LYNDON B. JOHNSON

and the

POLITICS OF ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL



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ABRAHAM BEN-ZVI
Tel Aviv University

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Contents

In memory of Rosa and David Rosenbaum, beloved grandparents who perished in Auschwitz

Foreword

This book is a continuation of Abraham Ben-Zvi's earlier path-breaking studies of the politics of arms sales to Israel in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. Taken together, this body of work constitutes a fundamental and definitive re-examination of this decisive period in the building of the close US-Israel relationship that became, and remains, a fixed point of reference in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Despite the controversies and contestations that attach to this topic, Ben-Zvi's trilogy will stand the test of time because he has dug deeply into the primary sources and allows them to speak for themselves, while combining this meticulous research with a sophisticated conceptual framework and a penetrating analysis that plays no favorites.

Each stage of this project has corrected prevailing stereotypes about the birth and early childhood of the US-Israeli alliance. The first volume showed how the initial turn to a more supportive US stance toward Israel, often credited to the Kennedy administration, actually began in the later Eisenhower years and reflected changing realities in the Middle East. The Kennedy-era study focused on the first major arms sale to Israel, the 1962 Hawk anti-aircraft missile deal, connecting it persuasively to a historic shift in strategic thinking within the defense community rather than to transient political factors, and showed that the critical transition took place well before the 1967 war, rather than after it.

The book in hand covers the culmination of this process during the Johnson years: with the beginning of an on-going arms supply relationship. Ben-Zvi concentrates on the two major arms sales—M-48A Patton tanks in 1965 and A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bombers in 1966—with some attention to the 1968 sale of Phantom fighters. Even here, however, previous perceptions need to be qualified. Ben-Zvi points out that there was not a simple linear process of growing cooperation, but rather a series of tendentious bargaining situations with different strategic and political components in each.

This close analysis of policy-making inevitably underlines the role of bureaucratic, cognitive, and other subjective elements in the policy process, despite the overwhelming strategic and security concerns of US policy in the Cold War era. The Johnson years appear to exhibit these influences even more strongly. perhaps because the basic strategic choice—working with Israel in order to keep a balance and have a moderating influence—had been made, and what remained were questions of finetuning, in which internal forces could be more influential. Be that as it may, Lyndon Johnson's pronounced sympathy for Israel, and growing distrust of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, did not translate simply and directly into greater support of Israel. Not only did there remain the 'traditionalists' who had resisted the policy shift from the outset, but the 'pragmatists' who wanted to try a new approach also expected a 'quid pro quo' from Israel for key arms transactions, and were quite ready to play hardball in order to secure this reciprocity.

We now know, thanks in large part to the work of Avner Cohen, that the major US concern in these tough behind-the-scenes encounters was Israel's likely development of nuclear weapons, following the earlier revelation of the existence of the Dimona reactor and US pressure for Israel to join the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty. Ben-Zvi puts all these elements in place, providing an arresting case study of how and why bargaining between a superpower and a local power does not always favor the former. In this case, the many competing concerns of US policy, in the Middle East and elsewhere, militated against the kind of brutal singlemindedness that would have been needed to bludgeon Israel into submission on an issue as critical as building a nuclear deterrent.

The cumulative impact of the three arms sales, despite the inevitable contretemps, was 'the establishment of a *de facto* patron-client strategic relationship in the American-Israeli sphere before the outbreak of the June 1967 Six Day War.' The story of this relationship, in all its nuances, has never been better told.

Professor Alan Dowty
University of Notre Dame 2003

Preface and Acknowledgements

This manuscript was written as a sequel to an earlier endeavor,[1] which attempted to reconstruct and elucidate President John F.Kennedy's decision, of August 1962, to set aside the traditional American posture of refusing to sell advanced weapons systems to Israel and to approve the sale of Hawk short-range, anti-aircraft missiles to the Israeli Government of David Ben-Gurion. As was the case in *John F.Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel*, which was largely based on documentary material (primarily from the John F.Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston), so will the following chapters rely extensively on primary sources, particularly those available at the Lyndon B.Johnson Library in Austin and the Israeli State Archives (ISA) in Jerusalem.

Furthermore, the earlier analysis of the Hawk decision viewed the Kennedy Administration not as a unitary entity, whose main actors were fully and invariably committed to the same vision of the world and derivative policy preferences and recommendations, but rather as an extremely heterogeneous machine, whose components fiercely competed with one another for influence and dominance.

Similarly, the present effort to shed light on the actual dynamics of the decision-making process concerning the issue of arms sales to Israel, as it unfolded during the Johnson era (and which culminated in three major Presidential decisions to sell Israel tanks and planes), will rely upon the 'bureaucratic politics' paradigm as its central analytical tool or conceptual prism. It is through this paradigm that the evolution of American arms sales policy between November 1963 and January 1969 (with particular emphasis on the M-48A Patton tank and the A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bomber deals) can be most persuasively illuminated and explained. In view of the fact that the decision-making process concerning the sale to Israel of 50 Phantom fighter-bombers, concluded on 7 November 1968, was closely patterned on the M-48A Patton tank sale and the A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bomber

transaction, it will be addressed largely in analytical rather than chronological terms.

Notwithstanding this apparent continuity and compatibility in terms of both content, context and approach, *LBJ and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel* should not be viewed as a succession of linear and continuous decisions all originating in President Kennedy's landmark decision of August 1962 to cross the Rubicon and reverse a policy to which successive administrations had been irrevocably committed. Instead, as the following analysis will seek to demonstrate, the process by which American arms sales policy toward Israel was shaped and delineated was cyclical (and occasionally dialectical) rather than linear, with at least some of the moves and tactics which were adopted by members of the Johnson high-policy elite reflecting the lessons they drew from the Hawk experience. This learning experience, in turn, resulted occasionally in a bargaining approach which was intrinsically incompatible with the strategy of expected reciprocity, on the basis of which the Hawk decision was made.[2] In other words, the legacy or shadow of the Hawk formed a major component in, or constraint on, the thinking of several key policy-makers in Washington during the Johnson Presidency, leading them to pursue or advocate negotiating tactics which were fundamentally different from those pursued by the Kennedy Administration in the summer of 1962.

It is to an examination of these tactics, as well as to an analysis of the regional strategic context within which they unfolded, that we now turn.

I wish to thank my friends and colleagues Azar Gat, Bar Joseph, Aharon Klieman, Anat Kurz, Zach Levey, Gil Merom, Yossi Shain, Yiftah Shapir, David Tal and David Vital for their thoughtful and insightful suggestions on various aspects of this work.

I am also indebted to Sylvia Weinberg for her dedicated and thoroughly professional work on all the technical aspects of the manuscript, and to Georgina Clark-Mazo who—as was the case with *John F Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel*—combined the highest professional standards as a most scrupulous and careful editor with a most thoughtful, encouraging and supportive attitude. My cooperation with her proved to be once again a most rewarding, stimulating and enlightening learning experience, for which I am most grateful. The staff of the Bender-Moss Library at Tel Aviv University, the Lyndon B.Johnson Library in Austin, the John F.Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, and the ISA in Jerusalem all provided valuable technical and bibliographical assistance. Finally, I wish to thank my research assistant, Gil-li Vardi, who provided valuable technical and bibliographical assistance, particularly in processing the documentary

material at the ISA.Dana Preisler and Dima Adamsky were also most helpful in producing valuable bibliographical assistance.

Finally, I wish to thank my daughter, Doreen, for her creative comments and suggestions, which helped me clarify and sharpen the main themes of this work.

NOTES

1 . Abraham Ben-Zvi, *John F.kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
2 . Ibid., p. 76.

Abbreviations

AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIPAC	American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FLOSY	The Front for the Liberation of South Yemen
FRG	The Federal Republic of Germany (also known as West Germany)
FRUS	*Foreign Relations of the United States*
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	Israeli Air Force
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
ISA	Israeli State Archives
JFKL	John F.Kennedy Library
LBJL	Lyndon B.Johnson Library
MAPAI	Israel Workers' Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NJCRAC	National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	National Security Files (in the John F Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries)
PFLOAG	The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PPK	Papers of President Kennedy, John F.Kennedy Library

RAFI	Israel Workers' List
RG	Record Group
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
UAC	United Arab Command
UAR	United Arab Republic
USIS	United States Information Service
USNA	United States National Archives and Records Administration

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Introduction Lyndon B.Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk

A preliminary reconstruction of the American-Israeli relations as they unfolded during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson points to an innate paradox. On the one hand, viewing the Middle Eastern strategic landscape exclusively through the lens of the omnivorous, all-encompassing superpower confrontation, President Johnson—from the very inception of his administration—depicted Israel as a strategic ally of the United States and as a reliable bulwark against the recalcitrant and radical forces of pan-Arab nationalism. Perceiving Israel as a power capable of safeguarding and promoting a broad range of American security interests in the region, the President was relentless in his efforts to broaden, consolidate and institutionalize the largely *ad hoc* and highlyconstrained forms of strategic and political cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem, which had been established during John F. Kennedy's last year in the White House.[1]

At the same time, contrary to his predecessor's initial desire to improve relations with Egypt by vastly increasing the level (and improving the terms) of economic assistance to Cairo,[2] American relations with Egypt and its leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, remained permeated with tension and mistrust and fraught with incessant crises during most of Johnson's tenure as president. Perceiving the Egyptian leader 'as an instrument of the Kremlin,'[3] President Johnson was uninhibited and outspoken in his criticism of Egypt's global and regional *modus operandi* over a variety of issues and events ranging from its continued military intervention in Yemen; its unabated support of the rebels in the Congo in defiance of the American position; and the equally relentless Egyptian drive to liquidate Western military presence in Oman, Aden, Cyprus and the strategically important Wheelus airfield in Libya. The President also criticized the burning of the American library and cultural center in Cairo (which was perpetrated by African students, on Thanksgiving Day 1964, protesting the American posture in the Congo); as well as the downing, shortly thereafter, of a civilian American plane which mistakenly entered Egypt's airspace; and the seizing

—by the Egyptian Government—of the assets of the Ford Motor Company in November 1966 following a dispute with the firm over customs duties.[4]

Notwithstanding the fact that American—Egyptian relations remained charged with suspicion and friction during most of the Johnson era (with President Nasser's strong opposition to the Vietnam War further aggravating an already highly-charged, emotion-laden dyad), and notwithstanding the growing American perception of Israel as a major regional asset to Washington's strategic interests in the region (which was manifested most clearly in June 1967), there remained an occasional gap—within the bounds of the American-Israeli framework—between the conceptual and the tangible or between the psychological and the operational relationship.

In other words—and here lies the core of the paradox—the fact that President Johnson 'was very anti-Nasser' and sought to disengage himself completely from the accommodative posture of 'trying to do business with Nasser',[5] which had characterized American diplomacy during the early part of Kennedy's tenure as president, while viewing Israel as a major pro-Western stronghold in the region, could not in itself guarantee that American policy in the Egyptian-Israeli sphere would invariably and quintessentially reflect these presidential predispositions and preferences. Clearly, the inherent irreconcilability—as perceived by the President—between Israel and Egypt in terms of their respective patterns of foreign policy behavior on both the regional and global levels (with Egypt supporting a broad range of anti-American and anti-British causes from Cyprus to Puerto Rico and Vietnam, and with Israel repeatedly demonstrating a willingness to support most of his policies[6]), did not always precipitate dichotomous and irreconcilable policies within the Egyptian-Israeli zone.

Specifically, despite the fact that President Johnson's initial attitude toward Israel was closely and irrevocably patterned on the basic premises of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm,[7] and was thus permeated with sympathy, empathy and goodwill (for example, such enterprises as 'the Israeli conversion of the barren [Negev] desert into a fertile agricultural land [reminding] him of projects he had sponsored along the Pedernales'[8]), the actual formation of American policy toward Israel during the Johnson Presidency—particularly in the field of arms sales—was not always directly and inextricably linked to, or derived from, the cluster of sentiments, feelings and beliefs which comprised the core of the 'Special Relationship' orientation.

In seeking to elucidate the origins of this discrepancy between belief and actual behavior, which was repeatedly and forcefully manifested in the

incessant difficulties that surrounded all Israeli efforts to secure arms from the Johnson Administration, it is clear that the process by which American policy in the Middle East in general, and the administration's arms sales posture toward Israel in particular, was shaped and delineated, did not even marginally approximate the logic and basic premises of the 'rational choice' model of decision. Far from being 'a calculated solution to a strategic problem,' reached by a unitary actor on the basis of a scrupulous assessment of the expected outcome of several well-defined, mutually exclusive policy alternatives,[9] this process incorporated divergent perspectives and dimensions which reflected the different (and occasionally the incompatible) bureaucratic, organizational and domestic priorities, interests and preferences of the various individuals and organizations involved in the formation of the administration's arms sales policy toward Israel. These individuals and organizations did not pursue a single consensual set of strategic objectives, nor did they share the same vision of the world or of the region. Rather, they were predisposed to see 'different faces of [the] issues'[10] as a result of their different belief systems and organizational affiliations and were continuously engaged in fierce competition with one another for power and influence, maneuvering into *ad hoc* coalitions and alliances, each trying to capture the attention and support of the central decision-maker.[11]

Thus, in seeking to build a 'majority coalition'[12] which would enable them to carry out their preferred arms sales strategy toward Israel, the members of Washington's high-policy elite involved in the process (who were arranged hierarchically within the national decision-making apparatus), can be thought of as partisan actors, constantly engaged in a number of sectorial and competitive bargaining games rather than as a cohesive group of players pursuing a single homogeneous good as stipulated by proponents of the 'rational choice' approach to state behavior and its origins.[13]

Turning now from the basic organizational, bureaucratic and domestic parameters of the process by which American arms sales policy toward Israel during the Johnson era was made, to the actual dynamics of this process—namely, to the specific composition and relative power of the forces striving to influence the decision-making process—an effort will be made not only to identify the main individuals and organizations involved in the bargaining over American arms sales policy toward Israel, but to expose and analyze the lessons which some of the participants drew from their involvement (while serving in the Kennedy Administration) in the first instance in which an advance weapon (the Hawk anti-aircraft, short-range missile) was sold to Israel. It is assumed that although the basic attitudes and positions of

some of the players in this bargaining game (particularly within the Department of State) remained essentially unchanged throughout the Kennedy and Johnson periods, other actors—primarily Robert Komer, who played a significant role in the process while serving initially as the leading expert on Middle Eastern issues at the National Security Council (NSC) in both administrations and later as Deputy Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs—did modify or revise some of their recommended strategies and tactics as a result of the Hawk sale and its perceived short-range ramifications.

In other words, whereas the specific positions advocated by most officials in the Department of State during the Johnson era who were involved in the formulation of the American arms sales policy toward Israel (including Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until September 1965, Phillips Talbot; Under-Secretary of State until September 1966, George W.Ball; and members of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) were invariably patterned on their preconceived and fixed background images or basic visions of the region,[14] other actors (particularly within the NSC) were not as strongly committed to a single set of pre-existing beliefs and views, being occasionally prepared to set aside their background images of the Middle East for the sake of taking advantage of the opportunities inherent in a highly dynamic and fluctuating regional landscape.

Based upon this distinction in terms of the structure (as well as the specific content) of the dominant beliefs and preferred strategies adhered to and supported by the various participants in the process, three divergent groups can be identified: the traditionalists, the pragmatists and the domestically oriented policy-makers and bureaucrats.

The traditionalist group, whose core comprised the Middle Eastern experts of the Department of State, strongly supported Washington's traditional arms sales policy, which was based upon the innate reluctance of successive administrations to become major arms suppliers to the Middle East.[15] Policy-makers who belonged to this category (and who reflected deeply-held departmental convictions, beliefs and legacies) feared that 'any unilateral action in Israel's favor [in the field of arms sales] would be liable to aid Soviet expansion among the Arab states,'[16] and that the supply of American arms to Israel was bound to have serious repercussions across the Arab world and thus jeopardize vital American security interests in the region. They remained adamantly and irreconcilably opposed—throughout the 1950s and part of the 1960s—both to the possibility that the US would become an arms supplier to Israel and, more broadly, that it would predicate

its posture within the American-Israeli framework upon the premises of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm. In their thinking, the wish that American diplomacy could maintain 'an appearance of impartiality' in the Arab-Israeli sphere[17] converged with, and was further reinforced by, considerations related to regional stability and to the perceived need to prevent a highly dangerous 'arms race between Israel and the Arab states.'[18]

Fully committed to the logic and basic premises of the 'spiral model,'[19] proponents of this foreign policy orientation—who were inherently riskaverse—remained convinced that the supply, by the US, of advanced weapons systems to Israel would not only 'link us closely to Israel's security at the expense of our relations with the rest of the Arab world,'[20] but would aggravate an already tense, emotion-laden situation along the Arab-Israeli front by exacerbating and intensifying the Arabs' feelings of vulnerability and insecurity. The inevitable outcome of this growing Arab perception of the Israeli threat in the aftermath of any change in the regional balance of military capabilities would therefore be, according to the traditionalist policy-makers, 'an increased arms race with the Russians backing Nasser,'[21] leading possibly to 'an uncontrolled escalation.'[22]

Another component of the traditionalists' approach was the belief—which remained largely unchanged throughout the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations—that, in view of the long-standing and substantial asymmetry in military capabilities between the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which favored Israel, there was no need for the US to supply Israel with arms and thus to encourage it to rely exclusively upon the premises of deterrence and coercion backed by superior military power) of its neighbors. Believing that Israel's security concerns were exaggerated and completely divorced from the actual distribution of military power, such traditionalist policy-makers as Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot consistently and vehemently argued that:

> …in terms of leadership, morale, organization, training, logistics, maintenance and intelligence…mobilization capacity, massive financial and material support from abroad, scientific know-how and skilled manpower…the Israelis enjoy clear superiority, which was unlikely to evaporate in the foreseeable future.[23]

Against the backdrop of this 'considerable overall [Israeli] military superiority over the combined power of all the Arab forces' and the corollary assumption that, in view of the chronic disunity and cleavage in the Arab world (combined with the continued weakness of the 'Arab military power and fighting capability'), there was but a low probability that the Arabs

would launch a major offensive against Israel, proponents of the traditionalist approach remained convinced that any deviation or departure from the traditional American arms sales policy toward Israel would be a prescription for added turbulence and turmoil in the Arab-Israeli zone.[24]

During the Kennedy era, this group of traditionalist decision-makers was deprived of much of its traditional base of power and support within the administration.[25] In the case of the Hawk decision, it was confronted by a powerful coalition comprising officials from the NSC and the Department of Defense (and ultimately by President Kennedy himself), and had to finally acquiesce in a decision which was clearly incompatible with the arms sales posture it continuously advocated and pursued.[26] By comparison, President Johnson downgraded the role of the NSC in the shaping of American policy in the Middle East and while foreign policy formulation during his era 'became more diffused,'[27] traditionalist policy-makers did manage to regain some of their influence in the power games which revolved around the sale of arms to Israel, particularly during President Johnson's last year in the White House.[28]

Whereas the actual policies advocated by the traditionalists were inextricably linked to their pre-existing background images (derived largely from their organizational perspective) concerning the dangers to American interests and regional stability which were inherent in the supply of arms to Israel, the group of pragmatist policy-makers, to which we now turn, was committed to a far less stable, uniform and coherent set of background images, being simultaneously sensitive to divergent stimuli, pressures and considerations.[29] Indeed, unlike the traditionalists, whose immediate images and specific perceptions and interpretations of the actual dynamics of the regional environment were closely patterned on their background images or basic and initial visions of the region (which reflected, in turn, long-standing organizational traditions and legacies), the group of pragmatist participants in the process (whose organizational background was, in general, more diverse than that of the traditionalists) was inherently prepared to deviate from its original cluster of background images in view of the changing circumstances and thus to predicate its actual and specific behavior within the American-Israeli dyad upon a set of immediate images, which were occasionally decoupled from the basic, preliminary beliefs and predispositions.[30]

Furthermore, unlike the traditionalists, who were influenced in their thinking and behavior by a single set of political and strategic considerations and calculations, the group of pragmatists—whose quintessential representative in the Johnson foreign policy machinery was Robert Komer of the NSC (and which also included President Johnson, albeit not to the

same extent, as well as several officials from the Department of Defense)—was continuously exposed to more than one policy and bureaucratic angle of observation. In the case of Komer, for example, an entire complex of domestic and electoral considerations and requirements (derived from his proximity to the White House) either converged with, or was incompatible with his competing strategic needs and objectives.

The existence of this multifaceted and highly complex decisional agenda precipitated a recognition of the need for compromises and trade-offs between competing or incompatible policy options and led to the frequent adoption of a relativist and expedient approach, which was based upon the pragmatists' keen awareness of the gap separating the optimal from the feasible and of the subsequent need to predicate policy upon the minimalist and transient requirements of the 'bounded rationality' approach to decision-making rather than upon more ambitious or immutable premises and axioms.[31]

Indeed, contrary to the traditionalists' innate reluctance to even marginally deviate from their preconceived conviction that the supply of arms to Israel would be detrimental to core American political and strategic interests in the Middle East, the pragmatists—who were acutely aware of the President's domestic needs and not only of the region's strategic landscape—were constantly prepared to engage in intricate 'twolevel games'[32] in an effort to maintain or broaden President Johnson's infrastructure of domestic support even at the cost of modifying or even abandoning the traditional tenets of American arms sales policy. Seeking to reconcile the gap between these two clusters of considerations and constraints, this group of policy-makers, who were anxious 'to protect [the President's] domestic flank,'[33] tended to view the 'limited and carefully spaced out US arms sales to Israel'[34] under specific circumstances as fully compatible with the basic strategic objectives which the administration attempted to promote in the Middle East (on condition that such sales were part of broader 'quid pro quos,' which involved Israeli concessions on a variety of regional and security issues[35]).

Specifically, whereas the traditionalists were exclusively preoccupied with the adverse impact that any change in the American arms sales posture was expected to have upon regional stability and core American interests and objectives in the Arab world, the pragmatists adhered to a considerably more optimistic vision of the ramifications that were likely to result from such a change—provided that the supply of arms to Israel constituted only one facet, fully incorporated into a broader strategy which required Israel to set aside some of its own traditional positions and strategies along the Arab-Israeli front.

Convinced that the sale to Israel of such advanced weapons systems as the Hawk missiles, the M-48A Patton tanks or the A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bombers would help alleviate Israel's feelings of vulnerability and fears of isolation and encirclement, the group of pragmatist participants in the decision-making process looked upon these transactions as reassuring, confidence-building measures, which were bound to induce the Israeli leadership to adopt a more accommodative approach in the Arab-Israeli sphere. Focusing on the Israeli rather than on the Arab side of the equation (as the traditionalists were predisposed to do), the pragmatists believed that, provided with military incentives of sufficient magnitude (which would reinforce the long-standing American commitment to Israel's security), Israel would become increasingly prepared to pursue a moderate and conciliatory posture toward its protagonists. Rather than precipitating or fueling a highly dangerous arms race and thus 'adding to instability in the region,'[36] as the traditionalists consistently warned, the sale of American arms to Israel was viewed by the pragmatists as a stabilizing stratagem which, as such, had the potential of noticeably decreasing any Israeli 'pre-emptive tendencies' as well as 'the tendency to go nuclear,' which Israel may have contemplated 'as the best means of offsetting the decline in its conventional deterrent posture.'[37]

As Komer's words clearly imply, contrary to the propensity of the traditionalists to underscore the overall balance of capabilities (which favored Israel) when addressing issues related to the military dimension of the Arab-Israeli predicament, the pragmatists tended to predicate their policy recommendations upon a specific and detailed assessment of the components and determinants which comprised—in the aggregate - the military balance. This perspective enabled them to recognize the possibility that despite its overall qualitative superiority, Israel could still find itself vulnerable to certain military threats (such as the threat of an Egyptian surprise air attack in 1962[38]), or inferior in certain dimensions and categories (such as armor in 1964 and 1965).[39]

Notwithstanding this innate pragmatist propensity to decouple the specific, transient and particular from the general and permanent ingredients and components of military power, and thus to support, in principle, the supply of arms to Israel in instances where 'a growing imbalance'[40] in certain distinctive capabilities and weapons systems within the Israeli-Arab framework which 'posed a real problem'[41] for Israel's security was detected, the road toward the actual reorientation of the American arms sales posture toward Israel during the Johnson era proved to be long and tortuous.

The pragmatists were continuously confronted by 'a blocking coalition,'[42] which included the traditionalist group and its *ad hoc* allies within the administration, and had therefore to search for additional partners —particularly the domestically oriented policy-makers—in order to forge a 'majority coalition'; also, their own support of the supply of arms to Israel was always qualified, being contingent upon specific trade-offs and linkages in different policy frameworks, which were designed to ensure that Israel would indeed reciprocate for the weapons it was permitted to purchase. As we shall soon see, it is precisely in this context that the lessons drawn by the pragmatists from the Hawk experience would surface in the immediate aftermath of this sale, precipitating change in the pragmatists' choice of tactics when the issue of providing Israel with new weapons systems was addressed in the course of the Johnson Presidency.

In the case of the pragmatists, their set of domestic calculations was but one facet of a broad and diverse complex of beliefs and policy considerations whose core was comprised of strategic perceptions and policy recommendations. However, the domestically oriented administration officials and decision-makers were largely (and occasionally exclusively) motivated by considerations which were inextricably related to, or derived from, core elements of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm. Reflecting 'a widespread fund of goodwill toward Israel that is not restricted to the Jewish community,' and an equally strong and unwavering commitment to Israel's continued national existence, integrity and security,[43] this paradigm incorporated a broadly based cluster of beliefs and attitudes that underscored the cultural affinity and similarity between these two political entities in terms of their historical ethos, pioneering spirit, political culture and commitment to democracy:

> The bond between the United States and Israel is unquestionably strengthened because of the congruence of values between the two nations. Americans can identify with Israel's national style…in a way that has no parallel on the Arab side… Consequently, a predisposition no doubt exists in American political culture that works to the advantage of the Israelis.[44]

In view of the durability, pervasiveness and legitimacy of these visions of 'a shared identity and transnational values,'[45] which had been incorporated into the 'Special Relationship' paradigm since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, it is hardly surprising that pro-Israeli interest groups and organizations frequently managed to successfully translate these widespread, yet amorphous sentiments and feelings of empathy, sympathy and

solidarity, into well-defined and concrete policies, programs and pressures. To the extent that American Jews—the backbone of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm—were able to advance their interest in Israel and to effectively employ such mechanisms as electoral politics as a means of engendering pro-Israeli policies, their success clearly reflected the sympathy on the part of their non-Jewish organizational coalition partners (such as the US Congress) and the public at large.[46]

Indeed, by quintessentially representing the core premises of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm, such Jewish organizations as the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations, and the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—together with their long-standing Congressional allies—repeatedly managed, particularly from the late 1960s, to effectively constrain and delimit the range of policy options (including coercive measures) considered by the executive branch *vis-à-vis* Israel. They also, on a number of occasions, caused American leaders to adopt a pro-Israeli posture which was incompatible with at least some of their initial preferences and desires.[47]

In the context of the evolution and formulation of American arms sales policy during the Kennedy period and most of the Johnson era, representatives of this domestically oriented category within the administration—such as Deputy Special Counsel to the President Myer Feldman, and his considerably less assertive successor Harry McPherson - continuously endeavored to consolidate 'majority coalitions' with the pragmatists as a means of ensuring that American diplomacy in this sphere 'is consistent with the beliefs and values of most Americans,' thus reflecting the essence of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm.[48] However, toward the end of the 1960s it became evident that the relative influence and power which these individual representatives of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm within official Washington managed to exert on the shaping of the American arms sales posture had markedly diminished as a variety of Jewish (and non-Jewish) organizations became increasingly important and assertive in promoting their domestically oriented agenda at their expense.

In the summer of 1962, the formation of an *ad hoc* coalition between representatives of the domestically oriented and pragmatist groups proved to be the decisive factor in enabling them to ultimately win the protracted interdepartmental bargaining game over the issue of whether to abandon American traditional arms sales policy toward Israel. Confronted with a powerful coalition comprising Komer (and his superiors in the NSC), Feldman and several officials from the Department of Defense (and ultimately President Kennedy himself), the traditionalists within the

Department of State had to finally acquiesce in a decision which was inherently incompatible with the posture they consistently advocated and pursued.[49]

Notwithstanding the fact that the domestically oriented and pragmatist decision-makers ultimately managed to forge a 'majority coalition,' which effectively isolated and outmaneuvered their bureaucratic opponents and thus paved the way toward the conclusion of the Hawk deal, it became evident in the immediate aftermath of the Hawk decision that beneath the facade of apparent unity and cooperation between the partners in this winning coalition, there remained significant differences in their respective assumptions and expectations of the specific terms and conditions under which the decision to sell the Hawk missile to Israel was made. The nature of this disagreement and the lessons which the pragmatists drew from their 'Hawk experience' concerning Israel's *modus operandi* and behavioral style profoundly affected their thinking and bargaining strategies when the issue of selling new weapons systems to Israel (such as the M-48A Patton tanks) became the focus of a new bargaining game during the early part of the Johnson Administration.

