of agreed-upon reference points or political-cum-territorial definitions has added to the existing political and ideological diffuseness of the Resistance. One consequence is that the critical end state, the definition of a Palestinian state, has remained in limbo (see Chapter 11). Since there are no real guidelines for effective political communication, Palestinian spokesmen have had to utilize a series of secondary symbols, romantic and visionary

concepts that have had little concrete political or territorial content.(84)

In this sense Palestinian ideologies are millennial in their political and motivational thrust. They are indeed political versions of the "vision of return," but with a difference. Where Palestinian writers and poets articulated the theme of mystical yearning for a lost Palestine or the inevitability of ultimate revenge, Palestinian ideologues have translated these into calls for action. (And as also noted, there is considerable overlap between writers, poets, and ideologues in Resistance leadership.) Palestinian ideologies are therefore, in David Apter's terminology, "political religions."(85) They function to define the situation and prescribe necessary corrective action in terms of a set of absolute moral precepts. All actions, personal or collective, are tied into this Palestinian value system. Culturally speaking, this system of moral precepts draws very heavily on larger Islamic notions of community building and behavior control. As combined with the melange of Western and non-Western political theories utilized by Resistance thinkers, it is also a complex form of cultural borrowing and acculturation (see Chapter 11).

Thus, in spite of the ideological differences between the several commando organizations, there is a general consensus on several key beliefs which express these Palestinian cultural themes: the necessity for Palestinian control of Palestinian destiny; the reality of a distinct and separate Palestinian national identity; and the necessity of armed struggle, militant action to achieve Palestinian goals. These central beliefs in turn have been socialized in succeeding generations of Palestinians by the existence and activity of the Resistance movement as a whole. Whatever the specific political fortunes of any given combination of guerrilla organizations may be, Palestinian ideologists have apparently succeeded in creating and inculcating a nationalist belief system, a belief system which is complete in its general parameters, one which is capable of generating mass action, and one which appears to have great historical staying power. According to a number of studies, young Palestinians have become highly politicized in terms of these beliefs.(86) The extensive infrastructure which Resistance organizations have built up serves as a behavioral reinforcement to Resistance ideology: community-building programs are articulated in ideological terms; ideological tracts are used as basic educational materials; ideologically "correct" attitudes are inculcated in all training sessions. The long-term political implications would seem to be obvious: Palestinian nationalism, as a belief system, has become and will remain a factor in the politics of any Middle Eastern peace settlement.

But even here, Palestinian ideological success in articulating the discontent of the Palestinian community has carried with it severe restrictions on future political accommodations with the Israelis. The technique for creating (or resurrecting, to borrow Ba'thist terminology) Palestinian political identity and community has been to unleash pent-up emotions in ideologies of violence: Fanonism for Fatah, class war for

the Fronts. As long as the Resistance had little prospect of being forced to deal with pragmatic political solutions, this unfocused yet intense and absolutist emotionalism was functional insofar as the requirements of mobilizing Palestinian nationalist sentiments were concerned. But when, after the October War, it appeared that some settlement might be possible, Palestinian leaders found themselves trapped in a sense by their very ideological success. Like the Algerians before them, when the prospect of peace appeared, the tensions and emotions created by these ideologies of violence turned inward, and the Resistance was torn apart by internecine conflict. Whether Resistance leadership can fashion some strategy to sublimate this violence remains unanswered.

However, this is only the collective aspect. At the level of organizations, Palestinian ideologies have quite a different impact. Because these ideologies are uniquely bound up with both leadership-legitimizing strategies and organizational-survival strategies, they function to constrain Palestinian leadership in a number of ways.

Because these ideological definitions are articulated in a context of inter- and intra-group leadership conflict, they have tended to become reified. Ideological positions once stated have tended to become the outside parameters of action, parameters so important, and defended so intensely, that any deviation from them has been the cause of splits within Resistance organizations. Palestinian ideology, in this aspect, has therefore operated to dramatically reduce the range of options open to Palestinian leaders, because to opt for a policy in contradiction to a stated ideological position is to invite the charge of treason.

Where these ideologies have become identified with given organizations, they have functioned equally to prevent (or at least seriously limit) any form of organizational compromise – that is to say, to limit the ability of leaders (even if they wanted to) to commit their organizations to some larger framework, the PLO, at the possible cost of some loss of organizational autonomy.

The consequent of these contradictory aspects of ideology at the collective level, and that of the several organizations, is to produce a pattern of legitimacy, or political institutionalization, which mirrors that existing in the larger Arab environment. On one hand, there is an increasingly defined overarching value and belief system, a system which is a politicized extension of preexisting Palestinian social and cultural values. In its functional effect on the Palestinian community, this system operates much as pan-Arab ideologies do in respect to the Arab world as a whole; as relatively free-floating belief systems of great emotional power, but which are largely independent of any particular institutional arrangement.

On the other hand are a series of more narrowly defined organizational ideologies, focused on the solidarity and identity needs of individual groups. Here there are intensely held loyalties; loyalties almost of a primordial nature in that they are bound up with notions of individual and collective honor; loyalties so powerful that any perceived insult must be avenged by force – hence the endemic phenomenon of intergroup fighting. The interaction between these conflicting defini-

tions of loyalty provides the political dialectic against which Arab and Palestinian leadership attempt to operationalize successful legitimizing strategies. In the Arab world, this bifurcated pattern pits the demands of local, communal identifications against those of the pan-ideologies; in the Palestinian world, they pit claims for identification with the Resistance as a whole (and its current organizational format, the PLO) against those of the member groups.

TRANSFER OF LEGITIMACY REVISITED: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Between these macro and micro levels of identification, at the level of the PLO itself, legitimacy is still an open issue. Clearly there is some identification with the PLO, especially as this identification is increasingly superimposed on older clique and communal identifications. But equally, there is a divisiveness which is defined and reified by ideological conflicts and reinforced by the characteristics of Resistance infrastructure. The result is the situation described more generally by Huntington, the "gap" between mobilized political belief and emotions and the institutionalization of political structures capable of containing these beliefs and emotions in an ordered process of action.

Heretofore, Arab and Palestinian leaders have attempted to close the gap by a variety of strategies: techniques utilizing charismatic appeals; various forms of one-party organization; strategies aimed at creating coalitions of traditional groups; and intra-Arab strategies based on sublimating discontents outward in some grand design, or by repressing them on the basis of calls for unity in the face of outside threats. These existing political strategies are, it would appear, being supplemented by two longer-term changes: (a) an increasing intellectual tendency to redefine nationalist political symbols in narrower terms of territorially defined communities (Egyptians, Kuwaytis, Palestinians); and (b) a sociological tendency for kinship and communal groupings to become more specifically political in their orientations. In Lebanon, for example, cliques around traditional leaders (Zu'ama') have become partially transformed into quasi-bureaucratized political parties.(87) The same process appears to be happening among the Palestinians: existing traditional loyalties are being tied into organized Resistance groups.

The result is a narrowing of the legitimacy or institutionalization gap; a narrowing from the top in terms of more concrete political referents; from the bottom, in terms of less diffuse communal loyalties. To the extent that the Arab and Palestinian leaderships can interweave these trends, articulating political referents in more concrete terms, using politicized groups to radiate loyalties, they may be able to close the legitimacy gap. In terms of the Resistance, the politics of coalition building dealt with earlier will determine whether existing pan-Arab and parochial loyalties can be transferred to the PLO structure, or one like it.

8 Resistance Infrastructure: Organization for Behavior Modification

The PLO and all major commando groups have developed extensive social institutions: social welfare services, educational systems, and medical facilities. The purpose of these has been to augment or replace traditional communal ties and allegiances with a new set derived from membership within a given commando organization. This new structure would then serve to bind together leaders and followers and create the behavioral basis for group identification and solidarity and, equally, to link Resistance organizations with Palestinian society. In short, these social and political extensions of the commando military nucleus would serve as agents of socialization. They would build an ever-widening base of support both in terms of incorporating the loyalties of progressively wider constellations of subgroups in the Palestinian population, and in terms of politically educating successive generations of Palestinians:

> We have trained our young people everywhere in the world where we have been given a training opportunity. This diversity of training has given us a many-sided, many-faceted revolutionary fighting impact in guerrilla warfare, and there is no doubt that our fighting men have been able to reformulate their training through their continuous revolutionary and combat exercises.(1)

Concern with developing a comprehensive infrastructure stemmed from an analysis of the failure of the 1936 revolt. Sharabi summarized the Resistance viewpoint:

> The revolt was deprived of the indispensable secular framework [i.e., the organizational framework]. There seems little doubt that the political leaders had only scant understanding of the political uses of violence . . . Inevitably there was a radical divorce between the fighters in the field and the politicians in the cities; for their part, the fighters were content to leave

> policy-making to the politicians, and the politicians eager to keep political control. No rational coordination was ever devised between the two elements.(2)

Although commando community-building efforts look alike, there are profound differences in the type of community envisioned. The contrast in aims is sharpest between Fatah and the PFLP. Fatah draws its inspiration from the Muslim Brethren. The Brethren combined Qur'anic organizational principles with Western socialistic practice. They promoted a return to Islamic fundamentalism while at the same time developing programs for adult education, free medical services, physical training courses, and cooperatively run industries. The thrust of Brethren strategy was to defend Islamic institutions by utilizing Western techniques.

In much the same manner, Fatah has developed an infrastructure which is basically an extension of existing Islamic and familial patterns; a grafting of new behavior onto existing customs. Older techniques for providing social support have been translated into contemporary terms. Fatah's approach to social organization might well be drawn directly from the words of Sura IV:

> And do good -
> To parents, kinsfolk,
> Orphans, those in need
> Neighbors who are near,
> Neighbors who are strangers,
> The Companion by your side,
> The way-farer ye meet
> And what your right hands possess:
> For God loveth not
> The arrogant, the vainglorious; -
> Nor those who are niggardly . . . (3)

Along these lines, Fatah has created a number of free services, including a pension fund and martyrs fund, which pay survival benefits to widows and orphans of Fatah personnel killed in action.

The PFLP, on the other hand, views its infrastructure as the nucleus of an entirely new order. Its aim is to destroy the existing "reactionary cultures and rotten habits," especially those of religion and feudalism. Traditional institutions are therefore to be rejected, and particularly so, those institutions which keep women in an inferior position. The PFLP is unique in the Arab world in that it has been an early and consistent supporter of woman's emancipation. As Chaliand points out, the PFLP conceives itself as waging two struggles simultaneously, the struggle against Israel and imperialism and the struggle against Arab reaction.(4) The PFLP's infrastructure is designed therefore to inculcate both martial expertise and a revolutionary outlook; to transform a local nationalist movement into a revolutionary force in the Arab world.

RECRUITMENT: THE MANPOWER BASE

The first major problem facing Resistance leaders was that of converting available manpower into an effective fighting force, a force that would also form the nucleus of a national movement. Estimates of potential recruits ranged widely, the most optimistic placing the figure at approximately 200,000 men: "If we figure on having mobilized about 10 percent of a population of about two million, I'd say that about 200,000 Palestinians are fighting with Fatah. Of these, about one third are real guerrillas – well equipped, well trained, ready to keep on a running battle with Israeli troops."(5)

Original manpower estimates were based largely on UNRWA figures, especially on the numbers of Palestinian males. Variations in numbers, therefore, reflected leadership opinions as to what age groups should be considered eligible sources of recruitment; the broader the age span, the more potential recruits. One of the first acts of the newly reconstituted PLO was to start identifying and registering Palestinians, to get an accurate account of available manpower.

In August 1976 this data served as the basis for a PLO decision to inaugurate a general mobilization. In an effort to augment Palestinian forces fighting in the Lebanese civil war, an across-the-board conscription was ordered. All Palestinians between 18 and 30 were to serve under the PLO flag in Lebanon.(6) This move capped a series of de facto attempts at conscription in which Palestinian groups stopped cars in random searches for young men of fighting age.

But even though such a conscription might be ordered, there remained problems in its implementation. For those Palestinians residing in Israeli-controlled territories, in Syria, and in Jordan it would be difficult to get permission to leave in order to fight in Lebanon. By contrast, Palestinians from Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, and other outlying countries faced a transportation problem. In addition, there appeared to be considerable resistance to the idea of forced conscription. According to one Palestinian leader, the decree aroused fears that new conscripts would be sent "directly to the slaughterhouse." Nevertheless, PLO spokesmen later reported that the training camps were open and functioning.(7)

Aside from numbers, there was an even more serious issue of education and training. The educational level within the Palestinian community ranged from an elite of some 50,000 who had university degrees (a relatively large figure for any country in the Arab World)(8) to a mass base of camp residents with extremely low education levels.(9)

In the late 1960s the Institute for Palestine Studies began a manpower study to determine the precise educational and demographic characteristics of the Palestinian community. This survey, the High Level Manpower Assessment Project (HLMA), produced the following findings, among others:

1. Number of Palestinian university students compares well with the number of Israeli university students.
2. Rate of growth of number of Palestinian students is possibly greater than that of the Israelis.
3. Ratio of educated manpower to total population is higher for the Palestinians than any other Arab country.

The head of the Palestine Planning Board, Dr. Nabil Sha'th, concluded that insofar as education was concerned:

> It is clear in any case, that the Palestinians, although in exile, have not failed to meet the challenge of education. They constitute a community with sufficient qualifications and training to be a formidable source of high level manpower. They have assisted in the process of nation building and institution creating in the other countries of the Arab world, and through this their capacity to do the same in the future in their own country has acquired added credibility.(10)

Nevertheless, this sharp dichotomy in educational levels posed both strategic and administrative problems: should recruitment and training be geared to the lowest common denominator of available manpower, or should it be selective – aiming at the educated elite? The Marxists, by virtue of their organizational, intellectual, and ideological predispositions, chose to be selective. Fatah moved in the direction of mass numbers.

In either case, an infrastructure of training and other support services had to be built up. Here Fatah was most seriously affected, partially because of its strategy of numbers, partially because of its claim to be the representative of the Palestinian people. Many of Fatah's original recruits were said to be hashish smugglers from Syria and Lebanon, as well as other criminals, as these were the only personnel with any knowledge of the territory. This criminal element continued to remain a source of constant intraorganizational unrest and violence, and complicated an already difficult problem of discipline and control. The explosion of volunteers which followed al-Karamah further exacerbated existing control and motivational problems.

In general, prior to the June 1967 war, the Resistance had done little in the way of building up an infrastructure capable of supplying a continuous flow of trained recruits. As noted, pre-June organizations were uniformly small and concerned more with day-to-day operations, with the minimal requirements of organizational survival, rather than with plans and policies for expansion. After June (and especially after al-Karamah), considerable attention was of necessity paid to creating an organizational framework capable of utilizing Palestinian manpower resources, a structure which would enable the Resistance to both survive and grow. Although progress in raising the level of military skill and political consciousness has been spotty (but remember, the Resistance started with an extremely unpromising political and demographic

situation), there is evidence of increasing professionalism in commando groups. (The more specific military problems of discipline, coordination, and control are dealt with in the following chapter.) Commando casualty rates, which were initially extremely high, have been declining as training and expertise have improved. But while this may be true in an overall sense, casualty rates and effectiveness vary according to group size. Other things being equal – that is, not counting suicide missions – smaller groups are generally better trained and more effective than larger groups. Additionally, there are variations between PLA units.

FINANCES: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE

If any sort of ongoing organizational structure was to be established, an effective financial apparatus had to be set up. Here the operative fact was the lack of any Palestinian-controlled and stable source of revenues. As a stateless people, the Palestinians had no access to natural resources. Even if a Palestinian state were established, say on the West Bank – with or without Gaza, the problem of lack of natural resources would not be significantly different. The West Bank is basically a farming economy; what was needed were much larger sources of funds, either from an industrial complex (currently supplied by Israel in connection with the West Bank), foreign aid of some sort, trade, or oil revenues.

As part of a strategy aimed at broadening the PLO (and Resistance) financial base, PLO leadership opted for creating an industrial infrastructure, in this case by creating an organizational complex apparently modeled after the Israeli General Federation of Labor (Histadrut). The Histadrut was originally designed to create an urban working force, but its activities were successively expanded to include not only the organization of industrial and labor relations, but also ideological, cultural, and educational functions. The Palestinian version of the Histadrut was called Samid – an acronym meaning "the Resistance."

Samid was organized in 1970 (some sources say 1971) in Jordan, and was initially a rehabilitation center for the children of dead commandos. At the time, its goals were twofold: (a) to rehabilitate or educate these orphaned children (it should be noted that care for orphaned children is a Qur'anic duty imposed on near relatives and is a very traditional Islamic concern); and (b) to build a "revolutionary" basis for self-sufficiency for the Resistance. Samid consists of some 33 industries, mostly light manufacturing, including factories making military uniforms and some weaponry (at an installation in Syria which is operated under Syrian control), civilian clothing, office furniture, and other consumer items. Samid's total work force is estimated at anywhere between 3,000 and 7,500, most of it (about 80 percent) female. These workers are in turn organized into "Revolutionary Syndical Committees," committees designed both to educate and to indoctrinate the embryonic Palestinian working class.(11)

Even so, Samid itself is not a sufficiently large industrial base to meet PLO financial needs. Resistance leaders have been forced to resort to a variety of fund-raising tactics, tactics ranging from securing funds via summit agreements committing Arab governments to formally contributing to the PLO treasury, to working arrangements with individual Arab leaders, such as al-Qadhdhafi, to large-scale public relations and fund-raising campaigns, to mafia-style operations (basically "suggestions" to businessmen in the Gulf and elsewhere that it would be "politically advisable" to contribute), to bank robberies, and to kidnapping and ransoms (in the case of smaller radical groups like the ACO). PLO fund raising is said to be directed by Khalil al-Wazir. Disbursements are made by the PLO Executive Committee.

PLO-Resistance fund raising has nevertheless been relatively successful. PLO revenues are estimated at approximately half a billion annually. As a consequence, the Resistance has been able to expand both its social and educational services. Nonmilitary training (agricultural cooperatives, for example) has been expanded and extended to include both Palestinian and Arab populations. Medical and social services were added, not only for the commandos, but also for the Palestinian refugee camps and for many Jordanian and Lebanese villages hitherto largely neglected by their own governments. The PLO and Fatah, with their far greater resources, are primarily responsible for the construction of this infrastructure, but some of the other organizations are also active, particularly in refugee camps and Jordanian and Lebanese villages.(12)

When the PLO was founded in 1964, the Arab League subsidy, derived from contributions by the member states, was channeled through the PLO's financial branch, the Palestinian National Fund. Fatah, however, adopted an entirely different system in the beginning, as explained by Salah Khalaf:

> The movement was financed from purely Palestinian sources. In view of our secretive policy – a policy which we carried to the extreme in the beginning – we decided not to take a single millieme from other than Fatah members. It may now be said – this is no longer a secret – that we followed the policy of obtaining employment and business activity in the oil-rich Arab regions, like the Arabian Gulf. . . . essentials needed by a person working in the Gulf area because they were anxious to save the greatest possible portion of their income or salaries for the benefit of the movement – one-half at least and often more.
>
> Before starting operations – this secret may now be disclosed – we imposed on every member the requirement of paying to a special fund a large sum of money which he was to secure by any means, even by borrowing if need be. The reason for this was that before starting our armed struggle operations we took into account even the worst possibilities, such as the possible failure of the movement and the death of a large number of comrades,

> and it was incumbent upon us to assure their families of a certain sum of money which would help them to survive irrespective of all else. We deposited this fund in trust with a group of reliable Palestinians for disbursement, particularly to martyrs' families, in the event that any untoward thing should happen to Palestinian action or to the movement.(13)

After Fatah joined the PLO in February 1969, it undertook, according to Khalaf, to unify the levy on Palestinians by collecting a liberation tax from all of them through the National Fund,(14) in the functioning of which Fatah had the controlling voice. The liberation tax amounts to 5 percent of a Palestinian's salary.

Nevertheless, Fatah, as a result of its rapid expansion, had to seek support from PLO financial sources as well. In the front rank of such sources are Arab governments. In view of the rising popularity and importance of the guerrillas, these have substantially enlarged their contributions, though not always to the extent hoped for by the Palestinians. The allocations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and Libya are, for example, restricted by the agreement they made a few months after the June War of 1967 to donate nearly $400 million a year to Egypt and Jordan, until the "consequences" of Israel's attack were eliminated.

Contributions from these governments also reflect a variety of domestic and inter-Arab political concerns, as well as a genuine desire to help the Resistance. Chief among these contributors are Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, Algeria, Libya, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt, and Algeria have consistently supported and funded Fatah. In the case of the Saudis, this support stemmed from two long-term considerations. During the 1960s, when the Saudis were at swords' points with radical Arab nationalists, aiding Palestinian groups provided a convenient way to demonstrate Saudi backing for the Arab nationalist cause. Second, many of Fatah's leaders were connected with the Muslim Brethren, a movement already financed by the Saudis. Hence, financing Fatah was a logical extension of Saudi policy.

Kuwayti contributions, in part, reflect the fact that Kuwayt has a large Palestinian community. Given the size of this community (some 15 to 20 percent of the Kuwayti population) and the relative weakness of Kuwayti defense forces, both internal stability and external neutrality could be adversely affected by a breakdown of relations with the Palestinians and their Arab supporters. Here again, Fatah has been the chief beneficiary because of its stand regarding noninvolvement in Arab domestic affairs. Some Fatah leaders, Khalid al-Hasan, for example, are said to draw salaries directly from the Kuwayti government.(15)

Algerian, Iraqi, and Libyan aid stems from yet other factors. Algeria has been both mentor and model for Fatah, and has tended to support it. Iraq, by contrast, has supported more radical groups; after the October 1973 war, Iraq backed the PFLP in particular. Libyan aid has varied according to al-Qadhdhafi's assessment of the situation. In 1969, for example, Libya contributed to both Fatah and the PFLP. In 1971 Libya undertook a massive financing campaign to restore the Resistance after

its defeat in Jordan. At the height of this campaign, al-Qadhdhafi announced that he would equip every Palestinian willing to fight. By late 1972, however, relations between Libya and most of the commando organizations had worsened, principally because al-Qadhdhafi felt that commandos were not doing enough fighting. Funding was restricted and Libyan training camps were closed. However, Libyan support for BSO operations continued unabated.

After the Israeli downing of a Libyan airliner in February 1973, Libyan support for all commando groups again increased dramatically, and Libya began a recruiting campaign on behalf of the Resistance.(16) But, later in that year, Libyan money was once more diverted away from Fatah and the PLO as a consequence of their rapprochement with Egypt. In 1974, following the formation of the Rejection Front, Libyan resources have supported its efforts to prevent any diplomatic settlement of the Palestine question. In addition, the Libyans began sponsoring their own groups, notably the ANYLP and the Arm of the Arab Revolution.(17) In this connection, "Carlos" was said to have received 25 million pounds for his part in the hijacking of OPEC ministers in December 1975 (although al-Qadhdhafi himself denied ever assisting Carlos).(18) However, following the al-Sadat peace initiative, al-Qadhdhafi again pledged all possible aid to the Palestinians. In June 1978 he went so far as to put Libya's navy and air force at the disposal of the Palestinians (for Libyan aid in training and supplying Resistance forces, see Chapter 9).(19)

At the Arab summit conference at Rabat in December 1969, 'Arafat asked for guaranteed subsidies of at least $44 million a year for the PLO.(20) The total of what the Arab governments promised remains obscure, but there are signs that it was a good deal less than the request, and varied considerably from government to government. In February 1970 the Kuwayt National Assembly unanimously passed a bill providing for a one-time grant of $14 million for the PLO in discharge of the commitment made by Kuwayt at Rabat.(21) North African funds came from Morocco; arms and men from Algeria; and diplomatic support from Tunisia.(22)

Besides making cash outlays to the National Fund of the PLO, a number of Arab governments support the Resistance with a variety of special taxes. Dubai, one of the wealthier of the United Arab Emirates, imposed taxes for this purpose on hotel bills, cables, and air tickets. Kuwayt deducted 1 percent of the salaries of all teachers for the Palestine Armed Struggle Command.(23) Contributions also flow in from a large number of official and private bodies and individuals in the Arab World. Arab ministers of labor are concerned with providing pensions for disabled guerrillas and the children of those killed in battle.(24) A Libyan philanthropist opened a school in Amman for the daughters of martyrs.(25) Arab trade unions have played their part, along with a horse-racing club in Iraq and the Federation of Arab Veterinarians.(26) The Chamber of Commerce in Amman imposed a levy on merchants based on the amount of their registered capital, as well as a fixed fee on every business transaction.(27)

In addition, the Resistance, despite its proclaimed goal of establishing a secular state in Palestine, receives help from Islamic circles, both Arab and non-Arab. The Islamic World was agitated by Israel's occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem and outraged by the fire in the al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam's third most sacred shrine. Following the al-Aqsa fire, the late King Faysal was so personally outraged at this desecration that he called for an immediate war: "Now that all peaceful methods have been exhausted, I appeal to you to declare a jihad."(28) In any event, Muslim sensitivity over the status of the holy places has resulted in extensive support for the commandos, both financial and political.

Among Asian countries with a predominant Muslim population are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. India and the Philippines have large Muslim minorities. In Africa, Mauritania and Somalia are predominantly Muslim. Muslims constitute the largest religious element in Nigeria, and are well represented in a number of other states of Black Africa. Muslim religious leaders, including the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, have held that at least part of the zakat, the religious tax which is considered one of the five pillars of Islam, can be used to support the Resistance movement.

A conference of Muslim 'ulama' held in Cairo at the end of February and in early March 1970 was attended by Muslim representatives from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (both of which have Muslim populations), as well as by a representative of Fatah. Besides calling for military aid for the Palestinian Resistance and the sending of Muslim volunteers, the conference noted the Afghan delegates exposition of the theory of jihad (holy war), and heard the Rector of the Azhar University of Cairo approve the principle of using the zakat for the benefit of the Resistance.(29)

Nevertheless, finances have remained a persistent problem. In a report submitted to the 10th PNC in January 1973, Dr. Sayigh said the 1971/1972 budget showed a deficit of some 250 million Jordanian dinars; that unpaid commitments to the PLO were 7.2 million Jordanian dinars; to the PLA, 15 million Jordanian dinars.(30) He added that commando groups had failed to contribute to the PNC, but had simply raised funds for themselves or sent money directly to the Palestinian Red Crescent instead.

At the meeting of the Kuwayt National Fund (attended by heads of Foreign and Defense Ministries on November 15, 1972), the PLO submitted a plan for a liberations fund:

1. A percentage of the budget for each Arab country.
2. A liberation tax or percentage of each individual Arab citizen's income.
3. A liberation tax on each Palestinian.

This revenue would go to a number of uses: the confrontation troops, PLO organizational expenses, and support for families of commandos who were killed or wounded. The plan, however, was coldly received.(31)

In spite of its growing political importance, the Resistance was (and remains) basically dependent on outside revenues. This dependence, in turn, meant that its political options were severely constrained. On the one hand, if the leadership went too far in the direction of or confrontation with its Arab host governments, it risked losing funds. If, on the other hand, it erred in the direction of compliance, it risked loss of recruits, prestige among the Palestinian population, and ability to control splinter groups.

In this context, the Jordanian war produced the crisis in funding; a gigantic drop in the popularity of the Resistance, which adversely affected fund raising. In a report submitted to the National Council, Zahayr al-'Alami, then head of the PNF, painted a grave picture of the movement's finances. According to 'Alami, a combination of declining contributions and rising expenses – especially in connection with the PLA – had created an enormous deficit. Arab governments had failed to meet their funding commitments, and in turn, the PNC was forced to shoulder the entire expense of maintaining PLA units. 'Ayn Jalut forces, moved from Egypt to Syria in September 1970, had been paid for by the fund. Hittin troops attached to Syrian regular units were also supported by the fund. The Iraqi government had also notified the PLO that it would not pay salaries of al-Qadisiyah contingents stationed in Iraq.(32)

These constraints were most acute for the PLO and Fatah; and were exacerbated by the activities of terrorist groups. BSO attacks on the Saudi embassies in Khartum in March and in Paris in September 1973 produced a Saudi-Fatah crisis and seriously jeopardized a major source of funds. These attacks took place at a time when Libya and Algeria had already sharply reduced their contributions, and neither the PLO nor Fatah could afford to lose the remaining Saudi or Kuwayti subsidies. The PLO had, in fact, been forced to cut back on salaries in February 1973, a move which led to great bitterness.(33)

In the wake of Khartum, 'Arafat had diligently worked to ease strained relations between Fatah and the Saudis and to avert the threat of both reduced aid and restrictions on Palestinians in Saudi Arabia.(34) The Paris raid was even more embarrassing because it occurred almost immediately after 'Arafat's effort had borne fruit. Coincident with the second attack, Prince Fahd had given an interview to al-Hawadith in which he spoke of the renewed relations between Fatah and Saudi Arabia:

> Splits took place inside the commando action for which we found no justification because we believe that there is no room for divisions in the ranks of a people that lives outside its homeland, and that it would be better if these conflicts were delayed until after the liberation had been accomplished . . . Our relations were of course affected by these conflicts. However, now, as you know these relations have entered a new era of understanding and joint cooperation with Fatah itself. . . . (35)

Relations were patched up, but the threat of a sudden loss of revenue caused by acts of uncontrolled elements still hangs over PLO and Fatah leadership.

At the Rabat Summit of 1974, the PLO was granted a subsidy of $50 million,(36) this in the context of an agreement by the oil producers, most notably Saudi Arabia, to finance the "confrontation states" – Egypt, Syria, and Jordan – and including the PLO. However, these amounts were not entirely assured since they were (and are) subject to fluctuating political considerations: (a) Continued good bilateral relations between the PLO and the oil producers, which means in effect that the PLO must bow to producers' political demands or face loss of revenues; (b) larger multilateral relations between the producers, the confrontation states, and the PLO, which introduce still other political complexities such as divergence of policy on the issue of peace or war into fund raising; and (c) still more complex relations among the Arab states themselves, in this case between the two major post-1973 coalitions, the Steadfastness Front (Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, the PLO itself – including Rejection Front organizations and Algeria) and the Arab Entente (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Kuwayt, North Yemen, Morocco, and Mauritania). These coalitions have their origins in larger rivalries for control of the Middle East. But one of the results of inter-Arab coalition conflict has been a series of openings for Palestinian groups to maneuver between Arab coalitions (much like Third World states exploited cold war politics) to secure financing and political support. (Palestinian strategies in this Middle Eastern context are explored in some detail in Chapter 11).

One of the consequences of the Camp David agreements, for example, was a shift in these theretofore diametrically opposed coalitions, as Arab leaders in both the Steadfastness Front and the Entente sought to block any unilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. For the Resistance, the result was the creation of an additional source of revenue, a new Arab defense fund approved at the Baghdad Summit (November 2-4, 1978). The PLO share of this fund was to be some $400 million annually for the ten years, a figure which included $100 million for the West Bank and Gaza specifically and an additional $50 million for unspecified allocation to the occupied territories.(37) In short, the Resistance, whether in the form of the PLO or some post-PLO government, will remain very much the economic client of surrounding Arab governments, unless and until it acquires (which is unlikely) an independent economic base. In the politics of a peace settlement, the economic leverage exercised by donor Arab states will be a critical factor.

TRAINING: THE CREATION OF MILITANTS

While all Palestinian social institutions played a role in creating a mass base, the critical agents of socialization were the military and political facilities. Therefore all commando organizations placed great stress on both military and political training. As with the organizational formats of commando groups, commando training programs tend to be replications of one another, variations of the same model. A number of accounts of commando military training were provided by firsthand observations in Fatah and PFLP camps by French, American, and Arab writers.(38) Initially, Palestinians were quite open about training methods and welcomed foreign observers. But following the Beirut raid of April 10, 1973 in which a number of Fatah leaders were killed, commando officials have been chary about letting outsiders into training areas.

Military Training

The early extensive training of Palestinians was carried on in Algeria. Later on, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon became centers of training activity. After the Jordanian civil war, training camps were moved out of Jordan, mostly into Syria, which became the major locus of training camps, supply depots, and repair facilities.(39) In 1971 Libya began to fund and organize training camps. At the high point of PLO-Libyan relations in early 1972, there were said to be as many as 8,000 commandos training in Libya.(40) Specialized training is given in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya: Palestinian frogmen are said to have been trained at Ras Hilal near the Libyan-Egyptian border since 1971.(41) Selected trainees have been sent to the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam, from where some are said to have been assigned for a time to combat zones in South Vietnam. Some special training has apparently been done in Europe and even in Australia. The training camps are usually in rear areas, often in mountainous terrain, and are kept as inconspicuous as possible. Installations usually consist of nothing more than ordinary buildings or tents.

For about two years after the June war, the Resistance lacked good instructors, and the training was slipshod. Beginning in the summer of 1969, however, this situation began to change. As Sharabi put it (with some overstatement):

> In late 1969, a core of Palestinian instructors was formed from men trained abroad and with long combat experience in Palestine, making possible advanced and specialized training in Jordan.
>
> . . . Training was now [by the summer of 1969] rational, streamlined, and professional. . . . The training pr(gram, greatly re-

> fined, corresponded to specific combat needs and was more pragmatic in orientation. Instructors were not only plentiful, but better qualified from both the professional and political points of view.(42)

The corps of Palestinian instructors was leavened with experts from Syria, Algeria, and other Arab countries. By 1976 progress in training had reached a point where a "War College of the Palestine Revolution" was graduating officers to serve in the al-'Asifah Forces.

A typical camp contains from 100 to 150 recruits. A Fatah camp in Syria visited by Chaliand had 120, ranging in age from 17 to 25, with five military instructors, a physical training instructor, and a political commissar.(43) The rank and file of the recruits are made up predominantly of peasants and members of the lower middle class, with the great majority coming from the refugee camps. A survey of one class of trainees showed a very high literacy rate, some 94 percent literate, with 32 percent of the men having secondary school education and 8 percent having college degrees.(44)

According to Resistance sources, once a volunteer applies for commando training, his capabilities are carefully scrutinized by a special committee. If accepted, he is sent to a training camp for a trial period of 20 days, during which his stability, obedience, capacity for self-discipline, and other qualities are assessed. About a third of the volunteers are said to fail to meet the required standards. Those who pass go on to take the regular course, lasting two months or more, at the end of which they qualify as full-fledged guerrillas.(45)

Physical training includes long-distance running, jujitsu, and karate. Military training starts out with instruction in the use of a variety of weapons, such as automatic rifles and pistols, bazookas, rockets, mines, and "white weapons" (daggers and bayonets). Tactical training includes simulated individual and group attacks on enemy installations, ambushes, laying mines, crossing minefields,(46) crossing electronic fences, and hand-to-hand combat. Seasoned recruits go through maneuvers with live ammunition, and run over obstacle courses which include barriers of flaming kerosene. Night marches are often undertaken, and many hours are spent on guard duty. Special attention is given to familiarizing the recruits with use of the terrain, which is often not well-suited for guerrilla operations, except for mountainous areas. Discipline in the camps is strict: Alcoholic drinks are prohibited and meals are usually eaten standing up. A man found asleep on guard duty three times in a row is summarily discharged.

Chaliand provides this training schedule of PDF camps, a schedule typical of those of most groups:

4:00 A.M.	Reveille, a run, physical training.
4:45 A.M.	Breakfast
5:15 A.M.	Wash, clean up camp.
7:30 A.M.	Assembly for discussion, day's program, distribution of tasks.

9:30-10:00 A.M.	Free time.
10:00-12:00 noon	Physical training, close combat training, reading.
12:00-1:30 P.M.	Lunch.
1:30-3:00 P.M.	Free time, cleaning equipment, weapons training, target practice.
3:00-5:00 P.M.	Political education.
5:00-6:00 P.M.	Free time.
6:00 P.M.	Supper.
8:00-9:00 P.M.	First night watch begins, lights out.(47)

Militia Training

In addition to training fida'iyin, most organizations maintain training centers for auxiliary popular militia. This militia forms the third part of a triadic division of fighting forces: a conventional army (the PLA), fida'iyin units, and militia formations. The militia's function is to operate as a rear guard and to protect fida'iyin from attacks by Arab states. This role was stated originally in the May 1970 Unity Agreement and has been reaffirmed in a number of subsequent documents:

> The resistance groups are to arm the Palestinian and Arab masses in the countries bordering occupied Palestine in order to defend the resistance against attempts to subvert or liquidate it. They will promote active military cooperation between themselves in order to repel any Zionist imperialist invasion of Arab territories bordering Palestine.(48)

Militia training therefore is designed to operationalize this defensive role. Training curricula are considerably shorter than those of regular commandos. Courses ordinarily do not last much over three weeks, and are geared to produce trainees who can defend themselves in an urban setting. Urban guerrilla tactics are stressed, along with methods to defend cities and towns, especially against armor and mechanized units. Militia personnel are therefore drilled on the details of street location, entrances and exits of the city in question, and sites of hospitals and vital economic and military installations. In addition, considerable emphasis is placed on building and manning fortified bunkers in and around major refugee camps. While not on duty, militia members blend into the rest of the population. Female militia members also train with weapons, but most of them concentrate on first aid, morale raising, and supply operations.(49)

The advantage to the Resistance of this militia training is that it produces a steady stream of manpower at relatively little cost. In this respect, the goal (at least of the major Resistance organizations) appears to be the training of the entire male refugee population between the ages of 15 and 45 (along the same line of thinking that led PLO leaders to call for a general conscription). Therefore, classes are

generally large, numbering between 200 and 500 recruits. In terms of cost, Resistance leaders estimate that perhaps 1,000 militia can be trained in less time and with less expense than 100 commandos.(50)

In addition to its purely military role, the militia serves as an organizational expression of commando theories of guerrilla warfare – in this case, the notion (drawn from Mao) that it is necessary to engage an entire population in the struggle against an enemy. Militia units thus have a dual function, the second being that of creating the widest possible base of support in refugee camps (on the theory that the "revolutionaries are like fish in a big ocean called the masses," and without this ocean the revolutionaries would be helpless and vulnerable). Militia training, then, is also an extension of commando political training.(51)

In Fatah, representatives of al-'Asifah units lecture to militia personnel: Political awakening is emphasized in militia curricula. The idea is to make the individual militia member aware of the reasons for his or her presence in the militia and the purpose of carrying arms. After militia personnel have graduated from the regular course, they never lose contact with their organizatons. Members are in constant touch with the political leadership, and also attend daily meetings for political and military discussions. The PFLP militia also receive political education, but on a much less intensive scale than regular commandos.(52)

The organizational evolution of the PDF militia is typical of that of other militias. Originally, PDF militia units were loosely organized and ill-equipped, using Czech and Chinese machine guns and homemade Molotov cocktails (and in some cases only clubs and daggers). Their initial role was that of guarding camps and Palestinian quarters in cities:

> When the front was formed, we started to organize people in the camps and in areas where Palestinians lived . . . At the outset there was no definite form for the militia organization . . . However, our main training camps were present in three areas: 'Amman, Jarash and Irbid. The fundamental task of these camps was to prepare the militia men and train them on the use of available weapons . . . This format continued to be followed . . . until after September 1970. . . .
>
> However, the September events proved to us through experience that we were supposed to have a form organizing the militia situation and facilitating immediate and fast mobilization and organization. The initial form proposed and adopted at the time was the form of the "site." This form reflected the size of the militia in a certain location within which the militia was divided into groups operating inside a quarter [each militia unit was responsible for guarding a quarter].(53)

After 1970 new weapons were acquired (Kalashnikovs and RPG-2s and RPG-7s), and the organizational structure was made more complex. The simple quarter organization was replaced by a series of geographically based commands, and specialized units were created:

> This form was selected because it provides the militia with an area command, site command and platoon command controlled by a province command. This means gradation in the organizational division and a better and more efficient distribution of the tasks. Bylaws were also drawn up to organize the militia's internal relations, to control its formation and to define the issues of affiliation and membership and of the rights and duties of a militia member.(54)

To some extent, this emphasis on securing a defended rear area has paid dividends. In the Jordanian civil war of 1970, Palestinian forces – both commando and militia – were able to hold out in urban areas far longer than expected. Although they were eventually driven out, the ability of Palestinians to raise the costs of urban warfare to extremely high, even unacceptable, levels must give Arab governments confronted with the option to attack or not attack Palestinian installations some pause. In the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976 Palestinian units fought effectively in both urban and rural areas against both Christian and Syrian troops. Palestinian units, many of them militia forces, were able to inflict surprising casualties on Syrian armor.

Political Training

In keeping with their ideological conceptions of insurgent war, all commando groups provide some form of political training. The rationale behind this attitude is expressed by a Fatah leader:

> In a liberation movement, political policy springs from the mouth of the rifle, and we in Fatah are fighters in the political field as well as in the military field. Each of these fields serves and complements the other with Fatah's general strategic plan. Thus we do not differentiate between political action and military action, and to emphasize this we refrain from sending to the armed resistance field any combatant unless he passes through our political organization.(55)

The same leader said that Fatah's basic rule is that its men "should first be politicians and then fighters."(56)

The commando training camps devote as much as ten hours a week or more to political indoctrination and discussion. Each camp ordinarily has its own library containing Arabic newspapers and periodicals, the Palestinian National Covenant, the numerous publications of the PLO and Fatah, and the writings of guerrilla leaders like Habash and Hawati-

mah. Instruction is given in subjects such as Arab and Islamic history, the Palestinian cause, the goals of the Palestinian revolution, and the evils of Zionism and imperialism.

Chaliand gives the following impressions of political training in a Fatah camp:

> Political formation is of a much lower standard than military training. Certainly there are political books: Castro, Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, Giap, Rodinson, General de Gaulle's memoirs, and also Mein Kampf. In view of my surprise at the inclusion of the latter work, the political commissar explained that it was necessary to read everything and that, as the Israelis behave like Nazis, it is useful to know something about the Nazis.
>
> The general intellectual level is underdeveloped, and if we do not consider the presence of revolutionary books as the expression of an integrated political culture, it can be seen during discussion on precise points (not in general declarations and stock phrases) that the theoretical tools are embryonic and the ideology confused. From Fanon they take the description of the psychology of the colonized and the need to resort to violence; from Guevara, the texts advocating the need for armed conflict; from Mao, the concept of the prolonged war; from Debray, whose works are extensively translated into Arabic, the idea that the party is useless, for "the guerrilla nucleus is the party in gestation." The only elements which are in some way integrated are those that can be integrated by a national movement, which is what Fatah really is.(57)

Another description of Fatah political training was provided by al-Sayyad. The school, called "The School of Political Cadres," consisted of a corridor of a building. It contained a blackboard, an emblem of Fatah, a map of Palestine, and a blow-up drawing of a Kalashnikov. The students were regular Fatah members and the instructor a Fatah unit leader. The curriculum consisted of: the study of different revolutions; the historical background of the Palestine conflict; the aims and ideologies of the movement; the Zionist movement and Israeli military establishment; the revolutionary awakening and revolutionary conduct, strategy, and tactics; mine laying techniques; Hebrew language study; the geography of Palestine; and farming techniques which would be used in helping Arab farmers.(58)

The training schedule at a PFLP camp intersperses large doses of political indoctrination between strenuous sessions of physical and military training. Part of the morning is spent on political orientation, with discussions carried into the lunch period. Before supper, there is group self-criticism, some of which may be political. After supper comes tutoring in Hebrew and geography. The recruits then read revolutionary literature by authors such as Marx, Lenin, and Mao before going to bed.(59) Comparing Fatah, the PFLP, and PDF, Chaliand found

the PDF's training ahead of any of the others in sophistication, including as it does exposure to the works of such Western thinkers as Maurice Dobb, Paul Baran, and Charles Bettelheim.(60)

PFLP Schools for Cadres last not quite five months, a longer curriculum than those of other groups. Chaliand outlines the PFLP's 1970 political education program as follows:

1. Marxist-Leninist theory

2. The kind of age we are living in:
   Imperialism
   Revolution and counter-revolution

3. Political problems:

   The Zionist movement
   Israel and what it is like
   The Palestinian problem and the Arab world

4. PFLP:
   The birth and development of the movement
   The first split and its causes (PFLP-High Command)
   The second split and its causes (PDFLP)
   The PFLP and the Arab Nationalist Movement(61)

Training of Boys

The commando organizations place great emphasis on the training of boys, who are called Ashbal ("Lion Cubs"). This is in keeping with the general strategy of a long-term, popular liberation war and also with a recognition of demographic characteristics of Palestinian population. Boys in their teens or even younger are regarded as "the generation that will reach the Mediterranean Sea." The commandos are apparently determined to prove that Zionists are wrong in believing that this new generation, born outside Palestine, will not have the same passionate attachment as the older generation to the land now occupied by Israel.

Therefore most commando groups operate special camps for the Ashbal.(62) Originally, such camps were established to take care of the sons of Palestine killed in battle, but now many of the recruits are refugee youth whose parents are still living. According to Chaliand, the commandos have "a very clear awareness and feeling that they are fighting for the refugees, of whom they themselves form an organic part,(63) and aim to turn the Ashbal from refugees into freedom fighters.

A Fatah camp for Ashbal in Lebanon had 300 boys ranging in age from ten to fourteen.(64) One group of boys came to the camp in the morning, while others went to school in the morning and came to camp in the afternoon. The earliest recruits had already been in the camp

program for seven months. Reading and writing were taught to those not in school. The afternoon schedule was as follows:

Monday	–	Target practice with Chinese submachine guns; Judo; History of Palestine
Tuesday	–	Close combat; Lessons about the refugees and Fatah; Football
Wednesday	–	Target practice with the Kalashnikov automatic rifle; History of Palestine; Obstacle race
Thursday	–	Target practice with the Belgian FN (assault rifle); Free sports
Friday	–	Fifteen-mile march
Saturday	–	Close combat; Combat course; Target practice with an Egyptian rifle; Political instruction
Sunday	–	Close combat; Machine-gun practice; Political instruction; Football

Other sports the Ashbal engage in are volleyball, tug-of-war, track and field events, and boxing. Besides target practice and close combat, the Ashbal learn other warfare techniques. Political indoctrination is more thorough in the PFLP camps than in the Fatah camps but heavily stressed in both. All camps emphasize the importance of character building and the maintenance of an esprit de corps. Since the Resistance has generated an outpouring of literature, indoctrination is reinforced by the reciting of patriotic poems and the singing of patriotic songs.

Although some of the Ashbal go straight into the guerrilla organizations at the age of fifteen or even earlier, a new type of camp has been established to provide a transitional period of training. In November 1969 Fatah opened in Jordan its first camp for boys aged fourteen to seventeen, which graduated its first class at the end of January 1970.(65) The Ashbal help the Resistance by serving as guides and guards. Many have gone into battle alongside the guerrillas, beginning as early as al-Karamah in March 1968. Ashbal also took part in the unsuccessful defense of Tall al-Za'tar Camp in July and August 1976. Other Ashbal live in the occupied territories, where they take part in demonstrations, circulate Palestinian literature, and gather intelligence for the commandos.

Training of Women and Girls

The Resistance is also accelerating a fundamental change in the nature of Palestinian society by bringing thousands of women and girls into activities once reserved for men.(66) In fact, the role of women in the Resistance is much akin to that of women in the Algerian war. Until recently, many Palestinians, particularly the Muslims among them, held that a woman's place was in the home. These attitudes are now changing to some extent under the impact of this new image of women as compatriots in the Resistance.(67)

While many women and girls work as nurses, teachers, and secretaries, others engage in combat and combat-related duties.(68) Palestinian media is full of stories and pictures illustrating their determination and exploits in action. Training camps have been established for them, and sometimes girls and boys are graduated together. When 'Arafat attended graduation exercises at a girls' camp run by the PLA, among the commandos clustering about him were a girl of twelve, a woman of 38, and a mother of six children. The camp in question provided training in both guerrilla and conventional military tactics. Wearing uniforms and fatigue caps, girls learn how to use machine guns and mines. For example, photographs of graduation exercises at a PFLP camp show girls practicing judo and engaging in hand-to-hand combat.(69) Like men, they also receive political training. In recent years both Fatah and the PFLP have multiplied their training camps for women and girls in Lebanon.

Although most commando organizations utilize women on special missions (one of the earliest Resistance martyrs was Shadiyah Abu al-Ghazalih of Fatah), the PFLP in particular stresses the use of women in combat, either solitary or together with male guerrillas – planting bombs in a Jerusalem supermarket and in the Hebrew University, and hijacking an El Al aircraft.(70) Women and girls in the occupied territories have consistently taken part in demonstrations against the occupation, and in distributing material printed by the Resistance organizations.

Layla Khalid of the PFLP is one of the most famous women in the Resistance. In an interview she described her own career in the Resistance:

> By the time I was sixteen I was secretly a member of the Arab Nationalist Movement, believing in a liberated Palestine within a unified, socialist Arab world. My elder brothers and sisters had joined this party before me. We planned, we dreamed, we argued. I visited the West Bank, what was left of Palestine, and traveled over it to get to know my country . . . It took June 1967 and the expulsion of another quarter of a million Palestinians to make me decide that I had to do something positive for the cause of liberation . . . So I joined the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Last summer I did full commando training with the PFLP, after which I was selected and trained for this mission.(71)

MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

Palestinian medical services were created as a consequence of (a) a growing need for medical facilities to handle commando casualties, (b) a parallel need to provide general public health services to Palestinians in and out of camps, and (c) a lack of sufficient alternative medical services within the Arab World.(72) In January 1969 Fatah took the lead

in founding the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), which the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized as "an official society that performs its first-aid, medical, and humanitarian role in serving the Palestinian people and the needy in every field."(73)

The principal goals of the PRCS are to "confirm the existence of the Palestinian personality in connection with health, social, and cultural affairs, "to provide medical and first-aid care for the guerrillas, the refugees, and the Palestinians living in territories occupied by Israel, and to attempt to ensure proper treatment for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.(74) In line with these goals, the PRCS opened branches in Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. These branches are active in raising funds and securing equipment and supplies.

During the first year of its existence, the PRCS set up medical and social centers in refugee camps and in villages near the fighting fronts. Doctors, pharmacists, and dentists were recruited, and nurses and first-aid men were trained. Many of these recruits left established practices in the West to return to the Middle East to serve with the Resistance. Arrangements were made with Jordanian government hospitals and surgeons and other specialists for the handling of emergency cases. By the beginning of 1970 the medical centers were giving free medical care and medication to about 40,000 patients a month. For the commandos in the field, first-aid handbooks and kits were prepared; selected personnel were given training in first-aid in a course lasting three months; and medical and first-aid patrols were formed to accompany the fighting men on forays into the occupied territories. Blood banks were organized in cooperation with the Jordanian government. Convalescent homes were opened for commandos recovering from wounds. By 1979, PRCS facilities had been expanded to include 12 hospitals and 100 clinics, making it one of the best medical services in the Middle East.(75)

An American correspondent gave the following sympathetic description of medical work being done by Fatah:

> All Fatah guerrillas I met were Palestinian but one, a handsome 27-year-old Egyptian psychiatrist. He had left a Cairo hospital to work as a Fatah doctor. He was examining patients by kerosene light in a corrugated-iron shack that Fatah ran as a clinic in the Marka (Malika?) refugee camp (pop. 15,000). The doctor treated 200 refugees a day at the camp; they no longer bothered with the UN-run clinic. His medicine was ample. It came, often free, through American, Swiss, and Russian channels. Arabs in the U.S. had collected $60,000 worth of drugs for Fatah. Arab doctors in the U.S. were financing a hospital bus. Doctors at the American University of Beirut had already outfitted another.
>
> When a Fatah raiding party went out, the Egyptian doctor kept at his aid station at least ten guerrilla blood donors, so that direct transfusions could be given as casualties were brought

> back. Serious casualties, I learned later, were sent on to hospitals in Beirut and Kuwayt. One Fatah lieutenant had his leg sheared off in combat; he was flown to London for treatment and an artificial leg.(76)

In conjunction with each medical center, the PRCS has established a social center to train women and girls in sewing, needlework, knitting, and weaving, and to fit them for social work and surveys in the refugee camps.

The PRCS has also taken on a political role. Its first official act after recognition by the PLO was to take part as an observer in a regional conference of Red Cross, Red Crescent, and (Iranian) Red Lion and Sun societies held in Kuwayt at the end of January 1969. PRCS delegates submitted a report charging Israel with violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Declaration of Human Rights in the treatment of Palestinian prisoners. These delegates recommended that Palestinian guerrillas should, when captured, be considered as prisoners of war, in accordance with the resolutions of the New Delhi Conference of 1956 concerning the Algerian resistance.(77) At the International Conference of the Red Cross in Istanbul in September 1969, the PRCS presented an illustrated report in French, English, and Spanish which again accused Israel of violating the Geneva Conventions and the Declaration of Human Rights. The Conference voted in favor of a resolution calling on Israel to treat captured Palestinian guerrillas as prisoners of war.(78) In July 1978 Dr. Fathi 'Arafat (Yasir's brother), head of the PRCS, defined the political and social nature of PRCS activities, especially its organizational role: "The society concerns itself not just with the Palestinians' medical and humanitarian needs, but is like a combination of the Red Cross, Health Ministry and Social and Cultural Affairs Ministry of a European country."(79)

INFRASTRUCTURE, NATION AND STATE

Taken together, Palestinian social and economic institutions provide a structural framework for the nationalist movement. Unlike the Palestinian community of the 1920s to 1940s, the contemporary Resistance has created an apparently resilient infrastructure. The political consequences of this infrastructure over time will be extremely important in a number of senses, both positive and negative in respect to the social and political integration of the Resistance as a nationalist movement. On the positive side, Resistance infrastructure contributes to Resistance integration on two levels.

1. Perceptually and emotionally, commando educational and social services operate to reinforce Palestinian ideologies. Ideological definitions of the Palestinian self-image and the Palestinian role in the Middle Eastern environment are given concrete behavioral application. These educational and social programs are not only themselves a concrete expression of ideological definitions of action, but are self-conscious agents of indoctrination as well.

2. These institutions function to mediate and direct the process of social mobilization. Unlike traditional Palestinian institutions which appear to have been largely overwhelmed by the events which shattered the Palestinian community, Resistance institutions are specifically designed to handle problems of social change. They promote specific economic and social welfare interests of Palestinian populations. As a consequence, they have a personal and special value apart from their connection with the Resistance.

They are also carefully organized structures of incentives, structures which promote specific economic and social welfare interests of Palestinian populations. In addition, in their strictly organizational aspect, they provide ready-made matrices of roles and interpersonal relationships. In this sense – that of providing Palestinians with social support – they play a role not unlike that played by American political machines at the turn of the century, the role of integrating otherwise socially uprooted populations.(80) But unlike these machines, Resistance institutions are equally geared to a steady expansion of the scope and level of services offered, and as such they contribute to the legitimacy of the Resistance by creating both the perception and the reality of institutional effectiveness.(81) In addition, they complement and extend the Fatah/PLO strategy of structural proliferation, of creating an increasingly differentiated and flexible organizational format with which to tie the Resistance to Palestinian society.(82)

However, the operation of this infrastructure is not totally functional to the Resistance as a whole and to the PLO/Fatah in particular. This is because Resistance leadership is divided among competing groups, each with its own ideology and infrastructure. The already deep cleavages among leaders are reinforced by infrastructural reinforcement. Here, the multiplicity of social and educational institutions, along with their relative economic independence, functions to support leadership divisions. The analogy here is that of the operations of a multiparty system wherein the conditions of election are such that each party (or candidate) has an independent power base. The result is that there is no mechanism to promote a consensus-building process because each leader is relatively immune to PLO/Fatah sanctions short of force. The consequence is that the already weak organizational legitimacy of the PLO itself is further weakened by infrastructural compartmentalization.

To conclude, Resistance infrastructure operates to reinforce the effects of Resistance ideology. It functions to accelerate Palestinian social mobilization on the one hand, and legitimates the movement as a whole. But on the other hand, it equally reinforces existing leadership problems, problems whose resolution or nonresolution will have a crucial impact on whether the Palestinians will be able to play any meaningful role in any sort of peace framework.

9 Military Operations: Strategies and Resources

Ideologies supply the answers to larger questions such as the nature of the conflict and the role and identity of the Palestinians. Strategic and tactical doctrines are the outgrowth of much narrower concerns such as organizational control, recruitment, training, combat effectiveness, and application of resources against available targets. Like ideological systems, military doctrines are developed in a larger context of personal and political relationships, and these in turn shape military orientations. Here the ideological "openness" of the Resistance translates into competing theories of military strategy and tactics.

In addition, problems of decision making already inherent in the organizational format of the Resistance take on added dimensions when the military requirements of precision planning and execution are confronted. To be effective militarily, the Resistance had to develop a decision-making structure capable of controlling the use of force by the Resistance. Given the divisions within the Resistance, such a control was (and is) extremely difficult to achieve. As Bard O'Neil pointed out, this failure had extensive ramifications:

> Given the strengths of their adversary, such disunity was a luxury the Palestinians could ill afford; it diverted both resources and attention from the primary target, detracted from their image, precluded the creation and implementation of a coherent strategy, led to undisciplined behavior (which often worked at cross purposes with the interests of the resistance as a whole), and undermined relations with external support states that were so important in light of the guerrilla inability to set up popular bases in the target area.(1)

Since all commando organizations maintain their own military formations, and none of these is individually capable of waging a successful insurgency, the problem of coordinating fida'iyin activities is

a crucial issue for Resistance leadership. Not only is coordination complicated by long-standing political rivalries, but it is also exacerbated by conflicts over access to and utilization of scarce military resources. Commando groups jealously guard their organizational independence and sources of supply, and aggressively promote their own doctrinal views at the expense of a unified strategy. After the defeat in Jordan, the PLA Chief of Staff 'Abd al-Razzak al-Yahya, himself a military "classicist" in the World War I tradition, delivered this critique of fida'iyin military failings:

> Every organization has its own military formations which are loyal to no other but the organization concerned and receives orders from no other quarter but the command of the organization. The organization still has its own methods of obtaining and arming its members. There has been no real unified military command to which all would adhere.(2)

Commando military operations are split between organizations which are more or less coordinated by the PLO and those carried out by Rejection Front members.(3) The PNC Political Program of March 1971 classified PLO forces into three categories: regular forces, commando forces, and popular militia. In turn, these forces are split between those forces controlled by the Military Department headed by Zuhayr Muhsin and those controlled by the General Command of the Palestine Revolution headed by 'Arafat. The Military Department commands, in theory, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and its commando auxiliary, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF).(4) The General Command coordinates the activities of the independent commando groups and their militias and the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC). Under the terms of the Unity Agreement of 1972, most commando military communiques are disseminated in the name of the General Command.

This bifurcated command structure reflects both the limits of PLO political authority and differences over appropriate military strategy and tactics. On one hand, the PLA was a bureaucratized force with extensive links to Arab governments; on the other hand, the commando groups were both organizationally amorphous and almost anarchically independent. The problem with respect to the PLA was to wean it away from its Arab suppliers. That, with respect to the commando groups, was to create some modus vivendi between the PLO and their respective leaders. But note that these political divisions also reflected more fundamental choices respecting the organizational format with which to wage war. PLA theorists argued that full-scale Western military organization was the solution. Guerrilla strategists, alternatively, have opted for organizational strategies which blend Western and non-Western formats, and utilized existing clique and factional social patterns. Sociologically speaking, the ongoing tension between the PLA and the commando groups was rooted in what amounted to two contrasting approaches to change itself. The PLA leadership was committed to a wholesale Westernization, while the commandos opted for a mixture of Western and traditional forms.

The bifurcation also reflects the long-standing struggle for control of the PLO itself between Syria, which progressively asserted its domination over Palestinian military units, and fida'iyin leaders, who sought to maintain their independence either as separate commando groups or as the collective leadership of the PLO. The Syrian strategy of reducing Palestinian independence and utilizing Palestinian forces for Syrian foreign policy aims began in the 1950s. It continued in the 1960s with Syrian support of Fatah, and later Syrian control of PLA forces in Syria. After 1970, the wholesale move of commando organizations from Jordan into Syria enormously augmented Syrian influence; Syria became the supply depot of the Resistance. The appointment of Muhsin as head of the PLO military department in effect symbolized growing Syrian control.(5) After Muhsin's death in July 1979, Syrian control was continued by the appointment of Mahmud al-'Azzam to head both al-Sa'iqah and the PLO military department. Al-'Azzam, a Palestinian, was a Major General in the Syrian Air Force. (See Chapter 5 for details.)

In commenting on the dismissal of PLA Chief of Staff Misbah al-Budayri, Salah Khalaf explained:

> In brief, the story of al-Budayri is the story of the Syrian trusteeship over the PLA. When the revolution (meaning Fatah) entered the PLO and became its leader, the revolution inherited from the previous command agreements with the countries in which the PLA was stationed. These agreements do not give the [PLO] command any control over this army. Its only control or its only relationship with the PLA comes through its relations with the country in which the army is stationed. The relationship is thus subject to the yardstick of agreement or disagreement with this country. But Syria is an exception to this. Syria has taken control of the PLA since its inception. Syria has never permitted the revolution (PLO) command to have any control over this army, that is in the sense of the power to move it to positions which the revolutionary command thinks proper unless this suits the Syrian command. Thus the Syrian regimes and its representative to the PLO [Muhsin]have been careful to select a commander who suits such a policy.
>
> We will testify for the sake of history that Misbah al-Budayri was the best and most pliant tool in the hands of the Syrian regime. The Arab masses do not know that al-Budayri was dismissed unanimously by the members of the Executive Committee about a year ago. This decision was defied by Zuhayr Muhsin in his capacity as the Syrian regime's representative in the al-Sa'iqah organization. He told them [the Executive Committee] verbatim: "I am one while you are ten, but I want to see how this decision is going to be implemented." He withdrew from the meeting. Actually Zuhayr Muhsin had his way. This decision was not implemented and Misbah al-Budayri continued to head

the PLA and to vanquish the Palestinian will thanks to the Syrian trusteeship over this army.(6)

CONVENTIONAL WARFARE: THE PLA ALTERNATIVE TO GUERRILLA ACTION

The PLA was created in 1965, shortly after the PLO itself was established. The original idea was to give the PLO a regular military force, one modeled after the Algerian NLF's conventional army, the ALN. Like the ALN, the PLA rapidly became an independent force in its own right, challenging PLO authority almost from the first, and ultimately opposing the PLO in the Lebanese civil war of 1975.(7)

PLO-PLA relations have been characterized by an uneasy co-existence ever since the takeover of the PLO commando groups in 1968. This unease stems from a number of sources both organizational and ideological, but basically it is the product of profound differences in outlook. The PLA has institutionalized Western (Soviet) patterns of formal bureaucration; guerrilla groups are basically clique organizations. PLA officers therefore stress conventional operations; the commandos insist on a war of popular liberation.

Career-wise these differences stem from sharply different backgrounds. PLA officers are conventionally trained, socialized into conceiving of warfare in terms of large-scale, mechanized operations. Strategically, they view the problem of liberating Palestine as one involving a relatively short conventional war, a war in which the PLA would operate in conjunction with regular Arab armies. Professionally, these officers have little use for disorganized, pinprick guerrilla tactics – tactics, as they see it, utilized by amateurs leading ill-disciplined units, many of whose members are little better than criminals. (Interestingly, the several ex-PLA or ex-Syrian officers in the Resistance itself, notably Jibril and Za'rur, bring the same sort of critical attitude toward their approach to guerrilla operations.)

To the extent that PLA officers admit the utility of guerrilla warfare, they do so in terms articulated by Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas. In his book Armed Struggle in Facing the Israeli Challenge, Talas had argued for partisan-style operations as a complement to regular tactics:

> The partisans' war centered on the rear-front of the enemy and aims at weakening him, occupying his forces and jamming his communication lines, and lends its moral support to the regular forces and the people throughout the whole country, etc. . . . is on the whole, coordinated strategically with regular warfare.
>
> In addition, the partisans' war plays an outstanding role in the coordination of operations during military expeditions. In order to accomplish the various jobs of coordination during military campaigns, the leaders of the partisans' bases located in the

> rear-front, plus the leaders of the partisans' armies that are temporarily sent out of their bases, should distribute their forces in a rational manner. They should – while taking into account the place and time factors and by the use of various methods – launch a strong attack on the vital and most accessible enemy points, and by so doing, weaken the enemy, hold his forces and hinder his communication lines, thereby helping our forces on the front lines.(8)

In line with this view of the role of irregular forces, the PLA command created an auxiliary, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), a guerrilla-type organization which would operate in the West Bank and (especially) Gaza where it could draw on the remnants of the pre-1967 PLA infrastructure. In a tactical sense, therefore, the PLF functions in this secondary role, to augment rather than supplant regular PLA units. However, its creation was dictated by political considerations which outweigh strictly military dictates. It plays a political role in the interorganizational politics between the PLA and the Resistance groups.

In an organizational sense, the PLF was formed in February 1968 as a counter to the growing popularity of commando organizations. Palestinian recruits who might otherwise have joined the PLA were volunteering for Fatah and other groups instead. In addition, a number of officers, most notably Captains Jibril and Za'rur, were leaving the PLA to form their own commando groups. Therefore, both to forestall further inroads on personnel and to take advantage of the guerrilla mystique, the PLA command had to organize its own commando auxiliary.(9) Even so, its first commander, Col. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Wajih, was trained in conventional rather than guerrilla tactics, and the PLA command structure never really placed much tactical emphasis on insurgent action.

The nucleus of PLF membership was drawn from pre-June 1967 PLA units stationed in Gaza. Its members were said to receive salaries and to be among the best paid of all Palestinian organizations.(10) In spite of this monetary inducement, the PLF failed to become a major organization; it was unable to compete with either Fatah or the PFLP for recruits. As a consequence, it has remained relatively small, numbering some 2,000 men at its height in 1969 or 1970 and approximately 800 men at present.(11) Even so, the PLF signed the Unity Agreement of May 6, 1970 and was given one seat on the Central Committee.(12)

Most PLF operations are carried out in Gaza, where it, Fatah, and the PFLP are the major commando forces. Its specialty apparently is urban terrorism: random grenade throwing, using a corps of young boys as activists; assassination of Arabs suspected of collaborating with the Israelis; assassination of Israelis themselves; and the organization of student and other demonstrations and riots. Most of its arms appeared to be Chinese, either directly supplied to the old PLA units, or from caches of arms buried in the wake of the 1967 war.

These tactics were aggressively countered by the Israelis. Israeli counter-insurgency operations in the Gaza Strip consisted of a combination of heavy patrolling by Druze police, demolition of houses, large-scale refugee resettlement projects, and a cordoning off of the Strip. These, in connection with house-to-house searches, succeeded in reducing the effectiveness of all commando organizations, including the PLF.(13) In February 1973 Israeli sources claimed that the commander of the PLF, Mahmud Madbuh (Mayshush?) had been arrested.(14) Later that summer, Israeli spokesmen claimed that the PLF had been completely broken as a consequence of the discovery of a number of its cells and the arrest of their members. However, in 1974 commando activity in the Gaza again began to increase, and the PLF has been operating there (and in the West Bank).

PLA Organizational Politics

This professional soldier's distaste for guerrilla strategy and tactics is reinforced by organizational considerations. The PLA was created before guerrilla action became popular. It was the original military arm of the PLO, and for that matter, of the Palestinian national movement.(15) Its officers and men possess a rudimentary organizational identity, one distinct from that of the commandos. Ex-PLA Chief of Staff al-Budayri made this distinction between the PLA, the commandos, and the Palestinian people in defending the PLA's actions in Lebanon:

> Both [the PLO and Rejection Front] sides have been trying to lure us to their side. However, we refused to align ourselves with either in the affirmation of our commitments to the resolutions of the PNC and the PLO and the views of the majority of the Palestinian Arab people.(16)

The existence of this organizational identity has led PLA leadership to develop a set of PLA-related goals that are separate from, and often in conflict with, goals set by commando leadership. Because commando units use light weapons, easily obtainable from a variety of sources, they are relatively unconstrained (in relation to the PLA) in terms of needing stable client-patron relations with arms suppliers. Moreover, the smaller the organization, the less need for "normalizing" relations with Arab governments. The PLA, on the other hand, is equipped with armor, artillery, and other equipment, both expensive and technologically sophisticated. Sources of supply for this type of hardware are extremely limited. In addition, there are the added problems of access to spare parts and to training facilities. PLA commanders, therefore, are not free to choose among alternative sources; they are constrained by their own military technology.

Politically, PLA commanders have been faced with a double problem concerning protection of supply sources: first, that of maintaining good working relationships with Arab patrons; second, that of preventing commando activities from jeopardizing these relationships. PLA commanders have therefore consistently stressed the PLA's independence from the Resistance leadership, and have equally consistently decried "extremism" in the Resistance. Tactically, they have sought to water down commando influence in the PLO by pushing for an expanded PNC membership. The new members would be drawn from non-commando "independents" and would offset commando voting majorities. A note to the PNC in February 1971 summarized the PLA position:

> The present Council was established on the basis that most of its members would be from the [commando] organizations in the hope that this might accomplish national unity as well as unity of the Palestinian struggle on the political, military, information and financial levels. But this has not been achieved during the mandate of this council, which means that retaining the Council would keep the divisions and consecrate dispersion.
>
> All the organizations of which the majority of this Council is composed, have maintained their entities and redundant agencies which have caused considerable harm to the Palestinian entity and prevented the Palestinian movement from achieving its aims and obstructed its struggle. Therefore, retaining the present Council and the leadership which sprang from it would mean maintaining the many entities of the organizations more than maintaining the united Palestinian entity.
>
> The leadership which stemmed out of this Council was supposed to be a collective leadership in accordance with Article 15 of the Internal Statutes of the PLO, which stipulates that the leadership is a collective one whose members are responsible collectively and individually. But the leadership has remained, in many of its actions and behavior, an individual leadership which, in many cases, undertook negative actions that caused harm to the Palestinian movement. . . .
>
> The Palestinian movement, during the mandate of the present Council and under the present leadership, has suffered many crises and difficulties, most outstanding of which were the painful events in Jordan last September, which placed a serious responsibility on the shoulders of this Council and the leadership. The feeling of responsibility demands that the mandate of this Council should not be extended and that a new Council be formed.(17)

As a consequence, the PLA note argued, a complete reform of PLO leadership was needed. A new PNC should be formed, one more representative of non-commando points of view:

1. The majority of the New Council will not be from members of the (commando) organizations. The main Palestinian organizations will have limited proportionate representation.

2. The new Council will include representatives of the various sectors and centers of concentration of the people of Palestine.

3. Formation of a new Executive Committee for the PLO with the majority of the members from outside the various (commando) organizations. The main organizations will be represented in the committee in a limited proportion.

4. A preparatory committee from outside the (commando) organization will name the members of the new National Council.(18)

Added to these organizational differences in needs and outlooks were other pressures stemming from Arab host governments. Because of its proposed ability to deploy both armor and artillery, the PLA represented a quantum leap in the military force available to the Palestinians. Therefore, the PLA presented considerable potential threat to Arab governments on whose soil its units were stationed. The threat generated by the existence of the PLA stemmed from two quarters: first, concern that already restive Palestinian populations would be acquiring a large-scale conventional force, a force that might conceivably be a match for indigenous Arab military establishments; second, concern that the PLA might become an instrument in the hands of non-Palestinians or possibly other Arab governments with political or territorial designs of their own.

Therefore, there was extreme Arab reluctance to allow the formation of a Palestinian conventional force. Ahmad al-Shuqayri lobbied intensely for such from the outset of his appointment as head of the PLO. But only the Egyptians and Iraqis were initially willing to allow recruitment of PLA units, and these were to be both small and under Egyptian and Iraqi commands respectively.(19) Al-Shuqayri's efforts, backed by Nasir, ultimately led to approval of the idea of a PLA: Arab leaders finally agreed to its creation at the September 1964 summit. Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwayt pledged themselves to finance it, and Egypt also agreed to allow PLA units to train in the Sinai. However, overall Arab influence was to be assured by placing the PLA under a unified Arab command.(20) PLA headquarters was to be located in Damascus. It remained there until 'Arafat ordered it moved to Beirut in July 1976.

Of the countries faced with the prospect of sponsoring PLA units, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were most affected by the PLA presence. Egypt kept PLA units away from major Egyptian population centers, stationing the PLA in Gaza and later along the canal. Iraq maintained

only a small PLA force, one not sufficiently strong to affect Iraqi security. For Jordan and Lebanon, however, the issue of a PLA presence was critical, the more so because Syria embarked on a systematic campaign to utilize its PLA contingents as an instrument of political and military pressure against both countries. Under Syrian auspices, PLA units invaded Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1976. King Husayn originally opposed both the PLO and the PLA, and agreed to a PLO presence only reluctantly. He allowed the PLO to set up offices in refugee camps, but restricted their activities. The PLO was not permitted to tax the refugees, nor to recruit them for the PLA, nor to station PLA units in border villages.(21) Lebanon refused to allow PLA forces on its soil, but did permit Palestinians residing in Lebanon to join the PLA. However, once a Palestinian had enrolled in the PLA, he was not permitted to return to Lebanon, even to visit his family while on leave from the PLA.(22)

PLA troops in Syria, some 6,000 men, were organized and trained by the Syrian military, and were under Syrian control for all practical purposes. This control was formally ratified by the PLO in June 1966. In the context of escalating border tension between Syria and Israel, al-Shuqayri directed the PLA commander in Syria to place his forces at Syrian disposal. PLO officials were also instructed to cooperate with Syrian efforts to mobilize Palestinians residing in Syria, as part of a general mobilization campaign.(23)

In addition, more direct Arab control was to be assured by decentralizing the PLA command structure. PLA units were to be formed under the auspices of host governments. These units were to be attached to existing armies, trained and officered by host government personnel. Four separate PLA brigades were to be manned, three by Palestinians already serving with the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies, and a fourth to be recruited directly from Palestinians in Gaza.(24) This decentralization was ratified by the PLO Internal Statutes, approved by the PNC in July 1968:

> Art. 22: The PLO will establish an army of the sons of Palestine to be known as the Palestine Liberation Army which will have an independent command, and will work under the supervision of the Executive Committee, and will carry out its instructions and resolutions. Its national duty is to be the vanguard of the battle for the liberation of Palestine.(25)

From the outset there were problems of both training and equipment. The PLA's potential major arms supplier, the USSR, was unwilling to provide the PLA directly with weapons. Al-Shuqayri was forced to turn to China as an alternative. In March 1965 al-Shuqayri went to Peking and received an offer of arms and finances, and by 1966 Chinese equipment was being integrated into PLA units.(26) Nevertheless, PLA units remained relatively ill equipped, being mostly supplied with light weapons, mortars and AK-47s, grenade launchers, with small quantities of armor (aging T-34s) and artillery. Training was conducted in Gaza,

Syria, China, and North Vietnam. By June 1966, an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 PLA recruits were being trained in Syria, another 8,000 to 9,000 in Gaza.(27)

In spite of boasts by al-Shuqayri, the PLA remained an ineffective military force. Immediately preceding the 1967 war, al-Shuqayri placed the PLA under the joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian command. During the war itself the PLA force in Gaza was quickly overrun (although not without extensive fighting), and units attached to Syrian and Iraqi forces in Jordan were also quickly knocked out of battle.(28) This miserable showing of the PLA made it a target for criticism by the guerrillas, criticism that was heightened after the war by what the guerrillas thought was a tendency for the PLA to hold back from the front lines with Israel. Naturally enough, this criticism was deeply resented within the ranks of the PLA, and when the guerrillas were defeated in Jordan, PLA commanders were quick to criticize.(29)

Post-June Reorganization and Deployment

After the June war, the PLA was reorganized and repositioned. Syrian and Iraqi units were split up; PLA personnel from these formed the nucleus of al-Sa'iqah and the ALF respectively. The PLA in Syria was placed under the command of a Syrian-trained officer, (then) Mayor 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and Egyptian officers (carryovers from the Joint command) were removed.(30) PLA contingents attached to Iraqi forces remained in Jordan until late 1970. Those attached to Syrian forces were withdrawn to the Dar'a region along the Syrian-Jordanian border. Remnants from Gaza were stationed along the canal. By early 1969, some 60 percent of PLA personnel were reported to be stationed in the Canal Zone, 30 percent with Iraqi forces in Jordan, and 10 percent with Syrian forces. Canal Zone strength was estimated at about 4,000, Iraqi units at around 2,000, and Syrian units at approximately 6,000 men.(31)

The "new" PLA was organized into three brigades: the 'Ayn Jalut forces stationed in Egypt, the Hittin forces in Syria, and the al-Qadisiyah forces in Iraq. In addition, a small PLA force remained in Jordan. In September 1970, a fourth brigade, the Yarmuk forces, was created from elements of the Hittin and al-Qadisiyah forces and deserters from the Jordanian army.(32) During the Jordanian civil war itself, Hittin forces briefly invaded northern Jordan along with the Syrian army. At roughly the same time, 'Ayn Jalut and al-Qadisiyah units were moved to southern Syria. Both forces later returned to Egypt and Iraq respectively. By late 1973, PLA strength was estimated at 15,000 men, with Hittin, Yarmuk, and al-Qadisiyah forces in Syria at about 10,000 men, and the remainder split between 'Ayn Jalut in Egypt, al-Qadisiyah forces in Iraq, and a Jordanian brigade of approximately 800 men.(33) (This latter may have been the PLF, since the numbers are about right, and its commander was Col. Nusaybah). By 1976 the PLA was estimated to have between 17,000 and 20,000 men under arms.

These were equipped with approximately 100 tanks, 2,000 armored cars and tracked vehicles, and both heavy and light artillery.

