
ROUTLEDGE STUDIES ON THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT
Palestinian Political Discourse
Between exile and occupation
Emile Badarin
ROUTLEDGE

Palestinian Political Discourse

A great deal of political and academic responses to the Israel–Palestine conflict have seen the Palestinians as an object of Western and Israeli discourses, rather than through their own Palestinian discourse. This has hindered understanding of the internal mechanisms involved in the production of the Palestinian conditions.

Palestinian Political Discourse presents an in-depth examination of Palestinian political discourse since an-Nakba (the Catastrophe) in 1948 and stitches together the underlying mechanisms and rules that have shaped Palestinian politics, in turn synthesizing, interpreting, and scrutinizing these rules. Studying the question of Palestine discursively offers new ways to rethink political agency, structures, identity, institutions, and power relations while interpreting Palestinian actions. This book adds new understanding to Palestinian political agency by explaining how political actions were constructed. Discourse analysis methodology underlies the critical examination of the genealogy of concepts and frames that have oriented Palestinian political thought. Contrary to established views that ascribe shifts in Palestinian politics primarily to external factors and international changes, this book demonstrates how transformation has been a continuing inbuilt feature within the discursive regime and that dramatic shifts were only effects of much deeper, slowly evolving changes.

Examining discourse, and thus language, offers an exceptional possibility to see from the Palestinian perspective. As such, this book provides material vital to the deeper interpretation of the Palestinian question. It will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Israel–Palestine studies, Middle East studies, and discourse analysis.

Emile Badarin is a researcher in Middle East politics. His research interests cut across the disciplinary boundaries of international relations theory, Middle East politics, Israel–Palestine, discourse analysis, settler-colonialism, and peacebuilding.

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Emile Badarin

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Translations from Arabic are my own throughout, except where stated.

Abbreviations

AMA	The Agreement on Movement and Access
ANM	The Arab National Movement
APG	All-Palestine Government
API	The Arab Peace Initiative
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Doc.	Document
EC	Executive Committee
EUPOL COPPS	The European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
IM	International Mechanism
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IUNGC	*Intifada's* United National General Command
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
NSF	[PA] National Security Forces
NSU	Negotiation Support Unit (at the Palestinian Authority)
oPt	occupied Palestinian territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PASF	Palestinian Armed Security Forces
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GA	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – *General Command*
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestinian National Council
Quartet	US, EU, UN and Russia
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USSC	The Office of the United States Security Coordinator
WBG	West Bank and Gaza
AA	Abu Alaa (Head of the PA negotiation team)
AG	Gen. Amos Gilad (Israeli Security Expert)
AM	Abu Mazen (Abbas, Mahmoud) (The PA President)
CD	Condoleezza Rice (US Secretary of State)
DH	David Hale (US Middle East Advisor)
EO	Eued Olmert (Israel Prime Minister, 2006–2008)
GM	George Mitchell (US Envoy to Israel Palestine, 2009)
HA	Maj. Gen. Hazem Atallah (PA Police Director, Major General)
JJ	Gen. James Jones (US Special Envoy for the Middle East Security)

JS	Jonathan Schwartz (US State Department Legal Expert)
KD	Gen. Keith Dayton (US Security Coordinator)
LL	Col. Lane Lance (US Security Expert)
P	Anonymous (From the Israeli Intelligence)
RS	Robert Serry (United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process)
SE	Saeb Erekat (PA Chief Negotiator)
SF	Salam Fayyad (Former PA Prime Minister)
TB	Tal Becker (Israeli Negotiator)
TL	Tzipi Livni (Israel Foreign Minister, 2006–2008)
UD	Udi Dekel (Israeli Negotiator)
YAR	Yasir Abed Rabo (Senior Palestinian Negotiator)
ZC	Ziyad Clot (PA Former Legal Adviser)

Introduction

> After the acrimonious suspense came 15 May. At midnight your father awakened me with a voice of brave hope: "wake up to witness the advent of the Arab armies into Palestine." I frantically woke up, and we ran barefoot through the hills to reach the main road. While gazing from a distance we saw the Arab army vehicles' shimmering headlights ascending toward Ras an-Naqura – a passage point between Lebanon and Palestine. When we eventually arrived at the road, we felt chilled and overwhelmed by your father's yelling. He ran after the vehicles like a child, while hailing the armies with a growling voice. Despite his heavy gasps he continued to run, and we were running and hailing with him. The good soldiers gazed at us with idle silence…. The vehicles stopped abruptly. We retreated home exhausted, panting meekly and unable to speak. When a passing vehicle cast light on your father's face, we saw his tears. Since then, everything proceeded lethargically. Proclamations of the liberation of Palestine had deceived us, but bitter reality took over and melancholia fell upon our faces once again. It became extremely difficult to talk about Palestine and our happy past in the orange orchard and home.

This paraphrased passage from the *Land of the Sad Oranges* by the eminent Palestinian novelist Ghassan Kanafani portrays the appalling speed at which the Palestinian reality and mood moved from vivacious hope about returning home into utter despondency (Kanafani [1958] 1987: 77–78).[1] Talking about the past in Palestine became injurious. Hope ceased on 15 May 1948. Political choices had to be made in a new era pregnant with acute uncertainty, and with extreme contingency. This book ventures to examine the discursive terms of these political choices. In particular, I will explore the Palestinian representative political discourse since an-Nakba (the Catastrophe) in 1948, while focusing on discursive evolution and transformation, and their implications for everyday life – for brevity I will use the phrase "Palestinian discourse."

There is abundant literature on Israel–Palestine, yet an exhaustive examination of the Palestinian discourse remains largely an uncharted field of inquiry. This debate is urgent as never before. Although much of what is said about Palestine lies within the realm of discourse, there is no systematic examination of the discursive terms – that is, the rules that govern discourse. Studying the question of Palestine discursively offers new ways to rethink political agency, structures, identity, institutions, and power relations in interpreting Palestinian actions. More importantly, discourse methodology sidesteps predetermined (empiricist) theoretical assumptions or a weak–powerful dichotomy. For this reason, I explore concepts coming out of actual events and context that brings the Palestinian political agency to life, explaining how

political actions were constructed and how Palestinians interpreted the world they were "thrown into" (to use a Heideggerian term). Discourse analysis allows us critically to examine the genealogy of concepts that oriented Palestinian politics and question existing knowledge. Examining language offers an exceptional possibility to see Palestinians through their own eyes; underlining their agency and bringing this subjugated knowledge to the forefront. That is essential to interpreting the Palestinian question and politics.

For better or worse, an overabundance of political and academic literature addresses Palestine and Palestinians in relation to Israeli policies, where the Palestinians are seen as a passive object of Zionism, lacking their own agency. While searching for literature on Palestinian discourse, I found a book entitled *Discourse and Palestine* (Moors *et al.* 1995). The theme of the book is uneven for obvious reasons: it is an edited book composed of discrete conference papers. But here, too, the Palestinians appear to be an object of Western and Israeli discourses, rather than of their own discourse. In the 1980s a group of Israeli "new historians" produced a wave of publications that deconstructed the Zionist narrative; their work, based on official Israeli archival documents, demonstrated how devastating Zionism has been to the Palestinian community. That literature changed the debate on Israel–Palestine and opened new avenues for the Palestinian narrative to be taken seriously in the Western academic world. In relative terms, however, only a narrow scholarship takes Palestinians as a subject in their own right. Some of this research will be highlighted throughout the book. The internal mechanisms involved in the creation of the Palestinian conditions received considerably less attention than their impact and effects.

My goal here is critically to investigate the underlying mechanisms and processes that have shaped the post-1948 Palestinian political discourse. Once the discursive regime of Palestine was established, it became the regulator and producer of interaction between its subject positions and concrete facts on the ground. This book is essentially a rudimentary interpretation of a specific aspect of the Palestinian political experience rather than a totality of what could possibly be said on the subject. It is counterproductive to hide beneath the veil of (supposed) objectivity, as all interpretations are relative and subjective. The acknowledgment of relativity and subjectivity is essential for formulating moral and ethical judgments, because historical events can be discovered and told in many different ways. According to Hayden White, "eventness" comes out of "emplotting" selected events into a particular narrative; that is, how particular happenings were remembered, singled out, structured, and chronologically sequenced in order to produce a meaningful story. This process begins with a "poetic" and linguistic endeavor (White 1980: 20, 1975: 30–31). Edward Said explains the relationship between discourse, interpretation, and reality succinctly. Knowledge about human societies is historical and "therefore rests upon judgment and interpretation. This is not to say that facts or data are nonexistent, but that facts get their importance from what is made of them in interpretation" (Said 1997: 162). From this perspective, it is important to examine the events of Palestinian questions discursively to understand the connections – between concrete events, performative actions, and political language – that produce meaning.

The proliferation of political concepts and vocabulary has regulated the production of self-image, of past and present conditions, and the meaning of an-Nakba for its own subject. All of this confluence has been assimilated in the Palestinian political lexicon. Clearly, each term and

concept has certain historical traces beyond any individual or group. The Palestinian discourse is neither a subject that Palestinians themselves have produced *nor* a fixed set of rules, rather it is the discourse that has been (re-)producing "the Palestinian" and to some extent the question of Palestine. It is a continuous process of making and remaking. This book synthesizes, interprets, and scrutinizes the rules of construction of the Palestinian discourse and the justifications it rests upon.

"Discourse" is a broad, confusing term and is often taken to be synonymous with "language." However, wherever the word *discourse* appears in this book, it signifies the "rules of formation" or the logics behind a particular conceptualization of a certain social event (Foucault 2002, 1978; Laclau 2000). In the preface of an important book, William Connolly argued that examination of discourse must interpret "tacit" judgments embedded in the language of politics, into explicit considerations more fully subject to critical assessment" (Connolly 1993: Preface (first edition)). The examination of discourse is essentially critical and political in its commitment to uncover unstated meanings loaded in discursive elements and a moral and ethical appraisal of their effects on everyday life.

To explain what I mean by the Palestinian discourse, it is necessary to define Palestine and Palestinian as political concepts. First, Palestine is a place of continuous interpretation and representation. Its subjects and objects have constantly replaced one another, coexisted, merged with one another, or discontinued. Its boundaries existed only in rudimentary, but ever-changing imaginations. Contradictory and competing claims and narratives have constructed, time and again, their own Palestine for a period of time, before disappearing, leaving behind their traces, on which a new narrative can begin. Because Palestine is an interpretation (Said 1992), discontinued historical layers, continued emergences and disappearances (of civilizations, traditions, habits, languages, religions, landscape, geographical borders) it *must* be understood discursively.

Samih Farsoun, a renowned Palestinian sociologist, describes Palestinians as the

> descendants of an extensive mixing of local and regional peoples, including the Canaanites, Philistines, Hebrews, Samaritans, Hellenic Greeks, Romans, Nabatean Arabs, tribal nomadic Arabs, some Europeans from the Crusades, some Turks, and other minorities; after the Islamic conquests of the seventh century, however, they became overwhelmingly Arabs. Thus, this mixed-stock of people has developed an Arab-Islamic culture for at least fourteen centuries …
>
> (Farsoun 2004: 4)

Until the end of the nineteenth century, this place with vague borderlines was called Palestine, and the majority of its inhabitants called themselves Palestinians. Second, the term "Palestinian" is paradoxical: it makes associations in terms of similarities and differences simultaneously, and this is understood by its subjects. Therefore, this book conceives the concept of Palestinian metaphorically as a site for differentiation and similitude. Differentiation and similitude are not only dependent on each other, but also conform to a discursive system.

At the outset of the twentieth century, a new discourse (Zionism) emerged to challenge,

replace, and disperse the Palestinian discourse that had accumulated over the previous fourteen centuries. Each discourse constructed and configured the place differently. Hence, a discursive struggle emerged over the construction of Palestine and its very meaning. Even so, neither discourse remained stable; each has its own adaptation, disappearance, ignorance, denial, internalization, and reciprocation. The struggle is therefore over and within discourse: "discourse is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized," as Foucault put it (Foucault 1984: 110).

Subsequently the Palestinian discourse entered a new phase of politicization to encounter Zionism, which constructed Palestine and the Palestinians in a way diametrically opposed to how the Palestinians conceive themselves and their space. Fifty years later, in 1948, the Palestinian agency emerged as a displaced discourse that had lost its physical links with the land, and hence its focus shifted (collecting Palestinians' memories, reconstructing their identity, rethinking the place they belong to and its other, fighting disappearance by producing appearance).

Even today, the meaning of "Palestinian" is not a straightforward; it signifies different things to its own subjects. An anecdote in Sari Nusseibeh's book makes the point effectively. For example, although two Palestinian intellectuals, Walid Khalidi and Nusseibeh, have reflected on the pronoun "us" to signify the Palestinian people, they had different conceptions of it. For Khalidi, it represents the diaspora Palestinians, while for Nusseibeh it refers to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Nusseibeh 2011: 5). Nevertheless both were united by the idea of referring to a select part of Palestinian society as being representative of the whole, and by a sense of urgency in prioritizing the designated part over other segments of society.

Against this historical backdrop, it is analytically useful to approach the Palestinian discourse as a constellation of micro-discourses that belong to different periods, constituencies, geopolitical contexts, and power relations. Each discourse passes elements of its rules of formation into other discourses that initiate forces to create novel unpredictable possibilities of becoming. The Palestinian dispersion, division, multiplicity of structures, location, politics, laws, geopolitics, and so on, are the facts and sites of this discourse. Each of these discourses, in their internal relations and external forces, impinge on and penetrate into one another in a way that exposes the overall discourse to constantly evolving uncertainties, adaptations, and new potentials. In fact, this sets the stage for discursive evolution. It is therefore more productive to appreciate the multiple and heterogeneous interacting micro-discursive systems that underlie the collective assemblage of Palestinian political thinking.

Since 1948, Palestinian identity and experience have acquired three forms: refugees; the "Arabs of" Israel; and the occupied people in the West Bank and Gaza. To be a Palestinian refugee, unequal citizen in Israel, or occupied/colonized involves the mediation of an entire network of regulations, political and legal judgments, language, and social practices to constitute each classificatory subject position. As a result of power redistribution, almost every Palestinian individual has become a subject of the refugee system, occupation/colonialism, state discrimination, or a combination of these.

Following the disintegration of Palestinian society, a detail-focused debate on Palestine has multiplied exponentially at the cost of the overarching narrative. The regularity of imagining the totality of Palestine and its population was discontinued, clearing the way for new forms of

statements that would articulate Palestine through its parts. The absence of an inclusive geographical and demographical interpretation of Palestine triggered a process of reinterpretation of the "self," the "other," their context, and the relationships that connect them. While details have attracted ample academic inquiry, the evolution and change within and between these details lacked the same attention.

This book establishes the underlying rules that produced and ordered these details and how they have changed over the last six decades. It examines the mechanisms of discourse production in Palestinian politics rather than its details. In general, it summarizes the Palestinian discursive rules of formation into eleven overlapping rules: (1) an-Nakba and the order of discontinuity; (2) an-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution; (3) provisional horizon, socialization, and referentiality; (4) motion; (5) the logic of division; (6) statehood; (7) neoliberal peace; (8) the mathematico-judicial schema; (9) market logic; (10) security as peace; and (11) replacement. The meaning of each rule of formation will be discussed thoroughly.

I see post-1948 as a starting point, although it is a challenge to define a precise starting point, because 1948 represents a discontinuity of social and political structure in Palestine and the beginning of a new structure that became more visible in the 1960s. It is true that the more distinctive Palestinian political moves began in the 1960s, yet it is appropriate to situate the genesis of these moves within the decade that preceded them. Some scholars refer to this as a hiatus in the Palestinian politics, but this argument fails to account for proactive Palestinian efforts that led to the establishment of political institutions a few years later. Furthermore, an-Nakba's metaphorical denotation provides a very useful analytical gateway into the subject. An-Nakba captures the Palestinian conditions since 1948 in two ways: first, it registers the broken or malfunctioning joints between the Palestinians and their homeland; second, how to heal and reconstruct these joints has been the subject matter of the entire Palestinian political enterprise since then (the various scenarios will be elaborated in Chapter 2). The divergent themes loaded in the term "an-Nakba" carried the discontinuation of Palestine as an imagined geographical and demographical totality, leading to a process of de-articulation and new discursive reconstructions in a relatively short period of time.

Exile played a major role in shaping the Palestinian discourse until the PLO seriously contemplated abandoning the struggle for liberating the entire Mandatory Palestine and then decided to settle for four times less than that amount. This is not all. The negotiation record described in the Palestine Papers leaked to Al Jazeera (the Doha-based media network) in January 2011 shows that the Palestinians, represented by the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA), once again compromised their position in 1988 (a Palestinian state on 22 percent of Palestine, self-determination, and the return of refugees) and ventured their readiness to settle for less than the Oslo Accords were supposed to yield. Until late 1960s, this had been ethically and politically unthinkable for the Palestinians.

How did all this happen? How could what used to be unimaginable and unrealistic have become the official and most realistic goal? What is the relationship between the Palestinian discourse at different stages of the struggle and the present reality? What are the policies and decisions, made or missed out, in this discourse? The extent of Palestinian internalization of the colonial discourse is yet another important issue to consider. How does internalization

alter the registers of Palestinian political culture, and how does it relate to the overall settlercolonial structure in Palestine? Internalization of occupation and colonization concepts and terminologies implies that representative Palestinian politics shares a range of biased judgments with Israeli politics, bearing in mind that *to internalize something does* not *necessarily mean to accept it, but rather to go along with it as a* fait accompli. These questions will be addressed in the following pages.

One could argue that the Palestinian leadership had no option or was forced to settle for less. But this is dubious. After all, there is "no neat way to draw the line between persuasion and force, and therefore no neat way to draw a line between a cause of changed belief which was also a reason and one which was a 'mere' cause." (Rorty 1989: 48) Even if I do not go as far as Richard Rorty, the argument remains too deterministic and overlooks the Palestinian agency. I will show throughout this book that choices were made and constructed – they were never given. Yes, the production of those choices has been mostly determined by the conditions of settler-colonialism and exile. Nevertheless, continued disregard of Palestinian agency plays into the hands of hegemonic discourses that subjugate the knowledge of the colonized, and hence contributes to severe interpretive shortcomings.

The transformation in the Palestinian discourse is obvious to an engaged observer; yet it remains a lacuna in the literature. It is quite a challenge to define the exact point at which transformation occurred because social developments are slow moving. Many scholars attribute this change to major developments on the international scene, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War in 1991. In consequence, the United States has become the dominant player (or is perceived as such) in world politics, and in the Israel–Palestine conflict in particular. Accordingly, the positivist view has ascribed the shift in Palestinian goals to this mega-narrative (Ben-Ami 2006; Finkelstein 2003; Khalidi 2006, among others). To be fair, this view appears sound and is backed with rich empirical evidence. However, that approach has its limitations; this book demonstrates: first, how transformation has been a continuing feature inside the political discursive regime from the beginning; second, that spectacular shifts, such as the Palestinian declaration of independence in 1988, were only the effects of much deeper, slowly evolving changes.

Since an-Nakba, Palestinian politics has undergone constant change and transformation. Patterns of political statements were sustained for a period of time, and gradually new patterns appeared while others disappeared. Therefore, the discursive rules of formation have evolved through a manifold process of deferral, differentiation, equivalence, and juxtaposition of concepts and ideas belonging to different historical and political discourses. This dense interdiscursive interaction encompassed ample conflicting, ambiguous, and paradoxical elements, hence the dynamic and unfixed relationships, which served as the means of articulation and de-articulation.

The Palestinian perception of Palestine as the entire area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River was discontinued in the Palestinians' own political calculations. At present, Palestine is envisaged through its parts and divisions. This has implications for how Palestinians perceive themselves as an "imagined political community" while making political choices. Indeed, more than half of the Palestinian population, the refugee portion in this case, was marginalized and later characterized as a burden and obstacle to peace and progress.

Palestinian exile was the initial author and bearer of the Palestinian narrative: as Edward Said argued, "[e]xile is thus the fundamental condition of Palestinian life, the source of what is both over- and underdeveloped about it, …" (Said 1992: xxviii). This implies that a Palestinian narrative, struggle, and conscious identity had developed *in* exile and *by* the exiled. This jars with the way the Oslo peace process paradoxically represented the exiles and dealt with their fate.

Now let us have a closer outline of the scope, methodology, and structure of the book. It is impossible to study the totality of any discourse, in fact totality itself is impossible, so cutting through history to delimit the ambiguous boundary of the case study is inescapable. The scope of this inquiry deals with a specific timeframe, with a beginning and end, taken from the history of Palestine. The boundaries of this complex history are determined by what Foucault calls a "positivity" – an emergence and transformation of a particular discursive system (Foucault 2002: 191). Post-an-Nakba order represents a historical positivity. Events of the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1948 have led to deep, enduring transformations *to* and *within* Palestinian society and the evolution of a wholly new discursive system. The spontaneous collective Palestinian national identity and narrative acquired a conscious delineation to cope with the existential changes that have befallen the Palestinians. This is not to say, however, that previous historical events do not matter; on the contrary, events before 1948 inform the subsequent discourse. The historical perspective and literature on Israel– Palestine in general inform the way I approach post-1948 politics.

It should also be noted that this book goes without the discourse of Palestinians in Israel; their subject deserves an independent research of its own. Yet I benefit from existing literature on the subject. Finally, the book stands without an examination of the Islamic turn in Palestinian politics. Generally, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) champion the Islam-oriented political discourse, usually called political Islam. The perceptible rise of Islam-influenced movements in the Palestinian struggle coincided temporally with the PLO's diplomatic maneuvers at the outset of the first Intifada in 1987. A consideration of the interaction between the two discourses would have produced a more holistic interpretation, but due to familiar research constraints, this matter is adjourned for now.

Methodologically, I adopt discourse analysis. The word "discourse" is usually received with ambiguous connotations that encumber the reader. One of the immediate objections has to do with the relationship between discourse and reality, with *what causes what*. Leaving aside the meta-theoretical debate on the matter, which is already sufficient (see Campbell 1998; Gaddis 1996), *discourse* constitutes how we conceive things in one way rather than another. It governs the regular distribution of vocabulary, allegories, and statements about a certain social event. Discourse is a regime that produces regularities, rules, and subjects, and defines social boundaries through particular power structures (Foucault 2002; 1984). Discursive ontology construes meaning as unstable, unfixed, and always in motion. Simultaneously, there is always a struggle within discursive structures for meaning, stabilization, and transformation. The Gramscian concept of hegemony stabilizes meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111). Nonetheless, hegemony and stability of meaning are contingent and a matter of degree (Fairclough 1992: 74). This account of discourse integrates material with social existence.

What is denied, however, is the claim that material objects "could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive conditions of emergence" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 108). Discourse constitutes subject positions, moving material existence into discursive reality and hence towards a social existence.

Discourse analysis must uncover the rules of formation, relations, the determination of subject positions (what position should the agent occupy to constitute a subject of discourse), material function, entailments, and meanings. Thus discourse examination transcends semantics or the grammar of language. More specifically, discursive rules of formation are the terms that govern the flow of judgments and enunciations, therefore they are not the attributes of semantics, words, or individuals (Foucault 2002: 103–121).

I consider Palestinian discourse as the political site for the (re-)production of subjectivity, operation of power relations, and identity. This analysis aims neither to predict nor to provide causal explanations, for it does not see the problem in the cause or point of origin, but rather in the rules and the relations that made such outcomes possible. Moreover, social causes and truths change, and similar concepts have to be constructed before one can speak of them. The analytical approach is bound up with an interpretive "ethos," which has the "inherently critical" aim to uncover the contestability of established truths, and certainly *not* an alternative theory of truth (Connolly 1993, 1984). Foucault's understanding of critique is instructive and will enlighten the analysis in the pages that follow; so it is useful to cite it at length here:

> A critique […] is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest. […] It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institution; there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.
>
> (Foucault 1988: 154–155)

I have examined a rich corpus of primary and secondary sources, including literature, autobiographies, accounts written by politicians, newspapers, school textbooks, and documents from the diplomatic record of negotiations (including all of the Palestine Papers). Yet there is still a lot left out. In general, I tried to explore sources with political authority and public familiarity in terms consistent with the discursive approach as relying on material already in the public domain; therefore I do not venture to prove or disprove specific claims, or compile new facts from hidden archival material. My purpose here is to engage with already well-known and visible material, and turn it into a "difficult gesture" (to borrow a phrase from Foucualt, above) in the process of extracting the rules of its formation. These rules can be found in styles, moods, tropes, metaphors, and statements. This objective and methodology requires selective examination of related documents and literature.

Interpretation is always context based and informed by situational material, whether linguistic or non-linguistic (Gadamer 2004). However, language remains a key space for the

constitution of power relations and meaningful acts. Therefore, examining political statements is indispensable to accessing underlying rules and logics that form and regulate the flow of these statements. Although political statements are found in political texts, acts and institutions, discourse analysis transcends individualities and intentions to meditate on the subject positions from which individuals speak and act, that is, the way they perform their function in the discursive system. As such, in examining statements associated with individuals I am concerned merely with the authority and representativeness with which they speak. As Michael Shapiro argues: "What *is* privileged is the linguistic structure within which subjects are caught up" not their persona per se (Shapiro 1984: 4, emphasis added).

I make five conceptual assumptions that have to be clarified. First, this book considers Palestinian political discourse as a social phenomenon involving complex and multi-layered clusters of different discursive regimes and practices. Positive visible and invisible productive forces – internal and external power relations – animated these regimes and produced change, transformation, and constitution. Second, the transformation of the Palestinian discourse is not merely a consequence of what has been done to Palestine and the Palestinians in a passive sense. On the contrary, the very existence of a Palestinian discourse inevitably demonstrates its positive and constitutive nature: a function of Palestine and Palestinians' reality today. Third, the Palestinian discourse interacts with a wide range of discursive systems (e.g., judicial, UN resolutions, laws of war, liberalism, realism, economy, religions, history); it plays its part in the comprehensive, international, and local discourses. Accordingly, each of these horizons should be taken into consideration.

Fourth, I consider language to be the locus for the constitution of reality, development, and change; this question is of the first order, as language tells us about the frameworks in which actual events become infused into social reality and vice versa. Fifth, the Palestinian discourse since 1948 has been situated within exile and colonial conditions. Out of these conditions a particular Palestinian agency emerged. It is therefore important to define the power relations underlying Palestinian political agency since its encounter with Zionism. The conditions since 1948 do not fall into neatly defined categories; rather, overlapping concepts compete to interpret these circumstances as colonialism or occupation, for example, while recently apartheid has become a common concept describing the Israel–Palestine relations. No paradigm, however, captures the gist of this relationship as well as that of settler-colonialism.

At the beginning, conditions of colonialism, settler-colonialism, and exile determined the evolution of the Palestinian struggle. Palestine was put under the British "mandate" in 1922 to secure the establishment of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine (Article 2, Mandate Resolution). One only needs to replace the word "mandate" with "colonial" and "Jewish" with a "settler" home to unmask the power relations. After 1948, colonialism ended, settler-colonialism intensified and the replacement of natives with settlers advanced at a rapid pace. There is a key difference between colonialism and settler-colonialism: the former aims to exploit and dominate the natives for economic purposes, whereas the latter aims to eliminate natives, expropriate their land, and populate it with settlers (Kimmerling 2001; Veracini 2007, 2006; Wolfe 1999). In the course of 1948, Israel displaced half the Palestinian population, destroyed the refugees' villages, and repopulated their spaces with new settlers. Since then, settler expansion continues and settler–native power relations continue.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first establishes the genealogical discursive developments after 1948 and provides an evaluation of some familiar historical events. It begins by examining the metaphorical meaning of an-Nakba, which serves as an analytical lens. The analysis shows how the disappearance of Palestine as an imagined totality has evolved, enabling the emergence of new identities and spatial mapping. I argue that an-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and a new discursive reconstruction emerged in a relatively short period of time. In Chapter 2, the discussion turns to the second theme of an-Nakba and navigates through the imagined solutions. It begins with a brief contextualization of the imaginative horizon. I argued here that the provisional and temporary calculations were the rule after 1948; from now on, the discussion will continue to map out the constitution of imaginable solutions. A process of socialization and interdiscursive interactions opened up for new terminologies and concepts to materialize. In effect, a process of de-articulation and re-articulation of previous constructions ensued.

Chapter 3 draws on the rules that implicitly informed the construction of the Palestinian discourse discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. In addition to the process of socialization and provisional horizon, I found a referential function governing the dispersion of discursive statements, which modulated the contents of a possible settlement and negotiation. With the invisible alliance between socialization, provisional horizons, and referentialism, Palestinians are likely to remain at the receiving end of systematic embedded power relations. The second part of Chapter 3 dwells on the relationship between referentialism and the politics of the first Intifada (1987–1993). I argue that framing the Intifada through a matrix of referentiality and PLO politics led to socialization *en masse* in the West Bank and Gaza.

Chapter 4 explores the role of kinetic metaphor in the Israel–Palestine peace process discourse. I explain how the embedded metaphor in the peace process has provided an analytical lens and helped structure the Palestinian discourse since the 1990s. I contend that the logic of motion has set the discursive priorities, and constituted contradictory forces: forward, progressive, and backward. The preeminence of the transition and motion rule intercepted the possibility of articulation and interpretation. Chapter 5 analyzes the representation of the material and ideational existence of Palestine in Palestinian political discourse. It demonstrates how logics of division and market, embedded in peace rituals, helped to dismantle the imagined totality of Palestine. The fragmented territorial and ideational framing is projected onto Palestinians as an imagined political community. The cause of Palestine is therefore spatially and demographically subdivided. I then explore the market-like operations and a mathematico-judicial schema of ratios and referentiality that regulate discursive flow. The metaphorical market, in conjunction with the mathematico-judicial formula, modulated key aspects of the conflict and correlated them with the ideal of peace. This logic objectified land, the human body, and language.

Chapter 6 navigates the role of security in the construction of peace. Securityridden tropes register linguistic and performative hegemony in the discourse. More importantly, the chapter evaluates the Palestinian engagement with security/peace discourse channeled through so-called capacity-building schemes, to find that securitization was an effective mechanism to divide the Palestinian political structure further. The second part of Chapter 6 examines the Palestinian– Israeli debate on Hamas and Gaza, especially after 2005. The basic debate

concocted the analytical perspective that informed the construction of Hamas and Gaza as a threat to peace, or the "enemies of peace," and thus a common other.

My aims in this book are modest and in I do not attempt to provide an allinclusive interpretation. We should be suspicious of the tendency to profess closure when reality is far too complex to be bracketed in academic abstractions, even if abstractions are necessary to make sense of the world. Situational reality is rife with contingency and multiple forces that press against each other, some of it beyond imagination. The story in the pages to follow may seem as fragmented and confused as the reality of Palestinian society and politics. But again, this must be better than an artificial, neatly structured narrative. The fragmentation is reflected in the confluence of various complex and evolving discursive layers and logics. However, putting this into a historical perspective is essential if we are to understand the connections between different parts of the narrative. The story emerges as a symbiosis between theoretical, historical, and concrete policymaking inputs. If this book is to have any political focus, I hope that it is clear enough to the reader that theoretical tools and thoughts (I have in mind the neoliberal peace paradigm) are not neutral but part of the subtle action-orienting regimes at macro- and micro-levels. These regimes pivot on abstractions and hence lapses and erasures of complex reality, remaining in the realm of "problem solving" (Cox 1981). The following chapters do not attempt to find a solution but aim to create problems in areas that may seem unproblematic.

Note

1 All efforts have been made to contact the copyright holders, but have unfortunately failed.

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1 Since that day and beyond

The usual translation of an-Nakba as a "catastrophe" conceals the metaphorloaded meaning in the Arabic word. As an entry point it is worthwhile to consult the dictionary, *lisan al-'arab*. Each Arabic word corresponds to a basic "root" (infinitive form). *Nakaba* is the root of an-Nakba, meaning a malfunctioning *mankab* (joint) or *manakib* (joints), which makes a human or animal lopsided. More specifically, *mankab* signifies the joint between the upper-arm bone and shoulder of humans, and all the joints between the limbs and torso of an animal. The etymological sense of an-Nakba designates an ill-fitting link between the limbs and torso and it is a common curse in mundane Palestinian parlance. However, since 1948 it has been used exclusively to articulate the loss of Palestine and broken links between the Palestinians who were forced into exile and their lands, homes, and memories. From this standpoint, An-Nakba continues.

The layers of metaphor in an-Nakba explains the conditions of the production of Palestinian discourse since 1948 very well. In general, two themes characterized this discourse: the first dwells on the broken joints between the Palestinians and their homeland, while the second considers "struggle" against colonization, that is the way to restore and heal these joints. An-Nakba, as a concept, is not a mere static representation of the fall of Palestine in 1948 and the journey into exile, but rather a continued reinterpretation and (re-)representation of social acts and developments that emerged since then in light of the discourse that constituted an-Nakba, and the discourse *it* has constituted. Thus it is an unfinished, uncertain, and contingent process of becoming, which cannot be foretold.

All in all, this chapter establishes a genealogical overview of the building blocks of the Palestinian political interpretations of an-Nakba to understand how streams of power relations impacted on the Palestinian plight. I engage here with some familiar historical facts while reading history genealogically from today's perspective. And indeed, since 1993, the same representative structure, which was built in exile, migrated altogether to the West Bank and Gaza. An-Nakba's metaphorical meaning serves as an analytical vehicle for this and the next chapter in particular. Here I explore the articulation of the broken joints; the next chapter examines Palestinian-constructed solutions that attempt to heal the joints.

Shattering the joints

The events of 1948 were depicted through various murky expressions in the Palestinian discourse. Ghassan Kanafani, a celebrated Palestinian novelist, who was assassinated in 1972 by the Israeli intelligence, described that time as "ominous days," "hazy moments," and "merciless nightmare" (Kanafani 1961: 20, 26, 40). These expressions carry Palestinian trauma and susceptibility. They also tell us about Palestinians' perception of the moments

during which the joints between themselves and their land, homes, and families petered out. The time and moments of the an-Nakba were pronounced as *exceptionally* ominous and merciless, and this remains imprinted in the Palestinian physical (ruined villages, homelessness, broken families, exile) and psychological existence. Consequently, "that time" sets a benchmark and reference point for the Palestinian present. It is a threshold that simultaneously separates and connects the social order inside and outside Palestine, and before and after an-Nakba. The present, or the "after," is described and understood in relation to "that day" by saying: "that had happened after a month from the slaughter," "that day" has become "a sign of the big time signs." It is "that time" when the Palestinians bade "farewell" to the oranges and left the "orange trees to the Jews," and "when we [the fleeing Palestinians] arrived in Sidon [in Lebanon], we became refugees" (Kanafani 1987: 75–76).

This disconnection between land and people is both temporal and spatial. Any reference to the past has to be chronicled from that day.[1] Palestinians' present refugee status is also counted from that day, or moment, when they "arrived in Sidon" (exile). Once the Palestinians had arrived on land that they deemed not to be theirs, they became conscious of the attunements that would challenge their ideational existence from that moment onwards. Their new identity became that of Palestinian refugees, for the physical links and immediacy to their land, homes, and families had discontinued. In *Men in the Sun* (1963), Kanafani explains how Palestinian society became a refugee society. A collective feeling of loss, defeat, shame, cowardice, maltreatment, alienation, betrayal, and the acute experience of an ambiguous and uncertain future infiltrated everyday life. The characterization of the UNRWA's services as "a shot of morphine" for the refugees succinctly articulates their grief (cited in Bruhns 1955: 133).

In 1951, the Refugee Convention laid down criteria for a refugee subject position as someone who, "not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence … is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (UNHCR 2010, article 1, A/2). According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is also someone who has a "wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." In 1967, the Refugee Convention was universalized with the exception of three categories: those who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity; (2) those who receive assistance or protection from agencies of the UN other than UNHCR; and (3) those who have a status equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum (UNHCR 2010, article 1/C, D, E). At the outset of the Convention, the Palestinian case is singled out and exempted from the scope of the convention (UNHCR 2011, 2010: 4). The subtext puts the victims (Palestinian refugees) on par with those who have committed atrocious war crimes.

Although these individuals fit the refugee criteria, their 'refugeeness' was denied, implying that Palestinian refugees are unlike others. Their right to an international intervention to offer them repatriation, compensation, protection, and sustenance (enshrined in refugee conventions or by enforcing UN resolution number 194) is thus eschewed (Bartholomeusz 2010; Quigley 2005). Universal refugee conventions are replaced with a temporary subsidiary agency called the United Nation Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The UN General Assembly determines the UNRWA's mandate, its funds are dependent on voluntary donations leading to regular budget deficits, and its services are contingent on the approval of host governments. These

services are limited to humanitarian aid in the areas of education, health, social services, and the protection of women and children.

To be regarded as a Palestinian refugee, one must fall within the following criteria:

> persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. Palestine Refugees, and descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are eligible to register for UNRWA services. The Agency accepts new applications from persons who wish to be registered as Palestine Refugees.
>
> (Cited in Bartholomeusz 2010: 452)

Be that as it may, since 1948 a weighty portion of the Palestinian population began to inhabit different geopolitical spaces and hence became the subject of multitude of regional and international institutions. This phenomenon has readymade theoretical abstractions within the political language to frame instances of forced immigration and guiding legal and relief precepts to deal with the situation. This language interpellates[2] and exposes the Palestinians to a set of existing refugee and humanitarian institutions, regulations, conventions, programs, and so on. This group of people was called "the Palestine refugees" in the official discourse of the UN and other humanitarian organizations. The first UN resolution 212 (III) on "the Palestine refugees," and Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 ventured into a series of terminologies, international laws and norms to mediate on the social, humanitarian, and legal status of these refugees. In this regard, the UNRWA developed a "disciplinary-type 'refugee regime'" composed of norms and regulations to govern the relationship between itself and the refugees (Al-Husseini 2010: 9).

Most related UN reports and resolutions were entitled "… Palestine Refugees" and called for "relief," "aid," and "assistance" to assuage the refugees' "critical situation." Initially, for the UN, the exiled Palestinians constituted a humanitarian incident and an urgent "problem of the relief." In the name of "the Palestine refugees problem" financial speculations, budgetary questions and funds evolved. Resolution 212 (III) elaborated a system of institutions, positions and codes.[3] It also encouraged other organizations (like the Red Cross and World Health Organization) to be involved in structuring the refugees' conditions. Resolution 194 called for the "rehabilitation," "return," "repatriation," and "resettlement" of "the Palestine refugees." The proto-relief mission was transformed into a permanent mission and new apparatus were distributed. Among these administrative and technical apparatus were the Director of the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees and the UNRWA; its related army of sub-institutions, personnel, experts, monitoring groups, data collection and registration, social researchers, philanthropists, symbols, schools, and medical and social services were established and marked by the UNRWA flag and blue color. As the subject of this institutional network, the implicated Palestinians became refugees, whose fate and daily life have since then been governed by a congregation of non-Palestinian institutions.

The web of institutions, regulations and resolutions constituted the infrastructure of the refugee subject position (*laji'*). Being subject to the refugee institutional infrastructure informed the refugee identity and materialized it in social reality through diverse regulations,

symbols, deeds, identifications, language, spatial environment, and so forth. The UNRWA is an apolitical organization that is mainly concerned with relief services. Nevertheless, the Palestinian refugees regarded it as a "legal justification for their right to return," and the ration card became a symbol of a "physical link with Palestine" (Al-Husseini 2000: 52).

Precarious conditions of exile and refugeeness generate fragile identities. Deep feelings of loss, alienation, helplessness, humiliation, cowardice, memory, and nostalgia, among others, were the currency of everyday Palestinian discourse. This shared spirit heightened the sense of a distinctive Palestinian character. The differences (however delicate or significant) between the refugees and the people of the hosting Arab countries became entirely discernable. As the years went by, the refugees carved for themselves a place in the new environment, while opposing assimilation and resettlement. Heretofore precepts of the refugee identity are (perceived as) temporary and in suspense.

Consider, for example, Kanafani's metaphorical characterization of the refugees' situation back then in relation to their social environment "they have tried to melt me like a piece of sugar in a cup; however, I still exist, notwithstanding everything" (Kanafani 1963: 17). Indeed, Palestinians in exile melted in a different way: they assimilated into one (albeit heterogeneous) collectivity: the Palestinian refugees. Such new circumstances have reflexively added a particularist national layer into the Palestinian struggle, in contrast with their previous identification with the broader Arab and Islamic entity, yet without erasure of the Arab and Islamic traces. However, the Palestinians sustained a perception of threat against their particular identity – the "Palestinian personality" (Al-Hassan 1977: 164). For instance, education, which plays a significant role in shaping self-perception and worldviews, has become a non-Palestinian enterprise, with systematic ambiguities and omission. As Ibrahim Abu-Lughod argues, "the most serious and yet natural omission concerns [the Palestinian] identity itself" (Abu-Lughod 1973: 96).[4]

Since "that day," the referent Palestine has been bifurcated linguistically and thus imaginatively. New phrases like "occupied land" and the "remaining land," [5] replaced, or at least challenged, the historical name Palestine. For example, the main character in Kanafani's novel *The Land of Sad Oranges* finds it shameful to return to his original home in the area occupied by Israel in 1948. But he also reveals the new perceived definition of Palestine as a divided space where the "Mandelbaum gate creates a stone barrier between the occupied and remaining land" (Kanafani 1987: 23–24).

Before an-Nakba's dust settled, a struggle ensued over the political status of the "remained land." That space was labeled the West Bank[6] of the Jordan River and Gaza Strip, in order to represent the annexation of the West to the East Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom as something natural and palatable. After the 1950 elections, members from the West Bank and the East Bank (twenty members each) formed the parliament and declared unanimously "to confirm the unification of both banks of the Jordan river in one state called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan". In addition to the annexation, the royal decree omitted the word Palestine from the official documents and replaced it with "West Bank" (Sahliyeh 1988: 10). The competition between the Hashemite monarchy, Egypt, and the All-Palestine Government (APG) paralyzed the first Palestinian government at a critical time, and perhaps delayed the establishment of a "Palestinian Entity" (Shemesh 1984; Shlaim 2009, 1990). The story of the APG and the

Palestinian Entity is particularly telling, so it is worth examining them each in turn.

The Palestinian experience evolved from within three circles: internal; regional Arab regimes; and international (Al-Hout 2011: 182; Sayigh 1997: 9). But here, too, and for various reasons, the conditions of each circle had transformed radically after an-Nakba. At first, the Palestinian social, political, and spatial reality acquired novel and unfamiliar forms. The majority of the Palestinians became refugees in exile: their traditional social fabric was torn apart and their leadership disappeared. On the regional level, however, the Zionist movement became a strong state actor (Israel) that defeated the Arab armies. (Some Arab regimes had already their secret understanding with the Zionist leaders.) Furthermore, maltreatment of exiled Palestinians became ubiquitous. Finally, the international stage had also transformed: the British mandate had terminated; there had been a surge in American power with its appetite for overseas intervention; Cold War politics prevailed; the UN emerged and established international regulations and norms about refugees, human rights, occupation, and specific resolutions that sought to determine the status of Palestine and the Palestinians. The three circles overlapped even before 1948; however, since then almost every Palestinian individual had to deal directly with these circles, without being filtered through the Palestinian leadership.

In short, an-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and the Palestinians, and foisted new discursive reconstructions in a relatively short period of time. This included the reconstruction of Palestinian identities into refugee identity (in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq), Arab-Israeli citizens, the Arabs of Israel or the Arabs of 1948, West Bank and Gaza residents). Geographically, the space was rerepresented as the West Bank, Gaza, Israel, occupied, and remaining land. Indeed, Palestine had ceased to be conceived as a geographical totality, as I will elaborate in Chapter 5. A number of institutions (the UN, UNRWA, and relief agencies, among others) appeared in order to govern and draw the relationship between these new discursive variables. Out of this radical spatio-demographic transformation was born the pressing need to build a new order that would reconcile the fragmented Palestinian reality.

The order of fragmentation

For a long time during the British mandate/colonization period, Palestinian leadership failed to build proto-state institutions. When Palestinians managed to establish political parties and forums, their familial-elitist leadership was ineffectual and weakened by personal rivalries (Khalidi 2006, 2001; Sayigh 1997); "strong antagonism and tension" characterized the relationships between various groups (Darwazeh 1993, V: 564).

In 1922, the League of Nations delegated the "administration" of Palestine to Britain. The Resolution mentioned "Palestine" forty-five times, "Jewish" eleven times, the "Jewish national homeland" four times, and the "Jewish People" twice; yet it utterly eliminated any direct mention of the Palestinians (Muslims and Christians) who at that time represented about 90 percent of the population of Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1987). That 90 percent was categorized not only in a secondary and negative sense as "non-Jewish communities in Palestine" or "other sections of the population," but also as a non-people who may only enjoy "civil and religious rights" (Khalidi 1997: 22–23). Put simply, their political rights were negated.

To the League of Nations and Britain, Palestine had no people but rather an abstract catch-all for other communities or sections of population without a national identity. Thus they were represented negatively as "non"-X (non-Jewish communities). This meant that Palestine was *the* place to be filled with X: the People. From this perspective, one could say that the Mandate Resolution is the most realistic and performative interpretation of the dubious early Zionist claim: people without a land to the land without a people. Given this interpretation of socio-spatial existence, it is no surprise to find terms – like "cooperation," "advising," "interest of," "facilitate," "arrange with," among others – used selectively to articulate the style of the relationship between the Jewish Agency and the mandate government in Palestine.

The United Nations continued to operate by the same or similar language as that of its precursor with regard to Palestinian national identity. The word "Palestinian" was rarely used as a descriptive modality of the indigenous inhabitants. Instead, they were represented by other modalities (e.g., Arabs, communities) juxtaposed with the noun Palestine (e.g., "Arab people," "people *of* Palestine," "communities *in* Palestine," "Palestine refugees"). Until late 1974, only on rare occasions did UN documents use the adjective "Palestinian."[7] Since 1948, the UN was far more concerned with the Armistice Agreement and the relations between the Arab regimes and Israel. Issues related to the Palestinians were filtered through the Arab regimes. In doing so, the UN avoided dealing with the gist of the conflict as being about *Palestine* and *directly with the Palestinians*. The filtering mechanism also sustained the negation of the Palestinian agency as a national people. For that matter, it is worth highlighting that what later became an "international legitimacy" in the Palestinian political dictionary emerged out of an ironclad indifference to the very existence of the Palestinian people, as we shall see in Chapter 3.

After an-Nakba, Palestine was geo-demographically re-managed afresh, and new social classifications were inspired by and derived from spatial categorization. First, geographically Palestine was reinterpreted into: occupied land that became Israel; and the remaining land, now called the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza. Similarly, the population of Palestine was split into five categories: Jewish-Israelis; "Arabs of Israel or 1948"; refugees; the internally displaced; and the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. After 1967 that last group was reclassified into the occupied Palestinians, while the Jerusalemites' status became more uncertain than ever, as residents (not citizens) of Israel.

The sovereignty was also redistributed along the lines of human stratification described above. Sovereignty over the first four groups was resolved quickly. Israel assumed sovereignty over the Jewish and Palestinian residents, while the hosting Arab governments ruled over the refugees.

The Palestinians who remained in the "occupied land" (Israel proper) have become, without prior assent, Arab-Israeli citizens in theory (see the Endorsement of the Israeli Citizenship Law 1952). They were governed by military laws until 1966; even today their status verges on unequal citizenship, and they are treated as a demographic threat, a fifth column (Kimmerling 2001; Pappé 2011), or as surplus "citizens" with the potential for a population "swap" (i.e., transfer) with the PA, as we will see later. Meanwhile, the residents of the "remained land" (West Bank and Gaza) were officially annexed to either Jordan or Egypt (administratively in the case of Gaza).

The designation of Palestinians in Israel as "the Arabs of Israel," "the Arabs of 1948,"

"Israeli Arabs," "Palestinians in Israel," "Palestinians/Arabs of inside" has infiltrated Palestinian discourse and still in circulation today. The Arab world still receives this group with astounding suspicion. The perception of PalestinianIsraeli citizens is an unresolved matter. They have been classified in exclusionary ways, neither as full Israelis nor Palestinians, but "the Arabs of …" or "the Palestinians of …"[8] Nevertheless, this attitude has begun to change in the last decade or two (Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury 2011).

In particular, governance of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza was met with abundant external and internal rivalry between different Arab states, especially Jordan. Competition also surged internally, between the familial-elitist Palestinian leadership inherited from the pre- and post-an-Nakba orders, the first order spearheaded by Haj Amin Al-Husseini and the latter by Al-Shuqayri. As a result, the Palestinian leadership arrived to the Arab League in a weak, divided and antagonistic spirit, making it easier for the League to create deep interventions and hegemony over the Palestinian political order after 1948.

A representative instance of that intervention is the Arab League's condescending and self-claimed right to appoint Palestinian representatives; then, in June 1948, it rearranged the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). In July 1948, the League imposed its civil administration on Gaza and deprived it of political or military power. The League had overall power over the AHC and civil administration because both were politically and financially dependent on it. But for political reasons, the League (via Egypt) needed to emphasize the "visibility" of the Palestinian character in diplomatic arenas (Heikal 1996; Shemesh 1984), yet *without* any independent political leverage.

These factors compelled the League to upgrade the civil administration into the All-Palestine Government (APG). By and large, the upgrade evolved as a result of internal rivalries within Arab regimes, as well as through needs, antagonisms, and public appeasement, keeping the Palestine issue under control all the while (Alazaaer, n.d.; Shlaim 1990: 40). Nevertheless the APG inherited its objectives, structure, and leadership from its forerunner. Both were dependent on Arab regimes and declared their aim to establish an "Arab Palestinian state over entire Palestine" on "democratic bases." The armed struggle reverberated strongly through the Arab and Palestinian public, while for the Arab regimes it was evident that their monopoly over armed struggle and finances would attenuate the APG's ability to mobilize the public.

The APG's grand strategy was clear, despite its ineffectiveness and lack of representation. It endorsed the common political language of the time: self-determination, the goal of an independent state over entire Palestine, and the establishment of a government on democratic bases (Al-Aref 1956, II: 134). In reality, however, the APG was all but democratic. None of its leaders was elected but were appointed based on familial support, and its constituent assembly was from the notables. The APG declared itself to be "a sovereign" government over the entire Palestine, though it had no effective presence on the ground, it was financially and militarily dependent on the Arab regimes, and above all it was unpopular. The Arab League and the APG visions differed radically. In hindsight, however, the Arab states lacked a vision for the future of Palestine, with the exception of King Abdullah of Jordan, who was in favor of the partition of Palestine to maximize his territorial sovereignty over the West Bank (Shlaim 1990: 38–43). The Hashemite monarch responded by convening the notables of the West Bank

in Amman and then in Jericho as means to stifle the APG. After all, he was the actual sovereign on the ground.

Pan-Arabism, al-qawmiyya, and nationalism

The Arab world experienced two key strands of political ideologies between 1952 and 1970: Pan-Arabism (*al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya*), led by Egyptian Nasserist discourse; and regionalism (*iqlimiyya*), led by Iraq (*Ba'th*). The former called for an overarching Arab unity and expansive revolutionary and nationalistic spirit, whereas the latter embraced a realist/statist worldview in conjunction with a federal Arab unity (Muslih 1989; Shemesh 1984: 95–96). Such an ideological division in the broader Arab political context swept all the way through Palestinian politics. The Palestinian groups, which later transformed into political movements, were colored by predominant political ideologies in the Arab world besides Marxism. Pan-Arabism and Marxism were the main themes that divided the worldviews of the Palestinian groups, until the rise of the Islamoriented political movements in Palestine. Pan-Arabist rhetoric embraced "revolutionary and nationalistic" objectives, Arab unity, and a confrontation with imperialism and colonialism.

Indeed, pan-Arabist discourse was a substantial source that helped crystallize Palestinian self-representation. For instance, until 1968 Palestinians refrained from using word "national" (*watani*); rather, they used figures of speech to signify their belonging to the wider Arab entity (*qawmi*), which saved them from the charge of separatism.

Since the APG proved satisfactory neither to the Arab regimes nor to Palestinians, the search for *al-kayan al-falastini* (a Palestinian entity) remained an unfinished matter until the rise of the PLO in 1964. In Arabic, the word *kayan* signifies existence or being. After an-Nakba, Palestinian existence was interrupted and replaced by another existence in the very place where once the "Palestinian existence" had been. Drawing on this context, the pursuit of a Palestinian entity was meant to create "political representation" for the Palestinians as a people. The *representation* issue dominated the Palestinian Entity (Shemesh 1984). At the first Palestinian National Council (PNC), in 1964, Ahmad Al-Shuqayri argued that although "*al-kayan al-falastini*" is a strange expression, the "special disaster of Palestine" and destruction of the Palestinian entity justifies it. To him it was "inevitable" that this "entity" would need to be established so as to resume "the life of the Palestinian people," who would take "full responsibility to liberate their homeland and achieve self-determination" (Al-Shuqayri 1964).

In 1964, the APG was transformed into the PLO by the same Arab regimes, using the same leadership style and depending on the same Arab hegemony. In fact, the Palestinian presence in the preparations that preceded the PLO was marginal. For example, Ahmad Al-Shuqayri (the only Palestinian in the meetings) was present as an *expert* and his proposals were met with adamant objections and rejection (Shemesh 1984: 117).

