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


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This is a plea to American Christians from an American Christian who is profoundly disturbed by what is happening in Palestine. He feels that all is not well in Palestine — that a great wrong has been done to the native Arabs, and he believes that every Christian should be concerned about it. He shows that our own interests, both as Americans and as Christians, are endangered, and then proceeds to point out that something can still be done to ameliorate a serious situation. Drawing from his extensive and firsthand knowledge of the people and the conditions of Palestine, Dr. Burrows offers constructive suggestions for establishing justice and relieving suffering.

Acknowledging the issue to be controversial, Dr. Burrows approaches it in a spirit of fairness, though not neutrality. In his own words: "In this book I shall sincerely try to be fair to both sides. Strongly as I feel that Zionism is basically and tragically wrong, I shall endeavor to express my convictions in such a way that Jewish friends, whom I respect and admire but with whom I profoundly differ on this question, will at least feel that I am honest and moved by worthy motives."

Palestine Is Our Business is a timely book, including incidents and statements as recent as July, 1949. All those interested in the Palestine question who are honestly concerned about it have much to gain by a careful reading of this book.



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**Palestine is
Our Business**

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*To the
Homeless and Destitute
Native People
of the
Holy Land*

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FOREWORD

MOST OF WHAT I KNOW and believe about Palestine has been acquired by residence in the Near East, including a year (1930-1931) as visiting professor at the American University of Beirut and two terms of a year each (1931-1932, 1947-1948) as director of the American School of Oriental Research at Jerusalem, but in neither case do my views in any way represent the institutions named, which are engaged only in education and research and have no political affiliations or commitments whatever. I am no longer employed by either organization, nor am I an officer of either of them. While teaching there about the remote past, I learned something about the present and became acquainted with people with whom I have corresponded ever since. Special acknowledgments are due here to those friends, necessarily unnamed, from whose letters I quote several paragraphs.

It is a pleasure to express my great indebtedness to my wife, who has seen what I have seen and feels as I do about it, and who has read my manuscript and made many very helpful suggestions, including the title of the book.

To name all the sources from which information used in this book has been drawn would mean listing a large number

of books and articles read over the past twenty years and more, and many persons from whose conversation and correspondence I have learned more than I have from the books. Sources for most of the quoted material in this book are given in the text itself, and all quotations not otherwise identified are taken from newspaper reports. For published items of current news since May, 1948, I have depended almost entirely upon *The New York Times*. Permission to quote from its dispatches, and especially articles by Anne O'Hare McCormick and Gene Currivan, is hereby gratefully acknowledged. Brief quotations from "My Diary at the Conference of Paris," by David Hunter Miller; "Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929"; "Palestine Royal Commission Report"; "The Arab Awakening," by George Antonius; "Parliamentary Debates, Commons," Great Britain; "Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress"; "The Peace Negotiations," by Robert Lansing; and "Report by C. F. Strickland," Government of Palestine, are cited from *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, 2 vols., published for the ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc., by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947.

To The Westminster Press I am grateful for undertaking the publication of a book on such a controversial subject and for bringing it out so expeditiously. Of course, this involves no commitment to my position, but has been done as a contribution to the free discussion of an important issue.

INTRODUCTION: A FAIR WARNING

THIS BOOK is a plea to American Christians from an American Christian who is profoundly disturbed by what has been happening in Palestine and believes that every Christian should be concerned about it. All is not settled and all is not well in Palestine. A terrible wrong has been done to the native people of the country. The blame for what has happened must be distributed among all concerned, including ourselves. Our own interests, both as Americans and as Christians, are endangered. The interests of the Jewish people also have suffered. And we can still do something about it. To show the truth of these statements is the task of the chapters that follow.

This is not intended to be a report of dispassionate research, nicely balancing pros and cons and avoiding any commitment. It is a plea for moral judgment and personal action. Any reader who does not wish to expose himself to an appeal to his conscience and his will is hereby warned that he will proceed at his own risk. What is needed in such a case as this is not the disinterested objectivity of a historian dealing with the past, or a scientist dissecting a corpse. This is a question of the most immediate and vital concern to many hundreds

of thousands of living people. It is an issue on which one concerned with right and wrong must take a position and try to do something. What will be attempted here is to clarify the problem by bringing out the basic moral issue and subordinating to it all other considerations.

There are two sides to the question, to be sure. Discrimination is required, because no such issue is ever entirely one of black and white. Fairness is essential, but fairness is not the same thing as neutrality. If one side is right and the other wrong, neutrality is not just. When I was a small boy, my father once placed one of my brothers and me on opposite sides of a door and asked us to tell him of what wood it was made. One of us confidently pronounced it oak; the other with equal confidence said it was pine. Then our father showed us the edge of the door. It was made of pine, with an oak veneer on one side. Objective and academic discussions of important social and moral issues often make the mistake of conscientiously examining both sides of the door without ever looking at the edge. If they did that, they might find that one side, while quite real, was only a veneer.

In such a hotly controversial issue as the problem of Palestine, it is not at all easy to see what is just and right. Wrong has been piled upon wrong, and feelings have become so desperate and bitter that reconciliation may be impossible for generations. Clouds of passion have obscured the real issues. The fact that religious feeling is involved has not made for greater clarity. The full technique of propaganda, appealing to emotion rather than to reason, has been brought to bear. The age-old device of calling names and proceeding on the assumption that one's own motives are high and pure, while those of the opponent are selfish and sinister, has been indulged in freely.

In a democratic society, however, we cannot hope to get ahead without frank, open discussion of the most controversial

issues. We must be willing to put all our cards on the table. No one, of course, will be so naïve as to suppose that this can be done without incurring misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Political debate is not ordinarily conducted with a primary concern for strict accuracy or for full justice to opponents. A lawyer in court works for a verdict; justice is the business of the judge and the jury. Sincerity and scrupulous accuracy are so unusual in the discussion of controversial questions that ulterior motives and meanings are bound to be suspected or assumed. But democracy cannot survive if emotional propaganda is allowed to preclude fair and honest argument, or to deter us from seeking justice. Somebody must try to sift out the truth and state it, letting the chips fall where they may. Whether the attempt to be fair works or not, a Christian is bound to make it.

In this book I shall sincerely try to be fair to both sides. Strongly as I feel that Zionism is basically and tragically wrong, I shall endeavor to express my convictions in such a way that Jewish friends, whom I respect and admire but with whom I profoundly differ on this question, will at least feel that I am honest and moved by worthy motives.

In order that the reader may know just where I shall try to lead him, let me expand slightly the basic propositions stated in the opening paragraph. A vigorous new Jewish state, set up in part of a tiny, poor country, now faces staggering problems of immigration and assimilation, housing, economic stability and development, and perhaps defense. Palestine was already occupied before the Jews came in, and its inhabitants did not want a Jewish state in their country. There has been a war, the Arabs of Palestine and their allies have been defeated, and now the native people of the country are miserable and insecure, two thirds or more of them being either homeless refugees or almost equally destitute. Contrary

to a widespread impression in the United States, however, a real, stable peace between Israel and the Arab nations is still far from being achieved.

All this has come about through a tragic and inexcusable failure to respect the basic right of the Arab people of Palestine to determine their own way of life and their own government. Any sincere attempt to assess the responsibility for what has happened must lead to the conclusion that all concerned are involved in the guilt. All have much to answer for—the British, the United Nations, the United States, the Christians of the world, the Arabs, and the Jews. In all fairness, however, it must be said that the Arab people of Palestine, who have suffered most, have suffered for something that they did not in the first place bring upon themselves. The wrongs they have done have been either errors of judgment, contrary to their own interests, or acts of fear and desperation, inexcusable but understandable. The best case that can be made for Zionism is not good enough to justify the wrong done by the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. What solid good has been accomplished by the Zionists could have been accomplished at far less cost, economic and human.

All this deeply concerns us as Christians, not because of any religious prejudice, but because we are committed to the cause of justice everywhere. We have also real, legitimate, specifically Christian interests which have suffered by the division of the Holy Land and the establishment of a Jewish state in a large part of it. What happens in Palestine is our business as American citizens also. Our nation has had a large part in the wrong that has been done. In being a party to the injustice, moreover, we have at the same time injured our own national interests. The moral prestige of the United States throughout the Middle East has been almost irreparably damaged, and with it our opportunity to render service to

the people of that region, as we were previously doing with notable success. Our strategic and economic interests in the Middle East have been adversely affected. We have also allowed a disquieting problem of minority pressure to be injected into our domestic politics.

The best interests of the Jewish people themselves have suffered as a result of what they and we have done. Secular nationalism has threatened the moral and spiritual power of Judaism, a tremendous financial strain has been put upon the Jews of America, their patriotic and ethnic loyalties are in danger of being at least confused, and anti-Jewish feeling has been stirred up in the Arab nations and elsewhere.

What has been done cannot be undone, but there are still a few things that can and must be done. First of all, as individual Christians and as Church organizations, we must give generously for the relief and rehabilitation of the wretched native people of the Holy Land. The power our nation now has in the world and the power of public opinion in determining our national policies render it imperative that we also make our convictions and wishes known to our Government, so that it will do its share and use its influence in the United Nations to see that adequate provision is made for the Palestinian refugees, that the boundaries of Israel are set and preserved in such a way as to bring them within reasonable limits and prevent further expansion at the expense of the Arabs, that the Christian interests in Palestine are secured, that the Arab people of Palestine are given a government in accordance with their own desires, and that the peaceful economic and cultural development of the whole Middle East is promoted. Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, we shall also have to deal realistically and decently with the fact that Palestine has not solved and can never solve the Jewish problem.

PALESTINE IS OUR BUSINESS

1

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

THE OUTSTANDING FACT of the Palestinian situation, about which everything else revolves, is of course the existence of the state of Israel. The establishment of this ambitious, vigorous, aggressively progressive little nation was the culmination of a long process, which I shall here review very briefly in the hope that this book may fall into the hands of a few people not already familiar with the subject. Many points will come up later for more detailed treatment.

Before the First World War, Palestine was, as it had been for four hundred years, a part of the Turkish empire. After the war the League of Nations entrusted the administration of Palestine as a mandated territory to Great Britain, and incorporated in the Mandate a famous document, the Balfour Declaration, which the British Government had issued in 1917, committing itself to the promotion of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. During the period between the First and the Second World Wars the Zionists actively pushed colonization, and the country in general made considerable progress as compared with the conditions that had obtained under the Turkish regime. The Zionists failed, how-

ever, to achieve a cordial, co-operative relationship with the native Arab population, while both Jews and Arabs felt that Great Britain was not fulfilling its promises to them. Before World War II there were several waves of disorder and violence, in which the Jewish colonists were generally on the defensive and showed remarkable restraint.

During the war, while the Jews were more definitely and actively on the side of the Allies than the Arabs were, the Arabs abandoned their acts of violence against the British, while the Jews, resenting restrictions placed by the British on Jewish immigration, began to resort to terrorism. After the close of the war the situation deteriorated to such a degree that in 1947 the British Government, which had troubles enough of its own to contend with, turned over the problem of Palestine to the United Nations. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), appointed to work out a solution, reported a plan to divide Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, with an international zone including Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and this was adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, as a recommendation to the nations and peoples concerned, but with no provision for enforcing it. Great Britain, declining the responsibility of enforcing any plan not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, announced that it would relinquish the Mandate on May 15, 1948, and proceeded to withdraw its forces. The Arabs refused to recognize the partition of their country and did not set up a separate Arab state. The United Nations appointed a commission, which reported in April that it could not carry out the partition plan. On May 14 the independent state of Israel was proclaimed.

The Zionists had been well prepared for self-government by the experience of administering their own affairs in education, health, social welfare, and religion under the Mandate through their National Council. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, as

a part of its work of immigration and colonization, had carried on quasi-diplomatic relations with many countries. Both the National Council and the Jewish Agency were elected by a democratic process. Israel is said to be having some difficulty now in finding enough men with the requisite training and experience to fill the offices of the Government, but it is at least in a much better position than it would have been without the experience of thirty years under the British administration.

A provisional government served from the middle of May to the beginning of 1949. A general election was held in January, and a constituent assembly was convened at Jerusalem on February 14. Chaim Weizmann, who had served as president in the provisional government, and David Ben-Gurion, who had served as premier, were both re-elected. On March 3, Ben-Gurion announced the formation of a coalition government.

The bitter war with the Arab armies in the spring and summer of 1948 will be considered later. Israel was recognized by many Governments, our own heading the procession. Its application for membership in the United Nations was approved by the Security Council in March, 1949, and by the General Assembly at Lake Success on May 11.

Neither the war nor the enormous problem of the subsequent immigration has dampened the pioneering spirit and modernistic ideas of the Israelis. Great plans have been made for the future, and many of them will undoubtedly be carried out. Before the end of 1948 it was announced that blueprints had been drawn up for town-planning on an extensive scale. There was to be a development sufficient to accommodate a population of 100,000 on Haifa bay. A town to accommodate 50,000 people, north of Tel Aviv, was so planned that the residential district would be in the center, and the industries and

business establishments on the outskirts. A city of 5,000 in the southern desert, to serve as a center for recreation, marketing, health, and administration for the surrounding agricultural settlements, was contemplated also. A project for the Sea of Galilee included a resort on the shore, 600 feet below the level of the Mediterranean, and one on a nearby hill 600 feet above sea level, providing for a long season by the difference of altitude between the two. Ambitious plans for industrial development have at least reached the blueprint stage. Dazzling opportunities for financial investment are seen, and organizations to exploit them have been formed, though it has been found necessary to warn speculators that Israel is no place for get-rich-quick projects.

The young state suffers severely from growing pains. A child growing so fast that his clothes are never large enough is a feeble analogy for the phenomenal increase of Israel's population. Before the First World War there were only about 85,000 Jews in Palestine. The number grew to nearly 175,000 in 1931, and by the end of 1946 it had become more than 600,000. Rapid as this rate of increase seemed at the time, it was far below what the Zionists desired. With the adoption of the partition plan by the United Nations Assembly in 1947, they looked forward to 6,000 or 8,000 immigrants a month. The reality has far outstripped their wildest dreams. After the establishment of the state of Israel, Jewish immigrants began pouring into the country at a constantly accelerating rate. The Jewish population increased at about 10,000 a month during the rest of the year 1948. During the whole first year of the state's existence, according to the Hebrew calendar (i.e., from May 14, 1948, to May 4, 1949), there were 220,000 immigrants. By this time they were coming in at the rate of 30,000 a month. At least 250,000 were expected during the year 1949, and as many as 250,000 during each of the

following two years. This would more than double the Jewish population of Palestine as it was in 1947. At first Israel planned for 1,000,000 immigrants in ten years. Now it is believed that there may be that many within four years. These estimates may prove somewhat excessive, for it was announced on July 14, 1949, that between March and June the rate of immigration had dropped 50 per cent and that while 150,000 had come in during the first half of 1949, there might be only half that number during the remainder of the year. Even so the problem of absorption would be enormous.

This has been happening, it must be remembered, in only a part of a very small country. Alford Carleton, a missionary, writing of the view from a plane flying over Palestine, says, "Suddenly the whole scene seemed ridiculously small, like a map of the Holy Land on a sand table in a primary class of a church school!" (*The Cedar Bough*, March, 1949, p. 2). The whole area included in Palestine under the Mandate, after the separation of Transjordan, was a little more than 10,000 square miles. That is less than the area of Belgium; it is less than a quarter of the size of Guatemala. If you place a map of Palestine over one of New England, drawn to the same scale, so that Dan falls at Laconia, New Hampshire, Capernaum will fall at about Concord; Samaria will be not far from Fitchburg, Massachusetts; Jerusalem will be near the northwest corner of Rhode Island; Gaza will be at Hartford, Connecticut; and Beersheba will be a little west of Norwich, Connecticut. Or let the Jordan run down the valley of the Hudson: if Dan is a little north of Albany, Jericho will be close to Newburgh; Jerusalem will be a little northwest of West Point; Beersheba will be some 20 miles west of Jersey City; and the southern end of the Dead Sea will be at the southern tip of Manhattan. Try it a little farther west. Put Dan at Toledo, Ohio, and Beersheba will be about

20 miles directly west of Dayton. Or, if you live in California, put Beersheba at San Diego, and Dan will be at Ludlow; put Gaza at Berkeley, and Samaria will be close to Sacramento, while Dan will fall about 20 miles north of Nevada City. Palestine would fit into California nearly 16 times. Texas is 26 times as large as Palestine. Nearly a third of the area of Palestine, moreover, is in the southern desert or Negeb, while nearly half of the remainder consists of rocky, barren hills.

The partition plan adopted by the United Nations in November, 1947, assigned a little more than half of the country to a little less than a third of the population, who owned less than a tenth of the land. Of the 10,050 square miles in Palestine, 5,678 square miles (about 55 per cent of the total) were allotted to the Jews. Roughly one half of this (27 per cent of the total area) was in the Negeb. Israel now holds considerably more than was allotted to it by the United Nations resolution. Western Galilee, parts of the coastal plain, most of Jerusalem and a triangular "corridor" connecting it with the coastal plain, and considerable areas in the south have been occupied by Israeli forces, though assigned to the Arabs or to the international zone of Jerusalem. The half of Palestine awarded to the Jewish state has thus been increased by conquest to about three quarters of the country. Even so, and even if Israel is not compelled to relinquish the conquered areas or equivalent territory elsewhere, what is now held amounts only to about 7,800 square miles, about the area of New Jersey.

The enormous influx of new immigrants has created an acute problem for this tiny nation. The question of overpopulation has already become serious. This is not a matter of room, but of the nature of the country and its ability to support such a dense population. Palestine is not only small; it is also very poor in natural resources. Denouncing all efforts

to find a Jewish homeland elsewhere than in Palestine, Weizmann criticizes Israel Zangwill's Jewish Territorial Organization for trying to deflect Jewish emigrants from Europe to "some waste and desolate place such as could only be rendered habitable after decades of work and the expenditure of untold wealth." The description would apply admirably to Palestine itself.

The question of Palestine's absorptive capacity had been raised by Sir Herbert Samuel at the first meeting between representatives of the British Government and the Zionists near the end of 1916. From then on it played a large part in all discussions of the Zionist program. The Zionists claim, with good reason, that they have increased the economic absorptive capacity of the country by reclaiming marshy lands and sandy wastes. They claim that they could have increased it much more if the British had not restricted their opportunities. They will undoubtedly continue to increase the possibilities of accommodating a large population. It is quite possible that they may, on the small scale that is all that the size of the country permits, outstrip any previous accomplishment of this sort in world history. There are limits, however, to what can be done. The work of development will require not only an enormous expenditure of money, but also considerable time, and peace.

Already the financial outlay of the tiny new state is colossal. Reading of the sums being expended, one wonders sometimes whether he is reading about Israel or the Congress of the United States. On August 24, 1948, Mr. Ben-Gurion told the Zionist General Council that the war with the Arabs was costing Israel more than £100,000 a day, "or about three fourths of its aggregate national income." At that time it was estimated that something like \$16,000,000 a month would have to be spent for the colonization of immigrants over and

above the cost of land. This amount was twice the normal expenditure of the Government for all Palestine under the British Mandate. The total cost of the government of Israel including defense was estimated at \$50,000,000 a month (Edwin Samuel, *Middle East Journal*, January, 1949, pp. 10, 11).

As the rate of immigration increased, it became evident that still more money would be needed. In October the Jewish Agency said that \$64,000,000 would be required to build 37,000 housing units, each to consist of two rooms and to accommodate a family of three. It was then believed that 120,000 immigrants would be received in the next twelve months. In November the chairman of the United Jewish Appeal said that the cost of absorbing immigrants was about \$2,000 apiece and that the figure of 125,000 a year was "no longer a blueprint but a current reality." This would mean an expenditure of \$250,000,000 a year. On the first of February, 1949, the president of the Jewish National Fund, at a dinner in New York, announced plans for fifty-one new colonies within the next three months, and eighty more later.

The flood of immigrants has badly dislocated the economic life of the little nation. With all due allowance for the "campaign oratory" associated with fund-raising, it is clear that the situation is critical. Rabbi Herzog said at Tel Aviv on April 19, 1949, before flying to America to help the United Jewish Appeal in its campaign for funds, "I want to make American Jewry understand and appreciate the gravity of the crisis here."

Especially acute is the problem of housing. Many of the new immigrants, to be sure, were accommodated in the homes left vacant by Arab refugees and in new settlements built on the sites of demolished Arab villages. In a full-page advertisement of the United Jewish Appeal on March 11, 1949, Berl Locker said: "It was comparatively easy to absorb the first

100,000 in 1948. . . . In the midst of this war, something strange and unexpected happened. The Arabs left town and city. As a result, there were many houses ready and waiting for the newcomers. In Jaffa, for example, we were able to place more than 30,000 immigrants." The following day Gene Currivan wrote from Tel Aviv to *The New York Times* that, of 170,000 Jewish refugees received in Israel since the beginning of 1948, there were 87,000 in transit camps, youth organization centers, collective farms and settlement groups, or in the homes of relatives and friends. Of the other 83,000, he said: "The remainder of the new immigrants are making their homes in many occupied Arab villages throughout Israel. . . . In most cases the villages have been leveled or partly destroyed. . . . In Arab villages that remained intact most of the houses were nothing more than mud huts. These are being systematically replaced by modern buildings and pre-fabricated homes." We shall have more to say concerning this highhanded treatment of people's homes, but whatever may be said to excuse or condemn it, it could not go on forever.

On March 18, 1949, it was reported that the Jewish Agency was spending more than \$1,000,000 a month to maintain nearly 40,000 new immigrants in 21 reception camps. A full-page ad of the United Jewish Appeal in *The New York Times* of April 26 stated that 60,000 immigrants were living on the bare ground, 20,000 of them having not even a tent over their heads. To meet the financial strain of this situation, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion announced on March 18 that high taxes and a strict austerity program would be introduced.

President Weizmann said at New York on April 14: "We are admitting immigrants without restriction. We have to do it; we have no choice. We must make a superhuman effort to get them out of Europe and to give them a home in our country." Mrs. Weizmann said at a luncheon of Jewish

women in New York on May 4 that perhaps very soon no Jews would be allowed to leave eastern Europe, therefore immigration into Israel must proceed at top speed. "We have lost 6,000,000 Jews," she said; "we cannot afford to lose any more." The possibility that immigration might have to be restricted, however, was already being considered. The purchase of 10,000 tents by the Jewish Agency was reported by the correspondent of the *Times* at Tel Aviv on April 23 as "evidence that immigration into Israel was reaching the saturation point." On April 26 Ben-Gurion denied that the Government would restrict immigration, but admitted that 53,000 newcomers were living "in conditions of frightful overcrowding." He said that the high cost of living was "strangling efforts for housing." The following day the chief rabbi of Israel, arriving at New York, said that immigration might have to be curtailed unless the housing situation in Israel was remedied immediately.

On May 7, members of the American Jewish Committee meeting at New York were told that 60,000 small homes were needed immediately to accommodate immigrants, and many more would be needed for the 250,000 expected during the coming year. In a statement issued on May 25 the former governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman, reported the situation as he had seen it during a week's tour of Israel. "The situation in the camps which Mrs. Lehman and I visited," he said, "underscores the need for immediate, large-scale assistance from the United Jewish Appeal. Some 60,000 people are confined in these stifling camps, living in tents and barracks. . . . The housing conditions among the more than 20,000 immigrants who have been settled in abandoned Arab villages is truly pitiful. Yet thousands now in the camps are clamoring for the opportunity to set up homes in these ruined places." After a survey lasting three weeks, Prof. Leo Grebler

said early in June that the supply of vacant Arab houses was nearly exhausted. At about the same time Israel's Minister of Labor, Social Insurance, and Housing, Mrs. Golda Myerson, said that Israel would not suspend immigration and would solve the housing problem, their chief concern being financial. Robert Nathan, the director of the Jewish Agency's economic department, declared on June 22 that to absorb the 750,000 immigrants expected in the next few years would require at least \$2,000,000,000.