In addition, some effort has been made to give the PLA an air defense capability: some 1,000 PLA officers have been trained in Syria as pilots and aircraft-maintenance specialists.(34) There are other reports that PLA (or non-PLA) personnel have been serving as pilots in a number of other Arab countries, notably Syria, and Iraq.(35) Insofar as the Libyans were concerned, 'Arafat claimed that they had set up an independent Palestinian MIG squadron (type not given), and had trained Palestinians in a variety of aircraft including advanced Mirages and MIG-23s.(36) Still other accounts suggested that Palestinians were training in Uganda and North Korea.(37)

In the wake of a Syrian-Jordanian military agreement of June 1975, PLA units in Jordan were to be given an air defense capability. The PLA was to be allowed to install SAMs along the Jordan river frontier with Israel.(38) This move was part of a more general Syrian strategy to extend its air defense system into Lebanon as well as Jordan. The missiles in question, SA-6s and SA-7s were of particular concern to the Israelis, and by May and June 1979 they had begun a series of air sorties into Lebanon to test the effectiveness of this emerging air defense system.(39) However, the Resistance itself is apparently trying to acquire some SA-6s on its own (it apparently already has the less effective SA-7). According to al-Watan, 'Arafat asked the USSR to give the Resistance an SA-6 system to defend the refugee camps. The Soviets reportedly said they would consider the request, but that the Palestinians should try Arab sources first.(40)

PLA forces were, however, divided in their loyalty. The Hittin forces, largely commanded by Syrian officers, were considered pro-Syrian. These were sent into Lebanon in January 1976, and subsequently took part in the Syrian campaign to neutralize PLO forces in Lebanon. The al-Qadisiyah forces also crossed from Syria into Lebanon. Although partly officered by Syrians, they were not believed to be firmly under Syrian domination. The Yarmuk forces were also active on the Syrian side. However, during the fighting in Lebanon, both al-Sa'iqah and the Syrian-commanded PLA forces were said to suffer large numbers of desertions.(41) At the outset of the fighting, the VOP had called upon all PLA personnel to define their stand:

> Brother in the Liberation Army you are called on to define your place, which should only be on the side of your fida'iyin brother and the Lebanese fighter . . . We are confident of you, brother officers and soldiers of the Liberation Army . . . (42)

The fact that PLO leadership felt compelled to do this speaks for itself. Only the 'Ayn Jalut forces, sent in by Egypt in February "when Palestinian camps were surrounded and subject to attacks" were considered fully loyal to the PLO, and actually fought on the PLO side.(43)

PLA and PLO: From Coexistence to Conflict

As a consequence of the anomalous situation of the PLA in respect to both the PLO and Arab governments, PLA-PLO relationships have never been smooth. The PLA itself was convulsed by factional politics: personal differences and hatreds among PLA officers; cliques based on differing local interest; conflicting loyalties to host governments. The upshot was a politics of shifting coalitions, a PLA version of inter-guerrilla politics. In this context, PLO attempts to subordinate the PLA to its authority met little success. And these efforts were vigorously opposed by both Syria and Jordan. The Hittin forces command, in particular, not only resisted PLO efforts at control, but posed itself as a possible alternative leadership of the Resistance.(44)

The conflict between the PLO and PLA began almost immediately after the June 1967 war. In January 1968 the PLO Executive Committee abolished the PLA commander-in-chief post (held by General Wajih al-Mandani), in an effort to reduce the autonomous status of the PLA. This move was followed in July by the appointment of Brig. al-Yahyah as chief of staff (replacing Suhbi al-Jabi), who it was felt would cooperate with PLO leadership. Al-Yahyah, however, was arrested in August by the PLA commander in Damascus, Brig. 'Uthman Haddad (who also held the post of chief of staff).(45) In the complicated shuffle that followed, Brig. Mishbah al-Budayri emerged as Chief of Staff. However, al-Budayri, in turn, led a PLA "mutiny" against PLO authority, and was replaced by al-Yahyah (now with the rank of Commander in Chief) with Haddad as Chief of Staff.(46)

When 'Arafat became head of the PLO, he indicated that the PLA would be moved into action in the occupied territories. In addition, the PLA was to be turned into a "people's army" to be purged of its "bureaucratic" character.(47) This proposal, not surprisingly, produced opposition from within the PLA command, an opposition made more complex by the personal rivalry between al-Yahyah and Haddad, the PLA's two senior officers. Al-Yahyah was supported by PLO civilians; Haddad by the Syrian government, especially by then Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad.(48) In any event, the PLA response was to demand representation on the Executive Committee and in the PNC.

'Arafat was proclaimed supreme commander of the PLA during the seventh PNC meeting in Cairo (May-June 1970) and again attempted to bring the PLA under PLO control. Haddad promptly mutinied with the backing of the Syrians. In July 'Arafat (at al-Yahyah's insistence) dismissed Haddad, who in turn refused to acknowledge 'Arafat's authority. Haddad remained as commander of the Hittin forces, and was eventually reappointed to his old post.The schism was patched up, and the PLA agreed to accept the authority of the Executive Committee in return for being given one seat on it. In addition, the PLF was given a seat. Nevertheless, hostility between the two commanders remained high, and in fact took on an added dimension with the disaffection of al-Yahyah from the PLO.

Originally, al-Yahyah had cooperated closely with 'Arafat, but he had become increasingly alienated by the lack of unity and control within the PLO and the inability of the PLA to coordinate military operations involving guerrilla units. He temporarily resigned his position as chief of staff early in 1971 after sending a note to the PNC warning against the dangers of continued division within the Palestinian ranks. In June, al-Yahyah further reiterated the PLA's objections to the loose structure of the Resistance movement. At that time he sent a stiff note to the PLO Executive Committee, then in session in Damascus, demanding that a new PNC be formed, one that would be dominated numerically by non-guerrilla individuals. The note went on to add that unless some radical reorganization was undertaken, the defects of the past would merely be transmitted anew into the present.(49)

By September the situation within the PLA and between its commander and the PLO had become intolerable. The long simmering dispute between al-Yahyah and Haddad flared anew with the murder of 'Abd al-Rahman Barada'i, the civilian head of PLA intelligence in Lebanon, and this threatened to tear the organization apart. Al-Rahman had been arrested by PLA men under the orders of Captain Ahmad Muhammad Hanafi, the commander of the PLA branch in Lebanon and a follower of Haddad.(50) Following an attempt to assassinate 'Arafat, and with a devastating conflict clearly imminent within the PLA, the Executive Committee ordered the dismissal of both al-Yahyah and Haddad. Their respective followers were dismissed in a general purge of suspected Communists, officers trained in China, and adherents of the PFLP.(51)

However, the twin dismissals and the purge did not end PLO-PLA differences. Al-Yahyah's replacement, Brig. al-Budayri, was technically on loan to the PLA from the Syrian army. With his appointment, Syrian influence over the PLA began to increase dramatically. This influence was accentuated by Executive Committee's decision to give Muhsin (who had a dual role as Executive Committee member and head of al-Sa'iqah) authority to end political activity within the PLA. Thus, in effect, Syrian control over the PLA was institutionalized within the PLO itself.

This growing Syrian domination over the PLA led to further divisions within the Resistance. On one hand, the PFLP and PDF were concerned that the PLA would become a conservative force within the Resistance. The PFLP's feeling was summed up by George Habash in June 1970. While praising the PLA for its training and courage, he expressed the hope of "revolutionizing" it and transforming it into a "popular combatant force."(52)

On the other hand, Fatah leaders suspected that Syria was planning to use its control of the PLA and al-Sa'iqah to create an alternative leadership within the Resistance, a joint organization which would challenge Fatah dominance of the PLO.(53) This suspicion deepened into a certainty in early 1973 when the Syrians began exerting pressure on the Resistance to reach an accommodation with Jordan, as part of a general Syrian scheme to revive the eastern front against Israel. PLA

Commander al-Budayri himself vigorously advocated a rapprochement with Jordan.(54) Nevertheless, as a consequence of Syrian pressure backed up by Syrian restrictions on commando activity and confiscations of arms shipments, plus the threat of Egyptian and Saudi disfavor, the PLO executive committee agreed to an accommodation with Jordan.

After the October war, relations between the PLO and PLA became progressively more strained, the more so as Syrian policy moved in the direction of a military alliance with Jordan. Brig. al-Budayri took to making public attacks on the PLO leadership collectively and 'Arafat personally: the PLO was accused of being dominated by extremists and of failing to provide the PLA with necessary arms and equipment. More specifically, al-Budayri refused to dismiss the commander of PLA (PLF) forces in Jordan, Nihad Nusaybah. In January 1973, the PLO had cut off funds for Nusaybah's unit on the grounds that he was a Jordanian sympathizer.(55)

Al-Budayri still refused to dismiss Nusaybah, and in March 1975 tendered his own resignation instead.(56) In April, Brigadier Walid Jamus was appointed acting chief of staff, with al-Budayri remaining in command in the Hittin forces and still using the title of chief of staff.(57)

This anomalous situation continued throughout the Lebanese civil war while PLA units fought with their nominal PLO commanders. In a desperate move to restore PLO authority, Fatah forces arrested al-Budayri in June 1976. The following month, 'Arafat formally dismissed the general, ordered PLA headquarters moved from Damascus to Beirut, and assumed personal command of the PLA.(58)

In an attempt to bridge this conflict, the PNC at its 13th session approved a plan to unify the PLA, commando forces, and militias. This new combined force would be called "The Army and Armed Forces of the Palestine Revolution." The plan, submitted by the PNC's military committee, called for the establishment of a supreme military council under the leadership of the chairman of the executive committee. The council would be composed of the supreme commander (the chairman) and the commanders of the PLA, guerrilla forces, and militias (including youth clubs and organizations). Its functions would include appointing commanders, establishing military units, and laying out plans, programs, and budgets to guarantee the unification of the army. Day-to-day operations would apparently be under the control of the head of the military department, Zuhayr Muhsin, assisted by two deputies, Nimr Salih (Abu Salih) of Fatah and Salih Raf'at of the PDF.(59)

In spite of this proposed reorganization, the PLA remains largely independent of PLO control. Indeed, in the context of intra-Resistance maneuvering and coalition building in response to Egyptian peace initiatives, the PLA joined with opponents of 'Arafat and his supporters. At one point early in 1977, there were rumors that al-Budayri and Nusaybah were negotiating with anti-PLO, West Bank leaders to form a counter-bloc to the PLO. Later, in October 1977, Israeli sources carried reports to the effect that al-Budayri had aligned the PLA with al-

Sa'iqah, Jibril's faction of the GC, and the Rejection Front to prevent any PLO participation in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.(60) The upshot of all this is that as far as the PLO is concerned, its conventional military arm is at best an uncertain political and military quantity.

INSURGENT WARFARE: STRATEGY AND IDEOLOGY

In contrast to the PLA, commando doctrines stress the primacy of insurgent war: a mix of military and political operations which are summed up in the concept of armed struggle. As a matter of tactical practice, they utilize a mix of four categories of operations: general terrorism – assassination and bombings; guerrilla tactics – ambushes and demolition; urban guerrilla techniques – riots and robberies; and international terrorism – assassination and hijacking globally. The choice of emphasis or combination is, in turn, based on the organization's specific doctrinal orientation. Smaller, less well financed groups tend in the direction of urban or international terrorism; the larger groups stress guerrilla warfare.

Resistance military strategies, therefore, run the gamut from the relatively orthodox guerrilla of Fatah to the radical and anarchic international terror of the BSO and its imitators. Fatah, because of its resources and its concern with the public relations aspect of its operations, has usually opted for a more or less (with the exception of the BSO) standard guerrilla approach. Tactics and targeting are limited to conform to its thesis that the main theater of operations is Israel and the immediate surrounding Arab states. The PFLP and General Command, both operating from a much smaller base, plan and carry out operations aimed at achieving the maximum communications and emotional impact with minimum utilization of personnel.

These stress an accumulation of acts of terror, conceiving the problem as one of hitting both Israeli targets and links with the West. Although they engage in regular guerrilla tactics, they place considerable emphasis on international terrorism. The BSO and its ideological offshoots expand the scope of operations to include all possible targets, non-Arab and Arab, whose destruction is deemed essential to their respective goals.

Fatah and the PFLP have published the most comprehensive strategic analyses, and they are prototypical of the strategic debate over tactics, targets, and resource allocations, which has essentially divided the Resistance. Fatah theorists originally conceived the strategic problem as one of reversing a military and political equation: the enemy has technological superiority and a high level of military mobilization combined with moral and political underdevelopment, while the commandos have political and moral superiority combined with a low level of technological development. The main goal of the commandos is to convert their political and moral superiority into a correspondingly high degree of military efficiency.(61) In keeping with this formulation,

Fatah aims at large-scale and continuous confrontations with Israeli units. This is in line with Fatah's doctrine of an armed liberation struggle. Israeli defenses are divided into two categories: the "shield," consisting of paramilitary settlements in border areas; and the "spear," the regular armed forces. The function of the shield is to lighten defense burdens placed on the spear, while that of the spear is to strike at military detachments in Arab states which appear to threaten the security of Israel.

In coping with this arrangement, Fatah adheres to the Mao/Giap theory of the stages of a guerrilla war. Three stages are envisioned. The first is "hit and run" or "mines and bombs." The military objective here is to weaken the shield by repeated heavy attacks so that the spear must move in to protect it. At the same time, recurrent strikes are to be launched at army patrols and small barracks in outlying areas. These tactics are designed to tie the Israelis down to defensive positions and to reduce their mobility. The political objectives in this stage are twofold: (a) to weaken the morale of the enemy by forcing him on the defensive, which will make him allocate a large part of his military resources to inspection and supervision; and (b) to raise the morale of the guerrillas by engaging in offensive maneuvers which provide combat experience and allow the conditions of the guerrilla war to develop.

The second stage(62) calls for operations increased in size and scope. According to Fatah, these operations aim at occupying and holding defensive positions in the territories seized by Israel. Here the military objective is to nullify the effectiveness of the shield entirely, thereby compelling the spear to move completely over to a defensive role. The political objective is to militarize Israeli society, creating conditions under which the Israeli army will get involved in politics and become a target for domestic criticism. The third stage is the breakout from the positions secured earlier and the forming of a genuine popular uprising in the occupied territories.(63)

The crucial issue here is whether such a theory (one designed for conditions in Vietnam) is equally applicable to the far different terrain of geographic Palestine. Fatah maintains that, with modifications, it is; George Habash of the PFLP holds that it is not. Fatah writers took pains to point out the uniqueness of the Palestinian war of liberation:

> For every political or military action there is a definite objective and a plan embracing the available means and resources under the prevailing conditions for the achievement of that objective. This is called the general strategy. This strategy could be different, and, in fact, it is different by necessity from one movement to another depending on the material and historical circumstances, as well as on the movement's own circumstances (strength of organization, experience, and theoretical and political awakening).(64)

Habash, by contrast, argues that commando resources are insufficient for large-scale operations. Instead, quality, not quantity should be stressed:

> The main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured. To harass, to upset, to work on the nerves through unexpected small damages. Brute force is out: this is a thinking man's game, especially when one is as poor as the Popular Front is. It would be silly for us to even think of waging a regular war; imperialism is too powerful and Israel is too strong. The only way to destroy them is to give a little blow here, a little blow there; to advance step by step, inch by inch, for years, for decades, with determination, doggedness, patience. And we will discuss our present strategy. It's a smart one, you see; would you really want to fly El Al? I wouldn't.(65)

The PFLP, therefore, with its relative paucity of men and resources, concentrated on small-scale, highly organized raids into the occupied territories and Israel itself. At one point, Habash claimed that "85% of the military activity inside Israel is our doing, not Fatah's. We lead almost every attack within the Gaza Strip, and about 50 percent of those in the rest of the occupied territory."(66)

In addition, the PFLP use terror for its political and psychological shock effort. Terror was to be a form of communication:

> We believe that to kill a Jew far from the battleground has more of an effect than killing 100 of them in battle; it attracts more attention. And when we set fire to a store in London, those few flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim, because we force people to ask what is going on, and so they get to know our tragic situation.(67)

These strategic differences were in turn translated into differences over target selection. Fatah, officially at least, insists that operations be confined as much as possible to military targets, seeking to protect its image as that of a legitimate national liberation movement rather than a terrorist group. Fatah's leaders have, for example, reportedly therefore tried to control the actions of Ahmid Jibril's General Command, which attacks civilians. When the Command bombed a Swissair jet in February 1970, its chiefs are reported to have been forced to sign the Unified Command's denial of guilt after an angry exchange.(68) After the GC rocketed an Israeli school bus in May 1970, Fatah publicly denounced the deed.

Subscribing to the principle of total war, the PFLP and the General Command make no distinction between military and civilian targets. Their targets are anything within Israel, any Israeli installation in other countries, all foreign businesses dealing with Israel, and conservative Arab countries regarded as agents of the United States. American installations in the Arab lands are also targets, as the PFLP declares in its slogan "Israel is America; America is Israel." The PFLP is especially determined to disrupt Israeli air and sea communications with the West. Habash reasons that, as Israel is "an island isolated from its friends and surrounded by enemy lands," attacks on its links with the outside world become a tactical imperative.(69)

Nayif Hawatimah, however, took essentially the same position as Fatah. He once characterized individual terrorism as being opposed to the joint action of the masses. Hawatimah even went so far as to declare that "the war of liberation is a popular war very far removed from individual acts of heroism." Hawatimah later joined with Fatah in condemning acts of international terrorism. (Therefore, the PDF attack on Ma'alot came as a shock to many who thought the PDF more moderate than other commando groups in terms of its attitude toward terror.(70))

Culture, Group Conflict and Military Coordination

Because of the profound strategic differences between Fatah and the PFLP, differences reinforced by other political considerations, unity of effort was extremely difficult to achieve. In line with its general political strategy of building a coalition of commando groups under the auspices of the PLO, Fatah also pushed for a unification of military capabilities. Military coordination, however, became and remained more a function of political relationships than an application of consistent military policy.(71)

Divisions over appropriate military strategy, however, were only one aspect of the larger problem of unifying commando effort. From the beginning, Resistance leadership had to contend with the problem of disciplining its own ranks; discipline in the sense of coherent planning and execution, and in the sense of controlling an anarchic behavior of individual fida'iyin. Here the problem of imposing an organizational format requiring a specific form of cooperative behavior on Palestinian cultural individualism reasserted itself with a vengeance. Not only that, but this individualism was reinforced by the clique pattern of intergroup conflict: conflict between groups which refused, for a combination of ideological, political, and cultural reasons, to subordinate themselves to anyone.

Al-Thawra described the discipline problem facing the Resistance in October 1968: the situation in the Jordan Valley was one of near complete confusion. The existence of a multitude of commando groups seriously complicated commando military efforts and prevented the Resistance from turning commando activity into a "popular revolution" against Israel.

Commando attacks, recruiting, and general conduct were disorganized. For example, on September 26 elements of al-Sa'iqah moved in on an Israeli target on the West Bank. However, other men in uniform suddenly appeared, and a firefight almost developed between the two groups. Fortunately, the other group was able to identify itself in time, and it joined with the al-Sa'iqah unit to complete the attack. Later, however, both groups sought to claim sole credit for the raid.(72)

The existence of commando groups, each competing for recruits, had created a certain degree of opportunism. Although most the commandos were enthusiastic young Palestinians, there were also

disorderly and opportunist elements. Young men would join this or that organization for a variety of reasons unconnected with the goals of the Resistance: because of friendships, political leanings, or to get paid. These bogus commandos, if they did not get the pay scale they wanted, would then threaten the leaders of their respective organizations that they would join rival groups if the pay was not forthcoming. Moreover, a number of individuals were using commando work as a screen for what amounted to criminal behavior. Certain commandos, when asked at police roadblocks to show their identity cards, had instead drawn their guns and threatened policemen. Still others frequented bars, got drunk, and shot off their weapons. Still another group merely sat in cafes for hours, showing off their weapons to passersby.(73)

Originally, commando military activities were supervised by a loosely organized commando coordinating council, which had neither authority nor efficiency. Almost immediately after gaining majority representation in the PLO, therefore, Fatah leaders began to press for some mechanism both to coordinate military operations and to maintain discipline within the Resistance. In March 1969 they succeeded in promoting the formation of a Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), with the PFLP as the only significant holdout. PASC originally consisted of representatives from Fatah, al-Sa'iqah, the PFLP, and the PDF. Its function was to coordinate military action, and thus replace the coordinating council. In addition, PASC was to be the sole source of military communiques, preventing the embarrassing practice of having multiple groups taking credit for the same attack.(74) Although more organizations ultimately joined PASC, it never really became an effective organization. Its chief contribution to military coordination was to plan and execute "Operation Greenbelt," a series of raids against Israeli settlements in the northern Jordan Valley. Other than that, it was relegated to policing the refugee camps and functioning as a recruiting and records center.(75) Currently, PASC issues identity cards to participating commando personnel, arrests commandos found fighting with each other or engaging in other breaches of discipline, and operates recruiting centers for the PLO.(76)

In spite of PASC's efforts, commando discipline remained a problem, particularly so where lawless bands of fida'iyin created disturbances in both Lebanon and Jordan and triggered crises between these regimes and the Resistance. As an outgrowth of Resistance-Jordanian confrontation in February 1970, a second coordinating body, the Unified Command, was formed. This time, the PFLP agreed to join, and along with Fatah and others, a total of ten groups were represented in the command.

However, the price for getting such an inclusive framework was "decentralization of power": members of the command surrendered little independence to the command's central authority. The command was split between a central command located in Amman and a series of semiautonomous regional commanders located in different "military sectors" in Jordan. Accordingly, sector commands operated with scant reference to the Amman-based leadership. The internal statutes of the Unified Command described the prerogatives of sector commands as:

1. Drawing up the broadlines of plans for the implementation of the Unified Command's objectives within the framework of plans and instructions approved by the Central Unified Command.

2. Supervising actions of various agencies of the command and acting as watchdog on them.

3. Making political decisions with regard to the protection of the resistance movement and relations with the government agencies, mobilization of the masses, escalation of armed struggle against the enemy within the framework of the resolutions of the Central Command and in the light of the conditions in the Northern Sector.

4. The Sector Command can reject any decisions made by the associated agencies by a majority of two thirds.(77)

Not surprisingly, this structure was unsuccessful, and was replaced within six months by the Unity Formula of May 1970. Under its terms, "All resistance groups consent to the formation of a unified military committee to develop armed struggle and move into a new stage of commando action and popular liberation warfare."(78) This in turn was superseded by yet another command. When the PNC met in Cairo from May 30 to June 4, the ten main guerrilla organizations, including for the first time the hitherto refractory PFLP, were represented. The PNC decided to form a new higher military command with a general staff.(79)

This arrangement was quickly put to the test when fighting broke out only a couple of days later between the Resistance and Jordanian forces. The Central Committee in an emergency meeting in Amman elected 'Arafat commander in chief of the Resistance forces and head of the new higher command. But this did not restrain George Habash and the PFLP from going further toward undermining King Husayn's regime than Fatah was prepared to do. In this emergency meeting the Central Committee decided to divide Jordan into a number of military zones, with a military commander and a political commissioner for each zone, and to form supervisory committees for all the refugee camps.(80) Headquarters of the northern zone (the Mountain Command) was at 'Ajlun, that of the southern zone (the Coast Command) was at Amman. These commands, however, lacked any sort of administrative coordination, and operated virtually independent of one another. As a consequence, some of the smaller organizations were able to maneuver between the two commands (which were opposed to each other anyway) to escalate the situation into the disastrous confrontation with Jordan.(81)

As part of the general reorganization that followed the war in Jordan, the PNC adopted a plan designed to centralize all Resistance military forces under one command, the General Command of the

Palestine Revolution. (The PNC's program closely followed a proposal put forth by the PDF, excerpted in al-Siyasah, April 2, 1972). As with earlier structures, the General Command was designed to coordinate Resistance military activity. In addition, however, it was given an augmented role in unifying and standardizing all aspects of military operations. According to the terms of the PNC Political Program of March 1971, the Command's functions were:

1. To lead military action.
2. To lay down the necessary military plans for the revolution's forces.
3. To escalate military action within the laid down program and plans.
4. To reorganize the forces of the revolution on the basis of unity in organization, training, arming and operation.
5. To develop the fighting units and their potentials so as to conform with the nature of the revolutionary struggle in every phase.
6. To lay down one budget for these forces which shall be approved by the National Council.
7. To issue military communiques.
8. To appoint the political leadership of the general command of the revolution's forces.
9. These forces shall have a commander in chief and a chief of staff who shall be appointed by the political leadership.(82)

Like previous bodies, however, its actual grant of authority was the product of a compromise formula. On the one hand, the Political Program asserted the principle of strict adherence to the political and military decisions of the PLO:

> All commando organizations, fighting forces, union, and national leaders shall participate in the national unity on condition that they abide fully by the Palestinian National Charter and the decisions of the national assemblies.(83)

On the other hand, individual organizations were given virtual autonomy of action:

> The merger of commando organizations having identical ideologies or political thought in one organization is a national necessity. Until this takes place, it is the right of each organization to safeguard its organizational existence provided it disbands all other institutions and merges them in the PLO. Within both the legislative and the higher executive institutions of the PLO, the principles of democratic centralization, collective leadership, and commitment of the minority to decisions taken by majority vote shall prevail.(84)

In spite of these efforts, discipline and coordination proved discouraging. Smaller groups, in particular, continued to fight among themselves. In the wake of a clash between GC and PDF forces in June 1974, Filastin al-Thawrah admonished both sides:

> Some shooting incidents broke out last week between some commando elements. These incidents were soon exaggerated and blown out of proportion by the imperialist and reactionary information media that sought to make them appear as if they were the essence of the Palestinian truth. . . . The revolution cannot shut its eyes to what happened and cannot leave any loophole. For the revolution is in an advanced position of clashing with the enemy, and the enemy is bound to infiltrate from any loophole in this position . . . (85)

But other than those structures and PASC intervention, the PLO remained relatively unable to make its writ stick.

Given the political problems inherent in the makeup and decentralized structure of the Resistance, only minimal coordination has been achieved to date. Nevertheless, the issue of PLO leadership's ability to control its members has become even more pressing following the October war, with the possibility of a peace settlement. On the one hand, the PLO's ability to garner international recognition depends in large part on its ability to control the more anarchic elements in its ranks, both local extremists and international terrorists.

On the other hand, its very survival in Arab host countries depends on its success in constraining the provocative acts of undisciplined groups. The mistakes of Jordan in 1970 were repeated in Lebanon in 1975 and 1976: PLO leadership allowed itself to be dragged into an essentially non-Palestinian civil war, with equally disastrous consequences. In its aftermath, and with the implementation of an Arab deterrent force (Syrian-dominated), PLO leaders were especially concerned to prevent incidents which might be utilized by Arab detente force units as pretexts for further restrictions on the Resistance. Indeed, the PLO reportedly went so far as to set up yet another force, the Palestine Deterrent Force, to ensure even more control – but with little success. Fighting between commando units remains a continuing feature of intra-Resistance relations.

GUERRILLA WARFARE: DEBATE OVER DEPLOYMENT

Guerrilla deployment and tactics per se are also the result of interplay between ideology, strategic doctrines, and the tactical environment. Basically, three types of operations are carried out: cross-border attacks staged from bases in surrounding Arab states; those mounted from bases within Israel or from the occupied territories (including attacks on non-Israelis, tourists, and Arab "collaborators"); and seaborne raids launched from Lebanese ports. As elsewhere, there is

considerable disagreement among commando military experts on the desirability and effectiveness of either type.

The adoption of any of these tactics required a commitment of resources and an assessment of the risk/benefit mix involved. Border raids needed a series of camps, larger fixed training and supply facilities toward the rear, and small, mobile staging bases toward the front. To effectively carry on border warfare, therefore, the cooperation of host Arab states had to be secured. Localized operations within Israel required the creation of an underground network capable of channeling arms and supplies to clandestine cadres. Here the chief problems were logistics and the maintenance of organizational security. Sea-borne sorties required meticulous planning, timing and execution. Here the problem was that of concealment.

From a risk/benefit viewpoint, different tactics also presented different prospects. The initial cost for border warfare was high in terms of investment in facilities and manpower, yet its risk of loss was relatively low: once a pipeline to the front had been established, new manpower could be continuously moved forward. There were, however, political risks that Israeli countermeasures would force host countries to crack down on activities, as happened in Jordan and Lebanon. Underground warfare, on the other hand, was initially cheaper, but the risk of total loss was enormously greater, as was the replacement cost in both time and money. Underground warfare had, however, the political advantage in that it would be depicted as a revolt against an occupying power. In this connection, Israeli countermeasures could then be exploited propagandistically.(86) Indiscriminate urban terrorism was probably also the cheapest in terms of money and men, but riskiest in terms of reprisals and adverse political publicity. Sea-borne operations had the advantage of being spectacular, like international terrorist attacks, but had the disadvantage that the risk of discovery and interception was extremely high. Moreover the naval facilities from which these attacks were staged were exceptionally vulnerable to Israeli naval bombardment.

In the years prior to the expulsion from Jordan, Fatah had concentrated its manpower in the Jordan Valley, an area bounded by al-Salt to the south, Irbid to the north, and 'Ajlun and Jarash to the west and east. In Syria, commando camps had been established south of Damascus and northwest of Dar'a. In Lebanon, the al'Arqub area to the south ("Fatah-land") and the Biqa Valley to the east were Resistance sites. Traditional Fatah doctrine looked upon these areas as "Arab Hanoi's":

> Every revolution must have a safe base, an area where guerrillas can receive their training, get their arms supply and also rest after guerrilla operations. The specification for such a base is that it should be as far as possible from enemy reach. As far as the Palestinian revolution is concerned, a safe base can be in Syria, Jordan, or Lebanon, or in all of them at the same time. Jordan is the most important among them because the majority of the Palestinian people live there.(87)

Part of the reason for Fatah's insistence on utilizing operating bases in Arab territories lay in the success of Israeli countermeasures in the occupied territories. Fatah leadership originally attempted to set up a guerrilla infrastructure within the occupied territories, commando cells in villages and towns. In early February 1969, for example, Fatah announced that it had completed setting up a number of bases inside the "occupied homeland." The statement went on to say that from these "well-hidden, well-stocked bases, Palestinian commandos are now operating daily throughout the old and newly occupied areas."(88) But between 1969 and 1973, at least, these cells were quickly discovered by Israeli intelligence, and their membership arrested. Israelis were able to utilize Palestinian villagers as informers, and in general succeeded in depriving Fatah of a local source of support in the West Bank.(89) Moreover, Israeli search-and-destroy techniques, especially heavy patrolling with helicopters, made it difficult for guerrilla units to remain undetected inside Israeli-held territory for extended periods.

Gaza was a somewhat different situation. Here Fatah, along with the PFLP and PLF, was able to operate more successfully, since the population was violently anti-Israeli and thus more willing to aid the commandos. Palestinians living in Gaza were among the poorest and most displaced of all the 1948 refugees. Those who had any marketable skills quickly left, leaving only unskilled laborers and dispossessed farmers. Under Egyptian administration, the economic status of Gaza inhabitants improved only slightly, and smuggling became a widespread means by which supplement UNWRA rations.(90) With the sudden departure of the Egyptians, the Gaza economy collapsed, and along with it the municipal services. Gaza dwellers were left with little in the way of social or communal organizations. Initially, the Israelis refrained from interfering in Gaza society, and in the interim, guerrilla organizations were able to set up a functioning infrastructure. The guerrillas succeeded in getting almost total control over refugee camps. At one point in 1969 'Arafat was able to claim that "the Israelis may rule Gaza by day, I rule by night."(91) Nevertheless, by 1970 or 1971 Israeli countermeasures drastically reduced Palestinian ability to mount operations. It was not until 1974 that the commandos were able to conduct any significant efforts in Gaza.

In spite of these reverses, the issue of creating an underground in the occupied territories continued to be pressed. In the critiques of Resistance ideology and military strategy that followed, a consistent point of attack was the argument that the Resistance was vulnerable in Arab countries because it lacked a strong position in the occupied territories. Why, the question was repeatedly asked, was there an active presence in Gaza, yet almost none in the West Bank?(92)

In the contrast, the PFLP consistently stressed mobility along the borders and the creation of bases in the occupied territories. It also worked at penetrating the Gaza Strip and the Hebron area. Its bases in the Arab states surrounding Israel were mainly in south Lebanon, with a small force in Jordan, south of the Dead Sea (until 1970). In these areas the PFLP used a two-tier system (as did Fatah), with main encamp-

ments well back from the frontier and small assault bases on the frontier itself where raiding parties got last-minute briefings.(93)

The PFLP always opposed Fatah's heavy concentration of commandos in the Jordan Valley, arguing that Israeli tactics – such as the construction of electronic fences, vigorous patrolling, and the use of lookout trenches, spotlights, mines, and strips of smooth sand – had changed the tactical situation. According to the PFLP, these "new realities" made a review of guerrilla strategy and tactics imperative. To combat them, the PFLP suggested: (a) formation of mobile units all along the eastern front, widening the scope of action to such an extent that Israeli forces would become overextended; (b) transfer of commando operations from areas already fortified by Israel to unfortified rear areas through the creation of units capable of striking at communications and other installations away from the front; and (c) adoption of the tactics striking at the economic and human resources of the enemy as well as foreign sources of his strength. In the late 1960s, the PFLP reached the following conclusion:

> The continuation of numerical concentration in the Jordan Valley – however important the valley may be – and the continuation of shelling Israeli positions from the borderline would lead to placing the guerrillas where the enemy wants them, namely, within the Israeli theory of "Living with the guerrillas." This would also limit the effectiveness of the guerrilla action and lead to seeking "propaganda victories."(94)

Nevertheless, a PASC study released in July 1970 documented the heavy concentration of commando attacks along the Jordan Valley prior to the Jordanian civil war. Covering the period between 1965 and 1969, it claimed that the combined PASC membership at the time (Fatah, al-Sa'iqah, the ALF, the PLF, the GC, the PAO, and the PSF) had carried out 6,000 attacks; some 3,900 in 1969 alone. In geographical terms, 67 percent of the attacks took place in the Jordan Valley, 7 percent in the Golan Heights, 10 percent in Gaza, 3.4 percent in Upper Galilee, 7 percent in the Negev and the northern Dead Sea area, 3.5 percent in the West Bank, and 2.1 percent in other areas. Whether or not the raw numerical totals are accurate, the distribution of the percentages gives an idea of the locus of commando operations.(95)

After September 1970, southern Lebanon became the main theater of operations. The al-'Arqub region of Lebanon, bordering on Israel's northern border, offered the commandos an ideal terrain from which to operate: the area was mountainous, affording both hiding places for the commandos and difficulties for any Israeli armor that attempted to penetrate the region. Moreover, it was easily and safely supplied from Syria along a mountainous route, dubbed the "'Arafat trail" (after the "Ho Chi Minh" trail in Vietnam).(96) As a consequence, the Israelis were forced to resort to a combination of air strikes against southern Lebanon, plus successive search-and-destroy operations beginning on a large scale in 1969. These attacks, in turn, had major political repercus-

sions in Lebanon itself and ultimately contributed to the civil war of 1975-1976. To counter the political effects of repeated Israeli attacks on south Lebanon, Fatah launched a major propaganda campaign to defend the continuance of guerrilla operations from Lebanon. In the course of this campaign, the Palestinian view of Lebanon's strategic position as a passage was articulated in December 1969 by Abu al-Hasan:

> All we want is to pass through South Lebanon to Palestine . . . The Palestinian revolution respects Lebanon's sovereignty. All we want is to get to Upper Galilee . . . We refuse the claim that Lebanon has a special status, because Lebanon is part of the Arab world. Wrong are those who believe that Lebanon cannot be defended . . . We came to Lebanon because we know its people love heroism and those who struggle for the recovery of their homeland. . . (97)

Nevertheless, the continuing warfare in the south produced major population changes within Lebanon: basically, the migration of between 50 and 100,000 Shi'a vilagers from the south into the area around Beirut. This influx added to existing Christian/Muslim tensions and contributed to the escalation of intercommunal fighting. Ultimately, the Palestinians were drawn into the fighting on the side of the Muslims, and the Syrians intervened on the Christian side. By late 1976, Syrian forces had overwhelmed most of the Palestinian units in Lebanon.

In spite of the involvement of large numbers of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and the determined resistance of Christian militia, Palestinian units began to move back into south Lebanon. By the end of 1977, some 3,000 to 4,000 Palestinians, perhaps a third of the total Palestinian force in Lebanon, were repositioned in the south. Many of these were dug into a series of heavily fortified bases in an area between the Litani River and the Lebanese border.(98)

As a consequence, these bases constituted a continuing threat to Israeli settlements to the south, and when an opportunity presented itself, such as the Fatah raid on the Tel Aviv highway of March 11, 1978, Israeli forces attacked, as on March 15, 1978. In the ensuing search-and-destroy operation, Israeli units systematically dismantled most Resistance positions, and killed a number of guerrillas.(99) Most of the guerrillas, however, moved north out of reach of Israeli forces and began filtering back in small groups within a few weeks.(100)

Weapons and Tactics

Most commando attacks have been cross-border affairs carried out by small squads usually numbering ten members or less. More of the raiding personnel are men, although some women do take part: the PFLP, for example, stresses the use of women as carriers, decoys, and

sometimes as demolition experts.(101) Units appear to be divided into two types: those armed with heavy rockets, Suhub al-Jahim ("Clouds of Hell") units; and those specializing in demolition. In addition, the commandos are armed with a variety of weapons, a combination of AK-47s (Kalashnikov machine guns), mortars, grenade launchers (RPG-2s), and antitank rockets of both Russian and Chinese manufacture. Administratively, these groups are designated either by numbers or by the names of fallen martyrs. Most of them cross the Israeli border at night, and then attempt mine laying, booby trapping, ambushes, or rocket attacks. Coordination between units is losse, usually under the aegis of the General Command. Some groups operate according to coded instructions broadcast over VOP transmitters; others operate spontaneously.

Initially, both the tactics and weaponry were crude. Most of the rocket attacks were carried out in the form of mounting Katyusha rockets on flatbed trucks, driving the trucks to the frontier, firing, and moving off before Israeli artillery or aircraft would reply. These rockets were, consequently, off-target more often than not.(102) However, the commandos developed a capability to manufacture their own rockets. In May 1974 a number of locally made Katyusha-style rockets were found in Jerusalem, indicating both an upgrading in sophisticated weaponry and an ability to smuggle these weapons into Israel proper.

Commando coordination, tactical mobility, and accuracy of fire also appeared to be improving. Early hit-and-run operations were expanded to some extent into larger attacks, "mobile war" operations by several groups carried out simultaneously. For example, Operation Greenbelt in August 1969 was planned by PASC command and executed by the combined forces of Fatah, the PLA, and the PLF against three settlements and three army posts in the northern Jordan Valley.(103) Moreover, Fatah in particular began to concentrate its attacks on villages inhabited by new immigrants rather than on kibbutzim, on the theory that the immigrants lacked the ideological staying power of the kibbutzniks.(104) Here, instead of using mobile launchers, commandos began to set up and aim rockets armed with timed fuses; when the rockets fired, commandos would be miles away. According to Dobson, those tactics did in fact create something of a morale crisis in northern settlements.(105)

As early as 1969 Fatah was said to be using some armored cars, 106-mm field guns, antitank guns, and antiaircraft guns. By 1975 commando units fighting in the Lebanese civil war were reported using quantities of armored vehicles (mostly armored cars supplied by Libya) and heavy artillery up to 155 mm. In addition, there were reports that SA-7s (Strelas), shoulder-held antiaircraft rockets, were being supplied to some commando units (allegedly by the Syrians),(106) all of which, taken together, amounted to a significant upgrading in weapons available to commando forces.

Most of the weaponry used by the commandos was Russian, usually received indirectly via those Arab governments using such arms. However, an unexpectedly large supply of arms was apparently supplied

by the Chinese. In an interview with al-Nahar after the October war, 'Arafat was quoted as saying that many of the weapons used in the war came from the PRC: "At this time, our friends the Chinese brought us to our military positions quantities of arms and ammunition as a gift to support our struggle."(107)

Originally, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria supplied most of the weaponry, usually older Russian weapons that had been originally given to regular Arab forces. Nevertheless, the amount of weaponry made available was apparently restricted. According to Faruq al-Qaddumi, Fatah had more men than arms when it launched its first raid on the last night of December 1964.(108) After the 1967 war, Fatah units moved into the Sinai (reportedly in the last two weeks in June) and collected arms and ammunition abandoned by retreating Egyptian forces. Similar commando salvage operations were conducted in the Golan Heights. In addition, other weapons were bought from Bedouin tribes in the Sinai. Some weapons and explosives were apparently cached in the Gaza area for later use against Israeli occupying forces.(109) As commando organizations grew in size, political importance, and financial capability, their sources of arms supply became more diversified. Those organizations which were directly tied to specific Arab governments, al-Sa'iqah and the ALF, remained primarily dependent on Syria and Iraq respectively (although al-Sa'iah did apparently buy some arms on the open market). Fatah, because of its superior financial resources, was able to buy arms on the open market in relatively large amounts, in addition to receiving them from Arab sources. Most of the open-market arms appear to have come from Europe, but in September 1976 there were unconfirmed reports that Fatah had negotiated an arms deal with a U.S. firm; these arms were said to consist of mortars, heavy machine guns and 120-mm artillery.(110) The Popular Fronts relied equally on a variety of sources, but most of their arms appear to come from either Iraq or Libya.(111) Small quantities of captured Israeli arms supplemented those acquired through regular channels.

Tactically, the border war resembled a continuation of the style of insurgency originally carried on in Algeria and Vietnam. Like the French and the U.S., the Israelis attempted to seal off border areas. Electronic fences were built along the Jordanian, Syrian, and finally, Lebanese fronts. The latest system in the north consisted of 50 miles of concertina wire, studded with razor blade fragments, backed by an electronically sensitized 12-foot fence topped by barbed wire. This was, in turn, supplemented by a wide stretch of cleared and raked earth designed to show footprints.(112) Floodlights were later added to this arrangement. Israeli patrols searched the area each morning for both tracks and mines. Commandos replied by a variety of tactics, such as walking backwards and wearing lambs wool pads designed to blot out footprints.(113)

In spite of the overwhelming Israeli success in containing border-crossing operations, Resistance tacticians persisted, and in fact increased their attempts to set up an insurgent infrastructure within the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel itself. In this, they had some success,

particularly in the area of creating arms caches. Arms had been smuggled into Israel before, but Israeli security forces had usually been able to discover them. As a consequence, while the Resistance had sufficient personnel to man clandestine cadres, it was not able to supply these cadres with arms on any regular basis.

However, by late 1972 the Resistance appeared to be getting outside assistance in its clandestine efforts in Israel. In December, Israeli security arrested between 40 and 100 persons (most later released) charged with membership in a Syrian-sponsored spy ring, and there is some suggestion that the Syrians were operating with Soviet help. Most of these were Arabs recruited at Haifa University, but there were also a small number of Israelis, these connected with the Israeli radical left (MATZPEN and the Red Front). Before it was discovered, the ring passed on information to the Syrians (and probably also to the Soviets) concerning Israeli military installations, especially radar sites, and concerning weaponry used against the Resistance and air defense systems used against the Syrians.(114) Most probably this information was digested and later put to use in the October 1973 war. Two years later, in December 1974, Hilarion Capucci, the Greek Catholic Archbishop, was arrested on similar charges: that he was engaged in arms smuggling. And in early 1978, Israeli sources alleged that the Bishop of the Armenian Church, Kanal Georgian, was actually a KGB agent actively engaged in recruiting additional KGB agents in Israel.(115) Similarly, the administrative director of the Russian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem was said to be the chief KGB agent.(116) In 1975, Palestinian guerrillas had been able to mount some 125 attacks within Israel and the occupied territories, some 72 in Jerusalem itself. Most of the guerrillas were killed or captured.(117)

By late 1978 Ze'ev Shif noted that the Palestinians had developed an ability to smuggle arms and explosives into Israel, from Cyprus into Haifa. Where before, the Resistance had manpower but no equipment, organization, or planning, now these seemed to be present:

> The conclusion is that they have succeeded in smuggling in from outside the borders large amounts of material . . . In the past they used Haifa as their entry point. Various pieces of equipment, in which explosives were usually hidden, were sent from Cyprus via Haifa . . . It is not unlikely that a similar route exists today . . . If there has been any marked improvement it is in the clandestine organization. Secrecy has increased. In other words, the organizations have departmentalized. Every group knows about itself only, its department only, and has no knowledge of other cells and units.(118)

Shif's conclusion was later borne out by the May 2, 1980 massacre of Israelis in Hebron by PLO gunmen. According to Israeli sources, the attackers had been recruited and organized locally, indicating an increased sophistication in mounting guerrilla operations within Israel and the occupied territories.

The "leapfrog" strategy

The success of Israeli countermeasures, combined with Arab restraints on Palestinian border raids, led to a considerable debate among guerrilla strategists. The outcome between 1971 and 1974 was the dominance of those strategists who stressed international terrorism. But with the PLO decision to opt for a diplomatic approach, this emphasis was reversed. The new tactic was to leapfrog Israeli perimeter defenses by mounting attacks originating from within Israel proper, or by attacking the relatively undefended Israeli coast – but to do so in terms of a tactic previously utilized by the international terrorist groups, namely that of capturing, holding, and ultimately killing otherwise innocent civilians.

In the early part of 1974 a series of especially spectacular and bloody attacks were begun. On April 11 the GC seized and held a school building in the upper Galilee settlement of Kiryat Shimoneh. After being besieged by Israeli troops, the raiding party blew up both themselves and their captives.(119) This was followed on May 15 by a PDF attack on a second school at Ma'alot, also in upper Galilee. In the melee that followed, over 100 persons were either killed or wounded.(120) On June 25 a Fatah unit attacking from the north seized a building at Nahariya. In addition, there were a series of smaller attacks: the GC alone, for example, is estimated to have carried out some 20 raids between January and June.(121)

The politics behind this new strategy were complex. Officially, the raids were designed to coincide with the PNC adoption of a phased political program (May-June) which was in turn designed to facilitate the creation of a Palestinian entity in the occupied territories in the case that they should be returned to Arab control. More specifically, the goals were: (1) to keep military pressure on Israelis as much as possible, to force an end to what Palestinian leaders saw as Israeli delaying tactics; (2) to keep the Palestinian issue alive in the eyes of the world, to prevent its being buried in the course of projected peace negotiations; and (3) on a local level, to retaliate directly for stepped-up Israeli air raids on Palestinian installations in Lebanon.

After the Nahariya attack, a PLO spokesman described the new campaign as the beginning of a series of attacks launched from within Israel:

> This operation was carried out by the Martyr Kamal al-'Udwan Group, which has operated inside the occupied territory since the new plan came into effect. . . . Our fighters were able to hit specified targets and the enemy was unable to overpower them until large military reinforcements had been summoned to the scene of the operation. . . . Our operations do not start from Lebanon. They are operations carried out by the command in the interior in accordance with the plan in effect.(122)

Moreover, these new raids were to be part of a political-military mix, to be aimed at demonstrating the political reality of the Palestinians rather than at purely military objectives. This, in effect, represented a considerable incorporation of the PFLP viewpoint into Fatah thinking, basically a recognition of the limits of fida'iyin military capabilities and the alternative technique of using military operations as communicative acts. In an interview with Newsweek editor Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'Arafat detailed this modified view:

> For 26 years we have been treated as numbers by a UN relief committee. We are not even recognized by the UN. Until our armed resistance manifested itself, we had no identity, no national character. We were stateless and there was a concerted plan to . . . force us to melt into the local scenery all over the Middle East. The gun has made our people regain a lot we had lost in 1948. Our heroic struggle has enabled us to become the most important number in the Middle East equation . . . commando raids are one of the political means we use . . . Our basic aim is the survival of our people, their right to go home and the formation of a modern democratic state.(123)

However, beneath this facade of unity there were diverse and contradictory policies. The Resistance leadership had been badly split over the issue of a government in exile since September 1972. PLO conservatives led by Fatah favored the idea; the radicals opposed it. Existing intra-commando factionalism was intensified by Israeli air attacks on PLO frogmen and naval installations on the Lebanese coast near both Tyre and Sidon. This, in turn, triggered a secondary debate over the utility of such bases, and led to a clash between Lebanese army units and Fatah personnel attempting to repair the installations. The upshot was a further split between Fatah radicals (led by Hamdan 'Ashur) and pro-'Arafat loyalists: the radicals insisted on rebuilding; the conservatives attempted to ease relations with the Lebanese army.(124)

Radicals within the movement, and especially those factions which espoused international terrorism, had long felt that the Resistance must develop a capability to hit Israeli maritime interests. In June 1971 the PFLP attacked the tanker Coral Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea. Later it released a statement defining its reasons for the attack:

> This operation came to reaffirm the strategy of the PFLP which aims at striking at the enemy and his interests wherever they may be, especially striking at areas where the interests of the Israeli enemy meet with those of imperialism and reaction. . . . The tanker, Coral Sea, which was carrying 65,000 tons of crude oil, was an area in which the interests of the Israeli enemy met with those of imperialism, represented by oil monopolies, and Arab and Iranian reaction, both of which colluded with the Israeli enemy to supply oil to the Israeli Elath-Ashdod pipeline. The treason of Arab reaction, which began in February

> 1970, with supplying Saudi Arabian crude oil to the Israeli pipeline, cannot be ignored or allowed to pass without punishment.(125)

The Greek ship Sounion, carrying tourists to Israel, was sunk in Beirut harbor by a BSO group, and an attack was threatened against the Queen Elizabeth II. The net effect of these attacks or threats of attack was to generate intense Israeli concern about the safety of its shipping, a concern that led them to attempt to create a long-range naval force, one capable of protecting both the Israeli northern coast and Red Sea and its approaches.(126) Some of these Israeli naval units later took part in the blockade of Lebanese ports in 1976.

This developing Resistance ability to hit shipping became a threat to Western interests as well. In July 1979 Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister, Shaykh al-Yamani, warned that Palestinian guerrillas might sink one or two supertankers in the Straits of Hurmuz. As reproduced in the Arab Press Service, al-Yamani's statement came in answer to a question by Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave:

> Look what happened when the Israelis shot down five Syrian planes over Lebanon. This sort of thing can escalate rapidly. The Israelis are looking for pretexts to avoid facing the inevitability of a Palestinian homeland and withdrawal from the West Bank. The Palestinians are growing ever more desperate and I wouldn't be surprised if one day they sank one or two supertankers in the Straits of Hurmuz to force the world to do something about their plight and Israel's obstinacy. This would block the channel through which pass 19 million to 20 million barrels a day. . . . This would make the present crisis seem like child's play.(127)

Given the already worsening energy situation, such threats were considered extremely serious, the more so as some Palestinian leaders echoed al-Yamani's warning, and rumors were spread that Libya might be prepared to sponsor oil operations by rejectionist groups.(128) PLO spokesmen, by contrast, denied that such a strategy was completed by the PLO. According to PLO Paris office head Ibrahim Sus: "Such an action is not yet included in the PLO. We are a responsible organization and know the importance of oil to the West."(129) The consequence was an immediate U.S. response in the form of augmented desert training for U.S. Marines and a series of warnings about the possibility of intervention to protect the oil fields.(130)

The seaborne attacks of the first part of 1974, therefore, grew out of a number of considerations, only some of which were military. The April GC raid was timed before the projected PNC debate on PLO policy in respect to a government in exile, and was clearly designed to foreclose any such diplomatic option. The GC had already gone on record as opposing the combined Fatah, al-Sa'iqah, and PDF working paper which advocated the establishment of a "national presence" in the

occupied territories. And this opposition had gone to the extent of armed clashes between GC and Fatah members, following GC criticism of 'Arafat's leadership. According to GC sources, the Kiryat Shimoneh attack was therefore to demonstrate the impossibility of a diplomatic solution.(131)

The PDF raid, on the contrary, was intended to refute accusations that the PDF was "defeatist," that is, was willing to sacrifice the "historic rights of the Palestinian people."(132) The Fatah amphibious landing (after several previous failures) was the outgrowth of an equally complex set of factors: intra-leadership splits; the pressure of outbidding by rival groups on the issue of selling out the Palestinian cause; the organizational necessity to hold the loyalty of its members by demonstrating its continued militancy; and the necessity of preventing peace negotiations in which the PLO would be isolated.

Indeed, just these sorts of considerations seem to have been behind the decision to launch another seaborne attack in March 1978. After a lull of well over three years, due mostly to Resistance involvement in the Lebanese civil war, a Fatah raiding party landed some 50 miles north of Tel Aviv. Moving south down a coastal highway, the raiders seized a bus and began shooting at traffic as they continued toward Tel Aviv. By the time Israeli forces had either killed or captured the fida'iyin, at least 34 people had been killed.(133)

The decision to attack was the outcome of considerations mentioned above. But the overriding concern here was the impact of the Lebanese civil war on Resistance ability to influence policy in surrounding Arab states (especially Egypt, in light of al-Sadat's peace initiative) and to maintain Resistance credibility in the eyes of key international actors, principally the U.S. After some debate in which the pros and cons were argued, and especially the possible adverse effect of such an operation on the Resistance's image, it was decided to act.(134)

The raid and the training of the men were personally planned by Khalil al-Wazir.(135) The raiders then split into two groups, one moving to Cyprus, the other transferred by sea to a point opposite the Israeli coast, where it was shipped off in rubber boats with instructions to attack a Tel Aviv hotel. Because of bad weather and poor navigation, the raiders ended up considerably to the north of their intended target, and began their attack on an ad hoc basis, randomly shooting passersby.

In any event, this new strategy may be expected to be resorted to again in spite of the danger of Israeli reprisals such as those which followed against Resistance installations in southern Lebanon. The same internal Resistance dynamics which produced the 1974 attacks operated in 1978 and 1979.(136) In addition, the prospect of a peace settlement along the lines of the Camp David accords can be expected to trigger even more such raids (and probably even a further resort to international terrorism) as Resistance organizations jockey for position.(137)

Effectiveness of Operations

Any assessment of the military capability and potential of the guerrillas must start with the fact that the substantial growth of the movement has taken place during only a little more than 15 years. Fatah, which began military operations in 1965, remained relatively small and inconsequential until the battle of al-Karamah in March 1968, after which it was swamped by thousands of volunteers. While guerrilla sorties today are not fundamentally different from those before June 1967, their quantitative increase has produced a qualitative change in the border situation. Instead of facing sporadic raids by small bands, Israel has to contend with more or less continuous guerrilla attacks with the attendant military, economic, and psychological strain of a 24-hour-a-day defense. This persistent low-level threat adds to an already onerous burden posed by the conventional armaments of surrounding Arab states.

At present the guerrillas do not appear militarily very impressive. Their casulty rate is still high and their use of weapons is still often amateurish. But it would be a mistake to write off their military potential entirely. The Algerian FLN was also militarily inefficient, but in a guerrilla war efficiency is only one factor. The ability to maintain steady military and psychological pressure, to wear down the enemy until he makes political concessions, is the key to victory in guerrilla war. There is no reason to assume that the Palestinians will be any less determined than their Algerian counterparts.

Western writers generally stress the military weakness of the commandos. They point to the facts that: (a) the Resistance does not have any secure base of operations; (b) it has been defeated in terms of its aims, the ability to carry out operations within Israel proper; and (c) the relatively small scale of damage which it can inflict on Israel is important.(138) They therefore conclude that the Resistance is to be dismissed, at least militarily. This of course is hotly debated by Palestinian spokesmen.

Typical of this analysis of commando capabilities is that written by Harkabi. Comparing the situation in Palestine with the situations in Algeria and Vietnam, he found the following limitations militating against the success of the Palestinians: (a) the ratio of manpower is in Israel's favor (in Algeria 400,000 French soldiers faced 10 million Algerians, while in Palestine proper there are two million Israelis versus one million Palestinians). (b) The terrain in Palestine is mostly open country without sufficient cover from air attacks. (c) The Palestinians lack sanctuaries comparable to those enjoyed by the Vietcong. Harkabi's conclusion was that the guerrillas would be unable to do more than engage in random terrorism and that they would fail to establish bases on the West Bank.(139)

On the Arab side, a similar assessment was offered by al-Ahram's former editor, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. Haykal argued that not only were numbers and terrain unfavorable to commando operations, but that in any event the Palestinians would be unable to play more

than a limited role. Their major contributions to the struggle against Israel would be limited to either harassing tactics designed to weaken Israeli will or to symbolizing the Arab will to resist. Palestinian operations were therefore of secondary importance to combat between regular Arab and Israeli units: "The resistance cannot achieve liquidation of Israeli aggression, which is a broader responsibility. It is the responsibility of the entire Arab nation on a broader and wider front, with complete concentration and mobilization."(140)

But while this view appeared to parallel Harkabi's on the surface, there were considerable differences. Where Harkabi was concerned with demonstrating the essential hopelessness of Palestinian military expectations, Haykal's analysis was part of a grand strategy debate that split the Arab World after the June War. On one side, the Palestinians, Syrians, and Algerians promoted a war of popular liberation, arguing (as above) that only an extended guerrilla war would be effective against the Israelis. On the other, the Egyptians countered with the proposition that only large-scale conventional forces could force an Israeli withdrawal. So, not only were competing theories of military strategy at issue, but also competing definitions of national interest, in this case Egyptian versus Palestinian and Syrian.

The dynamics of this strategic debate provided the backdrop to both the evolution of the Arab strategy for fighting the October War and the division in the Arab world after it. For their part, the Egyptians (meaning al-Sadat) extended their analysis of the use of force, and argued that the "military option" had declined as a result of the changed conditions after 1973. According to this theory, the wars of both 1967 and 1973 were inconclusive: in 1967 the Israeli military victory was not sufficient to change the Arab position; in 1973 the Arabs were prevented from winning by U.S. intervention. The Egyptian conclusion was that, since military force was not going to be conclusive by reason that Western powers would not allow it to be, the only viable alternative was negotiation.

The popular war or armed struggle doctrine has nevertheless been maintained by Resistance leaders. As articulated by 'Arafat, the critical element is time:

> I do not say we achieved a great feat in 1973, but proved we were equal. We proved that as Arabs we know how to use sophisticated war tools. This allowed us to prove that the Israeli theory of security is wrong. The Zionist theory is based on the assumption that qualitative superiority will outweigh quantitative superiority. . . . The 1973 war proved that this qualitative difference does not exist. I would like to add something that the German philosopher Hegel said when he spoke about dialectics and he said that quantitative accumulation leads to qualitative change. This means that an increase in the number of educated people in the Arab homeland, even if their standard is lower than that of educated people in Israel, Europe or the United States, will lead to a qualitative change. . . . This refutes al-Sadat's

theory, which assumes that Israel-United States superiority will continue.

It is true that we are not able to defeat Israel now; but who called upon al-Sadat to go to war tomorrow. We achieved some equality with Israel during the 1973 war. It is possible that we may stop for a while to launch a war in 1979 and a third in 1986, taking into consideration what Ben Gurion said to the effect that the Arabs can take more than one defeat but Israel cannot bear the loss of one single battle.(141)

Resistance strategists are well aware of the limits on Palestinian military capabilities, as evidenced by the debates summarized earlier. The twin concerns of formulating an effective military capability and generating a credible threat run through all Palestinian discussions of strategy and tactics. Indeed, the concern with credibility has been a major factor in Palestinian thinking from the movement's beginning, as noted in Chapter 11. Later it became one of the driving forces behind the shift in tactics to international terrorism.

On this point, 'Arafat went out of his way to assert the improvement in Resistance military capabilities:

I still remember the first operation carried out by the Fatah movement's first prisoner, the combatant Mahmud Bakr Hijazi, whom we could not supply, the day he was sent on his mission, with more than one old machine gun of the Sten class and one case of ammunition. . . .

I also remember our first encounter with the Zionist enemy in 1967, near the town of Janin, a day on which Dayan cockily said . . . "In my hands the Palestine Resistance is like an egg and I will crush it when I want."

I remember this, and much else, and compare it to the splendid confrontation which our armed forces waged against the Zionist raid on Southern Lebanon, the raid which the enemy calls the al-Litani War [Operation Litani] and we ourselves call the Fifth War . . . Of the "egg" Dayan talked about in 1967, Gur, commander of the enemy army in 1978, said: "We are battling an enemy which fights with a high military competence." In the battle of Janin we dealt with the enemy in a narrow, limited level of operations and in our Fifth War we confronted him along a front dozens of kilometers long in addition to his naval and air forces.(142)

The problem in assessing the effectiveness of commando operations is in one sense a problem in sorting out the truth of what happened from various other claims. Israeli spokesmen consistently argue that the Resistance is militarily impotent, a force which is of small conse-

quence. Some Arab writers, on the other hand, tend to glorify the exploits of the commandos without sufficient regard for their possibility, let alone plausibility. The problem of credibility is complicated by the practice of several different groups declaring that they engaged in the same military operation. This duplication of claims has been minimized since the unity agreements of 1972, but it still exists.

Therefore the true picture lies somewhere in between, and may in fact be different from either version. In conventional terms, the commandos clearly cannot cope with Israel on any given military index. This is obvious from the fact that they could not mount more than a brief holding action against a much smaller, but no less professional, Jordanian army (even though they had help in the form of an abortive Syrian intervention). And while at the outset of the Lebanese civil war the guerrillas and their Muslim allies were able to defeat opposing Christian forces, once regular Syrian troops entered the battle the trend was swiftly reversed.

The numbers of Palestinian combatants are relatively small and poorly equipped. They lack armor and artillery in sufficient amounts to sustain large-scale actions.(143) Their technological sophistication, while improving in some areas (small and medium weaponry), is not a match for the sophisticated weapons systems currently being employed by regular Arab and Israeli forces. The contrast between the scale of operations mounted by the Egyptians in their attack across the canal in 1973 and those undertaken by Palestinian forces reveals a quantum differential in military technology, organization, and logistics.

During the October war itself, commandos supplemented regular Arab armies. Usually they functioned as an extension of Arab Special Forces, hitting targets behind Israeli lines in both the Golan and Sinai, and providing additional manpower in the Golan. 'Arafat himself left for south Lebanon a week before the attack, and guerrilla camps in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were alerted for possible action.(144) A Fatah force arrived at the Egyptian front on October 3, and guerrilla forces went on full alert on October 5.(145) Palestinian sources estimated that some 26,000 fida'iyin were mobilized under a unified command to fight on all three fronts. At least 500 fida'iyin were said to be operating within Israel.(146)

Altogether, these sources claimed a total of some 200 operations, including attacks on 42 settlements, on convoys, on air fields, on fuel depots, on troop staging points, and on one radar site.(147) Fida'iyin units struck at the rear of Israeli forces in the Golan. Settlements in the Kiryat Shimoneh area were attacked.(148) In the Sinai, fida'iyin units operating out of Gaza attempted to cut Israeli supply lines in an area between Khan Yunis and Beersheba. Some units crossed over from Jordan to attack targets in the Jerusalem area. Other operating from south Lebanon managed to occupy the heights of Abu Ru'us, south of Mt. Hermon.(149)

The PLA also played an ancillary role in the October war. As a result of agreements reached at the mini-summit of September 10-13 1973, some 5,000 PLA troops were moved into Jordan, units of the

Yarmuk brigade to the north, units of the 'Ayn Jalut forces to the south. Both contingents were under direct Jordanian control, being commanded by Jordanian officers.(150)

In the fighting, PLA units were active on both the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. Hittin forces joined with regular Syrian units in the Golan fighting and some Yarmuk forces crossed into Lebanon. 'Ayn Jalut forces were active along the canal as part of the "Fourth Army," a collection of PLA, Kuwayti, and Algerian contingents. According to the London Times, the PLA was the first to observe and identify the Israeli armored force which crossed the canal on October 15. When the PLA commander reported the presence of the Israelis, his Egyptian counterparts refused to believe him, a mistake which cost the Egyptians dearly.(151)

The Palestinians themselves later expanded on this story. According to Salah Khalaf, the Egyptians had more than adequate warning and still failed to react:

> Up to this day, I still find the behavior of the Egyptian high command – indeed, the behavior of al-Sadat himself – beyond belief. On 10 October, four days before Israeli commando units crossed the canal at a point known as the Deversoir . . . Egyptian intelligence agents disguised as bedouins signalled Cairo that Israeli pontoon bridges and amphibious tanks had passed through al-'Arish. The very nature of that kind of military equipment and weaponry should in itself be proof that the Israelis will try to cross the canal. . . Furthermore, the Egyptian staff command has in its files several plans. . . . specifically designed to thwart penetration attempts in at least four weak points, including the Deversoir. Therefore, the Israeli penetration plan was nothing unexpected. But what did the Egyptian high command do? Nothing. It also appears that the information radioed from al-'Arish was not reported to al-Sadat.
>
> Two days later, as the advance forces of General Sharon's troops reached the Deversoir area, a second warning was sounded – this time from our side. The commanders of the PLA and the Fatah forces which, with Kuwayti forces, were assigned to the defense of the Deversoir, informed Cairo of an imminent Israeli attack. Egyptian officials, however, failed to react or send reinforcements.(152)

Nevertheless, the small scale of Palestinian military efforts does not necessarily translate into an equivalent lack of significance. Given the tense and extremely escalatory situation which has characterized the Arab-Israeli confrontation, Palestinian activities (possibly militarily irrelevant in a different situation) can trigger a much larger conflict. Elimination of commando bases in Gaza and the Sinai was a basic Israeli military goal of 1956. In 1967 'Abd al-Nasir himself is said to have pleaded with the Syrians to restrain Palestinian border attacks, fully

recognizing their escalatory potential.(153) In 1973 Egyptian concern over the possible repercussions of Palestinian international terrorism was one of the factors leading to a decision to risk a preemptive war rather than absorb possible Israeli reprisals.

This triggering potential has been magnified rather than decreased with time. Pranger and Tahtinen, in their analysis of the post-1973 Arab-Israeli military equation, point out that the current and projected situation is one of increasing instability: the likelihood of preemptive (and pre-preemptive) attacks has been systematically increased by the types of weapons both sides have been receiving; and while destructive capabilities have increased, those for deterrence have not; the consequence is a situation in which judgments concerning the need for a preemptive attack will be increasingly prone to mistake.(154)

Given this situation of "hair trigger" attack on warning response, any Palestinian activities which generate either Israeli reprisals or Arab troop movements could detonate another Middle Eastern war.(155) Palestinian long-term strategy appears to be designed to exploit just this:

> It is not my choice alone but was imposed on me. What have we done after the 1967 war, or to be more exact, what was the role of the Palestinian revolution? We engaged the Zionist enemy militarily and psychologically until the Arab armies were built. We are now playing the same role. We must keep the area ablaze until the Egyptian absence is compensated for, either through returning Egypt to the arena of war . . . or until balance is restored through building the eastern front.(156)

10 International Terrorism: Global Extension of Conflict

International terrorism is the most spectacular action of the Resistance. In a curious and cynical sense, Palestinian international terror has been chiefly responsible for sensitizing the world to the existence of the Resistance and of the Palestinian issue in general. Brian Jenkins noted:

> Recently, terrorism has been used most successfully on an international scale by the Palestinian guerrillas. That there is now pressure for an Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian homeland, that the Palestinian Liberation Organization may now be accorded international recognition as the legitimate government of a stateless people, is owing at least in part to the success of Palestinian terrorists in bringing their cause violently and dramatically before the eyes of the world. Without endorsing terrorism, one must wonder what success they could have won had they operated within the established bounds of conventional warfare and polite diplomacy.(1)

Terrorism per se is not a new phenomenon. But political terrorism in the West, in the sense of ideologically inspired violence, is only about 200 years old, dating roughly from the time of the French Revolution and the emergence of aggressively nationalist politics.(2) The only previous form of inter-nation violence which resembled contemporary international terrorism was piracy, attacks on international shipping. Piracy per se was pragmatic rather than ideological in nature, concerned with economic rather than political motive. But in terms of the strategy of attacking sensitive and vulnerable economic and communication targets and the use of extortion, pirate operations foreshadowed and served as models for both insurgent warfare and international terror.(3)

Pre-20th century terrorism was, however, by and large limited in its scope, constrained by the technology available to terrorists and by the relatively decentralized international environment itself. The impact of contemporary international terrorism has been magnified by a number of autonomous changes in the international system; changes which terrorists have been able to exploit for their own advantage: (a) the development of air transport systems peculiarly vulnerable to attack (much as was the shipping that pirates attacked); (b) the extension of a global communications network which facilitated (invited, really) the broadcast of demands and added a key communications dimension to terrorist political strategies; (c) the creation of sophisticated technologies of destruction, especially in explosives, which gave small groups enormous firepower (M-26 flash grenades, for example); and (d) the division of the international system into interlocking conflicts, which provided terrorists with the possibility of multiple sources of potential support.(4)

On July 22, 1968 the PFLP hijacked a 707 enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv and diverted it to Algeria. In effect this hijack was the beginning of "modern" international terror since it was the initial attack on an air carrier. Whereas conventional guerrilla strategy aims at confronting a technologically sophisticated opponent by utilizing the resources of a traditional society and culture, international terrorism aims at the reverse: here the strategy is to exploit the very weaknesses created by technological sophistication, not only to exploit these weaknesses, but to use selected items of the opponent's technology in doing so. In addition, the small scale of terrorist organization parallels to some extent traditional organizational forms. The clandestine cell, for example, in its tightness and solidarity, parallels the pattern of group and factional loyalty in the Arab World. (Many terrorist units adopt the names of Palestinians killed in earlier battles as a sign of their kinship-like ties.) International terrorism, at least in the Arab World, then, is in a sense a form of acculturation: Western communications and technology are grafted onto organizational formats indigenous to Arab society. Given the geographical fragmentation of the Palestinians, and their already extensive organizational linkages with the Middle East, it should be no surprise that Resistance strategists would sooner or later opt for this form of violence.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR

Palestinian international terrorism, like other Resistance activities, stems from a complex set of factors: (a) the "agonizing reappraisal" of Palestinian military operations in the wake of the Jordan war, an appraisal which was an extension of the earlier debate over tactics and deployment; (b) the profound legitimacy crises which shook the Resistance after 1970, and created a generational cleavage which was in turn worked into the existing organizational tensions within the Resistance; and (c) changes in the Arab environment, namely the polarization of the

Arab World into two blocs of states, the moderates of the Arab Entente and the Steadfastness Front states committed to opposing any form of peace settlement.

The confrontation doctrine followed by Fatah, as noted, had as a corollary the strategy adopted by Algeria's FLN. The Algerians utilized guerrilla action to provoke the French into making reprisals on theretofore uninvolved populations. The idea was to make these populations suffer so that they would come into the struggle on the side of the FLN. When put into practice by Palestinian strategists, this meant that populations in the Jordan Valley and southern Lebanon would be exposed to Israeli air attacks.

In the post-Jordan reassessment, however, this strategy was sharply criticized on a number of grounds. Palestinian spokesmen expressed great concern for the high loss of lives, not only in Jordan but in commando operations generally. 'Arafat estimated that there were some 30,000 Palestinian casualties, dead and wounded, between 1967 and 1970, including losses suffered in the Jordanian civil war. Israeli sources put the figures at 4,000 killed and between 9,000 and 10,000 wounded during the same period. No small blame for these losses was placed on commando leadership. Even before the defeat, al-Anwar had published the names of commandos who had been killed in the previous two years. The list, some 3,000 names, came as a shock to many Palestinians. One Palestinian figure called upon the leadership to see that commandos undertook effective operations and then returned to base safely: "Accurate planning was necessary to cut down human losses."(5) Later, the Palestine Research Center published a study, based largely on Fatah records, of commandos killed in action. Among its conclusions:

1. The sweeping majority of the commandos belonged to the "poor and impoverished classes and to inhabitants of refugee camps . . ."

2. But, the majority of commandos killed were both young and relatively well educated. . . . (6)

A large percentage of those killed in action were born after 1948; i.e. were born outside Palestine. The bulk of commandos killed were between the ages of 15 and 30. About two-thirds unmarried.

Education:
57 percent had grade school education.
17 percent had high school education.
6 percent had university education.
4 percent were illiterate.

Profession:
45 percent were skilled and unskilled workers.
24 percent were students.
20 percent were military.
.5 percent were professional.(7)

In short, the confrontation strategy was costing the Resistance dearly in terms of its most valuable resource, its educated youth.

In particular, Fatah's theory of large-scale confrontation was attacked as being responsible for the high casualties. Most of the criticism came from the PFLP, but other sources echoed it. Its thrust was an extension of Habash's argument that Fatah was wrong to use either Algeria or Vietnam as a strategic model. Specifically, the critique was based on three points. First, the Arab states surrounding Israel were not permitting Palestinians to carry out operations against Israel. Palestinian military activities were severely restricted and not really significant. Second, as long as this was so, it would be useless to continue engaging superior Israeli forces. Nothing could be accomplished without the aid of conventional Arab armies. Third, that Palestinian manpower was a limited resource. Commando forces numbered only a few thousand, and the total Palestinian population outside the occupied territories was less than 2 million. To continue to accept high casualties under these conditions was tantamount to national suicide.

Arguably then, neither Algeria nor Vietnam were applicable. If the Algerians were able to justify a million casualties, the Palestinians were not. It was necessary to abandon futile border raids and to concentrate elsewhere, to carry out sabotage operations within Israel proper, or, more ominously, to hit Israeli targets anywhere in the world.(8)

This polarization of views over proper strategy, and tactics has sharpened rather than diminished over time. It has, in some cases, superseded ideological differences as the major source of schism within the Resistance. This debate was shaped by a series of factors: the declining military fortunes of the resistance, after Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1976; the impact of interorganizational splits that occurred as a consequence of this decline; and the changing diplomatic fortunes of the Resistance and the impact of terrorism on chances for international recognition. Between 1971 and 1973 the proponents of international terror were clearly ascendent. Between 1974 and early 1976 the more conservative strategists dominated.

But if the defeat in Lebanon is paralleled by a political defeat on the issue of Palestinian autonomy, the balance will no doubt shift again toward advocates of terrorism. After a series of U.S. moves in the United Nations in the spring of 1980, which appeared to indicate continued U.S. opposition to the idea of a Palestine State (see chapter 11 below), PLO leadership appeared to have decided on just such a shift. The PLO attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron in May 1980 was widely interpreted as a reversal of a previous PLO policy of emphasizing diplomatic rather than military tactics. Moreover, the attack, clearly timed to take advantage of escalating tension in the occupied territories as a consequence of the collapse of the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks, was foreshadowed by an increase in PLO-connected terrorist incidents in Europe.

Theoretical differences were punctuated by tactical constraints. Between 1971 and 1973 the ability of the Resistance to undertake cross-border forays declined, as border after border was sealed off. Israeli countermeasures had largely limited these raids, and commando attempts to organize cells within the occupied territory had been blocked by Israeli intelligence.(9) In addition, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon had moved to block Palestinian operations from their respective territories. Jordan had expelled the resistance by the spring of 1971, denying them access to the Jordan Valley. Syria had begun restricting commando activities and encircling commando bases, and had mounted an anti-commando propaganda campaign of sorts, stirring up populations in frontier villages where commandos were quartered.(10) Syrian hostility was especially ominous, since Syrian territory not only functioned as a geographical link between Jordan and Lebanon, but it also contained the main supply and staging centers of the Resistance.

Early in 1973 Filastin al-Thawrah published statistics of commando operations for the years 1969, 1971, and 1972. The numerical comparison of commando operations carried out in 1969, at the height of the Resistance's power and popularity, with those in 1972 graphically demonstrates the Resistance's slackened conventional guerrilla activity:(11)

	1969	1970	1971	1972(12)
Claimed sorties	2390	N/A	545	327

As conventional attacks declined, the number of hijackings and other international terrorist acts increased:(13)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Identified acts(14)	8	21(15)	14	20	32	21(16)

In any event, the result was a policy victory for those leaders favoring a shift to terrorist tactics. In the case of Fatah, this led to the creation (or splitting off) of Black September and later offshoots of the BSO. Here the process was one of organizational fragmentation with a series of increasingly uncontrollable factions splitting off. For the PFLP, the process was rather one of proliferation of existing organizational structures, basically following the lines of the parent ANM structure. In 1972 the PRF formally split off, although it appears to have maintained fairly close operational ties with the PFLP (Wadi' Haddad apparently planned terrorist operations for both organizations.) Later, a series of short-lived organizations connected with the PFLP appeared: the Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (1973), Sons of the Occupied Homeland (1973), Arab Armed Struggle

Organization (1975), and Organization of Struggle Against World Imperialism, a PRF offshoot (1976).

Black September

An offshoot of Fatah (but not necessarily under Fatah's control), the BSO is the most famous (or infamous) of all Palestinian terrorist organizations and serves as a model for a number of subsequent groups. Black September takes its name from the September 1970 civil war in Jordan where the Palestinians were badly beaten. Here it should be noted that there is considerable symbolism in both Black September's name and the choice of some of its targets. The term "Black September" expresses the despair of the Palestinians following the battles in Jordan. Later organizations, notably Black June (itself an offshoot of the BSO) have used the same symbolism. Black June stands for the Syrian defeat of Palestinian forces in Lebanon in June 1976. The Arabic verb meaning "to blacken" (sawwada) also connotes "to bring into disgrace, dishonor." Therefore the "black" part of Black September expresses a sense of being dishonored and, conversely, a determination to take revenge, a very traditional Arab theme (but also one articulated in Fatah's ideology, and before that by Frantz Fanon). Parenthetically, other terrorist groups use a different metaphor: PFLP offshoots usually style themselves the "sons of," meaning in this context the members of a traditionally defined kinship community.