It took four years (1959–1963) of groundwork before the PLO emerged. The relations between Arab states were precarious at that historical moment. It was a period of ideological rivalry between the revolutionary/pan-Arabism camp, and the regionalist/statist camp. Amid this simmering rivalry and antagonism, there were plenty of obstacles to any binding decision regarding the Palestinian question, and the Palestinian entity in particular, to be taken,

particularly since, as a rule, only unanimous decisions in the Arab League Council were binding for all states (Arab League Charter, art.7). This rule alone was enough to foster a state of indeterminacy, because unanimity was unfeasible. Between 1950 and 1960, the entire political environment was volatile in the so-called confrontation states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, where most of the Palestinian refugees live). The political structures were deeply influenced by the previous colonizers and were in state-building phases. The "confrontational" states had their implicit or explicit understandings with the Zionist Agency (Sayigh 1997: 11). These regimes had limited options for Palestine other than diplomacy, or, more accurately, they lacked the will to construct other options. Finally, the Arab world was divided by proxy Cold War politics and wars. Some Arab regimes were in alliances with the Soviets, especially Egypt during the 1960s. Through mainly Egyptian efforts, the Soviets agreed to support Fatah (Heikal 1996). However, this was a pretence rather than a genuine support, for the question of Palestine itself was an uncontroversial issue between the world superpowers.

According to Al-Shuqayri, Palestinians were excluded from the diplomatic circuit because they "were not embodied in their cause"; rather, others *represented* them (Al-Shuqayri 1964). The Palestine question was therefore treated as an Arab–Israeli matter in the international diplomatic arenas (especially in the UN), with the implication that this matter had to be negotiated between the Arab regimes and Israel. Palestinians were thus excluded. The struggle between Arab regimes and the PLO over the right to represent Palestinians continued for a decade (1964–1974), until the latter garnered political recognition as "sole representative of the Palestinian people."

To reverse perception of the situation from an Arab–Israeli conflict to a Palestinian–Israeli one, Egypt came up with the idea of establishing a Palestinian entity in 1959 to *represent* the Palestinians as a people (Shemesh 1984). In being so, this entity would be the answer to the "dangerous and dreadful question asked in international forums for 16 years: where is this people that international forums talk of its cause?" (Al-Shuqayri 1964). In hindsight, however, this reframing obviously had negative impacts on the Palestinian struggle and made it possible for certain Arab regimes to downgrade the question of Palestine and pursue separate peace understandings with Israel.

The nascent Palestinian entity, back then, found itself in conflicting relationships with its context. It was designed, managed by, and subordinated to the Arab regimes and affected by their sensitivities (especially Egypt and Jordan). On the other hand, it had to satisfy the political requirement for some sort of *perceptible* official Palestinian representation. Subsequently, it was necessary for any Palestinian entity to internalize at least two Jordanian conditions: first, only after *the complete* liberation of Palestine may the Palestinians decide their destiny; and second, the struggle for liberation must go via the Arab regimes (Shemesh 1984: 119).

The two conditions meant that the Palestinian entity lacked "territorial sovereignty" over any part of Palestine in the foreseeable future, so Jordanian reign in the West Bank could continue unchallenged. The PLO gave in: Al-Shuqayri declared that "the emergence of the Palestinian entity in Jerusalem *does not* aim to separate the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom, but we aim to liberate our usurped homeland in the west of the West Bank; we have *no* goals in the

West Bank, our goals lie in the west of the West Bank" (Al-Shuqayri 1964). The first condition was literally inserted in the fourth article of the Palestinian Qawmi Charter of 1964,[9] which unambiguously discounts the territorial sovereignty over any part of Palestine as pronounced in article number 24.

In the main, the fine details of the PLO design were drafted to concur with the Arab regimes' concerns. Retrospectively, the details of the Palestinian representation (i.e., effective political institutions) were tailored to the size of the Arab regimes' political reckonings at that time. Thus representatives were appointed based on their loyalty to the regimes in Jordan and Egypt in particular.[10] Members of the PNC were chosen using an appointment mechanism at odds with the PLO Basic Law, which endorsed the principle of "direct election of the PNC members" (article 5).

Although the PLO is meant to answer the question of representation, neither its initial Charter nor Basic Law (of 1964) gave it the right to represent the Palestinians. Instead, representative capacity and highest power were consigned to the Executive Committee (see articles 15 and 16/a of the Basic Law). Furthermore, the Executive Committee was molded according to the political divisions of Arab politics (mainly with respect to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria). The Arab League appointed Al-Shuqayri, and he appointed himself the chairman of the Executive Committee; he also appointed the other members (Shemesh 1984: 125).

The Executive Committee is the nucleus of the PLO, where each Palestinian movement is represented in one way or another (before the rise of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, which remain outside the PLO). However, the majority of its members were supposed "independents," appointed by the PLO's chairman. This structure guaranteed the predominance of the chairman's views (in this case, Yasser Arafat). Here, we should make a clear distinction between the individual and the structure of the subject position. The problem lies with the inherited appointment system, structure, and Basic Law governing the PLO, which grants the Executive Committee the highest power and appointment system, all without effective checks and balances. This might explain why the structure of the Executive Committee constituted a subject of contention between various Palestinian organizations after the factions took over the PLO, in particular between Fatah and PFLP (Habash 2009). This power distribution also explains why Fatah and Hamas have never reached an agreement for the latter to join the PLO. This discussion will be elaborated further toward the end of this chapter.

The Palestinian Qawmi Charter is the first authoritative document speaking in the name of the Palestinians, and provided a touchstone for subsequent texts after an-Nakba. As such, it deserves adequate examination. First, the Qawmi Charter is in the main a reflection of pan-Arabist politics and the hegemonic power relations between Arab regimes and the PLO. The Charter's theme combines *al-qawmiyya*, Arab unity, and a revolutionary spirit. The first two articles of the Charter define Palestine geographically on the basis of the borders laid down by the British mandate. Palestine is defined as "an Arab homeland," bound up with "all Arab countries through *al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya*." While article 8 demands the inculcation of "the Arab revolutionary manners" that are a "*qawmi* duty" in the new Palestinian generations.

The Charter states:

> We, the Arab Palestinian people, … who believed in Arabism and in our right to liberate

> our homeland and to enjoy freedom and dignity, have determined to gather our strength and mobilize all efforts and capabilities to continue the struggle and proceed on the path of the Holy War (*al-jihad al-muqqadas*) until the final and complete victory is realized.
>
> We, the Arab Palestinian people, believe in our *right of self-defense and regaining our usurped homeland entirely* – a right endorsed by international conventions and norms – especially, the UN Charter and implementation of the human rights principles.
>
> We recognize the international political relations nature, in its various dimensions and goals, … *and for the sake of the honor of the Palestinians and their right* to *free and dignified life* … We, the Palestinian Arab people, *dictate and declare this Palestinian qawmi Charter and swear to realize it*.
>
> (Palestinian Qawmi Charter 1964, emphasis added)

The declarative statement at the onset of the Charter affirms the Palestinian selfperception as a "people" through a dual process of similitude and differentiation: they are Arabs, but also form a distinct Arabic collective. That expresses a complex, multi-layered identification: a wider affiliation with pan-Arabism and a more particular and refined identification with Palestine.

Particular Palestinian identity was framed according to spatial and temporal factors, not ethnic or ideological ones. Articles 6 and 7 state: "the Palestinians are the Arab citizens who used to live normally in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled or remained, and any child of an Arab-Palestinian father before this date, whether outside or inside Palestine, is a Palestinian." Also "the Jews from a Palestinian origin are considered Palestinians … " (Palestinian Qawmi Charter 1964).[11]

Identification with pan-Arabism recapitulated the predominant political theme of the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world. The double identity and allegiance were justified as a necessary step for achieving Arab unity as follows: "the Palestinian people must maintain their Palestinian character" to partake effectively in the achievement of Arab unity (article 11). Furthermore, any Palestinian movement that aspired for some sort of self-reliance and autonomous action was regarded as an outlier and separatist (Cobban 1984). To avoid the charge of "separatism," the PLO argued that Arab unity and Palestine liberation are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are "complementary goals, one leads to the other," and the "future of the Arab people, and its existence depends on the future of Palestine" (article 12). The argument continued to underline the *temporary* status of the PLO as an expression of a distinctive Palestinian character; and hence the *permanent* Palestinian political order would be determined "[once] liberation is concluded" (article 10). I emphasize two words in the last sentence to prefigure an argument that will be made in Chapter 3, on the provisional thinking that guided much of Palestinian politics since 1948.

The Charter is rich with modalities to express affinity with the designated objectives. Tropes such as "we the Palestinian Arab people, believe, swear, declare" are perfect representative examples. Yet this high modality has structural ironies and contradictions: the PLO spoke declaratively in the name of the entire Palestinian people, never mind the Arab regimes' hegemony. The Charter identified Palestinian losses (or broken links) regarding homeland, freedom, dignity, and honor. National unity, *al-qawmiyya* mobilization, and struggle for liberation were the main outlines of the envisioned strategy to redeem these losses (article

10).

The Charter laid the foundation for the long process of linguistic construction of Palestinian rights, which evolved around three main principles: statehood in the West Bank and Gaza; self-determination; and the right of return, as I shall explain in detail later. This meant "regaining" the connection between the "ArabPalestinian people" and their "homeland," and restoring their sense of "honor and dignity," articulated as "rights" and a "national and sacred goal" (article 13). First, the PLO drew on normative concepts of honor and dignity (*al-sharaf wa al-karama*) in Palestinian society.[12] Bearing on these concepts, Palestinian factions (not yet involved in the PLO) evinced the same correlation between land redemption and national dignity (Al-Asyfa 1965).

Land has a special status in Palestinian culture. Possessing land is a source of dignity, homage, and privilege for the individual, family, and social group. Losing it is viewed through a filter of opprobrium. In fact, the loss of land comes second only to socially unacceptable sexual practices, as expressed in the familiar proverb dating from before an-Nakba: *al-ard walaa al-'ard* (losing land but not being raped) (Khalaf 1981). All this shows how intimate is the Palestinian attachment to land, and explains the formidable feelings of shame among refugees forced to leave their land behind.

Furthermore, the Charter built on common international norms (e.g., selfdefense, human rights, the UN Charter, self-determination) as a means to substantiate the "right" to regain the "usurped homeland entirely." Yet the Charter peculiarly overlooked the fact that the UN, and the League of Nations before it, was wholeheartedly behind the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish homeland there, regardless of detrimental effects to Palestinian society.

One of the curious ironies of the Charter is the lucidity with which it represents the "right" to redeem Palestinian losses, yet there is faultless ambiguity regarding the strategy for realizing that right, namely, how would the struggle be waged? What is the nature of the struggle? What is the *al-jihad al-muqqadas*? This is to ask but a few questions. In fact, the Charter codifies Palestinian reliance on Arab regimes and represents Palestinian liberation as an Arab national (*qawmi*) duty, as stated in article 13. The PLO expressed an ironclad affinity to the declared rights ("who believe in its right to …"); however, such modality leaves ample room for ambivalence and uncertainty about the possibility and determination to attain the declared objectives in practice.

It is therefore right to conclude this section in arguing that the PLO's structure answered the needs of the Arab regimes more than the Palestinian questions. From the beginning, the constructed "Palestinian rights" ware tailor-made to fit Arab political conditions rather than Palestinian aspirations. This explains the dramatic shifts in the definition of Palestinian rights, and the sporadic efforts to achieve them, without recourse to the beholders' perspective, that of the Palestinian people. The PLO preferred top-down "legitimacy" from the Arab regimes and later from international resolutions.

The organization of organizations

It may appear, as Khalidi argues, that the period that followed an-Nakba until the mid-1960s

represents a "hiatus in [the political] manifestation" of the Palestinian identity (Khalidi 1997: 186). Yet this was not a period of political disappearance, but rather one of fecundity, producing the nucleus of the Palestinian political movements, most notably the Arab National Movement (ANM, later PFLP) and Fatah. The dynamic ideological differences, which often took an antagonistic form, between various Palestinian movements over and within action-orienting discursive concepts (e.g., the meaning of Palestine, liberation, state, Palestinian rights, armed struggle, peace, refugees, relations with other regimes, and so forth) opened new possibilities to encounter the visceral order of each concept and its relationships with other concepts and statements in the discursive field.[13] The analysis of these possibilities will be systematically available in this and the next chapter. Now I analyze the interpretative framework of the Palestinian organizations. To make such an interpretation possible, it is necessary to explore: (1) how each organization represented the context and environment of emergence and operation; (2) how it represented itself; and (3) its Other(s). These three points will be examined in order.

First, how each Palestinian organization understood its environment is informed by *situational* orientations and precepts. For several decades, the nodal concepts of *al-wataniyya* and *al-wihda al-'arabiyya* (local or territorial nationalism and pan-Arabism, respectively) were in circulation throughout Arab discourse as a source of resistance to the Ottoman reign and provided a grand normative foundation for the Arab awakening (*al-sahwa al-'arabiyya*). Palestine has been a touchstone in pan-Arabist discourse. It was located at the heart of the putative Arab unity as typified in the slogan of the time: "Arab unity is the road to the liberation of Palestine." The question of Palestine was deemed integral to the Arab–Israeli conflict and was an Arab nationalist concern (Heikal 1996). At the time, the process of decolonization was fresh in the region (that is, in the countries of exile for Palestinians) and Arab countries were pursuing their statebuilding projects separately, in contradiction to pan-Arabism. Generally and summarily speaking, the Arab regimes' political mood could be characterized by ambivalence, internal rivalry, and inward looking; subsequently the question of Palestine was secondary, unless it served the political purposes and internal rhetoric of a particular regime. Unlike the pre-an-Nakba leadership, the new leadership was aware of that mood and had become exceedingly disillusioned with the Arab regimes. Faruq Al-Qaddumi, a leading politician from Fatah and the PLO, makes this perfectly clear: "In the past, the Palestinian cause was robbed by Arab claims and counterclaims, in the middle of the which Palestinian opinion was lost" (Al-Qaddumi 1988: 6).

In parallel to the development of the PLO, two other Palestinian organizations, the Arab National Movement (ANM) and Fatah, were in the making. They met and diverged on various aspects. The ANM and Fatah emerged out of a similar experience of an-Nakba and exile. The former was founded relatively soon after an-Nakba, in 1951, by George Habash, one of the pivotal political figures in Palestinian politics (also known as *al-Hakim*, the wise). Later Habash became secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) until 2000.

Fatah formation began almost a decade later. Pan-Arabism remained a key reference point for the PLO and ANM; they also concocted a new dependency relationship between pan-Arabism, Arab unity, and Palestine liberation. The PLO articulated the way in which Arab

unity and the liberation of Palestine complement each other. It did not matter whether liberation or unity would happen first, realization of one goal systematically leads to the other (Palestinian Qawmi Charter 1964, article 12). On the other hand, the ANM construed "a dialectic relationship" between the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the ANM, Zionism has grand imperialist objectives against "the entire Arab nation including Palestine. Therefore, we [in the ANM] need to develop a comprehensive project for Arab unity that takes the liberation of Palestine as priority …" (Habash 2009: 38). This interpretation of the pan-Arabism Arabism-liberation relationship placates the Arab regimes, Arab public, and Palestinians. At the same time, it leaves a vast space for each group to elicit its convenient interpretation. Furthermore, the PLO's vision for liberation and Arab unity remains understated. The outcome is a state of non-action, which augurs ill for both unity and liberation.

A decade after an-Nakba, Fatah was simmering in Kuwait. The young founders, then at the helm, were very cautious and skeptical of the Arab regimes and the PLO. Fatah had reversed the slogan and argued that "the Arab unity would be realized after liberating Palestine, not the opposite" (Khalaf 1981: 34). That was a novelty in Palestinian thinking that changed the direction and focus of action. With this mode of thinking, the reality of the Palestinians and Arab states was revisited and reinterpreted in a way that was directly opposed to the traditional Palestinian viewpoint, which considered Palestine part of "an Arab Alliance" (Al-Husseini 1999: 334). Even the ANM shared that view. According to Salah Khalaf, a key founder better known as Abu-Iyad, Fatah's founders "at least knew what was detrimental to the Palestinian cause; our estimate was that our people could await nothing from existing Arab regimes … and we believed that the Palestinians should essentially depend on themselves" (Khalaf 1981: 19–20). Initially, Fatah considered the Arab regimes serviceable to the existence of Israel, even "facilitating and helping to enforce the status quo, that is, the establishment of the state of Israel" (ibid.: 31).

The ANM distrusted the Arab regimes as well; however, the general style of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, perhaps the most charismatic president of Egypt, concurred with the movement's worldview; the ANM's "commitment to Nas[s]ir, his philosophy on political, social, and economic issues, and his regional agenda was to be the determining influence on the ideology and behavior of the ANM for over a decade" (Sayigh 1997: 75). Fatah also found itself increasingly in warmer relations with Nasser's regime soon after the June 1967 war, which granted Fatah further legitimacy, visibility, and primacy over other organizations (Heikal 1996: 19). For the Palestinians (and Arabs in general), President Nasser represented "the man of liberation," though this image was dashed after the 1967 war (Habash 2009: 72). As a result, and after two decades, the ANM came to the same conclusion as Fatah, and decided to reconfigure itself into a particularist Palestinian movement. Particularist thinking has prevailed ever since.

Mutual tension and suspicion between "revolutionary" Palestinian leadership (which has steered the PLO since 1968) and Arab regimes persisted despite their growing convergence and improving relations. The right to represent the Palestinian people and speak in their name was one of the foremost sources of conflict between the Arab regimes and Palestinian movements for a long time. Thus, since 1968, the PLO has been unwavering on its right to

represent the Palestinians and safeguard its *ability* to represent. A couple of instances make the point. According to Habash:

> The independence of the Palestinian decision-making … is indispensable for our struggle and *a condition for the existence* of our revolution which *we must protect against all odds* …. The forces that threaten the Palestinian decision at this stage are primarily the Arab reactionary regimes…. The independence of Palestinian decision-making means the independence of the PLO from these regimes.
>
> (Habash 2009: 134, emphasis added)

Similarly, Faruq Al-Qaddumi explained that "[s]ome regimes do not like the fact that the PLO is the sole, legitimate representative, but *no Arab state has the right to speak for the Palestinians*." He also declared the independent representation "a right, there must be an independent Palestinian delegation on an equal basis" (Al-Qaddumi 1988: 5, 11). From the Palestinian perspective, the importance of Palestinians having the right to speak for themselves is absolute. A compromise on that right puts their political agency in peril.

Second, interpretation of a particular social context is closely related to selfimage. Rhizomic power relations with the surrounding environment (events, Arab politics, Zionism) have informed Palestinian self-perception and judgment. After all, interpretation is co-constitutive and always *situational* (Gadamer 2004).

In the main, Marxism and pan-Arabism shaped the ANM's worldview, which featured special attention to class relations and the exploration of the means to lead a popular struggle embraced by the Arab masses, including Palestinians, for liberation. Since its formation between 1951 and 1952, the movement adopted a three-word catchphrase: "unity, liberation, and revenge." Revenge was substituted later by "recovering Palestine" (*istirja' falastin*). Structurally, the ANM initiated several branches in Arab countries (except Palestine), and both Palestinians and non-Palestinians were recruited. Strict discipline, political education (based on the books of Marx, Lenin, and Mao), hierarchy, and secrecy governed its mode of operation. The ANM and its offshoot the PLFP were the first Marxist movements to appeal to a large swath of the youth, worker, and peasant classes in the Arab world (Sharabi 2001). Following the collapse of Egyptian-Syrian unity in 1961 and the "disappointment" after the 1967 war, it was increasingly obvious that long-awaited Arab unity was off the horizon. Since then, the effort to locate the Palestinian struggle within the broader formula of pan-Arabism has been surrendered by the ANM (Habash 2009: 25–50). In December 1967, the ANM, in conjunction with other left-wing groups,[14] founded a new entity called the PFLP.

Internal rivalries and ideological differences between these left-wing groups remained unresolved, and within a short time (in 1969) some of these groups withdrew from the PFLP and formed the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by Nayef Hawatmeh. Later, far-left groups defected from the PFLP and DFLP and formed their new organizations: PLFP-General Command, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); and Fida. The last three, dubbed the "rejectionists," showed outright opposition to PLO policies. Contrary to its all-inclusive rhetoric, the ANM hatched several Palestinian organizations in a short period of time.

Unlike the ANM, Fatah had a different interpretation of the context. Fatah's organizers were young, enthusiastic, and eager-to-act refugees. They coveted an independent institution to facilitate collective action and lead the struggle for liberation, and they entertained two structures for this putative organization. The first took cues from the APG and a Palestinian government in exile. The second and more popular choice, however, was in favor of an independent Palestinian liberation movement to wage the struggle, rather than imitating a tested-andfailed model; they felt that

> existing Arab reality would never allow even the establishment of a Palestinian organization, and so there was no alternative for the Palestinians but to go underground and adopt absolute secrecy in their organization, until it could impose itself on that reality and force recognition.
>
> (Al-Wazir, cited Sayigh 1997: 83–84)

Unlike the ANM, Fatah initially made no distinction between "conservative and progressive" regimes; rather, it was very "wary of all [Arab] regimes" and argued that Palestinians must assume responsibility over the armed struggle, which "should be prepared, organized and waged by the Palestinians to the end" (Khalaf 1981: 23).

The rationale of Fatah was political; revenge was off the agenda. From the beginning, it represented itself as the "movement" of all Palestinians and therefore it was a particularist one (Sharabi 2001). Though the ANM and Fatah shared the same goal of liberating Palestine, their focus differed enormously. Fatah looked from a narrower, but focused, angle into Palestine, whereas the ANM approached the struggle through a regional, grand-design prism, with Palestine one of many (supposed) objectives. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the ANM project was far too ambitious and was at odds with contextual forces (Arab regimes' rivalry and foreign interventions). The ANM tried to reconcile the irreconcilable by committing itself to the liberation of Palestine, Nassir's regime, and pan-Arabism, without working out the contradictions between these goals. After all, the Egyptian regime curbed Palestinian armed attacks – Egypt was tied up with the Armistice Agreement – and it had no solution to the Palestinian question. As mentioned earlier, these contradictions have gradually spurred the ANM to re-orientate its lens toward Palestine (Habash 2009: 71).

At this stage, the inherited thinking from the pre-an-Nakba order that tied Palestine liberation to Arab unity and grand designs waned. On the other hand, the particularist view became hegemonic in Palestinian politics. Fatah emphasized the particular character of the Palestinian straggle over that of the general Arab agenda. This perspective was reinforced by the widespread mood for a self-determined Palestinian initiative and responsibility to reverse the ill-fated conditions of Palestinians, instead of waiting for the Arab regimes to act (Cobban 1984). This judgment was attentive to the refugees' sentiments. The refugees, and Fatah's founders in particular, perceived themselves in an absolutely negative way, as a group of persecuted people *without* what other peoples have. (They were, and some still are, *without* homeland, passports, weapons, direction, support, association, respect, state.) That feeling was expressed vividly in the *Structure of Revolutionary Construction*: "Our people have lived, driven out in every country, humiliated in the lands of exile" – only "revolution" could

reverse such peculiar reality (See Sayigh 1997: 88).

From the standpoint of the founders of the ANM and Fatah, the PLO is neither a representative nor an independent body. Though neither organization opposed the establishment of the PLO (Hamid 1975: 94), they coveted an alternative "independent" and "popular organization." The gap between the young leadership and the old one was far too wide to be bridged: each had different worldviews, and harbored suspicions and sometimes quarrels. Cooperation was not a viable strategy. The fresh start that Fatah pursued suggested a normative detachment from the ancient regime and defeated "sons of [elite] families and traditional figures" (Mahmoud Abbas, cited in Hurani 1980: 102). In the light of the PLO's structural composition (old leadership, coupled with the dominance of the Arab regimes as explained above), the young and emerging Palestinian leadership at the time viewed the PLO as follows:

> we considered the PLO to be an Arab instrument and [its military wing] a part of the Arab armies. In view of our experiences with the Arabs and especially in 1936, and our deep lack of trust towards them … we feared that the PLO would kill or divert the awakening of our people
>
> (Khalid Al-Hasan, cited in Hurani 1980: 101)

Hence, for Fatah, the PLO represented an Arab tool to impede the Palestinian revolution and independent action. George Habash argued in the same vein: "the ANM did not join the PLO because it did not show a revolutionary orientation due to its ties with the Arab regimes" (Habash 2009: 72).

The PLO represented conflicting options for the Palestinian organizations. On the one hand, these organizations believed that joining the PLO would entail associating the revolution with the Arab regimes. That would inevitably repudiate the revolution, as articulated in a popular saying: "all revolutions born in Palestine are aborted in the Arab capitals" (Khalaf 1981: 31). On the other hand, the PLO had already enjoyed certain legitimacy and manifest existence (diplomats, charters, a military wing, conferences), all of which non-PLO organizations had desperately strived for. Thus, despite all the bad feeling toward the PLO, Fatah was planning how to entice the PLO to take up the revolutionary agenda, and therefore Fatah considered engagement with the PLO in order to "transform it from inside." On the other hand, the ANM "believed that the establishment of the PLO was fundamental to the constitution of a legitimate framework that would unite the Palestinian forces" (Habash 2009: 72). In 1967, emerged the potential to restructure the PLO.

In the remainder of this section, I will first dwell on the new avenues that became available to the Palestinian political institutions after the June 1967 war, or *al-naksa* (relapse) as Palestinians and Arabs refer to it, and then move to the third point about the representation of the "Other."

In spite of its disastrous effects, the war dampened the Arab regimes' influence on Palestinian political choices. It was thus an opportunity for the Palestinian organizations to make their independent choices to join and reform the PLO. Be that as it may, the ANM, Fatah, and the PLO were the primary Palestinian organizations that constituted the order of Palestinian discourse after an-Nakba until the Islam-oriented movements became influential in

Palestine. Although each institution had its own distinctive path of development, rationale, and worldview, they had an identical *raison d'être*: the liberation of Palestine, or recuperation from an-Nakba through return from exile.

In 1968, the various Palestinian institutions were merged into the PLO, with Fatah at the helm. The PLO's charter was amended to fit the worldviews of the new forces. First, the *al-qawmiyya* as the guiding theme of the charter was substituted by al-*wataniyya/watani* (nationalism/national), as explicitly nuanced in the title of the amended charter, "The Palestinian National Charter". Second, nationalist and revolutionary logic became the source of legitimacy and justification (instead of *al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya*). Articles 7 and 15 of the new charter considered "The Liberation of Palestine" an expression of "national duty" for all Palestinians and a "*qawmi* duty" for the Arab world. This formulation drew the boundaries between Palestinian (national) concerns and non-Palestinian or Arab concerns (*qawmi*).

The revision of the PLO's structure was a historic and transformative moment. It removed the internal and external ambiguity regarding the identity of the PLO as a representative body. The "revolutionary" spirit and the move for Palestinian self-representation were brought inside the PLO, and since then the PLO has been a principal available space for the production of performative Palestinian political discourse. This has tended to reproduce the PLO in a circular way. National issues reigned supreme over other social differences (class, religion, territorial distinctions, gender) within the PLO; this was a matter of "consensus" (Shemesh 2004: 93) aiming to establish a more unified representative political body to lead the struggle. Nevertheless, disagreement over the meaning and the content of the "national issues" emerged, which produced ongoing, politically paralyzing behaviors, including withdrawal from the executive committee, the formation of the Rejection Front, infighting, and so on.

Turning to the third and last point, how the Palestinians represented the "Other" (Zionism): this was closely related to their understanding of the global and regional political atmosphere at the time. But indeed Zionism was (and still is) seen as the opposite of what it means to be Palestinian. The word Zionism is derived from "Zion," the Biblical name of "the city of David" or Jerusalem. Zionism is a movement of "return" to, and "redemption" (*geolat a-karka'*) of the land of "Zion" and "Eretz Yisrael." For Zionists, this constitutes a modern, "pluralistic," and "open utopia," which combines both ancient and modern dispositions (Gorny 1998: 245, 249). Zionists see their ideology as drawing

> its sustenance both from traditional roots and from the sources of rational and optimistic modernism in its conception of the development of society… Zionism, relatively to other ideologies, has succeeded in realizing most of its objectives, … For all these reasons, it can serve as an example of the success of modernism.
>
> (Gorny 1998: 241–242)

Zionism understands itself in juxtaposition with the West, modernity, and rationalism, and represents itself as an example of a successful and triumphant movement (see Pappé 2014). On the other hand, "everything positive from the Zionist standpoint looked *absolutely* negative from the perspective of the native Arab Palestinians" (Said 1992: 84, emphasis added). For Palestinians, Zionism is a "colonial," "imperial," "aggressive and expansionist" movement to

which the Palestinians are victim (*dahiyya*). Victimhood entailed sacrifice and struggle (*al-tadhiya wa al-nidal*) on the part of the Palestinians to confront and restrain the advance of "global Zionism and imperialism," as pronounced at the outset of the Palestinian Charter of 1964. "From the standpoint of its victims," to use Edward Said's words, Zionism, "is at bottom an *unchanging* idea" for creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Said 1992: 56, emphasis added).

Zionism came out of European imperialism, anti-Semitism, and the persecution of Jews, which culminated with the Holocaust. However, at the outset of the twentieth century, the Zionist movement managed to garner the backing and support of imperialist powers (Schneer 2011). The Western appetite for grand design schemes (particularly in the Middle East) gave practical meaning and shape to the imaginative idea of putting Zionism on the world map. The proactive Zionist networks that engaged with Western powers spurred Palestinians to associate Zionism with "international colonialism" (*al-isti'mar al-'alami*). For instance, in 1919 the first Palestinian conference argued for "resisting Zionism and colonialism," and the High Arab Committee Charter, in 1922, about three decades before the foundation of Israel in 1948, avowed to "liberate Palestine from Zionism and colonialism." At this stage of the struggle no distinction was made between Zionism and colonialism. Zionism was considered colonialism or a "colonial movement" (*haraka isti'mariyya*).

An-Nakba was bound up with Zionism; for Palestinians this was a paradoxical phenomenon that required much retrospective analysis. The *yishuv* (settlement) leader, David Ben-Gurion, declared the birth of "the State of Israel" in May 1948. Palestinians, however, rejected this name and instead called it "the Zionist entity," "the entity," or "the Israeli entity" interchangeably (*al-kayan al-suhywni*, *al-kayan, al-kayan al-isra'ili*, respectively, in Arabic). Nevertheless, a qualitative difference between Zionism and Israel was maintained in Palestinian discourse. The former was considered a tool for global imperialism, while Israel was constructed as "the vanguard of the destructive [Zionist] movement, the pillar of colonialism, and a constant source of anxiety and turmoil in the Middle East in particular and the international community in general" (Palestinian Qawmi Charter 1964, Article 19; see also PNC Fifth Session 1969).

The Palestinian perspective on Zionism, Israel, and the relation between these and the West has never been stabilized; rather it continued to be in a process of making. Concepts like imperialism, racism, and colonialism, among others, were brought into the discourse to stabilize (albeit temporarily) the meanings of Israel, Zionism, and their relationships. For example, Arafat argued at his first speech to the UN General Assembly that Zionism is "an imperialist, colonialist, racist, discriminatory and reactionary ideology," whose "logic concurs with anti-Semitism" (Arafat 1974). Because Zionism claimed to represent the Jews and drew on biblical texts to justify its *raison d'être*, an essentialist nexus was constructed between Zionist political objectives and religion. This meant that "every Jewish person was perceived as Zionist and thus an enemy" from the Palestinian viewpoint; however, the "essential" Zionism/Judaism nexus diminished in a relatively brief period, in 1959 (Habash 2009: 49). That was a significant step toward incorporating diversity in Israeli society into the register of political deliberations, a distinction made on the basis of class within Israeli society. Advocates suggested the possibility of establishing contacts with Jewish forces in Israel to

draw them closer to the Palestinian side at an early stage (Sharabi 2001: 81–82).

Other than the generalized representation of Zionism discussed above, a more nuanced representation emerged in 1968, that of a "political movement organically connected with global imperialism," making it "the enemy of all liberation and progressive movements in the world." That understanding consigns Zionism to an instrument of Western imperialism. Seeing Zionism as an "identical" manifestation of a general phenomenon (imperialism and colonialism) reduced the possibility of thorough scrutiny of the movement's operational system, ideas, and objectives. This obfuscated discrepancies between Zionist and traditional Western imperialism.

Palestinians' mode of resistance and relationships with Zionists were grew out of the Palestinian interpretation of Zionism. Instances of resistance to imperial and colonial projects elsewhere provided examples that Palestinians could model their struggle on.

Israel, however, was constructed as a:

> tool for the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for global imperialism … "Israel" is a strategic location [for global imperialism] in the heart of the Arab world intended to destroy the aspirations of the Arab people for liberation, unity, and progress. "Israel" is a permanent source of threat for peace in the Middle East and the world.
>
> (Palestinian National Charter 1968, Article 22)

The "conquest of Palestine is only a bridge that would lead to other Arab lands beyond the boundaries of Palestine." The Palestinian leadership used the 1967 war to stabilize this belief: "the June [1967] War is only the first wave to leap to the head of the bridge that would proceed into another Arab Land …" (PNC Fourth Session 1968). Zionism epitomized "an enemy"; this perspective, however, was generally based on indirect inferences from the association of Zionism with imperialism and colonialism, not out of the critical examination of its structures and tenets. That was at least the case during the early stages of the struggle. For example, the PNC Fourth Session (1968) outlined "the enemy" in "three interconnected powers: Israel, global Zionism, and global imperialism led by the US." Accordingly, "the focus" of "the Palestinian struggle" must transcend the geographical boundaries of Palestine to defy the trilateral enemy (ibid.).

In parallel, the first construction (Zionism as a manifestation of global imperialism) encouraged the perception of Israel as an instrumental "tool for Zionism" and for Western imperialism, hence the power relations between Israel, Zionism, and the West were understood as hierarchical, with Israel at the bottom of the scale. Arafat, for example, favored the instrumental-hierarchal image of Israel: "I regard Israel as a mere watch-dog doing its job in this area on the orders of its American master" (Arafat 1981: 147). However, the Palestinian perspective on Israel has been elastic. The gradual transformations in other parts of the Palestinian discourse have spurred the PLO to rework its perspective on Israel, which changed from an absolute enemy to an "adversary" with whom the Palestinians have "compatible goals": "Israel and the Palestinian people have similar and *compatible goals* … Israel wants to be master of its own fate – an independent state, secure, and at peace with neighbors" (Khalaf 1990, 96, emphasis added). Once again, that perspective changed and Israel became a

"partner" in the peace process, as we shall see later.

Liberation (*al-tahrir*)

The concepts of liberty or freedom and (recently) democracy are central nodal points in the contemporary language of politics. Liberty is an imperative for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a "primary good" for political theorists (Rawls 1993: 181). Self-determination constitutes the practice of a liberty and allows us to act according to our self-understanding. Individual human liberty and self-determination (the essence of liberalism) were extended to collectivities, such as nations, peoples, and communities. Liberal attention to individualism at the cost of community gave rise to the communitarian school of thought, advocating the normative value of the community (see Sandel 1998). The principle of "self-determination of peoples" gained normative political ground both in theory and practice at the onset of the twentieth century, which marked the rise of nationalism, liberation movements, and later decolonization.

Self-determination of nations, or peoples, became an essential principle in the nation-state international order. With the advance of nationalism in the West and elsewhere, national self-determination was considered one of the key governing rules of world order. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, the UN Charter (see UN Charter 1945: Article 1/II), and international law all endorsed self-determination. Of course, what constitutes a "people" or a "nation" and what should be the process of self-determination are contingent and contested matters.

What is now called the Middle East (or "Near East" in American political jargon) has been the site for a competition between great powers leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire and colonization of its territories. Britain colonized Palestine after World War I and granted the Zionist movement a foothold there, culminating in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. In 1922 the League of Nations (which was predominantly controlled by Western states) formalized the British rule over Palestine and the Zionist project. The Mandate Resolution made it unequivocal to the Palestinians that Britain would not cut back on its support and commitment to the Zionist project. In response, the Palestinians revolted in 1936 against "British colonialism and the Zionist invasion" (Palestine Encyclopedia 1984: 623–641).

Mainstream political language provided the vocabulary through which Palestinian leaders conceptualized the conditions encountering Palestine as colonialism which captures two entities: colonized (the Palestinians) and colonizer (Britain) connected through an antagonist relationship. The logic of equivalence[15] made it possible for Palestinians to see themselves in a struggle for liberation and self-determination similar to liberation movements elsewhere in the world: the Palestinian struggle constituted a "liberationist cause similar to other liberation causes in the world" (Al-Shuqayri 1964). The PNC echoed this understanding: "The Palestinian revolution is an indivisible part of global liberation movements in the struggle against global colonialism and imperialism. Simultaneously, the Palestinian revolution is fighting another enemy, global Zionism, which is a segment of global imperialism" (PNC Sixth Session 1969: Appendix 1).

The logic of equivalence helps to condense complex social events into simplified

conceptual abstractions, allowing chains of corresponding associations to insinuate relationships between Britain, the West, and Zionism, and submerge them into one unit or subject position: colonizers. At the same time the Palestinian agent was articulated as "revolutionary." This description accentuates commonalities and connections between Palestinians, suggesting that they constitute a singular, revolutionary subject position at odds with their colonizers. That construction was present both before and after an-Nakba. The PNC sketched out the relation like this: "at this stage the PNC considers the *main contradiction* to be with the Zionist enemy and colonialism, and all other *internal contradictions are secondary* and must stop" (PNC Fifth Session 1969: First Annex, emphasis added).

Since the Palestinian (re-)action was constituted into a struggle (*nidal*) and then a "liberationist" (*taharuri*) or "revolutionary" (*thawri*) struggle, multiple networks of categories, subject positions, and institutions emerged as a performative incarnation of that struggle. The *fida'i*[16] subject position embodied the active performance of the struggle, that is *al-'amal al-fida'i*. To occupy the *fida'i* subject position is willingly to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the liberation of Palestine. To be a *fida'i* was by far the most honorable position in the Palestinian revolution. Virtually all Palestinian institutions after an-Nakba were branded as liberationist, "strugglist" (*nidaliyya*), *fida'i*, and confrontational, as demonstrated by their titles.[17] Such branding granted these institutions and their activities a moral capital, and made them a powerful interpellation force.

Until the late 1980s, the concept of liberation was central in the Palestinian discourse, and had certain discursive functions. Indeed "the liberation of Palestine was *the biggest goal* of Arab liberation activities, and Palestinian people are the *vanguards of the liberation battle*"; moreover, "liberating Palestine is considered *essential and fateful*" (PNC Second Session 1965). The concept of liberation regulated, organized, and stabilized the meaning of other moments in the discourse.[18] Initially, it stabilized (temporarily) the meaning of Israel from the standpoint of the Palestinians as a "continuous imperialist aggression at odds with the right of self-determination." Hence, from a liberationist viewpoint, the "struggle to liberate the homeland by all means" is warrantable (PNC First session 1964).

Furthermore, the concept of liberation provided the raw material from which the purview of necessary practices for liberation and self-determination were constructed. Namely, it warranted the struggle for liberation (*al-nidal min ajl al-tahrir*). In general, two modes were contemplated to lead the struggle: armed guerrilla warfare or protest by non-violent means, inspired by Gandhi. The first option was more attractive at the time and the guerrilla warfare in Algeria and Vietnam were seen as an example to be emulated (Khalaf 1981: 32). That choice could be explained by looking at demographic changes. After all, the number of the Palestinians in Palestine had been significantly reduced as a result of the 1948 expulsions. Alternatively, the choice could also be motivated by the desire to resolve identity dissonance and stamp out the image of "the weak and inferior" Palestinian, restoring a sense of "pride" (Khalaf, cited in Shemesh 2004: 97). In terms consistent with this view, Arafat explained how the PLO had transformed Palestinians "from *a refugee people* waiting in queues for charity and alms from UNRWA into *a people fighting for freedom*" (Arafat 1982: 6, emphasis added).

Apparently, the discourse put Palestine liberation and armed struggle in a direct relationship. More accurately, liberation stipulated armed struggle. This linkage flowed

unchecked in the early PLO and PNC statements. As the PLO "matured" and became embroiled in the mechanics of socialization, reference to armed struggle has been gradually reduced until it disappeared from the common discourse. However, it regained momentum with the emerging Islamic movements of the mid-1980s, especially the Islamic Jihad and later Hamas (Al-Nawaati 2002). Linking liberation with armed struggle was rationalized using two general ideological concepts: *al-qawmiyya* ("Palestinian liberation battle" is a *qawmi* goal (PLO Basic Law)) and the religious notion of jihad. The first PNC session stated explicitly that "*al-Jihad* is the holy duty of every Palestinian." Ironically, neither concept is specific to Palestine, though both have a certain resonance in Palestinian society. The PLO re-articulated the correlation between armed struggle and liberation as a nationalist one; however, religious linkages resurfaced in the discourse of the movements that have Islamic characteristics.

The concept of liberation drew the boundaries of the Palestinian discourse. It also governed and regulated the flow of relationships and linkages between statements in the discursive field. Therefore, transformation in the construction process of the concept of liberation and its internal rules of formations entailed efficient revisions and re-articulations of other dependent concepts. The meaning of liberation has changed during the past six decades or so. Examination of the developments in the concept of liberation will be adjourned to the next chapter and now the discussion will turn to the armed struggle.

The armed struggle

At the outset it is worth mentioning that this section is not about armed struggle per se, which is covered extensively in Yazid Sayigh's book *Armed Struggle and the Search for State* (1997). However, I try in this brief analysis to focus on the function and locus of the "armed struggle" as a concept and practice in the discourse.

The Palestinian discourse registered the liberation of Palestine as an incontestable historical inevitability. Usually armed struggle is articulated in conjunction with liberation. Coupling armed struggle with liberation overshadowed the possibility of ruminating over the stable meaning and content of armed struggle. Initially, armed struggle was represented as the only option for Palestinian salvation, which in effect diminished the prospects of a "political solution" in the discourse. The armed struggle was characterized as "the only way to liberation" (*al-tariq al-wahid*): "there is no alternative to the armed struggle to solve the Palestinian issue" (Habash 2009: 59). That discursive schema emphasized a *missing* alternative to the armed struggle; therefore, it was declared to be the "only option," and other possibilities were discounted from the menu of possible actions. This approach is in itself an implicit justification for choosing armed struggle. It also mutes the debate over the details of the relationship between armed struggle and liberation, which has been an ambiguous matter ever since.

Until 1967 most Palestinian movements (with the exception of Fatah), including the PLO, conceptualized the armed struggle as one component of an overall Arab–Israeli war, not a separate conflict. After all, Arab regimes made sensational statements about the liberation of Palestine (especially in the official media). Also we should bear in mind that the Palestinians had already seen themselves as "part of an Arab alliance" (Al-Husseini 1999: 334). For

example, from the Palestinians' viewpoint at that time, the idea of splitting the West Bank from its eastern counterpart (i.e., Jordan) contravened dreams of pan-Arabism. Moreover, the liberation of Palestine was considered an Arab responsibility (Sahliyeh 1988).

While drawing on the "war of the people" notion, Fatah embarked on a policy of "conscious entanglement" in its warfare against Israel from Syria,[19] in order to *drag* the "Arab masses" into the revolutionary agenda. In essence, the argument goes like this:

> our military action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then *become involved* [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses. This *extends* the circle of conflict and *compels* the Arab governments either to join us or stand against us.
>
> (Al-Hassan 1987: 128–129, cited in Sayigh 1997: 120, emphasis added)

To be sure, language such as "become involved," "extends," and "compels" in the above citation (Habash, Arafat, and Khalaf, amongst others, argued for a similar logic) illustrates how Fatah's strategic thinking was oriented in terms of interpellation or *dragging* the Arab regimes and public into their conflict. Surprisingly, there were hardly any analyses of the "masses"; rather, rudimentary and general notions informed the conception of the "masses."

Official Palestinian institutions like the PLO and the PNC began to deliberate an operative and narrower understanding of armed struggle after Fatah's first armed attack in January 1965.[20] The attack accrued momentous political and symbolic capital, which informed the judgment of that moment in the struggle as being "ripe" to inaugurate the "battle for liberation" (PNC Third Session 1965). The configurative description of the operative struggle decreed an immediate "armed clash with Israel" as an initial step toward the eventual battle for salvation (Koestler 2013).

The PNC emphasized that "the battle must *inevitably* be fought." It was portrayed as "a decisive battle that determines the destiny of the whole Arab world" (PNC Third Session 1965, emphasis added). The "battle" was constructed as inevitable and fateful; "refrain from waging the battle" would be "synonymous to its loss, division instead of Arab unity, permanent threat, more territorial losses, and giving up the Arab liberationist goal" (PNC Third Session 1965). This construction was made possible by drawing on the (supposedly) shared Arab dreams of unity. Waging "the decisive battle" would incarnate that dream. Moreover, it shows how the PLO saw the struggle for liberation as indivisible from the broader Arab–Israeli conflict. This way of thinking presupposes an implicit nexus between the particular (armed struggle to liberate Palestine), Arab regimes, and the wider Arab public. Undoubtedly that nexus does exist, but there was no careful analysis of its potentials and limitations.

Fatah continued to operate within the grand framework of the PLO, which aims for the liberation of Palestine. While initially rebuffing the PLO's political style (elite leadership and dependency), Fatah made a strong commitment to the armed struggle as the "only" means of liberation. From an early stage, in 1956, Fatah's founders organized a commando battalion to prove, or satisfy, their enthusiasm for action as opposed to rhetoric. The founders hastened to declare the armed struggle with little deliberation or formulation of a grand strategy of their own. Ideological and theoretical debates were sidelined, for it was believed that such debates would motivate factionalism, a "negative phenomenon that divides" (Khalaf 1981: 34).

The primacy of armed struggle emerged from a mainly Palestinian (negative) self-understanding, while the visibility of arms in the hands of the youngsters had psycho-symbolic effects that mitigated the weak Palestinian self-perception. In 1969, the number of institutions related to armed struggle and the number of underground operations increased, while the quality of field and political training improved, and women and children (aged ten to fifteen) were also included in revolutionary camps (Sharabi 2001, 62–63). Discourse on armed struggle also proved a superb interpellative device, generating attention in nascent Palestinian movements and enlisting new members. For example, hijacking airplanes (one of the most controversial tactics) was thought of as a means to "remove the Palestinian cause from amnesia and present it to international public opinion" and as "a main factor for attracting new members to the PFLP" (Habash 2009: 108, 111). Similarly, Fatah used armed struggle to highlight the Palestinian cause in the context of global public opinion and for recruitment purposes. Furthermore, armed struggle was considered a mechanism that would help "transcend ideological discrepancies [between various Palestinian social classes] and a stimulator and intermediary factor for unity" (Khalaf 1981: 33–34; Sharabi 2001).

The Palestinian Qawmi Charter was amended mainly because it was felt that the armed struggle was not emphasized enough, so the newer version rectified this in 1968. The Palestinian movements' merge into the PLO structure was understood as contingent upon the latter's commitment to "the armed struggle as the only road to liberate Palestine" (Khalaf 1981: 63, 65). The movements succeeded in adding this condition to the charter. Following the defeat in 1967, the Arab regimes were in no position to resist such a demand and the *fida'iyyun* activities, especially after the al-Karama battle in 1968, became popular amongst the Arab populace. As a result, "armed struggle" appeared in Article 9 of the amended charter as a "strategy not a tactic," and every Palestinian individual was framed as a disciplined "Arab revolutionary" agent who would readily partake in the "armed struggle and sacrifice" (Palestinian National Charter 1968: Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 21).

The generous discursive capital spent on the constitution of armed struggle was a potent vehicle used to deflect serious deliberation over a grand strategy with clear-cut goals. The language of armed struggle became a routine litany: "relations inside the PLO are based on commitment to … sustain the armed revolution and working toward its continuity and escalation" (PLO Basic Law of 1968). The concept of the armed struggle and related terminology swept unchallenged through mundane discourse, especially after 1968, to the extent that the catchphrase "all authority for the resistance" reigned supreme in internal Palestinian power relations (Allush 1972). Armed struggle was also deeply ingrained in Palestinian cultural discourses, which protected it from serious evaluation and criticism (Nashif 2012: 73) The hidden meaning of the catchphrase is a deleterious psychological superiority among the *fida'iyyun*. Internal violence and the intimidation of political opponents with the weapon of armed struggle were concrete translations of that psychology, with internal violence paradoxically justified in the name of protecting the armed struggle. This was perhaps the biggest backlash in the routinized rhetoric of armed struggle.

Even then, however, the meaning of operative armed struggle was unstable among the various Palestinian movements. The ANM, Fatah, and the PLO had conflicting perspectives on the armed struggle. The Marxist-oriented movements (ANM/PFLP) conceived armed struggle

in accordance with "the conception of the war of the people" or "popular struggle" (Habash 1985: 9).

Fatah, however, established "the armed struggle" as a policy for "liberation" when its main founders were already unconvinced of their abilities to liberate Palestine. Fatah's "goals were humble," and included: (1) "to mobilize the spirit of people"; (2) "to keep Israel alert"; and (3) "to disturb the Israeli economy," while "we [Fatah's leaders] never believed at any moment that our actions would put the security of the Zionist state at risk" (Khalaf 1981: 54). Just two months after the 1967 war, Faruq Al-Qaddumi, a senior PLO politician and member of Fatah's Central Committee, "submitted a policy paper to Fatah's Central Committee … proposing that we [Fatah] declare our support for the establishment of a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza in the event that Israel would return this land [to the Palestinians]" (Khalaf 1981: 134). Given this ambivalence and the discrepancy between internal and public rhetoric about the armed struggle (and on most political matters) there emerged a possibility for opening up the debate and elaborating the discourse. The hardly audible murmurings about the ministate and detachment of liberation from the idea of armed struggle were the proto-thoughts that gradually evolved into a distinctive full-scale political strategy.

Exploring the representation of the 1967 war helps us to understand how armed struggle acquired a primary locus in Palestinian discourse, and reveals the war as a critical juncture in Palestinian history.

In 1967, a new genre of literature, that of the Palestinian resistance, began to reflect on the discursive interplay between public and political perceptions and the immediate and distant public (e.g., the African countries, Cuba) fighting colonialism. Unlike most Arabic literature that appeared after 1967, resistance literature did not engage in reflexive lamentation over the defeat. Rather, the future was its key concern (Kanafani 1968). Fadwa Touqan, a distinguished poet from Nablus, described the Palestinian frame of mind before and during the war as being "charged with hope, confidence and an assured victory": this feeling continued during the actual events of the war because the "reality of battles was absented for five days," and finally in the sixth day a "new ominous reality" and "shock" became apparent. Within this short-lived shock and awe resided the incipient ingredients of a "new phase of rejection, challenge, and resistance" (Touqan 1993: 11, 12, 16, 85). Indeed, the Arab world usually uses the term *al-naksa* to refer that war; this suggests a relapse and setback, short of total defeat.

To most Palestinian intellectuals the 1967 defeat was not the end of the war but a mere lost battle. Two prominent Palestinian poets, describe the end of the war thus:

> O my country, we did not float on a handful of water
> Therefore, we will not now get drowned in a handful of water
>
> (Zayyad 1967)

> I lost a nice dream
> […]
> However, I did not lose the way
>
> (Darwish 1967)

Aesthetic and political representations of the 1967 war reinforced each other "the 1967 defeat constituted a great disappointment for our hopes and dreams … we lost a battle but not the war" (Habash 2009: 50). Fatah echoed the same terminology (ibid.). Palestinian political movements framed the war as a possibility that "opened new horizons" for resistance movements to grow and develop (Khalaf 1981: 59). (For example, the war made it possible for the movements to operate along the Jordan River, giving members the opportunity to acquire new passports and amass weapons). As Arafat explained:

> Yes, the military defeat in 1967 was devastating, a disaster, *but* we had already *firmly* resolved to liberate our homeland. Our young men hastened to collect the arms that had been abandoned on the field battle in order to resist *again*.
>
> (Arafat 1982: 7–8, emphasis added)

Furthermore, the war posed the conditions of the Arab world afresh for reinterpretation, which in turn reoriented the focus and strategy of the Palestinian movements.

> We understood well the need to focus on the Palestinian issue if we wished to reach specific outcomes…. The armed struggle must be pivoted on the Palestinians themselves; they must organize their battle on the basis of a long-term popular war for liberation, following the Algerian, South Yemeni, and Vietnamese experiences.
>
> (Habash 2009: 73–74)

The war also reduced the gap between Fatah and the Arab regimes, encouraging Fatah to compromise its independence and ask for financial and military support, especially from Egypt (Heikal 1996: 19). The struggle in general, and armed struggles in particular, was an attractive strategy due to its tremendous resonance with the public mood after 1967. Armed struggle was an effective mantra to rally Palestinians, placate public opinion, and recruit more people to *fida'i* activities.

After 1967, the image of the (supposedly) impending confrontation was transformed. The singular "decisive and fateful battle" was given up both in aesthetic (poetry, literature, art) and political discourse. Instead, the struggle was constituted as "a *long*, *persistent* and determined battle … to *drain* [Israel's] resources… and *gradually* uncover its fake image"; it was understood as "waves of armed struggle," and as a "struggle [that] will *continue, escalate and expand* until the final victory is achieved." In sum, "the strategy of the Palestinian revolution adopts the *long-term war*," with armed struggle "reinforced by *other forms* of struggle" (PNC Fourth Session 1968, emphasis added). As Sharabi observed during his field study in the late 1960s, the leaders were all convinced that "decisive victory" was wishful thinking, embracing instead a long-term struggle composed of limited battles (Sharabi 2001: 77).