Housing, of course, is not the only need of the newcomers. They must have not only shelter but employment. Toward the end of April there were demonstrations by hundreds of unemployed ex-servicemen and new immigrants. To take care of this problem an extensive building program was announced. By the beginning of May the economic crisis in Israel had become acute. The great majority of the more than 200,000 immigrants who had already arrived were unskilled workers. Thousands of soldiers had been demobilized; also many workers in the citrus groves were left unemployed by the end of the season.

What resources does Israel have to meet these staggering needs? While it holds practically all the best farming land in Palestine, nearly half the territory it occupies is still a desert. This is capable of development, but only at great expense, and it cannot be done overnight. In 1919, after World War I, the prospects for a Jewish state in Palestine were outlined in recommendations by the Intelligence Section to the president and the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Contemplating all Palestine as the area of the Jewish national home, the report said, "As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of great importance since the success of the new state would de-

pend upon the possibilities of agricultural development" (David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. IV, p. 263, 1924). The importance of this water supply, particularly for irrigation, explains in part Israel's interest in controlling eastern Galilee. The chief source of the Jordan, however, is in Syria.

For the development of the insufficiently watered parts of Palestine an ambitious irrigation project was proposed in 1944 by Dr. Walter C. Lowdermilk in his book, *Palestine, Land of Promise* (Harper & Brothers, 1944). The details of the plan were worked out by a board of American engineers headed by James B. Hays. The essence of the proposal is that the water of the Jordan River and its tributaries above the Sea of Galilee would be drawn off into canals for the irrigation of the coastal plain and a part of the southern desert. Sea water would be brought by canal and tunnel from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea for hydroelectric power, and the evaporation of this water would leave a rich supply of salt. Dr. Lowdermilk claims that his proposed Jordan Valley Authority "would cost \$250,000,000 and would pay out in fifty years at 3 per cent interest from sale of irrigation water and electric power alone at rates charged in Southern California." At a Zionist meeting in New York on April 18, 1949, Dr. Emanuel Newman presented to Moshe Sharett a complete engineers' report on the Jordan Valley Authority Project.

So long as Israel holds the whole western shore of the Sea of Galilee and the southern part of its eastern shore, including the outlet into the Jordan, it can probably control the water supply sufficiently to provide for the irrigation project, for it is hardly likely that Syria would go to the trouble and expense of diverting the water from the sources of the Jordan at Banias and Tell el-Qadi, even if it were possible. Tell el-Qadi

(the Dan of the Old Testament) is, in fact, on the Palestinian side of the border and will probably remain in Israeli territory. The project, while expensive, is undoubtedly feasible, given time and peace.

Artesian wells have provided a further source of fresh water at various points, and the geologists of the Hebrew University have explored the possibilities of the country in this respect. The ambitious plans for the development of the Negeb, however, will require much more water than can be secured in this way. Weizmann claims that water for drinking can be secured by "desalting" the brackish water of southern Palestine, but he admits that the supply of sufficient quantities for irrigation "still needs study" (*Trial and Error*, p. 458, Harper & Brothers, 1949).

Power for industrial purposes could doubtless be provided by the Lowdermilk scheme of salt-water canals and tunnels from the Mediterranean if the Jordan Valley were under Israel's control or sufficiently friendly relations with Jordan could be achieved to make co-operation possible. The oil of Iraq, coming to Haifa by the pipe line across the desert, would be a simpler and cheaper source of power, one would suppose, but this too would require peace with the Arab nations. Weizmann advocates a fermentation industry to produce alcohol from root starches, which he believes could be grown in West Africa in quantities sufficient to "make the British Empire independent of oil wells" (*Trial and Error*, pp. 444, 445). Perhaps this project can be developed in Israel, but again both money and time are required. Oil may be discovered in the Negeb, but so far that is only a possibility. The chief economic resource of Israel for a long time to come will have to be money from the Jews of America.

Industrial development involves not only power but raw materials and markets. With few exceptions the raw materials

for any industry that can be developed in Palestine must be imported. The major exception is the potash of the Dead Sea. The Palestine Potash Company, Ltd., announced in March that it planned to reopen its plant at the Dead Sea as soon as the armistice with Transjordan was signed. Possibilities of producing cheap foods from peanuts and soybeans are envisaged by Dr. Weizmann. Here again Africa rather than Palestine itself would have to be the chief source of the raw materials.

The problem of markets involves two factors, peace and the cost of production. Israel's industries will have to compete with those of countries that can produce in larger quantities and more cheaply. Recognizing this, Weizmann proposes concentration on quality goods, like Swiss watches, but, with a few exceptions like the diamond-cutting industry, Israel is at present not equipped to produce goods of superior quality. A further difficulty lies in the fact that few of the immigrants from Europe have any specialized skill or training. The Jews who fled to Palestine from central Europe in the early days of the Nazi regime were largely professional and business people with moderate amounts of capital. The difficulty then was to absorb these white-collar elements into the agricultural economy of the colonies. The Displaced Persons now coming from the concentration camps have neither capital nor skill.

The problem of absorbing the immigrants is not merely economic. Many of those who come from the concentration camps of Europe are said to be in poor condition, morally as well as physically, requiring mental and emotional therapy. The president of the International Conference of Jewish Social Welfare said at the meeting of the organization at Cleveland in June, 1949, "Many refugees in Israel are psychologically upset today, because, after years in concentration camps they came expecting to find Israel a land of milk and honey

but instead face housing shortages and other problems." While there are many physicians, he said, there are not enough psychotherapists and social workers. It has been reported that the need for physical and mental training is to be met in part by drafting many of the immigrants into the Army.

The absorption of the newcomers is made still more difficult by the fact that they come from very different social and political backgrounds. Especially difficult to assimilate are the many coming from southern Arabia and northern Africa. Some misgiving has been expressed concerning the political problem that may be created for Israel by increasing the proportion of these Oriental Jews in a population consisting mainly of Jews from Europe and America. Of the 250,000 immigrants expected in 1949, it is said that 45,000 will come from the Arab countries and 25,000 from other Oriental lands, a total of about 28 per cent. The traditions and ways of living of the Oriental Jews are very different from those of the Jews from Europe and America. It has been reported that during a discussion in the Knesset concerning the salaries of Government officials and the allowances for their dependents, a Yeminite member asked whether the allowance for wives applied only to one wife for each member. It was decided, the report said, that the allowance would be so much "per wife."

In spite of this formidable constellation of problems the state of Israel continues to call for new immigrants from America. Why do they still want more and more people? Doubtless they wish to make good their boasts that they will provide a refuge for Jews anywhere in the world who wish to come to Palestine. The need of the Jewish refugees of Europe no longer requires such large-scale immigration, for there are not as many Jews left in the concentration camps as are expected to enter Israel this year. Man power is needed to build up the Negeb, no doubt, but the need to build up the Negeb

is the need to accommodate the increasing population. Why still more newcomers should be sought from such a country as the United States is not immediately apparent. Two reasons, however, may be discerned: One is that the formidable task of assimilating the varied elements from many lands and building up with such material a sound economic life calls for the know-how to be found best in America. The other reason, which is not to be ignored, is the need for defense. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in the opening speech of his campaign for the election in January, stressed the need for a large immigration from the point of view of national security. This note was brought out in an article by Anne O'Hare McCormick in the magazine section of *The New York Times* on February 13, 1949, in these words: "The aim is to absorb the greatest number in the shortest possible time in order first to create a nation and then to build up a population that will render its claim indisputable and its position impregnable in the territory it has occupied."

Much of the new population is being packed into the areas taken from the Arabs in addition to the territory allotted to Israel by the partition resolution of 1947. Front-line military positions have been converted into fortified settlements, constituting what has been called the Weizmann Line. The coast line, the Negeb, and Galilee are being fortified especially in this way, it is said. This is clearly one answer to the puzzling demand for more and more immigrants. It is evidently feared that unless the Negeb and Galilee are quickly filled with Jewish colonists, Israel will not be able to hold the territory conquered from the Arabs. The feeling that Israel is not yet out of danger from military attack has been expressed also by President Weizmann. Without some such explanation the insistence on more and more immigration to settle land in order to provide for more and more immigrants sounds very much

like the desire of the proverbial farmer to buy more land to raise more corn to feed more hogs to make more money to buy more land.

One is compelled to face the question whether the pressure of population will not lead, sooner or later, to a demand for territorial expansion, and indeed whether this is not one of the motives for continuing to desire immigration. There are still some parties in Israel that have never abandoned their claim to all of Palestine and Transjordan in spite of the official acceptance of the partition plan by the Zionists. Territorial ambitions are indignantly denied by the leaders of the present Government, but sometimes the difference between the extremists and the moderates appears to be merely a question of tactics and timing. Whether they want it or not, it seems certain that Israel will either have to restrict immigration or seek more territory before very long. The delineation of boundaries is one of the most important matters we shall have to consider under the head of agenda.

Meanwhile Israel has also internal problems of a political nature. Complaints are already beginning to be heard to the effect that the Army has too much power in the Government. The complexity of the system of proportional representation and the multiplicity of political parties constitute a problem. Jews from various countries tend to organize separate political parties. Something like a dozen parties were involved in the election of January, 1949. There are groups representing various ideologies as well as various national backgrounds, and there are also the distinctly religious parties. The most powerful parties are the two labor groups. The Mapai, or Palestine Labor Party, is moderately leftist. It favors co-operation with the United Nations and neutrality in the struggle between East and West. This is the party of the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. The next strongest party

is the Mapam, or United Workers, which stands much farther to the left and has definite leanings toward Russia. There are two prominent religious parties, the moderate religious group called Mizrachi and the ultraorthodox group, Agudat Yisrael, which was formerly non-Zionist.

The relation between religion and the state is a peculiarly difficult one for Israel, because of the close connection of religion and nationality in Jewish tradition. President Weizmann has made his position sufficiently plain in his autobiography: Israel, he says, "cannot put the clock back by making religion a cardinal principle in the conduct of the state. Religion should be relegated to the synagogue and the homes of those families that want it; it should occupy a special position in the schools; but it should not control the ministries of state." For the election of January, 1949, the religious parties formed a combination and won enough seats in the assembly to give them a considerable influence in the Government. Even among the religious groups in Israel, however, there are different views concerning the extent to which the traditional religious law should prevail in the laws of the new state. The most orthodox group holds that the civil and religious law codes should be identical. The leftist groups and the non-religious parties desire a separation between the laws of the state and the traditional law. The proposed constitution contemplates separate religious courts for Jews, Muslims, and Christians.

The conflict has already become manifest in connection with the observance of the Sabbath. For some time before the end of the British Mandate there had been difficulties when ships bringing immigrants arrived on the Sabbath, and orthodox passengers refused to debark on that day. This meant that the ships had to stay at Haifa overnight, involving considerable extra expense for the steamship lines. In April, 1949, the Gov-

ernment of Israel prohibited the debarkation of passengers at Haifa on the Sabbath. To criticism from the leftist elements in the Knesset, the Minister of Immigration, himself a member of one of the orthodox parties, replied that Saturday was the official day of rest in Israel, and the steamship lines would have to arrange their schedules so that their ships would reach Israel on other days.

Many citizens of Israel have opposed the idea that the power of the state should be used to enforce obedience to the religious law. They consider any attempt to enforce the religious law anachronistic, and believe that if it succeeded, the state could not survive. The position of the religious group is that while individuals should have complete liberty concerning Sabbath observance and the dietary laws, and the separate religious courts should have control of such matters as marriage and divorce for the adherents of the different religions, the Government itself should observe the Sabbath by suspending the operation of railways owned by the state and busses operated by the state, and customs and immigration offices should be closed on the Sabbath. The importing and selling of non-kosher foods should not be prohibited, but they should not be used in Government institutions, and hard currency should not be allotted for importing them.

In June it was reported from Jerusalem that a group of religious zealots, called Guardians of the City, were resorting to violence against Jews they condemned as pagans because of failure to observe the Sabbath in the traditional fashion. Damage to property and injury to persons had been caused by demonstrations at movie theaters that opened before the end of the Sabbath at sunset. The idea behind these acts seemed to be the typical assumption of terrorism that political action could be forced by violence. Meanwhile the president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis has com-

plained, in his opening address at the anniversary convention of the conference, that the Government of Israel, despite all protestations to the contrary, is not giving religious freedom to the congregations of Liberal Jews, comprising 600 or 700 families at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa.

Last but not least among Israel's problems is that of its Arab minority. According to the partition plan of 1947 there would have been more than 400,000 Arabs living among the 600,000 Jews in the Jewish state. With the addition of the areas conquered by Israel in 1948, there would have been a large Arab majority under Jewish dominion, had not hundreds of thousands of Arabs fled to the territory still held by the Arab armies and to the neighboring Arab countries. Otherwise even the phenomenally rapid Jewish immigration would not have caught up with the numerical preponderance of the Arabs in Israel for several years. It has been claimed that the Israelis were disappointed by the flight of the refugees, because this was a blow to their hopes that they could show the world how much better off the Arabs were in Israel than they were elsewhere. Rabbi A. H. Silver said to the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on October 2, 1947, when the partition plan was being considered, "We mean to be good neighbors not only to the Arab state of Palestine but to the Arab states throughout the Middle East, and certainly we mean scrupulously to respect the equal rights of the Arab population in the free and democratic Jewish state." Rabbi Silver and those who share his position cannot see that whatever civil rights are accorded the Arabs in Israel, they are not and cannot be on an equality with the Jews so long as it is a Jewish state.

That some of the Arabs are willing to live under a Jewish government is not to be questioned. Many of those who remained within the borders of Israel went to the polls and

voted in the general election in January, 1949. Much was made of the fact that for the first time Arab women had a part in an election. Three Arab representatives were elected and have been participating in the Knesset. Many of the refugees would now undoubtedly be only too glad to accept citizenship in Israel as the price of returning to their homes and farms. At Nazareth, when the Jewish forces were occupying all of western Galilee, the people invited the Israeli forces to occupy the town, though in this case it may well be that they made a virtue of necessity. Be that as it may, the great majority of the Arab people of all classes unquestionably feared and hated the Jews, for reasons that we shall consider in the next chapter.

The proposed constitution of Israel gives the Arabs equal civil rights. The Israelis can afford this, provided the Arabs remain a minority, but, even so, practical difficulties can be seen. As Edwin Samuel says concerning the theoretical equality of Jews and Arabs, "How far it is capable of realization when the Arab minority in Israel is largely sullen, frightened, and resentful is another matter." He points out also that the neighboring Arab states will not be content to let the Arabs in Israel alone (*Middle East Journal*, January, 1949, pp. 12 f.). Undoubtedly that is one reason for the hesitation of Israel to readmit the refugees in large numbers, in addition to the fact that, having occupied or demolished the Arabs' homes, they have no place to put them if they come back. What is to be done about this crucial problem will require thoughtful consideration after we have looked at other aspects of the situation. It may prove to be the most formidable of all the problems confronting Israel.

2

THE WRONG DONE TO THE ARABS OF PALESTINE

THE LITTLE COUNTRY in which the new Jewish state has been set up was already occupied before the Zionist immigration began. It was no virgin wilderness, inhabited only by a few roaming savages. It was not, as the earlier Zionists liked to call it, "a country without a people for a people without a country." The Arab population of Palestine was not so large in Turkish times as it became under the British Mandate. While the number of Jews has been growing by immigration, the Arab population has been growing chiefly by natural increase. Before the First World War the birth rate was about equaled by the death rate, so that the population remained fairly stationary. Under the British regime, however, the death rate was greatly lowered. This produced a net natural increase believed to have been the highest in the world. Even before this, however, in 1914, there were about 690,000 Arabs in Palestine.

They were not wandering Bedouins. One reason for the prevalent lack of concern among Americans over the displacement of the Palestinian Arabs is the common assumption that they were merely a few nomads living in tents. Even so well-

informed a man as Sumner Welles shows an extraordinary misunderstanding of the situation at this point, estimating that of the less than 700,000 inhabitants of Palestine before World War I, about a fourth were Jews and Christians, and the rest Muslims, "of whom the majority were migrant Bedouins" (*We Need Not Fail*, p. 4, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948). Now, in the first place, the native Christians of Palestine were Arabs and opposed to Zionism; they should therefore have been counted with the Muslims rather than with the Jews. Even more misleading and quite untrue is the statement that the majority of Muslims were Bedouins. Actually most of the Palestinian Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, were farmers living in permanent villages. The rest were craftsmen, shopkeepers, and professional men living in the principal cities. The few migrant Bedouins from the desert south and west of Palestine who wandered in and out of the country were probably not even included at that time in the estimates of the population. Mr. Welles's remark brings to mind a Jewish colonist who confessed a feeling of shame because he had come to Palestine supposing that the Jewish settlements were the only inhabited places in the land. He was amazed to find the whole country dotted with Arab villages, not shown on the maps with which he was familiar.

The ancestors of many of the Palestinian Arabs have lived in the same villages for many centuries, though it is doubtless true that newcomers have been moving in also during that time. Even in Turkish times the density of the Arab population in Palestine, aside from the southern desert, was about that of the State of Michigan. By 1947 it had almost doubled, reaching a figure of nearly 1,300,000.

While the population of the Jewish state, according to the partition plan of 1947, would have been about 60 per cent Jewish and about 40 per cent Arab, that of the Arab state

would have been 99 per cent Arab and only 1 per cent Jewish. There would have been about 10,000 Jews and 800,000 Arabs. In the areas added to Israel by military occupation there was a large Arab majority; much of it is now dispersed in the other Arab countries, but a large part of it is crowded into the reduced area in Palestine still held by the Arabs. The shifting boundaries and people have made it difficult to secure accurate figures, but a conservative estimate indicates that there must be more than 1,000,000 Arabs now living in something like 2,500 square miles, i.e., at least 400 to the square mile. The density of population in Connecticut is 350 to the square mile. The nature of the country, moreover, is very different from that of Connecticut, consisting largely of rough highlands isolated from the outside world except by way of Transjordan. We shall have to come back to these facts presently.

Regardless of numbers and density of settlement, the Palestinian Arabs did not want a Jewish state set up in their country. By fair means and foul they have fought for a generation the Zionist immigration and occupation. The fact that they have used foul means as well as fair does not cancel the fact that they were opposed, and had a right to be opposed, to Zionism.

The Zionists have always protested that they have no quarrel with the Arabs and are always ready to extend to them the hand of brotherhood. In two or three ways that is quite true. At the very least it has always been true that the Zionists would gladly be friends with the Arabs if the latter would submit to Jewish control of the country. The hand of brotherhood held out to the Arabs has always been that of a rather patronizing elder brother. It is doubtless true also that some of the Arab farmers and villagers, who have never known any real self-government and think only in terms of the choice

between one master and another, would even be willing to live under a Jewish government. I have been told, and I do not doubt it, that Arabs living near one of the Jewish scientific institutions said that if partition came they would rather live in the Jewish than in the Arab part of the country. And, finally, it is true that there would have been no quarrel at all between the Jews and Arabs if the former had been content to develop the country and make a home for themselves in limited numbers without advancing any political claims. If the Zionist objects that the price of peace would have been too high on that condition, he fails to recognize how much his own prosperity and safety still depend on winning the good will of the Arabs.

The antagonism between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is not a matter of religious or racial prejudice. On that score the Arabs must be excused for assuming a somewhat self-righteous attitude toward us. The struggle is primarily economic and political, and, in the second place, cultural, not at all racial or religious. The unity of the Arabs among themselves (like that of the Jews, for that matter) is in reality not racial but cultural. The Arabs of Palestine are such by language and culture and only in part by race, for the blood of Crusaders, Romans, Greeks, perhaps Israelites and even Canaanites, flows in their veins; indeed, if the truth were known, it might be found that they have as much of the blood of the ancient Hebrews as the Jews themselves have. In the past, as compared with the Western nations, they have shown relatively little antagonism for Jews as such. Maimonides, revered by Jews the world over as the second Moses, was personal physician to the son of Saladin, King Richard's great antagonist.

The Arabs' hatred of the Jews, a relatively new thing but now so deep and bitter that it will not be removed for gen-

erations, if ever, is rooted in the fear aroused by the strangeness, the manifest ability, and, above all, the aggressiveness of the Zionist colonists. A Christian Arab in Jerusalem once said to me in a tone of childlike bewilderment, "I don't understand their language; I don't understand their ways; they make me feel like a foreigner in my own country." With an unwilling and perhaps unconscious respect for the ability of the Jews, amounting sometimes almost to an inferiority complex, the Arab fears domination by these almost incredibly vigorous aliens who have swarmed into his land. That they can do in a day what it would take him a generation to accomplish does not make him feel easier. But he would have accepted them, and did accept them and work with them, before their political claims and activities frightened him. Capable of fanaticism, he has sometimes been aroused to frightful acts by appeals to religious prejudice, but this would not have happened if the newcomers had not claimed that his country belonged to them, and frankly avowed their intention to make it "as Jewish as England is English."

The riots and massacres that took place in the first decade of the British administration were undoubtedly the result of panic fanned by agitation. Many of the common people firmly believed that as soon as the Jews became sufficiently numerous and strong they would massacre all the Arabs. Only those who have seen it happen can realize how alarming to the Arab farmers was the rapid growth of the Jewish population. Whatever might have been possible if the Jewish national home had not expanded with such vigor and speed (slow though it seemed to the Zionists themselves), any real friendly co-operation was soon out of the question. As Jewish immigration increased and the settlements were able to get along more and more without employing Arab labor, the common people grew more and more afraid that they would, as the

report of the Shaw Commission put it, "be deprived of their livelihood and pass under the political domination of the Jews" (*Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929*, 1930, Cmd. 3530). Certainly the Arabs wanted peace. They asked nothing, in fact, but to be left alone.

The rate of Jewish immigration was accelerated during the period of economic development between 1931 and 1936, and the fears of the Arabs increased. The report of the Royal Commission in 1937 said that while the Arab population shared in the greater prosperity of the country at this time, political opposition to Zionism was nevertheless growing. It appeared that a Jewish majority was imminent, bringing with it for the Arabs the "intolerable prospect of a Jewish state—of Palestinian Arabs being ruled by Jews" (*Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 82, 1937, Cmd. 5479). During the following three years, up to the outbreak of World War II, the economic development continued, but the political struggle became only more intense. In 1936 organized disorders broke out under the name of an Arab "strike," which in the following year became an open armed revolt against the British. A Royal Commission recommended partition, and a plan of partition was devised by another commission appointed for this purpose, but it was dropped because of the resentment of the Arabs.

This led to the strict limitation of immigration by the White Paper of 1939, bitterly condemned by Jewish writers as "the final capitulation to Arab violence." The Jews protested against any artificial restriction of immigration while the economic absorptive capacity of the country was growing. The rise of the Nazis to power in Germany had increased the immigration of Jews from Germany and adjoining countries, many of whom brought substantial amounts of capital and a high degree of skill and knowledge. The economic prosperity

of Palestine was to a considerable extent the result of this high-grade immigration. But the greater the numbers and prosperity of the Jews, the greater grew the danger of their dominating the Arabs.

At the same time British prestige in the Near East had suffered from the Ethiopian "incident," and there is no doubt that the Axis powers had a part in stirring up the disturbance in Palestine. Underlying all this, however, and affording the fuel for the fire, was the psychological situation created by the rapidly growing economic and political power of the Jewish colonists. One who saw the situation developing and heard the expressions of feeling among the Arabs could not fail to be impressed by the fact that they were bewildered and scared, and with good reason. It is not at all difficult for agitators, native or foreign, to play upon fears inspired by the people's own everyday experience.