Originally, the BSO was an amorphous series of loosely connected terrorist groups (cells really). Because of this, it was originally argued that it was more an idea, a trend within the Resistance, or a cover name used by a multitude of groups, rather than a single organization: "It cannot be pinpointed, tracked down or crushed. It has no name, no flag, no slogans, headquarters or base. It requires only men who have the determination to fight and succeed and the courage to die."(17) However, within a year or so the BSO had acquired an extensive organizational sophistication, and its tactics and targeting displayed considerable calculation and expertise. Later, Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah (Abu Da'ud), an identified BSO leader, explicitly stated that Black September was really a cover for terrorist operations run by Fatah intelligence: "There is no such thing as Black September. Fatah announced its operations under this name so that Fatah would not appear as the direct executor of the operations of the intelligence organ which is run by Abu Yusuf [Yusuf al-Najjar] and Abu Hasan [Ali Hasan Salamah]."(18)

The nucleus of the BSO was a small group of militants, followers of the Fatah military commander for northern Jordan, Abu 'Ali Iyad (whose real name was said to be Muhammad Mustafa Siyan).(19) Abu 'Ali Iyad had apparently been arguing for some time that the Resistance should stress both secret operations and the priority of military action. Along these lines, some of his followers had already been training for terrorist operations, and had developed contacts with a number of non-

Palestinian groups which used Palestinian training facilities in Jordan.(20)

Abu 'Ali Iyad was killed in the fighting around Jarash and 'Ajlun in July 1971, when King Husayn's troops engaged in an all-out campaign to end the Resistance presence in northern Jordan. The campaign began in April, and by that July the remaining fida'iyin were surrounded and ultimately decimated (approximately 1,300 were killed).(21) Many of the Resistance leaders had already fled the area (which produced immense bitterness among the younger rank and file). Abu 'Ali Iyad, however, remained, was wounded, and was captured by Jordanian troops.

After this point there are two versions of his death. One states that he was killed by Jordanian Bedouin troops (plausible enough, given the ferocity of the fighting and the no-quarter attitude on both sides during the civil war). The other version – and the one accepted by Abu 'Ali Iyad's followers – is that he was tortured and killed personally by Wasfi al-Tal, the Jordanian Prime Minister and the man regarded by the Palestinians as responsible for unleashing the Bedouin in the first place.(22) Later his body was dragged through a number of north Jordan villages behind a Centurion tank.

As a consequence, his followers vowed revenge and formed a group dedicated to that goal, the Revenging Palestinians. Al-Tal was the first victim of this group (now calling themselves the Abu 'Ali Iyad Group) when he was shot down by four men in the lobby of the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo in November 1971. In a symbolic gesture, one of the assassins knelt down and drank his blood. There is some confusion about who founded this group. One source identified Mansur Sulayman Khalifah, one of the assassins of al-Tal.(23) Other sources suggest that Abu 'Ali's sister might have been the original organizer.(24) Still others suggest that Fu'ad Shamali, said to have been the chief military planner for the BSO until his death (from cancer) in 1972, was the BSO's original leader after Abu 'Ali Iyad.(25)

Whatever the facts, the Resistance was bitterly divided over the events of September, and the leaderships of every organization were challenged. From this point on, a number of radical organizations, all dedicated to some form of international terror, split off from almost every major Resistance group. And the issues were usually the same: younger, more militant members challenged the "historic leaders" on the grounds that they were armchair revolutionaries. The older leaders in general responded by arguing that organizational survival required some accommodation with Arab establishments at minimum, and international opinion at maximum. The result was either an actual split or, as in the case of Fatah (and apparently the PFLP), the creation of a new group affiliated organizationally with the parent group but publically separate from it – the BSO and its offshoots, and a number of offshoots off the PFLP.

In the case of Fatah, the embattled leadership was forced to hold a general congress in Damascus in late August and early September 1971. Here the militants (led by Hamdan 'Ashur) threatened to split the

organization unless Fatah gave up its policy of coexisting with Arab regimes, meaning primarily Jordan and secondarily Saudi Arabia and Egypt.(26) Moderates and older Fatah leaders (especially Khalid al-Hasan), in contrast, were concerned with the disastrous implications of this proposed policy which would mean a loss of major organizational sources of support – Saudi Arabian money and diplomatic contacts, and Egyptian training facilities and arms transfers. (Egypt was apparently one of the major channels by which Soviet equipment flowed to the Resistance.) Given the traumatic defeat in Jordan, the Resistance in general and Fatah in particular could not afford to alienate these allies.

At that congress (or perhaps even before it), the idea was advanced that a small group of guerrillas, about 500 men, would be trained in secret for terrorist missions, and that this group would operate relatively free from any organizational restraints. In any event, the idea was adopted, and training in a number of Arab and some non-Arab countries was begun.(27) Even so, Fatah leadership remained split over the prospect of a secret terrorist arm. When al-Tal was assassinated, Khalid al-Hasan condemned it at the same time that Sawt al-'Asifah was praising the act and Fatah officials were arranging for Egyptian lawyers to defend the assassins.(28) Here it should be noted that Fatah leaders have consistently denied any responsibility for the BSO. As late as 1978 Salah Khalaf stated:

> Black September was never a terrorist organization, but has acted as an adjunct to the resistance movement when the latter was unable to undertake its full military and political tasks. Its members have always affirmed that they were not organizationally connected with Fatah or the PLO. I knew a number of them, and I can affirm that they mostly belong to various fedayeen organizations. Because they emerged from the ranks of these organizations, they truly represented the feelings of frustration and indignation which fill the hearts of the Palestinian people.(29)

Whatever BSO's origins, there was a connection between it and Fatah intelligence – in particular, a special operations section headed by Yusuf al-Najjar and 'Ali Hasan Salamah. According to Abu Da'ud (whose statement broadcast over Jordanian radio is one of the few inside accounts of BSO operations), Salah Khalef was in charge of those operations designed for their political effect (like the Munich massacre of September 1972); Khalil al-Wazir planned a series of more localized attacks (mostly, it appears, the BSO's Asian operations, such as the seizure of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok); 'Ali Hasan Salamah planned most of the European attacks (attacks on oil installations in the Netherlands, Trieste, and Germany); and al-Najjar, sometimes in cooperation with al-Wazir, appears to have specialized in assassinations (including that of al-Tal, according to Abu Da'ud).(30)

After the deaths of al-Najjar and 'Udwan, 'Ali Hasan Salamah appears to have taken operational control over the BSO (Salamah was

himself assassinated in January 1979) and became regarded by the Israelis as their most dangerous opponent. He was regarded by the Resistance as one of its most brilliant tacticians. Salamah was born in Iraq in 1942 to a Muslim family. His father, Shaykh Hasan Salamah, was a Palestinian nationalist hero, head of al-Muqaddas, commander of the central sector of Palestine during the fighting of 1948, and was killed by the Haganah in that year. Along with Salamah's father, a number of other close relatives were killed in the 1940s. As a consequence, Salamah was highly politicized from his youth. In 1944 the family moved to Beirut, where Salamah grew up. After the Lebanese civil war in 1958, the family moved to Cairo. In 1964 he attended the Palestinian National Assembly, and was co-opted into the newly created PLO. Later he joined Fatah. His career in Fatah revolved around intelligence. In 1968 he was sent out of the Middle East (probably to North Korea) to receive training in intelligence techniques. Later he was sent to Amman to engage in intelligence operations. After the Jordanian civil war, he and a number of other operatives moved to Lebanon and Syria. He was then put in charge of BSO operations under the direction of Salah Khalaf. Personally, Salamah was an extremely flamboyant and apparently charismatic leader. He was also said to have a strong and sometimes abrasive personality, but one that allowed him to dominate his colleagues.(31)

The BSO itself was never an especially large organization. Arab sources estimated its membership at between 100 and 300 men (Israeli sources say 300 to 400 men). Of these, only about 60 or so men were said (by Arab sources) to be active members, with the rest in various stages of training.(32) Organizationally, the BSO appears to have consisted of self-contained (usually four-man) cells. These were organized only immediately prior to attacks, and were made up of a demolitions expert and supporting personnel. (Note that this process of rapid combination and re-combination parallels the process of clique-formation in the Arab World.) Instructions for attacks appear to have come from coded radio messages (at least this was the technique used during the Khartum attack). The cells themselves were formed and coordinated by a series of intermediaries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

According to Dobson, BSO European operations were put together by Muhammad Budiyah from January 1969 until his death in June 1973. Smith, however, says that Budiyah was the PFLP's chief European contact. In fact, Budiyah probably served as the contact for both, particularly after May 1972 when the two organizations pooled their resources. Overall coordination and planning appears to have been provided by Fatah intelligence.(33) As a consequence, the BSO was very hard to detect before its attacks (and Israeli hit teams appears to have concentrated on assassinating the intermediaries).

As to targeting, BSO members apparently spent considerable time (a) keeping track of the movements of Israeli delegations of various types; (b) following Israeli flight crews; and (c) logging the movements of Israeli aircraft.(34) The scope and accuracy of BSO target selection

indicates a very high level of training and a considerable intelligence-resource base. While the BSO clearly received information from a number of other terrorist organizations, there are suggestions that it was helped by regular intelligence services of some Eastern European and Asian countries, and possibly of the Soviet Union itself.

In this sense, Hirst is correct in his insistence that the BSO was more a state of mind than anything else. Like some underground movements in the United States, the BSO (as noted in Chapter 7) was extremely popular, especially among younger Arabs. Among Egyptian students, for example, there were "support Black September" societies. Therefore, like organizations connected to the "movement" in the United States, the BSO enjoyed considerable external support; like the "movement," its organization was also so decentralized and fluid as to limit severely any sort of routinized police tactics. On this score, it should also be noted that the Israelis began to combat the BSO successfully only after adopting a parallel organizational format.(35)

What distinguished the BSO from most other fida'iyin groups was the high educational level and sophistication of training of its members. Although data are scant, BSO members, to the extent that they can be identified, are representative of those militants described by the research center as the foremost casualties of the Resistance. According to some sources, these militants were: (a) born in refugee camps; (b) young; (c) educated mainly in Egypt (which, outside of Beirut's American University, has the best educational facilities in the Middle East, including a fluency in languages other than Arabic); (d) Muslim – and a high percent are said to be Muslim Brethren; (e) able to blend into Arab communities in Europe; and (f) disillusioned by the "failure" of established Resistance leadership.(36) Some of the BSO recruits came from Fatah units, basically units trained to operate behind Israeli lines; others appear to have been recruited on an ad hoc basis, on the theory that as newcomers they would be less likely to be known to surrounding intelligence agencies (some of these apparently were not told that they had become BSO operatives until it was too late to withdraw); still others were experts exchanged from non-BSO organizations.(37) Most of these recruits were trained in camps located initially in Algeria (after Jordan) and also in Syria and Lebanon.(38)

But of even more importance was the BSO's dedication to secrecy, and the willingness of its members to die for the Palestinian cause. There are aprocryphal stories about threats to Western newsmen attempting to write stories about the BSO or even interview some of its members.(39) Apropos of this, Dobson compounds a theory that one of the goals of the Punishment Organization which sought Da'ud's release by attacking the Saudi Embassy in Paris in September 1973 was to recapture Da'ud and punish him for revealing BSO secrets.(40) Abu Da'ud's statement did in fact blow the BSO's cover. It was broadcast on March 24, 1973; and on April 1 an Israeli hit team assassinated 'Udwan and al-Najjar and captured lists of BSO operatives.(41) After this raid, the BSO totally reorganized itself. One Arab source noted that BSO members were imbued with a "kamikaze" mentality; that its cells were

really suicide squads. As a consequence, some Resistance groups (specifically al-Sa'iqah) expressed reservations that BSO operations would be aimed at Arab governments and would soon goad them into even further repressions of the Resistance than the Jordanians.(42)

Originally, the BSO was more anti-Jordanian than anything else. As the editors of Arab World noted, early BSO attacks were aimed at Jordanian targets: first the assassination of al-Tal; then an unsuccessful attempt on Zayd Rifa'i; and then other attempts to hijack Royal Jordanian Airlines aircraft. Even after these, BSO attacks were aimed at European installations that supplied Israel with oil and electronic equipment, rather than directed against Israel itself (a pattern that was quick to change).(43)

From the first, however, there was an issue as to who controlled the BSO. Because of its decentralized nature, the BSO was even more difficult to bring under direct Fatah control. All the organizational problems within Fatah itself were accentuated in connection with the BSO. Further, the BSO had originated in a segment of Fatah which was opposed to 'Arafat's policies, indeed opposed to 'Arafat himself. For Fatah leadership, controlling BSO operations became a problem.(44) Initially the BSO served as an organizational safety valve, and outlet for Fatah radicals who would otherwise have directed their activities at overthrowing its leadership; a technique for satisfying the Fatah wing that wanted to adopt a terrorist strategy. Later, the BSO took on an impetus of its own. It became a key issue in the struggle between the left and the right in Fatah. Ultimately, BSO members (such as the Black June faction) began acting on their own, irrespective of any Fatah direction. Their attacks expanded from Israeli targets to Arab installations, and the effect was to threaten the structure of Fatah financing and its bases in the Middle East and Europe.

The BSO seizure of the Saudi Embassy at Khartum on March 1, 1973 illustrates the problems of uncontrolled terrorism insofar as Fatah was concerned. Its impact on Fatah and the Resistance was disastrous. The Sudan reacted by demanding restrictions on the Resistance by every Arab state in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia threatened to cut off its funding of Fatah. Jordan confirmed the death sentences already ordered on Fatah/BSO prisoners, including Abu Da'ud (arrested for an attempt on Husayn's life in February), and raised its conditions for the release of any Resistance prisoners to that of an end of all anti-Jordanian Resistance activity, guaranteed by Arab governments. Other Arab governments were concerned, partly because this attack appeared to represent a new trend in BSO operations, that of attacking Arab governments themselves, and partly because the "execution" of American diplomats seemed to presage a wave of anti-U.S. actions in the Arab World, thus jeopardizing already tense U.S.-Arab relations.(45)

Khartum deepened already existing splits in Fatah leadership. The right considered it a sabotage of Fatah's policy of coexistence; the left felt the operation was a tactical mistake, but approved of the use of terrorism in general.(46) In April, the PDF denounced the BSO as an organization of adventurers, adding its weight to that of Fatah right-

ists. In July, following the hijacking of a JAL jet, Fatah denounced the act as contrary to the goals of the Resistance. In August, after the Athens Airport massacre, both Fatah and al-Sa'iqah condemned the attack. This attempt to limit terrorist activities, however, split Fatah further and accelerated the formation of a number of splinters from the BSO, notably 'Abd al-Ghafur's and Abu Nidal's groups. In addition, a number of BSO members moved over to the PFLP, and formed composite BSO-PFLP organizations such as the Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYLP), and began to carry out raids under a variety of names. These new groups, in turn, were being supported against any Fatah interference by Arab governments, notably Iraq and Libya.

Fatah: The Revolutionary Council (Black June)

This is a Baghdad-based organization with a very complicated history and complex linkages with other terrorist organizations. On one hand, the Revolutionary Council is a splinter off the BSO, and has been able to utilize a number of BSO contacts. As such, it still has leverage within Fatah itself – to such an extent that Fatah leadership was forced to set up a special "hit team" of its own to purge Revolutionary Council adherents. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Council operates as an agent of the Iraqi government, and has been the cutting edge of a series of assassination operations aimed at moderates within Fatah and the PLO. Finally, the Revolutionary Council has extensive ties (again growing out of its BSO origins) to both the PFLP and Libya. Its leader, Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Abu Nidal),(47) is widely considered to have been the moving force behind the creation of the Rejection Front. As such, the Revolutionary Council, despite its small numbers (an estimated 500 men), is one of the more potent terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Arab governments claim that it has been responsible for most of the assassinations of Arab leaders in recent years.(48)

Although its origins are not altogether clear, it appears that Abu Nidal's faction had its nucleus in the same radical segment of Fatah that produced the BSO. There is some suggestion that the "Free Officers of al-'Asifah Forces" (or alternatively the "Revolutionary Organization of the Forces of al-'Asifah") were connected with Abu Nidal. Here the organizational link was a splinter group formed by Fatah's financial officer in Jordan, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafur (Abu Muhammad).

According to Arab sources, 'Abd al-Ghafur at one point either asked to take over part of the operations of the BSO and was refused, and hence split off from Fatah, or he absconded with Fatah funds.(49) In any event, he set up his own organization, which was to be more radical than the BSO itself and took the name "Revolutionary Organization of the Forces of al-'Asifah." In this he was apparently successful in getting Libyan support, and his group operated out of Libya with Libyan financial and diplomatic aid.(50) Al-Ghafur's men (calling themselves

the "Seventh Sucide Squad") attacked passengers in the lounge of the Athens airport. In December 1973, al-Ghafur's group, now in conjunction with Abu Nidal (and using the name "Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine," ANYLP) massacred passengers at Rome airport and hijacked a Lufthansa 707. After the Athens attack, al-Ghafur moved his operational base to Iraq, and he and Abu Nidal openly cooperated in attacking Fatah leadership. In February 1974 al-Ghafur's men (now calling themselves the "Muslim International Guerrillas") seized a Greek freighter at Karachi, and used it to bargain for the commutation of the death sentences imposed by the Greek Government on two terrorists captured during the Athens airport attack. For his activities, al-Ghafur was tried in absentia and sentenced to death (like Abu Nidal); in September 1974 he was shot by unidentified assailants while staying in Beirut.(51) After al-Ghafur's death, Abu Nidal's followers hijacked a BOAC VC-10 from Dubai to Tunis in November 1974, and named their operation in honor of al-Ghafur.

In August 1971 al-Banna was appointed head of the PLO Higher Committee for Palestinian Affairs in Baghdad. He was chosen because of his earlier connection with the Ba'th, which was something of a plus because of the previous difficulties between PLO representatives and the Iraqis (exacerbated by the Iraqi creation of the ALF and even more so by the failure of Iraqi military units in Jordan to aid Palestinians during the September 1970 fighting). By 1972, however, the Iraqis were opposing the PLO, and had succeeded in co-opting Abu Nidal. In 1973, al-Banna openly split with Fatah leadership, formed his own faction of the BSO, and carried out a number of operations independent of and in opposition to Fatah's policy of limiting terrorist actions. In September 1973 a group called the Punishment Organization and identified with Abu Nidal seized the Saudi embassy in Paris (an especially damaging blow to Fatah and the PLO in the wake of the consequences of the earlier attack on the Saudi embassy in Khartum). This was followed by the massacre and hijacking at Rome airport.

At the same time, Abu Nidal aligned himself with the Iraqis and vigorously echoed their attacks on the PLO for cooperating with the Egyptians and Syrians. (The Baghdad VOP was put at Abu Nidal's disposal by the Iraqis.) Consequently, the PLO dismissed him as head of the Baghdad offices, and Fatah expelled him. Using his Iraqi base, Abu Nidal apparently tried to engineer a takeover of Fatah itself. In the summer of 1974 Fatah intelligence discovered a plot to assassinate a number of leaders and take over the organization (members of the Kuwayt Regional Committee). Interrogation of some of the participants identified Abu Nidal as the mastermind. In October 1974, Abu Nidal was tried in absentia by a Fatah revolutionary court and sentenced to death. Because of Iraqi protection, Fatah was not able to carry out the sentence, and Abu Nidal has since become one of Fatah's more implacable foes.(52)

In addition, however, Abu Nidal's group seems to have had contacts with Muhammad Budiyah's organization in Europe. Several of the early 1975 attacks by Abu Nidal's men were by groups styling themselves the

"Muhammad Budiyah Group." Later, the group took the names "Black June" and "Black June and September" indicating an ideological, if not organizational, tie with the BSO. Furthermore, there are stories to the effect that some of Black June's operations, notably the attack on the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus (September 1976), the attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman (November 1976), and the attempted assassination of Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam (December 1976) were planned by "Carlos." If true, this would indicate a link between Black June and the BSO and PFLP offshoots supported by Libya. In addition, Black June has apparently created links with a number of European terrorist groups (probably as a function of its Iraqi ties). Egyptian sources, for instance, insist that Black June has ties with the Italian Red Brigades; a charge denied by Abu Nidal personally.(53)

Abu Nidal's activities represent (like the ACO) a tendency for terrorist operations to ramify outward and involve targets not at all associated with any Resistance goals; a tendency for violence to become its own self-reinforcing rationale. On one hand, Abu Nidal's attacks are aimed at splitting Fatah leadership per se, in destroying any moderate voices within the Resistance. PLO spokesmen such as Hammami, al-Qalaq, and 'Ali Yasin (PLO representative in Kuwayt, assassinated in June 1978) who openly argued for some peaceful solution to the Palestine problem, including some accommodation with Israel, were targeted by Abu Nidal's agents. And in June 1978 Fatah sources claimed they had discovered an Iraqi-backed plan to assassinate a number of Palestinian leaders.(54) PLO gunmen replied to these attacks and others by attacking Iraqi embassies in Europe.

Equally, these attacks were designed to prevent any movement toward peace. The December 1973 massacre at Rome, for example, was said to be a last-minute alternative: the real plan was to use two terrorist squads to assassinate UN Secretary General Waldheim and Henry Kissinger. The idea was to prevent the convening of the Geneva Middle East peace conference scheduled for December. UN, U.S., and Soviet security discovered the plan. Kissinger's plane – which was supposed to land at Beirut airport, where one group was waiting – was diverted to a military airfield. The other group, already in Europe, then shifted its attack to the Rome airport.(55) The Dubai hijacking of November 22, 1974 followed 'Arafat's November 14 speech at the UN. The conclusion is that the hijacking was designed to embarrass both 'Arafat and the PLO by demonstrating Palestinian opposition to any policy of moderation. Moreover, it was intended to destroy any image of international respectability that the PLO might be acquiring as a result of the Rabat Summit in October, 1974 when Arab leaders recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and followed by the partial UN recognition. Finally, in February 1977 al-Qabas reported that Fatah and al-Sa'iqah had cooperated to block a Black June attempt to assassinate Cyrus Vance when his plane landed at Beirut airport. (The same report also claimed that 'Arafat had personally interceded to prevent Black June from carryng out an operation in Italy designed to secure the release of Black June members in Italian

jails.)(56) If the assassination had been successful, it would have dramatically altered U.S. policy, which at the time seemed to be moving in the direction of recognizing the PLO.

In the Arab context, Abu Nidal's group functions as a surrogate for Iraqi Arab world strategies. Abu Nidal's headquarters are also those of the Rejection Front (although George Habash is its titular head), and in this sense he plays a pivotal role in Iraqi orchestration of opposition to Arab moderate leaders. Even more, Abu Nidal's men, operating under the name Black June have carried out a number of attacks on Syrian and Jordanian targets. Iraqi strategic interests are quite clear in the case of these attacks, since Iraq and Syria were not only ideologically opposed branches of the Ba'th party, but also strategically opposed over the issue of the division of the Euphrates waters (see Chapter 6). The result was a series of cross-border terrorist attacks apparently directed by Iraqi intelligence, but using a variety of groups: the ACO, Black June, and a number of others.

After al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977, Iraqi strategy shifted from a confrontation with Syria to attempts to build a grand anti-Sadat coalition in the Arab world and to overthrow al-Sadat or assassinate him. Abu Nidal's group was used here to assassinate the editor of al-Ahram, Yusuf al-Siba'i, in February 1978. Later, Egyptian security claimed to have discovered a more widespread plot to assassinate a number of officials. The organization responsible was an offshoot styling itself "The Correct Course of Fatah" (sometimes also translated as "The True Line of Fatah"). This group was apparently directed by another ex-Fatah member, Naji 'Allush, who had left Fatah after a confrontation with 'Arafat in 1978. The Correct Course of Fatah was said by the Egyptians to have extensive international contacts.(57)

Later, Kuwayti sources reported that the Correct Course was one faction of the Revolutionary Council, which itself had begun to split up when Abu Nidal suffered a heart attack in January 1979. The 'Allush faction, which included ex-BSO leader Abu Da'ud, was said to have taken over. Abu Nidal would apparently continue to run the Rejection Front training camp while 'Allush would run the external operations.(58) 'Allush, however, appeared to have gone out on his own: he formed a new group, The Arab Popular Liberation Front (obviously styled after the Iraqi ALF) in November 1979.

The following groups were all connected with the PFLP, but operated as linkages between it and either the BSO per se, or its dissident splinters. As such there is some confusion as to their organizational parentage. In operation they appear to be little more than holding companies, designed to coordinate terrorist resources either to facilitate other group's attacks or to mount one or two operations on their own.

Arab Armed Struggle Organization (AASO)

A relatively little known organization, AASO is apparently one of a series of contact points for Palestinians and European revolutionary

groups. According to AASO's own account, it was founded by Michel Murkabil in the middle or late 1960s; and recruited from among Arab students in France.(59) According to other sources, Murkabil (a Lebanese) was a member of the PFLP, and was the liaison between PFLP headquarters in Beirut and a European cell headed by Muhammad Budiyah (and later by "Carlos"). Murkabil also had contacts with Abu Nidal's BSO splinters, and is said to have participated in some of Abu Nidal's operations.(60) Among other tasks, Murkabil apparently drew up a "hit list" of prominent Zionists living in Europe.(61) The AASO was involved in a number of attacks variously credited to the BSO or PFLP: the assassination of the Israeli Consul General at Istanbul in May 1971 (actually carried out by the Turkish People's Liberation Front), the murder of an Israeli military attache in Washington in July 1973 (attributed to either the BSO or PFLP): the attempted assassination in London of Joseph Seiff in December 1973 (attempted by either Carlos or the IRA); the seizure of the French Embassy at the Hague in September 1974 (a combined URA-PFLP attack); and other attacks on Zionists in West Germany.(62) Murkabil was killed in June 1975, allegedly by Carlos, who was said to have suspected that Murkabil had turned informer.(63)

Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYLP or ANYOLP)

This is usually described as a Libyan-backed combination of BSO and PFLP splinters, in this case, Wadi' Haddad's faction.(64) ANYLP was set up on April 9, 1973, and its first known operation was the bombing of an El Al aircraft at the Rome airport in August 1972. Although the bombers were originally thought to be BSO members, the organization ultimately responsible was a group called "the Nationalist Organization for the Liberation of Palestine." One of the bombers, however, was later also identified as belonging to 'Abd al-Ghafur's group. Available evidence indicates that ANYLP had links with both the PFLP and BSO cells operating in Europe, as well as with Abu Nidal's rump BSO faction. The ANYLP massacre at the Rome airport in December 1973, however, was clearly planned by al-Ghafur.(65) According to the London Times, ANYLP had been wholly taken over by the Libyans by the time of the massacre: although al-Ghafur was the overall coordinator, members of the Libyan RCC were involved, and Libyan financial and diplomatic resources supported ANYLP.(66) By this time, al-Qadhdhafi had been accused of providing aid to a number of terrorist groups, including the IRA (a shipload of Libyan-purchased arms bound for the IRA was intercepted by the Irish Navy in Early April 1973)(67) and Philippine Muslim Insurgents.(68)

The ANYLP, however, appears to be the first direct Libyan involvement in terrorism, in the sense that it was a Libyan-sponsored group, rather than being supported only indirectly via aid to a preexisting group. Its genesis was al-Qadhdhafi's response to the shooting down of a Libyan 727 on February 21, 1973. The official Israeli version was that

their pilots had attempted to make contact with the 727, but to no avail. They were then forced to shoot it down because there was a possibility that it had been taken over by BSO terrorists, and the BSO had made a number of threats to hijack an aircraft and crash it into a major Israeli city.(69) According to Tinnin, the BSO had actually intended to carry out such a suicide attack in July 1973, when a group styling itself the "Organization of the Sons of the Occupied Homeland" hijacked a JAL 747 from Amsterdam to Dubai to Benghazi.(70) (The movie Black Sunday is based on a similar scenario: in this case a blimp is hijacked with the intention of killing the President of the United States and most of the audience at the Super Bowl football game.) Most sources, however, indicate that the hijacking was a combined PFLP-United Red Army (URA) operation.(71) According to Time,(72) the airliner was shot down because it had accidently strayed over the Israeli nuclear facility in the Negev.

This downing was followed by the Israeli attack on Resistance leaders in Beirut on April 10, and by a fire-breathing speech by al-Qadhdhafi on April 17, in which he accused Syria and Egypt of betraying the Palestinian cause, and then went on to lash out at the Resistance: "Where is the Palestinian resistance movement today? The resistance movement today is non-existent. It exists in broadcasts but without resistance. It has been destroyed by the Arabs in cooperation with Israel."(73) Al-Qadhdhafi also claimed that the commander of the Egyptian Air Force, Husni Mubarak, had refused to send up fighters to defend the 727, and that later, when al-Qadhdhafi had proposed an Arab plan for revenge, Syria and Egypt had rejected it. Therefore, he invited Palestinians who were disappointed by the Resistance's general lack of militancy to come to Libya, in this case to revenge themselves and the Libyans on the Israelis.(74)

In any event, the 'Abd al-Ghafur and Abu Nidal factions of Fatah and BSO moved to Libya, along with part of the PFLP. Here it is not entirely clear whether Wadi' Haddad was personally connected with the PFLP group, or whether it was a separate set of militants. The PRF with which Haddad ultimately became connected split off in March 1972, and some sources state that Haddad split with Habash at the same time.(75) Others claim that the split between the two men occurred after the Lod attack on May 30, 1972.(76) But given the fact that Habash had organized a meeting of international terrorist groups in order to pool their resources earlier that month, it seems unlikely that stories of Habash's opposition to international terrorism were entirely true. Rather, one or both of the other explanations are more plausible.

1. Habash's heart condition had grown progressively worse. (According to Smith, Fatah sources suggested that part of Habash's heart condition might have been due to his affair with URA terrorist, Fusako Shigenobu.)(77) As a result, Haddad, who had run the PFLP "Special Operations Branch" since 1969, had taken over effective operational control of PFLP foreign operations. The murder of PFLP spokesman Ghassan Kanafani on July 8, 1972 removed a stabilizing force from the PFLP, and at the same time strengthened the extremist faction which

demanded immediate and dramatic vengeance.(78) Haddad, therefore, simply went out on his own, independently of the PFLP – although maintaining ties with it until 1976, when he was formally expelled.(79) Haddad originally operated out of Beirut, but left after a rocket attack on his apartment in July 1970. For a while he used Baghdad as the headquarters of the Special Operations Section,(80) but later moved to Libya.(81) According to the Christian Science Monitor, at least part of this mobility was due to the fact that unidentified Arab interests had put out a contract on him.(82) From there Haddad shifted to South Yemen, Somalia, and Kuwayt as his bases. Haddad was said to have taken with him a cadre of specialists in international terror.

2. Alternatively, however, it is possible that Haddad maintained rather close connections with the PFLP all along, and that the story of his independent activities was similar to that which stressed the differences between Fatah and the BSO.(83) Since Haddad was connected with Carlos, and Carlos was (and is) still apparently connected with the Libyans,(84) presumably the working linkage was continuously maintained. Parenthetically, the Middle-East Intelligence Survey, published in Tel Aviv, reported that ANYLP was led by Marwan Haddad in 1976 and consisted of Fatah splinters, while Wadi' Haddad's PRF was a separate organization.(85) It should be noted that the Libyans have had ties to both South Yemen and (at one point) Somalia, that the raid on the Vienna OPEC meeting (December 1975) was executed with Libyan, Algerian, and IRA cooperation, and that the Entebbe hijacking (June 1976) was planned in Libya.(86)

Arm of the Arab Revolution

The "Arm" is responsible for the most widely publicized acts of international terrorism second only to the BSO massacre of the Israeli Olympic Team in 1972: the seizure and kidnapping of OPEC ministers in December 1975, and the hijacking of an Air France airbus to Entebbe, Uganda in January 1976. Unlike ANYLP, the Arm appears to have been a wholly independent organization, basically an offshoot of the PRF. The OPEC kidnapping and the Entebbe hijacking have been the subjects of a considerable literature; so there is little that can be added.(87) With the death of Haddad, however, the Arm appears to have retrenched – although there are persistent rumors that Carlos has taken over Haddad's role as chief planner and organizer.

THE ECOLOGY OF TERRORISM: ORGANIZATIONAL EXTENSIONS OF VIOLENCE

As Segre and Adler pointed out some years ago:

> The modern system of mass communication and mass production allows that permanent "marginal" fringe of the population which

> exists in every society to congregate for the purpose of committing anti-social acts with a facility which did not exist in the past. An operation can be planned in Germany by a Palestine Arab, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan, with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied by an Algerian diplomat financed with Libyan money.(88)

The advantages of such inter-terrorist collaboration are obvious. As with a simple criminal conspiracy, such collaborations: (a) has made more complex crimes (terrorist acts) feasible; (b) has rendered these acts harder to prevent; and (c) has made them more likely to be attempted. For example, BSO and PFLP cells operating in Europe were able to acquire and use passports originally stolen by the Baader-Meinhof gang. U.S. M-26 grenades also stolen by Baader-Meinhof were distributed in turn by Carlos to Palestinian groups as well as to the TPLA and the URA. The net effect of these intraorganizational links is to augment supplies, documents, and attack and escape routes available to terrorists.(89)

Segre and Adler were referring to terrorism in general, but their comments of course are even more applicable to Palestinian terrorism. The same environmental situation which produced the organizational problems of the "Carpet of the Wind" also served to facilitate inter-Arab and international terrorism. Personnel and organizational fluidity already mark Resistance policies; these characteristics are intensified by terrorist tactics. A number of terrorist organizations, the ANYLP or Arm of the Arab Revolution, among many others, for example, are holding companies whose personnel are drawn from other organizations and combine on an operation-by-operation basis. The Schoenau attack was apparently originally planned by the BSO, and later carried out by an al-Sa'iqah team which had a PDF member on it. In addition, personnel shift allegiances from organization to organization. Abu Nidal, for example, appears to have belonged to either the PFLP or PDF before he joined Fatah and then split off to form his own organization. Layla Khalid was recruited into the Resistance by Fatah's al-Salamah, and then moved to the PFLP. As a result, the linkage combinations possible within the Middle East and externally are extensive.

1. Culturally, Palestinian organizations can and do utilize the extensive Palestinian contacts with primordial groups in the Middle East. Fatah and its offshoots primarily use Islamic groups, both Sunni (in Turkey) and Shi'a (in Iran); the Popular Fronts are linked more to either Christian or secularist groups. But the primordial pattern persists to a larger extent outside the Middle East itself. Palestinian involvement with the IRA stems from the Catholic/Protestant conflict in Ireland. Likewise, contacts with the FLQ are based on its role in the French-speaking separatist movement in Canada, and links with Philippine Muslim groups flow from Muslim/non-Muslim conflicts in Asia. But note too that the addition of non-Palestinian terrorist personnel to Palestinian operations has added different and sometimes unexpected

cultural dimensions. The Kamikaze mentality displayed by URA terrorists during the Lod massacre was something that would not have been expected on the basis of previous Palestinian attacks (even perhaps those of the BSO).(90)

2. Structurally, terrorist linkages were extensions of clique linkage patterns, now with a sophisticated organizational format, which formed the substratum of the Resistance. Here, the major change was in the scope of political action, extending clique linkages to non-Palestinian cliques.

3. Ideologically, the shared concept of revolutionary violence linked a number of otherwise disparate organizations. The URA, in a statement issued after several of its combined operations with the PFLP, summed up this notion:

> We in the Red Army have the mission of speeding up the solidarity between the Japanese and Palestinian peoples. We have the mission of forging a unity of struggle between all oppressed peoples, surmounting geographical barriers. . . . We declare our readiness to meet our friends and launch armed struggle, jointly with the Palestinians, to rout the Zionist enemy in offensive battles as soon as possible . . . We should choose the time, place and target ourselves, because if we confine our struggle to a limited framework, this will be a factor assisting the enemy . . . We are not committed to international laws, obeying these laws or struggling within the limits of these laws. . . . But history is always a struggle between two interpretations of justice: the interpretation of the oppressed and the interpretation of the oppressors. Their justice is to kill the Vietnamese people, suppress the black people in the ghettoes and deprive the Palestinian people of their right. Our justice is to remove their justice, liquidate it and defeat it throughout the world everyday.(91)

Although conceptually much more narrow in its definition of the Arab/Israel conflict, Fatah has also produced a number of documents which articulate a theory of global unity. In a pamphlet titled The Palestinian Revolution and World Liberation Movements, Fatah ideologues advanced (or more accurately repeated) a theory of global class struggle between Western imperialism and non-Western national liberation movements. But even here there is a careful insistence on the uniqueness of the Palestinian struggle:

> World Liberation Movements acquire common political and military characteristics linked to the nature of relations between the political and military forces that control our World. It is clear that the growth of Liberation Movements after the Second World War was related to the political and military polarization which divided the World into two blocs. The first bloc consists of the Western Capitalist Camp led by the United States, which tried

> after its victory to inherit the Colonial heritage of the crumbling European Empires. The second bloc included the Socialist States led by the Soviet Union.
>
> The growth of contradictions between Colonialist European powers led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It is obvious that the breakdown of the military and economic structure of the Colonialist powers as a result of the War; the growth of the Nationalist current in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the increase of political awareness among the colonized masses; and the emergence of objective political and economic conditions for challenging the Colonialist rule gave birth to many National Liberation Movements. Their growth, in quantity and quality, led to a third bloc outside the domination of the two Western and Eastern blocs.
>
> The Palestinian Revolution is a natural ally to all Movements opposing Imperalism in our age, and it interacts with all revolutionary movements in the World. It enriches its struggle by the revolutionary experiences of oppressed peoples who fight to liberate their lands and achieve freedom. At the same time, it is required to present new means for revolutionary struggle that is related to the unique conditions and political and military requirements of its own experiences. In doing so, however, it is not isolating itself from revolutionary currents in the World.(92)

4. Strategically, Palestinian terrorist extensions follow larger Western and Soviet linkages to the Middle East. Palestinian organizational efforts and target selection are shaped by larger cold-war patterns of conflict, patterns which in turn are superimposed on an ongoing structure of inter-Arab conflict patterns. Here Palestinian organizational strategies interact with Arab and superpower strategies in a convoluted "surrogate warfare."(93)

5. Generationally, the demographic characteristics of BSO members – especially their youth and establishment outlook, indicative of a generational cleavage within Fatah – appear to be a common factor cutting across national divisions. Here it might be added that Wadi' Haddad's pro-terrorist PFLP wing was also dominated by younger PFLP members. But on a more general scale, Charles Russel and Bowman Miller suggest that these erstwhile BSO characteristics are shared by other terrorists. Most terrorists on whom data were available were in their early twenties (BSO and PFLP members were in their late twenties, but Fatah and PFLP leaders cadres are in their forties). Most were single, which would logically follow from their relative youth. Most were urban residents, well educated, and from middle- or upper-middle-class backgrounds.(94) Arguably, the shared attitudes of middle-class sons revolting against their fathers' world facilitated cross-cultural terrorist linkages.

LINKAGE STRATEGIES

The consequence of operations along these dimensions is a ramification and intensification of tensions and conflicts within the Resistance and between the Resistance and surrounding states, both Israel and the Arabs. This ramification, however, is the product of a very self-conscious Palestinian linkage strategy. Beginning in the 1960s, linkages were created between the Palestinian Resistance as a whole and other revolutionary movements. Coalitions of groups were put together on the basis of shared strategic orientations, in terms of the Resistance, and on the basis of global extensions of the premises already embodied in Resistance ideological and military conceptions.

In addition, the basic organizational strategies of Fatah and the PFLP operated to shape international linkages. Fatah had as one of its goals an evolution into an internationally recognized nationalist movement. Uncontrolled international terrorism was clearly incompatible with this goal, an incompatibility that became increasingly apparent. The PFLP had no such option at the time; international terror, therefore, was tactically functional in terms of intra-Resistance politics.

These linkage strategies differed considerably (with the exception of the BSO interlude). Fatah for the most part evolved a pattern of organizational relationships consistent with its conception of the struggle against Israel. Its initial contacts were, therefore, with groups in Turkey and Iran, countries that were part of the Middle Eastern system, yet either neutral or pro-Israeli. In addition, Fatah initially appears to have made contacts with Islamic groups, Sunnis in Turkey and Shi'as in Iran, but later broadened its contacts to more secular groups as Fatah ideologues attempted to project a more secular image.

While Fatah linkage strategy was essentially conservative, the PFLP opted for an extensive series of links, and made use of a number of non-Palestinians, both volunteers and mercenaries. Part of this was due to the PFLP's small resources which in effect forced it to look for outside help to bolster its own position in the Resistance, especially so after its role in the Jordanian debacle. Part was due to the PFLP's theory of global conflict. But also there was a difference in the constraints imposed on Fatah and the PFLP by their respective sources of support. As noted, Fatah was limited in its alliance partners by the political necessity of maintaining ties with conservative regimes. Here the PFLP was less inhibited, and could even afford to mount operations, such as the OPEC kidnapping, that were direct attacks on these regimes. Hence the PFLP opted for the widest possible linkages with groups mostly outside of the Middle East.

According to Arab world sources, the principal architect of PFLP transnational political alliances (as distinct from terrorist linkages) was the late Ghassan Kanafani. (Kanafani was killed along with his niece when his car exploded on July 9, 1972. At first it was considered a possibility that Jordanian agents had hot-wired the car; later this theory was discarded and Israeli agents were blamed.)(95) Kanafani,

who was said to be the fourth most influential PFLP leader, was a spokesman for the PFLP and the editor of al-Hadaf, a major PFLP publication. Kanafani joined the ANM in 1954 and later helped form the PFLP along with Habash, Haddad, and Hawatimah after the 1967 war. After Hawatimah broke away, Kanafani remained as the PFLP's most articulate spokesman. In this context, Kanafani defended the PFLP from attacks by PDF and later PRF ideologues, in this case arguing that the admittedly bourgeois PFLP could acquire a genuine Marxist-Leninist orientation. In his role as spokesman, Kanafani became the PFLP's key contact with the international left. Among other organizations, Kanafani is said to have engineered PFLP links with the Tupamaros, the URA, the Baader-Meinhof gang, various Trotskyites in England and France, the TPLA, the Dhofar Liberation Front, and other revolutionaries in and around the Gulf.(96)

Terrorist targeting doctrines also flowed from these larger organizational strategies. With the exception of the Munich massacre, which was apparently designed for its international shock effect,(97) Fatah-BSO operations were generally aimed at targets which could be described (loosely) as military targets(98) – the installations supplying war materiel to Israel and the political and financial figures who gave Israel external support. The PFLP was not limited by any such doctrine. PFLP targeting was designed from the beginning for its communications and emotional effect, as part of what Edward Weisband and Damir Roguly call a "verbal strategy" of terrorism.(99)

Terrorist Linkage Politics: Transnational Coalition-Building

The terrorist network evolved as the consequence of a series of interlocking inter-terrorist summits during which various terrorist organizations agreed to pool their resources. At each summit, terrorist organizations would commit their resources, and more importantly the resources of other groups with which they already had working relationships. The result, after about a decade of coordination, is a pattern of linkages which resembles a complex sociogram (or more colorfully, a fantastically complex spiderweb). Appendix 17 depicts most of these relationships in which Middle Eastern (Palestinian, Arab, and non-Arab) organizations were involved. The implications of this linkage network are, of course, that terrorist violence can be, and is, extended beyond the Middle East, and that Palestinian (and Arab) terrorists can and have become increasingly involved in activities not necessarily connected with Middle Eastern conflicts. The net result is to expand the scope of potential terrorist violence dramatically.

Resistance contacts with other terrorist groups began in the middle 1960s. At least by 1969, these contacts had become substantial enough to allow Resistance organizations to begin organizational exchanges. By the summer of 1970 extensive numbers of non-Palestinians were being trained at Resistance camps. These so-called international brigades

were said to be composed of Turks, Iranians, Germans (from the Baader-Meinhof gang), and a few U.S. Black Panthers.(100) Some were trained in Jordan, others in Syria, Lebanon, and Algeria.(101) Since Fatah personnel who were to later become BSO operatives were also trained in some of these camps, the potential for organizational interchange existed from the beginning. In addition, FLQ personnel were trained at PDF camps in Jordan.(102)

The Turkish group was the Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth) which was said to be in training in Jordan.(103) By 1971 'Arafat was able to claim that at least 100 Turkish citizens were training in Palestinian camps (presumably with other groups as well as Fatah).(104) The Dev Genc in turn split into a number of factions: the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA), the Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Turkish People's Liberation Party (TPLP). The TPLA in turn developed operational ties with the PFLP by 1972, and the TPLF followed suit in 1973 (these linkages were apparently brokered by Carlos). A PDF spokesman claimed that "a number of Turkish revolutionaries had been welcomed by the PDF, and have fought against the Zionist enemy before going back to their country to carry out the struggle against imperialism." Since this statement was issued in the aftermath of a TPLF kidnapping and shooting of the Israeli consul general in Istanbul in May 1971, the Turks referred to might have been from the TPLF.(105) Operationally these Turkish groups helped Palestinians smuggle arms from Eastern Europe (especially Bulgaria) across Turkey and into Syria. Later these groups, with Palestinian middle men, smuggled arms to Iranian insurgents.(106)

Fatah contacts with Iranian groups began even earlier, possibly by 1965. By 1971 there were reports of Iranians being trained in Lebanon. At least two groups were said to be receiving Fatah aid and training: the Freedom Movement (Nizat-e Azadi), a syncretistic group like Fatah, founded in 1961 (and itself an offshoot of an even earlier coalition, the Iranian National Front (INF), founded by Muhammad Musadiq); and a fundamentalist offshoot, the People's Fighters (Mujahidin-e Khalq),(107) formed in 1971. By 1973 Iranian sources were carrying stories of Fatah assistance to anti-Shah groups, most of this assistance coming via Fatah offices in the Gulf.(108) Like Fatah and the rest of the Resistance organizations, these were organizationally composed of a series of more or less interlocking cliques. According to Hubert Johnson:

> Except for the Tudeh Party, the other leftist groups and the National Liberation Movement [a coalition of religious and intellectual groups] have not functioned as political parties in any sense of the word. Instead they have functioned as small groups, often composed of persons with prior personal relationships. The number of brothers involved in these groups . . . is high. Recruitment is done on the basis of knowledge of a person's character and personality, rather than just anyone who shared their political or philosophical views. In this the groups functioned very much like dowrehs.(109)

The Mujahidin-e Khalq ("Fighters of the People") apparently received both Fatah training and Libyan financial aid from its inception. Tactically, it specialized in urban guerrilla warfare, and was responsible for the assassination of six U.S. Air Force colonels in 1976, and that of Paul Grimm, a senior oil company executive in December 1978. Ideologically, the Mujahidin combine Islam with socialism. Politically, they support Khumayni, but are to his left, are far more militant, and have refused (so far) to disarm themselves or place themselves in any way under his control.(110) In this regard, the goal of the Mujahidin leadership appears to become the "power behind the throne" in Iran. They now style themselves the National Movement of the Mujahidin, suggesting a Fatah-like organizational strategy of maximizing the size of their organization. (The Mujahidin currently are said to number between 40,000 and 50,000 men.)(111) The Mujahidin were apparently one of the groups which seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, as part of a complex internal powerplay aimed at ousting all pro-U.S. leaders from the Khumayni coalition, the Islamic Republican Party.(112)

By contrast, the PFLP forged links withthe Fida'i-ye Khalq ("Sacrificers of the People"), a Marxist-Leninist group also formed in 1971. The Fida'i-ye were, in turn, a coalition of ex-Tudeh ("Masses") Party members and some of the organizatinoal descendents of the INF. Like the PFLP, therefore, the Fida'i-ye are organizationally a coalition of earlier groups, and oriented toward Marxist-Leninist ideology. Like the PFLP also, the Fida'i-ye represent a major potential leftist and secularist alternative to the more Islamically oriented Mujahidin. Unlike the PFLP, however, which has currently split with the PLO and Fatah, the Fida'i-ye have formed an alliance with the Mujahidin, although they are said to be anticipating a right-left confrontation.(113) Again unlike the PFLP, the Fida'i-ye are an extremely large group, numbering over 40,000.

The Fida'i-ye also began as a clandestine group specializing in urban terror. Where the Mujahidin seemed to have specialized in assassinations, the Fida'i-ye attacked police posts and military installations of various types. PFLP training of the Fida'i-ye took place in Southern Lebanon, and like the PFLP, many of its arms came from East European sources (presumably because of its organizational connections with the Tudeh (the major Iranian pro-Soviet Communist party). In this regard, the PRF established contacts with the Tudeh itself, indicating a strong communist faction within the parent PFLP.)(114) The Fida'i-ye were also probably among the groups that stormed the U.S. embassy in November 1979.(115)

While the groundwork for future terrorist cooperation was laid before and during the summer training sessions of 1970, the critical operational planning session took place in May 1972, at the Badawi Refugee Camp outside of Tripoli. Here, under the auspices of the PFLP (and specifically of Wadi' Haddad), representatives of the BSO (Fu'ad Shamali and Saleh Khalaf), Fatah (Khalil al-Wazir), the IRA, Baader-Meinhof (Andreas Baader himself), the INF, and the TPLA met to pool

their organizational resources.(116) (The URA may or may not have also been present at this meeting. However, cooperation between the URA and PFLP had been in effect by at least 1970.)

The linkages created by this meeting were made possible by a number of factors. In March 1972, a PFLP Congress had endorsed a strategy calling for increased attacks on Israeli targets worldwide, under the slogan of "striking Israel in depth."(117) At about the same time the PFLP was holding its congress, a number of leftists met in Paris to coordinate their antiestablishment strategies. Among those attending were leaders of groups in the Resistance, the Gulf, Djibouti, Bangladesh, Central Africa, and a number of Communist parties.(118) As noted, the radicals in Fatah had earlier (in September 1971) succeeded in getting 'Arafat and the moderates to agree to a secret terrorist organization. Partially, this acceptance seems to have been based on an argument that the Palestinians must be able to veto any Arab moves toward peace without the Palestinians, and the assassination of al-Tal could be construed as an initial demonstration along these lines. The original terms of setting up the BSO were apparently that 'Arafat would have the personal OK or veto over any operations.(119) A conference had been held in Dublin also in late May 1972, at which the IRA, the PFLP, and the Libyans agreed to cooperate.(120) (The IRA and PFLP had had contacts since IRA personnel were trained in PFLP camps beginning in 1968.)(121)

This nuclear organizational cooperation facilitated the rapid extension of linkages to a range of other terrorist organizations. The tie with the IRA, for example, led to secondary relationships with a whole range of European and Latin American organizations, most of which had not previously been connected with Palestinian groups. IRA contacts included Basque separatists, the ETA,(122) and this connection in turn put IRA operatives in contact with a nucleus of European and Latin American groups which had relations with the ETA.(123) Among these groups were the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the French Groups of International Action (GARI).(124) The ERP, in turn, was linked to other Latin American groups based in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay (the Tupamaros). These groups had met at Cordoba, Argentina in 1970 to coordinate terrorist efforts.(125) GARI was in turn tied in with a number of other European groups.(126) With the IRA link, these were brought together with Palestinian groups (although some sources suggest that the original IRA-Palestinian contacts were in fact brokered by the Argentines.

In any event, by late 1972 terrorist groups composed of multinational memberships were operating: however, Palestinian-Latin American cooperation had started even earlier: a PLO delegation had attended a meeting of the Organization of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America at Havana in 1966. Contacts between the Resistance and Latin American groups, especially the Cubans (see below) made at this meeting were apparently rapidly followed up. For example, a Nicaraguan, Patrick Joseph Arguello, was Layla Khalid's teammate on the unsuccessful attempt to hijack a 707 in September 1970, as part of

the PFLP plan to hijack four aircraft.(127) The fact that Arguello was also part Irish indicates the possibility of an IRA connection as well. Immediately after the Tripoli meeting, PFLP and URA terrorists attacked the Lod airport and slaughtered a number of passengers in an airport lounge. IRA and PFLP operatives began to execute a series of attacks in Britain: the attempt on Lord Sieff in December 1973, for example, may actually have been carried out by IRA terrorists.(128) BSO and Red Brigades terrorists apparently combined to attack the oil refineries at Trieste in August 1972.(129) BSO-Red Brigades contacts were brokered by Muhammad Budiyah and were apparently maintained after his death, by Carlos and later by Abu Nidal and his rump BSO organization.(130) (According to 'Arafat, the BSO regularly made use of Turkish, Japanese, and Iranian agents.)(131)

Later terrorist attacks demonstrated continuing interorganizational personnel exchanges. Filipinos were involved in the Muslim International Guerrillas in the seizure of a Greek freighter at Karachi. (Arab world sources suggested that this indicated a Libyan connection, especially as the Filipinos demanded to be flown to Libya.)(132) A combination of Palestinians from the PFLP (Haddad's faction) and West Germans from the Red Army Faction (a splinter of the Baader-Meinhof gang and also closely associated with another Baader-Meinhof offshoot, the Second of June Movement which kidnapped a prominent West German official) organized under Libyan auspices as the Arm of the Arab Revolution kidnapped OPEC oil ministers in December 1975. Roughly the same combination was also responsible for the Entebbe hijacking in June 1976 and the Mogadiscio hijacking (this time using the title "Organization of Struggle Against World Imperialism").(133) A Portuguese group which attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in Lisbon in November 1979 was said to be operating under Palestinian control.(134)

The Tripoli meeting was followed by a March 1974 congress of revolutionary fronts in Baghdad. The congress was held in the offices of Abu Nidal's Revolutionary Council, and was apparently sponsored by the USSR. In addition to Palestinian delegations, the guest list included a number of groups whose operational spheres spanned Central Africa, the Red Sea region, the Gulf, and Iran. Among them were: the INF, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Ahvas (Iran), FROLINAT (the Chad), the United Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, the ELF,(135) the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Iran,(136) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan.(137) The linkages created in Baghdad further extended Palestinian activities into areas in North Africa (the PFLP, for example, established relations with Polisario in 1976),(138) and Iran, and appeared to tie these activities in with a post-1973 war, Soviet strategy of putting insurgent pressure on strategically located Middle Eastern countries.(139) Contacts among some of these groups were extended after this meeting. The original Iraqi coordinating and training function was progressively extended to South Yemen (in 1976) and to the Gulf (in 1978). The net effect of this extension was to triangulate the oil-producing areas of the Arabian Peninsula by a series of terrorist bases.

This triangulation strategy was mediated by a further series of high-level coordination talks, some of which appear to have been coordinated with a series of Arab summits involving the Rejection Front or its expanded offshoot, the Rejection and Steadfastness Front (see Chapter 11). In November 1976, Algerian and Libyan officials (both Libya and Algeria were later to join the steadfastness front) reportedly met with a number of terrorist groups and agreed to train, arm, and finance the ETA and a number of French groups.(140) Some of these European groups had already met at Trieste in 1974 to coordinate their own exchanges. In July 1977, Palestinians, Turks, Iranians, Japanese, the IRA, and Germans met at Larnaca, Cyprus (under Palestinian sponsorship). The outcome of this meeting was a step in the evolution of a Palestinian strategy that had been adopted in 1974,(141) a strategy of utilizing European and other groups to carry out attacks for the Resistance, such as the Portuguese attack on the Israeli ambassador in Lisbon in November 1979.

In late August 1978 South Yemen (Aden) hosted a coordination and strategy conference. Among those present were leaders of the Tudeh Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Palestinian Rejection Front organizations, Libyan and Ethiopian officials, Marxist groups from the Gulf, especially Qatar, Bahrayn, and Kuwayt, and Turkish groups. The goal of the conference was to set up an infrastructure which would facilitate exchanges of information and policy coordination in an attempt to exploit tensions in various areas: among others, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon (Lebanese leftists were said to be present), the Gulf, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Red Sea.(142) Arab world sources reporting on the conference attached particular importance to the presence of a representative from Ras al-Khaymah where earlier, it was said, Soviet and Cuban officers had visited the Amir and offered him military assistance in the event of hostilities either with Oman or with Iran.(143) The thrust of the conference, therefore, appeared to be in the direction of extending Soviet-promoted terrorist or insurgent coordination begun at Baghdad in 1974.

Even before the Baghdad meeting, the focus of Resistance activity had begun to shift to the south, extending its activities from the Gulf to the Red Sea. The ANM was active in the South Yemen National Liberation Front (NLF), and the NLF's secretary general, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, had very good relations with both the PFLP and PDF. Equally, the PFLP had an ELF connection: the attack on the Israeli chartered tanker Coral Sea was staged from an ELF base on Hanish Island. Further, both the PFLP and PDF had ties with Omani groups: the PFLP supported the PFLP, and the PDF aided PFLO's rival, the National Democratic Organization for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf.(144) The PFLP had opened information offices in Kuwayt as early as the spring of 1972 (at least before the Lod massacre).(145)

In February 1974 L'Orient le Jour noted that some Resistance organizations had begun moving their bases out of the area immediately surrounding Israel to what was described as "east of Suez," meaning the Arabian Peninsula.(146) The tactical reasons for such a move were

obvious: Lebanon had been pressing the PFLP to move its non-Arab terrorist colleagues (especially the URA) out of Lebanon;(147) Iraq had started restricting Haddad's activities; Libya had shown signs of withdrawing support from Habash; and Syria had cracked down on the GC. The response of these groups was to relocate initially in Dhofar and South Yemen.(148) Haddad's faction, for example, was fully operational in South Yemen by the time of the Entebbe hijack in 1976.

Parenthetically, the Syrian invasion of Lebanon also led to a movement of Resistance groups to Cyprus. In early 1977, the Guardian reported that the staff of the PLO information office at Nicosia had increased some two or three times in size.(149) Cyprus became a central transit point for arms flowing from Libya and elsewhere to Palestinian forces fighting in Lebanon. A number of sea battles were fought as Israeli naval units sought to disrupt this arms traffic. The presence of Palestinians was graphically demonstrated when Egyptian editor Yusuf Siba'i was assassinated in February 1978.

External Support: Terrorism and Surrogate Warfare in the Middle East

This increasing level of intergroup coordination, along with the expansion of terrorist strategic and tactical capabilities made these groups ideal agents for carrying on various conflicts at a distance. As Jenkins pointed out:

> The growing links between terrorist groups are extremely important. They provide small terrorist organizations with the resources to undertake far more serious operations than they would be capable of otherwise. They make identification more difficult, since local citizens can be used to carry out attacks; and they could ultimately produce some kind of worldwide terrorist movement directed against some group of countries for vague ideological, political or economic reasons, a concept that has been referred to by some terrorists as "simultaneous revolution."(150)

In this respect, Resistance terrorist groups were rapidly drawn into a series of conflicts throughout the Middle East which were essentially and originally unconnected with the Palestine issue. At one level there were a series of local conflicts which were exploited by Arab states as arenas in which to accomplish various strategic goals in the context of inter-Arab rivalries. The Lebanese civil war is an example here, a conflict which involved multiple Lebanese factions with various relations, friendly and hostile, with the Resistance, Syrians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis, and Libyans, all aiming at utilizing the war for their own ends. At another level, however, most of these same conflicts were exploited by the Soviets for their own purposes, and exploited usually with cooperation of Arab states friendly to the USSR. The result was a

strategic and tactical linkage between Resistance terrorism (and that of its organizational partners) and a much larger and more complex set of conflict relationships.

Jenkins has described this pattern of utilizing terrorist groups as agents in a relatively low-risk strategy of long-range conflict as "surrogate warfare":

> Terrorists, whatever their origin or cause have demonstrated the possibilities of a third alternative [to conventional war or protracted guerrilla war] – that of "surrogate warfare". Terrorism, though now rejected as a legitimate mode of warfare by most conventional military establishments, could become an accepted form of warfare in the future. Terrorists could be employed to provoke international incidents [like the seizing of the U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran], create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of sabotage. Governments could employ existing terrorist groups, or they could create their own terrorists. Terrorism requires only a small investment, certainly far less than it costs to wage conventional war . . . A secret backer of the terrorists can deny sponsoring them. The concepts of subversion, sabotage, of lightning raids carried out by commandos, are not new, but the opportunities are.(151)

The surrogate-warfare strategy has the advantage that its proponent can operate from a distance, safely insulated from any direct responsibility or possibility of reprisal. In one sense, it is a lower-level extension of the old Soviet doctrine of the war of national or popular liberation, a war in which non-Soviet troops fought against imperialists, but fought in a war which furthered the interests of the USSR. In the Middle East, surrogate warfare is a sophisticated extension of primordial conflict patterns into larger conflicts over the legitimacy of most, if not all, governments in the area. The most spectacular example of the destabilizing potential of surrogate warfare is the recent overthrow of the Shah in early 1979. Here, a supposedly invincible ruler, backed an impressive (by Middle Eastern standards) army and a well-trained and quite ruthless security apparatus, the SAVAK (Iranian National Organization for Intelligence and Security)(152) was brought down by a coalition of forces, many of whose component groups had links with the USSR via a whole series of intermediaries, including but not limited to Resistance organizations.

The threat that a similar combination of forces might be used to extend the "Iranian Revolution" into the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula was immediately recognized by Arab governments in question. The reality of this threat became apparent in the form of a seemingly bizarre attempt to capture the Great Mosque at Mecca in November 1979 – an attempt which was supposed to be coordinated with a second attack at Medina, and which was designed to trigger a major uprising against the

Saudi government. The U.S. also recognized the reality of this threat and responded in the form of the "Carter Doctrine," enunciated in January 1980, a declaration that any Soviet movement into the oil-producing areas would be met by U.S. military action.

Within the Middle East, the two major practitioners of the strategy of surrogate warfare are Libya and Iraq. In the case of Libya, al-Qadhdhafi's strategy of attacking Western positions in the Middle East, Israel, and all Arab states perceived to be pro-Western, logically led to a theory of targeting Western countries in their "own backyard," meaning attacking them in their own territories.(153) Tactically, this required the creation of an ability to hit targets located in Western countries as well as elsewhere. For this, Libya did not possess a sufficiently extensive and sophisticated intelligence organization (at least at the outset) to carry out clandestine foreign operations. This lack, plus Libya's oil wealth, led to the obvious conclusion: utilize existing terrorist groups; coordinate, finance, and supply them.(154)

To this end, al-Qadhdhafi and the members of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) began enlisting the services of a number of groups. But the selection of these groups, while seemingly random, was actually very carefully done to further the goals of the larger Libyan strategy. In June 1972 al-Qadhdhafi publically offered to help any and all anti-Western revolutionaries and to equip every Arab who was willing to join the Resistance.(155) Twenty-four hours later some 500 Palestinians and other Arabs had contacted the Libyan embassy in Cairo to register.(156) In the same speech, al-Qadhdhafi announced that he was arming the IRA (which brought an immediate British protest)(157) and the black-power movement in the U.S.(158) In addition, there were stories that Libyan funds had flowed to Quebec separatists and various U.S. organizations, including, it was said, funds channeled into the George Wallace campaign in 1968, in an effort to deadlock the U.S. presidential election.(159)

By 1976, the list of groups armed and trained had grown to encompass FROLINAT, Philippine Muslims, Thailand Muslims, Eritrean groups, and a variety of African organizations.(160) Actual training was done in a number of camps run by Libyan intelligence: at Janzur, Wadi al-Hayy, 'Uqbah ibn Nafi, and the Peoples Camp at Tobruk.(161) The arms supplied were usually Soviet, and Libyan embassies served as supply and communications centers.(162) Tripoli itself became the meeting place of almost every terrorist or insurgent group in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.(163) In addition, al-Qadhdhafi was alleged to be behind attempts to overthrow governments in Syria, Somalia, Tunisia (the Libyans were said to be training cadres of an invasion army), Morocco, the Philippines (extensive Libyan funding for antigovernment forces), Panama, Egypt, and the Sudan (a Libyan-sponsored invasion in July 1977).(164)

However, the Libyans rapidly began to set up their own organizations, either co-opting splinters from existing terrorist groups or creating completely new groups. Initially the Libyans used BSO and PFLP dissidents: factions or cliques allied with 'Abd al-Ghafur or Abu

Nidal in the BSO, and cliques associated with the Haddad wing of the PFLP (as above). From there the Libyans moved to organize directly with their own groups. In addition, by 1976 there were stories that al-Qadhdhafi was training a personal "hit team" at Wheelus, a former American Air Force base.(165) In 1977 Libya and the PFLP were reportedly forming the Palestinian Red Army, a coalition of various terrorist groups to be trained at Sirte. The chief function of the Red Army was to assassinate any Arab or Palestinian leader who attempted to negotiate a solution to the Palestine conflict, and to prevent any Geneva-style Peace conference.(166)

As a result, the Libyans were involved directly or indirectly in a number of major international terrorist incidents. The BSO squad that murdered Israeli Olympic team members at Munich was said to have been trained in Libya and its weapons to have been smuggled into West Germany via Libyan diplomatic pouches.(167) ANYLP terrorists who massacred passengers at Rome in December 1973 were apparently organized from Libya.(168) According to Sudanese President al-Numayri, the Khartum massacre of March 1973 was organized and directed from Libya. (Specifically, the mastermind behind the attack was the head of the PLO office in Khartum, Fawaz Yasin, who suddenly left for Libya on the day of the attack.) A Libyan-organized group apparently almost succeeded in capturing control of an Egyptian submarine in 1973. The group had orders to use the sub to sink the Queen Elizabeth II, but was overpowered by the Egyptian crew.(169) The OPEC kidnapping of December 1975 was averred to have been originally thought up by al-Qadhdhafi operating via the Arm of the Arab Revolution. The attack itself was planned by Haddad and carried out by Carlos (Haddad himself was being funded to the extent that he could afford to give some $3,000 per month to a series of terrorist cells in Europe and elsewhere).(170) In addition to the OPEC raid, terrorists belonging to the "Arm" were at one point seriously considering a plan to kidnap Pope Paul VI, until it was vetoed by Haddad who argued that no Arab country could politically afford to accept terrorists who had done such an act.(171) The Entebbee hijack was planned by Haddad while in Libya.(172)

The Iraqi use of surrogate warfare was based on quite different considerations. Where al-Qadhdhafi's strategy was predicated on an almost mystical vision of Arab and Islamic unity, the Iraqis (and especially Saddam Husayn, the architect of Iraqi strategy) were concerned more with the pragmatic exploitation of inter-Arab conflicts to Iraqi advantage. To be sure, there were ideological motivations here also. One of the major concerns of the Iraqis as representatives of one wing of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'th) was to defeat their ideological rivals in Syria. In addition, the Iraqis were very interested in expanding Iraqi influence into the Gulf. Where Libyan policy, therefore, tended to be coterminous with the geographical distribution of Muslims and global in terms of its targeting doctrine, Iraqi policy was oriented much more narrowly, basically around inter-Arab conflicts involving the Rejection and Steadfastness Front.

Beginning as early as 1972, the Iraqis began a systematic policy of utilizing (and encouraging) splits within the Resistance for their own ends: both 'Abd al-Ghafur and Abu Nidal were supported from Baghdad, as was the ACO.(173) In addition, the Iraqis (with Soviet backing) sponsored a series of meetings, such as the Baghdad meeting of 1974, designed to build a coalition of terrorist groups and, more importantly, to subordinate coalition control to Iraqi control and tie it in with the Rejection and Steadfastness Front. The Baghdad meeting was followed by an Iraqi bid in August 1974 to take over the direction of revolutionary groups in Oman and the Gulf, groups supported at that time by South Yemen. The Iraqis claimed that the South Yemenis were not effectively aiding PFLOAG in particular, and went so far as to suggest that if the South Yemenis were not amenable to the Iraqi plan, Iraqi funding of the South Yemeni budget might stop.(174) In 1976, as noted, Iraq and Libya agreed jointly to support terrorist groups in the area.

To supplement this coalition-building strategy, the Iraqis set up an infrastructure to support both Middle Eastern and other terrorist organizations. A series of training camps were set up. The largest of these (where over 500 terrorists and insurgents were being trained) was the Abu 'Ali Iyad camp at Habaniyah, some thirty miles from Baghdad. The camp was under the direct supervision of Abu Nidal, unlike other camps which were run by ALF cadres.(175) In these camps the number of terrorist organizations represented nearly equalled that in Tripoli. According to Deutsche Zeitung:

> Training takes place in military camps where the trainers and instructors are specialists of the Iraqi armed forces [many of these in turn were battlefield veterans from Iraqi campaigns against Kurdish insurgents]. . . On the training list are courses in weapons and explosives training, tactics of guerrilla warfare, and ideological indoctrination. The goals of the training are clearly defined: preparation of terror attacks against Israel, against Jewish institutions, and against "reactionary" Arab states, as well as "deviates" inside the PLO and operations abroad.(76)

In addition to training and arming, the Iraqis supported a "forgers center" said to have been established by the PFLP. Here passports and other documents stolen in Europe are reworked to appear to be legitimate identifications of terrorists seeking entry to a number of European countries.(177)

Groups trained and supplied from Iraq have carried out a number of attacks. The attempt to kidnap members of the Jordanian cabinet in February 1973 was staged from Iraq. This abortive plot (during the course of which Abu Da'ud was arrested) was apparently unusually complex. Some 20-30 men were given Saudi and Bahrayni passports, trained in Iraq, and then smuggled into Jordan from various Arab countries, especially Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia.(178) The group that attacked the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman in November 1976 was trained by Black June personnel in a camp outside of the Iraqi town of

Hit.(179) In September 1978 Syrian authorities claimed to have uncovered a gang of assassins and saboteurs operating under the direction of the Iraqis. These were responsible for a number of killings and bombings.(180) Iraqi-sponsored hit men were also responsible for the killing of a number of PLO officials in various parts of the world.

Externally, the Soviets have been the major proponent of surrogate warfare in the arena,(181) with the Chinese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese a distant second. Originally the USSR ignored the Resistance (partially no doubt because of its early Chinese connection), referring to it as a Trotskyite movement. After 1969, however, when it became obvious that the Resistance was going to be a factor in Middle Eastern politics, the Soviets began a series of cautious contacts with the PLO. 'Arafat was invited to the USSR in 1969, and has gone there a number of times subsequently. However, the USSR has not directly supplied any arms to the PLO (although Soviet arms are transferred from other countries), and has given the PLO very little financial support – although it did allow the PLO to open an office in Moscow.(182) Later, these political contacts were transformed into clandestine support for terrorist activities.

Here "Carlos" (Illyich Ramirez Sanchez, nicknamed "The Jackal," a Venezuelan citizen) appeared to be some sort of contact for the Soviets. Carlos himself was trained at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow, although he was supposedly expelled for "hooliganism" in 1970 (which may very well have been a cover story).(183) Carlos was the key organizer of most of the terrorist groups in Europe. Since the KGB would probably have known about most of these groups and their activities, there is some possibility that Carlos was a KGB operative.(184)

In any event, the USSR was careful not to openly support such groups, because of the obvious impact on its own foreign relations. However, a number of clandestine training centers in the USSR were set up: at Lumumba University itself, the Lenin Institute in Moscow, and elsewhere on the shores of the Black Sea.(185) A captured terrorist gave this interview to a Der Speigel reported, detailing the Soviet training curriculum:

> Hadir had been trained in a Soviet "friendship camp" on the Black Sea as a military engineer. "It was an ordinary course," he says; "nothing special" . . . The school, called "Samprobal", is part of the military academy not far from the town of Simferopol in the Crimea . . . The 23 subjects taught there include, among other things: Handling of various igniters, such as fuses and instant igniters, and of electrically detonated explosives; production of incendiaries, laying of minefields, bombing of bridges; the ABC's of warfare and protection against napalm. . . .
>
> Hadir said that a political course was also included in the training program. "One of the most important subjects was the

> Russian Revolution, its history and its causes. We studied a great deal about communism and socialism. The stress was of course on engineering aspects. Soviet technology, it was drilled into us time and again, is extremely highly developed". . .
>
> I asked him whether there had also been students from other Arab countries in his camp. "No," he said. "At our place, only members of liberation movements were trained. People from organizations throughout the world supporting the Soviet Union took part in the course – for instance, from Ethiopia and Zimbabwe."
>
> With the help of my sources in Israel and the United States, I managed to identify the location of the schools. As far as is known, there are training camps for terrorists, near Moscow, near Tashkent, near Baku on the Caspian Sea and near Odessa and Simferopol on the Black Sea. The Simferopol school is also known as "Soviet Academy for the Training of Foreigners." This is where primarily leadership cadres are trained. The curriculum includes such subjects as the employment of artillery, engineering, communications and the theory of guerrilla warfare. Of course this list is far from complete.(186)

Even more cautiously, the Soviet made use of a whole series of intermediaries between themselves (or rather between any direct Soviet organization and supply operations, as distinct from training) and terrorist organizations. (This Soviet pattern of using intermediaries was characteristic of most of the early Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East prior to the 1967 war: Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany were the major direct arms suppliers to Soviet clients in the Middle East.) Among East European countries operating as Soviet agents were Bulgaria (training camps at Varna and arms to Turkish and Iranian insurgents(187)), East Germany (a training camp near Finsterwalde(188)), Czechoslovakia (training camps and arms to various groups, including the IRA(189)), and Poland.(190)

In addition, the Soviets attempted to make use of local Arab Communist parties. These, as noted, were not especially strong, nor especially effective in Arab politics because of their perceived antipathy toward Islam. Communist Party attempts to penetrate the Resistance directly under the guise of the Ansar were failures. Nevertheless, there appears to have been some attempt to use these parties as surrogates. A meeting of Middle Eastern communist parties was held at Nicosia in March 1977 to coordinate their efforts.(191) (This meeting may or may not have been connected with a later meeting held at Larnaca, attended by terrorist representatives.) Still later, Egyptian sources claimed that communist cadres in Aden and Ethiopia were planning a series of assassinations of Arab leaders opposed to Soviet designs in the Middle East,(192) and that there was direct communist involvement in urban disorders in Egypt per se.(193)

The most active agents of the Soviets, however, were the Cubans. Small units of regular Cuban forces were deployed in Ethiopia, Aden, Syria, and Afghanistan. Cuba and the PLO reportedly signed a military cooperation agreement in July 1978.(194) Cuban intelligence (the DGI), under the supervision of the KGB, trains a number of terrorists at various camps in Cuba itself. And the Cubans function as go-betweens between the KGB and terrorist organizations.(195) Cuban operatives were said to be in contact with, among others, the Baader-Meinhof group, the Red Brigades, the IRA, and a number of Latin American groups.(196) Along these lines, George Habash himself visited Cuba in April 1978, and was said to have asked the Cubans to train as many as 500 PFLP guerrillas.(197)

Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese involvement was considerably less. Chinese policy toward Middle East insurgents appears to be a function of the Sino-Soviet conflict more than anything else. The Chinese, for example, had had contacts with the PLO dating from 1965 or 1966, in this case as instructors and suppliers to the PLA. (Chinese PLA instructors were apparently seconded to the PLA from the Syrian Army.(198)) Direct contacts with other Resistance groups appear to have come some years later. Chinese influence and aid were directed at the Arabian Peninsula rather than to the North. Chinese instructors were active with PFLOAG (something less than 20 Chinese instructors), and the Chinese were also involved in suporting FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of South Yemen) before the Soviets moved in to South Yemen in force.(199) During the period of the Cultural Revolution in China, most Chinese instructors were withdrawn from the Middle East. But with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese may be expected to reenter the area.

The North Koreans and North Vietnamese have played an even smaller role. North Vietnamese and Vietcong instructors were said to be training PLA members, both in their home countries and in camps in Jordan prior to the 1970 civil war.(200) In addition, the North Koreans are said to have brokered contacts between the PFLP and the URA in 1970 (although informal meetings between the two groups may have taken place as early as 1969).(201) The North Koreans were also alleged to be operating a drug-smuggling ring to finance international terrorism; the ring was headquartered in Damascus and reached as far north as Scandinavia.(202)

THE ORGANIZATIONAL COSTS OF TERRORISM: DESTRUCTION OF LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDING

If the benefits of terrorism were perceived as the generation of an effective political and military threat of effectiveness, the costs of terrorism rapidly came to outweigh these, at least for Fatah and the PLO. By 1972 however, these costs, both human and political, were becoming increasingly evident on a number of fronts.

