Chapter 11

Naming Enmity

The Case of Israel/Palestine

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For Joseph.

Enabling a naming of the enemy, three questions should and, for the most part, have emerged. *What is the enemy? Who is the enemy?,* and, finally, *What to do with (or to) the enemy?* When attending to the so-called Middle East conflict, the last two questions appear to have been answered repeatedly and with devastating clarity. Indeed, it would be hard to deny the overwhelming evidence that such is the case. Little room is thus left to displace the presumption of symmetry (the basic fact of mutual hostility) or to question the plain existence (if it can still be called such without obscenity) of adversaries or the deadly course of actions that have been taken (presumably, again, with parity). Yet hesitations and waverings remain as to the "proper" designations that would adequately name the past and current situation in Israel and Palestine. These designations, these names, are perhaps well known, and they say much about the agendas they serve, consciously or not. Who, after all, are the adversaries? Israelis and Palestinians? Jews and Muslims? Jews and Arabs? Political realists and religious extremists? Beyond an all-too-familiar, horrid, and seemingly inescapable "cycle of violence," what is it that maintains the distance and kindles the enmity named under these headings? What purposes are served by and what are the reasons for the naturalization of this distance, the naturalization of the opposition and the enmity between two adversaries (for there would be two and only two—no less, no more—parties involved), an enmity that, as prominent narratives would have us believe, goes back to ancient biblical times, the ineluctable legacy of "the Middle East," a region and a land eternally ravaged by war and conflict?

Apparently adjudicating on the substance of the enmity, the first set of terms (Israeli versus Palestinian) defines the substance as a political problem and more precisely as the result of two national and nationalist struggles over one territory. This forms the basis of more or less familiar (if hardly equal) narratives. Palestinians, yet to achieve national sovereignty, would be engaged in a struggle for a recognition of their national claims, claims contested (in part or *in toto*) by the Israelis, themselves successful heirs to a history of oppression and to a historical movement that strove to reach and

establish a "national home," national consciousness, national settlement, finally fighting a "war of independence."[1] Alternatively, the conflict may be inscribed in the aftermath of World War II and the general struggle against Western colonialism, with the added misfortune of a lack of resolution resulting from colonial and postcolonial configurations, or, more likely, from the stubborn resistance to resolution by one or more of the parties involved. Finally, the terms may signify the infuriating victory of the last colonial-settler state, bastion of Western imperialism and its colonial aims, against whom natives are still engaged in a fierce liberation struggle.

The second set of terms (Jew versus Muslim) locates the conflict on a much older theological scene. The intolerance of Islam would have made it impossible for the Jews to live on equal and peaceful terms with the Muslims, an impossibility that would go back to the historical treatment of religious minorities in Islamic regimes, to competing narrative claims over the Abrahamic traditions, or simply to the increasing slide into extremism found in all religious communities (Jewish as well as Muslim, Hindu, and even Christian—but I digress) with different consequences at different historical periods. Finally, the last set of terms (political realism versus religious fanaticism) constitutes a division that rearticulates those considered so far, necessitating adjustments, not the least of which is historical. Here, a political program (national, secular, and democratic) would oppose a fanatically religious zealotry, making a resolution all the more unlikely because of the asymmetric planes upon which the parties encounter (or fail to encounter) each other. The adversaries would be at war over a theologico-political divide that is also a historical one. The dark age of religion would be resisting the (not-so-new) dawn of secular democracy.

It is perhaps ironically difficult to consider that, although such narratives are well entrenched within American discourse (even if the closest to truth are considered—if considered—"radical"), none of the terms mentioned so far have dominated the discursive scene such as has deployed itself over the "Middle East conflict." How, then, did these ostensible markers (Jew and Arab) come to inscribe themselves so forcefully on modern discourses of the most varied kind—political, religious, cultural, and so forth—even when accompanying distinct or even opposed political agendas, caveats and sophisticated analyses, critiques and debunkings? The terms only appear to maintain the symmetry of planes such as we have already encountered. "Jew" is primarily a religious term (it is as such that it appears above), whereas "Arab," although often confused and collapsed with a religious conviction, is more widely understood as an ethnic marker. In this perspective, war would again be thought across a double divide: a religious community with nationalist aspirations would be facing a massive ethnic body, the latter rejecting the former for allergic reasons, with no other visible goal than that of expelling the foreign intruder. Here, one could alternatively point out that, in modern times at least, Jews have insisted on defining themselves (and have certainly been defined by less-than-friendly others) as "more than a religion."[2] If this is true, and if Jews are, in fact, an ethnic

community (a fact that "American Jews"—not "Jewish-Americans"—would perhaps want to deny at the manifest level), then the "Middle East conflict" can still be said to be thought and conducted on one ethnic plane.[3]