In this way, words like "*the*" and "*decisive*" in the context of battle disappeared from the Palestinian lexicon. A new style of ranking and temporizing surfaced. Although the correlation between liberation and armed struggle continued, the latter began to be qualified, ordered, and bound up with other political principles. The "armed struggle for the purpose of liberating our usurped homeland will *not* be accomplished unless it *completely concurs and dovetails* with the *political actions that would complete it*" (PNC Fourth Session 1968, emphasis added).

This statement expresses a particular order in which the armed struggle no longer appears as the "only means," or even as a priority. To the contrary, it needs to be judged in the light of *political* calculations. From now on, armed struggle began to be framed as *only one* component of overall struggle. For example, it was argued that "the method of revolution is a struggle in all forms and *on the face of it* the armed struggle" (PNC Sixth Session 1969). Classifying the armed struggle as a priority placed it in a comparative relationship with other forms of struggle, so that it could no longer be framed as "the only" option. Furthermore, subjecting armed struggle to a comparative mechanism contradicts Article 9 of the Palestinian National Charter, which considers it a "strategy, not a tactic." It is hard to imagine the subordination of "strategy" to other components.

Political calculations modulated comparative relationships and the order of concepts within the discourse. This frame of thinking reallocated leadership of the military department from the Liberation Army to the Executive Committee of the PLO (PNC Fourth Session 1968: General Decisions Number 1).[21] As a result, power over the means of the struggle was entrusted to political judgment. The more the leadership deliberated the political settlement, the more the armed struggle was pushed out of the discursive formula, until it was finally dropped to pave the way for "realism" and "peaceful settlements."

Language regarding the "practice" of armed struggle was omitted. And gradually armed struggle began to appear in the frame of a residual "right," which may (or may not) be "taken into consideration." Finally, when the PLO had eventually endorsed the "political solution" as its formal policy in late 1980s, the position of armed struggle in the political discourse changed. Statements about confrontation of "the Israeli threats" or "the Zionist occupation" replaced the nexus of liberation and armed struggle. In 1983, the PNC issued a resolution to make this point: "*taking into consideration* the importance of military preparation [i.e., not the overall priority] to confront the Israeli *threats* [i.e., not liberation]," it upheld "*the right* of our people to practice armed struggle to encounter the *Zionist occupation*" (PNC Eighteenth Session 1987; PNC Seventeenth Session 1983, emphasis added).

Temporizing established the possibility to defer the final goal and prioritized certain targets over others. In 1968, a "practical and comprehensive plan for the Palestinian liberation" bifurcated the struggle into one that was "long term" and a "series of interim short plans" (PNC Fourth Session 1968). This framing implied that the liberation of Palestine was deferred and made contingent upon progress in the interim and short-term plans. The title Khalaf chose for his article "Lowering the Sword" in 1990 is telling: it tendered a formal termination of armed struggle and signaled the beginning of a new phase of "peace negotiations."

In light of the above historical analysis of the genealogy of the basic conditions of Palestinian discourse, it is useful at this stage to situate two more important things: one is the subject position of Arafat, who obtained a fundamental space in the Palestinian politics; while the second has to do with the context of the politics in and over the West Bank and Gaza, which is now, for good or ill, the spatial center of Palestinian representative politics.

Arafat's subject position and consensus

The quota system was laid down to regulate power relations between the different

organizations that joined the PLO. The quota system was also purported to be an efficient mechanism that would ensure the continuation of armed struggle, the nucleus of the PLO structural reformation in 1968. The quest for "national unity," "rule by consensus," and a "truly democratic organization" suggested such a quota system in order to guarantee the representation of each movement within the PLO (Khalaf 1981). However, contradictory outcomes evolved once the system was put in operation.

First, the appointment of mandates prevailed and Fatah obtained the lion's share of power. Second, a large share was distributed in the so-called "independent" mandates, similar to Fatah's (Hamid 1975: 99–100). The so-called independent members were selected through the direct and indirect intervention of the PLO Executive Committee Chief (Arafat). Arafat managed to encumber opposition groups and continued to accumulate more power through arbitrary "expansion" of the independent blocks in the PLO apparatus (e.g., the PNC, the Central Council) by recruiting additional members (Ghanem 2010).

The "independents" were appointed on the basis of their allegiance to Arafat's line, while Arafat alone selected the independent members in the executive committee. In so doing, the system perpetuated the hegemony of Fatah's perspective in the PLO and related institutions. It proved a superb methodology for concentrating power in certain positions and perspectives. Fatah (among other movements) met attempts to reform the quota system with unyielding opposition; it was claimed that such attempts would put the "national unity" and "consensus rule" in jeopardy. Furthermore, certain Arab regimes, such as Syria, favored this structure and intervened forcefully to thwart reformation endeavors (Ghanem 2010: 73; Habash 2009: 157).

Consensus on political issues is at odds with the "antagonistic dimensions" of pluralist politics. It is unlikely that consensus can be reached without exclusion (Mouffe 1996: 9). On the one hand, the consensus reached was artificial, with autocratic means used to produce a veneer of consensus, employing techniques such as reigning over central institutions, buying loyalty, and silencing opposition, thereby expanding the pool of supporters in the "independents" block (Ghanem 2010). Expanding the pool of supporters rendered opposition as a contradiction of the national unity. That inflicted a reflexive self-suspicion and intimidation amongst the opposition: no politician wanted to risk being perceived as acting against the national interest.

In addition to the quota system, the roots of power distribution go back to the initial formation of the PLO. The PLO Basic Law demands "direct election of the PNC by the Palestinian people" (Article 5), which has never been fulfilled, and at the same time it concentrates power inside the Executive Committee. The gist of the Basic Law gives prominence to the Executive Committee and diminishes other institutions. This is especially evident in Articles 16, 17, and 18, which distribute layers of power and authority inside the Executive Committee. Article 16, for instance, grants the Executive Committee the power to "represent the Palestinian people," "supervising the formations of the PLO" and the "initiation of guidelines and special decisions relevant to the PLO's activities," as well as to "implement the PLO's financial policy and preparing its budget." Meanwhile, Article 18 consigned the Executive Committee to

> form new apparatus including: a military department and national funds for affairs and

> political and media affairs, research centers, and a pubic relations department…. The domain of every department will be governed by a special structure put in place by the Executive Committee.
>
> (Palestinian Basic Law 1968: Article 18)

Article 19 authorizes the Executive Committee to "liaise and coordinate with all organizations, unions and Arab and international institutions." Given the mode of operation in the Executive Committee, power accumulation meant that generous authority and power were ascribed to a limited number of politicians.

Politics in and over the West Bank and Gaza

The Palestinians' opportunities to articulate their political interests in the West Bank and Gaza were restricted from the beginning. Since 1967, if not before (Pappé 2013), Jordan and Israel were vying for the control of that part of Palestine. Jordan and then Israel imposed new structural changes to serve their interests.

In general, nationalism, Marxism, Islam-oriented forces, and PLO politics were simmering in the West Bank and Gaza, especially after 1968 (Sahliyeh 1988). Each of these political perspectives had different interests, rules, and power techniques. At the same time, the rooted contradictions and rivalries among these perspectives infiltrated Palestinian internal relations in the West Bank and Gaza, which increased tension and dynamism in the society. Social, political, and economic changes ensured further political fragmentation and a sense of vulnerability. These conditions encouraged Palestinians to look outside for guidance and assurance: to Jordan; the PLO; Israel; Islam; pan-Arabism; and Marxism.[22]

In practice, however, this translated into tentative choices, usually made and abandoned abruptly, from within the West Bank. For example, some envisaged a "transitional" alliance with Jordan, while others contemplated a Palestinian state or autonomy in the in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace with Israel. The PLO denounced these choices and declared them "deviant," "defeatist," and constitutive of "treason". Ironically as the time went by, the PLO re-articulated the same choices with almost the same criteria. The "independent state" camp proposed a five-year transitional period before Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. During that time, Palestinians would prove their commitment to security arrangements (Sahliyeh 1988: Chapter 3). These criteria were inscribed in the Oslo Accords. Moreover, the PLO signed an agreement with Jordan in 1985 with the aim of establishing a confederation between the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan.

Internal politics and social life in Palestine were not a priority for the PLO, because it was more concerned with building a proto-state structure in Lebanon. Edward Said described his misgivings about this policy as follows: "the connection between those achievements [in Lebanon] and freeing the occupied territories from Israeli military occupation was not reflected upon enough, was not therefore a central project" (Said 1983: 7).

In the mid-1980s, the notion of a Palestinian state on a small part of Palestinian land matured in the PLO's calculations, and the direction of its focus turned to the West Bank and Gaza. Topics like "the Occupied Homeland Affairs" or the "Occupied Homeland" began to appear

frequently on the agenda of PNC discussions. When the Intifada broke out in December 1987, the PLO adopted the motto "no voice loader then the voice of the Intifada,"[23] signifying how the PLO's focus has been channeled to the West Bank and Gaza since then.

Before proceeding to discuss Palestinian scenarios for solving the question of Palestine it may be useful to recap the main points made in this chapter. The general aim of the chapter was to highlight the situation and conditions of Palestinian political discourse after 1948. The first section explained how an-Nakba became a touchstone in Palestinian spatial and temporal awareness. The second focused on the metaphor in the word an-Nakba, emphasizing the broken physical links between Palestine and the Palestinians. The third section examined the organizational system of Palestinian discourse, which includes "self," "other," and context-interpretative conditions. The main argument is that Palestine is no longer imagined as a geographic and demographic totality, but is rather understood as a mixture of contingent components and divisions. I suggested that an-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and thereafter a new discursive reconstruction emerged, with several orienting political concepts developing. In this regard, I examined the concepts of liberation (*al-tahrir*) and armed struggle, and the nexus between them. I concluded that both concepts started to recede as the PLO began to consider diplomatic options, until they disappeared completely and gave way to the notion of "political settlement" through negotiations. The analysis ended with a contextualization of two recurrent notions: Arafat's subject position and politics in and over the West Bank and Gaza.

Notes

1 A contemporary Palestinian writer reiterates this perception of 1948: see Nashif 2012 (72).
2 On the concept of interpellation, see Althusser 1971 (174–182), Butler 1997, and Weldes 1999.
3 For example, an "ad hoc advisory committee" and an "advisory committee on administrative and budgetary questions" were established, and a "director of United Nation relief for Palestine refugees" was appointed. A "relief plan" and "regulations for administration and supervision" were drafted.
4 The "burden" of educating the younger generation of Palestinians after an-Nakba was assumed by non-Palestinian institutions, namely those of the Arab regimes and UNRWA. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod's analysis of the Palestinian education systems in exile demonstrates systematic ambiguities and omissions in the curricula. The Palestinian student

> was in no position to identify the major outlines of Palestinian history prior to or during the Mandate period; he would not be able to identify the specific importance of Palestine to Palestinians or the Arab people in general; he would remain ignorant of the social and economic life of the Palestinians prior to 1948; and he would remain unaware of the type and nature of the struggle which the Palestinian people waged to prevent the usurpation of Palestine … their attempts to preserve themselves as a community, and the outbreak of the Palestine revolution with specific objectives would remain a mystery if the Palestinians were to rely on the orientation and values of the educational system which prepared their offspring for the future…. Perhaps the most serious and yet natural omission concerns identity itself. For the curriculum viewed Palestine as an Arab country, and therefore its liberation as an Arab problem … the Palestinian, Arab though he may be, became *ipso facto* a Jordanian, Syrian or Lebanese, etc. He was to learn the facts of his social, cultural and political history and environment in terms of this "country."
>
> (Abu-Lughod 1973: 96)

5 Before 1967 the occupied land used to refer to what is now called Israel proper, which constitutes about 78 percent of the area of the historical Palestine. After June 1967, Israel occupied the rest of Palestine (the other 22 percent), what has since been called the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
6 The PLO internalized the Israelis' "1967 line," which coincided with earlier imperialist British plans. In 1940, the British High Commissioner adopted the Land Transfer Regulations, which divided Palestine into three zones: Zone A, where land transfer is limited to Palestinian Arabs (about 16.680 km2); Zone B (8.348 km2), where land was transferred from Palestinians to Jews; and the Zone outside A and B (1.292 km2), which could be freely transferred. The West Bank and

Gaza fell entirely in Zone A according to this division and annexed map (Doc.3369).

7 The term "Palestinian population" was used in UN General Assembly Resolution 106 (S–1) Special Committee on Palestine, 15 May 1947.

8 The designation of the Palestinians who became Israeli citizens did not come from the bearers of these titles; rather, they were enforced by others. According to a survey conducted by Mada al-Carmel research center in Haifa, about 66 percent of participants defined themselves as "Palestinians in Israel," while other groups of Arabs in Israel, such as Druze or Bedouin, prefer to define themselves as "Arabs in Israel" rather than Palestinians, which resonates with the history of Palestine as an integral part of the Arab world before Sykes–Picot Agreement (Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury 2011: 10–11).

9 Article 4 states, "The People of Palestine decide their destiny after the liberation of their homeland."

10 The Jordanian-affiliated members constituted the majority in the PNC, at 65 percent (Shemesh 1984: 127–128).

11 This definition of the "Palestinian" continued as is until the Palestinian National Charter was amended in 1998.

12 On the power of "honor and dignity," see Bowman 2006 (Chapter X) and Hobbes 1998.

13 On the concept of discursive field, see Foucault 2002.

14 Heroes of Return and Ahmad Jibril (the Palestine Liberation Front).

15 For more on the theoretical discussion of the logic of equivalence, see Glyons and Howarth 2007, Howarth 1997, and Laclau and Mouffe 2001.

16 The *fida'i* and *fida'iyyun* is the secular replacement of the religious subject position *al-mujahid* and *al-moujahidyn* used to describe the Palestinian fighters before an-Nakba.

17 For example, "liberation," "struggle," and "front" were central to the identity of any Palestinian entity. The APG revitalized the Holy War Army (jaysh al-jihad al-muqqadas), the very title of the PLO denotes "liberation", as do those of the Palestine *Liberation* Front (jabhat al-tahrir al-falastini), the Popular Front for the *Liberation* of Palestine (al-jabha al-sha'biyya li-tahrir falastin), and the Palestine *Liberation* Army (Jaish tahrir falastin), "the vanguard of Palestine liberation battle" (PLO Basic Law: Article 22). The nodal points liberation (*tahrir*) and confrontation or struggle (jihad, jabha, jaish) are inserted in the titles of every organization, and sometimes newspapers, magazines, civil institutions, etc. This reflects the predominant public mood and imagined political direction of these organizations when they were founded, in spite of the lack of the means to achieve the liberation of Palestine. The PLO Basic Law is rife with expressions like "liberationist mobilization," "Palestine liberation battle," and "liberation stamp" (see Articles 3, 22, 25).

18 On the concept of discursive moments, see Laclau and Mouffe 2001 (105–106).

19 At that time, the Syrian regime led by Amin Hafiz argued for a declaration of war on Israel (see Heikal 1996: 17).

20 In fact, it was not the first armed activity against Israel by the Palestinian movements; however, it was the first one to attract attention and significant symbolic meaning. The ANM carried out the first military attack on Israeli targets in Galilee in 1963 (Habash 2009: 71).

21 Before the 1967 war, the Palestinian Liberation Army led the "Army Department" (PNC Third Session 1965, Military Decision No. 10).

22 For a thorough analysis, see Chapter 3 in Ghanem 2010.

23 "No voice loader than the voice of the Intifada" was the slogan and opening header of every flyer disseminated during the first Intifada in 1987.

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2 A solution

Remaking the joints

Provisional horizons

Post-an-Nakba conditions were all temporary and provisional in the Palestinian perception. The set of rules that have organized the Palestinian political vision is an accumulation of an unstable, indeterminate, and narrow political horizon. Given the uncertainties and contingency of the historical moment, a rationale of long-term planning was unattainable, and therefore the Palestinian (re-)actions were often incoherent, conflicting, and short lived. In operative terms, therefore, a wide range of everyday patterns – involving economy, infrastructure, architecture, political decisions, organizations, laws, and institutions – were considered temporary arrangements. For example, the APG, the first Palestinian institution after 1948, called its Basic Law "temporary" (*mu'aqqat*). Provisional modes of thinking penetrated the lives of ordinary people. This is best evinced in the refugees' (and internally displaced) perception of their condition as temporary, and therefore they continued to anticipate to return to their original villages (Sabbagh-Khoury 2011).

Living within an interpretation of the present as a provisional state spurred a chain of orientations and inferences that helped construct corresponding conceptual abstractions about "self," "other(s)," and lived social circumstances. From this vantage point, the loss of Palestine was construed as a provisional loss, and thus to regain it was inevitable. Moreover, the representations of self/other and related concepts (i.e., identity) were constructed with temporal nuances that contained proactive possibilities for adaptation and reformation.

This basic interpretation has significant concrete entailments. The Palestinian dispersion (*al-shatat al-falastini*) and lifestyle had been regularized by the idea that an-Nakba conditions would come to an end when the exiled Palestinians returned to their homes. Nevertheless, to undo the contingent present (dispersion and exile in this case) and practice the right of return (*haq al-'awda*) "necessitates an armed struggle." The title of Kanafani's novel *Return to Haifa* (1970) captures this conceptual thread. At the end of the novel, Abu Khalid (the novel's main character, a Palestinian refugee from Haifa) allows the Jewish family occupying his house to remain "temporarily," because "that thing [return to his house] can be realized only after a war."

Palestinian politics have been caught up in a mode of thought that produces unstable outcomes. It is a self-fulfilling mode that has proved useful in justifying why a certain path was or was not taken. Political oscillations and dramatic conceptual shifts between liberation, a democratic state, the Interim/Ten-Point Program, confederation with Jordan, and a two-state solution were represented as "provisional" moves. The provisional mode is deeply present in

Palestinian life, especially since the Oslo project was put into motion.[1] Palestinian calculations have been contingent upon the hope that the future might be better. Nonetheless the future is still highly uncertain – not because it is impossible to predict, but rather because self-determination remains unfulfilled in the equation, exacerbating the sense of uncertainty. Everything becomes "temporary," "provisional," and "interim," to use the repeated expressions in the Palestinian politics.

Two judgments are inferred when we refer to something as temporary: dissatisfaction with the present status of the subject; and registration of a time frame, a beginning and an end to the relevant phase. The time frame is usually left indeterminate in Palestinian discourse. The unspecific time frame blurs boundaries between the provisional and permanent, facilitating a transition from one policy to another without discernible contradictions. Indeed, such a strategy provides self-comfort, expedient justification, and a weapon against opponents. On the other hand, political "mistakes" or "concessions" were constructed as temporary, followed by the usual litany: "*atamassuk bi al-thawabt al-wataniyya*" (adhering to the national fixed or inalienable rights). Besides its rhetorical function, such framing serves the leadership to contend that "ultimate" goals have not been given up. I will be discussing this further in another place later. A provisional horizon is appealing because its outcomes (political decisions and choices) are always said to be temporary, reducing resistance and critical interrogation for these outcomes.

From the Palestinian perspective, Zionism and the birth of Israel represented an existential problem and an unfinished reality. Israel, as matter of fact, is founded on Palestinian existence (*kayan*), so the struggle has been for the very space of existence. This "same space" is an essential component of both Palestinian and Zionist identities, and neither Palestinian nationalism nor Zionism would have been possible without the geographic space called Palestine.[2] How to manage and relate to that space (the lost home for Palestinians and the gained home for Zionists) in conjunction with its new facts (demography, power relations, difference, and competing narratives) has been the concern of Palestinian politics. Managing and relating to that space, which is intimately related to Palestinian identity (see Khalidi 1997), is what sustains the link between Palestine and the Palestinians.

Vocabularies for possible modes of management were elicited from a referential schema. The first mode proposed administering Mandatory Palestine after liberation. This entailed the expulsion of the Zionists, and in this case only the indigenous residents of the space (all Palestinians, inclusive of Palestinian Jews) would enjoy self-determination in Palestine. However, referral to democracy and other liberal political concepts inspired the development of another possibility: a democratic state over the entire territory of Palestine for all, Arab Palestinians and Jews. The second mode suggests the partial management of Palestine by establishing a Palestinian state on any "liberated" territory; this developed into what is now known as the two-state solution. In either mode, liberation continued to be a key nodal point and a driving force in the Palestinian discourse. Liberation of course meant different things at different stages, and hence the relations between liberation and the vocabulary that constitutes its meaning were replaced, modified, or dropped.

Before turning to the concept of liberation in Palestinian discourse, a brief reminder about discourse, political representation, and language is needed. Language is an important space for

the constitution of power relations and meaningful political acts, and therefore examining political statements is a key method of finding the discursive "rules of formation." The focus of such analysis goes beyond the individual and his or her intentions to the subject position from which a politician speaks.

Liberation as restoration of the past

Because the context of events before an-Nakba was defined as colonialism and Zionism was framed as an "organic part of colonialism", the fine disparities between Zionism and traditional colonialism were obscured. Because of this, the Palestinian struggle has frequently been compared with anticolonial struggles elsewhere in the world. The nature and objective of the Palestinian struggle was constructed through a parallel analogy, a struggle for liberating Palestine from the colonial power of Zionism.

To draw a perceptible difference between the post-1948 Palestinian movements and the pre-1948 leadership, the new leadership embraced rhetoric based on democratic concepts, representing themselves as the voice of the public. When these movements eventually joined the PLO in 1968, the democratic elements were migrated into collective Palestinian organizations (the PLO and PNC in particular) and these elements later became principal factors in the linguistic game articulating liberation. Introducing liberal, democracy-laden terminology into the definition of liberation suggested a reconstitution of the liberation method, that is, the armed struggle.

The sensitivity of liberalism and democracy to social nuances in the community directed attention toward the relationships between Judaism and Zionism, which in turn created a new terrain to constitute these differences in the discursive field. That produced an inclusive Palestinian categorization. The PLO's initial perspective considered "Jews of Palestinian origin" to be Palestinians. However, in 1968 a more inclusive perspective evolved to consider Jews who had resided in Palestine "since the beginning of the Zionist invasion of Palestine" as Palestinians (Palestinian National Charter 1968; Palestinian Qawmi Charter 1964, Article 6).

The democratic elements and the distinction between Judaism and Zionism contributed to the reconstruction of liberation as a repudiation of Zionism in Palestine, rather than of Jews in Palestine. At the same time, that reasoning provided a framework to reconfigure the concept of liberation in the form of an inclusive democratic state for all. Accordingly, the visceral contents of "liberation" were subsumed in three conditions: "termination of the [Zionist] entity in Palestine"; "return of the Palestinian people to their homeland"; and "establishing a democratic Palestinian state over the entire Palestinian soil without racist discrimination or religious bigotry" (PNC 1969b, Appendix 1). As "the Palestinian democratic state" filtered through common language, a more complex liberal and statist political language ran through the philosophy of the struggle.

New discursive elements were integrated into the content of liberation, and soon earlier terminology that had defined struggle as being against colonialism and imperialism (including Zionism) started to be abandoned. The regularity of juxtaposing conflicting phrases and terms, including "liberation," "struggle," "democratic state for all," "equality of rights and obligations," "coexistence," and "equality," increased significantly. Indeed, these

terminologies and their metaphorical entailments – that is, beyond their perspicuous signification – directed the imaginative (or "strategic") thought of the decision makers. The meaning of armed struggle, which had been articulated as a means of liberation, was transformed into a means to achieve the assumed liberal principles. The PNC declared that, "the Palestinian struggle aims to liberate the entire Palestine [and to establish] a society where all citizens coexist with equal rights and responsibilities (PNC 1970a, Appendix 1).

Since September 1969, the chain of equivalence that juxtaposes previous conceptions (the liberationist struggle, a state over the whole of Palestine, and armed struggle) with new ones imported from liberal political language (the democratic state, and democratic and liberal concepts) regulated the thought about solutions. Establishing an inclusive and democratic state over entire Palestine evolved as "the strategic goal" of the struggle (Khalaf 1981: 67–68). In 1971, "the Democratic Palestinian State" had become a topic and headline for PNC discussions (PNC 1971). Absorbing liberal political language into the Palestinian discourse destabilized previous meanings of liberation, statehood, and armed struggle. Instead, liberation, state, and armed struggle were reconstructed to accord with democratic and liberal principles. As such, match and mismatch within the interdiscursive dialogue reproduced the meaning of struggle and liberation afresh. For example, the wording of the armed struggle was reworked in order to remove elements that were incompatible with the tenets of democracy. In the light of that interdiscursive dialogue, the PNC concluded that "the armed struggle is not an ethnic or a sectarian struggle against the Jews," but was intended rather to liberate Palestine from "the Zionist colonialism" (PNC 1971). This discourse, however, is not without contradictions. The conflicting relationship between the means (armed struggle) and the ends (democratic/liberal values) remained unexamined, and Palestinian political representatives hardly pondered the contradiction.

In parallel with this transformation and the appearance of a different chain of equivalence, new concepts evolved while others were de-articulated or disappeared altogether. In 1970, the concepts of "conflict" and "Israel" were introduced to replace those of colonialism and Zionism. Previously, the word "Israel" was never (or rarely) used without qualification and euphemism, such as "the entity" or "the Zionist entity" (*al-kayan al-suhywni*), which suggested the rejection, negation, and minimization of the de facto reality of Israel. Embracing the *conflict* frame enacted possibilities for different solutions, which were ruled out when the situational power relations were configured as a colonial conquest. In the latter representation, armed struggle was considered to be the "only road" to liberate Palestine. In the "conflict with Israel" framework, armed struggle became "the only solution for the current conflict between us [Palestinians] and Israel" (PNC 1971). Furthermore, the twofold relation within the "armed struggle" itself (armed, plus struggle) was broken and de-articulated[3] into new combinations, such as "popular struggle," "the people's revolutionary war is the main road to liberate Palestine," "the popular revolutionary war," and "the long-term popular war" (PNC 1970b, 1970a).

Liberation as establishing a Palestinian state over any "liberated" part

The six-year interval between 1967 and 1973 was a period of reflection, reform, and redistribution of Palestinian institutions, apparatus, policies, justifications, and conceptions. The precipitous transition to the framework of "liberation as a democratic state over the entire Palestine" left little time to meditate on the choices and reforms that followed. The lack of reflection on new reformations was glossed over by a schema of tropes suggesting the transitional nature of reforms, which served as a primary justification for making certain choices. In 1973, a year before the adaptation of the PLO of the Ten-Point Program, a new committee called the "interim plan committee" was established to attend for "interim" arrangements that paved the way for the (supposedly) temporary phase (PNC 1973). The reformed official policy of the PLO was eventually declared in 1974; it was called the "Interim Political Plan," Ten-Point Program, or Temporary Political Programme (*al-barnamij al-siyyasi al-marhali, barnamij al-nuqat al-'ashr*).

The idea of a Palestinian self-governing body on a small area of Palestine[4] was already available in the general political discourse about Israel-Palestine. To be sure, UN Resolutions 181 and 242 stipulated the establishment of a Palestinian "self-governing body" over specific geographical boundaries of Palestine. This is now part of international law. The theoretical notion of a Palestinian political body or state over part of Palestine enjoyed the support of the superpowers and international institutions, and most Arab regimes entertained it as well (Egypt in particular).[5] For example, President Nassir scolded Fatah due to its "unrealistic" position on the Rogers Plan. As he put it: "a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza is better than nothing" (Khalaf 1981: 78). The PLO factions rejected the Rogers proposal categorically, while the PNC purported the Plan as a "suspicious bid to initiate a fake Palestinian entity." The PNC represented the proposed self-government in West Bank and Gaza like this:

> The truth of such [proposed] *fake* [Palestinian] entity would resemble in its reality an Israeli colony, which would liquidate the Palestinian cause completely in favor of Israel's interest. Simultaneously, it would be only a *temporary period to enable the Zionists to evacuate the Palestinian land occupied after 5 June* [1967] from its Arab residents. It is the beginning to annex [the occupied land in 1967] to the Israeli entity and establish *a collaborating Arab administration ... the PNC untimely denounces the idea of a fake Palestinian entity* … and any form of international protection [this is PLO/PA demand now]. The PNC declares that any Arab-Palestinian or non-Palestinian individual or group calling for, or supporting this collaborating entity and international protection is an enemy of the Arab-Palestinians and the Arab nation.
>
> (PNC 1968b, emphasis added)

The PNC also urged the PLO that they should

> firmly resist all *peaceful and surrender solutions*, and *reject* all agreements, resolutions, and plans that contradict *the right of the Palestinian people to the entirety of its homeland*. [The PLO must reject] the UN resolutions, the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, the Soviet Plan, and other similar plans.
>
> (PNC 1969a, emphasis added)

The terminology received from political theory, international relations, UN resolutions, and diplomatic initiatives infiltrated Palestinian discourse. Consequently, a significant discursive effort was dedicated to these terminologies – their meanings, entailments, whether to accept them or not, and so forth – until they melted into the discourse, and thus became the currency of political thought. It is hard today to imagine what a Palestinian discourse would be like without these inputs. The above citations illustrate the point. What is more important than the PLO's rejection (and later acceptance) of Resolution 242 was the interpretative process that ensued, which involved reference to various intertwined relations and fields of power (laws, rules, technical terms, and international political institutions) to construct a political standpoint on the examined subject, be it UN resolutions or diplomatic initiatives. I will discuss this referential device in more detail in Chapter 3.

The conceptual matrix that constituted the framework of the "settlement of conflict" (*taswiya al-sira'*) based on a Palestinian state on a small part of Palestine, introduced a novel possibility competing with the goal of a democratic state over the entire territory of Palestine or Palestinian liberation. The debate in favor or against these competing possibilities seized the discursive space. One of the conclusions drawn from this competition was the "distinction [made] between [accepting] a settlement [*taswiya*] and giving up," as Salah Khalaf explained. Moreover, he attempted to market the idea of a Palestinian mini-state as "a margin of flexibility and maneuver" (Khalaf 1981: 132). Key figures in Fatah's Central Committee contemplated a "settlement" that would lead to a "mini-state [*duwayla*] in the West Bank and Gaza, in the event Israel returns this land." It is worth mentioning that this point was made in a policy report "explaining the strategy and the tactic which Fatah should adopt … the report was met by stark objection and it was therefore maintained in an archive awaiting a better moment" (ibid.: 134).

The mini-state framework metamorphosed from outright denunciation to acceptance in the Palestinian thought. The framework was out there, pending an "event" that could be interpreted as a suitable time to open up the possibility of interpellation, when people could be enticed to it or could derive their own attachment to the mini-state framework.

Deliberation over potential solutions and political initiatives for resolving the conflict produced new divisions, groups, and framings according to the political position of agents at different periods, that is, new subjectivities were being manufactured. Anyone who renounced an all-out "revolution" to liberate entire Palestine was branded a "deviant and defeatist" and put into the "reactionary" camp (*al-raj'iyyun*) (PNC 1969a; PNC 1969b). However, over a few years gradual linguistic adaptation helped to erase the word "entire" and substituted it with the phrase "any liberated part of …" (of Palestine). Therefore, a new subject position, that of the "realistic revolutionaries" (*al-thawriyyun al-waqi'iyyun*), evolved to identify those who support the mini-state option and the political settlement of the struggle (a later chapter will explore this further).

Although the Interim Program was approved unanimously, differences over its interpretation soon appeared. Given the elastic and provisional interpretative horizons of the Palestinian leadership, the partitioning of Palestine was perceived as "a necessary transitional phase which will usher the establishment of a unified democratic state one day" (Al-Hout 1977: 11, emphasis added). On this account, left-wing movements considered the Interim Program a

ladder to continue the struggle from inside Palestine, but never an end in itself. According to Habash, "the PFLP endorsed the establishment of a national Palestinian authority over every liberated part of the Palestinian land and aimed to continue the liberation battle from there" (Habash 2009: 130). This was known as the *stage-by-stage* strategy.

Nevertheless, interpretations of the regional and international context rendered wholesale success of *stage-by-stage* very unlikely. As Habash explained,

> We are still living in a stage characterized by a clear imbalance of power to the advantage of the enemy. This means, a priori, that it is impossible to wrest even a minimal legitimate Palestinian national right, let alone achieve the implementation of the a stage-by-stage strategic program for the Palestinian national struggle.
>
> (Habash 1985: 9, emphasis added)

On the other side of the political spectrum, for the dominant parties in the PLO (Fatah in particular) the Interim Program was an end in itself, welcomed as "a great achievement" (Hawatmeh 1979b: 136), and a "national programme, the programme of return, the right to self-determination and independent state" (Khalaf 1979: 138).

Two significant but paradoxical events ensued between 1967 and 1973. On the one hand, the popularity of Palestinian movements increased significantly after the al-Karama battle, and on the other hand, an "existential threat" to the Palestinian movements was looming in 1970. King Hussein of Jordan was ready to "terminate the existence of the Palestinian resistance" (Habash 2009: 102) and "erase Palestine from the map and language" (Khalaf 1981: 71–72). The competition between King Hussein and the PLO over the representation of Palestinians and the fate of the West Bank consumed much of the PLO's energy. Jordan was declared a united kingdom by extending its sovereignty over the West Bank, and it assumed the right to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians. Verbal attacks on the Hashemite royalty augmented the tension between the PLO, the regime, and its army. The Palestinian movements also established the Black September organization (*ayluul al-aswad*) to carry out revenge attacks (the "Ghost War") against the Hashemite regime in the hope of destabilizing the regime in Jordan.

Several PLO members admitted that they sought to topple the Hashemite reign (Habash 2009: 102). Nonetheless, the phase that was to follow the suggested coup remained amorphous and under-articulated. The Jordanian regime was determined to end the Palestinian armed presence in Jordan. In July 1971, the Jordanian army carried out a full-scale operation against PLO fighters near the town of Ajloun. It was clear to the PLO then that these events constituted "the end of the Palestinian movement's expansion era." PLO leaders concluded that "there was no safe haven for the resistance … [and therefore] it is necessary to establish a state *even on one inch*" (Khalaf 1981: 71–72). I emphasize the phrase "even on one inch" to demonstrate the depth of internal tension between grand hopes and immediate ones.

What made the PLO embrace the Ten-Point/Interim Program? The facile, and perhaps obvious, way to answer this question would be to examine the Interim Program in the context of subsequent events. The causal relationship between the Interim Program and the Egyptian–Israeli war in October 1973 may appear self-evident, but before going any further it is worth examining how the war was constructed as a critical event.

The first PNC session after the 1973 war portrayed it as a "historical event in the life of the Arab nation and Palestinian people," which had "transformed the Middle East issue … from the condition of 'no war, no peace' and produced UNSC Resolution 338, which confirms Resolution 242 and calls for an international conference in Geneva …" (PNC 1974). For George Habash, the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian army was "a psychological victory" (Habash 2009: 133). The construction of the "October War"[6] as a momentous watershed coincided with the infrastructure of the provisional mode of thinking, described above, and with a period of internally ambivalent Palestinian political platforms and objectives. Accordingly, the war was seen to "put an end to the politics of all or nothing," being thus an opening for "partial decisions" and "adjustment of the objectives [of the struggle]" in the light of conditions on the ground (Khalaf 1981: 130). In practice, this was the first building block leading to the Oslo Process, which transformed the "end of all or nothing" mode of thinking into the strategy of a "gradual dismantling of the [Israeli] occupation" (Qurie 2006: 26).

Shortly after the declaration of the Interim Program, Arab and international venues were opened up for the Palestinian movement. The Arab regimes (via the Arab League) recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The UN followed suit and made the same recognition. In November 1974, Arafat was given the chance to speak from the UN General Assembly's podium before an international audience. He was thus transformed from being a "terrorist" to being a symbol of the Palestinian people and its cause. In a broader perspective, the Palestinian struggle too garnered further international legitimacy and recognition. Palestinians considered this change – the elevation of the PLO's status, widespread recognition of the Palestinian need for self-determination, and an invitation for a Palestinian spokesperson to appear in an official international forum – to be a significant achievement. That perspective is best expressed by Khalaf's statement: "we are no longer outlawed terrorist gangs and killers" (1981: 143). In effect, a long and painstaking process of socialization and assimilation began to operate inside the Palestinian movement. The PLO embarked on revisiting its position within the framework of the 1974 "achievements" as follows:

> Neither the traditional "No" … is revolutionary … nor "Yes" is a form of betrayal. To the contrary, rejection could be a method for escape [from taking decisive decisions] … our ancestors' rejection of the offers [for solving the Israel–Palestine conflict] … helped the Zionist project [evolve]… Why did the Palestinians not accept a *temporary* solution, as the Zionists did?
>
> (Khalaf 1981: 133, emphasis added)

For the first time, the PLO was recognized by the UN as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thus also recognizing Palestinians as a people, affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination, and recognizing previous UNSC resolutions with regard to Palestine, among them the Resolution 194 (that affirms the Palestinian the right of return). Arafat made a speech on the UN podium. The year 1974 could be described as the one that drew the PLO into a socialization process that gradually pushed it into discourse of

international politics, international relations, and foreign policies. The process of socialization was put in motion then and it has since begun to bear fruit. It ushered in the gradual internalization, learning, and incorporation of UN, political, and legal discourse into the PLO's worldviews, which filtered all the way through into Palestinian political discourse until relevant UN resolutions began to dictate the framework of the PLO's politics, usually referred to as "international legitimacy" (*al-shar'iyya al-dawliyya*).

The transition from aiming for one state to aiming for a state on "any liberated part" was justified as a temporary and interim "phase," yet there was no specified timeline. This misleadingly, albeit implicitly, suggests there will be forthcoming phases. Although the Interim Program was deemed provisional, it was actually the accumulation of a fragmented and contradictory discursive formulation that had stretched over half a decade. It produced new grounding guidelines that still influence Palestinian discursive flow. The Interim Program invalidated and replaced the all-or-nothing rule. Liberation, which used to be considered an indivisible objective, was qualified according to the imperatives of political realism. In consequence, a whole set of new political concepts and terminology were incorporated into Palestinian discourse.

Politics is said to be the art of the possible; however, the framing of a particular issue is what constructs it as possible or impossible, let alone political or apolitical. What the PLO once constructed as a possibility (liberating Palestine, aborting the Zionist project, and rejecting UN resolutions) was restructured as unrealistic or impossible. For example, the PLO vindicated the rejection of Resolution 242, which: (1) constitutes "a de-facto recognition of Israel"; (2) "relinquishes the fundamental right of the Arab-Palestinian people to its entire homeland"; (3) expresses a "commitment to Israel's security from the Arab states"; (4) "curbs *fida'iyyun* activities"; (5) "terminates the Palestinian revolution"; (6) aims in "establishing a demographic and geographical barrier that divides the Arab world"; (7) "increases the power of imperialism"; and (8) "destroys the armed Palestinian struggle" (see PNC 1969a, 1968b).

However, when interim logic became the orienting rule the interpretation was adapted. Attention to language slippage shows how the PLO opposed to "deal with" Resolution 242, but not the actual contents of the resolution. Moreover, the "ultimate rejection of and resistance to … negotiating with the imperialist occupier and the Zionist enemy" (PNC 1970b) was replaced by an implicit endorsement of negotiation with Israel. The PNC declared that "no Arab state or leader is allowed to *negotiate* on behalf of the Palestinian people and its sole and true representative, the PLO". Thus the issue concerned who was "allowed [and not allowed] to negotiate" (PNC 1974: Interim/Ten-Point Program). Remarkably, 1974 led to a proliferation of ambiguity in Palestinian discourse. Expressions used to articulate the PLO's stance since 1974 have been undecided and supple compared with the vocabulary of the 1950s and 1960s.

The rise of the two-states solution

The reciprocal gestures between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s, which culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords, was an important interpretative material that occupied generous space in Palestinian discourse at the time. By and large, Palestinians categorically

denounced the Egyptian–Israeli rapprochement; to them, it represented a threat that aimed "to liquidate the Palestinian cause and end the role of the PLO" (Khalaf 1979: 140). Threat-leaden tropes carried their forebodings. For the Palestinian politicians, Camp David augured "a new enslavement of the Palestinian people" (Arafat 1979: 198), was a "conspiracy" (Habash 1979: 134), a "defeatist move" (Hawatmeh 1979a: 193), "the most dangerous of these conspiracies" (Fatah Central Committee 1978), "the most dangerous link in the chain of the hostile conspiracy that has been unfolding since 1948", "a total surrender by Sadat", constituted "turning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a colony subject to perpetual occupation" (PLO Executive Committee 1979: 177–178), and so forth. Such a threat compelled "a cohesive Palestinian stand to encounter the Camp David conspiracy" (Habash 1979: 134) and to wage a "struggle against the Camp David Agreements," because "thwarting the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and self-government plan is the most immediate task on the agenda…" (DFLP 1979).

Examining the construction of the "Camp David's threat" from the Palestinian perspective shows two things: first, the logic of negotiation was not condemned per se, and the PLO was still keen on negotiation under cover of an international conference; second, the exclusion of the PLO from the Camp David diplomatic process is what bothered Palestinians most. Moreover, Camp David offered unsatisfactory promises that would simply usher in "a deformed autonomous rule, and nothing more" (Khalaf 1979: 145). The "shock" of President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 reunited the PLO once more, dissolving the rejection front and forming in its place the steadfastness front, in favor of restraining and boycotting Egypt. Ironically, this shock offered no incentive to rethink the politics of the phases mentioned earlier, but on contrary revalidated it.

The steadfastness front called for a "clear policy," and demanded a Palestinian state, the right of return, and Israeli withdrawal from land occupied in 1967 (Habash 2009: 152–59). A Palestinian National Authority (which did not have the status of a state) was proposed as the governing body during the transitional phase. Accordingly, the National Authority intercepted the content of liberation and armed struggle. The Ten-Point/Interim Program argued, "the PLO struggles by all available means and prioritises the armed struggle to liberate Palestinian land and fight to establish the independent National Authority of the people on every liberated part of the Palestinian land." Terms such as "liquidating," "exterminating," "the Zionist entity," and "liberating the entire Palestine" were abandoned. The National Authority, "after being established," would be responsible "for unifying countries in confrontation" with Israel (*tawhid duwal al-muwajaha*) to pursue the struggle for the entire liberation of Palestine (Interim Program, article 8). The introduction of the Palestinian National Authority entailed that the armed struggle should wait until that authority was instituted. Hence, the authority and the "liberated part" (on which the authority would be founded) would be established through negotiation, or at least not through armed struggle. In other words, the armed struggle was neutralized. Furthermore, liberation was no longer the (direct) objective of the struggle: "complete liberation" and establishment of a "democratic Palestinian state" were postponed for another phase. Instead, the struggle had to be directed toward "unifying countries in confrontation." By this arrangement, Palestinian struggle was focused on internal Arab issues rather than Palestine and its Israeli colonization.

In a step toward performing the "temporary" measures and putting the National Authority

into reality, three remarkable things took place. First, the PLO began to define Palestine as the "occupied land of 1948" and "occupied land of 1967." Second, Palestinian politics began to naturalize itself to the language of international law, which provided a reservoir of referential concepts.[7] Third, the representation of "Israelis" (not Zionists or the Jews) was reconsidered. Generally, until 1977 almost every Israeli was condemned as "an enemy regardless of his/her ideological beliefs" (Khalaf 1981: 22). In 1977, motivated by the maxim "know your enemy," current president of the PLO and PA Mahmoud Abbas, then a member of the PLO Executive Committee, conducted research on Israel's demographic character. He concluded that at least 50 percent of Israelis are oriental Jews, those who had previously inhabited Arab countries before moving to Israel. Abbas saw potential for building a "dialogue" with these oriental Jews in order "to reach peace" (Abbas 1994: 25–26).

The move to contact Israelis constituted the breaking of a taboo and has since been repudiated. It was the result of the changing representation of Zionism, Jews, and Israel, described above. The PNC Thirteenth Session decided in favor of "contacting and coordinating with democratic and progressive Jewish forces." This paved the way for enthusiastic Palestinian politicians to communicate with Israeli forces, often in secret. In the PNC's Seventeenth Session of 1983, "contacts with Jewish forces" was a main subject on the agenda (PNC 1983).

The decline of liberation and rise of the two-state solution

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the most senior PLO figure after Arafat, more than a decade before the official inauguration of the peace process at the 1991 Madrid Conference, wrote the following:

> We may be more understandable if we say: *a safe haven, no matter how small* it might be, or *an embassy*, to which any Palestinian could resort to if he or she is hurt or threatened. This is the *primary aspiration for every Palestinian*…. On the second day, after celebrating the *establishment of a state in the liberated territories of the West Bank and Gaza we will begin distributing identity cards*. It is possible that *many* Palestinians would decide not to live in the new state for practical reasons. However, they could live in another Arab country without stress and complexities!… And if they feel threatened for some reason or another they could return to Palestine [more precisely the Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza], where there would be no discrimination against them … there will no longer be any *Palestinian sabotage activities* [*nashatat takhribiyya falastiniyya*] when we have a state to lead and protect. *Extremism would disappear from our ranks*, even from the ranks of the "Rejection Front" …
>
> (Khalaf 1981: 213–214, emphasis added)

Ostensible psychological vulnerability coupled with the fervent pursuit of a state or statist institutions (an embassy, ID cards, passports) – that is, the assertion and performance of Palestinian identity in the form of hard documents (that can be shown to others) – is nothing new for Palestinians. Indeed, these manifestations have been unfolding since an-Nakba, if not

before.

I will now point out some new subtexts identifiable in the citation above. First, the proposition construes the Palestinian state as the ultimate answer to Palestinian vulnerabilities and needs. Second, Khalaf espouses these needs with a defined territorial dimension that accedes with Resolution 242, which the PLO continued to resist (at least in public) until 1988. Third, the argument implies a shift from, or a reinterpretation of, the Interim/Ten-Point Program toward what has since been called the two-state solution. Fourth, the argument implicitly countenances a two-state solution without the return of the refugees. Fifth, Khalaf literally internalizes the Israeli narrative of Palestinian activities (often signified as a "struggle," *nidal*) and refers to these acts as "Palestinian sabotage activities." The exact terminology is borrowed from the Israeli discourse on the Palestinian struggle. What is most important is the *moment* when the citation above and rationale loaded in it appeared: before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Khalaf's book was published in 1978). This makes dubious any claim that the invasion was the *cause* of PLO policy transformation. I do not say that the invasion was irrelevant, but dismiss the claim that the Palestinian leadership was directed in a specific direction.

Once the principle of establishing mini-state on parts of Palestine had been approved, the discursive field was infiltrated by series of "statist" tropes that modulated the Palestinian self-understanding of their rights. Some examples of what I mean by statist tropes are: "an independent national Palestinian state," "national rights," "national interest," "just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East," "Geneva conventions with regard to the occupied population," and "international legitimacy," among others (PNC 1983, 1991).

At the PNC Nineteenth Session, Palestinian rights (*al-huqwq al-falastiniyya*) were articulated in terms of "self-determination," "right of return," "an independent state" over the "occupied Palestinian territories," "Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian occupied land in 1967 including the Arab Jerusalem," and "establishing temporary government" (PNC 1988). These rights were conceived under the rubric "inalienable Palestinian nation rights" (*al-huqwq al-falastiniyya al-thabita*, often referred to simply as *al-thawabt*). The means to achieve this list of rights remained unarticulated, however, rendering everything apparently flexible, open-ended, and contingent on whatever political realism might offer.

At least since the late 1980s, the PLO was coopted into the "triumphant" neoliberal worldview (see PNC 1991). This followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, which for the Palestinian leadership marked a severance with the past. The leaders saw the promise of a "new reality" in the war on Iraq in 1991, which compelled them "to give absolute priority to peace in the Middle East" and count on "international legality" that had "become of central importance" (Al-Hassan 1992: 31, 36, 39). This wishful "new vision" imposed itself on a political schema that sought to distance itself from previous frameworks of the struggle (mainly the armed struggle) and to replace them with the framework of political settlement. Khaled al-Hassan, a senior PLO leader and one of Fatah founders, expresses this as follows:

> If these events [the "*détente*," the "end of the Iraq–Iran war" and the arrival of a "global economy"] marked the *end of an era and open the way to a new vision* of the *new world*, it is because they have necessitated a *new form of thinking*, a *new way of dealing* with a

new chapter in our lives.

(Al-Hassan 1992: 15–16, emphasis added)

Along the same lines, Khalaf contended that the "change in the world order," the "unpredictable global balance," the defeat of communist ideology, and "the rise of Islamic fundamentalism" moved issues of "self-determination, freedom, and basic human rights" to the center of the global political agenda. The Palestinian leadership saw the new world circumstances as benevolent, believing them favorable for establishing Palestinians' rights, self-determination, and statehood. They considered it necessary to embrace the changes and adopt a more realistic and pragmatic notion of national rights. Pragmatism was juxtaposed with, and formulated as an equivalent to, a "negotiated settlement"; the new approach would promote "a two-state solution" and flexibility on the right of return (Khalaf 1990: 92–93).

If the whole world began to seem different in early 1990s, then we can imagine the degree of transformation in the Palestinian self-perception, the understanding of Palestinians' cause and their "other." Israel was reinterpreted afresh. The depiction of Israel as an "enemy" was given up in favor of an "adversary" with whom the Palestinians shared "compatible goals." Language – such as "pragmatism," "realistic," "assessment of objective-reality," "sense of responsibility," and "reaching maturity" (Al-Hout 1977: 11; Al-Qaddumi 1988: 5; Khalaf 1979: 141) – was used to anchor insecure, contested beliefs and create orthodoxy. As Edward Said argues, orthodoxies aim to demote and restrain critical examination (Said 1975: 302–303).

The Western-led peace process between Israel and the PLO/PA has been in progress for more than two decades now. Nevertheless, the reality continues to be one of Israeli domination over most aspects of Palestinian life, with some administrative aspects delegated to the PA apparatus. Israeli expansion, violence, and discrimination against Palestinians have been intensifying in a blatant contravention of peace. The peace process *itself* is stark testimony to the fact that the neoliberal approach is impractical; it seems that realism can only achieve an endless peacebuilding "process," yet fails to establish peace in real life.

The concept of liberation has been in steady decline. Initially it transformed from "liberation of the entire Palestine" to "liberation of any part," until being totally dropped from Palestinian discourse by the mid-1980s. "Liberation" was replaced with "resistance to the Zionist occupation," the aim to "resolve the Palestinian issue," "to find a just solution for the Palestinian issue," and "the right to confront the Zionist occupation" (PNC 1983, PNC 1988). Even the replacements came out of the gradual adaption of previous concepts. For instance, "resistance" was substituted for words such as termination, liberation, and liquidation, while "occupation" was substituted for colonialism in political statements. Recently, the notion of liberation infers an attenuated statehood in the West Bank and Gaza and a special arrangement for Jerusalem, with land swaps and without the true return of refugees, as we shall see later.

Particularly after the 1980s, so-called "political realism" governed much of the PLO's thinking, becoming a guiding and explanatory schema for decision making. Nonetheless, it is important to contextualize political realism, and to understand it in the same way that political agents have represented it. The PLO unquestionably picked up the neoliberal worldviews of the world order, and in shifting its policy the PLO may seem to have been jumping on the

bandwagon (joining the most powerful actor, in this case the USA) following the rise of a unipolar world system. Although this may seem to be the case, this book's analysis of Palestinian discourse points to different explanations. The infrastructure of the interim, limited state, and national rights was already organized and well distributed before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which experts (including international relations theorists) failed to foresee.

Certainly, the PLO peace initiative in 1988 was a visible point of transition, but its contents, mechanisms, apparatus, and terminology had been developed, deliberated, and distributed incrementally since an-Nakba. The "politics of phases," pragmatism, and statist framework began to crystallize when Palestinian movements took over the PLO in 1968. It was in 1974 that this political apparatus became a public platform. Nevertheless, 1988 offered an opportunity for the accumulated ideas, concepts, and terminologies in the Palestinian lexicon to materialize in concrete acts. The uncritical reception of the neoliberal interpretation was a way to realize what had already crystallized in the PLO's institutions and the perception of its leaders. After a long period of a piecemeal political socialization, the PLO internalized most, if not all, of the terms of internationally imagined scenarios for resolving the question of Palestine. It matters little whether this was intentional; what matters is how the language expressing the PLO's position evolved. Surprisingly, Palestinian politicians crossed from one stage to the next without significant reflection and review.

The crux of the matter: the UNSC Resolution 242

After the 1967 war, in November of the same year, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242, which has been a core reference point in the political discourse. It will be clear throughout the pages that follow that the acceptance of Resolution 242 as a substratum for any possible or imagined solution amounts to a subscription to the Israeli (and Western) discourse on the way forward. A neoliberal understanding of peace, the Israeli understanding of peace, and marketlike transactions are the backbone of this resolution. Therefore, the distribution, and then the endorsement, of Resolution 242 opened up a process of internalization of its subtexts on several subjects, including peace, security, and an introduction of market rules to modulate land and humans in relation to the refugees and prisoners. These subjects will be thoroughly examined in Chapters 5 and 6. But for now, let us cast light on the function of Resolution 242 in Palestinian discourse.

