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ROUTLEDGE

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD ISRAEL

From Consensus to Divide

Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD ISRAEL

This book examines trends in American public opinion about Israel in over 75 years, from 1944 to 2019. Analyzing data from hundreds of surveys in jargon-free writing, the authors show that public support for Israel has seen a dramatic shift toward increased division between partisan and select demographic groups, elaborating on the implications that this important change may have for the countries' special relationship. Scholars and students of American foreign policy, public opinion, Middle East politics and international relations, as well as policy analysts, policymakers, journalists and anyone interested in American policy toward Israel, will want to read this book. Online data tool for plotting and examining data used in this book is available at www.idc.ac.il/apoi.

Special Features

- An Online Appendix including all surveys used throughout the book.
- A Roper Center-approved Data Tool that allows readers to create their own figures based on data used in the book: https://www.idc.ac.il/en/schools/government/research/apoi/pages/data-tool.aspx.

Amnon Cavari is Assistant Professor and Head of the American Public Opinion toward Israel (APOI) project at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. He received his PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His research focuses on the interrelationship between elite actions and mass attitudes in the United States and Israel.

Guy Freedman is a graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin and is the manager of the American Public Opinion toward Israel (APOI) project at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. His research interests are in American public opinion and public policy.

This is a first rate study of the evolution of American attitudes toward Israel since World War Two. Using quantitative survey data, the authors convincingly argue that Israel, which at one time had strong bipartisan support in the United States, has now become a partisan issue in US politics.

Robert O. Freedman, *Johns Hopkins University*

The idea that US Middle East policy has been hijacked by a small cabal of Jews is disturbingly resilient. Scrutinizing decades of US survey data, Cavari and Freedman put that fiction to rest, demonstrating the large partisan divide over Israel that actually drives US policy. Unfortunately, the growth of hyper-partisanship in the US has been matched by partisan gridlock in Israel. Any hope for Middle East peace, therefore, must grapple with the thorny issue of ideologically driven partisanship.

Peter Hays Gries, *University of Manchester*

Who would have thought, back in 1948, that Israel would come to occupy such a central place in American public opinion or that its most fervent American supporters would come to include Evangelical Christians as well as American Jews and to include proportionally more Republicans than Democrats? Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman have conducted a sweeping, intelligent, and thoughtful review of American attitudes toward Israel from 1944 through 2019, looking at both changes over time and differences between segments of the American population. Their book will be of interest to, and a valuable resource for students of American public opinion and voting behavior, American foreign policy, and the relations, political and otherwise, between the US and Israel.

Robert C. Luskin, *University of Texas at Austin*

The first comprehensive book on American public opinion towards Israel since the end of the Cold War. Timely, and rigorous; a must read for anyone interested in the US-Israeli relationship.

Jonathan Rynhold, *Bar Ilan University*

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From Amnon Cavari: To my parents, Benzion and Shulamit Cavari, for their unwavering encouragement and support.

From Guy Freedman: To Hagar Bar Josef, for putting up with all the late nights.

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The book is a product of over ten years of work, half of it together. We are thankful for all the people who supported this project along the way.

The first thanks go to Robert O. Freedman (Bob), who initiated the entire project by making a comment to Amnon in 2007 that it is time that someone take up the task to systematically examine American public opinion toward Israel. This book is a culmination of over ten years of work responding to that comment. We hope the book answers some of the questions Bob raised then and over numerous meetings to discuss our data. Bob was not surprised by any of them. He understands American public opinion toward Israel without seeing the hard evidence, but Bob appreciates the empirical evidence that supports these claims. Amnon is forever in debt for introducing him to this topic and for Bob's friendship along the way.

The book is a product of an extraordinary meeting between a university student—Guy—and a university professor—Amnon. Guy was a second-year undergraduate student at IDC taking a class with Amnon. At the end of the semester, Guy asked to meet and talk about the course (Guy had many comments), which soon shifted to lengthy discussions about research and interests. That started our fruitful collaboration—with Guy as a research assistant, project manager of the American Public Opinion toward Israel research group at IDC (APOI) and soon after a coauthor in several journal articles and this book—and friendship. We are both immensely thankful to the IDC for creating a learning and research environment that makes such meetings possible.

In working on this project, we found academic and personal friendship with Jonathan Rynhold, who shares our interest in this topic. We've learned from our occasional discussions and draw much of our theoretical claims from his influential work. Moran Yarchi joined APOI to help collect and analyze data

on US media attention to Israel. In our writing, we rely on that work to justify and explain our focus on public opinion.

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We presented different versions of the project at various academic events; at faculty seminars at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC, the Sammy Ofer School of Communications at IDC, the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and at the department of political science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln; and at annual conferences of the Association for Israel Studies, the American Political Science Association, the Israeli Political Science Association, the Midwest Political Science Association and the Southern Political Science Association. In each one of these meetings, we received thoughtful and valuable comments from our discussants, fellow panelists and audience.

Though so many people helped us along the way, we are fully responsible for the outcome and the errors.

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The book could not have been possible without the Roper iPoll archive, which provides access to most of the data in the book. We are also thankful to the professional team at Roper for helping us in searching, downloading and preparing the data we used. Sorting through the abundance of data available via iPoll would have been impossible without the assistance of the team at

Roper. Querying their database on our behalf, they were able to provide us with topline datasets consisting of thousands of survey items for us to examine and to quickly identify those that are available for individual-level analysis. Specifically, we thank Peter Enns, Brett M. Powell, Kathleen J. Weldon and whomever else at the Roper center who may have assisted us in our requests, unbeknownst to us.

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Over the time working on the project, Guy finished his bachelor degree, started and completed his MA degree at IDC and moved on to pursue his PhD at the University of Texas at Austin. He dedicates the book to his wife, Hagar, who put up with all of his late nights devoted to this book.

Amnon dedicates the book to his parents, Benzion and Shulamit Cavari, who initiated in him a life of knowledge and critique and taught him that democratic action has power only when it rests on public support.

1

INTRODUCTION

"Criticize Israel? For Democratic Voters, It's Now Fair Game."
(New York Times, November 1, 2019)

Americans are opinionated about Israel, have a favorable view of Israel and support Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a Gallup survey from February 2019, 69 percent of respondents said they have a very favorable or mostly favorable view of Israel. Twenty-eight percent of respondents said they have a mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable view of Israel. A very marginal share of Americans (3%) had no opinion.[1]

This level of response and support has substantially increased over the years. Consider three snapshots from the last three decades. In March 1989—at the height of the First Intifada—a small majority of Americans (56%) had a favorable view of Israel (38% had an unfavorable view, and 13% had no opinion). A decade later, in February 1999, the favorability ratings climbed to 66 percent. The following decade, in April 2009, the overall favorability was at nearly 70 percent, a rate that has remained relatively stable since then.[2] Americans have consistently supported Israel, and over time, they have become more opinionated about Israel and more supportive of it.

The trend of increasing opinion and support, however, masks a fundamental change in the structure of Americans' attitudes toward Israel that is revealed in an increasing partisan divide. Consider the partisan divide in the three aforementioned snapshots. In 1989, there was no meaningful difference in favorability ratings between Republicans and Democrats. By 1999, overall support had increased, and still we witnessed no meaningful gap between partisans. By 2009, Republican support was 13 percentage points higher than Democrats. Ten years

later, in 2019, this divide was almost 20 percentage points and highly significant.[3] Indeed, Americans have a favorable view of Israel, a view that has only increased over time, but this favorability is increasingly taking on a partisan dimension that did not exist before.

This divide is manifested in political action. Over more than a decade now, we see differences in elite rhetoric and policies among Republicans and Democrats, and an attempt to rely on the growing public divide on this issue in order to make Israel part of the American political playbook. Though we find evidence for this trend throughout the last decade, it was most pronounced during the 2016 campaign and the administration change that followed—from the Democratic administration of Barack Obama to the Republican administration of Donald Trump. Soon after President Obama took office (January 2009), Benjamin Netanyahu formed a right-of-center coalition government (March 2009) and started the longest stretch of control of Israeli government of any person before him, spanning all of Obama's two terms in office and Trump's (first) term (as of September 2020). From the beginning, Obama and Netanyahu did not get on well. This is partly explained by differences in personality, ideological differences and past experiences of some of Obama's senior advisors with Netanyahu but also in major policy disputes between the two leaders, including Israel's actions in the occupied territories, the nuclear deal with Iran and policies toward Muslim countries in the region (Freedman, 2017).

Surveys during Obama's two terms in office reveal that Americans did not find the president to be a strong supporter of Israel. Americans were divided on this issue during Obama's first term in office (with about 40% on either side). In 2015 a plurality of American (48%) thought the president was not a strong supporter of Israel.[4]

During the 2016 presidential elections, several Republican candidates equated this public image of Obama with the Democratic position on Israel and utilized it to differentiate themselves from Democrats on foreign policy (Cavari & Freedman, 2017). This is well summarized in remarks Donald Trump made on foreign policy on April 27, 2016 (Trump, 2016).

> Israel, our great friend and the one true democracy in the Middle East has been snubbed and criticized by an administration that lacks moral clarity. . . . President Obama has not been a friend to Israel. He has treated Iran with tender love and care and made it a great power. Iran has, indeed, become a great, great power in just a very short period of time, because of what we've done. All of the expense and all at the expense of Israel, our allies in the region and very importantly, the United States itself.