Specifically, in the process of building and consolidating the majority coalition *en route* to the conclusion of the Hawk deal, the pragmatists and the domestically oriented participants in this 'decision game' predicated their joint bargaining approach upon the premises of the 'strategy of expected reciprocity,' that is, upon the willingness of one side in the equation, namely, the USA, to take a unilateral cooperative initiative in the hope that it would encourage the other party (Israel) to reciprocate in kind by offering 'a conciliatory action in return.'[50] Unlike more circumscribed and binding strategies (which were advocated by several other participants in the process), such as the strategy of quid pro quo, which made the Hawk sale contingent upon specific, concrete and simultaneous Israeli concessions (primarily in the context of the Palestinian predicament),[51] the strategy of expected reciprocity, which is also termed 'tit for tat,' was patterned upon the more optimistic belief that the initiation of the first accommodative move in a sequence was capable of setting in motion a mutually beneficial and reassuring chain of cooperative interactions by altering the opponent's threat perceptions and risk calculations and consequently inducing him to reciprocate in kind.[52]

Indeed, in the thinking of the pragmatists, the innate belief in the power of confidence-building measures and positive sanctions to induce the Israeli recipient to respond in kind by moderating his position on key strategic issues (such as the cluster of issues related to the future of the Palestinian refugees, where the drafting of the Johnson Plan for comprehensively

resolving this predicament was completed at the precise moment when the bargaining over the Hawk reached its final phase), converged with, and was further reinforced by, their desire to maintain the traditional electoral alliance between the Jewish community and the Democratic Party on the eve of the November 1962 Congressional elections.[53] And while the expectations of the pragmatists laid, in August 1962, the groundwork of the winning coalition between the pragmatist and the domestically oriented policy-makers, it also precipitated, in subsequent months, the breakdown of this partnership. The collapse of the Hawk majority coalition, occurred when it became clear to the pragmatists that the Ben-Gurion Government had not even marginally modifed its mode of conduct in the Palestinian zone after the inducement of the Hawk deal had been promised, as they hoped and expected.[54]

Faced with Israel's continued recalcitrance, defiance and unbounded opposition to the Johnson Plan, such pragmatists as Robert Komer, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, and his deputy, Carl Kaysen, became increasingly prepared to abandon their initial belief in the power of unconditional inducements to engender change in the operational code of the recipient and to adopt instead a bargaining strategy based on automatic, binding and concurrent trade-offs between incentive and compensation.[55] In other words, the offering of new military incentives to Israel could not be any longer patterned on the amorphous and non-binding premises of expected reciprocity. Rather than an advance payment for future Israeli concessions, the military incentive would now be offered, in view of the Hawk experience, only as compensation to Israel for actions taken earlier by the Israeli Government toward third parties (or for earlier accommodative Israeli actions and initiatives) or as an integral part of a built-in, explicit and simultaneous linkage between an accommodative Israeli move and the American reward or payment.

Thus, whereas, during the period immediately preceding the conclusion of the Hawk deal, the pragmatists were largely influenced in their thinking and behavior by the 'shadow of the future'[56]—namely, by their expectation that the provision of a major incentive to Israel would provide the desired impetus for a reciprocal Israeli move on a later occasion—they became increasingly willing, when these expectations failed to materialize, to rely upon the cluster of beliefs and sentiments comprising 'the shadow of the past' as the conceptual source of their new advocated arms sales approach.

While such pragmatists as Komer and Kaysen became increasingly frustrated and incensed when it became evident that the Hawk deal did not have any moderating influence upon Israel's behavior in the Palestinian

sphere as anticipated but, in fact, encouraged the Israeli leadership to defy with impunity Washington's preferences and objectives, no such transformation occurred in the case of the domestically oriented members of the Kennedy Administration. The President's Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman, was the central domestically oriented player in the process and played a major role in persuading the President to ultimately accept the logic and basic premises of the strategy of expected reciprocity as the basis of the Hawk decision. He remained committed to his original approach and fully and unequivocally supported Israel's irreconcilable reaction to the Johnson Plan by recommending that the administration 'simply recognize that [it] is a non-starter.'[57] Believing that President Kennedy should disengage himself rapidly from the Johnson Plan (a scenario which ultimately materialized in late January 1963), Feldman's actions in the immediate aftermath of the Hawk decision were designed to reap the maximum domestic and electoral benefits from the sale by briefing leaders of the American-Jewish community of the decision.

Thus, whereas Komer's messages during the period following the Hawk deal were permeated with anger and bitterness in view of the fact that 'Israel —having gotten the Hawks—is making an all-out effort to sink the Johnson Plan,'[58] and that 'we have gotten nothing [from the Israelis] in return for the Hawks,'[59] the concurrent moves of his former domestically oriented partner reflected a far more upbeat and optimistic mood. Not only did the Hawk sale considerably broaden the President's margin of support among Jewish voters, as Feldman had hoped, but his efforts guaranteed that the actual delivery of the Hawk to Israel would take place on the eve of the November 1964 Presidential elections, an eventuality which—he happily observed—was bound to have 'the optimal political impact.'[60]

Clearly, whereas the pragmatists emerged from the Hawk episode with the conviction that, in dealing with Israel, 'we want to avoid giving if possible before we have taped down the quid pro quos,'[61] and that 'we cannot commit ourselves to Israel's defense without making sure that we have not given it a blank check,'[62] no such lessons concerning the need to link any future 'increase in Israel's military capabilities [to] some quid pro quo from Israel'[63] were evident in the thinking of the domestically oriented policy-makers. Continuously preoccupied with the need to maximize the domestic benefits inherent in the Hawk decision, Feldman's activities during the period following the deal were intended to ensure that it would indeed be fully implemented without any delay, procrastination or qualification, regardless of the Israeli *modus operandi* along the Palestinian front.[64]

In conclusion, although pragmatist participants in the decision-making process, such as Komer, Bundy and Kaysen, did not altogether abandon the basic premises upon which their overall approach within the American-Israeli dyad was shaped and delineated in the wake of the Hawk experience, the shadow of this event (the failure of the Israelis to reciprocate) precipitated a significant change in their choice of bargaining strategies when the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, the administration should sell new weapons systems to Israel resurfaced. This was to be a salient and pressing policy question which continually preoccupied President Johnson's foreign policy elite. Thus, as a result of this learning experience, the pragmatists' initial belief that even a qualified Israeli 'promise of future cooperation' constituted a sufficient basis for initiating cooperative actions *vis-à-vis* Israel[65] subsequently faded into the background and was ultimately replaced by the notion of 'conditional cooperation' (which was patterned on some of the premises of the 'grim trigger strategy'). This notion ruled out the 'unilateral provision of benefits'[66] and advantages in the hope of inducing 'reciprocal cooperation' and thus reflected the pragmatists' recognition that Israel was the party that 'defected'—to use the terminology of game theory—in the Hawk deal by failing to carry out its part of the expected exchange.[67]

The outcome of this failure of the strategy of expected reciprocity to set in motion a process of conflict-reduction within the Israeli-Palestinian framework and the lessons which the pivotal group of pragmatist policy-makers drew from this perceived debacle therefore guaranteed that more direct forms of linkage would now dominate the American-Israeli landscape. With the shadow of the Hawk hovering constantly in the background as a reminder of the weaknesses and pitfalls inherent in the pursuit of the posture of *de facto* 'unconditional co-operation,'[68] Israel would now have to pay a political or strategic price for the arms requested. Indeed, the price it so vehemently refused to pay in the summer of 1962 in return for the Hawks would be extracted from successive Israeli Governments during the Johnson years,[69] albeit not in the Palestinian sphere.

It is to the analysis of the actual dynamics of the politics of arms sales as they developed within the American-Israeli framework during this period that we now turn.

NOTES

1. See, on the establishment of security ties between the US and Israel during the Kennedy Presidency, Fawaz A.Gerges, *The Superpowers in the Middle East: Regional and International Politics,* 1955–1967 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 194; Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 172–3; Douglas Little, 'From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed: Seeking Order in the Middle East', in Thomas G.Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: America's Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 176; Douglas Little, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 25 (1993), pp. 568–85; Ethan Nadelmann, 'Setting the Stage: American Policy Toward the Middle East, 1961–1966', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 14 (1982), pp. 435–57; Mordechai Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy Towards the Arab States and Israel* (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1983), pp. 45–6.
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3. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov,' The United States and Israel Since 1948: A "Special Relationship"?', *Diplomatic History,* 22, 2 (1998), p. 237.
4. Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East,* pp. 186–8; Nadelmann,'Setting the Stage', pp. 446–7; Douglas Little, 'A Fool's Errand: America and the Middle East, 1961–1969', in Diane B. Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 292–3; Douglas Little, 'Choosing Sides: Lyndon Johnson and the Middle East', in Robert A.Divine (ed.), *The Johnson Years,*Vol. 3, *LBJ at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 156–7; Steven L.Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 122–3; Warren I.Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser', in Warren I.Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 290. On the military role which Israel played in the effort to thwart the Egyptian forces in the Yemeni civil war (involving the supply of military equipment to the Royalist forces), see Zeev Maoz, 'Israeli Intervention in Intra-Arab Affairs', in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon S.Klieman (eds), *Global Politics: Essays in Honour of David* Vital (London: Frank Cass, 2001),p. 163 (note l5).

5 . See Oral History Interview with Robert W.Komer, 22 December 1969, part 1, John F.Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston (hereafter JFKL): 45. See also Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', pp. 290–2.
6 . Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 124–5.
7 . See, for an analysis of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm, Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 15–27. See also Bernard Reich, *The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 186–6; Michael N.Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', in Peter J.Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 434–5; Charles Lipson, 'American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits', in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *US-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 130–4; William B.Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 15–24; Peter Gross, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York: Knopf, 1983).
8. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 122-4.
9. Glenn H.Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 340. See also Robert A.Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 15–16;John D. Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 24–46; William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 7–8; Leon V.Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 12–16; Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 7; Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 151–7.
10. Graham T.Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,* 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 162.
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13. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish,* pp. 12–13. See also, in this connection, Neil Smelser, 'The Rational Choice Perspective', *Rationality and Society,* 4 (1992), pp. 381–410; T.Clifton Morgan, *Untying the Knot of War: A Bargaining Theory of International Crises* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 27.
14. For an analysis of the concept 'background images', see Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations,* pp. 291–339. See also Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence,* pp. 114–15.
15. Abraham Ben-Zvi, *John F.Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 11. For additional evidence on the basic perceptions and beliefs of traditionalist policy-makers, see Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Robert D.Kaplan, *The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite* (New York: The Free Press, 1993); Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: Norton, 1990). For earlier evidence on this traditionalist perspective, see Isaac Alteras, 'Eisenhower and the Sinai Campaign of 1956: The First Major Crisis in US-Israeli Relations', in David Tal (ed.), *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 26; Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 315.
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22. Remarks of Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (since January 1962) George C.McGhee, which were made on 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1:2–3. On the theoretical implications of this traditionalist desire to avoid risky situations and choices (one of which is the tendency 'to process information selectively'), see Yaacov Y.I.Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 29.
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24. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1:2–3. See also Rusk's remarks of 15 August 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Abraham Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/2:1.
25. On the growing power of the NSC in the decision-making process during the Kennedy era at the expense of the Department of State, see Komer's Oral History Interview of 22 December 1969, part 4, JFKL: 18–22; part 5:1–47. See also Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* p. 56; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 99; Carl M. Brauer, 'John F. Kennedy: The Endurance of Inspirational Leadership', in Fred I. Greenstein (ed.), *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 108–33; Larry Berman, 'Lyndon B.Johnson: Paths Chosen and Opportunities Lost', in *Leadership in the Modern Presidency,* pp. 134–63. For earlier cases in which the Department of State was unsuccessful in its efforts to shape American foreign policy see, for example, Harold L. Wilensky (ed.), *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 50–7; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 50–5; Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish,* pp. 19–25; Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 31–70.
26. Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* p. 56.
27. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 125.
28. Message of 3 May 1966 from the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Efraim Evron, to the Deputy Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Moshe Bitan. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/2:1–3. See also the message which was sent on 1 May 1966, from Israeli Foreign

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34. Quoted from Komer's message of 15 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:330.

35. Quoted from Komer's message of 9 February 1965 to President Johnson, *FRUS 18:*320. On the theoretical implications of this approach, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 128–42.
36. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1:2–3.
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38. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 114.

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40. Bundy's remarks of 10 January 1964. Quoted from ibid., p. 11.
41. Bundy's remarks of 10 January 1964. Quoted from ibid., p. 11.
42. For the term 'blocking coalition', see Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, p. 350. See also Rosati, 'Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective', pp. 336–7.
43. Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship*, p. 15. See also Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 365; Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', pp. 432–4; Abram F.K.Organski, *The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 27–32; George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 28–9; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 34; Seth P.Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 53–4; Camille Mansour, *Beyond Alliance: Israel and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 190; Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948', pp. 231–2; David Rodman, 'Patron-Client Dynamics: Mapping the American-Israeli Relationship', *Israel Affairs*, 4, 2 (1997), pp. 26–46; Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, pp. 15–24; Gabriel Sheffer, 'The United States-Israeli "Special Relationship"', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 9, 4 (1987), pp. 1–6; Gabriel Sheffer, 'Shared Values as the Bases for the US-Israeli "Special Relationship"', in Sheffer, *Dynamics of Dependence*, pp. 4–5; Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 572; Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and their Homelands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 21.
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50. Alexander L.George, 'Strategies of Facilitating Cooperation', in Alexander L. George, Philip J.Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds), *US-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 693. The basic premises of the 'strategy of expected reciprocity' were developed by Robert Axelrod in the context of a simulation game called 'Prisoner's Dilemma'. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 27–54. See also, for further analyses of this strategy, Russell J.Lenz, 'Influence Techniques Among Nations', in Philip E.Tetlock, J.L.Husbands, Robert Jervis *et al.* (eds), *Behavior, Society, and International Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 96–7; Janice Gross Stein, 'The Political Economy of Security Agreements: The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David', in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, pp. 86–7; Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, pp. 285–90; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Art of Bargaining* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 58–75; Robert O.Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 40 (1986), pp. 1–27; Kenneth A.Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', *World Politics*, 38, 1 (1985), pp. 1–24; James K.Esser and S.S.Komorita, 'Reciprocity and Concession Making in Bargaining', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 31, 5 (1975), pp. 864–72; Warner Wilson, 'Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemmas Game', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 15 (1971), pp. 167–95; Deborah Welch Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations', *Negotiation Journal*, 4, 3 (1988), pp. 281–301; James D.Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 264–6; Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', *World Politics*, 44, 3 (1992), pp. 466–96; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 14; Gideon Doron and Itai Sened, *Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process* (London: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 59; Terrence P.Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 181–3, 187; Stephen J. Majeski and Shane Fricks, 'Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39 (1995), pp. 622–45; Joanne Gowa, 'Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations', *International Organization*, 40 (1986), pp. 167–86; Joseph M.Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Problem of International

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57. Quoted from Harman's memorandum of 14 September 1962 concerning his 13 September 1962 conversation with Feldman, which was sent to Haim

Yahil, Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8:1–2.

58. Quoted from Komer's message of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen, *FRUS* 18:122–3. See also Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales*, p. 82.
59. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 5 December 1962 to Kennedy. Papers of President Kennedy (PPK), National Security Files (NSF), Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3–4. See also Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales*, p. 89.
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67. Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity', p. 285. See also McGilligvray and Smith, 'Trust and Cooperation', p. 810.
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2
The Road to the M-48A Patton Tank

An examination of the basic premises, upon which the Middle Eastern policy of the Johnson Administration was formulated from its very inception, clearly underscores the President's preference for conservative, pro-Western Arab regimes; a preference which was inherently incompatible with the initial predisposition and policies of his predecessor.[1]

In early 1961, the Kennedy Administration embarked upon a major diplomatic effort which was designed to improve relations with Egypt. Convinced that, in view of President Nasser's 'desire not to become too dependent on the Soviet Union,' American diplomacy was provided with an exquisite opportunity to exert 'some restraining influence on [Egyptian policies] by creating a vested interest, on Nasser's part, in good relations with the US,'[2] President Kennedy moved quickly to vastly increase the level of economic assistance to Egypt (particularly the PL480 surplus wheat program) without making it contingent upon any specific political or economic preconditions. Fully committed to the logic and premises of the strategy of expected reciprocity (which was to similarly surface within the American-Israeli framework in August 1962), the Kennedy Administration strongly believed that the unilateral initiation of an accommodative course *vis-à-vis* Egypt would ultimately succeed in inducing President Nasser to reciprocate in kind and ultimately become fully integrated into a framework of moderation and restraint, unwilling to risk the interruption of the much-needed Western aid in an era of continued tension between Cairo and Moscow.[3]

However, the fact that this unilateral provision of economic benefits to Egypt by the Kennedy Administration failed to even marginally change President Nasser's order of regional and global priorities and did not result in any reciprocal and accommodative Egyptian moves, led President Johnson, as soon as he took office, to question the validity and viability of the strategy of expected reciprocity within the American-Egyptian dyad.

Indeed, in late 1963, faced with recent indications of regional recalcitrance, radicalism and intransigence on the part of President Nasser—such as his refusal to implement the terms of the April 1963 disengagement agreement in Yemen (which called for a phased withdrawal of all foreign troops from Yemen); his continued effort to threaten the existence of the monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and his flirtation with China, Cuba, and the Vietcong—President Johnson (as well as Robert Komer, the chief advocate and supporter of President Kennedy's strategy of expected reciprocity toward Egypt) was, from the very beginning of his presidency, predisposed to set aside the accommodative strategy of his predecessor. Instead, the President opted to predicate the American posture toward Egypt (which was now perceived as an obedient Soviet proxy) upon more direct, organic and explicit forms of linkage between the continued provision of American assistance to Egypt, and 'a compensatory quid pro quo in the form of a less antagonistic policy on [Nasser's] part.'[4]

President Johnson's initial propensity to abandon—or at least significantly modify—the strategy of *de facto* unconditional cooperation, which was implemented within the American-Egyptian dyad during the Kennedy era, was further reinforced during his first year in the White House. Indeed, events and developments of great salience and magnitude—such as Egypt's continued military intervention in Yemen (in defiance of the disengagement agreement); its intensified efforts to terminate Western military presence in Aden, Oman, Cyprus and Libya; its continued support of the rebels in the Congo; its involvement in the burning of the American library and cultural center in Cairo in November 1964; its role in the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)[5] and the anti-American United Arab Command (UAC); and the downing of an American civilian plane which mistakenly entered Egyptian airspace—were but a few of the most prominent sources of cleavage and stress between Washington and Cairo in 1964 which further aggravated and exacerbated a situation already permeated with tension and charged with animosity in American-Egyptian relations.[6]

Combined with President Nasser's increasingly inflammatory and combative anti-American rhetoric—which culminated in his emotionladen Port Said speech of 23 December 1964, in which he urged 'those who do not accept our behavior…to go and drink from the sea and if the Mediterranean is not enough to slate their thirsts…they can carry on with the Red Sea'[7]—these mounting indications that American-Egyptian relations were indeed fraught with pervasive tension, dispute and misunderstanding, led President Johnson, in late 1964, to seriously consider the immediate suspension of 'all US economic aid for Egypt.'[8]

Although the President ultimately decided, in February 1965, not to cross the Rubicon by abruptly suspending all PL-480 agricultural shipments to Egypt, despite strong Congressional pressures to do so—as he feared that such a measure might lead President Nasser to adopt an even more radical and irreconcilable position toward the US[9]—this American restraint in the face of Egypt's unabated recalcitrance could not prevent the further deterioration in American—Egyptian relations during 1965. This deterioration was manifested most dramatically in President Nasser's repeated public pledge 'to support national liberation movements every where in an effort to overthrow pro-American regimes' in the Third World; in his growing clandestine aid to such radical groups as the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), which conducted numerous raids against British installations in Aden and Oman; and in his sharp and vitriolic denunciations of the escalating American intervention inVietnam, which accompanied his decision to permit the Vietcong to open an information bureau in Cairo in April 1965.[10] In the words of CIA Director John McCone, which provide a picture of a relationship overshadowed by continued divergence and irreconcilability:

> During the past two years we have not received very much in return for our assistance to Egypt. In fact, the Egyptians have done many things harmful to our interests, such as sending more troops into Yemen rather than withdrawing them, exerting various types of pressure against the British, and encouraging Libya to ask us and the United Kingdom to give up our Libyan bases. In addition, we have been unable to persuade the Egyptians to slow down the arms race which they were undertaking.[11]

Notwithstanding this picture of a relationship permeated with cleavage and overshadowed by confrontation (which reflected the President's unabated determination to contain Soviet influence by strengthening 'pro-Western regimes [in the Middle East]' while isolating 'Arab nationalists in Cairo and elsewhere'[12]), and notwithstanding President Johnson's unwavering commitment to the cluster of values, beliefs and attitudes which comprised the backbone of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm between Washington and Jerusalem, no direct, automatic and linear linkage was established during the entire Johnson Presidency between these diametrically opposite images of the protagonists in the Arab—Israeli conflict, and the American arms sales policy toward Israel.[13]

Indeed, despite the continued American determination 'to isolate Nasser' and 'to check the tide of Soviet-backed revolutionary nationalism that seemed to be sweeping the Arab world,'[14] and despite the President's innate 'sympathy toward Israel' (which was reinforced by his 'biblically based religious background'[15]), the entire complex of issues pertaining to the sale of American arms to Israel remained at least partially divorced from the broad strategic vision of the Middle East which the Johnson Administration continuously sought to translate into reality. Clearly, President Johnson's vision of Israel as a bastion of democratic values and a reliable bulwark which —as such—comprised an indispensable and vital component in the American effort to challenge, restrain and contain the regional forces of radicalism and militancy, did not always precipitate a derivative, fully compatible arms sales posture.

In seeking to explain this discrepancy, it has already been suggested that the shadow of the Hawk experience, as well as the growing power of the traditionalist faction within President Johnson's foreign policy machinery, played a major role in creating this occasional gap between the President's preliminary visions of the Middle Eastern strategic, cultural, political and ideological landscape (and its divergent components), and the cluster of considerably more specific arms sales preferences and policies, which were formulated under concrete circumstances and in response to conflicting pressures. It is to the reconstruction of the actual dynamics of this process, as it unfolded during Lyndon Johnson's term as President, that we now turn.

On 29 July 1965, in an exchange of letters between Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Peter Solbert, and Special Assistant to the Israeli Defense Minister, Zvi Dinstein, the Johnson Administration formally agreed to sell to Israel 210 M-48A Patton medium tanks (with conversion kits and 105-mm guns) at a cost of $42 million, 'to be paid over two years.'[16] What is amazing about the timing of the sale is the fact that the initial Israeli request for the M-48A Patton tanks had been formally submitted more than two years before the deal was finally concluded and that, furthermore, both the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations were basically sympathetic to the Israeli request. In a meeting which took place in New York on 30 September 1963, between Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Foreign Minister—alluding to the growing gap in the 'quality of…advanced weapons' between Egypt and Israel, which reinforced the need for Israel to 'maintain a strong deterrent'—expressed Israel's abiding interest in 'procuring…new tanks' as a means of maintaining stability across the Israeli-Egyptian border.[17]

One month later, in a message to President Kennedy, sent on 4 November 1963, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol reiterated this request, arguing that 'in the absence of a formal US security guarantee, Israel must seek alternative means to assure its security in the face [of the Egyptian] missile and sophisticated weapons development and its conventional arms build up.' Hence, the Prime Minister concluded, 'Israel will not possess the necessary capacity in the near future to deter aggressive Egyptian moves without considerable help in obtaining ground-to-ground missiles, tanks and increased naval power.'[18]

Whereas all branches of the administration were unanimous in their belief that, in view of 'the inaccuracy…and limited reliability of the Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)…it was extremely unlikely that any Egyptian missile attack would have [any] serious results, at least for the next five years,' and that, consequently, 'there was no conventional military justification for the Israeli effort to purchase such missiles in France,'[19] Robert Komer (as well as the other pragmatists in the NSC, the Department of Defense and the US Army) was at the same time convinced that:

> Israel [had] an increasingly good case for [tanks], as Egypt's inventory of Soviet models continues to grow and that, consequently, we can, in principle, help meet this problem (they want mostly M-48s) either from our own surpluses or indirectly through releasing surplus M-48s from our NATO allies as they re-equip.[20]

Komer's assessment that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) indeed faced 'a problem about modernization in their armor'[21] was accepted at face value by all the American participants in the first American-Israeli dialogue on regional security issues, which was inaugurated in Washington on 13 November 1963, and was not seriously challenged by any other administration officials or agencies outside the Department of State in subsequent months. Although the November 1963 dialogue exposed major differences between Washington and Jerusalem on such issues as the military significance of Egypt's missile development program, the magnitude of the overall Arab military threat to Israel and the nature of the American commitment to Israel's security, it did result in an understanding concerning the Israeli need to modernize its tank force.[22]

Indeed, during the period immediately following this dialogue, faced with repeated Israeli requests 'to replace at least 300 of its tanks with more effective tanks' and thus to help Israel 'maintain a credible policy of deterrence' in view of the recent purchase, by Egypt, 'of Soviet T-54 and Stalin 3 tanks,' as well as MIG-19 and MIG-21 interceptors and Tupolev-16

bombers,[23] such pragmatists as Komer and McGeorge Bundy were predisposed to accept the Israeli position and to define the tank issue as 'a real question which we could look at in real terms.'[24] The Department of State—the backbone of the traditionalists—continued to vehemently oppose any new sale of arms to Israel, fearing—as they had feared in the past—that it would 'drive the Arabs into the arms of the Soviets', and thus disrupt a relationship 'with the Arabs which we have built up with considerable effort over the past several years.'[25] However, most other individuals and organizations operating in the Johnson Administration, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, viewed 'the replacement of 300 of Israel's present M-4 tanks [as] militarily sound on the basis of modernization,' namely, in view of the fact that 'the bulk of its [M-4 Sherman tank] inventory is obsolescent' and 'that the Arabs possess modern heavily armed and armored tanks.'[26] Feldman—whose behavior in 1964 was reminiscent of his approach to the Hawk issue—also fully supported the tank sale (despite the fact that, unlike the Hawk, the requested tank constituted an offensive weapons system). Indeed, his 15 January 1964 meeting with Ambassador Abraham Harman focused on the specific financial terms of the deal rather than on its intrinsic merits.[27]

Notwithstanding the apparent emergence, in early 1964, of a majority coalition supporting the sale, and notwithstanding the fact that Secretary Robert McNamara, on 26 January 1964, conveyed his 'approval in principle of a tank sale to Israel' to the Department of State[28] and even authorized, four days later, 'the extension of credit for the sale of 200 M-48A3 tanks to Israel over the next 1–2 years and 100 M-60 tanks over the next 2–3 years,'[29] the actual conclusion of the deal was not forthcoming. Despite these mounting indications of support, which convinced the Eshkol Government that the formal announcement of the sale was imminent, Israel would have in fact to wait another 18 months before a decision finalizing the sale was ultimately made.

In seeking to explain this discrepancy between the apparent and the actual, it is clear that the shadow of the past converged with, and was further reinforced by, a cluster of specific domestic considerations (which, on this occasion, prompted President Johnson to adopt a posture of procrastination toward the tank sale); the result being the adoption of a strategy which, at least temporarily, ruled out the unconditional and immediate sale of M-48A tanks to Israel.

Unlike the case of the Hawk, in which the issue of the sale to Israel of a specific weaponry was effectively separated from any preconditions or direct and binding linkages to other policy frameworks, the subject of whether to conclude the tank deal was incorporated, early in 1964, into a system of

explicit and built-in trade-offs which—by making it contingent upon certain reciprocal Israeli actions—had the potential of restricting Israel's margin of maneuverability. Clearly, the pragmatists' original reliance, in 1962, upon non-binding premises and expectations was now replaced—as a result of the lessons drawn from this episode—by an insistence on more binding forms of linkage or compensation, which were quintessentially premised upon the logic of the quid pro quo bargaining strategy. Believing that the American-Israeli dyad was essentially 'a one-way street' predicated upon the asymmetrical notions of 'all get and no give,' pragmatists such as Komer and Bundy were now determined to find a more 'satisfactory basis for our relationship.'[30]

During the period immediately following Lyndon B.Johnson's entrance into the White House, this pervasive shadow of the past became inextricably linked to an acutely menacing, sharply-delineated shadow of the future, which Robert Komer and McGeorge Bundy strongly believed in. Accumulating reports indicated to the American intelligence community that Israel and the French company Marcel Dassault had signed, in April 1963, an agreement to produce for Israel the MD-620 SSM capable of carrying a 750 kg warhead.[31] This threatening foreshadowing of a nuclear future exacerbated the fear that Israel's 'French connection,' in addition to 'encouraging Egypt to be more aggressive than purely [conventional] military calculations would justify,' could now create 'the real possibility of a whole new dimension in the Middle East arms race.'[32] Since Israel already possessed 'an operating reactor,' the argument continued, the April 1963 agreement was potentially capable of enabling it (to acquire a nuclear delivery capability.'[33]

Anxious to prevent the possibility that Israel would 'acquire an independent nuclear deterrent,'[34] the pragmatists became increasingly predisposed to make the tanks sale contingent upon specific Israeli assurances 'to forego (or sharply limit) their missile buildup'. The M-48A Patton tank was to be used as a powerful leverage for 'achieving greater Israeli cooperation in matters of importance to us.'[35] In Komer's words, which clearly elucidate the essence of this quid pro quo strategy:

> If we facilitate solution of Israel's tank problem, we should get assurance in return that Israel will not plunge the Near East into either the sophisticated missile or the nuclear weapons field.[36]

Convinced that a tight linkage between 'the tanks' and 'our concerns over Israel's move toward a missile (and perhaps nuclear) capability' could enable the President to 'retain flexibility on this matter till the moment of

maximum political advantage,'[37] Komer was now prepared to abandon his original strategy of expected reciprocity as manifested in the Hawk episode, and instead to rely upon direct and binding forms of linkage and reciprocity as the basis of his bargaining approach in subsequent months. Thus, while he continued to recommend that President Johnson 'take action toward helping meet Israel's tank needs,' Komer opted to oppose Feldman's recommendation that the M-48A tanks should be unconditionally 'sold right now.'[38] Instead, Komer suggested that 'before the President decides [on the tank issue]', he should 'further explore…what cooperation can we get from Israel in return—such as avoiding a missile and nuclear arms race.'[39]

It is precisely around the specific terms of this exchange that the bargaining game between Washington and Jerusalem revolved in subsequent months—a game in which the M-48A tank became the bait for inducing Israel 'not to buy missiles'[40] and to refrain from crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus was the relatively simple issue of the sale to Israel of a conventional weapons system linked to the immensely complex cluster of issues related to the Dimona nuclear reactor and its regional and global significance.