1. In the wake of the Munich massacre, a special squad of Israeli intelligence (Mossad)(203) was set up. This squad, some 50 to 100 strong and collectively designated the "Wrath of God," systematically assassinated Palestinian leaders, especially those connected with international terrorism. And although Palestinian and Arab sources argue that many of the victims of the Wrath of God were innocent, it would appear from published sources that its targeting was quite accurate.(204) This Israeli counter-terror activity was met by equally determined Palestinian hit teams, and the result was a "spook war" throughout Europe and the Middle East. In the Middle East, Beirut was the center of both sides' activities;(205) in Europe, West Germany and France, where there were large concentrations of Arabs, were the main battlegrounds. However, the violence reached as far north as Norway, and even touched the U.S. when an Israeli air attache, Col. Yusuf Allon, was killed in July 1973.(206)

Dobson, Tinnin, and Smith have published accounts of this "war," and Khalaf has provided his own version:

> The "war of darkness" or the "war of phantoms," as some call it, continued and grew in intensity. The intelligence service of the Zionist state sent letter bombs to a number of our strugglers in various capitals, including Beirut, Algiers, Tripoli, Cairo, Stockholm, Bonn and Copenhagen.
>
> Black September retaliated to the best of its ability, doubling its operations in the meantime. Three days after the murder of Abu al-Khayr, it killed an Israeli agent in the middle of Madrid. The agent was posing as Baruch Cohen but his real name was Moise Henan Eichy. . . . It was evident that Cohen held an important position within the Israeli intelligence system. Among other things, he set up a network of Palestinian students in Spain. One of their tasks was to investigate Palestinians residing in Spain, especially with regard to their political affiliations and inclinations. Another task was to collect information and intelligence in various Arab countries, such as Lebanon and Egypt, which the recruits visited on vacation. In a latter phase, Cohen drew up plans to attack Jewish-owned establishments in Spain, including some with close links with Israel, in order to defame the Palestinians among the Spanish public and thus induce their expulsion from Spain. What he did not know, however, was that several of his recruits were members of Black September and were pretending to cooperate with him on the instructions of their organization. He also did not know that a decision had been made to execute him when he began to suspect the loyalty of those who failed to carry out their assignments under various pretexts. . . .
>
> In March 1973, Black September killed another Israeli agent, namely, Simcha (Gerlitzer) in Nicosia. Nearly a month later, on 9

> April, two attempts were made in Nicosia – one against the quarters of the ambassador of the Zionist state, the other against an El Al plane at the airport. But the Israeli reply, as it was called, was a crushing one. On the morning of the day following the double attack, which coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Dayr Yasin massacre, an Israeli commando unit landed in Beirut and assassinated three main leaders of the resistance movement – Yusuf al-Najjar (Abu Yusuf), Kamal 'Adwan, and Kamal Nasir.(207)

The death toll was enormous. According to 'Arafat, at least 66 Fatah members died in France alone.(208) (Aharon Yariv was later to claim that his men had thwarted more than 70 percent of Arab terrorist attacks between May 1972 and July 1973.(209)) Added to Israeli efforts were those of the Jordanians. After the BSO assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in November 1971, the Jordanians began their own campaign against the BSO. In particular, Jordanian agents sought after the assassins of al-Tal. Jordanian agents were implicated in the attempted bombing of Ziyad Hilu, one of al-Tal's assassins.(210) As a consequence of this three-sided underground war, no commando leader was safe. After the April 1973 Beirut raid, the movement as a whole went underground. The leadership was removed to "protective areas," areas considered to be safe by virtue of the fact that they were in refugee camps or pro-Palestinian Lebanese towns. The organizations were decentralized; different departments were split up among headquarters in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Kuwayt; Fatah's headquarters was moved to Damascus.(211)

2. Within the Arab World, governments began to undertake a series of restrictions on Resistance activities after the Khartum massacre. Commando operations from Syria were further restricted (they had always been under Syrian control, but even this was tightened again, first in January 1973 and then after Khartum). Lebanese authorities equally tried to force the commandos to stop all cross-border operations. Jordan and the Sudan publically condemned the Resistance; Saudi Arabia threatened to cut off funding; and in general, the reaction in the Arab World was hostile.(212)

3. The position of Palestinian and Arab communities abroad was adversely affected. Palestinian terrorists had, of course, made use of those expatriate Arab and Palestinian communities as sources of recruitment and as providers of "safe houses," hiding places in European and other countries where terrorists could plan and organize. In West Germany alone, for example, there were an estimated 55,000 Arabs of which some 6,000 were Palestinians. Within this Arab-Palestinian community there were at least six clandestine organizations (obviously with links to West German terrorists and others) and some 100 subsidiary front organizations.(213)

In addition, the Resistance had achieved some modus vivendi with various European governments, a modus that allowed Resistance personnel a relatively free hand in utilizing the resources of Arab-

Palestinian communities. For example, the Italian police had been notably lax in keeping track of Palestinian operatives.(214) Equally, the French police and French security force (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, DST) originally appear to have allowed the Palestinians some latitude in their international contacts.(215) According to Iranian sources, various Resistance organizations had made an agreement with French officials, to the effect that Palestinians would not act in France, in return for which the French would allow them to organize and base themselves in France.(216)

Moreover, some private or semiprivate corporations, in this case European airlines, had reportedly made deals with the Resistance in which the airlines paid "protection money" for not being made victims of hijacking or other terrorist acts.(217) Most of this official laxity was obviously the product of the host government's relations with regular Arab governments, presumably the oil-producing states which financed Fatah and the PLO in particular. But in practice, it allowed the Palestinians to use Europe (and elsewhere) as a theater of terrorist operations and terrorist linkage strategies.

The result, however, of repeated terrorist attacks was to dramatically reverse this congenial European attitude. After the Munich massacre, West Germany began to push for an international police system (separate from Interpol) that would cover most of Europe and be specifically trained in counter-terrorist operations. In addition, visa controls on all Arabs would be tightened, and all Arab travellers would be required to produce evidence that they were not connected with terrorist organizations.(218) Along these lines a series of deportations of Arabs from West Germany was begun. This was followed by U.S. moves to screen Arab travelers for terrorists,(219) and this screening was extended to include both Arab students in the U.S. and U.S. citizens of Arab descent. After the discovery of a terrorist unit armed with an SA-7 in September 1973, Italian police began a crackdown on suspected terrorists.(220) After the December massacre at the Rome airport, French police and security forces began a roundup of Palestinians and Arabs.(221) British counter-terror units were similarly mobilized, and the British response went to the extent of surrounding Heathrow airport with armored cars and specially trained men (known as the Special Air Service, SAS).(222)

4. Finally, the international position of the PLO was jeopardized by terrorist activities. This became an acute concern after the October 1973 war, and especially as the PLO began to get increased UN recognition. Fatah had always been sensitive to the adverse political consequences of being linked to international terrorism, and attempted to play both sides, to utilize the BSO while maintaining an official distance from it. Even more so, with the prospect of a negotiated Egyptian-Israeli settlement of the Palestinian question, the necessity of some international standing took on added dimensions: obviously, if the PLO did not have any such standing, it could hardly expect to maneuver itself into any Egyptian-Israeli discussion. To meet this need, PLO leaders opted for a strategy of actively pursuing diplomatic recognition

and international standing (see Chapter 11). However, the issue of PLO espousal of terrorism severely constrained such a strategy. For example, both the U.S. and Great Britain insisted that terrorist activities be stopped before any consideration can be given to recognizing the PLO. Britain in particular objected to Palestinian training of IRA personnel in Lebanon. At a London meeting between the PLO's Faruq al-Qaddumi and British foreign officials in December 1979, this point was again raised.(223)

The upshot of this was a renewed clash at the February 1974 meeting of the PLO Executive Council. On one side were Fatah and a majority of Ex-Comm members; on the other was the PFLP, backed by the General Command. Ostensibly, the issue was what to do about terrorist operations like the massacre at the Leonardo da Vinci (Fiumicino) Airport in December 1973 and the attack on the Shell refinery in Singapore in January 1974. Actually, however, the debate was over whether to modify military strategy so that the way would be open for a possible settlement, or to keep on with a terrorist campaign. If a diplomatic option was to be created, international terrorism would have to stop. 'Arafat and the majority came down hard on the side of stopping terrorism; the PFLP and its allies went to the other extreme.

The moderates managed to prevail, but they did so at the cost of further splitting the PLO. Not only were the PFLP, GC, and PSF alienated by the shift in strategy, but Fatah itself was divided. These groups, including Fatah splinters, formed their own organization, the Rejection Front, in the Fall of 1974.

In any event, following the promulgation of the June 1974 political program, the PLO committed itself to opposing international terrorism. Instead, military operations within Israel were to be escalated. In an interview in al-Akhbar in July 1974, Zuhayr Muhsin declared that the PLO would step up its efforts inside Israeli territory in the next few months. This was partly to disprove Israeli arguments that the Palestinians were operating solely from Lebanon, partly to demonstrate to the world that the PLO had the support of Palestinians in the occupied territories: "We have passed the stage of operating from outside [Israel]."(224)

Habash and the Rejection Front, however, moved further in the direction of terror. The only historic choice, said Habash, was to "escalate the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction."(225) In keeping with this, the Rejection Front was said to have planned even more attacks. In February 1974, the Daily Express published an account of projected PFLP strategy:

> . . . combined operations in Europe and Asia by squads of guerrillas drawn from the so-called Japanese Red Army and from the PFLP. The operations will follow the pattern of the two combined strikes of last week – in Singapore, where the oil tanks were attacked, and in Kuwayt, where the Japanese embassy was seized. . . . Bassam abu Sharif told me: "Hijackings are old hat. Our methods have changed."(226)

In response, the PLO began a massive campaign to end hijacking by Palestinians within its ranks. Following the hijacking of a British Airways jet from Dubai to Libya and then to Tunis, November 22-25, by members of Abu Nidal's group, Salah Khalaf himself directed a roundup of individuals considered actual or potential threats to the PLO's newfound international status. In a statement released following the hijacking, Khalaf announced that he had personally ordered the arrest of some 26 persons suspected of being connected with the plot.(227) Later reports in the Arab press claimed that as many as 80 Palestinians had been rounded by in Beirut alone, and sent to another Arab capital (originally believed to be Cairo) under house arrest.(228) Moreover, it was rumored at least that Fatah intelligence had drawn up the list of persons to be placed under arrest.(229) Suspects were tried by a Revolutionary Court, and those convicted were sentenced to a PLO-run prison set up outside Damascus.(230)

Because of this PLO pressure, the PFLP was forced to move away from its advocacy of hijacking while at the same time defending other international acts. In an interview with al-Dustur (Beirut) in January 1974, Habash declared:

> Foreign operations [operations launched in foreign countries] are the natural result of the collision of two opposing forces outside the soil of the homeland. The first force is our Palestinian people, who were driven out of their homeland and dispersed throughout the world. The second force are the Zionist interests, which are the direct enemy and the principal beneficiary from the displacement of our people. There are two forces then outside the homeland, which can be described as the criminal and the victim, and are contradictory by their very natures. It is the duty of the revolutionary movement to make plans for this collision and use it in the service of the cause and the revolution. . . . We had used a variety of methods in the past. Some of them had served their purpose; others are still suitable for serving the revolution and the cause.
>
> If we went into details, we would say that the method of the hijacking of aircraft had served its purpose, and could not offer more than what it had offered already, without harming the other aspects of struggle, particularly after the Palestinian cause had won wide sectors of friends throughout the world, and got enough publicity.
>
> On the other hand, we can say that other methods are still capable of serving the cause and the revolution, without producing the above-mentioned negative effects. An example is the attempt to sink the Israeli oil-tanker Coral Sea in the Red Sea. There remains a very important point in this connection. It is to emphasize that our military action abroad is auxiliary action, compared to our military action inside the occupied lands, whichforms the principal and basic form of our revolutionary struggle.(231)

However, the attempt to shut off terror as a basic Resistance conflict strategy backfired. Given the pervasive ideological reification of violence and the traumatic events in Jordan which led to the decision to opt for terror, such an abrupt shift was not possible. Instead, the level of violence which already existed among Resistance groups as an outgrowth of intense organizational rivalry was itself escalated. PLO attempts to control dissident terrorists were met by terrorist violence, now abetted by the Arab supporters of the dissidents, especially Iraq. Between 1976 and 1978 a number of PLO officials were assassinated, and PLO offices were attacked on a worldwide basis. The PLO response was to mount its own "hit team" operations against the dissidents: PLO operatives (possibly in conjunction with Syrian agents) attacked Iraqi embassies in Europe.(232)

THE SYSTEMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM: RAMIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

In addition to the costs to Resistance organizations per se, Palestinian terrorism began to ramify outward in the Arab system itself: the number of organizations devoted to almost random terrorism began to multiply (see Appendix 15) and the scope of violence increased. Instead of targeting Israeli installations and personnel, terrorist groups began to attack Arab targets. While the BSO had originally aimed at Jordanian targets as part of its revenge, Arab regimes had been spared, largely because the major Palestinian groups required their support. In the case of successive generations of terrorists, however, this restraint was removed by the creation of external links with sources of support outside the Middle East. The result was an extension of both the geographical scope of Palestinian-connected violence away from the immediate borders of Israel and outward into the Middle East and the level of violence in the sense that Arab (and Palestinian) and non-Arab leaders became targets for uncontrolled "hit teams."

Partially as a function of intra-Resistance conflicts between Fatah and the PFLP, partially also as a consequence of the increasing involvement of Resistance organizations in intra-Arab conflicts (a price for the support of some of the more radical Arab regimes), the ideological scope of violence became steadily broadened. Where Fatah had originally conceived of the conflict in narrow terms, the PFLP had early laid down the dictum:

> We are determined to make the law of revolution the law of the world, even if this would lead to the destruction of the system invented by the capitalist world over the bodies of the exploiters. . . . The PFLP, as a revolutionary vanguard, has blown up the standards and concepts imposed by the imperialist capi-

talist ideology on the white western man and the underdeveloped human beings.(233)

As the editors of Arab World noted at the time, the PFLP had gone far beyond other radical ideologies (Nasirism, Ba'th socialism), and had proclaimed its intention to apply "revolutionary law" to the Arab world as well.(234) In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Palestinian-connected violence had been confined to Israel and those Arab states, notably Lebanon and Jordan, bordering Israel. But after the Jordanian civil war, Palestinian targeting in the Arab world moved progressively outward: To Cairo in 1971; to Khartum in 1973; and after 1976, to the Gulf, where Palestinian organizations were said to be connected with disturbances in Kuwayt(235) and threats to the stability of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)(236)– so much so that some of the Gulf states proposed the creation of a "Gulf Interpol" to control terrorist activity.(237)

The assassination of Wasfi al-Tal also marks the beginning of the extension of Palestinian violence into the ranks of the Arab elite. There have, of course, been a number of other assassinations of Arab leaders, but these have been a consequence of conflicts between regular Arab regimes. The al-Tal killing was markedly different because it was the product of Resistance political and emotional considerations.(238) In any event, this symbolic murder inaugurated what amounts to a return to the interpersonal violence of the 10th century, when the original assassins (hashishin) killed thousands of victims. The roster of leaders whose murders were attempted includes most major Arab leaders: al-Sadat,(239) Husayn,(240) Hasan II,(241) al-Qadhdhafi,(242) and others. Attempts were reported on the lives of Americans, Kissinger and Vance, on the Shah(243), and of course ultimately on Resistance leaders themselves.(244) The net effect was to dramatically increase existing instability in the area. Both in scope and level, the amount of violence in the Middle East as a whole, not merely in the Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli context, was expanded by Palestinian terrorism. Because of the extensive network of terrorist linkages, the Palestinian issue was progressively worked into other conflicts, a theme that will be taken up in the next chapter.

11 The Politics of Protracted Conflict: Resistance Organization and the Middle Eastern System

One of the propositions of conflict theory(1) is that if a conflict is to be fought at some level of violence less than that aiming at the complete annihilation of both sides, two structural elements are necessary: (a) a set of "rules" limiting the uses of violence must exist; and (b) parties to the conflict must be both identifiable per se and unified. Without either (or both) of these conditions, a conflict approaches the ultimate in non-directed violence, a violence which aims only at the physical annihilation of the opponent, at his individual or collective assassination.(2)

A corollary might be added to this: In the age of increasingly sophisticated and destructive military technology of surrogate warfare between clients of superpowers, and of the ideological and organizational proliferation of international terrorism, such unstructured conflicts tend over time to ramify outward, to involve successively larger constellations of international actors, to metastasize through the international system.(3) When Arab leaders speak of the "radicalization" of the Arab world, for example, they mean precisely this process of ramification: a multidimensional extension of a conflict originating in (and over) Palestine to successively wider populations and territories, an increasingly complex linkage involving previously independent conflicts.

Edward Azar had conceptualized this process in terms of a concept of protracted social conflict.(4) According to Azar,

> Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high – the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity . . . [These] conflicts tend to be a mixture of both ethnic and inter-state conflicts. They do not permit change in the fundamental grievances, and continually reduce chances for dealing with conflict settlement issues.

> They tend to generate, reinforce, or intensify mutual images of deception. They tend to increase the likelihood of confusion in the direct and indirect communications between the parties and their allies. They increase the anxieties of the parties to the conflict, and they foster tension and conflict-maintenance strategies.(5)

What Azar is expressing in this notion is a variation of Tom Little's concept of interlocking revolutions. Here the basic sources of strain and dislocation in the Arab system, the twin crises over authority and legitimacy, are bound up together with the resolution or nonresolution of the Palestinian conflict. The multiplicity of linkages which tie these conflicts has been detailed in the preceding chapters: ideological trends in the Arab world; organizational genealogies, and geographical dispersal. The behavioral mechanism which supplies the dynamics to this linkage system is the nexus of Arab, Israeli, and Palestinian conflict strategies: strategies designed to accomplish a number of different ends; strategies aimed at solving the authority crisis by redefining both communal values and the role of authority in relation to these values; strategies geared to restoring or bolstering legitimacy by defining national identities and the role of individual Arab regimes (or elites) in articulating and defending that identity.(6) These strategies, in turn, cycled together to produce events, accelerators in Johnson's usage, which introduced a second order of unforeseen and unplanned extensions of the original conflict patterns.

SPACE AND CONFLICT: THE GEOPOLITICS OF RESISTANCE IMPACT

Several years ago Michael Brecher developed a model of Middle Eastern politics which combined the analytical or abstract qualities of social science systems theory with a more concrete analysis based on geopolitics. In Brecher's usage the model was designed to distinguish and explain alternative Israeli strategies for dealing with the Arab world. However, it serves equally well (perhaps even better) as a basis from which to assess the present impact and future potential of the Resistance. Accordingly, the operational environment with which Israeli (or Arab) foreign policy had to contend resembled a series of concentric circles of states (see fig. 11.1). In geometric order from the center, these were: those states making up a "core" around Israel proper; a second circle of states (divided in turn into a "periphery" and "outer ring") outside the core but still geographically within the Middle East; and still other constellations of states making up the surrounding international system.(7) In turn, core and periphery of states were further grouped in a Middle Eastern regional system which was a subsystem, that is, a series of states which are a definable local pattern of interaction, of a larger international system.



Fig. 11.1. Spatial dimensions of the Palestine conflict (1948-1979).

> A subordinate state system, as suggested elsewhere, requires six conditions for its existence: (1) delimited scope, with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) at least three actors; (3) objective recognition by most other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the global system; (4) self-identification as such; (5) units of power relatively inferior to units in the dominant system, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) more intensive and influential penetration of the subordinate system by the dominant system than the reverse. Measured by these criteria the Middle East is certainly one of the few developed subordinate systems in contemporary international politics.(8)

The utility of this model is that it combined both systems theory and older geographical analysis. On one hand, the structural or interaction patterns of the states involved were defined so as to allow them to be categorized into "core" and "periphery" in terms of their response to Israel. On the other hand, the geographical position of these states in the Middle East itself was taken into account. The result was (and is) a model which sharply highlights changes in action patterns, or changes in the dynamics of strategy and counter-strategy.

Moreover, the model, which was itself an intellectual abstraction, was such that it approximated the perceptions of the area by both Israeli and Arab decision makers. Although Brecher designed it originally from the viewpoint of Israeli strategists, it was applicable to their Arab counterparts as well: 'Abd al-Nasir, for example, once analogized the position of Egypt as being at the center of three concentric circles of foreign policy arena: Arab, African, and Islamic. Currently, al-Qadhdhafi uses a similar conception.

In addition, those states immediately bordering on Israel, those which Brecher defines as core states, are similarly defined by Arab strategists. After the Khartum Conference of 1967 these states were defined as "confrontation states," a designation that was later changed to "frontline states." In either case, the operational assumption behind the definition was the same: that these states were actively engaged in opposing Israeli policies, opposing them to the point of armed confrontation. Parenthetically, this notion of confrontation or frontline states has been used, by Palestinians and others, to designate both a state's strategic role and also the attitude of its elite. (Like Israeli strategy, Palestinian strategy used exactly the same notion of core and periphery: Here the dynamics of Palestinian/core relations are defined in terms of the doctrine of armed struggle and its corollary, the Algerian strategy.)

A state's position within any one of these circles, therefore, was dependent on two factors: its geographical proximity to Israel, and the nature of its relations, friendly, hostile, or neutral. Core states, those immediately surrounding Israel, were also ones which presented the issues of border security: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Iraq was marginal to the core, being aligned with core states in terms of its

hostility to Israel, but geographically removed from Israeli borders, making it part of the periphery. In practical military terms this geographical separation was very important, although it was usually glossed over in more polemically oriented conceptions of Arab-Israeli conflict relationships. In the 1973 war, for example, Iraqi armor was forced to drive across a considerable desert to get to the eastern front. When it arrived it was not only in no mechanical condition to fight, but also added to the developing confusion among Syrian and Jordanian forces. (The Iraqis have since gone out of their way to supply armored units with tank transports.) Israeli relations with core states were characterized by continuous warfare on a variety of levels, political, military, and psychological. These conflict relationships periodically escalated into open war involving, as noted, a weapons technology of increasing sophistication and destructiveness.

Although the core was a basically hostile environment, core state interaction patterns had some systemic characteristics which allowed Israeli policymakers room to maneuver to reduce the total threat. First, Arab states in the core had varying levels of military capability: in order of relative strength, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.(9) The important point here was that each Arab state was individually weaker than Israel; as long as these states did not combine their military potential, the threat to Israel was relatively small. Second, these states were plagued by domestic political instability. Arab core elites, in attempting to compensate, tended to project these instabilities onto inter-Arab relations. The consequence was a systemic interaction pattern which reflected both a high level of conflict behavior and an incoherence in foreign policy inputs. Inter-Arab politics was marked by (a) "overbidding" in the sense that foreign policy goals were stated in maxim terms, terms not often related to military or political capabilities; and (b) a high degree of mistrust, or conversely, a low degree of cooperation.(10) Therefore the dynamics of Arab-to-Arab relations were such that effective political or military coalitions in the core were both rare and short-lived.

The periphery consisted of the Arab states of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and two Muslim but non-Arab states, Iran and Turkey. These states were geographically removed from Israel and therefore did not usually directly affect Israeli security interests. Although the Arab states of the periphery were as politically hostile to Israel as the core states, their active support of core states was discontinuous. North African states, with the exception of Algeria and Libya, were cautious and low key in their approach to Arab-Israeli issues. In addition, Arabian Peninsula states, at least until the late 1960s, were at odds with the more radical core states' fundamental political and economic interests. Egypt and Syria, for example, were both radical in political outlook and impoverished in resources. Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt were, alternatively, politically conservative and oil-rich. The two non-Arab states of the periphery, Turkey and Iran, had their own differences with the Arabs; consequently these were amenable to friendly relations with Israel; and in effect functioned as diplomatic supporters of Israel within the Middle East itself.(11)

This system was, in Brecher's usage, characterized by both a highly developed communications network, a network which both facilitated and augmented interaction among the Arab states making it up, generating an extremely high level of interaction per se:

> Closely related to systemic integration is the character of interaction among its members. Relations among the core Arab states are intense and multilateral. They are in constant contact at every level and use every form of interaction – diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural, and personal. The process is so intense that developments in the domestic politics of one state have spill-over effects on the internal (and frequently on the external) affairs of others as well as on the power and psychological equilibria of the Near East core of the system.(12)

The consequence were that: (a) there were a number of openings for strategic interaction and/or penetration between and among core, periphery, and even external states; and (b) there were systemic features which produced a more or less continuous and institutionalized "spill-over" effect insofar as conflict patterns were concerned (e.g. Azar's protracted social conflict).

But because the strategies of the actors concerned were themselves designed to articulate new national identities, to legitimate relatively recently installed Arab ruling elites, to answer questions about the relationship of the Arab world to its larger international environment, emergent conflict patterns had an undefined quality. In Stanley Hoffman's terms, conflict within the Middle Eastern system was a conflict which involved the fundamental definition of the actors themselves. As a consequence, not only were conflicts characterized by a "spillover," but they were definitional rather than procedural: there was a parallel tendency for the scope and level of conflict-connected violence to expand. In conventional military terms, violence expanded or ramified by virtue of the introduction of increasingly destructive weapons, currently up to the level of nuclear technology. In nonconventional terms, violence ramified in the proliferation of international terrorism, terrorism which extended its geographical targeting to the entire world and its individual targeting to all personnel perceived as enemies. The result was a conflict system characterized by an increasing normlessness, an increasing breakdown in the definitions of the parties and of the rules delimiting conflict, a "revolutionary system," in short.(13)

Like Israeli leadership, Palestinian leaders were of necessity required to operate within this complex foreign policy environment. But unlike Israeli leadership, the Palestinians had to move from a position of weakness. Where the Israelis had an overwhelming technological advantage (and in some cases, a numerical advantage as well) and a compact, geographically homogeneous population, the Palestinians had none of these. Rather, Palestinian policies toward other actors in the environment were shaped by two givens: first, the fact that the Resistance lacked sovereignty over a defined territory. Control over

territory that the Resistance had access to was either shared or contested. Second, the goal of the Resistance was (and is) to acquire a territory which was claimed by one or more other actors. The upshot of this was that Palestinian leadership had to compensate for its lack of the territorial requisites of national power. Resistance policy stemming from this environmental imperative have been both contradictory and subject to extreme disagreement within the PLO framework. To compensate for military and political weaknesses, Palestinian leaders have been forced to seek out allies, coalition partners among Arab states and others (international terrorist groups). As with Israeli strategists, Palestinian leaders were confronted by a relatively structured system of constraints and opportunities. The debates over ideology, military strategy, and the use of international terror give ample evidence both of Palestinian awareness of these constraints and opportunities and of great differences of opinion as to how to deal with them.(14) These differences, as is obvious from the foregoing material, have been complicated by intra-Palestinian conflicts. But (again like the Israelis) Palestinian leaders face a series of concentric circles with varying strategic implications – the Arab world, core and periphery, and the larger international environment. Parenthetically, in many ways Palestinian policy toward these is the mirror image of Israeli policy.

The Arab world was the primary area of concern for Palestinian strategists. At its core was the confrontation states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and a neutral, Lebanon. In these states the bulk of the Palestinians were concentrated, and their territories are both Palestinian staging areas and theaters of military operation. In a crucial sense, the military fortunes of the commandos were dependent on their ability to operate from these states. Periphery Arab states were important for a different set of reasons. These supplied needed political and economic support, directly or indirectly affected Palestinian relations with the core states, and to some extent supported Palestinian goals via the use of oil and diplomatic resources in the larger international environment.

For the Palestinians, as for the Israelis, the surrounding international system could be strategically divided into three components: the West, the Soviet bloc, and the Third World. The West functions as both a source of arms and an ancillary base for both political and military operations; political in the sense that PLO offices have been opened in most Western countries; military in the sense that a number of international terrorist operations have been staged from Western countries. However, the dominant elements here are the two superpowers, the U.S. and USSR. The USSR and Eastern Europe are the major sources of arms; the U.S. is the greatest potential source of political leverage vis-a-vis Israel. In respect to the superpowers, the Palestinians are in a situation analogous to that of the Egyptians prior to the October war; the USSR supplied the wherewithall for a possible military solution, but the U.S. was the key to a diplomatic solution.

The Third World and the UN supply a climate of favorable international opinion and organizational support. Regular Third World gov-

ernments through their activities at the UN have given the Palestinian position international exposure and recognition and have placed Israel and the U.S. in a difficult diplomatic situation.(15) Third World insurgent organizations have supplied their Palestinian counterparts with added manpower and facilities.

CORE CONFLICT TO JUNE 1967: STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY

Because of an accident of history, the creation of an independent Israel coincided with creation of all of the Arab states which bordered it, with the exception of Egypt. The conflict in Palestine was both behaviorally and perceptually an extension of conflicts between nationalists and imperialists. During the prewar fighting in Palestine, there was a constant flow of men, arms, and some finances across Palestinian-Arab borders, as a function of linkages between various Arab nationalist groups and Palestinian irregulars. With the outbreak of war, the first major act of newly installed Arab elites was to send forces into Palestine/Israel, thus making their ability to intervene in Palestine a key criterion of their claim to legitimacy from the very outset of their rule.(16)

The consequence of the defeat in Palestine was, not surprisingly, perceived by the relevant populations (in this case small counter-elites of socially mobilized intellectuals and military officers) as evidence of these governments' unfitness to rule.(17) And the consequent extreme loss of legitimacy insofar as these officers and civilians were concerned, coupled with a generalized lack of support from a passive or even hostile population, produced a series of revolutionary situations and eventual coups. The almost universal targets of these coups were originally the existing ruling elite, the personnel and framework of the regime itself, and nothing beyond this.(18) Nevertheless these new "radical" governments were extremely sensitive to the impact of a failure to act (or appear to be acting) to restore Palestinian rights. In turn, their legitimizing strategies began increasingly to center on the Palestinian issue.(19)

Here, however, the thrust of these strategies was to dramatically increase the scope of conflict. On one hand they were couched in systemic terms, arguing that Arab unity alone was the way for the Arabs to reverse the defeat in Palestine. On the other hand, they argued for redefinitions of existing, weakly legitimized political communities in the Arab world, either in terms of Nasir's Arab socialism or Ba'th socialism.(20) These new strategies were by definition mutually exclusive and targeted against existing definitions of community, as opposed to a narrower category of regimes as targets.(21) In this evolving pattern conflict the Palestinians were essentially the agents of competing Arab elites.

For Israeli strategists, the complex system of conflicts created by these legitimizing strategies provided some openings: inter-Arab differences could be exacerbated by the adroit use of force. Another set of

openings was created by the increasingly tense relationship of the Arab world to the larger international system, or more specifically, to Western states within it.

Persistent Western efforts to control the Middle East ultimately generated an intense wave of anti-Western nationalism, an attitudinal and emotional "set" which sharply defined the limits of Arab-Western interaction. This nationalism, when worked into the inter-Arab pattern of overbidding, forced Arab elites (even those whose survival clearly depended on Western support, such as the Hashemites in Jordan) to engage in anti-Western politics which, naturally enough, produced an anti-Arab backlash in the West.(22) The upshot was that Israeli policy-makers had a relatively free hand in fashioning linkages with Western powers, and were able to mobilize effective Western support in the U.S. This option became even more extensive as the Arab/Israeli conflict became linked with the larger bipolarization of the international system.(23) Israel was therefore able to derive needed support, both militarily and diplomatically, from Europe and the U.S. to offset USSR movement into the area.

Israeli policy preceding the 1967 war took advantage of these opportunities. Insofar as the core was concerned, Israeli strategists were anxious to prevent any combination of Arab military force capable of overwhelming the Israel Defense Forces. This concern was expressed in terms of a set of indices, the occurrence of which would call for an immediate preemptive attack by Israel:

1. An Arab military concentration in Jordan
2. An Egyptian military concentration in the Sinai
3. An Arab blockade of the Straits of Tiran
4. An escalation of Arab-supported fida'iyin activity(24)

Parenthetically, the wars of 1956 and 1967 were preceded by the occurrence, in a strikingly similar fashion, of these factors.(25)

Israeli opinion was divided, however, over the question of how to prevent these circumstances. Specifically, what strategies were to be followed in order to: (a) control or lessen Arab border violence in the short run; and (b) stabilize the region in the long run? One strand of thought saw the issue in moral terms, and argued that a strategy of concessions was necessary to assuage the wrongs done the Arab population of Palestine. An alternative view, identified originally with Moshe Sharett, defined the problem as one of "normalizing" relations with surrounding Arab states. Here the preferred strategy was one of bargaining; a policy of incremental improvement in relations, an active search for points of contact with the Arabs. The third and dominant (Ben Gurion) thesis was one that stressed the necessity of dealing from a position of strength: core states should be deterred from hostile acts by application of overwhelming military force.(26)

After 1955 the issue was settled in favor of the deterrence strategy: Arab attacks, either shelling by regular military units or sponsorship of guerrilla activity, were met by massive counterblows designed to inflict

unacceptably high casualties and aimed at exploiting existing divisions between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. After the 1956 war, a parallel strategy, that of creating a buffer zone, was introduced by insisting on a UN presence capable (theoretically) of neutralizing Egyptian threats from the Sinai, a low-key strategy designed to utilize Israeli diplomatic strength in the UN.

With the core more or less stabilized, Israeli strategists moved outward, seeking to balance off Arab allies in the periphery and the international system. Efforts were made to secure working arrangements with Turkey and Iran, to create economic ties with both countries. Additional foreign policy energy was directed at Europe and Africa. Here the goals were (a) to balance Arab support at the UN; (b) to isolate the Arab Middle East from its hinterland and encircle the core with Israeli Third World allies; and (c) to secure access to Western military technology at sufficient levels to offset any arms transfers to Arab states (and in the case of Iran, to secure access to Middle Eastern oil).

1967 AND BEYOND: ESCALATION INTO THE PERIPHERY AND OUTWARD

The 1967 war radically changed Israeli/Arab relationships at the core(27) and led to a strategic reassessment by all sides (including, of course, the Palestinian). The Israelis emerged as the clear victor and the occupier of additional Arab territories. The surrounding Arab regimes, in turn, found themselves the unplanned victims of their own legimating strategies. The unrest that confronted earlier regimes was now turned against them.

If the June war was a product of inter-Arab rivalries combined with Israeli military responses at the core, it was still localized in the sense that the definition of violence (the rules of the conflict) was still limited – in this case, limited by a theory of victory via conventional warfare and limited to those states on Israel's borders. The enormous systemic consequences of this war were largely unforeseen. Nevertheless, these were an extension of both the scope and the definition of permissible (indeed, strategically necessary) violence on a number of levels. In terms of the problems facing Arab elites, the issues of stability which had theretofore been confined to those of regime or elite legitimacy were broadened. The issue became that of the nature and purpose of authority in the Arab world as well, and the arguments for resolving this issue more than ever revolved around the requirement of success in dealing with a now augmented state of Israel. A number of strategies were developed by defeated Arab elites to reverse the unfavorable military equation. The conflict itself was redefined, especially by Palestinian strategies, in order to shift the focus from Arab to Palestinian concerns.

The parameters and impact of these strategies were set by the geopolitical "givens" of the core and the pattern of Israeli strategic

choices. Here, Israeli strategists had the luxury of utilizing them, in this case by withholding any territorial concessions until Arab states were willing to come to the negotiating table. The logic here was simple. Arab leaderships would find themselves under increasing domestic pressure to regain their lost territories; the longer they delayed, the more Israel would create "new facts" by settling into these territories; therefore, Arab leaderships would eventually come to realize that negotiations were preferable to continued conflict.

Moreover, since Israel had overwhelming military superiority, Israel would define the framework within which these negotiations would take place. And, the parameters of this framework would be defined by two policy positions: (a) that any new Arab-Israeli relationships be based on "defensible borders"; and (b) that these relationships be the product of "direct negotiations."

The concept of defensible borders reflected both an estimate of the type of wars most likely to be fought in the future and an estimate of the political demography of the occupied territories. Future wars were conceived to be conflicts fought with extensions of existing strategy and technology – basically ground conflicts, with air power functioning as an adjunct to highly mobile armor. Moreover, they would be fought under conditions wherein a small Israeli standing force would be opposed to much larger Arab forces at the outset. What was required in this situation was: (a) strategic depth, to give Israeli reserve units time to fully mobilize; and (b) sufficient topological protection for Israeli population centers from Arab bombardment.(28)

Insofar as the demographic issue was concerned, the issue was less clear, but Israeli thinking appeared to be based on the experience with the Arab community remaining in Israel after the war of 1948. Israeli Arabs had remained politically passive, a relatively isolated population retaining its traditional culture and leadership. There was no reason to suppose that Arab populations of the West Bank and Gaza would behave any differently, and indeed, it might be possible to create economic links between these populations and Israel which would outweigh political differences.

The insistence on direct negotiations reflected an Israeli assessment of the relationship between the core and the international system. The lesson of 1956, seemingly repeated in 1967, had been that external powers were relatively powerless to affect events in the core, especially so in a situation of rapid escalation. Moreover, it also reflected increasing Israeli disillusionment with the UN's ability to stabilize the border situation. In addition, it had the potential that it might further split Arab states, in this case by tempting one or more of them to enter into negotiations in an effort to regain lost territories at the expense of others. Here Jordan was the most likely negotiating partner, and some contacts between the Jordanians and Israelis seem to have taken place. Parenthetically, the Khartum formula of "no peace, no recognition, no negotiation" was designed among other things to forestall just such an event.

Israeli strategy in the post-1967 environment, then, was basically an extension of the earlier pattern. However, there was one major difference in that the U.S. replaced Europe as the major source of support. The almost complete polarization of the Middle East which followed the war, and the rupture of U.S. relations with Arab core states coupled with dramatic USSR military and diplomatic support for Egypt and Syria, introduced superpower conflict into the core. For the time being at least, the core became the focal point of a form of balance of power politics which took the form of an arms race by proxy, with the U.S. supplying Israel and the USSR supplying Egypt and Syria.

The balance of forces in the core might have continued for some time except for two critical changes: (a) the emergence of a new actor, the PLO; and (b) a change of leadership in Syria and Egypt. The death of 'Abd al-Nasir and a coup in Syria brought two relatively conservative leaders, al-Sadat and al-Asad, into power. Unlike previous leaders, these men were extremely pragmatic and concerned with developing foreign policy strategies which had some relation to actual capabilities.(29) Between 1970 and 1973, al-Sadat and al-Asad engaged in extensive negotiations designed to build a tripartite coalition of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, a coalition that would link core and periphery. The coalition was based on a set of interlocking interests: Egyptian and Syrian interests in regaining lost territory; Saudi interests in checking the destabilizing consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As an extension of this coalition, Jordan, the PLO, and Algeria were brought in: Jordan and the PLO as part of the military alliance; Algeria as a broker between the core and Africa.

Where Israeli strategy was to neutralize the core militarily and isolate it politically, Arab counter-strategy was to link core, periphery, and international system and to neutralize Israeli military superiority by creating an alliance system which would bring overwhelming political pressure to bear on Israel. The key targets here were: the U.N. and the Third World (especially Africa); the non-Muslim states of the periphery; and the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) the industrialized West.

Arab UN strategy capitalized on a larger change in the international system: the increasing proportion of Third World to Western states. In the UN this meant a growing numerical preponderance of Third World votes. This was in turn coupled with a tendency of Third World states to perceive conflicts in colonial terms, to view with favor the activities of the national liberation movements. The political consequences of this shift in perspective in the UN had already been evident in increasing UN hostility to Israel on issues of border violations. The key to this strategy, and its basic logic, lay in the number of African states in the UN: some 48 African states, plus a number of Third World states could create a voting bloc of 77 or so states, a number sufficient to pass anti-Israeli resolutions, to dramatize Arab positions, and to put pressure on Israel's Western supporters. This voting bloc, when combined with a generally favorable majority in the Security Council, could force Israel into near diplomatic isolation.

The strategy, as it developed, appeared to be based on two grounds: (a) the political arguments that Israeli occupation of Arab territories was in effect a colonial situation akin to that in Rhodesia and South Africa, and that Afro-Arab solidarity was necessary to defeat this colonialism; and (b) the economic argument that Arab states could offer Africans considerable aid, originally in terms of financial assistance and, after October 1973, in terms of preferred access to Arab oil. These arguments operated with telling effects. By April 1972, the OAU had begun to pass outspokenly anti-Israeli resolutions. By May 1973, six African states had already broken relations with Israel. During the course of the war, a number of others followed. Ultimately, about 30 African states severed relations with Israel. Paralleling this were persistent efforts to neutralize Turkey and Iran. These apparently started prior to Nasir's death, but were accelerated by Sadat. On the eve of the October war, Egyptian diplomacy managed to secure Turkish and Iranian support for the Arab position.(30)

The improved Arab position in Africa and vis-a-vis Turkey and Iran created a favorable background context for the U.S./Western strategy. This strategy focused on escalating the conflict at the core and then using this escalation as an excuse to bring the oil weapon into play. To do this, extremely meticulous military planning was carried out between Egyptian and Syrian commanders – planning, organizing, and training which took the better part of 1973. The tactical concepts utilized here were (a) to force Israel to fight on two fronts simultaneously, thus taking advantage of Arab numbers, and (b) to fight a positional war, if possible, to neutralize superior Israeli ability to maneuver.(31) Moreover, this war was to be accompanied by an information policy designed to win over world opinion by stressing the limited nature of Arab goals, and to give the impression of Arab moderation and reasonableness.

As far as the U.S. was concerned, this strategy had two salient purposes: (a) to convince U.S. policymakers that Arab states were indeed capable of escalating the conflict to a level which could endanger the world; and (b) to demonstrate that U.S. interests in supporting Israel in the core could not be separated from U.S. interests in securing access to Middle Eastern oil. In this, Arab strategists were clearly successful.

The upshot was a radically changed environment facing the Israelis. In the core, Israel found itself facing an Arab military coalition which appeared capable of generating considerable threat to Israeli security. Given one of the "Lessons" of 1967 and 1973 (that strategic surprise gave the attackers a potentially overwhelming advantage), the military situation was extremely unstable. In 1974 and again in 1976, Syrian troop movements in the Golan Heights and Lebanon threatened to set off another round of fighting. In the periphery, both Turkey and Iran had moved toward the Arabs. In the international system, the UN had become a relatively hostile forum. UN debates and subsequent resolutions had become "Palestinianized" in the sense that these stressed the Arab/Palestinian viewpoint.(32) In the international system, Western

and U.S. support for Israel had been eroded by a combination of Arab oil and information politics. The U.S. was caught between its interests in supporting Israel and its interests in securing continued access to Middle East oil.

Palestinian strategies followed the general Arab thrust of linking the core with outside actors. Blocked militarily in Jordan in 1970-1971(33) and largely stalemated in Lebanon, Resistance leaders resorted first to international terrorism, and then began a systematic movement into the Arab hinterland sometime in 1974. 'Arafat later articulated the basis of this new strategy:

> The Palestinian revolution has its own characteristics, interconnections and affiliations. It is not a local or regional liberation movement. It is connected and impacts with all Arab events. Our revolution's strategic depth is pan-Arab. What happens in the Arab Maghreb between Algeria and Morocco, particularly in the wake of the Egyptian regime's attempt to escalate the conflict by blatant intervention, affects us directly and indirectly. What happens in the Eastern front also affects us, whether we like it or not. The same thing applies to the Iranian revolution's relations with the Gulf states.(34)

Therefore, as corollaries to the military "leapfrog" strategy (of attacking either from within the occupied territories or attempting seaborne raids) and the movement to the Arab periphery, Resistance (PLO) strategists began a concerted drive (a) to gain U.S. recognition, and thus alienate Israel's principal ally – a strategy obviously influenced by al-Sadat's strategic thinking; and (b) as an alternative and complement, to gain European recognition. Here the tactics were complex, but the reasoning was simple: if the U.S. could be maneuvered into supporting some form of Palestinian political entity, or some form of Palestinian rights, then the U.S. would put pressure directly on the Israelis on behalf of the Resistance; ergo, the Resistance would not have to operate via Arab itermediaries, and could do via its links with a superpower what it could not do via its Arab allies. Obviously, Resistance leaders had studied Israeli policy in this respect, and Resistance strategy here paralleled that of the Israelis. Secondly, if the U.S. ploy failed, the Resistance could use European states as a counterweight to the U.S. In fact, these states were even more vulnerable to Arab oil strategies, and therefore to the Resistance's conservative supporters, than was the U.S.

The shift to this strategy appears to coincide with the shift toward acceptance of a Palestinian entity in the spring of 1974. And the impetus toward this shift appears to have been a consequence of PLO/Fatah leadership's perception that the post-October situation was becoming increasingly unfavorable on a number of counts: (a) The Resistance's ability to conduct military operations was declining and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon some two years later only more openly demonstrated this decline. (b) The Egyptian peace strategy

threatened to leave the PLO outside of an imposed settlement, and in this case one possibly imposed by Arab leaderships themselves in a return to the pre-1967 pattern. (c) There was a parallel possibility that West Bank leaders might be induced to enter this potential Arab-Israeli peace. (d) But there was also an improved possibility of international recognition following the initial Arab recognition at Rabat at the end of 1974 (and, of course, the grant of UN observer status).

Insofar as U.S.-PLO relations were concerned, the grounds for any accommodation were extremely narrow. For its part the U.S. insisted on two concessions before any recognition of the PLO would be considered: (a) an end to terrorism, which meant not only international terrorism but also an end to "armed struggle"; and (b) PLO recognition of Israel, either via an acceptance of UN Resolution 242 or a direct recognition. These were the terms of Sinai II (1975) in which the U.S. gave Israel assurances that it would not recognize the PLO as long as the PLO refused to recognize Israel.(35) Either of these terms, of course, would be major concessions for the PLO: On one hand, an acceptance would destroy the already fragile consensus among the Resistance elite. On the other hand, recognition of Israel before any quid pro quo would mean giving up the PLO's most important bargaining counter. Moreover, U.S. policymakers were equally concerned that even if the PLO would be induced to make such a commitment, the institutionalized factionalism within it would render any such decision virtually unenforceable by its leadership. In addition, there was the spector of Vietnam; the nagging fear that if a second insurgent movement could succeed via either guerrilla warfare or international terror, then such a tactic might be perceived as eminently successful by yet other such movements, and in effect set off a cycle of destabilizing effects throughout the entire Third World.(36) Therefore, there was considerable risk, perceived and real, for both sides.

Prior to the 1973 war there do not seem to have been any direct contacts. Clearly, however, there was some U.S. interest in the Resistance, as witnessed by several Rand studies. And it may be assumed that some unofficial contacts, probably by third-party intermediaries, took place.(37) At this point, neither the U.S. nor the Resistance was especially interested in contacts. Indeed, the Rogers Plan of 1970, and the rumored Kissinger Plan(38) of 1973 dealt almost exclusively in terms of Israeli-Egyptian relations. However, according to Arab sources, a Kissinger aide (identified as one Fischer) was said to have met with a number of Palestinian leaders, but not necessarily with any Resistance leaders, as early as 1970.(39)

Immediately after the 1973 war, however, there were a series of reports about unconfirmed contacts between the U.S. and the PLO. In New York, rumors floating around the UN suggested that some U.S. officials had at least talked with PLO personnel allegedly attached to regular Arab delegations (especially after 'Arafat's speech to the UN in November 1974). In the Middle East, these contacts were almost uniformly brokered through Arab leaders, principally al-Sadat(40) and the Saudis.(41) But a number of private and public personalities were

involved also: Among the Arabs, an American University of Beirut professor, Walid Khalidi, was said to be one of the major go-betweens.(42) Among Americans, Senator Fulbright met Resistance leaders in Beirut shortly after the October war,(43) and since then, a number of Congressional leaders have talked to Resistance personnel or figures identified as being close to the Resistance.(44)

As of late 1974, following 'Arafat's UN speech, the official U.S. attitude was not to deal with the PLO. UN Representative John Scali, for example, attacked "those who profess to see no difference between slaughter of innocents and a struggle for national liberation" (meaning 'Arafat).(45) However, there were indications of some change. President Ford at one point told reporters that "there must be agreement toward settlement of the problems between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, between Israel, Jordan, and the PLO on the other."(46) U.S. officials were quick to deny any suggestions that this might have implied any recognition of the PLO, but there were still other "slips" – by Joseph Sisco for instance: "We regard the PLO as the overall umbrella organization of the Palestinians."(47)

U.S.-PLO contacts were again instituted (assuming there was a lull between 1974 and 1976) in connection with the assassination of U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Francis Meloy. These were extended during the Lebanese crisis; as a consequence, PLO personnel were assigned as bodyguards to Americans, and the PLO itself assisted the U.S. evacuation of Lebanon.(47) U.S. acceptance of PLO assistance in this manner raised the issue of whether or not the U.S. had given it de facto recognition.(48) (The same issue was raised again when a PLO team went to Tehran in November 1979 to negotiate for the release of U.S. hostages.)

In 1977 President Carter raised the issue by suggesting that the U.S. might be prepared to support a "Palestinian Homeland."(49) Since then, there apparently have been a series of contacts on a multitude of levels.(50) The most spectacular of these was the reportedly unauthorized contact with PLO UN delegation personnel by UN Representative Andrew Young in August 1979. Young's resignation following a storm of protest added a further complication, that of tension between U.S. black and Jewish communities (some prominent black leaders then contacted the PLO themselves).(51)

The Young resignation was followed in March 1980 by an equally sudden reversal of U.S. policy. Following an affirmative U.S. vote on a Security Council resolution calling for the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, President Carter declared that the vote had been a mistake and did not represent U.S. policy. Whatever the facts behind this reversal, it symbolized the profound U.S. uncertainty as to how to deal with the PLO. (For Resistance leaders, the reversal served to confirm their own suspicions of U.S. reliability in general, and strengthened the position of those who argued for a return to armed struggle as the only strategy with any hope for success.)

Palestinian European strategy followed by the same lines: a series of contacts at various levels with European officials. Many of these

contacts appear to have been originally brokered by the late al-Qalaq and Hammami, but the orchestration of the European strategy itself has been generally attributed to al-Qaddumi.(52) According to Arab world sources, a seven-man team was set up to handle these contacts: al-Qaddumi; Isam Sartawi, the PLO's "roving ambassador" in Europe; Sidqi Danjani; Ibrahim Sus; Ghazi Husayn; 'Umar al-Hamdi; 'Abd al-Latif Hijlih; and Sa'id Kamal.(53) As a result of their efforts, 'Arafat was able to make a number of successful high-level visits to Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Turkey. In addition, by early 1980 both Great Britain and France appeared to be on the verge of recognizing the PLO (a number of Third world countries, of course, had already done so). The net effect of this strategy was to give the PLO a "European option."

By June 1980, this European option (and it should be made clear that PLO efforts were supported by substantial Arab, especially oil producer, pressure) had crystallized in the form of a European Community (EC) resolution calling for recognition of a Palestinian right to self-determination. Again Britain and France were the prime movers behind this resolution; and their ultimate goal appeared to be to use it as a springboard for a later UN vote changing 242 to include mention of the Palestinians as active participants.(54) As with the US, the Europeans were concerned with Palestinian factionalism, and proposed to use diplomatic means to strengthen the centrist group around 'Arafat, here by pushing the idea of a Palestine state or entity. And by tying this state or entity to Arab countries perceived as pro-Western, thus stabilizing the area.(55)

However, there were two unforeseen consequences of this interplay of Palestinian and Arab strategy: (a) In spatial terms, the Palestinian issue became linked to a number of other conflicts in the Middle East and Africa,(56) and in the Middle East the conflict was extended into the Gulf region (especially so after the collapse of the Shah).(57) (b) But perhaps more importantly, the conflict became bound up with older and larger issues involving the nature of authority in the Arab world. Here, partially because of the Israeli occupation of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and partially because of Arab (especially Saudi and Libyan) strategies involving the use of religious appeals, the conflict took on a religious dimension.

In organizational terms, splits within the Resistance became enmeshed in a wider polarization of the Arab world over the issue of al-Sadat's peace initiative. Following the 12th PNC meeting in Cairo in June 1974 the Resistance itself was split: A faction led by the PFLP and composed of the ALF, GC and PSF in addition withdrew from most of the institutions of the PLO. (It should be noted that most of these organizations left the door open for later reconciliation by maintaining some representatives in the PLO.)(58) This faction styled itself the Rejection Front, meaning that it rejected any form of compromise, especially on the issue of a Palestinian state; (see chapter seven above) and rapidly acquired the support of Arab states equally determined to reject any peace settlement.(59) This informal working alliance was, in turn, formalized after al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.

At the Tripoli, Libya "Summit of Resistance" a coalition of the Rejection Front and anti-Sadat Arab states was put together: The conferees agreed to set up an Arab front with a joint political and military command; and issued a declaration rejecting UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and any other international conferences based on them.(60) A series of summits followed, the most dramatic of which was the Baghdad Summit of November 1978 (by then this coalition consisted of the Rejection Front, the PLO, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya and South Yemen) at which heretofore conservative states, especially Saudi Arabia, were enlisted in opposition to the Camp David peace formula.

This organizational polarization was both paralleled and amplified by a much wider (and more diffuse) movement of rejection of Western cultural influence. A rejection which was, however, also both an assertion of Islamic values and a search for some form of authority to implement these values.

While the Rejectionist movement grew out of splits within the Resistance itself, its major impetus came from Arab states concerned with a shift in the Arab world, and Arab-Israeli balance of power as a consequence of the movement of Egypt toward the West (and Israel). In the Arab world, this movement was widely perceived as the outcome of post-1973 Israeli strategy, a strategy that was designed to break up the coalition that fought the war (here, by engaging the Egyptians in peace negotiations), and to consolidate Israeli control over the occupied territories, in this case by accelerating the pace of Jewish settlements while simultaneously probing for Arab interests, either Jordanian or West Bank Palestinian, which would acquiesce to a continued Israeli presence.

But even here, the grand anti-Sadat coalition was riven with its own internal conflicts, conflicts deriving from preexisting strategies aimed at securing a variety of goals. The Libyans, for example, wanted to use the Steadfastness Front as a springboard for their drive to replace the Egyptians as titular leaders of the Arab world. The Syrians wanted to transform it into an alliance with Jordan, and then one with Iraq (broken up by an ill-considered Syrian attempt to overthrow the Iraqi government in 1979). The Iraqis, in turn, wished to create a coalition capable of blocking any Iranian movement into the Gulf while, at the same time, facilitating an increasing Iraqi influence in that area. The Saudis strove to prevent the Steadfastness Front from becoming totally hostile to any accommodation with the West, and to prevent it from completely isolating al-Sadat.

In turn, the complexity and intensity of these conflicts was reflected within the Resistance elite. As Arab states maneuvered for their own ends, they sought support from various factions within the Resistance. As a consequence, existing Resistance factional patterns shifted along with the larger alliance patterns in the Arab world. By the middle of 1980, for example, the more or less stable factional splits within Fatah had partially recombined into three groups (described in Arab world sources as groups "A," "B," and "C"). Group "A" was headed by Khalil al-Wazir and a group of moderates – among them, Khalid al-

Hasan, Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid and Fatah intelligence, and the commanders of the 'Asifah forces. These were said to be opting for a policy of rapprochement with Jordan (a policy inaugurated in 1978) with an eye toward the creation of some Palestinian state linked with and supported by Jordan. This faction was backed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia (themselves linked by a common interest in preventing militant Shi'ism from spreading in the Gulf). Group "B" was headed by Salah Khalaf along with Faruq al-Qaddumi and the PLO Political Department. Group "B" opposed any union with Jordan and demanded an independent Palestinian state. It was covertly supported by the Egyptians who perceived this position as being supportive of their own attempts to negotiate some form of Palestinian autonomy. The last group, Group "C," was led by Nimr Salih and composed of pro-Syrian Palestinians, among them a number of PLA officers including Brig. Budayri. It espoused the Rejection Front opposition to any negotiations and consequently was backed by Syria, Libya, and Algeria, and within the Resistance by the PLA, al-Sa'iqah, the PFLP, PDF, and GC.

In the middle 1960s the Saudis attempted to combat the spread of Nasirism (itself a heavily Islamic ideology) by creating an "Islamic Alliance," with some success. Later this Saudi policy was extended into Africa as a strategy of countering Israeli attempts to encapsulate the Middle East within a circle of pro-Israeli African states. In the later 1960s, al-Qadhdhafi had opted for an even more aggressive Islamic policy, this time tying it to attacks on Arab governments (such as al-Sadat's) which are seen (especially after Camp David) as turning traitor on Islam and becoming an agent of the West and the Israelis, and to attacks on the West itself via international terrorism. In the late 1970s this Sunni revolt was paralleled by militant, messianic Shi'ism in Iran. The Khumayni "Islamic Revolution" in Iran threatens an extension of this militancy into those areas of the Gulf with large Shi'a populations. And indeed, Khumayni's strategy of creating a series of Islamic republics throughout the Islamic world is the Shi'a counterpart to al-Qadhdhafi's Sunni policies.(61) The result has been a wave of Islamic protest in most Arab countries: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (here an attack on the Grand Mosque by some 500 militants).(62) This wave of Islam was even more explicitly linked to the Resistance because of its ties with the Muslim Brethren, on one hand, and its close relations with Khumayni supporters on the other.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATION: THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT PERCEPTIONS

Added to Palestinian political strategies was a communications strategy, one designed to take advantage of the Resistance's communications resources and the characteristics of the larger Arab environment. Communications here served as a technique for controlling the organizational environment, internally and externally,(63) by shaping perceptions. From the beginning, commando organizations made exten-

sive efforts to develop a communications network. Their initial efforts, notably Fatah's al-Filastinuna and the even earlier al-Tha'r of George Habash's group, were relatively restricted in terms of circulation. Few if any Arab governments encouraged Resistance publications, and most of the original Resistance literature was clandestine. However, after the 1967 war, and especially after al-Karamah, Palestinian media have undergone an expansion in numbers. By 1970-1971, at the height of the Resistance's drive for publicity, the Journal of Palestinian Studies (itself an important member of the Palestinian media) enumerated some 48 different printed publications.

According to an analysis carried in al-Sayyad, Palestinian media were remarkably different in their approach and content from pre-1967 Arab media: their handling of news items was more sophisticated; revolutionary themes were consistently woven through material presented; advertising was not allowed; authorship was generally not attributed to individuals; and publications were distributed free or at minimal cost.(64) This media stressed news of the Resistance plus a heavy cultural emphasis, and its avowed ultimate goal was to express the Palestinian revolutionary viewpoint from all aspects.(65)

The Resistance also acquired the use of a number of radio transmitters. These were originally located in Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, and later Iraq. Because of the potential political impact of radio broadcasts in the Arab world, the content of Palestinian radio has been an especially sensitive issue between the Resistance and host Arab governments. VOP transmitters were shut down by the Egyptians in 1970 after broadcasts critical of Nasir's acceptance of the Rogers Plan, by the Syrians in 1973 after attacks on the Syrian rapprochement with Husayn (and also apparently to prevent leaks concerning the impending October attack), and by the Egyptians again following attacks on al-Sadat for signing Sinai II.

Palestinian broadcasts were begun by the Egyptians in 1954 when the Palestinian Service of Radio Cairo was aired. Other Arab states followed the Egyptian example. Iraq inaugurated a Palestine Program in 1962, and Syria began a "Palestinian Broadcast" in 1964. In each case, however, the broadcast content was determined by Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian officials, and was designed to promote national rather than Palestinian interests.(66) Apparently the first official PLO transmitter (Sawt al-Filastin – the Voice of Palestine, VOP) began operation in Cairo in 1964. This transmitter operated independently of other transmitters used by Fatah, which identified themselves with the station names of Sawt al-'Asifah - Voice of 'Asifah.(67) With the takeover of the PLO by Fatah, these transmitters were apparently consolidated as the VOP. The Fatah station in the Dar'a region of southern Syria continued to use the call names Fatah Radio and Voice of 'Asifah until 1972 when it switched to the call name VOP following the Unity Agreement of 1972.

In terms of more specific organizational problems, this emphasis on media was a response to a twofold task facing Resistance leaders. On

the one hand, in keeping with its ideological definition of the situation, they had of necessity to create a means of communicating their own version of events both to the Palestinians as such and to wider Arab audiences. For the Palestinians this communication served a dual purpose of breaking down the power base of traditional, non-Resistance Palestinian leaders, and communicating the correct nationalist or revolutionary standards of behavior to the fragmented Palestinian population. For Arab audiences in general, it would provide an ability to present the Palestinian viewpoint and to appeal over the heads of Arab governments, thus giving the Resistance an ability to counter possible anti-Palestinian propaganda.

Therefore, Resistance organizations were faced with a complex and contradictory problem of communications. They had to develop some vehicle of communicating with two sets of audiences: internally with scattered Palestinian populations; externally with wider Arab and even international audiences. To do this successfully required a delicate balancing act in terms of information policy. Because of the problematic political position of expatriate Palestinian communities, Arab governments concerned tended to view commando efforts to propagandize these communities as activities verging on sedition. On the other hand, if the Resistance was to mobilize Palestinian loyalty, extensive communications aimed specifically at Palestinians were needed. In content, therefore, these communications had to project an image which would produce a flow of recruits and money, but at the same time one which would not antagonize actual or potential Arab supporters.

This was not an especially easy task. In a 1969 lecture delivered at the American University in Beirut, Abu Iyad described the adverse publicity given Fatah by Arab governments:

> In Jordan, they said we were the agents of Nasirism while in Egypt they said we were Muslim Brothers, and in Kuwayt they said we were horrible leftists . . . We had therefore to fight on two fronts: the front of suspicion and the front of collecting funds and weapons.(68)

More concretely, Resistance spokesmen had to contend with and overcome the pan-Arab conceptualization of the conflict put forth by a variety of sources, Arab, Israeli, and Western. For example, as late as summer 1976 the English-language Jerusalem Post described the situation as follows:

> The Arab-Israeli dispute, as its name has always implied, is basically between Israel and the Arab world as represented by the confrontation states and some of the "crazy states" on the periphery such as Libya. The issue is not Israel's retention of the lands it has conquered in 1967 nor the rights of the Arab population in these lands to national self-determination – issues which did not exist prior to 1967 – but the Arab world's

> unreadiness to concede that there is room for non-Arab states and societies in what it prefers to view as the purely Arab heartland of the Middle East. . . . Injection of the Palestinian motif was a successful propaganda ploy of the past seven years which was meant to undermine Israeli's position as a beleaguered underdog. . . (69)

Moreover, there was yet another goal, that of communicating the "reality" of the Resistance to the outside world. The key here was the projection of credibility: first and foremost, military credibility, a critical necessity in the wake of a string of Arab defeats; second, political credibility, the impression that Resistance organizations were the legitimate spokesmen of the Palestinians. Of the two goals, that of military credibility took first priority. In a work significantly titled "Palestinian Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness," Sharabi pointed to the need for credibility on a variety of levels:

> The Palestine guerrilla movement, like almost any part to war, confronts credibility on several levels. Credibility must be established among the guerrillas themselves, it has to be transmitted to their friends and enemies, and the times require its ultimate verification by the tribunal of world opinion.(70)

The principle vehicle of communicating an appearance of military effectiveness was the military communique. These were aimed at several sets of audiences: Palestinians themselves, other Arabs, Israelis, and the Western world in general. The goals were different in respect to each. For the Palestinian and Arab audiences the aim was to create the belief that Palestinians were actively engaging the enemy. For Israeli audiences the communiques were designed to weaken Israeli morale and create a sense of being under constant hostile pressure. For Western audiences they were to give the impression that the Palestinians were a credible threat to Western interests and to awaken Western curiosity about the Palestinians themselves – curiosity which, it was hoped, would lead to an understanding of the Palestinian situation.

These communiques, however, were not especially noteworthy for their accuracy. Indeed, not only were there numerous exaggerations, but a practice rapidly developed whereby different organizations would take credit for the same "operation." In an attempt to control this behavior, the Unity Agreement of 1972 required that military communiques be issued solely by the General Command. Even so, accuracy is still an issue, as for example:

> In accordance with the orders issued by the General Command of the Palestine Revolution Forces to our striking groups in the occupied homeland, Palestine, one of the heavy rocket units was moved to a specified place in occupied Jerusalem to strike at the government compound and the Zionist Knesset building in the Levi Sha'fan. The unit fired the first salvo of rockets at 0415

> today at the ministries' compound and the Knesset building. The heavy rockets scored direct hits and caused heavy damage and casualties. Soon after that, fire engines and ambulances rushed to the area. A large number of troops of the Zionist army and police also went to the scene and our revolutionaries surprised them at 0430 by firing another salvo of heavy rockets which scored direct hits and inflicted heavy casualties on the Zionist enemy troops and damaged the targets.(71)

Organizational considerations aside, a number of factors would have coalesced to produce an aggressive Palestinian information policy. First, the cultural context in which Palestinian media had to operate would almost automatically predispose commando leaders toward such policies. Arab political discourse is in general characterized by an emphasis on the emotive aspects of politics, a communications tradition of overstatement (verbal outbidding) and exaggeration. Political success in the Arab world is often quite closely tied to an ability to successfully manipulate linguistic expression. This has its roots in Arab oral tradition, existing from pre-Islamic times. The impact of linguistic skills is in turn amplified by the commonality of Arab cultural and symbolic patterns throughout the area.(72)

Second, there was a heightened Arab concern in general with the political impact of communications, which was intensified in the wake of the 1967 war. Surprised by the almost universally hostile reaction of the international community to Arab propaganda efforts prior to and during the war, Arab spokesmen and commentators launched a far-reaching analysis of Arab communication failings. This new emphasis on finding the correct use of media to achieve desired political effect reached its height between 1968 and 1970, about the time Palestinian media began to expand in scope and numbers. PLO spokesman Ahmad Shukayri was singled out by Palestinians and non-Palestinians alike as a source of an extremely unflattering and politically harmful image of the Palestinians: he had managed to project an image of both Arabs and Palestinians as bloodthirsty extremists and murderers. In the aftermath of this critique, both Arab and Palestinian media strove to develop an information policy that would effectively promote their political goals.(73)

In any event, Resistance leadership would have been sociologically and occupationally predisposed toward an emphasis on media exploitation because of the heavy concentration of intelligensia within the Palestinian Resistance. As noted, the Resistance includes a natural communication elite, having literally co-opted the talents of a generation of Palestinian literati. An extraordinarily large number of poets and novelists are represented among the top leadership. The late Kamal Nasir and Ghasan Kanafani were noted literary figures prior to their becoming involved in the Resistance. Among the current leadership, Walid Qamhawi of the PNF has written novels, as has the ALF's al-Khayyali and Hawatimah of the PDF. Journalists are also heavily represented. Mahmud Darwish himself was at one point the acting

director of the PLO's Research Center. Added to these literary figures were numbers of highly educated Palestinians.(74)

Therefore Palestinian media play a critical role on a number of different levels. On one hand they generate political leverage among Arab populations and leaders. Equally, they are deeply involved in Resistance nation-building strategies. Here they reinforce other elements of Resistance infrastructure. They link the organizational or behavioral structure of the Resistance movement with its ideological or belief system. In this sense, media transmit the "myths" of Palestinian nationalism and the definitions of self and situation embodied in Palestinian ideologies. And they provide a vehicle to spread Resistance political views to audiences outside of existing infrastructure capabilities. As late as October 1979, 'Arafat stressed the critical importance of Palestinian control over their own media sources:

> I would first like to draw attention to the fact that our information organs, more than any other, should hold themselves aloof from sources that are hostile to our struggle and determined to distort our words and moves. Unfortunately, I have noticed that some reports and comments in certain Arabic newspapers published only meters away from us sound as if they are from another world.(75)

ORGANIZATION AND GENERATIONS: THE RESISTANCE AS A BEHAVIORAL MODEL

Earlier it was suggested that social mobilization in the Arab world could be conceived as the politicization of a series of generations of young Arabs. In the context of the Palestine conflict, the Palestinians, as noted, have been able to project the image of themselves as the youthful saviors of the Arabs. Although hard data are lacking,(76) there is some indication that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Resistance itself became part of that politicization process. Impressionistic evidence of student support for the Palestinians throughout the Arab world, and extending to Turkey and Iran (the Palestinian connection is particularly evident in Iranian student politics) suggests that the Resistance has functioned as a behavioral model – in this case, a model of generational revolt.(77) Here the impact of such a model has been accentuated by the communications characteristics of the Arab world, and by the communications skills of the Palestinians themselves. Moreover, this notion of a younger generation taking over, and restoring lost values (a theme of Palestinian communications) is very much in the tradition of Arab politics. Witness, for example, the number of groups using the title "young" (meaning revolutionary or new, rather than merely youthful): Young Turks, Young Egyptians, Young Tunisians, the 'neo-Ba'th", the Dev Genc, and so on. While the long-term effects of the existence of the Resistance are not clear at this point, it would appear that it has become a factor in the politicization of Arab generations.

Since the Resistance is by its own definition an antiestablishment force, its destabilizing influence can be expected to continue and even ramify as long as there is no settlement and/or larger questions involving legitimacy and authority in the Arab world continue to be tied to a settlement. The point here, of course, is that not only is the Palestine conflict ramifying outward from its source; it is also taking on a temporal quality as well. To the extent that it becomes a phenomenon of intergenerational conflict, its long-term effects will be magnified.

Some ten years ago George Rentz and his associates made this assessment of the generational potential of the Resistance as an "event":

> The guerrilla mystique has taken hold of two key social groups in particular, the students and the intellectuals. In Lebanon, for example, university students have demonstrated in favor of the guerrillas, and Lebanese artists collaborate in producing guerrilla posters. The resistance leadership is well aware of its appeal to such groups and goes out of its way to exploit it. The special characteristics of the Palestinians and the concentration of numbers of them among the Arab intelligentsia have given them a certain advantage in molding popular opinion. But the progressive alienation, under the aegis of guerrilla propaganda, of the younger educated generation from existing regimes could have long-term consequences quite apart from the Palestinian issue.(78)

After a decade, these conclusions would seem to still be accurate.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CRISIS LINKAGE: ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

At the outset of this work the question was raised whether it was possible at all to bring the Palestinians (meaning the Resistance) into any meaningful peace negotiations. The material presented since then has demonstrated the complexity of this problem. Conflicts within the PLO structure, basically conflicts within the factions or cliques making up the Resistance elite, have not been solved. Nor has any organizationally structured and institutionalized mode of conflict management within this elite been successful so far. As long as elite differences could be submerged, as long as a Palestinian unit could be created on the basis of a response to outside (Israeli or Arab) threat, there was some elite cohesion. When, after the 1973 war, the issue of a possible peace (that is, a non-conflict situation) became a potentiality, this cohesion rapidly broke down. The fragility of this consensus was demonstrated again in June 1980: at the same time 'Arafat and PLO centrists were espousing a moderate line designed to win European (and hopefully U.S.) support for some sort of Palestinian entity, a Fatah

Congress meeting in Damascus declared its commitment to the destruction of Israel and the liberation of all of Palestine.(79) Even if a framework for elite conflict management could be institutionalized, (and there is some indication that 'Arafat is moving in the direction of centralizing PLO decision making),(80) there remains the problem of resocializing Palestinian masses away from a commitment to continuing armed struggle. After decades of continuous conflict, this may be extremely difficult. Parenthetically, Palestinian strategists appear to have considered the possibility that mass acceptance of such an ideological change might be difficult to achieve.(81)

In addition, as Ghassan Tuwayai pointed out, the millennial elements in Resistance ideology are difficult to reconcile with the pragmatism required for a successful negotiating strategy:

> Can Arafat go that far [recognize Israel] in both his "diplomacy in revolution", and his "democracy in revolution"? This is the question. Though today at the height of his glory, he will soon have to deliver results, or probably be overthrown. His option now is one of peace – a dangerous path for a revolutionary who is also leading a "foreign war" against an enemy whose only response to your offers of peace is increased violence and hatred. Whence the necessity for Arafat never to forget, while being very pragmatic, the purpose of political action.
>
> This "purpose", the ideal of the revolution and its ultimate objective, Arafat expressed at the U.N. in what we have termed earlier a "messianic" concept. Pragmatism, related to this concept, or purpose, becomes for the revolutionaries "gradualism". For the realists, it is a form of gradualism that may never have to reach its ultimate goal. Yet the ultimate goal has to remain there, be it as an alibi. An alibi for what, one would immediately ask? For violence? Certainly not. Violence carries its own logical justification with it. In this context, its logic would be one of despair as no other course is open before you when your enemy refuses to "meet with you except on the battlefield," always anxious to push you to escalate by retaliating with acts that are far more "terrorizing" than your own, far more cruel, and also far more effective. Nay, even more: there develops an objective alliance between violence and counterviolence, an alliance against the common enemy, moderation, as a path to peace.(82)

Moreover, there is an organizational-risk consideration here as well. Armed struggle functions to legimate Resistance leadership. Equally, it functions to give the Resistance organizational cohesion, unity versus an enemy, and ultimately it is a bargaining counter to extract Israeli concessions (or is at least so perceived by Resistance leadership). The upshot is that Resistance organizational dynamics per se will make it very difficult (although not necessarily impossible) for its leadership to

move from a conflict-oriented strategy to a conflict-resolution strategy. This difficulty, in both the long and short term, should not be underestimated, especially since factions or groups opposing such a shift can find Arab allies (along the lines of the Rejection Front). The same organizational dynamics will also operate to produce alternatively: (a) a process of maximizing organizational and political goals (intra-Resistance outbidding) or (b) a tendency to define goals in the vaguest possible terms, even if a bargaining strategy is chosen. Leadership choices of preferred end states (basically definitions of what sort of political solution is acceptable)(83) will therefore also be a function of organizational (or clique) politics.

> In practical terms again, Arafat has to race today against the "unholy alliance" of both extremisms: the Israeli and the Palestinian maximalists. Of this alliance, only war can be born, a war that will destroy even those who have started it, a war that has no better image, in terms of precedents, than that of Samson, the lone-tormented Samson of the Bible, pulling down the pillars of the temple on himself, and his enemies alike.(84)

To return to the propositions of conflict theory stated at the outset, not only is the conflict inherently unstructured, but one of the critical parties, the Palestinians, are still in the process of becoming defined. The organizational boundaries of the "Palestinian nation," whether structured by the PLO or some other entity, are still unclear. The definition of membership in the Palestinian national community is still a matter of some debate. And finally, the locus and legitimacy of Palestinian decision making is not yet settled. One conclusion along these lines was reached by Bruce Stanley:

> The inability of the PLO to control fragmentation and maintain a cohesive, goal-directed movement is a result of its inability to forge bonds directly to the members. Thus, legitimacy is constantly in question, the tools necessary to produce and maintain a movement are denied it, and energy that could be focused on goal attainment is expended in maintaining a fragile structure. The departure of individuals from such a movement has not been difficult. Unable to forge the tools necessary to increase the costs of fragmentation, faced with incessant, unpredictable crisis, the Palestinian movement has hindered its own attempts at goal attainment. Internal dynamics have forestalled many options the movement might have attempted. Until bonds can be developed that bypass the group level, there will be little outward focus that is not inhibited by internal problems of legitimacy.(85)

END STATES: FORMULAS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Since the 1948 war, a number of formulas for resolving the Palestine question have been put forth by various parties.(86) Prior to the 1967 war, most if not all of these involved some form of resettlement, repatriation, or both. None of these really had any chance, because the conflict strategies of core Arab states (combined with the Israeli strategy of massive retaliation) created a situation earlier characterized as a "prisoner's dilemma." It was only after the June war that surrounding Arab states acquired an interest in finding some formula for achieving an Israeli withdrawal. And this formula was, in turn, bounded by the terms of UN Resolution 242, basically a carefully (and somewhat ambiguously) worded document which (because of the difficulty of getting a cease-fire) called for:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

These terms were incorporated into UN Resolution 338, the cease-fire resolution which followed the 1973 war.(87)

One problem with UN Resolutions 242 and 338 is that they are frameworks designed around relations between the Israelis and regular Arab states. They assume a basic and pragmatic rationality on the part of parties to any agreement (a basic assumption of most theories of bargaining as conflict resolution). As such, they did not take into account either the structure or the psychology of protracted conflict. Nor did they take into account Palestinian nationalism: any settlement now couched in terms of compensation or resettlement is politically unacceptable to the Palestinians. Equally, it may be added, any settlement which departed from the Resolutions 242 and 338 formula was (and is) unacceptable to the Israelis for the obvious reason that the creation of yet another potentially hostile entity dramatically increases Israel's security problems.(88)

Not unsurprisingly, Palestinian reaction to this was to state nationalist goals in the maximum possible terms (as already indicated, Resistance organizational dynamics would have predisposed Resistance leaders toward this option anyway). The result was the formulation of the goal of the "democratic, secular state" in Palestine,(89) a concept that (Israeli analysts were quick to point out) would mean the end of Israel.(90) However, there were still intra-Resistance discussions of alternative goals as early as 1970, and possibly before. But given the overwhelming problems of engendering any kind of concensus, and the

additional problem of military unity, these discussions were not pursued.

After the 1973 War, as noted, the situation became such that the Resistance was required to redefine its goals: The first such redefinition, the PNC vote (after bitter debate) to accept the creation of a "Palestinian Entity" split the Resistance.(91) After the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, this "entity" (sometimes also referred to as a "national authority," but not as a "government in exile") was increasingly replaced by terminology using the term "Palestininan state."(92) And indeed, there have been increasing rumors that the PLO has formulated a plan for a Palestinian state.(93) (An article in Foreign Affairs by Walid Khalidi is said to contain these proposals.(94) However, at this point the process of redefining organizational goals is still fluid and incomplete.(95)

ORGANIZATION: POWER, THEORY AND CULTURE

If events in Palestine demonstrate anything, they demonstrate the ability of a small but well-organized community to defeat a much larger but disorganized community. Where Yishuv leadership was able to concentrate and apply force in a coherent and rational manner, Palestinian leadership was seemingly incapable of formulating or executing any strategy other than a series of negative demands backed up by incoherent violence. Nor were the intervening Arab forces in 1948 of any help: these were disorganized and uncoordinated, and managed to completely misuse what should have been an overwhelming advantage in arms and manpower.

This organizational superiority proved decisive for the Israelis in 1948, and it has proven equally so in every Arab-Israeli war since then, with the exception of 1973. Prior to the October 1973 war, an Israeli military doctrine which stressed superb organization, detailed planning, and great tactical flexibility was confronted by Arab forces lacking in all but the most rudimentary organizational capability. It was not until Egyptian and Syrian analysts fashioned a military and political strategy consistent with their respective organizational capabilities that the Israelis were faced with any comparably organized opponent. Even here, Arab forces broke down when their new-found organizational format and behavior was faced with situations which were not "programmed" in advance.