Many Zionists, blaming the British for the opposition they have encountered, claim that in the beginning even the leaders of the Arabs were in full sympathy with them. Much is made in this connection of Prince Faisal's letter of March 3, 1919, to Felix Frankfurter, which said: "We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. . . . We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another." Would it had worked out that way! If Faisal had been given what the allied Governments promised him, the subsequent developments might have been very different. An Arab statesman who had an important part in the negotiations in 1919 has said to me that he believes they came very near solving the problem of Palestine at that time. Two questions, however, must be raised concerning Faisal's statement: Did he know or care how the people of Palestine felt, and did he have any right to speak for them? Whatever he may have

felt, there can be no question that the majority of the people of Palestine were opposed to the idea of a Jewish state. President Wilson's King-Crane Commission in 1919 condemned the Zionist program on the ground that the people of Palestine were against it. A Zionist publication, condemning this conclusion as determined by political propaganda instead of objective investigation, admits at the same time that it "undoubtedly reflected the prevalent political attitude in Syria and Palestine" (*Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies*, Vol. I, p. 218, Yale University Press, 1947).

The Zionists have claimed that even among the people of Palestine itself only the effendis, the wealthy class, were opposed to them. It is quite true that the common people have rarely been consulted. Since it is the rights of the common people that chiefly concern us as Christians, it is important that their attitude be rightly understood. The common people undoubtedly did not oppose Jewish immigration so long as they had no fear of a Jewish majority or of economic domination by the Jews. The Arabs are a friendly and hospitable people, and they have repeatedly shown themselves able and willing to co-operate with Jewish neighbors. They have been quite willing to take advantage of superior facilities provided by the British or the Jews in such matters as health. Human need does not raise political questions when they can be avoided.

As typical of what often happened, and might have happened much more often, I think of an Arab who grew up in one of the villages near Jerusalem and had the advantage of early association with British and American people. He often said that the fellahin should be consulted instead of the effendis concerning their attitude toward the Jews, implying that they would be more disposed toward co-operation. When his brother's baby almost died from malnutrition and poor care, this young man took the child to the Hadassah Hospital,

where its life was saved. Unable to continue paying the high charges at the hospital, he later transferred the baby to a home maintained under American auspices, but the Arab physician there protested against taking care of a child who had first been taken to Jewish doctors. The young man was highly indignant at such a narrow attitude.

In spite of all that may be said, however, of the potential and initial friendliness of the people toward the first Jewish settlers, there can be no real question that their hostility grew in proportion to the growth of the Jewish settlements. This is as true of the poorest peasants as it is of the wealthy class. Landowners who yielded to temptation and sold their land to Jews were condemned by public opinion and often compelled to flee the country for their lives.

In so far as it is true that the wealthy Arab effendis have resisted Zionism because of their vested interests in the old feudal system, it is easily understood by one who has observed the resistance to social changes in England and America. Let us not be hypocrites. Even if we dare to reverse Jesus' metaphor and claim that there is a beam in our neighbor's eye, there is at least a splinter in our own. Neither eagerness on the part of those who have inherited wealth to distribute it nor zeal for industrial democracy on the part of investors and executives can be called the most conspicuous feature of the American way of life. If a very prominent British statesman could say of Franco and his crowd, "After all, they are our kind of people," a great many Americans, with far greater justification, would feel the same way about the cultured, courteous, intelligent Arabs of the wealthy class. They are just about as much opposed to revolution, and probably fully as much interested in social reform, as their counterparts in American and European society. I know one of them who has proposed to translate an Italian novel into Arabic as a means

of showing how the transition from feudalism to a democratic social order can be accomplished without violent revolution.

As a matter of fact, it has sometimes been the wealthy landlords who have collaborated with the Zionists by selling them land. When the newspapers reported in 1948 that the Sheikh of Abu Ghosh had been fighting with the Jews against both the British and the armies of the Arab nations, a group of Arab students at an American university to whom I mentioned this fact replied: "Of course! He is a large landowner and has made a lot of money selling land to the Jews." It is by no means true that the opposition to Zionism has been confined to the wealthy class. Whatever may have been the case in the beginning, the feeling has penetrated every part of the population.

It is particularly strong in the younger generation of students, by no means entirely drawn from the wealthier class. They are "the young effendis" to whom Freya Stark dedicated her *Arab Island*. They represent a new, growing, and much-needed middle class in the Arab countries. They are eager for the spread and improvement of education for the whole people, both men and women. Their social and political ideals are definitely Western in spite of their present bitterness toward the Western nations. Many of them feel that their elders are responsible for the unfortunate position in which they now find themselves. One of them, now in a high administrative position, wrote to me recently that his generation blamed American support of the Zionists first of all for the Arabs' military defeat, but he added, "I want you to know that lack of unity amongst our old generation leaders is a second reason for our loss and you will soon hear that these leaders will be punished for their unexcused faults."

When the partition resolution was passed by the UN Assembly, there was general dismay among the native people of

Palestine, who from the beginning felt that this meant inevitable war. Arab boys in the American Friends' School at Ramallah expressed their first reaction by asking, "What will this do to our education?" A young man in Bethlehem, telling me of the large number of people already leaving the country, said, "We want a place where we can sleep all night." During the following months the Arabs could be heard on all sides singing anti-Zionist songs. One of them told me that many of these had been composed during the disorders of 1936-1939.

The strength and intensity of the Arab opposition to partition was badly underestimated at Lake Success and at Washington. The amount of force that would have been necessary to put the plan into operation was not realized by the delegates who voted for it. Sumner Welles declares that the cardinal defect of the partition plan was the failure to provide for enforcement. Its cardinal defect was its essential injustice, but because it was unjust it would have necessitated, not a small police force, but an army of occupation. A British friend of mine in Jerusalem spoke with amused disdain of the "Philippine Boy Scouts" who, it was assumed, could provide security where a hundred thousand British soldiers had failed. A remark made at the time by the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem is worth pondering in this connection. An army of occupation, he said, need not know the language or understand the customs of the people, but a police force must know the people and their language. A composite force drawn from several nations would have been completely ineffective in a rebellious Palestine.

The winter of 1947-1948 was one of deepening tragedy in Palestine. While the Jews hailed with exuberant joy their great "moral victory" and proceeded with preparations for their independence, Arab resentment and fear found expres-

sion in blowing up buildings and shooting from roofs and barricades. Jewish terrorism diverted some of its attention from the British to the Arabs. Jews moved out of Arab districts and Arabs moved out of Jewish districts. Attacks were made on Arab villages by Jews and on Jewish colonies by Arabs. The British administration let one part of the Government after another go out of existence, but would not allow the UN Commission to do anything effective toward setting up new machinery. While it was still being questioned in America whether Great Britain really intended to leave Palestine, the British forces were getting out as fast as the means of transport made possible.

The Arabs created an "army of liberation" on the order of the guerrilla forces that had fought the British in 1936-1939, poorly organized and still more poorly equipped. Forces from the Arab nations began to cross the borders and set up camps in the central highlands with no real opposition from the British. The middle of May came, the last British forces and officials withdrew, the state of Israel was proclaimed, and the war was on. The new state quickly proved itself able not only to defend itself but to expand. In addition to the city of Jaffa, which had been awarded to the Arabs, and the city of Haifa, which was supposed to be internationalized, all of western Galilee, which had been allotted to the Arabs in the partition plan, was overrun and occupied. That this was part of a definite strategic plan is made clear by statements of Haganah officers to Major George Fielding Eliot, as reported in his *Hate, Hope and High Explosives*. From a military point of view the occupation of western Galilee was essential for the defense of eastern Galilee. Equally important from a military point of view, but quite beyond the intention of the United Nations, was the occupation of a "corridor" connecting Jerusalem with the Israeli territory in the coastal plain. Not only room for a

highway to Jerusalem, but a triangular area of about 100 square miles was conquered. In Jerusalem itself the best residential districts outside the walled Old City were taken over; indeed, this process began long before the end of the Mandate. Some of the country and a part of the main road to the south of the city were occupied also. The Egyptian Army in the south was soundly beaten; the troops of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in the central and northern part of the country were held at bay. On October 21, 1948, Beersheba, which was in Arab territory according to the partition plan, was captured by Israeli troops, freeing the roads to the settlements in the Negeb and cutting off the Egyptian troops in the neighborhood of Bethlehem.

Only the Arab Legion of Transjordan was successful against the Jewish troops. Immediately upon the withdrawal of the British in the middle of May, 1948, the Haganah attacked the Old City of Jerusalem, but it was held back for three days until the Arab Legion, which had been withdrawn across the Jordan, came to the relief of the Arabs in the city. After severe fighting the Jews were completely expelled from the walled area.

Before the end of the British Mandate many Arabs had left their homes in territory occupied by the Jews. Not all of them left voluntarily. I know that because I had to provide accommodations for some of them, and personally helped one family to move when they were ordered by the Jews to leave within twenty-four hours. The massacre at Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948, started a veritable stampede. Soon after that most of the Arabs living in Haifa fled from the city. In July, Count Bernadotte reported to the United Nations Security Council that at the beginning of the second truce Israeli forces had attacked three villages south of Haifa and driven out the 8,000 Arab inhabitants after a week's battle, destroying their homes. On

September 13 he ordered Israel to readmit these villagers, whom he had found living in the region of Jenin, and to rebuild their homes.

On October 12 a dispatch from London reported that an Englishman touring the refugee areas had found Jericho swarming with 10,000 refugees, and Bir Zeit, the normal population of which was about 1,000, crowded with 14,000 refugees. He found a family living under each of the olive trees on the hillsides, often burning for firewood these trees which had taken generations to grow, and upon which the owners were dependent for their living. The town of Ramallah, a few miles north of Jerusalem, had more than trebled its population by December. Some of the United Nations personnel there then began a small-scale plan of relief on their own, each of the men contributing £1 each week. One of them, a captain of the American Air Force, adopted a ten-year-old girl. On November 4 the United Nations announced that from 50,000 to 100,000 more refugees had been added to the previous 500,000 by the latest Israeli offenses. In the south, Beersheba lost all but about 200 of its population of 3,000, the rest having fled before the Israeli Army.

A personal letter from Palestine, dated January 16, 1949, said, "Jews continue to drive out Arabs who had remained in their villages; this is to make room for new immigrants." That refugees were still leaving areas held by the Israelis was shown by the mounting figures of those requiring relief. In May the International Red Cross urged that a large part of the population in the parts of Palestine held by the Arab Legion be recognized as "resident refugees." The task of providing for the refugees who had swarmed into these areas and the impossibility of carrying on normal occupations had made the people who still lived in their own homes almost as destitute as those who had fled from Israeli territory. According to

the most reliable figures available in June, 1949, there were then more than 940,000 Arabs receiving relief in the Arab-held part of Palestine and the surrounding countries. Israeli authorities claimed that not much more than 500,000 of these were actually refugees from Israel, but our State Department put the number at about 700,000. Late in June the Government of Jordan complained to the United Nations that 1,500 Arabs had been forcibly expelled from an area ceded to Israel in the armistice agreement.

To give the reader a more concrete idea of what this means, I quote part of a letter received last winter from a Christian Arab, a graduate of an American theological seminary, who was living as a refugee in Bethlehem:

As you know, I was living in Jerusalem in the Greek Colony with my family. My mother, brothers, sisters, and their families were living in Musrara Quarter. . . . I was the last Arab to leave the Greek Colony in Jerusalem with my family and so I was actually in the midst of hell up to the fourth of May when I was forced to leave. . . . For days before I left Jerusalem I was not able to get food for my small children, who really experienced hunger as I had before them. We lived under this condition for more than three months, after which I decided to take as little clothing as possible, due to the scarcity of transport, and leave for Bethlehem. So I left everything at home, closed the door and left with my family to the little town where Jesus was born. I rented one room where we had to use it for everything. We sleep in it and yet receive our friends in it also. One month after we reached Bethlehem my wife gave birth to a baby boy. . . . I was reminded of his Master . . . so I have great hopes that my little son will follow in the footsteps of his Master when he grows to be a man, although we call him now the little beggar of Bethlehem. . . . I feel sorry for losing my library of 2,500 books. . . . But on the other hand I feel that God has blessed me by giving me that little child, who is worth more than the riches of this world. . . . The last news we heard is that the Jews looted all Arab houses in Jerusalem and I was told that my house was com-

pletely destroyed. . . . As to the state of affairs at present, it is something beyond imagination. . . . Hundreds of families are living on very little food. Every now and then you find a boy or a girl fainting on the street due to hunger and lack of nourishment. Diseases such as tuberculosis, typhus, typhoid, smallpox and fevers are spreading amongst the people in an alarming manner. Hundreds of families are living in caves with hardly any cover to warm themselves. The other day a woman gave birth to a child; she was obliged to wrap him with a straw mat because she has no clothing at all. Lately I was in Jerusalem to see a relative. To my amazement I found his two-year-old daughter lying half dead due to rickets. His newborn baby has signs of rickets due to lack of nourishment. I slept that night with the family, which consisted of six persons, in a room not bigger than an American kitchen. The trouble with the Christian Arab is that he can't beg and so he is really lost and suffers most. Lately, due to snow and very cold weather, many refugees died in Nablus, Amman, and Ramallah. . . . The morale of the people is getting very low. . . . The other day a religious old man said, "If all these miseries and sufferings are going to lead us to heaven, I can assure you that heaven is not worth all this trouble."

Several months have passed since that letter was written, and much has happened, but a real and secure peace has not come to the Holy Land. Through the patient and persevering efforts of Dr. Ralph L. Bunche, armistice agreements have been reached between Israel and some of the Arab nations, but the efforts of the UN Conciliation Commission at Lausanne to bring the delegates of Israel and the Arab nations together have thus far proved unavailing. What may develop between the time when this book goes to press and the time when it comes into the reader's hands cannot be predicted. It is safe to say, however, that there will still be no real peace. The Arabs are beaten, not reconciled. Their bitter resentment might in time wear off if Israel could convince them that they had no need to fear further aggression and expansion by Israel. It is doubtful that they can be so convinced. Thus far,

in spite of repeated protestations, it can hardly be said that the policy of Israel toward the Arabs has pointed in that direction. Reports from the Middle East agree that in all the Arab countries and among all groups and classes it is felt that only one phase of a long war has been fought.

Those who are inclined to assume that because the Arabs have been defeated they will accept the situation and proceed as though nothing had happened fail to consider three facts of Arab mentality. One is the psychological effect of Muslim fatalism. Arab friends said to me last winter, "Of course we know that one atomic bomb would destroy all of us." But that made no difference in their feelings or their activities. When many Arabs were already being killed by Jewish bombs and bullets, months before the end of the Mandate, an Arab said to me, "We expected this, but such things don't bother you if you really believe in fate." The effect of such fatalism is not always or necessarily resignation and submission; when it is felt that there is a duty to be performed, the belief in fate makes one willing to do what has to be done without concern for consequences. Martyrdom for a sacred cause is by no means an unfamiliar idea to the Arab.

The second fact that should be realized by the Western peoples more fully than it is is that the Arabs have not so strong a sense as we have of the value of human life. Perhaps life is no more cheap to them than it is to the military mind in the West, but one who talks with them sometimes gets the impression that they have an appalling indifference to loss of life. The fact that a battle has gone against them, or that hundreds of their people have been killed, is not felt as a motive for surrender and submission, but rather as demanding increased resistance and revenge.

A third fact to be remembered by Christians is that Islam does not teach turning the other cheek. Christians in practice

feel resentment and seek revenge, but their consciences condemn them. Muslims have never been taught that it is wrong to avenge oneself. We can hardly condemn them for being more consistent than we are.

Why did the Arab nations so furiously rage together against Israel? What was it to them? Why did Iraq and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Arab League pour their none too abundant resources into this struggle? It may be claimed, though without much plausibility, that Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria hoped to get slices of territory in Palestine, but the wildest imagination cannot attribute such an idea to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Lebanon. They simply did not want a Jewish state in Palestine. Why do almost all non-Jewish Americans who have lived in the Near East, and who have become personally acquainted with the situation, sympathize with the Arabs? It is not that they have anything against the Jewish people as such. Many of them have gone to the Near East favorably disposed toward Zionism. The whole basis of their opposition to it is the conviction that Zionism is morally wrong, because it involves injustice to the native people of Palestine. In the division of Palestine, and the establishment of a Jewish state over part of it, basic human rights of the native people of the country have been violated, in particular the right to live in peaceful possession of the land that they and their ancestors have occupied for more than a thousand years, and the right to determine for themselves under what government they will live. Opposition to Zionism rests on the conviction that there can be no justice without a consistent application of the principles enunciated in the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations Covenant, the Atlantic Charter, and the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

The mandatory system of the League of Nations was os-

tensibly set up for the benefit of the people of each country concerned, with the declared purpose of preparing them for self-government and then giving it to them. According to that principle, when a mandate was surrendered, it should have been surrendered to the people themselves; and if the United Nations takes over a mandated territory, it should dispose of it in accord with the purpose of the mandate. The imposition of any government upon the people of a country by any outside power or group of powers, even if it is done in the interest of the people themselves and for their protection, is at best paternalistic. Imposing an alien group on a country that does not want it is of the very essence of imperialism. Whether or not we think that the Arabs ought to welcome the Jews and the Jewish state, they do not in fact want them.

Criticizing the contention of Senator Austin in April, 1948, that the decision as to what should be done with Palestine belonged to Great Britain, France, and the United States, Sumner Welles (*We Need Not Fail*, p. 47) says that this "would be returning to the days when great powers decided the fate of peoples as though they were cattle." Yet he is quite willing that the United Nations should do just that with the Arabs of Palestine. The Arabs' claim to Palestine, he says (p. 45) is based on "the sole ground that the Arabs constitute a majority of the Palestinian population and have inhabited the country for many centuries." What more should one ask? The same willingness to dispose of Palestine without considering the desires of its native people appears in the often-heard argument that since we cannot ask other nations to accept Jewish refugees when we will not do it ourselves, Palestine remains the only solution of the problem. In other words, in the case of Palestine, we do not have to ask anybody's consent!

The question of a state may and should be distinguished from the question of immigration and purchase of land. A

considerable amount of Jewish immigration, and the purchase of much larger amounts of land than have actually been purchased, might have been possible and entirely justifiable if they could have been accomplished without violating the political rights of the native people. It is true, as the Zionists constantly remind us, that the League of Nations Mandate instructed the British to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions," and to "encourage . . . close settlement by Jews on the land," but this was to be done while at the same time "insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced." If that last condition means anything beyond the unresolved and unacknowledged, though perhaps not unconscious, contradiction of many such documents, it indicates that the League of Nations contemplated no such enormous Jewish immigration as has taken place.

The question who should have control over the amount of immigration to be allowed was a somewhat sore point from the beginning. At a preliminary meeting between the British and the Zionists late in 1916, a year before the Balfour Declaration was issued, Sir Herbert Samuel said that the sovereign power should have supervision over immigration, but Dr. Weizmann denied this. Neither group seems to have considered the right of the existing population to determine the amount of immigration. The Arab attitude on this question was expressed in a statement to the UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 by the Foreign Minister of Iraq. Immigration, he said, "should not take place without the consent of the Arabs of Palestine, and their view of the absorptive capacity of the country should be paramount. Even then immigration shall not be discriminatory and there is no justification for having Jewish immigrants mainly. The quota should be fairly distributed amongst all Muslims, Christians, and

Jews who wish to come to Palestine to lead a spiritual life" (*Iraq's Point of View on the Palestine Question*. The Arab Office, Washington, D.C., 1947).

Zionist reasoning always starts from the assumption that Palestine belongs to the Jews. This basic assumption appears in a remark of Chief Rabbi Herzog. When an American relief worker said in the spring of 1948 that both sides should be willing to make concessions, the chief rabbi replied that in accepting partition the Jews had already agreed to give half of their country to the Arabs! The record of early discussions between the British and the Zionists reveals hardly any mention of the Arab population of Palestine. The tardy recognition of Arab interests in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 was denounced as a betrayal of the purpose of the Mandate.

The avowed purpose of the mandatory system, as we have seen, was to bring the peoples concerned to self-government. In June, 1918, the British issued a statement at Cairo concerning territories liberated from the Turks by the allied armies. It included this sentence: "It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed" (George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 434, Lippincott, 1939). On November 7 of the same year an Anglo-French declaration proclaimed that the object of Great Britain and France in the Near East was "the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population" (Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, Vol. 145, col. 36).

That the Arabs of Palestine have some rights has been verbally recognized in many Zionist pronouncements, but the

fact that the Zionist program itself was in essence a violation of the whole principle of self-determination has rarely been faced. At the Peace Conference at Paris following the First World War, Secretary Lansing asked Weizmann, "What do you mean by the Jewish national home?" Weizmann reports (*Trial and Error*, p. 244), "I defined the Jewish national home to mean the creation of an administration which would arise out of the natural conditions of the country—always safeguarding the interests of non-Jews—with the hope that by Jewish immigration Palestine would ultimately become as Jewish as England is English." With that hope, what could he mean by the interests of non-Jews? What Arab interests would be safeguarded if Palestine became as Jewish as England is English?

In 1921 the Twelfth Zionist Congress passed a resolution intended to conciliate the Arabs, saying, "The Congress emphatically declares that the progress of Jewish colonization will not affect the rights and needs of the working Arab nation" (*Reports of the Executive to the XIIIth Zionist Congress*, Vol. I, p. 150, Gordon, 1922). Unfortunately the most emphatic declaration could not make it so. The Zionists could not understand why in spite of such a gesture the Arabs "remained obdurate." Spokesmen of Zionism have constantly given assurance that the "rights" or "legitimate interests" of the non-Jewish population would be safeguarded. The question is, *What* rights? Is it meant that the Arab inhabitants of the Jewish state would have civil and religious liberty and a right to vote and participate as a minority? The Jews themselves have not been satisfied with that in Palestine or elsewhere. The Jews in Palestine have of course recognized the fact that the Arabs were there, and have even felt very generous toward them, but have regarded them as mere squatters. Now the Israelis are relieved that so many of the Arabs have left, and

clearly feel that they did not belong there anyway. Over and over again, both in Jewish and non-Jewish statements, the assumption is made that Palestine can be taken over by the Jews without violating the rights of the Arab population. An adequate definition of those rights would have made impossible the satisfaction of Jewish nationalistic ambitions in Palestine.

The right of a majority of the people of a country to choose their own government would hardly be questioned in any other instance. The Zionist assumption was that the right should be exercised only when the majority had become Jewish. This fact, clearly recognized by both parties, explains the unwavering opposition of the Arabs to unlimited Jewish immigration, and it explains the refusal of the Zionists to accept any form of self-government while they remained a minority. Lloyd George said in a much-quoted statement concerning what the British Cabinet had in mind when the Balfour Declaration was issued: "The idea was that a Jewish state was not to be set up immediately by the peace treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them . . . and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth" (quoted by Sumner Welles, *op. cit.*, without reference). One may ask how it was to be judged "when the time arrived" other than by the attainment of a Jewish majority. On the second anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Sir Herbert Samuel said that to establish a Jewish state in Palestine at that time would put the majority of the people under the rule of the minority, which would be undemocratic. The implication would seem to be that a Jewish

majority must first be obtained — contrary to the will of the present majority!

The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine can be rationally defended only by denying that the principle of self-determination is applicable. Some protagonists of Zionism have actually taken this position. At the Paris Peace Conference following the First World War, Secretary Lansing frankly criticized the principle of self-determination, calling it "one of those declarations of principle which sounds true, which in the abstract may be true, and which appeals strongly to man's innate sense of moral right and to his conception of natural justice, but which, when the attempt is made to apply it in every case, becomes a source of political instability and domestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion" (Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*, pp. 102, 97, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921). That, to be sure, was the way it worked in 1776!

Lansing exposed the real practical difficulty when he said that the great question concerning self-determination for Palestine was, "How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically committed?" Exactly so! The two could not be reconciled. President Wilson simply betrayed his own principle when he agreed to omit any mention of it from the final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and when he subsequently buried the report of the King-Crane Commission.

It is all very well to point out the practical complications in applying the principle of self-determination, and to qualify it if we must, provided we do not merely forget it. The whole effort to impose a Jewish state on a people who clearly did not want it remains essentially immoral, whatever may be said about it from a legal point of view, because it means disposing of something that does not belong to you. (The legal

argument for Zionism will be discussed in Chapter 4.)