Donald Trump vowed to change the US priorities and strengthen the relationship of his administration with Israel and its government. In December 2016,

just before entering office, the president-elect responded to UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which states that Israel's settlement activities constitute a "flagrant violation" of international law. The US did not veto the resolution and it passed in a 14–0 vote. In response, the president-elect tweeted the following:

> We cannot continue to let Israel be treated with such total disdain and disrespect. They used to have a great friend in the U.S., but not anymore. The beginning of the end was the horrible Iran deal, and now this (U.N.)! Stay strong Israel, January 20th is fast approaching!
>
> *(@realDonaldTrump, December 28, 2016)*

Upon entering office, President Trump took a very different approach toward Israel than his predecessor. Within less than a month in office, the President invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to the White House, the fifth foreign leader to visit President Trump, and embraced their friendship. Americans supported this change of heart. A majority of Americans (52%) said in February 2017 that President Trump's attitude toward Israel was about right, and 13% thought that it was not friendly enough. Only 19% of Americans said that Trump was too friendly.[5]

Three months later, in May 2017, on his first foreign trip, President Trump visited Israel. In doing so, he contrasted himself from his predecessor, who did not visit Israel until his second term. During the trip, the President prayed at the Western Wall in the old city of Jerusalem—the first president to ever visit the place, which is largely perceived by the international community as occupied territory (Hirsch, 2005; Breger & Hammer, 2018). The President reiterated the importance of his actions, what it signals to the future of the US-Israel relationship, and separated himself from previous administrations (Trump, 2017).

> On my first trip overseas as President, I have come to this sacred and ancient land to reaffirm the unbreakable bond between the United States and the State of Israel.
>
> America's security partnership with Israel is stronger than ever. Under my administration, you see the difference—big, big beautiful difference.

President Trump has followed on his promises and demonstrated his strong support for Israel—as he sees it and as the Israeli government perceived it. The president withdrew the United States from the Iran Nuclear Deal, an agreement Israel tried to prevent and consistently opposed since it was signed. He provided Israel with a long-awaited wish to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and implemented a two-decade old congressional resolution to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem. Trump surprised the international community by recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. And, most recently, he

recognized Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank and changed the long-standing US policy that saw the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal under international law.

President Trump—a president known for his partisan rhetoric (Jacobson, 2019)—made Israel a salient issue in his public appeals, where he hammers on the existing divide on Israel among party elites and mass Americans, emphasizes his support for Israel, contrasts himself from his predecessors and labels Democrats as anti-Israel. In doing so, President Trump adds Israel to the political playbook in the United States, making Israel a wedge issue between Republicans and Democrats. Here is the president in a press conference in August 21, 2019 (Trump, 2019a):

> So I have been responsible for a lot of great things for Israel. One of them was moving the Embassy to Jerusalem, making Jerusalem the capital of Israel. One of them was the Golan Heights. One of them, frankly, is Iran. No President has ever done anywhere close to what I've done, between Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Iran—and other things. No President has done what I've done. . . .
>
> In my opinion, the Democrats have gone very far away from Israel. I cannot understand how they can do that. They don't want to fund Israel. They want to take away foreign aid to Israel. They want to do a lot of bad things to Israel.

While the divide may be exaggerated here, it rests on an existing trend in American public opinion about Israel that is the focus of this book. *Americans are increasingly opinionated about and have favorable and supportive views of Israel. This favorable opinion, however, has in recent years aligned along the partisan divide that increasingly characterizes American politics*. We argue that this change significantly alters the public discourse and, as the epigraph to this book summarizes well, makes Israel a political partisan issue. We further suggest that this change may affect the nature and strength of the special relationship between the United States and Israel.

Our primary goal in this book is descriptive—we want to survey attitudes of Americans toward Israel over time and across issues, to examine group variation in public attitudes and to assess the scope of partisan divide. To do so, we examine longitudinal trends and average overall effects rather than present evidence from particular surveys. We believe that trends tell a better story, one that is less affected by occasional lows and highs in public opinion that may be caused by domestic or foreign events and minimizes the effects of polling or wording biases.

But we go beyond a simple descriptive account of public opinion toward Israel. Using rigorous statistical models, we examine the independent effect of various demographic and political divides on support for Israel. We examine

the nature of the partisan divide over Israel and we offer a causal explanation to the partisan divide that incorporates what we know about the way Americans think about foreign policy.

Throughout the book, we rely on systematic analyses of extensive survey data on American public opinion toward Israel from 1944 to 2019—simply, all surveys we were able to put our hands on that do not represent a particular interest in the region (see data section later in this Introduction for a detailed account of the surveys). Using these data, we plot aggregate trends over time and apply statistical tools on individual-level data to estimate contributing effects. To improve accessibility of the book, we minimize the use of technical jargon and present all of our statistical results in figures that summarize the significance and size of the effects. Model estimates are included in the Appendix following each chapter.

Plan of the Book

The book begins with a broad comparative approach and gradually narrows down to specific groups and divisions in American public opinion toward Israel. The change is in the type of data examined and the methods employed—from descriptive statistics of topline data in Part I of the book (Chapters 2–4) to statistical models of individual level data in Part II of the book (Chapters 5–8).

Chapter 2 launches our discussion of the exceptional support for Israel and the increasing partisan divide of this support. We first demonstrate this exceptional support using data from several countries around the world. We show that Americans have a more favorable view of Israel than most people around the world, and that, compared to other people in other countries, they overwhelmingly side more with Israel than with the Palestinians. We then survey existing work on this exceptional support among Americans and argue that we need a systematic, comprehensive and current assessment of this support and especially of the increasing partisan dimension. Finally, we connect our discussion to the broader debate about the meaning of public opinion about foreign affairs and the extent of the partisan divide on this issue.

In *Chapter 3*, we continue with our comparative approach to illustrate the exceptional views that Americans have toward Israel, but this time we examine how Americans view different countries and how Israel rates in comparison. We demonstrate that in the eyes of the American public, only a few strong American allies appear more favorable than Israel. Israel is viewed favorably in comparison to most countries, especially its contemporary rivals. Our analysis relies on a measure of positive affect toward Israel. Following an extant literature on the formation of attitudes, we argue that positive affect serves as a useful heuristic shortcut for forming supportive opinions of Israel when information and knowledge are scarce. We return to this argument and test it in Chapter 7.

In *Chapter 4*, we move beyond the overall, general questions of favorability to a wider range of questions asking Americans about their views of the Arab-Israeli conflict and US involvement in the conflict and the region. We begin our discussion with an analysis of general longitudinal series about taking a side in the conflict—which side Americans sympathize with, to whom they attribute blame for the conflict, and whom they think the US should side with. Next, we analyze support for the use of force in the region—by either side. We then examine attitudes of Americans about the peace process—prospects of peace and views of specific questions that are at the heart of the debate. Finally, we inspect how Americans view the role of the United States in the conflict—whether they want the US to be involved, make diplomatic efforts, commit troops and provide foreign aid. Together, these questions offer an important review of the attitudes of Americans about the conflict. Americans overwhelmingly side with Israel and are willing to back their support with extensive funding (US aid), but they are critical of its actions and of the role that the United States plays in solving or attaining to the conflict. This chapter offers the richest aggregate data available on Israel, over time and across issues.

The next four chapters form the second part of the book in which we move from aggregate attitudes to an investigation of group variation in support for Israel, using individual-level data. We focus on six series: Favorable opinion of Israel, sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, attribution of blame for the violence, support for Israeli use of force, support for US aid to Israel and views about the most dominant question in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, support for an independent Palestinian state. Chapters 5 through 7 examine group-level variation in support for Israel using the first five series of data. In Chapter 8, we analyze public views about an independent Palestinian state, an issue that we do not align along a pro-con Israel divide.

Chapter 5 focuses on demographic divides—gender, age, generation, race, education and religion. To demonstrate differences in attitudes, we examine longitudinal trends and test overall average effects using a series of regression models (to which we add additional controls). The models in this chapter provide the baseline for the models in the following chapters. Our findings reveal that there is little variation in support for Israel across most demographic groups. Most differences are small and often inconsistent. When variation exists, support for Israel usually remains high across all groups and over all issues. Yet some meaningful differences do stand out: Religious affiliation is particularly important in explaining variation in support for Israel, with the highest levels of support among Jews and evangelical Protestants, followed by mainline Protestants. We also find that the gap between evangelical Protestants and mainline Protestants has increased over time. Some differences also exist along racial lines, with white Americans slightly more supportive than African-Americans and Hispanics, although this gap appears to be closing. Generational distinctions matter as well, with lower support in recent generations. Other, weaker, differences exist—men

are sometimes more supportive of Israel than women, and younger age groups are sometimes less supportive, as are college-educated respondents.

Chapter 6 opens our discussion of the partisan divide. First, we demonstrate the partisan gap on our five series of support for Israel. We then assess three different explanations for this process—a social alignment, an ideological alignment and an elite-led party alignment. Each of these explanations suggests different empirical expectations. We test each one using a series of moderation models in which we interact party identification of respondents with an indicator that captures each of the intervening explanations. We find support for each explanation yet argue that the strongest effect is that of elite divide offering clearer cues. This latter effect may also have the most far-reaching consequences to the stability of US-Israeli relationship.

In *Chapter 7*, we take another step to assess the nature of the partisan divide by examining the role of affect (measured through favorability). To do so, we first separate the general series of favorability and examine how it explains support for Israel using each of the remaining policy domains: sympathies, blame, use of force (by Israel) and aid. We then test how favorability mediates the relationship between party and policy positions. The findings reveal that gaps in partisan preferences are a product of variation in the affective lenses through which partisans view Israel. Simply put, Republicans feel a stronger positive affect toward Israel than Democrats do, and this "gut feeling" manifests itself in greater support for Israel.

Chapter 8 offers our last empirical analysis and focuses on public views about an independent Palestinian state. We treat this series in a separate chapter because we find no justification for pitting support for a Palestinian state and opposition to a Palestinian state as a pro-con Israel issue. Americans—as Israelis—can *support* Israel and either support or oppose a Palestinian state. This is especially evident when we examine the partisan gap. Americans are divided over the issue, yet favorability for Israel—an important explanation of the divide on all other issues examined in Chapter 7—fails to explain this divide. Instead, we suggest that attitudes about establishing an independent Palestinian state are better explained by the different priorities Americans have in foreign policy, and especially the divide among Republicans and Democrats over the goals they prioritize for US foreign policy. Using a survey experiment, we demonstrate how triggering different goals affects partisan support for a Palestinian state.