The tension that permeated and pervaded the American-Israeli dyad during the Kennedy era over a broad range of issues which were inextricably linked to the Dimona project (such as the American insistence on periodic inspections of the reactor and on an intrusive and comprehensive examination of all the areas and facilities of the site)[41] faded into the background in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of President Kennedy. However, President Johnson (who was less sensitive than his predecessor to the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation[42]) was still prepared to use the tank issue as a convenient vehicle or springboard for extracting concessions from Israel both as regards nuclear weapons and the use of conventional weapons in the Arab-Israeli conflict (albeit not in the Palestinian sphere).

Before turning to the actual dynamics of this bargaining game as it unfolded in 1964 and early 1965, another cluster of considerations which, in early 1964, militated against the early conclusion of the sale, thus reinforcing 'the nuclear constraint,' should be addressed. President Johnson's basic vision of Israel was predicated upon the core values of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and 'his door was always open' to such prominent members of the American-Jewish community (a staunch supporter of this paradigm) as Democratic party fund-raiser, Abraham Feinberg, Arthur Krim of Paramount Pictures, and David Ginsberg, a prominent Washington lawyer;[43] yet, paradoxically, his acute sensitivity to domestic and electoral considerations occasionally—as was the case in early

1964—precipitated courses of action which were inherently incompatible with Israeli interests. Indeed, the President's decision to procrastinate over the Israeli request for the M-48A tank was not the outcome of mounting pressures from traditionalist policy-makers (who were continuously concerned with the regional ramifications of the sale, regardless of its specific terms and conditions), but the result of important domestic-electoral calculations arising from the approaching Presidential elections of November 1964.

Thus, contrary to the widespread assumption that sensitivity to considerations which were strongly influenced by the 'Special Relationship' paradigm (particularly in an election year) invariably resulted in a derivative pro-Israeli policy—'the power of Israel's friends' in the United States indeed forced President Johnson, in late 1964, to make 'a series of gestures toward Israel'[44]—no such gestures were in fact forthcoming in early 1964 in the context of American arms sales policy. On this occasion, considerations which were patterned on domestically oriented premises and determinants engendered a course of action which could not be reconciled in principle with the basic *modus operandi* of proponents of the 'Special Relationship'.[45]

For example, fearing that the dynamics and pressures of the approaching Presidential campaign might require the provision of a major accommodative measure toward Israel on the very eve of the November 1964 elections—in order to broaden and solidify his infrastructure of support among Jewish voters—President Johnson was reluctant to give away his precious trump card, the promise to provide tanks, at an early stage in his run for re-election. Incapable of knowing at this juncture that his eventual Republican opponent in the Presidential race, Senator Barry Goldwater (from Arizona) would not pose the slightest challenge to his overwhelming popularity among the Jewish proponents of the 'Special Relationship', the President opted to cling to this valuable political resource until the exigencies of the campaign dictated otherwise.[46] The words of Assistant Secretary of Defense Solbert clearly demonstrate that, in the President's thinking, the perceived requirements and needs of his domestic environment clearly outweighed strategic considerations:

> The President, while sympathetic [to Israel's requests for tanks], does not see the need to make a final decision now. He wants to wait until the election is closer, in any case, and feels [that] if we give tanks to the Israelis now, they will be back at us before November for something else.

Consequently:

> …any decision to sell tanks should not be conveyed to the Israelis at least until Prime Minister Eshkol's visit here in June [1964], which would meet the President's point about optimum political timing.[47]

Thus, in early 1964, the complex of domestic considerations (albeit in a revised form) and the cluster of beliefs regarding the nuclear specter of the future (derived from the shadow of the not-too-distant past) became two mutually reinforcing components in the administration's arms sales posture. Determined, for essentially domestic reasons, 'to delay decision on the tank sale for the present,'[48] the President resorted to the strategy of quid pro quo between the Israeli 'missile and nuclear plans' and the tank sale, fully recognizing that—in view of the difficulties experienced during earlier efforts to induce Israel to remove the screen of secrecy surrounding its nuclear project and to agree to fully cooperate with American demands—the accomplishment of such a trade-off or linkage could only be reached after protracted and difficult negotiations.

As the actual battle over the M-48A tank approached, the composition of the forces seeking to consolidate a majority coalition became clearly defined. As was the case in the Hawk episode, the group which was initially categorically opposed to the sale consisted mainly of traditionalist policy-makers. These individuals largely reflected the long-standing views and policy preferences of the Department of State, and particularly of its Middle Eastern experts.

Concerned with the repercussions of the deal on regional stability and 'American relations with the Arabs,' the traditionalists were convinced that the supply of tanks to Israel—which they viewed as unnecessary on purely military grounds in view of Israel's overall qualitative superiority over its Arab adversaries—would result in a 'close military identification with [Israel]'. Such an eventuality, they believed, 'would not only destroy the influence we need to maintain with the Arabs' (thus further aggravating the already emotion-laden, highly-charged American-Egyptian relations), but would 'stimulate closer Arab—Soviet ties' while reducing 'our ability to bring about an eventual peaceful solution to the Arab-Israel dispute.'[49] In the words of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John D.Jernegan, which typify the traditionalist premises and visions that remained essentially intact over the years despite the fact that the American-Egyptian dyad became increasingly fraught with tension and permeated with crisis and controversy:

> We are giving careful consideration to Israel's request for military assistance. Traditionally, however, we have refrained from becoming

> a major supplier of offensive arms to Near Eastern states. Israel has been able to maintain an effective military force through arms acquisitions in Western Europe without economic hardship. We would prefer to avoid political complications to our relations with the Arabs that would result from selling tanks to Israel. Maintenance of our influence with the Arabs is vital to assure successful US support of Israeli interests… Reliance upon US capability and preparedness to protect Israel is the best means to assure Israel's security.[50]

Furthermore, the traditionalists remained extremely skeptical in their assessment of the likelihood that the strategy of quid pro quo would be effective 'in dissuading Israel from proceeding in its missile program.' They still vividly remembered how Israel's initial promises to accept the Johnson Plan, at least in principle, receded into the background and evaporated in the immediate aftermath of the Hawk sale, and were unwilling to take the risks of defection which were inherent in the pursuit of any strategy which was premised upon the notion of reciprocity; they thus remained fully committed to their opposition 'at this time, to approving the sale of tanks to Israel.'[51]

As was the case with proponents of the traditionalist view, Myer Feldman —the most prominent and outspoken representative of the domestically oriented policy-makers—remained irreversibly wedded to the complex of views and recommendations which he had forcefully articulated during the bargaining game which had preceded the Hawk decision. Totally committed to his belief that the unconditional sale of the tanks to Israel should be announced 'as soon as possible' and that—as in the case of the Hawk—this decision should be conveyed by him without delay to 'the leaders of the Jewish community,' Feldman was largely motivated by electoral considerations pertaining to the Jewish vote. These considerations were further reinforced and augmented by his belief in the 'growing preponderance of Arab tank strength.'[52]

Whereas, as in the case of the Hawk, the traditionalists concentrated on the overall balance of power between the protagonists in the Arab—Israeli dispute (and consequently remained unimpressed when a specific asymmetry in a distinct category developed favoring Egypt), Feldman was inclined to decouple the tank issue from the broader military picture. Hence, he recommended the immediate supply of tanks to Israel strictly because of this specific asymmetry in armor, and he significantly downplayed the likely repercussions of the sale on American relations with the Arab world:

> It seems to me that the logic in favor of providing tanks for the Israeli armed forces is inexorable… There is no doubt of the growing preponderance of Arab tank strength. Nor is there any question about the Israeli need for modern tanks if Israel is to be able to meet the military threat posed by Russian tanks in Arab hands… It is said that any announcement indicating American military support for the Israeli Army would disrupt our relationships with the Arab nations. I must confess that I am somewhat skeptical of this argument…and am more inclined to believe that firmness will attract respect [in the Arab world] more than concessions will win their favor… To prevent war, these tanks are needed before the disparity between Egyptian and Israeli equipment becomes too great.[53]

Furthermore, in reiterating his opposition to the linkage or trade-off strategy, Feldman relied upon the same line of argumentation which had proved to be most effective in persuading President Kennedy to approve his strategy of *de facto* non-linkage (or expected reciprocity), arguing vehemently that an insistence on any form of linkage or quid pro quo would infringe upon Israel's rights 'as a sovereign power' to define for itself 'what weapons it needs for its defense.'[54]

Beneath the facade of these strategic considerations, driven by Feldman's belief that the sale of the tanks would increase rather than decrease regional stability by effectively deterring Egypt, Feldman's thinking continued to be dominated by electoral calculations which revolved around the overriding political need to use the sale as a means of consolidating the President's base of support among the proponents of the 'Special Relationship', both within the Jewish community and in the US Congress, in an election year and, in the process, to pre-empt any Republican effort to use the tank issue as a springboard for attacking and embarrassing the administration:

> If the Republicans [in the US Senate] used their…great dissatisfaction with stories they had been hearing about the reluctance of the United States to supply tanks to Israel…it would be dangerous to all Democrats. If [Senator Kenneth] Keating, [Senator Jacob] Javits, [Senator Hugh] Scott or any of the other Republicans make a public statement and we then agree to supply tanks, we would appear to be reacting to their demand—it gives the Republicans too much credit.[55]

Although both President Johnson and his Deputy Special Counsel were motivated in their thinking by an identical cluster of domestic considerations and needs, this preoccupation with electoral calculations led

them to fundamentally different conclusions concerning the optimal timing for providing Israel with an incentive of sufficient magnitude and significance in order to guarantee President Johnson's electoral victory among the proponents of the 'Special Relationship'. The President was reluctant to give away the decisive incentive of the M-48A tank at an early stage of his Presidential campaign for fear that the impact of this move would diminish and subside into the background in subsequent months (forcing him to reinforce it with another incentive on the very eve of the elections). Feldman, however—who was continuously preoccupied with the immediate political needs of the campaign—feared that any such procrastination would adversely affect domestic policies by providing the President's Republican opponents with 'a big stick' for attacking the President's Arab-Israeli policies, thus enabling them to establish an infrastructure of support in traditional Democratic strongholds.[56]

Whereas, in the case of the Hawk, President Kennedy had ultimately decided to grant his support to the coalition which was formed between the pragmatists and the domestically oriented participants in the process, President Johnson's decision in early 1964 to procrastinate over the tank sale effectively sealed the fate of Feldman's efforts to revive his 1962 partnership with the pragmatists in order to modify the President's thinking and short-term preferences. Indeed, in spite of all his time and effort, Feldman soon realized that—faced with an unequivocal Presidential preference—the pragmatists (primarily Komer and Bundy) remained unimpressed with his arguments and advocated strategy; he was thus deprived of the pivotal role he had managed to play in the bargaining which culminated in the Hawk decision.

As in the case of the Hawk, the pragmatists' attitude and preferred policy recommendations in 1964 were shaped and delineated by a variety of concerns, constraints and sensitivities. Although the President's approach to the sale in 1964 was almost exclusively derived from domestic calculations and assessments, for Komer and Bundy the domestic factor comprised only one factor within a far broader and multidimensional set of largely strategic considerations and preferences which reflected the exigencies of the situation rather than any fixed, pre-existing 'background images'.

On the strategic level, the pragmatists were profoundly concerned with the dangers of escalation and deterioration inherent in Israel's 'acquisition of good missiles.' This acquisition, Komer observed on 23 March 1964, 'will trigger Egypt to get good missiles in return' and may even result in an 'Egyptian pre-emptive attack.[57] Against the backdrop of this extremely menacing scenario it was essential to link the tank sale to the missile issue to effectively ensure that Israel did not develop a nuclear capability. Whereas

the traditionalists were completely skeptical about the possibility of achieving such a binding and credible linkage, Komer and Bundy remained hopeful that their advocated strategy of quid pro quo would ultimately succeed in preventing Israel from buying 'surface-to-surface missiles from the French'. An Israeli-French deal could, in view of the fact that 'the Israelis have a nuclear reactor which could make plutonium', lead to 'a wholly new level of escalation in the Middle East arms race.'[58]

These strategic considerations militated against the unconditional sale of the M-48A tank to Israel, and merged with, and were further reinforced by, another set of related strategic-political calculations (to which the pragmatists were acutely sensitive by virtue of their direct link to the White House). These revolved around the pragmatists' growing concern, in the spring of 1964, that the administration might find itself in the unenviable position of having to support Israel on such issues as the potentially explosive Jordan 'Water Crisis' (in which Syria was preparing to divert water assigned to Israel under the Johnson Plan in defiance of the American position[59]). Under such adverse regional circumstances, the pragmatists assumed that the conclusion of 'a big tank sale' with Israel could only exacerbate the already tense and highlycharged American-Arab relations and thus 'simply undermine our relations with the Arabs' while 'thrusting [them] into the hands of Moscow.'[60] Such an eventuality, Komer observed on 28 May 1964, would not only jeopardize American strategic and economic interests in the region, but it could be equally detrimental to Israeli interests:

> If we choose Israel's side so openly that the Arabs form alliances with Moscow, Israel loses just as much as we. Our present policy gives the Arabs an incentive not to swing too far away from the West. This is simple common sense.[61]

Notwithstanding the apparent failure of the recent American effort to use economic incentives as the most appropriate means of channeling and integrating Egypt (as well as other Arab parties) into a framework of moderation, Komer—the chief architect of this accommodative strategy during the Kennedy era—did not altogether abandon his hope that the provision of incentives and 'positive sanctions,' when offered as an integral part of a quid pro quo strategy, could ultimately provide the impetus for restraint and growing stability. Still, he remained opposed to the *unconditional* and direct sale of the M-48A tank to Israel, preferring instead a strategy that would extract from Israel concessions of significant magnitude as a necessary part of the equation while obfuscating the American role in the transaction.

In early 1964, these strategic considerations were augmented by another set of calculations and assessments, which were inextricably related to 'the politics of [the sale].' As in the case of President Johnson, the pragmatists' sensitivity—at this juncture—to the domestic environment did not precipitate a decision in favor of the immediate conclusion of the deal. Contrary to Feldman's fear that the Republican leadership in the US Congress could use the tank issue as a convenient and effective lever or springboard for attacking the administration, Bundy believed that a public debate over the issue would backfire against both the Republicans and the Israelis because it would not remain confined to the delimited and isolated parameters and the intrinsic characteristics of the M-48A tank sale. Instead, Bundy predicted that such a debate was bound to intersect with 'the politics of missiles or the politics of Arab reaction,' thus precipitating 'a very serious backlash against the Israelis.'[62] In other words, by virtue of becoming an integral part of a broader complex of issues related to the dangers to regional and global stability inherent in nuclear proliferation and in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, the tank issue could thus provide the administration with a convenient bridgehead for attacking 'the Israeli missile issue.'[63]

Ultimately, in view of the President's desire to leave the Israeli request to purchase tanks in abeyance for a while, and of the pragmatists' continued refusal to decouple 'the tank issue' from 'Israel's missile issue' and instead to insist on conditions and prerequisites 'that would minimize the risk to us,'[64] Feldman's urgent efforts to revive his 'Hawk scenario' and thus to predicate American arms sales policy upon his preferred notion of non-linkage, were doomed to failure.

Notwithstanding Feldman's claim, in his 11 May 1964 message to the President, that 'he [had] rarely been exposed to as much pressure as I [have] had recently on the question of tanks for Israel,' which originated from 'members of Congress' and 'leaders of the Jewish community,' and that this pressure could only be contained if 'a favorable decision [on the tank issue]' could be made 'as soon as possible,'[65] no change in the recently formulated policy of linkage was in sight. The traditionalists' advocated policy of categorically refusing to sell to Israel the M-48A tank 'either directly or indirectly' for fear that 'it would create bitter Arab resentment against the US'[66] while disrupting the regional balance of power, was also rejected by the President. However, it became increasingly clear in 1964 that, in view of President Johnson's predilection for procrastination and of the pragmatists' insistence on a binding quid pro quo, the process of reaching a decision acceptable to Israel on the specific parameters and conditions of the sale would indeed be long, arduous and tense.

With Feldman's hopes of once again consolidating a majority coalition comprising the pragmatists and the President fading rapidly into the background, it became increasingly evident that the new American arms sales policy which emerged in 1964 was fundamentally incompatible with the notion of *de facto* unilateralism which the Deputy Special Counsel so consistently and vehemently advocated. Indeed, confronted with a powerful coalition comprising the pragmatists and the President, Feldman had to acquiesce (as the traditionalists did in 1962) in a decision which dramatically contradicted his recommended course (as it did the pragmatists' own advocated policy in 1962).

Turning now to the actual dynamics of the bargaining process as it unfolded in 1964 and 1965, it is clear that—in view of the President's unequivocal preferences as articulated in early 1964—this process was extremely constrained, being strictly confined to the question of the appropriate trade-off between the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel and the nature of the concurrent (direct or indirect) Israeli concessions. Within these delimited parameters, three clusters of issues emerged as the most dominant components of any trade-off. One of these clusters (Israel's nuclear facilities and presumed plans) was immensely complex as it was inextricably related to core Israeli security concerns, interests and sensitivities. The growing American suspicion that 'Israel's covert program was aimed at a nuclear capability' and that the acquisition of missiles and technology from France could enable it 'to put nuclear warheads on their missiles'[67] further aggravated the already tense, highlycharged American-Israeli bargaining.

The two remaining sets of issues which intermittently preoccupied American and Israeli negotiators in 1964 and early 1965, were whether the administration should directly—or through intermediaries—upply the M-48A tank to Israel; and the specific form of linkage between the tank sale and Jordan's request for American arms. While the 'nuclear linkage' was by far the thorniest obstacle along the bargaining road, the 'German connection' in the tank sale, although a temporary one, also proved to be exceedingly convoluted and cumbersome. This involved a plethora of operational, technical and diplomatic complications and difficulties, which were precipitated by an attempt to use the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as the intermediary in the transaction.[68]

The first indication that the decision-making process concerning the M-48A tank sale would indeed be long and arduous came in the request, made on 23 December 1963 by the American Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, in the course of his meeting with Prime Minister Eshkol. As the ambassador pointed out, in view of the possibility that 'the impression that Israel might be developing a [nuclear] weapon may provoke

Nasser' (or precipitate a highly dangerous nuclear arms race in the region), it was essential for the administration 'to reassure Nasser that the Dimona reactor's purpose was peaceful.'[69]

Although this request was closely patterned on earlier and abortive American efforts made during the Kennedy era to obtain Israel's approval for this 'reassuring move,' in early 1964 it became clear that this continued American desire 'to reassure Nasser that our recent inspection of Israel's Dimona reactor shows [that] Israel is not going nuclear'[70] no longer comprised merely a non-binding request to the Eshkol Government, but had become an explicit precondition for the tank sale. As Komer's 18 February 1964 memorandum to President Johnson clearly indicates, the question which now preoccupied the pragmatists was not whether to link the tank sale to any component of the Dimona project, but 'how far to link the tanks to our concerns over Israel's move toward a missile (and perhaps a nuclear) capability.'[71]

Ultimately, believing that 'reassuring Nasser on the matter of Dimona was a vital aspect of the US strategy to retain its influence with the Arabs' (in view of the mounting reports that Israel 'was building up a sophisticated missile capability'[72]), Komer and Bundy—with the backing of the President—moved to directly and explicitly link this 'reassurance request' to the tank sale in a way that *de facto* made the sale contingent upon a prior Israeli compliance with this request. Fearing that Israel's 'apparent desire to keep the Arabs guessing [about Dimona] is highly dangerous and…might spark Nasser into a foolish pre-emptive move'[73] or inspire him 'to get exotic weapons…and better missiles from the USSR,'[74] the pragmatists became increasingly predisposed to consider the desired Israeli reassurance to Egypt as a major confidence-building and stabilizing measure, both within the American-Israeli framework and the Israeli-Egyptian dyad. They surmised that this reassuring measure would be capable of allaying with one stroke the growing fear that, behind the screen of secrecy, Israel was 'at least putting itself in a position to go nuclear.'[75]

Notwithstanding this growing American determination to pursue 'the reassuring strategy' of linkage, the initial Israeli reaction to this request, which was based on its policy of 'nuclear ambiguity,' was defiant. Prime Minister Eshkol insisted that this posture of maintaining a margin of ambiguity and 'uncertainty regarding Israel's deterrent capacity' was bound to deter and restrain President Nasser by making him 'apprehensive…as to Israel's military capabilities.'[76] On numerous occasions in the spring of 1964, the Prime Minister reiterated his opposition to any such unilateral Israeli move or gesture, maintaining that 'it is good for Nasser to worry about Israel's military capabilities.'[77]

Oblivious to President Johnson's repeated assertion—articulated most forcefully in his personal message of 19 March 1964—that 'we are far from confident that apprehension as to Israel's atomic potential will…help deter Nasser from attacking Israel,' and that 'quite the contrary, we believe that Nasser's fear of a developing Israeli nuclear power may drive him to a choice between accelerating the Egyptian military build-up or a desperate pre-emptive attack,'[78] the Israeli Prime Minister remained—at least temporarily—committed to his posture of 'keeping Nasser in the dark.'[79] He therefore insisted that 'to prevent war, Nasser must be deterred, not reassured' and that, accordingly, the tank deal should be separated completely from any other security matter or framework.[80]

Not until Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to Washington, in early June 1964, was this recalcitrant approach finally abandoned. The Prime Minister was initially unresponsive to the President's request, made in the course of their first meeting, which took place on 1 June 1964, that Israel 'let us reassure Nasser about Dimona' as a means of 'keeping Egypt from getting into nuclear production.'[81] He said that he could not 'agree that Nasser should be told the real situation in Dimona because Nasser is an enemy… and is committed to the destruction of Israel.'[82] However, he decided, on the following day, to shift course and to acquiesce in the American pressure in view of the President's 'overall friendly attitude toward Israel,'[83] and to modify his position by permitting Washington 'to reassure Nasser on Dimona,'[84] in the hope that this concession would result in a reciprocal American move in the form of the immediate conclusion of the desired tank deal.

The Prime Minister's decision to accept the American request 'to reassure Nasser on Dimona' was part of a calculated trade-off intended to make it easier for him to reject a second, and considerably more problematic request —namely, that Israel 'accept IAEA [the International Atomic Energy Agency] controls' for its Dimona nuclear reactor and thus provide definitive proof that—by making its nuclear reactor fully accessible to periodic and intrusive IAEA inspections—it was 'not going to get into nuclear production.'[85] However, the mounting Israeli hopes and expectations that, by assenting to the 'reassuring request' (while rejecting the request to accept IAEA controls for Dimona), a window of opportunity would be opened for Israeli diplomacy to finalize the tank deal in the immediate aftermath of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit, failed to materialize. Nor did the issue of IAEA controls subside into the background without leaving a trace during the months which followed the June 1964 visit. The road toward the conclusion of the tank deal was still long and rocky, with the question of

IAEA controls ultimately becoming a major stumbling block in the final hurdle of the bargaining process.

However, before the bargaining could reach its final phase, the parties had to overcome another major obstacle, which was inherent in the pragmatists' desire to conceal the American role in the tank deal. Although the pragmatists (and the President) recognized 'that Israel's armor needs gradual modernization to keep a dangerous imbalance from developing,'[86] they were determined to meet these needs 'without exposing American diplomacy to unacceptable political risks.'[87]

Seeking to maintain 'an appearance of balance between Israel and the Arabs' that would 'give us leverage with the Arabs,'[88] Komer was convinced that the only course for 'preserving Israel's security' without 'undermining our relations with the Arabs'[89] (as a result of both a direct tank sale and the backing of Israel in the Jordan 'Water Crisis') was to avoid 'a direct sale of tanks' to Israel:[90]

> I do not believe that the US can afford a direct sale of tanks [to Israel]. Nonetheless we are as interested as ever in seeing Israeli deterrent capabilities maintained… We believe, based on recent inquiries, that [Israel] can buy enough modern tanks to meet its needs—in quantities, on terms, and with delivery schedules comparable to the best we could do ourselves—from the UK and possibly West Germany [the Federal Republic of Germany]… We promise US *help* in paving the way. *The one absolute imperative is to avoid publicity*… If the finger is pointed at London or Bonn, it would be politically impossible for them to fill such a large order.[91]

Contrary to the initial opposition of most traditionalists to the sale of American tanks to Israel (whether directly or through intermediaries), the pragmatists were prepared, in the summer of 1964, to 'help Israel in every way possible to get a sufficient quantity of tanks elsewhere.'[92] Ultimately, when the 'third party option' for supplying the M-48A tank collapsed in early 1965, Komer and Bundy quickly adjusted their thinking to the new circumstances and began to advocate the direct and undisguised sale of tanks to Israel on condition that (unlike the Hawk sale) it would be incorporated into a trade-off involving genuine Israeli concessions on core security matters.

Although 'a German deal'[93] was only one among several options which the administration explored, the Israeli insistence that 'only M-48As from West Germany [the Federal Republic of Germany] will do'[94] led the

administration to focus exclusively on the German option. In seeking to purchase the M-48A tank, Israel was particularly impressed with its relatively low price as well as with the fact that this tank was capable of operating twice as long without refueling in comparison with the Centurion tank.[95] Prime Minister Eshkol made an urgent plea to President Johnson 'not to push us into the Centurions' as a substitute for the M-48A tank but, instead, to impress upon the German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, 'the historical German obligation to help Israel [by selling it the M-48A tank].'[96] The President ultimately managed, in July 1964, to persuade the reluctant chancellor to give his approval for a triangular arrangement whereby the Pentagon would provide the FRG with new and advanced M-48A(3) tanks in return for the delivery by the FRG (via Italy) of 150 older M-48A(1) tanks from its own inventory to Israel.[97] Shortly thereafter, despite strong resistance from Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, the FRG ratified the decision and agreed to sell the Eshkol Government 150 M-48A(1) tanks.[98]

In the immediate aftermath of the Johnson-Erhard agreement the Israelis repeatedly expressed the hope that the tank issue—which had clouded American-Israeli relations for more than a year—would at long last fade into the background with the rapid and uninterrupted implementation of the agreement. This failed to happen. Indeed, in February 1965, it became clear that the 'German connection' was nothing more than a passing, inconsequential episode in a long and tortuous saga and, as such, could not provide the impetus for comprehensively resolving the matter. Indeed, the fear of both American and German decision-makers throughout the summer and fall of 1964, that 'the supply of US-made tanks to Israel' would become 'public knowledge' and thus cause 'severe political damage' to American and German interests in the region by virtue of 'projecting an image of close military association' within the American-German-Israeli triad,[99] ultimately became a reality in early 1965. Although the German press began to publish reports about 'the growing military ties' between Bonn and Jerusalem as early as late October 1964,[100] the initial reports and articles were of a general and opaque nature and did not disclose the specific terms and parameters of the M-48A tank sale. However, ten weeks later the picture changed dramatically with the beginning of a spate of specific leaks in both the German press and the American media, which continued uninterruptedly for a month and which reconstructed with precision the intricate negotiations behind the M-48A tank sales.[101]

In the wake of these disclosures, several Arab states launched a harsh political campaign against the Erhard Government, threatening to suspend diplomatic relations with the FRG and to recognize its East German adversary unless the tank deal was cancelled. In late January 1965, Egypt

even invited Bonn's nemesis, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht, for an official visit to Cairo (which was scheduled for late February 1965).[102]

Faced with these adverse and highly threatening developments, Chancellor Erhard—whose attitude toward the deal was skeptical from its inception—decided, on 12 February 1965, to suspend the implementation of the deal and to offer Israel financial compensation. Of the 150 M-48A (1) tanks which had been promised to Israel via the German back door, 110 remained undelivered when the deal was suspended. A lastditch American effort to persuade Chancellor Erhard to reconsider his decision was unsuccessful. The Chancellor was determined, explained his special representative to Washington, Kurt Birrenbach, 'to hold his ground as the last Western state with much political capital in the Arab world.'[103]

The abrupt ending of the German involvement in the tank sale by no means guaranteed that the Johnson Administration would now agree to unconditionally transfer the remaining 110 undelivered M-48A tanks directly to Israel. Instead, it became increasingly clear, in the wake of the collapse of the German option, that Washington had not abandoned its vision of the M-48A tank as an incentive in a new framework of trade-offs, which required Israel to pay an additional price both *vis-à-vis* Jordan and the nuclear sphere. Thus, although it had already paid for the indirect sale by permitting Washington to 'reassure President Nasser on Dimona,' the Eshkol Government found itself in the wake of the German debacle involved in a new bargaining game involving largely (albeit not exclusively) the same issues. It was a game whose structure and rules required additional concessions in order to obtain the remaining undelivered tanks (as well as 100 additional M-48A tanks) directly from the US.