By and large, Resolution 242 and its subtext were heavily circulated within Palestinian discourse, but in a negative and dismissive fashion until the mid-1980s. Negation, however, did not exclude the possibility of considering, or becoming inspired by, at least some of its tenets. In fact, the passages cited above, from Khalaf's writings in 1981 and Fatah's Executive Committee policy report after the 1967 war, illustrate how influential the resolution was on Palestinian political thought.

However, as negotiation was approved in principle and the socialization process progressed, the initial interpretations of Resolution 242 were discontinued and new ones produced.[8] Some examples of what I mean by initial interpretations are: "UNSC Resolution 242 entails that we accept negotiating the right of the refugees [to return and compensation]" (Khalaf 1981: 127); "242 deals with refugees. We are not refugees. We are a people, the core

of the whole problem" (Arafat 1978: 172).

In the mid-1980s, the same resolution text was reinterpreted as follows:

> Our stand was that we want [Resolution] 242 and 338 *to be accompanied by another UN resolution* on our people's right to self-determination within a confederation with Jordan.… The price Arafat was asked to pay was exorbitant. *It was the relinquishment of the last of his negotiating cards and the open recognition of Resolution 242*.
>
> (Khalaf 1986: 169–170, 173, emphasis added)

> Therefore, we wanted mention made of all UN resolutions because international legality cannot be divided.… the PLO recognizes the international resolutions as a whole, a not separately.
>
> (Arafat 1986: 27; 33, emphasis added)

> We *do not agree on this resolution unconditionally because of what it does not contain*, not because of what it contains. Resolution 242 means Israeli withdrawal *from the territories it occupied in 1967*. Who among us is against the withdrawal? We all support the withdrawal.… There is the cause of the Palestinian people – national, legitimate right not included in Resolution 242 and included in the other UN resolutions. Therefore, we say *resolution 242, 338, and the other UN resolutions*.
>
> (Abu-Sharif 1988: 238, emphasis added)

These long citations offer a misleading reinterpretation of previous approaches. Juxtaposing statements of the 1960s or the 1970s with those of the 1980s evinces the sheer contradiction. Statements such as "Our stand was that we want [Resolution] 242 and 338 to be accompanied by another UN resolution," "we wanted mention made of all UN resolutions," and "including all relevant UN resolutions" move the essence and focus outside the text of Resolution 242.

To be sure, while commenting on the conditions under which the PLO would conduct negotiations with Israel, Khalaf depicted the Palestinian recognition of Resolution 242 as the last "negotiating" card. The last sentence makes it evident that the *recognition* of Resolution 242 was considered a mere bargaining chip, rather than a matter of principle. The Palestinians removed the framework of Resolution 242 from a list of controversial issues and stabilized it. In the end, the PLO not only recognized Resolution 242 (and 338), but also considered it "the basis for negotiation with Israel" (Arafat 1989: 181). From now on, the territorial and statist dimensions would take precedence over other components of inalienable Palestinian nation rights.

The refugees' question

In Chapter 1 I examined the construction of the Palestinian refugee subject position. Now, the analysis turns to its social and political performative impacts. The phrase "Palestinian refugees" evokes negative connotative images. The refugees are usually depicted as weak, needy, and cowardly, as victims who have sold out, and above all as a "problem," to host countries in particular. Almost every individual refugee has had to interact with a web of

refugee institutions and laws, even learning to speak the language and carry the stamps, symbols, and ration cards (*kart al-wakala*) of these institutions. Negative images have been projected onto the refugees and these images were reflexively internalized. Being identified in terms of a "problem," "question," and "issue" disconnects the refugees from broader Palestinian issues, and suggests that they need an independent resolution (Said 1992: 4). The refugees have been construed as a problem: unwelcome visitors, a burden, a threat to the international community and the Arab countries (Sayigh 1977: 21). This mode of articulation carries with it detrimental subtexts, implying that anything to do with the refugees is esoteric, longstanding, and intractable. In being a problem, the refugees' social and economic lives are uncertain and ambiguous, exacerbating their vulnerability.

From this perspective, the refugees are a problem, and that characterizes their lives: a problem from within. The inward internalization of the refugee identity (via the initially constructed negative concept of a refugee) stimulates reprojections, which manifest in a public abjuration of the self-image of the (supposedly) powerless, inferior, and cowardly Palestinian refugee. "Our people is not the one that bear[s] the refugee identity, [our people] carries the fighting *fida'i* identity," Khalaf explains (Khalaf 1971, cited in Shemesh 2004: 97). An early study of the refugees' attitudes shows the paradoxical coexistence of both rejection and acceptance: the rejection of the UNRWA resettlement (*al-tawtin*) and development plans; and the bitter reception of UNRWA relief and rations (Al-Husseini 2010, 2000). Bruhns captured this attitude very well: "When [the refugee is] requested to reject concrete items, the refugee is articulate." (Bruhns 1955: 135).

Al-tawtin (settlement, resettlement) appeared in the discourse to express a proposed political solution to the "refugee problem." The English translation of *al-tawtin* (which can be both a noun and a verb) obscures the significant locus of the notion of "homeland" embedded in the Arabic term. *Al-tawtin* refers to the process that aims to settle the refugees in the hosting countries as their new homeland. The policies of *al-tawtin* were met with overwhelming rejection among the refugees, who still scorn these policies despite the passage of time. *Al-tawtin* as a mechanism entails a permanent severance between the individual refugee and his or her fine traces of identity accumulated over centuries in Palestine, the homeland (*al-watan, el-blad*).[9] *Al-tawtin* is a contentious and provocative subject, especially for Palestinians, Jordanians, and Lebanese. The perspicuous contradiction between *al-tawtin* and *al-wataniyya* (nationalism) explains the disavowal of the former. Common organic socio-spatial memories of Palestine provide the texture of the refugees' nationalism after an-Nakba, which unfolded spontaneously as result of the reflexive interpretation of being-already-in (to use Heidegger's term) a situation loaded with ideational subtexts. From the refugees' standpoint, "*wataniyya*" is therefore synonymous with a return to their homes, villages, and towns (Sayigh 1977). In other words, it constitutes a return to their *watan* (homeland). Nationalism in this case is an interpretation of return and the opposite of *al-tawtin*.

The land, homeland, and return constituted the subject for most Palestinian literary works, of refugees in particular. These conveyed the refugees' feelings and perceptions of themselves and the world. Refugees' deep sense of injustice, acrimony, detachment from their reality, and determination to return to their homeland and memories of Palestine were reflected in their poetry, art, folklore, novels, cartoons, theater, and other popular means. Some writers went a

step further by juxtaposing the refugees' experience with that of their victimizers. For example, Tibawi metaphorically labeled refugees' emotional thrust as a "new Zionism," in which the Palestinian refugee became "the new Zionist who never forgets" (Tibawi 1963: 514).

Negative images coming from the refugee subject position, while essential to their identity at this juncture, reminded the refugees of the fragilities and dependencies they strove to deny. The refugee subject position was resisted and recategorized as "returnees" (*al-'a'idun*) in the first PNC meeting.[10] A special PLO apparatus was also created in order to attend to "returnee issues." The figurative expression *al-'a'idwn* demonstrates the refugees' willingness to return, and a political commitment to realize that goal.

In the PNC's second meeting, "Returnee Affairs" appeared as a headline on the agenda. Stamping out "the refugee identity" and restoring a sense of pride became the goal of the Palestinian struggle. The new Palestinian "personality" or identity was articulated as the opposite of a refugee: a revolutionary (*al-thawri*) and martyr (*fida'i*). The two words, "revolutionary" and "martyr" (*fida'iyyun*), stood for the ideal image in which Palestinians wanted to see themselves: free, powerful, resilient, rebellious toward oppression, and resourceful (not needing assistance), ready to sacrifice everything including life itself to liberate the homeland. The *fida'iyyun* saw themselves as a "generation of suffering, of sacrifice, the generation of pain and hardships … This long, unusual problem [of Israel–Palestine] needs revolutionaries of a certain kind, unusual revolutionaries, revolutionaries capable of taking the long view, revolutionaries prepared for sacrifice and continuous sacrifice" (Arafat 1973: 167).

There is substantial interaction between role performance, identity, selfperception, reflexivity, and the formation of political groups. Returnee, martyr, and revolutionary were among the key constitutive elements of the Palestinian identity in exile, and an integral part of everyday discourse in the media, poetry, and the names of institutions (the Al-'Awda Center, Al-'Awda Vanguards, and *al-'awda* dreams). However, the "returnee" identity is contingent upon revolutionary and sacrificial acts (*al-'amal al-thawri*, *al-'amal al-fida'i*) as proof of the eagerness to return. Liberation was interpreted as "synonymous" with return (Shemesh 2004). This may explain the total absence of any direct reference to the refugees and return in the PLO Charter (1964 or 1968), which instead emphasized liberation. Any attempt "to absorb and assimilate the diaspora Palestinians in the societies in which they live" was deemed a "conspiracy" that would impinge on and detract from the revolutionary self-image (PNC 1972).

The "revolutionary" and refugee (or returnee) representations coexisted with and perpetuated one another. Nonetheless, such an identity was perceived as being under constant threat from "the Zionist and imperial" forces, which "aim to *wipe out* the character of the Palestinian people and its entity" (PNC 1969a, First Annex, Political Manifestation, emphasis added). This sense of exceptional threat and vulnerability took their toll on Palestinian political behavior. In Arafat's words,

> no other country has been confronted with a plan to liquidate its national identity, as has happened in the case of Palestine, nor confronted a plan to empty a country of its people as has happened in the case of the Palestinian people.

(Arafat 1982: 4)

The refugees became the main authors of Palestinian political discourse, specially after various Palestinian organizations joined the PLO in 1968. Since then, armed struggle was injected into the PLO Charter in order to discern and emphasize the *fida'i* self-perception, and to negate the image of the weak refugee. Spectacles of power, arms, and militarism reached their pinnacle in Jordan between 1969 and 1971, and in Lebanon between 1972 and 1982. The phrase "all authority for the resistance" defined these periods. Negative and ideal images were imbricated (though the former was denied), leading to internal violence, as described in Chapter 1.

According to Jacques Derrida, discourse is a dual process of deferral and *différance* (Derrida 1982): a change in the articulation of one concept or subject inspires change in related concepts that defer to it. From that perspective, since concepts of refugees and return are closely deferred and linked with the discursive construction of land and homeland, any change (or internalization) in the conception of land and homeland (the occupied land of 1967 or 1948, East or West Jerusalem, return to the homeland or a Palestinian state) would suggest revision of thought on refugees and return. This happened in reality. As the PLO proceeded with interim steps in 1974, rejectionist styles gradually started to recede. Meanwhile, maintaining the "return" as a primary objective appears inconsistent with the politics of phases. First, state-oriented objectives over "any part" of Palestine imbricated the framework and typology of priorities. Second, provisional and interim calculation constituted a space that helped to defer the question of return. That was justified by claiming that the ultimate return would be achieved after establishing a democratic state over the entire Palestine.

The Interim/Ten-Point Program signaled the PLO's readiness to negotiate each element of the conflict with reference to the refugees. Point three of the program states: "the PLO fights against any Palestinian entity that would lead to a recognition [of Israel], reconciliation, security borders, waiving the national right of our people and depriving them of their right to return and self-determination over their national soil" (PNC 1974). The transition in the Palestinian political position on the refugee issue is clear. First, refugees and their return are no longer exclusive, but on a par with other political and statist concepts, such as borders, recognition, reconciliation, self-determination, national rights, national soil, and so forth. Note that establishment of a "combatant national authority" was articulated in point two, before the right of return. Second, return was excluded from the ten points; instead the fight was against "waiving … and depriving the refugees of the right to return." There is an important qualitative difference between the "right to" and the actual performance of return. The PLO position on the refugees has often been articulated in convoluted, ambiguous, and indirect language that allows different readings. Third, endorsing the negotiation principle means negotiating the content of the right of return: the "right to return … should be on the agenda of any negotiation" (Khalaf 1990: 100).

The PLO oscillation between objectives (liberation 1964–1968, one state 1969–1973, temporary state 1974–1987, two states 1988–current) entailed transformation in the imagined solutions of the sub-objectives or the dependent family of issues around the orienting nodal point. Embracing the two-state solution in accordance with "international legitimacy" (*al-*

shar'iyya al-dawliyya) had its ramification on the interpretation of each sub-nodal point, including the refugee issue. UN resolutions guided the imagined path through which the Palestinian state would be realized and how the refugee issue would be settled. Accordingly, the refugee issue was articulated as *qadiyya* (a judicial case) or *qadiyyat al-laji'yyn*, something that should be "resolved" judicially through international law and institutions, "specially Resolution 194" (PNC 1988, 1991). Pronouncing the refugees as a problem found its way into Palestinian political discourse, particularly since a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza had become the official framework.

Even worse, the refugees were not only framed as a problem but also as a "burden": "[the PLO] do[es] not expect any party to carry this *burden* alone (Khalaf 1990: 104, emphasis added). There are corollaries to this construction: first, it meant that the whole refugee question could be postponed (which has been the case); and second, the PLO freed itself from the "burden" of the refugee question by classifying it as an international community and international law issue – that is, by transferring the refugee issue to other institutions and abandoning responsibility for it, as PNC argued, "resolving the refugee issue according to relevant the UN resolutions" (PNC 1988).

The interests of Israel and other countries were given precedence over the rights of the refugees; therefore, powerful states and international institutions have been shaping the content of the right to return while coopting the Palestinian leadership. In this regard, Khalaf's argument about solving "the *problem of* millions of Palestinian refugee … in a manner that *serves the vital interest of Israel*, Palestine and the region" is a perfect case in point. The PLO has become more concerned with the symbolic meaning of accepting "the principle of the right of return or compensation" than its actual implementation. Since the "*details of such a return are to be left open* for negotiations … we [the PLO] shall for our part *remain flexible* regarding its implementation."

> The right to return … is not an insurmountable obstacle to a settlement…. Our position is that the "right of return or compensation" (and the second part of this position is often overlooked) has been legitimized by the successive UN resolutions.
>
> (Khalaf 1990: 100–104, emphasis added)

Of course, the PLO's position on the refugee question during the 1990s does not correspond with its position in 2009, when it considered the right of return a "bargaining chip." Nevertheless, the former position was a point of departure in the piecemeal and painstaking transformation. While bearing in mind that the whole Palestinian project has been constructed as provisional since an-Nakba, which became an official framework for policy making in 1974, it is not surprising to see the refugee question postponed to another (supposedly forthcoming) indeterminate "phase." Although Palestinians' rights were labeled "inalienable" national rights, all of them were negotiable, and the following passage demonstrates that they were thought of as such in the political calculations:

> The right to *return to the Palestinian state* is not negotiable. It's a natural right for every Palestinian to return to the Palestinian state…. Any Palestinian who lives in exile who

> wants to come to the Palestinian state … must be able to do so. But if there are Palestinians who wish to return to the place they left in 1948, let us leave that to the negotiating table.
>
> (Husayni 1989: 11–12)

In fact, the PLO leadership re-represented the right of return by dividing it into two elements: return to the putative Palestinian state is considered "not negotiable," while the return to the actual homeland (which has been called Israel since 1948) is negotiable. Meanwhile, in the 2000s it was considered to be a bargaining chip, and the focus was put on a "just solution," *not* return. This point will be elaborated further based on the negotiation record (the Palestine Papers) and with reference to how the PLO/PA handling of the refugee question impacted its legal and human dimension.

Notes

1 Provisional thinking is also evident in material projects like infrastructure projects and NGO services, among others.
2 Palestinian nationalism in the contemporary sense would not have been possible because identity making unfolds through space and time. Had Zionism not colonized Palestine and had the Arab world not been dissected by the Sykes–Picot Agreement, a different identification might have been adopted.
3 Reference to the armed struggle decreased significantly after 1968 (in 1973 it appeared four times, but only once in 1981) until it disappeared in official discourse.
4 UNSC Resolution 181, the Partition Plan, allocated about 43 percent of the total area of Mandatory Palestine to a Palestinian self-governing body, whereas Resolution 242 allocated the land that Israel occupied in the course of 1967 war, which constitutes about 22 percent of Palestine.
5 The US support for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is theoretical and was not pursued in practice. In fact, the US blocked the establishment of a Palestinian state in 2011 and used its veto at the Security Council in 2011. The US also voted against the recognition of Palestine as an observing member of the UN General Assembly in 2012.
6 In the Arab world, including among Palestinians, the Egyptian–Israeli war that broke out on 6 October 1973 was designated the "October War" (*harb October/tishrin*), but Israelis call it the "Yom Kippur War": Western academia adopted the Israeli version.
7 For example, it became common to articulate phrases such as "Palestinian inviolable national rights" or "the realization of our firm rights endorsed by the UN since 1974, especially Resolution 3236" (PNC 1977).
8 The Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242 focused on the vague wording of specific clauses such as "withdrawal," and that there was no definite article (the) before the word "territories". For example, Major Dayan argued that "Resolution 242 of November 1967 … did not call on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw fully to that line. Instead, it concluded that Israel would need 'secure and recognized boundaries' " (Dayan 2010: 22). For more on this issue, see Finkelstein 2003 (144–149).
9 In the colloquial Palestinian Arabic, *el-blad* (plural) signifies the entire Palestine, whereas *el-balad* (singular) signifies the individual town or village to which the speaker belongs.
10 Most, if not all, PNC members were either first or second-generation Palestinian refugees.

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3 A referential function

The undertaking in this chapter is to distill and appraise the discursive rules from the discussion in previous chapters. The political vocabulary and concepts and their frameworks that have regulated the production of self-image, reality (past and present), and the meaning of an-Nakba for its own subjects have been assimilated into the Palestinian lexicon ever since. This conceptual implantation created points of departure that had previously been unavailable. Clearly, each of these vocabularies and concepts has certain historical traces beyond any individual or group. But once they are combined, replaced, juxtaposed and meditated on, new possibilities open up for productive intervention, that is, new possibilities for becoming, as William Connolly explicates in *The Fragility of Things* (Connolly 2013). That possibility is filled with new spontaneous and innovative acts, which with hindsight can be explained by drawing direct causality from past events. This perspective appreciates the visceral productive forces of human and nonhuman forces.

With an-Nakba, two rhetorical devices were constructed: the Arab "legitimacy" and the international "legitimacy" (*al-shar'iyya al-'arabyya wa alshar'iyya al-dawliyya*), which oriented the decision-making process and justifed political behavior. The two "legitimacies" were developed and operated simultaneously. They also functioned as grounding touchstones. Despite the Palestinian rejection of the Mandate (colonial) Resolution and the Partition Resolution 181, the text of these resolutions informed territorial claims, and was later drawn upon to defend the declaration of the Palestinian state, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence in 1988. The APG (All-Palestine Government) was built on the Mandate Resolution: it aspired to establish an independent state that corresponded with the map of Palestine as defined in the Mandate Resolution. Meanwhile, the Palestinian leadership considered Resolution 181 to be "the basis for Palestinian independence" and Resolutions 242 and 338 as "the basis for negotiation" (Arafat 1989: 181). From this perspective, one could say that the contents of Palestinian independence (where, when, how, and for whom) remained undecided and flexible. As shown in Chapter 2, negotiation had become the key for achieving Palestinian statehood. Taking negotiation as *the* supreme mechanism for constituting meanings implies the Palestinian endorsement of the "right" of others to participate in constructing Palestinians' self-determination. It also alludes to a Palestinian acknowledgment of the contingency of their national rights upon uncertain future mechanics of negotiation.

Closer attention to the context in which negotiation was set out reveals how its contents were already distributed in the diplomatic discourse (in the UN resolutions, initiatives, summits, and regional agreements) about the question of Palestine before being mediated on by the negotiation mechanism. In other words, the PLO came to the negotiation table with predetermined conditions from which the PLO, and Palestinians in general, were excluded on official (by Western governments, for example) and unofficial (such as the media and academia) levels (see Said 1992: 15–45).

The Palestinian intervention in the formation of international "legitimacy" was minimal; however, it was a partial factor in shaping the "Arab legitimacy," especially after 1968. Tying together the Palestinian cause and dual legitimacy was a Palestinian construction that helped to produce reference points and grounding principles for decisions. It also helped the Palestinian leadership to correspond to the political context wherever it happened to operate, particularly in exile. As a result, a referential function was infused spontaneously, without prior deliberation. It was infused through the steady performance of referentiality that became interwoven with the political imagination of the Palestinians (and others). At present, it is difficult to think of Palestine without this function. Hence, the political process operated in a referential function to either or both legitimacies. The referential function is elastic, incomplete, and always in a state of evolution and becoming.

By and large, referring to external texts or discourse to promote certain policies or lines of argument is a sensible and pragmatic tool that builds on whatever rhetorical capital or popularity such a text has already established. Consider, for example, the ample positive connotations and nuances that flow from the reference to international law or human rights. But here, too, referentiality is not without its embedded internal mechanisms of power, for any international convention, law, or initiative has specific discursive rules of formation based on historical power relations. Infusing bits and pieces from multiple texts involves systematic introduction, and thus internalization, of the different rules of formations, judgments, conceptual registers, and emphases that regulate them. A transformation on one conceptual register may alter the balance of interrelated registers and expose them to parallel adjustments. By inviting different rules of formations into the original structures and relationships, the latter is opened up for re-evaluation and adjustment against particular reference points, resulting in new possibilities of becoming.

The political culture of referentiality internalizes the entire structure out of which an-Nakba has emerged by anchoring the national project on international positions and the positions of the Arab regimes (direct and indirect) before and after 1948. The practice of referentiality itself is therefore one of the key meanings of an-Nakba. It expresses the inability to anchor Palestinian rights outside the frame, which in many ways contributed to the dislocation of the Palestinian society. The continuous reference to dual legitimacy supplied Palestinian discourse with raw materials, which had always oriented and informed Palestinian political thinking in positive and negative ways. Referentiality prepared the stage for new linguistic games and extrapolations. This has penetrated deep into the language of the peace process and public education, as we shall see in later chapters. Understanding UN resolutions or Arab League summits as having "legitimacy" (*shar'iyya*) served internal purposes, and represented the UN or Arab interpretation of the Palestinian question as legally and morally superior to other interpretations.

The referential function out of which Palestinian rights were drawn was temporarily stabilized. However, we should remember that neither international nor Arab "legitimacy" is a fixed matter; both are always in a process of re-formation. Considering the diplomatic record, many UN resolutions have been issued on the question of Palestine, and several Arab and non-Arab summits, initiatives, and conferences have been carried out since 1948, and all have helped to construct knowledge on Palestine. Extrapolating "Palestinian rights" from

international and Arab legitimacies entailed an ipso facto systematic change in the content of these rights in accordance with changes and adjustments in the international and regional interpretation of the Israel– Palestine question.

Palestinian rights as they are currently understood comprise a set of loose and under-articulated concepts, which is above all inconsistent with the claim that renders them inalienable rights (*al-thawabt*). These rights were initially subsumed by the idea of liberation as an incarnation of self-determination over the entire Palestine. In 1974, Palestinian rights were given a specific territorial dimension as a result of the infusion of nationalism, projecting territorial authority onto the imaginative horizon of the Palestinian leadership. That is, they were put under the leadership of the (putative) Palestinian Authority, territorialized in the light of Resolution 242, and anchored by Arab and international legitimacy through a constellation of referential acts that transformed the rules of formation of the Palestinian rights.

The "inalienable" Palestinian national rights included three things: "right to return, to self-determination, and to establish our [Palestinian] independent state" in the West Bank and Gaza (Arafat 1982: 8). Every movement within the PLO shared this interpretation: "These organizations had further agreed upon the principles of the PLO's interim national programme, the programme of return, the right to self-determination and the independent state" (Hawatmeh 1979b: 192, 1979a: 136). How and where to realize these national rights has been an ambiguous matter and an area of disagreement in Palestinian politics. Nevertheless, armed (especially on the left) and political struggle were among the options. The engagement in the referential function invited new dominant concepts to the fore. Calling for international conferences, summits, citing UN resolutions, political initiatives, and the like has constituted the content of not only the PLO's discourse, but also the discourse of its sub-organizations. Since the 1980s, notions of an "international conference on the basis of the UN resolutions," a "peaceful and just solution," and calls to "cling to peace" (Arafat 1986b: 214–215), as well as a "peaceful solution for Palestine questions" (*Journal of Palestine Studies* 1986) and "peace for territories" (Arafat 1986a: 32) were *the* dominant themes of the PLO's political language, which crystallized around the mid-1980s as a means that would transform abstract Palestinian "nation rights" into concrete reality.

The following citations from the 1980s illustrate my point. The PLO struck an agreement with Jordan on the basis of the following principles (emphasis added):

> Total withdrawal from the *territories occupied in 1967* for a comprehensive peace … 2. Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people… 3. Resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with United Nations resolutions. 4. Resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects. 4. And on this basis, *peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an International Conference …*
>
> (*Journal of Palestine Studies* 1985: 206)

> … the conscious and calculated linking of armed struggle and political struggle against the Zionist occupation of Arab territories. The PLO's political moves are *aimed at creating an international atmosphere conducive to the recognition of our inalienable national rights*, primarily the right of the Palestinian people to *self-determination and*

establish an independent state.

(Arafat 1985: 152)

Our struggle is in conformity with the UN Charter.

(Arafat 1982: 9)

A pattern of echoes had developed between the PLO and international forums (mainly UN-related ones). Consider the Draft Declaration of the UN International Conference on the Question of Palestine on 6 September 1983, which:

> reaffirms and stresses that a just solution of the question of Palestine, the core of the problem, is the crucial element in a *comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement* in the Middle East. This settlement must be based on the *implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions* concerning the question of Palestine and *attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people*, including the *right to self-determination* and *right to the establishment of its own independent state in* Palestine and should be also be based on the *provision by Security Council of guarantees for peace and security …*
>
> (*Journal of Palestine Studies* 1984: 204, emphasis added)

Comparing the Draft Declaration with the internal language of the PLO on the so-called "international legitimacy" demonstrates the degree of infiltration and organic relations between the two discourses. Today, the usual litany of referential ideas are more current than ever, as clearly reflected in the so-called "Prisoners' Document" (*wathiqat al-asra*), which was drafted by representatives of the Palestinian political movements, including Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, in Israeli jails (Al Jazeera 2006).

The fine wording of the three national Palestinian rights draws heavily on the UN framings of the question of Palestine. Two of these rights, self-determination and the independent state, have been articulated with relative ease. However, a different linguistic schema is called into operation whenever refugee rights are concerned. The right of return is usually clad in complex and indirect phrases or omitted altogether (as in the last two citations). The refugee question is usually expressed as something subsidiary, to be resolved "in accordance with" or "based on" the United Nations resolutions, and recently (since 2002) the Arab Peace Initiative. This intricate and indirect language relegates the refugee question into a second or third-rate matter in comparison with the right to self-determination and statehood. The exact nature of the supposed solution and the specific resolution (194) that regulate and govern the imaginative thinking about the refugees have been repeatedly silenced and mystified, being wrapped up within phrases such as "in accordance with …" or "all relevant UN resolutions," and recently "a just and agreed upon" solution. I am going to discuss this in some detail in later chapters. But for now let us see how the loose language on the refugee question intercedes in the issue of self-determination.

The ambiguous language on refugees calls into question the right to self-determination of the Palestinian *people*. At least half of Palestinian people (the refugees, let alone the Palestinians in Israel) would not be able to exercise right of self-determination, and gradually the return

option was put to rest. Indeed, the latter scenario was already in the making, as we will see while analyzing the Palestine Papers. Tethering Palestinian self-determination to the anticipated Palestinian state on 22 percent of Palestine automatically de-links half of the Palestinian people from performing self-determination as *Palestinians*, even if they were to return to their "homes" in what is now called Israel. In other words, the territorialization of self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza excludes Palestinians who live beyond this area from that right. More to the point, the mechanics of the discursive conception of the refugees and their right is a gradual process of de-Palestinization, both of the refugees and of the Palestinians in Israel. What is paradoxical and eccentric in this conclusion is the fact that it came from the refugees themselves, as most Palestinian leaders are themselves refugees.

Referentialism was a prelude for reflexivity and socialization. Indeed, the performance of referentiality is infused in performers' political identity and resonates with the overall institutions in which they are set. Micro-power politics embedded in the practicing referentiality socialize the performer, working on his or her self-identity. Palestinian thought has experienced a gradual imbrication of the act of referring to and extrapolating from multiple discourses, so that they have become essential to the existence, evolution, and maintenance of Palestinian discourse. Via reflexive engagement the initial conception of the Palestinian cause as one of an uprooted people from their homeland started to lose its allure as an orienting framework. Owing to referentialism, reflexivity, and socialization, the cause was reconstructed into a territorial conflict over the details of when, where, and how much. This is the subject of later chapters.

Genuine public Palestinian contributions, such as the first Intifada in 1987, were often dwarfed and overtaken by the prevalent Palestinian political referentialism. Referentialism contributed to the gradual assimilation of the neoliberal peace recipe in the Palestinian political discourse through continuous shifts from one "phase," UN resolution, initiative, or summit, to another. Arguing for a "peaceful settlement" based on "partition[ing] the land between two peoples" (Khalaf 1990: 96) in conjunction with a representation of Palestinian statehood as the future "salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis" (Arafat 1989: 180) is the precise internalization of a realist-liberalist interpretation of peace.

Maintaining and living with contradiction is perhaps something that is hard to reconcile in "Western" philosophy. However, social reality itself is a cauldron of contradiction and paradox. The Palestinian discourse is rife with structural and organic contradictions. Among the key contradictions with which Palestinians lived was the irreconcilable tension between the 1974 Interim Plan and the simultaneous bid for a "comprehensive settlement," without taking note of the contradictory entailments of concepts like *interim* and *comprehensive* on the national struggle – that is, they were attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.

The PLO's structure answered the needs of the Arab states rather than the Palestinian question, as mentioned elsewhere. From the beginning, "Palestinian rights" were tailored to suit Arab political conditions more than Palestinian aspirations. This explains the dramatic and chronic shifts in the articulation of the Palestinian rights, and how they would be achieved from time to time without going back to the rightful holders of the rights, the Palestinian people. The PLO preferred top-down legitimacy from Arab regimes, and later from international

resolutions and forums, or a combination thereof, rather than seeking it from the people it adamantly claimed to represent.

I suggest paying critical attention to the aspects of invisible power in referentialism. Invisible power grew into the Palestinian discourse and was spontaneously internalized. The referential function in the Palestinian cause is power-ridden and works most of the time in one direction: the weaker refers to the norms of the powerful. Power differentials played a significant rule in the construction and interpretation of the Mandate Resolution, the Partition Resolution of 1947, or Resolution 242.[1] The Palestinian political style is caught up within the invisible alliance between socialization, the provisional horizon, and referentialism; therefore, the Palestinians are likely to remain at the receiving end, irrespective of the balance of power that modulates their relationship with Israel. The imbalance is far more extreme than the one described by Edward Said as the lost equipoise between the Palestinians and Israelis (Said 1993). The flow in the direction of power is embedded and internalized; it forms the way Palestinians perceive their rights and struggle. Ironically, the referential function is a Palestinian construct that often directs their discourse toward borrowing and receiving. It is therefore not only a matter of a dichotomy between weak and strong, but also a system of power differentials from the beginning.

The terms of reference *(al-marji'iyya)*

The substance of referentiality has three patterns. The first involves reference to the PLO Basic Law and Charter as foundational guiding sources. The second pattern represents an incipient opening up to outside regional and international anchoring sources, such as the Interim/Ten-Point Program, the UN resolutions, the Fez Summit of 1982 and the 1988 Declaration of Independence. The third pattern, however, started with the Madrid Conference of 1991 and has continued to the present day. Referentiality served as the basis for the so-called *marji'iyyat al-'amaliyya al-silmiyya* (the peace process terms of reference) or *marji'iyyat al-mufawadat* (negotiation's terms of reference). Since referentiality is unfixed, *al-marji'iyya* has been evolving and changing with it. The last pattern is very broad, multiple, and intertextual. It is an assemblage of principles instantiated from various UN resolutions, summits, agreements, conferences, and visions. These elements are *embedded* in one another; each has a particular context and logic, which is a source of inconsistency, dissonance, and disruption. The *logic of embedding* therefore explains the construction of *marji'iyyat al-mufawadat* and the internal developments and contradictions that motivate further discursive transformation.

Since 2011, we are witnessing the making of a new referential pattern that centers on UN institutions. It is evolving from within the third pattern and builds on incipient forces on multiple fronts, including the increasingly sympathetic international public view of Palestinian conditions, disseminating the Palestinian narrative through social media and boycott and solidarity movements. At this stage, it is possible to detect rather than predict the direction of these forces, which are open to a wide range of possibilities.

Certain diplomatic moments – such as the Madrid Conference in 1991, Resolutions 242 and 338, the Clinton Parameters of 2001, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) of 2002, the Bush Vision of 2002, the Roadmap of 2003 (Performance Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution),

the Quartet Principles of 2006, and the Annapolis Summit 2007 – offered an ongoing possibility for constituting terms of reference. Yet these movements all contain seeds of dissonance, conflict, contradiction, and even violence. Palestinian and Israeli representatives disagree on the content of virtually all of these moments, and therefore they have sought to embed some parts and ignore others in their distinctive versions.

To be sure, even if the "parties" agree upon certain elements of the terms of reference, each would still hold a different interpretation, and would fight over which part to cite and which to leave out.[2] For example, Israel and the PLO/PA acknowledge UNSC Resolution 242 and the two-state solution; however, they maintain diametrically opposing interpretations. From the Israeli viewpoint, Resolution 242 grants Israel rights in the West Bank, whereas the PLO/PA interpret it as a full withdrawal to the 1967 Armistice Line. Furthermore, for Israel the two-state solution is closely linked to the character of Israel as a "Jewish State." As explained by former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni, each state is "the homeland for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspiration and self-determination" (PP Doc.2003, TL).

Two incommensurable terms of reference governed the so-called peace negotiations. On the one hand, the Palestinians put out the following reference points: the API of 2002; international law and legitimacy; Resolutions 242 and 338; the agreed resolution of the refugee question based on API and Resolution 194, the Bush Vision, Roadmap, and the two-state solution (Doc.2826, Doc.2055, Doc.2003). On the other hand, the Israelis listed the following terms of reference: "the Bush vision, the principle of two states for two peoples, language referring to the fact that a future agreement will address all outstanding issues, that the two states will be the homelands of their respective peoples and fulfill their national aspirations, Israel a state for the Jewish people, and Palestine for the Palestinians, [Resolution] 242, 338, RM [Roadmap] and previous agreements, 3 quartet principles" (Doc.2002); "*The Roadmap and previous agreements as accepted by the parties*"; the "US will judge, [and] no timeline for completion of negotiations" (Doc.1987); also adding a "reference to the Jewish refugees" (Doc.3651). The above interrogation of terms of reference shows how the very principles supposed to guide the solution of conflict issues are themselves issues of conflict.

Referentiality in the politics of the Intifada

There is much research covering most aspects of the first Intifada, which broke out in December 1987. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I consider the politics of the Intifada in relation to wider discursive adjustments since 1948. Political communication between the leadership, grassroots activists, and the public in the West Bank and Gaza was mainly conveyed through the flyer mechanism (*al-manashir*): simply, flyers were prepared and distributed secretly over-night to out-maneuver the Israeli military.

In their book, *Speaking Stones*, Mishal and Aharoni studied a large sample of flyers for the chapter entitled "Paper War" (Mishal and Aharoni 1994). Their analysis, however, adopts a narrow contextualization that renders the flyers a drop in the ocean of Israeli resources. First of all, the analysis of incipience and confluence of the flyers comes from the colonizer's perspective of the colonized. Second, the substance is concerned with what the flyers' texts

mean for Israel, with only marginal attention to Palestinian interests and ambitions. Third, the authors uncritically employed a common Israeli lens to represent the Palestinians, their space, and acts. The space is signified as "territories" (*shtahim* in Hebrew), or Israel's backyard. Meanwhile, Palestinian acts were characterized in terms of radicalism, and Palestinians as irrational, lacking the ability to conduct a civilized dialogue. Consider the primal scene the authors drew in the first page of the book: "The Intifada inspired a new kind of Palestinian radicalism, a radicalism borne on young shoulders, a radicalism that conducts its dialogue with Israel and the local population via the stone, the slingshot, the petrol bomb, and the leaflet" (Mishal and Aharoni 1994: 1). Note the frequent iteration of the word "radicalism." For them, even the distribution of flyers is a "war," as the title of their opening chapter tells. From this mindset, anything short of total Palestinian acquiescence is a prelude to violence and radicalism.

My analysis of about 100 flyers interrogates the redistribution of power relations between the politics of the PLO and the public in Palestine. I will demonstrate how the energetic Intifada's events and politics have opened up the common discourse in Palestine (mainly in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza) to the PLO's politics vis-à-vis its future. The flyers' text will be read in two layers: first, in relation to the political milieu; and second, in terms of the Intifada's actual performance (commercial strikes, throwing stones, demonstrations, boycotts, and so on).

The spark of the first Intifada coincided temporally with the PLO's diplomatic endeavors toward the mid-1980s. The timing was a significant factor because it started when a specific set of "rights" was constructed, discursively stabilized and deemed inviolable, legitimate, Palestinian national rights. The migration of the discourse on rights to Palestine gave the Intifada political form and purpose. Meanwhile, the underlying conceptual regimes of socialization, provisional horizon, and referentiality continued to organize and influence the politics of the Intifada.

In the main, PLO-related news was rarely featured in the headlines of local newspapers before 1987; rather, they were usually mentioned fleetingly, as the record of the main local newspaper in the West Bank and Gaza, *al-Quds*,[3] shows. It would be unwise to discount the Israeli constraints and surveillance imposed on local media outlets as a reason for the lack coverage of PLO activities in the national political news.[4] Yet this does not invalidate analysis of the discourse as it appears. No system of surveillance is bulletproof and free of cracks, something which is often exploited by creative initiatives. Once the events of the Intifada evolved on the ground, local newspapers began to report on these events, along with PLO activities, declarations, and conferences.

If one surveys local newspapers, it is impossible to escape witnessing political phrases such as "the settlement of the Palestinian cause" (*taswiyat al-qadiyya al-falastiniyya*), "international conference" (*mu'tamar dawli*), "endeavors for solving the Middle East crisis" (*masa'i hal azmat al-sharq al-awast*), "activating the peace process" (*tanshit 'amaliyyt al-salam*), and "independent state" (*al-dawla al-mustaqilla*), along with the names and pictures of PLO figures. These become prevalent and were regularly featured on the first pages of newspapers from late 1987 onward. When the Intifada broke out, an ironic pattern in local newspapers began to juxtapose imagery and descriptive text of actual events with diplomatic

PLO moves. Texts often referred to performative acts as "violent events" (*ahdath al-'unf)* or "confrontations" with Israeli forces (*sidamat*). Despite the increasing intensity and spread of such events and mass disobedience, diplomacy-ridden subjects dominated the newspapers. Although on the front page, concrete events of the Intifada occupied minimal space and attention. This spatial juxtaposition on paper demonstrates yet another unspoken contrast between Palestinians inside and outside Palestine, and a relationship between internal concrete acts and external diplomatic ones.

In general, research on the first Intifada hastens to emphasize its spontaneity (Schiff and Ya'ari 1990). To the contrary, proto-thoughts of confrontation were simmering, but imperceptible to Israeli intelligence. Potential grassroots leadership was unfolding, and already considering a confrontation with Israeli forces (Bilal 2013).[5] The PLO followed actual events closely once they started. Even more, it supported, and later designed, actual events on the ground (Habash 2009: 205). Initially, the PLO's engagement was embodied in the formation of the Intifada's United National General Command (IUNGC). Later, the IUNGC oriented, ordered, and above all supplied the events with specific contents and guidelines for operational acts. It also introduced a new apparatus called "striking squads" (*al-majmu'at al-dariba*) to police and discipline those dissenting from the imperatives of the "struggle schedule" (*al-barnamij al-nidali*).

Khalil al-Wazir, best known as Abu-Jihad, who served in the upper echelons of Fatah and the PLO, led the IUNGC from his exile. The flyer mechanism proved a convenient mode of communication to transfer PLO-made plans and instructions into the West Bank and Gaza. Thus the IUNGC, striking squads, and flyers were the main linking channels between peoples of the Intifada and those in exile. Seeing it from this angle, the Intifada offered an opportunity for the PLO to establish perceptible connections with its potential constituents and future spatial center. What is far more significant at this point of time is the concrete authoritative relationship that was established between PLO politics and events on Palestinian land for the first time since 1967. The commands articulated in the flyers materialized through wide popular participation. The link between the PLO and the public flourished, and the West Bank and Gaza became a more receptive geopolitical site for PLO discourse. Since then, the PLO's focus has shifted from outside to inside. In other words, the Intifada provided the necessary nexus between outside and inside Palestinians.

The IUNGC distributed about 100 flyers between 1988 and 1993. The flyers' format was consistent, always beginning with the refrain "no voice louder than the voice of the intifada" (*la sawt ya'lw fawqa sawt al-intifada*), an adapted version of an earlier slogan, "all authority for the revolution". The flyer praises and hails the populace (*yaa jamahir…*) with three sections: the political agenda of the PLO, a brief political analysis, and general guidelines, ending with a weekly action plan.

At first, the political agenda was clearly stated again and again in almost every flyer in the same order: right to return, self-determination, and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza "under the leadership of the PLO, *the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people* everywhere." Affairmation of the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people was especially acute then, in order to out-maneuver the American and Arab regimes' efforts to marginalize the PLO (Abu-Sharif 2009: 151–156). Therefore, the phrase that

pronounce the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative" was underlined in every flyer and statement. To emphasize its leadership further, the PLO staged a "strike under the slogan: 'no alternative to the PLO our sole legitimate representative' ", and affirmation of the exclusive entitlement of the PLO "to manage the conflict and Political solution" (Flyer no. 10 1988; Flyer no. 34 1989).

As an equation, the building blocks of the political message were as follows: Intifada + consonants (or inalienable rights) + national + rights + return + self-determination + independent state + East (or Arab) Jerusalem. This is succinctly expressed as follows:

> To the masses of our great people … your victorious Intifada is escalating day after day, and attaining one achievement after another. It is going forward in an unyielding courage and stable unity in the struggle while holding onto the *fixed principles* [*al-thawabt*] of the Palestinian *national* action exemplified in the Palestinian *national* [1] *right of return*, [2] *self-determination*, and [3] the *independent state* over its *national* soil with the *Arab Jerusalem* as its capital …
>
> (Flyer no. 22 1988, opening paragraph, emphasis added)

A correlation was made between the Intifada and Palestinian statehood on parts of Palestine. According to Habash, the Palestinian state has become "a very realistic possibility" (Habash 2009: 205). From the beginning, the discourse was imbued with statist concepts, giving the Intifada a function and lever to champion the pursuit of state: the possibility had to be seized. Husayni explains this very well:

> Now we [the PLO leadership] have strength behind us. We are relying on the Intifada. We can now face the Israelis and say what we want. If they ask us to stop the Intifada we will say no. Before, when we met with them we had nothing to say, only to beg.
>
> (Husayni 1989: 14)

Consolidating the idea of *Palestinian national rights* was the cardinal message of the thirty-odd flyers circulated during 1988. In parallel, the flyer mechanism served as a vehicle to migrate the referential political discourse into the public discourse in the West Bank and Gaza through the repetitive citation of UN resolutions and political initiatives in the form of "rejection," "denunciation," or "calling on" certain actions, or asking for the convening of an "international conference." The general message of the flyers was to validate the "political solution," and in this way they increased the legitimacy and political status of the PLO on Palestinian land. But there is something broader to say here: framing the Intifada through a referential network and PLO politics led to socialization *en masse* in the West Bank and Gaza, with which we are familiar in hindsight.[6]

Usually the "action-plan" or "struggle schedule" would set out a range of activities and ask the public to carry them out in the West Bank and Gaza. Every day was linked with a particular schedule. Most of the activities were attuned to resonate with the cultural and historical significance of the date, and certain days were even given additional titles to emphasize political sentiments, such as Martyr Day, PLO Day, Flag Day, or Declaration of Independence

Day. The struggle schedule decreed the following: throwing stones at the settlers and occupation soldiers; carrying out strikes; closing shops (they were allowed to open only a few hours a day); abstaining from paying taxes and bails, closing roads (using rocks, the tyres of vehicles, and nails, for example); dissolving local municipal and council committees; resignation from positions in the Israeli civil administration and police; writing on walls (and signing as the IUNCC or PLO); raising the Palestinian flag over minarets, electricity cables and houses; raising the picture of the "brother and the leader" Arafat; defying curfews; boycotting *al-Nahar* newspaper; boycott of Israeli goods; and participating in a "loud public demonstration while chanting 'with our soul and blood we sacrifice ourselves for the martyr … with our soul and blood we sacrifice ourselves for Palestine.' " The IUNGC devised an action plan compatible with various professions of Palestinian middle class to increase public engagement.

As the Intifada's first year came to a close, especially after the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on 15 November 1988 in Algiers, the central message of the flyers began readily to fuse statist and diplomatic language together more vigorously, and since that date, every flyer was signed using the phrase "the state of Palestine" (Flyer no. 31 1988). The Declaration and "peaceful solution" of the conflict were constructed as "a causal outcome of the Intifada, sacrifice and the new reality on the political map"; however, this "new" reality augured well for the PLO's diplomatic framework, which involved a "Palestinian independent state and appealing for just peace …" (Flyer no. 45 1989: 45) The Declaration of Independence was assembled at a critical juncture to rally the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by "celebrating the Declaration of Independence" as "a *step on the way* to announcing a real independence" (Flyer no. 29, Flyer no. 30 1988) Notice how provisional thinking was employed to justify the gap between a symbolic "declaration" and "real" independence.

Political statements put the Intifada into a relationship of linear dependency with the struggle, occupation, and an independent Palestinian state. For example, in 1989 Palestinian officials sent a memorandum to the US Assistant Secretary of State to explain (their self-imagined) objectives of the Intifada as the "rejection of, and resistance to, the Israeli occupation of our land and oppression of our people" (G.27: 346). Meanwhile, the termination of Israeli occupation was constructed to signify the end of the struggle, and hence paving the way for Palestinian statehood as the following statements reveal: "continue the struggle until the regress of the occupation"; "the popular armed struggle until realizing the independent Palestinian state"; and "the struggle path is the tested and credible path to drive out the occupation" (Flyer no. 10, Flyer no. 11, Flyer no. 13 1988).

The exclusive correlation between occupation and struggle overshadowed other aspects of Israel–Palestine conflict and confined the conflict to narrow spatial and demographic entities. I have showed in earlier chapters how the meaning and purpose of the struggle evolved in Palestinian political thought. This official understanding of the struggle coopted the Intifada and limited its goals to "regress" or "drive out" the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and replace it with a Palestinian state. It is worth noticing what is present and what is omitted in the above citations. Reading between the lines, it seems that the use of the term "occupation" draws the spatial boundary of the conflict within 22 percent of historical Palestine; meanwhile phrases that signify the rest of Palestine (78 percent) are absent. Moreover, the framing

excludes the future of the refugees and Palestinians in Israel from the suggested self-determination. In other words, over half of the Palestinian population was disfranchised.

The overflow of state-laden vocabulary was usually conveyed in conjunction with the referential regime and diplomatic peaceful solutions. The PLO argued for

> a serious work to formulate a clear and decisive *Political Plan* to underwrite our people's *inviolable national rights* in tandem with the requirements of the *current phase*. The Plan must be capable of dealing with the *international community* while expressing the Palestinian commitment to the realization of *peace based on* justice in the region and *solving our cause honorably*.
>
> (Flyer no. 28 1988, emphasis added)

Another flyer explained the Political Plan as a "Palestinian *peace aggression* … to *force* Israel to accept *the international will* in convening an international conference" (Flyer no. 31 1988, emphasis added). Curious juxtapositions, such as peace and aggression or force and accept, in addition to their internal rhetorical functions, are a veneer that attempts to disguise, obfuscate, and confuse. The terminology of peace, negotiation, and dialogue infiltrated the discourse and modulated the articulation of the struggle in a way that rendered it amenable to negotiation. In the early 1990s, the purpose of the struggle was transformed again from "ending the occupation" to a "struggle for peace" or a "struggle to achieve just and permanent peace" (Flyer no. 66 1990, Flyer no. 85 1992).

The theme of the struggle schedule was adjusted in late 1989. Demands of confrontation festered, and *peace* was elevated to the status of a new theme. Consider this appeal for a mass demonstration in favor of the Palestinian peace: "21 October is a general strike to protest against Shamir's [Israeli prime minister 1986–1992] plan and to underline commitment to the Palestinian peace plan" (Flyer no. 46 1989). Since then, the mission has become "to find the required political solution and reach a just peace" and a "comprehensive and balanced solution" (Flyer no. 52 1990), rather than to terminate Israeli colonization and to work toward meaningful self-determination for the entire Palestinian people, let alone the liberation of Palestine, as used to be the asserted purpose of the struggle.

Liberation, the initial focus of the struggle, as I explained in Chapters 1 and 2, disappeared altogether from the linguistic equation. It was put to rest. Since the mid-1980s, expressions such as "ending the occupation," "honorable solution," and "peace and settlement" replaced liberation. With the arrival of "the political battle," "peace aggression," and similar phrases, the armed and popular manifestations of struggle in the Intifada were relegated and diminished in seeking to open up the space for diplomatic actions, which usually unfolded in a metaphorical confrontation (aggression, battle) to regenerate the psychological nuances of the "revolutionary spirit" accumulated since 1960s. Such metaphorical expressions give revolutionary capital to political solutions.

Take, for instance, the IUNGC depiction of relationships between acts of confrontation and PLO politics:

> The IUNGC knows well that *a just and comprehensive solution* for the Palestinian

> question will not be achieved through future dialogue and negotiation in isolation from the struggle on the ground, which represents the spearhead of the political activity. *But the struggle on the ground alone will not achieve this solution without waging the political battle*; these two directions are organically connected.
>
> (Flyer no. 70 1991, emphasis added)

The above citation provides an example of the constructed relationship between the performative acts of the Intifada and the PLO's propensity for diplomatic compromise with Israel. Yet every orienting notion is ambiguous and openended. It is not clear what a "comprehensive solution," "dialogue and negotiation," "struggle," or "political battle" mean in practical terms.

Every system has internal cracks and loopholes that could be creatively exploited in favor of resisting forces. The Intifada was a popular homegrown creative initiative to challenge dominance in the broader sense, rather than a narrow set of calculated political arrangements. The PLO's calculations were infused into this initiative, for it was seen as a "possibility" to equate political considerations with concrete elements (land, people, actions). In this way, the broader potential of the Intifada (challenging domination) was reduced to correspond with the two-state solution as follows: withdrawal from the Palestinian and Arab occupied land since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem; abolition of all annexations and removal of settlements; putting occupied Palestinian land under UN supervision; and convening an international conference with UN supervision (Flyer no. 26 1988). Furthermore, from the PLO's point of view, the two-state solution is "not a free concession, but rather *a realistic, revolutionary, and responsible* representation that put an end to Zionist lies about the goals of our successful revolution, and *[the two-state solution] puts an end to the suffering of our people inside and outside Palestine … our forthcoming state is for all Palestinians*" (Flyer no. 29 1988, emphasis added). This implies that, first, any other solution is unrealistic, unrevolutionary, and irresponsible, and second, that the refugees' "return" is something to be addressed *within* the supposed Palestinian state.

There are a number of important observations to be made in relation to the flyer mechanism. First, the number of distributed flyers declined steadily (thirty-one flyers in 1988, nineteen in 1989, fifteen in 1990, ten in 1991, twelve in 1992, and ten in 1993). Cutting back on flyers could be interpreted, perhaps with hind-sight, as a sign of the PLO's retreating interest in concrete acts in favor of diplomacy. The following example supports that reading. Arafat called on the Palestinians to give up Intifada activities in favor of taking part "in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation" (I.1.2: 142). Second, with the transformation from "rights" to "state," and finally to "peace," the PLO's overall appeal to Palestinians ebbed, while requests for violent escalations were discontinued. Third, the linguistic structure of the flyers embraced nationalistic and mainly secular phrases devoid of religious citations (contra Hamas and the Islamic Jihad). Fourth, there is a clear assimilation of concepts and expressions imbued with the geographic and demographic divisions of Palestine. Expressions like "the Palestinian occupied land," "our people inside [Israel]," "our people behind the green line," "inside the

48," and "the IUNGC in *the* occupied territories" are examples (Flyer no. 4 1988; Flyer no. 42 1989). Internalizing such concepts indicates acknowledgment of the status quo and a decision to be "realistic" about it. Fifth, although the Palestinian contribution to the Declaration of Principles signed toward the end of the Intifada between the PLO and Israel was limited to inclusion of or alteration of particular articles (Qurie 2005; Shehadeh 1997), curiously, a great deal of the orienting phrases were almost literally assimilated in the Declaration of Principles. Consider, for example, this collection of phrases from the Declaration: "comprehensive peace"; "put an end to the conflict"; "based on Resolutions 242 and 338"; "national authority"; "mutual interests"; and "the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza." Moreover, the Palestinians expressed their readiness to postpone the principle refugee question and self-determination.

Notes

1 Several scholars have analyzed aspects of power in the UN resolutions concerning Israel–Palestine conflict: see Finkelstein 2003 (144–149) and Pappé 2007 (30–38).