Now that the establishment of the Jewish state is a *fait accompli*, there is a prevalent feeling that there is no longer any use in discussing the right or wrong of Zionism. One gets the impression that the Zionists have what they want and feel that the less questions raised about it the better. Any realistic appraisal of the problem and any realistic program for the future must of course start with the situation as it is, not as we may think it should have been. There are other questions, however, that must be faced. Is everything really settled? How long will it remain settled? Should it be allowed to remain settled as it is now? Accomplished facts are not always or necessarily permanent, and success does not justify wrong. Hitler had many accomplished facts to boast of in Europe, but they did not stand. The liquidation of 6,000,000 Jews in Europe by the Nazis was not made right by the fact that it had been accomplished. If we try to judge as Christians, we cannot evade the question of right and wrong.

A Jewish correspondent wrote to me during the past year, "I ask you to lay aside for the moment your feeling that a grave wrong has been done to the Arabs." That is precisely what we must on no account put aside or forget. It is the basic moral fact on which everything else depends.

3

WHO IS TO BLAME?

THE RESPONSIBILITY for the situation that has developed can not all be laid on the shoulders of any one group. Both Arabs and Jews in Palestine are very severe in their criticism of Great Britain. The British for their part feel aggrieved. Neither Jews nor Arabs, they feel, appreciate what Great Britain did for them during the thirty years of the Mandate. The fact that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was ambiguous, as will appear more fully later, enables Great Britain now to protest with an air of injured innocence that it fulfilled its obligations to the Jews, because a Jewish national home was established in Palestine. It is undeniably true that much more was done by the British for the Jews than they are disposed to acknowledge. It is not surprising, moreover, that the killing of British soldiers and police by Jewish terrorists was denounced as a demonstration of criminal ingratitude.

With all that may be said in defense of the British, however, they are open to serious criticism. In the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the acceptance and administration of the Mandate, they were unquestionably playing imperialistic power politics. The involved and partly secret negotiations

during and after the First World War included mutually inconsistent commitments. It is unnecessary here to go into this very long story. Some of it will come up for review in another connection. In the administration of the Mandate the British exerted insufficient effort to bring the Jews and Arabs together in a united independent government. Perhaps this was impossible, and it is true that attempts were made to establish legislative councils and other organs of democratic government. There is abundant reason to feel, however, that more might have been done in this direction. There was often some justification for the feeling among both Jews and Arabs that the British were practicing the old policy, "divide and rule," for their own imperialistic purposes.

While the Arabs have good grounds for their complaints against the whole project of the Jewish national home in Palestine, the Jews are right in maintaining that the policy of restricting Jewish immigration embodied in the White Paper of 1939 was wrung from the British by Arab terrorism. It is equally true that the abandonment of the Mandate was accomplished by Jewish terrorism. After Great Britain had announced that it was giving up the Mandate and had thrown the problem of Palestine into the lap of the United Nations, the administration in Palestine refused to co-operate with the United Nations, claiming sole authority over the country until the end of the Mandate while actually allowing troops from the neighboring Arab nations to establish themselves in the country. Up to the very end of the Mandate the British made the work of the United Nations Commission quite futile. They not only refused to co-operate in any positive way, but so limited the opportunities of the Commission that it was unable to accomplish anything.

British policy in the Middle East has had as one of its premises the importance of gaining and holding the friendship of

the Arabs. At this point it would seem that the British have rather lamentably failed. While at times, and in some quarters, it is felt that Great Britain is the only friend the Arabs have left in the Western world, there is also a very widespread dislike of British control and a desire to get rid of it. A large part of the trouble between King Abdullah and the other Arab states lies in the fact that he is commonly considered a mere tool of the British.

If there is much for which the British can fairly be blamed, it is also true that a great deal of responsibility for the tragedy of Palestine must rest on the United Nations. To be sure, the task was an extremely difficult one. There was much justification for the complaint of our representative, Herschel Johnson, "Neither the Jews nor the Arabs will ever be completely satisfied with anything we do." On the other hand, there is reason to believe that a wise program, as fair as possible to both parties, would have been accepted without warfare if it had been firmly insisted upon and enforced by sanctions. The partition plan that was adopted was no such program. It was neither fair nor realistic.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine tried sincerely to reach a wise and just decision. One of the major difficulties it faced was the shortness of the time available. Whatever considerations may have led to the unfortunate program adopted by the majority of the committee, it cannot be said that they did not try to do their job well. The plan they formulated, however, was impractical in two ways. The boundaries were illogical, following no natural geographic, ethnic, or economic lines and no perceptible principle except the desire to include as many as possible of the widely scattered Jewish colonies in Jewish territory. The other point at which the plan was unrealistic was the assumption of "economic union" on which it rested. The Committee and the Assembly

blandly assumed that once the plan was approved the Arabs would cheerfully co-operate in trade and other relationships with the Jewish state. Actually they were already boycotting Jewish goods, and they were so embittered that they would not have co-operated at all. The proposed economic union would have been impossible.

When the report of the Committee was submitted in September, 1947, there was still a good possibility that wiser counsels might prevail. The character of the Assembly, as a forum for debate with no real power to enforce its decisions, made it inevitable that any plan adopted must be one that the delegates thought could be carried out with the consent of both parties, or at least with no insuperable opposition. The minority report of the UNSCOP, favoring a federal government for the whole country, was rejected by the Assembly, obviously because neither Jews nor Arabs supported it. Some modification of it, however, might have produced agreement if a serious effort in this direction had been made. The result of the adoption of the partition plan was to encourage the Zionists and completely discourage the Arabs concerning the possibility of getting what they wanted from the United Nations. Anti-Zionist groups among the Jews themselves were discouraged also.

During the spring of 1948 the procedure in the United Nations was completely befuddled. The Commission sent to Jerusalem was not merely frustrated by the un-co-operative attitude of the British; it could hardly have been expected to accomplish anything without more specific instructions and some real authority behind it. The appointment of a truce commission in April and of Count Folke Bernadotte as United Nations mediator for Palestine in May (six days after the end of the Mandate) implicitly acknowledged that some other way would have to be found. The report that Count

Bernadotte later drew up, and which came before the Assembly at Paris in September after his assassination, was still a plan of partition, severely limiting the territory assigned to Israel. It did not gain general support, though it might have been carried through if the United States and Great Britain had stood by it. The patient and able efforts of Count Bernadotte and his assistants, and of Dr. Bunche after Bernadotte's death, to secure truces and induce both sides to observe them, and to bring about armistice agreements after the cessation of fighting, deserve all commendation. The Conciliation Commission appointed in December, 1948, has been unable, through no fault of its own, to make perceptible progress toward a more permanent peace settlement.

For the failure of the United Nations to solve the problem of Palestine in time, much of the blame must rest upon the United States. In the first place, we have officially espoused the Zionist cause on the ostensible basis of a humanitarian interest in the Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe, while at the same time we failed to make a decent provision for them by opening the doors of our own country. An act passed by Congress had notoriously discriminated against Jewish refugees from eastern Europe by excluding those who had not been in concentration camps before December 22, 1945. In this case the President cannot be held responsible. He had advocated a much more liberal act, and he has continued ever since to ask that the present act be made more liberal. Since he was at the same time urging that this country admit 400,000 of the Displaced Persons, there may have been some excuse for his urging that the British admit one quarter of that number to Palestine, though, to be sure, there was much more than four times as much room for them in the United States as there was in Palestine. No excuse whatever can be given for those Americans who vociferously demanded that

Palestine be opened to the Jewish refugees of Europe, but at the same time did nothing to secure their admission to the United States.

Americans must be held responsible also for the support they gave to Jewish terrorists in Palestine. An extreme example of this was the reception accorded Menachem Beigin, the leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, when he visited the United States in November, 1948, to raise funds and gain prestige for his political campaign in preparation for the national election in Israel. A full-page advertisement in *The New York Times* for November 23 hailed him as "the man who defied an empire and gained glory for Israel." The frightful acts of terrorism that had been committed by his group were glorified as "unprecedented, daring, and retaliatory measures," by which "the hitherto pariah people of the world, the Jews, won back their dignity and self-respect and the respect of the entire civilized world." The ad listed the names of "more than 1,000 distinguished Americans from all walks of life, including United States Senators, Representatives, governors, the clergy, educators, artists and writers, industrialists and labor leaders" who welcomed Beigin to the United States on his "good will mission." To the everlasting credit of American Jews, there were many who did not hesitate to protest publicly that for them the exploits of the Irgun meant anything but "dignity and self-respect and the respect of the entire civilized world."

Not only did individual American citizens support even the least creditable policies and acts of Palestinian Zionists; our Government must also bear the responsibility for the adoption of the plan of partition by the United Nations. If one regards this decision as wise and just, the fact that our Government used its influence to bring about the adoption of the plan may be a matter of pride. Even so, the methods by which the result was achieved were not such as to give Ameri-

can citizens cause for boasting. The vote for partition in the United Nations Assembly on November 29, 1947, was forced through by our Government with a shameless resort to the timeworn methods of power politics. Hailed by the Zionists with exuberant joy as a great moral victory, it was in fact an immoral victory. It was a shameful demonstration of the sad fact that the old morally discredited ways of unscrupulous pressure and diplomatic intimidation could control a body formed for the high purpose of achieving international justice. It was a staggering blow to confidence in the United Nations and in the United States of America.

In March, 1948, when it became evident that the partition resolution could not be put into effect except by force, the American delegation announced that the United States withdrew its support of the plan and favored a trusteeship for Palestine. President Truman at once stultified this proposal of his own delegation by proclaiming his continued support of partition, but any effective enforcement of the partition plan was so obviously out of the question that it was not even attempted.

During the political campaign in the autumn of 1948, the scramble of political candidates for the Zionist vote was disgraceful. Each took pains to express devotion to the Zionist program. The approval of the Bernadotte plan for Palestine by Secretary Marshall at Paris proved embarrassing to the Democratic party. When Governor Dewey made a public statement commending the original partition resolution of 1947, President Truman found it necessary to issue a statement repeating his support of the 1947 plan and stating that no change in it that was not acceptable to Israel would have his approval. As a partial and transparent attempt to save face for our delegation at Paris, it was said that the Bernadotte plan should be used as a "basis of negotiation."

Our delegates to the United Nations consistently urged the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations without any previous commitments concerning boundaries, the internationalizing of Jerusalem, or the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees. While such extraordinary political pressure as had been used in 1947 does not seem to have been necessary on this question, there is no doubt that the active support of the American delegation had much to do with the final admission of Israel to the United Nations. Again this is not a matter of censure if it be granted that the admission of Israel without commitments on the points mentioned was desirable. The fact is recalled here to emphasize the share of responsibility that the United States must bear for all the consequences of the Zionist program in Palestine.

With all the blame that may fairly be laid at the doors of others, the Arabs themselves have much for which they cannot hold anyone else responsible. No Christian can condone the acts of violence perpetrated by Arabs against Jews in Palestine during the British Mandate. The Arabs have only themselves to blame for the fact that they never succeeded in agreeing upon a positive policy and achieving active co-operation in their resistance to Zionism before the great wave of immigration came. They made a serious mistake, also, in failing to compromise with the Jews while it was possible. The recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of 1946, for example, that 100,000 Jewish Displaced Persons should be admitted to Palestine, could have been accepted, and while it would have put some strain upon the absorptive capacity of the country at the time, this would have been nothing to what has actually happened during the past year. If the Arabs had co-operated with the moderate elements among the Zionists, and particularly with the *Ihud* movement headed by Dr. Magnes, they might have achieved a working

agreement that would not have been intolerable.

For their international position it is unfortunate that the Arabs were largely pro-German during World War II. It was not that they were against the Western democracies as such. They were not pro-Nazi, but simply pro-Arab. They were trying to find support for their own aspirations. Having been promised what was not delivered by the Allies after the First World War, they thought they had a better chance this time to get what they wanted from the Axis. It was a bad guess, but one that is not hard to understand.

Their refusal to co-operate with the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 was another bit of bad strategy. Their reasons were plain enough. One commission after another had come to Palestine and issued a report, but nothing constructive was ever done as a consequence. This time they felt that there was no use in attempting to present their position to the committee. Actually this was the first commission representing the international community, and it would have been well worth while to make every effort to produce a favorable impression upon them. It is at least possible that a wiser and fairer plan might have been devised by the committee if the Arabs had co-operated.

After the committee made its report to the Assembly, strong advocacy of a plan for a federal government of Palestine might have prevented the adoption of the partition plan. The issue hung so long in the balance, and was finally settled only by such powerful pressure from our Government, that any well considered and strongly backed constructive proposal might have won the day. As it was, the representatives of the Arabs proposed a plan of federation so late in the day that their proposal could hardly be expected to win support or even to be considered sincere.

While the negative and un-co-operative policy of the Arabs

was unwise from the standpoint of practical policy, their basic position was not at all unreasonable. They had consistently advocated an independent government of Palestine with full rights of citizenship for Jews as well as Arabs. The Jews were, of course, quite unwilling to accept this arrangement so long as they were in a minority, but they are now claiming great credit for allowing the Arabs in Israel exactly the same position.

Among the mistakes of the Arabs must be reckoned their optimism concerning their military strength as compared with the Zionists. During the winter of 1947-1948 they were all apparently quite confident that when the British withdrew they could herd the Jews into a small area on the coast of the Mediterranean and blockade them there until they were willing to come to terms.

The failure of the Arabs to have a government organized and ready at the end of the Mandate was another disastrous error. There were both theoretical and practical difficulties. On the theoretical side, it was felt that to set up a separate Arab government would be to recognize a Jewish state and accept the principle of partition. On the practical side, the Arabs probably could not have set up a government that would have gained general support. The great hero of the common people, the Mufti of Jerusalem, would almost inevitably have been the head of any Arab government for Palestine at that time, but he would not have been acceptable to the surrounding Arab states and would have had considerable opposition even in Palestine. There were many who favored Abdullah of Transjordan, but Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were opposed to him. With full allowance for such difficulties, however, it was a serious blunder not to have any government ready.

The Arabs are condemned for resisting by violence a de-

cision of the United Nations. They did not accept the partition resolution. The Jews accepted it because it was favorable to them, though some of them had mental reservations, as recent declarations of their intention to hold all conquered territory make plain. In any case, the United Nations Assembly itself proceeded very much as though it had abandoned the plan, which was at most only a recommendation without binding authority.

The flight of the Arab refugees from their villages was a great mistake from the point of view of political advantage. Fearing that they would be massacred if they remained, they naturally took flight, as people of all countries have done under similar circumstances. In so far as the Arab leaders, however, urged the people to leave their homes, and even warned them that they would be regarded as traitors if they did not do so, they are culpable. How far the stampede of the refugees was actually influenced by such advice from their own leaders it is difficult to determine now. Unquestionably this happened in some places, but we shall see presently that it was by no means the principal factor.

In general it is clear that the Arabs suffered all along the line from inept leadership. Many of them are and were quite aware of that fact. They have been guilty of worse faults also, but not every charge brought against them can be justified. Most unjust and untrue of all is the constantly repeated claim that they were the aggressors in the fighting of 1948. Pro-Zionist writers regularly use such words as "aggression" and "invasion" with reference to the Arabs, willfully ignoring the fact that the Arabs consider the Jews invaders and aggressors. A quite different view of the situation would emerge if the word "resistance" were used. The insistent effort of Zionist propaganda to distinguish between the Arabs of Palestine and the armies of the neighboring Arab states involves an espe-

cially misleading conception of the attitude of the Palestinian Arabs. As I have said elsewhere, the armies from the Arab nations invaded Palestine only in the sense that the American Army invaded England during World War II. The Arabs of Palestine welcomed them as their defenders against the Jews.

As a matter of fact, in many places Israel actually took the initiative in the fighting. This was true not only at Jerusalem but also at Haifa and throughout western Galilee. It is quite true that from a military standpoint such prompt action was necessary in view of the presence of Arab forces in the country. To use an expression from our own frontier days, Israel simply beat the Arabs to the draw. This, however, does not justify the designation of the Arabs as aggressors. Certainly it was not the Arabs who drove the refugees from their homes. The refugees did not flee from the Arab armies but to them.

The whole problem of aggression goes back to the basic question: To whom does the country rightly belong? The native people of Palestine cannot be held responsible for what has really caused the whole trouble, the imposition upon them of an enormous body of immigrants from other lands, with ways very different from theirs and speaking a language they do not understand.

Whatever blame may be ascribed either to the Palestinian Arabs or to the other Arab nations, there is much for which the Jews must be held responsible. The situation would have been very different if they had followed a different procedure, even if the basic Zionist purpose was not relinquished. A great deal of trouble was caused from the beginning by the un-co-operative attitude and decidedly undiplomatic approach of many Jews to the Arabs. There were some, especially among the earliest colonists, who made a sincere effort to understand

the Arabs, studied their language, and sometimes lived among them for a while to become acquainted with their ideas and way of life. If all the colonists had acted thus, the whole tragic series of events might never have occurred. The opposition of the Arabs to the Zionists is based not only on economic and political but also on psychological grounds. Whatever else the Arabs may be, they are almost always polite. They cannot understand the frequently brusque and arrogant attitude of the Jewish colonists. Perhaps this attitude is to be explained by the fact that it is the most aggressive European and American Jews who have gone to Palestine. A woman who was practically the mother of one of the colonies said to me one day, apologizing for some rather rude behavior on the part of a member of the colony, "You must remember that most of our young people here are illegal immigrants."

The tactlessness with which extreme political claims have often been expressed by prominent Zionists has not helped to reconcile the Arabs to the movement. The attitude of the Zionists toward the Arabs, at its worst, has been that of our Western frontiersmen, who said that the only good Indian was a dead Indian. This was the attitude of a young *halutz* (pioneer) who said to me, "The Arabs are just savages; they ought to go back to the desert where they belong." At its best, the Zionist attitude to the Arabs has been patronizing and paternalistic. The landlady of a Jewish pension in Tel Aviv at which I spent a night during the disorders of 1936 said to me, "You mustn't think too badly of our Arabs."

The worst fault of the Zionists was their resort to violence to achieve their ends. True, the Arabs used violence before the Jews did, and during the disorders of the period preceding World War II the Jewish colonists exercised remarkable self-control. Not until the White Paper of 1939 provoked them to desperation did outright terrorism on the part of the

Jews begin. It is true also that the policy of terrorism was not practiced or approved by all the Zionists. Whether the majority secretly rejoiced in it may never be known, but there were certainly many who did. Some groups among the Zionists have not only refused to relinquish the claim to all Palestine and Transjordan but have maintained that violence and deception were justified in order to attain their goal. The leader of the Irgun, Menachem Beigin, said in a speech at New York in December, 1948: "We should all remember that the fight is not over yet. We must continue to fight with new methods and new weapons until the whole of Israel is liberated and the whole of our people are back in the country." At the same meeting another speaker said: "The reason partition was accepted was to avoid bloodshed. Why shouldn't we have fought for the rest of the country?" Beigin's position was repudiated by some Zionist leaders, but not so widely or emphatically as might have been desired.

During the period of terrorism before the end of the Mandate the Zionists who publicly disapproved violent methods often said that they knew who the terrorists were and could put a stop to the violence if the British would let them alone. They did not co-operate with the Government in apprehending the terrorists, however, and it seemed clear that in this policy they had the approval of the majority of the Palestinian Jews. The climax of terrorism was reached in the cold-blooded murder of the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, and his French assistant, Colonel André Pierre Serot, on September 17, 1948, in Katamon, one of the residential districts outside the Old City, which had been occupied by the Jews during the spring. The assassins have never been apprehended. The general attitude of the Zionists toward the murder of Bernadotte seemed to be, "It is too bad; let's talk about something else." In a letter published in *The New York*

Times of September 24, Dr. Judah L. Magnes, denouncing the outrage, laid part of the blame on American supporters of the terrorists, and added, "A large measure of responsibility must also fall upon those official circles in Israel who at one time and another carried on joint activities with terrorist groups, and instead of suppressing them came to an understanding with them, incorporating them into the official armed forces."

The Jewish claim that the Arabs were the aggressors in the warfare that accompanied and followed the end of the Mandate has already been refuted, and it has been pointed out that in some places, including Jerusalem, the Jews themselves were the aggressors. In the Arab residential districts outside of the Old City at Jerusalem which were taken over by the Jews, the houses of the Arab citizens who had fled were completely looted. Doors, windows, electric fixtures, even plumbing, and everything movable were carted off. Within the Old City the Arabs destroyed many buildings in the old Jewish quarter, including some historic synagogues, but at least one of these had been occupied by Jewish fighters and used as a military post.

The attitude of the Government of Israel toward the deliberations and decisions of the United Nations has not been what we might expect after their indignant denunciation of the Arabs for rejecting the plan of partition. During the fighting, and even during the periods of truce imposed by the United Nations, the Israelis brought in military equipment and planes by every possible means. During the truce in July and August, "young potential soldiers" were brought into Israel in such numbers as to evoke protests from United Nations officers. Shipments of matériel were received from the Soviet countries, and the Zatec airfield in western Bohemia was used as a base for shipment of arms by air for the Israeli forces. Even in November the public press reported that arms

were reaching Israel from Czechoslovakia in defiance of UN truce regulations.

On October 28, after the Israeli forces had pushed the Egyptians back in the Negeb, Mr. Ben-Gurion told the State Council that the victory was "a great debacle for United Nations endeavors in Palestine." On November 12 he said: "We are not going to fight the United Nations if they send troops into our country, but we are not going to agree to resolutions adopted in haste and without consideration. Unless we are physically forced we will not abandon any positions that we have won in the south." Israel repeatedly defied orders of the United Nations mediator and boldly announced that it would defy any decision it considered unfavorable. It has been quite clear from the beginning that the Israelis had no intention whatever of keeping within the borders set by the partition plan of November, 1947, which at the same time they exalted as a sacred international pronouncement defied by the Arabs.

Over and above every other aspect of the division of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel is the tragic plight of the Arab refugees. The Government of Israel and the proponents of Zionism insist that Israel must not be held responsible for this tragedy. It was on the advice of the Arab leaders and of the departing British, they allege, that the refugees fled. We have already seen that while there is some truth in this claim so far as the beginning of the exodus is concerned, what turned it into a stampede was the frightful massacre at Deir Yassin on April 9. It was fear that drove most of the people from their homes. We have seen also that not all fled of their own accord, and that forcible expulsion continued as late as June, 1949.

Whether or not the Jews are to be held responsible for the flight of the refugees, they are responsible for what they have done about it and what they do from now on. Journalists and

relief workers report that for those Arabs who have remained in Israel provisions have been made that are all that can be expected under the circumstances. What has been done about the Arabs who fled from their homes is not so commendable. The Israelis have evidently proceeded on the assumption that the refugees would never come home. An Associated Press dispatch dated September 13, 1948, reports: "The port of Haifa, once one of the Middle East's busiest harbors, echoes daily with the rumbling of dynamite in the Jewish slum clearance program. Arab quarters are being leveled. . . . Nazareth, sacred to Christendom as the home of Jesus, appears normal. There was no mass flight there. . . . But between Haifa and Nazareth there are dozens of villages deserted and in ruins. Homes of those half million Displaced Persons were there. Buildings not leveled in fighting now are being reduced to rubble." Later reports to the same effect have come from other places. The use of Arab homes for Jewish immigrants has been noted already in Chapter 1.

The official attitude of the Government of Israel toward the return of the refugees has been, to say the least, cool. At Paris, on November 15, 1948, Mr. Shertok said before the UN Political Committee that no refugees would be readmitted during the war and it would be better not to let them come back anyway. That position has been often and consistently reaffirmed. This is the first of the questions we shall have to consider under the head of agenda (Chapter 8).

Underlying everything else for which the Zionists may fairly be blamed is the initial assumption that the native people of Palestine did not have to be considered as anything more than a minor nuisance, and their consent to the occupation of their country was unnecessary. Not every form of Zionism has made that assumption, but it is the fundamental fallacy of the particular brand of Zionist philosophy and pro-

gram on which the Jewish state in Palestine has been built.