In other words, not only did the supply of arms to Israel become, due to the lessons drawn from the sale of the Hawk, an inseparable part of an intricate trade-off involving prior or concurrent Israeli concessions—and could no longer be *de facto* decoupled from other developments or dimensions in Israel's domestic or external strategic environment—but the actual dynamics of the process forced Israel into expanding its contribution to the exchange when a new bargaining game over the terms of the sale of arms to Israel and Jordan started to unfold.

Although the Jordanian request for arms from the Johnson Administration was initially dealt with by such traditionalist policy-makers as Secretary Rusk on its intrinsic merits and without any linkage to the 1964 commitment to supply the M-48 A tank to Israel via the FRG, it was later incorporated into the equation as an essential component in a new quid pro quo following Bonn's decision to close this route before completing the transaction. Also, while the bargaining agenda that ultimately emerged

included an expanded and enlarged reward for Israel, it was still predicated upon the vision of the M-48A tank as a commodity to be traded once again for new Israeli concessions.[104]

The issue of the sale of American arms (including 20 F-104G interceptors) to Jordan, which later intersected with the unresolved issue of the supply of the remaining 110 M-48A tanks to Israel, was raised for the first time during the Johnson Presidency on 15 April 1964, in the course of King Hussein's official visit to Washington.[105] Although the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was traditionally committed to a proWestern foreign policy, in the spring of 1964—under pressure from President Nasser (the King's nemesis in the not-too-distant past) to turn to the East for military assistance—the King opted for an ambiguous policy concerning the future direction of Jordan's arms procurement (and possibly defense) policy by threatening to 'start shopping in Moscow for military hardware' if he could not acquire arms from the Johnson Administration.[106] As the memorandum of his 15 April 1964 meeting with Secretary McNamara reveals, King Hussein:

> asked whether the secretary was prepared to sell arms to Jordan… He mentioned that there were enticements—financial and ideological—to tie to the Soviets. He stated, for example, that the Soviets offer MIG-21 [interceptors] at two-thirds price. He hopes that the US looks at both sides of the problem and does nothing to make it difficult for the US's friends to continue the course they want to continue, as friends of the US.[107]

It is highly doubtful whether the King's thinly veiled threat to shift allegiances and to readjust Jordan's deeply ingrained, long-standing proWestern orientation in accordance with the preferences and interests of President Nasser (who—in collaboration with Jordanian and Palestinian nationalists—repeatedly attempted to topple the Hashemite Kingdom[108]) amounted to more than a tactical maneuver, designed to extract from the Johnson Administration the requested weapons systems, and particularly the highly-desired F-104G interceptors. Still, most traditionalists in the Department of State were acutely alarmed by the prospect—which they considered as real and imminent—that 'Soviet equipment will be delivered [to Jordan] either through Egypt or directly from the Soviet Union.'[109] The words of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, Thomas L.Hughes, clearly highlight the traditionalists' pervasive perception of the likely repercussions of a Soviet-Jordanian arms deal within the Jordanian—Israeli dyad:

> The delivery of twenty MIG-21s to Jordan would be regarded by Israel with considerable concern as a drastic change in Jordan's military procurement that could also have political repercussions internally in Jordan… They would be fearful that Nasser's influence in Jordan would expand…and would probably feel that this would not only pose a danger to King Hussein's regime but would also be followed by an extension via Jordan of the Egyptian military threat to Israel.
>
> The introduction into Jordan of Soviet-built aircraft, even though they were to be channeled through Egypt, would raise for the Israelis the specter of future arms deals with Jordan such as those that the Soviet Union has concluded with Iraq, Syria and Egypt. This, the Israelis might fear, would extend copious supplies of Soviet arms to Jordan, the Arab neighbor that has the largest and most difficult border for Israel to defend.[110]

This overriding concern about the highly-menacing 'prospect of Soviet aircraft in Jordan'[111] (which could bring the administration into a growing identification with, and support of, Israel due to the increasing threat to its security) was shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who viewed an American refusal 'to sell supersonic aircraft to Jordan' as highly detrimental to its strategic interests. 'The most significant implication inherent in the refusal…appears to be the potential loss of the restraining influence which the United States can exert on Jordan,' observed the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General David A.Burchinal, in his memorandum of 30 July 1964 to Secretary McNamara.[112]

Against this backdrop of the perceived threat to core 'US interests'[113] and regional stability—a threat which was inherent in the provision of Soviet arms to Jordan (directly or though Egypt)—most participants in the shaping of American arms sales policy in the Middle East shared the view that the Jordanian request 'should not be met with a flat refusal'[114] and that the administration was, therefore, required 'to assist Jordan in the formulation of long-range plans for equipping and modernizing Jordan's ground forces within its capacity to operate, maintain, and support.'[115] The President endorsed this view; but Feldman consistently opposed the sale. Thus, although President Johnson was not continuously or intensively involved in all facets of American diplomacy in the Middle East, he held strong views concerning the need to provide arms to Jordan, insisting that a failure to do so 'would lead to disastrous results' and that 'if the United States did not sell arms to Jordan, it would not sell arms to Israel.'[116] Furthermore, both

the pragmatists and the traditionalists were convinced that the provision of American weaponry to the Hashemite Kingdom was bound to be 'a controlled operation,' with the administration regulating 'the quantities, types, spares and replacements' of the systems supplied so that they 'pose far less danger to Israel than a much larger batch from the Soviets.'[117]

There remained, of course, the question of the specific types of weapons to be supplied, their 'delivery schedule and other details,'[118] as well as the likely ramifications of the transaction on American-Israeli relations (particularly as regards Israel's security predicament).

As we shall soon see, these issues came to increasingly preoccupy the administration in late 1964 and early 1965, with the ultimate result being the emergence of a new form of linkage between the American-Jordanian and the American-Israeli policy frameworks. It is to the analysis of the new bargaining process, which culminated in the formation of this linkage and which incorporated, once again, a nuclear dimension, that we now turn.

Although both the pragmatists and the traditionalists were united in seeking to pre-empt and thus abort a Soviet or an Egyptian arms deal with Jordan, which could lead to 'the defection of the Hashemite Kingdom' from the Western sphere of influence,[119] they disagreed with one another on the question of whether Israel should be compensated for such steps (supported in principle by both the pragmatists and the traditionalists), such as American 'assistance in the formulation of plans for equipping and modernizing Jordan's ground forces within its capability to operate, maintain, and support.'[120]

Pragmatists such as Komer and Bundy were acutely sensitive to both the regional strategic context and to the American domestic setting, while recognizing the need to prevent a Jordanian shift toward the Eastern bloc. They were also, from the outset of the 'Jordanian Crisis,' predisposed to approach the issue in terms of an inevitable trade-off between the supply of American tanks to Jordan and a simultaneous compensation to Israel (which would enable the administration, with one stroke, to supply the remaining 'German tanks' to Israel).

Believing that compensation of this sort was crucial in order to reassure the Jewish and Congressional proponents of the 'Special Relationship' (particularly during the period preceding the Presidential elections of November 1964), the pragmatists therefore sought to neutralize or disarm 'Israel's greatest leverage' by agreeing in advance to a quid pro quo with Israel (while seeking initially to exclude planes from the American-Jordanian deal).[121] The fact that the arms in question were sought by King Hussein for the purpose 'of backing the Arab scheme to divert Jordan headwaters'[122] (to which the administration was firmly opposed), further reinforced this

domestic need to compensate Israel for each category of weapons which the administration agreed to sell to Amman (including planes at a later phase if necessary).

Thus, whereas the traditionalists were largely opposed (albeit with an ever-diminishing determination) to 'the direct supply of offensive US arms to Israel' regardless of the circumstances, believing that such a move 'might force those Arab states now drawing on Western arms to turn to the Soviet Union,'[123] the pragmatists—while sharing the traditionalists' view that 'some positive response to Jordan's request is necessary'[124]— reached the conclusion that the sale of arms to Jordan could not, and should not, be decoupled from a concurrent move *vis-à-vis* Israel. Therefore, they argued that an effort to approach the Jordanian theater without linking it to the Israeli part of the equation was bound to provoke strong 'Congressional reactions'[125] and an 'acute… US Zionist pressure *to sell arms directly to Israel too*.'[126] Instead of eventually acquiescing to these pressures (under circumstances which would reduce the administration's margin of maneuverability *vis-à-vis* Israel) it was preferable—according to this pragmatist logic—to recognize from the beginning that 'sooner or later' the administration would be 'required to sell arms to Israel' as a result of domestic pressures from proponents of the 'Special Relationship' and strategic considerations and developments such as 'the growing Soviet arms sales to the Arabs, which will slowly tilt the balance against Israel.'[127]

Hence, it was essential for American diplomacy—according to this line of argumentation—to take the initiative by setting its own terms and conditions for the direct sale of arms to Israel before it was compelled to do so under adverse circumstances and with but a limited latitude of choice and influence.[128] In the words of Robert Komer:

> Since this basic policy reversal on our part (from avoiding sales to making them) is probably inevitable, there is a case for making it now! The Arabs may react violently, but they will also react violently when we have to back Israel in a Jordan waters crisis. *And Arab knowledge that they could not win an arms race against Israel* should contribute over the long run to a dampening down of the Arab-Israeli dispute.[129]

Thus, motivated by a cluster of strategic considerations based on the need to maintain an adequate 'deterrent balance between Israel and its neighbors' [130] to eliminate the prospect of a pre-emptive Israeli strike, further reinforced by a complex of domestic calculations, the pragmatists were now prepared—in early 1965—to break away from the traditional caveats and tenets of the American arms sales posture. They hoped that this

would enable the administration to define the parameters of its desired trade-off from a position of strength not only between the sale of arms to Jordan and to Israel, but also between the sale of arms to Israel and the nature of compensation from Israel. The pragmatists now expected to extract additional concessions from Israel in exchange for the compensation it was about to receive in the form of the M-48A tanks because of the suspension of the German deal and the decision to supply arms to Jordan.

Contrary to the traditionalists' initial opposition to the direct sale of arms to Israel as long as no 'disproportionate build-up of arms' developed on the Arab side[131] and to Feldman's categorical opposition to the very idea of supplying arms to Jordan,[132] the pragmatists' recommended approach was considerably more nuanced, being predicated upon the premises of reciprocity and balance between conflicting or competing objectives and interests. The traditionalists supported the supply of American arms to Jordan as a necessary means of preventing and preempting a Soviet-Jordanian (or an Egyptian-Jordanian) arms deal but were concerned with the highly-menacing prospect of 'a rising spiral of military capability between Israel and the Arab world'[133] (which they believed was inherent in the Jordanian request and 'sooner or later' and was bound to 'result in an explosion [between Israel and its protagonists]'[134]). The pragmatists, however, were much more complacent in addressing this 'Jordanian predicament.'

Unlike the traditionalists, the pragmatists believed that the King's initiative could provide the Johnson Administration with the needed impetus for modifying its traditional arms sales course, and that the new policy of selling arms to Israel would ultimately culminate in a quid pro quo incorporating valuable Israeli concessions on the issues of 'nuclear non-proliferation and the acceptance [by Israel] of IAEA controls.'[135] Indeed, convinced that 'the US policy of avoiding direct arms sales [to Israel] was out of date,' Komer approached the last round of bargaining, as one of the administration's emissaries to Israel, fully and irreconcilably wedded to the view that 'we must become direct arms suppliers to Israel' and that the adoption of this course could become the lever for obtaining 'in return, certain undertakings [from Israel].'[136] As Komer further elaborated:

> We were being pushed in this direction anyway… It was a fact of life that we were going to have to change our policy… We needed their active support if we were to get away with the Jordan arms sale—the only way to get this was to tell them we would sell to them too. So why not bite the bullet?[137]

The beginning of the final phase of the American-Israeli bargaining over the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel (and over the sale of American arms to Jordan) further underscored the pre-existing differences—in terms of the policies advocated—between the main groups involved in the process. The traditionalists initially sought to decouple the sale of arms to the Hashemite Kingdom (which they fully supported) from any reciprocal move toward Israel and were, therefore, predisposed to view any such reciprocal measure as a last resort, to be contemplated only if there was conclusive proof that the military balance of capabilities between Israel and its neighbors had indeed been significantly disrupted (and that Israel was unable to replenish 'its military needs elsewhere'[138]). However, pragmatists such as Komer and Bundy taking part in the intragovernmental and intergovernmental bargaining, looked upon the supply of arms to Israel as an integral, inseparable part of the decision to supply arms to Jordan.

During the final sequence of the bargaining, which culminated in the Hawk decision of August 1962, the pragmatists and the domestically oriented members of the Kennedy foreign policy elite had managed to form a majority coalition by winning the support of President Kennedy for their advocated strategy of expected reciprocity (thus isolating and outmaneuvering the remaining pockets of traditionalist opposition). The situation in 1965 was fundamentally different, with Deputy Special Counsel Feldman—the tireless and quintessential representative and spokesman of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm—finding himself increasingly isolated and deprived of the influence he had been able to exert when the bargaining over the Hawk missile reached its final stage. Whereas in 1962 he had been sent to Israel to convey to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion the specific terms of the Hawk deal—he was now excluded from the final phase of the negotiations with Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Meir (after some hesitation, President Johnson decided against his dispatch to Israel as one of the emissaries for the final round of negotiations with the Israeli leadership[139]). The fact that these negotiations took place shortly before his resignation from the Johnson Administration came into effect drastically diminished his power, influence and margin of maneuverability in this intragovernmental bargaining game. Relegated to the margins of the process, Feldman was unable to prevent the traditionalists and the pragmatists (his allies in the not too distant past) from forging a winning coalition, which was predicated upon the premises of the strategy of quid pro quo between the American-Jordanian and the American-Israeli frameworks.

Both Feldman and the traditionalists initially supported the strategy of non-linkage between these dyads. Notwithstanding the vast differences in

terms of their respective visions of both the regional balance of power and the derivative policy recommendations concerning the sale of arms to the disputants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, both Feldman and the traditionalists originally believed that the Israeli context and the Jordanian setting should be dealt with separately and without linking them to one another. Feldman thus fully and enthusiastically supported the sale to Israel of the M-48A tank on its own intrinsic merits and without linking it to either the supply of similar tanks or any other advanced weaponry to Jordan or to Israeli concessions in the nuclear field (or in the conventional context of its desired behavior in the 'Water Crisis' with the Arab League and Syria[140]). Not only did he continuously attempt to decouple these issues from one another, but the Deputy Special Counsel remained—until his departure from the administration—highly skeptical as to whether 'an offer [to sell arms to Jordan]' should be made by President Johnson.[141] Even when he finally realized that the sale of American arms to Jordan was inevitable, Feldman still endeavored to differentiate between the two frameworks by insisting that the scope of the planned American—Jordanian deal should be considerably smaller than the American-Israeli sale and that 'an American offer to sell the M-48 [tank to Jordan]' should 'be very modest.'[142] Similarly, the traditionalists initially opposed any direct and immediate linkage between the two transactions and repeatedly 'expressed reservations' in addressing this strategy.[143] Seeking to procrastinate on any decision concerning the sale of arms to Israel in the wake of a Jordanian deal (which they wholeheartedly supported), they preferred to 'consider making selective and direct sales [to Israel]' only if there should develop any 'disproportionate build-up of arms on the Arab side.'[144]

Ultimately, however, it was the traditionalists' decision to abandon their preferred non-linkage strategy (which they explained as 'exceptional'[145]) as a means of ensuring the sale of American arms to Jordan (while extracting from Israel additional concessions in return for the supply of the M-48A tank), which practically settled the intragovernmental debate on the issue and laid the groundwork for the American-Israeli agreement, of 10 March 1965, on the terms and provisions of the sale of the M-48A tank.

Unlike the case of the Hawk—in which the traditionalists remained adamantly opposed throughout the decision-making process to any policy option that entailed or required the abandonment of the traditional American arms sales posture, and in which they were ultimately outmaneuvered by the combined forces of the pragmatists and the domestically oriented members of the Kennedy Administration—in the case of the M-48A tank sale, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and his entourage ultimately adopted a more pragmatic and dynamic position, which was

sensitive to domestic considerations and not only to strategicregional calculations. Their apparent willingness to deviate, in principle, from the traditional parameters of the American arms sales posture was linked to several specific Israeli commitments and reciprocal moves (including its acquiescence in the American-Jordanian deal).

It was this willingness—based on the traditionalists' realization that any effort to decouple the sale of arms to Jordan from Israel's security predicament would be 'bitterly resented by Congress and the American people'[146] and thus adversely affect 'US Middle East policies'[147]—which paved the way toward the resolution of both bargaining games: the one between the pragmatists, the traditionalists and the domestically oriented players; and that between the Johnson Administration and the Eshkol Government. The official arms sales policy that ultimately emerged at the end of the protracted intragovernmental and intergovernmental bargaining was closely patterned on the notions of reciprocity, linkage and compensation.

The bargaining games over the shaping of the American arms sales posture, which were played with so much intensity in Washington and Tel Aviv in February and early March 1965, were largely confined to the question of the specific trade-offs between the Jordanian and Israeli frameworks and between the sale of weaponry to Israel and Prime Minister Eshkol's reciprocal moves. After reaching an early understanding that, in view of the overriding political need 'to justify [the sale of arms] to Jordan in a way that would satisfy domestic critics,'[148] the administration had now to accompany an arms transaction to Jordan with a decision 'to sell arms to Israel as well…as the only way to buy off the Israelis and protect [the President's] domestic flank,'[149] the pragmatists and the traditionalists concentrated—in both their subsequent intragovernmental bargaining and in their negotiations with the Israeli Government—on Israel's role in this equation; that is, on the additional price to be extracted from Prime Minister Eshkol in return for the direct supply of American arms.

As Feldman's view that the Jordanian request for arms should be rejected by the administration became outdated and irrelevant, the pragmatists emerged as the dominant faction in this bureaucratic game, convincing both the President and the traditionalists that their advocated linkage strategy was 'a fact of life,'[150] which was 'far less costly' to American interests than more comprehensive and far-reaching forms of compensation to Israel such as 'a flat US security guarantee and joint [American-Israeli] planning, which would spook the Arabs even more.'[151] Paradoxically, then, in the thinking of the pragmatists, the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel was a means of ensuring that no formal alliance would be consolidated in the

American-Israeli sphere. In other words, it was perceived as the substitute, rather than a precipitant, for a formal patron-client association.

Against the backdrop of this intragovernmental agreement concerning the strategic parameters of the bargaining with Israel, the emphasis—in both Washington and Tel Aviv—shifted to the level of the actual components of the deal: that is, to the specific configuration and components of the trade-off, in the hope that the final shape of the deal would indeed satisfy American public opinion without threatening core American interests in the Middle East. The President sent three officials to the Middle East in early February 1965. The mission of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Phillips Talbot, who arrived in Amman on 7 February 1965, was to negotiate the terms of the sale to Jordan of the basic M-48A tank. However, the mission of the administration's emissaries to Israel was considerably more complex: that is, to finalize the sale of the M-48A tank as an integral part of a package involving Israeli commitments to Washington in return for the weapons procured. To accomplish this mission, two experienced officials were chosen: Robert Komer of the NSC, whom President Johnson considered as 'pretty knowledgeable, tough and loyal as far as the American interest is concerned';[152] and Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell W.Harriman, who was picked by the President for the mission by virtue of his close ties with the New York Jewish community, originating during his tenure as the Democratic Governor of New York, and not by virtue of his being an experienced member of Washington's foreign policy establishment.

Seeking to strike a balance between the national interest and the 'Special Relationship', President Johnson dispatched two negotiators to Tel Aviv on two consecutive trips in February 1965: one negotiator who 'has got the national interest first' (namely, the pragmatist Komer); and the second—Under-Secretary Harriman—who 'has a lot of vested capital with the New York Jewish community' and 'more stature [than Feldman] from the Jewish standpoint.'[153] This reflected at least some of the characteristics of the domestically oriented *modus operandi* (albeit without its opposition to trade-offs and linkages) rather than the essence of the traditionalist approach. It was this renewed partnership between the pragmatist Komer and the domestically oriented Harriman (reminiscent, in no small measure, of the Komer-Feldman relationship two and a half years earlier), which played a major role in laying the groundwork, or infrastructure, of the M-48A tank deal.

However, despite this Presidential awareness of the need to incorporate divergent perspectives and paradigms into the process and, specifically, to protect not only American strategic interests in the region but his domestic

base of support, it became increasingly clear as the bargaining progressed that the occasional differences which emerged between the respective views and recommendations of Komer and Harriman were largely minor and insignificant. Komer, however, proved to be the more dominant negotiator in comparison to Harriman, who left Israel on 1 March 1965, ten days before the discussions with the Israeli leadership were successfully completed.

Komer's view—comprehensively articulated on the eve of his first mission to Israel—was that 'it was a fact of life that we were going to have to change our [arms sales] policy.' [154]This was further reinforced following his meetings with Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Meir. Faced with the repeated and strong Israeli claim that 'any increase in Jordanian capabilities, plus Israel's loss of further German arms, created an even greater…requirement for an added Israeli deterrent strength'[155] and that, consequently, the Israeli Government 'simply cannot go along with US sales to Jordan, much less quietly support them, *unless certain other measures are taken to enhance* [*Israel's*] *security position*,'[156] Komer's pre-existing conviction that 'Israel can be brought to accept, and even to support quietly, limited arms aid to Jordan if we are prepared to do and say those things which would reinforce the deterrent balance,'[157] was further reaffirmed as a result of his encounter with the Israeli leadership.

Acutely sensitive now, in the wake of this encounter, to the dangers of 'general deterioration' and escalation along the Israeli-Jordanian front, which were inherent in the 'sale of arms to Jordan without at least doing the same for Israel,'[158] Komer became increasingly outspoken, in the immediate aftermath of his first mission to Israel, in recommending to the President his pre-conceived strategy of quid pro quo. Komer was particularly impressed by the mood of desperation which informed the thinking of Prime Minister Eshkol and his foreign policy and defense entourage due to the recent 'deterioration' in Israel's security position and the acutely menacing 'prospect of even a modest increase in the strength of one…of [Israel's] adjacent countries.' As a result, he predicated his support for the supply of the M-48A tank to Israel upon a complex of strategic considerations related to regional stability, to which he was directly and forcefully exposed in the course of his February 1965 trips to Israel.[159] These considerations were further augmented by Harriman's continued preoccupation with domestic politics, which led this domestically oriented Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs to join Komer in supporting the M-48A sale, albeit not as a unilateral act as Feldman had continuously recommended, but as part of a package necessitating Israeli concessions.

Indeed, Komer was profoundly alarmed by the spate of the 'veiled and not veiled [Israeli] references to the need for pre-emption' due to the Israeli perception of 'a gathering storm' across the Jordan being the inevitable outcome of an American—Jordanian arms deal.[160] He was therefore uninhibited and immovable in insisting that 'the direct US supply of arms to Israel'[161] was the only way (as part of a broader trade-off) to defuse and mitigate the 'pre-emptive' tendency 'which is building in Israel,' and which 'will become an increasing risk [to regional stability] so long as the Israelis see no other way out of their dilemma.'[162] Seeking to allay the 'acute Israeli worry over the general deterioration of [its] security position,' which has recently engendered 'a pre-emptive psychology,'[163] Komer's prescription, or suggested panacea, remained simple and unequivocal, namely, the provision to Israel of 'compensatory actions' in the form of 'direct arms supplies' (for which the administration could extract an additional price[164]).

Thus, although this 'linkage medicine' had already been prescribed by Komer during the period immediately preceding his twofold mission to Israel, his direct exposure to the atmosphere of desperation, defiance and recalcitrance—which informed the thinking of the Israeli Government as soon as it recognized the possibility that the impending American-Jordanian arms deal would not automatically entail specific and concurrent compensatory measures toward Israel—further 'reinforced [his] conviction'[165] that 'controlled US arms sales to Jordan'[166] should be accompanied by a reciprocal and concurrent move toward Israel. As Komer further elaborated in his message of 28 February 1965 to the President:

> Frankly, I believe we must give the Israelis some hope on the hardware if we want a deal in time to give Hussein his answer. The minimum needed is a promise to consider favorably Israel's tank and plane requests, subject of course to later agreement on type, number, price, delivery schedules and timing of each step in each specific case.[167]

Faced with these strong and unequivocal recommendations, the traditionalists in Washington—who had already acquiesced in the pragmatists' insistence upon a direct linkage between the American-Jordanian dyad and the American-Israeli dyad prior to Komer's and Harriman's mission to Israel—were now determined to make the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel contingent upon a number of preconditions. The most important precondition was the acceptance by Israel of 'full IAEA safeguards' on all its nuclear facilities as well as its assurance to the US that it 'would not develop a nuclear weapons capability.'[168]

Although the idea of integrating the sale of arms to Israel into 'a package,' involving 'certain firm undertakings from the Israeli Government,'[169] originated in the pragmatists' thinking long before the mission of Komer and Harriman was even contemplated—and thus quintessentially reflected the essence of their bargaining approach and unabated advocacy of the concepts of linkage and reciprocity—it became increasingly clear to the two American emissaries that the question of the specific terms and the nature of the desired linkage could not be easily resolved or side-stepped. And while the issue of the Israeli acceptance of IAEA controls and safeguards—which had emerged in late February 1965 as the thorniest element in this package—had already surfaced on several earlier occasions, it was now incorporated into the equation as a major precondition for obtaining the M-48A tank. According to the President's instructions, of 21 February 1965, to Komer and Harriman, 'we wish a firm written reiteration of Israel's intentions not to develop nuclear weapons, and that Israel clarify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities.'[170]

Although the issue of IAEA controls and safeguards was only one component incorporated into a broader complex of promises, commitments and undertakings which the Israeli Government was 'expected' to make as the prerequisites for the M-48A tank transaction (these included Israel's quiet support of 'our Jordan program [or arms sales]' and its commitment 'not to undertake pre-emptive military action against Arab diversion works'[171]), its formal and explicit inclusion as an integral part of the proposed quid pro quo, in late February and early March 1965, further aggravated American-Israeli relations which had already been permeated with emotion and fraught with suspicion and uncertainty.[172]

When deciding to make the M-48A tank deal contingent upon an Israeli acceptance of IAEA controls, the traditionalists had been particularly impressed with the assessments of the CIA, which repeatedly warned that the visits paid by American scientists to Dimona 'would not accomplish the goal set for them by the Kennedy Administration,' namely, 'to determine the status of nuclear research and development in Israel.'[173] Against this backdrop, and in view of the administration's assessment that 'all indications are toward Israeli acquisition of nuclear capability…[by] 1968–9,'[174] Israel's acquiescence in the issue of IAEA safeguards was viewed in Washington as an essential alternative to the Dimona visits.[175] A plethora of intelligence reports suggested that the Marcel Dassault company which—in April 1963—signed an agreement to produce the MD-620 SSM for Israel, may have already produced the missile, and further reinforced the logic inherent in this precondition, since the MD-620 SSM was capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[176]

Notwithstanding the traditionalists' insistence on a trade-off between Israel's consent 'to IAEA observation' and the 'selective direct sales of military equipment to Israel,'[177] by late February and early March 1965 it became increasingly clear to the American representatives that Prime Minister Eshkol remained adamantly and irrevocably opposed to integrating the Dimona nuclear reactor into any system or framework of intrusive international control and inspection. Contrary to his willingness to accept an American-Jordanian arms deal[178] (on condition that Israel's deterrent strength is fully maintained), the Israeli Prime Minister remained recalcitrant in addressing this nuclear prerequisite throughout the protracted mission to Israel of Komer and Harriman.[179]

The Israeli opposition to any form of IAEA controls, which remained firm and unwavering despite strong American pressure, was based upon two sets of arguments. The first, the regional-strategic argument, underscored the principle of symmetry between Israel and Egypt and maintained that Egypt—which was still rhetorically committed to the destruction of the Jewish State—had not yet placed its own reactor under IAEA safeguards.[180] Although Prime Minister Eshkol was ultimately prepared to reaffirm Israel's 'non-nuclear undertaking,' he insisted upon an organic, built-in linkage between the Israeli and Egyptian acceptance of IAEA controls. 'Israel would accept IAEA controls,' he repeatedly asserted, but 'together with Nasser.'[181]

Thus, despite Secretary Rusk's repeated and strong efforts—embedded in his instructions to Harriman and Komer—to decouple the issue of IAEA controls from the Israeli-Egyptian dyad and instead to link it exclusively to the American-Israeli framework as a major precondition not only for the M-48A tank sale but for the continued partnership between Washington and Jerusalem, no change in the Israeli attitude was in sight.[182] Indeed, although Komer (albeit not Harriman) used, in his bargaining with the Israeli political and military leadership, 'tough language, not excluding a veiled threat' [183] that an Israeli failure to accept IAEA controls 'might not only cause the most serious crisis [Israel] had in [its] relations with the United States,'[184] but could ultimately result in the 'withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East altogether,'[185] this belligerent rhetoric could not coerce the Israeli Prime Minister into acquiescing to American pressure.