2 For example, Tzipi Levin said,

> We quoted parts of the RM [Roadmap of 2003], you quoted others. If we keep the RM, we can delete the quotes and make it shorter. Two real problems: one is the ToR [Terms of Reference]. But we need to find a formula. I think we cannot agree to all the ToR that you [Palestinian side] put.
>
> (Doc.1987)

> We are now looking at what we have and where are the gaps. Without writing this down you know we are working according to [Resolution] 242 and 338. We are not talking about giving you all of [19]67 [land], but when you look at the facts on the ground and the discussion on swaps, it is based on it.
>
> (Doc.2826, TL)

3 I have reviewed almost all issues of *al-Quds* published between 1974 and 1978, and between 1987 and 1993. Hard copies are available at Hebron Municipality Library.

4 For more on Israeli censorship of the West Bank's press and Palestinian resistance to censorship, see Najjar 1995.

5 According to the memoir of Adnan Maswady (one of the key founders of Hamas in Palestine), members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine began debating and organizing a confrontation strategy against Israeli forces around the mid-1980s. On 23 October 1987, the founders of what later became known as Hamas decided to take practical confrontation measures (Bilal 2013: 96–101).

6 Hamas, the biggest rival of PLO politics, has gradually became implicated in performing referentialism and statist discourse in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza, especially after the 2006 Palestinian election. The head of Hamas Political Bureau Khalid Mashal articulated this position unequivocally in an interview with Christine Amanpour on 21 November 2012.

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Palestine Papers (PP)

(All Palestine Papers accessed 10 August 2012.)

Doc.2826 (2008) Minutes of the General Plenary Meeting, King David Hotel, West Jerusalem, 20 June, www.ajtransparency.com/files/2826.pdf.
Doc.3651 (2008) Progress Meeting on Refugees, King David Hotel, Jerusalem, 14 September, www.ajtransparency.com/files/3651.pdf.
Doc.1987 (2007) Minutes from Fifth Negotiation Team Meeting (in preparation for Annapolis), Mount Zion Hotel, West Jerusalem, 31 October, www.ajtransparency.com/files/1987.pdf.
Doc.2002 (2007) Minutes from Seventh Negotiation Team Meeting (in preparation for Annapolis), Crowne Plaza Hotel, West Jerusalem, 12 November, www.ajtransparency.com/files/2002.pdf.
Doc.2003 (2007) Minutes from Eighth Negotiation Team Meeting (in preparation for Annapolis), 5.00 p.m., Mount Zion Hotel, West Jerusalem, 31 November, www.ajtransparency.com/files/2003.pdf.
Doc.2055 (2007) Minutes from Tenth Negotiation Team Meeting (in preparation for Annapolis), King David Hotel, West Jerusalem, 19 November, www.ajtransparency.com/files/2055.pdf.

Intifada flyers

(All flyers accessed 20 May 2012; all are in Arabic.)

Flyer no. 4 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_04.pdf.
Flyer no. 10 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_10.pdf.
Flyer no. 11 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_11.pdf.
Flyer no. 13 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_13.pdf.

Flyer no. 22 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_22.pdf.
Flyer no. 26 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_26.pdf.
Flyer no. 28 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_28.pdf.
Flyer no. 29 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_29.pdf.
Flyer no. 30 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_30.pdf.
Flyer no. 31 (1988) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_31.pdf.
Flyer no. 34 (1989) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_34.pdf.
Flyer no. 42 (1989) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_42.pdf.
Flyer no. 45 (1989) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_45.pdf.
Flyer no. 46 (1989) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_46.pdf.
Flyer no. 52 (1990) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_52.pdf.
Flyer no. 66 (1990) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_66.pdf.
Flyer no. 70 (1991) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_70.pdf.
Flyer no. 85 (1992) wafainfo.ps/pdf/bayan_85.pdf.

G.27 (1989) "Palestinian Memorandum to the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs John Kelly," in M. Abdul Hadi (ed.) (1997) *Documents on Palestine, Vol. I: From the Pre-Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference* (Jerusalem: Palestine Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, PASSIA): 346–347.

I.1.2 (1993) "Letter from Chairman Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst (9 September 1993)," in M. Abdul Hadi (ed.) (1997) *Documents on Palestine, Vol. II: From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period* (Jerusalem: Palestine Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, PASSIA): 141.

Interlude

Heretofore the analysis has established three principal discursive rules of formation; it is useful to keep them in mind while reading the following chapters. The first and second rules are drawn from the metaphorical meanings embedded in the word an-Nakba. First, an-Nakba events put an end to the physical link between Palestine and the majority of the Palestinian population then preparing the stage for exile and refugee conditions. These events became a benchmark in the Palestinian discourse that at once separates and connects the social orders *within and outside* Palestine and *before and after* 1948. From then on, the new discursive order had constituted Palestine through its parts: Palestine as an imagined totality was discontinued in the Palestinian political calculations. This opened the space for different articulations, concepts, spatial mapping, identities, and new forms of struggle and politics to appear.

The second rule relates to the pursuit of a solution for the Palestinian question. By and large, finding a solution to restore the links between Palestine and the Palestinians organized the post-1948 discourse. Several scenarios have evolved since then, including the liberation of entire Palestine, a democratic state for all, and a state over any part of Palestine, which eventually metamorphosed into the two-state solution. All this transpired after deep adjustments, and the appearance and disappearance of central orienting concepts in the discourse based on the contingent evolution of actual events and interpretations.

The third rule organized the order after 1948 through a painstaking process of socialization, referentiality, and a provisional mode of thought and psychology. Arrangements that have unfolded since an-Nakba have been articulated as temporary and provisional, pending the conclusion of a final solution (liberation and return of the refugees in particular). However, the provisional horizon became self-fulfilling and the norm. In the meantime, the practice of referentiality, citing a wide range of political, diplomatic, and legal statements as a source of authority, invited new styles and concepts into the purview of circulating political vocabulary, metaphors, thoughts, and scenarios. Referentiality, best captured by the phrase "Arab and international legitimacy" (*al-shar'iyya al-'arabiyya wa al-dawliyya*), became a key source for stipulating and deriving discursive material and conceptual anchoring. In short, selective international and Arab interpretations of the question of Palestine reigned supreme over the understanding of Palestinian national rights. These rights were linked and derived from unstable and ever changing anchoring points. In the context of this reading, I argued that power relations in Palestinian discourse are embedded in the referential rule itself. As mentioned earlier, Palestinians' contribution to the material to which they refer to is next to nothing. Therefore, whenever Palestinian agents made a new reference to particular point in the referential scheme, the relational power sustaining that point is infused into the Palestinian political reckoning, opening it up for new metamorphoses. The problem is therefore not a dichotomy between strength and weakness but a whole system of power differentials, which shapes and sustains the discourse.

The following chapters consider the evolution of Palestinian political discourse during the peace-process era, based on wide range of selected documents from the Israel–Palestine peace-process record and using the Palestine Papers as a text for interpretative analysis. This textual material shares a common theme: representing official Palestinian political communication with its Israeli counterpart.

While examining this material I continue to reveal the internal rules of formations and logics of Palestinian political discourse. Moreover, I attempt to analyze how this discourse has continued to evolve and change since the early 1990s. Indeed, since 1991 Palestinian political discourse became engaged in a direct relationship and exchange with Israeli colonial discourse. I also examine modes of internalization, that is, how the colonized internalize the discourse of the colonizer. This helps to explain how discursive adaptations and internalization reshaped the Palestinian perception of Palestine and the question of Palestine.

At this stage, it useful to make three methodological remarks. Discourse does not consist of ready-made documents, but needs to be analytically constructed based on the visible and invisible relations and linkages that make articulation possible. Once these relations are constructed, they provide an analytical lens for re-reading the textual content afresh. Therefore, the methodological basis of this section involves a double reading of the same text. The primary reading is concerned with the construction of analytical relations, regimes of thought, and rules of formation, as discussed in the introduction. The discoveries and perspectives of the first reading inform the second, which is more concerned with the performativity of discourse.

Key junctures are used methodologically to organize the analysis. They also help to put discourse within a spatial and temporal contextual framework, especially when the case study is stretched over a long period of time, and where many factors are involved. However, these junctures do not exist by themselves, but they are constructed as such through numerous practices. The signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 between the PLO and Israel is constituted as a key juncture. This construction is a product of various discourses: (1) a prior discourse about peace negotiations from 1988 until the Oslo channel came out to the public; (2) during the signing, which includes indirect meanings relating to its location (the White House garden), the opulent ceremony, the media response, live streaming, and speeches of politicians who pronounced the event as a "key junction," "a new dawn," and "a new history"; and (3) the discourse and actions that followed the event itself. Given this background, the following chapters are structured in terms of the juncture of the Declaration of Principles and attempt to analyze the discursive developments around it.

Here is a condensed overview of the main findings of this section. First, metaphors from different modes of thought have intersected and produced new discursive material, deferring and discontinuing others. Second, an embedded metaphor in peace-building processes in general, and the Israel–Palestine peace process in particular, has structured Palestinian discourse for the last two decades. Third, the logic of division has made it possible to replace Palestine as an imagined socio-spatial totality with numerous divisions. Fourth, neoliberal thought on peace has played a significant role in shaping and setting priorities for Palestinian discourse. That version of peace metamorphosed into two principal rules: peace as security; and market logic. Both have played a central role in orienting the ways in which each division

of Palestine is modulated. Together, these four rules have reduced the complexity of the Palestinian question to abstract and logarithmic simulacra.

4 Peace from within the "process"

A metaphorical conceptual system

Politics of deferral

It is useful to consider the emotional state of the Palestinian leadership as it became embroiled in the peace process. The leadership regarded Palestinians' achievements as being profoundly ephemeral and volatile. Ahmad Qurie, a senior Palestinian politician who represented the PLO in the secret negotiation meetings in Oslo in 1993, discharged his perspective on the Palestinian accomplishments like this:

> the accomplishments which the Palestinians achieved as individuals or collectives resemble tall buildings without ceilings, or decorative trees without deep roots, vulnerable to being uprooted. This reinforced the dream of return, which was enriched by powerful feelings of dispossession and lack of citizenship in exile.
>
> (Qurie 2005: 18)

The psychological currents that led to Palestinian accomplishments being deemed temporary and transitional were at their height in the late 1980s. The PLO was called into question in the light of the new conditions of the Intifada, the emergence of Islam-oriented movements such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, coupled with the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the Israeli search for local Palestinian leadership from the West Bank and Gaza. This meant that PLO political attitudes were determined by the fear of being out-maneuvered, which in turn prepared the stage for the deferral of all other issues as long as the PLO was accepted as a partner in the political process by the US administration and Israel (Abbas 1994; Shehadeh 1997).

The idea of "transitional" agreements and understandings that may "lead to" Palestinian self-determination is consonant with the already proactive mode of thought that endorses "temporary steps" in the pursuit of a solution for the Palestinian question. Terminology that expresses this temporariness resonates in Palestinian society beyond the PLO. For instance, local political figures in the West Bank and Gaza declared, "Any *phases* in the peace process must be clearly designated as *interim stages* in an overall process, with internal coherence and causality logic, *leading to* the defined objective of independence and statehood, security, and genuine regional stability and development" (G.27, emphasis added). With the advent of the peace process, transitional thinking has been inscribed in actual planning and policies, whether in public negotiation in Washington or in secret ones in Oslo. The Palestinian delegation in Washington proposed a model of a Palestinian interim self-governing authority, and the same

happened in Oslo (H.25: 59).

Since the late 1980s, the PLO saw the solution in a negotiated peace deal with Israel, as has already been shown. The transitional mode of reasoning was again put toward concrete political outcomes. At this stage, the dissonance between revolutionary rhetoric and actual behavior was glaring. The official discourse then produced a new interpretation to combine revolutionary concepts with actual politics. That was called "revolutionary reality" (*al-waqi' al-thawri*), implying a temporal link between the discourse of the 1960s and self-perception, and the actual diplomatic approach that was unfolding. The subject position of revolutionaries was juxtaposed with "the possible" and the "real" to constitute "realistic revolutionaries" (*al-thawriyyuwn al-waqi'iyyuwn*), as distinguished from an unstated but dangerous opposite. Against this framework, those who remain true to the ideals set out in the 1960s represent a negative force. The next step was to construct the "possible" and "real" as evolving temporally, in phases. Thus the PLO adopted the "burning phases method" (*manhajiyyat harq al-marahil*), step by step, to break the Israeli "NOs" and "register precedence" (*tasjil sabiqa*). Meanwhile, diplomacy and negotiation were represented as "the only possible" way forward and "a compulsory corridor," as Qurie explains (Qurie 2005: 19, 29, 44). The abstract interpretative equation goes like this: revolution; reality; step by step; negotiation as compulsory and the only way forward. This eviscerates the initial equation of revolution, liberation, return, in which armed struggle is the only way for the liberation of entire Palestine. Concepts of liberation, return, armed struggle, and Palestine are discontinued.

The mechanism to reach the professed realistic outcomes has been actualized through the practice of diplomatic rituals in multiple series of negotiation meetings, declarations, summits, conferences, exchanges of letters, speeches, and so forth. These rituals were named the "peace process." The phrase "peace process" brings together two different and contested concepts: peace and process. Peace belongs to the realm of ideas, and therefore it is an interpretation and means different things to different people. Peace is a relative experience. Meanwhile, the already available neoliberal perspective on peace dominates contemporary peace-building thoughts and blueprints. That perspective unfolded in an automatic pattern called *process*, with an inner ability to reproduce itself. These automatatic processes have officially been fueled with self-perpetuating rituals since the Madrid Conference in 1991, both in secret and in public.[1] The metaphor in the word *process*, as a calculated and mechanized series of events, bestowed an impression of analysis and authority on the actions of peace agents. Individuals played the role of peace agents by being implicated in the rituals of peace.

Building on the "rational" neoliberal calculations of peace, the period that followed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 was constituted and imagined even before it had begun. For the Palestinians, the Declaration of Principles represented "a new journey towards a new future" and a moment where "peace has started" (I.1: 141). The Oslo Accords "put our [Palestinian] people at the beginning of the road toward independence and the establishment of statehood and glory [*al-kayan wa al-majd*]" (Qurie 2005: 14). Similarly, the Israelis perceived themselves as embarking on "a new journey … [and a] new dawn" (ibid.). Peace agents positioned themselves in a "transitional process"; however, each side saw its journey taking a completely different direction. On the one hand, Palestinians conceived themselves as part of a process "leading to" and "toward" statehood and self-determination. On the other

hand, Israelis saw a process "leading to" an "arrangement" pertaining to the Palestinian issue and an opportunity to maximize security and continued hegemony (Ben-Ami 2006).[2] Israel's view on the Palestinian "functional autonomy" short of sovereign powers was formulated clearly during Camp David in 1978 (Shalev 1980).

Motion logic directed reason, order, and priorities. Essentially, the process was divided into two sequential phases. First, a "transitional period leading to a permanent settlement based on the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338" (I.4, Article 1). Everything in this "transitional" phase was deemed unstable and negotiable, and hence produced ambiguous and kinesis-laden tropes to guide behavior. For example, authority, land, and military forces were rendered "transferable," coded in agreements as: the "orderly transfer of authority from Israel"; "Israel will withdraw and re-deploy its forces"; it will "dissolve its Civil Administration"; and "the Palestinian Authority will assume executive authority in the area of responsibilities transferred to it" (H.25: 59). The principle of "moving forward" justified the re-categorization of central issues as "final-status", "complicated" issues, which impeded progress. Final-status issues and self-determination needed to be postponed and deferred.

To illustrate my point that motion-laden metaphors structured the framework of the peace process, it is useful to consider the following extracts from peace agents' statements (emphasis added):

> I have been filled with faith that the arduous *trek* on the long *path* of pain will end in our home's yard … to take the first *steps* in the battle, the battle of peace.
>
> (Arafat J.9: 236)

> Because peace requires concerted *action*, the parties agreed to explore practical *steps* in the political, economic, security, and human dimension … to *accelerate* negotiations on all tracks.
>
> (J.13: 239).

> The peace process is the only *path* to *security and peace* for Israel, the Palestinians and neighbouring states.
>
> (K.5: 275)

> We have return to the *path of peace* along which they have already *traveled* so far.
>
> (K.20: 294)

> For three years now, the Israelis and the Palestinians have been *moving forward along the path* to a lasting peace.
>
> (K.24: 297)

> This [Hebron] agreement represents an important *step on the road towards* a just and stable peace.
>
> (K.44: 321)

> … leaders agreed that the Oslo peace process must *move forward* to succeed.

(K.46: 322)

… an important *step towards* … using the *momentum* created by the Hebron agreement.

(L.1)

we've obviously made remarkable *strides* … *put* the peace process *back on track*…. We will be talking … about how best to *move forward*. And we will look for the *ways* to do that …"

(L.14: 342)

… to *get the peace process back on track*. We have Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo opened the *path* to their peaceful coexistence…. It is time to take concerts *steps towards* a lasting peace.

(L.28: 357)

… we think there should be *positive steps forward* by both the Palestinians and the Israelis to *reignite* the peace process and to *reengineer* peace negotiations.

(L.14: 343)

… to create *thrusting force* in order to achieve a *breakthrough* and *move* the negotiation process … *pushing* Israel to realize what remains of the short distance on the *way* to sitting [on the negotiation table] with the PLO … creating links between stages in order not to falter, but to make smooth and steady progress toward a final situation … the latent *thrusting power* in the peace process.

(Qurie 2005: 114, 169, 332)

The transient process was conceived to usher in a subsequent "permanent" and static phase. Mobility would end when all "outstanding issues" were settled. The diplomatic record is awash with motion-laden figures of speech. These metaphors have functions and orientations that politicians are not necessarily conscious of. (For more on metaphor and politics, see De Man 1984; Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Shapiro 1985.)

In this process, Palestinians' inviolable national rights (*al-thawabit*) were transformed into vague and flexible issues under different titles: "outstanding issues"; "permanent status issues" (*qadaya al-hal al-da'im*); and "core issues." The nature of these "issues" has yet to be processed and determined within the automatatic processes of peace through its diverse rituals. These rituals were constituted as the "only way" and the "only option" for resolving the conflict and generating peace.

Once the process is put into operation, considerable institutional and structural power flows via discourse to keep it going. Moving "forward," "progress," and "momentum" are perceived to be hierarchically superior than their opposite (to be backward, reactionary, or motionless). Therefore, taking measures to "save," "protect," and "revive" the process per se appears ethically defensible and desirable (Doc.2100; Doc.1451; Doc.1440). The peacemakers "endeavor to save the peace process, to protect it and to put it back on track" (L.10: 339). The need to ensure its "irreversibility" justified diverse (violent) actions, which were portrayed as

procedures to "*combat* all acts that aim to *destroy the peace process*, particularly terrorism and violence, and to *stand staunchly* against and *put an end* to all such acts" (J.13: 239, emphasis added). The effect of this understanding has re-regulated the colonized–colonizer relationship through judicial and institutional constructs.[3] It has also produced new binary categories in Palestinian society such as, pro/anti-Oslo, with/against the Palestinian Authority, violent/non-violent, resistance/compromise, lawful/fugitive, pragmatic/ideological, realistic/unrealistic, and so forth, which contributed to further Palestinian political disintegration. Critics like Edward Said and Joseph Massad predicted the entailments of the peace process (Massad 2006; Said 2002). As Massad put it, the PLO's recognition of Israel in 1993 "amounted to the final legitimation of the Jewish state as having the 'right' to be a racist apartheid state by the very people against whom its racist policies have been/are practiced …" (Massad 2006: 97).

The second half of the binary always indicates an anti-peace force, and is thus an obstacle to progress. Anyone who impeded the peace process by being "unpragmatic" and "unrealistic" seemed to merit blame and punishment. Anything that seemed incompatible with this system of peace was construed as "endanger[ing] peace and stability" (I.2: 142). This system of peace implicates peace agents in violent acts, contrary to the ideals of peace. It orders them to "continue to *combat* terror" and *"pave the way* for a Palestinian-Israeli future devoid of *terror and violence*" (K.1: 24, emphasis added). Nevertheless, the term *terror* was circulated in peace discourse without any functional definition. As we shall see, lack of definition usually favors the stronger party in deciding which acts constitute terror and which do not.

The uncertainty in the internal dynamics of motion has usually been coopted by self-serving assumptions borrowed from the neoliberal peace-building paradigm. When someone states that "the process must be put on track" as we have seen in citations above, the existence of the track and that such a track will lead to peace are assumptions. It is important to explain how the assumption of that movement, as something positive, produced particular conceptions of peace, and how certain practical measures were justified as a means for moving forward. Generally speaking, peace appeared in the image of an object undergoing constant movements and transformations. It is something that "grows," is "entrenched," is "built"; it requires a "solid basis" and "material conditions." It has "enemies" and "friends"; it is also precarious, facing constant dangers and risks from the "enemies of peace." Subsequently, peace-builders must undertake two opposed actions: to "build and protect" and to "combat and eliminate." Diplomats involved in the peace process declared that there is

> no real peace *without* security and stability. The parties declared that they are committed to *combat* all acts that aim to *destroy* the peace process, particularly *terrorism and violence*, and to *stand staunchly* against and *put an end* to all such acts.
>
> (I.13: 239)

Such modes of articulation constitute peace as being contingent upon security in its narrowest sense. It will be useful to keep the linguistic game of peace and security in mind: in the following chapters, more will be said on this nexus and its impact on the Palestinian discourse.

Perceptions of peace at the juncture of building and destroying stimulated the construction of

a "non-peace" subject position, which functions as a constitutive other.[4] The "enemies of peace" (the constitutive other of peace agents) stand in competition with the "alliance for peace." These perceptions also inform actions and embed the forces of "destruction" and "violence" as "required" elements for peace-making. Besides "promot[ing] security and stability," peace agents must also "prevent the enemies of peace from achieving their ultimate objective of destroying the real opportunity for peace" (J.26). The pursuit of peace bifurcated violence into two: violence from within, which is never constituted as violence but a "legitimate" and "required" act; and the violence that is automatically constituted as terrorism. Hence the "alliance for peace" is founded on a premise that does "not allow anti-peace forces to prevail" (L.4: 331). "The enemies of peace are purposefully and relentlessly attacking Israel. So that *war against terror being waged by those who support the path of peace*," said the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (L.31: 365, emphasis added). Nothing was said about violence against Palestinians.

The confused and ambiguous notions of "enemy" and "violence" put the whole peace-building endeavor into question. If "violence serves the enemies of peace," as the European Parliament declared, then how is it possible that violent acts carried out in the name of peace do not serve those enemies? In reality, the peace process gave violence form and validity as a means to "save," "protect," and "put the peace process on track" (K.2: 273; L.10: 339); that is, to continue stubbornly with the predetermined terms of peace that were set in Camp David 1978, in conjunction with notions elicited from neoliberal thought, rather than constructing genuine terms consistent with contextual human reality. This analytical bifurcation, with its well-received framework based around legitimate-illegitimate and builders-destroyers binaries interpret which actions are to be classified violence or non-violence. This helps to construct an internal Palestinian other, as I shall argue in later chapters.

Furthermore, the representation of peace as something in motion and progressive swept through the discourse of the donors and funders of the peace process. For example, European policy makers circulated the same kinetic tropes, such as the "*rule of the road* for the negotiating process," "*rowing* together in the *direction* of security," to "put the peace process back on *track*," and to "*restore momentum*, … *accelerating* permanent status negotiations" (L.28: 360–62). With these motion schemata in mind, certain actions were articulated as "obstacles" to peace, that is, as occluding progress and movement. This also informed and intercepted the UN legal judgment. We frequently hear or read that the UN has called the Jewish-only settlements in the West Bank "illegal and a major obstacle to peace" (L.6: 333). These enunciations blur the line between international law and peace process, and put the latter on a par with international law.

The "process" of peace coincided with another evolving "process" to govern spatial movement in the West Bank (I have discussed this in Badarin 2014). The latter process has a direct impact on the spatial sphere of Palestinian representatives and institutions. Since June 1967, Israeli legal and spatial strategies have been unfolding with the aim to govern and restrict Palestinian movement and utility of space (Halper 2009; Shehadeh 1997). However, revised transportation routes and mobility permits were already in place before the arrival of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza, and had also been codified in agreements with the PLO. Policies of spatial reorganization were carried out to control movement further and provide

oversight. A new net of roads was designed to achieve fluid movement for (mainly Jewish) Israelis and simultaneously diminish the mobility of Palestinians. Indeed, a hierarchical order was established, based on ethno-religious identities. Every Palestinian urban neighborhood was generically codified as an "Area", and collectively described as "Areas,"[5] in harmony with the Israeli concept of "territories" (Shenhav 2007). The internalization of this constrained the spatial and temporal horizons of Palestinians and their leadership to particular areas and periods of time. The Palestinian leadership endorsed, normalized, and internalized Israeli domination and control, so long as it remained "in an invisible manner," behind "tinted glass," with "indirect and invisible Israeli checking" (I.13: 158–159) and in absolute secrecy (Doc.2702). These became the spatial and temporal spheres from which Palestinian representatives have operated since 1994.

To be sure, discourse is not something coherent and without contradiction; on some occasions, Palestinians resisted secrecy. For example, Palestinians preferred pure occupation to the Israeli insistence on codifying Israeli oversight. The Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat "prefer[red] occupation" to the demand of maintaining "some Israeli [hidden] 'stuff' [on borders]" (Doc.616, UD).

Land, goods, and people were re-characterized to fit into the system controlling the "state of nature" in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians living there were given new green identification documents, permits for movement, and magnetic IDs. Land was divided into elastic[6] Areas A, B, and C; the sea was divided into areas K, L, and M; and goods were categorized into A1, A2, and B. The powerful defined these criteria (area, quantity, and type) and ensured the chronic dependency and underdevelopment of the weaker side (see Roy 2007).[7] Under the guise of the "free trade economy" and the attempt to "consolidate a foundation of free-market economy" (J.1), the Palestinian economy was put in an unequal competition with the well-established Israeli economy.

Although it is not my intention to evaluate the Oslo Accords, it is constructive to review its inconsistencies with regard to space. For example, on the one hand, it demands a "settlement freeze," while on the other hand, it describes an agreement to reap the "full amount of income tax collected from Palestinians" employed in the settlements, mainly in construction (Paris Protocol 1994, Article v/b 1994). Moreover, Palestinians assumed responsibility for protecting settlements: "the Palestinian side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the settlements" (I.19, Article xviii: 179). The British military liaison officer took it for granted that the PA National Security Forces' (NSF) "concept of operation" included the protection of Israeli settlements (Doc.308, Article 14, B-3). Obviously, this implies that the Palestinians can tolerate the continuation of Jewish-only settlements in the very area on which they aim to establish their own state. Despite the paradox between unabated Israeli expansion and the principle of "land for peace," Palestinians continued to engage with the peace process. This inconsistent behavior helped the Americans (among others) to downgrade Palestinians' pleas; as George Mitchell put it, "I have a 6 inch folder on my desk containing all your statements on the settlement freeze, and despite that you negotiated" (Doc.4899).

Conceptions revisited

The flow of metaphorical abstractions and, of course, the entailed actions impinge on nodal concepts in the Palestinian discourse. We should therefore ask how the meaning and position of organizing concepts like Palestine, liberation, return, and resistance evolve. The pre-eminence of mobility has placed limitations on what can be said. The very *possibility* of expressing something is constrained and modulated by the peace rituals and referentiality. These rituals became another constitutive substratum. Palestinians positioned themselves in uncertain temporary settings during the "interim phase" in parts of the West Bank and Gaza ("Gaza-Jericho first"), while looking for opportunities via peace rituals for further spatial and status *extension*.

Movement-ridden configurations, such as "*transfer* of jurisdiction," the "*withdrawal* of Israeli military government and its civil administration," "*withdrawal* from all populated areas," "*withdrawal* in mutually agreed phases to *redeployment* points along the borders of the occupied territories," "further redeployment", etc. (H.25: 59–60) molded the nature of conceivable actions. Such tropes are entrenched in (supposedly) peace-oriented Palestinian discourse; they gained primacy over the vocabulary of revolution and self-determination. A new competing cause, "the cause of genuine peace," thus emerged on the PLO's political agenda, later substituting its *raison d'être as a liberation movement* (H.27: 62). In 1993, the Executive Committee of the PLO declared in the name of all Palestinians that "Our brave people will remain determined on their *aims and rights* until just and *honorable peace* is attained …" (I.3: 144, emphasis added).

The discontinuation and replacement of "liberation rationale" in favor of the "cause of peace" (or "honourable peace") carried with it the possibility of reinterpreting the relationship between colonized and colonizer (Palestinians and Israelis respectively). The colonized–colonizer relationship was reproduced in the form of a *dispute* between two parties that needed to be settled through only direct negotiations. Bassam Abu-Sharif, who was a leading figure in the PLO and served as a senior advisor to Arafat, captures this view as follows: "We [the PLO] see no way for any dispute to be settled without direct talks between the parties to that dispute" (G.8: 310). In short, the order of replacement goes like this: dispute replaced conflict (Doc.3597); before that, conflict had replaced occupation; and the latter had replaced colonialism and imperialism, as earlier chapters demonstrated. Introducing the dispute relationship involves a difference of opinion about ambiguous "issues," rather than a national cause, and a commitment to resolve "all outstanding issues … through negotiations" (I.2: 142). The term "outstanding issues" is deceptive because it misleadingly implies that other issues were already resolved. This belies the depth of problem.

The "peaceful settlement" (*al-taswiyya al-silmiyya*) and "dispute to be settled" (*hal al-sira', hal al-niza'*) replaced the logic of liberation altogether. Such phrases explain the extent to which the Palestinians have internalized the Israeli formula for "self-government arrangements," "coordination," and "selfrule" for the "inhabitants of the territories," whereby these inhabitants (the Palestinians) are given "an opportunity to run their own affairs in most spheres" (H.29: 65) or to "enable the Palestinians to administer their own affairs" (H.42: 120). To internalize something does not necessarily mean to accept it; rather, it means to go

along with something as a *fait accompli*. To be sure, the Palestinian leadership drafted and approved a similar self-governing model that involved the establishment of a "new authority" to "enable the Palestinians to gain control over political, economic and other decisions that affect their lives and fate" (H.32: 73). Indeed, the Oslo Accords defined the scope of "spheres" in a functional and service-based way.[8] Moreover, the spheres-based agreement decentralized the Palestinian Authority vis-à-vis Israel into a mere direct "coordination": not only the main Palestinian Authority but also every authority organ had to have its quasi-independent relations with Israel. Serious debate on possible ramifications was obscured in maintaining rhetorical devices, which were quickly contradicted in practice, such as adherence to national Palestinians' rights by claiming that the new situation "does not in any way prejudice the exercise of their [the Palestinian] legitimate right to self-determination" (ibid.). The result of the practical measures taken to create a "new authority" with little administrative self-government has never been critically or legally analyzed (Abbas 1994; Qurie 2005; Shehadeh 1997).

Despite the change in the representative Palestinian discourse, the essence of the colonized–colonizer relationship between Israel and the Palestinians continued intact. The peace process introduced an additional network of intermediary institutions (offices, centers, police and intelligence forces, committees and sub-committees[9]) to administer and run Palestinian affairs. So instead of terminating the institutions of the Israeli military government and its "civil" administration, the intermediaries coexisted with them. In fact, the traditional colonial institutions "empowered" and "legitimized" the new intermediaries (J.6, Article VI).

The dispersion of intermediary institutions represents a schema for the division and delegation of labor between new and existing institutions. So the entire undertaking of managing the occupied Palestinians was redistributed afresh, yet while preserving Israel as the ultimate source of power and authority (see Shehadeh 1997). The flow of information and power via intermediaries was given a new shape through mechanisms of "coordination," "cooperation," "liaison," "communication," and so forth. These mechanisms established and serviced the micro-power relations that "monitored" and ensured the continuation of "exchange of information between the two sides" (I.19, Annex I: 181; J.6, Article X, Annex III). This control extends over the dead as much as it does living Palestinians: the PA is obliged to "inform the [Israeli] Civil Administration in a routine manner of birth or deaths" of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza (J.6, Annex II: 217). This allows traditional colonial institutions to update their detailed information about colonized subjects. This reveals how bio-power management was inscribed in agreements with the colonized. In other words, the Palestinian leadership had already internalized the primacy of colonial institutions in determining and keeping track of who is Palestinian and who is not.

Instead of writing a new innovative narrative of settler decolonization that terminates domination, the peace process proved to abet settler colonization by compelling the colonized to *coordinate* and *cooperate*. Resistance to the colonial power was dampened. The current Palestinian state of affairs is ordered by a Palestinian–Israeli relationship based on dependency and dominance over almost all imaginable domains (economic, military, judicial, cultural, and transport).

Facts and indications gathered from the negotiation record and agreements between the

PLO/PA and Israel are particularly telling. The relationship is codified into agreements that institutionalize the Israeli hegemony and dominance under the pretense of ambiguous formulas of "coordination," "cooperation," and "state-to-state relation." Security and economic relations are among the key arrangements that govern the Palestinian–Israeli relationship on the macroscopic and microscopic level. Security-wise, at the macroscopic level, the PLO/PA has endorsed foreign tutelage composed of military bodies. They argued for "bilateral and regional security cooperation from Israel based on the principle of reciprocity and sovereign equality" and "strong international presence … under the leadership of the UN, NATO, US, EU, or a combination thereof" (Doc.2702, Annex). It is not clear what "reciprocity and sovereign equality" means in the context of gigantic and powerful institutions.

Cooperation or collaboration with Israel (*al-ta'awun ma' isra'il*) used to be taboo in Palestinian discourse. Palestinians executed many of their fellows on the ground of "*al-ta'awun*." Through the Oslo Accords and the so-called Performance Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution (the Roadmap), cooperation – especially security (and economic) cooperation (*al-ta'awun al-amni*) – became systematic and customary (Oslo I: 3/e Annex II; Annex III). The prefix "co" suggests joint actions and purposes. It also moderates the psychological distance between involved parties and distorts the reality of the colonized–colonizer relationship by masking it as something else. The logic of coordination and cooperation has been internalized at the micro level of daily interactions. In one telling example, the PA complained about Israeli raids on Palestinian towns because of a *lack of prior coordination* with the PA, not the raids or Israeli military "missions" per se. Chief PLO/PA negotiator Saeb Erekat argued, "Israel *has not coordinated its activities with Palestinian security* forces despite its obligation to do so under the Interim Agreement and the Road Map. It *failed to share any information about its planned military activities in Nablus*" (Doc.2918, emphasis added). In another instance, the Palestinians asked Israeli security to submit a list of "dangerous [Palestinian] people" to the PA so that the latter could arrest them (Doc.2657; Doc.1832).

The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) for the Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt (signed November 2005) is a paradigm for the mapping of "invisible" Israeli control (Doc.3264). From that agreement we learn about three types of responsibly underlying the practical measures of the peace process: first, the Palestinian side performs the required action; second, the EU and US contribute with funds and equipment, and monitor the performance of the Palestinians; third, the Israeli side approves and decides. The coordination and cooperation schema prescribed US-led training and preparation of Palestinian security personnel, European funding, and Israeli evaluation of Palestinian performance. This schema coopted the Palestinian security and political leadership. For example, the former Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, was recorded saying in a security meeting that the "Israelis, even [Yuval] Diskin,[10] are saying good things about Pal[estinian] performance" (Doc.3274).

The application of coordination and cooperation resulted in externalizing a sector of the Palestinian people who do not to fit the peace process mold: these began to constitute a new, internal Palestinian "other." Many security meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives provided a candid exchange of information and involved political analysis evaluating Hamas and Gaza, especially since 2006. The language depicted the internal "other"

as a security threat and an obstinate obstacle to the progress of the peace process. The following summery of a security meeting (note the interrogative style) between the Palestinian side, represented by Saeb Erekat (SE) and Colonel Hazem Attallah (HA), and the Israeli side, represented by Ephraim Sneh (ES) and Eitan Dangot (ED), demonstrates the openness of discussion regardng the conditions of this Palestinian "other":

> ES: how many loyal men do you have now in the PG?
>
> ED asked about the recent transfer of guns from Jordan. HA replied that 200 guns were transferred to Ramallah and 465 to Gaza. He said that a number of the guns are not fit for use (some are very old – 1950s). He said he needed at least functional Kalashnikovs. He concluded that this transfer is insufficient. His preliminary assessment was that 60 out of the 200 guns in Ramallah are simply not useable.
>
> ED asked about number of people that Hamas has on the ground in Gaza. HA said the estimate is up to 5,000.
>
> ES asked about reports that there may be an agreement with Hamas: If so, what will happen?
>
> SE said it [an agreement between Hamas and the PA] will not happen. The issue is not about forming a joint government – rather it's about the programme, and the Quartet conditions.
>
> (Doc.640)

In practice, the PA frequently committed severe breaches of human rights. The PA acknowledged conducting surveillance and censorship of "mosques" and control of "*al-zaqat*" (Islamic religious donations), "killing Palestinians," incarcerating Palestinians, and committing violations of human rights as a means of countering the internal "other" (Doc.4827). "Observing and follow[ing] incitement in mosques, schools, universities and residential clusters, and local media" also became normal practice (Doc.160; Doc.173). Ironically, the joint US and EU training programs, which were (supposedly) "heavy on human rights," did not challenge these human rights violations (Dayton 2009: 7). As General Keith Dayton put it: "the [PA] intelligence guys are good. The Israelis like them. They say they are giving as much as they are taking from them – but they are causing some problems for international donors because they are torturing people" (Doc.4676). The way this *general* (the representative of a US/EU project) articulates the problems of torture and aid highlights his callous indifference towards the former and concern over funds for his mission in the West Bank and Gaza. As a matter of fact, the head of the PA security forces divulged that PA police forces were given orders to shoot Palestinians in contravention of human rights. In his own words:

> In Qabatya [a Palestinian town] today when someone shot at the NSF [PA National Security Forces], they shot back. That is the way, they have to learn to respect the authority of the Palestinian security forces. I understand human rights, but this is not Switzerland.
>
> (Doc.2520, HA)

The Palestinian security apparatus internalized the language of Israeli security to the extent

of contemplating "the possibility … of establishing a secure buffer zone to prevent missiles" launched from Gaza into Israel (Doc.616, HA). Anti-occupation acts sounded unreasonable to the Palestinian leadership. For example, in a security meeting with Dayton, Erekat wondered, "why anyone would attack Karni [Crossing between Gaza and Israel]. What is their interest?" Activities like attacks on Karni or launching missiles were constructed as a vehicle "to undermine the president [Abbas], and generally to cause trouble" (ibid.) In other words, these acts were considered irrational, merely an attempt to "cause trouble." Even more important, the Palestinian leadership did not view Israeli policies as a valid justification for such action. This framing constitutes a positive link between Israel, the PA, and internal Palestinian politics that helps to interpret acts against colonization as being against the Palestinian leadership. Indeed, the PA is coopted by the neoliberal peace, or the American-European framework of peace. And since 2002 it has increasingly believed that implementing the precepts of this peace and doing "everything possible to build the [state] institutions" is the only way toward Palestinian statehood (Doc.4827).

Confusion by design

The piecemeal transformation of Palestinian political discourse established a certain vision of "the possible" and "the realistic" (*al-mumkin, al-waqi'i*) solution to the question of Palestine, based on fragmented readings of equivocal geopolitical conditions, diplomatic interactions, and interpretations of UN resolutions, yet with an equally caricature-like grasp of the object of this reading and how others, mainly Israel and the US, interpreted this object; that is, is the reality (*al-waqi')* in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. In fact, the PLO snubbed the internal Palestinian knowledge of maps, legal affairs, and reality on the ground (Shehadeh 1997: 161).

The PLO/PA gave up the quest for justice in favor of a "realistic" territorial arrangement. Ironically, the PLO recognized Israel in the absence of a single word to describe its territorial character. The boundaries of the arrangement were conceived through the so-called "Arab and international legitimacy," consequently the Palestinian leadership thought that it had already made a compromise by accepting 22 percent of historical Palestine. In his letter to President Clinton during the Camp David negotiations in 2000, Arafat made it clear that "by accepting UNSC Resolution 242, I have accepted only 22 percent of the historical land of Palestine. Thus I have made the biggest and foremost concession for a final settlement" (cited in Qurie 2006: 352). However, the internalized operative terminology (e.g. "based on," "in accordance with Resolution 242," and "agreed upon") tilted toward the Israelis' understanding: that the compromise had not yet been made and it needed to be negotiated from within the 22 percent.[11] The "permanent status issues", which were postponed for future negotiations, were on elements within the 22 percent, the West Bank, and Gaza (I.4: 145).

Peace-building is not a singular endeavor, but a compound situation of consistent and inconsistent narratives, justice, and injustice; it is a situation where no argument is dismissed and every view is heard. My critique of the peace process is therefore concerned with the denial of an equal opportunity to articulate the terms of peace and justice from the beginning. The peace process framework determined these terms in advance. The language of power and politics modulated the concept of peace; hence, something is either just or unjust only

according to the conditions of power. The USA laid down the principles of a "just peace" between Israel and the Palestinians after it emerged triumphant from the first Gulf War of 1990–1991:

> A *comprehensive peace* must be *grounded in* the United Nations Security Council Resolutions *242 and 338* and the principle of *territory for peace*. This principle must be elaborated to *provide for Israel's security and recognition*, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the *twin test of fairness and security* ... we *must foster economic development for the sake of peace* and progress … foster *economic freedom and prosperity* for all people in region.… By meeting these challenges, we can build a framework for peace.
>
> (Bush 1991, emphasis added)

According to this view, although the "peace" framework was stabilized to some extent, the object of negotiations was confused from the beginning. The PLO's starting point was historic Palestine, of which it settled on 22 percent; whereas the Israeli starting point was from within the 22 percent of Palestine (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza). Despite this key "misunderstanding," peace rituals continued on ambiguous grounds, negotiating territorial and ideal aspects of peace within the phrase "territory for peace."

The market metaphor embedded in the phrase "territory *for* peace" (or "land for peace"), together with the reductive positivist notion of security, formed the basis for the meaning of peace and justice. Arbitrary intertextuality from selected UN Security Council resolutions fixed the meaning of "just," "lasting," and "comprehensive" peace. Meanwhile, these principles gained broader recognition through their currency among think tanks and non-governmental organizations. For example, the Alliance for Peace echoed the words above, declaring that it aims "at the achievement of lasting and comprehensive peace based on the formula of land for peace, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their aspects" (L.4: 331).

Justice and fairness evolved as no more than the exchange of land, the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338, security arrangements, and economic development. From this perspective, a "just and comprehensive peace" constitutes the interplay between these elements, thus dismissing the reality of suffering on the ground. In other words, the termination of colonization or occupation and the move to address the rights of Palestinian refugees were undermined in the supposed formula for a "just and comprehensive peace," while alternative peace visions were disregarded. These "peace" principles filtered down to local leadership. For example, in August 1989 a handful of West Bank and Gaza local figures signed a memorandum calling for "implementation of the principle of land for peace" (G.27: 347). It would be fair to say that there was some sort of consensus on the broader framework; however, the details of "how much" (e.g., land, security, sovereignty) were left to business-like negotiation; indeed, this is the following chapter will explore.

Notes

1 The Israeli Government and the PLO negotiated publicly in Washington after the Madrid Conference, whereas a secret

negotiation channel was initiated in Oslo in early 1993.

2 The Oslo Accords, including the Paris Economic Protocol, have effectively institutionalized Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians. For a thorough critique of Oslo Accords, see Said, *The End of the Peace Process*, 2001; see also Shehadeh 1997.

3 For a thorough examination of the legal structure that has developed since the Olso porcess, see Shehadeh 1997.

4 On the theoretical debate about binary construction, see Howarth 1997.

5 According to the Paris Economic Protocol of 1994, the term *areas* "means the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority." This entails that the Palestinian leadership endorsed the codification of Palestinian urban areas.

6 For more on the notion of spatial elasticity in the West Bank, see Weizman 2007.

7 The Paris Economic Protocol connects and weighs the price of every product and service in the West Bank and Gaza against the Israeli market. For example, the quantity of imported goods is classified into categories A1 and A2, and if the quantity exceeds an "agreed upon" limit the PA must charge no less than the Israeli purchase tax and levies. Israel has automatic ("agreed upon") veto power on the quantity and type of imported goods. The Protocol formalized Israel's economic hegemony over the Palestinian market in the following ways: using the Israeli currency; the Israeli monopoly over customs; and fixing Palestinian VAT (15–16 percent) at a similar rate to Israeli VAT (17 percent). Moreover, the Palestinian gasoline price is directly linked to the one in Israel: the difference in price does not exceed 15 percent. The high process of gasoline in conjunction with Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza (until 2005) that cause immense delay makes the transportation of products extremely expensive.

8 In September 1992, the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin proposed the following fifteen spheres: administration of justice; administration of personal matters; agriculture; ecology; education and culture; finance, budget, and taxation; health; social welfare; industry and commerce communication; labor; local police; local transportation; municipal affairs; religious affairs; and tourism (H.41). These spheres "encompass nearly all aspect of the Palestinians' daily life. Issues relating to security, foreign relations, Israeli and vital Israeli needs in the territories will remain in Israel's hand in the framework of residual power" (ibid.: 99). Israel wanted to transfer its authorities into the following spheres: "education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and other authorities agreed upon" (I.4: 149, article iv). Hanan Ashrawi declined this proposal.

9 Examples include the following committees: Coordination; the Liaison Office; the Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee; the Joint Regional Civil Affairs Sub-Committee; the Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center; the Aviation Sub-Committee; and various "ministries."

10 Yuval Disken is the former director of the General Security Service (Shabak) in Israel.

11 The Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242 differs from that of the Palestinians. Israel believes that Resolution 242 grants her rights in parts of the West Bank; for more details, see Dayan 2010 (22).

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5 A discontinued image of Palestine

The two-decade long (1991–2011) peace process between the PLO and Israel is a significant constitutive milestone in the Palestinian discourse. The process has played a significant role in the production, revision, and displacement of actionorienting concepts like Palestine and inviolable Palestinian national rights (*al-thawabt*). Although such concepts continued to organize official Palestinian discourse, their contents changed. This is what I shall be referring to as the logic of replacement.

As we have seen above, the historical image associated with the referent Palestine became no longer (spontaneously) available in thought. Instead, partial components of the referent overwhelmed the discourse. Components or "issues" relating to Palestine crop up more easily than the whole cause: Palestine as a complete idea is lost.

Losing, or muddling, the completeness of Palestine disrupted the perception of Palestinians as an "imagined political community" (to use Anderson's phrase) and cast further ambiguity over and within the Palestinian subject position. This led to supplementary afterthoughts and qualifications being injected into the discourse, sometimes in parenthesis: for example "Palestinians (living in the occupied Palestinian territory)." These qualifications denote who is included, excluded, and whose opinion matters. Throughout the peace process, the imagined "state of Palestine" – in the West Bank and Gaza – replaced Palestine as a perceived totality; equally, the assumed state replaced the PLO, which represents an overarching framework that incorporates all Palestinians (Doc.3597).

The PA expressed "content with the 1967 [border] line" as a "baseline for the border" between the future Palestinian state and Israel (Doc.2731). It is important to note the ambiguity of the word "baseline" in relation to the much repeated Arabic phrase, *holding on to Palestinian inviolable national rights* (*al-tamasuk bi al-thawabi al-wataniyya*). There is a qualitative difference between the baseline for a right and an inviolable right. The former suggests indeterminacy and the potential to bargain over the said right, making the territorial dimension anything but inviolable – even to the Palestinian leadership. It also suggests that the imagined map of the "new Palestine" is not even settled in Palestinian political consciousness, resulting in the strains of indeterminacy embodied in phrases like "modifications" on the 1967 borders, land swaps and annexation (ibid.).

Notions such as "baseline" and "swaps" have consequential infiltrations into the Palestinian narrative, rights, and spatial perception of Palestine. Endorsing these notions implicitly involves the recognition of Israel's entitlement to the refugees' properties beyond the 1967 non-border line (land, in particular, which Israel classifies as Absentee Property[1]). Moreover, it deeply impinges on the refugees' right to restitution.[2] Hence, the PLO/PA's simultaneous bidding for restitution and swaps is inconsistent. However, this is not to derogate from the right

itself, rather from the politics framing that right. The leadership has been conscious of this dilemma since a confidential analysis carried out by the Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) highlighted the implication of the swaps principle on refugee rights (Doc.3001).

In an interview on the Israeli Channel II on 2 November 2012, which coincided with the Balfour Declaration's anniversary, PLO/PA President Mahmoud Abbas went beyond the tacit meaning of Palestine as subsumed in the peace process codes. "Palestine now for me is [19]67 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, this is now and forever. I believe that [the] West Bank and Gaza *is* Palestine … and the other parts [are] Israel," President Abbas said. He also denied his right to return to his original home in Safad, a town whose Palestinian population were driven into exile in 1948. Of course this is a personal choice. However, interpretation flows from within text and context, and therefore, while speaking from the subject position of the "president," and particularly on Israeli TV, political subtexts diminishing the right of return need to be noticed.

All in all, the question of Palestine in its totality had officially ended in 1991. The logic of division penetrated through the wholeness, slicing it up into issues, sub-issues, and claims that could be debated (Doc.2547).[3] The suspension of the totality of Palestine in favor of the selectively imagined components exemplifies what Edward Said called the oxymoron of "overlapping territories" (Said 1994: 210). The Palestinians are at once fighting for recognition and internalizing colonial designs for Palestine.[4] The Palestinian question has been split into various parts, in typological order, as "core issues" (these include territory, refugees, Jerusalem, security, water) and "generic issues" (these include state-to-state issues such as compensation, economics and trade, fiscal matters, infrastructure and services, energy, tourism) (Doc.2093). Each sub-issue was given a particular political track, or policy.

Each issue is placed within a mathematical-judicial schema of percentages, numbers, UN resolutions, and pragmatism.[5] Consider, for example, the "issues" of land, Jerusalem, and the refugees. The "land issue" is reduced to the size of the territory occupied in 1967, using percentages, swaps, and exchanges. Jerusalem is also split into "East and West," "Yerushalayim and Al-Quds," and "territory and arrangements" (Doc.2003). The refugees' rights and fate, the core of the Palestinian question, were demoted to the status of an issue ("the refugees issue"), which was split between the policies of Tal Baker and Saeb Erekat on the one side, and Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas on the other. In this way, four men were entrusted to determine the fate of approximately half of the Palestinian population, yet with "unclear Palestinian red lines" (Doc.3460). Furthermore, the "refugee issue" is divided between a set of options: return to Israel, return to the (putative) Palestinian state, compensation, or settlement in refugees' current place of residence or in a third country (Doc.2731). As far as the return option is concerned, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were prioritized over the rest.[6] The political estimates were geared toward diminishing the possibility of the refugees returning to their homes in accordance with international law, and more emphasis was put on "marketing" the non-return options. This will be discussed further at the end of the chapter.

Core and generic issues come with a "matrix" of agreed or disagreed upon "positions," "offers and counteroffers" (Doc.3610; Doc.2826). The difference between the Israeli and

Palestinian positions is articulated as a "gap." In the words of the Palestinian negotiator-politicians: "We look into the *positions of both sides* and means to *bridge the gap* between them"; "We all know what the end game looks like (1967 border with minor modifications …). *It is a matter of trade-offs that can be agreed [upon] quickly*"; and there are bound to be "trade-offs within and between issues" (Doc.2454; Doc.1815; Doc.4861, SE, emphasis added). The term *gap* is both strategic and misleading. It falsely underrates differences[7] and insinuates an impression that the process is "moving forward" (according to the logic of mobility) and that "trade-offs" (according to the logic of the market) will keep the process running (Doc.2093).

The transformation from the national representation of the Palestinian cause to a political dispute modulated by mathematical-judicial and market-like negotiations led to the production of new apparatus (the PLO Department of Negotiation, NSU) and the destruction of old ones (the Department of Refugee Affairs). Obviously, this formula dispensed with the *fida'iyyun* (freedom fighters) subject position, which it replaced with those of an army of lawyers, negotiators, experts, advisors, and bureaucrats. For example, although the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs still exists in name, it does not appear anywhere in the negotiation record. Out of this assemblage of embryonic institutions and positions emerged a technical and political language of sub-institutions, sub-committees, categories, and so forth.[8]

Perhaps the major effect of transition from national struggle to dispute manifests itself in the loose ends of the nexus between the forerunning institutions embodied in the PLO and the subsequent institutions that the PA stands for. Officially, the PLO is supposed to determine the political and statutory platform of the PA (J.1: 207). In reality, however, Israel was given the right (at least) to have a say in the design of PA's structure, legislative, and executive power, in accordance with the Interim Agreement of 1995 (J.17).[9] The shapes of the PA and its institutions are bound to, and "empowered" by, Israeli policies and institutions. This is not to dismiss Palestinian agency, but to describe the conditions under which it operates. The result has been an ambivalent PLO-PA oscillation between discursive layers, according to audience: between ritual, formal, and rhetorical declarations on the one hand, and practical and performative discourse on the other.