One of the ironies of the naming of enmity said to oppose Jew to Arab resides in the fact that the ethnic argument is, of course, rarely mentioned.[4] Among the numerous "ethnic conflicts" and instances of "ethnic violence" that have marked the twentieth century and its aftermath, none would seem to provide an adequate analogy to the situation at hand.[5] This could be made even clearer were one to suggest that, between Jews and Arabs, we are witnessing a racial and racist confrontation, comparable to South Africa. The analogy has, of course, been raised—and not without justification given the ideological, economic, and military convergences and collaborations between the apartheid state and the state of Israel.[6] Yet, it has rarely been pushed to the point of suggesting that two "races" are here at war. This too is a question of names, and more. Were Arabs and Jews deemed two races, the vocabulary of race, which has been inherited from the nineteenth century (and which continues to operate in different guises and contexts), would likely impose upon them both the term "Semites." Even taking into account the massive collusions surrounding the modern invention of Jews as an "ethnic" (and national) grouping at the time when racial and nationalist theories were being elaborated,[7] or debates as to whether Arabs were or not considered "Semites" in racial and racist discourse (Lewis 1999), the general acceptance of the term today (think of "Semitic languages") would make it difficult to separate, on ethnic, racial, or racist terms, Jews from Arabs without endeavoring to reconstruct a new and improved racial vocabulary, or worse, a racist science (or without attempting to render this endeavor invisible). Here lies another irony: the terms that continue to dominate the discursive field called "Israel and Palestine" (or better yet, "the Middle East") fail to revive (or at least to make explicit) the very history upon which they would seem to be predicated: the history of racism. For who, today, would dare to speak of the Jews as a race? More generally, who would dare to speak not of a "clash of civilizations" but of a "war of races"? Even the argument that new names might still designate the "same" phenomena (and there is cause for such concern), one would have to account for the discursive shift that has rendered race invisible or, more precisely, unnameable in the case of Jews and Arabs.

One rarely observed reason that "Jew" and "Arab" remain dominant markers is that they continue to determine the daily life of millions. Indeed, "ethnic" self-definition having been massively accepted by Jewish organizations across the Western world (with, among other factors, the unabashed emphasis on preserving Judaism by protecting it from miscegenation—or, in its more benign appellation, "intermarriage"), the terms "Jew" and "Arab" have gained institutional (and military) force precisely where the discourse of European racism would have presumably been, if not vanquished, at least avenged. In the state of Israel, as part of a larger apparatus of discriminating measures, government-issued, mandatory I.D. cards have been prescribed

by the Israeli legislature for fifty years (the practice has now been interrupted for no less troubling reasons linked to the massive arrival of non-Jewish Russian immigrants). On these cards, which every citizen of the state must carry, Jew and Arab—embodiments of Althusserian interpellations—come before the law under two headings: "Nationality" (Jew, Arab) is thereby distinguished from "citizenship" (Israeli), and one can already note that, in one register of the "nationality" category, "Jew" is de-theologized, whereas "Arab" is simply maintained as distinct from any religious content, an ethnic or simply political marker. How has it become possible for the state that claimed reparations for one of the most horrifying chapters in the history of racism and state-sponsored racism to institutionalize a "national" (read, ethnic) distinction among its own citizens? What history is preserved, or worse, re-enacted in the naming of Jew and Arab as ethnic categories? In a proximate context, Bernard Lewis sketches an Eastern European genealogy for this distinction between nationality (i.e., ethnic nationality) and citizenship. Lewis confirms the terms of the debate as we have been exploring them by pointing out that the institutionalization of this distinction involved the transformation of religion into ethnicity (in our case, "Jew"), and a confinement, even a kind of eradication of religion (here, "Arab," which stands for, and erases, Muslim, or Christian) as an identity category. The significance of this "secular" institution that would leave religion behind is traced by Lewis to the Soviet Union, in particular, although Lewis could have referred to the general shift undergone in the changing (self-)perception of Jews in the West, from a "religious" minority to a "racial" one. The pragmatic, if not historical, reasons for that shift at the institutional level are made clear in Lewis's comment that "ethnic nationality, unlike religion, cannot be changed by an act of conversion."[8] Disciplined citizens, Foucault might say, cannot simply transform themselves. They must be locatable. (Imagine the conundrum the Jewish state would face if Arab Jews, Zionism's Jewish victims, as Ella Shohat has argued (1988), had insisted on being "nationalized" as Arabs, or if Palestinians had invoked Jewish roots—or better yet, converted en masse). But be that as it may, we may temporarily conclude from this simplifying survey that whether one speaks of Israelis and Palestinians (nationalism as the primary factor), Jews and Muslims (religion as the primary factor), or Jews and Arabs (with poised, so-called "democratic" politics, on one side and "fanatical" religion, on the other), one is never simply mistaken. One does, however, maintain and further sediment a violent state of affairs that, institutionalized by the state of Israel (among other institutions and organizations), reinscribes invisible or uninterrogated ethnic and racist distinctions, gaping distances and enmities between Jew and Arab.