In *Chapter 9*, we conclude the book with a discussion of the findings and an assessment of its effects. We argue that the *NY Times* header that opens this book is real. Americans are rapidly dividing over Israel, and this has changed the role of Israel in the playbook of US politics. We demonstrate how this change affects current politics—from the frequent clashes between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to the emerging voices within the Democratic Party that critique Israel and challenge US policy in the region, and finally to the unprecedented one-sided approach of the Trump administration

in handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We claim that this can affect the special relationship between the United States and Israel in the future.

Data

This is a book about public opinion that relies on extensive survey data collected over time. In researching and writing the book, we use the breadth of public opinion polls that have been routinely and increasingly conducted in the United States since the 1940s, primarily, since Israel's independence. To date, Israel has been one of the most asked-about countries in public opinion surveys in the United States. As an illustration, a simple search of the word Israel in the Roper iPoll survey archive yields 3,767 unique survey questions from 1948 to the end of 2019. In comparison, during the same time period Iraq is included in 16,839 questions, Russia (or the Soviet Union) in 8,560 questions, China in 3,416, Iran in 3,287, Vietnam in 2,265, Korea 2,230 (specifically North Korea in 1,271), Mexico in 1,782, Syria in 1,413, Germany in 1,187 and Egypt in 633.[6] Except for Iraq, which the US was at war with (twice), and Russia, which has been the US primary rival in most of the post-World War II period, public opinion surveys ask about Israel more than any other country. The large number of survey questions about Israel by commercial companies is evidence of the public interest in this issue. Americans are exposed to events and policies regarding Israel and are constantly asked about their opinion on them. Rarely do public opinion scholars have such rich data to work with. We take advantage of this wealth of data and make overreaching claims about American attitudes toward Israel.

Public opinion polls remain the best method of assessing public attitudes toward an object of study. But we are cautious about misusing public opinion data. Misreading public attitudes is a greater risk when relying on single snapshots of data to make broad inferences (Kull & Destler, 1999). Therefore, the majority of this book is about aggregate and group-level trends identified in survey data concerning Israel. Trends have the advantage of drowning out noise that originates in sampling errors, measurement error or occasional preceding events with short-term effects. Aggregate trends have been used in previous studies that have contributed greatly to the understanding of public opinion (e.g., Page & Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 1999). Page and Shapiro (1992), for example, use aggregate trends to demonstrate the rational, predictable and consistent nature of public opinion. They also lay the foundations for their seminal contribution about parallel publics—the parallel movement of group-level opinion over time, which influences much of this study. We follow a similar approach in this book. In Part I, we analyze aggregate trends to demonstrate the strong support that Americans afford Israel. In Part II, starting with Chapter 5, we revert to a descriptive and statistical analysis of group-level trends. In all, we rely on numerous surveys that we pull together. Where appropriate, we complement our trend analyses with

anecdotal evidence, but the main body of empirical evidence we use in this book is based on trends and overall effects.

In each chapter, we take great care to list for our readers the survey items we use. We provide full information about polling organizations, the scope of the data, their availability, as well as their limitations, and important considerations in question wording. When pooling together multiple survey items, bias rooted in question wording may alter results. In both our topline analysis and our statistical models, we account for such biases. If there is concern of too large a bias, or if a specific instance of a survey item appears too different in wording from the entire trend, we exclude it. Similarly, we use only nationally representative surveys (mostly of national adults and a few of registered voters). Finally, in the Appendix of the book, we provide an extensive list of every single survey used in this book, including information relevant for accessing and replicating the data (also available online with additional information).

We retrieved almost the entirety of our data from the online iPoll archive, provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. The team at the Roper Center was instrumental in assisting our efforts to query their database. With their assistance, we received a list of all survey items, topline and individual-level, that referenced Israel in any context—a total of 3,832 questions in 1,361 surveys matched this criterion.[7] Our interest is in what people think about Israel, the extent to which they support Israel (especially, but not only, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict) and their preferences for US involvement in solving the conflict. Spanning 75 years, our data begin in December 1944—the final months of WWII and leading up to the establishment of Israel in 1948—and end with the most up-to-date available survey as of December 2019. From this dataset, we extracted 955 questions from 507 surveys, matching these interests. Items that did not make the cut were not asked in a nationally representative sample of American adults, were unsuitable for analyzing longitudinal trends (i.e., were not asked frequently enough) or were outside the scope of this book (for instance, what Americans think of Israeli leaders or Israel's political institutions, how Americans prioritize Israel compared to other foreign policy goals, approval of the US government in its handling of US-Israel relations, attitudes toward American Jews, knowledge items, etc.).

We also use several additional datasets, mostly for comparative purposes. In Chapter 2, we illustrate the rise in partisan polarization on foreign policy using 16 surveys from the Chicago Council of Global Affairs (CCGA) and six Transnational Trends surveys (available through ICPSR, the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan) that provide a comparative perspective of feelings toward Israel. In Chapters 3 and 4 we use data from 400 surveys to compare attitudes of Americans toward Israel to their attitudes toward other countries on three different measures—favorability, viewing various countries as allies and attitudes toward foreign aid. Access to Roper iPoll and the ICPSR was made available to us through our institutions, the Interdisciplinary Center

(IDC) Herzliya and the University of Texas at Austin. Two additional surveys in Chapter 3, comparing Americans' sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict to the sympathies in other countries, are freely accessible on the Pew Research Center website as part of their global attitudes series.

Finally, we complement these data with three additional surveys. In Chapters 3 and 8 we use two original surveys of our own, relying on nationally representative samples using the Qualtrics panel in October 2016 and Amazon mTurk in May 2017. Funding for these surveys was provided by the Academic Advancement Fund at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya. In Chapter 6, we complement our analysis with survey data courtesy of Peter Gries. This survey of a nationally representative sample was conducted in April 2011 by the YouGov panel and offers a unique opportunity to examine the role of religious fundamentalism in attitudes toward Israel.

We use Stata 13 to plot most of the figures presented throughout the book, as well as the regression models estimated in Part II of the book. In some cases, we use R & RStudio to estimate more advanced models (*k*-means clustering in Chapter 3 and mediation models in Chapters 5, 7 and 8). Where appropriate, we cite the relevant R package used to estimate our models or plot our results.

A Note About Authors' "Bias"

We are both Israelis. We have our personal view of the importance of US-Israeli relations (extremely important) and on the meaning of partisan disagreement for this relationship (extremely dangerous). These views are not necessarily shared by everyone. Some will argue that a decrease in US support for Israel and the politicization of the relationship between the two countries may be a positive change for the State of Israel, that Israel relies too much on this friendship and that, by not taking it for granted, Israel may be more careful in its actions. These are valid propositions.

This book, however, is not about our opinion about the importance of the special relations between the two countries. Rather, it is an attempt to systematically assess American public opinion toward Israel. Though we measure support, we do not argue that support for Israel is good or bad. We argue that it is exceptionally high when compared to other nations, that this support is essential for maintaining the special relationship and that support is taking a partisan dimension that did not exist before.

And still, we need to define and operationalize support. We do that by equating an opinion that is aligned with Israel's official position and actions (regardless of social and political critique in Israel) with support for Israel. A show of support for Israel is defined as holding a favorable view of Israel, sympathizing with Israel, preferring that the United States side with Israel, blaming Israel's rivals in the conflict, supporting military intervention if needed and

providing economic and military aid to Israel. We concede that in doing so we simplify a complicated multidimensional issue. One can read each of these decisions as completely flawed, or at a minimum imprecise. A person can sympathize more with the Palestinians, blame Israel's actions, side with the Palestinians and oppose military and economic intervention—and still have a favorable view of Israel. We do not argue otherwise. We only suggest that such a dichotomy is necessary in order to fulfill the task we take on ourselves in this book—to present longitudinal trends of public opinion data regarding Israel and the ever-evolving Arab-Israeli conflict. Putting aside controversies about Israel and its relationship with its adversaries—among Israelis, Americans and the global community—how do Americans view Israel, its actions and the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Notes

1. Gallup Organization. February 1–10, 2019. Roper question ID: 31116081.00021.
2. Gallup Organization. February 28–March 3, 1989. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.040689.R1F.

   Gallup Organization. February 8–9, 1999. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.99FEB8.R02C.

   CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, April 3–5, 2009. Roper question ID: USORC.040709A.R20K.
3. Chi Square statistics (between the two parties only) for 1989, 1999 are insignificant—1.20 (p = .27) and 1.97 (p = .16) respectively—but significant in 2009 and 2019–4.28 (p = .04) and 30.75 (p = .00) respectively.
4. Quinnipiac Surveys. September 27—October 3, 2011. Roper ID: USQUINN.100611.R55. April 14–19, 2010. Roper question ID: USQUINN.042210.R52. April 16–21, 2015. Roper ID: USQUINN.042715.R53.
5. Quinnipiac University Polling Institute. February 16–21, 2017. Roper ID: USQUINN.022317.R62.
6. Using the following search terms (% is used for wildcard to allow all forms of the word): Israel%, Iraq%, Russia% OR Soviet%, Chin%, Iran%, Vietnam%, Korea%, Korea% AND North%, Mexic%, Syria%, German%. The search is not case-sensitive.
7. This number is slightly higher than the number of questions that results in a simple search in their archive. This list is more accurate and extensive, also including questions that do not specifically mention Israel (like Jerusalem or a two-state solution).

PART I

Trends in Public Support

2

STUDYING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL

Attitudes about Israel have long been an exception in American public opinion about foreign affairs. Americans are opinionated about Israel (Cavari & Freedman, 2019), have a favorable view of Israel (Cavari, 2012; Gilboa, 1987) and overwhelmingly support Israel in the Middle East conflict between Israel and Arab countries or between Israel and the Palestinians (Cavari, 2012; Rynhold, 2015).

To illustrate the strength of American public views of Israel, we compare the attitudes of Americans toward Israel to the attitudes of people in other countries for which data are available. Transatlantic Trend surveys from 2004 to 2012 compare the attitudes toward Israel of residents in 13 countries using a similar question. From 2004 to 2008, respondents were asked to rate their feelings toward Israel using a thermometer question: "I would like you to rate your feelings toward [Israel] on a scale from 0 to 100." In the 2012 survey, the same pollster asked a similar question using a categorical response: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Israel."