This chapter must not close without a reminder that the Christians of the world must bear some of the blame for the violence done to the Holy Land. Discrimination, segregation, persecutions, and pogroms gave point to the demand for a Jewish homeland. Failure to provide a safe haven elsewhere for the victims of persecution in Europe gave color to the Zionist insistence that only in Palestine could they find refuge. Failure to express promptly and strongly the interest of Christians in Palestine allowed the land to be divided, and even the provision of the partition plan for internationalizing Jerusalem was almost forgotten. Christian apathy, and fear of stirring up anti-Semitic feeling, let the Arab refugees go hungry and cold, in spite of the frantic appeals of a few individuals and the devoted efforts of a few organizations, when adequate publicity and organization might have prevented much misery and saved many lives. Failure still to realize what has happened and what it means for Christianity prevents the action that should be taken. But there will be more to say on these matters in subsequent chapters.

THE CASE FOR ZIONISM

THERE IS MUCH IN ZIONISM that is bound to appeal strongly to any sincere Christian and to any person with a social conscience, but the best case that can be made for it is still not good enough to outweigh the injustice committed against the Arabs. Of course I cannot here present a statement of Zionism that any Zionist would accept as adequate. I can only mention and very briefly discuss what seem to be the main lines of the argument.

The idea of a Jewish homeland should be distinguished from the idea of a Jewish state, for there have been many who sympathized with the former while rejecting the latter. Leaving aside for the moment the question of an independent state, we may say that the Jewish national home involves two aspirations: a refuge for the homeless Jews of the world and a center for the revival and development of Jewish culture.

Undoubtedly the chief appeal of Zionism to the American people since World War II has been the solution it seemed to offer to the problem of the victims of Nazi oppression in Europe. Does opposition to political Zionism then show indifference to the plight of these wretched people? Not at all!

The responsibility for the homeless people in the concentration camps of Europe rests, not on the Arab nations of the Middle East, but on the Christian nations of the West. As a place of refuge for Jews from other lands Palestine is entirely inadequate, as its present condition eloquently attests. It must be admitted that the Jews of Palestine have shown the courage of their convictions in receiving and attempting to accommodate the flood of immigrants, but the very magnitude of the task exposes the fallacy of the constant insistence on Palestine as the only acceptable refuge for persecuted Jews. There is reason to believe, indeed, that this insistence has itself complicated and postponed the solution of the problem of the Jewish Displaced Persons. The Zionists are now reaping what they have sown. It has often appeared during the past ten years that they were not so much concerned to save the Jewish refugees of Europe as they were to exploit them for their own political ends.

The Jewish national home means more, however, than a haven for persecuted Jews. The stress on preserving distinctive Jewish cultural values has been a strong motive in the Zionist movement. Many Jews have undoubtedly found in Palestine a new sense of freedom and dignity, an emancipation from the haunting inferiority complex of their previous existence in a Gentile environment. It is true also that a new literature and many forms of cultural expression have arisen in the colonies. New and promising experiments in economic and social organization have been going on. Excellent scientific, educational, and philanthropic institutions have been established. A poignant element in the tragedy of partition and war and the erection of the Jewish state is the interruption all this has meant for the really constructive achievements of the Zionist settlements. But with full and admiring recognition of the positive side of cultural Zionism, it must still

be maintained that Jews have no right to erect a cultural home for themselves on a foundation of injustice to the Arabs. A center of Jewish spiritual life and culture might have been built, and to a certain extent was built, for a very limited number of immigrants. It is the combination of this ideal with the determination to bring in unlimited numbers of immigrants and set up a state that has violated the rights of the native population.

The demand for an independent political existence is based on the elementary desire for safety. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was the persecution of Jews in eastern Europe that gave strength to this feeling. It was deepened by the frightful experience of the Jews under Hitler. A Jewish schoolteacher once wrote to me: "I was prior to 1935 only a lukewarm Zionist. But events have made it very clear to any Jew that has the courage to face reality that no Jew can look for security in any Christian country."

To that there are three things to be said. First, it should not be taken for granted that the Jews will be safe in Palestine. That is a very doubtful assumption. If the good will of the Arabs had been cultivated and their fears and resentment had not been aroused, a unitary or binational state might have been set up, in which there would have been security for all. Now the state of Israel can hope for safety and preservation only by substantial and continued support from the United Nations. The Arabs may submit to pressure for the time being, but so long as they feel that they have been wronged, they will only wait for an opportunity to "get even," and there will be intermittent boycotts, strikes, and riots in the meantime, with the constant danger of raids and massacres when feeling runs especially high.

Secondly, the Jews of the world are in a sorry state indeed if they can hope for no security except in Palestine, for at

most only a small fraction of them can ever find refuge there. The vast majority of the Jews in the world will never even seriously consider migrating to Palestine.

Thirdly, shameful as may be the discrimination practiced against Jews even in the United States, it is not true that there is no security for Jews here or in other Christian lands. In England and France and other countries, as well as the United States, many Jews have found not only safety but prosperity and happiness, and there is good hope that by persevering effort (more wisely conducted, to be sure, than has sometimes been the case) they may attain genuine emancipation and full civil and social rights throughout Christendom. Perhaps they will have to become more willing to give up some of their separatism. They cannot stress constantly their difference and separation from other people and at the same time expect to be treated just like others. Anti-Semitism is a shameful stain on Christian civilization, but it can be eradicated if the Jews themselves will do their part. Segregation is no way to solve the problems of minorities. Ultimately it would mean going back to the principle of the ghetto, the only difference being that there would be one bigger and better ghetto.

If the Jewish people, or some of them, desired a state of their own, they had as much right to it as any other people, but they did not have to establish it in Palestine. Weizmann remarks in his autobiography that Palestine is not even mentioned in Theodor Herzl's *Jewish State*. Leo Pinsker, one of the great pioneers of Zionism, held originally that the Jews should not attach themselves to the place where their political life had been violently interrupted and destroyed. Herzl himself was in favor of accepting a British offer of territory in Uganda. Palestine is so conspicuously unsuited to be the seat of a thriving state that one is bound to ask why those whose

chief interest was political so insistently demanded that their state be set up in that poor little country.

A true answer to that question lies in the fact that for Zionism the emotional associations of Palestine count for more than the geographic reality. In thus giving sentiment priority over geography and economics the Zionists cannot be called unrealistic; in fact they have shown a very tough realism. The enormous devotion developed and exploited by the Zionist movement comes largely from the age-old associations that Palestine has for Judaism. The prayer books of orthodox Jews throughout the world are full of the hope of restoration to the Holy Land. The study of the Talmud keeps alive this emotional attachment for those whose delight is in the law of the Lord. Orthodox Jews the world over have been accustomed to greet one another through the centuries with the wish, "Next year in Jerusalem!" Of course, very few of those using the expression have had any intention of trying to go to Palestine within the year. They have not been like an old Scottish preacher I once met on the way to Palestine, who told me that when he reached his eightieth birthday, he said to his wife, "Before this year is over I am going to be either in Jerusalem or in the New Jerusalem." (He got to Jerusalem.)

Not for Jews alone is Palestine the Holy Land. As the next chapter will emphasize, it is our spiritual home too. Jerusalem is also one of the holy cities of Islam, and the sacred area containing the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock is venerated throughout the Muslim world as one of the three most holy places of their religion. Hebron also is a holy place for the Arabs. Let me quote Fadhel Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq, as spokesman for the Arabs: "As for the continued spiritual connection of the Jews with Palestine this does not entitle them to return to Palestine. For spiritually Palestine is

holy to the Christians and Muslims and Jews alike. . . . The fact is that spiritual connections with a place do not necessarily entail political connections. All the Muslims in the world have spiritual connections with Hejaz, but politically Hejaz belongs to its own inhabitants" (*Iraq's Point of View* . . .).

As a matter of fact, the devout Jews who took most seriously the religious associations of Palestine were never the most active members of the organized Zionist movement. Weizmann says of the pious old European Jews, who went to Palestine to die and be buried in sacred soil, that for the Zionist movement they were "a useless and even retarding element" (*Trial and Error*, p. 125). In 1903 the orthodox group among the Zionists, the Mizrachi party, actually favored accepting the offer of Uganda. In fact, the Sixth Zionist Congress that year voted to accept the offer.

Whatever they could have done if they had tried, it may be that Palestine was the only place that would inspire the idealism and sacrifice necessary to establish the Jewish national home. It is definitely not the only place that the nations of the world could grant to the Jews as a homeland. Other places have been offered, Uganda being the best known but not the only instance. In any case, the unwillingness of the Jews to make the requisite effort for setting up their national home in any other place is no justification for overriding the rights of the people already living in Palestine. The nations of the world might well have said to the Zionists: "Palestine is already occupied and is both inadequate and unavailable. We will give you more and better territory elsewhere; take it or leave it."

By right or by wrong, the Jews now have their state in Palestine. As matters stood in the middle of May, 1948, when the British withdrew, the Jews would have had to set up a state in sheer self-defense, even if they had not wanted to do so.

The only objection one can now fairly raise is not an objection to the fact that the Jewish state was established at that time, but to the whole program, the whole concatenation of policies and acts that led to this point.

Thus far I have been arguing that the Jewish state in Palestine was not necessary. But Zionists claim that Palestine belongs to them by right as their national home. This claim is based on Biblical, historical, and legal grounds. Let me consider these arguments in turn.

One who has been following recent developments in Palestine, and who reads again those parts of the Old Testament that refer to the return of the Jews from exile, can sometimes hardly help feeling that all this is now being fulfilled. To the Zionists it must inevitably seem so. Does not the Bible promise Palestine to Israel? It does, but the state of Israel established in 1948 is not the fulfillment of that promise. What I shall say, all too briefly, on this subject is addressed to Christians, who believe that the Old Testament is completed and fulfilled by the New Testament. Those who do not accept this premise will not find the evidence convincing. To them I would say only that the argument of the next five paragraphs leads to a negative conclusion: The existence of the state of Israel cannot be justified on the ground that it fulfills a divine promise made to the ancient Hebrew nation.

God promised to Abraham that his seed should inherit the Land of Canaan as their everlasting possession (Gen. 12:1, 7; 13:14-17; 15:7, 18). Ishmael, the ancestor of the Arabs, was a son of Abraham, but the promise was inherited by Isaac (Gen. 17:20, 21; 21:9-33). Paul says that those who have faith are the sons of Abraham (Gal. 3:7; cf. Luke 3:8). The promise of endless duration, it is important to remember, was made also to the royal line of David (II Sam. 7:10-16; Jer. 33:17-22). Sometimes the promise appears to be entirely unconditioned;

in other places, however, it is explicitly made contingent upon Israel's obedience to the law of God. When Israel in fact proves to be rebellious and disobedient, the covenant is declared to have been broken (Isa. 24:5; Jer. 11:10; 31:32; Ezek. 16:59). Even so, forgiveness and restoration are promised if the stricken nation repents (Lev. 26:40-45). Jeremiah even promises a new covenant to take the place of the old one which has been broken (Jer. 31:31-34).

The destruction of the Kingdom of Israel by the Assyrians in the eighth century B.C. and the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah by the Chaldeans in the sixth century were recognized as vindicating and fulfilling the warnings of the prophets. In the bitterness and humiliation of the exile in Babylonia the stricken people did, at least in part, repent. They were also, in part, restored to Palestine. The new community considered itself the recipient of the promised new covenant, but it was not an independent kingdom, and no descendant of David reigned as its king. It was largely ruled by the priests, subject to the Persian emperors. For the fulfillment of the promise of an eternal Davidic kingdom orthodox Judaism still looks to the future days of the Messiah.

In the New Testament the promise of a new covenant and a king of David's line is said to be fulfilled by the coming of Christ, not in a political but in a spiritual sense (Matt. 2:1-12; Luke 2:1-39; John 18:33-37). His own blood was the blood of the new covenant (Luke 22:20; cf. Ex. 24:8). By rejecting him the Jewish nation as such forfeited its claim to the promises, and his Church took its place as the people of the covenant (Matt. 21:33-43). The book of The Acts records the struggle within the community of Jesus' disciples between those who thought of the gospel as belonging only to the Jewish people and those who considered it a light for the Gentiles. The conception of the Church as the true remnant of Israel (Rom.

11:5), the real Israel of God (Gal. 6:16), based not on race or nationality but on faith alone (Gal. 3:7, 28, 29), won the day.

All of the first disciples and a great many of the later converts were Jews, but the Jewish people as a whole rejected the idea of a universal religion, independent of ethnic or national limitation, and clung to the ancient hope of restoration to divine favor and supremacy in the world as a people and a nation. From the Christian point of view this was the great, tragic error of Judaism. In our time Reformed Judaism has revived the prophetic conception of Israel as a "light to the Gentiles" and a blessing to all nations (Isa. 49:6; Gen. 12:3). Zionism goes back to the ancient stress on nationalism (see Chapter 7).

We must not, of course, make the Old Testament a mere counterfoil for the New Testament. It is still Scripture for us, not merely ancient literature or a source for the history of religion in antiquity. What is true in it, however, is that which comes to fullest realization in the gospel of Christ. One thing is certain. Nothing that is essentially unjust or contrary to the Spirit of Christ can be the will of God. Let him who speaks of the fulfillment of prophecy remember Jer. 22:13: "Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness"; and Micah 3:10: "They build up Zion with blood."

Somewhat related to the argument from Scripture, yet distinct, is the historical argument. The question of the Jews' historic right to Palestine has been so much debated that one cannot hope to throw any new light on it, but it is still important to call attention to some basic points that tend to be lost in the welter of argument. While Palestine is not *the* historic home of the whole Arab people in the same way that it is the historic home of the Jewish people, there is a real, direct connection, and it is much more fresh than the tie between the Children of Israel and the Land of Canaan. For

the Arabs of Palestine, as distinguished from the Arab peoples as a whole, the land is their historical homeland in the sense that their ancestors have been living in it for generations and centuries. They do not have to go back two thousand years to pick up a broken connection; it is living and continuous, unbroken for the past thirteen hundred years. That is not to say that there were no Arabs in Palestine before the seventh century, or that all the present Arab inhabitants can trace their descent to a "Mayflower" of the desert which brought their ancestors to that country a thousand years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock. What is meant is that the population of Palestine has been predominantly Arab since the seventh century.

For the Arabs, Palestine is not a separate country in itself. From the time it became a part of the Roman Empire down to the artificial delineation of the mandated areas after World War I, Palestine had no separate existence as an independent state. The Crusaders set up, not one, but several different kingdoms and principalities in the Near East, none being co-extensive with the territory of the Hebrew state at any period of its existence. The wavering fortunes of the caliphate during the more than nine hundred years between the Arab conquest and the absorption of what was left of its power by the Turks saw many more or less independent rulers gain and lose control of Palestine. But there was no time during all those centuries when it could be said that Palestine was no longer an integral part of the Arab world. In population, language, and culture it remained distinctly Arab even through the brief period of the Crusades, and it continued so through the four centuries of Turkish domination. The historical connection of the Arabs with Palestine is the same as their connection with other integral parts of the Arab world.

Far too much attention has been given to the duration of

the Jewish and Arab occupations. Figures have been tossed about rather recklessly by both sides. There has been a tendency, in the heat of debate, to claim for one's own side the full number of centuries in which there have been Jews or Arabs, as the case may be, living in Palestine, while the other side is allowed only the length of time during which it exercised full political sovereignty. The real question is not how long each people dominated Palestine; the question is, Who has the right to possess and control it now?

Occupation at some time in the past does not establish a right to present possession. Frank C. Sakran remarks (*Palestine Dilemma*, p. 204, Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1948) that if Palestine belongs by historic right to the Jews, it may be claimed that California belongs to Mexico, Mexico belongs to Spain, and Spain belongs to the Arabs. If the question to whom Palestine belongs is to be decided on the basis of occupation in the past, how shall we choose the period that is to be the basis of the decision? If political sovereignty at some time in the past is to be accepted as decisive, perhaps Italy and Greece and Persia, not to mention Iraq, will have to be allowed to enter their claims.

On a hill overlooking the seashore between Groton and Mystic, Connecticut, there is an old farmhouse which was owned by my family at the time of the American Revolution, and beside it is the little family graveyard of some of my ancestors. I have visited the place several times with great interest, and on one occasion I made bold to ask the occupant's permission to see the inside of the old house. With a notable lack of cordiality he allowed me to come in and look around, and I could not blame him for the coolness of his welcome. It is not hard to imagine how he would have felt if I had told him that because this was the home of my forefathers it was rightfully mine, and that he must make place for me. He

would hardly have admitted the force of my claim even if I had generously offered to pay for the house, or to let him occupy part of it.

The Arab claim to Palestine on historical grounds rests ultimately on conquest by force. So does our claim to most of the territory occupied now by the United States. So do the claims of most nations to their domains. So does the claim of the Hebrews to the ancient Land of Canaan. That the conquest in this case was carried out in obedience to a divine command and in fulfillment of a divine promise is attested by the Bible, but the significance of that fact lies in the realm of religious faith and has already been discussed from that point of view. From the point of view of history, apart from its religious interpretation, the Arab conquest and the Hebrew conquest are alike, except that the Arab conquest was more recent by many centuries and led to an occupation that has continued to our own day. Occupation by conquest must be recognized for the past. For the present and future we claim to have outgrown it. Acquisition of territory by force since the establishment of the United Nations should not be recognized as constituting a right to sovereignty.

The present Palestinian Arabs are not all direct descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the country or of the Arabs who conquered Palestine; they are a mixed group. Neither are the Jewish people of today wholly or predominantly direct descendants of the ancient Israelites. Here and at other points the historical claim of the Arabs is significant merely as balancing the Jewish claim on historical grounds. The main point on the Arab side of the question is not that the Arabs were at any particular time in the past, or for any particular length of time, the possessors or rulers of Palestine, but that they were its actual occupants at the time of World War I, when Great Britain and the League of Nations undertook to dispose of it.

The legal argument is rather involved, as legal arguments are likely to be. The present writer claims no competence for discussing it. He is entitled, however, to express an opinion on the reasoning employed by the lawyers. The distinction between the legal and the historical argument, as the terms are here used, is that the legal claim of the Zionists to Palestine is based on international recognition of their right to the country.

The first step toward formal international recognition of the Jewish claim to Palestine was the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." Great Britain, of course, did not own Palestine and could not give it to the Jews. All the British Government said was that it was favorably inclined toward the idea of the Jewish national home and would do what it could to bring this about. A little later, with the help of the Arabs, the British conquered Palestine.

Strange to relate, the chief opposition to the Balfour Declaration in Great Britain came from Jews. In its final form the declaration was quite different from what had been proposed by the Zionists, and the modifications were brought about by the insistence of Jews both in England and in the United States. The history of the negotiations shows plainly that the notorious vagueness and ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration were not the result of inadvertence, but of compromise.

But the Balfour Declaration is not merely ambiguous; it is self-contradictory. In connection with the principle of self-

determination (Chapter 2), I have pointed out that to impose a Jewish national home upon the people of Palestine against their wishes was incompatible with maintaining the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants. Worse yet, while Great Britain was promising to help the Jews to establish their national home, it was also making large promises to the Arabs. At the time of the First World War there was a growing movement of Arab nationalism and a strong desire for independence from Turkey. To gain the aid of the Arabs in defeating Turkey, Great Britain posed as their liberator. They were promised and expected after the war a free and independent Arab nation.

Great Britain's commitment to the Arabs was given official, or nearly official, expression in the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein in 1915, more than two years before the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs had drawn up a statement of conditions on which they would join the British in fighting the Turks, including boundaries of the territory within which they would expect Arab independence to be recognized. The British accepted these conditions and boundaries with the following qualification: "The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation." The British have based on this qualification their claim that they did not promise Palestine to the Arabs. If it was their intention to exclude Palestine from the area promised to the Arabs, they expressed it in language well calculated to keep the Arabs from guessing what they meant. Doubtless the McMahon correspondence would in any case have no standing in international law as constituting a legal title of the Arabs to Palestine. Like the Balfour Declaration itself, McMahon's promise was given be-

fore Great Britain conquered Palestine. It was a promise, however; and at most it did not clearly make an exception of Palestine, as could easily have been done if desired. Even worse than the ambiguity of such documents was the perfidy—it can hardly be called less—of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 17, 1916, by which Great Britain, France, and Russia parceled out among themselves the territory they hoped to conquer from the Turks.

The Arabs aided Great Britain in the war against Turkey, fulfilling their part of the bargain. How valuable their aid was from a military point of view has no bearing on the question of what the bargain involved. Great Britain had made pledges to the Arabs that were understood by them, certainly by all but a few leaders at most, to include Palestine in the territory promised for an independent Arab state. These pledges were not fulfilled.

The Covenant of the League of Nations established mandates to bring the territory conquered from the Turkish empire to self-government. The Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 22, Paragraph 4) specifically applies the mandatory system to the portions of the defeated Turkish empire that "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." The Arabs of Palestine, at that time 93 per cent of the country's population, had reached the same stage of development as the Arab people in other parts of the Turkish empire. In the case of Palestine, however, in spite of the clauses saying that the rights of the population were to be observed, the idea of the Jewish national home was imposed upon the country against the opposition of its people. The Balfour Declaration was incorporated in the Mandate for Palestine.

The Mandate thus contradicted the basic purpose of the mandatory system. On that ground, a layman would suppose, it might be declared invalid by the International Court of Justice.

An official British reply to the Arab contention that the Jewish national home was inconsistent with self-determination was given in a letter written March 1, 1922, under the direction of Winston Churchill, at that time Secretary of State for the Colonies. Great Britain, it said, had bound itself "by a pledge which is antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations." In other words, the previous commitment of one nation made irrelevant the question of consistency and legality in the action of the international body! On that basis, it should be remembered that the McMahon promise to the Arabs preceded the Balfour Declaration by more than two years.

The League of Nations was succeeded by the United Nations as the organized international community. The United Nations thus became the heir of what little was left of the League's mandatory system. Therefore Great Britain, driven to very human exasperation by Jewish terrorism, decided to relinquish the Mandate and tossed it into the lap of the United Nations. The Arabs have contested the legal right of the United Nations to take over the Mandate and decide who should govern Palestine. They have asked without avail that the question be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Sumner Welles (*op. cit.*, pp. 44-48) defends the legal right of the United Nations to exercise authority over Palestine in a statement that may be summarized as follows: The Arabs were not an independent nation but subject to the Turks; Turkey was defeated and ceded the territory of which Palestine is a part to the Allies, who vested their sovereignty over it in the League of Nations; the United Nations as the successor of the League of Nations is the recognized representative of the organized community of nations; therefore the

sovereign authority over Palestine belongs to the United Nations. Q.E.D.

If this argument is legally sound, there is still a moral limit to the ways in which the authority may be exercised. The greater the authority, the greater the moral responsibility. When a legal right has been exercised unwisely and unfairly, the action should be reconsidered. The authority of the League of Nations and its mandates, inherited by the United Nations, is at least morally, if not legally, subordinate to the rights and interests of the populations concerned. According to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, reformulated and reasserted in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, Palestine should have become an independent Arab state, or part of one, before the Second World War. With the surrender of the Mandate, the United Nations had an opportunity to rectify the contradiction between the purpose of the mandatory system and the imposition of the Jewish national home on the unwilling people of Palestine. That opportunity was lost, but perhaps it is not too late to hope that the legal authority of the United Nations over Palestine may yet be exercised in a way consonant with their moral responsibility.

The Biblical argument, the historical argument, and the legal argument, singly and in combination, are not strong enough to establish a right of the Jews to impose their own state on the native population of Palestine. A few subsidiary arguments remain to be considered, but they are equally insufficient to establish a case for Zionism.

Any objection to Zionism is likely to be met by the question, "Didn't the Jews buy the land and pay for it?" Now the fact that land has been bought and paid for establishes only ownership of that land; it does not establish a right to political control of the country in which the land is located. When

foreigners come into a country and buy land in it, their title is subject to the laws and government of the country. If enough of them legally acquire residence and citizenship to become a majority of the voting population, they may rightly gain political power, but the fact of having bought land does not in itself constitute any political right. We should not be happy if a group of Russians bought property in this country and then claimed the right to set up a state of their own in our midst. The fact that the Jews were willing to pay high prices for land in Palestine does not enhance the validity of their title to it, nor add any new implications to their rights as owners. As a matter of fact, at the end of the British Mandate the Jewish colonists, comprising a third of the population, actually owned less than a tenth of the land. Even in Rehavia, the most Jewish part of the New City in Jerusalem, a large proportion of the Jews lived in houses belonging to Arabs.