The theme of Israeli military superiority which runs through Arab-Israeli relations has much more than a military dimension. It is also symptomatic of a larger collision of organizational principles, of an extended cultural contact between the Arab world and the West, a contact which, in turn, has generated a process of change within the Arab world. The process was originally imposed by Westerners on Arab leaderships and populations, but has now become the subject of very sophisticated and intense analysis by Arab intellectuals. Military organization in the Middle East was and is a response to Western

military threats. But the Arab (and Turkish) response has usually lagged behind technological developments in the West. Hence indigenous Middle Eastern armies have generally found themselves technologically outclassed. This historical tendency has been turned into a strategic dictim by Israeli military planners who now stress the acquisition and use of extremely accurate and devastating weapons with which to counter Arab strategies designed to utilize an overwhelming numerical advance in men and weaponry.

However, while technology was the basic problem for Middle Eastern reformers, it was intertwined with that of organization. Western technology subsumes both an organizational capability in terms of structure and an organizational culture in terms of the institutionalized values necessary to the effective behavior within an organization. In this context, Arab strategies for modernization can be seen as attempts to utilize Western organizational theory, to adapt it to existing social and cultural patterns.

Organization theory in the West states a series of propositions concerning formalized sets of roles or positions, definitions of the scope and relationship of power and authority attached to these roles, and patterns of symbols and motivational values. A formal organization in the Western sense, then, is at once a structure of precisely defined relationships and a culture whose behavioral values reinforce this structure. The classic definition of this type of organization is Max Weber's. Structurally speaking, an organization is characterized as follows:

> There is the principle of fixed and official jursidictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules. . . . The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties. . . . The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means . . . which may be placed at the disposal of these officials.(96)

In addition, there is an organizational culture which stresses rationality and discipline: "The content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order.(97)

This formal or bureaucratic organization, with its emphasis on rationality and its concomitant destructive impact on preexisting nonformal, nonrational social patterns, has come to dominate Western society. This impact, in turn, has generated an enormous outpouring of literature in the West; a literature one of whose major themes has been the preoccupation with the consequences of this dominance.(98) In turn, Western notions of change and modernization have been based on the contrast, explicit or implicit, between bureaucratized and non-bureaucratized societies, between "rational" and "traditional" or

nonrational behavior.(99) And as an extension of these notions,(100) Western strategies for conflict management have also assumed that conflict is best handled by structuring it in terms of bureaucratic categories.(101)

In the Arab world, however, this is not the case. Peculiarly Western notions of rationality and organization embodied in Western theories of conflict resolution are neither the only nor the predominantly accepted modes of thought and action. Indeed, their acceptance has been grudging because they are perceived as being in conflict with other, more important values (a theme which is found in the trend toward "humanism" in the West). Acceptance, therefore, involves a balancing of values: military effectiveness, on one hand, versus retention of traditional Arab and Islamic patterns on the other. And the balance that seems to be emerging is one frought with tension and conflict: the very fact that a balance has had to be structured (or is perceived so by Arab and Palestinian leadership) has in turn produced still further dislocation in Arab Muslim society, dislocations currently finding a religious expression as the "Islamic revival."

For the Resistance this problem of cultural borrowing is even more difficult. In a sense, the Resistance itself is a complex acculturation phenomenon. Resistance ideologies, for example, articulate a series of conflicting themes, themes defining both the problems and the solutions to questions of Palestinian identity and authority. On one hand, Palestinian ideologues start with a conception of the Palestinian situation which is very Islamic: the ghurbah as a sort of Palestinian state of nature. But from there, the answers supplied diverge in terms of the amount of cultural borrowing utilized by their proponents. Fatah, for example, uses the least foreign material here, drawing its inspiration from Fanon, a combination of themes from French psychiatry and Algerian culture. The organizational extension is that of an organization in which solidarity is based on traditional notions of honor and vengeance, coupled with some very Western ideas about the necessity of psychological catharsis. The fronts utilize more direct organizational extensions of clan or clique patterns of organization. These conceive and organize themselves as small, elect groups bound together with a tightly knit solidarity, groups which are in effect the ultimate vehicles for terrorist activities.

Resistance organizational patterns that have so far emerged are not totally the product of ideological conceptions of the Palestinian environment; they are also extensions of earlier organizations. These genealogical ties have interacted with ideologies to produce the matrix or organizational matrices that have been used and the pattern of cross-organizational linkages that characterize the Resistance. And in a more historical sense, these genealogies relate present-day Resistance organizations to much more fundamental Arab and Islamic (Sunni and Shi'a) notions of organization. And also in a genealogical sense, these emergent patterns typify in microcosm the larger issues of organizational and behavioral modification in the Arab world.

Appendices 1-17

APPENDIX 1

al-'ASIFAH COMMUNIQUE NO. 1

6 January 1965

From among our steadfast people, waiting at the borders, our revolutionary vanguard has issued forth, in the belief that armed revolution is our only path to Palestine and freedom. Let the imperialists and Zionists know that the people of Palestine are still in the field of battle and shall never be swept away.

Our enemies have forgotten our strength and our history of revolutions. We are determined to resort to armed conflict whatever the obstacles, until all conspiracies are foiled. The Zionists have planned to stay long in our country by executing diversion and reconstruction projects aimed at increasing their potential for aggression and forcing the Arab world to accept the fait accompli.

Because of all these threats and since time is running out, our revolutionary vanguard had to move fast in order to paralyze the enemy's plans and projects. In this task, we rely upon our own strength and on the capabilities of the people of Palestine.

We hereby declare to the whole world that we are bound indissolubly to the soil of our homeland. Our moving force is our own faith that this is the only means which can reactivate our problem which has been dormant for so long. But we must also inform the world that we are bound, by our destiny and struggle, to the Arab nation which will help us both materially and morally.

We appeal to the Arabs of Palestine, to our single Arab nation and to lovers of freedom everywhere to aid the fighting men of al-'Asifah in their heroic struggle. We pledge ourselves to fight until Palestine is liberated and resumes its place in the very heart of the Arab world. Long live the Arab nation. Long live our Arab Palestine.

al-Ra'y al-'Amm, 7 January 1965

APPENDIX 2

PALESTINIAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY (PRCS)

The aims and objectives of the PRCS as spelled out by its Information Committee are:

(1) To embody the Palestinian entity and to confirm the existence of the Palestinian personality in connection with health, social, and cultural affairs of the Palestinians, on both the local and international levels.

(2) To provide medical and first-aid care for the Palestinian freedom fighter, by establishing first-aid and medical centers and hospitals and by procuring well-equipped ambulances.

(3) To ensure proper treatment for the Palestinians wounded, imprisoned, arrested, or captured by Israeli occupying authorities in occupied Palestine. The PRCS tries to achieve this through compiling information on the kinds of treatment and torture Israel uses against such Palestinians which violate the Geneva Convention and the Declaration of Human Rights, conveying this information to the International Red Cross, the international organizations, the United Nations, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, who in their turn should do what they can to ensure the required proper treatment of the Palestinian prisoners.

(4) To provide, through the International Red Cross, material, medical, and social assistance for Palestinians in occupied Palestine. Through the same channels the PRCS shall try to deliver letters to them and to reunite separated families.

(5) To adopt [sic] the health, social, and cultural affairs of the Palestinian refugees through the following means:

(a) Setting up medical centers in the refugee camps, to offer the refugees free medical treatment and health education.

(b) Establishing social centers that teach them how to retain their dignity through cooperation and mutual help, help them make better and more fruitful use of their time through employing them in handicrafts such as embroidery, weaving, knitting, and sewing. Their production is to be sold in charity bazaars and exhibitions, and the funds are to be distributed among the needy.

(c) Setting up cultural centers to help the refugee youth enlighten their minds and widen their cultural scope through readings, discussions, and seminars. These cultural centers are also to be used for eliminating illiteracy and for moral enlightenment.

(d) Establishing sports centers to help the youth develop their physical and spiritual health and to teach them order and cooperation.

(6) To hold first-aid and nursing courses to train the largest number of Palestinians in nursing and first-aid work.

(7) To give Palestinians in the Arab world and abroad the opportunity to extend effective help to their brother refugees.

(8) To receive international assistance to the Palestinian refugees and distribute it among them, and to see to it that the responsible organizations do try to improve the refugees' life conditions.

(9) As an expression of its sincere desire to alleviate human suffering, the PRCS intends to have an active share in lessening the painful effects of local and international tragedies and crises.

Fatah, vol. 2, no. 4 (6 February 1970), pp. 8-9.

APPENDIX 3

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT

The Palestine National Council at its session in Cairo from July 10 to 17 undertook to have the following revised version of the Palestinian National Covenant prepared.

Art. 1): Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian people and an integral part of the great homeland, and the people of Palestine are a part of the Arab nation.

Art. 2): Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British Mandate is an integral regional unit.

Art. 3): The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and when the liberation of its homeland is completed it will exercise self-determination solely according to its own will and choice.

Art. 4): The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent characteristic that does not disappear, and it is transferred from fathers to sons. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the disasters which came over it do not deprive it of its Palestinian personality and affiliation and do not nullify them.

Art. 5): The Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled from there or remained. Whoever is born to a Palestinian Arab father after this date, within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian.

Art. 6): Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Art. 7): The Palestinian affiliation and the material, spiritual, and historical ties with Palestine are permanent realities. The upbringing of the Palestinian individual in an Arab and revolutionary fashion, the undertaking of all means of forging consciousness and training the Palestinian, in order to acquaint him profoundly with his homeland, spiritually and materially, and preparing him for the conflict and the armed struggle, as well as for the sacrifice of his property and his life to restore his homeland, until the liberation – all this is a national duty.

Art. 8): The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of the national struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Therefore, the contradictions among the Palestine national forces are of a secondary order which must be suspended in the interest of the fundamental contradiction between Zionism and colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis, the Palestinian masses, whether in the homeland or in places of exile, organizations and individuals, comprise one national front which acts to restore Palestine and liberate it through armed struggle.

Art. 9): Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore strategy and not tactics. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march forward toward the armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and return to it, to maintain its right to a natural life in it, and to exercise its right of self-determination in it and sovereignty over it.

Art. 10): Guerrilla action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of liberation. This demands its promotion, extension, and protection, and the mobilization of all the mass and scientific capabilities of the Palestinians, their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian Revolution, and cohesion in that national struggle among the various groups of the people of Palestine, and between them and the Arab masses, to guarantee the continuation of the revolution, its advancement and victory.

Art. 11): The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (wataniyah) unity, national (qawmiyah) mobilization, and liberation.

Art. 12): The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. In order to fulfill its role in realizing this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness of its existence, and resist any plan that tends to disintegrate or weaken it.

Art. 13): Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary aims. Each one paves the way for realization of the other. Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity. Working for both goes hand in hand.

Art. 14): The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine issue. The endeavor and effort of the Arab nation to liberate Palestine follows from this connection. The people of Palestine assumes its vanguard role in realizing this sacred national aim.

Art. 15): The liberation of Palestine from an Arab viewpoint is a national duty to repulse the Zionist, imperialist invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine. Its full responsibilities fall upon the Arab nation, peoples, and governments, with the Palestine Arab people at their head.

For this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human material, and spiritual capacities to participate actively with the people of Palestine in the liberation of Palestine. They must, especially in the present stage of armed Palestinian revolution, grant and offer the people of Palestine all possible help and every material and human support, and afford it every sure means and opportunity enabling it to continue to assume its vanguard role in pursuing its armed revolution until the liberation of its homeland.

Art. 16): The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual viewpoint, will prepare an atmosphere of tranquility and peace for the Holy Land, in the shade of which all the Holy Places will be safeguarded, and freedom of worship and visitation to all will be guaranteed, without distinction or discrimination of race, color, language or religion. For this reason, the people of Palestine look to the support of all the spiritual forces in the world.

Art. 17): The liberation of Palestine, from a human viewpoint, will restore to the Palestinian man his dignity, glory, and freedom. For this, the Palestinian Arab people looks to the support of those in the world who believe in the dignity and freedom of man.

Art. 18): The liberation of Palestine, from an international viewpoint, is a defensive act necessitated by the requirements of self-defense. For this reason, the people of Palestine, desiring to befriend all peoples, looks to the support of the states which love freedom, justice, and peace in restoring the legal situation to Palestine, establishing security and peace in its territory, and enabling its people to exercise national (wataniyah) sovereignty and national (qawmiyah) freedom.

Art. 19): The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are fundamentally null and void, whatever time has elapsed, because this was contrary to the wish of the people of Palestine and its natural right to its homeland, and it contradicts the principles embodied in the charter of the United Nations, the first of which is the right of self-determination.

Art. 20): The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Document, and what has been based upon them are considered null and void. The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jew and Palestine does not tally with historical realities nor with the constituents of statehood in their true sense. Judaism, in its character as a religion of revelation, is not a nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews are not one people with an independent personality. They are rather citizens of the states to which they belong.

Art. 21): The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine, and rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestine issue or its internationalization.

Art. 22): Zionism is a political movement organically related to world imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatical movement in its formation; aggressive, expansionist and colonialist in its aims; and Fascist and Nazi in its means. Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for world imperialism. It is a concentration and jumping-off point for imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress.

Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world. Since the liberation of Palestine will liquidate the Zionist and imperialist presence and bring about the stabilization of peace in the Middle East, the people of Palestine looks to the support of all liberal men of the world and all the forces of good, progress, and peace; and implores all of them, regardless of their different learnings and orientations, to offer all help and support to the people of Palestine in its just and legal struggle to liberate its homeland.

Art. 23): The demands of security and peace and the requirements of truth and justice oblige all states that preserve friendly relations among people and maintain the loyalty of citizens to their homelands to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity.

Art. 24): The Palestinian Arab people believes in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and the right of peoples to exercise them.

Art. 25): To realize the aims of this covenant and its principles the Palestine Liberation Organization will undertake its full role in liberating Palestine.

Art. 26): The Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in its struggle to restore its homeland, liberate it, return to it, and exercise the right of self-determination in it. This responsibility extends to all military, political, and financial matters, and all else that the Palestine issue requires in the Arab and international spheres.

Art. 27): The Palestine Liberation Organization will cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its capacities, and will maintain neutrality in their mutual relations in the light of, and on the basis of, the requirements of the battle of liberation, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Art. 28): The Palestinian Arab people insists upon the originality and independence of its national revolution and rejects every manner of interference, guardianship, and subordination.

Art. 29): The Palestinian Arab People possesses the prior and original right in liberating and restoring its homeland and will define its position with reference to all states and powers on the basis of their positions with reference to the issue of Palestine and the extent of their support for the Palestinian Arab people in its revolution to realize its aims.

Art. 30): The fighters and bearers of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army, which will be the protecting arm of the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Art. 31): This organization shall have a flag, oath, and anthem, all of which will be determined in accordance with a special system.

Art. 32): To this covenant is attached a law known as the fundamental law of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in

which is determined the manner of the organization's formation, its committees, institutions, the special functions of every one of them, and all the requisite duties associated with them in accordance with this covenant.

Art. 33): This covenant cannot be amended except by a two-third majority of all the members of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization in a special session called for this purpose.

The New Middle East, no. 18 (March 1970) pp. 48-49(1)

(1) A somewhat different English translation is given in The Arab World Weekly, 22 March 1969, pp. i-v.

APPENDIX 4

UNITY FORMULA

6 May 1970

A. All resistance movement groups regard the Palestine Liberation Organization as the broad framework for national unity.

B. Matters agreed upon commit (all groups) collectively while matters still in suspense are left for each group to deal with as it deems fit. Matters related to the security of the revolution commit the groups collectively.

C. All groups shall participate in the forthcoming Palestinian National Council and the institutions emanating from the Palestine Liberation Organization. The question of the percentage representation of each of the organizations in the National Council shall not become a point of issue among the commando organizations.

D. By a National Council decree, a Central Committee shall be formed, with the participation of all resistance groups, to assume its leadership role in the resistance movement. The Central Committee emanating from the National Council shall replace the current Unified Command. The Central Committee shall comprise the Executive Committee of the PLO, representatives of the commando organizations, the head of the Palestinian National Council, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Army, and a number of independents.

   The Palestinian Resistance Movement, represented by the Unified Command and following long discussions, agreed that the points listed here below represent, together with the Palestinian National Covenant and National Council resolution, the broad framework for joint political and military action:

   1. The working, toiling, and all other forces of the Palestinian and Arab masses that have an interest in the stage of national liberation and in the complete liberation of the Palestinian homeland constitute the forces of the Palestinian revolution.
   2. The Palestinian struggle springs from the faith in the unity of the people on the Palestinian-Jordanian terrain as well as from the faith in that the people of Palestine are part of the Arab nation and that the land of Palestine is part of the Arab land.
   3. The Palestinian revolution is an integral part of the contemporary Arab revolutionary movement and an integral part of the world national liberation movement against world imperialism and Zionism.
   4. The enemies of Palestinian national liberation are represented by Zionism, Israel, imperialism, and all lackey forces that are, dialectically or self-regardingly, linked to imperialism and colonialism.
   5. The objective of the Palestinian struggle is the liberation of the whole of Palestine to establish a community in which all citizens

will coexist with equal rights and obligations within the context of the Arab nation's aspirations for unity and progress.

6. Popular revolutionary war is the main path to the liberation of Palestine.
7. The people of Palestine and their national liberation movement struggle for all-out liberation and reject all peaceful, stifling, and submissive solutions; all reactionary and colonialist conspiracies to establish a Palestinian state on parts of Palestinian territory; and the stifling United Nations resolution of 22 November 1967.
8. The Palestinian revolution considers Arab land surrounding Israel as legitimate ground for Palestinian struggle and any attempt to close down any Arab country to the Palestinian resistance would be tantamount to treason to the objectives of the people of Palestine and the Arab nation in liberating Palestine.
9. The Palestinian revolution declares its complete independence from all Arab regimes and rejects all attempts to circumscribe it, tutor it, contain it, or subordinate it.
10. All resistance groups consent to the formation of a unified military committee to develop armed struggle and move into a new stage of commando action and popular liberation warfare.
11. To arm the masses of our Palestinian and Arab people in the Arab countries bordering occupied Palestine, to protect the resistance from attempts to crack down on it and liquidate it, and to participate effectively in confronting any Zionist/imperialist invasion of the Arab territories bordering Palestine.
12. Israel, by virtue of its structure, represents an exclusivist, racist society tied to imperialism. As such, the limited progressive forces within it cannot effect any basic change in its Zionist, racist, and imperialist structure. This is why the aim of the Palestinian revolution is to dismantle this entity with its political, military, social, syndical, and cultural institutions and to liberate all of Palestine.

The unity formula was signed by the following organizations:

PLO Executive Committee
Fatah
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Democratic Front
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command
Palestine Arab Organization
al-Sa'iqah
Arab Liberation Front
Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Struggle Front

Fatah, vol. 2, no. 9 (29 May 1970), p. 4.

APPENDIX 5

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION BUDGET

The Palestine National Fund submitted a financial report to the seventh session of the Palestine National Council held from May 30 to June 4, 1970. Some details of the budget of the Palestine Liberaiton Organization, including the Palestine Liberation Army, have been released.(1)

Expenses for the period from July 1, 1969 to March 31, 1970 are given as follows (in Jordanian dinars, with one dinar equalling $2.80):

Departments	
Palestine National Council	5,643
Executive Committee	38,534
Administrative Affairs	9,280
Military Affairs	55,394
Popular Organization	32,180
Information, National Guidance	10,663
Political Affairs	5,460
Palestine National Fund	9,207
Occupied Homeland Affairs	35,017
Total	201,378
Institutions	
Research Center	28,779
Planning Center	10,106
Voice of Palestine Radio	22,002
Total	60,887
Armed Forces	
General Command	259,212
Hittin Forces(2)	275,542
al-Qadisiyah Forces(2)	13,159
Popular Liberation Forces(2)	498,760
Palestine Armed Struggle Command	28,742
Total	1,075,415
PLO Offices	
Beirut	9,026
Damascus	5,351
Cairo	8,891
Amman	4,815
Libya	2,933
Kuwayt	7,366

Baghdad	5,578
Algeria	2,952
Khartum	1,600
Dohah, Qatar	1,774
Rabat	2,223
New York	10,849
Peking	3,380
Total	66,738

Commitments to the PLO by members of the Arab League are given as follows (in pounds sterling):(3)

Jordan	38,600
Tunisia	93,400
Algeria	120,000
Sudan	82,200
Iraq	240,000
Saudi Arabia	249,400
Syria	80,000
Egypt	474,600
Yemen Arab Republic	10,000
Kuwayt	310,000
Lebanon	77,000
Libya	84,800
Morocco	140,000
Total	2,000,000

(1) al-Ahram (Cairo) 2 June 1970, p. 9; an-Nahar Arab Report, I, 16 (22 June 1970), pp. 2-3; The Arab World (Beirut) 3 June 1970, pp. 11-12.

(2) Hittin and al-Qadisiyah are two of the three main units in the PLA. For some reason the third unit, 'Ayn Jalut, is not listed. The Popular Liberation Forces are the PLA's guerrilla auxiliary.

(3) The figures given here are apparently those fixed a year or two after formation of the PLO, and include commitments for both the PLO and the PLA.

Southern Yemen, which joined the League three years after the formation of the PLO and is already burdened with severe economic problems, has not, it seems, been required to shoulder a commitment.

The PNF report noted that some Arab states, unnamed in the public releases, have never contributed to the PLO. In the 1966-1967 fiscal year only Libya and Lebanon honored their commitments; for the following year Libya alone paid its share; and for the fiscal years 1968-1969 and 1969-1970 none of the Arab states paid anything. In June 1970 the Arab states were said to be in arrears to the tune of £ St. 12,896,065, of which £ 4,157,265 was due to the PLO and £ St. 8,738,800 was due to the PLA. The report went on to say, however, that Kuwayt

and Libya had promised to pay their commitments to the PLO and PLA in full; that the UAR had undertaken to increase the number of the PLA contingents; that Iraq had agreed to make up its arrears and to provide 20,000 Iraqi dinars (one dinar equaling $2.80) a month for the PLA contingents in Jordan; and that Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Lebanon would consider meeting their commitments. Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen Arab Republic had not given definite responses when the PNF report was prepared.

APPENDIX 6

POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

March 1971

Since the vanguards of our struggling people undertook at the outset of 1965 to launch the armed revolution against the Zionist political entity maintained by the force of aggression over the land of Palestine, they believed, along with the large Arab masses and all the free people of the world behind them, that armed struggle is the only, indelible way to liberate the whole of the Palestinian land.

Today, the Palestinian Revolution goes through a critical and dangerous stage of its struggle in confronting a ferocious extermination attempt in which what took place in Jordan in the course of the September massacre coincides with what takes place within the occupied territory in terms of oppression and genocide.

This wicked conspiracy is aimed this time at liquidating the Palestinian Revolution and the national movement in Jordan. This time, it was also directed against the revolutionary spirit and the overall Palestinian national cause. Thus, both world imperialism and world zionism on the one hand and the Zionist settler-state and the counter-revolutionary forces in the Arab World on the other agreed that it was time to launch this ferocious, liquidation assault to circumscribe the dangers involved in escalation of the Palestinian Revolution and its spreading throughout the Arab nation, bulldozing thereby the interests of the enemies – something which would inevitably destroy their common interests in this part of the world.

Moreover, explosion of the situation in Indochina and the continued progress of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia coupled with added victories scored by the Vietnamese revolution have prompted U.S. circles to look out for all possible means for pacifying the area on the basis of consolidating the military victory achieved by the enemy in 1967.

Thus the Palestinian Revolution was not confronting any more the repression, derangement and deceit on the imperialist/Zionist front only, but it was also confronting these same challenges all along the front of counter-revolutionary forces in the Arab nation, i.e., the forces which took it upon themselves to rip the Palestinian Revolution from within by exhausting it through internal strife and side battles.

In the face of such new and dangerous conditions, the Palestinian Revolution agreed in all factions and forces to declare its transitional Political Program under the principles listed below – hoping that this program would answer the pertinent questions of the current phase and pledging to use it as a plan of action for escalating the Revolution, increasing its organized forces and rallying greater Palestinian and Arab mass support.

On the Palestinian Level

1 – The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the masses of the Palestinian Arab people in all their struggling and political organizations and in all their association, unions and societies – regardless of their inclinations and ideas but as long as they are fully committed to the tenants of the Palestinian Charter, the decisions of the legislative and executive organs of the PLO, the political and military programs, and the internal by-laws of the PLO and as long as they are committed also to struggle for the complete liberation of the whole of Palestine and the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland. It is not permissible to exclude any individual or group from PLO membership, except in cases affecting the security of the Revolution or involving a violation of the National Charter principles – and this upon a decision by the PLO Executive Committee or the Palestinian National Council in case it were in session.

2 – While reiterating that the basic and central aim of the Palestinian Revolution is to liberate completely the whole of the Palestinian homeland, the transitional aim is to protect the revolution from its enemies and to escalate it in preparation for the achievement of its basic aim by mobilizing the Palestinian masses revolutionarily, politically, militarily and psychologically and by making them all participate in the liberation war, in escalation of the armed struggle against the enemy and in the unification of all Palestinian masses within and outside the occupied homeland for that purpose.

The Nature of the Palestinian Revolution

1 – The Palestinian Revolution is a national liberation movement. As such it conforms in its strategy and tactics with the rest of the national liberation movements, the Socialist countries and the revolutionary and democratic forces in the world in the sense that it is the movement of all masses struggling against foreign occupation, believing in the inevitability of liberation and prepared to join in the struggle for its achievement. This means that the Palestinian people, in all their national causes and factions in all their organizations and groups, and regardless of their ideologies and principles, are called upon to join as one body their armed national revolution.

2 – The Palestinian Revolution represents the movement of progress in the Palestinian Arab society on the following bases:

a – On the basis that it struggles against a racist, settler-type of occupation which is part of the dark forces in the world which obstruct the course of history.

b – On the basis that it struggles against world imperialism led by the U.S.A., the protector of Zionist occupation which has alienated the rights and frustrated the hopes of our people.

c – On the basis that it intends to build the Palestinian Arab society where the principles of democracy, peace, justice, freedom and

equality would prevail; where all principles and faiths would be respected; where all rights and freedoms would be safeguarded; and where all types of feudal exploitation, and racial and religious discrimination would be done away with.

The Forms of Struggle

The armed struggle undertaken by the revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people at the outset of 1965 (meaning the guerrilla war escalating to a comprehensive popular war of liberation) is the principal form of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Joint action by regular troops and commando forces in the armed struggle is more liable to realize the victorious popular revolution. All other forms of struggle should be parallel to the armed struggle.

The Only Solution to the Palestine Cause

The only solution to the Palestine cause is the liberation of the whole of Palestine through armed struggle. Thus, the liquidation solution and/or any other solution which could encroach on the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people over the whole of their homeland are rejected. The Palestinian Revolution declares at this point its unequivocal commitment to the following:

a – Relentless struggle against all attempts, efforts, plots and forces which aim at interrupting, obstructing or deviating the revolution from its course and against all liquidation plans regardless of the form they take. This necessitates development of the Palestinian Revolution and an increase in its efficiency in all fields.

b – Strong opposition to the proponents of the puppet Palestinian state over part of the Palestinian soil on the ground that efforts to set up such a puppet state are part and parcel of the attempt to liquidate the Palestine cause.

c – Taking all necessary and determined steps to protect the course of the Palestinian Revolution and the right of the national Palestinian presence to cooperate closely and jointly with the Jordanian national movement and the Arab national movements.

The Democratic Palestinian State

The Palestinian armed struggle is neither a racial nor a sectarian struggle against the Jews. That's why the future state in the Palestine liberated from Zionist colonialism will be the democratic Palestinian state, where those wishing to live peacefully in it would enjoy equal rights and obligations within the framework of the aspirations of the Arab nation to national liberation and complete unity, with emphasis on the unity of the people on both banks of the River Jordan.

Work on the Jordan Level

What links Jordan to Palestine are national ties and a national unity moulded by history, culture and language since time immemorial. The creation of a political entity in East Jordan and another in Palestine is not founded on any legitimacy or on any acceptable premise. It rather falls in the realm of the operation of fragmentation used by colonialism to rip the unity of our Arab nation and people in the wake of the First World War.

But this fragmentation did not prevent the masses on the western and eastern banks from feeling that they are the masses of the same people and from remaining united against the imperialist/Zionist conspiracy.

The Palestine Revolution which brandished the slogan of the liberation of Palestine did not intend to differentiate between the eastern bank and the western bank of the River (Jordan). Nor did it believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people could be disassociated from the struggle of the masses in Jordan. Taking into consideration specific requirements at a phase in history, it concentrated on directing all forces toward Palestine in order to focus its cause on the Palestinian, Arab and international levels.

Our concern about the unity of the Palestinian/Jordanian masses and our knowledge of the role which it could play in escalating the liberation struggle reiterate our faith in the following:

a – This regional unity must be reflected in a united struggle taking the form of a national Jordanian front which would have among its basic tasks the establishment of a national regime in Jordan that would participate in the liberation of Palestine and would support the fighting Palestinian forces with all its means. This in turn is part of the struggle of the Arab nation for liberation and unity.

b – The unity of Palestine and East Jordan is a national unity and we are asked to protect it and strengthen it by foiling all attempts to weaken it or dismantle it.

Project for National Unity of the Palestinian Revolution Forces

General principles:

National unity would be based on the following organization principles:

1 – The PLO is the framework grouping all the Palestinian revolutionary forces for the sake of an armed revolution which would liberate the whole of the Palestinian land. This organization has a Charter governing its path, specifying its objectives and organizing its work. It also has a National Council and a leadership selected by the National Council which serves as the highest executive authority of the PLO as is stipulated in the bylaws. This leadership would undertake to lay down a unified general plan for Palestinian endeavor in all fields. This would

be implemented through the PLO institutions grouping all tools of the revolution.

2 – All commando organizations, fighting forces, union, and national leaders shall participate in the national unity on condition that they abide fully by the Palestinian National Charter and the decisions of the national assemblies.

3 – The merger of commando organizations having identical ideologies or political thought in one organization is a national necessity. Until this takes place, it is the right of each organization to safeguard its organizational existence provided it disbands all other institutions and merges them in the PLO. Within both the legislative and the higher executive institutions of the PLO, the principles of democratic centralization, collective leadership, and commitment of the minority to decisions taken by majority vote shall prevail.

It remains the right of every organization or group to reconsider its view through the legislative and executive institutions provided they remain committed meanwhile to the decisions taken. Each organization retains the right to criticize within its cadres the decisions taken by the legislative and executive institutions. With regards national action on the Jordanian scene, it shall be governed by the program of the Jordanian national front.

4 – The National Council shall lay down a transitory political, military, informational and financial strategy binding for everybody.

5 – A leadership shall be formed to assume the responsibility of leading the Palestinian struggle in all its aspects and spheres.

6 – Absolute adherence to the decisions of the command are a basic condition for the unity of the march. The leadership undertakes to implement its decisions and those of the national assemblies. It shall also handle cases of non-compliance and lack of discipline in the light of what it deems the higher interest of the revolution to be.

The Organizational Structure

The PLO shall have the following organization structure:

1 – A National Council
2 – A Central Committee
3 – A Political Bureau
4 – The Institutions, departments and offices
5 – A military leadership for the Palestinian Revolution
6 – The Palestinian National Fund

1 – The National Council

A – The National Council shall be formed of 150 members.

B – The National Council shall convene once a year, taking into consideration the front-like relationships in national unity. The members shall be selected from among:

a. Representatives of the fighting forces.

b. Representatives of the unions, vocational unions and mass organizations.

c. Intellectuals and experts committed to the revolution.

d. Geographic representation shall be taken into account as much as possible.

And all of this on condition of commitment to the Palestinian National Charter.

C – The life-span of the said National Council shall be three years, starting from the date of its first meeting.

D – The Central Committee together with the Speaker of the National Council, the army chief and whoever they deem fit, will select the members of the new National Council provided that it shall convene at a date not later than June 30, 1971.

2 – The Central Committee

3 – The Political Bureau

4 – The General Command of the Revolution's forces: The Palestinian Revolution has three principal fighting forces: 1. The regular forces. 2. The commando forces. 3. The forces of the popular militia.

The functions of the Command shall be: 1. To lead military action. 2. To lay down the necessary military plans for the revolution's forces. 3. To escalate military action within the laid down program and plans. 4. To reorganize the forces of the revolution on the basis of unity in organization, training, arming and operation. 5. To develop the fighting units and their potentials so as to conform with the nature of the revolutionary struggle in every phase. 6. To lay down one budget for these forces which shall be approved by the National Council. 7. To issue military communiques. 8. To appoint the political leadership of the general command of the revolution's forces. 9. These forces shall have a commander in chief and a chief of staff who shall be appointed by the political leadership.

5 – The National Fund:

The Palestinian National Fund shall be the fund of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Revolution. The Palestinian Revolution's finances shall be unified in both income and expenditures. The financial bylaws shall be amended to conform with the revolutionary nature of the struggle. Expenses of the fights of the various organizations shall be borne by the Unified Popular Fund-Raising. The deficit shall be borne by the National Fund.

6 – The Institution's departments and offices:

In order to fulfill its functions and objectives, the Political Bureau shall set up the following institutions and departments: 1. The Political and Information departments. 2. The Secretariat and Administration. 3. The Military Department. 4. The Organization and Mobilization Department. 5. The Regional (local) Committees. 6. The PLO leadership in order to fulfill its functions and objectives, shall set up all other necessary institutions and departments. The prerogatives, specialties and scope of work of these institutions and departments shall be spelled out in internal house rules.

Fatah, vol 3, no. 1 (23 March 1971), pp. 14, 16

APPENDIX 7

"WILL" OF MUNICH GUERRILLAS

To our brothers and comrades along the long path. We had not wished to write our will, because we want to live, not because we love life, particularly our life, the cruel and bitter life of the Palestinian people, but we wanted to live that our struggle may continue. Tonight, the fourth of September 1972, at 10 P.M., only a few hours before we are to move, one of the brethren raised the question of why we should not leave a word to our comrades, our people, our nation and to the world public opinion, which is worth nothing in our view. We began to discuss this.

Collective Will. But let us write the outcome of this discussion. Let it be a collective will, and a new method. For we are taking part in one operation, and all of us may die together. Or our operation may succeed and our people may triumph. Let the collective will be a symbol for eternal cooperation, and a symbol of collective thinking, planning and implementation.

Languages. The chief of the operation asked his deputy, who is in charge of negotiating with the Germans, how many languages he knew. He answered: 'If you mean the languages people speak I know German, English and French. But if you mean the language that our enemies understand and in which we believe, it is the language of force, challenge and determination to reach our objectives. This is the language of real peace which is indivisible, in Palestine, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Latin America, Africa and every spot of the earth where the oppressed people are fighting for freedom and justice.

Reaction. One of us asked about the reaction we expected for the operation. Another answered that this depended on our behavior, firmness and our success in showing our humane image. We are not murderers or highway men. We are an oppressed people, who have no land or home, no identity card or passport, and nothing to fear for or fear from. We have maintained silence as refugees for more than 18 years. We have begged for mercy, pity and sympathy. And all that they gave us was the relief for those who are held to be weak, and winter and summer aid. As to the land as to the home, they are for our enemy to come and go. Until we carried our guns and felt that we are people, and so they conspired against us. What do you expect from such enemies? Their reaction will be violent against us. They will say we are terrorists, fascists, murderers and criminals, and other epithets which they alone deserve.

Determination. One of us asked whether the state of the Zionist occupation will accept our demands. Another answered: "I don't know. What I know is that this time we will make them know that we are serious, and that we shall carry our plan in full. The best guarantee for the success of our plan is that we sold our lives the moment we joined the ranks of the revolution. He who sells his life for the sake of his objective should succeed and should triumph."

Arab-German Relations. One of us asked: "What will become of our relations, as Arabs, with Germany?" The chief of the operation answered laughingly: "West Germany is a life-channel for the Zionist entity. It pays for past mistakes, by making more mistakes at the expense of our people. It would take a long time if I were to enumerate for you the funds West Germany paid to our enemy. Nevertheless, we are not against the German people; we are familiar with their aspiration for unity, and their longing to rid themselves of the colonialism and imperialism, which also control our country. We are not against any people in the world but, at the same time, we ask, and it is our right to ask: Why does the Zionist delegation have a place in this tournament? Why is the banner of occupation, which is based on terrorism and intimidation, be raised next to the flags of all countries of the world, and our flag be absent from the tournament? The whole world is having fun and watching, while we suffer and suffer and fight on more than one front, and no ears listen to our complaint or to the moaning of our people. Wish it were confined to our enemy and the supporters of our enemy, but the blow that comes from those who pretend to be Arabs and nationalists and interested in the people's homeland's interest, is the blow that hurts and causes pain."

September. Have you forgotten that we are operating under the name of Black September? Have you forgotten Hussein's September? But the path is long and difficult, and we must take revenge, and the banner should be handed from one generation to the next until the land is liberated, and the homeland is liberated of the hirelings and lackeys. It was here that one of our brothers entered and suggested that we put this discussion on paper and write our will and send it by our secret methods at 1 am on the night of September 4 to our secret command. One of our brothers wrote the following points and all of us added our signatures to them.

Eight Principles. We, the revolutionaries of the Kaf'r Bir'im and Iqrit operation in Munich, pledge our people that we shall not weaken or be negligent in performing the mission that has been assigned to us, and that we shall hold our lives cheap for the sake of liberating our prisoners from the occupation jails. We do not mean by our action to kill the innocents; we are fighting for justice and against injustice and will do anything for the sake of the oppressed.

1. We do not want to destroy the world or sabotage peace by our revolutionary action. What we want is for the world to understand and realize the ugly role played by the Zionist occupation in our country, and the tragedy which our people are living.

2. We urge all the free and honorable people of the world to show understanding to our revolutionary method, which we use for hitting all colonialist and imperialist interests in the world and exposing to the public the imperialist-Zionist connections, that our Arab nation and the revolutionary masses of the world would know what is Israel, and who its supporters are.

3. We are an integral part of the armed Palestinian revolution, which is a part of the Arab liberation movement. Therefore, we urge that the Palestinian rifles should not be laid down, regardless of the conspiracies, the oppression and the difficulty of the path. We also urge the Arab nation to activate its guns and activate its men. For the land will not be liberated, without fighting, and fighting alone, without death, and death alone, without blood, and blood alone.

4. Only the strong enjoy the respect of the world. We shall not be strong by words, announcements and information. We shall be strong only when we regard death as we regard life, and turn the honor commitment into an honor of practice, thus giving our slogans a content of practical struggle, that would make our enemies doubt their ability to confront us, and make them eventually believe that they have no alternative but to meet our just demands.

5. We apologize to the youths of the world who are taking part in the Olympiad, if our operation would hurt their feelings. But we urge them to remember that there is a people whose land has been occupied and their honor trampled for the past 24 years, a people who are suffering and in pain. There is no harm then if the youths of the world would understand their tragedy for a few hours. There is a people who have been suffering for years under the yoke of an enemy who has his place in this tournament. So, let the games stop for a few hours.

6. We do not care where we may be buried for, as our grandfathers said, the skinning of the sheep after it is slaughtered does not hurt. But we urge the youths of the Arab nation to care for death that life may be theirs, life for them, their homelands and their peoples.

7. To our comrades in the Black September organization, our comrades-in-arms, and our struggling brothers, members of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, we say that by carrying on along the path, you show loyalty to our blood. To all the sons of the Arab nation, we say that when one martyr falls from us, he is replaced by a thousand men, and that every drop of blood that you lost, or we lost, is the fuel that lights for this nation the flares of victory and liberation.

8. Lastly, pardon us, our brethren, for you will find enclosed in this message the sum of 500 dollars and 37 marks, which we want to bequeath to the revolution because we know that the day may come when it may need this money, small as it is . . . Long live the Palestinian people, the Arab nation and the free revolutionaries of the world.

Palestine News Agency, 11 September 1972

APPENDIX 8

ABU DA'UD'S CONFESSION
(Excerpts)

Amman Radio, 24 March 1973

Tell us about your identity in detail.

Answer: My name is Muhammad Da'ud Muhammad 'Awdah. I am 36 years old. My nationality is Jordanian. My father's nationality is Jordanian. I currently reside in Damascus.

Question: Do you belong to a political party or organization, and what is your position in the organization?

Answer: I do not belong to any political organization, but I belong to the Fatah movement which is a political organization. My position in it is that of a member of the Revolutionary Council since November 1970. I joined the movement through 'Ali Hasan Salamah in Kuwayt in 1968. . . .

Question: . . . How do you explain the Jordanian events from 1967 to September 1970?

Answer: Fida'iyin action in Jordan led to the September events. It started with the fabrication of internal crises and ended with the attempt to seize power. The September incidents resulted in the withdrawal of the Iraqi and Syrian armies from Jordan, the physical destruction of the eastern front and casting doubts on the intentions of these two armies in a possible war especially when the Syrian Army attacked the Jordanian Army and entered Al-Ramtha. The fida'iyin effort was directed at the army. It raised several question marks.

Question: From a practical and theoretical viewpoint do you think that the current fida'iyin action represents the correct trend of the fida'iyin?

Answer: Fida'iyin action should be directed at the occupied soil. Because it lacks this ability at the moment its description as fida'iyin action, for which it has been initiated, no longer applies. Fida'iyin action had lost the major arena.

Question: What are the operations which the Fatah movement has carried out and who are the persons who were in charge of these operations?

Answer: The special operations organ affiliated with intelligence carries out the operations. The intelligence branch is headed by Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar and his deputy Hamad al-'Ayidi. Ghazi al-Husayni and 'Ali Hasan Salamah are Hamad al-'Ayidi's assistants. Because Hamad al-'Ayidi's personality is weak and Ghazi al-Husayni's personality is also weak and 'Ali Hasan Salamah's personality is stronger, the latter has managed to carry out operations alone and he used to act without reference to Hamad al-'Ayidi. Salamah gathered a group of young men around him. Most of them had a criminal record. The source of 'Ali Hasan Salamah's power comes from the fact that he is supported

by Abu 'Ammar personally. When he obtains the resources he needs to mount the operations, he does not go back to Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar. But he usually goes back to him when he cannot find the resources so that Al-Najjar can provide him with the money and the other needs.

There is no such thing called Black September. Fatah announces its operations under this name so that Fatah would not appear as the direct executor of the operations only the intelligence organ (which is run by) Abu Yusuf and Abu Hasan attributes the operations to the Black September. Abu Iyad does not link the operations to Black September. Abu Iyad carries out special operations whose quality and not number is accentuated. He plans for big operations like the Munich operation and the abortive operation to take over the premier's office. The operations which Abu Yusuf carries out in collaboration with Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) are usually ad hoc operations. They do not need long-term planning.

Question: Name the operations which have been carried out by Abu Iyad, 'Ali Hasan Salamah, and by Abu Yusuf and Khalil al-Wazir.

Answer: First, Abu Iyad operations. The successful operations are the Munich operations and the killing of an Israeli intelligence officer in Madrid early January 1972. I do not know who implemented that operation. The unsuccessful operations are: the operation against the Council of Ministers in Amman. Second, 'Ali Hasan Salamah's operations. The successful ones are the Trieste operation – blowing up oil storage tanks in Trieste, Italy. These storage tanks supply Europe and Germany with fuel. He sought the help of Al-Shamali in this operation. Al-Shamali died of cancer and he was the husband of Antun Sa'adah's daughter. I do not know the persons who carried it out. The second operation was blowing up the gas storage tanks in the Netherlands and Germany. The third operation was killing five Jordanians in Hamburg on the pretext that they collaborated with the Israeli intelligence. The fourth operation was firing shots on the Jordanian Ambassador in London, Zayd al-Rifa'i. The fifth operation was the blowing up of an Israeli vessel in the United States. He also has one unsuccessful operation: the attempted attack in Austria on the Soviet Jews who were emigrating to Israel. Three, Abu Yusuf operations: killing Wasfi al-Tall. He personally assigned the men through Yahya 'Ashur. He transported them to Cairo and subsequently, he himself transported the weapons to Cairo. He carries an Algerian diplomatic passport. The Sabena plane operation at LOD airport, the LOD operation was a failure; the Bangkok operation which was a failure also; another operation, which was supposed to take place together with the Bangkok operation, was attacking the Israeli embassy in Romania; that too failed. Another failure was the attempt on the life of 'Abdallah Salah in Tunis. It did not succeed because the Tunisian security measures were good. 'Abdallah Salah went to Tunis to put forward the United Kingdom [of King Husayn] project. Abu Jihad took part in the Bangkok operation. There were other operations against Mustafa Dudin, 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, 'Abdallah Salah in May 1971. They were planned by Abu Yusuf and Abu Jihad. They failed.

This is my statement which was obtained from me of my own free will, choice and full freedom, and I endorse it with my signature.

Middle East Monitor, vol. 3, no. 8 (15 April 1973) pp. 7-8

APPENDIX 9

PROGRAM OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT – 1973

1 – resisting Zionist occupation and struggling for the liberation of our lands;

2 – securing the legitimate rights of our Palestinian people, the first of which is their right to self-determination and repatriation on their own land;

3 – rejection of all conspirational projects aimed at liquidating the cause of our Palestinian Arab people and forfeiting their rights. These include Zionist plans such as that for the Palestinian entity, a civil administration and self-rule, the Allon Plan or King Hussein's Plan. American settlements and other similar and capitulative and liquidative settlements;

4 – defending Arab lands and property in the face of confiscation and acts of Judaization;

5 – protecting the Arab economy and preserving Arab commercial, industrial and agricultural institutions and projects in the face of attempts by the occupiers to strike at them and annex them to Zionist companies;

6 – protecting our Arab culture and history from Zionist distortion, particularly as done in academic curricula;

7 – defending our sacred shrines in the face of Zionist attempts to destroy or seize them;

8 – reviving our popular heritage and resistance literature which consecrates the attachment of our people of their land and their heroic struggle for its defense;

9 – caring for men and women fighters among our people who now suffer in Zionist jails, struggling to improve their treatment, to secure their release, to look after their families, and to care for their women, children and relatives;

10 – backing organizations of the masses such as trade unions, women's and students' federations, clubs and religious and social organizations, defending the groups they represent and mobilizing their potential to struggle against occupation; working with all these organizations to protect them from Zionist attempts to infiltrate them and to resist attempts by the occupiers to sow dissent, disintegration and a lack of nationalism among them;

11 – the Front affirms the unity of the two brotherly Palestinian and Jordanian people and declares its close association and cohesion with the Jordanian national movement in the struggle to convert Jordan into a strong base which the Arab and Palestinian struggle relies upon to combat the imperialist Zionist aggression;

12 – the Front asserts that the national movement of our Palestinian people within and outside the occupied lands is a genuine part of the Arab liberation movement; it also asserts that the continuation of Zionist occupation and aggression threatens not only the rights and

interests of the Palestinian people, but it also threatens the rights and existence of the other brotherly Arab people;

13 – the Front struggles for the purpose of strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperation with all progressive and revolutionary forces in the world, particularly the socialist states, and works to gain more friends and supporters of our just cause throughout the world.

an-Nahar Arab Report, 6 January 1975

APPENDIX 10

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION POLITICAL PROGRAM

2 June 1974

1. Re-affirming the previous stand taken by the PLO that resolution 242, which obscures the national rights of our people, deals with the case of our people as a problem of refugees. Therefore, the PLO refuses to deal with this resolution on this basis at any level, whether Arab or foreign, and including the Geneva conference.

2. The PLO struggles by all methods, foremost of which is the method of armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian lands and establish the fighting, independent national authority of the people on any part of Palestinian soil that is liberated. It emphasizes that this will not be realized except by introducing more changes to the balance of force, in the interest of our people and their struggle.

3. The PLO struggles against any plan for a Palestinian entity whose price is recognition, peace and secure borders, the renunciation of the historical right, and the deprivation of our people of their right to return and their right to determine their destiny on their national soil.

4. The PLO holds that any step of liberation that is taken is a link in the chain of seeking to realize its strategy, which is to establish a Palestinian democratic state as specified in the past resolutions of the National Council.

5. The PLO struggles with the Jordanian national forces to set up a Jordanian-Palestinian national front, whose objective is to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan that would merge with the Palestinian entity, that would be established as a result of the struggle.

6. The PLO struggles to establish a unity of struggle between Palestinian and Arab peoples, and between all forces of Arab liberation that agree to this program.

7. The Palestinian national authority will struggle to urge the confrontation states to complete the full liberation of Palestinian soil as a step toward pan-Arab unity.

8. The PLO struggles to consolidate its solidarity with the socialist states and the international forces of liberation and progress for the sake of defeating all Zionist-reactionary-imperialist conspiracies.

9. In the light of this program, the PLO struggles to strengthen national unity and to promote it to a level that would enable it to undertake its national and Arab duties and tasks.

10. In the light of this program, the leadership of the revolution lays down the tactics that will serve and secure the realization of these objectives.

al-Nahar, 3 June 1974

APPENDIX 11

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION INTERNAL STATUTES

Chapter One: General Principles

Art. 1) In accordance with the provisions of these statutes, Palestinians will set up an organization to be known as the Palestine Liberaton Organization.

Art. 2) The Palestine Liberation Organization will exercise its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter and the provisions of these statutes, as well as other regulations, rulings and resolutions issued in accordance with them.

Art. 3) Relations within the PLO should be based on commitment to national struggle and action, close connections between the various levels from the grassroots of the organization to its collective leadership, respect by the minority for the will of the majority, winning the people's conficence by means of persuasion, maintaining the Palestinian struggle movement, strengthening the Palestinian armed revolution and working to ensure its continuity and escalation, so that the liberation drive will continue until victory.

In accordance and implementation of this principle, the Executive Committee should draw up special statutes for the branches of the organization, taking into account the circumstances of the Palestinians in their various gathering places, as well as the circumstances of the Palestinian revolution and the objectives of the Charter and the Statutes.

Art. 4) All Palestinians are natural members of the PLO, performing their duty of liberating their homeland to the best of their abilities; the Palestinian people are the major grassroots of the PLO.

Chapter Two: The National Council

Art. 5) Members of the National Council are elected by the Palestinian people by direct ballot in accordance with statutes which the Executive Committee should draw up for this purpose.

Art. 6) a. If the organization of elections for the National Council is not possible, the existing National Council should continue until elections become possible.

b. If a seat or more of the National Council becomes vacant, the Council should appoint a member, or members, to fill the vacant seats.

Art. 7) a. The National Council is the supreme authority of the PLO and draws up its policy, plans and programs.

b. Jerusalem is the seat of the Palestinian National Council.

Art. 8) The term of the National Council is three years; it meets periodically at the invitation of its chairman every six months, or holds extraordinary sessions at the invitation of its chairman, and on the

request of the Executive Committee or one quarter of its members; it should meet in Jerusalem, Gaza or anywhere else, in accordance with the circumstances; if the chairman of the Council does not issue invitations for the meeting, the meeting will be held at the time and place specified in the request made by its members or the Executive Committee.

Art. 9) The National Council will have a chairmanship bureau, consisting of its chairman, two deputies of the chairman, and a secretary, all to be elected by the National Council at the beginning of its session.

Art. 10) In its ordinary sessions, the Council will consider: a. the annual report made by the Executive Committee on the achievements of the PLO and its branches. b. the annual report of the National Fund and the ratification of the budget. c. the recommendations submitted by the Executive Committee and the Council's committees. d. any other questions that may be referred to it.

Art. 11) In order to facilitate its work, the National Council will set up the necessary committees. These committees will submit reports and recommendations to the National Council which will discuss them and issue the necessary resolutions.

Art. 12) The Council's legal quorum is the presence of two thirds of its members; resolutions are taken by the majority of the votes of the present members.

Chapter Three: The Executive Committee

Art. 13) a. All members of the Executive Committee should be elected by the National Council. b. The chairman of the Executive Committee should be elected by the Committee itself. c. The Executive Committee should be elected from within the National Council.

Art. 14) The Executive Committee will be formed of 11 members, including the board chairman of the Palestinian National Fund. (The number was later raised to 14, but the Executive Committee now includes only 13 members, after the withdrawal of the PFLP representative). If some of the Executive Committee seats become vacant for any reason at a time when the National Council is not in session, the vacancies should be filled as follows:

a. If the vacant seats are less than one third, then filling them should be postponed until the next session of the National Council. b. If the vacant seats are one third or more of the Committee's seats then they should be filled by the National Council which should be invited to a special session within 30 days. c. If the invitation of the National Council to an extraordinary session is impossible, then the vacancies in the last two cases should be filled by the Executive Committee, the Council's bureau and any members of the Council who can attend; they will meet in a joint session for this purpose, and the new members will be chosen by the majority of the votes of those present.

Art. 15) The Executive Committee is the highest executive authority of the PLO; it is in continuous session and its members are fulltimers; it is charged with implementing the policy, plans and programs decided by the National Council, and is responsible before it, individually and as a group.

Art. 16) The Executive Committee: a. represents the Palestinian people. b. supervises the branches of the organization. c. issues the regulations and instructions and takes the necessary decisions for organizing the PLO's activities, provided they do not contradict the Charter or the Internal Statutes. d. implements the PLO's financial policy and prepares its budget.

Generally, the Executive Committee discharges all the responsibilities of the PLO in accordance with the broadlines and resolutions taken by the National Council.

Art. 17) The permanent seat of the Executive Committee is Jerusalem, but it may hold its meetings anywhere else it considers appropriate.

Art. 18) The Executive Committee will set up the following departments: a. the military department. b. the political and information affairs department. c. The Palestinian National Fund department. d. the research and specialized organizations department. e. the administrative affairs department. f. any other department which the Committee may find necessary.

Each department will have a director-general and the necessary number of personnel. The competence of each department will be defined by special regulations to be drawn up by the Executive Committee.

Art. 19) The Executive Committee will strengthen relations and coordinate action between the PLO and all other Arab and international organizations and federations, which have common objectives, or which help the PLO realize its objectives.

Art. 20) The Executive Committee continues to exercise its functions as long as it enjoys the confidence of the National Council: the Executive Committee should submit its resignation to the new National Council at its first meeting; its re-election is possible.

Art. 21) The legal quorum of the Executive Committee is two thirds of its members; its resolutions are taken by the majority of the votes of the present members.

Chapter Four: General Provisions

Art. 22) The PLO will establish an army of the sons of Palestine to be known as the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), which will have an independent command, and will work under the supervision of the Executive Committee, and will carry out its instructions and resolutions; its national duty is to be the vanguard of the battle for the liberation of Palestine.

Art. 23) The Executive Committee will see to it that Palestinians join the Arab military colleges and institutes for the purpose of military training, the mobilization of the capabilities and energies of Palestinians and preparing them for the battle of liberation.

Art. 24) A fund will be set up and will be known as the Palestinian National Fund to finance the PLO's activities; it will be run by a special board of directors to be set up in accordance with special statutes drawn up by the National Council.

Art. 25) The Fund's revenues will consist of: a. a permanent tax on Palestinians that will be imposed and levied in accordance with special regulations. b. financial assistance extended by the Arab governments and nation. c. the liberation stamp which Arab countries will issue for use in post, and other, exchanges. d. donations and gifts. e. loans and aid extended by Arab or friendly peoples. f. any other sources of revenue approved by the National Council.

Art. 26) Committees will be set up in Arab and friendly countries to be known as the "Support Palestine Committees" to collect donations and aid the PLO in its Arab endeavors.

Art. 27) The representation of the Palestinian people at Arab organizations and conferences will be at the level decided by the Executive Committee; the Executive Committee should appoint a Palestine representative at the Arab League.

Art. 28) The Executive Committee is empowered to issue the necessary regulations for implementing the provisions of these statutes.

Art. 29) The amendment or alteration of the Internal Statutes or making additions to them is the prerogative of the National Council, but a two-third majority vote is necessary.

Chapter Five: Provisional Principles

Art. 30) The National Council meeting in Cairo on July 10, 1968 should replace the previous and provisional National Council of the PLO and exercise all the powers given it by these statutes.

Art. 31) The term of the above mentioned National Council is two years, beginning on July 10, 1968; if the organization of elections for the next Council is not possible, it should meet and decide either to extend its term or set up a new Council in the manner it considers appropriate.

Art. 32) Only the National Council has the right to occasionally add new persons to its membership, whenever it considers this appropriate, and in accordance with the requirements of the battle of liberation and the promotion of national unity, and in accordance with the provisions of the National Charter and the regulations which the Executive Committee will submit at its next session.

Arab World Weekly, 22 March 1969
and 22 February 1975

APPENDIX 12. PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS(1)

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Yasir 'Arafat (Chairman) Khalil al-Wazir (Deputy Chairman) Hani al-Hasan (Political Advisor) 'Abd al-Muhsin abu Mayzar (Spokesman) Faruq al-Qaddumi (Political Department) Brig. Mahmud al-'Azzam (Military Department) Yasir 'Abd al-Rabbuh (Information) Walid Qamhawi (Chairman, National Fund) Khalid al-Fahum (Chairman, PNC) Dr. Nabil Sha'th (Palestine Planning Board) Mahmud Darwish (Palestine Research Center: Acting Director) Dr. 'Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali(13) (Educational and cultural affairs)	Same as Fatah East Europe Syria Iraq Libya USSR PRC Own manufacture	Same as Fatah Arab Government subsidies decided by Arab League Some light industry	Same as Fatah, but increasing number of West Bank independents	---	---

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
	Hamid Abu Sitta (Occupied Territories) Muhammad Zuhayr Nashashibi (Administrative Affairs) Majid Abu Shararah (Unified Information) Zuhdi Labib al-Tarazi (UN Observer Delegation)					
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)	Yasir 'Arafat (Commander in Chief) Brig. Misbah al-Budaryi (Brig. Walid Jamus appointed Acting Commander in Chief, 29 April 1975)(3) Abu Khalid (PASC)	PRC; Arab Governments; USSR	Same as PLO	USSR-Arab military doctrines, heavy Syrian influence	10,000	20,000
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)	Brig. Nihad Nusaybah (Col. Na'im 'Abd al-Rahman al-Khatib appointed Nusaybah's successor, October 28, 1979)	Same as PLO	Same as PLO	Same as PLO, Urban terrorism	____	800+[a]
Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement)	Yasir 'Arafat Salah Khalaf Khalil al-Wazir Faruq al-Qaddumi Hani al-Hasan Majid Abu Shararah	USSR PRC Egypt Libya Open Market	Private Individuals Saudi Arabia Kuwayt Abu Dhabi Algeria	Relatively non-ideological, Liberation of Palestine by armed struggle, creation of	15,000	10,000+ (with a possible 15,000 additional militia)

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
	Khalid al-Hasan Brig. Sa'd Sayil Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah(19) Nimr Salih Mahmud Rida 'Abbas Mahammad 'Atib Ghunaym	Captured Israeli Arms Own Manufacture		democratic, secular state in Palestine, some Muslim Brethren influence		
Popular Front for(6) the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	George Habash Wadi' Haddad(15) Bassam Abu Sharif Ahmad al-Yamani Haytham Ayyubi Taysir Qubb'ah Salah Muhammad Salah Hashim 'Ali Muhsin Tawfiq Abu 'Isa 'Awdah Butrus 'Awdah Abu 'Ali Mustafa	East Europe Iraq Open Market Captured Israeli Arms	Iraq Private Individuals Libya	Marxist-Leninist, Self-styled "Asian Socialist"	8,000	3,000
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDF)	Nayif Hawatimah Salah Raf'at Adib 'Abd al-Rabbuh Bilal al-Hasan Jalal Kishk Muhammad Kishli(4) Muhsin Ibrahim Yasir 'Abd al-Rabbuh	East Europe Syria Open Market Captured Israeli Arms	East Europe Private Individuals USSR	Maoist, committed to Lin Piao, but increasingly pro-USSR	1,000	3,000+***[b]

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
	Abu Adnan Abu Layla 'Umar Qasim	USSR				
Popular Front for(6) the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP, GC)	Ahmad Jibril Fadlu Shruru Talal Naji 'Ali Ishak 'Umar Shihabi Abu 'Abd al-'Abbas(14) 'Abd al-Fattah Ghanim	Various Libya Syria	Various Libya Syria	Non-programmatic, Some Ba'th (Syrian) influence	500	400*[C]
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Abu 'Abd al-'Abbas Tal 'at Ya'qub	Iraq	Iraq	Non-programmatic, but pro-Iraq	____	____
Palestine Arab(5) Organization (PAO)	Ahmad Za'rur	Egypt	Egypt	Pro-Egyptian	100	____
al-Sa'iqah (Thunderbolt)	Zuhayr Muhsin(20) Sami al-'Attari Mahmud al-'Azzam Col. Salah al-Mu'ani Majid Muhsin Dafi al-Jum'ani Muhammad al-M'ayitah Yasir 'Amr	Syria USSR Open Market Captured Israeli Arms	Syria	Syrian Neo-Ba'thist	7,000	2,000

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
	Ahmad Shahabi Yusuf al-Birji Zuhayr Muhsin					
Arab Liberation(6) Front (ALF)	'Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad Zaid Haydar Munir al-Razzaz Shahir Yusuf Tawfig Suttan Ahmad Mar'ashli Abu Shihab	Iraq	Iraq	Iraqi Ba'thist, Maoist	3,000	1,000
Action Group for(5) the Liberation of Palestine (AGLP)	Isam Sartawi	Egypt	Egypt	Pro-Egyptian		
Popular Struggle(5,6) Front (PSF)	Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah Dr. Samir Ghawshah	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Non-programmatic Some Ba'th(Syrian) influence	200	150
Arm of Arab Revolution	Wadi' Haddad(15) "Carlos"/PFLP/ Japanese Red Army Connections/TPLA/Baader Meinhof Group	Libya Iraq PFLP	Libya Iraq	Rejection of all peace plans Arab world-wide revolution	____	____

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
				Some PFLP influence		
Black September (7) Organization	Salah Khalaf Khalil al-Wazir 'Ali Hasan Salamah(18) Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah Fakhri Amri Sabri al-Banna(8)	Same as Fatah Libya	Same as Fatah Libya	Non-programmatic Fanonism	____	150****[d]
Black June (Fatah the Revolutionary Council)	Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal)(10) Abu Ra'id Naji 'Allush(19) Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah (Abu Da'ud)(19) Abu Zaki 'Umar Fahmi Abu Hazin 'Abd al-Rahman 'Isa	Iraq	Iraq	Same as "Arm"	____	500
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP)	'Abd al-Fattah Yasir	PRC	Refugee camps in Syria	Maoist	100	____
Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRF)	Wadi' Haddad(15) Ahmad Dulaymi Salim Darduni Abu al-Fawz Abu Husayn	Same as PFLP People's Republic of South	Same as PFLP	Trotskyite, Some Syrian Ba'th influence	____	100

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
	Abu Riyad Abu Khalid	Yemen USSR Cuba				
Ansar (Partisans)(12)	Fu'ad Nasir (Jordan) Nicola Shawi (Lebanon) Khalid Bakdash (Syria) 'Aziz Muhammad (Iraq)	USSR Fatah al-Sa'iqah	USSR	Pro-Soviet	50**[e]	____
Arab Sinai Organization (ASO)	Egyptian Officers Palestinian recruits	Egypt	Egypt	Pro-Egyptian	____	____
Palestine National(9) Front (PNF) (PLO)	Dr. Mustafa Hilmi 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar 'Abd al-Jawad Salih Walid Qamhawi 'Ali Hamsi Naji Abu Firas 'Arabi 'Awad Ahmad Muhammad	None	PLO	PLO political arm in occupied territories, Socialist and Communist influence	____	____
Palestine National (17) Front (PNF) (Syrian)	Muhammad Sulayman Naju 'Arif al-Maw'id Nabil al-Salti	Syria	Syria	Syrian neo-Ba'thist	____	400

Organization	Leadership	Sources of Arms	Financing	Ideological Orientation	Estimated Strength(2) 1970	1979
Arab Nationalist (10) Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYLP)	Marwan Haddad Libya RCC members Breakaway PFLP/Fatah	Libya USSR Open Market	Libya	Libyan-style Arab/Muslim revolution, PFLP-BSO influence	____	____
Front for Participation in the Palestinian Revolution	Kamal Junblatt(16) CC Members of Arab Communist Parties	Political action Unity with world revolutionary movements	Algeria	Revolutionary Socialism, Communism	____	____
Arab Communist(11) Organization (ACO)	'Ali al-Ghadban Breakaway Communist Factions	Bank robberies Private Individuals	PFLP Iraq	Tupamaros tactics; Violent overthrow of all Arab governments	____	100***[f]

a. Possibly 1,100 men
b. Possibly 5,000 men
c. Some sources give a figure of 500 men
d. Some sources give estimates as high as 300-400 members
e. Some sources claim the membership to be as low as 10 men, others claim 400 members
f. Some sources give a figure of 1200 members

Notes:

1. Not all of these groups are still active, nor is this a complete listing of groups. See text for details.
2. Estimate of total manpower includes both actual and noncombatants.
3. Brig. Jamus's appointment was apparently not confirmed.
4. Associated with Organization of Lebanese Socialists (OLS).
5. Merged with Fatah – July 1971.
6. Member of rejection front.
7. Disbanded September 1974.
8. Condemned to death by Fatah, October 1974, forms breakaway Fatah group in Iraq, Fatah-The Revolutionary Council, in 1973.
9. Allied with Palestine Executive Committee for Occupied Homeland Affairs.
10. Breakaway PFLP group, links with BSO.
11. Amalgamated with Socialist Revolutionary Organization of Lebanon (SRO).
12. Disbanded 1972, members joined Fatah.
13. Member of rejection front: withdrew from PLO executive committee in 1974.
14. Forms breakaway group, the Palestine Liberation Front, in April 1977.
15. Died March 1978.
16. Murdered March 1976.
17. Breakaway PLO/Fatah group, pro-Syrian and anti 'Arafat.
18. Murdered January 1979.
19. Joins Sabri al-Banna's breakaway faction 1978 or 1979.
20. Murdered July 1979.

Sources:

Arab World Weekly (24 May 1969)
Christian Science Monitor (4 August 1970) pp. 11-12
Arab World Weekly (19 June 1971)
Arab World Weekly (10 July 1971)
an-Nahar Arab Report (20 March 1972)
an-Nahar Arab Report (29 May 1972)
New York Times (7 October 1972)
an-Nahar Arab Report (31 July 1973)
Time (11 November 1974), p. 35.
Arab World Weekly (12 July 1975)
an-Nahar Arab Report (1 September 1975)
Arab Report and Record (1-15 May 1976)
Arab Report and Record (16-31 August 1978)
Arab Press Service (22 October 1979)
Quandt, op. cit.
Jureidini an Hazen, op. cit.

APPENDIX 16

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM(1)
1968-1979

DATE	EVENT	GROUP
22 July 68	El Al 707 from Rome to Tel Aviv hijacked and diverted to Algeria	PFLP
26 Dec 68	Attack on an El Al plane at Athens airport.	PFLP
18 Feb 69	El Al airliner preparing for take-off from Zurich for Tel Aviv attacked.	PFLP
25 Feb 69	Bomb exploded in the British consulate in Jerusalem.	PFLP
30 May 69	Tapline blown up.	PFLP
18 July 69	London department stores known to have links with Israel firebombed.	PFLP
25 Aug 69	Israeli Zim lines office in London bombed; one person injured.	PFLP
29 Aug 69	TWA 707 en route between Paris and Athens hijacked and flown to Syria, where the passengers were removed and the plane destroyed.	PFLP
8 Sep 69	Israeli embassies at the Hague and Bonn and El Al offices in Brussels bombed.	
27 Nov 69	El Al offices in Athens attacked.	PSF

(1) Does not include all attempted acts of terrorism.

24 Dec 69	3 Arabs arrested as they tried to board a TWA plane in Athens bound for Rome and New York.	PFLP
10 Feb 70	3 Arabs attacked El Al passengers at Munich.	PFLP/AOLP
21 Feb 70	Swissair plane en route from Zurich to Tel Aviv crashed on take-off.	GC
21 Feb 70	Bomb exploded in an Austrian plane carrying mail from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv.	PFLP
23 Feb 70	Attack on a tourist bus near Hebron.	
29 Mar 70	U.S. Embassy in Beirut bombed.	PFLP
15 Apr 70	Attack on U.S. Embassy in Amman.	
25 Apr 70	Bomb exploded in El Al office in Istanbul.	
4 May 70	Attack on Israeli Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay.	Fatah
22 May 70	Israeli school bus attacked.	GC
7 June 70	U.S. political secretary in Amman kidnapped.	PFLP
7 June 70	U.S. military attache, and wife slightly wounded by gun-fire at Amman roadblock.	
9 June 70	60 foreigners held hostage in two Amman hotels.	PFLP
10 June 70	U.S. military attache in Amman shot.	PFLP
22 July 70	Olympic Airways jet en route from Beirut to Athens hijacked.	PSF

6 Sep 70	3 airliners, PAN AM 747, Swissair DC-8, TWA 707 hijacked. A fourth hijack attempt foiled and Layla Khalid captured.	PFLP
9 Sep 70	BOAC DC-8 hijacked.	PFLP
11 Sep 70	USIS official kidnapped.	PLA
15 Mar 71	Gulf oil refinery in Rotterdam sabotaged.	BSO
21 May 71	Israeli council general in Istanbul kidnapped and assassinated.	TPLF/PFLP
4 June 71	Liberian registry tanker, Coral Sea, attacked in the Bab al-Mandab straights.	PFLP/ELF
24 Aug 71	Bomb damages a Jordanian airliner in Madrid.	Fatah
8 Sep 71	Jordanian Alia airliner hijacked.	Fatah
9 Sep 71	Tapline sabotaged.	
15 Sep 71	Tapline sabotaged.	
16 Sep 71	Hand grenade into a crowd of American tourists in Jerusalem.	
24 Oct 71	Tapline sabotaged.	
10 Nov 71	Intercontinental hotel in Amman damaged by explosions.	
28 Nov 71	Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal assassinated, Cairo.	BSO
15 Dec 71	Attempted assassination of Jordan's Ambassador to London, Zayd Rafa'i.	BSO
16 Dec 71	3 persons injured by parcel bombs in the Jordanian mission to the U.N. in Geneva.	BSO

Jan 72	Letter bombs mailed from various European countries to Israeli officials and businessmen.	PFLP/GC
6 Feb 72	Gas-Pumping station in Holland sabotaged.	BSO
6 Feb 72	5 Jordanians in Cologne W. Germany murdered for allegedly spying for Israel.	BSO
8 Feb 72	Plant producing generators for Israeli aircraft in Hamburg sabotaged.	BSO
22 Feb 72	Lufthansa 747 hijacked from India to Aden.	PFLP
22 Feb 72	Pipeline near Hamburg sabotaged.	BSO
8 May 72	Sabena 707 from Vienna to Athens to Lod airport hijacked.	BSO
30 May 72	The Japanese Red Army, with the PFLP, massacres passengers at Lod airport.	URA/PFLP
5 Aug 72	Oil storage facility at Trieste burned.	BSO/Red Brigades?
16 Aug 72	El Al plane damaged by a bomb.	ANYLP
22 Aug 72	South Yemen DC-6 en route from Beirut to Cairo hijacked.	Eagles of National Unity
5 Sep 72	Massacre of Israeli Olympic team.	BSO
19 Sep 72	Israeli diplomat in London killed by a letter bomb.	BSO
Sep-Oct 72	Wave of letter bombs.	BSO
29 Oct 72	Lufthansa 727 en route from Beirut to Ankara hijacked and flown to Munich. BSO members released by FRG.	BSO

28 Dec 72	Israeli Embassy in Bangkok seized.	BSO
8 Jan 73	Bomb destroys Paris office of Jewish Agency.	BSO
11 Jan 73	Arabs attacked foreigners in a Kaiserslautein, West Germany restaurant.	BSO
26 Jan 73	Baruch Cohen, Israeli intelligence agent, assassinated in Madrid.	BSO
1 Mar 73	Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartum seized.	BSO
4 Mar 73	Greek ship, Sounion, sunk in Beirut harbor.	BSO
6,7 Mar 73	Time bombs found in rental cars in New York.	BSO
12 Mar 73	Israeli businessman killed, Nicosia.	BSO
9 Apr 73	Nicosia apartment where Israeli Ambassador lived attacked.	BSO/ANYLP
27 Apr 73	El Al employee shot, Rome.	BSO
9 June 73	West German arms plant sabotaged.	BSO
1 June 73	Israeli military attache shot, Washington.	BSO/PFLP
20 July 73	Japan Airlines 747 hijacked.	Organization of the Sons of Occupied Homeland (PFLP/URA)
5 Aug 73	Passengers at Athens airport attacked.	Seventh Suicide Squad ('Abd al-Ghafur/PFLP)
5 Sep 73	Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris attacked.	Punishment Organization (Abu Nidal)

5 Sep 73	5 Arabs arrested by Italian police who said they were planning to shoot down an El Al airplane.	BSO
7 Sep 73	Bomb destroys Israeli exhibit at West Berlin.	BSO
28 Sep 73	Jewish emigres en route from Russia to Israel kidnapped. Kidnappers demand that Austria close the Schoenau Castle as a transit camp.	Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution (al'Sa'iqah/PDF)
18 Oct 73	Bank of America in Beirut seized.	SRO
25 Nov 73	Hijacked KLM 747 after it took off from Beirut.	ANYLP
17 Dec 73	Massacre at Leonardo da Vinci (Fiumicino) airport.	ANYLP/Abu Nidal
31 Dec 73	Zionist Joseph Sieff wounded in his London mansion.	PFLP/IRA
31 Jan 74	Refinery in Singapore burned.	URA/PFLP
1 Feb 74	Henry Haim, President of Association of Honest Allies of Israeli, attacked in Paris.	
2 Feb 74	Greek freighter seized at Karachi.	Muslim International Guerrillas ('Abd al-Ghafur)
6 Feb 74	Japanese Embassy in Kuwayt seized.	Sons of Occupied Homeland (PFLP/URA)
3 Mar 74	British Airways VC-10 hijacked en route from Bombay to London.	ANYLP
11 Apr 74	Qiryat Shemona attacked.	PFLP/GC

1 May 74	Tapline monitoring station damaged.	ANYLP
8 May 74	USIS center in Beirut bombed.	SRO
15 May 74	Ma'alot massacre	PDF
29 May 74	JAL office in West Berlin bombed.	Organization of Sons of Occupied Homeland (PFLP)
25 June 74	Nahariya, Israel, apartment house attacked.	Fatah
3 Aug 74	2 anti-Arab newspapers, United Jewish Social Fund offices bombed.	BSO/PFLP
14 Aug 74	U.S. Pavilion at Damascus International Fair bombed.	ACO
26 Aug 74	Israeli tourist office, Frankfurt, bombed.	
8 Sep 74	TWA jet crashes in the Ionean Sea.	ANYLP
13 Sep 74	French Embassy at the Hague seized.	URA/PFLP
14 Sep 74	USIS site in Damascus bombed.	ACO
16 Sep 74	Grenade explodes outside Le Drugstore.	PFLP (Carlos)
22 Nov 74	BOAC jet hijacked from Dubai to Tunis.	Abu Nidal/PFLP
22 Dec 74	U.S. tourist in Jerusalem injured by grenade.	PLO
13 Jan 75	Yugoslav jet damaged by bazooka shells at Orly airport.	Muhammad Budiyah Group (Abu Nidal)

17 Jan 75	2 terrorists fired bazooka rounds at an El Al plane at Orly airport. The attackers escaped.	Muhammad Budiyah (Abu Nidal)/PFLP
19 Jan 75	Unsuccessful attempt to destroy El Al jet at Orly.	Muhammad Budiyah Group (Abu Nidal)
5 Mar 75	Savoy Hotel on Tel Aviv beach attacked.	Fatah
29 June 75	U.S. military attache kidnapped.	Revolutionary Arab Socialist Organization (PSF)
4 Aug 75	U.S. consulate in Kuala Lumpur seized.	URA/PFLP
13 Nov 75	Explosion in Zion Square.	PDF
21 Dec 75	OPEC meeting broken into, 3 killed and 90 held hostage.	Arm of Arab Revolution (Carlos/ Haddad/ Red Army Faction)
3 May 76	A booby-trapped motorcycle exploded in Jerusalem injuring 30 people, one fatally.	PDF
25 May 76	A suitcase bomb exploded at Lydda airport killing two and wounding 10 others.	PFLP and Baader Meinhof
16 June 76	U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Frances Meloy, assassinated.	PFLP
27 June 76	Air France plane with 240 passengers hijacked to Entebbe Airport, Uganda. Israeli military forces rescued the hostages on 3/4 July.	Arm of Arab Revolution (Carlos/ Haddad/PDF/ Red Army Faction)

11 July 76	Passengers boarding an El Al plane in Istanbul attacked.	PFLP
4 Sep 76	KLM Royal Dutch plane en route from Nice, France to Amsterdam hijacked.	PFLP/GC?
26 Sep 76	Semiramis Hotel in Damascus taken over: 3 captured terrorists publicly hung.	Black June (Abu Nidal)
26 Sep 76	Israeli, Jewish, U.S. firms in Rome bombed.	Ghassan Kanafani anti-Zionist Commandos (PFL)
29 Sep 76	Dutch terrorist group trained by PFLP uncovered in Netherlands.	PFLP
11 Oct 76	Syrian Embassies at Rome and Islamabad attacked.	Black June (Abu Nidal)
16 Nov 76	The Intercontinental Hotel in Amman taken over.	Black June (Abu Nidal)
1 Dec 76	Attempted assassination of Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam.	Black June (Abu Nidal)
4 Jan 77	Christians in Beirut machine-gunned from passing car.	ACO
7 Jan 77	Abu Da'ud, mastermind of "Black September" operation at Munich in '72 arrested in France, later released (11 Jan 77).	
3 Feb 77	Palestinian Book Shop in Paris bombed.	Phalange
8 July 77	Kuwait Airways Boeing 707 with 55 people aboard hijacked on flight from Beirut to Kuwait.	Abu Sayyid (breakaway Fatah)

16 Aug 77	Bomb explosion on an Israeli bus at Afula, Israel injures 8.	PLO
17 Aug 77	Bomb explodes in the square at Nablus, on the West Bank, wounding 6.	PLO
27 Aug 77	Bomb explodes in Gaza, Jerusalem and Afula.	General Command of the Palestinian Resistance Forces
15 Oct 77	Lufthansa Boeing 737 with 91 people aboard hijacked to Mogadishu, Somalia.	Organization of Struggle against World Imperialism (Wadi' Haddad)
25 Oct 77	Attempted assassination of Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam in Abu Dhabi; United Arab Emirates Minister of State, Sayf Ibn Sa'id al-Ghubash, killed.	Black June and September (Abu Nidal)
4 Jan 78	PLO representative in London, Sa'id Hammami, killed in London	Black June and September Organization (Abu Nidal)
13 Jan 78	Premises of PFLP weekly, Al-Hadaf, bombed in Beirut causing serious damage.	?
1 Feb 78	Poisoned Israeli oranges found in Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Sweden, and Belgium.	Arab Revolutionary Army
18 Feb 78	Gunmen murder Yusuf Siba'i, Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and editor of the Cairo Daily al-Ahram, in Nicosia, Cyprus; Egyptians attempt abortive rescue.	Abu Nidal
11 Mar 78	Palestinian commando raid responsible for deaths of 37 near Tel Aviv.	Fatah

May 78	3 men fire on passengers in El Al lounge at Orly Airport, France.	Sons of South Lebanon (PFLP)
June 78	PLO representative to Kuwayt, 'Ali Yasin, assassinated in Kuwayt.	Abu Nidal
July 78	2 rockets fired at the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut.	PLO
July 78	Bomb explodes outside Iraqi Embassy in Brussels, Belgium.	PLO
July 78	Iraqi Ambassador to Great Britain, Taha Da'ud, attacked in London.	PLO
July 78	Palestinians take over Iraqi Embassy in Paris, France.	PLO
Aug 78	Gunmen attack Iraqi Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.	Fatah
Aug 78	2 Jordanians murder PLO representatives, 'Izz al-Din Qalaq and 'Adnan Hammad, in Paris.	Black June and September Organization (Abu Nidal)
Aug 78	4 die when armed men attack PLO office in Islamabad, Pakistan.	Black June and September Organization (Abu Nidal)
Aug 78	Bomb explosion at PLF headquarters in Beirut kills over 150 people.	Fatah
Aug 78	Palestinian kills Iraqi military attache at Iraqi Embassy in Tripoli.	?
Aug 78	Machine gun and grenade attack on El Al bus in London kills one and injures nine.	PFLP
Jan 79	Attack on guest house in Ma'alot	PDF?