Suspending the question of accuracy as to an analysis that would attempt to isolate the three spheres that have been recalled here (politics, religion, ethnicity)—surely, it is both contrived and inaccurate to engage in such analytical, isolating speculations in such a complex situation—one must still account for the enduring power of names; the hegemonic dominance of two

among them, in particular; as well as for the answers they provide to questions of historical origins (clearly, each set of names embodies a distinct historical narrative, a particular array of inevitabilities) and, more urgently, to possibilities of a resolution, one that would admittedly have to answer the call of justice. At this juncture, I want to address the power of naming enmity, the sustaining role played by names such as "Jew" and "Arab," insofar as they constitute the terms with which both question and answer (cause and effect, origins and solutions) are thought. Within the general frame that they provide, as I have tried to elaborate it here, they are themselves answers of sorts to two of the questions with which we began regarding the enemy. Who is the enemy? (the Jew, the Arab) What to do with the enemy? (discriminate against, expel, occupy, harass, starve, shoot, bomb, deport, torture, kill, etc. but also eat like and eat with, speak and sleep with, dress like, listen to the music of, hire, exploit, collaborate with, imitate, admire, etc.). The first of the three questions mentioned (What is the enemy?) has not been answered for at least two reasons.

Until the twentieth century, within the Western discursive sphere that occupies us here, the question, What is the enemy?, had not been asked. No field of knowledge had claimed the enemy as one of its founding concepts (compare the discourse on love in philosophy or theology, or friendship and sovereignty in politics); no field of knowledge, no discipline, had claimed to provide an answer to the question: What is the enemy?[9] Today, there is ever less certainty as to what an enemy is, and although this enigmatic fact hardly constitutes an obstacle to the devastating treatment of enemies everywhere, it remains puzzling enough to call for a poised reconsideration. Second, the undeniable and continued investment (from theological and emotional, to political and economic) of the West in Israel and Palestine, in the Jew and the Arab, and most important in their categorization as enemies, remains at some level profoundly puzzling. (Compare, for example, the lesser media coverage of Chechnya or even Ireland at the time, and so not only in the United States.) Here, too, answers have yet to be formulated. As paradigmatic enemies of the West (mostly, but not only, of Christian Europe), Jews (as theological and later racial enemies) and Arabs (as political and military enemies, from the Saracens to the Turk, from despotism to terrorism) belong to a long, almost uninterrupted history of concern and fear about Muslim presence in Europe (today referred to as a "demographic threat" in Europe and in Israel), and a no less uninterrupted history of negotiating, more or less violently, the presence of Jewish populations. The Jew, the Arab, then, constitute the basic terms of a Western history of the enemy, a history that, were it written, would provide an elaborate answer as to how the enemy becomes what the enemy is (or was). This history, this enemy which is not *one,* partakes of Jew, of Arab, and of the West. It engages and confronts each of the terms in their mutual and co-constitutive relations. This history could also be named, with some anachronism, a history of the Semites (that Western construct that more or less lumped together Jews and Arabs, ancient Hebrews and "Middle Eastern" peoples). Itself a potentially signifi-