In Figure 2.1, we plot the mean responses for each country over time (for the thermometer items we calculate the mean rating, and for the favorability item in 2012 we calculate the percent of respondents who reported a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of Israel). Although the surveys include only 13 countries, the figure demonstrates the exceptionally positive views that Americans have toward Israel. On average, only Americans have a favorable view of Israel—it is the only country in which the majority opinion consistently surpasses the middle threshold of 50 in all six surveys. All European countries included in these data have a negative view of Israel and consistently rate Israel in the 25–50 range. Turkey, the only Muslim country



FIGURE 2.1 Israel Favorability Ratings in 13 Countries

Note: *N* = 68,183 in six surveys.

Dots represent the mean thermometer rating toward Israel in 2004–08; diamonds represent the percent of favorable attitudes toward Israel in 2012 (pooling together the categories very favorable and somewhat favorable).

Samples include national adults in 13 countries using data from the Transatlantic surveys. Data are available via the ICPSR website.

surveyed in these data, is decisively negative. Differences between years for each country are relatively small.

Attitudes of Americans toward Israel extend beyond feelings of warmth or favorability. Two surveys conducted by the Pew Global Project in 2007 and 2013 compare global attitudes about the Arab-Israeli conflict asking publics around the world about their sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The question allows respondents to state which side in the conflict they sympathize with more—Israel or the Palestinians—effectively requiring them to choose one side over the other. In 2007, the question was asked in 45 countries, offering a good comparison across the globe. In 2013, the question was asked in only 11 countries, but this additional snapshot, six years later, provides a check on the 2007 study.

We plot responses to both surveys in Figure 2.2. For each country, we plot the percent of respondents who sympathized more with Israel



FIGURE 2.2 Global Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (2007 and 2013)

Note: *N* = 39,118 (2007); 13,265 (2013).

Bars represent the percent who sympathize with Israel (dark gray) and with the Palestinians (light gray), excluding item nonresponse. Black dots represent the absolute difference between the two.

Not displayed in the figure: Percent of people who sympathize with both/neither side, do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults in 45 countries (2007) and 11 countries (2013) using data from the Pew Global Project.

(dark gray bars) and those who sympathized more with the Palestinians (light gray bars). We do not display nonresponses, which includes all respondents who refused to answer, reported don't know, or offered voluntary responses such as sympathizing with both sides or neither side. To compare attitudes between countries, we overlay the bars with a measure of the differential between sympathies with Israel and with the Palestinians in absolute terms (black dots). A high value (in absolute terms) indicates a stronger preference to either side. We order the countries by the strength of Israel-Palestinian sympathies—from strong partial to Israel to a strong advantage to the Palestinians.

Of the 45 countries surveyed in 2007 (left), the United States and Ivory Coast lead the public sympathies toward Israel. In these two countries, the

gap between public sympathies for Israel and sympathies for the Palestinians is about three to one. In the following group of countries—from the Czech Republic to South Africa (11 countries)—more people sympathize with Israel than with the Palestinians, but the margins are significantly smaller. People in the next group of countries—Japan through Italy (13 countries)—are less likely to voice an opinion and are equally sympathetic with both sides. People in the next eight countries—Bulgaria through Mali—exhibit a small advantage to the Palestinians. People in the final group of countries—from Senegal through Egypt (11 countries)—are overwhelmingly more sympathetic toward the Palestinians. These countries are Arab or Muslim countries.

The comparison in 2013 (right panel) yields a similar picture of overwhelming support among Americans. The mass publics in Germany, Russia and France show an evenly split opinion. Citizens of China and Great Britain show a clear edge to the Palestinians. The five Muslim countries are overwhelmingly more supportive of the Palestinians. Indeed, the United States is a global outlier in its positive public sentiment toward Israel.

The exceptional views of Israel among the American public have been the subject of some scholarly work. In a seminal study of this topic, Eytan Gilboa (1987) examined the overall support for Israel among Americans and among various groups in American society. At the outset, Gilboa identifies the central purpose of his book: "to construct basic long-term trends in American opinion on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict within appropriate historical contexts and perspectives" (p. 2). Relying on rich public opinion data, Gilboa illustrates the strength of American public support for Israel—a support that is manifested in general views of the country and its people and with regard to specific policies in times of peace and war. Gilboa also demonstrates that this support cuts across most sociodemographic and political groups. The importance of this support is not light-weighted. As he strongly argues, the special relations between Israel and the United States would have been untenable without a favorable public opinion.

Gilboa's observations are echoed in more recent work that reinforces the importance of public opinion in establishing and maintaining the special relations. As Walter Russell Mead wrote in *Foreign Affairs*: "To understand why U.S. policy is pro-Israel rather than neutral or pro-Palestinian, one must study the sources of non-elite, non-Jewish support for the Jewish state" (Mead, 2008, p. 30). Michael Koplow (2011) demonstrates empirically the importance of public opinion to this relationship, suggesting that voter preferences through electoral processes help explain much of the support that the United States provides Israel.

Gilboa's book made the necessary connection between policy and opinion, linking the special relationship between Israel and the United States to American public opinion about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also

forces us to think not only about overall trends in public support but also about group differences and their potential effect on the structure of overall support. Additionally, the book combines general attitudes with policy specific ones. American public opinion toward Israel is a function of overall views of Israel and of views about specific policy debates—connected to Israel or to the United States.

Yet, his comprehensive analysis of American public opinion toward Israel up to 1985 (last survey included in the analysis) is now overwhelmingly dated. Gilboa refers to an Arab-Israeli conflict that largely manifested itself in the context of the Cold War and as an international conflict between nation states—Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. In this conflict, Israel was perceived as an underdog in a ruthless, undemocratic neighborhood aligned with the Soviet Union, the primary enemy of the United States. A repeated question in Harris surveys from 1970, 1980 and 1987 show that nearly 80 percent of Americans (74%, 86%, and 79%, respectively) agreed with the statement that "Israel is a small, courageous, democratic nation, which is trying to preserve its independence."[1]

Toward the end of the period examined in the book, Israel signed a peace treaty with an Arab country (Egypt in 1979), and the conflict began to transition to one that involved Israel and nonstate organizations. Gilboa's study was published in 1987, itself a major turning point in the conflict, in which Israel first faced a violent Palestinian popular uprising—the First Intifada. Until then, the Palestinians were not yet the focal point of attention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even in the United States, there was no independent representative entity for Palestinians, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was listed as a terrorist organization (Koenig, 1988). The United States only began openly talking with the PLO in 1988 after the latter accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to exist, and renounced terrorism (Reagan, 1988).

Furthermore, Gilboa refers to a world that is deeply affected by the Cold War, where the United States leads the West against the Soviet Union. In this world, Israel is an ally of the Western coalition that relies on Western (mostly American) military equipment and strategy, and Arab countries are an ally of the Soviet Union, which relies on Soviet military equipment and strategy. The Arab-Israeli conflict was therefore a theater of war within the global Cold War (Spiegel, 1986). This view was summarized well by President Nixon in 1978 (quoted in Spiegel, 1986, p. 172):

> Since U.S.-Soviet interests as the world's two competing superpowers were so widespread and overlapping, it was unrealistic to separate or compartmentalize areas of concern. Therefore, we decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade

> with progress in areas that were important to us—Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin.

The global environment has changed overwhelmingly since then. Russian presence in the region has retracted (Freedman, 2010),[2] the United States is reducing its arms sales in the region and the dependence on Middle Eastern oil has declined. But US involvement and interest in the region has not dissolved. The United States is involved militarily in the region as part of its war against global terrorism. Although American independence on Middle Eastern oil has decreased (but has not been eliminated altogether) and the United States has an independent supply of natural gas, US allies are still dependent on Middle Eastern energy supply. The oil trade is in US dollars and hence affects the US economy, and the Middle East holds large shares of the global supplies of natural gas. Furthermore, the Middle East is a growing economic market that draws much interest from American companies. Finally, the Middle East offers the United States an important venue for security and economic influence on other regions—North Africa through Egypt, and Pakistan through Saudi Arabia.

The mass media environment has also changed dramatically over the last 30 years. Americans who were tuned to the news about Israel until 1985 were limited to information available on the major media outlets and to the decisions of these outlets on what to cover and how to frame the events. Since then, the US media has fragmented, offering a variety of local news sources, and—with the development of cable channels—highly ideological news with a 24-hour news cycle and access to global news outlets (Baum, 2003). This variation is evident also in the content and framing of news about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Cavari & Gabay, 2014). The more recent development of new media and the change in consumption of news that followed have further changed the news reporting and their ideological bias that Americans receive about the region (Baum & Groeling, 2010).

Despite these changes, additional work on American public opinion about Israel has not been as comprehensive as Gilboa's study. This is not to say that the issue was completely neglected, however. Existing work points to the role of public opinion in maintaining the special relations between the two countries (Mead, 2008; Koplow, 2011), to trends in the clarity of opinions (Cavari & Freedman, 2019), to the level of support (Cavari, 2012, 2013; Gilboa, 2009; Rynhold, 2015) and to the change from public consensus to a divide among several demographic—mainly religious—and political groups (Baumgartner, Francia, & Morris, 2008; Cavari, 2013; Gries, 2014; Mayer, 2004; Rynhold, 2015).

Some work examine the effect of *information* and *media coverage* on public opinion about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Krosnick and Telhami (1995; Telhami & Krosnick,

1996) demonstrate that the attentive public—people who are more engaged and informed in public affairs—and the issue public—people who believe the issue is important to them or to the nation—have stronger positions on the conflict. They find no difference in the balance of opinion between the general public and the attentive public but find that support for Israel is stronger among the issue public. Cavari and Gabay (2014) and Leep and Coen (2016) demonstrate that the way in which the conflict is covered by the media can affect public opinion about it and the extent of public support for Israel.