Fully and irrevocably committed to his opposition to the IAEA scenario (unless Egypt agreed to simultaneously accept IAEA controls), Prime Minister Eshkol augmented his regional-strategic argument (which was based on his vision of the severity of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and of the refusal of Egypt to accept IAEA controls, in particular) with a cluster of domestically oriented claims. These revolved around the Prime Minister's

growing domestic predicament, whose origin lay in the defection of former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion from the ruling Israel Workers' Party (MAPAI), and the growing challenge he posed to his successor.

The final confrontation between Prime Minister Eshkol and his much-admired predecessor—which took place at the MAPAI convention in February 1965—coincided with the final phase of the American-Israeli bargaining over the M-48A tank and was fraught with rumors (which were disseminated by Ben-Gurion's supporters, including Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres), according to which Prime Minister Eshkol, unlike Ben-Gurion, was 'soft' on Dimona and may have already compromised Israel's most vital security interests in his approach to the nuclear issue (which was referred to in the Israeli press as the 'sensitive matter'). Although the accusations were groundless (in 1965, Prime Minister Eshkol remained fully committed to the basic premises of the nuclear policy of Ben-Gurion),[186] they made the beleaguered prime minister even more resolute and determined not to concede on the question of IAEA controls, particularly against the background of the approaching Parliamentary elections (which were scheduled for 2 November 1965). Indeed, in the course of the elections campaign, BenGurion—who became the leader of a newly-founded political party named Israel Workers' List (RAFI)—viciously and adamantly challenged the leadership and 'moral authority' of his heir.[187]

Against the backdrop of this 'domestic constraint' the administration—unwilling to further exacerbate the Prime Minister's political and electoral predicament[188]—decided, at the end of the day, to acquiesce and ultimately agreed to sell the M-48A tanks to Israel *without* obtaining the highly-desired Israeli nuclear concession. Indeed, notwithstanding the traditionalists' unabated hopes and expectations—which were reiterated as late as on 1 March 1965—of 'find[ing] ways to bring [Israel] into IAEA safeguards' as the most appropriate means of preventing 'the dissemination of nuclear weapons into the Near East,'[189] it become increasingly evident as the bargaining approached its conclusion that the balance of motivation in this case favored Israel, which was more determined and committed than the administration to hold onto its initial position regardless of the cost involved. With the shadow of former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion looming in the background as a major strategic threat to his successor, Prime Minister Eshkol remained 'unwilling,' under such adverse circumstances, 'to commit [himself] irrevocably' to IAEA controls.[190] As Harriman further observed, while Eshkol:

> …has no intention of undertaking nuclear arms development under present circumstances and will restate whatever he has said before, including that Israel pledges it will not be the first to bring or develop nuclear arms into the Middle East…clear that it is not politically possible for [him] to do more than the above.[191]

Ultimately, then, confronted by an uncompromising Israeli Prime Minister, who headed 'a relatively unstable coalition government' in an elections year,[192] and faced with a severe time constraint (caused by the need 'to give Hussein his answer [on the sale of arms],'[193] President Johnson and his traditionalist Secretary of State Rusk decided to accept the pragmatists' recommendations that 'we must give [the] Israelis some hope on hardware' while 'leaving [the] question of IAEA to [the] future.'[194]

And indeed, in the 'Memorandum of Understanding,' which was signed on 10 March 1965 between Eshkol and Komer, no reference was made to IAEA controls or safeguards. Fearing that a failure to reach an agreement with Israel would prevent the administration from concluding the much-desired arms deal with Jordan (and thus increase the pressure upon King Hussein to turn to Egypt or to the Soviet Union in his quest for arms), President Johnson and the traditionalist proponents of the 'linkage posture' between the direct supply of arms to Israel and Prime Minister Eshkol's acceptance of IAEA controls reluctantly decided to accept the standard Israeli promise 'not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab—Israeli area'[195] as the substitute for the far more binding commitment they sought to obtain from the Eshkol Government.

Although President Johnson, like President Kennedy, 'wanted Dimona placed under IAEA safeguards…took a different approach [from his predecessor].'[196] As Cohen further maintains, the President:

> …did not exert pressure on Israel through tough presidential letters, but instead relied on an emissary, a government official. When it became evident to Johnson that Eshkol had rejected Komer's pressure regarding IAEA safeguards, he backed off and avoided confrontation. The Israeli rejection of IAEA safeguards did not prevent Israel and the United States from reaching an understanding. Indeed, the United States agreed to supply Israel with conventional armaments, while Eshkol agreed that Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.[197]

Indeed, the Israeli 'nuclear pledge'—which was incorporated into the 10 March 1965 Memorandum of Understanding—fell considerably short of

the American expectations and was closely patterned on such earlier Israeli statements and assurances as Prime Minister Eshkol's promise to President Johnson (made in the course of their 1 June 1964 meeting).[198] It surfaced once again in February and early March 1965, when Prime Minister Eshkol reiterated his willingness 'to reaffirm [Israel's] non-nuclear undertaking'[199] but without formally restricting Israel's margin of maneuverability and latitude of choice in connection with the Dimona project.

Thus, as was the case in the summer of 1962, the group of pragmatist policy-makers, whose advocated strategy was continuously predicated upon the premises of non-coercive linkage between the American-Jordanian dyad and the American-Israeli framework, emerged victorious at the end of the intragovernmental bargaining over the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel. Acutely sensitive to the limits of what was 'politically tolerable to Eshkol,'[200] Komer and Harriman were prepared to settle for less than the 'far-reaching reciprocal [Israeli] undertakings'[201] they had initially hoped to extract from Israel in the nuclear zone.

Nevertheless, the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding can be thought of on the whole as a decidedly reciprocal document. Comprising 'a large package of quid pro quos' between the 'US sales of arms to Jordan' (with Israel's acquiescence) and 'the selected direct sales to Israel,'[202] the agreement was clearly based upon the principle of symmetry and compensation in most of its provisions. For example, in view of the administration's decision to sell M-48A (basic) tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers to Jordan and the fact that of the 150 M-48A(1) tanks that the FRG agreed, in July 1964, to sell to Israel, only 40 were actually delivered before the deal was suspended, the administration now agreed to provide Israel with 210 M-48A tanks: 100 of these tanks (of type M-48A (1)) were sold as compensation for the deal with Jordan while 110 tanks (of the more advanced M-48A(2C) type) were sold as a substitute for the 110 undelivered 'German' tanks.[203] (The deal itself was formally concluded on 29 July 1965, following additional negotiations on such matters as the terms of payment for the tanks.) The principle of strict symmetry was explicitly reaffirmed in the agreement, which stated (in article VII) that 'the United States will ensure the sale directly to Israel at her request of at least the same number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan.'[204] As further compensation for the 210 tanks (and in return for King Hussein's promise 'to keep his [American armor] on the East Bank of the Jordan'[205]), Israel agreed *de facto* 'not to attack or undercut [the sale of arms to Jordan].'[206] This promise was implicit in articleVII of the agreement, which committed the signatory parties to maintain 'full secrecy…on all matters [related to the twofold sale].'[207]

Although this Israeli commitment guaranteed that the pragmatists' most feared political nightmare, namely, the formation of a domestic political front fraught with tension and permeated with accusations over the administration's 'betrayal' of Israel, would not materialize in the immediate future, Komer—whose political vision surpassed this minimalist objective—entertained a far more ambitious political design that was closely patterned on the *modus operandi* of his ally in the Hawk decision, Myer Feldman.

Specifically, although the 10 March 1965 agreement committed Israel to 'full secrecy,' Komer—always sensitive not only to the possible strategic ramifications of the American-Israeli deal but also to its perceived impact upon the representatives of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm—sought to mobilize its hardcore supporters into actively supporting both the Israeli and the Jordanian arms deals. Thus, while seeking to avoid any 'press leaks' about the twofold transaction, Komer was determined to use Ambassador Harman's ties with the American-Jewish community as a convenient springboard for effectively marketing the American-Jordanian arms deal in a way that would minimize the dangers of upheaval and backlash. As he told Prime Minister Eshkol shortly after both had signed the Memorandum of Understanding:

> We will count on [Harman] to inform Israel's friends in the United States that the Jordan arms deal was something Israel understands [that] the United States felt compelled to go ahead with in order to avoid the introduction of Nasser's Soviet arms in Jordan, etc.[208]

However, despite the initial success of Komer's stratagem, his fear that the American-Jordanian M-48 tank deal would be leaked to the press indeed materialized in December 1965, when detailed reports on the transaction (accompanied by pictures of the unloading of the tanks at the Jordanian port of Aqaba) appeared in several American newspapers, including *The New York Times*. Although these leaks did not precipitate the same reaction that followed the press revelations (of February 1965) of the German-Israeli tank deal, they profoundly embarrassed the administration and triggered a stormy wave of protest against the Jordanian sale, which was led by a group of Israel's supporters in Congress.[209] They also precipitated a serious crisis of confidence in American-Israeli relations, which originated in the suspicion—shared by such traditionalists in the Department of State as Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Rodger P.Davies—that Israel was responsible for these leaks and that continued disclosures 'could lead to the breakdown of communications between us.'[210]

In addition to the formal, direct and explicit linkage that was established in the 10 March 1965 agreement between the Jordanian and Israeli transactions and between the sale of arms to Israel and Prime Minister Eshkol's reciprocal commitments to keep the American-Jordanian deal secret and 'not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area,' an implicit and less binding form of linkage was reached on 10 March 1965 on the issue of whether or not Israel had the right to resort to 'pre-emptive action' as the means to counter the Arab plan to divert the Jordan headwaters and thereby reduce Israel's water supply.[211] Although the traditionalists were initially determined to solicit an ironclad and irrevocable commitment from the Israeli Government 'not to use force' under any circumstances 'against Arab diversion works' and instead to counter Syrian diversion operations by enlisting the support of the UN to 'develop world opinion' on Israel's side,[212] they were faced—as was the case of the nuclear issue—with a recalcitrant Israeli position, which considered 'the avoidance of a pre-emptive [Israeli] attack over Jordan waters' as incompatible with its 'ultimate sovereign' rights.[213]

Indeed, despite Harriman's rhetoric and open threat that *'the US would oppose you if you take pre-emptive action'* and the demand for 'a firm understanding that Israel would take the peaceful road to solve the problem of Arab spite diversion,'[214] it became clear at the end of the bargaining that the balance of motivation and resolve once again favored Israel, which was prepared to pay the full price of defiance rather than to acquiesce on an issue which was perceived by its leadership as inextricably related to core security interests.

Notwithstanding this failure to persuade Israel to agree to a 'broad package of quid pro quos…in return for selective direct sales to Israel,'[215] and notwithstanding the inability of the American negotiators to fundamentally modify Israeli policies on such core issues as the Dimona project, the 'much more limited deal,'[216] which was concluded on 10 March 1965, was still considered satisfactory by the pragmatists[217] (if not by the traditionalists). Komer remained committed to his belief in the power of 'positive sanctions' (albeit as an integral part of a trade-off now and not on a unilateral basis) to moderate the behavior of the recipient by integrating him—through economic and military assistance—into a framework of restraint and accommodation. He was also convinced that the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel (combined with the American commitments—incorporated into the 10 March 1965 agreement—to guarantee 'the independence and integrity of Israel' and to 'prevent the development of a significant military imbalance between Israel and its neighbors'[218]) would

indeed steer and channel the Israeli leadership in the direction of pragmatism and flexibility.

Thus reassured of the unwavering American commitment to Israel's security, Prime Minister Eshkol—according to Komer's optimistic thinking—would feel less threatened by developments along the Arab-Israeli front. Indeed, with the sale of the M-48A tank looming in the background as a credible and definitive indication of 'the continued US interest in [Israel's] integrity and security,' Komer expected the Israeli Government to become more receptive to American preferences and predilections in such matters as the 'Water Crisis', and thus to refrain from resorting to military action in defiance of the administration's expressed policy (even without formally committing itself to such a course).[219] As he pointed out in his message of 13 March 1965 to President Johnson, 'we believe that the likelihood of a pre-emptive military strike by Israel has been substantially reduced [in the aftermath of the 10 March 1965 agreement].'[220]

During the period immediately following the conclusion of the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli accord, it became evident that Komer's expectations that the tank sale would be perceived by Israel as a reassuring, confidence-building measure which would entice the Israeli Prime Minister to adopt a more pragmatic position in the 'Water Crisis' had materialized in this delimited and constrained context (albeit not in the broader context of the multidimensional Arab-Israeli predicament). Although the Syrian effort to divert the Jordan headwaters continued to precipitate occasional incidents and skirmishes along the Syrian—Israeli border,[221] in 1965 Israel avoided any major pre-emptive move which could have escalated into a new round of hostilities between Israel and Syria and thus—contrary to its *modus operandi* in late 1964—largely refrained, in the aftermath of the 10 March 1965 agreement, from the use of artillery and air power in its effort to thwart the Syrian diversion scheme.[222]

Whereas the conclusion of the 10 March 1965 Memorandum of Understanding constituted the second victory in three years for the pragmatist proponents of the strategy of positive inducements (the first being the Hawk sale), for the traditionalist policy-makers and administration officials, this agreement was the second occasion in which a basic and long-standing component of their advocated Middle East policy—namely, their innate opposition to the supply of advanced weapons systems to Israel (as a corollary of their continued desire to prevent the US from becoming a major arms supplier to the Middle East[223])—was abandoned.

Faced with this repeated debacle and inability to shape the regional landscape in accordance with their basic premises and preconceptions,

Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Talbot and their subordinates tended—on the eve of, and in the immediate aftermath of, the 10 March 1965 agreement—to downgrade the significance of the tank sale to Israel by depicting it (as they did in the aftermath of the Hawk deal) as merely an exception to or deviation from 'the existing policy' rather than as its *de facto* repudiation.[224] As Rusk further observed on 3 March 1965:

> The USG [United States Government] is prepared to sell military equipment to Israel comparable in quantities and kinds to the equipment that the United States sells to Jordan to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC [United Arab Command] to Jordan. The United States regards such sales *as an exception to its existing policy and not as creating any precedent for the future.*[225]

However, contrary to the traditionalists' expectations and their propensity to view the M-48A tank sale to Israel as 'a rare exception' to its policy of 'exercising restraint in supplying arms to the principal parties [in the] Arab-Israel dispute,'[226] the March 1965 agreement was not to be the last occasion during President Johnson's tenure in which Secretary Rusk had to witness the abandonment of his deeply held traditionalist approach. A corollary of the American-Israeli tank deal, namely, the issue of the sale of American fighter-bombers to Israel, began to increasingly dominate the thinking and agenda of the traditionalists, the pragmatists and—to a far lesser extent—the domestically oriented participants in the decision-making process immediately after the conclusion of the tank agreement as they prepared for another round of intragovernmental and intergovernmental bargaining.

In view of the essential similarity (in terms of both the process and its outcome) between the bargaining over the tanks and the planes (both the Skyhawks in 1966 and the Phantoms in 1968), the following review of the dynamics of the process which culminated, in February 1966, in the administration's decision to sell to Israel 24A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bombers (and to give it an option to purchase 24 additional Skyhawks), will concentrate primarily on certain core dimensions and components of American policy toward Israel (such as those related to the Dimona nuclear project), which surfaced (as they did in the M-48A tank case) as part of the quid pro quo which the administration sought once again to consolidate.

NOTES

1. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 126.
2. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 15 January 1962, to Kennedy, *FRUS* 17, p. 402.
3. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 101–2.
4. Quoted from Komer's message of 30 June 1962 to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W.Rostow, *FRUS* 17:173. See also Komer's memorandum of 24 July 1964 to Bundy. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1964, LBJL: 1; Little, 'Choosing Sides', pp. 156–7; Nadelmann, 'Setting the Stage', pp. 446–7; Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', pp. 287–93; Gerges, *The Superpowers in the Middle East*, p. 156.
5. Anat Kurz, 'The Institutionalization of Popular Struggles: Between "Terrorist Organizations" and "Social Movements": The Case of Fatah' Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, PhD Dissertation, submitted in 2002, pp. 99–103; Moshe Shemesh, 'Egypt's Commitment to the Palestinian Cause', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, 34 (1985), pp. 16–30; Michael N.Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations on Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 146–7.
6. Nadelmann, 'Setting the Stage', pp. 446–7; Little, 'A Fool's Errand', pp. 292–5; Little, 'Choosing Sides', pp. 155–7; Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', pp. 287–93; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 176–7; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 122. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 288.
7. Quoted by Little, 'A Fool's Errand', p. 293. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 122; Nadelmann, 'Setting the Stage', p. 447; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, p. 188; Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', p. 291.
8. Little, 'A Fool's Errand', p. 293. See also Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 161; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 179, 188.
9. For evidence on the bargaining between the Congress and the administration over the issue of whether to deny any further sale of agricultural products to Egypt during the fiscal year 1965 which ended, on 3 February 1965, in the adoption—by both the Senate and the House of Representatives—of a resolution which gave the President the discretion in dealing with the last portion of the three-year program of PL-48 assistance to Egypt, see *FRUS* 18:281 (editorial note).
10. Little, 'Choosing Sides', pp. 161–2. See also Little,'A Fool's Errand', p. 293; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 124; Gerges, *The Superpowers in the Middle East*, p. 188.

11. Quoted from the briefing given on 2 April 1964 by CIA Director John McCone to members of the NSC. NSC Meetings File, Vol. 1,1964, NSC Meeting No. 525, LBJL: 3–4.
12. Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 151. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 123–5; Mordechai Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 200.
13. On the broader theoretical implications of this gap between belief and actual behavior, see Alexander L.George, 'The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The "Operational Code" Belief System', in Falkowski, *Psychological Models in International Politics*, pp. 95–124.
14. Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 15.
15. Spiegel, *The Other Arab—Israeli Conflict*, p. 123. See also, in this connection, David Schoenbaum, 'More Special than Others', *Diplomatic History*, 22,2 (1998), pp. 273–83.
16. The details of the sale were incorporated into a memorandum, submitted by Komer to Johnson on 29 July 1965, *FRUS* 18:483. See also Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', p. 99.
17. Quoted from the memorandum of the 30 September 1963 meeting between Rusk and Meir, *FRUS* 18:718.
18. Quoted from Eshkol's message of 4 November 1963 to Kennedy, *FRUS* 18:773–4.
19. Quoted from a Special National Intelligence Estimate on 'The Egyptian Missile Program and its Implications for Israel', which was drafted on 4 December 1963, *FRUS* 18:825–6. See also Komer's message of 19 November 1963 to Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1; Komer's memorandum of 18 November 1963 for the record. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963–4, JFKL: 1–3; Komer's memorandum of 19 November 1963 for the record. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 3–4; Komer's memorandum of 21 November 1963 for the record. PPK, NSF, Box 427, Robert W.Komer: Israel, 1963, JFKL: 3; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 197.
20. Quoted from Komer's message of 19 November 1963 to Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1.
21. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 18 November 1963 for the record. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 4.
22. For reviews of this dialogue see, for example, Komer's memorandum of 21 November 1963 for the record. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–4; Harman's message of 22 November 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4:1–3; the messages which were sent on 15 November 1963 and on 18 November 1963 by the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Mordechai Gazit, to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4:1–2. See also, in this connection, Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace*, p. 202.

23. Harman's remarks of 3 January 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Rusk, *FRUS* 18:4.
24. Bundy's remarks of 10January 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman and Gazit, *FRUS* 18:12–13.
25. Quoted from Talbot's message of 18 November 1963 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:792.
26. Quoted from the message which was sent on 18 January 1964 by Rear Admiral J.W. Davis, Deputy Director, the Joint Staff, to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, *FRUS* 18:25. See also the memorandum, which was submitted on 12 March 1964 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G.Wheeler, to Secretary McNamara, *FRUS* 18:67; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 140; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 132.
27. Memorandum of the 15 January 1964 conversation between Feldman and Harman, *FRUS* 18:15–16.
28. The reference to McNamara's approval, 'in principle, of a tank sale to Israel', was made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Peter Solbert. Quoted from his memorandum of 15 February 1964 to McNamara, *FRUS* 18: 32.
29. Quoted from a message which was sent on 30 January 1964 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank K. Sloan, to Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Alexis Johnson, *FRUS* 18:53 (note 2). The message indicates that 'McNamara had authorized the extension of credit for the sale.'
30. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 23 March 1965 to Feldman, *FRUS* 18:78.
31. For evidence on the agreement, which was concluded on 26 April 1963, between the Marcel Dassault Company and the Israeli Government, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 116, 232.
32. Bundy's remarks of 10January 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman and Gazit, *FRUS* 18:12–13. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 197.
33. Bundy's remarks of 10January 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman and Gazit, *FRUS* 18:13. See also Komer's message of 19 November 1963 to Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 2–3.
34. Quoted from the memorandum which was submitted on 15 February 1963 by Deputy Assistant Solbert to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:33. The memorandum refers to the 'likelihood' of an Israeli agreement with Marcel Dassault.
35. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 18 February 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Robert W.Komer, Memos, 1964, LBJL: 1.
36. Ibid. See also Komer's memorandum of 29 January 1964 to Johnson. Country File, The Middle East, Israel, Memos and Misc., 1964, LBJL: 1; Komer's memorandum of 26 February 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:43–4.

37. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 29 January 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, The Middle East, Israel, Memos and Misc., 1964, LBJL: 1.
38. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 18 February 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Robert W.Komer, Memos and Misc., 1964, LBJL: 1. See also Komer's memorandum of 26 February 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:43–4.
39. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 29January 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, The Middle East, Israel, Memos and Misc., 1964, LBJL: 1.
40. Quoted from a handwritten note sent on 17 February 1964 from McNamara to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, William P.Bundy, *FRUS* 18: 35 (note 6).
41. On Kennedy's approach toward the Dimona nuclear reactor and the 1963 'nuclear crisis' in American-Israeli relations, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 99–136; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 124–6; Zaki Shalom, 'Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and the Dimona Project, 1962–1963', *Israel Studies*, 1, 1 (1996), pp. 3–33.
42. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 195.
43. Little,'Choosing Sides', p. 155.See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 128; Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', p. 282; Harman's message of 24 August 1964 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/1:1.
44. Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East', p. 289.
45. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 141; Harman's message of 24 August 1964 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/1:1.
46. On President Johnson's general preoccupation with domestic considerations see, for example, Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 125; Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 152; Robert A.Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power* (New York: Knopf, 1983), p. xii; Larry Berman, 'Lyndon B. Johnson: Paths Chosen and Opportunities Lost', in Greenstein, *Leadership in the Modern Presidency*, pp. 138–9; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East,* pp. 90-1.
47. Solbert's words. Quoted from his 15 February 1964 memorandum to McNamara, *FRUS* 18: 32–3.
48. Ibid.,p.33.
49. Quoted from the memorandum which was submitted on 16 January 1964 by Rusk to Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 19. For an Israeli analysis which underscores these traditionalist positions, see Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Prime Minister Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11: 1. For an earlier articulation of this set of traditionalist arguments in the context of the Hawk episode, see Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* pp. 70-100. For additional evidence of the position of the Department of State, see Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 131.
50. Quoted from the briefing memorandum which was submitted on 5 March 1964 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John

D. Jernegan, to Secretary Rusk. Record Group (RG) 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, Defense Affairs (DEF) 12-15, Israel, 1964, United States National Archives and Records Administration (USNA), College Park, MA: 1-2. This traditionalist assessment was supported by the CIA, whose Special National Intelligence assessment of 15 April 1964 predicted that the supply of the M-48A tank to Israel would result in an Arab retaliation against the Western oil companies, thus creating a window of opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit this cleavage. See *FRUS* 18: 101-2.

51. Quoted from Jernegan's memorandum of 28 February 1964 to Deputy Under-Secretary of State Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 46-7.
52. Quoted from Feldman's memorandum of 14 March 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964—65, LBJL: 1. For an earlier instance (the case of the Hawk), in which Feldman consistently advocated that the sale be concluded 'as soon as possible', see Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* p. 74.
53. Quoted from Feldman's memorandum of 14 March 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964-65, LBJL: 1-2.
54. For an identical argument in the context of the Hawk sale, see Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* pp. 75-6. For an Israeli analysis which asserts that 'Feldman is the only administration official who supports the immediate and unconditional conclusion of the tanks deal', see Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11:2.
55. Quoted from Feldman's memorandum of 4 March to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964—65, LBJL: 1. For evidence concerning Feldman's sensitivity to electoral considerations as manifested in the Hawk episode, see Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* p. 75. See also Feldman's memorandum of 11 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964-65, LBJL: 1.
56. It appears in retrospect that Feldman's fears were exaggerated. Despite the Republicans' complaints, Johnson's overwhelming popularity among proponents of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm (most of whom supported his domestic legislation) was never in jeopardy during the Presidential campaign of 1964. For an Israeli assessment of Feldman's views and preferences, see Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11: 2.
57. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 23 March 1964 to Feldman, *FRUS* 18: 76. Emphasis in original. See also, in this connection, Jack S. Levy, 'Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War', *World Politics,* 40, 1 (1987), pp. 82-107.
58. Quoted from Bundy's memorandum of 8 March 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:65.
59. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 144. See also Komer's memorandum of 26 February 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:44.

60. Quoted from Johnson's memorandum of 15 May 1964 to Feldman, which was drafted by Komer, *FRUS* 18:125. See also Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11:6.
61. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 3. See also Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11:5–6.
62. Quoted from Bundy's memorandum of March 8 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:65.
63. Ibid.
64. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 15 May 1964 to Bundy. NSF, Files of Robert W.Komer, Israel Security, 1963–66, LBJL: 1.
65. Quoted from Feldman's memorandum of 11 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964–65, LBJL: 1. See also, in this connection, Harman's message of 10 March 1964 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/11:4–5.
66. Quoted from the memorandum of the conversation which took place on 22 May 1964 between Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (in the Department of State), Rodger P.Davies, and Gazit. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964–65, LBJL: 1.
67. Bundy's words of 16 May 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his discussion with Johnson, Rusk, Talbot and McNamara, *FRUS* 18:130.
68. See, for example, Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 144–5; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 132–3; Little, 'Choosing Sides', pp. 162–3; Little, 'A Fool's Errand', p. 294.
69. Barbour's words of 23 December 1963. Quoted from his conversation with Eshkol by Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 196.
70. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 26 February 1964 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:44.
71. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 18 February 1964 to Johnson by Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 197.
72. Ibid., p. 197 (Cohen quotes an undated memorandum which was drafted by Bundy).
73. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 3–4.
74. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 2 June to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 1.
75. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 1.
76. Quoted from the message which was sent on 3 March 1964 by the Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Aryeh Levavi, to Harman, by Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 199.
77. Ibid.
78. Quoted from Johnson's message of 19 March 1964 to Eshkol, *FRUS* 18:73–4. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 200.

79. Quoted from Johnson's message of 19 March 1964 to Eshkol, *FRUS* 18:74.
80. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 200.
81. Johnson's remarks of 1 June 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Eshkol. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 2.
82. Eshkol's remarks of 1 June 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 5.
83. Quoted from Gazit's message of 3 June 1964 to Levavi. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/13:1. See also Gazit's message of 4 June 1964 to Levavi. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3504/11:1.
84. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 3 June 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 1. See also, in this connection, the telephone conversation which took place on 1 June 1964 between Komer and Under-Secretary of State George W.Ball. Papers of George W.Ball, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 2.
85. Johnson's remarks of 1 June 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Eshkol. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 2. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 for the President. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 4; Komer's memorandum of 2 June 1964 for the President. Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 2. The objective of the IAEA was to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to set in place a safeguard system to ensure that nuclear cooperation would not be bent to military purposes (Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 79).
86. Quoted from Johnson's memorandum of 15 May 1964 to Feldman, which was drafted by Komer, *FRUS* 18:125.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 124.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 125. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964. Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 3; Komer's memorandum of 1 June 1964 to Johnson. Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 1; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 142–3; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 131–2.
91. Quoted from Johnson's memorandum of 15 May 1964 (which was drafted by Komer) to Feldman, *FRUS* 18:125. Emphasis original. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 2.
92. Johnson's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his 1 June 1964 conversation with Eshkol. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 1.
93. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 3.

94. Eshkol's remarks of 1 June 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 1–2. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1964 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1964, LBJL: 3.
95. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 203. See also Peres's remarks of 2 June 1964. Quoted from his conversation with Acting Secretary of State George Ball, *FRUS* 18:161. The administration was prepared to pursue the Centurion option, and the traditionalists in particular were ready to use their influence in London in order to ensure that the British government agreed to the sale. Israel, however, remained fully wedded to its view that the 250 Centurion tanks it sought to buy should augment rather than substitute its M-48A tank order.
96. Eshkol's remarks of 1 June 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 1964, LBJL: 3.
97. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 204; Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 163; Spiegel, *The Other Arab—Israeli Conflict,* p. 132; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 142.
98. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 142. For details of the American-German agreement, see the memorandum of the conversation which took place on 1 October 1964 between Talbot and Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3504/17:1–3.
99. Quoted from the memorandum which was drafted on 7 November 1964 by Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Averell W. Harriman to Bundy. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964–65, LBJL: 1.
100. Quoted from the message which was sent on 28 October 1964 from the Israeli Embassy in Vienna to Yahil. The message cites the reports which were published on 26 October 1964 in several German newspapers, including the *Frankfurter Rundschau.* ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3533/1:102. See also Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 142.
101. See, for example, the report in the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten* of 12January 1965, as quoted in the message which was sent on 12 January 1965 from the Israeli diplomatic mission in Bonn to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3533/2:1. See also Harman's message of 11 February 1965 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/9:1; Gazit's message of 22 January 1965 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3533/2: 1. The message quotes a detailed report on CBS News (of 20 February 1965) on the tank sale. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 142; Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 163.
102. Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 143. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132. On the pragmatists' reaction to the cancellation, see Komer's memorandum of 21 January 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:274–5.