28 Mar 79	Attempted seaborne raid on Natanya	Fatah
13 July 79	Four terrorists seize Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey	Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution (al-Sa'iqah)
25 July 79	Zuhayr Muhsin assassinated in Cannes, France	?
13 Nov 79	Attempt on Israeli Ambassador in Lisbon, Portugal	PLO/Portuguese Extremists (Internationalist Militant Workers)

Sources: Arab Report and Record, various
Arab World Weekly, various
Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1975)
New York Times, various

APPENDIX 15
FATAH ORGANIZATION



SOURCES:

Abu Da'ud's Confession, *loc. cit.*
an-Nahar Arab Report (various)
Arab World (various)
Chaliand, Resistance, pp. 67ff.

1. Assassinated January 1979
2. Joins Fatah — The Revolutionary Council 1978

APPENDIX 17

THE ECOLOGY OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM



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Sterling, *loc. cit.*
Arab World Weekly (June 19, 1971)
Arab World Weekly (June 10, 1972)
The Times (London), (January 4, 1974)
Arab World Weekly (January 25, 1975)
Arab World Weekly (February 22, 1975)
Christian Science Monitor (August 5, 1975)
Arab Press Service (July 21, 1976)
Christian Science Monitor (March 14, 15, 1977)

New York Times (October 22, 1977)
San Francisco Chronicle (October 9, 10, 11, 1978)
Arab Press Service (May 9, 16, 1978)
Arab Report and Record (various)
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Notes

INTRODUCTION

(1) The Palestinian landscape is, however, littered with the wreckage of plans for resettlement and repatriation.

(2) See, for example, Michael Reisman, The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), and Richard H. Pfaff, Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969), for discussions of diplomatic options theoretically available.

(3) Search for Peace in the Middle East (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1970), pp. 70-71.

(4) Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," Middle East Journal, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (summer 1969), p. 307.

(5) Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 1-3. See similar analyses in: Willard A. Beling, ed., The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy (Albany: State University of New York, 1973); George S. McGovern, "Realities of the Middle East," Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975); and the extensive airing of all sides of the problem contained in: U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs, The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Priorities for Peace (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975).

(6) Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Scope and Limit of a Fedayeen Consensus," The Wiener Library Bulletin, vol. XXIV, no. 4 (1970/1971), pp. 1-8,

reprinted with some editing in Y. Harkabi, Palestinians and Israel (Jerusalem: Kater Publishing House, Ltd., 1974), pp. 115-130.

(7) Toward Peace in the Middle East, p. 11.

(8) On the problems of defining terrorism see: Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1975), pp. 1-4. For accounts of the emergence of Fida'iyin see: Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967); Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Isma'ilis Against the Islamic World (Hague: Mouton & Co., 1955). For the definitional issues involved in civil or guerrilla wars see: Richard A. Falk, ed., The International Law of Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). For the differing conceptions of revolutionary or insurgent warfare see: Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968).

(9) There is considerable debate as to whether terrorism should by definition be confined to acts of private individuals or whether it should also include acts of governments. For discussions of the problems of defining violence in an even broader concept, but with the same public/private distinction, see: Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Also: John Norton Moore, "Towards Legal Restraints on Terrorism," American Journal of International Law, vol. 67, no. 5 (November 1973), pp. 88-100; W.T. Mallison and S.V. Mallison, "Terrorism in International Law," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. IV, no. 2 (winter 1975), pp. 36-51; Thomas M. Frank and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., "Preliminary Thoughts on an International Convention on Terrorism," American Journal of International Law, vol. 68, no. 1 (January 1974), pp. 69-90, for legal arguments.

The Arab view is presented in: "The Many Sides of Terrorism," I and II, Arab World Weekly (December 4 and 11, 1972) and "Terrorism Old and New," Arab World Weekly (March 12, 1973). The specifically Palestinian defense of terrorism was articulated by Shafiq al-Hut in an interview in al-Watan al-'Arabi (April 27-May 3, 1979), pp. 32-34:

> Why do you denounce terrorism when it explodes a bomb in a garbage can, but do not do the same when it drops napalm and cluster bombs from U.S. made planes? If it is a matter of means, we would welcome any type of planes you might like to offer us. I constantly maintained that war is terrorism, and terrorism is a human tragedy. However, instead of shedding tears and displaying grief, we should eliminate the causes of war. To deny the rights of a certain people is sure to lead to war, fighting and destruction. There should not be a double standard for terrorism. We must eliminate the causes of terrorism by recognizing the rights of our people. This is the right path to peace. To deny the

Palestinian rights to their land, to self-determination, to keep them in exile and to ask them to keep silent is an impossibility, rather it is hypocrisy itself.

CHAPTER 1

(1) See the series of analyses published by the American Enterprise Institute dealing with the political and military implications of this weaponry: Dale R. Tahtinen, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Today (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1973); The Arab-Israeli Military Balance since October 1973 (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1974); Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Nuclear Threat in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975); Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Implications of the 1976 Arab-Israeli Military Status (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976); Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976).

(2) Reprinted in Fred S. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press), 1968, pp. 359-360; Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961); Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jon Kimche, The Unromantics: The Great Powers and the Balfour Declaration (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968). Use of the phrase "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" to describe the Palestinian Arab majority was and is bitterly resented by Palestinians. See: Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914 and 1967 (New York: New World Press, 1967); Michael E. Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).

(3) For similar analyses see: Don Peretz, "Israel and the Arab Nations," in J.H. Thompson and R.D. Reischauer, eds., Modernization of the Arab World (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 166-177; Harry B. Ellis, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today," in Georgiana Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 118-147; Clarence O. Huntley, "Arab Versus Jew: The Evolution of Two National Strategies," Naval War College Review, vol. 22, no. 3 (November 1969), pp. 69-92; David P. Forsyth, "UNRWA, The Palestine Refugees, and World Politics," International Organization, vol. XXV, no. 1 (winter 1971), pp. 26-45; Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968). See also the comments contained in Malcolm H. Kerr, ed., The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975). John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September (London: Frank Cass, 1973), however, prefers to trace the conflict's origins back to the Roman conquest of Palestine, arguing that the

Palestinians have historically been deprived of their political rights. In sharp contrast, Richard J. Ward, Don Peretz, and Evan Wilson, The Palestine State: A Rational Approach (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977) prefer to focus on the very contemporary problem of what to do about the Palestinians.

(4) Richard Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," Comparative Politics, vol. 2, no. 2 (January 1970), pp. 147-168.

(5) See: Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959).

(6) Ottomanism was one of several ideologies espoused by reforming Ottoman elites in the 19th century. Basically, it was designed to bridge existing local identifications rooted in traditional patterns of self-contained communal organization (millets). The ideological consequence of this organized localism was the maintenance of distinct, self-reinforcing ethnic and religious identifications: primordial identities. To counter this, some Ottoman nationalists argued that a new, over-arching political identity should be created, one that would serve to focus political identifications and loyalties on the institutions of the empire. The conceptual framework for this loyalty was the notion of Ottomanism: all citizens of the Empire were to be equal among themselves and equal in their political relationships to the government. To achieve this equality, these elites inaugurated a series of reforms, collectively known as the Tanzimat, which were designed to organize and rationalize Ottoman political, administrative, and economic institutions. The result was a nationalist reaction, first on the part of Christians per se in the Balkans, and then on that of Arab populations. On Ottomanism and Ottoman reforms in general see: Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962); Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2nd ed., vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Kamal H. Karpat, "Modern Turkey," in P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lampton, and Bernard Lewis, eds, The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 527-565.

(7) The "classic" history of the development of Arab nationalism in the Levant in George Antonious, The Arab Awakening (New York: Capricorn, 1965). See also: C. Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," The Middle East Journal, vol. 16, no. 2 (spring 1962), pp. 145-168; Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Malcolm H. Kerr, Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand,

1969); Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (London: Frank Cass, 1974); Ward et al, pp. 3ff.

(8) There is considerable controversy over the nature of British pledges contained in the Husayn-McMahon exchanges. Partly this is due to the fact that the exchanges were part of a series of negotiations between the British and several European governments, negotiations in which the territory of the Ottoman Empire was used as a bargaining counter (in the best imperialist tradition) to entice these governments to enter the war on the British side. It should be remembered that World War I started in July 1914, and by 1915-1916 the fighting in Europe had settled down into a grinding trench war. Given these military conditions, British policymakers were naturally anxious to add as many allies as they could, and, given the balance of power politics of the time, non-Western territory was perceived and used as a component of national power. Partly also, there was a built-in element of bureaucratic politics in the British foreign policy apparatus. In the case of the Middle East, two policy elites – one in London and one in the India Office – vied for control of British Middle Eastern policy.

(9) See: McMahon Letter of October 24, 1915, reprinted in Khouri, Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 359; Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs; John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961); George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959) for general accounts of the politics of these negotiations.

(10) For contrasting views see: Yasir 'Arafat, Address to the UN, November 13, 1975; Henry Cattan, Palestine, the Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1969), chap. 1; Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation," in John W. Halderman, ed., The Middle East Crisis (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969), pp. 5-31; Shabtai Rosenne, "Directions for a Middle East Settlement – Some Underlying Problems," in Halderman, Middle East Crisis, pp. 44-67; W.T. Mallison, "The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law," in Ibrahim Abu-Lubhod, ed., The Transformation of Palestine (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 61-111.

(11) Mandate for Palestine, 24 July 1922, reprinted in Khouri, Arab-Israeli Dilemma, pp. 361-362.

(12) Rony E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict (Geneva: Librarie E. Droz, 1959), p. 30. Arab opposition to Jewish immigration dates from its beginnings in the 1880s, and Arab leaders were apparently extremely sensitive to the potential threat from political Zionism from the first. See: Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," in Albert Hourani, ed., Middle Eastern Affairs, St. Anthony's Papers, no. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 77-107.

(13) John Ruedy, "The Dynamics of Land Alienation," in Abu-Lughod, Transformation of Palestine, pp. 119-138; Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in ibid., pp. 139-163. See also: J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1950); John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate (London: The Cresset Press, 1959); William R. Polk, David Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

(14) David Waines, "The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance," in Abu-Lughod, Transformation of Palestine, pp. 207-236; Tom Bowden, "The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936-9," Middle East Studies, vol. 11, no. 2 (May 1975), pp. 147-174; Polk et al., Backdrop to Tragedy, pp. 241ff.; Ward et al., Palestine State, pp. 12ff; Taysir Nashif, "Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VI, no. 4 (summer 1977), pp. 113-121; Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate," in William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 7-41; Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 184.

(15) There appears to have been a heavy Muslim Brethren influence in the Revolt, an influence which has persisted into later Palestinian organizations, especially Fatah. In particular, the Black Hand led by Shaykh 'Izz al-Din Qasim is a concrete organizational link between the Brethren, the Arab Revolt, and Fatah, see below.

(16) James P. Jankowski, "The Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936-1939," Muslim World, vol. LXIII, no. 3 (July 1973), pp. 228-229. In terms of numbers, some 10,000 Palestinians took part in the revolt; about 3,000 Palestinians were killed or wounded in the fighting.

(17) The Haganah (Defense), a secret militia, had been formed in the early 1920s to defend Jewish settlements against Arab attacks. By 1936 its membership had been expanded to an estimated 10,000 trained and armed personnel. Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, p. 42.

(18) Extracted from Harry B. Ellis, The Dilemma of Israel (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1970), p. 22.

(19) The Palmach (Plugot ha-Nechatz, "strike units") was originally formed of some 1,500 youths and secretly trained by the British Army in 1942. Its initial mission was to function as a partisan unit in the event of a German occupation of Palestine. It later formed the nucleus of the command force of the Haganah.

The Irgun (ha-Irgun ha-Zvei ha-Leumi be-Erez Yisrael), "National Military Organization in Palestine" was the military arm of the Revisionist Party of Vladimir Jabotinsky. Its organizational origins go

back to a splinter off the Haganah, the Haganah B, formed in 1931 by Haganah commanders in the Jerusalem area. The Haganah B itself was not part of the Revisionist Party, but the Revisionists supplied most of its officers and recruits. Although the Irgun began operations under this name in 1938, its activities apparently began a year earlier.

The Stern Gang, named after its leader Avraham Stern, was a radical splinter off the Irgun. In 1940 Stern and a small group of followers broke with Irgun leadership over the latter's temporary suspension of terrorist activities. For details, see Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, pp. 92-93, 164-166, 242-244, and source cited in note 18.

(20) Samuel L. Sharp, "Israel (1945-1948)," in D.M. Condit, Bert Cooper, Jr., and others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 2. (Washington, D.C.: Social Science Institute, The American University, 1967), pp. 409-430; See also: Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Secker & Warburg, 1960); Netanel Lorch, Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949 (Hartford, Conn: Hartmore House, Inc., 1968); Yigal Allon, Shield of David (New York: Random House, 1970); R.D. Wilson, Cordon and Search (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1949); John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957); "Palestine (1945-1948)," in Andrew R. Molnar et al, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1963); R.N. Anderson, "Search Operations in Palestine: The Problem of the Soldier," The Army Quarterly, vol. LV (January 1948), pp. 201-208; Edgar O'Ballance, "Palestine and Afterwards," The Army Quarterly, vol. LXVIII (April 1954), pp. 121-128; Nafez Nazzal, "The Zionist Occupation of Western Galilee,1948," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. III, no. 3 (spring 1974), pp. 58-76; Fauzi al-Qawuqji, "Memoirs, 1948," I and II, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. I, no. 4 (summer 1972), pp. 27-58 and vol. II, no. 1 (autumn 1972), pp. 3-33, for summaries of the fighting.

(21) See the interpretations of factors leading to this decision by: Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel: Palestine from Balfour to Bevin (London: The New English Library, Ltd., 1965); John Snetzinger, Truman, The Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974). See also the recently declassified materials contained in Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), pp. 999-1328.

(22) See: Cattan, Palestine, the Arabs and Israel, pp. 33ff; Nabil Elarabi, "Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partisan Resolution and the 1949 Armistice," in Halderman, Middle East Crisis, pp. 97-109; George J. Tomeh, "When the UN Dropped the Palestinian Question," Journal of the Palestine Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1974), pp. 15-30.

(23) Contrast: Refugees in the Middle East: A Solution in Peace, (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Israel, 1967), p. 20, with Cattan, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel, pp. 52-66.

(24) Gabbay, Political Study of Arab-Jewish Conflict, p. 175; Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 30. Both use figures provided by the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East.

(25) Don Peretz, The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1969), p. 14.

(26) Ibid., p. 16.

(27) Abba Eban, "The Refugee Problem," in Walter Laqueur, ed., The Israel-Arab Reader (New York: Citadel Press, 1968), pp. 11, 151-164, is a concise statement of the Israeli position.

(28) Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," in ibid., pp. 143-151, articulates the Arab argument. See also: Childers, "The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees," in Abu-Lughod, Transformation of Palestine, pp. 165-202; David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), pp. 108-146. For a contemporary account of the fighting at Dayr Yasin see The Times (London), 10, 12, 13 April 1948. Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), offers a highly controversial account which appears to support the Arab version of events.

(29) Polk et al., Backdrop to Tragedy, p. 291.

(30) See: ibid., p. 290; Gabbay, Political Study of Arab-Jewish Conflict, p. 98; Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 34. Polk et al. and Safran (who was an eyewitness) state that there were appeals by Arab leaders to evacuate, and that there was expulsion of Palestinians by Israeli forces. See also: Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach," Commentary, vol. 59, no. 1 (January 1975), pp. 32-48, for a similar analysis.

(31) Peretz, Palestine Arab Refugee Problem, p. 10; Pablo De Azcarate, Mission in Palestine, 1948-1952 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 16-66. Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), pp. 162-165, defends the attack on Dayr Yasin by arguing that it was a heavily defended Arab strongpoint. But he too concludes that the spread of news of its fall contributed to the Arab panic. See also: Samuel Katz, Days of Fire (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968); Manya Mardor, Haganah (New York: New American Library, 1964); Nathaniel Lorch, Edge of the Sword (New

York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1961). On the Israeli use of psychological warfare techniques in 1948 see: Leo Heiman, "All's Fair," Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 48, no. 6 (June 1964), pp. 37-40.

(32) Gabbay, Political Study of Arab-Jewish Conflict, pp. 169ff.

(33) These estimates represent only a rough outline of the geographical distribution of Palestinians.

(34) Lebanese sources put the number of Palestinians in Lebanon much higher, estimating some 275,000 in camps and 95,000 outside of camps, for a total of 360,000. Arab World Weekly, April 14, 1973.

(35) Some sources give much higher figures for 1979: a total of 430,000 to 480,000 in the entire Arabian Peninsula. Of these some 240,000 to 260,000 are in Kuwayt, 40,000 in Qatar, 40,000 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), plus smaller Palestinian communities in Iraq, Bahrayn, and Oman. These, together with the 110,000 Palestinians in Saudi Arabia, make up the total. See Arab Press Service (September 26-October 3, 1979. Note that there is a definitional problem here: some 150,000 Palestinians in the Arabian Peninsula are also counted as residents of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon because their families live in these countries.

(36) Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs in Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 3; Janet L. Abu Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in Abu Lughod, Transformation of Palestine, pp. 139-163; Edward Hagopian and A.B. Zahlan, "Palestine's Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. III, no. 4 (summer 1974), pp. 32-73; Gabbay, Political Study of Arab-Jewish Conflict, pp. 165ff; PLO estimates reproduced in The Middle East, no. 28 (February 1977), p. 14; Maghreb-Machrek (Paris), April, May, June 1978, pp. 82-83, translated in Joint Publications Research Service hereinafter cited as JPRS, 22 August 1978, pp. 1-3.

(37) Don Peretz, "The Arab-Israeli War: Israel's Administration and the Arab Refugees," Foreign Affairs, vol. XLVI, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 336-346. See also: Louise W. Holborn, "The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem," International Journal, vol. XXIII, no. 1 (winter 1967-1968), pp. 82-96; Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat, "Palestinian Refugees of 1967: A Sociological Study," Muslim World, vol. LX, no. 1 (April 1970), pp. 123-142.

(38) Naturally, there is a good deal of controversy about which side started the fighting. For contrasting views see: Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Massive Retaliation in Arab-Israeli Relations," Middle East Journal, vol. 20 (Autumn 1966), pp. 435-455; Michael C. Hudson, "The Arab States; Politics Toward Israel,: in Abu-Lughod, Transformation of Palestine, pp. 309-336; Janice Terry, "Israel's Policy Toward the Arab

States," in ibid., pp. 337-354; Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), especially chap. 1-4; Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), chap. 1; Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., Publisher, 1967), chap. 9; Lt. General E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York: Obolensky, 1963); Commander Elmo Hutchison, Violent Truce (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956); Major General Carl Von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York: Schocken Books, 1967); Safran, From War to War, especially pp. 36ff; Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, no. 4 (July 1965), pp. 626-638; Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems," Foreign Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2 (January 1955), pp. 250-267.

(39) The Times (London), June 8, 1950; New York Times, January 23, 1952. In addition, many of the raiders were smugglers, and considered extremely dangerous by Israeli officials.

(40) Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 47-55.

(41) Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 281.

(42) Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Anchor Books, 1964) p. 47: For comments on a similar process in Algeria during the Revolutionary War see: Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press 1968, p. 69; Paul A. Jureidini, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 92. For general comments, see the following works and the literature cited therein: H.R.P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1949), pp. 526-531; Sania Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960) p. 39, 105; Raphael Patai, Society, Culture and Change in the MIddle East, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969); Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1972).

(43) See for example The New York Times, January 2, 1953, for a summary of the Israeli position concerning border raids.

(44) The Israeli publication, New Outlook, (Tel Aviv), is the contemporary voice of this stream of Zionist thought.

(45) UN Resolution 194, Article 11. See also: Forsyth, "UNWRA, The Palestinian Refugees, and World Politics," in International Organization but contrast: Amos Perlmutter, "Patrons in the Babylonian Captivity of Clients: UNWRA and World Politics," International Organization, vol. XXV, no. 2 (1971) pp. 306-308.

(46) See: L. Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed., vol. I ed. by H. Lauterpacht, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955) p. 117, 642 for the concepts of sovereignty and nationality as they are defined in international law.

(47) Cattan, Palestine, the Arabs and Israel, p. 7.

(48) Palestinian citizenship evolved into the uneasy status of a protected population under United Nations' trusteeship. See: Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), for the legal status of the Mandates per se; Oppenheim, International Law, p. 221, for the evolution of this status under the UN; and James N. Murry, Jr., The United Nations Trusteeship System (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), for the trusteeships themselves.

(49) See, for example: George J. Tomeh, "Legal Status of Arab Refugees," in Halderman, Middle East Crisis, pp. 110-124; Landau, Arabs in Israel; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (Beirut: The Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1969). For one view of the right of Palestinians to return to what is now Israel based on UN Resolutions and other international conventions see: W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, "The Right of Return," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. IX, no. 3 (Spring 1980), pp. 125-136.

(50) See: Gabbay, Political Study of Arab-Jewish Conflict, pp. 202-219, for a summary.

(51) Peretz, Arab Refugee Problem, pp. 34-38; But contrast: Joseph B. Schechtman, The Arab Refugee Problem (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), pp. 77-93.

(52) Eugene V. Rostow's comments during a discussion of the legal aspects of peace in the Middle East, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 64, no. 4 (1970), p. 82.

(53) See Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Fuad Jabber, The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1971) since revised and reprinted as part III of William S. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 186-198.

(54) Golda Meir interview, The Times (London) June 15, 1969.

(55) Embassy of Israel, Refugees in the Middle East, pp. 3-7.

(56) See John C. Harsanyi, "Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflict," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Relations and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 370-379.

(57) Malcolm Kerr, "The Arabs and Israelis: Perceptual Dimensions to Their Dilemma," in Willard A. Beling, ed., The MIddle East: Quest for an American Policy (Albany, N.Y.: The State University of New York Press, 1973) p. 31; Huntley, "Arab versus Jew" Naval War College Review; Note also the comments of an American fact finding mission in the area:

> At bottom, each side is filled with what seems to be absolute distrust of the other. The Israelis fear that the Arabs do not accept their existence, will not make peace if one were signed. The Arabs fear that the Israelis will not return any of the Arab lands now occupied and will, in time, demand more. At the heart of the peace-making problem is the challenge to find ways to put down those two great fears.

Search for Peace in the Middle East, (Philadelphia, American Friends Service Committee, 1970) p. 70. In general, see: Barry M. Blechman, "The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of Surrounding Arab Nations Directed at Israel," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 16, no. 2 (June 1972) pp. 155-181; Benjamin Beit Hallami, "Some Psychological and Cultural Factors in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Review of the Literature, ibid., pp. 269-280.

(58) Harkabi, Arab Attitudes, p. 459.

(59) Henry A. Kissinger, "Global Peace, the Middle East and the United States," The Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, September 16, 1975).

(60) See The Times (London), January 2, 1950, for an early description of the aftermath of 1948.

(61) Khouri, Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 164.

(62) Fawaz Turki, "To Be a Palestinian," Journal of Palestinian Studies, vol. III, no. 3 (spring 1974), p. 12.

CHAPTER 2

(1) Y. Harkabi, "The Palestinians in the Israel-Arab Conflict," in Harkabi, Palestinians and Israel, pp. 24-47.

(2) Ironically enough, this Israeli argument has been echoed by some Arab ideologists who insist that the Palestinians were part of an "Arab Revolution," basically a movement of the Arab world away from Western domination, both political and cultural. Here the issue was articulated in terms of "regionalism" versus "nationalism." Palestinians were accused of turning their backs on their broader and true relations with the rest of the Arab world in favor of a narrow and divisive parochialism.

(3) Yehoshua Porat, "The Palestine-Arab Nationalist Movement," Middle East Information Series, vol. XXV (winter 1973-1974) pp. 11-16. Strategically, the AHC was divided over whether to deal with Zionist land alienation tactics in the context of an Arab worldwide confrontation, or to treat the issue as specifically Palestinian. The choice had considerable political ramification: If Palestine were dealt with in Arab terms, it would mean the advantage of numbers, aid from other Arabs. But these numbers could be brought to bear against Zionism only at the cost of submerging a Palestinian into an Arab identity. Alternatively, the AHC could opt to go it alone, foregoing outside Arab aid, but retaining Palestinian control of their own affairs.

(4) Arab Press Service (May 2/9, 1979):

In the period 1968-1978, Palestinians killed by Arabs:

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972-75	1976-78
Jordan	50	28	22,000	900	14	11
Syria	16	45	20	56	17	1,200*
Lebanon	2	240	90	34	950	24,000
Egypt	13	6	2	-	9	
Iraq	-	10	4	11	2	60
Libya	-	-	15	2	22	11
Other states (total of about 30 Palestinians	70	18	150	50	170	400
TOTAL	150	347	22,281	1,053	1,184	25,682

*Killed in fighting in Lebanon

During the 1968-1978 period the various Palestinian guerrilla organizaions are said to have killed about 2,000 Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, and about 15,000 Arabs, mostly during the

> Lebanon civil war in which the casualties inflicted by the Palestinians on right-wing Christians or Syrians are separate from those inflicted by leftist/Muslim parties. . . . Palestinian casualties inflicted by Israeli troops during combat or reprisal raids total about 5,000. Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip killed by Israeli occupation authorities in the same period are said to total about 70.

(5) The term "Resistance" has met with some objection outside the Arab world. Arguably, resistance implies the forceful defense of a territory by a resident population. Therefore, Palestinian cross-border raids into Israel proper are not resistance per se but rather armed aggression. This is generally the view taken by Israelis. Palestinians, however, argue that they are resisting an original and a continuing expulsion from their homeland. The term "Resistance," in addition, as it is used by Palestinian spokesmen, means also a much larger resistance; in this case, the resistance against any form of political, social, or cultural submergence into a non-Palestinian entity.

(6) See Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, for the standard treatment.

(7) Tom Little, "The New Arab Extremists: A View from the Arab World," Conflict Studies, no. 4 (May 1970), p. 5.

(8) See, for example, the collection of essays in: Abdeen Jabara and Janice Terry, The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution (Wilmette, Ill: The Medina University Press, 1971).

(9) See Halim Barakat, "Alienation and Revolution in Arab Life," reprinted in The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 4 (summer 1977), pp. 111-125.

(10) On this see Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964); Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

(11) Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Palo Alto, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964), pp. 5-6; and see also Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), for an expanded treatment.

(12) Johnson, Revolution.

(13) G.E. von Grunebaum, Modern Islam (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 335-390.

(14) Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1968), pp. 5-6. But see also: Shakir Mustafa,

"Arab Cultural Crisis and the Impact of the Past," The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 11 (Spring 1979), pp. 43-50; R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives," The Middle East Journal, 34, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 1-12.

(15) Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 8-9.

(16) Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Leonard Binder et al, Crisis and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 136; and Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 64-79, for a discussion of the concept of legitimacy.

(17) Binder, Ideological Revolution, p. 1.

(18) H.A.R. Gibb, "An Interpretation of Islamic History," in Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 22-24.

(19) See Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), for the most extensive treatment of the legitimacy crisis in the Arab world.

(20) The clique as a unit of action in traditional societies has been studied from a number of perspectives. See: Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande and James C. Scott, Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1977); John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite-A Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Robert Springberg, "Patterns of Association in the Egyptian Political Elite," in George Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), pp. 83-108; James Alban Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 44-49. A clique is a group of individuals tied together by a variety of shared attributes: personal friendship, descent, reciprocal political, economic or social interests. It is characterized by a rough equality among its members, and by a lack of any more formal organizational relationships. The term clique is synonymous with faction or cadre.

(21) Karl W. Deutsch originally formulated this concept in its contemporary form. See his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, vol. 55, no. 3 (September 1961), pp. 493-502. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Com-

munication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953). But see also Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order, especially pp. 1-92, for an extended use of this concept. Parenthetically, Deutsch identifies Karl Mannheim's theory of "fundamental democratization" as a major source for this concept.

(22) Huntington, Political Order, pp. 53-59.

(23) Ernest B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 464-465.

(24) This notion of the interplay between the patterned "givens" of a social or historical system and the uniqueness of individual human decisions is not especially new. In the Arab world it was articulated as early as the 14th century by the Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldun. The issue of how to assess the relative importance of systemic properties against those of individual actors has wracked the social sciences. For a discussion of this problem in terms of international systems theory see Haas, Beyond the Nation State, pp. 51-71.

(25) The notion of political generations has certain parallels with Manfred Halpern's concept of the New Middle Class, in that both point to a shared outlook based on some other common characteristics: In Halpern's usage, this characteristic is a common "class" membership, class being here defined as membership in the middle ranges of bureaucratic organization and some Western education; the common outlook of this class is therefore the product of a shared pattern of organizational socialization. See: Manfred A. Halpern The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 51-78. The conception of political generations, on the other hand, is much more a communications phenomena: the impact of communications about an event which affects populations that are sufficiently socially mobilized to respond to these communications. Here the factor of socialization, or rather "dis-sociation," is that of social change in general, rather than specific organizational pressures.

(26) The concept of social metastasis is Johnson's, see his Revolution, p. 9.

(27) Johnson, Revolution, pp. 12-13.

(28) Ali Hillal Dessouki, "Arab Intellectuals and al-Nakba: The Search for Fundamentalism," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1973), pp. 187-196.

(29) See the most famous of these: Constantine Zurayq, The Meaning of the Disaster, trans. R. Baylie Winder (Beirut: Khayat's, 1956).

(30) For example, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, n.d.).

(31) See the comments of Walter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 90-91; The Times (London), May 20, 1967, for summaries of the propaganda barrage and its effects.

(32) New York Times November 26, 1973. Trever J. LeGrssick, "Some Recent War-Related Arabic Fiction," The Middle East Journal, vol. 25, no. 4 (autumn 1971), pp. 491-505; Nissim Rejwan, "The Impact of the June War on Arab Intellectuals," New Outlook, vol. 14, no. 8 (October-November 1971), pp. 25-34.

(33) Eliezer Be'eri, "A Note on Coups d'Etat in the Middle East," The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 2 (1970), pp. 123-130.

(34) Haas, Beyond the Nation State, p. 473.

(35) See Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Charles F. Gallagher, "Language, Culture and Ideology: The Arab World," in K.H. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 199-231.

(36) These are set forth in greater detail in: Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 3-13. The term organization needs some definition. As used here it means any social entity characterized by (a) a set of patterned relationships which have some persistence and stability over time and (b) a set of perceptions and beliefs that are shared by individuals within the aforementioned relationships. The relationships are usually described by the term "structure" and the perceptions and beliefs are defined as a "culture," or "subculture." As such, these entities can run the gamut from informal, ad hoc groupings to highly structured bureaucratic organizations. Formal organizations, as a distinct category of organizations, are those which are self-consciously created by their members to carry out some defined purpose. Note that rationality and calculation are thus part of the definition of a formal organization. For a series of definitions incorporating the notions of rationality and calculation, see Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1962), pp. 2-8; Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 20-21; Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 1-3.

(37) See Binder, Ideological Revolution; George I. Blanksten, "Transference of Social and Political Loyalties," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Society (UNESCO: Mouton, 1963), pp. 175-196; Hudson, Arab Politics.

(38) Hudson, "Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement," Middle East Journal.

(39) Elia Zurek, "Toward a Sociology of the Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VI, no. 4 (summer 1977), pp. 3-16.

(40) See Joel S. Migdal, ed., Palestinian Society and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), for an extensive treatment.

(41) See Harkabi, Palestinians in Israel-Arab Conflict; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), for a summary of the theoretical literature on the causes and consequences of marginality.

(42) Mahmud Darwish, "Lover from Palestine," in Sulafa Hijjawi, trans. and ed., Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine (Baghdad: al-Jumhuriya Printing House, 1968), pp. 19-22; see also: John Cooley's extensive and sympathetic treatment in his Green March; Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Wells of Bitterness: A Survey of Israeli-Arab Political Poetry," The Arab World, vol. XVI, no. 2 (February 1970), pp. 30-36; Naseer Aruri and Edmund Gareeb, eds., Enemy of the Sun (Washington, D.C.: Drum and Spear Press, 1970); Jabra I. Jabra, "The Palestinian Exile as Writer," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VIII, no. 2 (winter 1979), pp. 77-87.

(43) Communique No. 1 from the Headquarters of the 'Asifah Forces.

(44) Quoted in al-Watan al-'Arabi, February 2, 1979, pp. 27-29.

(45) James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45.

(46) See Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," in Ideological Revolution, pp. 254-278.

(47) Nayif Hawatimah interviewed in Revolution Africaine (Algiers), February 8-14, pp. 27-32.

(48) See The Times (London), 2 January 1950, for a description; and Fawaz Turk The Disinherited.

(49) Yoram Ben-Porath and Emanuel Marx, Some Sociological and Economic Aspects of Refugee Camps (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1971), pp. 16 and 20.

(50) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 80-82.

(51) Hawatimah, "interview," in Revolution Africaine.

(52) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 79ff. See also: Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach," Commentary, vol. 59, no. 1 (January 1975), pp. 32-48.

(53) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 54.

(54) Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement Since 1967," in Willard A. Beling, The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973), pp. 101-125.

(55) Arab World Daily, October 6, 1967.

(56) Ibid. Fatah had previously refused to cooperate with any other groups. Arab World Daily, February 25, 1966. And as late as August 1969, the PFLP had refused to participate in the newly recognized PNC. Arab World Daily, August 5, 1969.

(57) Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 350-356, provides a concise account of the fighting. For a Resistance view of the battle, see "The Tale of Karameh," Arab Palestinian Resistance, IV, no. 3 (March 1972): 14-28.

(58) Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 313.

(59) Don Peretz, "Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (January 1970), pp. 322-333.

(60) Excerpted in Arab World, March 22, 1969.

(61) See the comments of Ahmad Baha al-Din, editor of al-Musawwar, summarized in Arab World Daily, May 13, 1969.

(62) See Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review, vol. LXIII, no. 3 (September 1969), pp. 689-718.

(63) Ibid., pp. 708-712.

(64) See George Lenczowski, "Arab Bloc Realignments," Current History, vol. 53, no. 316 (December 1967), pp. 346-351; Malcolm Kerr, Regional Arab Politics and Conflict with Israel (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, October 1969).

(65) An-Nahar Arab Report, Backgrounder, vol. 2, no. 39 (September 27, 1972).

(66) Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 130-132.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Ibid.; Fuad Jabber, The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, May 1971), p. 2.

(69) Arab World Weekly, September 13, 1965.

(70) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 47.

(71) Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 57.

(72) Ibid., p. 57; Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement," in Quest For an American Policy, p. 67.

(73) An-Nahar Arab Report, September 9, 1971.

(74) Hudson "Palestinian Resistance Movement" in Quest for an American Policy.

(75) The Egyptians, from Nasir onward, have consistently pursued a policy aimed at confining Palestinian political energies within a stable institutional structure, thereby making the Palestinians somewhat more predictable and controllable, and thus reducing their destabilizing potential. See chapter eleven.

(76) An-Nahar Arab Report, October 1972.

(77) Salah Khalaf in al-Hurriyah, August 25, 1969.

(78) Hudson, "Palestinian Resistance Movement," in Quest For an American Policy, p. 108.

(79) Arab World, March 3, 1971.

(80) Excerpted in Arab World, January 9, 1971.

(81) Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

(1) Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance," Middle East Journal, p. 297.

(2) Jabber, Palestinian Resistance, p. 2.

(3) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 64-65.

(4) Fatah (the colloquial pronunciation) or Fath (the classical pronunciation) meaning "conquest" or "victory," is a backward acronym from the short form of the organization's Arabic name, Harakat Tahrir Filastin (Palestine Liberation Movement). The definite article al should not be prefixed to Fatah. At first, Fatah's initials were read in the original Arabic order, producing the acronym HTF, which when pronounced as HATF, meant "death." Whether the acronym was reversed because of the negative connotations of this verbal interpretation, or whether it was reversed because of a growing sense of optimism, is not known. The term "Fath," it should be noted, refers to the Islamic conquest of Egypt in the seventh century. The term Fatihah, a derivation of the root verb Fataha, refers to the opening lines of each verse in the Qur'an.

(5) The Holy Qur'an, trans. A. Yusef 'Ali (New York: McGreger & Werner, Inc., 1946), p. 1391. The commentary is of some interest. According to Yusuf 'Ali, Sura 48 describes the events surrounding the signing of the Treaty of al-Hudaybiya in A.D. 628, a treaty which marks the emergence of Islam as a political force. The lesson to be drawn is that victory comes from "cool, courage, devotion, faith and patience":

> Victory and Help go with calmness of mind,
> Faith, Fidelity, zeal and earnestness,
> Not with greed, lukewarmness, or timidity,
> Discipline and obedience are essential
> For service. The rewards for service are not
> To be measured by immediate results,
> But accrue in countless hidden ways
> For Patience and Restraint. Be strong
> against Evil, but kind and gentle amongst
> Yourselves: the seed will grow and become
> Strong, to your wonder and delight.(p. 1390)

(6) Interview with 'Arafat in al-Sayyad, 23 January 1969.

(7) On the Brethren in general see: James Hayworth-Dunne, Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington, D.C., 1950); Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964); Ishak Musa Hussaini, The Moslem Brethren (Beirut: Kayat's, 1956); Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1961); Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

(8) The Times (London), September 30, 1965.

(9) Arab World Weekly, April 12, 1969.

(10) Sir Reader Bullard, ed., The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 198.

(11) Arab World, September 18, 1969.

(12) an-Nahar Arab Report, June 16, 1975; al-Ahram, November 23, 1976. The Brethren were also active in the "bread riots" of January 1977.

(13) The Times (London), October 24, 1951, July 25, 1953.

(14) The Times (London), January 18, 1952. Up to 1968, for example, 'Abd al-Nasir regarded Fatah as merely an arm of the Brethren. 'Arafat himself was responsible for the military training of engineering students. Salah Khalaf, "Leaves from the Memoirs of Abu Iyad – Palestinian without an Identity," al-Mustaqbal (Paris), trans. in JPRS, October 24, 1978; Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), pp. 17-19; Thomas Kiernan, Arafat: The Man and the Myth (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 61-65 for details.

(15) Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and the Middle East Crisis (Maxwell Air Force Base: The Air University, 1969), p. 17.

(16) On the raid and its historical consequences in starting the chain of events leading to the 1956 Suez War, see: Kenneth Love, Suez, the Twice Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), pp. 5 and 83; Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir interview in Akhir Sa'ah, May 29, 1956; Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), pp. 5 and 6; Abdullah Schliefer, "The Emergence of Fatah," The Arab World, vol. XV, no. 5 (May 1969), pp. 16-20.

(17) Love, Suez, p. 85 quoting an interview with 'Abd al-Nasir; Dayan, Diary.

(18) Christopher Dobson, Black September: Its Short, Violent History (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 6. Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 12; and Kiernan, Arafat, p. 21, are in accord.

(19) Early in its organizational career, Fatah either allied itself with or absorbed a number of fundamentalist Islamic groups on the fringes of the Brotherhood. Among them: the Ibad al-Rahman (Worshippers of the Merciful), a Lebanese organization; the Islamic Liberation Party of

Shaykh Taqi al-Din Nabhani, a Jordanian group; and the Organization of the Vanguard of Self-Sacrifice for the Liberation of Palestine, a descendent of an earlier Palestinian group, the Black Hand, but which had transferred its operations to Syria and Egypt. See Yaari, Strike Terror, pp. 29-43, for details.

(20) See: J. Gaspard, "Palestine: Who's Who Among the Guerrillas," New Middle East, no. 18 (March 1970), pp. 12-16. The SNSP-Fatah alliance in Lebanon was based on a joint anti-Syrian stance: The SNSP had been hostile to the Syrian Ba'th Party since the mid 1950s; as a consequence, its leadership had developed pro-Iraqi and pro-Libyan orientations (both were opponents of the Syrians), and received support from these countries during the fighting.

(21) When the guerrilla leaders were concealing their identity, they went only by noms de guerre beginning with "Abu" ("father of"). Abu 'Ammar would indicate that 'Arafat may have a son named 'Ammar. Therefore: Yasir 'Arafat = Abu 'Ammar; Salah Khalaf = Abu Iyad; Khalil al-Wazir = Abu Jihad; Faruq al-Qaddumi = Abu Lutf. There is, apparently, more to these noms de guerre than just secrecy; there is an Islamic symbolism. In addition to meaning "father of 'Ammar," Abu 'Ammar can also be an allusion to a historic figure, 'Ammar ibn Yasir, a companion of the Prophet and a courageous warrior in the early battles of Islam. See: Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," Commentary, vol. 61, no. 1 (January 1976), pp. 39-49, especially p. 42, for this interpretation. Kiernan states that 'Arafat took the name Yasir out of respect for the Palestinian hero Yasir al-Birah, Arafat, p. 80.

(22) See Quandt's comments, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 89.

(23) Cooley adds Yahya Ghavani to the list of original Fatah leaders, pointing out that he and 'Arafat formed the first Fatah cell in Kuwayt.

(24) Cooley, Green March, p. 90; Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 83. Al-Najjar and 'Udwan were later killed during an Israeli raid on Fatah headquarters in Beirut, April 10, 1973. The raid created on internal crisis in Lebanon. For details see: Egyptian Gazette, 12 April 1973; Arab Action (New York) April 16, 1973. See: Khalaf, "Memoirs", al-Mustaqbal, for details on the raid. PLO spokesman Kamal Nasir was also murdered.

(25) But cf. Kiernan, Arafat, p. 22, for the argument that 'Arafat was born in Gaza instead.

(26) Albert Parry, Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1976), p. 452.

(27) Yasir 'Arafat interview with Oriana Fallaci, reprinted from L'Europeo in The New Republic November 16, 1974, pp. 10-12, especially p. 12.

(28) But at a reduced level: it was not until Boumedienne took over in 1965 that Algerian arms began flowing to Fatah. Khalaf, "Memoirs", al-Mustaqbal.

(29) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 13, 1974.

(30) See Norman Cousins description, "Last Chance for Peace in the Middle East," Saturday Review March 22, 1975, p. 13.

(31) Harkabi, Fedayeen Action, p. 36.

(32) an-Nahar Arab Report, December 8, 1975.

(33) Ibid.

(34) an-Nahar Arab Report, August 6, 1973, October 9, 1972.

(35) an-Nahar Arab Report, December 29, 1975.

(36) al-Hayah, March 31, 1970, as summarized in The New Middle East, no. 20 (May 1970), p. 9.

(37) Khalaf, "Memoirs," al-Mustaqbal.

(38) Arab World Weekly, November 23, 1974.

(39) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 5, 1976.

(40) Edgar O'Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967-1972 (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), p. 27.

(41) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 5, 1976. In line with this thinking, al-Wazir is said to have planned the Munich massacre of September 1972 and the raid along the Haifa-Tel Aviv Road in March 1978.

(42) Khalil al-Wazir interview in Nea Efimeridha, May 13, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereinafter cited as FBIS, 17 May 1978.

(43) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 12, 1976.

(44) Abu Lutf (Faruq al-Qaddumi) interviewed by Oriana Fallaci in Look, June 30, 1970, pp. 25-26. See also the Italian text in L'Europeo, March 19, 1970, p. 26.

(45) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 16, 1973; Arab World Weekly, April 14, 1973.

(46) Quoted in an-Nahar Arab Report, January 5, 1976.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne, p. 74. For a somewhat differently phrased version see al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyah, no. 22 (January 1970), p. 4; an-Nahar Arab Report, February 11, 1974; The Palestine National Liberation Movement; al-Fatah (mimeo, n.d.), pp. 13-14.

(49) Appendix 3 contains the Palestine National Covenant.

(50) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, pp. 29-31; Cooley, Green March, p. 92. The main training camps were set up outside of al-Hama and Maysalum. Even before al-Jundi, Col. Ahmad Suwaydani had made contact with Fatah. Suwaydani, like current Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas, espoused a theory of guerrilla war. Unlike Talas who feels that guerrillas play a secondary role, however, Suwaydani felt that a full-fledged war of popular liberation along Maoist lines was the correct strategy for dealing with Israel. See: Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 56.

(51) According to Salah Khalaf, "Memoirs", al-Mustaqbal, Hafiz al-Asad was also one of Fatah's early supporters. In his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Syrian Air Force, al-Asad brokered arms shipments from Algeria to Fatah.

(52) Time, June 28, 1965.

(53) Cooley, Green March, pp. 94-95. A tactic which was apparently adopted in the case of the BSO.

(54) Time, June 18, 1965.

(55) Abu Lutf, in Look, p. 25.

(56) Time, June 18, 1965.

(57) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 31.

(58) Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne, p. 70.

(59) John M. Mecklin in Fortune July 1, 1970, p. 88.

(60) Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 1970.

(61) Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.

(62) Abu Lutf, in Look, p. 26.

(63) Abu Iyad in al-Tali'ah, (June 1969), pp. 66-67 and in Dialogue with Fatah, p. 46.

(64) Chaliand, Resistance, p. 67.

(65) See Appendix 15.

(66) Chaliand, Resistance, p. 67; Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah statement on Amman Radio, March 24, 1973.

(67) Arab World Weekly, March 22, 1969.

(68) al-Sayyad, October 13, 1971; Arab World Weekly, October 2, 1971.

(69) A pattern not significantly different from standard Arab coalition politics.

(70) For example, prior to the Egyptian/Saudi rapprochement of 1971, the right opposed any dealings with the Egyptians on the grounds that these would alienate the Saudis. This viewpoint was overruled by a coalition of centrsits – principally 'Arafat and al-Qaddumi (who has been consistently in favor of good relations with Egypt) – and leftist leader Khalaf. Later, these coalitions shifted in response to Egyptian/Saudi shifts. An-Nahar Arab Report, September 7, 1970, March 23, 1970; Arab World, October 14, 1971; Arab World Weekly, January 20, 1973; an-Nahar Arab Report, January 23, 1973.

(71) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 26, 1973; 'Arafat's own role is unclear. Obviously he acted as a mediator, yet there are some reports which identify him as being "pro-Egyptian." He had a number of meetings with the late King Faysal in Riyadh (flown apparently in Faysal's private jet) between 1971 and 1973. In addition, he was angered by what he described as al-Hasan's attempt to spread defeatism in the Resistance: "Those leaders who are tired of the struggle should give way to the strugglers of the revolution." an-Nahar Arab Report, January 29, 1973.

(72) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 17, 1972. It was also triggered by Husayn's plan for a federated West Bank-East Bank state.

(73) On Abu Nidal, see chapter 10.

(74) 'Ashur had been Fatah representative in Lebanon since 1967, and had established an armed militia in refugee camps. In this effort he was apparently aided by the Palestinian branch of the PPS. 'Arafat was forced to bring in large numbers of troops from Syria, including PLA units, to restore order. an-Nahar Arab Report, October 16, 1972.

(75) Arab World Weekly, October 21, 1972.

(76) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 29, 1973.

(77) al-Hasan declared apropos of attempts to negotiate a peace: "This is the resolution of the Palestinian resistance movement: any Arab leader who signs agreements with Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people will be shot." Tehran Journal, March 11, 1973. Khalid al-Hasan also supported BSO activities.

(78) 'Arafat pushed the creation of a special department within the PLO to: (a) encourage Jewish emigration from Israel; (b) engage in psychological and intelligence operations: and (c) contact possible Israeli allies. The original contacts were between RAKAH, the "Red Front" and MATZPEN (these an extension of earlier dialogues between the PDF and MATZPEN) – that is to say, anti-Zionist elements in Israel. These were expanded to include talks with a number of figures connected with the Israeli government circles. In March 1977, the PNC, however, voted against such expanded contacts, and after the election of Menahem Begin in May 1977, contacts appear to have been suspended. See: Middle-East Intelligence Survey, May 1-15, 1977.

(79) Cairo Radio, December 30, 1976; Arab Report and Record, January 1-15, 1977. The "self-criticism" was later extended to include Sa'id Kamal, Deputy head of the PLO Political Department, because of his pro-Egyptian sympathies.

(80) Arab Press Service, April 25, 1978.

(81) Anti-'Arafat factions within Fatah were also supported by Rejection Front groups.

(82) Khalaf interview excerpted in Middle-East Intelligence Survey, April 16-30, 1978. Alternatively, the pro-Egypt, pro-Saudi factions represented by Khalid al-Hasan supported this soft line.

(83) VOP (Baghdad), May 13, 1978, in FBIS, May 16, 1978.

(84) al-Ra'y al-'Amm May 11, 1978, in JPRS, June 27, 1978, pp. 13-14.

(85) Abu Da'ud interview in al-Dustur, July 10-16, 1978, pp. 14-16.

(86) al-Nahar, 18 April 1978.

(87) According to an Israeli source, 'Arafat's strategy was to accelerate Israeli withdrawal from the south by acquiescing in the UN presence. Hence the accord with Waldheim. Then the guerrillas would gradually infiltrate back into the south, avoiding UN forces. This strategy, however, depended upon rather tight control of Resistance personnel. See Middle-East Intelligence Survey, 16-30 April 1978.

(88) al-Watan, April 22, 1978; FBIS, April 28, 1978.

(89) al-Ra'y al-'Amm, April 24, 1978; FBIS, April 28, 1978.

(90) Middle East Intelligence Survey, April 16-30, 1978.

(91) Arab Report and Record, April 16-30, 1978; Abu Nidal and Abu Da'ud had reportedly been in contact since 1975: Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1978.

(92) Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1978; al-Watan, April 22, 1978, FBIS, April 28, 1978.

(93) al-Siyasah, April 30, 1979, FBIS, May 4, 1979.

(94) Arab Report and Record, June 16-30, 1978.

(95) Events, August 11, 1978, p. 17.

CHAPTER 4

(1) Patrick Seale, "The Emerging Political Map of the Middle East," Asian Affairs, vol. 64, no. 1 (February 1977), pp. 14-20.

(2) For the history of the ANM through 1968, see: Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).

(3) The ANM's political liabilities in terms of the hostility of Arab regimes to the ANM are also translated into liabilities for the Fronts.

(4) Cooley, Green March, p. 134.

(5) ANM recruitment patterns parallel those of the Ba'th to a striking extent: both were organized in an urban and educated environment.

(6) Moreover, the various branches operated independently of each other. For example, the Kuwayti branch headed by al-Khatib is said to have opposed an extension of Palestinian activities into Kuwayt, while at the same time opposing the Kuwayti government. Thus on the one hand, the Kuwayti ANM maintains close links with the PFLP, but on the other, it opposes the creation of PFLP cells in Kuwayt (which were established anyway). See Chapter 11; Arab Press Service, April 11-18, 1979.

(7) Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation, p. 46 for organizational details.

(8) Ibid., p. 47.

(17) Cooley, Green March, p. 133.

(18) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974.

(19) Alternatively identified as either the Arab Youth or the Young Arab Men.

(20) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974; Leila S. Kadi, "Origins of Armed Resistance," in Russell Stetler, ed., Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, San Francisco, Calif.: Ramparts Press, 1972), pp. 117-145.

(21) See Cooley, Green March, p. 136; Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation, p. 25.

(22) ANM cells were created a year or so before the formal announcement.

(23) Mertz, "Why George Habash Turned Marxist," Mid-East. Cooley gives 1953 as the date of the ANM's founding.

(24) an-Nahar Arab Report, June 1, 1970.

(25) al-Dustur, January 20, 1975.

(26) To be fair, Habash does not have the organizational resources at hand as does 'Arafat.

(27) Habash, however, is married and has two daughters. an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974.

(28) Israeli Defense Minister Dayan later defended the act by calling it a "protective mechanism" aimed at preventing sabotage and countering threats to Israeli security, and by saying that, as such, it was part of an Israeli policy of striking at Palestinian terrorists wherever they were.

(29) See: Events, April 21, 1978, p. 5; Arab Report and Record, March 16-31, 1978; interview with Subhi Ghawshah, "Reflections and Scenes from the life of Wadi' Haddad," al-Ra'y al-'Amm, April 14, 1978.

(30) Among these radicals was Nayif Hawatimah.

(31) See Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation, pp. 62-81, for details.

(32) Habash and Haddad had already organized the "Palestine Region" – which was also known as the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine – a title subsequently taken over by Hawatimah's Vengeance Youth. The Palestine Region recruited largely among Palestinians in the ANM. More specifically, it became the personal vehicle of Habash and Haddad.

(9) Ibid., p. 57.

(10) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 59; an-Nahar Arab Report, 7 September 1970; Churba, Fedayeen, p. 34.

(11) Robert Anton Mertz, "Why George Habash Turned Marxist," Mid-East, vol. X, no. 4 (August 1970), pp. 31-36.

(12) Ibid.

(13) The "Christian" element in the PFLP should not be overstressed. Its membership includes more Muslims than Christians; equally, Fatah has many Christian adherents. See Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 89 for a discussion of the religious identifications of resistance leadership cadres.

(14) It is possible that in addition, PFLP leaders are merely accepting the inevitable, that PFLP membership will always be small, partly because of its extremist political views, views which have only narrow popular appeal, partly because of its initial identification with Christians. Cooley quotes Edward Sa'b of Le Jour to the effect that "If George Habash had been named Ahmad Habash, the whole history of the Fedayeen movement and the Middle East might have been different." Cooley, Green March, p. 139.

(15) According to al-Usbu' al-'Arabi, Haddad was allegedly murdered in Baghdad. (He had apparently made Baghdad his headquarters for some time.) al-Usbu' al-'Arabi, September 26, 1977. There is confusion as to both the date and the nature of Haddad's death. al-Usbu' cited above fixes his death in July 1977; and indeed an official announcement of his death was made in November 1977. This announcement could, however, have been a cover story, since Haddad apparently planned the Mogadishu hijacking of October 1977. Nonetheless, later reports place his death in March 1978, and a large funeral was held in Baghdad in early April of 1978. Here again, the versions differ. One version says that he died of leukemia in an East German hospital (or alternatively in Baghdad after returning to Iraq). Yet again, there are stories that Haddad was poisoned by Iraqi intelligence; that Haddad was poisoned during the course of a dinner with Iraqi intelligence chief Sa'dun Shakir. The motive for Haddad's assassination derived from differences between Haddad's organization and the Iraqis. Accordingly, the Iraqis wanted Haddad to inform them in advance of his proposed operations so that they could limit them. Also, the Iraqis wanted to supplant Haddad's group with that of Abu Nidal. See: Middle-East Intelligence Survey, April 1-15, 1978; Arab Report and Record, March 16-31, 1978; al-Nahar, April 2, 1978; al-Hawadith, April 6, 1978, VOP (Clandestine), August 24, 1978 in FBIS, August 25, 1978.

(16) Some sources indicate that al-'Urwah goes back as far as 1918.

(33) Kadi, "Origins" in Palestine, pp. 134-135. The Vengeance Youth were also known as the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and published a few communiques under this name. Kazziha states that the Vengeance Youth was originally the military arm of the "Palestine Region" – a fact which may account for its use of the NFLP title.

(34) Excerpted in Mertz, "Why George Habash Turned Marxist," Mid-East, p. 31.

(35) PFLP Communique of December 11, 1967, excerpted in Arab World, December 12, 1967.

(36) Middle East Monitor, vol. II, no. 6 (March 15, 1972); an-Nahar Arab Report, February 15, 1975, September 22, 1975.

(37) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974. Hawatimah is a bachelor like 'Arafat.

(38) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 18, 1974.

(39) Ideological Manifesto issued by the OLS in December 1969, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, February 28, 1970.

(40) Arab World Weekly, July 24, 1971. OCAL's political aims parallel those of the PDF. Also Arab Press Service, October 31, 1979.

(41) Excerpted in Arab World, May 6, 1969. Parenthetically, the statement also saluted Communist China for "its correct universal attitude towards the Palestine Case."

(42) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 4, 1974; Arab Press Service, October 31, 1979.

(43) But these figures may be low. According to some sources, the PDF now approaches the PFLP in size; therefore a number of around 3,000-4,000 men may be more accurate. Arab Press Service, October 31, 1979, claims 5,000 men.

(44) Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne, p. 95.

(45) al-Nahar, February 19, 1969. Alternatively, Habash accuses the PDF of "infantile leftism": "Those people [of the PDFLP]suffer from infantile leftism. We are not as against the Arab regimes as they are. We criticize but collaborate with Arab regimes, as Mao did with the Kuomintang against the Japanese threat in China. In organizational matters, they say 'first build a Marxist-Leninist party and then fight'. We say, the revolutionary party is built in the revolutionary process itself." Interview with Habash, excerpted in Cooley, Green March, p. 143.

(46) al-Hurriyah, February 10, 1969.

(47) al-Hurriyah, September 1, 1969.

(48) See Cooley, Green March, p. 195 on these and other Israeli groups.

(49) Middle East Intelligence Survey, February 1-15, 1979.

(50) Nayif Hawatimah interview in al-Hurriyah, February 19, 1979, in JPRS, April 13, 1979, pp. 9-26.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Arab Report and Record, May 16-31, 1978.

(53) Middle East Intelligence Survey, February 1-15, 1979.

(54) Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 1970.

(55) al-Hawadith, February 21, 1969.

(56) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 62; elements splitting off from Hawatimah's PDF formed the rest. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 22.

(57) New York Times, November 5, 1968. PLO spokesmen asserted that Dablan had been expelled from the PLA.

(58) Kadi, "Origins", in Palestine, pp. 139-141.

(59) The Arab World, September 16, 1966.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Kadi, "Origins", in Palestine.

(62) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 85.

(63) The Times (London), November 5 and 6, 1968.

(64) al-Thawrah, November 6, 1968.

(65) al-Jabir was one of the original members of the Heroes of Return.

(66) Amman Radio, May 31, 1971.

(67) Excerpted in an-Nahar Arab Report, March 20, 1972.

(68) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 25, 1974.

(69) Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

(1) See Rosenau, Linkage Politics, pp. 44-49.

(2) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 67.

(3) See Quandt's approach, ibid, pp. 55-58.

(4) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 9, 1970.

(5) al-Dustur excerpted in Arab World Weekly, April 27, 1974.

(6) Excerpted from a press conference in Beirut, April 13, 1974.

(7) See Arab Press Service, February 2, 1976. The PLF's original leadership included Jibril, 'Ali Bushnaq, Fadly Shruru, Tahir Dablan, and Ahmad Za'rur.

(8) At the time, the PLF was divided into three operational units named after Palestinian heroes – 'Abd al-Qadir al-Hussayni, 'Abd al-Latif Shruru, and 'Izz al-Din al-Qassim. See: Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 60; Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, p. 81.

(9) Arab World Weekly, April 27, 1974.

(10) Before the June War of 1967 there were two separate organizations, one called the Palestinian Liberation Front and the other Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Apparently the first of the two was the one sponsored by the Syrian Ba'thists. Confusion also exists regarding Jibril's connection with guerrilla organizations known as the Heroes of the Return and the Road of the Return (Butrus identifies the latter with the Palestinian Liberation Front.)

(11) The Heroes of the Return, mentioned in the preceding footnote, was one of these groups.

(12) The GC account states that Jibril was overall military commander. Arab World Weekly, April 27, 1974.

(13) The Haganah before the establishment of the State of Israel had a leftist Wing A and a rightist Wing B.

(14) Arab World Weekly, July 12, 1975.

(15) Arab World Weekly, April 27, 1974.

(16) Algiers Radio, December 29, 1975.

(17) Arab World, June 2, 1970, pp. 11-12.

(18) Ila al-Amam, May 17, 1974.

(19) Arab World, June 2, 1970.

(20) Arab World, May 2, 1970.

(21) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 25, 1974. In 1974, the GC joined with the PFLP and ALF to form the Rejection Front. The GC's relationships with the PLO had always been strained. In June 1971 PASC police raided and closed GC offices in Lebanon following a shooting incident. In 1974, a fight between the GC and PDF brought not only PASC intervention, but a formal PLO condemnation.

(22) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 8, 1974.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Arab Report and Record, February 15-29, 1976.

(25) Arab Press Service, December 31, 1976.

(26) Washington Post, December 22, 1976.

(27) Events, August 25, 1978, p. 5; Arab Report and Record, August 16-31, 1978.

(28) Arab World, February 28, 1969.

(29) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 67.

(30) Arab World, November 28, 1969.

(31) Arab World, July 23, 1970. Gharbiyah was one of the original members of the PLO; he was enlisted in the PLO by Ahmad Shukayri himself.

(32) Gharbiyah announced his retirement from the PSF in March 1977.

(33) Arab World, November 28, 1969.

(34) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 67.

(35) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 14, 1975.

(36) Or Action Organization. The AGLP called itself in Arabic hay'ah which can be translated as either group or organization. The AGLP in some of its English language publications uses the term "Action Organization."

(37) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 67.

(38) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(39) Der Spiegel, February 16, 1970, p. 84.

(40) Arab World, June 15, 1970.

(41) Arab World Weekly, January 9, 1971.

(42) al-Anwar, January 10, 1971; Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 129.

(43) The Arabic name can be translated in either way.

(44) Gerard Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne, p. 62.

(45) Middle East News Agency (hereafter cited as MENA), Cairo, July 11, 1971.

(46) Literally almost nothing is known about this organization. It apparently existed for only a very short time, and recruited from Muslim Brethren or other conservative religious strata.

(47) During the 1975/1976 fighting in Lebanon, a number of al-Sa'iqah personnel defected to the PLO. These included a number of high-ranking al-Sa'iqah and Ba'th leaders as well. Hanna Bathish, identified as one of the top al-Sa'iqah leaders, split off to form his own group, the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation war, in July 1976. The following November there were reports of a major shakeup within al-Sa'iqah itself; Zuhayr Muhsin and Sami al-'Attari, two major leaders were to have their power curtailed, and a new man, Mahmud al-'Azzam was to take over the direction of military affairs. Arab Report and Record, November 16-30, 1976.

(48) The name al-Sa'iqah, "Thunderbolt," has been used by several groups. Because of this, the leaders of al-Sa'iqah at one point debated changing the organization's name to avoid confusion with similarly named groups.

(49) Arab World Weekly, September 29, 1973; Arab World, September 10, 1973; an-Nahar Arab Report, February 12, 1973.

(50) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 1, 1974.

(51) Churba, Fedayeen, p. 16.

(52) Ibid.

(53) See Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 64-65, for a discussion of Syrian political considerations in forming al-Sa'iqah.

(54) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 1, 1974.

(55) Bernard Lewis, "The Consequences of the Defeat," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 321-335.

(56) Jadid was one of the prime movers in the creation of al-Sa'iqah. Not much was known about him except that he was an 'Alawi from the Latakia area. He was educated in Syria and attended the Syrian Military Academy. As a youth he was apparently a member of the PPS and later joined the Ba'th. Always a hard-liner, Jadid rejected any compromise on the Arab-Israeli problem, and was an exponent of a war of popular liberation. Arab World Weekly, November 9, 1968.

(57) The civilian leadership also attempted the same strategy with the Syrian "Peoples Army," a militia force. Arab World Weekly, August 15, 1970.

(58) See Cooley, Green March, pp. 116-118, for details.

(59) Arab World, September 19, 1968.

(60) Excerpted in Arab World Weekly, November 8, 1969.

(61) Daily Star, Octber 4, 1973, October 5, 1973; Arab World Weekly, October 6, 1973; an-Nahar Arab Report, October 8, 1973.

(62) According to Colin Smith, the Schoenau raid was originally planned by the BSO which, in turn, turned the operation over to the PFLP, and that the professional terrorist known as "Carlos" was behind the attack. See: Colin Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 124-132. In fact, a number of groups seem to have cooperated in this operation. See chapter 10.

(63) See The Times (London), December 9, 1973, and the following series of articles, for this interpretation. For a discussion of the effect of the disinformation ploys used by the Egyptians and Syrians, and a summary of some of the recent literature on them, see: Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 18-50; also the comments of Gen. Chaim Herzog, "The Middle East War of 1973," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) vol. 120, no. 1 (March 1975), pp. 3-13.

(64) For details see The Guardian (Manchester), September 15, 1973; and for Syrian interpretation of this air battle, see al-Asad's comments made during an address on the anniversary of the Ba'th Revolution, March 8, 1974, reproduced in FBIS, March 11, 1974.

(65) Cairo Radio, (July 13, 1979), in FBIS, July 16, 1979. The Eagles ultimately surrendered to Turkish police.

(66) See Jerusalem Post (International Edition), July 29-August 4, 1979. Abu Tha'ir, described as the head of al-Sa'iqah's military security, specifically accused Egyptian intelligence of assassinating Muhsin. According to Abu Tha'ir, the Egyptians had made a number of previous attempts, and this latest effort was made in cooperation with Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service. Kuwayt News Agency (hereafter cited as KUNA), July 27, 1979, in FBIS, August 1, 1979. Bassam Abu Sharif of the PFLP added that the collaboration was the product of a secret meeting between the two intelligence services held in Cairo, May 3, 1979. Iraqi News Agency (hereafter cited as INA), Baghdad, July 29, 1979, in FBIS, August 1, 1979.

(67) New York Times, April 25, 1979.

(68) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 64; Arab World Weekly, April 18, 1970.

(69) an-Nahar Arab Report, December 8, 1975.

(70) Ibid.

(71) Voice of Lebanon (hereafter cited as VOL) Clandestine, August 3, 1979, in FBIS, August 3, 1979.

(72) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 1, 1974.

(73) Ibid.

(74) al-Yawm, September 24, 1974; also Arab World Weekly, September 29, 1973; an-Nahar Arab Report, October 15, 1973.

(75) Arab Press Service, February 2, 1976.

(76) For details see Michel H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria, The MIddle East Journal, vol. 8, no. 5 (spring 1972), pp. 122-135; Moshe Ma'oz, "Attempts at Creating a Modern Political Community in Syria," The Middle East Journal, vol. 26, no. 4 (autumn 1972), pp. 398-44; Eric Rouleau, "What is the Ba'th?," reprinted in Irene L. Gendzier, ed., A Middle East Reader (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 156-171. The net effect of this coup was to divide the Syrian and Iraqi parties into two warring camps.

(77) Iraq and Syria have been close to war on a number of recent occasions. See an-Nahar Arab Report, February 24, 1975, March 10, 1975, and May 5, 1975, for details.

(78) See Eliezer Be'eri, "A Note on Coups d'Etat in the Middle East," The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 2 (1970), pp. 123-130. Arab World Daily, February 5-6, 1969; O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 75.

(79) Arab World, January 15, 1970.

(80) Note too that, as is the case with organizations created by Syria and Egypt, the ALF served a control function. Because it dramatized the Iraqi commitment to the cause of Palestine, it provided a convenient rationale for controlling or even excluding other bona fide Resistance groups on the grounds that the ALF was all that was needed.

(81) Quoted in an-Nahar Arab Report, April 8, 1974.

(82) In the same way, the Syrian government utilizes either al-Sa'iqah or some PLA units as "fronts" for regular troops.

(83) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 8, 1974.

(84) The ALF joined the PFLP in fighting al-Sa'iqah units in Lebanon. Arab Press Service, December 31, 1976.

(85) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 8, 1974.

(86) Arab World, June 21, 1975.

(87) Israeli Radio, November 1, 1976.

(88) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 31, 1972.

(89) Excerpted from al-Hadaf, May 18, 1974.

(90) The Egyptian press began publicizing its exploits in December 1968.

(91) al-Hawadith, January 10, 1969, p. 10.

(92) Gen. Ahmad Isma'il, interview with al-Ahram, November 18, 1973.

(93) Gen. Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili, interview with al-Akhbar, November 21, 1973.

(94) al-Ahram, December 23, 1968.

(95) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(96) Arab World Weekly, April 27, 1974.

CHAPTER 6

(1) Maoist-oriented Arab communist factions, of course, are not.

(2) Although there are differences among scholars as to the potential attractiveness of communism, see: Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 6-27. One argument is Halpern, Politics of Social Change, pp. 150-162. The alternative position is that communism will eventually supplant nationalism in the area, and that communism and Islam share the same authoritarian doctrinal structure. A shift from Islam to communism would therefore be a matter of only minor changes in the substantive content of Arab political thought.

(3) See Halpern, Politics of Social Change, pp. 168-192, for an expansion on these points.

(4) World Marxist Review, vol. 11, no. 9 (September 1968), p. 53.

(5) Fahmi Salfiti in World Marxist Review, vol. 11, nos. 10-11 (October-November 1968), p. 89.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Arab World, June 20, 1970.

(8) Arab World, June 12, 1970.

(9) Arab World, July 24, 1971.

(10) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 8, 1974.

(11) Ibid. Estimates of al-Ansar's strength vary from 10 to 400.

(12) an-Nahar Arab Report, February 3, 1975.

(13) Arab World, July 19, 1975.

(14) al-Nahar, July 13, 1975.

(15) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 14, 1975.

(16) al-Nahar, October 22, 1973.

(17) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 14, 1975.

(18) Arab World, January 25, 1975.

(19) an-Nahar Arab Report, September 1, 1975.

(20) See al-Sadat's comments in an interview published simultaneously in 'Ukaz and al-Jumhuriyah, February 8, 1977, wherein he accused Communist elements of fomenting the riots of January 18-21, 1977. In 1978 these charges were broadened by Egyptian media to include stories of Communist plans to kill a number of Arab leaders, with teams of assassins trained in either Ethiopia or South Yemen. Ahkir Sa'ah, July 5, 1978.

(21) The PNF should not be confused with a Syrian-sponsored group with the same name. The Syrian PNF numbers about 400 and appears to have its headquarters in the Yarmuk camp, near Damascus. See: Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen, The Palestinian Movement in Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 29, for details.

(22) Arab World Weekly, February 27, 1971.

(23) Voice of Palestine (hereafter VOP) interview, August 3, 1973.

(24) The emergence of a "new middle class," a stratum of Arab society which is educated, salaried, and politicized has been analyzed by Halpern, Politics of Social Change and Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

(25) New York Times, November 24, 25, 1966.

(26) See I. Stockman, "The Changing Social Values of the Palestinians: The New Outlook on Life of the Arab Peasant," The New Middle East, no. 9, (June 1969), pp. 18-21.

(27) Ruz al-Yusuf, August 23, 1967.

(28) For various descriptions of Israeli occupation policies see: The Times (London), October 28, 1969; Don Peretz, "The Arab-Israeli War: Israeli's Administration and the Arab Refugees," Foreign Affairs, vol. XLVI, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 336-346; Nissim Rejwan, "Palestinians under Israeli Occupation: The Search for Identity," Midstream, vol. XVII, no. 2 (February 1971), pp. 43-52; Nimrod Raphaeli, "Military Government in the Occupied Territories: An Israeli View," The Middle East Journal, vol. XXIII, no. 2 (spring 1969), pp. 177-190; Yasir 'Arafat, "The Occupied Territories: Palestinians at the Crossroads," New Outlook, XV, no. 2 (February 1972), pp. 23-27; Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen Guerrillas Against Israel, pp. 91-99; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978).

(29) See Landau, Arabs in Israel.

(30) See Jiryis, Arabs in Israel, pp. 129-166, and Landau, Arabs in Israel, p. 92 for contrasting accounts of al-'Ard's activities.

(31) Translated in Jiryis, Arabs in Israel, pp. 132-133.

(32) New York Times, May 3, 1972.

(33) See Sir John Richmond, "After the Husayn Plan: What Hope for Palestinian Arabs?," New Middle East, no. 46 (July 1972), pp. 34-42. Most Arab commentators saw the plan as part of a concerted Jordanian/Israeli effort to undermine the Palestinian cause. For two months prior to the king's announcement, West Bank leaders had been sounded out, amid a flurry of rumors of Jordanian/Israeli peace negotiations. The Times (London), March 17, 1972. 'Arafat personally accused the king of having met with Mrs. Meir in 'Aqaba. New York Times, March 22, 1972.

(34) Communique of the PNC, April 10, 1974.

(35) Political Unity Program, June 28, 1972.

(36) Egyptian Gazette, April 12, 1973.

(37) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 6, 1975.

(38) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 6, 1975.

(39) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 6, 1975.

(40) As a consequence of their part in these activities, a number of PNF leaders including 'Abd al-Mayzar, Salih and Qamhawi were expelled by the Israelis in December 1973. The Times (London), December 10, 1973.

(41) Jerusalem Post, December 30, 1975.

(42) As a consequence of these actions, disturbances broke out in Nablus on March 7. The violence rapidly spread the length and breadth of the West Bank, Galilee, and in the Little Triangle. Israeli troops called in to restore order were confronted by road blocks and stones. The troops responded by shooting; several Arabs were killed, resulting in a fresh cycle of violence. The Arab mayors resigned; a general strike involving both West Bankers and Israeli Arabs was called for March 30, the "Day of the Land." See: Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1976.

(43) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 19, 1976.

(44) Ma'ariv, April 14, 1976.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Quoted in the New York Times, April 14, 1976.

(47) See New York Times, December 7, 1973 for an analysis of West Bank feeling. Also: Eli Redness, "The Day of the Land," in Ma'ariv, April 2, 1976, p. 16, for an Israeli commentary on the increased sense of Palestinian awareness among Israeli Arabs. On an official level an analysis of the political potential of this new awareness was produced by Yisra'el Qeniq, an official of the Interior Ministry. The Qeniq Plan as the report came to be known caused tremendous controversy within Israeli circles and outrage in Arab circles because it bluntly discussed the problems of permanently integrating Arab populations within Israel. See: FBIS, September 14, 1976.

(48) an-Nahar, October 22, 1973.

(49) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 27, 1974.

(50) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 6, 1975.

(51) It was also a strategy designed to bolster Soviet influence in the Arab world in the wake of the expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt in July 1972.

(52) Arab World Weekly, December 2, 1972.

(53) Junblatt was assassinated March 16, 1977, when his car was ambushed and machine-gunned by at least four gunmen. (His sister had been murdered previously.) Junblatt's assassination triggered bloody Druze reprisals against Christian villages in Lebanon, and these in turn threatened to expand into a major Druze uprising. The Syrian government, in particular, felt especially threatened; the Druzes in the al-Suwayda district of Syria had periodically risen against the government (the threat of a Druze uprising had been one of the factors contributing to the Syrian escalation of April-June 1967). And given the already tense situation in Syria as a consequence of the regime's de facto alliance with Christians and Israelis against Muslims, another Druze rebellion could have led to the regime's overthrow. Syrian fears were exacerbated by persistent Iraqi accusations that the Syrians, al-Asad's brother Rif'at in particular, had planned and carried out the assassination (INA, March 21, 1977); as a consequence, the Syrians requested and received Jordanian help in the form of troop movements into the al-Suwayda area. Junblatt was succeeded by his son Walid as head of the Junblatt clan, and presumably to the leadership of Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party and the Front.