Over against the vigorous progressive achievements of the Zionists the backwardness of the Arab population is often stressed as justifying the claims of the Zionists. One who knows Palestine will be realistic concerning the economic and cultural status of the Arabs. Considering their limitations frankly and honestly, however, we must remember also what may be seen in corresponding sections of the population of our own country. There are many thousands of people in the United States whose economic, social, and cultural status is not so much higher than that of the poorest Arab peasants of Palestine that we can afford to feel superior. Obviously the Arabs do not have the initiative and aggressiveness of the Zionist colonists. They are not used to moving fast and do not particularly admire the frantic haste of Western life. They do not want to be forced to compete with the type of Western activism introduced by the Jews.

If some of the Arabs seem to be still living in the Middle

Ages, contempt for them as an inferior people is entirely unjustified. They have a great cultural tradition, of which they are rightly proud. They differ among themselves in social status, as we do. They differ in education and wealth and ability, as we do. Individually, they are very intelligent. They learn quickly and easily. C. F. Strickland, a British authority on co-operatives, reported in 1930 that the Palestinian peasants had "a very acute intelligence" ("Report by C. F. Strickland," Government of Palestine, 1930, p. 11). The things that he found retarding their economic development were very much those with which American farmers have to contend. Many of the younger generation among the Arabs fully realize their situation and are eager to improve it. Considerable progress was made under the British Mandate. One of the most striking phenomena in the Middle East today, and especially in Palestine, is the intense popular interest in education.

There is much truth in the charge that the Arab social system is still feudal. It is true enough to cause grave concern among educated Arabs. We must remember that they have a handicap of centuries to overcome. The flourishing culture of the medieval Arab empire was destroyed by the Mongol invaders, and the misrule of the Turkish empire produced stagnation rather than progress. But again one does well to keep in mind the virtual peonage of many farmers in parts of the United States and the lack of economic democracy in American industry. It has been said with some justification that our Government in its relations with the Arab countries has worked too much with the reactionary feudalists. This has undoubtedly been true of the British also, and it has been true of our relations with other countries in Europe and Asia. The younger generation offers a much more promising point of attachment. Students play a much larger part in politics in the Arab nations than they do in this country. To be sure,

their efforts are commonly limited to strikes and demonstrations, but they are the material for the potential democracy of the future.

Political corruption is all too common in the Middle East. It is all too common in Europe and America also, and with much less excuse. The oppressive foreign governments with which the countries of the Middle East have been cursed during most of the time from the days of the Romans to the First World War have left a cynical attitude toward any government on the part of many of the people, with an unconscious assumption that political office and graft are inseparable. I have encountered the same feeling in this country.

The Arabs are perhaps weakest at organization. Their towns, to be sure, seem to be fairly well administered, and the neighborhood committees which were organized as the British administration withdrew from Palestine seemed to work very well. In their opposition to Zionism, however, the Arabs were never able to get beyond such purely negative measures as strikes and boycotts.

If the Arabs are just emerging from the Middle Ages, they need the kind of help that American missionary and educational institutions have been giving them for the past generation. Progress may be slow, but it cannot be hurried. It is certainly not promoted by making the people fear and hate us. The point of view of the educated Arab on this matter was expressed by the Foreign Minister of Iraq to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: "The Arabs want to develop in the modern world in their own way and from within, for no real culture can be achieved by imposition or superficial imitation" (*Iraq's Point of View . . .*). The Zionist program is not justified by saying that the Arabs are a backward people, as though that gave any other people a right to go in and take over their country. To make the relatively

lower level of civilization of any people an excuse for setting up a new government over their country is sheer imperialism.

The Zionists often claim that they have contributed much to the welfare of the Arabs in Palestine. Much has been said of the possibilities of agricultural and industrial development for the Arabs through co-operation with the Jews and imitating them. There has undoubtedly been some improvement in the farming methods of Arabs in the neighborhood of some of the Jewish settlements. There has been improvement also that cannot be attributed to Jewish influence. Some of it may be due to Arabs who have lived in America, of whom there are many in Palestine. Some of it has been made possible by the fact that there has been much more money in the country since World War II, largely because of the great numbers of military forces in the country during the war. Those who contrast the ancient farming methods of the Arabs with the modern methods and machinery of the Zionists forget that the Zionists have the benefit of funds contributed from other countries and can therefore do what is impossible for the Arabs without such financial support.

In the early days of the Jewish national home the Arabs profited by the building enterprises of the colonists because they owned the stone quarries and also provided most of the skilled labor. Arab labor was used less and less, however, as Jewish immigration increased, and it was not long before the development of the Jewish settlements led to unemployment among the Arabs, canceling out any benefit that might previously have been received. In any case, no amount of economic benefit of a paternalistic sort can be accepted as justifying the Zionist program.

It may be that those Arabs who live within the borders of Israel will now enjoy a higher economic status than most of those living in the Arab nations. In the Arab-held sections of

Palestine and in the other Arab countries it may be that the Arabs will profit by the necessity of making progress in self-defense, in order to compete with Israel and survive in the same world. All this may be freely acknowledged and welcomed. It will still have no bearing on the basic moral issue of the right or wrong of Zionism.

5

CHRISTIAN INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

ASIDE FROM THE BASIC QUESTION of justice, what happens in Palestine is also our business as Christians because we have specifically Christian interests in Palestine, and they have seriously suffered by the division of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in part of the country. Let me say here that to speak of specifically Christian interests in the Holy Land is not to be taken as evidence of religious prejudice. Because we have the highest respect for both Judaism and Islam, and because we fully appreciate their religious interests in Palestine, we as Christians have all the more right to maintain that we too have interests there which are entitled to respect. Our special interests as Christians, like our national interests as Americans, must be kept subordinate to the larger moral issue of justice toward the native people of Palestine. With that qualification, our Christian interests are real and important, and we have a right to demand that they be respected.

Why should we as Christians be concerned about the Holy Land? Because it *is* the Holy Land, *our* Holy Land. It is a land full of sacred associations for every Christian.

The partition plan of 1947 attempted to provide for the Christian interests in Palestine by establishing an international zone, including Jerusalem with its environs and Bethlehem. The actual result of the passage of the partition resolution was that Jerusalem was immediately split into two armed camps. Even so, the internationalization of Jerusalem might have been accomplished if vigorous action had been taken at once by the United Nations, and if the Christian bodies of the world had insisted upon it. Anne O'Hare McCormick, writing to *The New York Times* from Jerusalem on January 20, 1949, says that both sides "complain bitterly that the Christian nations did not lift a finger to save the city from war and destruction." She quotes an Arab officer as saying, "The battle was joined between those who did care." The Vatican has been more outspoken and emphatic in its advocacy of the internationalization of Jerusalem than any other ecclesiastical body, but even its pronouncements came rather late. On October 23, 1948, Pope Pius XII addressed to the Catholic bishops throughout the world an encyclical letter (*In multiplicibus*) urging the importance of international guarantees for free access to the holy places. On April 15, 1949, another encyclical to the same effect was issued.

Jerusalem, as the very term Zionism implies, has always stood at the center of Jewish aspirations to return to the Holy Land. The motto of the Zionist movement has been taken from Ps. 137: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." When the partition plan was promulgated, many Zionists, while disliking the idea of internationalizing Jerusalem, accepted it as a part of the price of international recognition of their aspirations. When the British withdrew, it was hardly to be expected that the 104,000 Jews of Jerusalem would be left undefended. The part occupied by the Jews was in fact greatly increased both before and after

the end of the Mandate, leaving only the walled Old City and a part of the most completely Arab section to the north of it under Arab control. An Israeli spokesman said a few months later that "it was the courage and endurance of the Jews alone that saved the city from complete destruction and subjugation to Arab rule." Translated into more objective terms, this means that the Arabs probably would have done to Rehavia, the principal Jewish residential quarter, what the Jews had already done to such predominantly Arab districts of the New City as Talbiya, the Bakaa, the German Colony, the Greek Colony, and Katamon, and what they later did to the Musrara quarter.

A Jewish military governorship of Jerusalem was instituted on August 2, 1948, and brought to an end on February 1, 1949, when the parts of Jerusalem under Jewish control were put under "the same arrangements that obtained in other parts of the state of Israel." Weizmann, speaking at Jerusalem on December 1, 1948, said that while special arrangements should be made for the holy places in the Old City, the Jewish New City could not be placed under foreign rule. Recognizing that there were some who demanded Jewish control of the Old City also, he advised them to be patient. Ben-Gurion said on March 10, 1949, at a meeting of the Israeli Parliament, "Jerusalem is as much a part of Israel as any other part." In a special dispatch to *The New York Times* on April 2, Gene Currivan reported that an elaborate "back to Jerusalem" movement was being planned in preparation for an ultimate "Jerusalem the capital" plan. Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok (now Sharett), has repeatedly defined Israel's position concerning the future of Jerusalem, saying that the Jewish part of Jerusalem should be a part of Israel, while the Old City with its holy places should be put under an international regime. At the May meeting of the UN Assembly, when Israel's ap-

plication for membership was held up for a while by the concern of a number of delegates for Jerusalem as well as for the refugees, the representative of Israel, Mr. Eban, assured the Ad Hoc Political Committee that his Government at that time favored an international regime for the whole of Jerusalem, but one functionally limited to the control and protection of the holy places.

Over against the Jewish program, the Arabs submitted to Count Bernadotte on August 13, 1948, a detailed plan for the division and demilitarization of Jerusalem. It was proposed that the Arabs and Jews should divide Jerusalem between them and administer and police their respective areas. The frontier between them should be policed by United Nations guards, and water, electricity, and telephone services should be run by the United Nations. Jews would be allowed to visit their holy places in the Old City at particular times and in limited numbers with United Nations escort. Arabs and Jews would both be allowed to regain possession of their homes. The Arabs now favor the complete internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area, as will appear in Chapter 8.

The Conciliation Commission is to bring in a report on the internationalization of Jerusalem at the meeting of the Assembly in September, 1949. What this report will be, or what action will be taken upon it, cannot be predicted at the time of this writing. Meanwhile, it must be said that the distinction between the Old City as Arab and the New City as Jewish is very misleading. Whatever arrangement may be made, this distinction should not be the primary basis. The Old City is the part of Jerusalem enclosed within the walls. These were built in the Turkish period and do not follow the same lines as the walls of any period of Biblical history. The site of the most ancient Jerusalem, in fact, now lies outside of the city altogether. The Old City, interesting and picturesque as it

was before the destruction wrought by the fighting of 1948, has no peculiar claim to sanctity in itself. Many of the holy places, to be sure, are within the wall, but by no means all of them. Archaeologists have often wished that the people might all be moved out and the whole area excavated. From the standpoint of sanitation alone this would have been worthwhile, and it would have been done without loss of life.

Jerusalem itself, for that matter, has no greater degree of sanctity than many other places in Palestine. In setting aside a special international zone, the partition plan of 1947 implied that there was something uniquely sacred about Jerusalem; but the Holy Land is not Jerusalem — it is Palestine. Bethlehem, which was included in the proposed international zone, is no more sacred than Nazareth or the Sea of Galilee or many other places scattered widely through the country. All Palestine is our Holy Land. Every sacred association it has for the Jew is equally sacred to the Christian, and, in addition to that, Palestine is the land of Jesus, the land where “the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us.” Not only Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Capernaum, and the Sea of Galilee, with the hills above it, but also Caesarea Philippi, Jericho, Bethany, Emmaus, Jacob’s Well — all Palestine is holy ground.

Palestine contains also, as we have observed, sacred places of Islam. Speaking of them, a Palestinian Arab remarked to me, “You don’t have any sacred places in America, do you?” The idea of a country so new that it had no shrines with sacred associations of immemorial antiquity seemed very strange to him. The nearest analogy we have in this country is that of such patriotic shrines as Valley Forge. Our Holy Land is still Palestine.

The principal town with special associations for Christians that is under Israeli control is Nazareth. A disposition has been manifest to make Nazareth an example of what can be

expected for the holy places if they are under the Jewish Government. At Christmas, 1948, a Christian service there was broadcast to the world by the Israeli forces. There were also special arrangements at Jerusalem by which Christians on the Jewish side of the lines were allowed to attend worship on the Arab side, and there were arrangements for Christians to cross the lines to attend services at Bethlehem. The fact that such arrangements were necessary exhibits the difficulties for Christians involved in the very fact of partition. At Easter in 1949 there were no such arrangements except for the benefit of a few diplomatic representatives and United Nations officials. Bethlehem, being in Arab territory, is inaccessible to Christians in Israeli territory except by special permission of the authorities on both sides. Nazareth, being in Israeli-held territory, is inaccessible without such permission to Christians living on the Arab side of the lines.

The treatment of churches and other Christian property by military forces as a result of the fighting in Palestine is a delicate subject on which it is impossible to be frank without arousing violent resentment. Circulating stories of atrocities is unprofitable, because in any war atrocities are committed by soldiers on both sides. At the same time it is a fact of which every Christian should be aware, and concerning which he should feel deeply, that, during the fighting in Palestine, Christian places of worship were not only damaged, but deliberately desecrated. According to impartial and reliable reports, the Arabs were not guilty of such acts as the Jews were. Priests and other people connected with ecclesiastical institutions were killed and others severely wounded by Jewish weapons in the fighting, and churches and mosques were so badly damaged that very little of them was left. In fact, one eyewitness reports that he saw villages completely wiped out and no mosque left standing, though some churches had been

spared.

Late in May, 1948, the Christian Union in Palestine issued a manifesto listing eight institutions belonging to various Church bodies "from which Jews directed their fire on the Holy City." Fourteen institutions that had been damaged by shellfire were listed, some of them having been destroyed or badly damaged by the Jews, and others damaged by Arab shells after their occupation by Jewish forces. Three priests who had been killed were named and two who had been wounded, and the manifesto said that a hundred women, children, and other noncombatants had been casualties in the city "since the Jews began the attack." Specific details were given in an Associated Press dispatch from Jerusalem dated May 31, 1948. The Anglican Archbishop of York in February, 1949, charged that "many convents and churches have been desecrated, their pictures and images destroyed, and the figures of Christ torn from crosses and defiled." An act of desecration mentioned in complaints from both Jerusalem and Haifa, and probably deliberate though perhaps more shocking to Christian sensibility than the Israelis realized, was dancing by men and women of the Jewish forces in the sanctuaries.

Undoubtedly the better elements among the Jews of Palestine, perhaps the great majority of them and certainly the wiser heads in the Government, have been opposed to these outrages. Concerning one of the most flagrant instances an Israeli official has been quoted as saying in great embarrassment, "It was a case of irresponsible soldiers going off their heads; it was done by people out of Nazi concentration camps who had forgotten the rules of elementary behavior."

Since the cessation of large-scale fighting, some churches have been returned and the Israeli Government has officially committed itself to the return of other church property as soon

as it is felt to be no longer needed. On May 23, 1949, it was announced that the Church of the Dormition on Mount Zion would be returned to the Franciscan Order. This church, whose steeple overlooks the Jewish and Armenian quarters of the Old City, had been a center of particularly severe fighting when the Haganah was trying to fight its way into the Old City by the Zion Gate. On July 8, however, it was reported that the negotiations between the Israelis and the Franciscans had broken down. The proposed constitution of Israel includes these words: "Existing rights in respect to holy places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired. The liberty of access, visiting and transit to holy places shall be guaranteed." The Catholic Near East Welfare Association reported to the United Nations late in June, 1949, that there was now very little looting and desecration of religious institutions and that an agreement had been reached with the Israeli Government for the payment of compensation for damages.

The inbred hostility of many Jews to Christianity and Christians must be recognized as a part of the situation. It is limited to certain groups, to be sure, probably in particular those who come from the ghettos of eastern Europe. It is definitely not characteristic of the Jews I have known personally in Palestine. Those in positions of power and leadership are presumably fairly free from it. The attitude of the more liberal Jews to the Christian minority in Israel is on the whole, no doubt, much like that of the average Christian in America to the Mormons or perhaps the Christian Scientists, except that the Jew can hardly forget entirely that elsewhere Christians are in the majority and have often persecuted Jews. These variable, incalculable, but real emotional attitudes have played a considerable part in the treatment of Christian holy places by Jews, and they constitute a factor that must be taken into

account by the Israeli authorities and by the Christians of the world.

While property interests are involved in the concern of ecclesiastical officials for the holy places, our interest is not chiefly in the buildings erected on the sacred sites. Most Christians visiting Palestine, according to my observation, feel the force of sacred associations much less in the churches at the traditional holy places than they do at places where no such buildings exist, above all on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. With very few exceptions, notably the Franciscan churches at Gethsemane and on Mount Tabor, the church buildings are by no means beautiful or inspiring. The authenticity of the site itself, as all students of Palestinian archaeology know, is often uncertain, if not definitely improbable. If the site of an ancient and hallowed event is authentic, it cannot suffer from anything done to the buildings upon it, especially when the site itself is actually many feet below the present surface. On the other hand, the sacredness of a place is not necessarily dependent upon the historical authenticity of the site. The devotion of countless pilgrims through many centuries is enough to confer upon any place hallowed associations and meaning.

Churches, schools, and hospitals should be respected; so also should synagogues and mosques. They should be respected in their own right, for the worship and work that goes on in them now, not merely because of debatable associations with particular events of sacred history. The Dominican monastery north of the Damascus Gate may or may not be on the site of the stoning of Stephen; in either case, it is entitled to full respect. So are other schools and hospitals and churches that do not claim to stand on any sacred site. And, after all, what places can be holier than the homes of the people?

Another important interest that the Christian world has in Palestine is the value of archaeological and historical research

in the Holy Land for the study of the Bible and of Christian history. As a part of the privileges that all Christians have a right to claim, freedom of access and travel for study should not be forgotten. For this, peace is necessary. The division of the country has made Biblical study and research very much more difficult, and an important feature in any satisfactory peace settlement must be provision for free movement back and forth between different areas in the country for this purpose.

Christians have also the same interest in missionary work in Palestine that they have in any other country. What particular Government may control the country is immaterial from the missionary point of view, provided it affords full religious liberty, not only for worship but also for education and evangelism. Both in Israel and in the Arab part of Palestine, and in other Arab nations also, American missionary and educational institutions may have harder going in the next few years than they have had in the past. The many fine mission schools and churches for the native Christians in areas now controlled by Israel can do nothing if the people they formerly served remain refugees and are not allowed to come back to their homes. The Catholic Near East Welfare Association, in asking Secretary-General Trygve Lie to bring the question of international control of the holy places to the attention of the United Nations, said that many of the Catholic institutions in Palestine now had no "faithful to serve."

Many Americans seem to be unaware of the very existence of the native Christians of the Holy Land. Before so many of them fled from the country, there were about 140,000 Christians among the native people of Palestine. Most of the Arab Christians are the direct descendants of the people who were living in the same villages at the time of the Arab conquest 1,300 years ago, and whose ancestors had lived there for cen-

turies before that time. A considerable proportion of the Muslim population has come into the country since the Arab conquest; the native Christians are therefore on the whole the oldest part of the population. They have held to their religion through all these centuries of Muslim domination. More than 75,000 of the Arabs who have fled from Israeli-held territory are Christians. There are believed to be about 30,000 Christians still left in Israel.

The Christians among the refugees have suffered no less than the Muslims. The letter from Bethlehem that I have already quoted in part contains also this paragraph:

It is a pity that nearly all our Christian brethren are trying to leave Palestine. The Arab Christians are the relics of old Christianity and the remnants of the first Christians. With all their shortcomings and sins I must admit that they were the ones who upheld the banner of Jesus in spite of persecution and suffering. We are sorry to leave the Holy Land, but we are forced to because we can't stand this situation any more. Unless the Arab Christians are looked after by our Christian brethren outside, especially in America, the remains of old Christianity in Palestine will be wiped out.

One thing that has happened is good as far as it goes, and as long as it lasts: Christian and Muslim Arabs have been drawn closer together. The Christian Arabs have always been at one with the Muslims in their opposition to Zionism. There have been Christians among the most prominent representatives of the Arabs in the United Nations, such as Faris el-Khuri and Costi Zureik of Syria and Charles Malik of Lebanon. The common hostility to Zionism has undoubtedly made for better feeling between Christians and Muslims. During the winter and spring of 1947-1948 in Jerusalem, when the British administration was crumbling and there were many road blocks and much bombing and shooting, native Christians began wearing the cross prominently to show that they

were not Jews. When one remembers how the cross has been to the Muslims, ever since the Crusades, a hateful symbol of European aggression, this development appears rather remarkable. It is too bad that it took a common fear and hatred to draw Muslims and Christians together, but it is good to have them drawn closer together by something.

The danger now is that resentment at the treatment the Arab nations have received at the hands of the Western nations, and the consequent tendency toward reaction against everything Western and Christian, may again make the position of the Christian minority among the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere difficult. The nervousness displayed recently by Lebanon in its relations with Syria is significant in this connection, because Lebanon, which has a Christian majority, has always been apprehensive about domination by the strong Muslim majority in Syria.

What the position of the Christians in Israel will be like remains to be seen. The more liberal elements among the Jews will sincerely want to give Christians fair treatment as fellow citizens, and thus far the Government seems anxious to convince the Christian world that Christians will be well treated. We have seen that Nazareth has been made something of a show piece for this purpose. As was remarked in connection with the desecration of churches, however, there are many Jews in Palestine who have suffered so much as a minority in Christian countries that they will be tempted to try to get even, now that they are a majority in their own territory. It was doubtless one of them who said to a friend of mine in Jerusalem, "When we get control you can take your dead Christ and go home."

Specifically Protestant interests in Palestine, so far as churches, schools, and philanthropic institutions are concerned, are not so extensive as those of the Catholic Church. There

are some important Protestant institutions, however, in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine. The Anglican Collegiate Church of St. George, with St. George's School and other institutions under its supervision, should perhaps stand at the head of the list. The Scottish Presbyterian Church should be mentioned also. It was announced on April 29, 1949, that the Church of Scotland would soon resume its work in education and health in Palestine. The moderator of the Jerusalem Presbytery of the Church of Scotland was said to be negotiating with the Government of Israel at that time for the release of some of the property of the Church which had been occupied by military forces. He said that the Scottish church at Safed had been blown up, but that the rest of the property of the Church of Scotland was still in good condition. Dr. Torrance was returning to reopen the Sea of Galilee Mission Hospital at Tiberias. St. Andrew's Hospice at Jerusalem and the Church of Scotland Mission at Jaffa were to be reopened also.

American Christians are closely associated with the Lutheran institutions established and formerly controlled by the Germans, but now entrusted to American Lutherans. These include the Church of the Redeemer in the Old City and the Syrian Orphanage outside the walls. The latter has been occupied by the Haganah since the late winter or early spring of 1948. The Newman School of Missions also, which has been partly supported by American Protestants, especially the Methodists, is in a neighborhood now controlled by the Israelis and has had to suspend operation, but it has not been subjected to military occupation. There is also a Baptist church under American auspices at Jerusalem. In December, 1948, the Lutheran World Federation asked the United Nations to bring about the return of Church property to its owners and compensation for damage. In addition to the Syrian Orphan-

age at Jerusalem, the Lutheran body named the German Deaconess Hospital and the Talitha Kumi Girls' School at Jerusalem, a hospice and house on Mount Carmel, an orphanage at Nazareth, and an orange grove and farm elsewhere, all of which had been taken over by the Jews. Assurance has been given in writing by the Government of Israel that all such Church property will be returned to its owners as soon as this is deemed feasible.