Palestinian politicians were caught in a dilemma: it was not clear whether to speak from a PLO or PA position, necessitating a forward slash between the two structures – PLO/PA. The forward slash tells us a lot about this complex and opaque situation; it is both almost impossible to distinguish between the two entities, and yet still possible to alternate between them. The "PLO/PA" imperative is confusing and expedient at the same time. It turned out to be useful since it has made it possible for the leadership to situate itself strategically in two positions at once. First, the leadership has maintained exclusive representation of the Palestinian people without corresponding accountability. Second, PLO prerogatives and institutions were virtually put on hold. So whilst speaking from the PLO's position, the PA, represented by a thin elite, became the actual agent.[10] In sum, by capitalizing on the PLO's established political function and rhetorical capital,[11] the PLO framework was employed as a legitimizer for the decisions of a limited number of unrepresentative politicians and institutions. The PLO/PA leadership, institutions, and decisions are deeply subsumed in

colonial conditions. (Yet they attempt to determine the fate of the entire Palestinian people.) Thus creative initiatives of resistance, which exploit the loose ends of the colonial conditions, are found outside the official Palestinian institutions: they emerge form within popular Palestinian resistance movements, backed by international solidarity campaigns like the international movement of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS).

The PLO's leadership perceived Israel, especially after the first Intifada, as leaning toward "a compromise [*hal wasat*] based on 1967 borders" (Qurie 2005: 77). Articulating the settlement on 22 percent of historic Palestinian as *hal wasat* is absolutely flawed. In Arabic, *hal wasat* (literally, "a middle solution") evokes notions of "equality," "two sides," and "balanced interests" between the PLO and Israel. It impelled a reflexive reframing of Palestinian rights into Israeli "concessions" (*tanazulat*), "compromise" (*taswiyya*), and "gains" (*muktasabat*) (ibid.: 77, 98, 199).

Conceptual schemes on which the PLO/PA relied (dis)informed its judgment of the power play at work in the international relations in which it had become embroiled. The leaders' misguided perception cannot be more effectively expressed than in the following passage, from a senior Palestinian politician who was closely involved in the secrete Oslo channel:

> Negotiations were not between a defeated party and a victorious one imposing its conditions; it was understood that we were not the strong party, but neither were we the weaker party. This is the philosophy that governed the negotiation equation between the PLO and the Israeli government.
>
> (Hassan 1993: 22)

Let us consider few details to make the point clearer. First of all, the phrase *al-taswiyya al-silmiyya* (peaceful settlement) is misguided. The meaning embedded in the Arabic word *taswiyya* (derived from *sawwa*) entails equality and justice. Believing itself to be engaged in a relationship of "parity" and "partnership" between the "two sides," and in the context of well-established inter-state relations – international relations between Israel and the USA, in particular – the PLO/PA conducted itself inappropriately. It relied on a flawed consciousness of state capacities that were unparalleled in reality. The fiction of the "state of Palestine" even led to statist concepts and titles – such as "president," "prime minister," "ambassadors," "ministries," and "coup d'état" – being used in the West Bank and Gaza. This positioned Palestinian leaders as a subservient, colonized elite (see Fanon 2008, 1965).

After all, the PLO/PA is not state —though it has some elements of the state, and its entire structure is contingent upon colonial conditions and foreign sustenance. The framework of the peace process introduces political, administrative, and security functions to the PLO/PA without sovereignty.

The negotiation paradigm created a false equivalence: two equal parties sitting at the table to negotiate their respective positions —"our position" vis-à-vis "your positions" (Doc.2176). This order transferred the burden to the Palestinian side. It requires them to reciprocate "equally" or else be perceived as a negative force, obstacle to peace, and a non-partner. They are expected to make "offers", "counter offers" and "give" as much as they "take", notwithstanding the very little or nothing they initially have to reciprocate with.

The PLO/PA reliance on essentially *statist* concepts and terminologies (ministries, ministers, national security, governments, elections, *etc.*) without corresponding state-order in the real world has created a perplexed self-perception, neither a state entity nor a liberation movement. Consequently, the PLO/PA has lost, or at least dampened, its power as a liberation movement (a non-state actor). The account of power relations I present here is concerned with automaticity, which disempowers the PLO/PA and prevents it from using its genuine abilities as a liberation organization, rather than a state (this is not about Israel's power over the PLO/PA.) While being coopted into the false subject position of a state entity, the maneuvering capacity of the PLO/PA was diminished from within. This can be understood as self-abnegation, which is precisely what constrained the means for the struggle against colonial power.

Foucault observed that power and resistance to power are interwoven (Foucault 1978: 95). Palestinian power is resistance, in all its forms, to the power of Israeli settler-colonialism; the Palestinians' power, therefore, is not outside the colonial system. However, the clout of resistance originates from different regimes and rules. The (classical) power of colonialism originates from state apparatus, whereas counter-forces to colonialism emerge from non-state apparatus. The different nature of the two powers makes acts of resistance less predictable in magnitude and form. From this vantage point, harmonizing resistance with the power it is disposed to challenge and dismantle breaks the opposing nexus between them and makes the former more cooptative. The quasi-state structure within which Palestinians found themselves after the Oslo process reduced the scope for resistance.

A non/violent struggle

The character of Palestinian struggle evolved over time, and in parallel the means of the struggle evolved too. International law establishes a direct correlation between self-determination and the "legitimacy" of the struggle "by any means" against powers infringing on the right of self-determination, as UNGA Resolution 2649 XXV suggests. Apparently, this resolution makes no distinction between violent and non-violent means. Given the function of referentiality, and the fact that Palestinians are seeking their self-determination endorsed by international law, they have expressed their right to use "any means" to achieve that goal. It is pertinent to emphasize that Palestinians embraced multiple means to resist British and Israeli colonialism since 1917 (Qumsiyeh 2010). Nevertheless, the disctinction between violence and non-violence turned out to be an uneasy issue in the Palestinian discourse. In 1993, the PLO once again denounced terrorism[12] and pledged to undertake expansive measures, beyond the customary (however contested) definition of terrorism,[13] against "other acts of violence" (I.2: 142). Despite this pledge, the paradigm of non-violence remained on the margins of the PLO/PA discourse until the appearance of the so-called Quartet Principles or Conditions (*shurut al-ruba'iyyia*) in 2006.[14] Phrases like "culture of non-violence" and "non-violent means of conflict resolution" began to make frequent appearances in documents, plans, negotiations records, and above all in the street (see Doc.1987; Doc.2162).[15] Ironically, Mohammad Dahlan, who once occupied senior security positions in the PA apparatus, prescribed extreme violence as a vehicle to advance non-violence: "And we've told Hamas

that if *they* even think about *terrorist activities* after the agreement, *we* will *crush them*. *They* have the right to struggle through *other* means – but *not* violence" (Doc.38, emphasis added).

Indeed this violence was institutionalized and received generous financial and military resources under so-called capacity-building schemes, which prescribe violence to uproot the spirit of (non/violent) resistance and compel the colonized to cooperate and coordinate with the colonizer. It is ironic to find the so-called peace sponsors/agents institutionalizing, funding, and equipping violence, while expressing truculence toward the violent resistance against colonization. Violence is doubled, adding to the original violence: this is settler-colonialism. I will explore this in more detail in Chapter 6.

Internal Palestinian discourse on the means of the struggle became acute after the first Palestinian democratic election in 2006. The means of the struggle were muddled with new phrases on governability, legitimacy, and democracy. Here are a few examples. The political platform of the Palestinian National Unity Government (NUG) formed in 2007 called for "a Continued Cessation of Violence: While the NUG reaffirms the Palestinian people's inalienable and internationally-recognized right to resist occupation through legitimate means [*sic*]" (Doc.1674). Never mind the fact that international law says "any means." A senior Palestinian negotiator argued that "Every [Palestinian] party must … reject violence and only use democratic means for implementing their program" (Doc.1962, YAR). Furthermore, the relative achievement of violent struggle against the occupation/colonialism was constructed as a threat to the PLO/PA political line. For instance, the PA considered Israeli withdrawal from Gaza to be a threat to its policy of negotiation, signaling "a victory for violent elements" (Doc.177). The former PA prime minister, Salam Fayyad, argued against the opening of the Gaza border crossings because "the message will be that rockets [of Hamas] yield results" (Doc.2330). Despite the ambiguity of the terms "violence," "legitimate means," and "democratic means," none of these was defined or contextually reviewed. This omission strategically leaves space for constituting any action other than negotiations as violence. President Abbas rejected any notion of "violence" in resisting daily colonial actions, and stressed that "We want to use diplomacy. We want to use politics. We want to use negotiations. We want to use peaceful resistance. That's it" (Abbas 2012). In this way, enough Palestinian energy was consumed in warding off the (violent) forces standing in the face of Israeli colonial violence. This linguistic play constituted an arbitrary nexus between non-violence and the legitimacy principle (at odds with international law) in order to exclude not only rival political parties that do not (officially) embrace the PA's strategy, but also rival visions.

The "peaceful and popular resistance" gained further capital during the Fatah–Hamas reconciliation talks and the so-called Prisoners' Document. However, official calls for popular resistance remain unsubstantiated with either political goals or strategy. There are inherent contradictions between the structural conditions of the PLO/PA and the requirements of popular resistance. Take, for example, the conditions of Israeli–Palestinian security coordination and economic dependency, which eviscerate the self-esteem and self-reliance that any popular action requires. Riding the tide of popular resistance requires genuine grassroots initiatives to counter settler expansion.

As I mentioned elsewhere, discourse is neither coherent nor linear. Although the PLO/PA draw heavily on international law, referentiality was shelved with regard to the means of the

struggle once all options beyond negotiation and diplomacy were ruled out. In this regard, the end result is an attenuated conceptualization of the means of the struggle. Phrases such as "legitimate," "democratic," or "non-violent" demean the already diminished power of the colonized to resist colonization, even beyond that allowed by the default formula of international law. The distinction between violence and non-violence seeks to disarm the Palestinians' right to use violence as a means of resistance to colonialism. Whereas Israel continues to inflict violence on the Palestinians, and continues to use "any means" to sustain its dominance. The Palestinian discourse on non/violence did not emerge out of moral consideration, but rather for political purposes – first, to placate the peace sponsors and Israel, and later to exclude internal rival political forces, as we shall see in Chapter 6. Considering violent actions in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination as illegitimate and undemocratic is a new area of internalization of the Israeli perspective. It reverses the right to use any means in the struggle for self-determination. Violent and non-violent means are tools for resistance to power; it is always contingent upon local conditions, initiative, and creativity to select the best tools for resistance in any given situation. However, selection should always be made not only against the backdrop of strategic and tactical evaluations, but also a moral one.

A non/viable state

Donors' technical phraseology introduced the notion of a "viable" Palestinian entity, which gradually evolved into a state. In June 1997, the European Union presidency concluded that "The creation of a *viable and peaceful* sovereign Palestinian *entity* is the best *guarantee* of Israel's security" (L.28: 359, emphasis added). Former US President Bill Clinton echoed the same point: "I think there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a *sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodates Israeli's security* requirements *and the demographic realities*" (Clinton 2001). Viability here is bound with the Israeli conditions and unfolds as function of security. The Israeli perspective is a constitutive part of the interpretation of *viability*. For Israel, the nature of any tolerable Palestinian entity can be no more than an arrangement of an "enlarged autonomy," which the Palestinians might call a "state" if they wish (L.3: 329).[16]

It is common to speak of independent or sovereign states; however, the term "viable state" is an anomaly in political and international relations theory. Since 1974 Palestinians have been calling for the establishment of an "independent Palestinian state"; statehood is a key element of *al-thawabt al-wataniyya* (national inviolable rights). The phrase "viable state" (*dawla qabila lilhaya*) entered Palestinian discourse following George W. Bush's speech of 24 June 2002 (Bush 2002), where he outlined his vision for peace. Since then, the "Bush vision for peace" (*ru'yyat Bush lil-salam*) has been inscribed in the negotiators' terms of reference. President Bush laid down the interpretation of "viable state" as follows: (1) it achieves Israel's security; (2) it is peaceful and democratic; (3) it is "based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognize borders"; (4) it should "resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees" (i.e., short of return); and he later added (5) it should be "contiguous, sovereign and independent" (Bush

2004) and (6) "Palestine [should function] as a Palestinian homeland" (Bush 2007).

From the Palestinian standpoint, however, a viable state has to be economically and politically independent (Doc.2863), geographically contiguous, and "capable of absorbing most Palestinians here [in the West Bank and Gaza] and in the Diaspora [i.e. the refugees]" (Doc.2328). In another meeting, Ahmad Qurie (Abu Alaa) stated clearly that a viable state means "A state that has adequate land space that is geographically contiguous and is *able to absorb all civilians of whom refugees* are a part" (Doc.2309, emphasis added). The third aspect accommodates the Israeli understanding of "our *mutual interest* in the establishment of a viable Palestinian state" (Doc.1963, TL), and Bush's interpretation of a viable Palestinian state, mainly points (4) and (6). Here again the refugees were rendered a bargain chip in exchange for statehood.

The Palestinian endorsement of the adjective "viable" to describe their putative statehood, regardless of their interpretation of its contents, implies further elasticity of the meaning of the Palestinian national rights and a countenance to negotiate the internal substances of the already limited self-determination that the PLO ventured in 1988. The registers of viability were determined in advance, outside negotiations, as something subservient to the colonial obsession with the demographic development of the natives. Considering the extent of Israel's obsessions with security and demographics, the supposed Palestinian entity/state may be anything but viable.

At the marketplace of peace

The June 1967 war sketched the broader contours of the enviable peace in the international discourse. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 in November 1967 to frame the terms for a (supposedly) "just and lasting peace" between the Arab countries and Israel. For that peace to come, the resolution stipulates Israeli withdrawal "from [notice the deliberate omission of the definite article 'the' here] territories occupied" in 1967, in keeping with the principle of "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and in exchange for the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency." In essence, this formula is congruent with the realist interpretation of peace; it juxtaposes *territory* with *non-belligerency* and constitutes land and peace as convertible entities.

The metaphor loaded in the phrase "land/territory for peace" is the first building block of the market logic in the peace process that constitutes land and peace into bargain and barter objects. The phrase combines two concepts that belong to two different configurative meanings and rules of formation. Land has a quantifiable physical existence, whereas peace is ideational, qualitative and a relative experience. On this account, performing mathematical calculations over land is more tangible than working on the notion of peace. Hence, all types of logarithmic questions arise: how much land is required? What sort of peace is to be made for such area of land? If peace is equivalent to security, then how much land needs to be annexed for security reasons? The list of detail-focused questions can grow much longer. Moreover, the deliberate omission of the definite article (*the*) encouraged the "businesslike" or "souk" mentality to determine the quantity to be exchanged for peace. Peace agents were fully conscious of their position in a market-like schema. Early on in 1992, Hanan Ashrawi, a

former negotiator and active figure in Palestinian politics, characterized negotiations as "businesslike" (H.55: 132). In one of the plenary sessions Saeb Erekat mocked negotiators' "souk mentality" (Doc.2618). The role of the peace agents was conceptualized through market vocabulary too: they were called "brokers" and "partners" (Doc.2942). The US position as an "honest broker" implied a threefold subject position: Israel and the PLO/PA as buyer and seller, and the US as the middle man. Market-driven terminology and style also settle at lower levels. The NSU's reports and analysis which inform the plenary level abound with phrases like: "the API must be operationalised and *marketed*"; " 'shop' between Palestinian negotiators"; "A 'US only' initiative will be more difficult to *'market'* to Palestinian refugees"; " '*buy in'* of refugee communities in host states"; "sell ideas"; "more saleable." Or, as an Israeli maps expert puts it: "The leaders haggle, and we generate a map" (these examples are taken from Doc.5194; Doc.2095; Doc.2937; Doc.419; Doc.3424, emphasis added). The imaginative precepts loaded in such vocabulary prepare the decision makers to approach decisions affecting the lives of millions of people, as well as national and historical concerns, as a business or commercial transaction.

Market logic underlies the exchange relationship in the "land for peace" principle. Accordingly, additional market-driven precepts have gradually grown in number and significance, and infiltrated through the political language propagating the land/peace correlation. The implicit Palestinian endorsement of "land for peace" (i.e., Resolution 242) in 1974 marks the beginning of the discursive internalization of the market logic. Later, this logic was stretched beyond its original subjects (land/peace) to regulate humans, language, and legal rights. The diplomatic record is saturated with verbs, including: offer; give; take; want; pay for; package; deal; land exchange; lease; compensate; swap; sell; buy; transfer.[17] As such, land, humans, and ideas have become commodities and form the object of these verbs. The following examples will elucidate:

> The *7.3% offer* by Olmert is *the most generous*, and will be *perceived* by *Israelis* as *the most fair*. This is the offer.
>
> (Doc.2826, TL)

> *1:1 swap*. I *cannot* accept this percentage.
>
> (Doc.2484, TL, emphasis added)

> We have *offers* and *counter offers* on refugees.
>
> (Doc.4861, SE)

> … We've already paid in advance. We've already *delivered* on security…. They want us to *pay* 16 times for the same thing. Give them [families whose houses were demolished by Israel in Jerusalem] a *package* to rent something …
>
> (Doc.4882, RS)

> It has to be *Salam* [Fayyad] – not you or the Jordanians to *pay* them.
>
> (Doc.4882, SE, emphasis added)

The analysis of this web of signs should be situated inside their broader market-orienting regime and the subjects on which they operate. Scrutiny of the Palestine Papers indicates three main subjects: land; humans; and language. It is these three subjects that I shall analyze here.

First, land became a variable in the market-like operations. The phrase "land/territory for peace"[18] (*al-ard muqabil al-salam*) has been assimilated within Palestinian discourse as a key element in the peace process "terms of reference" (H.32: 73). Land is understood as the "real substance of the peace process" (H.31: 70). How much land is required to achieve peace is left to market operations. Here is an indicative extract from the negotiation record:

SE: So he should ask: [the 19]67 [borders] *Swaps*? What will be [the] *percentage*? You have the different *offers*. Can your experts define a *number*? The same applies to Jerusalem.… *Even the Old City [of Jerusalem] can be worked out* [discusses breakdown of sovereignty over Old City] except for the Haram [al-Sharif, Noble Sanctuary of Jerusalem] and what they call Temple Mount. There you need the creativity of people like me.

SE: A decision on what *percentage*. We *offered 2%*. They said no. So what's the percentage … 0.07%. It is *part of the swap* if we get sovereignty. Otherwise no.

JS: So *swaps, percentage* does not preclude different *numbers* …

SE: 1 to 1.

JS: And *value*?

RD: *Value* can be negotiated in the bilateral [negotiations]. (Doc.4899, emphasis added)

Here is an example of offer and counter-offer:

UD: There is difference between *offering a "package" deal* and our discussions on territory. You have not presented a *counter offer* to us.

SE: Yes, we did. On territory, we have *offered 1.9%* of the WB [West Bank].

UD: This is not a counter *offer to our "package*". It deals only with territory.

SE: But we have made *detailed offers* on refugees, territory, Jerusalem etc. We have submitted *detailed papers* on all issues. (Doc.3651, emphasis added)

SE: What is left are the needed *trade-offs*. When Olmert spoke of *6.5% in exchange* for 5.8[%], and AM [Abu Mazin, PA President] agreed to *swaps* in East Jerusalem, this is significant. Same with security…. On refugees, there were discussions *on numbers* that will return to Israel over a number of years. The deal is there. (Doc.2437) You know there are *trade-offs* within and between issues…. So if we have agreement on something, it is a *card* that I won't announce until the other issue is announced [*sic*]. (Doc.4861, emphasis added)

The above extracts suggest how entrenched the "souk mentality" is, which inadvertently bolstered the formula of peace through partition and at the same time belittled the possibility for peace through other means. Ample energy, effort, and time have been dedicated to bargaining "how much" land ought to be exchanged in the name of peace. More important is the

fact that this formula constitutes Palestinian land as abstract numbers and percentages, devoid of historical and national meaning, especially in the case of Jerusalem.

Second, the same computable frames that modulated land/territory were applied to humans (exchange of population, prisoners), concepts, and language. Let us now elaborate on two specific human categories – *refugees* and *prisoners* – to examine how the market rules affected the way they were considered.

The market-style negotiations structured thoughts and imaginations. The Palestinian inviolable national rights were subdivided into numbers, percentages, values, and financial indicators, and hence the rights turned into exchangeable objects. The refugee population is thus processed using mathematical operations. This approach is rooted in Resolution 242 and what American diplomacy says (or does not say) about the refugees. Article 2/b of Resolution 242 disregards any reference to Resolution 194 in favor of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." I have already argued that the meaning of "just" was left open to the market-like peace process. The market side of peace covered the human face in the guise of a numerical existence within a mathematical-judicial formula.

The refugees comprise approximately half of the Palestinian people (UNRWA Statistics 2012), and yet their presence in the peace process and in Palestinian political discourse is metaphorical: they are a virtual commodity that can be sold, bought, and bargained over. They are only present as objects, which have neither been represented nor been able to intervene, because they were left out from the start. The refugees and their rights constituted "bargaining chips" possessed by the PA: "these are *my* bargaining chips", a Palestinian negotiator said with reference to refugees rights (Doc.3284, emphasis added). The PA insists that it speaks on behalf of the excluded refugees. The exiled population that has been the source of the Palestinian narrative, identity, and struggle began to be viewed as a burden and obstacle to peace. In consequence, the refugees represented an unspeaking, and even dehumanized subject position, and hence an object for bargaining. This helped Israeli interlocutors to frame the refugees' return as an "unrealistic" negotiation subject, and also to reduce restitution to a "lump sum" transaction:

> [R]estitution [of the refugees] is totally *unrealistic* … I agree on a *lump sum*…. The Palestinian government would be in charge of *distrusting money* … [this is] what can be *sold* to the Israelis and the Palestinians.
>
> (Doc.3284, TB, emphasis added)

The Palestinians readily internalized the market operations vis-à-vis the refugees, as the following passage shows:

> … the only way to facilitate a *"buy in"* of the various refugee communities is to put the emphasis on individual justice…. Success … depends on our capacity to *market* a resolution proposal to refugees' communities…. *Selling* a US-led proposal might be quite a challenge.
>
> (Doc.3284, ZC)

The denial of any responsibility for the refugees' plight is deeply rooted in Israeli society. This

has been accomplished by silencing the dreadful discourse concerning the 1948 events, which characterize the Palestinian experience. From the Israeli view, 1948 epitomizes a "sacred year," "absolute justice," victory, independence, and redemption in the Israeli popular consciousness. Discourse on the Palestinian experience of an-Nakba, transfer, and the destruction of villages is systematically erased (Kimmerling 2001; Pappé 2010). After failing to criminalize any commemoration of an-Nakba, the Israel parliament passed the Nakba Law in March 2011, which suspends government funding to bodies that support the remembrance of the Palestinian dispossession.[19] The peacebuilding process adopted the Israeli framework in putting aside 1948 events, which was the gist of the problem. The post-1967 history is the only history that matters for the peace process. This is even the case for the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Goldstone 2009).

Since the Palestinian question was split between "tracks" and "issues," the refugee "issue/track" was divided into tracks too, as noted above. The refugee subject position appeared in the mathematical-judicial schema of the negotiations, yet with a tentative referent. No definition was given to define the "refugee" about whom the negotiations are concerned (Doc.3651). Furthermore, the Palestinian "redlines" on the refugee question and referent were flexible, ambiguous, and usually dealt with "in secret" (Doc.3460; Doc.2437; Doc.3048). This reveals how the refugees were absented. The absence of a referent, unclear principles, and secrecy were effective mechanisms for de-articulating the refugee question and marginalizing the refugees and their representation. That further downgraded the status and position of refugees in political and concrete policymaking.

The language of some Palestinian intellectuals suggests the depth of the refugees' marginalization. Consider these indicative phrases: "engage the outside Palestinians" (*ishrak filastiniyyi al-kharij*) and "activate the role of the diaspora" (*taf'iyyl dawr al-shatat*). Sari Nusseibeh, a Palestinian professor and president of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, argues that the right of return contravenes the "public good," and therefore the "best-option scenario" requires ditching that right or fulfilling it elsewhere. The only solutions he proposes for those who are unwilling to fit that mold is to be "discounted" or "left out of any deal" (Nusseibeh 2011: 140–142). It is paradoxical to argue for the public good and simultaneously discount half of the public (the refugees). Nusseibeh's terms foreclose and preempt the very prospects of the return option in advance.

The refugee question was classified as the "final status issue" and hence *deferred* to later negotiations. It was opened for discussion in the Camp David/Taba Summits in 2000/2001. Former US President Clinton crafted the "take it or leave it" vision, best known as the Clinton Parameters.[20] The US position on the refugees has been a generic reproduction of these parameters ever since. The parameters emphatically precluded the right of return and any mention of Israel's responsibility for the refugee question. To be sure, the parameters demand a "formulation on the right of return that will make it clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area" (Doc.48).

The refugee question was affected by discursive replacement. The Roadmap for Peace of 2003 (Roadmap 2003), which represents a practical application of orthodox peacemaking theory, replaced the "right of return" with "an *agreed*, just, fair, and *realistic* solution of the

refugee issue." As mentioned elsewhere, the Roadmap is an essential element of the Palestinian terms of reference, and therefore it is uncontroversial to say that the Palestinians have endorsed a "realistic" solution for the refugee. Textual displacements have been involved in reaching the supposedly realistic solution. The Palestinian officials reinterpreted Resolution 194, from the "return to their homes" into a "Return to Israel – to be implemented in accordance with an agreed annual quota and within an agreed period of time" (Doc.3597). This framing, first and foremost, internalizes Israel's overriding interpretation of "return," whether to allow the return of some refugees into Israel or not, and to define the status of those it may allow into its territory (immigrants, second or third class citizens). Second, the phrase "return to Israel" downgrades the right of return and renders the refugees' right to *choose* whether to return contingent on Israel's will.

The Roadmap's request to establish a "multilateral engagement" on the refugee issue developed into an international mechanism. A Palestinian-made "agreement draft" may serve as an exemplar of the internal Palestinian thought on this issue (see Doc.3597). Under the leadership of the US, the mechanism would be composed of the PA, Israel, the hosting countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), and donor and receiving countries, such as Canada. Three main tasks vested in the mechanism are: (1) to "*assist* in coordinating the orderly and secure implementation of the permanent destination options to be offered to Palestinian refugees"; (2) that (countries of the mechanism) "shall also provide *rehabilitation assistance*"; and (3) that "*all Palestinian refugee claims shall be resolved in accordance with procedures, criteria and time-limits determined by the international mechanism*" (Doc.3597, emphasis added).[21] Of course, no mention of even a moderate return, or of compensation for the refugees.

The mechanism has three major effects. The first effect is that of bypassing international law. The second is to isolate the Palestinian refugee question from global refugee phenomena (this aim was partially achieved in the 1950s, when Palestinians refugees were excluded from the UNHCR): the International Mechanism was planned as an "exclusive forum for dealing with the Palestinian refugee claims." This unequivocally entails the exclusion of international law (Resolution 194, in particular) and sets new conditions and criteria. Third, the mechanism outsources responsibility by transferring it from Israel[22] (which caused the problem at the first place) to other parties. It is also important to underline the lack of fixed resources and the nature of the intended mechanism as dependent on donors' goodwill; it is not an advocacy but a framework, as words emphasizing the voluntary nature of the relationship – to "assist," to "help" – indicate. The establishment of a new institution – the International Mechanism – to tackle the refugee issue is convenient for Israel, as it detaches refugees from international law and the UNRWA (Israel considers the UNRWA "part of the problem" (Doc.2437, TL)), and denies Israel's responsibility.

Parallel with the Roadmap, the Arab states developed an initiative for a comprehensive solution of the Arab–Israel conflict in December 2002. This became known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API), and was reaffirmed in 2007. The API's position on the refugee question is no more than an upgrade of Resolution 242 of 1967. It prescribed "a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be *agreed upon in accordance with* UN General Assembly Resolution 194" (API 2002, Article 2/b, emphasis added). The insertion of "agreed upon" and

"in accordance with" in conjunction with Resolution "194" is rhetorical and inconsistent. First, it allows a twofold interpretation, each directed to a specific audience. One interpretation underlines "in accordance with," where "194" is directed toward Palestinians (especially the refugees), while the other underlines "agreed upon" to offset the return option and market the position to Israel and the peace sponsors. As well as prioritizing the "agreed upon" clause, the wording uses two irreconcilable clauses, for it is impossible to reach an agreed upon solution and simultaneously enforce Resolution 194. The former clause entails negotiations over a disputed matter, while the latter endorses individual and collective legal rights.

The PLO/PA infused the terms of the API in its political discourse as a dominant clause to relegate Resolution 194 and international law in this regard. This was fulfilled in two steps: first, by wrapping the refugee question inside opaque textual formulations; and, second by replacing the particular (Resolution 194) with the general (the API). The API stipulates an unequivocal green light and cover from the Arab states to the PLO/PA to trade on the refugees' rights. With this ambiguous insertion the fate of the refugees was left open to marketlike bargains and uncertainties.

The fact that twenty-two Arab *governments* backed the API emboldened the PLO/PA to call publicly for a moderate ("agreed upon") solution to the refugee question, with symbolic return. Indeed, the Palestinians had already considered less than the right of return in the first session of the Camp David negotiations on 7 November 2000. As President Mahmoud Abbas put it:

> The return of four million Palestinian refugees would be catastrophic [*karitha*] for Israel, and this is unacceptable. We are calling for the right of return [*haq al-'awda*], and a significant return [*'awda mu'tabara*] … but we are confident that the refugees in Syria and Jordan would not return [*lan ya'*uwdu].
>
> (Mahmoud Abbas, cited in Qurie 2006: 243, emphasis added)

The call for return was made on the assumption that the majority of refugees "would not return" to Palestine if the peace sponsors could concoct tempting alternatives. Accordingly, return is transformed into a symbolic gesture that neither rectifies the historic injustice nor honors the national or human rights of the Palestinians.

Not only was the right of return treated as a bargaining chip but the language that signifies it was also constituted as such. The PLO/PA proposed, for example, to remove the mention of Resolution 194 if Israel were to agree to refer to the API (Doc.3284). Equally, the refugees were a trading card, secondary to other final status issues like Jerusalem and territory, as the following statement implies: "Let's see them move on Jerusalem and territory and we will move on security and refugees" (Doc.2769, SE). The refugees, their rights, and the language that articulates that were relegated to second or third-rate concerns and rendered tradable with benefits in other areas.

The new Palestinian reading of Resolution 194, whether at the plenary or expert level, is identical. An internal email explicating the significance of the refugee issue in the API underlines that the meaning of an "agreed upon" solution to the refugee question "means that the [prospective] resolution should also *adapt to current realities and to the legitimate interests*

and concerns of the different stakeholders in the issue, […] in particular, *Israel & the future State of Palestine*" (Doc.3271, emphasis added). In the same vein, President Abbas approached the refugee issue *via* the API. In a meeting with the Palestinian negotiation team in March 2009, President Abbas was recorded saying:

> The API represents close to a universal consensus … many people either understate or exaggerate the article on refugees: either say it is not enough, or interpret it to mean that 5 million refugees will return. *Neither is correct*. The language is correct in stating "just and agreed upon." Therefore I recommend that you focus on the API.
>
> On numbers of refugees, *it is illogical to ask Israel to take 5 million, or indeed 1 million* – that would mean the end of Israel. They said 5,000 over 5 years. This is even less than family reunification and is not acceptable.
>
> (Doc.4507)

> 1) Focus should be on the API, "it is the basis" he [Abbas, PA President] said. 2) "The API is an equation and a clause (requirement …) i.e. the equation is full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for full Arab and Islamic normalization, the clause/requirement is the refugees." As we said a just and agreed upon resolution based on [Resolution] 194. *Emphasize* agreed". These were his [Abbas] words.
>
> (Doc.1669, emphasis added)

First, President Abbas instructs his negotiation team to approach the refugee question through a detour, via the API. That is, by replacing the specific, legally recognized language on the individual and collective rights of the Palestinian refugees with a political initiative that lacks any legal significance. Second, Abbas' above interpretation of the API denies the vast majority of the refugees their *individual* right to return. In his view, a return of even "1 million [refugees] would mean the end of Israel." It is unclear on what basis that judgment is made, though it indicates tacit internalization and implicit acknowledgment of Israel as a "Jewish State"[23] in the political calculation of the leadership. Behind closed doors senior Palestinian politicians/negotiators contemplated recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Seab Erekat told Israeli counterparts, "It's your decision – we [PLO/PA] recognize your state however you want [to define it]" (See Doc.2002, YAR; Doc.2003: 4, SE). Indeed, this telling citation also reveals the calculations of the Palestinian leadership with regard to the number of Palestinians they wish to repatriate: less than one million but more than 25,000.[24]

The relative simplicity and lucidity of the legal status of the refugee questions was reproduced in more arcane and ambivalent expressions within the Palestinian political discourse, including: "agree upon"; "in accordance with"; "realistic solutions"; "annual quota"; "time limit." It has been wrapped up with other enunciations and texts (such as the API and the Roadmap) with the aim to subvert the right of return. To do that, the refugee issue is divided into four isolated solutions: reparation; settlement; reallocation; and "some" return to Israel (Doc.2344; Doc.2436, AA). The Palestinians discuss *symbolic*[25] return, as within the limits of their political imagination, the "full implementation of the right of return is unlikely."

Discourse was focused on creating a formula that could "be perceived as a real option" in order to "market" it to refugees (Doc.2731; see also Doc.3202). Meanwhile, stressing and maximizing the non-return options is one way to reduce the possible number of returnees (Doc.2344; Doc.4066).

The refugees were removed from the beginning, and were never given the chance to intervene, let alone set the agenda; others vied to represent them and design "offers" in their name, and afterwards sought means to "market [such offers] locally and internationally." For the purposes of marketing, a new " 'PR' unit" and "a minimum of coordination with refugee communities" were recommended (Doc.3548). This order substitutes the necessary meaningful political representation of the refugees with a minimal *coordination*, which, in concrete terms, is a deliberate abjuration of adequate representation.

A meeting entitled "Progress meeting on Refugees" was convened on 14 September 2008 to discuss "available" options for the refugees in detail. The PLO/PA chief negotiator "hardly disagree[s] on anything" on the Israeli list of agreed and disagreed points. More to the point, the PLO/PA and Israel are in accord on the following: (1) compensation (not restitution); (2) rehabilitation; (3) settlement choices (except return); (4) termination of the UNRWA; (5) the International Mechanism is the exclusive forum for solving the question of the refugees; (6) establishing an International Fund; (6) Israel will "contribute" to the International Fund; and (7) there should be no other obligation beyond the treaty (Doc.3651). Points of disagreement have little to do with the repatriation of the refugees, for that subject was already relegated to a mere emblematic matter, without implementation plans. Disagreement, however, lingered over secondary, though important, issues, such as linguistic framing of the reference to Resolution 194 and the API and the two states for two peoples, reference to the "Jewish refugees" (Jews from the Arab countries), the articulation of the responsibility for the refugees' plight, granting Palestinian refugees Palestinian citizenship,[26] the Israeli rejection of restitution, and the preference to "remain vague" on the Israeli contribution to the compensation for the Palestinian refugees, either to refugees or to hosting states (Doc.3651, TB).

Responsibility for the refugees' exodus in 1948 was classified among the "disputed" issues. Responsibility is indeed intimately bound up with the respective Palestinian and Israeli narratives. Israel refuses to recognize any responsibility for this exodus, despite the increasing evidence of its responsibility documented in sober historical studies (mostly by Israeli historians). The USA has fully backed the Israeli position: former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that "Responsibility is a loaded term" and "it is the responsibility of the international community, not Israel." She pressed the Palestinians to "imply responsibility without using that word/saying it [sic]" (Doc.2942). Rice's point was not taken at face value. However, we find market phraseology determining the pattern of the Palestinian political approach to the refugees' rights and responsibility understood in terms of "bargain chips" and "trading cards" (Doc.3048 3, SE).

All in all, I chose to dwell on this particular meeting because it exposes three things: deep-rooted Palestinian ambiguity; gaps between the decision-makers' level and their assistants; and dedication to a secret style of negotiation on the part of the PA political regime. It was pointed out, for example, that the PA shared "sensitive information with the Americans" that was unknown even to the "committee heads" (see Doc.3959). The mode of thinking in that meeting

clearly indicates the Palestinian willingness to accept a symbolic solution, short of any significant return.

The Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails is another human subject over whom market rules prevailed. In November 2014, the number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons is estimated at 5000–6000.[27] The negotiation record constitutes the prisoners as an object for further bargaining, listing, pricing, and linking, released and exploited to bolster specific leaders. This mode of thinking is obvious in the following conversations:

> TL [TZIPI LIVNI, ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR]: I know the complexity of the *lists* [of prisoners], and the *price* will be the *price* … When we need to release prisoners, we need to do it with *moderates* …
>
> AA [ABU ALAA (AHMAD QURIE), PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATOR]: Can AM [Abbas, PA President] expect 1,000 released?
>
> SE [SAEB EREKAT, PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATOR]: You used *"benchmarks"* in Berlin. *So let's invent something* – how about we are in this political process, as part of the process.
>
> TL: How about a *link to the situation in Jenin and Shechem* [Nablus] – areas with greater Palestinian security control. Can we release to those areas? [Discussion on criteria for release, numbers, lists, Hamas list].
>
> TL: Just throwing ideas: let's assume Hamas asked for a *list* – we release some to them and some…
>
> SE: Don't link us. It is time to release prisoners as part of the political process.
>
> TL: If I give you "heavy" ones, I may then need to give Hamas "heavier" ones.
>
> AA: You can release some to AM before Hamas, and some after.
>
> TL: Most of the "big fishes" are on the Hamas list.
>
> SE: Suggestion: I know the *complexity of the lists*, and *the price will be the price*. But if you want to tell Palestinians that is not the only way you function, look at the list of *pre-Oslo prisoners*.
>
> TL: I prefer *to release for the peace process* than on a holiday.
>
> SE: … So instead of Hamas releasing Marwan Barghouthi,[28] *have AM do it* – the same with the pre-1993 prisoners.
>
> TL: No. Maybe we can connect Gilad Shalit, as we have done to Rafah, and as opening Rafah is connected to you – *you get credit. That way you get credit for release of prisoners*. (Doc.2826, emphasis added)

The same pattern is used in other conversations:

> AA: As for the prisoners, if Israel responds to the demands of Hamas and releases 450 prisoners, some of whom are very important prisoners, this will *embarrass us*. But *if Israel releases the prisoner because Abu Mazen demands this, then the situation will be different*. (Doc.2436, emphasis added)

> AA: Any release of prisoners for Hamas should be after a release for Abu Mazen.… Particularly the old prisoners from before Oslo … I want to speak about *real*

prisoners that will be influential in the negotiations. (Doc.2797, emphasis added)

HA [HAZEM ATALLAH, PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATOR]: How to use the potential of the prisoners in support of the peace process … We need coordinated moves and measures in the interim period. Coordination of names, categories of prisoners … (Doc.2351, HA)

The extended passages cited above from negotiation meetings show a shared operative mode of thinking by Israelis and the Palestinians. They relied on the same rationale, style, concepts, and vocabulary. As a result, it was self-evident to both sides that prisoners represented a bargaining chip in the process. Prisoners were therefore listed and categorized into "heavy," "heavier," "pre-Oslo," political affiliation, "moderates," and used tactically as a means to "support the peace process," support particular politicians ("release for AM," "let AM do it," "you get the credit"), and political parties (Fatah versus Hamas). From the Palestinian leadership's point of view, the release of Palestinian prisoners, especially well-know figures, from Israeli jails would prove to the Palestinian public that negotiations yield tangible results. Yet these anxious attempts by the Palestinian leadership to convince its Israeli counterpart were in vain. To the contrary, in 2011 Israel agreed to free about a thousand Palestinian prisoners in exchange for an Israeli soldier held by Hamas since 2006, only when Palestinians combined the power of resistance and (indirect) negotiation.

The question of the prisoners is an emotional one for the Palestinian public. However, it is still a variable in terms of numbers. Whenever the peace process stalls, the release of prisoners from Israeli jails comes to the fore as sign of Israel's integrity. Indeed, so long as the Palestinians lack sovereignty, Israel remains able to release and detain more and more Palestinians at will. Therefore, Palestinian participation in a formula that constitutes the prisoners as a bargaining chip is both morally and strategically misguided.

Apart from land and human subjects, the market operations modulated language itself: that is, what could and could not be said, and how. Linguistic maneuvering is especially acute in politics and diplomacy. Henry Kissinger noted at the onset of his famous book, *A World Restored*, that diplomacy aims to build a "legitimate" system as a product of a shared understanding: "Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language" (Kissinger 1957: 2). George Mitchell, the architect of the "Good Friday Agreement" and later Obama's special envoy to the Middle East, understood this dilemma: "we need [a] language that both sides can agree to" (Doc.4844).

Although the Palestinians have internalized a great deal of the neoliberal peacebuilding and Israeli security language, the Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians still spoke a different languages on specific issues. To be sure, there was agreement on the overall framework, but difference on the details. Even at the non-political (expert) level, Palestinians and Israelis have different perspectives, as a Palestinian maps expert explains: "We must have a common language, agree on common maps and data, and then we can have a discussion about the issues" (Doc.2339, Samih Al-Abed). Market logic operates inside language itself. In other words, the bargain is within and over language as a means to bridge difference, as the following examples show.

I suggest that *you take out East Jerusalem* and I will *take out our [Israeli] language* on national aspirations … we want Jewish, you [PA] want independent and sovereign. Lets *take both out*.

(Doc.2055, TL)

Trade-offs like no refugees to Israel in return for the borders you want – we [the Israelis] cannot discuss it like this if we go through the issues one by one. [NOTE: Elsewhere she implied that the trade-off would likely be security and refugees for borders]

(Doc.1962, TL)

TB: I believe that 6.1 will be agreed at the end. Saeb [Erekat], you told me that if we accept the reference to the Arab Peace Initiative here, you would be ready to remove the reference to [Resolution] 194.

SE: I told you that we might consider it. (Doc.3284)

Linguistic obfuscation became more evident during George Mitchell's efforts to "revive" negotiations between Israel and the PA in 2009. Language encumbered his mission from the beginning, for he tried to accommodate all Israeli terms and phrases, which exclude the core issues (like Jerusalem and borders) on which the peace process is based. The following excerpt is sufficient to demonstrate the tension arising from language:

GM: *We are making efforts to find language that is satisfactory to you*. Then we will make an effort to get Israeli agreement…. So our discussion with them earlier was general and *did not get into the precise language* as we intend to do with you today…. We need as *straightforward a formulation* of that concept as possible:

> An independent and viable state encompassing all of the territory that was occupied in 1967 or its equivalent in value.

[NOTE: the word *equal* is avoided here!]

SE: What is this? What is it part of?

GM: ToR [Terms of Reference] or side letters. This is better than swaps for you,

JS: Your ToR *language didn't say equal*.

JS: We did not want a mathematical formula, so *we used "equivalent."* I know you have a specific area …

GM: I will read it all out loud and RD [Rami Dajani] can write it down. I recall our discussion on territory and your *concern on the previous language*, that it would preclude swaps from their territory. I raised it with them – that it meant they would get the blocs and you would get nothing – and they said that was not the intent and it did not occur to them. Now *we need to think of the context in which this language can occur*.

(Doc.4899, emphasis added)

Perhaps the market implications of the peace process have been transformed into a repetition of linguistic play that the Palestinians have imparted. The market style and the vast terminology and concepts it is bound up with have infiltrated the Palestinian consciousness. It is very hard to resist, or detect, the systematic demoralization and dehistorization of the conflict and its subjects when market regime reigns over the national struggle. Starting from 1967, fundamental questions about peace as justice and social equality were circumvented, but shying away from these questions has made peace endeavors suspect and otiose.

A deceptive primal scene in schoolbooks

Palestine ceased to exist as an imagined totality. Instead, it appears as an eclectic assemblage of temporal, demographic, and spatial fragments in the Palestinian political discourse. The rest of this of chapter explores how the primal scene of Palestine was depicted in the first ever Palestinian-produced school textbooks. It is not my intention to provide a through examination of the textbooks;[29] instead I focus on imagery and narrative in relation to the broader questions of this book. In particular, I will study the textbooks of the first to seventh grade covering four subjects: national and civil history, and geography. At this elementary stage, students are repeatedly exposed to the geopolitical narrative through imagery.

Palestinian textbooks have been examined and criticized heavily by Israeli studies;[30] however, most of these studies approach the textbooks to determine which parts of the textbooks could be interpreted as incitement to hatred of Israel and Jews, as well as to determine omissions (UNESCO 2006: 14). It is worth noting that after the colonization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli authorities modulated the content and design of the textbooks in order to guarantee a Palestinian education devoid of national sentiment and historical and spatial memory. The direct Israeli intervention ended in the late 1990s, when Israel transferred the responsibility of Palestinian education to the PA. In 1998, the Palestinian Legislative Council decided to draft a new school curriculum in stages (see Resolution 3/3/255), but an Israeli-produced curriculum continued to be used in Palestinian schools for several years until the Palestinian Ministry of Education gradually started to distribute its new textbooks.

According to the First Palestinian Curriculum Plan of 1988, the Declaration of Independence in 1988 and the establishment of the Palestinian state are among the key principles that to include in the textbooks (First Palestinian Curriculum Plan 1998: 7, 16). The spirit of the Oslo process was discharged in the new textbooks. Although the Oslo Accords granted the PA a mandate over education, equivocal clauses regarding "culture of peace" and "fighting incitement" restricted the PA's mandate and dampened essential terminology in the Palestinian narrative. The word "Palestine" and its imagined spatial equivalence were silenced in the textbooks, or are ambiguous at best, as we shall see.

The repertoire of imagery in the textbooks is political: it seeks to propagate narrative, identity, and spatial consciousness. Students are exposed from an early stage to a world that is "actively spatialized, divided up, labeled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser 'importance' by political geographers, other academics and political leaders" (Agnew 2003: 3). Maps are key imagery enabling students to locate themselves inside certain (defined

and abstract) boundary lines, colors, shapes, and landscape, informing the construction of an imaginary, visual, spatial, and territorialized identity.

Palestinian students in the first to seventh grades encounter illustrative images, maps, and spatial titles from the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza in their textbooks, including pictures of the Nativity Church, the Dome of the Rock, Hisham's Palace in Jericho, the Cave of Patriarchs in Hebron, the Dead Sea, Gaza Airport, the Sabastiya Ruins, Jenin Plain, and Gaza Plain (NE 1st G; CE 2nd G; NE 2nd G, I; NEii 2nd G; CE 3rd G, II). The frequency of visual echoing creates a pattern in which certain images in Palestine garner pervasive familiarity to the extent they become iconic spatial features. As a rule, visual registers of Palestine from places beyond the West Bank and Gaza are left out. On occasion, however, some odd registers can be noticed as secondary visual elements in the background (e.g., a picture of Akka/Acre Wall, NE 7th G: 47).

When the map of (historical) Palestine is provided, three curious lapses in the caption can be detected. The lapses aim to evade describing Palestine as a geographical totality. The map is either presented without a caption, or with a one that leaves the word "Palestine" out, or (at best) mentions it vaguely as a secondary term. Moreover, explanatory information (e.g., demography (see GoP 7th G: 43–45)) and symbols are situated only within the boundary of the West Bank and Gaza (i.e., inside the "1967 border" in peace process parlance); the rest of the map is painted in a plain color and with no or extremely limited information (Figures 5.1 and 5.3). The figure below, taken from a second grade schoolbook, displays a map of Palestine without a caption and with instructive signs over certain areas in the West Bank and Gaza only. The map is juxtaposed with a text asking students to provide the names of the different crops in the "*Palestinian areas*" (emphasis added). Figure 5.1 refers to cities in the West Bank and Gaza in the provided table to the right (Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Jericho, and Gaza).

Figure 5.2 shows a curious juxtaposition of imagery and text. First and foremost, the word "Palestine" is absent, although names of neighboring countries are indicated (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt). Inside the map boundary there are two colors, green and brown,[31] where information is placed on the areas in brown to signify the "Palestinian areas." There is no equivalent text on the area in green. In the absence of a caption, the text on the right constitutes a relationship between the two colored areas and indirectly informs students of the current names of these areas (see the English translation). There are complex relationships and inferences to be drawn – perhaps beyond the capacity of a fifth-grade student – from the map, colors, and text. The two words, Palestine and Israel, are readily provided in the textual description but not over a map or an image. This complexity is used strategically in order to leave ample space for connotative ambiguity (Barthes 1977). A textual representation inside corresponding boundary lines is not as malleable for interpretation.

نشاط : أملأ الجدول الآتي بأسماء المزروعات في المناطق الفلسطينية

Activity: fill in the table with the names of different types of plants found in the Palestinian areas

إسم المنطقة	نوع المزروعات
الخليل	
جنين	
نابلس	
أريحا	
غزة	

Name of the area	Type of plant
Hebron	
Jenin	
Nablus	
Jericho	
Gaza	

Figure 5.1 Schematic map of Palestine with information on areas in the West Bank and Gaza only (source: NE 2nd G, II: 34).

الاحتلالُ البريطاني :

وقعَ المجتمعُ الفلسطينيُّ تحتَ الاحتلالِ البريطانيِّ عامَ ١٩١٧م، واستمرَّ ذلك حتى الاحتلال الإسرائيلي عام ١٩٤٨م.

الاحتلال الإسرائيلي :

حلَّتْ بالمجتمع الفلسطينيِّ نكبةُ عام ١٩٤٨م على يد المُنَظَّمات الصُّهْيونية، حيث هُجِّرَ معظم الفلسطينيين من أرضهم، وأنشئت دولة اسرائيل في قسم من فلسطين، وَضُمَّتْ الضفة الغربية إلى الأردن عام ١٩٥٠م، وأُلحِقَ قطاعُ غزةَ بالإدارة المصرية. وحلَّت نكسة عام ١٩٦٧م بالمجتمع الفلسطيني، حين تمكَّن الإسرائيليون من احتلال باقي فلسطين المتمثل في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة، كما احتلت صحراءُ سيناء من مصر، وهضبةُ الجولان من سوريا.

The British Occupation

Palestinian society had fallen under the British occupation in 1917, which continued until the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1948.

The Israeli occupation

An-Nakba, which befell Palestinian society in 1948, was committed by Zionist organizations, which forced the majority of Palestinians to leave their land. Consequently, the state of Israel was founded on part of Palestine. The West Bank was annexed to Jordan, whereas the Gaza Strip was annexed to Egypt. In 1967, an-Naksa (relapse) befell the Palestinian society, as Israel occupied the rest of Palestine, including the Sinai desert from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Figure 5.2 The map of Palestine demarcating the West Bank and Gaza (source: NE 5th G: 30; see also NG 5th G: 63; HG 6th G: 53).

Figure 5.3 Governorates of the West Bank and Gaza (source: NE 6th G: 42).

During seventh grade students are exposed to further geographical and historical information about Palestine in their school textbooks. The text articulates the "natural borders of Palestine" as the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. It spells out the area of Palestine as 27,000 square kilometers and gives the length of its borders with neighboring Arab countries. But it also gives additional details of the West Bank (its area as 5,842 square kilometers) and Gaza (366 square kilometers), and leaves other areas without any details (see GoP 7th G: 4). Despite offering a good level of information about historical Palestine, there is a serious lapse in content. The relation between maps and instructive text is destroyed. For instance, the caption of the map in Figure 5.4 refrains from using a straightforward caption ("map of Palestine"), but rather "Palestine" needs to be inferred from the complex caption: "Map no. (3) – the Arab countries that border on Palestine."

In general, there are two narratives: one represented in text, the other through imagery. Schoolbooks are at ease with the former and tentative on the latter. Imagery – cartography in particular – is a powerful, refined, and implicit learning medium.[32] Implicit learning is fundamental to implanting a subliminal, automatic, and resilient mood of spatial associations and power relations. The selected images and maps in the Palestinian textbooks prepare students to *see* Palestine as fragments; meanwhile only iconic places in the West Bank and Gaza are visually and textually emphasized. Thus places beyond the West Bank and Gaza are cast beyond the realm of imagination. As a result, students are left with confused and fragmented imagery that encumbers their perception of Palestine as an imagined whole. A concomitant development in cartography emerged following the upgrade of the status of Palestine as a non-member observing state in 2012, which officially reduced Palestine to 22 percent of its historical area. In May 2013, the word Palestine became a tagline to designate a rather attenuated version of Palestine on Google Maps (Figure 5.5). By using the word

Palestine, Google has simply replaced the totality of the historical referent with some of its parts; it has also disseminated and universalized an illusory image. The Palestinian leadership welcomed this move as a palpable outcome of "diplomatic victory" (*al-nasr al-siyyasi*). The new map unambiguously stands for only miniscule fragments of Palestine, one-quarter of its original size, yet was applauded as a victory.

جـ- حدود فلسطين :

١- تذكر حدود فلسطين الطبيعية كما هو وارد في الخريطة رقم (٣).

٢- تذكر دولاً عربية مجاورة لفلسطين على الخريطة.

٣- تقارن مساحة فلسطين مع الدول العربية المجاورة.

د- تشرف فلسطين على البحرين الآتيين :

١- البحر المتوسط من الغرب.

٢- البحر الأحمر من الجنوب.

C. Borders of Palestine:

1. Define the natural borders of Palestine as shown on map number (3).
2. Nominate Arab countries adjacent to Palestine on the map.
3. Compare the area of Palestine with bordering Arab countries.

D. Palestine overlooks at the following Seas:

1. The Mediterranean Sea from the west.
2. The Red Sea from the south.

Caption:

Map number (3) – the Arab countries that border on Palestine

Figure 5.4 Palestine and surrounding countries (source: GoP 7th G: 4).