cant answer to the question, What is the enemy?, the history of the Semites (the Jew, the Arab) has yet to be written. Alternatively, and more generously, one could consider that it has been partly (and partially) written as two discrete histories: that of Europe and the Jews (the history of anti-Semitism, for the most part) and that of Islam and the West (the history of Orientalism). Two histories, then, which, without a shred of evidence or simple justification that they should be treated as distinct, continue to obey the governing "principles" that have defined the entire set of terms we have considered thus far, all of which, without exception, treat as given the clear and distinct gap, the dangerous state of enmity that allegedly separates Jew from Arab (in whatever configuration one chooses from those depicted above). Put another way, the reductive and uninterrogated claim that what there is between Jew and Arab is enmity already sets the stage for a resolution by way of separation. (On that model, the solution to Apartheid would be to separate blacks from whites, that is to say, to preserve and maintain Apartheid).[10] More important, without answering the crucial question as to what the enemy is, the entire discursive sphere I have tried to describe massively occludes the after all not unlikely possibility that Western history (the history of Christian Europe in its temporal and geographical extensions) plays a constitutive role in the sedimentation of the enmity between Jew and Arab.[11] What that role continues to be, what accounts for the investment in both Jew and Arab, what the mediating links are between these terms when viewed from the perspective of Europe and of the West at large—these are questions that have yet to be explored, let alone answered. Even to begin to treat the question of the alleged enmity between Jew and Arab (if these terms are in fact naming anything of relevance to the issue) by isolating them as the polar and systemic site of conflict, as origin and goal of a historical given, as if they always already, and at any point in history, constituted an autonomous and meaningful unit of analysis, is to obfuscate everything.

There are, of course, some important exceptions to this general state of obfuscation (even laudable attempts to move beyond it).[12] And yet, one would have to explain their exceptional (and marginal) status. One would have to account for the absence of both a concept of enemy (an answer to the question: What is?) and a history of the enemy (the forms and objects the question of enmity has taken in the West—itself a unit that remains, of course, difficult to grasp insofar as it has failed to define itself rigorously enough to provide an answer to said questions). More modestly, one would have to address what continues to constitute obstacles to filling these absences. It is therefore not a matter of establishing guilt or even responsibility (at least not yet) nor of claiming reparations (all in due time). It is rather about lifting obstacles that prevent a consideration of (minimally) historical and conceptual pressures such as those that continue to frame and determine the debate, and indeed, the "conflict," that prevent a consideration not just of the "Jewish question" (as that famous chapter and export of European history is called) but of an "Arab question" as well. Not all such obstacles can be lifted, certainly not at once, and provisions must obviously be made

for the fact that other pressures—contemporary or not—are at work, be they ideological, economic and financial, political and personal, and indeed, racist and religious. Some of these issues have been addressed. Some have not. Among those treated, some have gained currency in the public discourse, and some have not. At this point, and by way of a temporary conclusion, I want to leave these considerations aside and attend to the kind of politically imaginative work that may yet enable a different naming of Jew and Arab. Here, the terms are not yet thought of as one happy (or unhappy) togetherness of Arab and Jew, nor are they to be understood any longer as names of the enemy. Indeed, what these terms could name—and whether they are even to be preserved (but who could decide such a thing?)—remains to be discovered. In order to be new (but it may also be very old), what would thus be named would have to be other (the enemy is not the other), at least other than reductively oppositional. It may even overlap, producing and articulating different zones of indistinguishability, different planes of symmetry and asymmetry. More importantly, it may already be at work, today.

It is in this context that the Israeli historian Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin has suggested an original recasting of the concept of binationalism (borrowed in part from Hannah Arendt) in order, precisely, to avoid what currently constitutes an object of hegemonic consensus and was already at the center of the Oslo accords, namely, *separation*. As Arendt had pointed out, in the political program adopted by the Zionist leadership "the Arabs were simply not mentioned,"[13] and separation—the solution adopted by the UN in the partition plan of 1947—became and remained the only consistent agenda held valid or even viable by Zionism and its numerous supporters. But as Raz-Krakotzkin explains, the presupposition was always that "in order to establish a Jewish state and to ensure Jewish hegemony and Jewish majority, expulsion and exclusion were inevitable" (2001, 169). Separation is consistently put forward as the basic principle of a vision that advocates Jewish autonomy, "a kind of autonomy whose function is to separate the Palestinians from the Jews" (1998, 66). The definition of the state as a Jewish state rather than the state of its citizens "prevents any solution based on the principles of equality and partnership" (2001, 180). That such inequality remains the goal of what goes under the name of "peace process" (or other current "road-maps") is made clear when we "observe that in the Israeli public debate, the term 'peace' still does not mean primarily the fulfillment of Palestinian rights, including the rights of refugees, but rather the principle of separation, the same principle [Arendt] opposed in the 1940s" (2001, 171).[14] Today, in Israel "what is considered as a peace process," even one that should be revived, remains predicated on a concept that "preserves the exclusion of the Palestinian perspective from the discussion of Jewish identity," from the identity of the state (the means to such exclusion range from moving borders and erecting walls to population transfer by more or, well, still more violent means). It "enables one to ignore [the Palestinians'] political rights, and obviates the need to challenge the dominant historical narrative" (172), one that rewrites Jewish history as independent and