Protestant bodies have not been so outspoken as the Catholic Church has been in asserting their rights and interests in Palestine. There is, of course, no such strong centralized organization in Protestantism as the Roman Catholic hierarchy. There has also been a laudable but excessively timorous concern about provoking anti-Semitism. The World Council of Churches formed at Amsterdam in 1948 and denominational and interdenominational organizations in America, both for this reason and also because there were ardent proponents of Zionism among them, have on several occasions declined to make public statements condemning the treatment of Church property by the Israelis or bringing the plight of the Arab refugees to the attention of their people, though the executive committee of the World Council of Churches, as reported in the *Federal Council Bulletin* for March, 1949, was confronted "with appalling and well-documented reports of persecution and ruthless extermination of Christian Arabs by Jewish extremists in Palestine."

Satisfactory provision for the various Christian interests in Palestine does not depend upon any particular form of political settlement. Our vital concern with the Arab refugees, with boundaries, and with the whole question of the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine arises from our fundamental devotion to justice (Chapter 2). The satisfaction of our special interests as Christians depends, not on the faith or race of

those who are in control of the country, but simply on having a good government. Security and freedom of access and operation are the essential considerations. Our position on the political issues, therefore, need not be affected by any bias arising from our own interests. These questions we can and must judge on their own merits.

6

AMERICAN INTERESTS

WHAT HAPPENS IN PALESTINE is our business as American citizens because of the prominent part our nation has had in what has happened. Our Government has made repeated commitments to the Zionist program on almost every possible occasion. Official commitments began under President Wilson, though an interest in the general idea had been expressed by John Adams. In the spring of 1922, the United States Senate and House of Representatives unanimously passed a joint resolution repeating verbally the Balfour Declaration, except that the United States of America took the place of His Majesty's Government and a clause was added concerning the protection of the holy places. A treaty between Great Britain and the United States ratified in 1925 incorporated the Mandate for Palestine, thus giving our nation's approval in spite of the fact that we were not a member of the League of Nations. Pro-Zionist declarations were made by every president from Wilson to Truman. Our Government was responsible both for the vote in favor of the partition plan of 1947 and also for preventing its execution by blowing hot and cold in turn. Israel's membership in the United Nations was secured largely through the good offices of our Government.

What happens in Palestine is our business as American

citizens also because important national interests are at stake. As Americans we want what is best for our country. As American Christians we want our country to be in the right; we want to be on the side of justice. Justice and our national interest may not be the same thing. They must be clearly distinguished, and justice must come first. Having seen where justice lies, however, we should consider our national interest also. It may turn out that justice and national advantage lie in the same direction. In the long run nothing can be to our advantage if it is unjust.

As a result of the part played by the United States in the division of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel, the moral prestige of our nation throughout the Middle East has been almost irreparably damaged. To all who knew at first hand what Wendell Willkie called the reservoir of good will for America in the Near East, accumulated by generations of educational and missionary work, it has been heartbreaking to see the walls of the reservoir broken and the waters drained off by the declarations and acts of our Government during the past few years. Graduates of American schools and colleges, especially those of the American universities at Beirut and Cairo, are spread all over the Arab lands, many of them in positions of great dignity and influence. Having acquired along with their education a high admiration and real affection for America, they have felt something like a sense of personal injury at being robbed of their respect for our country. With a pathetic wistfulness they have cherished the hope that the kind of Americans they have known will somehow manage to bring about a change in the policy of the United States toward their people. They know that the American people want to do what is fair. They know that most Americans know very little about the Middle East, though they do not realize how great is our ignorance.

With the loss of respect and good will for the United States in the Middle East has gone much of our opportunity for rendering Christian services to the people of that region as we were doing with great success before our nation became so involved politically. The resentment and suspicion engendered by our policy have promoted reactionary tendencies and hostility to everything Western. On September 27, 1948, it was reported that the Pakistan delegate at Paris had spoken of "militant Zionism" as the "spearhead of a new aggression of the West against the East." By the East, of course, he did not mean Russia, but the Oriental nations. The effect of this reaction on the status of native Christians throughout the Middle East has already been mentioned.

Justice, with which as Christians we are primarily concerned, asks what is best for the people of Palestine and the whole Middle East. That is also our national interest. Our security and prosperity depend on peace and the welfare of all peoples. Immediate military and political advantages are another matter, but our basic national interest depends upon political stability, which is incompatible with economic insecurity and discontent.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the Mediterranean area and the region to the east of it are extremely important from the standpoint of strategy for the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and for Russia on the other. In Greece, in Turkey, and in Iran, our Government has been giving substantial aid with the purpose of building a strong bulwark against the southward expansion of Soviet power. Others among the Western nations are vitally interested in this area also. Undoubtedly a basic reason for our Government's support of Israel has been the necessity of preventing the new state from turning to Russia as its greatest friend. This probably explains President Truman's haste in extending

de facto recognition to Israel almost before the new state had time to announce its existence.

Much has been said about the Jewish state as an outstanding demonstration of democracy in the Middle East. The party in power in Israel is friendly toward the West, knowing quite well that Israel's very life is dependent upon Western support and particularly upon financial support from America. It is not so friendly toward us as to desire any trouble with Russia, and in the opposition parties there are elements much more friendly to Russia. If the pro-Russian elements in Israel should someday become dominant, our support of Israel might turn out to have given Russia a bridgehead behind our defenses in Turkey and Iran. It is therefore obviously to our advantage to support the friends of Western democracy in Israel. Even so, Russia's diplomatic representation in Israel affords a strong basis for Soviet propaganda and influence.

At best, the position of the Israeli Government as between East and West is neutral. President Weizmann has always been considered strongly pro-British, and his ambition to make Israel the Switzerland of the Middle East doubtless contemplates international neutrality as well as industrial development. Premier David Ben-Gurion in his first speech after the election of January, 1949, outlined a policy of co-operation with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such neutrality may be in the interests of world peace, but it is not in accord with the confident assurance which has often been expressed that Israel would be a strong ally for us in case of conflict with Russia. Perhaps from the standpoint of national self-interest it may be fortunate that Russia now seems to be turning against the Jews, though from a broader human standpoint it is unfortunate. It would not be wise, however, to draw far-reaching conclusions from any particular twist in Russian policy.

Not only the advantages of supporting Israel but also those of friendly relations with the Arab countries must be taken into account. Our security requires every effort to regain the confidence and friendship of the nations of the Middle East. It has been argued that they would be of little use to us as allies in case of war with Russia. Sumner Welles says that we could not prevent the occupation of Iran and Iraq by Russia. George Fielding Eliot also belittles the value of the Arab states as potential allies. As was pointed out, however, in the *Middle East Journal* of January, 1949 (pp. 64, 65), these countries are important for us, not as strong military allies, but as a base of operations and a source of supply.

If a mere layman may hazard a suggestion, it may be submitted that strategically the weakness of the Mid-Eastern countries would seem to be all the more reason for strengthening them. That is the principle on which we have proceeded in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Military experts may think of the Middle East merely as terrain for military operations, ignoring the inhabitants, but it might be well for us to have a few friends there to whom we could say, in the words of Scripture, "Occupy till I come."

That our relations with Great Britain were severely strained by the crisis in Palestine is notorious. More recently it has been reported that an effort was being made to reach a joint Anglo-American policy in the Middle East. Not only the need for bases, but also the general hostility toward England and the United States in the Arab countries and the importance of political and economic stability in the Middle East have been adduced as grounds for the need of such a policy.

A new danger to our interests in the Middle East has been created by the misery of the Arab refugees. This affords a point of contact for Communist agents which they have not been slow to exploit. Previously the Arabs had not been an

easy prey for Communists. There is no industrial proletariat in the Arab states, and both Christian and Muslim Arabs have felt strongly that Communism could not be reconciled with their religious convictions. Needy and discontented people, however, are always susceptible to the influence of agitators who promise them a better life through revolution, and Communism is always ready to exploit such people to promote instability and disorder.

A letter written on May 14, 1949, by a personal friend in Jerusalem said:

A sad feature which most Americans fail to realize is the great impetus that our country has given to Communism by its policy over here. I don't mean a Communistic state in Israel. The Stern Gang was Communist and the Israel Government is on good terms with Russia, but many of the Jews realize that the help they received from Moscow was due to no sympathetic idealism and that Russia, which was anti-Zionist until shortly before the partition, could easily turn around again. The danger of Communism is largely among the Arabs. There could be no more fertile soil for Communism than among the refugees. As they sit idle and know that nothing is being done to give them any permanent security, they listen to the Communistic propagandists who are among them. Moreover, their intelligent people are not free from Communistic leanings. Last week in Nablus the brother of _____, a lawyer, said to us: "My education is American, at the Friends' School in Ramallah and the American University of Beirut; but I am sorry that I ever received anything from Americans. I shall bring up my children to hate all Americans and British. I should welcome the Russians with open arms. After all that England and America have done to us, we feel that no country could have treated us worse and we are willing to take a chance on Russia."

Surely no American or Christian can face this situation with equanimity.

Prominent in all considerations of American interests in the

Middle East is the subject of oil. While this seems to be a very mercenary consideration, it cannot be ignored. Zionists are uneasy when it is mentioned. They seem to feel that it has nothing to do with the real issue concerning Palestine and can only distort the picture, but it is a part of the picture and not necessarily one of which we need to be ashamed. It must be considered as one aspect of our national interest in the Middle East, not to be put above the basic issue of justice or confused with it, but to be counted in with the other facts of the situation.

The disorders in Palestine during the year before the end of the British Mandate interrupted the flow of oil to the West from the wells of the Middle East. Jewish terrorists bombed the refinery at Haifa. The pipe line from Iraq has been shut off since the early days of the fighting, and the refinery at Haifa therefore remains idle. Negotiations for a new pipe line to the Mediterranean through Syria were held up for months, in large part because of resentment against our Palestinian policy, though there were other complicating factors.

To a very minor degree the question of oil enters into the Palestinian problem more directly. There is some hope that oil may be found in the southern desert of Palestine, since it has been found nearby in Egyptian territory. This is doubtless one reason for the interest of Great Britain as well as Israel in the Negeb, but it is only a secondary consideration. Access to the port of Aqaba at the head of the Red Sea and to Gaza on the Mediterranean is much more important for the immediate future. For Great Britain the protection of the Suez Canal is important also.

Concerning the importance of the oil supply of the Middle East for the United States, Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid said in a speech at New York in the spring of 1949: "This oil is needed for the economic recovery of Europe under the Mar-

shall Plan and for the use of the British Navy and of our own fleet when operating abroad. In case of war its control would be vital to each of the belligerents. Profits of oil companies have nothing to do with the question. We need the oil" (*American Near East Society Bulletin*, April, 1949, p. 3). The European Recovery Program is vitally dependent upon the oil of the Middle East. It is estimated that the 16 European nations participating in the program will by 1952 be consuming 250,000 barrels of oil every day, and 65 per cent of this is expected to come from the Middle East.

It is often alleged that American "oil diplomacy," by paying large royalties to the Governments of the countries in which the oil fields lie, is serving to entrench reactionary groups. Doubtless the oil companies have not exerted themselves to bring about political or social revolutions—that is hardly their business. In one case oil royalties have made a monarch, Ibn Saud, enormously rich. As Kermit Roosevelt points out in his recent book, *Arabs, Oil and History*, the oil revenues have not always been used for the good of the common people, but the people have to some extent benefited and they should benefit more. In promoting economic and social development for their own employees and for the people living near their plants, the oil companies themselves have actually done a great deal of good.

In view of the growing importance of the oil supply of the Middle East for our security and economic welfare, it is not surprising that the oil companies have joined with our military authorities and the State Department in urging the importance of friendly relations with the Arab countries from which and through which the oil must come. That this pro-Arab attitude of the oil interests should make them hostile to Zionism is only natural. This explains the resentment of the Zionists toward what they feel is a wealthy and powerful lobby exerting a

malign influence on our foreign policy in its own selfish interest. Now powerful pressure groups representing big business constitute beyond question one of our most serious political problems. Every American citizen should be alert to this danger. At the same time, the fact that a great business interest is on a certain side of a question of foreign policy should not prejudice us against that position. In this case the fact is that the interest of our whole nation demands the friendship with the Arab nations which the oil companies are eager to promote.

The oil companies are not the only group exerting pressure on our Government with regard to the Palestinian problem. The political pressure of Zionist organizations in American politics has been such as to arouse very serious misgivings. Whether their cause is right or wrong, it is not to our advantage that any minority group should have such a disproportionate influence on our Government. Minority rights, by the most liberal interpretation, do not include a right to dictate our foreign policy. In the election of 1948 the part played by Zionism confused the real issue of our domestic politics. This was true from the choice of a president down to a contest in the Bronx between two candidates for a seat in the Municipal Council, each of whom claimed to be a stronger supporter of Zionism than his rival—hardly the most important qualification for the office!

From the point of view of national prestige, military strategy and security, economic needs, and domestic politics alike, our nation's support of the Zionist cause and the state of Israel has been contrary to the best interests of the United States. American Christians might be willing to have it so if it were a deliberate sacrifice of national interest for the good of the world. When both national interest and justice suffer, as they do in this case, we cannot be so complacent about it.

JEWISH INTERESTS

IT IS BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION that the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine is to the best interest of the Jewish people themselves. Even the raising of this question is resented by Zionists. Public statements I have made on the subject have been denounced by a rabbi as "unwarranted and unwanted." Unwanted they may be, as wholesome truths often are, but that they are unwarranted is at least open to argument. At any rate, there are many Jews as well as Christians who feel as I do on this point. That fact indeed is resented most of all by the Zionists. Zionism is not Judaism. Those who oppose Zionism include a considerable body of Jewish people in this country. To label all opponents of Zionism anti-Semitists one must regard all Jews who oppose Zionism as traitors to their own faith and people. The Zionists do just that. In their ardent efforts to identify Zionism and Judaism they have put pressure amounting sometimes to real persecution upon Jews who do not espouse their cause.

Of the 5,000,000 Jews in the United States it is claimed that about 4,000,000 are at least sympathetic toward Zionism. The total membership of the 8 Zionist parties in the United States

is less than 700,000, but about 1,000,000 American Jews bought "shekels" to vote in the World Zionist Congress of 1946. Until fairly recently, Reformed Judaism was on the whole anti-Zionist. The best-known group of anti-Zionist Jews in this country is now the American Council for Judaism. Its position is indicated by the term its members use to designate themselves: "Americans of Jewish faith." They oppose the idea that the Jews are a race or a nation, and insist that Judaism is a religion, having the same position that any other religion has in relation to the State. Not all the opponents of Zionism among the Jews, however, belong to this organization or share its views. The Freeland League favors mass settlements of Jews, but not necessarily all in one place and not in any country where the inhabitants do not want them. There is also in this country a branch of an old European organization, the Jewish Labor Bund, which is Socialist, and as such strongly antinationalist, yet differs from the American Council for Judaism in maintaining that the Jews are a distinct cultural entity.

Most of the Jews who in the past opposed the philosophy and program of Zionism belonged to none of these groups, but were the most orthodox of orthodox Jews. Apparently they have now largely been won over to Zionism. Their traditional position, however, has been that the return of the exiles to Palestine could not take place until God himself brought it about, and then no human power could prevent it. This was the position of the large group that called itself "Agudat Yisrael" (or, with the European pronunciation, "Agudas Yisroel"). In the state of Israel this group now forms one of the parties of the religious bloc. Some orthodox Jews in this country — it is impossible to say how many — still hold the traditional orthodox view of Zionism. Let me quote from a letter written by a rabbi who says that he still con-

siders himself a member of Agudas Yisroel, but no longer takes any part in its work because of its capitulation to Zionism: "I am an orthodox Jew who is unalterably opposed to Zionism with its plan of a state because it spells injustice to the Arabs, and hence is impracticable, and because it would substitute secular materialistic nationalism for religion as the basis of the Jew."

It may fairly be asked why one should oppose Jewish nationalism and sympathize with the nationalistic aspirations of the Arabs. The answer is that the Jews are one in religion but citizens of many countries, whereas the Arabs are one in culture but belong to different religions, and the countries in which they aspire to self-government are their own native lands. The great trouble with Zionism is the attempt to be both a religion and a nation at the same time. The plan for Palestine advocated by the Arabs was a democracy with freedom of religion and complete separation of religion and the State, as in this country. Israel now claims to be a democracy with freedom of religion, but it insists at the same time on being a Jewish state.

For the Jews of the United States the establishment of Israel means an enormous financial burden. The new state cannot hope to become economically self-sufficient for a long time, if ever. Even if it could manage to meet what would be normal financial requirements for a nation of its size, it could not without a great deal of outside assistance cope with the enormous influx of immigrants. Speakers at a meeting in New York on March 20, 1949, said that the financial burden for the absorption of 750,000 to 1,000,000 immigrants in Israel in the next four years would have to be borne for the most part by American Jews. Public gifts and private investments as well as individual contributions were said to be required.

The enormous amounts of money raised from American

Jews for Israel are said to have endangered their own philanthropic and cultural activities in this country. A speaker at the Founder's Day exercises of Hebrew Union College on March 26, 1949, complained that this and similar institutions were not receiving adequate financial support because of the insistence on giving priority to foreign relief. I have been told that the Community Chest campaign in one of our great cities suffered materially last year because of the contributions withheld from it on account of the demands made for Israel.

There has been much discussion of the problem of dual loyalty which is raised for American Jews by the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine. Any suggestion by outsiders that American Jews might be less patriotic because of their devotion to Israel is naturally resented, but the discussions of the problem within Jewish organizations reveal its real seriousness. The first thing that should be said on this subject is that the danger is not disloyalty but dual loyalty. It is the strain in the minds and consciences of Jews themselves between two loyalties which are not necessarily incompatible but may become so. A philanthropic and cultural interest in Israel on the part of American Jews is something to which no one can fairly take exception. Devotion to Jewish culture in this country is equally unobjectionable. The ideal of cultural pluralism, with groups from many nations contributing to the rich variety of our common civilization, is a part of what we proudly call the American way of life. Political loyalty is another matter. The present stress on promoting Hebrew education and culture in the United States may be wholesome as a phase of cultural pluralism, provided it is definitely integrated into preparation for American citizenship. If Hebrew parochial schools and youth camps are used to train future citizens of Israel, their value for this country becomes decidedly questionable.

A report was issued in May, 1949, by a commission of the Zionist Organization of America on "Zionism and the Government of Israel." It stated that the establishment of Israel had not affected the citizenship of Jews in other countries, and went on to say that Jews living elsewhere should not be affiliated with political parties in Israel. Some American Jews, however, feel that the claims of Israel on the loyalty of American Jews constitute a real danger. The president of the American Council for Judaism, Lessing J. Rosenwald, said in his annual report on April 22, 1949, "The creation and recognition of a sovereign state of Israel has with alarming speed tremendously intensified the Jewish nationalists' desire to control our lives and to advance their claim that all Jews possess a 'Jewish' nationality." He complained that representatives of Israel spoke of Jews instead of Israelis and persisted in drawing Jews into the territorial and political problems of Israel.

The real danger of dual loyalty is that American Jews who sincerely desire to be both loyal Jews and loyal citizens of the United States will be inclined in spite of themselves to judge the issues of American politics, not on their own merits, but by their bearing on the interests of Israel. This is not a matter of sinister, underground, subversive influence; it is a matter of the sincere conviction of patriotic American citizens whose conception of what our Government should do is unconsciously but strongly colored by a commitment quite outside of our national interests.

An interesting phase of the relationship between American Jews and Israel, which has emerged since the creation of the Jewish state, is the ambition of the chief rabbi of Israel to be the supreme religious authority for the Jews of all lands. If the Jews of the world want such an authority, they are of course entitled to have it. It is not difficult to see, however, that

the result is likely to be further division among the Jews in America and other countries. One may ask also how it is proposed to secure the authority desired except by transporting to Israel and putting into official positions there those scholars whose real competence in the interpretation of the Torah gives them the only kind of authority Judaism has ever recognized.

A by-product of recent developments of which many American Jews are well aware is that the ardor of Jewish nationalism in the United States threatens to provoke a reaction against Jews in general. The basic cause of anti-Semitism, of course, is the fact that the Jews as a minority are a convenient scape-goat for any "inferiority complex" of the majority. This basic psychological and sociological factor is re-enforced by religious prejudice, which is unchristian but all too prevalent among Christians. The reality and virulence of these primary and usually unconscious causes of anti-Semitism make it all the more imperative that any added basis or even excuse should be avoided. Among the potential supplementary causes of anti-Semitism must be reckoned a reaction against Jewish nationalism. Righteous indignation at what some Jews have done easily becomes unrighteous antagonism to all Jews.

The welfare and even the safety of Jews in other lands has been jeopardized by the triumph of Zionism. A new wave of anti-Jewish feeling has been stirred up throughout the Arab world by the Zionist movement and the establishment of Israel. One need not imagine that the position of the Jews in Arab countries was previously ideal to realize that it is now much worse. In Iraq, for example, there is a large Jewish population, fairly well integrated and recognized as an important factor in the economic life of the country. The strong feeling against the Jewish state in Palestine has endangered their position. Some of them, to avoid this danger, are said to have made emphatic protestations of opposition to Zionism, and

even to have volunteered for service in the army to fight against Israel. Large numbers of Jews from the Arab countries have already swelled the numbers of new immigrants in Israel and have complicated the problem of assimilation. Fears have been expressed that these Oriental Jews, who have no background or training for such intensely modern life as that of Israel, will create serious difficulties for the welfare agencies and the government of the country.

Very much more might be said on these subjects, but he who ponders the facts here briefly indicated may well doubt that the Jewish people of the world have much reason to be exultant over the fact that there is a Jewish state now in Palestine.

AGENDA

THE READER WHO HAS STAYED WITH ME thus far may now fairly say, "I understand your opposition; what is your proposition?" Crying over spilled milk, or locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen, is of no avail. What can we do now about Palestine? The word "now" is a reminder that nothing is more quickly antiquated than specific proposals for action. What may be urged as this book goes to press (July, 1949) may already have been done or else forever made impossible by the time these pages are read. The United Nations Assembly is to hear the report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in September, and may (pray God) take decisive and adequate action. What will here be proposed may then perhaps serve as a check list to see what has been done meanwhile and what should still be done.

There is much that can be done. We can act both as individual Christians and as Church bodies. There is both direct, personal action and indirect, political action to be taken. The former will consist chiefly of giving money for the refugees and of personal efforts to awaken other people to the realities of the situation. Political action will involve working through

our Government for the larger measures needed to meet the situation. Our Government is now in a position of enormous power in the world, and therefore in a position of enormous responsibility. And our Government, with all its shortcomings, is responsive to public opinion. Even our foreign policy is ultimately determined by public opinion, or by what the president, the State Department, and Congress believe to be public opinion. If their idea of what the public wants is mistaken, it is our fault.

In taking political action individual Christians act mainly as citizens. Religious organizations have to guard scrupulously the separation of Church and State. We can hardly complain of Zionist political pressure for the interests of Zionism and at the same time ask our Churches to exert the same kind of pressure. What is needed here, however, is not political pressure for our own interests, institutional or sectarian, except as we may rightly ask for the protection of our missionary and educational institutions. The Roman Catholic Church will certainly not hesitate to demand that much, and other Churches have a right to do no less. The chief political action that Churches ought to take, however, is the clear, emphatic expression of their concern and their convictions with regard to the moral and spiritual issues of the situation and our nation's relation to it. They should insist on protection and freedom for all religious interests, Jewish as well as Christian, and Muslim also. Resolutions passed by ecclesiastical gatherings may have a very limited influence on the foreign policy of the United States, but they are not to be despised. More important are individual, personal letters to members of the Government, especially our own Senators and Representatives. Even this may be overdone or unwisely done. Common sense, consideration, and appropriate timing are essential. But we are more likely to do too little than too much.