The brief analysis of the visualization of Palestine in elementary textbooks takes us back to where this chapter started: the discontinuation of the imagined Palestine as a totality in the Palestinian political and public discourse. That discontinuity entailed a re-production of Palestine (spatially and demographically) and the loss of a compass for a grand strategy to orient the struggle – whether through diplomacy or other means. We have encountered a set of operative discursive logics or rules of formation: the logic of division, replacement, market, and a mathematical-judicial schema. The logic of division parsed Palestine into smaller territorial, human, and conceptual components, in the absence of an overarching imaginative framework. Once the political process started it was tempting to focus on the components that fit the orthodox framework of peace. Once imaginatively dispersed, the components of "Palestine" were evaluated and articulated through mathematical-judicial schema and left to market-like operations to work out the quantities and price of exchange. Thus land, humans, and the linguistic building blocks of the Palestinian narrative were objectified and constructed into "bargaining chips," and their historical, national, moral and human weight withered. The market operation of language inspired the logic of replacement, where the mold, so to speak, was maintained but the conceptual contents were replaced with new orienting concepts and vocabulary.



Figure 5.5 Screenshot of the map of Palestine as shown on Google Maps, August 2015.

The means of the struggle and nature of the coveted Palestinian self-determination were infiltrated with internalizations from the colonizer's discourse. Considering violent Palestinian modes of struggle for self-determination illegitimate and undemocratic is an abnegation and an internalization of the colonizer's view. The moral and tactical evaluation of the means to an end should always be charted and explained. Available discourse on the non/viability of the putative Palestinian state is viewed from the perspective of a fragmented Palestine, that causes further fragmentation, and makes it encumbent upon the colonized agent to negotiate with the colonizer for freedom and self-determination. In other words, the colonizer assumes power to determine the style of the acceptable "self-determination" of the native. The discontinuation of the imagined wholeness of Palestine in the Palestinian political calculations grants the colonizer ample power and time to exploit the native's perplexity. Lack of an overarching political imagination and conception of Palestine and Palestinians as a whole led to an inability to provide relatively stable strategic goals. Instead, alternation between visions (liberation, an inclusive and democratic state, a Palestinian-only state in part of Palestine) and lately territorial issues overrode non-territorial aspects.

Notes

1 On the Absentee Property Law, see Badil (2005: 41–55).
2 On the Palestine refugee rights in international law, see Takkenberg (1998).
3 A clause related to "end of claims," "end of conflict," "finality of claims" states the following: "The applicable legal principles, rules, and relevant precedents that govern the status of claims between parties following the conclusion of a treaty between them …" (Doc.2547).
4 The PLO internalized the Israeli-made 1967 division line that roughly coincided with the land transfer outline designed by the British Mandate. In 1949, the British High Commissioner adopted the Land Transfer Regulations, which divided Palestine into three Zones: Zone A, where land transfer is limited to Palestinian Arabs (about 16.680 km2); Zone B (8.348 km2), where land is transferred from Palestinians to Jews; and the Zone outside A and B (1.292 km2), which could be

freely transferred. The West Bank and Gaza fell entirely into Zone A according to this division and annexed map (Doc.3369). Furthermore, all legislation of the PA came from foreign powers, the British Mandate Courts Law of 1940 and the Israeli military governor (Shehadeh 1997: 150–151).

5 Palestinian pragmatism is relative to the Israeli perception of pragmatism, which is best summed up by these phrases from Israeli negotiators: "forget rights" and "facts of the ground" (Doc.2499).

6 Note that the PA argued for return of more than 50,000 (5,000 refugees per year for a period of ten years) and less than a million, i.e. maybe only the return of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

7 On the land issue the gap was on how much Israel would annex. The PA proposed 1.9 percent, whereas Israel wanted 7.3 percent of the West Bank to be annexed to Israel (Jerusalem is not included in 7.3 percent). Regarding refugees, the difference is on wording (responsibility vs suffering, total Israeli rejection of return). On security, the difference is on international presence and the degree of Palestinian state militarization: Israel rejects both options and argued for a demilitarized state, while the Palestinians argued for a state with limited arms. On settlements in the West Bank, Israel insists on annexing Ma'ale Adumim, Ariel, and the areas around these settlements. Jerusalem was not discussed and instead Tzipi Livni argued that the parties should say, "there are gaps [on Jerusalem]" (see Doc.2826; Doc.2797; Doc.2454).

8 See Doc.1739 for representative examples.

9 In September 1995, the "Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Oslo II" (J.17) laid down the structure and institutions of the PA. There are articles on the elections, structure, size and responsibilities of the Palestinian Council, and the executive position of al-Ra'iys (the president or chairman of the PA).

10 None of the PLO-related institutions was represented in the negotiations process. For example, the PLO Refugee Department was not present during the negotiation concerning the rights of Palestinian refugees, particularly return and restitution.

11 On the concept of rhetorical capital, see Ish-Shalom (2006).

12 In 1986, the PLO condemned "all acts of terrorism" (*Journal of Palestine Studies* 1986). The condemnation was reconfirmed in 1988 in Arafat's Speech to General Assembly.

13 Although the definition of terrorism is contested, there is consensus in the academic literature that terrorism is a "tactic," a "technique," and "instrumental," and that it aims to inflict fear among a wide number of civilians in order to achieve political ends (Blakeley 2011; Richardson 2006).

14 The Quartet required "all members of a future Palestinian Government must be committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map." See Statement By Middle East Quartet 2006.

15 This does not mean that non-violent struggle was not contemplated in the Palestinian case. To the contrary, there have been academic studies arguing for a non-violent struggle: Mubarak Awad was among the pioneers who argued for non-violence and gave examples of non-violent measures used by Palestinians during different periods. However, in juxtaposing non-violent struggle with armed struggle, Awad conflated them. Namely, non-violence would signify a struggle devoid of armed means only; this does not exclude violence per se (Awad 1984).

16 In 1997, major Israeli political parties from the right and left (Likud and Labor) reached an understanding on what they consider an acceptable governing structure in the West Bank and Gaza. The understanding states: "If the Palestinian entity *subject itself to limits* presented in this document, its *self-determination will be recognized*. According to an *alternative opinion* it will be regarded as an *enlarged autonomy*, and according to another *opinion*, *as a state*" (L.3: 329, emphasis added).

17 On the concept of transfer, see Masalha (1992).

18 Notice that land and territory are not synonymous in the legal language.

19 See Eighteenth Knesset Session, 22 March 2011 (www.knesset.gov.il/review/YearPage.aspx?yr=2011&lng=3, accessed 14 December 2014).

20 The Palestinians and Israelis submitted their reservations on the Clinton Parameters (Qurie 2005; Shlaim 2009).

21 Form the US perspective, the solution for the refugee issue lies in three things: (1) the "Palestinian state"; (2) "new international mechanisms"; and (3) "compensations" (see Bush 2008).

22 There is sufficient historical research to prove Israel's responsibility and intent for driving the Palestinians out of their homes in 1948 (Masalha 1992; Morris 2004; Pappé 2007).

23 The definition of Israel as a Jewish state invalidates the Palestinian narrative. Ahmad Khalidi examined the recognition of Israel as a "Jewish State" and drew out the implications of this for the Palestinian narrative, history, and moral and legal claims, along with real effects on Palestinians in Israel (Khalidi 2011). For more on the difference between Israel as a Jewish state and a state for the Jews, see Bishara (2005: 15–54).

24 Saeb Erekat echoed this calculation for the number of Palestinians the PLO/PA was striving to repatriate. In his words,

> On refugees, AM [Abu Mazen, President Mahmoud Abbas] said we need a credible number, not 5 million but not 1,000. Abu Mazen said. I am ready for the endgame. I know there are lots of painful decisions to make, but I am

ready to make them.

(Doc.4625)

25 As it appears from the NSU memorandums and recommendations, the PLO/PA tried hard to devise a pragmatic and symbolic solution for the refugee issue. The PLO/PA has acknowledged that it would negotiate the number of the refugees to be repatriated in the light of Israel's "legitimate concerns" regarding its "capacity to absorb" (Doc.3028). Another recommendation suggested finding new "resettlement options … in order to alleviative the pressure put on Israel …" (Doc.2930).

26 The PLO/PA President Abbas was recorded saying, "All refugees can get Palestinian citizenship (all 5 million) if they want…" (Doc.4507, AM).

27 Bet'Selem (16 November 2014) "Statistics on Palestinians in the custody of the Israeli security forces" (www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners, accessed 1 December 2014).

28 Marwan Barghouthi is a popular Palestinian political figure from Fatah; he has been imprisoned in Israel since 2002.

29 For a comprehensive examination and critique of Palestinian textbooks, see Abdul-Rahim (2008).

30 See Reports I (2003), II (2004), and III (2006): Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum (Jerusalem: Israeli/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI).

31 The choice of colors on maps carries political meaning related to self-image and the representation of the other. Nurit Peled-Elhanan, for instance, showed in her analysis of Israeli textbooks how brown is used to depict a negative image of the Arab or Palestinian space, while the Israeli-Jewish space is painted green to represent development and progress (Peled-Elhanan 2012).

32 On implicit learning, see Heath (2012).

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6 Peace, security, "us" and "them"

The power of internalization operates on the inner meta-thought registers, without alienating the agent, to insinuate a perception mood that insinuates assimilated ideas into cognition and self-reflection. Internalization is key because, unlike with diktats, first, internalization and subsequent behavior arise directly from the agent, and second, the internalized orienting ideas are held consistently, behind consciousness. Once Palestine ceased to be conceived as a totality – the biggest internalization of all – mechanisms of internalization multiplied and expanded over other Palestine-related issues. The Palestinian internalization of the securitized version of peace produced new dissecting structural and institutional outcomes. Securitization effectively ruptured Palestinian political and spatial composition in part of the already divided Palestine: the West Bank and Gaza.

In the canon of international relations theory, security-related questions are fundamental. As Der Derian puts it, "no other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of 'security' " (Der Derian 1995: 24–25). It is no wonder, then, to find a chapter on "democratic peace" inside every (under-)graduate Security Studies module. The theoretical perspective of the Copenhagen School of security studies helps us understand the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). Initially, the linguistic linkages, juxtapositions, and echoing of "peace and security" constitute the rudimentary infrastructure for peace securitization. Peace as a referent object is represented as something at risk. On this account, a process of identification began to constitute the "enemies of peace" and authorize "extra-ordinary" measures to defeat or stop them. As we shall see in the following section, Hamas and Gaza were represented as endangering peace, leading the PA, Israel, and peace sponsors to undertake joint extraordinary security measures against them, including surveillance, closing related institutions, torture, arrests, and even fully fledged military assaults.[1] The emphasis put on security dominated the peace rituals (in the form of meetings, summits, and communication) to the extent that it constituted a "precondition," as captured in the negotiation record: "in order to have peace, we need security first" (Doc.2324; Doc.616, Amus Gilad; Doc.2870).

By and large, security is imagined through a military prism whereby mighty military institutions and personnel shaped the agenda. The paradigm for this approach shows Israeli "peace" negotiators in their military uniforms at the negotiation table. Western discourse constructed the PA's security reforms (especially in the Roadmap) as the key for achieving security and hence peace, and pointed toward further Western engagement in actual strategies coupled with material and financial assistance to implement structural reformations within the Palestinian security institutions. This effort was dubbed *capacity building*. On the ground, however, American and European military institutions drafted the required security arrangements and reforms.[2]

Security is the backbone of the orthodox peace paradigm; this approach takes partition at a

face value, as a rational solution for conflicts involving ethnic or national groups, with the idea that each group can be given a state of its own. Such an approach is widely considered the best way to reduce the "security dilemma" (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Kaufmann 1996), a rationale that dates back to the seventeenth century Westphalian peace. This conventional wisdom is at the heart of the Israel–Palestine peace process: two states for two peoples "living side by side in peace and security" (Badarin 2016). Security has always been an orienting concept for the peacebuilding process. The EU, in its capacity as a key sponsor of the peace process, supported the "creation of a viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian entity," granted that it would be "the best guarantee of Israel's security" (L.28). Peace and security are usually embedded in the peace process framework – yet we are not told what peace and security mean. Reading between the lines, however, peace unfolds as a security arrangement that achieves Israeli security and Palestinian economic benefits. The peace and security schema points to peace as a mechanism producing security rather than addressing conflict issues and solving them justly. This side of peace is inappropriate for the question of Israel–Palestine, for questions of morality, justice, and equality are left out.

While being engrossed in the peace process, Palestinians were plugged into a security-based interpretation of peace as the best way toward building their state on parts of Palestine. Security-laden concepts and vocabulary infiltrated the Palestinian perception and political calculations. In terms of practical measures, however, the basic discourse on peace and security determined the scope for political schemes and allocation of funds. There has also been a perceptible expansion in the PA security sector and the amount of resources devoted to it. As concrete policy debates evolved, the image of peace as security was used and elaborated into a more sophisticated process to legitimize certain policy blueprints and their material consequences.

A "security-based diplomacy" became a hegemonic paradigm (Diker 2010: in structuring and contextualizing power relations between the Palestinians, Israelis, and peace sponsors. For example, the EU declared the peace process "the only path to *security and peace* for Israel, the Palestinians and neighbouring states" (K.5, emphasis added). Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel (1996–1999 and 2009–current), argued for a peace "based *first on the security* of Israel and its citizens. The *test of peace* agreement is *security*" (K.10, emphasis added). More pointedly, Israel believes that it has "special security needs" that no one (other than Israel) can comprehend (Doc.2797). Peace *is* security, from the Israeli standpoint. The phrase "peace and security" has been constantly reproduced in the form of a self-evident "truth" and singular simulacrum. The security-peace nexus has moved through the language of peace sponsors (later the Quartet) into Palestinian discourse. The performative result came about in 1993, when the PLO went beyond the "recognition" of Israel to underline the recognition of the "*right* of the State of Israel to exist in *peace and security*" (I.2, emphasis added). From now on, the Palestinians uncritically embraced the association of peace and security as singular and given representation.

Nietzsche's analysis of the moral judgment has proved timeless and pertinent. As he explains in the *Genealogy of Morals*,

> the judgment "good" did *not* originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much

> rather has it been the good themselves, that is, aristocratic, the powerful, the right-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good…
>
> (Nietzsche 2003 [1887]: 11, emphasis in original)

By a similar way of thinking, developed and powerful countries and institutions have defined the criteria for "good" and "bad" governance in much of the developing and less powerful countries. Palestine is no exception in this regard. The same military generals who served in the occupation of Iraq in 2003 were appointed to "oversee" the Palestinian reforms stipulated in the Roadmap.[3] The oversight and evaluation of the institution building and capacity building were controlled by dominant international institutions, such as the US Department of the Army, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU, the World Bank and the aforementioned military generals – not by the people these projects were intended serve.

Two security institutions were established in order to retrain, rebuild, and reform the Palestinian security forces: the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS). The USSC, for example,

> was established in *2005 to assist the PA in rebuilding its security capacity*. It provides *advice and guidance* to support PA Security Forces' efforts at reform, within the context of the Roadmap and the Two-State Solution. Working to the US Department of State, it is a *multi-national team led by a US 3-star General* with access to relevant PA and Government of Israel institutions. Work is focused on *bolstering Palestinian security institutions*, particularly the Ministry of Interior, as well as *professionalizing the Palestinian Armed Security Forces* (PASF).
>
> (Doc.2455, emphasis added)

The failure or success of the peace process was constructed as contingent upon the "Palestinian management of the internal security" (Doc.2455). The British Secret Intelligence Services (MI6) described "a real opportunity to revive the peace process, starting with security steps by the PA" (Doc.238). The Palestinians internalized this order and acted correspondingly. The chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, for instance, wrote to the US special envoy for Middle East security, General James Jones: "we [the PA] undertook that implementation of a comprehensive agreement will be *contingent on Palestinian security performance* …" (Doc.2702, emphasis added). In essence, the caliber of the socalled capacity-building schemes is reflected in their ability to respond to security contingencies. This paved the way for security reforms and training arrangements. After this brief preview of the basic security-oriented discourse in which Palestinians were engaged, let us now turn to the question of how far it was assimilated.

The basic discourse on "peace and security" created a scope for policy practices and financial distribution. Once the concrete policy debates began to evolve, the image of peace as security has been elaborated into a more sophisticated device that would legitimize certain policy blueprints and related concrete consequences. The powerful rhetorical device on

security helped stabilize and validate Palestinian internal discourse: Palestinian policies and actions (against the Palestinians) were considered essential security procedures, a Palestinian "responsibility" and necessary steps *toward* Palestinian statehood (logic of mobility).

As we know from the Oslo Accords, Palestinian representatives endorsed Israel's exclusive monopoly over "residual powers," including security and foreign relations (H.48). In light of this, half of the "peace and security" framework was already at Israel's discretion. After signing the Oslo Agreements, the PLO began to rebuild its security apparatus while preparing to relocate itself from Tunisia to the West Bank and Gaza. Previous PLO security apparatus such as the Palestinian Liberation Army (*jaish al-tahrir al-falastini*) and the freedom fighters subject position (*al-fida'iyyun*) were dispensed with. The new Palestinian security structure was put in a direct connection with the Israeli one through different formulas, such as "liaison committees," "coordination," "cooperation," a "District Cooperation Office (DCO)", and so on (I.4).

In particular, security-laden notions penetrated the Palestinian perception after the endorsement of the Roadmap in 2003. The Roadmap represented an operative blueprint of the orthodox (neoliberal) peacemaking theory in which security is a priori. The Roadmap put the onus on Palestinian "security performance." It revived the logic of progressive mobility, and insinuated a relentless war on Palestinian "violence and terrorism." Meanwhile, bearing in mind that fighting colonial power is warranted by "any means" (including violent ones) under international law (see UNGA Resolution 2649 (XXV) 1970) it is easy to see how a legitimate Palestinian approach became illegitimate. This effectively produced a mechanism to externalize and exclude a segment of local Palestinian political and resistance forces.

The Roadmap's criteria for peace articulates two things: the "road" and "map" that will guide the Israelis and Palestinians to the destination of "peace and security." The "road" is articulated by "partition," the "two states solution," "security arrangements," democratization, and economic prosperity. Accordingly, the Palestinians interpreted "internal capacity" building as a "security reform" (Doc.1952). For instance, the Palestinian security forces issued a document listing their achievements in 2008. Among these achievements is "Security Reform and Capacity Building inside the Palestinian Security Institution," which was translated into "Countering of terrorism penetrations inside the Security establishment." That included arrests of security services members for cooperating with Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, "failure and neglectance [*sic*] in guarding Islamic Jihad prisoners, and shooting fire towards an Israeli camp." Furthermore, cooperation and coordination with Israel was considered a third achievement (Doc.2277). Ironically, cooperation with internal Palestinian entities (Hamas and the Islamic Jihad) was deemed punishable; meanwhile, cooperation with Israel was praised as an accomplishment and a component of capacity building.

In 2007, the PA started a program with an adjunct "classification committee," exchange of names, and "psychological" treatment in order to "re-absorb and reintegrate" the fugitives and put them "under control." Each individual ("fugitive") was "classified" and the majority were made to sign a pledge to conform to the terms of "reintegration," while names of "non-Fatah militias" were submitted to Israel (Doc.1832; Doc.1831). According to a PA security plan issued in July 2007,

> There were three lists: First, a list of 38 names who were not part of AlAqsa Brigades. The arrangement was that they spend 1 week under supervision and are then released. Second, a list of 173 names who were part of Al-Aqsa Brigades. They were required to spend 3 months under close supervision and then get released if there were no problems. Third, the PA submitted a list of 260 names of people "wanted" by Israel, to which Israel responded by a list of 110 names that it had no problem with. The PA is awaiting Israeli response regarding the remaining 150 names.
>
> (Doc.1950)

In 2004, the PA developed a plan to reimpose security control over the West Bank and Gaza. The operational mode of the plan internalizes the regular Israeli security concepts and mechanisms. It appeals for uninterrupted security and political coordination with Israel, prohibits "direct friction with the Occupation forces," security control of certain areas, deploying checkpoints, reforming Fatah and disarming armed groups within it, and the formation of operations groups against: (1) suicide operations; (2) Qassam rockets; (3) shooting; (4) weapon smuggling and manufacturing; (5) tunnels between Gaza and Egypt; (6) violence finance; (7) and incitement (Doc.168). In another plan, the PA echoed and operationalized the same Israeli terminology, including terms such as "suicide operations," "illegal arms," "information about individuals trying to act against Israel," "fighting terrorism," "fighting incitement," "observe and record incitement in mosques," "barring friction with the Israeli side," "control of media apparatus," and "fighting incitement against the PA political program" (Doc.173). In the main, the 2004 and 2007 security plans seem to be an Arabic translation of the US/UK Plan (Doc.238).

The PA embraced the US–UK-made security plan,[4] suggesting "an intensive, short-term security drive to address Israeli and US preconditions for re-engagement" and to "enable the PA fully to meet its security obligations." The plan is hierarchical: "formed by [the] US; buy-in by the Quartet; then buy-in by the PA." The US/UK is to corroborate Palestinian performance and Israel will evaluate the outcomes (Doc.238: 1–2). The plan aims to instate an automatic Israeli–Palestinian security cooperation, Palestinian civil policing, and to impose additional constraints on resistant forces and debilitate their capabilities

> through the *disruption of their leadership* communications and command and control capabilities; the *detention of key middle-ranking officers* and the confiscation of their arsenals and financial resources held within the Occupied Territories. US and – informally – UK monitors would report both to Israel and to the Quartet. We could also explore the *temporary internment of leading Hamas and PIJ figures*, making sure they are well-treated, with EU finding.
>
> (Doc.238: 1–3, emphasis added)

At any rate, violence is embedded. The US–UK-designed and EU-funded plans prescribe violence to shape the political structure in the West Bank and Gaza (without naming it) and to uproot (non-)violent resistance to colonialism. Furthermore, these schemes automatize and compel the colonized agent to cooperate and coordinate with its colonizer.

Before proceeding with the discussion on institution building, it may be useful to explain the relationship between institutions and security in orthodox peacebuilding theory. Establishing an effective central authority to govern the Machiavellian *fortuna* or the Hobbesian state of nature is essential for peace to materialize. In contemporary peace theories, security, institution, and capacity building have replaced the classical idea of the sovereign as the guardian of peace. Through analyzing the text of the Israel–Palestine diplomatic record, one finds an underlying pattern of intersections over peace and security, and this mediates actual policies regarding institution building and capacity building projects in Palestine. Now the analysis turns to the domains that aid serves, the specification of capacity-building and institution-building arrangements, and how this structure of aid intersects with Palestinian discourse.

Following the optimistic discourse after the sensational signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the European Community amended its aid regulations to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza in its foreign aid program (J.4). Simultaneously, it crafted a new scheme, "Financial and Technical Cooperation with the Occupied Territories", as a means to "foster sustainable economic and social development" (J.3). Although the scheme refers to "the Occupied Territories," its actual scope, is limited to the *spheres* that were delegated to the Palestinians in accordance with the Oslo Accords, and it is perfectly attuned with tenets of liberal economic peace.[5]

In June 2002, the EU and the US (that is, the main donor countries) coformulated a plan entitled "Donor Support for Palestinian Reform" (Doc.130). The responsibility for design, finance, and supervision is divided among several Western states and institutions. Table 6.1 sums up the sectors and states. The plan prescribes "capacity/institutional building" as an "investment in peace" and "transition to statehood." It advances the sectors that do not impinge on the Israeli colonial policies in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. Moreover, each sector is confined within the framework of the Oslo Accords, which effectively legitimizes Israel's hegemony and codifies it in agreements. The Paris Protocol[6] represents the upper ceiling of the financial management and economic policy sector. Donors considered the protocol an indisputable overarching regime governing economic power relations.

Representatives of the US, IMF, World Bank (Washington Consensus), EU, and Japan echoed donor support for the Palestinian reform plan in suggesting

> the establishment of seven working groups in the field covering the areas of *market economics, financial accountability, civil society, local government, elections, judiciary, ministerial and civil service* reform. The objectives of the working groups would be to (i) flesh out the Matrix and identify priorities; (ii) provide status reports on Palestinian efforts to date …
>
> (Doc.131, emphasis added)

New security institutions, such as the security working groups (SWGs), were established to control the flow of information, assessment, and "coordination with Israel." Close attention to these plans and statements reveals how "coordination" and "cooperation" with the occupation became embedded in the rules of the game; the "SWGs will be asked to report on Palestinian progress as well as what is requested from Israelis and donors" (Doc.131). The colonial spirit

in the design of security institutions goes beyond material aspects to cultural and ethical ones. For instance, although these groups operate within a non-Western environment, they imposed Western ethical security codes, such as the European Code of Police Ethics (Doc.159, Annex). The security paradigm is paramount in the design of such capacity-building arrangements. The status quo and the Israeli security conditions were key criteria for determining which sectors to include and exclude from the reform schemes. The overall institution-building and capacity-building arrangements therefore coexisted with the operative colonial structure instead of bringing it to a close.

Table 6.1 Distribution of capacity-building projects and sectors between different states

State/institution	*Targeted sector*
UK, Belgium, IMF, World Bank	Financial management and economic policy-making…
European Commission (EC), Norway, UK, US, World Bank	Public administration and civil service reform
EC, US, World Bank	Strengthening local government
Australia, Denmark, EC, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, US, World Bank	Rule of law
EC, Sweden, UK, US, World Bank	Private sector development

In the aftermath of the US call for structural reform of the PA in 2002, several institutions[7] were set up as part of a gatekeeping infrastructure to reflect the donors' mood and priorities. These new security institutions seek to administer the reformation process and "bring together interested donors and international entities" as an answer to security-related aspects (Doc.1748). Institutions like the Palestinian National Authority Technical Team for Reform (PNA-TTR) and the US Security Coordinator (USSC) filtered communications: "*queries and commensurate information* responses are coordinated through a single donor relations function within the PNA-TTR" (ibid., emphasis added). Bearing on the path-dependence concept (Pierson 2004), gatekeeping of the flow of information from the beginning offers the best opportunity to construct the basis of aid/security contingent nexus.

The Israeli veto power is rooted at the micro-level of aid and donor projects. This power flows systematically from within and without direct Israeli intervention. For instance, during the preparation for the Bethlehem Investment Conference in 2010, the Palestinians had already prepared a "list of names [whom the] PA wants to invite" to the conference for "Israeli [security] clearance" (Doc.2330). It seemed natural and axiomatic for donors and planners to seek Israel's approval in advance. "Nothing had been provided to the Palestinians unless it has been thoroughly coordinated with the state of Israel and they agree to it," as General Keith Dayton explains (Dayton 2009: 7). He further adds that in any circumstances, funding must be approved first by Israel because the American "congress won't approve before checking with Israel" (Doc.5171, Keith Dayton). The US has maintained a sense of ownership of these institutions because it is one of the foremost funders of the PA institutions. From the US perspective, "it is unacceptable to the US [to give Hamas control over the West Bank institutions], after financing and training we've carried out – this defeats the purpose" (Doc.4844, George Mitchell). Foreign ownership of (supposedly) national institutions provides a means for systematic intervention, control and exclusion. Without too much airbrushing, the cited statements by high-profile representatives allude to a perspicuous

internalization of the Israelis' decisive stake in the shape and content of the Western-funded capacity-building projects.

Securitization is embedded in these capacity-building schemes. It is useful to consider the following passages for their lucid demonstration of the thought behind these schemes. In April 2004, in a letter to former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, George W. Bush assured Israel that

> The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt and others in international community, *to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations*, and *prevent* the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a *threat* …
>
> (Doc.180, emphasis added)

The EU/US reform arrangements correlate capacity building with democratization and police training:

> *Governance and capacity building* have been priority areas on the donor agenda since the beginning of the peace process, as donor engagement was premised on the idea of establishing a foundation for transition to Palestinian statehood. For its part, the World Bank prepared in September 1993 a seven-volume study entitled Developing the Occupied Territories: *An Investment in Peace…. Institution building, as defined by MOPIC* [Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation]*, includes institutional development, democracy development, legal development, and police training and support*.
>
> (Doc.130, emphasis added)

Furthermore, military/security institutions (MI6, the US Department of the Army) and military commanders were the foremost designers of capacity-building schemes in Palestine. For example, General Dayton decided how to spend US$80 million on security arrangements:

> I'll leave a copy of the recommendation I gave to my government on how to spend it ($43 million on communications equipment), upgrading training centers (Bethlehem and Jericho), training, $10 million train officers, $23 million to create new NSF [National Security Forces] battalion as discussed before, $3 million for MoI [Ministry of Interior] for strategic planning capabilities…. US money will focus on capacity building of MoI and focus on NSF while EU funds should focus on Police.
>
> (Doc.5171, Keith Dayton, emphasis added)

Besides security, aid is not without instrumental implicit and explicit political functions. EU special envoy to the Middle East peace process (2003–2011) Marc Otte pointed out that European aid aims "to *change people's ideology and political beliefs*. It is in the greater interest of the EU to see an Islamist government that *adopts an acceptable code of conduct*, and sets a positive example, than a total failure" (Doc.5173, emphasis added). The US, however, used aid to impede Hamas' government, he added. The deputy director of USAID

David Harden argued, "The 'sellability' of Salam Fayyad's vision is critical … It should include a strategy to 'regain' Gaza … *USAID is interested in an aggressive plan to demonstrate change in environment on the Palestinian street and alter the momentum*" (Doc.1871, emphasis added). Financial and material aid are premeditated to service and administer capacity-building and institution-building schemes, which became a main employment provider in the West Bank and Gaza and an effective pressure tool on Palestinians.

Now, aid is ventured on the basis of the Palestinian performance and compliance to arbitrary conditions of donor countries. Deviating from these conditions would swiftly dry out the financial sources of the PA, translating into a chronic "salary" deficit (*azmat al-rawatib*). The salary deficit is a pressure instrument on the Palestinians that induced PLO/PA President Abbas on 17 October 2006 to declare "bread more important than democracy," which refers to the preeminence of donor conditions over Palestinian national rights and right to resist colonial expansion. A rather blunt example would explain how donors used *money* to influence political choices. German representative to the PA Jorg Ranau unequivocally tried to bargain the release of the Israeli soldier who was captured by Hamas in 2006 and released as part of prisoners exchange in 2011, Gilad Shalit, for money; in his own words, "There will be *no money before movement on* Shalit" (Doc.5178, emphasis added).

The peace and security formula has been the backbone of the capacity-building and institutional-building projects. But the security in question here was merely viewed in a narrow militarized sense, as the security of Israel from Palestinian "violence." The implicit assumption of the civilized (Israelis) facing the violence of the uncivilized (Palestinians) underlines the peace and security formula. A civilization mission bound with security-laden notions animates capacity building as the best vehicle for restraining the "deviant" behavior of the colonized. In this way, a narrow racialized and militarized version of security became ingrained in Palestinian institutions. Palestinians endorsed the neoliberal peace in the hope of achieving statehood on part of Palestine. However, the outcome was something entirely different. The so-called institution and capacity building created Palestinian-run institutions that internalize a narrow securitization.

Divisive securitization

Colonial regimes are skillful in devising different techniques to offset the natives' resistance. Divide and rule is one of the oldest colonial techniques used to manage and coopt indigenous forces, exploiting a complex mediation of micro-politics practised on the colonized subject. The divide-and-rule politics were in full swing after the first Palestinian democratic election in 2006. It is therefore useful to explore the active construction of new divisions within Palestinian society and space in the West Bank and Gaza that unfolded in the negotiation record. This is best demonstrated by the example of the so-called Fatah–Hamas "split" (*al-inqisam*), which may evolve into a complete institutional and political separation between the West Bank and Gaza. One thing should be made clear: this analysis is by no means a defense of Hamas; it is rather an analysis of the negotiation record focusing on internal Palestinian politics in order to understand how colonial power avails itself of internal differences within native body politics.

The official Israeli–Palestinian (PLO/PA) debate on Hamas and Gaza triggered the creation of a discursive medium in which views and judgments were formulated and exchanged, and this in turn informed real policies. The debate facilitated the redistribution of "otherness" relationships between the colonized and colonizer. The debate focused on four principal subjects – the PLO/PA, Israel, Hamas, and Gaza – which were conceptually grouped into binary positions: "us" analyzing "them." The former, "us," represented the parties that enunciate and convene security meetings (that is, the PLO/PA and Israel) to discuss "them" (Hamas and Gaza), and construed the subject matter of those meetings as a dangerous and threatening other. Gaza was deemed the spatial sphere of this danger. This framing can be detected in the following extracts from various negotiation meetings.

In October 2007, the head of the Palestinian negotiation team Abu Alaa (Ahmad Qurie) was recorded thus:

> *We* cannot neglect that *Hamas* are [*sic*] there. On the ground in Gaza. *They* are in the West Bank. *We* follow *them*. Take *their* arms. Try to dismantle *their* infrastructure. 160 charities have been closed and are under investigation. 250 sheikhs have been expelled…. The key is how to succeed in Nablus. *They* are in Hebron but not as aggressive as in Nablus. In Gaza *they* have lost a lot. The continuation of the closure of Rafah [Crossing] and the tunnels – *they* are smuggling arms and money. This will give *them* more power. It is up to Israel and Egypt to stop the tunnels … [Israel not taking action on the tunnels either. TL: We are not there. [AA: yes you are.]].
>
> (Doc.1962, emphasis added, brackets in original)

> YASER ABD RABBO: No! *You* will provoke Egypt and provide *Hamas* a victory. *They* will say that the Annapolis conference is about *them*.
> SAEB EREKAT: *They* will not stand if *we* have an agreement.
>
> (Doc.1962, emphasis added)

> TZIPI LEVNI: Our strategic view is to strengthen *you* [the PA] and weaken *Hamas*.
>
> (Doc.2470, emphasis added)

The above conversation is structured around two subject positions: "us/we" and "they/them." The antagonistic relationship of "othering" associates the two positions and governs the discursive flow in security meetings and negotiations. The "we/us" position is there to reflexively signify the PLO/PA and Israel, whereas Hamas and Gaza constitutes the ultimate other ("they/them"). For the PLO/PA, Israeli, and American representatives, "othering" did not only concern Hamas, but also enmeshed those identifying with it and any related infrastructures. For instance, Rashid Abu-Shbak, head of Palestinian Security Services at the time, "agreed with KD [General Keith Dayton] that the proposal should not be only about the tunnels [dug between Gaza and Egypt], but *should deal with the people*" (Doc.1617). The discursive approach to security created a space to enunciate the Palestinians (PLO/PA) and Israelis as one group. But this came at the cost of constructing a new other carved away from Palestinian society and space.

The diplomatic record suggests that process of "othering" was underway as early as the preparation for the Palestinian legislative elections began in 2005. However, it became more

intense and visible after Hamas' electoral victory in 2006. In May 2006, a European representative asked about "the chances for changing Hamas government or its policy" (Doc.5156). Occasionally, the PA, US, and Israel (usually constituted as "us/we") devoted a complete security meeting to discuss Hamas-related issues (the "other", "they"), and to discuss various ways to weaken "them" (Doc.2797). For the PA, Israel, and the peace sponsors, Hamas' electoral victory in 2006 was construed as an anomaly, a "political crisis" that needed to be dealt with by the "regular" authority that the PLO/PA (supposedly) represented. In response to the "political crisis," the PA argued in favor of giving Hamas "the chance" to run the government whilst being put under careful supervision and observation (Doc.5168). Moreover, the antagonistic "us/them" relationship informed the PA's behavior – and perhaps had the same effect on Hamas, but this is a subject to discuss elsewhere. The PA's structural composition, which is based mainly around a single party (Fatah), heightened the partisan thinking that produced tactical (rather than principled) positions: "Not giving a chance to the government [led by Hamas] will mean that *they* did not fail, but *we* [PA/PLO and Israel] made *them* fail, and this is a strategic mistake" (Doc.5168, Saeb Erekat, emphasis added).

The "othering" relationship is sustained through a process of differentiation that first constructed the "other" (Hamas and Gaza) as a security concern and source of danger. It therefore seemed necessary to extricate that "other" from the assumed "self." To put it differently, this mode of thinking attempted to externalize danger (this will be elaborated further later). A brief remark is apt at this point. In general, the dividing line between "us" and "them" is built on the tension and competition between two camps: those who use "peace talks" and those who use "Qassams" (rockets/projectiles – a euphemism for violence), between "progress in the West Bank" and misery in Gaza, as Abu Alaa explained (Doc.2797, AA). Indeed, this is how the US interpreted the internal Palestinian political situation: "You [the PA] are the party of negotiations and Hamas is the party of armed resistance", George Mitchell said (Doc.4899).

The PA contemplated a number of soft and hard externalizing mechanisms to sideline the internal "other." Soft mechanisms included: first, exclusion by judicial means, such as "amending the law," to keep Hamas out of the political scene ("We should *fight them* with law and order"); and second, insinuating conditions that the "other" be unable to accept under any circumstances.[8] It was argued, for instance, that, "They [Hamas] must accept the PLO charter and its commitments" and "the Quartet conditions" (Doc.1962). These conditions are at odds with the political context: first, Hamas is outside the PLO's framework; and second, the PLO's Charter was practically nullified in 1998. On the other hand, violent mechanisms encompassed a range of policies, such as arrests, torture, censorship, closure of institutions, and confiscation of resources.[9] Spatially, however, the PA conceived Hamas' presence in the West Bank (or that of any significant rival political party) intolerable: as a senior PA figure asserted, "*they* [Hamas] can't be back in the WB [West Bank]" (Doc.4844, SE). Soft and hard measures were geared toward the isolation of Hamas and ensuring an unrivalled PLO/PA authority in the West Bank, in Area A, and with coordination with Israel. In consequence, this framing insinuated two spheres of influence into the perception: one in the West Bank, run by the PA; and another in Gaza, run by Hamas – though both function within the folds of the Israeli colonial hegemony.

The internal Palestinian "other" proved to be both useful and detrimental to the PLO/PA

calculations. The latter used the former as a negotiation card to represent itself as "the only option for peace" (Doc.2312, AA), and used its actions against Hamas as a manifestation of the PA's reliability. At the same time, subduing Hamas (among others) became a test to gauge the reliability of the PA and its responsibility for security. Still, punitive efforts to crush resistance (or "violence" in the peace process lexicon) failed to yield any political flexibility on the part of Israel or the US; on the contrary, Israeli and US intransigence continued.[10] The PA resorted to rhetorical devices to gloss over its resounding failure to translate its violent policies against Palestinians into political assets in the negotiations. To do so, rhetorical devices represented these actions as Palestinian "obligations" and tools for maintaining "order and law," "one authority," "one gun," and so on (Doc.4902). The PA pledged to continue heavy-handed security measures despite the evidently fruitless negotiations (Doc.4899; Doc.4828; Doc.4902). These measures were deliberately detached from the political process, and thus failed to command political leverage. Instead, the PA's popularity was in decline and the US government responded by reducing its financial support to the PA.

Since 2006, Hamas and Gaza have been constructed as the "common enemy" of Israel and the PLO/PA (Doc.2825, TL). A closer study of the Palestine Papers (among other documents) reveals a pattern of shared vocabulary and concepts to designate that enemy, which even urged the former Israeli Foreign Minister to "appreciate" the Palestinian "words about Gaza" (Doc.2797). In the meantime, the Israeli "words" used to frame Gaza, temporally and spatially, swept unchallenged and were met with utter silence from Palestinian representatives. In a (negotiation) meeting with their Israeli counterparts, the Palestinian representatives depicted Hamas as synonymous with terrorism (Doc.2277). From their perspective, Hamas represented a "regional problem" (Doc.1962, Yasir Abed Rabo): it "will apply shari'a [law] and export the Islamic regime to the neighbouring countries" (Doc.2312, AA), and was run by an outlawed group of "thugs in control of Gaza" (Doc.1830, SE). Lavish discursive efforts were invested in isolating Hamas from the political scene by highlighting its Islamist background and juxtaposing it with "radicalism," "political Islam in action," and "Abu Qutada (Chechnya)" (Doc.1830; Doc.1797, SE). Coupling Hamas with terrorism and radicalism saves the PA and Israel the trouble of justifying their actions toward Hamas, and Palestinians by and large. This was made possible by capitalizing on the already well-distributed negative discourse on terrorism and Islam (Said 1997), especially after 9/11, which rationalizes extraordinary measures against those who are classified as "radicals." For instance, the PA compared Hamas with movements carrying negative and radical connotations, and provided candid analysis to Western envoys with the hope of mobilizing several countries so as to exclude Hamas even further. Consider the following Palestinian political analysis, given as an answer to the question of David Welch, a senior US diplomat in the Middle East, "What constitutes a Hamas failure?":

> Well, a Hamas success is being able to deliver a long-term *hudna* [truce] and getting 60% of the West Bank. A Hamas failure is to form a government and then be [un]able to deliver or provide, but only *if* they cannot claim that its failure resulted from our "collusion with the Americans", etc. Hamas claims that Iran and Arab states have pledged financial support, and I congratulated them for that.

(Doc.5130, emphasis added)

In the main, the relationship between the PA and Hamas was expressed in hyperbolic terms as an "unending battle" (Doc.5175, SE), or a "struggle" between a "national project" and a "militia project" (Abbas 2007). Hamas was branded as irresponsible, emotional, irrational, dependent on others, and as having caused the "Mogadishu Syndrome" in Gaza. Linking Gaza with events in Somalia contributed to Hamas' piratical image, an unlawful, atavistic force exploiting the "the tunnel economy." The insinuations were that this irrational, emotional, and irresponsible subject was a danger and a prelude to instability, and therefore it needed treatment, confinement, and eradication. This construction aspired to justify the exclusion of internal Palestinian forces that do not conform to the Oslo peace paradigm and to preserve the PA's monopoly on speaking for the Palestinian people.

The exclusion was (and perhaps still is) designed and rooted at different levels. For example, the PA's advisory team, the Negotiation Support Unity (NSU),[11] "prepared a two pager on any *language* or arguments SF [Salam Fayyad] can use *to avoid including Hamas* in the operation of Rafah" (Doc.3797, emphasis added). Internal Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation between the PA and Hamas was either deemed "not possible" because "it will only legitimize them" (Doc.1815, SE), or listed as a mere "alternative" in case negotiations with Israel stalled (Doc.2864) and as something that may take place "only on 'our terms' [the PA]," as the Palestinian president explained (Doc.2800). It is difficult to separate such conceptions and framings from their concrete entailments (isolation, siege, silencing opposition, delimiting employment to PA supporters, detention, torture). It is worth citing at length some representative examples of the verbal operations in the "peace" process:

> The *battle* with Hamas in *unending*…. When you [Israeli representatives] *besiege* Gaza and *cut off* electricity and you see the *cry* over a *sick* child in the candlelight … this kind of *victory* they're [Hamas' leadership] seeking. They *don't care* about the *suffering* of the people … what will *destroy* Hamas is for us to reach an agreement. They *wager* on our *failure*.
>
> (Doc.2312)

> … Egypt is allowing the *tunnels to continue*.
>
> (Doc.5175, SE, emphasis added)

> Yes, and they'll [Hamas] apply Islamic *Shari'a* and *export their regime* to neighboring counties … Hamas must *not* feel that it's achieving *victory* … I hope Hamas will be *defeated*…. They *don't* work from their own interest *but for the interest of Iran* and sometimes Syria. I wanted the [Al-Aqsa] Brigade to remain as it was to *confront* Hamas … Hezbollah *paid* Hamas … Hamas *endangers* Egypt's national security.
>
> (Doc.2312, AA, emphasis added)

Close examination of the above extracts illustrates a construct of Hamas ("they/them") as an irresponsible and opportunist movement, a regional threat and an incarnation of radial Islam. Such characterization encouraged spurious links between Hamas and the population of Gaza,

so the latter became a target. Israel framed the civilian institutions in Gaza – and the people operating them – as part of the "infrastructure of terror," asserting that they "belong to a terrorist entity" ahead of the attack in 2008/2009 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003; Weizman 2007, 2012). The enormous death (of civilians) and destruction was glossed over by a ready-made chain of expressions, such as "side effects," "collateral damage," "proportionality," "surgical strikes," and "targeted killing." By a similar way of thinking, the PA launched a set of aggressive measures against these institutions. Hamas and those affiliated with it were deemed a "serious threat" that warranted waging a "fight" so that it could be be "dealt with" (Doc.2520, HA and anonymous Israeli intelligence representative). Consequently, Hamas must be "defeated," "overthrown," and excluded from politics until it accepts the arbitrary terms of the peace process.

The debate on the (non-)violent struggle discussed elsewhere is pertinent, for it is a significant part of the discursive mechanisms that disqualify and exclude rival forces from the peace process paradigm. That debate constituted any violent struggle (without defining "violent") as illegitimate and undemocratic to strangle competition with the PA's negotiation-only strategy and thus foreclosing opposing forces like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Brigades.

As it unfolds throughout the negotiation record, Gaza is imagined and represented primarily through metaphors of risk and danger. Hence, it stands for the spatial boundary of evil and peril. American and Israeli representatives, for instance, referred to Gaza using the following terms: "400 lb gorilla"; "hell"; "a country of terror"; and "Hamastan" (Doc.2800; Doc.2312). In the same vein, Palestinian representatives constituted a comparable metaphorical Gaza: it was "a very serious concern" and "the Emirate of Darkness" (Abbas 2007); it was associated with "Mogadishu Syndrome" and "the tunnel economy"; and it was "becoming more extremist, with al-Qaeda and the influence of Iran" (Doc.4676; Doc.4905; Doc.1815, SE). The PA considered itself to be managing a "war" in Gaza. It also drew on phrases laden with imperialist sentiments, such as "Gaza must be *won back* through the *hearts and minds*" of the Gazans (Doc.3726). Embedded judgments in technical phrases in the PA discourse tacitly configured Gaza as an external entity after Hamas took it over in 2007: "Gazans fleeing to the West Bank are 'refugees' "; "There are two Palestinian governments – one in Gaza and another in the West Bank"; "Gaza is no longer part of the Palestinian Authority"; there had been a "change of government" and a "coup d'état" (Doc.1796).

Gaza and Hamas were constructed with a conceptual history and regional associations that stretched beyond actual events (i.e. the Hamas electoral victory, its assumption of power in Gaza, security matters) and territorial limits. This confluence of representations amplifies the split and opens up associations between Gaza, Hamas, and regional problems. It implies that the "problem of Gaza" is wider than its geographical location and it would be impossible to deal with it peacefully. Violent repression thus becomes necessary. Most importantly, this danger-making discourse dominated the diplomatic process and hushed the possibility to debate violent and illegal Israeli actions that had been perpetrated against the people of Gaza for decades. The siege that practically rendered Gaza a gigantic open-air prison is a case in point. Astonishingly, as far as the Palestine Papers show, the negotiations made no attempt to bring this siege to an end. It was not even considered a subject for discussion. The analysis

demonstrated how the antagonist relationship was reallocated into the internal Palestinian political structure, shifting the perception of this relationship away from colonized and colonizer, and thus triggering further Palestinian political disintegration.

The language of war, rather than peace, piloted the supposed negotiation for the pursuit of peace. This is especially the case where Hamas and Gaza are concerned: these terms are often used with words such as battle, besiege, cry, sick, destroy, defeat, attack, fight. On several occasions the PA requested "guns and ammunitions" from Israel to deal "with the situation in Gaza" (Doc.540), even before Hamas took over Gaza in 2007. Since Israel and the PA shared the same discourse and terminology, and thus internal judgment, on Hamas, it was not surprising that Israel divulged its plans for an attack on Gaza (in 2008 and 2009) to PA President Abbas – who, to his credit, rejected the plan and argued "that he will not go to Gaza on an Israeli tank" (Doc.4899). However, the style of message exchange between the PLO/PA and Israel is far more telling than the response by the Palestinian leadership. The communication style demonstrates fluidity in the flow of information and coordination (at least regarding Hamas) between the PA and Israel, to the extent that it made the latter comfortable in sharing with the former its plans to attack Palestinians.

In November 2007, a conference was held in Annapolis in the US to "revive" (again?) the peace process and to follow up on the implementation of the Roadmap. The conference reverberated the same mantra: it was new era of peace, two states were living side by side in peace and security, resolving all outstanding issues, combating terrorism[12] – but succeeded only in triggering a series of intensive negotiations between the PA and Israel on the so-called finalstatus issues of the conflict. As a result, the PLO/PA reached a peak of optimism regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state, to the extent that former PA prime minister Salam Fayyad declared a two-year plan to establish the state institutions.[13] This fostered inordinate hope that the state would soon exist, but there was an obstacle to this "new era": Hamas.

Immediately after the Annapolis Conference, eighty-three donor countries convened in Paris and pledged US$7.4 billion in finance for Palestinian institution building (UNISPAL 2007), while Gaza was witnessing a strict economic, political, and territorial siege. Furthermore, since then Hamas and Gaza have been the subject and theme of almost every security negotiation session. Again, I will cite at length pertinent conversations from the negotiation record here. Only extended quotations from one of the security sessions held in Jerusalem on 4 February 2008 conveys the degree and style in which judgments on Gaza and Hamas were articulated:

> ABU ALAA: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is part of Fateh movement and they agreed to be part of the current [PA] security apparatus … *I wanted the Brigade to remain as it was to confront Hamas*.
> LIVNI: What about the *Gaza* Strip?
> ABU ALAA: The borders isn't [*sic*] a game and what *Hamas* [*is doing*] *endangers Egyptian national security*.
> LIVNI: The ball didn't come from Israel, but from Egypt to Gaza. How can *we* stop it?
> ABU ALAA: But it reached the hands of Hamas and *you know how to stop it if you want*.
> LIVNI: Did the opening of the borders appear to be a victory for Hamas?
> ABU ALAA: *Yes*, they appeared to have ended the siege … *What can you do about Philadelphia Crossing*?
> LIVNI: We're not there.
> ABU ALAA: You've re-occupied the West Bank, and *you can occupy the crossing if you want*.
> LIVNI: We can *re-occupy* the Gaza Strip. *What is your position*?
> ABU ALAA: Our strategic position is that we want a state in the West Bank and the Strip with a safe passage.

ABU ALAA: *Hamas must not feel that it's achieving daily victories*, sometimes with Israel and sometimes with Egypt, and Al-Jazeera Channel praises these victories. *I hope Hamas will be defeated*, not militarily I mean because we didn't try this; we didn't engage in a civil war … Palestinian control over Rafeh Crossing *will be a defeat for them*, … *We've to work to compel* Hamas to review its policies. They don't work for their own interest but for the interest of Iran and sometimes Syria.

(Doc.2312, emphasis added)

The interrogatory mode is obvious. Through interrogation of Palestinian politicians/negotiators, Israel succeeded in extracting fundamental information, not only about Hamas but also on the PA's attitude and internal calculations regarding Hamas and Gaza. The Palestinian politicians showed no hesitation in providing elaborate answers. In another related conversation on 28 February 2008, which took the form of a series of Israeli questions and Palestinian answers and analyses, Gaza and Hamas emerged as the ultimate "other" for Israel and the PA. Furthermore, there are already indications of plans to carry out a military attack on Gaza.

LIVNI: We were *forced* to leave Gaza, but *maybe will have to go back*. Our public is demanding we do something about the situation. *How does Gaza affect the West Bank street*?
ABU ALAA: People are worried: Where will this lead? But Hamas does not have a problem with it.
LIVNI: For them it's resistance … so giving them more power?
ABU ALAA: Steadfastness – resistance. All this is [*sic*] promoted by TV channels, and stories of conspiracies against *them.*
LIVNI: Negotiating with Hamas strengthens *them* and weakens *you*.
LIVNI: What are Hamas' parameters for success in Gaza?
ABU ALAA: Steadfastness in the face of the occupier with no peace process working. They invest in events like *massing at the border* and demonstrations when people are killed. They know how to use this.
LIVNI: But *can you explain Gaza*? I can't understand … the *mood of the people*. We left. How come they continue to fight?
HAZEM ATALLAH [PA POLICE DIRECTOR]: *Hamas used the* [Israeli] *withdrawal* [from Gaza in 2005] *for propaganda*: signs comparing results of 10 years of negotiations with those of struggle.
LIVNI: I heard this and *used this point internally* to argue that unilateralism was a mistake.
HAZEM ATALLAH: *They were destroyed*. It was clear until then that the fight was against Hamas and [Palestinian Islamic] Jihad. With Israeli attacks came infiltration of the services by Hamas. We are now cleaning the services.

(Doc.2289, emphasis added)

In March 2008 Israel unequivocally revealed its intention to perform a "massive operation" in Gaza. Amos Gilead, Israeli general and security expert, put it like this:

> My personal opinion, and I do not represent the government in this, is that sooner or later we will collide with Hamas because they, like Hezbollah, continue to build their military capacities. *We will clash with them but we will not stay in the Gaza Strip*.

LIVNI: The last sentence represents the position of the government.

(Doc.2454, emphasis added)

In June 2008, only four months before attacking Gaza in December 2008, Israel discussed with *Palestinian* officials its plans to attack *Palestinians* (or the "other within"!):

LIVNI: *Our choice was between a massive operation*, you would have stopped negotiations, or something else which undermines AM [Abu Mazen, the PA President].
ABU ALAA: It *legitimizes resistance*, missiles, etc.
LIVNI: So *we need to make sure that Gaza and Hamas are not legitimized* until they meet the conditions [of the

Quartet].