103. Quoted in Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 143. See also Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 163; Komer's memorandum of 21 January 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:274–5. For an analysis of the dangers and risks inherent in the strategy of selling arms through proxies in the context of British foreign and defense policy, see Mark Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
104. For an analysis of an expanded bargaining set, see Lebow, *The Art of Bargaining,* pp. 73–5.
105. See Hussein's remarks of 15 April 1964 in the memorandum of his conversation with McNamara and Talbot, *FRUS* 18:97.
106. Quoted from Hussein's interview in *Newsweek* of 20 April 1964, pp. 57–7, by Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 162.
107. Hussein's remarks of 15 April 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with McNamara and Talbot, *FRUS* 18:97. See also Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 162; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132.
108. For illustrations, see Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition,* pp. 76–7; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East,* pp. 152–63; Zaki Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan, 1960–1963* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), pp. 63–74.
109. Talbot's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 22 July 1964 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:182.
110. Quoted from Hughes's memorandum of 31 July 1964 to James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF19,USNA: 1.
111. Talbot's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 22 July 1964 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:183.
112. Quoted from the memorandum which was submitted on 30 July 1964 by Burchinal to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:188.
113. Ibid. See also Gazit's memorandum of 11 September 1964 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3504/3:1–2.
114. See Gazit's memorandum of 4 December 1964 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3504/3:1; Talbot's memorandum of 22 July 1964 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:182; Burchinal's memorandum of 30 July 1964 to McNamara.
115. Quoted from Rusk's telegram of 4 August 1964 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:189. See also Rusk's telegram of 8 August 1964 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:193–5.
116. Komer's remarks of 5 January 1964. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Gazit. NSF, Country File, Files of Robert W.Komer, Israel, 1964–66, LBJL: 1–2. For an analysis of the theoretical implications of the strategy which seeks to prevent the defection of an ally, see Daniel W.Drezner, 'Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multipolar Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?', *International Organization,* 54, 1 (2000), pp. 73–102.

117. Johnson's words. Quoted from his telephone conversation of 20 February 1965 with the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Trust Company, Abraham Feinberg (who was the President's personal friend), *FRUS* 18:342 (editorial note). For a retrospective analysis of the President's views, see Harman's memorandum of 14 July 1966 to Bitan. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/12:2.
118. Quoted from Burchinal's memorandum of 30 July 1964 to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:188. See also the memorandum which was submitted on 7 February 1965 by the Head of the North American Division in Israel's Foreign Ministry, Moshe Bitan, to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/ 9:1–2.
119. Quoted from Rusk's telegram of 12 August 1964 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:203. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 July 1964 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18: 186. See also Talbot's memorandum of 22 July 1964 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:182; the memorandum, which was submitted on 24 July 1964, by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Benjamin H. Read, to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:185. For an analysis of the theoretical implications of this contingency, see Drezner, 'Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multipolar Sanctions', pp. 86–7.
120. Quoted from Rusk's telegram of 4 August 1964 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:189. See also Komer's remarks of 5 January 1965, which were made in the course of his conversation with Gazit. NSF, Files of Robert W.Komer, Israel, 1964–66, LBJL: 102.
121. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 2 September 1964 to Bundy. NSF, Country File, Near East, 1964, LBJL: 1.
122. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 July 1964 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18:186.
123. Talbot's remarks of 14January 1965. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Rusk, *FRUS* 18:270.
124. Ball's remarks of 1 February 1965. Quoted from his message to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, *FRUS* 18:292.
125. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 6 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:309. On the basic differences between the strategies of linkage and decoupling see, for example, George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* p. 598; Roger Fisher, *International Conflict and Behavioral Saence* (NewYork: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 91–109; Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 174–224; Shmuel Sandler, 'Linkage and Decoupling in American Foreign Policy', in Nissan Oren (ed.), *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 155–61; Robert L. Beisner, '1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and Doves', *Political Science Quarterly,* 95 (1970), pp. 187–216; Ole R. Holsti, 'The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change', *International Studies Quarterly,* 23 (1979), pp. 339–59; Abraham Ben-Zvi,

The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973–1986, JCSS Study No. 5 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 13.

126. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 21 January 1965 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Near East, 1965, LBJL: 1. Emphasis original. What Komer envisioned was an outcome that was fully patterned on the logic of 'Pareto Superiority', namely, an outcome which promised to be more beneficial to both Israel and Jordan (as well as the US) than any alternative outcome. See, for an analysis of this outcome in the context of game theory, Steven J.Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 224.
127. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 6 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:309.
128. Ibid.,p.308.
129. Ibid., p. 309. Emphasis original. See also Komer's memorandum of 9 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:318–20.
130. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 6 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:309.
131. Rusk's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 9 February 1965 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964–65, LBJL: 1 (this document is also available in NSF, Country File, Near East, 1965, LBJL: 1).
132. See Feldman's remarks of 1 February 1965 in the Summary Notes of the 544th meeting of the NSC. NSC Meetings File, 1965, LBJL: 3.
133. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 6 February 1965 to the American Embassy in Beirut, *FRUS* 18:311.
134. Ibid. For an earlier illustration of the traditionalists' approach to the issue of the Jordanian arms deal, see Rusk's telegram of 12 August 1964 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:193–5.
135. Komer's memorandum of 9 February 1965. Quoted from his memorandum to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:320. See also Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1.
136. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 16 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:335–6. See also Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1–2; Komer's memorandum of 6 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:308–10.
137. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1.
138. Quoted from Rusk's memorandum of 10 February 1965 to Komer. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2.
139. Although the possibility that Feldman would be sent to Israel as one of the President's emissaries for the negotiations with the Israeli Government over the issue of the sale to Israel (and to Jordan) of the M-48A tank was considered by Johnson, the President ultimately decided to leave Feldman out of the mission (which was dispatched on 11 February 1965 to Israel), which included Robert Komer and Averel W.Harriman, Under-Secretary of State

for Political Affairs (who was chosen for the mission by virtue of his close ties with the American-Jewish leadership, which were consolidated when he served as governor of New York). See Ball's telephone remarks of 7 February 1965 to Komer. Papers of George W.Ball, Jordan, 1965, LBJL: 1. See also Ball's telephone remarks of 7 February 1965 to Johnson. Papers of George W.Ball, Jordan, 1965, LBJL: 1.

140. The 'Water Crisis' of 1965 originated in the Israeli endeavor to complete its National Water Carrier project, which reflected the premises of the Johnston Plan for distributing the waters of the Jordan River between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, and was fully supported by both the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations. Although Jordan acquiesced in the Israeli irrigation project (in which water was pumped from the Upper Jordan river to Lake Kinneret) and was even awarded—in September 1961—a loan from the World Bank in order to carry out its own irrigation project within the framework of the Johnston Plan, in 1959 Syria initiated a plan for diverting the water of the Jordan river at its sources (the Jordan river derives most of its water from three springs, two of which—the Hasbani and the Banias—were under Syrian and Lebanese control). Five years later, at the Arab summit conference of January 1964, the Syrian diversion plan was finally approved (following its approval by the Arab League's Political Committee). When Syria introduced earth-moving equipment into the diversion site and started to construct a channel to divert the waters of the Hasbani, Israel retaliated militarily with light firearms, mortars and medium-sized machine-guns and occasionally (as in November 1965) with artillery, tanks, and air power. However, in the aftermath of the 10 March 1965 agreement, Israel refrained from any major pre-emptive move which could have escalated into a new round of hostilities along the Syrian-Israeli front and thus resorted, in 1965, to the strategy of flexible response rather than of massive retaliation as the preferred means of aborting the Syrian scheme. For analyses of the background and development of this crisis, see Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 104–8; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 173–224; Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 62–3.

141. Feldman's words. Qutoed from his telephone conversation of 4 February 1965 with Ball. Papers of George W.Ball, Jordan, 1965, LBJL: 1.

142. Ibid. On Feldman's views, see also Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1; the memorandum for the record, which was drafted on 9 February 1965 by the Deputy Director for Plans in the CIA, Richard M.Helms, *FRUS* 18:321.

143. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy, in which he analyzed Ball's views concerning the sale of tanks to Israel. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2.
144. Quoted from Rusk's memorandum of 9 February 1965 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, Israeli Tanks, 1964–65, LBJL: 1.
145. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 19 March 1965 'to certain posts', *FRUS* 18: 416.
146. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 6 February 1965 to the American Embassy in Beirut, *FRUS* 18:311.
147. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 8 February 1965 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:317.
148. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1.
149. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 9 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:318. See also Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 1.
150. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2.
151. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 8 February 1965 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:317. See also Komer's memorandum of 6 March 1965 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18: 389.
152. Johnson's words. Quoted from his telephone conversation of 7 February 1965 with Ball. Papers of George W.Ball, Jordan, 1965, LBJL: 1.
153. Johnson's words, ibid.
154. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 7 February 1965 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18:316.
155. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram (which was sent from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv) of 13 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:326.
156. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 16 February 1965 (upon returning to Washington from the first of his two negotiating missions to Israel) to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:354. Emphasis original. See also Gazit's memorandum of 14 February 1965 to Levavi. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/17:1–2.
157. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 13 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:326.
158. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 15 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:331.
159. For an analysis of the impact of firsthand experiences upon the decision-maker's belief system, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* pp. 239–42.
160. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 13 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:325.

161. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 15 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:330.
162. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 13 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:325. On the theoretical implications of this approach, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* pp. 62–82.
163. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 15 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:331.
164. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 16 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:335.
165. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 13 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:326.
166. Ibid.
167. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 28 February 1965 to Johnson and the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:358.
168. Rusk's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 19 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:341. See also Johnson's memorandum of 21 February 1965 to Komer and Harriman. NSF, Files of Robert W.Komer, Israel Security, December 1963-March 1966, LBJL: 2–4.
169. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 16 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:334–5.
170. Johnson's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 21 February 1965 to Komer and Harriman. NSF, Files of Robert W.Komer, Israel Security, December 1963-March 1966, LBJL: 5.
171. Rusk's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 19 February to Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 341.
172. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 206.
173. Quoted from the memorandum submitted on 5 March 1965 by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, Rodger P. Davies, to Talbot, *FRUS* 18:382.
174. Ibid.
175. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 206.
176. Ibid., pp. 116, 232.
177. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 26 February 1965 to Harriman, *FRUS* 18: 349. See also the memorandum of Harriman's 25 February 1965 meeting with Eshkol. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2–3.
178. See, for example, the memorandum of Harriman's 25 February 1965 meeting with Eshkol. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2.
179. Ibid. See also Harriman's telegram of 28 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:358; Komer's telegram of 28 February 1965 to Johnson and Rusk, *FRUS* 18: 364–5.

180. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 206. See also the telegram of 25 February 1965 which was sent by Harriman and Komer to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:347.
181. Harriman's words. Quoted from his telegram of 26 February 1965 to the Department of State, *FRUS* 18:352.
182. See, for example, Rusk's telegram of 25 February 1965 to Harriman and Komer, *FRUS* 18:348.
183. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 206. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132.
184. Komer's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his 1 March 1965 conversation with Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, the Chief of Staff of the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) by Yitzhak Rabin, *Pinkas Sherut,*Vol. 2 [*A Service Notebook*] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv Book Guild, 1979), pp. 129–30 [in Hebrew]. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 206. Alluding to this stormy meeting and belligerent rhetoric, Komer reported to Bundy, in his telegram of 1 March 1965 (which was apparently drafted immediately following his meeting with Rabin), that 'I am surprised that [the] Israelis still speak to me'(Komer's words; quoted from his telegram of 1 March 1965 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18: 371). See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132.
185. Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs,* p. 65. See also Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 144–5; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Confict,* p. 133.
186. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* pp. 220–2.
187. Ibid., p. 222; Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb,* pp. 112–13; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 144–5; Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 9.
188. In the Parliamentary elections of 2 November 1965, Eshkol's party—MAPAI—won an overwhelming victory over Ben-Gurion's newly-formed RAFI party. Whereas MAPAI won 45 parliamentary seats, RAFI secured only 10 parliamentary seats.
189. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 1 March 1965 to Harriman, *FRUS* 18:368.
190. Harriman's words. Quoted from his telegram of 2 March 1965 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:373.
191. Ibid. See also Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 145; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 133. On the concept of 'the balance of motivation' as a determinant influencing the outcome of adversarial crises, see Russell J.Lenz, 'When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 27 (1983), pp. 97–120; Alexander L.George and William E.Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,* 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 1–22; George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* pp. 606–7.
192. Harriman's words. Quoted from his telegram of 28 February 1965 to Johnson (and Rusk), *FRUS* 18:359.
193. Ibid.,p.358.

194. Ibid.; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 133.
195. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:398.
196. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 207.
197. Ibid. In view of the available documentary material, Little's claim that in the 10 March 1965 Memorandum of Understanding, Israel accepted 'full IAEA safeguards on all [its] nuclear facilities', is erroneous (Little, 'Choosing Sides', p. 164).
198. For the memorandum of Eshkol's conversation of 1 June 1964 with Johnson, see *FRUS* 18:158.
199. Eshkol's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation of 26 February 1965 with Harriman, *FRUS* 18:352.
200. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 6 March 1965, *FRUS* 18:388.
201. Ibid.
202. Davies's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 5 March 1965 to Talbot, *FRUS* 18: 384.
203. See the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18: 399. The agreement on the sale of 100 M-48A tanks to Jordan was concluded on 18 March 1965. The agreement committed Jordan to keep the US and other 'free world sources' as the 'sole sources of supply to its armed forces', *FRUS* 18:405, note 5.
204. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:399.
205. Ibid., p. 398. See also Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 145.
206. Komer's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Eshkol, Meir and Peres of 10 March 1965, *FRUS* 18:397. See also ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/17:5.
207. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:399. See also the memorandum of the conversation of 25 February 1965 between Harriman, Komer, Eshkol and Meir. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc, Israel, 1965, LBJL: 4.
208. Komer's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his 10 March 1965 meeting with Eshkol, Meir and Peres, *FRUS* 18:396. See also ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/17:6; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 134.
209. Isaiah L.Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981), p. 182.
210. Quoted from Bitan's memorandum of 1 January 1966 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:1. For additional evidence on this crisis, see Bitan's memorandum of 2 January 1966 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3977/13: 1; Bitan's memorandum of 9 January 1966 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:1–2; Bitan's

memorandum of 16 January 1966 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:2–3; Komer's memorandum of 5 January 1966 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1966, LBJL: 1–2. An analysis of the relevant Israeli documents indicates that Israel was not responsible for the leak and that the agency responsible for the initial publication of the deal was the United States Information Service (USIS), whose Middle East publication 'indiscreetly pictured the unloading of the M-48 tank at Aqaba' (Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line,* p. 182). AIPAC, however, was quick to seize the opportunity and reprinted the story in *The Near East Report* (ibid.). As a result of these leaks, the Department of State publicly disclosed, on 6 February 1966, the arms deals with Jordan and Israel. See also, in this connection, Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurements', p. 101.

211. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 133; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 145. On the theoretical implications of the differences between explicit and implicit commitments in international relations, see Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The Rules of the Game* (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 49–94.
212. Quoted from Rusk's telegram of 25 February 1965 to Komer and Harriman, *FRUS* 18: 348. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab—Israeli Conflict,* p. 133.
213. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 7 March 1965 to Komer, *FRUS* 18:390. See also the memorandum of the conversation of 25 February 1965 between Harriman, Komer, Eshkol and Meir. NSF,The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2–3. See also Ezer Weizman, *On Eagle's Wings* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp. 206–7; Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 312.
214. Harriman's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation of 25 February 1965 with Eshkol and Meir. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2. Emphasis in original. See also Harriman's message of 15 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:408.
215. Davies's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 5 March 1965 to Talbot, *FRUS* 18: 383. See also Komer's memorandum of 13 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:406.
216. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 13 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:406.
217. See, for example, Komer's remarks in his conversation of 10 March 1965 with Eshkol, Meir and Peres, *FRUS* 18:396–7. Komer's memorandum of 13 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:406–7; Harriman's memorandum of 15 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 407–8.
218. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:398. See also Rusk's telegram of 10 March 1965 to the American Embassy in Amman, *FRUS* 18:400 US 18:400.
219. Komer's words. Quoted from his message of 13 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:407. For an *informal* Israeli commitment to refrain from 'major' retaliatory action even in the face of continued 'diversion works' by Syria, see

Eshkol's remarks in the memorandum of his 26 February 1965 conversation with Harriman. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2–3 (afternoon session).

220. Komer's words. Quoted from his message of 13 March 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:407.
221. Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb,* pp. 106–8; Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy,* pp. 181–95; Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs,* pp. 62–3.
222. Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb,* p. 108; Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs,* p. 63.
223. See, for example, Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* p. 10; Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', pp. 88–93.
224. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 3 March 1965 to Komer and Harriman, *FRUS* 18:378.
225. Ibid. (emphasis added).
226. Talbot's telegram of 23 April 1965 (from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv) to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:447.

3
The Road to the A-4E Skyhawk Fighter-Bomber

The issue of the sale to Israel of American fighter-bombers was inextricably linked to King Hussein's threat to purchase MIG-21 interceptors (from Egypt or the Soviet Union) unless provided with a comparable American alternative (such as 'the F-104 aircraft'[1]). Acutely alarmed by the consequences—in terms of regional stability and American strategic interests—of 'Soviet planes [in Jordan],'[2] all branches of the administration (with the exception of the departing Deputy Special Counsel Feldman) recognized the need to prevent the defection of King Hussein to the Eastern bloc by supplying arms to Jordan (exclusively, as the traditionalists recommended, or as part of a broader trade-off involving the sale of the M-48A tank to both Jordan and Israel, as the pragmatists insisted).

When it became abundantly clear to the administration that the Jordanian King remained irreconcilably wedded to the view that any arms deal with Washington must include planes as well as tanks, the pragmatists—unlike the traditionalists—began to support the sale of planes to Israel as a necessary compensation for what appeared in early 1965 (following months of procrastination, during which the administration sought to confine itself to the sale of armor to Jordan) as the impending sale of American planes to the Hashemite Kingdom.

Indeed, Komer and Harriman were irrevocably committed to the logic and basic premises of their linkage strategy (in any policy framework and context), and were also aware of the recent sale by the Soviet Union of the IL-28 light bombers to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. They therefore repeatedly and forcefully recommended, in the course of their February-March 1965 mission to Israel, that any agreement on the sale of American arms to Israel include 'certain aircraft.'[3]

Ultimately, believing that 'time was an urgent factor because we cannot be certain that the movement of the Arab bloc into Nasser's domination will not occur very fast if we are unable to proceed with Jordan,' and that 'MIG [interceptors] could arrive in Jordan from Egypt within a week or

two,' Secretary Rusk and the rest of his traditionalist entourage decided, in early March 1965, to include a commitment to sell planes to Jordan in the arms package to King Hussein; this was concluded on 18 March 1965.[4] The inevitable corollary of this decision was the traditionalists' subsequent decision (derived from their recognition that any effort to decouple the sale of planes to Jordan from a similar deal with Israel may abort the Jordanian enterprise) to apply the logic of the linkage strategy (which they had already reluctantly accepted in the context of the sale of armor to both Israel and Jordan) to the sphere of aircraft supplies as well, albeit not in a direct and linear way, but through intermediaries and third parties.

Thus, with the pragmatists' axiom that 'if we sell to Jordan, we must sell [directly or indirectly] to Israel too'[5] becoming, in early March 1965, the source of the administration's official policy in the context of the sale of both 'tanks and planes,'[6] what was left for American and Israeli negotiators in subsequent months was to agree on the type of plane to be supplied (and its country of origin), and on the cluster of linkages and conditions under which the transaction would be carried out. Indeed, the pragmatists' insistence that the administration's arms sales policy fully reflect the principle of reciprocity in all kinds and categories of military equipment became the basis upon which the 10 March 1965 agreement was ultimately forged. The pragmatists, the traditionalists and the domestically oriented participants in the formation of American policy in the Middle East shifted their attention thereafter to the issue of the specific undertakings which Israel was expected to make in return for the planes as well as to the appropriate mechanisms (such as the identity of the party to be involved) for making the transaction.

The reference, in the 10 March 1965 accord, to the American commitment to sell 'combat aircraft' to Israel, was of a general nature. Unlike the commitment to sell the M-48A tank to Israel, which was outlined in specific terms, the reference to the combat aircraft issue in the agreement was far more amorphous, with the document merely affirming the administration's willingness 'to ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States.'[7]

In view of the unspecific nature of the 'statement of intentions,'[8] the challenge that confronted both Israeli and American negotiators in subsequent months was to translate this general and amorphous commitment into a concrete and operational arms deal. It is to the bargaining over this issue that we now turn.

As in the negotiations over the sale of the M-48A tank to Israel, the initial American preference, in the aftermath of the 10 March 1965 accord, was

to avoid direct involvement in the transaction. In the M-48A episode, the administration resorted to the German back channel as a means of disguising its own role in the deal and agreed to sell the tank to Israel directly only after this German route was blocked. Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the 10 March 1965 agreement, both the pragmatists and the traditionalists shared the view that Washington should 'sell Israel jet aircraft only after Israel exhausted all possible Western European sources.'[9]

Fearing that the direct supply of offensive weapons to Israel 'can be expected to generate Arab reactions which would be detrimental to US political, military, and economic interests in the Middle East,' the White House, the Department of State and the Pentagon (albeit not with the same degree of determination and enthusiasm) maintained that 'every effort should be made to persuade Israel to satisfy its combat aircraft requirements from Western European sources.'[10] As Secretary Rusk pointed out, in his message of 5 June 1965, to the American Embassies in Tel Aviv, London, Paris and Bonn, 'a clear consensus' existed within the administration that it would be 'contrary to [American] interests to sell military aircraft to Israel' unless there was sufficient evidence indicating that Israel was unable to 'obtain suitable aircraft from Western European sources.'[11] 'In any event,' the Secretary concluded, 'we would not sell supersonic aircraft, the number would not exceed 24, and delivery would not be until 1967.'[12]

Two weeks later, in his message of 18 June 1965 to the American Ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen (Israel had been asked to look for aircraft options in Europe and primarily in France), Secretary Rusk was even more explicit in disclosing his preferences when he told the American Ambassador that 'it was very important to divert Israeli aircraft requests to European suppliers.'[13] The Secretary of State sought desperately—in view of the recent M-48A tank sale—to prevent the total collapse of the traditional American arms sales posture. He was also highly skeptical about the Israeli claims that no European aircraft option was either available or suitable for its requirements and needs, and instructed Ambassador Bohlen 'to determine whether [any] French aircraft might be suitable and available to Israel.'[14]

Thus, anxious to avoid 'a complete change in our Near East arms policy and the establishment of patron-client relations between Washington and Jerusalem in the field of arms sales,' Secretary Rusk reiterated—in his 18 June 1965 message to Ambassador Bohlen—his unshattered commitment to the very essence of his advocated 'non-supply' policy, despite the fact that it had by now become largely outdated: 'Since the US is completing the German-Israeli tank deal with 110 M-48A(2C)s and will provide additional

M-48 A(1)s or M-48 A(2C)s to Israel, it is most desirable that the US will not be obliged also to provide aircraft [to Israel].'[15]

Notwithstanding Secretary Rusk's strong opposition 'to any US sale [of aircraft] to Israel,'[16] it became increasingly clear in subsequent months that Israel remained fully and irrevocably committed to the 'American option' (for political as well as strategic reasons) in its quest for a suitable combat aircraft and thus refused to seriously consider any European alternative to the plane it was determined to purchase in Washington.[17]

This abiding Israeli interest 'in access to American planes regardless of the availability of European aircraft'[18] was most clearly and forcefully manifested in October 1965, in the course of the visit to Washington by the Commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), Major General Ezer Weizman. In his meetings with both the traditionalists and the pragmatists, Weizman forcefully argued that almost half of Israel's 200 combat aircraft was obsolescent and required immediate replacement. In the meantime, he added, Israel found itself vulnerable to a surprise Egyptian and Syrian air strike, particularly in view of the fact that both powers had undergone an accelerated process of technological development in such areas as air defense and air power. Further, maintaining that, in view of the 'unavailability [in France] of additional Vautour [fighter-bombers]' and 'new models of the Mirage [interceptors],'[19] the rest of the Israeli fleet (composed of the Super Mystére, the Mirage III-C interceptors and the Vautour fighter-bombers) was insufficient 'in numbers to meet Israel's "second strike" requirement to defeat the larger number of highperformance [Egyptian] aircraft and bomb radar sites and airfields in southern Egypt,'[20] Weizman presented to his hosts 'an ambitious shopping list.'[21] This list included 45 supersonic (F-4) Phantom fighter-bombers and 165 of the 'significantly cheaper subsonic Skyhawks.' The commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) placed particular emphasis on the Skyhawk fighter-bomber, arguing that the Israelis 'had exhausted the European market, particularly France, and found no comparable aircraft which met [its] range and take-off requirements.'[22] (Weizman's reference to the European market was based on the findings of an IAF procurement delegation which—in October 1964—had visited the French and British markets and did not find any appropriate combat aircraft.)

Despite his detailed and well-documented arguments, Major General Weizman's presentation—which reflected not only purely military considerations but also Israel's abiding desire to strengthen and institutionalize its political and strategic ties with Washington as a viable alternative to its increasingly uncertain 'French connection'—did not provide the impetus for instantly modifying American policy concerning

the supply of combat planes to Israel.[23] And while such pragmatists as Robert Komer were impressed with Weizman's arguments within the narrow and isolated parameters of Israel's 'air requirements,' the picture changed completely when they addressed the overall balance of military capabilities between Israel and its neighbors. In Komer's words:

> With all Israel's other assets—armored superiority, new French missiles and the Arab conviction that the US would come to Israel's aid—it would be hard to convince us that what the air force proposed was as essential to [Israel's] total posture as we had come to believe tanks were.[24]

Believing that the balance of general deterrence favored Israel despite its vulnerability to an air strike, the pragmatists remained unreceptive to Weizman's arguments and requests.

Indeed, against the backdrop of the pragmatists' conviction that an asymmetry in military capabilities favoring Israel still existed in the Arab—Israeli zone, the Israeli hopes and expectations that Weizman's October 1965 visit would precipitate an immediate reassessment of the American approach to the issue of 'modernizing the Israeli Air Force,'[25] proved premature. Instead, it was decided by both the pragmatists and the traditionalists that such a reassessment 'will come into play only if a renewed and exhaustive exploration…by Israel of the European market fails to turn up aircraft.'[26]

It was indeed on the basis of this 'exploration,' which was conducted not only by the IAF but (once again) by the American Ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen,[27] that the pragmatists ultimately opted, early in 1966, to abandon their *ad hoc* partnership with the traditionalists (who 'remained adamant against [the sale to Israel of] any American combat aircraft'[28]) and thus to support the 'carefully controlled plane sales to Israel.'[29]

Faced with Ambassador Bohlen's assessment that the Vautour fighter-bomber—'which was being used by the French military in Djibouti—could not be released' and that 'the Mirage IV [interceptor] was unlikely …to be made available [to Israel]'[30] (and that, consequently, even a 'highlevel US approach was unlikely to induce the French to make the Vautour available to Israel'[31]), Komer reached the conclusion that Israel had 'a good case for purchasing US planes,' particularly in view of the fact that 'Soviet MIG [interceptors] and bombers are still flowing to Egypt and Syria.'[32]

As has already been indicated, Secretary Rusk and the rest of the traditionalists invariably continued to view France—despite Ambassador

Bohlen's findings—'as the most logical source of aircraft supplier to Israel'[33] while repeatedly underscoring the 'dangers' to American 'political and military' interests, which were inherent in the supply of *any* type of American aircraft to Israel.[34] On the other hand, the pragmatist Komer, who was always quick to adjust his thinking and policy recommendations to the changing and fluctuating circumstances, became convinced that 'the drying up of Israel's regular European sources' made it imperative upon the administration to '*become the direct supplier*' not only in the context of the 'Hawks and the tanks,' but in the case of the 'plane sales'[35] to Israel as well.