Of all the points on which both direct and political action are needed, the most pressing is the problem of the Arab refugees. Much is being done for them, but not enough. Of the \$32,000,000 requested by the United Nations as Government contributions for relief, our Government has authorized the appropriation of the \$16,000,000 asked of it, but not much more than half of the remaining \$16,000,000 has been pledged and only a fraction of that actually paid. The appeal was based on an estimate of 500,000 refugees, which was very soon seen to be too small, and it was only intended to provide relief until September 1, 1949. Late in June the United Nations announced that an emergency advance of \$1,000,000 had been made to continue the work until the first of September. Further provision must be made to carry it on through the coming winter. On July 7 the assistant secretary-general of the UN issued another urgent appeal to the nations for contributions.

Private philanthropic and religious organizations in this country and in Europe have contributed both money and service. The Roman Catholic Church has been very active in relief work. Twenty American organizations, including oil companies as well as religious and welfare agencies, formed in the autumn of 1948 a United American Appeal for Holy Land Refugees, the Near East Foundation being designated as receiving agent for contributions. Outstanding, as always, has been the work of the American Friends Service Committee. In spite of such efforts, the United Nations Relief Administrator reported as late as December, 1948, that 90 per cent of the relief received had come from Arab sources.

Whatever may be accomplished by Government agencies, personal gifts for the relief of human beings in desperate need always help. Individuals and churches can organize and support measures to meet the immediate requirements of the

refugees. Among agencies to which gifts can be sent the following may be mentioned:

- American Friends Service Committee,
20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia 7, Pa.
- Catholic Near East Welfare Association,
480 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.
- Church World Service,
214 East 21st Street, New York, N. Y.
- Middle East Relief,
350 Fifth Avenue, New York 1, N. Y.
- Near East Foundation,
54 East 64th Street, New York 21, N. Y.

Relief, while imperative, is obviously not enough. At best it is temporary. Where and how are the refugees to live on a normal basis? The Arab states have consistently demanded that the refugees be allowed to return to their homes within Israeli-held territory. They have made this a prerequisite for any peace negotiations. Israel, however, has refused to make commitments concerning the readmission of refugees except as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. Diplomatic efforts to induce either side to compromise at this point have apparently had little success. Postponement of the whole question until a final peace settlement is achieved would mean that the Arab nations in order to secure the readmission of the refugees would first have to recognize Israel and accept the partition of Palestine. Early in June, Israel offered to allow the 230,000 refugees in the strip of coast about Gaza to live in Israel if Egypt would turn over to Israel this bit of territory. While the Israeli authorities seemed to feel that this was a very generous gesture, it is hard to see what it meant other than that if the territory should be ceded to Israel they would not expel the refugees in it, but would let them remain and would

assume the responsibility for their care and resettlement. Since then there have been a few indications of a slightly more conciliatory disposition, but no yielding on the main point at issue.

Spokesmen for Israel charge that the Arab nations are merely using the plight of the refugees as a political weapon. If so, this is as intolerable as the callous attitude of the Israelis. The United Nations and the United States must insist that the welfare of the refugees be placed above the political interests of either side in the controversy. It is they who have suffered most; it is they who are least responsible. Those who have investigated the matter on the ground agree that most of the refugees want to go home. Persistent efforts of refugees to slip through the lines and get back to their homes have been reported during the past year.

The reluctance of the Israelis to readmit the refugees is not hard to understand. Having filled many of the homes of the Arabs with Jewish immigrants and demolished others to make room for new buildings, the Israelis would no doubt find it hard to accommodate returning refugees. The economic burden of their own immigration may well seem to them all they can handle. Also, as the representatives of Israel have repeatedly pointed out, some of the returning refugees might become a fifth column within Israel. In any case they would create for Israel a serious minority problem. This problem, however, would have existed if the partition plan had been carried out peacefully and successfully, and the Arabs had remained in their homes. If Israel can take in 1,000,000 more Jews, it can take back 750,000 Arabs. Some screening of the refugees may have to be allowed, provided Israel will admit those who wish to return and are willing to be loyal citizens. The fact that Israel's formidable housing problem would be aggravated by the return of considerable numbers of Arabs

should not be allowed to determine what is to be done. The Arabs are not responsible for Israel's immigration problems and should not be the ones to suffer.

The question to what conditions and what kind of life the refugees would come back must, of course, be seriously considered. This problem was discussed by Clarence E. Pickett, executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, in a report published on March 20, 1949. Concerning the situation that refugees coming back to their homes would face, Mr. Pickett says:

"They must realize that even if they go home, as all of them long to do, their lives can never be as they were before 'the circumstances,' as they term the Middle East upheaval. Most of the refugees are farmers, and most of them farmed their little plots of land as they were farmed in the days of Jesus. But they will live in a different country now—a new state, a modern state, a state that is becoming more and more industrialized, and a state that will insist, for its own material survival, that every plot of land be used to produce the maximum amount possible. The refugees must realize that they are facing an industrial revolution, and must be willing to make the adjustments necessary." The report recommends full compensation for those who do not return, a program of public works to provide employment, and technical assistance in arranging credit and improving methods of farming. Perhaps this necessity of raising their standard of living would itself in the long run be some compensation for the deprivation and suffering the refugees are now undergoing.

The Israeli Government favors the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab nations. There is plenty of room in the other Arab lands. Most of it is desert, but those of the refugees who choose to remain where they are, if they can be provided for adequately, may be better off than they would be if they came

back to their own houses, even if their houses still exist. But Palestine is their home, and no power on earth has a right to make them live anywhere else. The attempt to solve problems of group relationships by shifting whole peoples here and there is at least as old as the days of the Assyrian Empire. It has been tried repeatedly in modern times, both in Europe and in Asia. But however well organized and carried out such a program may be, it is not morally justifiable without the consent of the people concerned.

As for compensation, the Government of Israel has put itself definitely on record as recognizing the property rights of those Arabs who have left their homes and lands in the territory of Israel, and has undertaken to make fair financial restitution. Rents paid by Jews who have occupied Arab property left vacant by the refugees are said to be held in reserve by the Government for this purpose. So far as it goes, this is all very well, and certainly preferable to outright expropriation. It must be observed, however, that unless the owners are given the choice between selling and reoccupying their property, what is involved is at best a forced sale, and acceptance of the payment by the Arab owner would mean giving up all claim to the property. Article 17 of the United Nations International Bill of Human Rights says, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." For those who return, moreover, compensation involves possession and refurnishing of their own homes, and being set up in business again in their own shops or on their own farms. If anybody must move into temporary camps, it should be the new immigrants, not the owners or former tenants.

President Weizmann has said (*Trial and Error*, p. 462) that the world would judge Israel by what it did with the Arabs. It would be well if the other leaders of his Government would take this to heart. As the existence of the United States of

America has involved much injustice to the American Indians, for which we can now make only partial atonement by giving their descendants decent treatment, so the continued existence of the state of Israel can be morally justified only by doing what is right and fair for the Arabs of Palestine. In this case it is still possible to make restitution not merely to their descendants but to the people who have been wronged. The United Nations and our Government have repeatedly committed themselves to the position that those refugees who want to go back to their homes should be allowed to do so. We must hold them to this commitment.

For those refugees who are willing or even prefer to take up new homes in the other Arab lands a large-scale program of resettlement and economic integration is necessary. One reason for the insistence of the Arab nations that the refugees be permitted to return to their own homes is unquestionably that these nations feel that they ought not to be burdened with the task of rehabilitation. With sufficient help from wealthier nations, however, some of them would gladly accommodate a fair share of the Palestinian Arabs. A technical committee of the Conciliation Commission was reported on July 1 to be investigating this matter. A Palestinian Development Corporation with British financial backing has already inaugurated a program of model settlements and irrigation in the Jordan Valley. It is encouraging to know that our Government is working on a program of resettlement and may ask Congress for at least \$15,000,000 for this purpose. Part of this money would be used to help Israel to resettle refugees who are allowed to return home; most of it would be used for aid to Arab Governments for resettlement and rehabilitation projects. Jordan and Syria in particular are understood to be willing to take advantage of such assistance. Care will be necessary, however, to avoid giving substance to fears already expressed

in the Arab countries that our nation is merely using its financial power to inveigle the Arab nations into relieving Israel of its responsibility toward the refugees.

Next to the resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees, the definition of the boundaries of Israel and guarantees that these boundaries will not be overstepped are most imperative. If the state of Israel is to endure, the territory within which it is to operate must be defined, and the boundaries set must be respected.

The boundaries to be set need not, and indeed should not, be those of the 1947 partition plan. Until another and better plan is adopted, however, this plan must be considered the legal basis of procedure. President Truman and the 1948 platform of the Democratic Party have said that nothing should be taken from Israel without its consent. On November 20, 1948, at the Paris meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Dr. Jessup fortunately qualified this rash commitment as follows: "The United States approves the claims of the state of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29 and considers that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the state of Israel. This means that reductions in such territory should be agreed [to] by Israel. If Israel desires additions, it would be necessary for Israel to offer an appropriate exchange through negotiations."

The new plan of partition suggested by Count Bernadotte in the report published after his assassination had the advantage of making the territory of Israel contiguous and homogeneous. It greatly reduced the amount of territory assigned to Israel, and in particular took from Israel the 2,800 square miles of the Negeb. It would seem much wiser to let Israel have the Negeb and to restore Galilee to the Arabs, or, better still, to internationalize a part of Galilee, including the Sea of Galilee

and Nazareth.

The importance of the Negeb for Israel is twofold: on the assumption that it can be made habitable, it is the only large area in Palestine available for settlement; it also affords access to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba and so makes possible a route for commercial contacts with the Far East. Western Galilee is far more fertile but not much more than a seventh of the size of the Negeb. The homes of many of the Arab refugees were in western Galilee. Its chief value for the Jews is that only by holding it can Israel effectively defend eastern Galilee.

The port of Haifa is of great importance for both commercial and military reasons, because it is the only port on the Mediterranean giving ready access to Transjordan and Iraq. The kingdom of Jordan, now land-locked except at Aqaba, would very much like to have a port on the Mediterranean. Late in June, 1949, there was a report that Israel might offer Jordan a free zone in the port of Haifa. Without access to the sea through its own territory, Jordan could make use of such a concession only by keeping peace with Israel; it would therefore be for Israel a means of making the Arab kingdom behave itself. If Jordan were given a strip of northern Galilee including Acre, a good port might be constructed there to rival Haifa, just as Israel might build a port of its own at the southern tip of the Negeb to rival Aqaba. To avoid such expensive duplication, an exchange of port privileges for Jordan at Haifa and for Israel at Aqaba might conceivably be included in a peace settlement, but again, to be a fair exchange, it would have to guarantee Jordan free access to the Mediterranean.

Another area, perhaps more likely to be forgotten and allowed to go to Israel by default, is the large wedge bitten out of the western side of the central highlands as a "corridor"

to Jerusalem. The disposition of this rugged territory, in which there were many Arab towns and in which many new fortified Jewish settlements have been planted, will presumably depend in large part on the plan adopted for Jerusalem. It must not be ignored, however, in the consideration of conquered areas for which compensation should be given if they are retained by Israel. It is particularly important in connection with the question of free access to Jerusalem.

If international guarantees were given the Arabs against further aggression by Israel and against any attempt to expand the territory of the Jewish state, a settlement might be reached. The Arabs know very well, however, that the Jews have in the past claimed all Palestine and Transjordan, and that some groups among them continue to assert this claim openly. Partition was accepted by the Zionists in 1947 in order to become dominant in a part of Palestine rather than be subject to an Arab majority in the whole country. The general attitude was that imprudently expressed by a Jew in an Arab shop in Jerusalem not long after the partition resolution was passed: "Don't worry; in fifty years we'll have the whole country." After the flight of the Arabs and the victories of the Haganah over the Arab armies, those who had been willing to accept the partition plan began to raise their eyes toward farther horizons. In March, 1949, a representative of the Israeli Foreign Office told the United Press that Israel must have the Negeb, because otherwise "we would be obliged to expand either northward at the expense of Syria or eastward, taking the remainder of Palestine still in Arab hands or even parts of Transjordan." In other words, if they are not given what they demand they will just have to take something else.

A statement of Israel's proposals for a permanent settlement of boundaries was presented at the Lausanne Conference in May, 1949. The terms were not published, but it was reported

that they were believed to be rather general and to include practically all of Palestine. In June, Foreign Minister Sharett stated before the Knesset that Israel would not yield to any pressure brought to bear upon it to induce it to yield any of the territory conquered from the Arabs. He said bluntly that the partition plan of 1947 had been made invalid by the attack of the Arabs upon Israel and could not now be used as a basis for settling Israel's frontier. Insistence on the part of the United States upon the principle of compensation or exchange of territory, he said, would be "most unrealistic, misleading, and complicating." However Mr. Sharett may feel about it, our Government has repeatedly refused to recognize territorial claims based on conquest. It must now consistently hold to its demand that territorial compensation be given for any areas of Palestine retained by Israel over and above what was assigned to the Jewish state by the partition plan.

The United Nations resolution of December 11, 1948, establishing the Palestine Conciliation Commission, instructed the Commission to present to the next regular session of the General Assembly "detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area." What has already been said on this subject in Chapter 5 is enough to indicate that it is one of the thorniest problems confronting the Commission. At Lausanne on June 20, 1949, the delegations of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan submitted a demand for full international control of Jerusalem and other holy places in Palestine, including Nazareth. The next day the head of the Israeli delegation told the Commission that Israel would not under any circumstances agree to a complete internationalization of Jerusalem. As an alternative to the division of the city he went so far as to suggest that it could all be given to Israel! Freedom of access to the holy places of the three religions might, he said, be guaranteed by Israel. Not only the

United Nations but also our own administration is pledged to the internationalization of Jerusalem. This was included in the 1948 platform of the Democratic Party and was repeated by President Truman in his statement of October 24.

All that the historic spiritual associations of the city can rightly mean to Jews can be satisfied together with the equally legitimate claims of Christianity and Islam, and in the same way. Israel certainly cannot expect to gain possession of the sacred area that was the site of the Temple but is now one of the holiest of all places to the faith of Muslims. If the synagogues in the Old City have not been completely destroyed, access to them can be guaranteed under the same terms as access to Christian and Muslim places of worship for the adherents of those religions. Even the legal claim of Zionism based on the action of the United Nations does not apply to Jerusalem. Local autonomy for the properly Jewish sections of the city (i.e., those already predominantly Jewish in 1947), and perhaps the right of self-defense if attacked, would be not only reasonable but entirely feasible under an international administration. The internationalization of the Jerusalem area is a minimum of what the Christians of the world should demand. Freedom and safety of access to Jerusalem must be guaranteed also. This would be greatly facilitated by an internationalized corridor to the sea, as proposed in the earlier partition plans of 1937. So might many peoples go up to the mountain of the Lord and learn his ways.

What form the international administration should take is a secondary consideration, but two points that should be included in the arrangement may be mentioned here. First, all three of the religions for which Palestine is a Holy Land should be fairly represented. If Muslim and Jewish interests could be conserved under a Christian Government, Christian interests could be conserved under a Jewish or Muslim Gov-

ernment, but for the adequate protection of all three religions an international regime in which all three are represented is necessary. Secondly, there are three groups of Christians that must be represented, since unfortunately no one of them would be accepted by the others as adequately representing their interests. The Roman Catholic Church will, of course, expect to have a voice in the administration. The Vatican was not pleased, it is said, when the League of Nations gave the Mandate over Palestine to a Protestant nation, and it has been reported as recently as May, 1949, that France would like to regain its traditional role as protector of Christian interests in the Holy Land. The Protestant Churches must also participate, possibly through a representative appointed by the World Council of Churches, though that organization includes more than Protestant bodies. Certainly the native Christians of the Greek Orthodox and other non-uniat Eastern churches (i.e., those not affiliated with Rome) must share in the government of the area in which they live, and in which their own religious institutions are located. Since these groups, like the Protestant denominations, cannot all have separate representation, some new co-operative organization may have to be created for them.

Not only Jerusalem but also the other principal holy places must be put under international jurisdiction. The inclusion of Nazareth in the proposal of the Arab delegates at Lausanne on June 20 has already been mentioned. The pronouncements of the Vatican have emphasized the Christian interest in places outside the Jerusalem area. A Catholic manual of the holy places (Baldi, *Enchiridion Locorum Sanctorum*) includes sacred sites in Judea, Samaria, and Galilee. All these must be protected, and free, safe access to them guaranteed, by an authority standing above both the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine.

How the authority of the United Nations can be enforced is a ticklish point in all these matters. There is as yet no international police force that can compel any state to observe the decisions of the United Nations. Sanctions can be applied, however, if necessary, provided the delegates can be induced to vote for them. As a matter of fact, the unenforced and unenforceable mediation of the United Nations in Palestine was remarkably successful in stopping the fighting and securing agreements. Strong, clear decisions backed up with sanctions would undoubtedly be effective.

What government is to control the part of Palestine left to the Arabs is another knotty question. The failure of the Arabs to have a government of their own ready at the termination of the Mandate has been discussed in Chapter 3. The "Gaza Government" set up later by the Mufti's group failed to secure strong support from either the Arab nations or the Palestinian Arabs. In the spring of 1949 there seemed to be considerable enthusiasm among the people of central Palestine for union with the kingdom of Jordan; indeed, the chief expressions of reluctance came from the eastern side of the river, where some feared that the more numerous and better educated Palestinians would have too much power in the Government. The antagonism to Abdullah in the other Arab countries, however, cast a shadow on the scene. When Jordan, as a part of the armistice agreement with Israel, ceded portions of fine farming land to Israel, and in so doing separated it from the villages where the people who farmed it lived, there was great resentment among the Palestinian Arabs and a cooling of their desire for union with Jordan. Christian Arabs of Bethlehem have expressed reluctance to be governed by any existing Arab state.

The most important consideration of all, according to the basic position of this book, is that the native people of Pales-

tine themselves shall have the government they want. They must have the help and protection of the United Nations in getting it. A trusteeship for a definitely limited time may be necessary, but it should not be imposed without the consent of the people to be governed. To find what the majority of the people want, a plebiscite should be conducted by the United Nations at the earliest possible date, after some educational preparation. Israel has actually proposed a trusteeship and has also instructed its delegates at Lausanne to advocate a plebiscite. Whether its motive is to stabilize the situation by determining the Arab power with which Israel will have to deal in Palestine, or whether it is merely to promote dissension among the Arabs, the proposal is sound. To obtain the consent of Jordan may now be difficult, since the Arab Legion now holds the territory in question, and on May 7, 1949, a new cabinet including three Palestinians was sworn in at Amman. The other Arab nations, however, might be induced to approve, and Abdullah would hardly stand out against both the Arab states and the United Nations, especially if he had a bit of sound British persuasion.

If by popular vote the people express a desire for union with Jordan, the United Nations should approve this arrangement. A Jewish correspondent has asked me, "Do you really think the cause of justice and democracy would be served if Abdullah were crowned king of Jerusalem and all Palestine?" It is a fair question, but my answer is, "Yes, if that is what the people want." There is no such thing as democracy if people are not allowed to make their own mistakes.

This question cannot be dismissed without giving serious consideration to the "line" said to be taken now by Communist agitators among the Arab refugees, which is that there should be a single state combining Arab Palestine and Israel. Such a consummation by a Communist revolution or by Is-

rael's swallowing up Arab Palestine would not be desirable, but the time may yet come when a free federation of Jewish and Arab states in a United States of Palestine will be possible. It can come about, however, only if there is first a free Arab state willing to enter into such a federation, and that can happen only if Israel can secure the trust and good will of the Arabs instead of bitter hatred and fear.

The threat of Communist agitation, exploiting the misery of the refugees, emphasizes the urgent need of economic development throughout the Arab nations which has been mentioned in Chapter 6 under the head of our American interests in the Middle East. In connection with the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees we have noted also the far-reaching plans now being considered by our Government under the famous "Point 4" of President Truman's inaugural address. For the sake of our own economic welfare and our own security, for the sake of the confidence and good will without which our educational and missionary institutions cannot do effective work or perhaps even survive, and for the sake of meeting human need in the spirit of Him who said, "Give ye them to eat," American Christians should support such a program. For the same reasons it is important that it be efficiently and wisely carried out. The Arabs have become suspicious and fearful of foreign political control through economic and cultural aid. We must avoid giving them any reason for such fears. Their own political and economic stability and their good will toward us are all we need for our interests. We must not tie any political strings to our gifts, such as the concessions to Israel which they suspect us of trying to extort from them. Our approach to them must be tactful, with care not to hurt their rather sensitive pride. It is a good sign, for example, that we are now speaking of "underdeveloped" rather than "backward" countries as the recipients of our

help.

While we are providing for the Arab refugees, fixing the boundaries of Israel, securing a satisfactory administration of Jerusalem and the holy places, helping the Palestinian Arabs to secure the government they want, and promoting the social and economic welfare of the whole Middle East, we had better also be preparing to find homes for the excess population of Israel. The saturation point for the present has been reached and passed. Demands for the suspension of immigration are already reported. Demonstrations of rebellious resentment by disillusioned and despairing immigrants are said to have occurred. Emptying the concentration camps of Europe is an achievement, but one of limited value if they are merely emptied into new concentration camps in Asia and other people's homes. Perhaps sooner than we expect the tide may turn, and room will have to be found for emigrants from Israel. Our own liberalized Displaced Persons Act, at this writing still hung up in the judiciary subcommittee of the Senate, must be passed, and possibly a still more liberal bill prepared. Projects, now discouraged, for colonization in more roomy and richer areas than Palestine may have to be revived and more strongly supported. Social and political conditions in which Jews and all other peoples can live with safety and satisfaction must be created in all countries. The Jewish problem still has to be solved, and it cannot be solved in Palestine.

Since this book is meant to be a call to action, let me conclude with a summary of what I ask you to do:

1. Give generously for the relief of the Arab refugees.
2. Stand up and be counted for the policy our Government must pursue with regard to Palestine. Tell your friends and write to your Senators and Representatives, the State Department, and the President, that

(a) All the Arab refugees who want to return to their homes must be allowed and helped to do so, and must be restored to their own villages, houses, and farms or places of business, with adequate compensation from the Government of Israel for destruction and damage.

(b) Refugees who prefer to make a new start outside of Israel must be resettled and put on their feet economically, with compensation from the Government of Israel equal to the value of their property and means of livelihood in their former homes.

(c) The boundaries of Israel must be fixed by the United Nations in such a way as to allow Israel to retain altogether not more than 5,678 square miles, the area allotted to it by the partition plan of 1947.

(d) Jerusalem and the area surrounding it, to an extent not less than was contemplated by the 1947 partition plan, must be placed under an international administration, and free access to it must be assured by an internationalized corridor to the Mediterranean.

(e) Holy places of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism throughout the country must be safeguarded by international supervision and protection, and by international control of the means of access to them for worshipers and pilgrims.

(f) Facilities and free opportunities for study and research throughout all Palestine must be guaranteed.

(g) The wishes of the people in the part of Palestine left under Arab control must be ascertained by a plebiscite, the government they desire must be granted them, and the inviolability of its territory must be internationally guaranteed.

(h) Carefully planned programs for the economic and cultural development of the whole Middle East, with stress on

self-determination and self-help, must be adopted, implemented, and competently administered.

(i) Homes must be found in this country or elsewhere for Jews desiring to become citizens of other countries than Israel, and their religious, civic, social, and economic rights must be guaranteed.

The Author

Since 1934, Dr. Millar Burrows has been Winkley Professor of Biblical Theology at Yale Divinity School. Educated at Cornell University (B.A.), Union Theological Seminary (B.D.), and Yale University (Ph.D.), he was ordained to the Presbyterian ministry in 1915. After holding charges for several years in both Texas and Tennessee, Dr. Burrows became Professor of Bible at Tusculum College, later moving on to Brown University, where he taught Biblical literature and history of religions.

Much of what he knows and believes about Palestine was acquired by residence in the Near East, and he is contributing his income from the sale of this book for the relief of Arab refugees. His experiences in Palestine included a year as visiting professor at the American University of Beirut and two terms of a year each (1931-1932; 1947-1948) as director of the American School of Oriental Research at Jerusalem. Dr. Burrows' views do not represent these institutions in any way. He is no longer employed by either organization, nor is he an officer of either.

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