(Doc.2797, emphasis added)

It is worth reiterating here that the style and mood in these conversations are far more revealing than their contents in representing the degree to which the Palestinian representatives were psychologically prepared to alienate internal political competition at any cost with a view to achieving Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza. The PA also adopted the (in-)famous imperialist divide-and-rule strategy, which Israel effectively used to destroy Palestinian society and further confuse its leadership. Consequently, Israel (as a colonial power) managed to move the struggle over and within the Palestinian political body in order to distract from the colonial actuality on the ground. Israel became a friend and part of the "us/we" category against the "them/they" group in this framework.

Such negotiation meetings were conducted in the name of peace and to solve the "final status issues"; in reality, however, generous time was invested in surveying and analyzing internal Palestinian conditions and potential reactions while planning a military attack on Gaza in 2008. This made it possible for Israel to re-deploy part of its military forces from the West Bank into Gaza. The former US security coordinator for Israel–Palestine, General Keith Dayton, unambiguously reveals: "As a matter of fact, a good portion of the Israeli army went off to Gaza from the West Bank – think about that for a minute – and the commander was absent for eight straight days" (Dayton 2009: 12). The information gathered from such negotiation meetings, coupled with uninterrupted security coordination, granted Israel the luxury to feel self-assured about the PA willingness to quell any uprising in the West Bank. The construction of Hamas and Gaza as a dangerous "other" correlates with the spatial and temporal securitization. Seen in this way, a hypothesis proposing (unconscious) Palestinian collusion with Israel's policies regarding Gaza in general, and the Israeli plans to attack Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 in particular, is not a farfetched one. Perhaps.

Be that as it may, the attack on Gaza 2008–2009 presented an opportunity for the internal PA counter-discourse to rise to the surface. A group of professional lawyers, political and legal advisors at the NSU, who constitute the micro-level producers of ideas for the PA negotiation team, became increasingly disenchanted with the negotiations paradigm, even before that attack – as the NSU's internal emails lucidly illustrate. One of these, from May 2008, states that the "Israelis are not taking these negotiations seriously," "the Israeli side has presented nothing," and did "not even respond to the Palestinian presentations" (Doc.2499). In October, another email mockingly highlighted that "after 1 y[ea]r of talking to Olmert, he's [Abbas] gotten 2 checkpoints removed, and 16 times the number of settlement tenders" (Doc.4095). The attack on Gaza opened up the discursive space for dormant debates on alternatives. The NUS recommended the PLO/PA to take progressive actions in the "wake of the Gaza disaster" as follows:

> The war on Gaza marks a turning point. The PLO/PA can no longer remain silent to the Israeli war crimes against their own people…. The PA is advised to take a firm stand and to officially end negotiations with Israel…. The leadership must capitalize on the growing awareness (even in the US) about the brutality of Israeli actions and the increasing calls for war crimes accountability and boycott, divestment campaigns…. The PLO/PA's

> strategy cannot be based on the zero-sum proposition put forth by the US/Israel that seeks to "deny Hamas a political victory" … Abu Mazen must take concrete steps toward reconciliation.
>
> The security apparatus should stop suppressing demonstrators and other parties' representatives, while disappearing when Israeli occupation forces invade Palestinian cities. It is highly recommended that the leadership revise its huge security budget (which accounts for around 35% of the total PA budget) and change the negative image of the security forces among the public which stand for nothing but a cover and protection of the occupier!… The "(Israeli) security first" approach has proven to be unrealistic, and dangerous…. PLO elections are urgently needed…. Therefore, the leadership should offer another option: that of popular resistance.
>
> (Doc.3706)

The significance of the citation above is that it is the first cry from within the negotiation apparatus that not only questions the viability of negotiations but also questions the relationship in which the colonized had become implicated as a result of the painstaking process of internalization. This cry also appeals to those committed to concrete actions that would alter the colonized–colonizer relationship from one of accommodation to one of (popular) resistance. The backdrop of fruitless negotiations and uncertainty, along with the reckless Israeli attack on Gaza provoked a sense of responsibility within some NSU members, who felt a moral and political duty to educate the public by disclosing the negotiation record to the Al Jazeera media network (Clot 2011).

The peace process came with its divisive binaries (with or against the process) that bifurcated Palestinian society and changed the dynamics of the Israeli– Palestinian relationship by dragging a significant segment of Palestinians into a discursive platform shared with their colonizers. Through internalizing this discursive platform, Palestinians and Israelis shared and exchanged judgments, frameworks, and policies with regard to Hamas and Gaza. This language depicted the former as a source of threat and as an impediment to peace. The latter was articulated as the spatial domain of danger. The four involved subjects were conceptually conjured into "us" (the PA/PLO and Israel) analyzing "them" (Hamas and Gaza). Although those classified under the category "them" are indeed part of the Palestinian people, "they" were conceived and represented as "other." Consequently, colonizer–colonized relationships were redistributed afresh and produced new binaries that externalized certain constituents of the Palestinian people. As such, the antagonistic relationship was infused into the colonized political body and society.

The Fateh–Hamas split ignited an ongoing internal Palestinian negotiation process, known as *'amaliyyat al-musalaha* (reconciliation process). Despite efforts to re-order the Palestinian political structure and the signing of an agreement between Fatah and Hamas to conclude the split in April 2014, the Palestinian political body is still divided between the PA in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza. And indeed Fatah and Hamas still view each other in exclusive and antagonistic terms.[14] Division and exclusion in the Palestinian political body, including within the PLO, have always existed, but the situation has never reached a level of "othering" where each side forms its own government: a "caretaker government" (*hukwmat tasryf a'mal*) in

Ramallah and a "deposed government" (*al-hukwma al-muqala*) in Gaza. Whilst under colonization, the two governments proved "successful," whether intentionally or not, in running Palestinian administrative affairs on behalf of the colonizer, which facilitated Israel's relentless colonial practices to continue unchallenged by either government. The divide-and-rule formula has been applied effectively in Palestine, diverting the energy of colonized people so that they struggle internally instead of focusing on the colonizer.

An inflated security apparatus is key to the securitized structure of Palestinianrun spheres. The security sector and its expenses have boomed very quickly since the establishment of the PA in a tiny part of Palestine. Here, it is useful to underline that the security apparatus of the PA multiplied (by about ten branches) beyond what the official Oslo Accords prescribed (a strong Palestinian police force). Undoubtedly this would have been impossible without Israel's endorsement. We still do not know what mutual agreements and understandings the PA and Israel undertook in order to create such proliferation, or how that relates to security coordination with Israel. But the discussion in this chapter demonstrates the one-sided nature of the exchange of information and services.

The loss of wholeness of the imagined Palestine has been a prelude for further divisions of land and people, and now political and resistance energy is diverted toward infighting. Yet this became possible in the light of intermediary institutions and so-called capacity-building schemes that brought the colonizer into the heart of Palestinian policy making. To imagine the degree of transformation in Palestinian discourse one simply needs to juxtapose present statements and their processes of construction with previous ones relating to the same subject. The discourse of capacity building opened the debate on the "generation" of the "new Palestinian," a subject position that systematically coordinates and collaborates with the colonial institutions.[15] However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the "new Palestinian personality," which the Palestinian movement wanted to "generate" after an-Nakba, was perceived as the returnee, martyr and revolutionary (*al 'a'id, al-fida'i, al-thawri*). The colonizer influence is thus no longer external or negative, but rather its produces the register of Palestinian policy from within and at a level of fine detail. The colonizer became a proactive agent in the discursive formation; therefore, the peace process remains a key chapter in Palestinian history, with deep influence on the formation of Palestinian political institutions.

Notes

1 For examples, see Doc.4844.
2 For example, the "Security Working Group" has been submitting reports and executive summaries to the US Department of the Army, the US security coordinator, US Consulate General, and Jerusalem, APO AE 09830 (Doc.390).
3 These military generals include: Lt Gen. Keith Dayton; Lt Gen. William Fraser, USAF; Col. William Costantini, USMC (special assistant to the assistant to the chairman joint chiefs of staff); LTC Richard Sele, US Army, Lt. Col. Darren Duke, USMC (Stationed full-time here, between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), US Con Gen Jake Wallace, US Con Gen Peter Evans, Political Officer (Doc.2260).
4 See Doc.168 and Doc.173 which represent the Arabic version of the British (Doc.238) security plans prepared by the PA.
5 Aid from the EU covered the following areas: "infrastructure, production, urban an rural development, education, health, environment, services, foreign trade, setting-up and improvement of institutions necessary for the proper working of the public administration and the advancement of democracy and human rights." (J.3 1734/94, article ii, 1994: 209, J.4 1994).
6 Paris Protocol was signed in May 1994 between the PA/PLO and Israel. It represents a framework that governs and regulates the economic relations between the two entities.
7 Among the security institutions which were established to control the flow of information are the following: Palestinian

National Authority Technical Team for Reform (PNA-TTR), Security Working Group (SWG), Security Sector Reform and Transformation (SSR&T), the US Security Coordinator (USSC).

8 The PA/PLO internal assessment suggests that Hamas (the other) will not accept these conditions under any circumstances. For instance, Saeb Erekat was recorded saying: "I have more chance of becoming a NASA astronaut than Hamas agreeing to a government that recognizes Israel" (Doc.4451).

9 The listed "achievements" of the Palestinian Security Forces included: "Arresting 34 members of Hamas and Islamic Jehad [*sic*], Sending notices for 132 citizens for illegal actions (regarding terrorism) and having relations with Hamas and Islamic Jehad. Shutting down 103 social and charity societies funded by Hamas and setting a mechanism to study the legal position of the other 55 societies. Confiscating 159 weapons, most of them were Kalashnikovs and M-16." See Doc.2277; Doc.160; Doc.238; Doc.173; Doc.4676.

10 To be sure, Israel recognizes the PA efforts to achieve Israel's security, however, this recognition was not shared on the negotiation table. For example, "AH notes that it is insulting that Israel is not acknowledging the seriousness of Palestinians with respect to security. Look at what Palestinians are doing with Hamas!]" (Doc.2003, AH). Israel considered the "effectiveness of your [PA] forces now is not reliable" (Doc.2289, TL) and "doesn't consider you [PA forces] a partner" (Doc.2289, AG).

11 The Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) serves as an advisory body to the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD). It was managed and directed by Adam Smith International until the NAD took over it in February 2010. The NSU is funded by Sweden, Norway, Netherlands and the UK (Doc.4916).

12 See George W. Bush "Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference" (27 November 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127.html, accessed10 August 2014.

13 See "Palestine – Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State: Program of the Thirteenth Government", August 2009, www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/palestine/shared/documents/Ending%20Occupation%20Establishing%20the%20State%20%28August%202009%29.pdf, accessed 10 September 2014.

14 Although, this book did not examine Hamas' discourse, it is still evident from the numerous statements and behavior of Hamas' representatives that it perceives Fatah and the PA (usually they refer to as "the PA team" or "Ramallah Authority" (*fariq alsulta, sultat ramallah*)) in exclusive terms and as their "other."

15 For example, a senior Israeli officer asked General Dayton: "How many more of these new Palestinians can you generate, and how quickly, because they are our way to leave the West Bank" (Dayton 2009: 7)

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7 What makes the Palestinian discourse?

It is worth recapitulating how the story began. In 1948 two antonymous events took place simultaneously in Palestine: the emergence of an organized Jewish community in the form of the state of Israel; and the disappearance and disintegration, albeit temporary, of the Palestinian community. This paradoxical event was the most celebrated moment in Israeli/Zionist history and the most "ominous day," which Palestinians call an-Nakba (usually translated as "catastrophe") in Palestine's modern history. However, this translation fails to capture the inner metaphor of the Arabic word that signifies the physical disconnection between Palestine and its people. Since "that day," the Palestinian political project evolved into an attempt to undo an-Nakba and re-establish the links between Palestine and the Palestinians. The shift from armed struggle to diplomatic struggle in 1988 and the subsequent peace process discourse constitute another episode in the pursuit of healing past wounds and present traumas.

The follower of the debate on Palestine since an-Nakba is likely to be over-whelmed by the multiplicity of details that dwarf the overall picture. Palestinians used to imagine and speak of Palestine as the totality of everything within the Mandate map. However, this normality was discontinued after 1948, and hence opened a new space for statements to articulate Palestine by its parts, triggering a process of reinterpretation regarding "self," "other," and context, and the power relations connecting them. While details have attracted ample academic inquiry, the evolution and change within and between these details have failed to achieve the same attention. This book has examined the underlying rules that produced and ordered these details, and how they have changed over the last six decades.

Since 1948 Palestinian political discourse has been in constant change and transformation. The flow of political statements was sustained for a while, and gradually new patterns appeared as others disappeared. Given this situation, what I refer to here as Palestinian political discourse is a constellation of mini-discourses that belong to different eras, each discourse passing its rules of formation into other discourses. Therefore, the discursive rules of formation and the genealogy of concepts and vocabulary have evolved through a manifold process of deferral, differentiation, equivalence, and juxtaposition of concepts and ideas belonging to different strands of historical and political thought. This rich interdiscursive process encompassed ample conflicting, ambiguous, and paradoxical elements, and hence dynamic and unfixed relationships, which served as means for articulation and de-articulation. Based on such processes, particular interpretations were constituted and sustained, and other (competing) interpretations were simultaneously discontinued. Now I will turn to the terms of the Palestinian discourse.

1 An-Nakba and the order of discontinuity

The metaphorical meaning that embedded in an-Nakba meant two things: first, the discontinuity

of the physical joints between Palestinian land and people; and second, the seeds of the struggle to recover these links. From this perspective, an-Nakba is not only the narrative of the 1948 events, but also the continual reinterpretation and reproduction of the history that has emerged since then. It is therefore a suitable starting point for examination. Palestinian literature that appeared shortly after 1948 described the events and journey to exile through gloomy expressions that depicted their circumstances, mood, and psychology. The moment when the physical connection between the people and land was superseded represented a reference point for the present. It is a paradoxical moment that at once separates and connects the social orders *in and outside* Palestine and *before and after* an-Nakba.

The disappearance of Palestine as an "imagined totality" made it possible for different identities, spatial mapping, and political constellations to evolve. The mood of exiled Palestinians was mediated by legal and political conceptions (including events of war) producing "the Palestine refugee" subject. This regime singled out Palestinian refugees and de-universalized their case. Spatially, however, Palestine was de-articulated into divisions (occupied and remaining land) annexed to different non-Palestinian sovereigns. Likewise, demography was reinterpreted afresh into three groups: refugees, Jordanian-Palestinians, and Arab-Israelis, yet each grouping was ambiguous, uncertain, and confused by its own subjects. The internal, regional, and international environment has radically changed and every Palestinian individual has to deal directly with foreign regimes. An-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and discursive reconstruction emerged in a relatively short period of time.

The Mandate Resolution of 1922 formed the framework for tackling the question of Palestine. It erased the modality "Palestinian" and represented Palestine within the same operative Zionist myth: a land without people for a people without land. The League of Nations and its successor the United Nations continued to operate the Mandate Resolution concepts until 1974, when the UN recognized the Palestinian right for self-determination. This language has infiltrated the Palestinian discourse, which became internalized as an "international legitimacy."

Palestinian political orientations were divided mainly along the lines of pan-Arabism, regionalism and Marxism. Pan-Arabism helped crystallize Palestinian self-representation as part of the *al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya*, and therefore local nationalism (*al-wataniyya*) did not appear as a nodal concept until 1968. Land is a key organizing dominator in Palestinian identity and social status. Land is associated with honor, dignity, and privilege: losing land is understood as shameful and demeaning. Thus de-linking Palestinians form their land resulted in profound deformations in identity beyond any quantitative valuation.

The discontinuity of the pre-an-Nakba order informed the construction of subsequent power relations. The pursuit of a representative entity ensued, with the aim of reversing the interpretation of the conflict from an Arab-Israeli to a Palestinian-Israeli one, leading to the establishment of the PLO. The PLO *Qawmi* (pan-Arabism) Charter was the first document that codified the meaning of Palestine, the Palestinian, and Palestinian rights. The constructed "Palestinian right" was tailored according to regional and international political conditions rather than Palestinian aspirations. This explains dramatic shifts in the definitions of these rights and the methods to achieve them without going back the Palestinian people.

The period from an-Nakba until the mid-1960s appears to be a hiatus in Palestinian politics;

however, this book analyzes it as a preparatory period out of which Palestinian political movements and their interpretive frameworks of "self," "other," and context were resurrected. The question of Palestine was central to nationalist and Pan-Arabist discourse. The PLO construed the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity as complementary; the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) considered them dialectal; while Fatah viewed liberation as a precondition for unity. The latter was a novelty in Palestinian thinking. The ANM and Fatah were suspicious of the Arab regimes and at the outset refused to join the PLO because they saw it as lacking revolutionary spirit. However, the PLO had what Palestinian movements wanted, and thus emerged the philosophy of engagement with the PLO in order to change it from within, until the various movements captured its center in 1968. Since then, the PLO has become the space for Palestinian politics. The construction of Zionism as "an enemy" grew out of Zionism's association with traditional imperialism and colonialism, and not out of critical examination of its structures and tenets. The linking of Zionism with imperialism and colonialism guided the initial perspective on the nature of the struggle. The gradual transformations in certain elements of the Palestinian discourse and its rules of formation have encouraged the PLO to rework its perception of Israel as an *adversary* (not an enemy) with whom Palestinians have "compatible goals."

The language of politics and regional context provided the terminological and conceptual input that constituted a perspective on what had been taking place in Palestine and how to act upon the events. Two antagonistic singular binaries – colonizer and colonized – appeared to depict the conditions and modalities, the former impinging on the latter's freedom. The concept of liberty and self-determination informed the construction of the required re/action as a struggle for liberation, that is, liberation was construed as an historical inevitability. The struggle was described either as armed or popular, but these were not mutually exclusive. This gave rise to the *fida'iyyun* (freedom fighters) subject position as an opposition to refugee identity. The link between liberation and armed struggle was dominant in the discourse, but was in consistent recession once the PLO began to consider diplomatic options and finally disappeared completely. Liberation and armed struggle stabilized the discourse; yet both receded and gave way to the concept of political settlement through negotiations and more recently non-violent, peaceful, "diplomatic" struggle.

Liberation drew the boundaries and the limits of the Palestinian discourse. It also governed and regulated the flow of relationships and linkages between statements in discursive fields. Therefore, transformation in the liberation construction and its internal terms of formation insinuated systematic revisions and re-articulations of dependent concepts. The meaning of liberation has changed fundamentally over the past six decades, and has finally been replaced by the concept of a "viable state" in parts of Palestine.

The armed struggle is another nodal concept. While being linked directly to liberation, armed struggle was deemed the "only way" for liberation. This stressed the missing alternative and thus delimited other possibilities and precluded critical analysis of a liberation or armed-struggle relationship. Fatah led the first underground operation in 1965, a symbolic performative act that impelled the PLO to consider a narrower understanding of the struggle as an armed clash with Israel. Indeed, the battle and waging of war were considered singular, inevitable, and fateful. Furthermore, the armed struggle proved to be an efficient interpellative

and uniting device. It helped to achieve a level of Palestinian unity under the PLO umbrella by bypassing ideological debates.

The generous discursive capital devoted to the construction of the armed-struggle concept was a potent diversionary tactic to avoid serious deliberation over a relatively stable strategy. The armed-struggle vocabulary became routine in public discourse, but ambivalence and the discrepancy between internal and public views on the armed struggle (and on most political matters) offered the possibility of elaboration and opening up debate. Palestinian interpretations of the 1967 war as a lost battle entailed a reconsideration of armed struggle. That specific battle was abandoned in favor of the long-term battle. The war opened a new horizon and opportunities. The armed struggle and its nexus with liberation started to be qualified and to appear in a typological order with other political principles – it was no longer "the only option." Instead, political calculations modulated the armed struggle until it was eventually dropped from the discourse.

The idea of a "mini-state" in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza was part of Palestinian political thinking as early as 1968, when the Palestinian movements took over the PLO; however, the idea matured and had imbued public discourse by the mid-1980s. The outbreak of the first Intifada stabilized the idea of statehood, which was conceived as a realistic possibility. Indeed, the phrase "No voice loader then the voice of the Intifada" dominated that period and helped to justify the re-ordering of priorities on the PLO's public agenda. The Intifada provided the necessary nexus between Palestinians outside and inside Palestine. With the help of the flyer mechanism, the referential political language migrated into the discourse of "inside," that is, from exile into the territory and to the people of the future state. The terminology of peace, negotiation, and dialogue infiltrated the discourse, which in effect replaced the articulation of the struggle for "ending the occupation" to a "struggle for peace." The building block of the political message looked like this: Intifada + inalienable national rights + national + rights + return + self-determination + independent state + Arab (East) Jerusalem. Framing the Intifada through a matrix of referentiality and PLO politics led to socialization *en masse* in the West Bank and Gaza – a familiar phenomenon, in hind-sight.

2 An-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution

The second metaphorical meaning of an-Nakba is the search for a solution. For Palestinians the political and social order that followed an-Nakba represented provisional and temporary conditions. This perspective has been caught up in a self-fulfilling mechanism that produces temporary outcomes; therefore, political decisions were usually indeterminate and justified as temporary. Constructing choices as temporary implies dissatisfaction with the existing situation and constructs a timeframe limiting those choices. Failure to determine the timeframe blurred the boundary between temporary and permanent, and implied further uncertainty and ambiguity. This was a productive and pragmatic tool that produced a self-fulfilling rationale that helped diffuse psychological dissonance and internal political opposition. Hence the transformation from one phase, or choice, to another was easier when it was represented and conceived as temporary.

Zionism, or "the other," was seen as an incomplete reality, an existential problem to be

countered by liberating either all or part of Palestine. Analogies with other liberation movements elsewhere in the world, in conjunction with the perception of Zionism as a colonial movement, posed liberation logic as the ultimate solution. The content of this liberation has been radically transformed over time. At first, liberation was conceived in terms of compelling Jewish settlers to leave Palestine. However, Palestinian movements introduced democratic and liberal elements into the discursive field, partly to distinguish themselves from the previous leadership. Chains of equivalence and differentiation mediated over old and new discursive moments. The meaning embedded in these new concepts and relationships inspired and oriented the political thinking, which destabilized erstwhile understandings of key nodal concepts, such as armed struggle, liberation, and "the other" (Zionism) to a more inclusive (but shortlived) imaginative horizon that entitled Palestinians and Jews equal citizenship in a democratic state.

The Egyptian–Israeli war of 1973 and the peace agreement that followed created a dilemma for Palestinian leaders. The war was perceived as a psychological victory, while Egyptian–Israeli rapprochement was a threat. This coincided with internal Palestinian indecision on competing visions of an inclusive democratic state or mini-state. The war and rapprochement opened the space for already existing calculations within narrow circles on the mini-state becoming public, hence stabilizing the interim and temporary logic. Moreover, international and regional socialization bore fruit and culminated in the recognition of particular Palestinian rights as inviolable. Three important conceptual transformations happened at this stage. First, Zionism and colonialism were replaced by two words – "Israel" and "conflict" – to signify "the other" and the type of relationship that binds Israel with Palestinians. Second, the reclassification of Israelis into progressives and Zionists permitted dialogue with the former, for the first time. Third, although the concept of liberation continued to organize the discourse, liberation was deferred until the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority and the unification of the "confrontational" Arab states.

With these conceptual transformations, a third alternative based on partial liberation that would achieve statehood on "any liberated part" of Palestine was constructed. This option was already present on the menu of what could be said about Israel–Palestine in diplomatic language, and this gradually penetrated into Palestinian political language, represented as a pending "temporary settlement," and hence it was positioned as an interim launching pad pointed toward the ultimate goal of total liberation of Palestine. (However, interpretations varied internally – some movements saw this as the goal, while for others it was an intervening phase in the struggle.) The transition from a one-state solution to "a state on any liberated part" was justified as an interim "phase," yet without any conceivable timeline. The implicit message was that complete liberation would be impossible until the future phases had been entered. Partial liberation produced new grounding rules and regulations, which oriented the discursive flow.

The concept of liberation had been in constant decline in political statements until was totally dropped from Palestinian discourse by the mid-1980s. Liberation was replaced with "resistance" (resistance vs termination, liberation, liquidation) to "Zionist occupation" (occupation vs colonialism) and phrases such as "resolve the Palestinian issue," "find a just solution for the Palestinian issue," and "the right to confront Zionist occupation." These pivotal

transitions reordered priorities and self-perception. Refugees, who were the main authors of the Palestinian political discourse, were framed not only as a problem but also as a "burden" to be transferred to other institutions, such as an international mechanism. This formulation detaches the refugee question from PLO responsibility. Later, the significance of the right of return plummeted to the extent that it was considered a "bargaining chip" in the peace process.

3 Provisional horizon, socialization, and referentiality

Discontinuity of the nexus between Palestine and the Palestinians after an-Nakba exposed the Palestinian people to diverse regional and international discursive regimes that brought about a process of socialization, with provisional horizons and referential practices. The practice of referring to a wide range of diplomatic, political, and legal discourse, which the Palestinians constituted as international and Arab legitimacy (*dual legitimacy*), became a vehicle to extrapolate and ground Palestinian rights. The referential function governed the contents of possible enunciations and governed their dispersion in the discourse. The reference to *dual legitimacy* supplied the Palestinian discourse with raw discursive material and served the internal justification: it represented the UN or Arab interpretation of Palestine as more legally and morally valid than other interpretations.

Referentiality filters down through discourse, while referential practice is empowered by perceived positive or legitimate capital that comes with citing international law or a widely accepted principle. It precipitates different rules for the formation of various discourses and spurs existing relationships to evaluate themselves against a reference point. Referentiality became one of the key rules of formation of the Palestinian discourse, which compelled a frequent transformation of "firm" or "inalienable" Palestinian national rights (*al-huqwq al-wataniyya al-thabita*). These rights were inferred from the unfixed and changing dual legitimacy – thus, any change in the reference point(s) would systematically open these rights to transformation. The process of socialization embedded referential practice within the discourse. As a result, the Palestinians' foundational political conception of their cause as that of an uprooted people from its homeland was suspended. At the same time, socialization helped to reconstruct the question of Palestine into a territorial cause and a quantitative conflict over the details of when, where, and how much.

By framing the boundaries of the Palestinian discourse, the invisible association between socialization, provisional horizon, and referentialism (which operate in tandem) has changed Palestinian self-understanding from within. The Palestinians internalized a deformed system of power relations, which had grown indifferent to their plight and aspirations. Palestinian politics is therefore likely to remain at the receiving end of the relationship. The flow in the direction of power is embedded and internalized: it is not only a dichotomy between weak and strong but involves a whole system of power differentials.

4 Mobility

Examination of the peacebuilding process reveals a loaded kinetic metaphor in the discourse, one which materializes abstractions and orients actions. The kinetic language and metaphor of

mobility have helped to structure Palestinian political thought since 1990. The logic of mobility has set the discursive priorities and constituted contradictory forces: forward and progressive against regressive forces. Ironically, metaphorical mobility coincided with hegemony over Palestinian physical movement in space. The metaphorical motion modulated the evolution of Palestinian rights and helped to create a system of classification and a revision of previous pivotal concepts.

Mobility logic directed reason, order, and priorities. The process was divided into two sequential stages: a transitional phase, leading to a permanent situation. Everything in the transitional phase is conceived as unstable and negotiable, and hence kinetic and ambiguous terminology evolved as guiding principles. Since the Palestinian leadership has already internalized the interim rationale, the principle of "moving forward" justified a recategorization of "firm" or inalienable Palestinian rights (*al-thawabit*) into "final status," "complicated" issues, and an impediment to progress. These rights therefore suggest a negative correlation with development and progress. The nature of these "issues" is processed within the automata of peace rituals; therefore, deferring key issues to another *supposedly* forthcoming phase, circumventing the possibility of substantive solutions, was convenient to Israeli–American conditions. Even when these issues emerged as a subject for discussion, it was either too late or they were processed under different conditions that were unfavorable to Palestinians. The term "outstanding issues" is deceiving and belittles the depth of the problem, for it misleadingly implies that "other" issues were already resolved.

Once the process was put in operation, considerable institutional and structural power managed, via discourse, to keep it functioning. Moving "forward," "progress," and "momentum" are hierarchically superior to their implied opposites (backward, reactionary, motionless). Therefore, measures to "save," "protect," and "revive" the process appear as morally defensible and practically desirable. The effect of this understanding has re-regulated the colonized– colonizer nexus through judicial and institutional constructs. It has also produced new binary categories in Palestinian society, leading to further political disintegration: pro- or anti-Oslo process; with or against the PA; violence or non-violence; resistance or compromise; lawful or fugitive; pragmatic or ideological; realistic or unrealistic. The "other" half of the binary always indicates an anti-peace force and thus appeared an obstacle to progress. "Unpragmatic" and "unrealistic" stances were represented as impeding the movement of the peace process, and were subsequently construed as a danger and threat to peace. Uncertainties in the internal dynamics of motion were overtaken by self-assuring presuppositions elicited from the neoliberalist peacebuilding paradigm.

The metaphorical abstractions intrinsic to the peace process, and their entailed actions, helped to alter key nodal concepts in the Palestinian discourse. Mobilityridden configurative language molded the nature of conceivable actions, superseding the language of revolution and self-determination. Thus a new competing cause, "the cause of genuine peace," emerged on the PLO's agenda, replacing its original *raison d'être* as a liberation movement. Moreover, the rule of "transition and moving forward" intercepted the possibility of articulating different approaches. The *possibility* itself was constrained and negotiated through peace rituals. That is to say, self-imagination is not a reflection of the self, but rather a complex and an unfinished process of analysis, projection, and re-projection founded on referentiality and peace rituals.

In this framework, Palestinians were situated in uncertain temporary settings during the "interim phase" (Gaza-Jericho first) while looking for opportunities via peace rituals for further spatial and status *extension*.

5 Logic of division

In the aftermath of an-Nakba, Palestine ceased to be perceived as a whole; instead, it is viewed through a fractured lens that allows us to see it only in terms of divisions and parts. This has profound implications on Palestine as an imagined space and Palestinians as a people. Palestine was spatially and demographically dissected and parceled into issues, sub-issues, and problems – all awaiting a solution. The conceptualization of the main components of Palestine (land, humans, and language) was re-imagined afresh. First, Palestine was spatially divided between occupied land and remaining land, 1948 Palestine and 1967 occupied territories, and Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. The latter was divided further into areas (A, B, and C), Palestinian "Areas," settlements, individual settlement clusters, land for swap, and military zones. Each was categorized into sub-groups, tracks, and values.

Spatial division led to parallel human categorization and divisions. Palestinians who remained in Israel (the occupied part of Palestine in 1948) were politically sidelined. The largest category of the Palestinian population was de-territorialized and driven into exile, becoming refugees. They were principle authors of the Palestinian narrative, institutions, political representation, and struggle in the pursuit of a return to Palestine. However, once Palestinian representatives (who were/are themselves refugees) embraced diplomacy in lieu of armed struggle, the right of return was compromised. This led to a process of de-articulation of the refugee question through a continued process of replacement; that is, the return option was replaced by non-return, "an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee question." The UNRWA and international law were replaced by the international mechanism, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Roadmap, and so on. As a result, arcane and ambiguous terminology replaced the lucid language of the right of return. Furthermore, the right of return became a bargaining chip, along with the language that signified it. The subject of these operations – the refugees – were marginalized and absented, and therefore public relations campaigns developed to market whatever very limited number (usually four) negotiators agreed upon. Linguistic terms of division and exchange operated over other categories of human subjects. Palestinian prisoners in the Israeli jails, for instance, were also used for diplomatic reasons as bargaining chips and to bolster certain leaders. The Palestinian participation in the formula that constitutes the refugees and prisoners as bargaining chips is morally bankrupt and strategically counterproductive. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (the occupied part of Palestine in 1967) became the subject of multiple regimes, including Jordan, Egypt, and Israel, and a hybrid Israel–PA regime evolved out of the so-called peace process in 1993.

The hybrid Israel–PA regime introduced intermediate institutions to administer and run Palestinian affairs, which coexisted with existing colonial institutions. Capacity-building schemas in preparation for the establishment of the Palestinian state strengthened the grip of these institutions and institutionalized cooperative and dependent power relations between the colonized and its colonizer. These intermediaries represented a schema for division and

delegation of labor between existing and new institutions. So the entire act of managing Palestinian subjects was redistributed afresh. From the Israeli–American perspective, this division served their overall objective: to create a Palestinian state as agreed with the PA on each sub-issue without reaching a comprehensive solution, that is, establishing a Palestinian state short of sovereign capacity and with provisional borders. Division made it possible to defer and reorder issues in order to continue the status quo. The peace process, by design, permits only generic issues as negotiation subjects. This means that the input is always less than the actual problem; hence any outcome would always be less than an agreement on the total or core issues.

6 Statehood

The struggle for the liberation of Palestine began as process to achieve self-determination for Palestinian people and it would be embodied politically in an independent state. This is what the short-lived All-Palestine Government professed to be building. But the idea of a Palestinian state was shelved in favor of a non-territorial Palestinian political representation (*al-kayan al-falastini*), which argued for liberation and self-determination within the bounds of pan-Arabism, rather than a separate Palestinian state, until the particularist Palestinian view triumphed in 1968. Subsequently, Palestinian movements took over the PLO and introduced the idea of self-determination in the form of an inclusive state over entire Palestine for all, Palestinians and Jews.

The slow disappearance of liberation, coupled with international and regional socialization (referentialism), galvanized the notion of statehood on "any liberated part," which then implicitly territorialized self-determination within a small part of Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza. Out of these discursive developments the statist-oriented thought evolved as part of a package including self-determination and the right of return. The apparatus of the "politics of phases," pragmatism, and statist framework began to metamorphize when Palestinian movements took over the PLO. From this perspective, 1968 was the moment that opened up the space for accumulated ideas, imaginations, concepts, and terminologies in the Palestinian lexicon and allowed them to materialize as a formal political platform by 1974. The statist mood and terminology invigorated the Palestinians' understanding of their rights, and produced calculations that had constituted statehood, regardless of size, as the ultimate answer to Palestinian vulnerabilities (a manifestation of identity on a specific territory) without fulfilling the Palestinian right of return and self-determination. The state (or equivalent central authority) is an essential feature of the neoliberal paradigm to which Palestinian policymakers subscribe. From the perspective of the Palestinian leadership, a Palestinian state on part of Palestine was increasingly considered a realistic possibility after the inception of the first Intifada in 1987. This discursive formation was an essential step leading to unilateral diplomacy, through which the statist view evolved into the two-state option via a "negotiated political settlement" with Israel. Subsequently, territorial and statist dimensions dominated other elements (self-determination and right of return) in what was constructed as "inalienable" Palestinian nation rights.

7 Neoliberal peace and the non-option

Socialization and referentialism played a significant role in orienting Palestinian perceptions of "the possible" and "the realistic." The Palestinian leadership interpreted the neoliberal post-Soviet Union narrative of the "new world order" as attentive to Palestinian national rights, and it therefore seemed appropriate to work from within, and be part of, this order. Accordingly, the PLO/PA forsook the quest for justice in favor of a "realistic" territorial existence within the limitations of the so-called international and Arab legitimacy. The infrastructure of the interim, limited state and national rights was already organized and well-distributed long before the new order. The contents, mechanisms, apparatus, and terminology of the PLO's peace initiative of 1988 were already developed and disseminated incrementally. The uncritical reception of the neoliberal analysis of the world order was viewed as a pragmatic opportunity to realize what had already crystallized in the PLO's politics.

The neoliberal peace formula has been widely operationalized since the end of the Cold War. It suggested a mixture of functional authority (or equivalent) security arrangements and liberal principles (democratization, liberal economic development). Peace rituals enacted through diplomatic performance (in the form of meetings, speeches, initiatives, communication) represented peace as a dynamic and transformative object that "grows"; it was "entrenched," "built;" it required a "solid basis," and had "enemies" and "friends." Peace was also seen as precarious and under constant threat.

Indeed, the capacity-building schemes in Palestine, designed and financed by the US and Europe, incorporated the neoliberal peace requirements. Such a perception of peace connects building with destroying, and stimulated the construction of a "non-peace" subject position that functioned as a constitutive other, the "enemies of peace" that corroborate the construction of an internal Palestinian other (an "other within").

Exclusive articulation styles emphasizing the non-option, *but* option "x," were regularly used to represent the means of the struggle. Initially, the armed struggle was construed as the "only method/road" (*al-taryq al-wahyd*) toward the liberation of Palestine. The grammar of exclusive articulation was persevered while the content was replaced. In this case, negotiation within the bounds of neoliberal peace superseded the armed struggle, and hence negotiation (and retrospectively the neoliberal framework) came to represent the "only way" forward. The transition from armed struggle to negotiation as the only option is the outcome of social and political cooptation of Palestinian leadership into the "new" world order in conjunction with the stipulations elicited from a neoliberal thesis and an internal perspective that considers any form of struggle outside diplomacy an irrational and futile endeavor. Any vision outside the American-Israeli framework was deemed a non-option. The "non-option but option x" is never the default setting but is always something actively constructed by de-articulating other options; the "only option" was therefore merely one on a list of possible options.

8 Mathematical-judicial schema

What I refer to as the mathematical-judicial schema is a combination of referentialism and market-like operations that have organized the discourse since the inception of the diplomatic

process between the PLO and Israel in 1991. This schema regulated the meaning of a "just and comprehensive solution" to the Israel–Palestine conflict by defining the shape of possible Palestinian rights and obligations. Justice and fairness evolved as haggles over land (less than 22 percent of Palestine), security, and economic arrangements. Ironically, the supposedly "just and comprehensive" peace formula failed even to say anything about Israeli decolonization or the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Alternative visions of peace were disregarded from the beginning. Text from international law, resolutions, summits, initiatives, and the like represented a rich repertoire of discursive material and calculative mechanisms to work out the details. A mathematical-judicial schema of ratios and deferral to various judicial devices helped bissect the totality of Palestine into issues and sub-issues of conflict.

9 Market logic

Market-oriented logic is inherent in the neoliberal paradigm, and in Resolution 242 in particular. This logic insinuated into Palestinian political calculations as they became embroiled in peace rituals. The rendering of the concept "land for peace" construes land and peace as convertible; then the question became how much – and which – land should be exchanged to achieve a particular version of peace. The mathematical-judicial schema represented the foundation and mechanism from which certain elements are derived, evaluated, and classified; meanwhile, market-like operations regulated the details and character of the hypothetical exchange. Land, the human body, and language were the objects of the market models. Land was worked out from less than 22 percent of the total area of Palestine. The refugees and Palestinian prisoners represented bargaining chips and tools for political leverage. The market face of peace has become routine in the conceptual play that guides Palestinian political consciousness. Consequently, market-like processes compromised the national struggle and normative nature of Palestinian rights.

10 Security as peace

The peace process is grounded in neoliberal (orthodox) peacebuilding, which governed the distribution of power-ridden relationships between the colonized, colonizer, and peace sponsors. This paradigm of peacebuilding renders security (albeit in narrow terms) an a priori condition for peace. The PLO/PA has internalized the "peace and security" imperative in order to join the "peace" camp. The securitization of peace inspired the construction of a threatening, "enemies of peace" subject position and prescribed extraordinary measures against these enemies. To that end, with the help of Western funding and training and Israeli oversight, Palestinian-run security institutions and policies were established, in parallel to the already well established Israeli security apparatus. As a consequence, everyday life in the West Bank and Gaza became doubly militarized, civil liberties ebbed, violence and torture were sanctioned – and those who deviated from the peace process mold were excluded. But this time Palestinians enacted stringent violent measures of control against Palestinians, which proved more efficient than direct Israeli control.

As mentioned earlier, order and authority are central concepts in the orthodox peace

paradigm. Institutions replaced the singular sovereign in the classical theory on peace. Capacity-building and institution-building arrangements were developed in Palestine to inculcate order and authority based on security/military frameworks. The peace process entrusts "residual powers" (security and foreign relations) in Israel; this entails that the PLO/PA have already embraced Israel's monopoly over half of the "peace and security" formula. The security-oriented discourse set the scope of concrete policies and financial funds. Capacitybuilding arrangements targeted the "spheres" that were transferred to Palestinians, which means that the scope of those arrangements was synchronized with the facts of colonization. The PLO/PA internalization of security concepts helped stabilize and validate its policies. Once the West Bank and Gaza became the geopolitical focus and sphere of the PLO/PA actions, previous security institutions were phased out and new ones emerged, and then re-structured under the auspices of the US, EU, and Israel. With near full foreign finance and design of the capacity-building arrangements, Palestinian society has increasingly become dependent on foreign sustenance, constituting further political pressure on Palestinians as exemplified in the chronic salary deficit (*azmat al-rawatib*).

While embracing the existing colonial order, capacity-building arrangements were construed as a necessary step toward future Palestinian statehood. Moreover, the Palestinian institutions, which emerged out of capacity building, codified the colonizer–colonized relationship at the micro-level under different procedures such as coordination, cooperation, and liaison. Several security institutions functioned as gate-keeping settings that helped to shape the mood of donors. Once these procedures were operated, they began to constitute and highlight certain possibilities and ignore others at a fresh stage, thus determining the institutional path of dependence. In this framework, "security" operated in one direction: Israeli security and Palestinian insecurity.

11 Replacement

The examination of the Palestinian discourse reveals the regular replacement of some figures of speech by others, while persevering the grammar and order of statements new (or modified versions of previous) concepts, terms, and tropes were reconfigured and adjusted. By replacement I mean a mechanism of substitution of tropes with corresponding new ones. Replacement facilitates the transition from one position to another and transforms the content without altering the overall governing structure. This creates a complex interpretive situation that makes it possible to claim that the "initial" position was not given up – usually by repeating the phrase "holding on inalienable Palestinian national rights" (*al-tamassuk bi al-thawabit al-wataniyya al-falastinyya*).

I have referred to various situations where displacement occurred throughout the book. For example, the substitution and discontinuation of "liberation rationale" in favor of the "cause of peace" and an "honourable peace" suggested the possibility of reinterpreting the colonized–colonizer relationship and reproducing it in the form of a "dispute" between "two parties" that needed to be settled through direct negotiations only. (Negotiation replaced armed struggle.) In short, dispute replaced conflict, but before that conflict replaced occupation, and occupation replaced colonialism and imperialism. The introduction of the dispute relationship involved a

difference of opinion about "outstanding issues," replacing the concept of a national cause. Such replacement deceptively uses the same grammar and structure of discourse but displaces its contents, transforming negotiation over inalienable national rights into a dispute over trivial matters.

Once again, the peace process needed to be revived and put back on track, as the logic of mobility can tell. In November 2007, the PA and Israel were therefore invited to Annapolis in the US to kick off a new round of talks that would implement the Roadmap and Bush's vision for a Palestinian state. This was known as the Annapolis Conference. Thereafter the PA and Israel embarked on extensive negotiation sessions on permanent status issues – territory, Jerusalem, and refugees, in particular. As happened during the secret meetings in Oslo, Israel controlled cartography and consistently vetoed any reference to 1967 borders or any equivalent cartographic representation. Instead, it has always worked from an Israeli-determined so-called "outline map" of the West Bank that excludes Jerusalem (Doc.2339 2008).

On one occasion, however, the US signaled its readiness to consider the entirety of the West Bank as a territorial reference. As the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained, "the US is working on the assumption that it is all the territory occupied in 1967" (Doc.2942). Rice reconfirmed the same point on another occasion (Doc.3048). From the PLO/PA standpoint, this was a significant achievement that corroborated its initial interpretation of the territorial settlement (a Palestinian state on 22 percent of Palestine). This is the maximum the Palestinians managed to achieve through negotiations.

The Israeli–Palestinian talks were suspended (at least in public) in the aftermath of the devastating 2008–2009 attack on Gaza, though the Palestinian hope for a better deal intensified when Barack Obama assumed the presidency of the United States in 2009, and reached its peak with Obama's famous speech in Cairo in June 2009. It was not long before Senator George Mitchell initiated "proximity talks" as a means to "revive" the peace process once more. Two important things happened at this juncture. First, Israel vetoed any reference to 1967 borders and Jerusalem, and settlement expansion continued despite the desperate PA plea for a temporary moratorium; the US envoys assimilated the Israeli positions and restated them to the Palestinians. Worst of all, Mitchell declined to acknowledge Rice's statements on the 1967 borders, and suggested "a mutually agreed outcome" rather than a "two-state solution," which allowed "subsequent [Israeli] developments" on the ground entailing unhindered expansion of settlements in the West Bank (Doc.4899 2009).

Now the two-state solution had been replaced with an "outcome," which represented a retraction from the declared official aim of the peace process. Through the Israeli and American perspective, this analysis of the conflict serves an overall objective of creating a Palestinian "state" on what may be agreed with the PLO/PA on sub-issues without providing an overall solution for the conflict.[1] US diplomacy, whether under G. W. Bush or Obama, failed to deal with core issues and endorsed Israeli unilateralism coupled with providing security and economic sustenance to the PA. Economic support became a pressure tool to compel the PA to "go with the process" (Doc.4844 2009), even though it is obvious that the peace process works against Palestinian self-determination within the framework of a two-state solution. The

ever stalling, to be revived process turned out to be a settler-colonial methodology for further land sequestration, dominance, and cooptation of the colonialized.

The spatial boundary for Palestinian self-determination on 22 percent of Palestine was constructed from the referential schema, as we saw in Chapter 3. From the standpoint of the Palestinian leadership, Israel and the US either endorsed this spatial interpretation or accepted it in course of negotiations. After two decades of diplomatic marathons it became obvious to the PA that US or Israeli endorsement of "the 1967" territorial boundary is a charade. The resignation of George Mitchell in May 2011 marked the end of this interpretation and the end of the peace process as we know it. The PA had found itself in a political trap; it had been "taken on a ride [*sic*] " (Doc.4905, SE), and soon realized that in the context of unceasing settler-expansion "the PA's structure and existence" were at risk (Abbas 2011). In 2011 the PLO/PA began to use unusual terms to underline the spatio-demographic effects of continued Israeli colonization of the West Bank and Jerusalem (in particular), which it considered as transforming Palestinian space into "isolate islands" (*juzur ma'zwla*), "Palestinian reservations" (*ma'azil falastiniyya*), and to constitute "racial discrimination" and "ethnic cleansing," threatening a "new Nakba" (*nakba jadiydda*) (Abbas 2011, 2012a).

Having failed to secure a defined territorial basis for the lofty promises of statehood, the fervent institution building (especially security institutions) in preparation for statehood seemed hollow. Once again the bilateral negotiation paradigm proved futile and sterile. But something else was in the making. In 2012, President Abbas declared a "new approach," based on seeking and consolidating the recognition of the state of Palestine internationally. Through international recognition, the PA aspired to settle "the legitimacy" of the future Palestinian state on "solid bases" (Abbas 2012b), a legitimacy that negotiations failed to affirm. The "solid bases" signify the territorial dimension of the Palestinian state. Given the US retractions and Israel's intransigence, the PA perceived the UN recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state in 2012 as a guarantee that "1967 borders" would be the benchmark for any subsequent diplomatic attempts. In other words, the aim was to protect the initial PLO's presupposition regarding the territorial character of the settlement. The PA sought to move away from bilateral negotiation into an internationalized version of the peace process. Indeed the "peace process" mode of thinking guides much of the PA discourse that still considers negotiation the only way forward; this is best reflected in a negotiation-imbued PLO study stipulating the outlines of its policy after the upgrade of Palestinian representation in the UN (Erekat 2012). The entire PLO/PA statehood project is grounded in referentiality. The closure of the bilateral negotiation pressed the Palestinians toward the source of referentiality, that is, international institutions and the UN in particular with Hamas' backing – a complete circle!

But all systems have loose ends. Now there is growing popular global solidarity with the Palestinian narrative and a new creative current, pushing for a different framework based on the universality of human rights and justice. The strength of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), solidarity movements, innovative media, and other strategies of resistance are opening up new possibilities and terms within the discourse on Israel–Palestine.

Note

1 Rice's analogy between Germany and Palestine is ill conceived, both historically and contextually. Germany was an aggressor country, and the Allied Forces occupied it in order to eliminate the Nazi regime and build the Democratic Republic of Germany. Palestine is not an aggressor but the victim, while Israel has been occupying and colonizing the Palestine for a long time (Doc.485; Doc.4882; Doc.2942).

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Glossary of Arabic terms

‘a’id (wun) returnee, returnees
al-‘amal al-fida’i sacrifice acts
al-‘amal al-thawri revolutionary acts
‘amaliyyat al-musalaha reconciliation process
al-ard muqabil al-salam land/territory for peace
al-‘awda return (to Palestine)
‘awda mu‘tabara significant return
azmat al-rawatib salary deficit
al-balad refers to the specific habitual area, e.g., village, town
ayluul al-aswad Black September
el-blad signifies the entire Palestine
al-barnamij al-nidali struggles program
barnamij al-nuqat al-‘ashr Ten-Point Program
al-barnamij al-siyyasi al-marhali temporary political program
dahiyya victim
dawla qabila lilhaya viable state
duwayla mini-state
fida’i (yyun) sacrificer, sacrificers
al-fida’iyyun sacrificers, freedom fighters
al-Hakim the wise
hal al-sira‘/al-niza‘ dispute/conflict settlement
hal wasat middle solution, compromise
haq al-‘awda right of return
harb October/tishrin October war between Egypt and Israel, broke out 6 October 1973
hudna lull
hukwmat tasrif a‘mal caretaker government
al-hukwma al-muqala deposed government
al-huqwq al-falastiniyya (al-thabita) inalienable Palestinian rights (often referred to as *al-thawabit*)
al-’inqisam split (between Fateh and Hamas)
jabha battlefront
juzur ma‘zwla isolated islands
i’qlimiyya regionalism
ishrak falastiniyyi al-kharij engage outside Palestinians
al-isti‘mar al-‘alami international colonialism
al-jihad al-muqqadas holy war

karitha catastrophe
al-kifah al-mussallah armed struggle
kart al-wakala ration cards given by the UNRWA
kayan entity
al-kayan al-falastini Palestinian entity
al-kayan al-isra'ili Israeli entity
al-kayan al-suhywni Zionist entity
laji' refugee
la sawt ya'lw fawqa sawt al-intifada no voice louder than the voice of the Intifada (motto of the first Intifada)
lan ya'uwdu would not return
ma'azil falastiniyya Palestinian reservations/enclaves
mankab joint between the upper-arm bone and shoulder in humans and joints between limbs and torso of an animal
al-majmu'at al-dariba striking squads
al-marji'iyya reference, terms of reference
marji'iyyat al-'amaliyya al-silmiyya terms of reference for the peace process
marji'iyyat al-mufawadat terms of reference for the negotiations
al-mujtama' al-dawli international community
manshwr flyer, leaflet
al-manashir plural of manshwr, flyers
munadil struggler, freedom fighter
mu'aqqat temporary
al-mufawadat negotiations
muktasabat gaining, winning
al-mumkin the possible
al-musalaha reconciliation
al-mutaradin fugitives
al-nasr al-siyyasi diplomatic victory
naksa relapse, refers to the Arab–Israeli war in 1967
nakaba incline or slant
nakba jadiydda new Nakba
nashatat takhribiyya falastiniyya Palestinian sabotage activities
nidal struggle
nidaliyya "strugglist"
al-nidal al-duplumasi diplomatic struggle
al-nidal min ajil al-tahrir struggle for liberation
al-nidal al-sha'bi popular struggle
qadiyya legal case, lawsuit
qadiyyat al-laji'yyn refugee case, issue
qawmi belonging to the wide Arab people
al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya pan-Arabism
al-raj'iyyun reactionaries

ru'yyat Bush lil-salam Bush vision for peace
sawwa equalize
shari'a Islamic law
al-sharaf wa al-karama honor and dignity
al-shar'iyya al-dawliyya international legitimacy
shar'iyya legitimacy
al-shatat diaspora
shurut al-ruba'iyyia quartet principles or conditions
sulta authority
al-ta'awun collaboration
al-ta'awun ma' isra'il collaboration with Israel
al-ta'awun al-'amni security cooperation
al-tadhiya wa al-nidal sacrifice and struggle
taf'yyl dawr al-shatat activate the role of the diaspora
tahrir liberation
taharuri liberating
al-thawabt finxed, a shorthand for the inalienable Palestinian national rights
al-thawabt al-wataniyya al-falastinyya the inalienable Palestinian national rights
al-tamasuk bi al-thawabi al-wataniyya al-falastinyya holding on the inalienable Palestinian national rights
al-thawri revolutionary
al-thawriyyun al-waqi'iyyun realistic revolutionaries
al-thuwar revolutionaries
al-tamassuk bi al-thawabit al-siyyasiyya to behold to the political firms
al-tamassuk bi al-thawabt al-wataniyya sticking to the national consonants
tanazulat concessions
al-tariq al-wahid the only way/road
tasjil sabiqa register a precedence
taswiyya settlement, compromise
al-taswiya al-silmiyya peaceful settlement
taswiya al-sira' settlement of the conflict
tawhid duwal al-muwajaha unification of the Arabs in confrontation (with Israel)
al-tawtin resettlement
al-waqi' reality
al-waqi'i the realistic
watan homeland
wataniyya (territorial) nationalism
wathiqat al-asra prisoners' document
al-wihda al-'arabiyya Arab unity
yaa jamahir hailing the audience, people
al-zaqat Islamic religious donation

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