Indeed, against the backdrop of the apparent unavailability of any European alternative to American planes, Komer resorted to the same pattern of thinking which characterized his *modus operandi* in the aftermath of the closure of the German route for supplying the M-48A tank to Israel. He recommended that the administration take the initiative and approve the plane transaction while insisting on several conditions and linkages which would make the sale (which, in his view, was inevitable in view of the imminent supply of American planes to Jordan and the mounting pressures which were exerted upon the administration by the Jewish and Congressional representatives of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm) less costly in terms of American regional interests and more beneficial in terms of its anticipated domestic impact.[36]

Specifically, not only would the sale help Israel 'maintain a sufficient deterrent edge to warn off Nasser' (which would stabilize the situation along the Arab—Israeli front and thus 'limit the chances of our being drawn into a Near East crisis'[37]) but it would—according to Komer's expectations—silence 'Hill and Zionist criticism,' which 'interferes with our ability to carry out a sensible [Middle Eastern] policy.'[38]

In the same way that Komer insisted, in the wake of the suspension of the German tank deal, on the need to take the initiative and sell the M-48A tank directly to Israel while setting in advance the terms and conditions for the deal (before the administration would be compelled to do so under adverse circumstances), this quintessential pragmatist (who, in October 1965, was appointed as Bundy's Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) also reiterated—in the wake of the collapse of the French aircraft option—his conviction that the only viable path left for the administration to pursue in February 1966 was to approve the sale of the planes as an integral part of a broader trade-off involving not only the 'quiet Israeli support of… US arms sales to Jordan'[39] but, more importantly, a meaningful Israeli concession in the nuclear field:

> *Can we use planes as a lever to keep Israel from going nuclear?* Desperation is what would most likely drive Israel to this choice, should it come to feel that the conventional balance was turning against it. So a judicious US arms supply, aimed at maintaining a deterrent balance, is as good an inhibitor as we have got… *In the last analysis, can we avoid selling planes to Israel sooner or later?* Given continued Soviet shipments to Egypt and Syria… Hill and other pressure is growing to the point where we probably would not have a defensible case much longer… *So if we are going to be badgered into selling planes anyway sooner or later, we can gain more and will risk less by doing so now when we can drive a hard bargain.*[40]

Irrevocably committed to his belief in the power of positive sanctions to steer and channel the recipient into a more pragmatic and less recalcitrant behavioral style, Komer—whose thinking and behavior in this episode was indeed closely patterned on his *modus operandi* in the M-48A episode—became a staunch advocate of the direct American supply of planes to Israel as soon as he realized that no alternative source for the transaction existed. Komer believed that a stronger and more assured Israel would also be more accommodative and prepared to take risks for the sake of stabilizing, if not mitigating, the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. This belief in the power of inducements and incentives to set in motion a process of conflict reduction converged with his (and with the President's) sensitivity to the domestic environment, and he ultimately emerged once again (as in the Hawk and M-48A episodes) as the central, most influential, participant in the decision-making process over the sale of the Skyhawk fighter-bomber to Israel.[41] His numerous memoranda to President Johnson indeed proved to be of crucial importance in overcoming the traditionalists' 'resistance to a new arms pipeline for Israel.'[42]

President Johnson ultimately becoming supportive of Komer's approach in early 1966, the focus of the process shifted from the question of whether the administration should supply combat planes to Israel, to the specific terms of the deal, including the renewed linkage, which the administration sought to establish, between conventional arms and nuclear weapons. As Komer recommended to Bundy in his memorandum of 21 January 1966:

> In my judgment, circumstances will probably demand that we end up selling some aircraft to the Israelis. If so, it is far wiser for us to soften them up on certain conditions…(on proliferation, on not making us prime suppliers) than to give way piecemeal and end up getting less than otherwise.[43]

Three weeks later, in his memorandum of 11 February 1966 to Secretary McNamara, Komer was even more explicit in describing 'Israel's aircraft package':

> Our aim is twofold: (a) sell the Israelis 48A-4E aircraft…(b) get them in return [to agree] to keep buying the bulk of its aircraft in Europe, and not seek any more from the US *through 1970* and not to use our aircraft as *nuclear weapons carriers*.[44]

This pragmatist effort, which became fully manifested in January and February 1966, to incorporate the Skyhawk deal into a trade-off involving Israel's nuclear project, did not unfold in a conceptual or bureaucratic vacuum, but was the extension of earlier attempts by the Johnson Administration to extract from Israel such concessions as the acceptance *of 'IAEA safeguards to all Israeli nudear facilities'*[45] in return for the supply of American arms.

As has already been pointed out, during the negotiations that preceded the 10 March 1965 accord, Prime Minister Eshkol remained adamant in his opposition to placing the Dimona reactor under IAEA controls and could not be persuaded or coerced into making any commitment beyond the general pledge that Israel would *not* be the first power 'to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israeli arena.'[46] Now, during the period that followed the M-48A tank deal, the 'nuclear linkage' once again came to increasingly dominate the American-Israeli dyad as a major bargaining leverage for the pragmatists, who hoped to use it as the means of modifying Israel's nuclear posture in exchange for the supply of American planes to Israel.

The reason for this renewed American preoccupation with Israel's nuclear activities could be that the pragmatists' growing willingness to make this issue the cornerstone of Israel's contribution to the Skyhawk package they hoped to conclude converged with the traditionalists' increasing concern with the spate of intelligence reports, which pointed toward the possibility of 'Israeli acquisition of nuclear capability…[by] 1968–9.'[47] Although the pragmatists became increasingly predisposed, in their reports and policy recommendations from late 1965 and early 1966, to underscore the tactical dimension of the nuclear question in their quest to employ the promise of the Skyhawk as the means of obtaining from the Israeli Prime Minister significant concessions in the nuclear field, they were also alarmed—as the traditionalists were—by the accumulating intelligence reports concerning Dimona.[48] Where they differed from the traditionalists was mainly in the choice of tactics for accomplishing the goal of preventing the Middle East

from becoming nuclear and, more specifically, in their readiness to provide compensation to Israel (by reinforcing its conventional deterrence) for its willingness to become more accommodative in its approach toward the Dimona nuclear project. As was the case with the M-48A tank sale, this pragmatist belief in the power of positive sanctions was not shared by Secretary Rusk and his traditionalist subordinates, who found it exceedingly difficult to accept the logic and basic premises of the quid pro quo strategy, on the basis of which weapons systems were sold to Israel.

Beyond the growing American concern with the possibility that 'the arms rivalry in the near East' might ultimately lead to the development of warheads for Israeli missiles purchased from France,[49] the linkage which was once again established between planes and nuclear weapons reflected the overriding American fear that these two categories—the conventional and the nuclear—could indeed become inextricably linked to one another by virtue of the potential use by Israel of the 'aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.'[50] Hence, as the Skyhawk sale became an increasingly tangible and concrete contingency, so did the pragmatists accelerate and intensify their efforts to incorporate it into a trade-off which would proceed beyond the amorphous and general parameters of the 10 March 1965 accord; this time extracting from Israel such definitive and specific assurances as a commitment not to use any American aircraft sold to Israel for unconventional purposes and operations.

Whereas, during the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the 10 March 1965 agreement, the administration concentrated on the need to place the Dimona reactor under IAEA controls, the focus of its activity in the aftermath of this accord shifted gradually to the question of 'the next US visit [to] Dimona.'[51] This issue had continuously preoccupied President Kennedy and had precipitated a serious crisis, in the spring of 1963, between the American President and Prime Minister BenGurion.[52] Thus, although President Johnson, in his message of 21 May 1965 to Prime Minister Eshkol, renewed the demand that Israel 'place the Dimona reactor and all other nuclear facilities under IAEA controls'[53] and asserted that can initiative by Israel to adopt IAEA safeguards would be in its own interest, since it would help assure Israel's long-term security by removing the threatening shadow of nuclear war in the Near East,'[54] the fact that the Israeli Prime Minister remained irrevocably opposed to this idea convinced the administration to change course and to concentrate instead on the 'question of a Dimona inspection'[55] by American scientists as the major 'nuclear prerequisite' for the Skyhawk deal.

The emergence, in late 1965 and early 1966, of the 'issue of the unilateral [American] inspection [of Dimona]'[56] as an essential part of the linkage

which the pragmatists sought to establish between Dimona and the Skyhawk in the aftermath of the collapse of the French aircraft option (and as an alternative to the IAEA prerequisite), was not accidental. Although the most recent inspection of Dimona, which was conducted on 28 January 1965, by 'three government scientists,' found 'no evidence of further [plutonium] extraction from irradiated fuel apart from some basic work in progress in the extensive plutonium research facilities,'[57] the fact that the American inspecting team discovered that the Dimona site 'has excellent development and production capability that warrants continued surveillance at maximum intervals of one year,'[58] alarmed both the pragmatists and the traditionalists.[59]

Indeed, despite the fact that the American inspectors of Dimona concluded that there 'appears to be no near-term possibility of a weapons development program at the Dimona site,'[60] some of their findings concerning 'the interesting changes,' that had taken place at the site 'since the previous [American] visit' as well as the reactor's 'production capability,'[61] converged with the fragments of information about Israel's nuclear plans, which had been recently gathered by the American intelligence community.[62]

The January 1965 inspection was incapable of conclusively dispersing this innate ambiguity; furthermore, Prime Minister Eshkol warned, in the course of his 22 April 1965 meeting with Assistant Secretary Talbot, that 'the Israeli Government could not foreswear nuclear weapon development in the absence of binding [American] security guarantees.'[63] The administration therefore ultimately opted to concentrate its efforts on the one and only aspect of the nuclear issue, namely, the continued inspection of Dimona, where a pattern of a qualified Israeli compliance[64] with American demands had already been established in January 1964. Although the administration considered the system 'of IAEA controls' a preferable alternative to these bilateral [inspection] arrangements,'[65] it decided to proceed in the direction which promised to provoke less resistance from Israel than the IAEA path.

Furthermore, not only did the collapse of the French aircraft option intensify, in late 1965, the American search for a trade-off involving a nuclear component, but the victory that Prime Minister Eshkol's party (MAPAI) secured in the 2 November 1965 Israeli Parliamentary elections eliminated from the domestic Israeli scene, in a single stroke, a major constraint which—during the months preceding the elections—had considerably restricted the Prime Minister's margin of maneuverability and latitude of choice as regards nuclear power. On the eve of the elections and against the backdrop of the recent defection of former Prime Minister

Ben-Gurion from MAPAI (and of his harsh attacks on Prime Minister Eshkol 'for compromising Israel's nuclear sovereignty'[66]), the Prime Minister began to procrastinate regarding American demands to inspect Dimona once again. His stance was particularly affected by the fact that the January 1965 inspection of Dimona had been leaked to the American press in March 1965 and profoundly embarrassed him. Now, in the wake of his sweeping electoral victory, he was potentially capable of embarking upon a more flexible nuclear course. Thus, with the threatening and challenging shadow of former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion quickly receding into the background, a window of opportunity was apparently opened for American diplomacy to extract concrete commitments in exchange for the Skyhawk.

Indeed, shortly after the Israeli elections had taken place, the administration renewed its request for an additional inspection of Dimona and forcefully reiterated the President's request, incorporated in his message of 21 May 1965 to Prime Minister Eshkol, 'to make such visits [of Dimona] on a regular basis.'[67] However, Prime Minister Eshkol continued (for a while) to procrastinate, explaining initially that 'he needed time to put together his new government'[68] and claiming later (after his new government was formed) that, as the January 1965 inspection had remained secret for merely two months before it was leaked, on 14 March 1965, to the *New York Times*, 'formal guarantees that complete secrecy would be observed by all agencies of the US Government' had to be obtained before the inspection could take place.[69] In addition to this, Prime Minister Eshkol —following the footsteps of his predecessor in 1963—refused to address the repeated American request to institutionalize the inspections by permitting 'regularly scheduled semiannual visits' of Dimona.[70]

Faced with this continued procrastination, in December 1965 the pragmatists intensified their search for a trade-off which would link the sale of the Skyhawk fighter-bomber to an Israeli nuclear commitment. Whereas both the traditionalists and the pragmatists shared the view that the Israeli Government should invite American experts 'to visit Dimona again as soon as possible,'[71] only the pragmatists envisioned the inspection not as an end in itself, but as an integral and necessary part of the desired Skyhawk transaction. Thus, although Komer (like Rusk) occasionally resorted to harsh rhetoric in his efforts to expedite the Dimona inspection,[72] this rhetoric constituted nothing more than the coercive component in an intricate and multifaceted bargaining strategy which was predicated, in its essence, upon his belief that 'circumstances will probably demand that we end up selling some aircraft to the Israelis.'[73]

Against the backdrop of the administration's escalating rhetoric and repeated assertion that the matter of 'these regular visits [to Dimona]' was

of 'utmost importance' which 'transcends other [issues] in our relationship,'[74] Prime Minister Eshkol—while seeking to postpone the inspection for approximately two months—agreed, in late January 1966, 'to undertake arrangements' for the forthcoming visit.[75] It was on the basis of this agreement that the final phase of the American-Israeli bargaining over the specific terms of the deal culminated in Washington in February 1966.

The groundwork for the Skyhawk package was laid in February 1966, during the visit to Washington of the recently appointed Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, which exposed differences in style and emphasis between the traditionalists and the pragmatists. Secretary Rusk, the quintessential and immutable traditionalist, who still 'saw dangers in the selling [to Israel] of the A-4E [Skyhawk],'[76] resorted to strong language in alluding to 'Israel's attitude on proliferation.' Thus, the Secretary of State repeatedly warned that 'Israel should expect the US to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on the matter of non-proliferation' and that 'the US could not be silent on its attitude toward proliferation'[77] at a time when it was considering the making even a qualified commitment to sell the Skyhawk fighter-bomber to Israel.

Focusing almost exclusively on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, Secretary Rusk expressed dissatisfaction with the Israeli commitment (incorporated into the 10 March 1965 accord) not to be the first party to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab—Israel area, comparing it 'to eight months of pregnancy,' namely, to a situation which would enable it to produce nuclear weapons within a short period of time.[78]

By comparison, President Johnson's meeting, of 9 February 1966, with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, was characterized by a far warmer atmosphere, and the President's remarks were permeated with empathy, friendship and goodwill toward Israel. According to the memorandum of this conversation, the President said that 'he wanted to do everything he reasonably could for Israel…[and] did not want the Israelis to feel insecure.' Reiterating his determination to 'live up to our commitments to small countries'[79] such as Israel and SouthVietnam, President Johnson gave a clear impression of intimacy and convergence within the American-Israeli framework that was fundamentally different from Secretary Rusk's vision of the dyad (as shown in the course of his conversation, of the same day, with Foreign Minister Eban). The latter conversation was fraught with suspicion and friction over a variety of issues, ranging from the desired terms of the Skyhawk package, to Israel's lukewarm approach to the government of South Vietnam.[80]

Three days later, on 12 February 1966, the ambiguity and contradictory signals finally faded into the background as Secretary of Defense McNamara outlined, in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eban, the specific terms of the proposed package (which fully reflected Komer's thinking and preferences). In its essence, the formula presented by Secretary McNamara constituted a trade-off between the administration's readiness to sell Israel 24 A-4E Skyhawks (and to give it the option of purchasing 24 additional fighter-bombers), and Israel's reformulated commitment of 10 March 1965 'not to be the first power in the Middle East to manufacture nuclear weapons.'[81] (The 10 March 1965 accord referred to the introduction and not to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons). In addition, the Secretary of Defense demanded—as part of 'the…conditions [which] would attach to our willingness to make this sale'—that Israel 'accept the need for periodic visits' by US scientists to Dimona and further agree not to use any 'US-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier.'[82]

Although the Israeli Government viewed 'the McNamara conditions' as an appropriate basis for agreement,[83] it remained opposed to the 'condition' concerning the 'periodic visits' to Dimona.[84] This opposition (which reflected the traditional Israeli approach dating back to the Kennedy era) necessitated additional negotiations between Ambassador Harman, the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Ephraim Evron and several pragmatists, including Komer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Townsend W. Hoopes.

As a result of these negotiations, a compromise was finally reached on 17 March 1966—one year (and one week) after the Komer-Eshkol Memorandum of Understanding concerning the structure of the agreement had been concluded. Unlike the 10 March 1965 agreement, the Skyhawk accord did not comprise a single formal document but was in fact embodied, in its core, in a 'basic letter,' which was submitted on 17 March 1966 by Ambassador Harman to Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes. While Harman's letter, in its opening paragraph, reaffirmed Israel's undertaking of 10 March 1965 'not to be the first power to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East,' it did not include any reference to the issue of the 'Dimona visits.'[85]

Indeed, whereas the Ambassador's letter did specifically reaffirm most of the 'conditions' that were outlined by Secretary McNamara in his 12 February 1966 meeting with Foreign Minister Eban, including the Israeli agreement 'not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier,'[86] it refrained from endorsing—directly or by implication—Secretary McNamara's condition that Israel 'accept the need for periodic visits [of Dimona].'[87] Instead, the issue was decoupled from the material

core of the agreement (namely, from Ambassador Harman's 'basic letter' of 17 March 1966) and was addressed in a separate message (which, together with several other statements and letters, accompanied the 17 March 1966 basic document[88]), which the Israeli Ambassador submitted on 11 April 1966 to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Raymond A. Hare.[89] Not only was the 'inspection issue' removed from the core of the agreement, but the Israeli position—which was quintessentially manifested in the 11 April 1966 document—fell considerably short of the traditionalists' long-standing expectations that the Skyhawk deal would guarantee 'routine semiannual visits long enough and with sufficient access to meet our inspection requirements.'[90]

Ambassador Harman was irrevocably opposed to any form of institutionalized inspection, and his message of 11 April 1966 to Assistant Secretary Hare merely agreed to visits to Dimona 'from time to time,' [91] a formula which guaranteed that Israel would continue to control the timing, duration and frequency of future American inspections. And although—in accordance with Prime Minister Eshkol's promise of January 1966—a team of American scientists finally inspected the Dimona facility on 2 April 1966, shortly before Ambassador Harman's letter was delivered to Assistant Secretary Hare,[92] this apparent gesture of goodwill and desire to alleviate American doubts and suspicions could not obscure the fact that, in the final analysis and notwithstanding its reciprocal ingredients, the Skyhawk agreement (including its attachments) most profoundly exposed the limits and bounds, beyond which Israel was unwilling to proceed despite continued and intensive American pressure.

Indeed, while Israel was prepared to accept a linkage between some of the conventional and nuclear components which comprised, in the aggregate, its overall strategic posture, it remained adamant in its refusal to accept any 'conditions' in the form of either periodic inspections of Dimona or IAEA controls and safeguards which could severely restrict its margin of maneuverability and latitude of choice in core security matters. Unwilling to acquiesce in an issue which was defined by the Israeli leadership as inextricably related to vital strategic interests, Israel ultimately prevailed in this encounter (as was the case in the 10 March 1965 agreement) despite intensive American efforts and pressures (exerted primarily by the traditionalists). In the words of Assistant Secretary John McNaughton, which shed light on the Israeli perspective of what was at stake:

> Prime Minister Eshkol was said to be particularly adamant in refusing a formal written agreement which might indicate to future historians that he bargained away Israel's future nuclear policy and opened the

> Dimona facility to US inspection for the sake of 'a mere 48 airplanes'.[93]

The Skyhawk deal was formally announced in Washington on 20 May 1966.[94] Ironically, both the traditionalists and some of the Israeli participants in the negotiations leading to the agreement remained unhappy with the 'inspection issue,' albeit for the opposite reasons. Whereas Secretary Rusk was frustrated with the administration's inability to compel Israel to agree to 'periodic visits' to Dimona, the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Ephraim Evron, bitterly complained, in the aftermath of the accord, that the American effort to incorporate into the Skyhawk agreement 'conditions and commitments on our part, affronted our honor and national pride.'[95] As in the case of the M-48 A tank sale, it was the pragmatists who emerged victorious from the bargaining over the Skyhawk fighter-bomber, with their preferred strategy of linkage ultimately forming the essence of the decision. In McNaughton's words, which clearly elucidate this pragmatist perspective:

> Notwithstanding these concessions [embedded in Ambassador Harman's letter of April 11, 1966, to Assistant Secretary Hare] aimed at assuaging the sensitivities of a small nation, we are satisfied that the conditions set forth by the President and yourself [McNamara] are fully incorporated in the agreements.[96]

Finally, although the Skyhawk deal was presented and 'sold' by the traditionalists as nothing more than 'a deviation' from the traditional American arms sales posture, the cumulative impact of the Hawk deal, the M-48A tank transaction and the Skyhawk sale was the establishment of a *de facto* patron-client strategic relationship in the American-Israeli sphere *before* the outbreak of the Six Day War in June 1967. Thus, notwithstanding Secretary Rusk's repeated efforts to downplay the magnitude and significance of the Skyhawk sale, it is clear in retrospect that the deal—coming in the wake of the M-48A tank transaction— provided a new impetus for predicating the American-Israeli framework upon new political and strategic premises and thus represented, according to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, 'a development of tremendous political value.'[97]

NOTES

1. Johnson's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 21 February 1965 to Komer and Harriman, *FRUS* 18:343. See also Rusk's memorandum of 1 February 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:283–7.
2. Johnson's words. Quoted from his telephone conversation of 20 February 1965 with Feinberg, *FRUS* 18:342 (editorial note; see also note 117 to chapter 2).
3. Harriman's words. Quoted from his telegram of 28 February 1965 to Johnson and Rusk, *FRUS* 18:359. In recommending the sale of American fighter-bombers to Israel, Harriman states that Komer shared this view.
4. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 1 March 1965 to Harriman, *FRUS* 18:366. As was the case in the American-Israeli accord of 10 March 1965, the reference to the administration's commitment to sell planes to Jordan, which was incorporated into the 18 March 1965 American-Jordanian agreement, was of a general nature. It was only in the 1 April 1966 American-Jordanian agreement that the administration became formally and specifically committed to the sale. On the specific terms of the 1 April 1966 sale, see the memorandum which was submitted on 31 March 1966 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John T. McNaughton, to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:571–3; Haim Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane: The Procurement of the First American Aircraft', in Zeev Lahish and Meir Amitai (eds), *Decade of Disquiet: Studies in the History of the Israel Air Force, 1957–1967* (Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense's Publication House, 1995), p. 415 [Hebrew].
5. Komer's words. Quoted from his telegram of 28 February 1965 to Johnson and Rusk (which supplemented Harriman's telegram of the same day), *FRUS* 18:336.
6. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 3 March 1965 to Komer, *FRUS* 18:378. See also Komer's memorandum of 29 July 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:483.
7. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:399.
8. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 208.
9. Ibid.
10. Quoted from the memorandum that was submitted on 6 May 1965 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:449. See also Talbot's words in the memorandum of his conversation of 19 May 1965 with Harman. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 3–5.
11. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 5 June 1965 to the American Embassies in Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Bonn. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2. See also Ball's telegram of 12 May 1965 to the American Ambassador in Israel, Walworth Barbour.

RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1; Rusk's telegram of 8 May 1965 to Barbour. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.

12. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 5 June 1965 to the American Embassies in Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Bonn. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2. See also Talbot's remarks in his conversation of 5 May 1965 with Harman. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. See also Ball's telegram of 12 May 1965 to Barbour. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–2; Rusk's telegram of 21 April 1965 to Talbot. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2.
13. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 18 June 1965 to Bohlen. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. Ibid. See also Ball's telegram of 12 May 1965 to Barbour. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–2; Barbour's telegram of 16 November 1965 to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
16. The reference to Rusk's view was made by Komer. Quoted from his memorandum of 29 July 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:483. See also Rusk's telegram of 27 August 1965 to the American Embassies in Paris, Amman, and Tel Aviv. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
17. See, for example, Harman's message of 10 June 1965 to Talbot, in which he stated that Israel was unable to find suitable military aircraft in Europe. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. See also Harman's words in the memorandum of his conversation of 19 May 1965 with Talbot. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 3. According to the memorandum of this conversation, Harman told Talbot that 'Israel had shopped in Western Europe [for combat aircraft] and found nothing suitable.' It is interesting to note that the first initiative on the issue was taken by the American manufacturer of the Skyhawk, the Douglas Corporation, which in 1963 provided information about the performance of the A-4D type to the Israeli Aerial Attache in Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Cantridge (Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', pp. 386–8).
18. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 208.
19. Ibid., p. 209; Rusk's telegram of 14 October 1965 to the American Embassies in Tel Aviv, Paris and London. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1; Rusk's telegram of 21 October 1965 to the American Embassies in Tel Aviv, Paris and London. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12, Jordan, USNA: 2; Rusk's telegram of 25 October 1965 to the American Embassies in Amman, Tel Aviv, Paris and London. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12, Jordan, USNA: 1. See also, in this connection, Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', pp. 392–3.

20. Quoted from the memorandum which was submitted on 14 October 1965 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, to Ambassador at Large Llewellyn L.Thompson. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. See also Komer's memorandum of 18 October 1965 for the record. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 1–4.
21. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 209. See also Kitchen's message of 14 October 1965 to Thompson. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1; Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', pp. 395–6. For an earlier explanation of Weizman's views, as articulated in November 1964, see Barbour's telegram of 6 November 1964 to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 7, US-Israel, USNA: 1.
22. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 209. See also Kitchen's message of 14 October 1965 to Thompson. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1; Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', p. 405.
23. Kitchen's message of 14October 1965 toThompson. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–2; Komer's memorandum of 18 October 1965 for the record. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 2–3. See also Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', pp. 392–3,405–8. On the debate, which divided the Israeli defense establishment in 1965, between proponents of the French and American orientations, see Eban, *An Autobiography,* p. 299.
24. Komer's words. Quoted from his 18 October 1965 memorandum for the record. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 3.
25. Ibid., p. 4. See also the memorandum submitted on 28 December 1965 by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Raymond A.Hare, to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2.
26. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 21 October 1965 to the American Embassies in Paris, London and Tel Aviv. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2. Barbour's telegram to Rusk, of 16 November 1965, indicates that the administration's policy of exploring the European market prior to any American commitment to supply planes to Israel, was scrupulously carried out. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
27. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 21 October 1965 to the American Embassies in Paris, London and Tel Aviv. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 2. On its part, Israel repeatedly reiterated, in the immediate aftermath of Weizman's visit, that 'there simply [were] no French planes in production or otherwise available', and that there was no justification for the continued American 'attempt to delay the supply of US planes.' (Meir's words. Quoted by Barbour in his telegram of 29 October 1965 to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA:l.)

28. This reference to the views of the Department of State was made by Komer. Quoted from his memorandum of 25 October 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:508. See also Komer's memorandum of 28 October 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:511.
29. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 8 February 1966 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 1.
30. Bohlen's words. Quoted from his telegram of 9 November 1965 to the Department of State. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. Concurrently, the American Embassy in London reported to Washington, on 4 November 1965, that the British Government was opposed to the 'possible sale to Israel of the Buccaneer strike aircraft because of its potential nuclear capability' RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. See also Rusk's telegram of 29 October 1965 to Bohlen. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1; Bohlen's telegram of 29 October 1965 to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–2.
31. Bohlen's words. Quoted from his telegram of 29 October 1966 to Rusk. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12, Israel, USNA: 2.
32. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 8 February 1966 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 3. See also Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', pp. 406–8.
33. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 3 November 1965 to the American Embassies in London, Paris and Tel Aviv. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1. See also Bitan's memorandum of 10 January 1966 to Harman and Evron. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:2.
34. Rusk's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting of 11 February 1966 with Johnson and McNamara, *FRUS* 18:551. See also Bitan's memorandum of 10 January 1966 to Harman and Evron. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:2.
35. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 8 February 1966 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 2 (emphasis original). See also Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', p. 412.
36. On Feldman's continued involvement in the planes' sale to Israel see Komer's memorandum of 12 January 1966 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18:533.
37. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 8 February 1966 to Johnson. NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, 1965–66, LBJL: 2.
38. Ibid., p. 3. See also Komer's note to Bundy which was attached to this memorandum.
39. Ibid., p.4.
40. Ibid. (emphasis original).
41. The fact that in October 1965 Komer was appointed as Bundy's Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may have contributed to his dominance in the process.

42. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 134. For an Israeli assessment of Komer's role in the process, see Evron's memorandum of 25 January 1966 to Bitan. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/16:1–2.
43. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 21 January 1966 to Bundy. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1966, LBJL: 2. See also the memorandum of Harman's meeting of 29 December 1965 with Rusk. NSF, The Middle East, Memos and Misc., Israel, 1965, LBJL: 2. On Johnson's role in the sale see Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', p. 412.
44. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 11 February 1966 to McNamara. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1966, LBJL: 1–2 (emphasis original). The A-4F subsonic Skyhawk fighter-bomber was less advanced and significantly cheaper than the F-4 supersonic Phantom fighter-bomber. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 209; Gnizi, 'Choosing a Plane', p. 410.
45. Rusk's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 10 May 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 454 (emphasis original).
46. Quoted from the 10 March 1965 American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, *FRUS* 18:398.
47. Quoted from the memorandum submitted on 5 March 1965 by Davies to Talbot, *FRUS* 18:382.
48. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 183.
49. Rusk's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 10 May 1965 to Johnson, *FRUS* 18: 455.
50. McNamara's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his 12 February 1966 conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban (who was appointed as foreign minister in January 1966), *FRUS* 18:553.
51. Barbour's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting of 18 January 1965 with Eban, by Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 210.
52. Ibid., pp. 113–36. See also Shai Feldman, *Israel's Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 218; Shalom, 'Kennedy, BenGurion and the Dimona Project, 1962–1963', p. 9.
53. Johnson's words. Quoted from his 21 May 1965 message to Eshkol, *FRUS* 18:463. In this message, Johnson referred to the issue of IAEA controls as 'a preferable alternative to these bilateral arrangements'; namely, to an American inspection of Dimona.
54. *FRUS* 18:464. See also Rusk's telegram of 21 April 1965 to Barbour. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
55. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 27 January 1966 to Barbour; see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 211. On Johnson's disappointment with Eshkol's message of 26 July 1965, see Rusk's telegram of 30 July 1965 to Barbour, *FRUS* 18:484.
56. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 254.
57. Ibid., p. 182.
58. Ibid., pp. 182–3.