Other studies examine the evolving association between *religion* and public support for Israel. Mayer (2004) suggests that the consensus found in earlier work concerning religious groups should be revised—mainly, the rise of evangelical Christians in the United States and the dominant role Israel plays in its religious identity.[3] Examining a battery of survey questions about support for Israel, he demonstrates a substantive and consistent divide between what he calls Christian fundamentalists and all other religious groups. Mayer concludes that "with the possible exception of Jewish Americans, fundamentalist Christians in the mass public are now the strongest supporters of Israel in America." Baumgartner et al. (2008) echo these findings. Assessing multiple surveys from 2005 and 2006, they show that religious beliefs play a significant role in predicting American public opinion on foreign policy issues in the Middle East. Specifically, evangelicals are among the strongest supporters of Israel and hold more negative views of Islam.

Rynhold (2015) examines this change over time and argues that although evangelicals and the general public support Israel, in recent years the gap in support between the two groups has increased. He further shows that while evangelicals have an increasingly distinct pro-Israel view, they too demonstrate a divide that mirrors broader theological and ideological divisions between traditionalist-conservatives, centrists-moderates and modernists-liberals. Adding to that, Gries (2014) demonstrates that the difference is rooted in theology, not religious practice. While religious practice is a powerful predictor of support for Israel, it is significant only among evangelicals. Views of Israel among mainline Protestants—regardless of their religious practice—are similar to the national average.

A large body of work focuses on the attitudes of American Jews, a group that has long been considered an exception in American public opinion on the issue of support for Israel. These studies demonstrate and debate over two trends: A decline in overall attachment to Israel and a growing generational and denominational divide in attachment and support for Israel (Gordis, 2019; Rynhold, 2015; Sasson, 2010, 2014; Sasson, Kadushin, & Saxe, 2010; Waxman, 2016, 2017; Weisberg, 2019). This process is well illustrated by Waxman in a book that summarizes the trend perfectly in its title *Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel* (2016). According to Waxman, "the era of uncritical

American Jewish support for Israel—of 'Israel, right or wrong'—is now long past" (p. 4). Whereas a decline in attachment may not be certain, a fundamental shift has occurred in the American Jewish relationship with Israel in the last two decades, as growing numbers of American Jews have become less willing to unquestioningly support Israel and more willing to publicly criticize its governments (Waxman, 2016).

Finally, an emerging body of work points to the growing divide along *party* and *ideological* lines—with Republicans and conservatives demonstrating more pro-Israel views and Democrats and liberals presenting more critical views of Israel. Cavari (2013) identifies this changing partisan landscape—from bipartisan agreement to polarization. Examining attitudes about a single question asked repeatedly over time (from 1967 to 2009), Cavari shows that Republicans and Democrats have grown apart, reaching a gap of about 30 percentage points—more than any other gap along any demographic and political dimension. Rynhold (2015) demonstrates this divide also on several policy issues during the last decade and connects this divide to a more fundamental ideological divide among party elites.

A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in January 2018 illustrates the strength of partisan divide on Israel.[4] The survey asked several questions about Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—sympathies in the Middle East, an evaluation of the way the president (Trump) is handling the conflict, views of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opinions on the feasibility of a peaceful, two-state solution to the conflict. We summarize the gap between Republicans and Democrats in Table 2.1. In all questions, the gap between Republicans and Democrats was among the highest of every existing demographic divide.

The strength of the religious and partisan divide forces us to rethink the popular consensus that once characterized the views of Americans toward Israel. Americans are no longer united over Israel. This is especially true concerning partisan divisions. Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both of which seemed to be above regular politics, are now increasingly part of the current political debate, a debate that has become more polarized over most issues.

TABLE 2.1 Partisan Gap in Public Attitudes Toward Israel

	Partisan Gap (Republicans—Democrats)
Sympathies (sympathize with Israel)	52
Donald Trump (striking a right balance between Israel and Palestinians)	52
Benjamin Netanyahu (favorable)	34
Peaceful resolution (feasible)	18

American Attitudes on Foreign Policy

The book focuses on attitudes of Americans about a foreign issue that has long occupied the American public sphere—the state of Israel and the conflicts it has with its neighbors and with the Palestinians over territory and independence. The notion that one can study the attitudes of Americans toward foreign issues and events has drawn a large body of work focused on the extent to which Americans hold meaningful attitudes about foreign policy and the structure of these attitudes. Early work on this topic centered on whether Americans have meaningful and coherent opinions on foreign policy issues. The conventional wisdom during early periods of public polling was that Americans exhibit low levels of knowledge concerning political issues that do not directly relate to them, and therefore they know very little about foreign affairs. Their attitudes on such matters, therefore, seemed volatile, moody and tended to shift easily from one worldview to another (Almond, 1950; Bailey, 1948; Converse, 1964; Kriesberg, 1949; Lippman, 1955; Miller, 1967).

This non-attitudes convention was questioned by the strong public involvement in the war in Vietnam (Caspary, 1970; Mueller, 1971, 1973; Verba & Brody, 1970; Verba et al., 1967), leading to a change from a focus on opinion leadership of elites to empirical investigation of mass attitudes (Holsti, 2004). These studies demonstrate that despite having minimal knowledge about foreign affairs, attitudes of Americans on foreign policy are structured, purposeful and primarily based on a cost-benefit analysis (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995; Hinckley, 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Knopf, 1998; Nincic & Ramos, 2010; Page & Bouton, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Richman, Malone, & Nolle, 1997; Wittkopf, 1990).

Page and Bouton (2006, p. 29) suggest that when forming their foreign policy preferences, Americans rely on basic needs, values and beliefs that work together with a number of other political attitudes and predispositions—including political ideologies and party loyalties, perceptions of international threats and problems, specific foreign policy goals and beliefs and feelings about specific foreign countries and leaders. These elements interact with each other to form hierarchical, means-end chains where, despite the lack of information, specific policy preferences follow logically from basic values and beliefs through foreign policy goals and perceptions about how best to achieve those goals. Our approach to public opinion about Israel is very much in line with this proposed model of public opinion.

Since foreign affairs are distant from the everyday concerns of most Americans, they are especially ripe for cue-giving by elite actors. These elite cues can vary from expert views to party attributes. Guisinger and Saunders (2017) demonstrate that the degree to which public attitudes are malleable, as well as the relative effect of partisan attribution, depends on the share of the population not already aligned with elite opinion and the degree to which an issue already

exhibits partisan polarization. Hence, the more party elites are polarized on an issue, the stronger effect partisan cues have on public opinion.

That party elites are increasingly polarized over a wide range of policy issues is rarely debated. Throughout the last three decades, the American political system has undergone a process of political polarization along party lines, with Republicans becoming more conservative and Democrats more liberal. This process is strongly manifested in presidential and congressional action, in electoral campaigns, in voting patterns and in studies of representation (Abramowitz, 2018; Ahler & Broockman, 2018; Campbell, 2016; Hetherington, 2009; Levendusky, 2009; Nivola & Brady, 2007; Poole & Rosenthal, 2007; Theriault, 2008). While most of the work on the divide over policy measures focuses on domestic issues, there is evidence of the extension of party conflict from domestic issues to foreign affairs as well (Gries, 2014; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006; Milner & Tingley, 2015).

Early studies on party divide on foreign affairs focus on the perceived liberal internationalist consensus and a congressional differential to the president. This bipartisan consensus was grounded in a theoretical understanding of congressional actions—that members of Congress avoided political conflict on foreign policy because of a perceived threat to national security during the Cold War. This view is strongly summarized in Senator Arthur Vandenberg's famous declaration that "politics stops at the water's edge." Facing the threat imposed by the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union, members of Congress supported the liberal internationalist approach led by presidents from both parties (Holsti, 2004; Meernik, 1993; Prins & Marshall, 2001).

The bipartisan consensus is challenged in more recent work that question the effect of a unifying threat. Souva and Rohde (2007), for example, posit that the nature of congressional action is explained better by elite opinion differences. As the opinions of Republican and Democratic elites polarize, foreign policy votes in Congress are less bipartisan. Trubowitz and Mellow (2011) demonstrate that the bipartisan coalition over foreign policy during the Cold War was possible because the national economy was strong and party coalitions were regionally diverse. In contrast, the economic volatility and regional polarization that characterizes the contemporary political environment makes bipartisan agreement in response to the threat of terrorism impossible. Similarly, Jeong and Quirk (2019) evince that even if a bipartisan coalition existed in the past, domestic and international processes contributed to its erosion during the war in Vietnam and even more so at the end of the Cold War, and it collapsed completely following 9/11 and the Iraq War.

The increasing divide among party elites suggests that we should also find an increasing divide among the American public—whether because party elites affect mass partisan divide or because the mass divide causes the elite divide, or both. A rich body of work examines the polarization of mass opinion on a range of policies, mostly relating to domestic politics (see, for example, a few recent book-length discussion of the scope, scale and effect of this process:

Abramowitz, 2018; Campbell, 2016; Fiorina, 2017). Evidence of mass polarization on foreign policy, however, is more limited. Beinart (2008) argues that the events following 9/11 and especially the elite divide over the war in Iraq ended the perceived public consensus over foreign policy and created a partisan divide over the war on terror. Holsti (2011) demonstrates this divide empirically with a wide range of survey questions regarding the war in Iraq. Taking a broader perspective of foreign policy, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (2007) show a sharp increase in the relationship between partisanship and a wide array of foreign policy and defense issues between 2002 and 2004. Nevertheless, these studies are limited to attitudes about a highly controversial war managed by a polarizing president (Jacobson, 2007). In a more comprehensive assessment of public opinion about foreign conflicts (in which the United States is involved), Berinsky (2009) shows that patterns of elite agreement and disagreement play a critical role in shaping the partisan divide—polarization of public opinion occurs when elites are divided or even at the presence of a prominent cue giver from one side of the aisle that is not challenged by elites on the other side.