autonomous, and diminishes the significance of a common history by relegating it to exceptional or even aberrant chapters.[15] In the final analysis, separation preserves (and aims to solidify) the history that would ineluctably associate *and* dissociate "Arab" and "Jew" as eternal enemies. Phrased another way, and more urgently perhaps, separation is what is already at work when "Tel-Aviv became the only city in the West to which the entrance of Arabs was forbidden. In many ways, then, we can regard the attitude behind the peace process as close to the radical right in Europe: the steps taken before and after the Oslo Accord are exactly those demanded by Le Pen and his followers in France" (1998, 67). What is missing from a debate with such shared parameters is "any considerable political position which could combine the discussion on Israeli-Jewish identity with the discussion on Palestinian rights" (75). What is missing is a "bi-national approach, namely one which does not separate the discussion on Israeli society from the Jewish-Palestinian conflict" (75). As Raz-Krakotzkin puts it elsewhere, "the concept of binationalism and the sense of responsibility on which Arendt insisted are even more relevant and important from the perspective of the present, when the Jewish State dominates the entire land, operating various systems of exclusion and dispossession with regard to the Arab inhabitants" (2001, 169). Binationalism "implies the realization that Palestinian history and Palestinian national identity are part of the discussion of Zionist history, essential parts of the context of responsibility. The definition of Palestinian rights and the definition of Jewish rights are one and the same. This is the context of responsibility that Zionism has created. . . . A binational perspective leads to . . . the definition of a common Jewish-Arab space."[16] In other words, binationalism directs us toward a thinking of the Jew, the Arab that would be named otherwise; otherwise, that is, than enmity.

Notes

1. Thus Kathleen Christison who, questioning the very appellation of the war of 1948 as Israel's "war of independence," nonetheless writes that the war "gave its independence" to the Jewish state (Christison 1999, 61). "Independence from whom," writes Joseph Massad, "remains unclear. After all, the British had already left voluntarily without being party to the war. The Arab armies had not been in occupation of any Palestinian land prior to the Zionist declaration" (Massad 2000a, 318).
2. The transition in the status (and the self-conception) of the Jews of Europe from a religious minority to an ethnic (or national) one has not gained the critical attention it deserves, but it has been documented and reflected upon by Hannah Arendt (1958) and, more recently, by Mitchell Hart (2000). The dichotomy between religious and ethnic, and more generally between religious and secular, should of course, be qualified, first and foremost in the historical linearity it maintains, but here is not the place to do so. Talal Asad (2003) has contributed most significantly to a rethinking of these last dichotomies.