(54) Arab World Weekly, December 2, 1972.

(55) Excerpted from Arab World Weekly, December 2, 1974.

(56) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 15, 1974 and August 2, 1974.

CHAPTER 7

(1) Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 18. See also Thomas S. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), for the analysis of ideology as applied to systems of ideas. For the Middle East in general, see: Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), pp. 3-18.

(2) Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 465.

(3) Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1936), p. 55.

(4) See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Douglas E. Ashford, Ideology and Participation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972); Apter, Politics, pp. 266-356; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 47-76, for summaries of the micro-analysis of ideology. Smelser, Collective Behavior, pp. 8-12.

(5) Shurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 17-23.

(6) See Quandt's strictures against too facile categorization of Palestinian ideologies along a left-right spectrum, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 111.

(7) See Muhammad Y. Muslih, "Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization," The Middle East Journal, vol. 30, no. 2 (spring 1976), pp. 127-140, for a similar categorization.

(8) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 17.

(9) Arab World, February 7, 1969.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ehud Yaari, "Al-Fatah's Political Thinking," New Outlook, vol. 11, no. 9 (November-December 1968), pp. 23-34.

(12) Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1966), pp. 33-34.

(13) Ibid., p. 73. See also Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited, pp. 43-74.

(14) Yaari, Strike Terror, quoting unnamed Fatah source.

(15) National Covenant, Article 17.

(16) See Emile A. Nakleh, "The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on the Palestinian Resistance," The Middle East Journal, vol. 25, no. 2 (spring 1971), pp. 180-200.

(17) Arab World Weekly, August 16, 1969, pp. 16-19.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Arab World Weekly, February 1, 1969.

(20) Arab World Weekly, September 13, 1969.

(21) 6 May 1970 Unity Agreement, Article 3.

(22) Khalid Fahum's remarks are summarizd in an-Nahar Arab Report, April 1, 1974.

(23) Fatah, al-Sa'iqah, PDF Working Paper, February 19, 1974.

(24) PFLP Working Paper, reprinted in an-Nahar Arab Report, April 27, 1974.

(25) George Habash, May Day speech, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, May 10, 1975.

(26) Compare this with Darwish's "Identity Card" in Aruri and Ghareeb, Enemy of the Sun, p. 2:

> Record!
> I am an Arab
> and my identity card
> is number fifty thousand.
> I have eight children
> and the ninth
> is coming in midsummer.
> Will you be angry?
>
> Record!
> I am an Arab
> without a name – without title
> patient in a country
> with people enraged.

(27) Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 73.

(28) Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1968.

(29) Arab World Weekly, December 16, 1969.

(30) See Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 95-96, Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 199; J. Gaspard, "Palestine: Who's Among the Guerrillas," New Middle East, no. 18 (March 1970), p. 12.

(31) National Covenant, Articles 13 and 15. See also the comments by Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 57-58.

(32) Arab World Weekly, December 6, 1969. This position, it should be noted, parallels that of the Muslim Brethren who also consider themselves to be outside of the normal range of politics.

(33) Arab World Weekly, September 13, 1969.

(34) Chaliand, Palestine Resistance, p. 3.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Arab World Weekly, February 8, 1969.

(37) PFLP Policy Statement, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, August 9, 1969.

(38) Arab World Weekly, March 1, 1969.

(39) ALF's Statement of Policy, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, September 6, 1969.

(40) Arab World Weekly, August 16, 1969, quoting al-Hadaf.

(41) Arab World Weekly, August 9, 1969, August 16, 1969. This is, of course, a restatement of Mao's analysis of class contradictions. Elsewhere, the PFLP simply quoted Mao directly. See: A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine (Amman: PFLP Information Dept., 1969), p. 7. The original source is Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, vol. 1, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 13.

(42) Arab World Weekly, August 9, 1969, August 16, 1969.

(43) Arab World Weekly, September 28, 1974.

(44) Arab World Weekly, February 1, 1969.

(45) Arab World, January 21, 1969; Arab World Weekly, February 1, 1969.

(46) Arab World Weekly, May 16, 1960.

(47) Arab World Weekly, February 1, 1969.

(48) Arab World Weekly, January 25, 1969 – Article 3 of Fatah's 10-point program: "The Palestinian action is committed to non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states provided the Arab states themselves do not make any reflection [meaning undermine] on the Palestine question or try to impose settlements of liquidation on the Palestinian people."

(49) Mao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), p. 88.

(50) Arab World Weekly, October 26, 1968. Here the influence appears to be that of Giap. See: Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's Army," in Russell Stetler, ed., The Military Art of People's War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 103.

(51) Article 7.

(52) Arab World Weekly, December 6, 1969.

(53) 'Arafat interview with Alia Solh, excerpted in Arab World, May 23, 1968.

(54) Yaari, Strike Terror.

(55) Arab World Daily, February 21, 1969, quoting Akhir Sa'ah.

(56) Ibid., 'Arafat interview with Solh.

(57) Arab World Weekly, August 9, 1969, again drawing heavily on Mao. See also A Strategy for Liberation, pp. 19-26.

(58) Arab World Weekly, September 22, 1969.

(59) Arab World Weekly, September 6, 1969.

(60) Arab World Weekly, February 8, 1969.

(61) In March 1971 the PNC held an acrimonious five-hour debate on the events in Jordan. The PFLP was attacked for starting the war by its multiple hijackings. PFLP spokesmen defended the actions, arguing that the conditions for the Jordanian move against the commandos were created by the Jordanian-Egyptian acceptance of the Rogers Plan. Other delegates argued that the resistance had overreacted to the Egyptian move. Arab World, March 3, 1971.

(62) al-Hurriyah, October 4, 1971.

(63) Kamal 'Udwan quoted in Arab World Weekly, January 23, 1971.

(64) See the excellent summary of post-Jordanian ideological divisions in Le Monde Weekly, January 27, 1971.

(65) See: Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent; Ashford, Ideology and Participation, pp. 65-113. The concept of cognitive dissonance refers to the phenomenon that humans tend to organize their information about the environment into logically related wholes, sometimes called cognitive or perceptual systems. When, however, the items of information do not fit, i.e., are dissonant, a tension is created, and there is a drive to bring the information back into consonance.

(66) Arab World Weekly, January 20, 1973.

(67) Excerpted from "Dialogue with Black September," al-Sayyad, September 13, 1972.

(68) Palestine News Agency (hereafter WAFA), September 11, 1972.

(69) Ibid.

(70) al-Sayyad, September 13, 1972.

(71) WAFA, September 11, 1972.

(72) al-Sayyad, September 13, 1972.

(73) Ibid.

(74) WAFA, September 11, 1972.

(75) Abu Hasan lecture at Beirut Arab University, in Arab World, December 3, 1969.

(76) Unity Agreement, Article 8.

(77) Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, p. 40.

(78) Chaliand, Palestininan Resistance, p. 3.

(79) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 63.

(80) See: Hudson, "The Palestinian Resistance," in Middle East Journal; Richard Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," for the thesis applied to Arab Nationalism in general.

(81) Smelser, Collective Behavior, pp. 312-313.

(82) Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 94.

(83) See: Lewis, "Return of Islam," Commentary.

(84) See: Lucian W. Pye, "Communications Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in Non-Western Societies," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 1 (spring 1956), pp. 249-256, on the general problem of political elites in the third world when confronted with the problem of communicating with an essentially politically unstructured population.

(85) Apter, Politics, pp. 292ff. Or alternatively, in Smelser's terminology, these ideologies define a "value-oriented movement." Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 313.

(86) Yasumasa Kuroda, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," The Middle East Journal, vol. XXVI,no. 3 (summer 1971), pp. 253-270. Rosemary Sayigh, "Sources of Palestinian Nationalism," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VI, no. 4 (summer 1977), pp. 17-40; Sylvie Mansour, "Identity Among Palestinian Youth: Male and Female Differentials," ibid., pp. 71-89; Tawfic E. Farah, "Political Socialization of Palestinian Children in Kuwait," ibid., pp. 90-102.

(87) See: Michael Johnson, "Political Bosses and their gangs: zu'ama and qabadayat in the Sunni Muslim quarters of Beirut," in Patrons and Clients, pp. 207-224; and the essays in Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966).

CHAPTER 8

(1) Yasir 'Arafat interview with Shafiq al-Hut in al-Watan al-'Arabi, July 7-13, pp. 18-22, in JPRS, September 18, 1978, pp. 15-28.

(2) Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, pp. 188-189.

(3) The Holy Qur'an, pp. 191-192.

(4) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, p. 153.

(5) Abu Lutf in Look, p. 26.

(6) VOP (Cairo), August 28, 1976.

(7) Arab Press Service, no. 153, August 30, 1976; Washington Post, August 29, 1976; VOP (Cairo), September 5, 1976.

(8) Estimate of the Institute for Palestine Studies in Free Palestine, vol. I, no. 2 (June 1969), p. 7.

(9) See: Bassem Sirhan, "Palestinian Refugee Camp Life in Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. IV, no. 2 (winter 1975), pp. 91-107; Yoram Ben-Porath and Emanuel Marx, Some Sociological and Economic Aspects of Refugee Camps on the West Bank (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1971), for descriptions of the demographic and educational characteristics of two samples of refugee populations.

(10) Nabil Sha'th, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. I, no. 2 (winter 1972), pp. 80-95; quote is from p. 95. One of the original designers of HLMA, Dr. Antoine Zahlan, also took on the task of analyzing the Arabs. His findings and conclusions are published in Science and Higher Education in Israel (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).

(11) "Samed Institute: Raises The Social And Educational Level of Its Workers," Palestine, August 15, 1978, reprinted in Palestine Digest, vol. 8, no. 6 (September 1978), pp. 17-18; The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1979; Le Figaro, August 21, 1979, in JPRS, October 9, 1979, pp. 1-3.

(12) See: George Rentz et al, The Palestine Resistance Movement Through 30 June 1970 (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1970), unpublished manuscript.

(13) Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in Dialogue with Fatah, pp. 33-34 and in al-Tali'ah, June 1969, p. 62.

(14) Khalaf in al-Hurriyah, August 25, 1969, pp. 4-5. A chart showing the distribution of Palestinians in Arab countries and their incomes in 1965 as given in al-Tali'ah, June 1969, p. 30.

(15) an-Nahar Arab Report, August 6, 1973.

(16) For details see Chapter 10.

(17) The Times (London), January 4, 1974; Jerusalem Post Weekly, June 10, 1975. See Chapter 10 for details.

(18) al-Qadhdhafi interview with John Ellison, The Daily Express, June 28, 1976.

(19) Arab Press Service, June 13, 1978.

(20) Cooley in The Christian Science Monitor, December 24, 1969.

(21) Middle East Economic Survey, vol. XIII, no. 18 (February 27, 1970), p. 10.

(22) Jeune Afrique, No. 471 (January 6-12, 1970), p. 31. Although Fatah and al-Sa'iqah were the main guerrilla organizations represented in the PLO before 1970, part of the contributions made to the National Fund was available for other guerrilla organizations. These have also developed their own sources of support, though nowhere on the same scale as that enjoyed by the PLO and Fatah.

(23) Mid-East, vol. X, no. 1 (February 1970), p. 29.

(24) al-Ahram, January 4, 1970.

(25) al-Nahar, February 19, 1969.

(26) al-Ahram, March 2,. 1970.

(27) al-Nahar, January 17, 1969.

(28) Quoted in Time, September 5, 1969.

(29) al-Ahram, February 28,-March 5, 1970.

(30) Details on the budget of the PLO released at the time of the seventh session of the Palestine National Council from May 30 to June 4, 1970 are given in the appendix. This budget indicates, in relative terms, the general pattern of funding and disbursement.

(31) Arab World Weekly, January 20, 1973.

(32) After submitting the report, 'Alami resigned and was succeeded by Dr. Yusuf Sayigh, a former economics professor at the American University in Beirut, who was in turn succeeded by Walid Qamhawi in 1974.

(33) an-Nahar Arab Report, February 26, 1973.

(34) Arab World, September 7, 1973.

(35) Arab Press Service, June 27, 1975. According to Israeli sources, these Palestinian personnel were both jet and helicopter pilots; the helicopters in question were gunships attached to the Iraqi Air Force. These pilots were theoretically to be made available to the Resistance, but in practice would probably be absorbed by units in the host countries. FBIS, March 20, 1979. By 1980, Arab sources were reporting that a small air force training base had been set up in Jordan at a site south of Amman, and that the Jordanian Air Force was supervising pilot training. Arab Press Service, June 18/25, 1980.

(36) Reportedly Egypt and Syria were to receive the lion's share of the total aid package, some $1,000 million apiece, followed by Jordan with $300 million and the PLO.

(37) Washington Post, November 6, 1978; Arab Report and Memo, November 6 and 13, 1978. The overall breakdown of the ten year, $3.5 billion per year fund was: Syria – $1.85 billion; Jordan – $1.2 billion; PLO – $400 million; occupied territories – $50 million. Washington Post, November 6, 1978.

(38) Gerard Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, pp. 2-3; Hisham Sharabi, "Palestinian Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness," Middle East Forum, vol. XLVI, nos. 2 & 3 (1970), pp. 19-64; Christopher S. Wren in Look, May 13, 1969, pp. 27-36; and Anon. in al-'Udwan wal-Fida'iyun, pp. 146-153. See also Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne.

(39) As a consequence of deteriorating PLO/Syrian relations caused by the fighting in Lebanon, Syrian authorities closed Fatah vehicle repair workshops and yards in Damascus. This, along with a Syrian prohibition on the movement of Palestinian vehicles on Syrian territory, effectively cut off Palestinian forces fighting in Lebanon from their major supply source. VOP (Clandestine), July 18, 1976.

(40) Arab World Weekly, September 16, 1972.

(41) "Libya's Foreign Adventures," Conflict Studies, vol. 41 (December 1973), p. 16. In Libya, British mercenaries are said to be instructing Palestinian frogmen in a variety of underwater techniques: sabotage, navigation, and diving. Similar frogmen camps were in operation in Sidon, Lebanon.

(42) Sharabi, "Credibility and Effectiveness," in Middle East Forum, p. 39.

(43) Chaliand, Movement, p. 2. Chaliand's descriptions of commando training are the most extensive to appear in a Western language.

(44) Sharabi, "Credibility and Effectiveness," in Middle East Forum, p. 39.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Ibid., see Anon., p. 151.

(47) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, pp. 97-98, 110.

(48) 6 May 1970 Unity Agreement, Article 11; Harkabi "Scope", p. 6.

(49) al-Sayyad, July 2, 1970. But in both Jordan and Lebanon, Palestinian women handled weapons and fought alongside men.

(50) Sharabi, "Credibility and Effectiveness," in Middle East Forum, p. 38.

(51) al-Sayyad, July 23, 1970.

(52) Ibid. Eligibility qualifications for Militia recruits parallel those for regular commandos: (1) loyalty to Palestinian cause; (2) a clean record; (3) obedience to orders of superiors.

(53) Liyanah Badr interview with PDF Militia leaders in al-Hurriyah, April 16, 1979, in JPRS, June 19, 1979, pp. 8-14.

(54) Ibid.

(55) Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in Dialogue with Fatah, pp. 43-44, and in al-Tali'ah, vol. 6 (June 1969), p. 66.

(56) Khalaf in Dialogue, p. 44, and al-Tali'ah, (June 1969), p. 66.

(57) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, p. 3. Works by other revolutionaries mentioned besides Debray have also been translated into Arabic.

(58) al-Sayyad, July 23, 1970.

(59) Wren, Look, p. 36.

(60) Chaliand, La resistance palestinienne, p. 91.

(61) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, pp. 157-158.

(62) Besides the sources cited in footnote 34, the following give material on the training of the Ashbal: al-Nahar, (January 1969), pp. 8-9; and p. 16; al-Hawadith, (March 28, 1969), pp. 10-11; al-Hawadith (June 6, 1969), pp. 13-15; al-Hawadith (August 1, 1969), pp. 10-13; al-Hawadith (December 12, 1969), pp. 10-13; and al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyah (January 1970), pp. 20-24.

(63) Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance, p. 5.

(64) Ibid., pp. 8-10.

(65) Fatah, (February 6, 1970), p. 5.

(66) On the role of Algerian women see: Juliette Minces, "Women in Algeria," in Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 159-171.

(67) The generic term for girls in training is zuhur (flowers).

(68) Nash'at al-Taghlibi in al-Hawadith (October 31, 1969), pp. 30-37, and in Akhir Sa'ah (November 19, 1969), pp. 13-15; Ghada Karmi,

"Liberation through Revolution for Palestinian Women," The Guardian (Manchester), May 14, 1976; Soraya Antonius, "Fighting on Two Fronts: Conversations with Palestinian Women," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VIII, no. 3 (spring 1979), pp. 26-45.

(69) al-Hadaf (November 29, 1979), p. 20. al-Taghlibi in al-Hawadith (October 31, 1969).

(70) The role of women also extends beyond their participation in commando organizations. A number of women have joined various Arab political parties, such as the Ba'th or the ANM. In addition, a specifically women's organization, The General Union of Palestine Women, is affiliated with the PLO. Originally founded in Jerusalem in 1964 (its headquarters was later moved to Beirut), it has extended branches to most Arab countries. The Guardian (May 14, 1976).

(71) "Interview with Leila Khalid," in Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 237. See the comments concerning PFLP female militants in Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel, pp. 111-115.

(72) See: Louis Eaks, "The Other Face of the Palestinian Resistance," The Guardian (Manchester), May 14, 1976.

(73) Fatah, (February 6, 1970), p. 8.

(74) The goals of the PRCS are set forth in greater detail in Appendix 6.

(75) Fatah, (February 6, 1970) (in English) and Fatah, March 23, 1970, pp. 8-9 (in Arabic). The second source gives a list of medical centers in Jordan and Lebanon on p. 9. The same list is given in al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyah, no. 23 (February 1970), p. 27; The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1979.

(76) Wren, Look, (May 13, 1969), pp. 33, 35.

(77) Fatah, (February 6, 1970).

(78) Ibid.

(79) Excerpted in Arab Report and Record, July 16-31, 1978.

(80) On political machines see Robert Merton's brilliant functional analysis in Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 84.

(81) On the relation of effectiveness to legitimacy see: Lipset, Political Man, pp. 64-65.

(82) Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 127-136, argues that organizational legitimacy is related to task expansion. In the case of the Resistance, the expansion of services is such a task expansion.

CHAPTER 9

(1) Bard E. O'Neil, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A political-Military Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 208.

(2) Arab World, January 30, 1971. These sentiments were echoed some five years later by Brig. al-Budayri: "Imagine a country or an entity governed by seven different parties each having its own army, ideology, Arab and world connections, and sources of financing. . . . Everyone of these parties will try to drag the army back to its own position. . ." Excerpted in SWASIA, vol. III, no. 4 (November 5, 1976), p. 7. This observation has been repeated with variations in PLA publications since. Sawt al-Filastin, the PLA's official magazine, has consistently called for a reorganization of the PLO to establish effective, centralized command and structure capable of controlling independent organizations.

(3) There is, however, informal coordination between members of the PLO and the Rejection Front: Ahmad Jibril of the GC is said to plan terrorist operations for a variety of groups, and PLO and Rejection Front units cooperated during the Lebanese civil war of 1976.

(4) PNC Political Program of March 1971, Organizational Structure, (4) and (6). Under the terms of the PLO Internal Statutes (Art. 22), the PLA has its own independent command and reports directly to the Executive Committee. It also has direct representation on various PLO decision-making bodies.

(5) Muhsin was appointed to this position during the 11th PNC session held in Cairo in January 1973. The circumstances of his appointment revolved around Syrian efforts to create an "eastern front" against Israel, a coalition of Arab forces that eventually fought in the 1973 war. Strategically, the eastern front idea was promoted by Syrian President al-Asad. From November 1970 onward, al-Asad tirelessly worked to create a coalition of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan; the Palestinians were to be incorporated into this framework.

(6) Interview with Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) VOP (clandestine) July 31, 1976, in FBIS, August 2, 1976.

(7) See: Paul A. Jureidni, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria, 1954-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963); and William B. Quandt, Algerian Military Development: The Professionalization of a Guerrilla Army (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1972), for descriptions of the ALN.

(8) Excerpted in Arab World, August 14, 1971.

(9) an-Nahar Arab Report, October 4, 1971; Arab World, July 9, 1970.

(10) Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel, pp. 110-112.

(11) Ibid.; Jureidini and Hazen give a figure of 1,100 men, Palestinian Movement in Politics, p. 21.

(12) Arab World, June 2, 1970.

(13) See Edgar O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," Journal of the Royal United Services' Institute for Defence Studies, (RUSI) vol. 117, no. 665 (March 1972), pp. 47-51; Jac Weller, "Military Aspects of the Palestinian Collapse," Military Review, vol. LIII, no. 7 (July 1973), pp. 56-67; O'Neil, Armed Struggle, pp. 63-105.

(14) Israeli Radio, February 14, 1973. According to Jureidini and Hazen, Palestinian Movement in Politics, p. 21, Nihad Nusaybah took over command of the PFL. Nusaybah was originally the commander of PLF forces in Lebanon.

(15) Not only was PLA the original PLO arm, but it was the parent of a number of commando organizations. Organizations drawing leaders and men from PLA forces include: the PLF (Jibril), the PFLP and PDF, the ALF, and al-Sa'iqah.

(16) Damascus Radio, (July 6, 1976).

(17) Excerpted in al-Nahar, February 20, 1971.

(18) Ibid.

(19) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 33.

(20) New York Times, September 11, 1964.

(21) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 25.

(22) Arab World, September 30, 1966.

(23) Radio Damascus, June 6, 1966.

(24) Arab World, July 9, 1970.

(25) Appendix 11.

(26) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 23; New York Times, November 26, 1966. Chinese PLO contacts were brokered by the Egyptians via the medium of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Union, headquartered in Cairo, and which the PLO joined in 1964; Cooley, Green March.

(27) New York Times, June 15, 1966. These estimates were probably significantly too high. About 500 PLA officers were trained in China. After 1967, some PLA officers were trained in the USSR, along with Egyptians and Syrians.

(28) O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI.

(29) See: "The Professionals 'Make their Play," Le Monde Weekly, February 24, 1971, p. 8; O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI; According to the an-Nahar staff, however, the PLA in Gaza fought gallantly, Riad N. El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, eds., Politics in Uniform: A Study of the Military in the Arab World and Israel, (Beirut: An-Nahar Report Books, n.d.), p. 85.

(30) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 38; Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel, p. 105.

(31) an-Nahar Arab Report, October 4, 1971; Arab World Weekly, October 2, 1971; Dirasat 'Arabiyyah, vol. V, no. 5 (March 1969), p. 162; O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI.

(32) The Yarmuk Forces appear to be part of Fatah, rather than the PLA; they are said to be under the direct control of 'Arafat himself. Arab Reports and Record, August 16-31, 1978.

(33) Jerusalem Post, September 18, 1973; Arab Report and Record, September 16-30, 1973. The size of PLA units stationed in Syria is difficult to estimate. As with al-Sa'iqah, the Syrians tend to augment PLA units with regular troops according to policy considerations of the moment. Although PLA forces in Jordan are nominally independent, they are in fact almost totally under Jordanian control. PLA officers, while Palestinians, are selected for their Jordanian sympathies. In 1976 the Jordanians were said to have acceeded to Syrian requests to increase PLA forces in Jordan to 6,000 men, fully equipped. This agreement reflected both Syrian/Jordanian military and political co-ordination and a Jordanian assessment of the extent of Syrian control over the PLA. al-Watan, December 5, 1976, FBIS, December 7, 1976.

(34) New York Times, January 21, 1976.

(35) Arab Press Service, June 27, 1975. According to Israeli sources summarized, the Palestinians were both jet and helicopter pilots, but would be absorbed by units in their host country rather than be returned to the Resistance. Later, Palestinian spokesmen went out of their way

to deny reports that Palestinian units had been sent to Uganda to help out Amin's beleaguered forces in March 1979. See: FBIS, March 20, 1979.

(36) Yasir 'Arafat interview in al-Hawadith, July 7-13, 1978, pp. 18-22, in JPRS, September 18, 1978, pp. 15-25. The 'Arafat interview followed an announcement by al-Qadhdhafi that Libya's navy and air force were at the disposal of the Resistance, Arab Press Service, June 13, 1978.

(37) Before the overthrow of Idi Amin, there were reports that 400 Palestinians were serving in Uganda, either as instructors or advisors. Some were said to be training as pilots using USSR aircraft supplies to Uganda. Arab Press Service, July 7, 1976. Israeli sources reported the Palestinians training in North Korea. Arab Press Service, June 27, 1975. At one point during the fighting in Lebanon, Kuwayti sources reported that the Palestinians were setting up an air field to accommodate transports and fighters. Summarized in Arab Press Service, July 7, 1976.

(38) FBIS, July 7, 1975. The SAMS were to be delivered to the PLA from Libya.

(39) Arab Press Service, 20-27 June 1979. According to Arab military analysts, the reason for the Israeli probing raids was to test the air defense system and thus avoid the surprise of 1973:

> The Israelis badly underestimated Arab air defenses in the 1973 war. In fact, they staged a number of provocative air raids into Syria before that war, inflicing heavy civilian losses. But the Syrians kept their nerve steady and took these blows, without using their SAMS or revealing their strength before the appropriate time. The Israelis may be worried that the same thing will happen to them again if they fight a war with Syria over Lebanon.

(40) al-Watan, June 11, 1979.

(41) For example, a unit described as "al-Sa'iqah Battalion 422 of the al-Qadisiyah Forces" joined the Muslim coalition on June 9, 1976. VOP (Clandestine), June 9, 1976.

(42) VOP (clandestine) June 1, 1976, excerpted in FBIS, June 2, 1976.

(43) Arab Report and Record, May 1-15, 1976; VOP (Clandestine), February 19, 1976. Estimates of the size of PLA forces involved in Lebanon were: 3,000 Hittin, 1,000 al-Qadisiyah, 5,000 Yarmuk, and 1,000 'Ayn Jalut forces.

(44) All Arab countries faced with the problem of dealing with PLA officers were careful to control the PLA insofar as possible. A variety of tactics were utilized to do so: systematic underpayment of pledged contributions to PLO/PLA budgets, restrictions on arms supplied to PLA forces, limits on PLA recruiting and training, incorporation of PLA units into host command structures, subversion of Palestinian officers and men in the PLA. In practice, much of this activity took the form of aggressive penetration of PLA units by host countries' intelligence services. 'Arafat commented on the problem of ensuring loyalty of the PLA, noting that the PLA "is a disciplined army, with the exception of some elements who belong to the intelligence service of the Arab country where contingents of the PLA exist . . ." Arab World Weekly, January 9, 1971.

(45) Arab World, July 10, 1970; Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, p. 32; Arab World Weekly, January 20, 1973; The Times (London), August 10, 1968; New York Times, September 14, 1968.

(46) el-Rayyes and Nahas, Politics in Uniform, p. 87.

(47) Arab World, July 9, 1970. Some guerrilla leaders in reference to the PLA's supposed ineptness referred to it as the "14th" Arab army, suggesting that it was inferior to the armies of the 13 other Arab states. In this connection, Faruq al-Qaddumi was especially critical of the PLA's bureaucracy.

(48) PLF units led by Nusaybah supported Haddad. At one point in the struggle, men loyal to al-Yahya kidnapped Nusaybah, but he escaped and with Jordanian help arrested his kidnappers. The connection between the Jordanians and Nusaybah is significant in light of later events. Arab World Weekly, October 2, 1971.

(49) Arab World, June 19, 1971. al-Yahya reportedly went so far as to call for 'Arafat's resignation.

(50) Arab World Weekly, October 2, 1971.

(51) New York Times, July 5, 1971; Arab World Weekly, October 19, 1971; Arab World, October 9, 1971.

(52) Arab World Daily, June 12, 1970. However it was just these revolutionary elements that were subject to a purge instituted by Haddad in August-September 1971, before his own dismissal, and later by al-Budayri. Arab World Daily, October 19, 1971.

(53) Arab World Weekly, January 20, 1973.

(54) Ibid.

(55) According to Amman Radio, January 15, 1973, the Jordanian forces had been penetrated not only by Jordanian intelligence, but by Libyan and Syrian intelligence as well. The VOP (Syria, August 8, 1973) amplified on the Jordanian involvement:

> King Husayn's authorities have started to exploit its presence for their own use. . . . The force has been compelled to stay in the desert area of the al-Salt camps at least 80 kilometers from the front . . . The Royal intelligence has been flagrantly interfering in the affairs of the force . . . by preventing those who are on leave in Syria, Cairo or Iraq from returning to Jordan in order to replace them with suspect elements recruited by the intelligence with the approval of the regiment's commander who has been collaborating with them. . .

(56) Nusaybah was later dismissed by Muhsin on March 16, 1975.

(57) Brig. Jamus's appointment apparently never took effect. In October 1978, Col. Mustafa Sa'd al-Din was appointed as PLA commander, replacing Brig. al-Budayri. al-Ra'y al-'Amm, October 3, 1978.

(58) al-Budayri was arrested by Fatah and incarcerated from June 7 to June 23; after his release, he returned to Syria. VOP (Clandestine), July 23, 1976; Damascus Radio, July 6, 1976. Earlier, Muhsin had been reportedly ousted as head of the Military Department, which apparently was only temporary. Al-Budayri, it may be added, is still recognized as commander of the PLA by Syria and Jordan.

(59) VOP (Cairo), March 23, 1977; al-Ra'y al-'Amm, March 24, 1977.

(60) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, October 1-15, 1977. More specifically, it was reported that Jordan and Syria were considering forming a second PLA commanded by al-Budayri. FBIS, August 4, 1976.

(61) Arab World, October 26, 1968.

(62) At one point, Fatah spokesmen claimed to have entered this second stage. This was said to have begun with "Operation Greenbelt," the temporary occupation of the settlement of al-Hamma (Mevo Hamma) in the Golan Heights in May 1969. In a show of unity, PLA units assisted in these attacks.

(63) Arab World, May 15, 1969.

(64) Arab World Weekly, October 26, 1968.

(65) Habash interviewed by Oriana Fallaci in Life, June 12, 1970, p. 34.

(66) Ibid.

(67) Ibid., p. 33.

(68) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 19, 1970.

(69) Life, June 12, 1970, pp. 32-33.

(70) al-Hurriyah, September 22, 1969. See, for example, Paul Jacobs, "Death of a Dialogue," Progressive, vol. 38, no. 9, p. 38-42.

(71) See Harkabi's comments, "The Weakness of the Fedayeen," in Palestinians and Israel (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, Ltd., 1974), pp. 107-114.

(72) al-Thawrah (Damascus), October 3, 1968.

(73) Ibid. Discipline has remained a consistent and unresolved problem. As late as 1973 Salah Khalaf admitted that between 10 and 20 percent of the fida'iyin were not under any sort of PLO control. al-Nahar, December 29, 1973.

(74) Arab World Weekly, May 24, 1969.

(75) See: John K. Cooley in The Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1970, p. 2.

(76) VOP (Cairo), August 29, 1976. PASC however remains the principal security force. In December 1976 it was decided to strengthen PASC to enable it to become a "strike force" with sufficient military power to control intergroup fighting. As a result, the size of PASC was increased from 1,000 men to approximately double that number. Arab Report and Record, August 16-31, 1978.

(77) Internal Statutes of the Northern Sector of the Unified Command, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, March 21, 1970.

(78) Unity Formula of 6 May 1970, Article 10.

(79) al-Ahram (Cairo), June 3, 1970, June 5, 1970, June 10, 1970.

(80) Arab World Weekly, June 13, 1970.

(81) an-Nahar Arab Report, February 1, 1971.

(82) Reprinted in Fatah, vol. III, no. (March 23, 1971), pp. 14, 16.

(83) Ibid.

(84) Ibid.

(85) Filastin al-Thawrah, July 2, 1974.

(86) See: Andrew R. Molnar et al, Human Factors, Considerations on Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1966); David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 4 (July 1975) pp. 683-698; John Dugard, "International Terrorism: Problems of Definition," International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 1 (January 1974), pp. 67-81; D.V. Segre and J.H. Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism," Survival, vol XV, no. 4 (July/August 1973) pp. 178-184; J. Boyer Bell, Transnational Terror (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975) for general analysis of insurgent and terrorist strategies.

(87) The Arab World, May 15, 1969.

(88) al-'Asifah communique, February 6, 1969.

(89) O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI; Weller, "Military Aspects of the Palestinian Collapse," Military Review. Also see: Oded Remba, "Israel and the Occupied Territories – A Common Market in the Making," New Middle East, no. 26 (November 1970), pp. 34-38; O'Neil, Armed Struggle, pp. 63-105.

(90) Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel, p. 109; Weller, "Military Aspects of the Palestinian Collapse," Military Review. For an early description of the conditions in Gaza, see "Homeless in Gaza," The Times (London), March 2, 1951, p. 7. Much of the employment in Gaza was generated either by the Egyptian military which employed Palestinians on its bases, or by the PLA which paid salaries to its Palestinian recruits.

(91) "Gaza: Town of Bitterness and Frustration," New Middle East, no. 41, (February 1972), p. 33.

(92) Arab World Weekly, July 9, 1971.

(93) Alfred Friendly in The Atlantic, September 3, 1969, pp. 12-20.

(94) Arab World, October 22, 1969.

(95) PASC communique excerpted in al-Bilad, June 30, 1970. Additionally, Fatah was said to have carried out 61.3 percent of the attacks, followed by the PFL with 20.4 percent, al-Sa'iqah with 9.5 percent, the ALF with 3 percent, and the rest combined with 2.9 percent. The PDF, which had earlier withdrawn from PASC, was credited with 3.7 percent. The PFLP, which was not a PASC member, claimed to have executed 220 operations in the first half of 1970 alone. See O'Neil, Armed Struggle, pp. 237-242, 249, for extensive statistics.

(96) Michael Hudson, "The Fedayeen are Forcing Lebanon's Hand," Mideast, vol. X, no. 1 (February 1970), pp. 7-15, for an analysis of Lebanon's strategic position insofar as commando operations are concerned.

(97) Abu Hasan lecture at Beirut Arab University, excerpted in Arab World, December 3, 1969.

(98) Training and staging areas were further north. This system of positions strongly resembled the fortified bunkers used by the Vietcong.

(99) An estimated 200 killed and 200 wounded. But in addition, some 2,000 Lebanese civilians were killed and another 265,000 turned into refugees. Time, April 3, 1978, pp. 30-32.

(100) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, April 1-15, 1978. Resistance strategy appeared to revolve around the infiltration of these small units, which would avoid contact with Israelis and UN forces and begin to set up a new infrastructure in the south.

(101) Schiff and Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel, p. 89.

(102) Reuter's dispatch, March 3, 1970.

(103) Arab World Weekly, August 16, 1969, pp. 7-8.

(104) Francis Ofner in The Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1970, p. 1.

(105) Dobson, Black September, p. 27.

(106) Washington Post, July 5, 1974.

(107) Yasir 'Arafat interviewed with al-Nahar, excerpted in Arab World Daily, November 15, 1973. Direct arms shipments reached the Palestinians from the harbors of Beirut, Latakia (Syria), and Basra (Iraq).

(108) Abu Lutf in Look, p. 25; L'Europeo, p. 24.

(109) O'Ballance, Guerrilla Power, p. 38.

(110) Arab Report and Record, September 1-15, 1976, quoting an AP dispatch from Damascus on September 8, 1976.

(111) Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 1970; The Times (London) January 4, 1974.

(112) Arab Report and Record, July 1-15, 1974.

(113) Dobson, Black September, A Fatah delegation went to Algeria for tactical advice. In 1978 Akhir Sa'iah reported that Cuban experts were training fida'iyin under the terms of a secret agreement. In addition to the training, the Cubans were said to have agreed to provide light weaponry. Akhir Sa'ah summarized by VOP (Clandestine), May 3, 1978, in FBIS, May 4, 1978.

(114) Time, December 25, 1972, pp. 25-26.

(115) Ha'aretz, February 15, 1978, in JPRS, April 6, 1978, pp. 82-83.

(116) Ibid. See also: John Baron, KGB: The Secret Network of Soviet Secret Agents (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974), pp. 29-62, for KGB efforts in the Middle East, and especially pp. 49-51, for KGB exploitation of Russian Orthodox Church facilities in the area.

(117) Shlomo Hillel, Police Minister, interview in the Jerusalem Post, May 19, 1976, in FBIS, May 19, 1976.

(118) Ze'ev Shif, "Terrorists Have Smuggled Large Amounts of Explosives for Their Recent Wave of Attacks," Ha'aretz, August 30, 1978, in JPRS, October 4, 1978, pp. 30-32.

(119) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(120) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974.

(121) Many of these raids were planned in conjunction with other commando organizations, most notably with the PDF. Ahmad Jibril was said to have been the foremost planner of these attacks.

(122) Mena (Cairo), June 26, 1974.

(123) Newsweek, July 22, 1974, p. 55.

(124) Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1972.

(125) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(126) Davar, June 27, 1969. This Israeli activity in turn triggered an Egyptian/Saudi response in the form of naval and military cooperation in the Red Sea. Arab World Weekly, July 31, 1971. During the 1973 War, Egyptian naval forces blockaded the Red Sea. After the war, Egypt and Saudi Arabia intervened to aid Somalia in its war with Ethiopia.

(127) Arab spokesmen were split over the wisdom of al-Yamani's threat, and rumors of an American intervention began to spread in the Middle East. Arab Press Service, July 11, 1979.

(128) Ibid.

(129) Ibid.

(130) Which brought this response from al-Yamani (in reaction to earlier stories about a newly created U.S. standby force for the Gulf): "If some people are thinking of a possible physical occupation of the oil fields, they can forget it. It cannot be done. Sabotage of a few key parts would halt production for a couple of years. And then where would we all be?"

(131) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(132) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 20, 1974.

(133) New York Times, March 12, 1978.

(134) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, March 16-31, 1978.

(135) The training was done at Damur, south of Beirut.

(136) A series of such seaborne raids were, in fact, attempted in 1978/1979; most were intercepted by Israeli patrol boats. For example, in April 1979 Israeli vessels seized a Cypriot freighter (the Stefanos); six Fatah guerrillas were captured, along with a quantity of arms. The raiders were on a mission also planned by al-Wazir. Israeli Radio, April 2, 1979 in FBIS, April 3, 1979. But a second raiding party, this time from the newly formed PLF succeeded in coming ashore at Nahariya. Tal'at Ya'qub press conference broadcast on VOP (Clandestine), April 22, 1979, in FBIS, April 23, 1979.

(137) Indeed, in the wake of Camp David, Palestinian leaders met in Damascus to consider the strategy of attacking U.S. targets. Baltimore Sun, September 22, 1978).

(138) O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI; O'Neil, Armed Struggle, pp. 206-213.

(139) Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, pp. 31-32.

(140) al-Ahram, August 18, 1968.

(141) 'Arafat interview in al-Hawadith, VOP (Clandestine), June 2, 1979, FBIS, June 5, 1979.

(142) Yasir 'Arafat interview in al-Watan al-'Arabi, July 7-13, 1978), pp. 18-22, translated in JPRS, September 18, 1978, pp. 15-28.

(143) Apropos of this, in January 1975 'Arafat declared that he had ordered a program of austerity because of lack of funds: "I did not issue

boots for the commandos this winter. Last year each commando received only a summer-weight uniform. There were cuts in rations because of soaring prices. Meals with meat have been reduced. . ." (quoted in Arab World Weekly, January 18, 1975).

(144) Filastin al-Thawrah, November 14, 1973.

(145) al-Sayyad, October 10, 1973; Daily Star, October 6, 1973.

(146) Daily Star, October 11, 1973.

(147) Daily Star, January 6, 1974. 'Arafat revealed that the Egyptians had originally asked for only 50 operations; the fida'iyin had carried out an additional 150 on their own.

(148) Ibid.

(149) al-Sayyad, October 10, 1973.

(150) Jerusalem Post, September 18, 1973. These units had roughly the same status as that of Saudi forces stationed in Jordan since 1967.

(151) The Times (London), October 28, 1973.

(152) Khalaf, "Memoirs," al-Mustaqbal.

(153) See Ahmed al-Shuqayri, On the Road to Defeat with the Arab Kings and Presidents (Beirut: Dar al-'Awdah, 1972).

(154) Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, Implications of the 1976 Arab-Israeli Military Status (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 11.

(155) Indeed any number of commando acts would serve as a catalyst: a large-scale commando raid, an airport massacre, a spectacular assassination. After Camp David, the Israelis were reported to be forming an elite counter-intelligence unit whose mission would be to protect certain Arab leaders from assassination attempts. San Francisco Examiner, October 3, 1978. For a discussion of the escalatory potential of Middle Eastern politics, and the subsequent ability of nominally "weak" actors to precipitate a large-scale conflict, see John W. Amos, II, Arab-Israeli Political/Military Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).

(156) 'Arafat interview in al-Hawadith, July 7-13, 1978.

CHAPTER 10

(1) Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (California seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1975), p. 13. Palestinian and Arab apologists have gone out of their way to defend the use of international terror. Also: Smith Hempstone, "Assessing Black September's Attack," Evening Star, September 12, 1972, reprinted in Palestine Digest, vol. 2, no. 7 (October 1972), p. 2.

(2) See the short bibliography contained in Parry, Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat, pp. 576-579; Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1976); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism and Political Crimes (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1975); J. Bowyer Bell, Transnational Terror (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1975); Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War (London: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 71-99; Richard A. Falk, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," American Journal of International Law, vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1969), pp. 415-433; Yehuda Z. Blum, "The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard," American Journal of International Law, vol. 64, no. 1 (January 1970), pp. 73-105; Hedly Bull, "Civil Violence and the Pattern of International Power," Adelphi Papers, no. 82, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 1971), pp. 27-36; Pierre Hassner, "Civil Violence and the Pattern of International Power," Adelphi Papers, no. 82, pp. 16-26; Brian M. Jenkins, "High Impact Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: the Impact of New Technology on Low Level Violence," in Geoffrey Kemp et al., eds., The Other Arms (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Company, 1975), pp. 91-108; David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 4 (July 1975), pp. 684-698; Jay Mallin, Terrorism as a Military Weapon," Air University Review, vol. 28, no. 2 (January-February 1977), pp. 54-61; Andrew J. Pierre, "The Politics of International Terrorism," Orbis, vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 125-126; Edward F. Mickolus, "Negotiating for Hostages: A Policy of Dilemma," Orbis, pp. 1309-1325; Robert G. Bell, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism Against International Civil Aviation, Orbis, pp. 1325-1343; W. Scott Thompson, "Political Violence and the Correlation of Forces," Orbis, pp. 1270-1288; John B. Wolf, "Controlling Political Terrorism in a Free Society," Orbis, p. 1309; Roberta Wohlstetter, "Kidnapping to Win Friends and Influence People," Survey (autumn 1974), pp. 39-40; J. Poust, "Terrorism and the International Law of War," Military Law Review, vol. 64 (spring 1974), pp. 1-36; Richard Schultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 32, no. 1 (spring/summer 1978), pp. 7-16; Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media and the Police," Journal of International Affairs, pp. 101-114; Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism, Trends and Potentialities," Journal of International Affairs, pp. 115-125.

(3) On the legal problems of dealing with piracy see: "Piracy," American Journal of International Law, supplement to vol. 26 (1932), pp. 749-765, and the synopsis of extant laws against piracy which follow. The issues raised in connection with an international draft convention on piracy parallel those raised almost four decades later in debates over a draft convention on international terrorism. For the application of essentially naval tactics of "hit-and-run" operations to land warfare, see: T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: International Collectors Library, 1926), 159-167, 300-302.

(4) See Louis Rene Beres, "Guerrillas, Terrorists and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics," Western Political Science Quarterly, vol. XXVII, no. 4 (December 1974), pp. 624-636; Robert A. Fearey, "International Terrorism," The Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), pp. 394-403. See O'Neil, Armed Struggle, pp. 14-34, for an extended discussion; and Bard E. O'Neil, "Toward a Typology of Political Terrorism," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 32, no. 1 (spring/summer 1978), pp. 17-42.

(5) Arab World Weekly, May 20, 1972.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8) George Habash, interview in an-Nahar, January 17, 1971.

(9) See Weller, "Military Aspects of the Palestinian Collapse," Military Review; O'Ballance, "Israeli Counter-Guerrilla Measures," RUSI.

(10) an-Nahar Arab Report, February 12, 1973.

(11) Excerpted in Arab World, January 6, 1973.

(12) The Daily Star, January 6, 1974. The number rose again in 1973 to 1,251, including 200 attacks during the October War.

(13) Arab World, May 13, 1972, December 22, 1973, for descriptions of many of these terrorist attacks. Jureidini and Hazen, Palestinian Movement in Politics, pp. 77-82, also provide a list of attacks.

(14) Includes terrorism within Israel and Arab countries, but not conventional attacks.

(15) Includes activities in Jordan.

(16) Includes General Command attack on Qiryat Shemona, April 11, 1974; PDF attack on Ma'alot, May 15, 1974; Fatah attack on Nahariya, June 25, 1974.

(17) Quoted in Hirst, Gun and Olive Branch, p. 310.

(18) Muhammad Da'ud 'Awdah, "Abu Da'ud's Confession," Amman Radio, March 24, 1973, excerpted in Middle East Monitor, April 15, 1973, pp. 7-8. Yaari, however, claims that the organizational nucleus of the BSO dates even earlier. In this case to a secret organization established as early as 1967 by Fatah intelligence. Its head at the time was Ra'uf al-Husayni, who was later identified as the leader of a BSO team that hijacked a Vienna-to-Athens Sabena 707 and forced it to land at Lod airport. Al-Husayni, along with one other surviving hijacker, was captured by the Israelis. Ehud Yaari, "The Change from Guerrilla to Terrorist Tactics," Davar, September 13, 1972, reprinted in New Outlook, vol. 15, no. 8 (October 1972), pp. 40-42.

(19) John B. Wolf, "Black September: Militant Palestinianism," Current History, vol. 64, no. 377 (January 1973), pp. 5-9; 37; an-Nahar Arab Report, May 29, 1972.

(20) Wolf, Current History. Part of the training was in the manufacture and use of letter bombs and other explosive devices.

(21) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(22) Dobson, Black September, p. 37; David B. Tinnin with Dag Christensen, The Hit Team (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1976), p. 41.

(23) Arab World Weekly, September 9, 1972.

(24) Dobson, Black September, p. 37; Tinnin, Hit Team, p. 41.

(25) Wolf, Current History, p. 37. Shamali was one of the planners of the Munich massacre.

(26) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 29, 1972; an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(27) Arab World Weekly, September 29, 1972.

(28) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 29, 1972.

(29) Khalaf, "Memoirs," al-Mustaqbal. Although Khalaf publicly denies any connection with Black September, the Egyptians at least regard him as its head: "Write in your minutes that the one who did this [openly spoke of the impending Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, after being sworn to secrecy] is Abu Iyad, of Black September . . ." Anwar al-Sadat, Address to People's Assembly, April 5, 1979, in FBIS, April 6, 1979.

(30) Abu Da'ud's statement on Amman Radio. For a list of BSO attacks, see Appendix 16.

(31) See Tinnin, Hit Team, pp. 49-51; New York Times, October 7, 1972; Monday Morning, January 29-February 4, 1979, pp. 16-26; Life, April 1979, pp. 101-106.

(32) New York Times, October 7, 1972; an-Nahar Arab Report, May 29, 1972; Edward Weisband and Damir Roguli, "Violence Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy," in Yonah Alexander, International Terrorism, pp. 258-319, especially p. 290; Tehran Journal, April 19, 1973. Wolf, Current History; Newsweek, September 18, 1972, pp. 24-34; Time, September 18, 1972, p. 35; U.S. News & World Report, September 18, 1972, pp. 16-18.

(33) See David Hirst, "Ethics of Terrorism," The Guardian (Manchester), October 21, 1972, p. 5; "Since Jordan: The Palestinian Fedayeen," Conflict Studies, no. 38 (September 1973), p. 8.

(34) See: Dobson, Black September, pp. 104-105; Colin Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 100-103; Cooley, Green March, p. 123, Time, September 25, 1972, p. 35.

(35) "Since Jordan," Conflict Studies, no. 38; Arab World Weekly, September 9, 1972.

(36) Tehran Journal, April 19, 1973; Time, September 18, 1972, p. 33.

(37) New York Times, October 7, 1972.

(38) an-Nahar Arab Report, May 29, 1972.

(39) See Cooley, Green March, p. 124.

(40) Dobson, Black September, p. 49.

(41) For details, see Tinnin, Hit Team, pp. 93-96; Dobson, Black September, pp. 119-123. Salah Khalaf in his "Memoirs", al-Mustaqbal, supplies another version.

(42) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(43) Arab World Weekly, September 9, 1972.

(44) Illustrative of the difficulties facing 'Arafat, in particular, in dealing with the BSO are the two versions of a telephone call between 'Arafat and the BSO members holding captured diplomats in Khartum. In one version, purportedly that of U.S. intelligence, 'Arafat was

described as having given a direct order to kill the diplomats. In a second, released by the Resistance, 'Arafat tried to stop the killings and was turned down by the young fanatics. Tehran Journal, July 14, 1973.

(45) Arab World Weekly, March 10, 1973; an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(46) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 26, 1973.

(47) According to the an-Nahar Arab Report editors, his name as registered with Fatah was Fahd 'Abd al-Fattah. an-Nahar Arab Report, December 2, 1974.

(48) See Abu Nidal interview with Fulvio Grimaldi, L'Expresso, May 21, 1978, in JPRS, July 18, 1978, pp. 5-9.

(49) Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1974.

(50) See The Times (London), January 4, 1974.

(51) Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1974. There are two versions of his death. According to one, al-Ghafur's execution was said to be ordered by Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid, code-named "Abu Hawl" which means "Father of Fear" and also is the colloquial name for the sphinx. Alternatively, it was reported that al-Ghafur ran into a PASC patrol while in Lebanon, and when ordered to surrender opened fire and was shot in the ensuing gun battle.

(52) Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1974; an-Nahar Arab Report, December 2, 1974. Hani al-Hasan interview in Monday Morning (Beirut), August 14-20, 1978, pp. 9-13. As early as 1973, Abu-Nidal was implicated in an Iraqi plot to assassinate Mahmud Ridda 'Abbas (Abu Mazin).

(53) Abu Nidal interview, L'Expresso. The Egyptian charge was broadcast by MENA, April 23, 1978, FBIS, April 24, 1978.

(54) Akhir Sa'ah, June 21, 1978, Akhir Sa'ah, July 5, 1978; in JPRS, July 25, 1978.

(55) Tehran Journal, December 26, 1973.

(56) al-Qabas, February 13, 1972, excerpted in Arab Report and Record, February 1-14, 1977.

(57) MENA, April 23, 1978; FBIS, April 24, 1978; al-Ahram, April 27, 1978, in Arab Report and Record, April 16-30, 1978.

(58) al-Siyasah, December 23, 1978; FBIS, December 28, 1978; al-Siyasah, April 30, 1979, FBIS, May 4, 1979.

(59) al-Hadaf, July 19, 1975.

(60) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 14, 1975; an-Nahar Arab Report, August 3, 1974.

(61) Arab World Weekly, July 19, 1975; Smith, Carlos, p. 199.

(62) Arab World Weekly, July 19, 1975.

(63) Smith, Carlos; Time, January 5, 1976, p. 46. Arab sources, however, have a different version, that Murkabil died in the gun battle between Carlos and two French policemen at the apartment where Carlos was hiding. According to these sources, rather than leading the police to Carlos, as Smith has it, Murkabil led them into a trap, aware that he would be killed also. Arab World Weekly, July 19, 1975; al-Hadaf, July 12, 1975. According to these sources, one of Murkabil's interrogators while he was held by French authorities was an American military attache, Col. Ernest Morgan. Morgan was kidnapped the same month by a PSF group.

(64) The Times (London), January 4, 1974.

(65) Arab World Weekly, January 12, 1974.

(66) The Times (London), January 4, 1974.

(67) The Times (London), April 3, 1973. The shipment, estimated at about 100 tons of arms, was to be smuggled into Ireland by a West German arms dealer.

(68) The Times (London), January 4, 1974; Also: The Times (London), June 12 and 13, 1972; Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972; Brief (Tel Aviv), June 1-15, 1972; The Washington Post, March 10, 1973; The Washington Post, May 11, 1973. In addition to the IRA and the Philippine Muslims, al-Qadhdhafi was said to be sending money simultaneously to the Black Panthers and the George Wallace presidential campaign.

(69) Dobson, Black September, pp.110-111; Tinnin, Hit Team, p. 130.

(70) Tinnin, Hit Team.

(71) See Dobson, Black September, pp. 150-155.

(72) Time, April 12, 1976, pp. 39-40.

(73) The Times (London), April 17, 1973.

(74) Ibid.

(75) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, July 1-15, 1976; Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1977.

(76) an-Nahar Arab Report, March 25, 1974. At the time of the split, the late Ghassan Kanafani was said to be the leader of a "leftist" group which not only opposed hijacking, but advocated a merger of all commando groups. Haddad's followers on the other hand, opposed any such mergers, and advocated continued terrorism. Middle East Monitor, March 15, 1972.

(77) Smith, Carlos, p. 114.

(78) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 17, 1972; Arab World Weekly, July 15, 1972; Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1977.

(79) Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1977.

(80) Arab World Weekly, January 12, 1974.

(81) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, July 1-15, 1976.

(82) David Anable, "Terrorism," Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 1977, p. 20.

(83) At the time of the 1970 hijackings, for example, there were two stories about Habash's involvement. One that he was out of the country (in North Korea) and did not know or approve of the hijackings. The other was that Habash had given advance approval for them before leaving Jordan.

(84) Anwar al-Sadat, press conference, December 11, 1977, FBIS, December 12, 1977.

(85) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, July 1-15, 1976.

(86) New York Times, July 16, 1976.

(87) On the OPEC kidnapping see: Smith, Carlos, p. 221; Time, December 29, 1975, pp. 20-21; Time, January 5, 1976, pp. 44-45; People, Oct. 11, 1976, pp. 24-27; Washington Post, December 22-October 23, 1975; Newsweek, January 5, 1976, p. 27. On Entebbe see: Heshayahu Ben-Porat, Eitan Haber, and Zeev Schiff, Entebbe Rescue (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1977); William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (New York: Bantam Books, 1976); Major General Mordekhay Gur, statement to press, Israeli Radio, July 8, 1976, in FBIS, July 9, 1976.

(88) Segre and Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism," Survival.

(89) Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 1977.

(90) Time, June 12, 1972, pp. 57-59; Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto," Asian Survey, vol. XVI, no. 9 (September 1976), pp. 830-845.

(91) Statement of the URA, originally published in al-Hadaf, excerpted in Arab World, September 17, 1973. See also: Bowyer Bell, Transnational Terror, pp. 69-78; Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," Conflict Studies, no. 7 (October 1970), pp. 3-4; Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XVI, no. 3 (September 1972), pp. 383-396.

(92) The Palestinian Revolution and World Revolutionary Movements (Beirut: al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyah, 1969).

(93) See Bull, Adelphi Papers, no. 82; Hassner, Adelphi Papers, no. 82; Jenkins, "High Level Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low Level Violence," in Other Arms Race. All of these authors stress the growing relationship between larger cold war patterns of conflict and local conflicts, a linkage that is explored in connection with the Resistance in Chapter 11. But see also, John W. Amos, II, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations, pp. 239-250 for a theory of conflict linkages in the Middle East.

(94) Charles A. Russell and Bowman W. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," Terrorism, vol. 1, no. 1 (1977), pp. 17-34.

(95) Dobson, Black September, p. 89. This killing and the earlier attempt on Abu Sharif (via a letter bomb) were apparently in retaliation for the PFLP/URA attack and massacre at Lod airport on May 30, 1972. Both Abu Sharif and Kanafani had apparently defended the Lod atrocity.

(96) an-Nahar Arab Report, July 17, 1972.

(97) On the motivations behind the Munich massacre, see: Hirst, Gun and Olive Branch, pp. 310-312.

(98) Dobson, Black September, pp. 62-63.

(99) Edward Weisband and Damir Roguly, "Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy," in Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism, pp. 258-319. See also: Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism, Terrorism, vol. 1, nos. 3/4 (1978), pp. 237-254.

(100) The editors of the Arab World listed these groups as being present in Palestinian camps prior to the September 1970 civil war: Black Panthers, URA, Baader-Meinhof, TPLA, PFLO, ELF, and various Iranian groups. Arab World Weekly, June 10, 1972; Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971; Tehran Journal, March 19, 1973; New York Times, June 26, 1978.

(101) Time, September 18, 1972, p. 35; Newsweek, September 18, 1972, pp. 24-34; US News & World Report, September 18, 1972, pp. 16-18; Wolf, Current History. Baader-Meinhof personnel trained in Fatah camps at Baalbak and in Syria.

(102) "Quebec, the Challenge from Within," Conflict Studies, no. 20 (February 1972). According to the editors of Conflict Studies among others, operations planned by the PDF and FLQ were the assassinations of the U.S. and Israeli Consuls in Montreal.

(103) Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1971. See also: Charles Wakebridge, "The Turkish Urban Guerrillas," New Middle East, no. 52/52 (January/February 1973), pp. 54-56.

(104) Miliyet, June 3, 1971.

(105) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(106) Arab Press Service, February 20, 1979.

(107) Arab Press Service, May 9/16, 1979.

(108) Tehran Journal, March 19, 1973; Kayhan International, June 3, 1973.

(109) Hubert Otis Johnson, III, Recent Opposition Groups in Iran, MA Thesis, Department of Languages, University of Utah, June 1975, p. 313.

(110) Arab Press Service, May 9/16, 1979.

(111) Neue Zuercher Zeitung, February 18-19, 1979.

(112) Arab Press Service, November 14/21, 1979.

(113) Arab Press Service, May 9/16, 1979.

(114) Ibid.

(115) Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 26.

(116) Dobson, Black September, pp. 69-70; Arab World sources specifically identified Baader as being present in Lebanon at the time of the

meeting. See an-Nahar, June 8, 1972; Arab World Weekly, June 10, 1972. According to these sources, no agreement had been reached between the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Resistance. These stories, it seems in retrospect, were clearly "covers" to dispel attention away from the growing organizational ties. On the Baader-Meinhof gang, see: Major John D. Elliott, "Action and Reaction: West Germany and the Baader-Meinhof Guerrillas," Strategic Review, vol. , no. (winter 1975), pp. 60-67. Baader-Meinhof personnel were also trained at PFLP camps in Jordan.

(117) Arab World Weekly, July 19, 1975.

(118) Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 1972.

(119) Dobson, Black September, pp. 38-40.

(120) Charles A. Russell, "Transnational Terrorism," Air University Review, January, 1976, pp. 1-10.

(121) Christian Science Monitor, August 31, 1972.

(122) On the ETA see: Time, January 7, 1974.

(123) Russell, Air University Review, pp. 2-4.

(124) Ibid.

(125) The Cordoba meeting was followed by an exchange of resources, both financial and personnel, in 1973-1974, the creation of a Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (during a meeting at Buenos Aires) in 1974, and a follow-up coordination session at Lisbon in 1975. See Russell, Air University Review; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977).

(126) Russell, Air University Review.

(127) See Peter Snow and David Phillips, The Arab Hijack War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), p. 10.

(128) There is some question as to whether BSO personnel might also have been involved. In any event, Lord Sieff was not just a random target insofar as the IRA was concerned. He was apparently involved in Northern Ireland politics. Arab World Weekly, January 12, 1974.

(129) Russell, Air University Review.

(130) Egyptian media have consistently claimed that Abu Nidal was linked with the Red Brigades. Abu Nidal has denied any connection.

(131) Arab World Weekly, March 17, 1973.

(132) Arab World Weekly, February 9, 1974. Al-Qadhdhafi is said to finance Muslim separatists in the Philippines.

(133) Russell, Air University Review; an-Nahar Arab Report, December 29, 1975.

(134) At a purported meeting in Beirut in August 1979, Fatah, PFLP, and al-Sa'iqah leaders were said to have met to discuss the problems of reconciling the continued use of international terror with the PLO's diplomatic strategy, a strategy which obviously required a dissociation of the PLO itself from such terror tactics. The solution was to utilize European and other groups; and to make Lisbon the key contact point for organizing terrorist operations.

(135) The ELF was formed in Cairo by Idris Muhammad Adin in 1958. Its main force however is concentrated in the area around Asmara, Ethiopia's second most populous city. In 1961 it created a military arm, the Eritrean Liberation Army (ELA), which began insurgent operations in Eritrea in 1965. Between 1962 and 1964 the ELF extended its contacts throughout the Middle East. Among these groups supporting the ELF were: Syria, Iraq, and the UAR, which provided arms and training; Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt, which supplied funding; and Lebanon which allowed the ELF to use its territory. Later Iraq, Libya, the Sudan and South Yemen began aiding the ELF. After the 1967 war, the ELF established ties with the Resistance: ELF members were trained in Fatah and GC camps in Lebanon. See an-Nahar Arab Report, May 17, 1971. The ELF was originally predominantly Muslim, and moderately leftist ideologically. However, there was a strong Christian element (the population of Eritrea is about evenly split between Muslims and Christians). Its initial strength was about 6,000 men, but in the 1970s this increased to between 10,000 and 15,000. Its current leader is Ahmad Nasir, and it is supported by Saudi Arabia, some Gulf states, and Syria.

In 1971/1972 a Christian faction broke away to form the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPF). This originally Christian organization evolved into a mixed Christian-Muslim group which was both Marxist and pan-Arab ideologically. The EPLF is about 20,000 strong, is led by Ramadan Muhammad Nur and Isayas Afiwurqi, and is supported by Libya and South Yemen. See Arab World Weekly, February 22, 1975. A third group, the Eritrean Liberation Front Popular Forces in turn split from the EPLF in 1976. This is the largest of the Eritrean insurgents, numbering at least 50,000 men. It is led by 'Usman Salah Sabbi, and is supported by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. See Arab Report and Record, July 16-31, 1978.

(136) The Kurds, a population of 3 to 5 million, occupy a strategic position athwart the oil regions of northern Iraq, Western Iran, and

Eastern Turkey. Kurdish nationalism dates from the 1920s when the Kurds began a series of uprisings against British colonial rule in Iraq. (Even earlier, the Kurds had a tradition of tribal revolts against Ottoman authorities.) In 1945/1946 a series of Kurdish states, backed by Soviet support, were established in northern and northwestern Iran. When these collapsed, Kurdish leaders organized as the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) fled to the USSR. They returned from this exile in 1958/1959 to reorganize in Iraq (at the invitation of the newly installed government of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim). However, relations rapidly worsened between the Kurds and the Iraqis, and the Kurds began a sporadic insurgency in northern Iraq. In this, they were aided by the SAVAK (because of Iranian hostilities with Iraq), the Israelis (in this case, the Mossad, because of Israeli hostilities with Iraq), and later the CIA (as a Kissinger-sponsored ploy to put pressure on Iraq in connection with a peace settlement following the October 1973 war). After the advent to power of Khumayni in Iran, aid flowed to the Kurds from various Communist parties, and Marxist groups in Iran and Turkey. In August/September 1979, Iranian Kurds staged a short-lived revolt against the Ayatollah's forces. On Kurdish nationalism and the KDP see: C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); C.J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq," The Middle East Journal, vol. 13, no. 1 (winter 1959), pp. 1-10; C.J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 6, no. 1 (1971), pp. 87-107; Derk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). For a contemporary analysis see: Arab Press Service, August 29-September 5, 1979.

(137) an-Nahar Arab Report, January 28, 1974; an-Nahar Arab Report, February 18, 1974; an-Nahar Arab Report, October 7, 1974.

(138) Algiers Radio, August 19, 1976, FBIS, August 23, 1976.

(139) See Amos, Arab-Israeli Political/Military Relations, pp. 226-230, and the literature therein cited.

(140) Russell, Air University Review.

(141) Ibid.

(142) Arab Press Service, September 12, 1978.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(145) an-Nahar Arab Report, June 12, 1972.

(146) L'Orient le Jour, February 5, 1974.

(147) About 100 URA members were in Lebanon. According to Japanese sources, they began leaving Lebanon as late as March 1977. KYODO, March 14, 1977, FBIS, March 15, 1977.

(148) L'Orient le Jour, February 5, 1974.

(149) The Guardian (Manchester), January 13, 1977.

(150) Jenkins, International Terrorism, p. 19. NATO officials at one point in 1976 felt that such a worldwide terrorist organization was indeed in the making. According to them, the Arm of the Arab Revolution was the key to the terrorist network in the Middle East, and was tied in with other networks outside of the Middle East. AP Dispatch (February 6, 1976).

(151) Jenkins, International Terrorism, p. 21.

(152) The SAVAK was trained by both the FBI and the Israelis, which accounts for a great deal of anti-American, anti-Israeli feeling in Iran. SAVAK agents are still said, by Arab sources, to have ties with the CIA, or alternatively with Israeli security forces. Conversely, Khumayni is reported to have turned the names of a number of Israeli agents connected with the SAVAK to 'Arafat. Jeune Afrique, no. 953 (April 11, 1979), p. 30.

(153) Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972.

(154) See: "Libya's Foreign Adventures," Conflict Studies, no. 41 (December 1973), for details.

(155) al-Qadhdhafi, Speech on the 2nd Anniversary of the U.S. Occupation of Wheelus Air Force Base, June 11, 1972, partially excerpted in Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972; Brief (Tel Aviv), June 1-15, 1972.

(156) Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972.

(157) The Times (London), June 12 and 13, 1972.

(158) Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972. IRA and Black power representatives were said to have visited Tripoli, Libya several times prior to al-Qadhdhafi's speech.

(159) Arab World Weekly, June 17, 1972.

(160) The New York Times, July 16, 1976.

(161) al-Ahram, August 11, 1976, FBIS, August 18, 1976; 8,000 men were being trained.

(162) The New York Times, July 16, 1976.

(163) Tom Weber, "The Strange Capital of World Terrorism," The San Francisco Chronicle, October 9, 11, and 19, 1978.

(164) "Libya's Foreign Adventures," Conflict Studies, no. 41, p. 4; Arab Press Service, July 7, 1976; The New York Times, July 16, 1976; Charles Holley, "Why Libya Exports Chaos," Atlas World Press Review, no. 23 (November 1976), pp. 14-16.

(165) The Times (London), April 19, 1976; The New York Times, July 16, 1976; al-Ahram, August 11, 1976. This hit team was apparently used to assassinate Libyan expatriates living in Europe in the summer of 1980.

(166) MENA, April 28, 1977, in Arab Report and Record, April 16-30, 1977.

(167) The New York Times, July 16, 1976.

(168) Arab World Weekly, January 12, 1974.

(169) Anable in the Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977.

(170) Hans Jeachim Klein interview in Der Speigel, August 7, 1978. The original plan was to kill the oil ministers of Iran (Jamshid Amuzgar) and Saudi Arabia (Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani), but both Iran and Saudi Arabia paid Carlos not to carry out the killings. The raid itself was supported by not only Libya, but also by Algeria and Iraq. The New York Times, July 16, 1976. According to Libyan oil minister 'Izz al-Din al-Mabruk:

> The leader of the commandos divided the oil ministers into three groups: 1. The progressists (as received) (Libya, Algeria, Iraq and Kuwayt because of the latter's good treatment of an earlier group of commandos). 2. Friends (Ecuador, Venezuela, Nigeria and Gabon.) 3. Reactionaries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). Carlos made it clear that he did not intend to harm any one of the first two groups "but these" while pointing his finger at the third group.

ARNA (Tripoli), December 27, 1975, in FBIS, December 29, 1975.

(171) Klein interview, Der Speigel.

(172) The New York Times, July 16, 1976. Klein "retired" after the Vienna (OPEC) attack; Carlos after Entebbe. In addition to his other activities, Carlos brokered a connection between the PFLP and the Dutch Socialist Revolutionary Party. Arab Report and Record, September 16-30, 1976. According to al-Sadat, Carlos is more or less perma-

nently residing in Tripoli: "Carlos constantly has rooms reserved for him in Tripoli hotels. He has been in Tripoli for two years now. For two years they [the Libyans] have been planning attacks on Arab heads of state – including myself – hijackings and attacks on embassies..." Interview in al-Siyasah, December 9, 1977; MENA, December 9, 1977, in FBIS (December 12, 1977).

(173) Hani al-Hasan quoted by Nadim Abu Ghannam in Monday Morning (Beirut), August 14-20, 1978, pp. 9-13:

> In 1970, Iraq escalated the situation in Jordan. In its radio broadcasts, it announced that it was placing its forces at the disposal of the Palestinian Revolution. When the clashes started, Iraq forgot all its promises. It withdrew its forces from Jordanian territory, leaving the Palestinian Revolution besieged in Jarash, Ajloun and Amman....
>
> Then, in 1972, the Iraqis started working on the creation of an organization aimed at splitting Fatah and distorting its aims. They brought out the name of Abu Nidal and hid behind it. In 1973, they sent gunmen to assassinate Abu Mazin in Damascus. The plan was to kill him and his children. We arrested the conspirators and sentenced them and Abu Nidal to death. But later, we released them and launched a dialogue with the Iraqis.
>
> The dialogue stopped in 1974, when we discovered and blocked an Iraqi attempt to kidnap the members of our Kuwayt Region Committee. The plan was to take them by plane to Tunis and kill them if 'Arafat did not issue a statement denouncing the decisions of the Palestinian National Council.
>
> In 1975-76, when the struggle erupted between the PLO and the Syrians, Iraqi Army Intelligence issued orders to stop anti-Fateh operations and we had a period of good relations. We started discussing the return of a confiscated RPG factory to us and the cessation of the monthly payment of 65,000 Iraqi dinars to Abu Nidal for use against Fateh. But all we got out of this was promises.
>
> In 1978, after the South Lebanese war, the normalization of Palestinian-Syrian relations became possible – relations based on total Palestinian independence from Syrian or any other control. That is when Iraq reactivated its plan and took a decision to

> murder Yasir 'Arafat's aides with a view to weakening him and "bringing him to his knees," as one of them put it. So they killed Said Hammami, 'Ali Yasin, 'Izz al-Din, Qalaq and Adnan Hammad – all in less than a year.

(174) an-Nahar Arab Report, August 19, 1974.

(175) Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977; Deutsche Zeitung, June 16, 1978, in JPRS, July 27, 1978, Arab Report and Record, August 16-31, 1978.

(176) Deutsche Zeitung, June 26, 1978.

(177) Ibid.; Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977.

(178) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 15, 1974.

(179) Deutsche Zeitung, June 16, 1978.

(180) SANA (Damascus), September 17, 1978; in FBIS, September 19, 1978.

(181) See the comments of Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA, summarized in Herbert Kresney, "How and Where Soviets Secretly Train Terrorists for the PLO," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, September 23, 1979, p. 23.

(182) Ibid.; "Since Jordan," Conflict Studies, no. 38, p. 16.

(183) See Smith, Carlos, for details. Also: Arab World Weekly, July 19, 1975; Time, January 5, 1976, p. 45; Newsweek, January 5, 1976, p. 27; People, October 11, 1976, pp. 24-27. Carlos gave out autographs during the OPEC kidnapping.

(184) Smith, Carlos; People, October 11, 1976.

(185) Kresney, in Sunday Examiner and Chronicle; Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977.

(186) Interview with 'Abd Allah Dallud, "Al-Fatah 'Completely in the Hands of Moscow," Der Speigel, September 17, 1979, pp. 156-162; in JPRS, October 31, 1979, pp. 1-6.

(187) Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977; John D. Gibson, II, Contemporary Terrorism (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978), p. 256; Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," Conflict Studies, no. 7 (1970), p. 12.

(188) Gibson, Contemporary Terrorism. The East Germans reportedly signed an agreement with the PLO in August 1973. In it the East Germans agreed to supply the PLO with war material, and to accommodate terrorists wounded during their underground missions. Quick (Munich), August 30, 1973, in FBIS, September 6, 1976.

(189) Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1977.

(190) Ibid. Outside the Soviet bloc, terrorist camps have been reported to exist in Greece and as far away as Australia, a clandestine frogman training facility.

(191) Arab Communist parties apparently held a second meeting a year later in Nicosia in April 1978. al-Hawadith, July 27, 1968, in FBIS, July 28, 1978.

(192) Akhir Sa'ah, July 5, 1978.

(193) Ibid.; Arab Press Service, February 2, 1977. The later disturbances in Egypt were allegedly organized during the Nicosia meeting.

(194) FBIS, July 28, 1978. The Cubans agreed to supply the PLO with a variety of light weapons, and Cuban experts were to train Palestinians. Cuban experts were said to be active in Lebanon, alongside PLO forces. VOL, May 3, 1978, in FBIS, May 4, 1978. Also: Arab Press Service, September 12, 1975.

(195) al-Musawwar, June 30, 1978, pp. 10-11, in JPRS, September 8, 1978.

(196) Ibid.

(197) Arab Report and Record, April 16-30, 1978.

(198) W.A.C. Adie, "China, Israel and the Arabs," Conflict Studies, no. 12 (May 1971), pp. 4ff.

(199) Ibid. PFLOAG was established in 1964, as an offshoot of the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). Its numbers were estimated at between 600 and 800 regular guerrillas and some 1,000-plus militia. Small numbers of PFLOAG personnel received training in China and the USSR. PLOAG, new PFLO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman) split in 1970, and a Maoist group, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf, emerged as its rival.

(200) Arab World Weekly, June 19, 1971.

(201) Ibid; Tehran Journal, March 19, 1973; Arab World Weekly, June 3 and 10, 1972; David Rees, "North Korea's Growth as a Subversive Centre," Conflict Studies, no. 28 (November 1972), p. 12. The North Koreans, as noted, also trained over 100 PFLP members in naval warfare, including apparently the squad that attacked the Coral Sea.

(202) Arab Report and Record, October 16-31, 1976.

(203) For a brief overview of Mossad, see: Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau, The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service (New York: New American Library, 1978); and Newsweek, September 3, 1979, p. 23.

(204) Golda Meir appointed ex-Intelligence Chief Aharon Yariv, who operated in conjunction with the then head of Mossad, Zvi Zamir.

(205) Beirut was the center of both sides' operations for a number of reasons: Most Palestinian organizations, apparently including the BSO, had their headquarters there. In addition, Beirut was a wide-open city in the tradition of Swiss cities in Europe. According to a take out by the Arab World: There are allegedly "Eastern spies seeking information about the West and vice-versa, Israeli spies seeking information about the Arab countries, including Lebanon, and Arab spies seeking information about other Arabs." Arab World Weekly, April 21, 1973, excerpting an article in al-Sayyad.

(206) See Dobson, Black September; Tinnin, Hit Team; and Smith, Carlos, for the most extended accounts. Also: Tehran Journal, July 23, 1973; Israel's Silent War, (Beirut: Fifth of June Society, 1973); Bernd Debusmann, "Mideast Agents' Savage War," Washington Post, March 12, 1973, p. 3; Arab World Weekly, August 4, 1973; Arab World Weekly, July 6, 1974; Time, November 6, 1972, pp. 63-64; Zionist Israeli Acts of Terrorism, 1937-1974 (Washington, D.C.: Free Palestine, n.d.).

(207) Khalaf, Memoirs, al-Mustaqbal.

(208) Arab World, August 4, 1974.

(209) "Since Jordan," Conflict Studies, no. 38, p. 12.

(210) "Since Jordan," Conflict Studies, no. 38; The Egyptian Gazette, April 11, 1973; Washington Post, March 12, 1973; The Times (London), August 13, 1973.

(211) an-Nahar Arab Report, April 30, 1973. A second Israeli attack along the lines of the April 1973 Beirut raid was apparently blocked, according to Hani al-Hasan. Arab Report and Record, April 1-15, 1975. The Spook War has apparently continued, although at a much less intense level. As late as December 1979, two Palestinians were killed in

Nicosia, Cyprus. One of them, Ibrahim 'Abd al-'Aziz Bararit (Abu Safwat), was alleged by Israeli sources to be the head of terrorists operating in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli Radio, December 18, 1979, FBIS, December 18, 1979.

(212) Arab World Weekly, March 10, 1973; Christian Science Monitor, September 26, 1976.

(213) Time, September 25, 1972, p. 35. Other sources indicate a somewhat larger number of Arabs, around 70,000. But in addition, there were also large Turkish (est. 600,000-700,000), Greek (est. 400,000 or more) and Yugoslavs (est. 600,000 or more). These large communities which, like the Arabs, were largely transient, provided both recruits and cover for a variety of terrorist organizations. In the Palestinian community alone, there were at least two groups openly connected with the PLO, the General Union of Palestinian Students and the General Union of Palestinian Workers.

(214) Ibid.

(215) Smith, Carlos, p. 120.

(216) Tehran Journal, January 5, 1974. The basic agreement was with the BSO. However, Mossad agents managed to infiltrate BSO cells in France and began a series of killings.

(217) Jerusalem Post, September 4, 1973. The airlines, which were not named, were said to be paying off the PFLP, the GC, and the PLO.

(218) Tehran Journal, September 27, 1973.

(219) New York Times, October 5, 1972; Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 1974; Elaine Hagopian, "Minority Rights in a Nation-State: The Nixon Administration's Campaign Against Arab-Americans," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. V, nos. 1 & 2 (autumn/winter 1976), pp. 94-114.

(220) Daily Star, September 27, 1973.

(221) Tehran Journal, January 5, 1974.

(222) New York Times, January 6, 1974; Time, January 12, 1974, p. 31; San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, February 10, 1974.