A general analysis of the increasing divide over time—one that is not about war—is offered by Abramowitz (2010) and Cavari and Freedman (2018). Using data from the American National Elections Surveys from 1984 to 2012, they compare the correlation between party identification and attitude preferences on six identical questions over time, one of which is defense spending. The trend for all questions is similar—including on defense spending—a strengthening correlation over time.

Increasing partisan polarization on foreign affairs may not be limited to wars or to defense spending. Yet it is difficult to analyze trends of other issues in foreign policy over time, since the issues asked in surveys change as a function of current events. Very few questions repeatedly appear in surveys over long periods of time, and thus longitudinal trends of most issues in foreign affairs are unavailable. To provide systematic empirical evidence of the growing partisan divide on foreign policy, we present here a novel approach to this challenge by relying on all available questions available. (we develop this approach in our previous work on mass polarization in the United States; see Cavari & Freedman, 2018). We downloaded all surveys of US national adults conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (or in its previous title, the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs) that are available via Roper iPoll and that include foreign policy questions and a party identification question. We define a policy question as one that presents respondents with a policy action the United States might take in the international stage (provide foreign aid, use US troops, go to war, apply pressure, operate through international organizations, etc.). To avoid any partisan bias that may be caused by question wording, we excluded any item that specifically references the president, a member of the administration or the two parties. To allow comparison over time, we included only questions that have a similar response structure—those which offer respondents two or four options

(Favor/Oppose, or Strongly Favor/Favor Somewhat/Oppose Somewhat/Strongly Oppose). A total of 16 surveys meet these requirements. The number of appropriate survey items in each survey ranges from 23 to 68, with an average of 47 items per survey and 750 items overall. The surveys are from 1974 to 2018 (the last CCGA survey available for analysis), with the majority from 2002 forward. To assess partisan divide, we excluded all options of item nonresponse and recode four-scale items into two categories to match the two-scale items.

Using these data, we test whether we see an increasing partisan divide over time, regardless of the questions asked. For each survey item, we calculate Cohen's *d* as a measure of effect size of the difference between Republicans and Democrats (excluding independents or others). Higher values indicate a greater difference between the two groups, with respect to the standard deviation of the sample (in other words, the two partisan groups are better sorted into two opposing preferences, and overlap is minimal). Conventional thresholds suggest 0.2 is a small effect, 0.5 is a moderate effect and 0.8 is a large effect (Cohen, 1988). We use the absolute value of Cohen's *d* because the direction of the difference is unimportant (that is, whether the mean for Republicans is higher or lower than that of Democrats).[5] We summarize the results in Figure 2.3.



FIGURE 2.3 Increasing Partisan Divide in Public Attitudes About Foreign Policy

Note: *N* = 24,263 in 16 surveys of national adults, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (formerly, the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs).

Gray dots represent the absolute value of Cohen's *d* on a single foreign policy item (750 items in total) in each survey. The black line is a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.75 (the surrounding shaded area, the 95 percent confidence interval of the line).

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

Gray dots represent the absolute value of Cohen's *d* on a single foreign policy item, as evidence of the extent of partisan disagreement on that item. The black line is a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.75 (the shaded area, the 95% confidence interval of the line), revealing the average trend of partisan polarization on all available foreign policy items in these surveys.

The results add empirical evidence to existing work and demonstrate the upward trend in partisan divide. Until the end of the twentieth Century, Americans were not divided on most of the foreign policy questions, and the mean divide is small (under 0.2). From 2004 forward (we do not have data for 2003), Americans are divided on a majority of the foreign policy questions, and the mean divide climbs to moderate levels. More recently, we also see an increasing number of questions on which Americans exhibit substantial divide along partisan lines, surpassing the 0.8 threshold. We concede that the number of questions, the topics asked, and the wording of the questions change over time, and that this change may explain some of the trends. Yet the overall trend is a telling one—Americans are increasingly divided over foreign policy along party lines.

Conclusion

Our interest in this book is to demonstrate the scale, scope and limits of Americans' support for Israel. We demonstrated in this chapter how exceptional this support is compared to peoples of other countries—Americans have a more favorable view of Israel than anywhere else surveyed, and their sympathies for Israel (compared to the Palestinians) is higher than anywhere else surveyed. Existing work on this issue reveal the strength of this support and identify several factors that explain this support. None of these studies, however, offer a comprehensive assessment of the scale and scope of support—measuring limited or dated data, usually examining one series of support for Israel or focusing on one particular explanatory factor. The strength of demographic and partisan divide—an emerging trend in US politics—has also defied sufficient attention in existing research.

In the following chapters, we fill in these gaps in scholarly work and offer a more comprehensive analysis of public opinion toward Israel, using the most extensive data on this topic ever compiled. In analyzing these data, we rely on emerging scholarly work on the nature of American public opinion about foreign affairs given the limited levels of knowledge and information most Americans have, and incorporating the dramatic change in partisan divide over foreign affairs. We wish to demonstrate that the elite divide over Israel has affected public opinion toward Israel by turning a largely consensual issue into one that is defined by partisan divide.

Notes

1. Louis Harris & Associates. August, 1970. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.70AUG.R10A. World Jewish Congress. July 11–23, 1980. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.80MEG.R07A01. Louis Harris & Associates. February 20–24, 1987. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.033087.R3A.

2. Russia's presence has resurged in recent years, especially ever since Trump became president. But the nature of this involvement and, especially, the US response to this presence is very different than during the Cold War period (Dannreuther, 2019).
3. For a discussion of the rise of Christian Zionism in the United States see, for example, Clark (2007), Goldman (2018), and Spector (2009).
4. Pew Research Center, January, 2018, "Republicans and Democrats Grow Even Further Apart in Views of Israel, Palestinians."
5. See Cavari and Freedman (2018) for an empirical illustration of Cohen's *d* as a measure of polarization and a discussion of alternative measures.

3

POSITIVE AFFECT IN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL

We began our book with a statement—Americans have an exceptionally favorable view of Israel. In Chapter 2, we demonstrated empirically that this favorable view of the American public is an exception when compared to public opinion worldwide (comparing to countries for which data are available). Available surveys suggest that Americans have a more favorable view of Israel than people in any other country. And when asked about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Americans overwhelmingly sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians—a rate that is not only exceptional in its level of support compared to all countries, but also very different from a select list of comparable countries (OECD countries, European countries, and other developed countries), where opinion about Israel is more balanced or partial to the Palestinians.

In this chapter, we examine a second aspect that makes American attitudes toward Israel unique. Here we compare what Americans think of Israel compared to what they think of several other countries. How do attitudes that Americans have toward Israel compare to their attitudes toward other countries? Which countries elicit positive emotions among Americans, which elicit negative ones, and where is Israel placed on the scale of positive-negative emotions? And how have these views changed over time?

Following an extant body of research, we argue that this comparison is important because Americans compensate for their lack of knowledge about foreign affairs by relying on "gut" beliefs and feelings about countries, which serve as an "affect" heuristic shortcut (Page & Bouton, 2006; Gries, 2014). In this case, a favorable view of Israel may assist them in developing their attitudes about a wide range of issue regarding Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lacking sufficient information about the conflict, people may rely on their affect toward Israel when evaluating complex policy questions regarding Israel. It is therefore important that we establish

the extent to which Americans have a favorable view of Israel to understand better their attitudes toward Israel.

Our goal here is a simple one: To demonstrate that Americans have a favorable view of Israel more than they do toward most other countries, and especially Israel's rival countries and foreign entities. Using data on views of Americans on numerous countries over time, we examine how exceptional Americans' affect toward Israel is within the American public mind. We then provide a theoretical discussion of the role of affect in determining attitudes. We conclude with a discussion of the possible sources of this favorability and test them empirically using a survey we administered in 2017. In Chapter 7, we return to the role of affect and empirically examine its effect on Americans' policy preferences toward Israel.

Feelings of Americans Toward Israel, in Comparative Perspective

We begin with an investigation of two longitudinal series—holding a favorable view of Israel and seeing Israel as an ally or friend (rather than unfriendly or an enemy). These two series have three empirical advantages for measuring beliefs and feelings toward Israel. First, the questions ask about general views of Israel that are not connected to a conflict or, at least not directly, to US foreign policy. Second, the questions present no cost to expressing a positive view of Israel. There is no "other side" that is affected by having a favorable view of Israel. One can have a favorable view of Israel and simultaneously have a favorable view of other countries or entities. Similarly, one can see Israel as an ally and have similar views of other countries in the region. Third, the two questions are asked about a range of countries and therefore allow us to compare attitudes of Americans toward Israel to attitudes toward other countries.

We examine each series separately for Israel and then compare them to trends in attitudes toward other countries. For both series of questions—favorability and ally/friend—we include all available data asking about Israel and about other countries over time. By taking a longitudinal approach, we avoid possible bias due to events and measurement error.

Both series suggest that public affect toward Israel is high and has increased over time. Moreover, we show that in comparison to views of most other countries, Americans hold strong positive feelings toward Israel. This is especially true when compared to attitudes of Americans toward Israel's adversaries.

Favorability

Survey items assessing Americans' favorability toward Israel offer a rich dataset, capturing their overall "gut" feelings toward Israel.[1] The series is based on a recurring survey question asking Americans whether they have a favorable view

of Israel. The most commonly worded version of this question offers four possible responses: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of . . . Israel?" Alternatively, a less frequent version of this question offers two possible responses: "Do you generally have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the following countries . . . Israel?" From 1989 to 2019, 59 surveys ask one of these questions about Israel. Only three surveys explicitly offered the choice of item nonresponse—"don't know" or "no opinion"—but all surveys recorded these voluntary responses.

To generate a comparable time-series, we recoded all responses to a two-category scale—favorable and unfavorable views—and treated all voluntary responses as nonresponse (and as we show later, nonresponse in all surveys is generally low). For each survey, we calculated the percent of respondents favoring Israel and the percent of respondents not favoring Israel (both are calculated from the total respondents, including all versions of nonresponse). We plot these results in Figure 3.1. Markers represent percentages in a single survey, using



FIGURE 3.1 Favorability Toward Israel, 1989–2019

Note: *N* = 63,184 in 59 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.4.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (57 surveys) and national registered voters (2).