3. The place of American Judaism in the history of ethnicization, partly manifest in the choice for nonhyphenation, has yet to be written. Pointers can be found in Hart 2000 and Massad 2003.
4. This has to do in part with the American scene, but also with the lack of account for the becoming-ethnic of Jews (see below, note 7). Invocations of an ethnic dimension in the "Middle East" and in the case of Israel and Palestine are, at any rate, rare in the West (less so, if still marginally, in Israel and Palestine), and are usually confined to highly specialized or activist circles. When they are made, all ideological shields are raised against them, and first of all the counter-accusation that one is thereby an anti-Semite and a racist, or, in even rarer cases (alas!), a self-hating Jew.
5. Oren Yiftachel (2000) fruitfully suggests analogies with Sri Lanka, Serbia, and South Africa. One may add, of course, India and Pakistan.
6. Massad has convincingly made the case in a number of publications. Most pertinently, during the implementation of the Oslo agreement, Massad (1999b) was pointing out the cruel ironies at work in these alleged resolutions. Nadia Abu El-Haj (2001) offers a different kind of analysis in which she demonstrates the existence of "spatial apartheid" in Israel and in occupied Palestine.
7. In an essential contribution to the issue at hand, Hart demonstrates that the nineteenth century witnessed the birth of a series of "Jewish sciences," among which social sciences (sociology and statistics, but also racial theory) held a prominent, if lesser known, place. These could be accurately described as the Jewish (mostly, but not only, Zionist) contribution to the rapidly evolving racial and racist discourses of the time—a long-lasting contribution. What took place with these scientific developments was a "redefinition of Jews and Judaism utilizing the language of social science." Typical of this Jewish endeavor is Alfred Nossig, according to whom "Jews must be redefined anthropologically as a *Volk* or *Stamm,* rather than as a religious community. . . . Nossig sought to demonstrate the essential unity of the Jewish *Stamm*" (Hart 2000, 34). Jewish social sciences (that is, the invention and adoption by Jewish scholars of a scientific discourse of auto-analysis) gave itself "two preeminent tasks." It would "illuminate the fact of the existence of a Jewish national or ethnic identity, and the 'worth' or 'value' of Jewry as a distinct and different collective entity." At the same time, it would "analyze and represent the causes for, and manifestations of, the dissolution of that identity—a process designated as 'abnormal' and 'diseased'—in the modern period" (43). The claim that Jews were diseased as a result of their diasporic existence became, of course, an essential argument for Zionism, which offered itself as the "cure." Others suggested more radical solutions, if still advocating the end of Jewish existence in Europe. Some begged to differ. Hart points out that at the turn of the century, "the denial by Zionism of the solely religious character of Jewry, and the attempt to redefine Jewry along national/racial lines, were anathema to the majority of Jews" (46). Although the term "race" has lost its currency in Jewish circles, one could hardly find any disagreement as to the basic terms that constitute Jewish identity today. Hart aptly depicts the beginnings of this modern development when he writes that "if, as Zionism claimed, Jews were united by more than a common faith, and yet lacked many of the attributes associated with nationhood—common territory, language, manners, customs—then on what basis could the Jews be said to constitute a *Volk?* Jewish racial unity and particularity provided scientific proof for Zionist claims that despite apparent differences between Jews around the world, they nonetheless consti-

tuted a people or a nation" (182). Within academic discourse, the *Wissenschaft des Judentums,* the more famous side of nineteenth-century "Jewish science" (which belonged mostly to what we would call the humanities), has undergone a radical (if not necessarily sufficient) critique. Yet, as Hart shows, there has been no debate, within Jewish studies or Jewish organizations, over the terms established by social scientists, only a massive occlusion (229ff.).

8. Lewis 1999, 34. As Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin points out, in her objection to the very notion of a Jewish state (which Yiftachel calls an "ethnocracy"), Arendt was already reading critically the history traced by Lewis. "Arendt pointed out that the main issue is not the separation of religion from the state, but rather the distinction between national identity and the state" (Raz-Krakotzkin 2001, 172).
9. Following Jacques Derrida's reflections on the concept of the enemy (1997), I have elaborated on this argument in my *The Jew, the Arab* (Anidjar 2003).
10. This program of separation is, as we will consider below, what Israeli left and right, along with Oslo and current "road-maps," have been advancing by way of a "solution."
11. Clearly, and without diminishing the importance of the significant, if few, scholars who have attended to it, what is occluded is much more than the history of colonialism. It also has to do with the history of the Jews, at least of those Jews who came to identify with Europe and with the West ("How the Jews Became White Folks," as Karen Brodkin [1998] puts it). This history too remains to be written, for it is not the "Jewish history" that is currently being taught. Surely, it could not be written without attending to a more general history of the enemy, a history, that is, of "Western Civilization."
12. Edward Said and Maxime Rodinson are prominent among these exceptions, but see also Shohat's groundbreaking study (1988), and see Massad's extensive work (1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2003), Chetrit 1999, and Alcalay 1993.
13. Arendt quoted in Raz-Krakotzkin 2001, 166.
14. Raz-Krakotzkin later contends that "even the two-state solution demands a binational position" (2001, 179).
15. Compare with Alcalay 1993. On the ruling, judeocentric conception of history that still passes for historiography, see Rodinson 1983, 1997.
16. Raz-Krakotzkin 2002, 321. Writing in a more somber tone, Massad 2000b reaches the same conclusion, orienting us toward a future that is already here. It is a "consequence of the triumph of the Zionist project," writes Massad, that "Palestinian Arab history and Zionist Jewish history have become inextricably linked. Events in Jewish history that Zionism appropriated became perforce connected to Palestinian history" (52). The state of Israel (and its allies) "have until today consistently refused to acknowledge the organic link between Zionism's successful history and the catastrophic history its success visited on the Palestinian people" (54).

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