(223) al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 6, 1979, in FBIS, December 12, 1979.

(224) al-Akhbar, July 6, 1974.

(225) The Daily Star, February 28, 1974.

(226) Daily Express, February 11, 1974.

(227) Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1974.

(228) Arab World Weekly, November 30, 1974.

(229) The association of Salah Khalaf with the purge was itself a curious development, since he had been generally considered the brains behind the BSO. Arab World Weekly, December 7, 1974.

(230) Arab World Weekly, February 1, 1975.

(231) al-Dustur, January 20, 1975.

(232) For details see: Time, August 14, 1978, p. 27; San Jose Mercury, August 13, 1978.

(233) al-Hadaf, excerpted in Arab World Weekly, September 19, 1970.

(234) Ibid.

(235) Arab Press Service, April 11/18, 1979. The Kuwayti branch of the ANM has close ties with the PFLP, although it opposes the extension of PFLP activities into Kuwayt. Even so, Wadi' Haddad was said to have established a cell of the special operations branch in Kuwayt.

(236) Arab Press Service, May 1, 1978.

(237) Arab Press Service, November 8, 1977. Anti-terrorist cooperation in the Gulf was instituted following the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Syria's Khaddam, but in which a UAE minister was killed. In March 1978, some 11 states had agreed at least in principal to exchange intelligence information in a local oil "interpol." Arab Press Service, May 8, 1978.

(238) See Kaplan, "Psycho-dynamics of Terrorism," Terrorism.

(239) On April 18, 1974, the Cairo Technical Military College was attacked in an apparent attempt to seize arms stored there. The same day, al-Sadat's motorcade was attacked. The attacks were followed by mass arrests. Africa Confidential, June 14, 1974; al-Anwar, April 23, 1974, FBIS, April 23, 1974. Later the PFLP was said to be planning to kill al-Sadat: FBIS, August 20, 1976. Still later, in 1977, a Libyan plan to kill al-Sadat was said to have been discovered by Israeli Intelligence and relayed to the Egyptians via the Moroccans. The good will created by this tip was instrumental in easing the way for an Israeli/Egyptian peace contract. Sidney Zion and Uri Dan, "Untold Story of the Mideast

Talks," New York Times Magazine, January 21, 1979, pp. 20-22. See also: Eitan Haber, Zeev Schiff, and Ehud Yaari, The Year of the Dove (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), pp. 9-13. Al-Sadat, however, remained extremely concerned about the possibility of his assassination. According to al-Ahram, April 22-24, 1978, some 4,000 new security officers were being trained to protect the president and key governmental officials. Unofficial rumors, however, suggested that in addition, upwards of 150,000 troops had been moved to the Cairo environs in the wake of an escalation of threats following al-Sadat's peace initiative. In addition, a number of naval units were said to be patrolling the waters off Alexandria to guard against possible seaborne attacks aimed at al-Sadat's coastal villa. When al-Sadat visited Israel in September 1979, his yacht was escorted by a U.S. submarine and destroyer.

(240) Arab World Weekly, November 23, 1977.

(241) Washington Post, November 5, 1974. The November plot was linked to Fatah; but there had been earlier plots against Hasan and/or Moroccan officials.

(242) Al-Qadhdhafi was reported (by otherwise hostile Egyptian sources) to have narrowly escaped being shot by a single assassin. The shooting which occurred in April 1977 resulted in a pistol shot wound in al-Qadhdhafi's hand. MENA (Cairo), April 24, 1977, FBIS, April 25, 1977.

(243) The Shah was apparently shot in the leg some time in 1978. Stories coming out of Iran, attributed the shooting to a cousin of the Shah whose violent temper was triggered by some sort of intra-familial dispute over money.

After the Khumayni government demanded that the Shah be returned, the PLO was said to be planning to kidnap him. According to Hani al-Hasan, specialized guerrilla groups had been organized, at the direct order of 'Arafat, to carry out the kidnapping. The original plan was to kidnap the Shah while he was in Morocco, but this never matured, and when the Shah left for the Bahamas, the idea appears to have been dropped. The Japan Times, April 28, 1979; Tehran Radio, April 28, 1979, in FBIS, April 30, 1979.

(244) Akhir Sa'ah published a story which claimed that Fatah had discovered an Iraqi plan to kill most of the major Resistance leaders, among them George Habash and Salah Khalaf. The Iraqi plan was said to have been discovered by PLO counterintelligence. Akhir Sa'ah, June 21, 1978, in JPRS, July 25, 1978, pp. 6-7. Faruq al-Qaddumi reportedly narrowly escaped assassination while stopped over in Paris enroute to the UN. Voice of Lebanon, December 15, 1979, FBIS, in December 18, 1979. Parenthetically, it should be noted that Fatah counterintelligence (which is presumably also the PLO's) was set up some time prior to 1967 and was originally headed by al-Qaddumi. After 1967, Khalaf was in charge. Khalaf, "Memoirs," al-Mustaqbal, p. 37.

Khalaf himself was the apparent target of an assassination attempt in late 1979. According to the PLO version, a friend of Khalaf's, Muhammad Yusuf was incited by Israeli intelligence to kill Khalaf. At the time, Yusuf was imprisoned in West Germany. Within a day after the PLO was informed that Israeli intelligence had had access to Yusuf, he mysteriously died. See Salah Khalaf interview in Der Speigel, December 19, 1979; West German Radio, November 6, 1979, in FBIS, November 7, 1979. This may or may not have set off a round of reprisals. In November (after Yusuf's death) the Israeli ambassador to Portugal was attacked; in December two Palestinians were killed in Cyprus; and in January the chief executive of El Al in Istanbul was assassinated. A group calling itself the "sons of the land," a title usually associated with the PFLP, claimed responsibility. Baghdad Radio, January 3, 1980, in FBIS, January 4, 1980. The statement released by the "sons" said that the victim, Avraham Eliazar, had planned the assassination of Resistance leaders.

CHAPTER 11

(1) On the intellectual background and general propositions of conflict theory see: Ralph Dahrendorf, Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

(2) The original proposition is George Simmel's. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 122-123.

(3) The notion of social metastasis is, of course, Johnson's. This notion of a conflict which is continually in flux and continually tends to expand has posed problems for theorists of conflict. One such theorist, John Galtung, in an attempt to analyze the Palestine conflict within the categories of formal conflict theory, once made this assessment:

> To define a conflict, the parties have to be specified, their values (goals as well as interests) must be given, and the incompatibility of these values must be demonstrated. That there is incompatibility [between Palestinians and Israelis] is obvious, but about what? The incompatibility rests not only in the geographical location of Jews or Arabs, but the claims to control the polity in which they are living. "Polity" is chosen here as a term roughly corresponding to "state." It has two connotations: territorial possession as well as social control. The question is: Who shall exercise this control, Arabs or Jews?

John Galtung, "The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict," Journal of Peace Research, vol. VIII, nos. 3-4 (1971), pp. 173-206, also reprinted in a shortened version as, "Conflict Theory and the Palestine Problem," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. II, no. 1 (autumn 1972), pp. 34-63. See

also the criticism of Galtung's approach by Charles Boasson, "Galtung's Version of 'The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict': Can Peace Research Transcend Prejudice and Dogma?" Journal of Peace Research, vol. 10, nos. 1-2 (1973), pp. 133-144.

Galtung's attempt to define the Palestine conflict illustrates both the strength and weakness of formal conflict theory as applied. On one hand, there is the logical and laudable process of defining the issues and the parties, a process that any diplomat (or attorney) would at once engage in as a necessary prerequisite to achieving a rational solution. On the other hand, however, there is the requirement that parties and issues be "given," i.e., be stable and unchanging. And here is the weakness of formal conflict theory as applied to fluid political situations: It has a static bias, and consequently effectively deals with only those conflicts whose parameters have been defined, either by time or otherwise. (The law of civil procedure, for example, sharply defines conflict by forcing the parties to define their contentions in terms of the (already defined) "elements" of a cause of action.) See Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 112-132; Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), for critical analyses of formal conflict theory.

In addition, the more formal theories of conflict resolution, as distinct from theories about conflict per se, assume a specific mind-set on the parts of the parties to conflict. In order for any conflict to be resolved, there must be bargaining behavior:

> Bargaining is the process whereby two or more parties seek to agree on what each shall give and take or perform and receive in a transaction between them. This definition assumes that while conflict is taken for granted, there are also common interests between adversaries. Further, the agreement struck between them is based on rational value-maximizing behavior, and each adversary's "best" choice of action depends on what the other party is expected to do.

Albert F. Eldridge, Images of Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 170-171. Theories of conflict resolution through bargaining then go on to set forth a series of sequences of making up bargaining behavior: information processing (definition of the problem), decision making (definition and selection of choices), and selection of a strategy to accomplish desired goals. See also: Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), for survey of the literature.

All of these theories, whether based on more elegant models of "maximizing" behavior, or more empirical models of "satisficing", share (obviously to different extents) the static bias of general conflict theories. But even more importantly, they require a curiously narrow definition of "rationality." Here "rationality" means a sequence of choices in which a given set of means is more or less continuously

related to a given set of intermediate ends. It is, in short, a pragmatic, case-by-case, form of choice or problem solving. See Deutsch, International Relations, pp. 114-115; and Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 3-8, for definitions and critiques of the concept of rationality used in conflict theory and its theoretical progeny. Moreover, the criteria of these pragmatic choices are in turn defined as "empiricism" in the sense that these choices are oriented toward problem solving and consistency in the sense that preferred goals are logically ranked, as well as the strategies utilized to attain them.

The point is that these definitions of both the nature of the conflict and the techniques to resolve conflict are embedded in Western cultural values and Western patterns of political behavior. And they do not necessarily apply in non-Western context. That is not to say that non-Western decision making is not rational, rather that it is responsive to factors outside of the narrow concept of rationality used in conflict and bargaining theory. Note also that the difference between Western "rational" patterns has been summed up in the famous "pattern variables" of Talcott Parsons. These, in turn, have been worked into a theory of change which has dominated Western thought on change and development until recently. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1951); Max Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961); and F.X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Ecstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 67-68. For critiques of this approach see: Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 171-188. Milton Singer, "Beyond Tradition and Modernity in Madras," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13 (April 1971), pp. 160-195; also Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," in Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), chap. 11.

(4) Edward Azar, Paul Jureidini, and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict in the Middle East," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VIII, no. 1 (autumn 1978), pp. 41-60. The concept of protracted conflict was originally used to describe cold-war relations between the West and the Communist bloc. As such, it focused on military and ideological confrontation; protracted social conflict adds the notion of a social and psychological dimension.

(5) Ibid., pp. 50-51.

(6) On this see: Amos, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations, pp. 222-223; Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

(7) See Lucian W. Pye, "Identity and Political Culture," in Crises, pp. 101-134, for the connection between legitimacy and identity.

(8) Michael Brecher, "The Middle East as a Subordinate System and its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2 (June 1969), pp. 117-139; Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 23-64. For another variant of this model, see Michael C. Hudson, "The Middle East," in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 466-500.

(9) See: The Military Balance, 1975-1976 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976) for a detailed breakdown of the relative strength of Israel and Arab core states. An interaction pattern aptly described by Malcolm Kerr as an "Arab Cold War." But a number of commentators have remarked on the essentially divisive and escalatory nature of inter-Arab politics: Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, vol. 10, no. 3 (April 1953), pp. 408-429; Michael C. Hudson, "The Middle East," in James N. Rosenau, et al, eds., World Politics: An Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 466-500; Richard W. Cottam, "International System Change in the Middle East," paper presented at MESA Convention, November 20-22, 1975.

(10) Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, p. 117.

(11) Ibid., pp. 117-119.

(12) Ibid., p. 123.

(13) Stanley Hoffman, "International Systems and International Law," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 205-237.

(14) Israeli strategy debate has been analyzed by Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel; Harkabi, Arab Strategies; Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970); Michael Brecher, "Ben Gurion and Sharett's Contrasting Images of the Arabs," New Middle East, no. 18 (March 1970), pp. 28-34; Abraham R. Wagner, Israeli Perceptions of American Security Policy: Current Trends and Future Alternatives (Beverly Hills: A.R. Wagner & Company, 1976); and Amos Perlmutter, "Begin's Strategy and Dayan's Tactics: The Conduct of Israeli Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 357-372.

(15) The UN has been a hostile forum insofar as the Israelis were concerned almost from the beginning. Immediately after the Partition Resolution of 1947, successive UN votes have called for a return of the

refugees. Later, UN majorities regularly voted to condemn Israeli military reprisals, and still later, UN members voted to censure Israel on a number of other issues, including a condemnation of Zionism as racism. The consequence, not unexpectedly, is that Israeli leaders have been forced to appear to be either ignoring or flouting UN pronouncements, thus compounding an already difficult situation. See: David H. Odem, Israeli Press Views on Relations between Israel and the UN; 1948-1967, unpublished mimeo, for the general trends. Also: Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, The United States in the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976) for U.S. problems in the UN.

(16) For details see: Sir Richard Allen, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent: Sources and Prospects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Kirk, A Short History; Elie Kedouri, England and the Middle East (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956); Malcolm H. Kerr, Regional Arab Politics; George Lenczewski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962); John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism; Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1964); Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence (Beirut: Khayyats, 1970).

(17) This perception was articulated in a number of ways: Among Egyptian military, for example, it was framed as a "stab in the back theory" – that the Faruq government had deliberately not supplied the Egyptian army with working equipment. On this see Nasir, Philosophy of the Revolution.

(18) See Nasir, Philosophy of the Revolution for the argument that the original goal of the RCC was to replace the corruption of the Faruq regime with a government which would lead the Egyptians out of their political and social crisis. It was only later, according to Nasir, that it became evident that a much larger change was necessary. However, see: Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Random House, 1968), for the argument that in Egypt the "revolution" consists of the replacement of one socially conservative elite by another. The originally Ba'thists, it might be added, were similarly conservative: Ba'th ideology, as opposed to the later and more radical neo-Ba'th version, did not contemplate any significant social engineering. The series of coups that these Ba'thists were involved with in Syria were not much more than changes at the top until the later 1960s. On the Ba'th see: Seale, Struggle for Syria; Torrey, Syrian Politics; Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,

1965); John F. Devlin, The Ba'th Party: A History of Its Origins to 1966 (Palo Alto, Calif.: The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1976).

(19) See Amos, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations, and the literature therein cited, especially chapter 3, pp. 28-62.

(20) See George Lenczowski, "Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq: Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices," reprinted from The Journal of Politics in The Department of Political Science Reprint Series (Berkeley: University of California, n.d.).

(21) See Johnson, Revolutionary Change, for a typology of revolutions based in part upon their definitions of the targets of violence.

(22) See the several articles contained in Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1969); William M. Carpenter and Stephen P. Gilbert, Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean-Middle East-Persian Gulf Region (Arlington, Va: Stanford Research Institute, 1974).

(23) Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, p. 67, summarizing an interview with Gideon Rafael.

(24) Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Shocken Books, 1967), p. 203; Yitzak Rabin, "Introduction," The Six-Day War (Israel: Israeli Defence Forces, 1968); Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 304-320.

(25) Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 280-282. Alternatively see Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1969), pp. 65-66.

(26) On Israeli African policy see: Jake C. Miller, "African-Israeli Relations: Impact on Continental Unity," The Middle East Journal, vol. 29, no. 4 (autumn 1975), pp. 393-399, and the literature therein cited. Shim'on Perez was apparently the architect of this policy.

(27) The definitive account of the 1967 war has yet to be written, but see: C. Ernest Dawn, "The Egyptian Remilitarization of the Sinai," The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1968), pp. 201-224; Nadav Safran, From War to War (New York: Pegasus, 1969); Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York: Doubleday, 1973); Walter Z. Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); Agdullal Schleiber, The Fall of Jerusalem (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); S.L.A. Marshall, Swift Sword (American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1967); H.H. King Husayn ibn Talal, Hussein of Jordan: My War with Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969).

(28) On the concept of defensible borders see Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1 (October 1976), pp. 38-52.

(29) See Amos, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations, pp. 99-112.

(30) Ibid., pp. 126-127.

(31) Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp. 388-390; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975); and Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, October 1975.

(32) See Edward H. Buehrig, "The UN, the U.S. and Palestine," The Middle East Journal, vol. 33, no. 4 (autumn 1979), pp. 435-443.

(33) On the Jordan civil war see: The Times (London), September 23, 1970; The New York Times, September 24, 1970; Edward R.F. Sheehan, "In the Flaming Streets of Amman," New York Times Magazine, September 27, 1970; Time, September 21, 1970, p. 18, and September 28, 1970, p. 16; Newsweek, September 21, 1970, p. 20, and September 28, 1970, p. 35; J. Gaspart, "Palestinian Waterloo at Ajloun – Military Myth and Political Realities," New Middle East, no. 36, (September 1971), pp. 32-34; Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, vol. LI, no. 9 (September 1971), pp. 38-48.

(34) 'Arafat interview in al-Watan al-'Arabi, October 25-31, 1979, pp. 28-31.

(35) The relevant "secret" terms of Sinai II (leaked almost at once) were:

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation of a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

Text in Arab World, October 11, 1975. However, the U.S. was constrained to do something about the Palestinians. The importance of the Palestinian issue was underlined by a State Department memorandum known popularly as the "Saunders document" which was incorporated in a congressional hearing on the Palestine question. U.S. House Committee on International Relations, The Palestine Issue in the Middle East

Peace Efforts (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976). Also: Marwan R. Buheiry, "The Saunders Document," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 28-40.

(36) Resistance ideologues have, in fact, interpreted the U.S. collapse in Vietnam as a vindication of insurgent warfare strategies.

(37) See William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), for an overview.

(38) Ibid.; Jason Morris, "Mideast Peace Plans Rumored and Denied," The Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1973, p. 2. The purported Kissinger plan called for an Israeli-Egyptian condominium over the Sinai, and did not appear to address itself to the Palestinian issue per se.

(39) an-Nahar Arab Report, October 7, 1974. This aide was said to have raised the issue of a Palestinian state.

(40) al-Sadat, for example, rather consistently claimed that the U.S. would be prepared to recognize the PLO in return for a PLO acceptance of UN 242. See Arab Report & Record, March 1-15, 1975, quoting al-Sadat's statement in al-Hawadith, March 13, 1975; Arab Report & Record, January 16-31, 1975, quoting al-Sadat's statement to Le Figaro, January 26, 1975.

(41) Crown Prince Fahd was one of the main Saudi intermediaries. During his visit to Washington in the spring of 1977 he apparently obtained U.S. assurances that it would recognize the PLO in exchange for PLO acceptance of UN 242. According to 'Arafat these assurances were carried to PLO leaders, and the PLO Central Council actually met in Damascus to consider them. The negotiations broke down almost at once over differences in what acceptance of UN 242 would entail. Yasir 'Arafat interview in al-Hawadith excerpted in FBIS, June 5, 1979. Fahd renewed his efforts in August 1979, in the context of other PLO/U.S. contacts. Arab Press Service, August 1-15, 1979.

(42) an-Nahar Arab Report, October 7, 1974.

(43) Ibid.

(44) For example, in January 1978 'Arafat met a delegation of four members of the House International Relations Committee in Damascus. FBIS, January 10, 1978.

(45) Arab World, November 30, 1974.

(46) Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the Arab press rather dramatically plays up any indication of U.S. movement toward recognizing the PLO.

(47) Ibid. Baltimore Sun, July 31, 1976.

(48) See The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1976, for a discussion.

(49) Arab World, March 24, 1979, and the Israeli reaction, Jerusalem Post, June 7, 1977.

(50) Middle-East Intelligence Survey, August 1-15, 1979; Arab Press Service, August 1-15, 1979, for details.

(51) Young claimed he was following up a rumor that the PLO was willing to accept UN Resolution 242. Parenthetically, there had been a consistant stream of "feelers" sent out by various PLO leaders on this issue, and some of them had in fact stated that the PLO was ready to change its position.

(52) Arab Press Service, November 7, 1979.

(53) Ibid.; The Middle East, no. 6 (December 1979), pp. 38-40.

(54) Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1980.

(55) Ibid.

(56) "Numerous Revolts with Arab Connection," Arab World, February 22, 1975, pp. 3-10, for a listing.

(57) John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 5 (summer 1979), pp. 1017-1034; The Impact of Iranian Events upon Persian Gulf & United States Security (Washington, D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979).

(58) FBIS, September 30, 1974; FBIS, March 21, 1977.

(59) FBIS, February 1, 1978.

(60) al-Safir, December 4, 1977; Arab Press Service, December 6, 1977.

(61) See: Ayatollah Khumayni, Islamic Government (Tehran, n.d.), for an outline of his thinking. Also: Arab Press Service, October 3-10, 1979, for an analysis of Khumayni's concept of a government by theologians.

(62) In addition to Lewis, "Return of Islam," Commentary, see: Raphael Israeli, "The New Wave of Islam," International Journal, vol. XXXIV, no. 3 (summer 1979), pp. 369-390; "Islam: The Rising Tide," Middle East Intelligence Survey, November 16-30, 1979, pp. 121-122.

(63) See O'Neal's discussion, Armed Struggle, pp. 14-17; and Schurmann's, Ideology and Organization, pp. 58-73 of the organizational uses of ideology.

(64) Fatah led all other groups with thirteen, the PLF-PIA had four; the PFLP, six; the PDF, seven; al-Sa'iqah, three; the ALF, two; the GC, two; the PSF, three; the AOLP, two; the POLP, two; and the PAO, five. Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, (autumn, 1971), pp. 136-139.

(65) al-Sayyad, July 9, 1970; Arab World, July 10, 1970.

(66) Ibid. But see also Cooley's treatment of Palestinian media in Green March. In addition to a wide variety of organizationally promoted publications, the PLO itself ran a number of more cultural and academically oriented institutes which published on a variety of topics concerning Palestine and Palestinians. The Palestine Research Center was founded in 1965 under PLO auspices, and published a number of studies and the periodical, Shu'un Filastiniyah (Palestinian Affairs). The Institute for Palestine Studies was founded somewhat earlier, in 1963, and is technically independent of the PLO. Its goal was (and is) to produce objective studies of the Palestine problem. One of its major publications is the Journal of Palestine Studies, published jointly with the University of Kuwayt.

(67) Donald R. Browne, "The Voices of Palestine: A Broadcasting House Divided Against Itself," The Middle East Journal, vol. 29, no. 2 (spring 1975), pp. 133-150.

(68) Abu Iyad lecture at the American University in Beirut, excerpted in Arab World, December 3, 1969.

(69) Jerusalem Post Weekly, July 27, 1976.

(70) Sharabi, "Credibility and Effectiveness," Middle East Forum.

(71) Military Communique No. 121/75 issued by the General Command of the Palestine Revolution on May 3, 1975.

(72) Charles F. Gallagher, "Language, Culture and Ideology," in K.H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 199-231.

(73) See for example the extensive analysis of Arab media failings in: Michael Sulieman, "An Evaluation of Middle East News Coverage in Seven American Magazines, July-December 1956," Arab Journal, vol. 4, Nos. 2-4 (1967), pp. 63-75; Michael Sulieman, "National Stereotypes and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (spring 1974), pp. 109-121; Ahmad Baha el-Din, "World Media and the Arabs: An Arab Perspective," in Abdeen Jabara and Janice Terry, eds.,

The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution (Wilmette, Ill: The Medina University Press International, 1971), pp. 77-85; Michael Adams, "European Media and the Arabs," in ibid., pp. 86-93. These, of course, are essentially Western-oriented analyses of Arab media problems, but they parallel a considerable body of literature in the Arab press itself. The results of this concern with projecting a new Arab image were, of course, most apparent in Arab media coverage of the October 1973 war. On this, see: William A. Rugh, "Arab Media and Politics during the October War," The Middle East Journal, vol. 29, no. 3 (summer 1975), pp. 310-328.

(74) Ibrahim Abu Lughod, "Educating a Community in Exile," Journal of Palestine Studies; and the comments of Rentz et al, The Palestinian Resistance:

> Many Palestinians who have found work in other Arab countries play important roles in the administrative, technical, educational, and intellectual spheres, roles essential to development programs, which gives them a disproportionate influence as molders of public opinion and agents of political change. Their wide scattering extends this influence well beyond the countries immediately facing Israel.

(75) Yasir 'Arafat interview in al-Watan al-'Arabi, October 25-31, 1979, pp. 28-31.

(76) Halim Barakat, "Social Factors Influencing Attitudes of University Students in Lebanon towards the Palestinian Resistance Movement," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. I, no. 1 (autumn 1971), pp. 87-112.

(77) On theories of behavioral contagion see: Ladd Wheeler, "Behavioral Contagion: Theory and Research," in Edward C. Simmel, Ronald A. Hoppe, and Alexander Milton, eds., Social Facilitation and Imitative Behavior (Boston: Allyn & Unwin, 1968); Marius I. Midlarsky, "Analyzing Diffusion and Contagion Effects: The Urban Disorders of the 1960s," The American Political Science Review, vol. 72, no. 3 (September 1978), pp. 996-10068.

(78) Rentz et al, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 140.

(79) Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1980.

(80) By juggling the representation of different groups, al-Nahar al-'Arabi wa al-Duwali, January 29, 1979, p. 5, in JPRS, May 1, 1979, pp. 11-17.

(81) See the comments of Hussein J. Agha, "What State for the Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VI, no. 1 (autumn 1976), pp. 3-38, especially p. 34: "The fighters of the resistance organizations

in general might not approve of a WBS (West Bank State) if that would deny them the right to continue their military struggle against Israel."

(82) Ghassan Tueni, "Arafat and the PLO," reprinted in an-Nahar Arab Report, December 2, 1974.

(83) For a lucid discussion of these politics as they apply to the definition of a "democratic, secular state" in Palestine, see Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 100-107.

(84) Tweni, "Arafat and the PLO," an-Nahar Arab Report.

(85) Bruce Stanley, "Fragmentation and National Liberation Movements: The PLO," Orbis, vol. 22, no. 4 (winter 1979), p. 1033-1055.

(86) See John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 3 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Malcolm H. Kerr, ed. The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975); Paul Jabber, "Peace Proposals for the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Middle East Studies Association, vol. XI, no. 1 (February, 1977), pp. 16-33, for exhaustive surveys of all peace plans.

(87) An Israeli analysis of these resolutions is contained in "The Legal Basis for a Settlement of the Middle Eastern Conflict," reprinted in an-Nahar Arab Report and Memo, September 19, 1977.

(88) On this see Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs.

(89) "Toward a Democratic Palestine," Fatah, vol. 1, no. 6 (n.d.) reprinted in The Arab World (New York), vol. XVI, nos. 5-6 (May-June 1970), pp. 30-34. And the National Covenant, Articles 1-6.

(90) Notably Harkabi.

(91) See: Issa al-Shubaibi, "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness," Journal of Palestinian Studies, vol. IX, no. 1 (autumn 1979), pp 67-84.

(92) an-Nahar Arab Report and Memo, June 6, 1977.

(93) See The Guardian Weekly (Manchester), August 7, 1977.

(94) Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A State for the Palestinians," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 4 (July 1978), pp. 695-713. For a Western discussion see: Ward, Peretz and Wilson, The Palestine State.

(95) See the same assessment, "Palestine: Redefining Aims and Strategies," an-Nahar Arab Report and Memo (September 4, 1978); and Stanley, "Fragmentation and National Liberation Movements," Orbis.

(96) Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 196.

(97) Ibid., p. 253, and as applied to bureaucracy, p. 229.

(98) For contrasting views of the implications of the spread of bureaucratic organization and culture in the West see: Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), and Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 352-434.

(99) See for example the critique of Western models of Arab psychology by Fouad M. Moughrabi, "The Arab Basic Personality: A Critical Study of the Literature," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (February 1978), pp. 99-112.

(100) For a summary and critique of these notions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics, 3, no. 3 (April 1971): 283-322.

(101) Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 3-85, explores the bureaucratic and rationalistic bases of "functionalism" as a theory of international conflict reduction. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, argues that the bureaucratic outlook is common to all national security conflict managers.

Index

'Abbas, Abu 'Abd al, 91, 95
'Abd, Bir al-, 111
Abdullah, King, 73
Abu Dhabi, 174
Abu Kabir, 49
Abu Ru'us (Heights), 213
Accelerator, 26
Acre, 7-8
Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine (AGLP), 63, 89, 97
Aden, 251
Adler, J.H., 233-34
Adib, 'Abd al-, 109
Afghanistan, 162, 251
Aflaq, Michel, 54, 70, 107
Africa, 60, 80, 82, 236, 246, 268, 270-71, 275
Ahmad, 'Abd al-Rahman, 109
'Ajlun, 199, 222
Ahram, al-, 35, 111, 210, 230
Akhbar, al-, 255
'Alami, Zahayr al-, 163
Al-Aqsa Fida'iyin Front, 92
Aleppo, 4
Algeria, 30, 49, 53, 132, 148, 160-61, 163-65, 174, 204, 210, 217, 219, 225, 239, 263, 270, 272, 278
Algerian NLF Conventional Army (ALN), 180
Algerian Resistance, 175
Algerian War, 172
Algerians, 53, 152, 210, 218-19
Algiers, 92, 252
Allison, Graham, 36
Allon, Yigal, 123
Allon, Yusuf, 252
'Allush, Naji, 67, 230
American Life Insurance, 117
American University of Beirut (AUB), 73, 76, 109, 174, 225, 279
American University in Cairo (AUC), 54
Amin, Hajj, 131
See also Hajj Amin al-Husayni
Amir (of Ras al-Khaymah), 243
Amman, 74, 79, 86, 96, 161, 168, 195-96, 224, 229
Amman Teachers College, 105
Ansar, 126, 250

Anwar, al-, 218
Apter, David, 151
Aqsa, al- (Fire), 162
Aqsa, al- (Mosque), 162
Arab Armed Struggle Organization (AASO), 220-21, 230
Arab Communist Organization (ACO), 72, 113, 117-19, 127, 159, 229-30, 248
Arab Communist Parties/Party, 80-84, 113-120 passim, 126, 131, 250
Arab Congress of Palestinians, 17
Arab Core States, 270
Arab Entente, 164, 218
Arab Front, 122
See also Popular Front
Arab Front for Participation in the Palestinian Revolution, 126
Arab Higher Committee (AHC), 5, 15, 17, 36, 44, 130, 131
Arab kings and presidents, 37
Arab Liberation Front (ALF), 44, 97-98, 100, 107-110, 130, 137, 186, 228, 230, 248, 281
Arab Liberation Movement, 124
Arab National Movement (ANM) Congress, 77
Arab Nationalist Movement, 23, 32, 44-46, 68-74, 79-80, 87, 91, 96, 99, 113, 121, 171, 173, 238, 343
See also PFLP
Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYLP), 161, 220, 228, 231, 233-34, 247
See also Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
Arab Oil, 271-72
Arab Popular Liberation Front, 230
Arab Press Service, 18, 208
Arab Revolt of 1916, 3
Arab Revolt of 1936, 5
Arab Revolution, 20, 100, 135, 137, 139
Arab Sinai Organization (ASO), 98, 110-11
Arab Socialist Labor Party (ASLP), 80
Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'th), 247
See also Ba'th Party
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), 77, 116, 126
Arab students, 254
Arab Summit Meeting at Rabat, 124
See also Rabat Summit of 1974, 124
Arab Summit Meeting of January 1964, 36, 99
Arabian Peninsula, 69-70, 87, 128, 242-43, 245, 251, 263
Arabic (Language), 225
Arabism ('Urubah), xiv, 3, 150
'Arafat, Dr. Fathi, 175
'Arafat Gang, 65
'Arafat Trail, 201
Arafat, Yasir, xv, 39, 41, 45, 47-54, 57, 61,

Arafat, Yasir (Cont.) 63-67, 75, 79, 85, 92, 98, 105, 107, 136, 141, 161, 163, 178, 187-90, 196, 200, 204, 207, 211-13, 218, 226, 230, 239, 241-42, 249, 253, 255, 272-74, 282-85
Aramco, 54
'Ard al-, (The Earth), 32, 57, 70, 122, 125
al-'Ard Movement, 32, 121
Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, 241
See also ERP
Arguello, Patrick Joseph, 241
'Arish, al-, 110-11, 214
Arm of the Arab Revolution, 161, 234, 242, 247
Armed Struggle Command, 98
Armed Struggle in Facing the Israeli Challenge (Book), 180
Armenian Church, 205
Armistice Agreements of 1949, 10
Army and Armed Forces of the Palestine Revolution, 190
'Arqub, al- (Area), 199, 201
'Arqub, al- (Battle), 94
Asad, al-, 23, 92, 95, 101-02, 104-06, 188, 270
Asad, Rif'at al-, 105
Ashbal, 171-72
'Ashur, Hamdan, 61, 63, 207, 222
'Asifah, al-, 50, 53, 55-57, 91, 168, 277
'Asifah, al- (Forces), 166, 277
'Asifah, al-, Forces - General command of, 59
'Asifah, Sawt al-, 223
'Atallah, 'Atallah, 63, 67
Athens Airport Massacre, 227
Atrash, Hasan al-, 85
'Attari, Sami al-, 105
Authority Crisis, 21
'Awdah, Muhammad Da'ud, 65, 221
Azar, Edward, 259-60, 264
'Azzam, Mahmud al-, 105

Baader Meinhof Group/ Gang, 76, 234, 239-42 passim, 251
Badawi Refugee Camp, 240
Baghdad, 63, 65, 69, 107, 228, 233, 242-43, 248
Baghdad Summit of November 1974, 248
Baghdad Summit (2-4 November 1978), xvii, 164
Bahrayn, 243
Bakdash, Khalid, 115
Baku, 250
Balfour Declaration, xiii, 2, 4
Bank of America, 118
Banna, Sabri al (Abu Nidal), 63, 65, 227-28
Bar Lev Line, 110-11
Barada'i, 'Abd al-Rahman, 189
Ba'th (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), 37, 45, 54, 69-70, 72, 92, 99-101, 104-08, 121, 126, 137, 230

Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), 241, 243
Ba'th Party - United Palestinian Organization of, 100
Battalions of Victory (Kata'ib al-Nasir), 72, 86
Baysan, 7
Beersheba, 8, 213
Begin, Menahem, xvii
Beirut, 69, 79, 86, 95, 97, 99, 117-18, 123, 126, 135, 175, 184, 190, 224, 228-33, 252-53, 256
Beirut Raid of 10 April 1973, 165
Ben-Bella, Ahmad, 49
Ben Gurion, David, 7, 11, 267
Benghazi, 232
Bettelheim, Charles, 171
Binder, Leonard, 22
Biqa' (Valley), 63, 199
Bitar, Salah al-Din, 54
Black June, 220-30 passim, 248
Black Sea, 249
Black September Organization (BSO), 47, 51-53, 55, 60, 63-65, 76, 142-48, 161, 163, 191, 208, 220-57 passim
Black September Operations (BSO), 238
Black Sunday (Movie), 232
Borchgrave, Arnaud de, 207-08
Brecher, Michael, 11, 260-64
Britain, Great Britain, British, 1-8, 17, 242
Brookings Group, xx
Buber, Martin, 12
Budayri, Misbah al, 179-91 passim
Budiyah, Muhammad, 119, 224, 228
Budiyah, Muhammad (Group), 229
Bulgaria, 127, 239, 250

Cairo, 3, 34, 37, 48, 53, 55, 88, 92, 117, 123, 162, 174, 188, 196, 214, 222, 224, 252, 256, 258, 278
Cairo University, 52, 79
Camp David Accords, Camp David Agreements, Camp David Formula, xvii, 81, 85, 164, 209
Canal, 110, 184, 186, 214
Canal Zone, 10, 46, 49
Capucci, Hilarion, 205
Carlos (The Jackel), 161, 229, 231, 233-34, 239, 242, 247, 249
Carter, Jimmy (President), xvii, 274
Carter Doctrine, 246
"Carpet of the Wind," 234
Casablanca, 35
Castro, 170
Central Committee (CC), 40, 59-60, 94, 97-98, 119, 143, 181, 196
Chaliand, 75, 82, 149, 155, 166, 170-71
China, 91, 96, 165, 185, 189, 204, 251
Chinese, 51, 53, 181, 204, 249-51
Cohen, Baruch, 252
Commando Coordinating Council, 195

Commands A and B, 72
Committee for Resisting Peace with Israel (al-Tha'r), 73
Communist Party of Lebanon, 93
Conflict Theory, 259, 285
Confrontation States (also Front Line States), xvi, 164, 262, 265
Congress of Revolutionary Fronts, 242
Coral Sea, 207, 243, 256
"Core", 260-63, 265, 267-71
The Correct Course of Fatah, 230
Crisis of the South Yemen Revolution (Book), 80
Cuba, 75, 82, 241, 251
Cuban Intelligence (DGI), 251
Cultural Revolution (Chinese), 251
Cyprus, xiii, 205, 209, 243-44

Dablan, Tahir, 85-86, 90
Dahb, 111
Dahi, Jihad, 69
Daily Express, 255
Danjani, Sidqi, 275
Damascus, 4, 52, 69, 85, 92, 95, 97, 100, 105, 184, 190, 222, 229, 251, 253, 256
Darduni, Salim, 88
Darwaza, al-Hakim, 70
Darwish, Mahmud, 28, 281
Da'ud, Abu, 65-67, 221, 223, 225-26, 230
Dayr Yasin (also Deir Yaseen), 7-8, 253
Dead Sea, 200-01
Debray, Regis, 131, 136, 144, 170
Declaration of Human Rights, 175
Defensible Borders, 269
Demilitarized Areas, 10
"Democratic Secular State" in Palestine, 286
Deterrence Theory, 11
Deutsch, Karl, 24
Deutsche Zeitung, 248
Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth), 239
Deversoir, 214
Dhofar Liberation Front, 238
Djibouti, 241
Dobson, Christopher, 47, 203, 224-25, 252
Druze(s), 85, 182
Dubai, 161, 228-29, 232, 256
Durkheim, Emile, 24
Dustur, al-, 90

Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, 81, 103-04
East Bank, 123, 143
East Germany, 127, 250
Egypt, xvii, xxv, 1, 8-9, 13-14, 26, 36-38, 45-46, 49, 52, 62, 71, 74, 78, 82, 84, 96, 98-99, 101, 104, 106, 110, 119, 134, 160-61, 163-65, 174, 184, 186-87, 204, 209, 215, 225, 232, 246, 250, 252, 262-63, 265, 268, 270, 274, 277-79
Egyptian Air Force, 232
Egyptian Army, 47, 49
Egyptian Intelligence, 47, 104

Egyptian/Israeli Peace Treaty, 81
Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council 1952 (RCC), 22
Eichmann, Adolf, 11
Eichy, Moise Henan, 252
El Al, 96, 193
Elath-Ashdod Pipeline, 207
Entebbe, 76, 87, 233, 242, 244, 247
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 127, 242-43
Eritrean Groups, 246
Ethiopia, 250-51
Executive Committee (of PLO), 39-40, 119, 138, 184-85, 188-90

Fahum, al-Khalid, 37, 133
Fanon, Frantz, 131-32, 135, 140, 221, 289
Fatah Information, 55
Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement), xvii, xx, 14, 32, 35, 38-39, 41, 43-71, 78, 81-82, 84, 87, 91, 93-100, 103-06, 108-09, 112, 114-18, 121, 126, 129-76, 179, 181, 189-95, 199-204, 206-09, 212-14, 218-41, 253-57, 272, 277-79
Fatah Intelligence (al-Rasd), 55, 221, 228, 256
Fatah Islam, 98
"Fatah-Land," 199
Fatah Operations, 238
Fatah Radio, 278
Fatah Revolutionary Council, 52, 67
Fatamid Dynasty, xxi
Fawz, Abu al-, 87-88
Faysal, King, 116, 162
Faysal, Yusuf, 119
Federation of Arab Veterinarians, 161
Fidi'iyin, xxi, 53, 65, 167, 177, 209
Fida'i-ye Khalq, 240
"Filastin," 17
Filastin al-Thawrah, 220
Filastinuna, 53, 56, 278
Firan, Wadi, 111
Fiumicino, 255
Ford, President, 274
Foreign Affairs, 287
Foreign Relations, Department of (Fatah), 59
Fortune, 57
"Fourth Army," 214
France, 1, 3, 231, 238, 252, 275
Free Officers of al-'Asifah Forces, 64, 227
Freedom Movement (Nizat-e Azadi), 239
French Groups of International Action, 241
See also GARI
Front for the Liberation of the Chad (FROLINAT), 242, 246
Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), 251
Front for Participation in the Palestinian Revolution, 32-33, 113

Fu'ad I University, 46, 49
Fulbright, Senator, 274

Galilee, 8, 124
Galilee Organization, 103
Gaulle, General de, 170
Gaza (also Gaza Strip), xx, 8-9, 13, 47, 49, 52-53, 55-56, 116, 123, 125, 158, 164, 181, 184-86, 193, 200-01, 204, 213-14, 269
General Command (GC), 33, 88, 90-92, 95, 97-98, 106, 116, 191, 193, 203, 206, 208-09, 244, 255, 275, 280
General Command A (or Wing A), 92
General Command B (or Wing B), 92, 98
General Command of the al-'Asifah Forces, 59
General Command of the Palestine Revolution, 178, 196
General Union of Palestinian Students, 49
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 175
Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, 110, 133-34, 229
Georgian, Kanal, 205
Gerlitzer, Simcha, 252
Germany, 223, 234
Ghadban, 'Ali al-, 117
Ghafur, 'Abd al-, 227-28, 231-32, 246-48
Gharbiyah, Bahjat Abu, 96
Ghawshaw, Dr. Samir, 96
Ghazalih, Shadiya Abu al-, 173
Ghurbah, 289
Giap, Vo Nguyen, 131, 170, 192
Glubb Pasha (Sir John Bagot), 73
Golan, 213
Golan Heights, 10, 99, 102, 141, 201, 204, 271
Grand Mosque (Great Mosque), 367
Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, 162
Grimm, Paul, 240
Guardian, 244
Guevarra, Che, 118, 131, 141, 170
Gulf (also Arabian Gulf), 159, 238-39, 241-43, 245, 247-48, 258, 272, 275
"Gulf Interpol," 258
Gur, Mordechai, 212
Gurion, Ben, 212

Haas, Ernst, 24, 27
Habaniyah, 248
Habash, George, 51, 53, 69-70, 72-80, 82, 85, 87, 91, 107, 119, 126, 147, 169, 189, 192-93, 196, 219, 230, 232, 238, 244, 251, 255-56, 278
Hadaf, al-, 77, 132, 238
Haddad, Marwan, 233
Haddad, 'Uthman, 188-89
Haddad, Wadi', 69, 72-73, 75-78, 88, 231-33, 238, 240, 242, 244, 247
Haddad Wing of the PFLP, 247
Hadir, 249
Haganah, 6, 224
Hague, The, 231
Haifa, 8, 54, 76, 102, 109, 205

Haifa University, 205
Halpern, Manfred, 28
Hama, 4
Hamad, 'Abd al-Karim, 73
Haman, 11
Hamdi, 'Umar al-, 275
Hamid, Hayil Abd al-, 65, 67
Hanish Island, 364
Hammami, Sa'id, 64-66, 97, 229, 275
Hammudah, Yahya, 37, 85
Harkabi, Yehoshafat, xix-xx, 210-11
Hasan II, 258
Hasan, al-, Brothers, 61, 65
Hasan, Hani al-, 48, 51, 64
Hasan, Khalid al- (Abu Sayyid), 48, 54, 62-65, 160, 223, 276
Hashemite Federation of 1958, 69
Hashemites, 267
Hatim, Abu, 66
Havana, 241
Hawadith, al-, 163
Hawatimah, Nayif, 30, 77-92 passim, 170, 194, 238, 281
Hayah, al-, 51
Haydar, Zayd (General), 109
Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn, 210
Hayy, Wadi al-, 246
Heathrow Airport, 254
Hebrew University, 173
Hebron, 96, 200
Heliopolis, 112
Heroes of the Return, 77
High Level Manpower Assessment Project (HLMA), 156
Higher Committee for Palestinian Affairs (PLO), 228
Higher Military Command, 196
Hijazi, Mahmud Bakr, 212
Hizlih, 'Abd al-Latif, 275
Hilu, Ziyad, 253
Hindi, Hani al-, 69
Hirst, David, 225
Histadrut, 158
Hit (Iraqi Town), 249
Hitan, Sadr al-, 111
Hittin Forces, 163, 186-88, 190, 214
Ho Chi Minh, 201
Hoffman, Stanley, 264
Holocaust, 6
Hudson, Michael, 28, 38-72
Hungary, 127
Huntington, Samuel, 22, 24, 153
Hurriyah, al-, 69
Husayn, Ahmad, 46
Husayn, King, 37, 39, 51-52, 62, 86, 106, 109, 121, 123, 142, 185, 196, 278
Husayn, Saddam, 247
Husayni, al- (Clan), 48-49
Husayni, 'Abd al-Qadir al-, 49
Husayni, (Husseini), Hajj Amin al-, 47, 132
Husaynis, al-, 5, 17, 25, 32
Husseini, Ghazi Abdel Kader el, 47
Husseini, Ziad El, 47
Huwaytat, 110

Ibrahim, Muhsin, 69-70, 79-80
Ila al-Amam (Forward March), 93, 95
India, 162

Indonesia, 162
Institute for Arab Studies, 118
Institute for Palestine Studies, 156
Intercontinental Hotel, Amman, 229, 248
International Brigades, 238
Interpol, 254
Iqlimiyah, 135
Iran, 46, 162, 234, 237, 240, 242-43, 263, 268, 271, 277, 282
Iranian National Front (INF), 239-40, 242
Iranian National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK), 245
Iranian Revolution, 245, 272
Iraq, 8-9, 13, 27, 44, 50, 62, 67, 69, 72, 75, 78, 80, 82, 87, 91, 95-96, 98, 101, 115, 119, 160-61, 174, 184, 187, 204, 213, 224, 228, 244, 246, 248, 253, 262-63, 276-78
Iraqi Ba'th, 101, 107, 137
Iraqi Communist Party, 81, 243
Iraqi Government, 108-09, 163, 227
Iraqi Intelligence, 118, 230
Iraqi Pan Arab Ba'th, 107
Irbid, 168, 199
Ireland, 234
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 230-46 passim, 250
Irgun Zvai Leumi, 6, 73
Islam, 3, 21, 113, 116, 162, 277
Islamic Council for the Palestine Question, 46
Islamic Republican Party, 240
Islamic Revival, 289
Islamic Revolution, 277
Isma'il, 'Abd al-Fattah, 69, 243
Isma'il, Muhammad Nabawi, 104
Israel, 18, 34, 36, 39, 49, 51, 53, 57, 64-67, 70, 77-78, 83, 91, 94, 97, 99-102, 106, 110, 115-16, 118-19, 121, 125, 127, 133, 137, 139, 142, 148, 155, 158, 171, 174, 189, 192-95, 200, 202-03, 205-19 passim, 226, 229, 232-34, 237, 246, 248, 250, 255, 258, 262-84 passim
Israel Socialist Organization (MATZPEN), 83, 205
Israeli Arab Communist Party (RAKAH), 121
Israeli Arabs, 119, 121, 125, 269
Israeli Army, 192
Israeli Communist Party (MAKI), 122
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), 267
Israeli National Water Carrier, 57
Israeli Olympic Team, 233, 247
Istanbul, 175, 231, 239

Italy, 234
Iyad, Abu 'Ali, 52, 61, 141, 221-22, 248

JAL (Japan Air Lines), 227
Jabaliyah, 110
Jabi, Suhbi Al-, 188
Jabir, Ahmad, 92
Jabir, Fayiz al-, 87
Jadid, Salah, 101, 104
Jaffa, 7-8, 52, 73, 92, 109
Jalut, 'Ayn, Forces, 163, 186-87, 214
Jamil, Naji, 105
Jamus, Walid, 190
Janin, 212
Janzur, 246
Japan, 234
Jarash, 168, 199, 222
Jenkins, Brian, 216, 244
Jerusalem, 17, 48, 53, 73, 84, 104, 123, 162, 203, 205, 213, 230, 280
Jerusalem Post, 279
Jerusalem Railway, 91
Jewish National Home, xiii, 2, 4
Jewish State, 3, 14
Jews, xiv-xv, 2-15 passim, 83, 103, 124
Jibril, Ahmad, 57, 76-78, 85, 90-98 passim, 180-81, 191, 193
Jihad, 162
Johnson, Chalmers, 20, 26, 260
Joint Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian Command, 186
Jordan, xiii, xvi, xx, 9-10, 12-13, 27, 34, 36, 39, 41, 52, 60-61, 63, 69, 73-75, 79, 81-88, 96, 98-99, 101-04, 106-08, 115-16, 121, 125, 143, 156, 159-60, 164-65, 172, 174, 178, 184-90, 195-96, 198-200, 213, 219-222, 227-28, 239, 243, 248, 251, 253, 258, 262-63, 265, 267-72, 274, 276, 279
Jordan River, 36-37
Jordan Valley, 143, 195, 199, 201, 218, 220
Jordanian Affairs, Department of (Fatah), 59
Jordanian Army, 121, 186, 213
Jordanian Civil War, 56, 65, 97, 109, 120, 139, 142, 144, 148, 163, 169, 184, 217, 257
Jordanian Communist Party, 112, 117
Jordanian Intelligence, 85
Jordanian Radio, 223
Journal of Palestinian Studies, 278
Jum'ani, Dafi al-, 104
Junblatt, Kamal, 126
Jundi 'Abd al-Karim al-, 57
June 1967 War, 10, 19, 27-28, 39, 110, 121, 138, 157, 165, 173, 181,

June 1967 War (Cont.)
186, 210, 268,
286

Kadi, Leila, 85
Kalamuni, 'Ali al-,
92
Kamal, Sa'id, 275
Kanafani, Ghassan, 70,
75, 78, 237-38,
281
Karachi, 228
Karamah, al- (Battle
of), xvi, 19,
25, 34-35, 57,
60, 100, 111-12,
144, 157, 172,
210, 278
Kata'ib, 86
Kata'ib al-Fida'i, 73
Kayid, Abu Yusuf al-,
63
Kayyali, 'Abd al-Wahab
al-, 109-10, 281
Kazziha, Walid, 69
KGB, 205, 249, 251
Khaddam, 'Abd al-Halim,
105, 229
Khalaf, Karim, 125
Khalaf, Salah, 48,
51-53, 58, 61,
65, 67, 97,
159-60, 179,
214, 223, 240,
252, 256
Khalid, Layla, 173,
234, 241
Khalidi, Walid, 274,
287
Khalifah, Mansur
Sulayman, 222
Khan Yunis, 213
Khartum, 62, 147, 163,
224, 226, 228,
258
Khartum Conference of
1967, 262
Khartum Formula, 269
Khartum Massacre, 247,
253
Khatib, Ahmad al-, 69
Khayr, Abu al-, 252
Khider, Muhammad, 49
Khumayni, Ayatollah, 21,
46, 240, 277
Kiryat Shimoneh, 206,
209, 213
Kishli, Muhammad, 79
Kissinger, Henry, 15,
229, 258
Kissinger Plan, 273
Kishk, Jalal, 79
Kreisky, Bruno, 103
Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP), 242
Kuwayt (also Kuwait),
8-9, 35-36,
48-51, 54, 61,
69, 78, 105,
115, 117-19,
156, 160-61,
164, 174-75,
184, 233, 343,
248, 253, 255,
258, 263, 279
Kuwayt National Assembly,
161
Kuwayt Regional Committee,
228
Kuwayti(s), 153, 160
Kuwayti Government, 51,
160
Kuwayti National Fund,
162

Lake Huleh, 10
Lake Tiberias, 10
Larnaca, 243, 250
Latin America, 9, 80,
82, 236
League of Arab Nations,
29
Lebanese Army, 106
Lebanese Civil War
(1975/1976), 65,
108, 169, 180,
203, 209, 219,
224, 244
Lebanese Communist
Party, 80, 93, 117

Lebanese Front, 204
Lebanese Government, 10, 93
Lebanese Military Intelligence, 117
Lebanon, xvi-xvii, 8-9, 13, 27, 63, 65, 67, 69, 73, 75, 80, 83, 88, 91, 95, 97, 99, 102, 105, 115-19, 148, 153, 156-57, 165, 171-74, 185, 187, 189, 195, 198-99, 201-02, 206, 208, 213, 219-20, 224-25, 239, 243-44, 252-53, 255, 258, 262-63, 265, 271-72, 274, 283
Legitimacy Crisis, 22, 217
Lenin, 55, 131, 170
Lenin Institute in Moscow, 249
Levant, 3, 46, 71
Liberation Tax, 160, 162
Libya, 9, 50, 52, 65, 88, 94, 160, 163, 165, 174, 187, 203-04, 208, 227-29, 232-33, 242-48, 256, 263, 279
Libyan Embassy in Cairo, 246
Libyan RCC (Revolutionary Command Council), 231, 246
Lisbon, 242
Litani, al- (War), 212
Litani River, 202
Little, Tom, 19-20, 260
"Little Triangle," 122
Lod Airport, 232, 235, 242
London, 64-65, 193, 255
London Times, 214, 231
Lutf, Abu, 54-55
Lydda, 7, 73

MACs (Mixed Armistice Commissions), 10
Ma'alot, 81, 194, 206
McLoy, Francis, 274
McMahon Pledge, 4
Madbuh, Mahmud, 182
Madrid, 252
Magnes, Judah, 12
Majdal, 7
Malaysia, 162
Mandani, General Wajih al-, 37, 77, 188
Mandate for Palestine, 4, 7, 9, 12
Mao Tse-Tung, 131, 147, 168, 170, 192
Martyr Kamal al-'Udwan Group, 206
Marx, Karl, 55, 170
Mauritania, 162, 164
M'ayitah, Mahmud al-, 104
Mayzar, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu, 119, 126
Mazzah (Prison), 50
Mecca, 245
Medina, 245
Mehmet 'Ali, 21
Mein Kampf, 170
Mena House, 104
Mertz, Robert, 70
Middle East, xiv, xvi-xxi, 19, 25, 119, 174, 207, 217, 224, 227, 234, 244-47, 250-52, 260, 263, 267-68, 270, 273

Middle East Intelligence Survey, 233
Military Council (Fatah), 59
Miller, Bowman, 236
Mini-Summit of 10-13 September 1973, 213
Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), 46, 73
Mobilization and Organization, Department of (Fatah), 54, 59
Mogadiscio, 242
Morgan, Col. Ernest, 96
Morocco, 161, 164, 246, 272
Moscow, 81, 93, 249
Mossad (Israeli Intelligence), 103, 200, 252
Mt. Hermon, 213
Mu'ani, Salah, 105
Mubarak, Husni, 232
Muqaddas, al Jihad al-, (The Holy Struggle), Palestinian People's Militia, 46, 49, 224
Muhammad, 'Aziz, 115
Muhsin, Hashin 'Ali, 87
Muhsin, Majid, 105
Muhsin, Zuhayr, 62, 99, 103-07, 178-79, 189-90, 255
Mujahidin-e Khalq, 239-40
Munich Massacre of September 1972, 144, 147, 223, 238, 247, 252, 254
Murkabil, Michel, 231
Musadiq, Muhammad, 239
Muslim Brethren, 21, 23, 32, 45, 49, 68, 70, 112-14, 116, 155, 160, 277, 279
See also Muslim Brotherhood, Moslem Brotherhood, Muslim Brothers),
Muslim International Guerrillas, 228

Nabhan, Muhammad Jabir, 109
Nablus, 54, 124
Nabulsi, Sulayman al-, 74
Nahar, al-, 204
Nahariya, 206
Najjar, Muhammad Yusaf al-, 55, 61, 221, 223, 225, 253
Nakba, al-, 26
Nashashibis, 5, 17, 25, 32
Nasir, Fu'ad, 115-16
Nasir, Jamal 'Abd al- (also Nasser, Gamal Abdel), 11, 37-38, 45, 50, 54, 62, 70, 111, 133, 138-39, 184, 214, 262, 270
Nasir, Kamil, 61, 253, 281
Nasirism, 23, 258
National Congress (Fatah), 59
National Covenant (PLO), xx, 13, 135, 141, 147, 169
National Democratic Organization for the Liberation of Oman and the Aranian Gulf, 243

National Front, 74, 96
National Fund, 119, 160-61
National Guidance Council, 34
National Liberation Front (FLN), 30, 41, 45, 49, 53, 59, 63, 131, 147, 210, 218
National Movement of the Mujahidin
See also Mujahidin-e Khalq), 240
Nationalist Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, 231
Nazareth, 124
Nazis, 170
Negev, 201, 232
Neo-Ba'th, 21, 100, 282
Neo-Bathists, 54
Netherlands, 223
New Delhi Conference, 175
New York, 65, 273
Newsweek, 207
Nicosia, 244, 250, 252
Nidal, Abu, 63, 65-67, 227-32, 234, 242, 247, 256
See al-Banna, Sabri
Nigeria, 162
Nimr, Nasib, 93, 116
National Liberation Front (NLF) North Viet-Nam, 41
National Liberation Front (NLF) South Yemen, 243
North Africa, 46, 242, 263
North America, 60
North Korea, 82, 187, 224
North Koreans, 53, 249-51
North Vietnam, 75, 82, 165, 186
North Vietnamese, 53, 249-51
North Yemen, 164
Northern Sector, 196
Norway, 252
Numayri (Numari) al-, 247
Nusaybah, Nihad, 186, 190

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 271
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 233, 242, 247
Occupied Territories, 114, 119, 121, 123-24, 164, 172, 174, 193, 200, 205-06, 220
October War (1973), 88, 105, 110-11, 118, 124-25, 128, 152, 160, 190, 198, 204-05, 211, 213-14, 265, 271-72, 278
Odessa, 250
Oman, 243, 248
Omani Groups, 243
O'Neil, Bard, 177
Operation Greenbelt, 195, 203
Operation Litani, 212
Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), 80, 116
Organization of Lebanese Socialists (OLS), 79-80
Organization of Struggle Against World Imperialism, 221, 242
Organization of the People's of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 241

Organization of the Sons of the Occupied Homeland, 232
L'Orient le Jour, 243
Ottoman Empire, 3, 12
Our Palestine (Filastinuna), 56

Pakistan, 46, 162
Palestine, xiii-xiv, xix-xx, 1-9, 14, 50, 53, 55, 59, 74-75, 77, 100, 114-15, 123, 127, 131, 133, 135, 138-41, 145-48, 167, 170-73, 185, 192, 202, 210, 224, 259, 266-67, 287
Palestine Arab Organization (PAO), 89, 92, 98
See also Arab Palestine Organization
Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), 94, 96, 109, 161, 178, 195, 198, 201, 203
Palestine Communist Party, 117
Palestine Deterrent Force, 198
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 44, 50, 58, 61, 77-78, 101, 106, 120, 158, 162-63, 167, 173, 178-90, 213-14, 251, 277
PLA Officer Corps, 32
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 57, 77-78, 86, 91-92, 95, 103, 118, 178, 181-82, 190, 200, 203
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), xvi-xvii, xix-xx, 5, 14, 18-19, 25, 36-42, 48, 50, 53, 59, 61-62, 64-67, 71, 75, 84-86, 94-97, 105-07, 109, 116-17, 119-20, 122-26, 134, 138, 143, 152-54, 156, 158-65, 175-76, 178-80, 182-85, 187-90, 194-95, 197-98, 206-09, 223-24, 227-30, 240-41, 248-49, 251, 254-57, 265, 270, 272-78, 281-82, 284-85, 287
PLO and the Rejection Front, 18
See also Rejection Front
PLO Central Committee, 85
PLO Congress (Palestine National Congress of 1964), 96
PLO Congress (Palestine National Congress of 1970), 109
PLO Executive Committee, 50, 84, 94, 138, 159
PLO Executive Council, 255
PLO Joint Military Coordination Council, 84
PLO Military Department, 105, 178
PLO Office for Affairs of the Occupied Territories, 119
PLO Planning Board, 238
PLO Research Center, 282

Palestine National Authority, 117
Palestine National Council (PNC), 38, 40-41, 55, 62, 82, 85, 94-95, 96-98, 116, 119-20, 123, 126, 133, 145, 163, 182-85, 188-90, 196-97, 206, 208, 287
PNC Political Program, 123, 178
Palestine National Front (PNF), 32, 113, 117, 119-27, 163, 281
Palestine National Fund (PNF), 40, 160
Palestine National Liberation Front (PNLF), 111-12
Palestine National Liberation Movement, 44
See also Fatah
Palestine Popular Liberation Front, 103
Palestine Popular Liberation Organization (POLP), 72
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 174-75
Palestine Region of the ANM, 77
Palestine Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP also PRF), 68, 72, 80, 87-88, 106, 220, 232-33, 238, 240
Palestine Students Union, 52
Palestinian Communist Party, 81
Palestinian Crescent, 99
Palestinian Entity, 19, 64, 71, 132, 143, 183, 206, 272
Palestinian Homeland, 83, 208, 216, 274
Palestinian Identity, 135, 137, 146, 150-51
Palestinian Media, 278
Palestinian National Assembly, 224
Palestinian National Council (PNC), 32
Palestinian National Movement, 182
Palestinian Nationalism, 17-21, 27-28, 82, 113, 125, 150-51, 282, 286
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 87
"Periphery", 260-80 passim
Phantoms of the Jordan Valley, 97
Philippine Muslim Groups, 234, 246
Philippines, 162, 246
Planning Center (PLO), 40
Poland, 127, 250
Political Department (PLO), 54
Political Program of March 1971, 197
Pope Paul VI, 247

Popular Democratic Front (PDF) or Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 32, 50-51, 68, 72, 79-84, 88, 95, 116, 126, 130, 133, 136-39, 142-43, 168, 170, 189-90, 194-95, 206, 208-09, 226, 234, 238, 243, 281
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine or Popular Democratic Front (PDFLP), 143, 149, 171
Popular Front, 122
See also Arab Front, 122
Popular Front for the Liberation of Ahvas (Iran), 242
Popular Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan, 242
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), 70, 243
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 32-33, 38, 41, 46, 50, 68, 70-72, 74, 77-78, 82, 84-85, 87-88, 90-94, 96-98, 100, 106, 108, 118, 126, 130-31, 133-35, 136-44, 149, 155, 160, 170-73, 181,
PFLP (Cont.) 189-96, 200-02, 207, 217, 219-20, 222, 224, 227, 230-44, 246, 248, 251, 255-57
PFLP (Haddad Wing), 247
PFLP High Command, 171
Palestinian Red Army, 247
Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 174
Palestinian Revolution, 20, 100, 128, 134-42, 147, 170, 215, 236, 272
Palestinian Revolution and World Liberation Movements, 235
Palestinian Service of Radio Cairo, 278
Palestinian State, xx, 12, 64, 71, 83, 123, 125, 134, 150, 275, 286
Palestinian State of Nature (Ghurbah), 289
Palestinians, xiii-xv, xvii-xxi, 2, 5, 7-20, 27-39, 56-57, 60-62, 77, 81-82, 91, 96, 98, 104, 108-11, 115, 120-37, 141, 144-54, 156-58, 160-78, 185, 187, 194, 200, 202, 206, 210-14, 217-21, 232, 234, 241-44, 254-56, 262, 264-66, 273, 279-85
Palmach, 6

Panama, 246
Paris, 64-66, 147, 163, 228, 241
Partisan Forces (al-Ansar), 114-17, 180
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, 249
Peking, 45, 185
Pension and Martyrs Fund (Fatah), 155
People's Camp (Tobruk), 246
PFLP Progressive Revolutionary Wing, 79, 230
Popular Front for the Liberation of Algeria el Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab (POLISARIO), 242
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), 248, 251
Popular Front in Uraguay (Tupamaros), 127
Popular Liberation Front (PLF), 89
Popular Liberation War - Vanguards, 86
See also al-Sa'iqah
Popular Liberation Warfare, 196
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP), 85
Popular Organization's Department (PLO), 54
Popular Struggle Front (PSF), 63, 96-97, 255
Port Said, 49
Portugal, 275
Pranger, Robert, 215
Protestant Conflict, 234
Punishment Organization, 225, 228
Pye, Lucian, 21-22

Qabas, al-, 229
Qaddumi, Faruq al-, 48-61 passim, 66-67, 120, 204, 255, 275
Qadhdhafi, Mu'ammar al-, 21, 159-61, 246-47, 258, 262, 277
Qadisiyah, al-, forces, 163, 186-87
"Qalag, al-" (The Anguish), 27
Qalag, al-, 'Izz al-Din, 64-66, 97, 229, 275
Qamhawi, Walid, 119, 281
Qasim, 'Abd al-Karim Regime, 107
Qasim, Adnan al-, 92
Qasima, 111
Qatar, 55, 105, 174, 243
Qiryat, Shmoneh, 90
Quandt, William, 31-32, 96, 104, 149-50
Quebec, 246
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ), 234, 239
Queen Elizabeth II (Ship), 208, 247
Qur'anic, 155

RAND, 273
RPG-2s, 203
Rabat Summit of 1969, 161
Rabat Summit of 1974, xvi, xx, 34, 38,

Rabat Summit (Cont.) 52, 54, 164, 229, 273
Rafah (Gaza), 55
Raf'at, Salih, 190
Ramallah, 125
Ramlah (also Ramleh), 7
Ras Hilal, 165
Ras al-Khaymah, 243
Ras Sadr, 111
Ra'y, al-, 74
Razzaz, Munir al-, 109
Red Army Faction, 242
Red Brigades, 229, 242, 251
Red Cross, 175
Red Front, 205
Red Lion, 175
Red Sea, 207, 242-43, 256
Refugees, xiii, xv, 7, 12, 19, 55, 174
Regionalism (Iqlimiyah), 135
Rejection and Steadfastness Front, 243, 247
Rejection Front, xvii, 18, 38, 42, 66-67, 71, 75, 84, 95-96, 161, 164, 178, 182, 191, 227, 230, 243, 255, 285
Rentz, George, 283
Research Center (PLO), 40
Revenging Palestinians, 222
Revolt of 1936, 30, 154
Revolution of the Carpet of the Wind, xv
Revolutionary Council (Fatah), 59, 65, 227, 230
Revolutionary Court (PLO), 256
Revolutionary Organization of the Forces of Al-Asifah, 227
Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization, 97
See also PSF
"Revolutionary System", 264
Rhodes Formula, 10
Rhodesia, 271
Rifa'i, Zayd, 226
Riyad, Abu, 88
Rodinson, Maxime, 170
Roger's Plan of 1970, 273, 278
Roguly, Damir, 238
Rome, 217, 229, 247
Rosenau, James, 29, 89
Rudays, Abu, 111
Rumania, 127
Russel, Charles, 236
Russian, 203
Russian Orthodox Church, 205

SA-7s, 203
SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army), 117
Sa'adah, Anton, 70
Sacrificers of the People, 240
Sadat, Anwar al, xvii, 21, 38, 46, 62, 66, 84, 106, 112, 209, 211-12, 214, 230, 258, 270-73, 275-78
Safad, 76
Sa'id, Nuri al, 73
St. Lukes School, 76
Sa'iqah, al, 44, 62, 85-86, 98-109, 116, 118, 126,

Sa'iqah, al (Cont.) 130, 133, 186-87, 189-91, 194, 208, 226, 229, 234
Sa'iqah, al-, Forces - General Command, 86
Salamah, 'Ali Hasan (also Salameh), 47, 57, 148, 221, 223-24, 234
Salamah, Shaykh Hasan, 224
Salih, 'Abd al-Jawad, 119
Salih, Nimr, 61, 65, 67, 190
Salt (also al-Salt), 79, 199
Samid, 158
Samprobal, 249
Samson, 285
Samu'al- (Village), 121
Sariyah, Salih 'Abd Allah, 112
Sarraj, Abd al-Hamid al-, 70
Sartawi, Dr. Isam, 65, 97, 275
Saudi Arabia, xvii, 8-9, 36, 45, 50, 52, 54, 61-63, 84, 98, 116, 156, 160, 163, 174, 184, 223, 226, 243, 248, 253, 263, 270, 277
Saudi Embassy in Khartum, 228
Saudi Embassy in Paris, 228
Sawt al-'Asifah (Voice of Asifah), 45, 278
Sawt al-Filastin (Voice of Palestine), 278
Sayigh, Dr. Yusuf, 162
Sayil, Sa'd, 67
Sayyad, al-, 115, 170, 278
Scali, John, 274
Scandinavia, 251
Schoenau, Austria, 81, 103, 234
Second of June Movement, 242
Second World War, 236
Secretariat (PLO), 97
Segre, D.V., 233-34
Seiff, (Lord) Joseph, 231
Semiramis Hotel, 229
"Seventh Suicide Squad", 228
Shah, 245, 258, 275
Shamali, Fu'ad, 222, 240
Sharabi, Hisham, 154, 165, 280
Shararah, Majid Abu, 67
Sharett, Moshe, 267
Sharif, Bassam Abu, 255
Sharif Husayn of Mecca, 3
Sharm al-Shaykh, 110-11
Sharon, Ariel, 214
Sha'th, Dr. Nabil, 157
Shatt, al-, 111
Shatura Agreement (June 1977), 65
Shawi, Nicola, 115
Sheraton Hotel, 222
Shi'a(s), 46, 100, 202, 234, 237, 277, 289
Shif, Ze'ev, 205
Shigenobu, Fusake, 232

Shihab, Abu, 87
Shi'ism, 277
Shishakli, Adib al, 73
Shruru, Fadlu, 93
Shuna Agreement of March 1949, 10
Shuqayri, Ahmad al-, 11, 37, 39, 85, 184-85
Siba'i, Yusuf al-, 230
Sidon, 207
Simferopol, 249
Sinai, 110-11, 141, 184, 204, 213-14, 267-68
Sinai, II (1975), 273, 278
Singapore, 255
Sirte, 247
Sisco, Joseph, 274
Siyan, Muhammad Mustafa, 221
Siyasah, al-, 197
Smith, Colin, 224, 232, 252
Socialist Revolutionary Organization in Lebanon (SRO), 118
Somalia, 162, 164, 233, 246
Sons of the Occupied Homeland, 220
Sounion (Ship), 208
South Africa, 271
South America, 60
South Vietnam, 165
South Yemen, 50, 69, 78, 80, 87, 233, 242, 244, 248, 251
South Yemenis, 248
Soviet(s), 126, 205, 243, 245, 249-51
Soviet Academy for the Training of Foreigners, 250
Soviet Bloc, 265
Soviet Government, 115
Spain, 252, 275
Special Air Service (SAS), 254
Special Forces - Egyptian (al-Sa'iqah), 111
Special Operations Branch, 55, 232
Der Speigel, 249
Spinney's Centre, 117
Stanley, Bruce, 285
Steadfastness Front, 38, 65, 164, 218, 243
Stern Gang, 6, 73
Stockholm, 252
Straits of Hurmuz, 208
Straits of Tiran, 267
Strelas, 203
See also SA-7
Stuttgart University, 49, 53
Sudan, 27, 164, 246, 253
Suez Canal, 110
Suez War of 1956, 55
Suhub al-Jamin (Clouds of Hell), 203
Sunday Telegraph, 47
Sunni(s), 46, 50, 100, 234, 237, 277, 289
Supply and Finance Department (Fatah), 59
Supreme Military Council (PLO), 190
Sura 48 (Fatah), 45
Sus, Ibrahim, 208, 275
Suwayda, al- (Region), 86
Suwaydani, Ahmad, 57

Syria, xvi, 1, 3, 8-9, 13-14, 21, 26, 37, 44, 47, 52, 62-63, 69-70, 73-75, 80, 82, 85-88, 91-92, 94, 98, 100-08, 115, 117-19, 132, 134, 139, 156-58, 163-66, 174, 179, 184-90, 199, 201, 204, 213, 220, 224-25, 230, 232, 239, 244, 247, 251, 253, 262-70 passim, 277-78
Syrian Air Force, 105
Syrian Army, 44, 104, 186, 251
Syrian Ba'th, 91, 118
Syrian Ba'th Party, 99, 105
Syrian Communist Party, 119
Syrian Intelligence, 50, 104
Syrian-Iraqi Union, 69
Syrian/Jordanian Military Agreement of June 1975, 187
Syrian Military Intelligence, 56, 91
Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP), 47, 70

Tahtinen, Dale, 215
Tal, Wasfi al-, 222-23, 226, 241, 253, 258
Talas, Mustafa, 101, 103, 180
Tall al Za'tar Camp, 172
Tarazi, Zuhdi al, 66
Tashkent, 250
Tehran, 245, 274
Tel Aviv, 90, 122, 202, 209, 217, 233
Temple Mount, 124
Thailand Muslims, 246
Tha'r, al (Revenge), 73, 278
Thawrah, al-, 86, 194, 198
Thawrah, al, al-Filastiniyah, 93
Time (Magazine), 57, 232
Tinnin, David, 232, 252
Tobruk People's Camp, 246
Trieste, 223, 242
Tripoli, Lebanon, 240
Tripoli, Libya, 110, 242, 246, 252
Trucial Shaykhdoms, 61
Trucial States, 8
See also United Arab Emirates
"The True Line of Fatah", 230
Tudeh, 239-40, 243
Tulkarm, 105
Tunis, 228, 256
Tunisia, 161, 246
Tupamaros, 117, 238, 241
Tur, al, 111
Turkey, 46, 104, 162, 234, 237, 239, 243, 263, 268, 271, 275, 282
Turki, Fawaz, 19, 28
Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA), 234, 238-40
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 231, 239

Turkish People's Liberation Party (TPLP), 239
Tuwayni, Ghassan, 284
Tyre, 207

UNIFIL, 95
USSR, 1, 53, 75, 79-81, 84, 103, 113-16, 126-27, 185, 187, 242, 244-45, 249, 265, 267, 270
'Udwan, Kamal (also 'Adwan, Kamal), 55, 61, 223, 225, 253
Uganda, 187, 233
'Ugbah ibn Nafi, 246
Ukraine, 81
'Ulama', 5, 45, 162
Umm al-Fahm, 122
See "Little Triangle"
Unified Arab Command, 184
Unified Command (PLO) (also United Command), 94, 97-98, 109, 116, 193, 195
Union of Palestinian Students, 49
United Arab Emirates (UAE), 61, 161, 258
United Arab Kingdom, 123
United Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, 242
United National Liberation Front, 136
United Palestinian Organization of the Ba'th Party, 100
United Nations, 54, 65-66, 229, 254, 265-274 passim, 284
UN General Assembly, 124
UN Resolution 242 (1967), 82, 102, 114-16, 127, 134, 273, 286
UN Resolution 338 (1973), 12, 286
UN Resolution 3236 (1974), 12
UN Secretary General Waldheim, 66, 229
UN Security Council, 270
UN Works & Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), 8, 35, 156, 200
United Red Army (URA), 76, 232-44 passim, 251, 255
See also Japanese Red Army; Red Army
United States (U.S. & U.S.A.), xix, 9, 13, 66, 80, 82-83, 96, 116, 128, 137, 174, 193, 204, 208-09, 211, 226, 235, 245-46, 250, 252, 255, 265-67, 270-75
U.S. Black Panthers, 239
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, 240, 245
Unity Agreement of May 1970, 133, 148, 167, 181
Unity Agreement of 1972, 178, 213, 280
Unity Formula (of 6 May 1970), 85, 97-98, 109, 196
University of London, 109
Uruguay, 241

Vance, Cyrus, 229, 258
Vanguards of the War of Popular Liberation, 99-100
See also al-Sa'iqah
Varna, 250
Vatican, 147
Vengeance Youth, 77
Vienna, 233
Viet Cong, 127, 251
Vision of the Return, 28, 150-51
Voice of 'Asifah, 278
Voice of Palestine (VOP), 187, 203, 278
Von Grunebaum, Gustave, 21

Wajih, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-, 181
Wallace, George, 246
War College of the Palestine Revolution, 166
War of 1948, xiii, 1, 26-27, 31, 77, 79, 269, 286-87
War of 1956 (Suez War), 1, 26, 79, 267-69
Watan, al-, 187
Wazir, Khalil al-, 47-61 passim, 65, 67, 76, 159, 209, 223, 240, 276
Weber, Max, 288
Weisband, Edward, 238
West, 146, 174, 191, 193, 208, 216, 265, 267, 270, 276, 287-88
West Bank, xvii, xx, 9, 12-13, 25, 33, 52, 62, 80, 96, 109, 119-26, 141, 158, 164, 173, 181-82, 190, 200-01, 204, 208, 210, 269, 273, 276
West Germany, 9, 49, 231, 247, 252-54
Wheelus Air Force Base, 247
White Paper of 1939, 6
"Will" of the Munich Guerrillas, 147

Yaghmur, Abd al-Khalig, 37
Yahyah, 'Abd al-Razzak al-, 178, 186, 188-89
Yamani, Ahmad al-, 73, 77
Yamani, Shaykh al-, 208
Yariv, Aharon, 253
Yarmuk Brigade, 314
Yarmuk Forces, 187, 214
Yasin, 'Ali, 229
Yasin, Fawaz, 247
Yasir, Abu al, 88
Yazur (Village), 92
Yishuv, 287
Young, Andrew, 274
Yugoslavia, 127, 162
Yusuf, Abu, 221, 253
Yuval, Kfar, 108

Zakat, 162
Za'rur, Ahmad, 85, 91-92, 98, 180-81
Zayyad, Tawfiq, 124
Zibdi, Mustafa, 78
Zimbabwe, 250
Zionism, xiv, xix, 2-3, 17-18, 55, 75, 93-94, 115, 128, 131, 137, 170

Zionist(s), 17, 110,
123, 125, 141,
170, 231, 235
Zu'ama', 153

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