Polling organizations include Gallup (34), ABC/WP (5), CBS/NYT (5), ORC (5) and others, each with fewer surveys (10 overall).

different markers to distinguish between four-category items (dots) and two-category items (diamonds). Full markers represent favorable opinion. Hollow markers represent unfavorable opinion. Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines across all surveys—for favorable views (dark line) and unfavorable views (light line).

The series begins with a small margin between favorable and unfavorable attitudes—both hovering around the 50 percent mark. Over time, Americans have come to voice more favorable views of Israel, reaching over 70 percent in recent years. Negative attitudes are significantly lower, declining from roughly 40 percent in 1989 to 20–30 percent by 2019. The rate of nonresponse (not displayed in the figure) is relatively stable, with a mean of 9.51 percent (SD = 7.45). This suggests that most Americans are opinionated about Israel and have a clear view of the country, a view that is increasingly positive.

To assess how this favorability compares to the views of Americans toward other nations, we examine the trends of the same question about other countries and international organizations. In total, available surveys reference 53 countries/organizations. But many of these countries/organizations are not asked frequently enough for longitudinal assessment. In order to avoid bias caused by occasional spikes in favorability—high or low—due to specific events or measurement error, we examine only countries with sufficient survey data. Our cutoff is an empirically objective one: Countries that appear in the median number of surveys (11) or more. Twenty-seven countries satisfy this criterion, appearing in 208 surveys since 1989 (the starting point for Israel),[2] including a total of 846 survey questions.

As in the case of Israel, we pool together all questions asking the favorability questions—including surveys using two- or four-scale responses—and calculate the percent of favorable and unfavorable attitudes. Comparing the mean percentage of favorable responses toward each country using the two-scale items and the four-scale items, we find no significant difference [$t(46) = -0.73$, $p = 0.468$], and the two series are highly correlated ($R = .88$, $p = .000$). Thus, pooling these responses together is empirically justified.

In Figure 3.2 we plot the percent of favorable attitudes toward each of the 27 countries/organizations in our data. Here, hollow dots represent the annual average of favorable attitudes toward each country, so that all countries are plotted on the same scale. The countries are sorted in descending order based on the overall mean level of favorability of each country. The countries rated the highest appear in the top-left corner. Overall favorability decreases from left to right, top to bottom.

Of the 27 countries, Israel is seventh in overall favorability. The two countries ranked the highest in terms of public favorability are Canada and Great Britain. These two countries share strong historical, cultural, and strategic ties with the United States. The United States and Canada are both former colonies of Great Britain. The three countries are English-speaking countries—the only ones in



FIGURE 3.2 Americans' Comparative Favorability Toward International Actors

Note: *N* = 227,759 in 846 surveys (208 survey questions).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.4.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (205 surveys) and national registered voters (3).

Polling organizations include Gallup (101), PSRA/SRBI (49), ABC/WP (14), ORC (8), CBS/NYT (6), Transnational Trends (6) and others, each with fewer surveys (30 overall).

the entire dataset. They also have a strong common cultural foundation. Strategically, these countries share similar interests and have often formed military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Canada is also one of the only two countries in the world that share a physical border with the United States (the other one, Mexico, is ninth). Moreover, the term "the special relationship," which often refers to US-Israel relations, was originally used to describe the relationship between the United States and Great Britain—an alignment that goes back over decades and has intensified in the modern era through two world wars (on the special relationship between Canada and the United States, see Haglund, 2009; Kirton, 1994; on Great Britain, see Baylis, 1997; Burk, 2009; Dumbrell, 2006, 2009).

Following Britain and Canada are Germany and Japan. These two countries share a complicated history with the United States in modern times, yet currently enjoy high American favorability. Both countries were enemies of the United States during World War II but subsequently went through an American-led process of democratization, received significant US aid and served as important military posts during the Cold War (Dumbrell & Schäfer, 2009; Gatzke, 1980; Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2003). The two countries still harbor the largest permanent military bases outside the United States (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 7).

The third group of countries includes France, India and Israel. These three countries enjoy high favorability among Americans and are closest to the first tier of countries. That Israel is so high up in the list is testament to the strong positive affect Americans feel toward Israel. We explore the reasons Americans may hold Israel in such high regard later in the chapter. As for France and India, the affinity toward France could be attributed to its strategic alliance with the United States in WWII, NATO and the Cold War, and later in Afghanistan and its war on terror (Davis, 2003). India has also been a strong American ally in Asia, especially since the end of the Cold War; it is the only democracy in its region and has often been a victim of terrorism (Bertsch, Gahlaut, & Srivastava, 2013).

Closing the top line of countries/organizations are the United Nations and Mexico. The first receives large support from the United States and is hosted in New York City. The second is a neighboring country sharing a border with the United States and strong economic ties. Both foreign entities enjoy relatively positive attitudes among the American public but little stability in that support.

The middle row includes nine countries and organizations that hover around—above or below—the 50 percent line, representing a relative split in public opinion about them. Americans have no clear animosity toward these entities, but no clear favorability either. This group include American competitors (and at times, rivals) on the global stage such as USSR/Russia and China.

Finally, the final row includes mostly Arab and Muslim countries—the majority of which are Israeli adversaries. It also includes American enemies such as Cuba and North Korea, both of which the United States had no official diplomatic relations with for most if not all of the period examined.

It is worthwhile to note that when we limit the data to the surveys that distinguish between levels of affinity and focus on the percent of respondents who view each country *very* favorably, Israel is ranked third among all countries (overall means: Canada = 45%; Great Britain = 39%; Israel = 20%), passing Japan (19%), Germany (18%), France (16%) and India (11%). We are hesitant, however, to rely on such data except for anecdotal evidence because it relies on more limited survey data and because we have less confidence in the ability of the wording of this question to accurately distinguish between levels of personal affinity.

In sum, Israel enjoys high favorability ratings among Americans, although not the highest. The few countries that bypass Israel in public favorability are some of the United States' closest allies, strategically, historically and culturally. As we move down the list, we discover that Israel is ranked higher than some other American allies—South Korea, for example—but more importantly, higher than all American adversaries and enemies in this period. Perhaps, most significant, is that Israel's own enemies are ranked far below Israel. Egypt and Jordan

stand out as two Arab/Muslim countries that enjoy slightly more favorable attitudes than their Arab and Muslim counterparts. Incidentally, these are the only two Arab countries that have a peace agreement with Israel, an agreement in which the United States was strongly involved in promoting (Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994) and that resulted in American economic and military investments in them.

American Allies

Following Gries (2014), we use a second operational measure of affect that measures how close of a friend/ally Americans view Israel. The wording of this question is as follows: "For each of the following countries, please say whether you consider it an ally of the United States, friendly but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States . . . Israel." If Americans feel a strong positive affect toward Israel, we expect it to be expressed in seeing Israel as a friendly country rather than an enemy. The findings in this section confirm our expectation and echo the results from the previous section.

Between 1977 and 2018, 53 surveys assessed Americans' response to this question on Israel. We examine the trend toward Israel in Figure 3.3. Similar to



FIGURE 3.3 From Friend to Ally

Note: *N* = 62,192 in 53 surveys (national adults).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include Harris (34), Gallup (7), ORC (5) and others, each with fewer surveys (5 overall).

the favorability series, an overwhelming and stable majority view Israel positively—either as an ally or friend. The data also suggest that over time, especially since the turn of the century, more Americans see Israel as an ally. This is an important change. Prior to 2001, Israel was more likely to be seen as a friend (mean = 39%, black hollow circles) than an ally (mean = 32%, black solid dots). Toward the late 1990s, the two categories converged to similar levels and by 2001, the two flipped. Since 2001, more Americans view Israel as an ally (mean = 43%) than as a friend (mean = 32%). The events of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, had a significant effect on how Americans view foreign policy (Berinsky, 2009; Holsti, 2004, 2011). For many Americans, a change toward Israel occurred as well—support for Israel in this period increased significantly (Cavari & Freedman, 2019), and now more than ever, Israel is considered by a majority of Americans as an ally.

To examine how these views fare in a comparative perspective, we follow the same procedure we applied to the favorability series. Over a similar period of time, Americans have been asked to rate the friendliness of 50 different countries. As before, we analyze only countries with a sufficiently large enough number of observations—27 countries (with a minimum of 10 data points, the median number of surveys per country). We plot the results in Figure 3.4. We



FIGURE 3.4 American Allies

Note: *N* = 141,401 in 123 surveys (523 survey questions).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.4.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (121 surveys) and national registered voters (2).

Polling organizations include Harris (47), Gallup (27), CBS/NYT (18), ORC (9), SSRS (8) and others, each with fewer surveys (14 overall).

use a stacked bar chart to plot the percentage of respondents who view each country as an ally or a friend. The stacked bar chart allows us to separate between the two slightly different categories—ally (dark gray bars) and friend (light gray bars)—and to assess the overall positive ratings of each country (the combined level of the two bars).

Similar to their status in the favorability series, Canada and Great Britain are the two top-ranked countries, with a majority of respondents consistently citing these two countries as allies and reaching almost 100% when including the "friend" category. The next group of countries closely resembles those found in Figure 3.2: Australia (insufficient data for favorability), Mexico, Germany, Japan, France, and Israel. A large majority of Americans view these countries as an ally/friend, though usually the "friend" category is larger (excluding, of course, Israel in recent years, and perhaps Australia, where they are roughly the same size). Closer to the 50 percent mark, we find a similar group of countries as before, and at the very bottom are once again mostly Arab/Muslim countries and North Korea.

Tiers of Affect

Our comparative analyses of descriptive trends reveal the positive affect that Americans feel toward a range of countries, measured with two longitudinal survey questions—favorability and US ally. These data show that Israel enjoys a strong positive affect when compared to most countries—but not all—and especially compared to its adversaries in the region. Nevertheless, the descriptive approach does not provide a clear empirical test of which group Israel belongs to. How special are Americans' views of Israel?