59. See, for example, Talbot's memorandum of 30 April 1965 to Rusk, *FRUS* 18:447.
60. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 182.
61. Ibid., pp. 181–2.
62. Ibid., p. 183.
63. Eshkol's words. Quoted in Talbot's telegram of 23 April 1965 to the Department of State, in which he summarized his conversation with Eshkol which took place in Tel Aviv on 22 April 1965, *FRUS* 18:447, note 3.
64. The American team of inspectors who visited Dimona in January 1965 complained that 'Israeli officials did not allow adequate time for a thorough inspection of the Dimona site and arranged no visits to sites of projected related facilities', and that 'Israeli officials ruled questions about procurement of uranium from abroad "outside the scope of the visits".' (Quoted from a Department of State memorandum which was submitted on 4 February 1965 to Bundy; see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 183.)The first inspection of the Dimona site by a team of American scientists took place on 18 January 1964 (Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* pp. 177–80).
65. Johnson's words. Quoted from his 21 May 1965 message to Eshkol, *FRUS* 18:463.
66. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 222.
67. Johnson's words. Quoted from his 21 May 1965 message to Eshkol, *FRUS* 18:463.
68. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 185.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Barbour's words. Quoted from his telegram of 19 January 1966 to Rusk, which summarized his meeting of 18 January 1966 with Eban; see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 210.
72. See, for example, Evron's message of 9 December 1965 to Bitan of his conversation of 8 December 1965 with Komer. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/20:2. See also Evron's complaints of the administration's procrastinating tactics in his message of 23 December 1965 to Bitan. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3502/2:1.
73. Komer's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 21 January 1966 to Bundy, *FRUS* 18:538.
74. Barbour's words. Quoted from his telegram of 19 January 1966 to Rusk, which summarized his meeting of 18 January 1966 with Eban; see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 210.
75. Ibid.
76. Rusk's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting of 11 February 1965 with Johnson and McNamara *FRUS* 18:551.
77. Rusk's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting of 9 February 1965 with Rusk, *FRUS* 18:549–50.
78. Ibid., p. 550. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* pp. 210–12.

79. Johnson's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting of 9 February 1966 with Eban, *FRUS* 518:548–9.
80. See, in this connection, Judith A.Klinghoffer, *Vietnam, Jews and the Middle East: Unintended Consequences* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999).
81. McNamara's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation of 12 February 1966 with Eban, *FRUS* 18:552–3. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 212.
82. McNamara's words. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation of 12 February 1966 with Eban, *FRUS* 18:553. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 212.
83. See Harman's remarks of 4 March 1966 in the memorandum of his conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes and Komer. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.
84. Ibid., p. 1. See also Evron's remarks of 14 March 1966 in the memorandum of his conversation with Davies. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–2. In his comprehensive memorandum of 8 April 1966 to Bitan, Evron complained about the administration's effort to incorporate into the Skyhawk agreement 'conditions and commitments on our part [which] affronted our honor and national pride.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/9:4.
85. For a discussion of the Israeli draft of the Harman-Hoopes exchange of letters, see the memorandum of the conversation which took place on 12 March 1966 between Harman, Evron, Hoopes and Davies. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1–5.
86. Ibid., p. 5.
87. Ibid., pp. 1, 5. See also the memorandum which was submitted on 31 March 1966 by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, JohnT.McNaughton, to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:571–3.
88. The reference to the additional documents in the agreement is made in *FRUS* 18:572, note 3.
89. See Harman's letter of 11 April 1966 to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Raymond A.Hare, *FRUS* 18:572 (note 5).
90. Rusk's words. Quoted from his telegram of 19 March 1966 to Barbour; see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 186.
91. Harman's words. Quoted from his message of 11 April 1966 to Hare, *FRUS* 18:572 (note 5).
92. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* pp. 186,213. As was the case in the aftermath of the January 1965 inspection, the April 1966 inspection was soon leaked to the *New York Times.* The same journalist—John W.Finney, who, on 14 March 1965, informed the readers of the *New York Times* of the 28 January 1965 inspection—disclosed the 2 April 1966 inspection three months later. See also, for a preliminary report of the 2 April 1966 inspection, the memorandum which was submitted on 4 May 1966 by the Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Joseph F.Carroll, to McNamara, *FRUS* 18: 582–3.

93. McNaughton's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 31 March 1966 to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:571.
94. The 20 May 1966 announcement followed the announcement which was made on 2 April 1966 of the American sale to Jordan of 36 F-104 interceptors. On the actual implementation of the Skyhawk deal, see Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence,* p. 180; Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace,* pp. 202–3.
95. Evron's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 8 April 1966 to Bitan. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3975/9:4. In his meeting of 24 April 1966 with Barbour and Hare, Eshkol was similarly critical of the agreement and 'chided the USG for selling only 48 planes rather than the full number it had requested, noting that his people would not see the planes for two years anyway.' (Quoted from the memorandum of the 24 April 1966 conversation. RG59, Records of the Department of State, DEF 12–15, Israel, USNA: 1.)
96. McNaughton's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 31 March 1966 to McNamara, *FRUS* 18:572. For evidence of the administration's effort, of December 1966, to reopen the deal in view of the Israeli retaliatory raid that took place on 14 November 1966 on the village of Samo'a, see Amir Oren, 'Yellow Peril, Black Box', *Ha'aretz,* 5 May 2000: B7 [Hebrew].
97. Eban's words. Quoted from his memorandum of 13 February 1966 to Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4332/5:2.

4
Beyond the F-4 Phantom Fighter-Bomber: The Changing Dynamics of the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel

As in the cases of the sale to Israel of the M-48A tank and the Skyhawk fighter-bomber, the road toward the Israeli acquisition (in November 1968) of 50 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers illustrates how, during the second half of the 1960s, American-Israeli relations did not develop along a single linear path. Rather, they incorporated two occasionally conflicting and incompatible dimensions, with the policies and politics of arms sales repeatedly surfacing as a major constraint, if not a major stumbling block, *en route* to the further consolidation of the *de facto* strategic and political alliance between Washington and Jerusalem. Indeed, during his tenure as President, Lyndon Baines Johnson repeatedly indicated that he shared the premises which formed the core of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and was therefore predisposed, in late May 1967, to give his 'tacit blessing' to Israel's decision 'to go to war' as soon as he became convinced that 'all diplomatic efforts to avert war were futile.'[1]

This supportive attitude was fundamentally incompatible with the far-reaching coercive and punitive tactics used by President Eisenhower *vis-à-vis* the Ben-Gurion Government during, and in the aftermath of, the 1956 Israeli-Egyptian Sinai War.[2] It was once again apparent in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 Six Day War, when President Johnson repeatedly underscored the need to link any Israeli withdrawal from 'her territorial gains' in the 1967 War to tangible and meaningful 'Arab diplomatic concessions' to Israel.[3]

Notwithstanding these indications of political and diplomatic support (which reflected the overwhelming support for, and identification with, Israel in American public opinion and was particularly salient and pronounced in the wake of the Six Day War), and notwithstanding the apparent emergence of 'a special patron-client relationship' within the American-Israeli framework during the period which followed the 1967 War,[4] it became increasingly evident in 1968 that the field of arms sales remained at least partially decoupled and divorced from other components

of the dyad and did not fully reflect the requirements embedded in this new patron-client relationship. Indeed, as was the case during the early years of the Johnson era, the President's repeatedly expressed determination to stand 'foursquare behind Israel on all matters that affected its vital security interests'[5] and his unabated conviction that 'Nasser was unreliable, untrustworthy, and undefendable'[6] did not invariably precipitate a derivative and fully compatible arms sales policy toward the Eshkol Government.

Thus, while President Johnson was predisposed to approach the Middle East, in the wake of the 1967 conflagration, in pure-bipolar terms—with Israel continuously depicted as the most reliable regional bulwark in the omnivorous, all-important global American effort to contain the forces of recalcitrance, radicalism and militancy and their local proxies and allies—this vision was neither immediately nor automatically translated into a fully compatible policy designed to ensure that Israel was indeed provided with all the weaponry needed in order to effectively contain Soviet penetration and encroachment.[7]

President Johnson's unabated preoccupation with the deepening quagmire inVietnam consumed most of his time and attention, and prevented him from uninterruptedly and forcefully shaping the American strategic posture in the Middle East. However, in the wake of the Six Day War, he wanted to stabilize the highly volatile situation along the Arab—Israeli front (and thus to control the risks of escalation inherent in continued tension between the Middle East protagonists) by establishing a diplomatic framework for managing and—if possible—mitigating the protracted and highly dangerous Arab-Israeli predicament along lines which were not always acceptable to the Eshkol Government.[8]

The President's inability to personally and continuously conduct American policy in the Arab-Israeli sphere contributed to the relative dominance of the traditionalist faction within the administration, and the intensifying American effort to stabilize and defuse a situation permeated with animosity and charged with tension in the aftermath of the 1967 War exposed differences between both the pragmatists and the traditionalists, on the one hand, and the Israeli Government on the other, over a broad range of security topics. These included: the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories; the permanent status of Jerusalem; the desired format and nature of the envisioned Arab-Israeli negotiations; and the shaping and specific components of the permanent (or interim) settlement. These differences occasionally prompted administration officials to seek concurrent trade-offs between the supply of the Phantom and Israel's compliance on such issues as the Jarring mission; however, the repeatedly expressed desire not to reach

'implicit or explicit agreements…for the sale of these aircraft' unless Israel agreed to fully cooperate with 'the Jarring UN mission' did not culminate, in 1968, in a coherent, far-reaching linkage posture on these post-1967 clusters of issues.[9]

Against the backdrop of these differences and constraints, the link between President Johnson's initial beliefs and his vision of Israel and the more specific delineated context—within which concrete decisions concerning Israel, the region and the peace process were made—became increasingly tenuous. It was against this conceptual, structural and organizational background (combined with the fact that the President was free from electoral considerations in the aftermath of his March 1968 decision not to seek re-election) that the American-Israeli bargaining over the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber unfolded. Such apparent anomalies as the administration's decision to procrastinate during most of 1968 on the Israeli request to purchase the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber despite the growing Soviet military involvement in Egypt, can also be explained against a background of the occasional incompatibility between considerations arising from the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and those pertaining to the American national interest orientation.[10]

Although several new actors entered the bargaining scene between the Johnson Administration and the Eshkol Government over the issue of the supply of 50 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel in 1968—including Walt W.Rostow who, in 1966, replaced McGeorge Bundy as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Harold H.Saunders who, in 1968, was acting as the NSC's Middle Eastern expert while his predecessor, Robert W.Komer, who played a pivotal role in the sale of arms to Israel during the period preceding the War, was now serving as Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Reconstruction inVietnam—they did not change its basic structure or inherent behavioral patterns, as repeatedly shown in the instances of the M-48A tank and the Skyhawk. It is indeed remarkable that despite the profound changes that took place in Israel's strategic and political environment in the aftermath of the Six Day War—such as the transformation of the Israeli-Arab conflict into a highly salient and pressing international issue directly involving the superpowers as well as all other major powers, which was clearly manifested in Resolution 242, passed unanimously by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, and the subsequent appointment, by the Security Council, of the Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Gunnar Jarring, as its special representative for implementing this resolution—the American-Israeli Phantom negotiations in 1968 still revolved around many, albeit not all, of the issues which had preoccupied American and Israeli diplomats during

the years immediately preceding the Six Day War. King Hussein's threat to defect to the Eastern bloc unless provided with advanced American weapons;[11] the persistent American effort to link any new arms deal to Israeli concessions in the nuclear sphere; and the traditionalists' unabated fear that the deal would further accelerate the Arab-Israeli arms race—these were but three of the issues and concerns which continued to engage American and Israeli negotiators throughout 1968 after comprising a major part of the bargaining agenda concerning the sale to Israel of the M-48A tank and the Skyhawk fighter-bomber.

Indeed, not only were at least some of the American and Israeli negotiating tactics similar, if not identical, in all three episodes, but the outcome of the 1968 process also essentially matched the way in which the bargaining was concluded in 1965 and 1966. In other words, for all the heated rhetoric and the pressures occasionally exerted by the traditionalists and, to a lesser extent, the pragmatists (particularly in the context of the nuclear predicament which—as in the not-too-distant past—emerged as the thorniest obstacle on the road toward an agreement), Israel remained irreconcilably committed to its pre-existing nuclear posture, unwilling to significantly modify or augment its long-standing pledge 'not to be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons.'[12]

The administration showed a growing willingness, in late 1968, to rely upon coercive rhetoric as its principal bargaining vehicle *vis-à-vis* the Israeli Government. This approach was most clearly manifested in the demand made by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul C.Warnke, in his meeting of 8 November 1968 with Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, that Israel 'agree to a US presence in and supervision of every Israeli arms-manufacturing installation and every defense institution engaged in research, development, or manufacture—including civilian research institutions'.[13] However, no change in the traditional Israeli position was forthcoming. Faced with these intrusive and far-reaching demands, the Eshkol Government remained adamant and irreconcilable in its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) as a prerequisite for obtaining the Phantom fighter-bomber, regardless of the cost involved.

As in the case of the M-48A tank and the Skyhawk fighter-bomber, the Johnson Administration was the side which finally acquiesced in the face of a highly resolved and determined Israeli Government, which repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to bear the political and military consequences of its defiance. Prime Minister Eshkol successfully resisted, in 1965 and 1966, American demands that Israel accept IAEA safeguards and controls in all its nuclear facilities; and, in late 1968, at the end of the protracted and

occasionally fierce bargaining over the sale of the Phantom fighter-bomber, he also managed to separate the arms deal from any linkage to the question of Israel's acceptance of the NPT and its intrusive safeguards system.[14]

In trying to account for this recurrent American inability to coerce Israel into acquiescence, it is evident that in addition to Israel's intrinsic risk calculations and perceptions of what its vital security interests required, the outcome of these negotiations reflected the basic compatibility and congruence between a complex of strategic considerations. These considerations were largely derived from the growing vision of Israel as a major asset to the West in a region fraught with radicalism and militancy, and a cluster of normative and affective considerations, which were closely patterned on the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and its organizational attributes and manifestations.

This convergence between the views of most, albeit not all, of the pragmatist policy-makers and the domestically oriented participants in the decision-making process concerning the sale of arms to Israel, therefore constituted the main factor that contributed to the eventual victory of the 'soft-liners' in the intragovernmental bargaining over American arms sales policy. These 'soft-liners', who ultimately managed to form a winning coalition in both the M-48A tank, the Skyhawk and the Phantom instances, remained supportive of the sale to Israel of advanced weapons systems even without a full Israeli compliance with all the requirements embedded in the strategy of a symmetrical quid pro quo or trade-off between the arms supplied and the nature of the Israeli concessions (particularly in the nuclear field).

In other words, the fact that the Israeli side ultimately managed to prevail in most of the encounters which revolved around the issue of the appropriate linkage between the provision of American arms and the nature, scope and magnitude of Israel's contribution to the transaction, cannot be exclusively attributed to Prime Minister Eshkol's high level of resolve and his determination not to compromise on the matters he viewed as inextricably related to vital security interests. Rather, it was also the outcome of the American administration's self-imposed restraint and innate unwillingness to cross the Rubicon by embarking upon an unrestrained coercive posture toward Israel.

It was, indeed, the relative dominance of the pragmatists (combined with the growing involvement of domestically oriented individuals and groups in this bargaining process during most of the 1960s), which ensured that the strategy of quid pro quo, to which the Johnson Presidency remained consistently committed, would be pursued and implemented in a highly restricted fashion, without making the sale of arms to Israel contingent upon

a major reorientation of Israel's security posture.[15] Thus, during the Johnson (as well as the Kennedy) era, it was this combination of Israel's unwavering determination not to deviate from basic tenets of its security posture, and Washington's own reluctance to pursue a 'pure', far-reaching coercive policy toward Jerusalem, which was largely responsible for the sale of American missiles, tanks and air-craft to the Ben-Gurion and Eshkol Governments without a reciprocal Israeli move of a similar magnitude or significance.

Notwithstanding this basic similarity in terms of the structure, content and outcome of the bargaining over the sale of American arms to Israel during the Johnson period, the differences between the specific and intrinsic issues debated in the cases under review, as well as between the tactical means and methods used by the various participants in the process, should not be ignored or obfuscated. Indeed, although a major part of the American-Israeli negotiating agenda remained unchanged during the entire Johnson era, some of the issues which had continuously preoccupied the participants in the process in 1965 and 1966 (such as the highly-charged Jordan 'Water Crisis') largely faded into the background and disappeared from the diplomatic scene, having been downgraded and outweighed by a new cluster of questions which reflected the political, strategic and territorial ramifications of the Six Day War.[16] And while these post-1967 issues, and particularly those pertaining to Resolution 242 and its appropriate interpretation and implementation, only partially and intermittently surfaced onto the American-Israeli bargaining over the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber in 1968, their inextricable link to the very core of the entire Arab—Israeli predicament guaranteed that they would remain, in future years and decades, an integral and indispensable part of any bargaining agenda in the American-Israeli zone.

Turning now to the sphere of the tactics adopted by the participants in the bargaining, it is clear that both the pragmatists, the traditionalists and the domestically oriented players in this game constantly engaged (albeit not to the same extent) in a twofold process of seeking to influence their Israeli counterparts both directly across the negotiating table and indirectly through leaks, innuendo and other manipulative moves designed to mobilize domestic support for their advocated strategy, in the hope of thereby intensifying the pressure upon the Israeli negotiators to acquiesce.[17]

In the context of these intricate 'two-level games', a major change in the *modus operandi* of the official and unofficial representatives of the domestically oriented participants came to be increasingly manifested during the 1960s. For example, during the period which preceded the bargaining over the Phantom in 1968, the views and opinions of these representatives (who quintessentially reflected the basic premises of the

'Special Relationship' paradigm) were largely articulated by individuals who either held official positions in the administration (such as Myer Feldman who—during the bargaining over the Hawk in 1962—played a critical role in President Kennedy's decision not to link the Hawk sale to any concurrent reciprocal Israeli move[18]) or who maintained close personal ties with President Johnson (such as Democratic party fundraiser and banker Abraham Feinberg, Arthur Krim of Paramount Pictures and David Ginsberg, a prominent Washington lawyer[19]).

By 1968, however, it became clear that the impact and influence of these formal and informal participants in the bargaining over the administration's arms sales policy had somewhat diminished. Prominent as they were, these individuals were now relegated to a supporting role, having been largely downgraded and overshadowed by a broad range of domestically oriented organizations and groups. Inspired by Israel's overwhelming victory in the Six Day War (which made the Jewish State immensely popular among broad segments of American public opinion), a variety of Jewish (and non-Jewish) organizations, as well as Israel's Congressional supporters, became increasingly outspoken during the period following the 1967 conflagration in promoting pro-Israeli positions and legislation.

During the years preceding the Six Day War, the American-Jewish community had not yet appeared on the American national scene as a viable, well-organized and effective political element, and it had been largely unwilling to directly and forcefully challenge official American policies, initiatives and actions which were perceived as detrimental to core Israeli security interests.[20] Notwithstanding its durability, this traditional reluctance to confront, head-on, Washington's diplomacy completely evaporated in the aftermath of the 1967 War. This provided the impetus for the core supporters of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm (and their non-Jewish organizational allies in American society and US Congress) to embark upon a new and far more assertive domestically oriented *modus operandi* in support of, and identification with, the State of Israel in defiance of the administration's policies, priorities and preferences.[21]

The fact that in its bargaining with the Johnson Administration over the Phantom sale, Israel now enjoyed a broad infrastructure of Jewish (and non-Jewish) organizational support was amply demonstrated throughout 1968. As Spiegel points out:

> In the face of the bureaucratic opposition [to the sale], the proIsraeli forces mounted a campaign of their own in 1968… A variety of non-Jewish organizations also endorsed the sale, including Americans for Democratic Action, the American Legion, and the AFL-CIO

> [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]. AIPAC…was active. It obtained statements supporting the sale from every presidential candidate and successfully lobbied for favorable planks at each party convention.[22]

Congress formed another component in this revised bargaining structure, which further augmented and reinforced the activities of Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, pressure groups and lobbies, and also severely restricted the administration's margin of maneuverability in pursuing its strategy of quid pro quo. Congressional intervention in the bargaining over the Phantom sale took the form of a 'sense of the Congress' resolution, which fully supported the sale of 'not less than 50' Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel and was incorporated into the 1968 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act. This indicated that the rules of the bargaining game within the American-Israeli dyad had now been fundamentally altered and that the process would not be confined any longer to a single negotiating table, framework or agenda.[23]

Thus, in the case of the Phantom, at the end of the day it became clear that what transpired in certain exogenous policy and organizational frameworks (such as US Congress) was even more significant in defining the parameters of the outcome than the intrinsic endogenous dynamics of the official intergovernmental bargaining process. In other words, when negotiating the Phantom deal, and when shaping American arms sales policy toward Israel, both the pragmatists and the traditionalists could no longer remain oblivious to the involvement of external, non-governmental organizations and groups, which enjoyed the support of broad segments of American public opinion.

This new reality—shown by the fact that in 1968 the administration could not confine the bargaining process to its original bounds and parameters, and that, consequently, the domestically oriented category now became fully institutionalized and embedded in the activities of numerous organizations—was fully recognized by President Johnson on 9 October 1968. Upon signing the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (into which the 'sense of Congress' resolution supporting the Phantom sale was incorporated), the President stated that he had 'taken note' of this 'sense of Congress' resolution and would ask Secretary Rusk to accelerate 'negotiations with the government of Israel [concerning the Phantom sale].'[24]

Less than a month later, on 7 November 1968, the Phantom deal was indeed concluded. The departing President was acutely sensitive to the prevailing mood on Capitol Hill and to the broad margin of institutional

support for Israel in American public opinion, and ultimately decided not to risk a major confrontation with the Eshkol Government (and US Congress) over the nuclear preconditions for the sale. He thus opted to conclude the agreement without obtaining the desired Israeli pledge to join the NPT.[25]

In view of this Presidential decision to acquiesce and conclude the Phantom deal even in the absence of a fully symmetrical quid pro quo, it is evident that the direct intergovernmental bargaining which took place in the Phantom case—and in numerous similar instances which would unfold in future years and decades—constituted only the tip of the iceberg in a far more intricate and complex game.

The American participants in this game were no longer able to ignore, control or manipulate any longer the plethora of social forces and organizations (or their Congressional partners) which penetrated the bounds of the diplomatic process. They therefore had to adjust some of their views and preferences concerning the merits and dangers inherent in the sale of arms to Israel in view of the dynamics of a broader social, political and ideological setting. On previous occasions when the sale of arms to Israel had been addressed and debated, the perceived views, predilections and preferences of these social groups and forces had comprised an integral part of the attitudinal prism or background of some of the participants in the process (namely, the pragmatists and the domestically-oriented actors). However, in 1968, this social infrastructure transcended and surpassed the level of the implicit, expected and the perceived, and became a tangible part of the bargaining setting, agenda and process.

Thus, rather than operating through surrogates or intermediaries to the administration (as in the case of Myer Feldman), domestically oriented groups and institutions could now directly influence the process by virtue of their organizational activities. In other words, there was no longer any need for a specific appointed liaison to support the 'Special Relationship' paradigm in official Washington—this had now become fully institutionalized, having been converted and transformed, by 1968, into a network of numerous organizations and groups (such as AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations), whose activities enjoyed a broad margin of domestic support.[26]

Against this new social backdrop and the far-reaching changes it precipitated in both the structure and substance of future bargaining over the sale of American arms to Israel, the 1968 Phantom episode has a significance and value far beyond its intrinsic and ideographic tenets and components. By exposing the inability of both the pragmatists and the traditionalists to control the dynamics of the process and to keep it largely

confined to its original intragovernmental and intergovernmental setting, this case clearly illustrated, and most forcefully underscored, the fact that a new bargaining system—predicated upon new rules of the game—had now emerged. As a result, for all its continued efforts to reach symmetrical trade-offs with Israel (or to pursue a posture incorporating coercive elements toward Israel), official Washington would now have to cope with powerful organizational constraints, associated with the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and its derivative domestically oriented attitudes and preferences in the Arab-Israeli sphere.

And, indeed, as in the Phantom case, successive administrations would frequently become compelled, in future crises, to scale down, obfuscate, or altogether abandon certain courses of action *vis-à-vis* Israel in the aftermath of unsuccessful encounters with these institutional constraints. On these occasions (such as the 'Reassessment Crisis' of 1975[27]), American leaders and diplomats were deprived of solid and broadly based domestic support for their symmetrical quid pro quo strategy, and were ultimately unable to induce the Israeli leadership to fundamentally modify its positions. And while successive administrations were relentless in trying to mobilize support for their advocated policies so as to counterbalance the impact of the domestically oriented organizations which supported Israel, these efforts to broaden Washington's margin of maneuverability *vis-à-vis* Israel frequently failed, gradually eliminating from the diplomatic scene the remaining residues of the traditional American arms sales policy in the Middle East.[28]

With the last traces of the original American refusal to become a major arms supplier to the region fading into the background of the American-Israeli relationship during the 1970s, the political pendulum finally completed its swing from being adamantly and irreconcilably opposed, during the 1950s, to the sale of any advanced weapons systems to Israel, to the opposite extreme of being Israel's major supplier of sophisticated weaponry.

NOTES

1. David Tal, 'Paving the Road to War: Israeli Diplomacy and the 1967 Crisis', in Ben-Zvi and Klieman (eds), *Global Politics,* p. 213.
2. On the coercive and punitive posture, which was pursued by the Eisenhower Administration toward the Ben-Gurion Government during, and in the aftermath of, the 1956 Israeli-Egyptian War, see, for example, Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* pp. 49–76; Robert D. Schulzinger, 'The Impact of Suez on United States Middle East Policy, 1957–1958', in Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh (eds), *The Suez-Sinai Crisis, 1956:*

Retrospective and Reappraisal (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 252; Robert R. Bowie, 'Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis', in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 210; William Stivers, 'Eisenhower and the Middle East', in Richard A. Malenson and David Mayers (eds), *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 193; Alteras, 'Eisenhower and the Sinai Campaign of 1956', pp. 30–40; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 50–1.

3. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 153.
4. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948', pp. 236–41.
5. Ibid., p. 238.
6. Johnson's remarks of 7 February 1968. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, 1968, LBJL: 1.
7. Bar-Siman-Tov, The United States and Israel since 1948', p. 241. See also, in this connection, George, 'The Causal nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior', pp. 95–119.
8. For illustration of this approach see, for example, Gazit, *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace,* pp. 204–5; the memorandum of the conversation, which took place on 9 September 1968 between Johnson and Rabin. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 6450/9: 1–3.
9. The reference to the proposed linkage between the supply of the Phantom to Israel's cooperation with the Jarring mission is quoted from the memorandum, which was submitted on 7 January 1968 by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow. NSF, Country File, Israel, 1968. LBJL: 4–5. For an analysis of some of these controversial issues see Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 134–64.
10. For a detailed juxtaposition of the 'Special Relationship' paradigm and the national interest orientation see Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* pp. 15–25.
11. On King Hussein's defection threats and their ramifications within both the American-Jordanian dyad and the American-Israeli framework, see, for example, the memorandum which was submitted, on 11 December 1967, by Acting Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Middle East, Jordan, 1967, LBJL: 1; Saunders's memorandum of 26 December 1967 to Rostow. NSF, Country File, Israel, 1967, LBJL: 1.
12. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 318. Quoted from the message which was sent on 22 November 1968 by Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul C.Warnke.

13. Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs,* p. 143. For a slightly different interpretation of the spirit and letter of the American demands in the 8 November 1968 meeting between Warnke and Rabin, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* p. 313.
14. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb,* pp. 318–21.
15. David Pollock, *The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 36.
16. For reviews of these questions, see, for example, Pollock, *The Politics of Pressure,* pp. 20–32; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 153–8; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 162–8; Quandt, *Peace Process,* pp. 54–8; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 342–9. See also, in this connection, Rostow's memorandum of 7 January 1968 to Johnson. NSF, Country File, Israel, 1968, LBJL: 1–3.
17. For illustrations of the presumed use by the administration of such indirect tactics as leaks, see, for example, Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 132; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* p. 142; Harman's message of 11 February 1965 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3501/9:1; Gazit's message of 22 January 1965 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3533/2:1. For an analysis of the theoretical implications of such 'two-level games', see Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', pp. 431–60.
18. For an analysis of Feldman's contribution to the 1962 Hawk sale, see Ben-Zvi, *Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales,* pp. 74–8.
19. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 128–9.
20. For illustrations see Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* pp. 44–5; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 148–9.
21. On the impact of the Six Day War on the American-Jewish community see, for example, Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 154; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel,* pp. 155–6.
22. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 161. For the text of a public statement which was issued on 17 September 1968 by the executive council of the AFL-CIO in support of the sale and which argued that the Phantom fighter-bombers 'were vitally needed for deterring aggression and preserving [Israel's] national existence', see ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 6556/7:1.
23. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 162–3. See also Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line,* pp. 218–20. For the views and assessments of the Israeli Embassy in Washington of the Congressional involvement in the Phantom issue, see ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 6556/75 (particularly the memoranda of 25 July 1968,2 August 1968 and 18 September 1968).
24. Johnson's statement of 9 October 1968. Quoted by Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* p. 163.
25. For reviews of additional cases, in which the US Congress undertook pro-Israeli measures and initiatives in future years and decades, see, for example, Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* pp. 18–20; Trice,

Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process, p. 57; Reich, *The United States and Israel,* pp. 190–1; Organski, *Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel,* pp. 78,83; Marvin C.Feuerwerger, *Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969–1976* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 76–106.

26. Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* p. 17; Reich, *The United States and Israel,* p. 202; Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East,* p. 66.
27. For an analysis of the 'Reassessment Crisis', see Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship,* pp. 77–102.
28. See, in this connection, Thomas R. Wheelock, 'Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage', *International Security,* 3, 2 (1978), pp. 123–37.

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