To examine this, we use a rigorous empirical method that divides the countries examined here into tiers of affect. Existing research, both on domestic and foreign politics, demonstrate the tendency of Americans to divide the political world into in-groups and out-groups, for example, along racial lines or in regard to immigration (Kinder & Kam, 2010; Wright & Citrin, 2011; Wright, Levy, & Citrin, 2016). We apply this logic to the international arena to analyze how Americans divide the countries into in-groups and out-groups. The closest tier should include countries that enjoy an especially favorable rating in the American mind. Further removed tiers should comprise countries that do not receive such positive ratings.

We use *k*-means clustering to test how different countries are grouped together in the American mind into tiers of affect. *K*-means clustering is a form of unsupervised machine-learning in which standardized observations are grouped together into clusters that minimize the within-group variation and maximize the between-group variation. To estimate such a model, this method requires aggregate level data in every year of measurement for all observations, which are not as readily available for the ally item as they are for

favorability. We therefore estimate our model on a subset of the favorability data for which we have more complete data, relying on 162 surveys conducted between 1999–2019 of the same 27 countries analyzed earlier.[3]

The first step in this process is to empirically determine the number of clusters that best fits the data. To avoid an arbitrary definition, we rely on the gap statistic (Tibshirani, Walther, & Hastie, 2001), which recommends four clusters to our data. We then use bootstrapping of 500 samples to identify the clusters of countries based on their longitudinal favorability ratings.[4] Countries that cluster together share minimal variance among them but maximal variance compared to countries that are classified into other clusters.

One way to present the results is to plot the spherical relationship between and within clusters. The different clusters can be identified based on their relative location and the polygon surrounding them. These clusters represent tiers of affect. The clusters closer to the top of the figure represent the countries



FIGURE 3.5 Clustering American Attitudes Toward International Actors

Note: Clusters of countries based on Americans' favorability ratings in 162 surveys (1999–2019). Clusters identified using a *k*-means clustering algorithm (bootstrapping for 500 samples). The number of clusters—four—is determined by the gap statistic (Tibshirani et al., 2001). Model estimated using the packages cluster and factoextra in R (Kassambara & Mundt, 2019; Maechler et al., 2019).

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

that are part of a tier of countries enjoying the highest favorability ratings. As we move down the figure, we move further out into tiers that have weaker favorability ratings. The size of the polygon represents the variation of each tier. A smaller polygon indicates smaller variability. Countries close to each other show weaker differences in public affinity.

The results of the clustering procedure reveal a very small cluster at the top of the scale consisting of only four countries: Canada, Great Britain, Germany and Japan. These are the countries that enjoy the highest levels of favorability and are markedly different from all others. Countries in the first tier cluster, have been described as countries that have a special relationship with the United States: Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan (Dumbrell & Schäfer, 2009; Dumbrell, 2006; Gatzke, 1980; Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2003). Contrary to our expectations, Israel is the only "special relationship" country (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998; Bass, 2004; Freedman, 2012; Lewis, 1999; Reich, 1984) to appear in the second tier. Other countries and organizations in the second tier have an important strategic relationship with the United States—France, South Korea (the third largest military presence outside of the United States; Department of Defense, 2018), NATO, EU, Mexico, Egypt, Turkey and India. The countries in this cluster each enjoy high ratings, but not the highest. Variation within this cluster is large, and three countries are clearly placed at the top of the cluster, verging on the first tier: France, India and Israel.

The remaining two clusters of countries represent those that Americans exclude from their closest circles. The third cluster consists of America's two most powerful adversaries—Russia and China. Saudi Arabia also appears here, as does Cuba. This cluster represents countries for which Americans have a slightly negative attitude, with ratings falling near to or just below the 50 percent line. Although attitudes toward Saudi Arabia are negative, it is important to note that they are more positive than most Arab/Muslim countries, enough for Saudi Arabia not to be included with the lowest tier cluster. Saudi Arabia has cooperated with the United States in recent years and has allowed the United States to establish military bases for use in the war in Iraq. It has also been helpful in containing Iranian power in the region (Chubin & Tripp, 2014). As expected, the lowest cluster includes most Arab/Muslim countries and North Korea. The tier of countries that have the weakest positive affect (and because of the structure of the survey item, the strongest negative affect) are some of the United States' and Israel's staunchest adversaries in recent years.

The Importance of Affect for Understanding American Public Opinion Toward Israel

That Americans have a positive affect toward Israel, among the highest globally and considerably higher than its adversaries, can have significant implications for public preferences. Questions concerning foreign affairs are complex, and

Americans are not sufficiently informed to systematically form their opinion about them (Converse, 1964; Delli-Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Holsti, 2004; Lupia, 2016). This is especially true regarding Israel. The American public is routinely asked who is responsible for an episodic eruption of violence between Israel and a particular Arab nation or the Palestinians, which of the two sides is more justified in their use of force or how the United States should react to these events. These difficult questions require a great deal of knowledge or, in the likely absence of knowledge, the ability to rely on heuristic shortcuts that may aid them in formulating an opinion.

A rich body of literature, spanning the fields of political science, economics and psychology, has explored the role of heuristic shortcuts in decision making. Heuristic shortcuts aid people when faced with complex decisions involving a great deal of uncertainty and limited resources to reduce uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The affect heuristic introduces the role of emotions in human cognition when evaluating alternatives and making decisions. Used extensively in the analysis of risk vs. reward (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), as well as in psychological experiments (e.g., Abelson, 1963; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Fazio, 2001), these studies suggest that when experiencing positive emotions toward an object, people tend to attribute a greater importance to its potential benefit over its possible risk. When experiencing negative emotions, the opposite might be true. For instance, people may be persuaded of the virtues of a particular car based on how good it looks to them—its size, its appealing color, its sturdiness, finish, etc. People judge objects based on the "gut" feeling of goodness or badness that they associate with it.

Several studies apply affect to political scenarios as well. In their seminal study, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) demonstrate the role of heuristics in the political choices of ordinary citizens and identify affect, dubbed likeability, as an important shortcut in the face of scarce political attention (see also Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003), for example, in voting decisions (Lodge & Stroh, 1993). In deciding whether to vote for a particular candidate, questions relating to her professional experience or policy positions and the extent to which one agrees with her, might be replaced with less-demanding questions about how voters feel toward the candidate. Heuristics of this type simplify the question by substituting it with questions such as "do I like the candidate?" (Kahneman, 2011; Lodge & Taber, 2005). This substitution serves as a shortcut for deciding which candidate to vote for.

This line of research has extended to the analysis of foreign policy attitudes as well. Page and Bouton (2006) demonstrate that feelings of Americans toward foreign countries and foreign leaders often serve as important elements, or shortcuts, in their foreign policy belief systems. Countries seen as hostile or threatening to the United States engender cold feelings and tend to be regarded

as appropriate objects of wary preparedeness, economic sanctions or even military attack. Countries that Americans believe to be friendly elicit warm feelings and are viewed as suitable alliance partners, recipients of foreign aid and providers of US military bases. Gries (2014) further demonstrates that a person's view of foreign countries serves as a mediator between political ideology and foreign policy preferences—a model we will return to in Chapter 7.

Reasons for the Positive Affect Toward Israel

We have demonstrated here that Americans feel a strong positive affect toward Israel and that this affect is high compared to most other countries (that Americans are asked about). These analyses present an end result but do not explain the causes of affect. Why do they have a positive affect? We identify seven reasons that are commonly referred to in existing literature and in popular discussion and examine empirical evidence for them using an original survey that asks Americans why they have a favorable view of Israel.

Shared Cultural Values

The United States and Israel share at least three important cultural aspects (Bickerton, 2009). First, both countries were established as immigrant countries, and Americans view Israel in solidarity as a sister-immigrant-based country (Daniels, 2002; Mead, 2008). Second, the military plays a very important role in both countries, not just politically but culturally. Soldiers are highly revered in both countries, and the military is often a source for social mobility (e.g. Broom & Smith, 1963; Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999; Segal, Bachman, & Dowdell, 1978). Moreover, Americans have a feeling of respect toward Israel as a small yet powerful military nation facing—and often overcoming—grave security threats and view Israel as a fighting society where individual liberal pursuits are not compromised by frequent military call-ups (Mitelpunkt, 2018). They may even identify with Israel in this respect, considering how the first 13 colonies were able to defeat the British Empire, the greatest empire at the time (Mead, 2008). Third, both people have a history of considering themselves as unique—American exceptionalism (e.g., Lipset, 1996) and Jews as the chosen people.[5]

Shared Religious Values

Israel is unique in the world in terms of religion—no other country exists as a Jewish country or has a Jewish majority. For some Americans, Israel's existence as a Jewish state is especially significant. Many Protestant Christians, specifically born-again evangelical Christians, view a Jewish state of Israel in a very positive light. For them, the establishment of a Jewish state is part of a broader religious

narrative in anticipating the second coming of Christ (Goldman, 2018; Marsden, 2013; Mayer, 2004; Mead, 2008; Spector, 2009). In Chapter 5, we demonstrate how evangelicals differ from other religious groups in their attitudes toward Israel. Additionally, despite significant constitutional differences between the two countries, the people in both countries consider themselves to be very religious—far more than in most Western democracies (Theodorou, 2015). The shared importance of religion that the people in both countries feel may contribute to the positive affect of the American public toward Israel.

Shared Political Values

Americans and Israelis have a different political culture, but they share some core values, especially when contrasted to Israel's neighbors. Israel was established as a liberal, secular democracy, and its citizens enjoy a high level of freedom compared to many other countries. These concepts are extremely important in American political culture and in explaining the affinity of Americans toward Israel (Mansour, 1994; Melman & Raviv, 1994; Thomas, 2007). Israel's democratic regime stands in stark contrast to the authoritarian regimes in most Arab/Muslim countries of the Middle East. In fact, if we compare the annual favorability toward the 23 states in Figure 3.2 (excluding non-state actors: the UN, NATO, EU and PLO/PNA) to measures of liberal democracy for the same group of countries, we find strong positive correlations. Specifically, there is a strong positive correlation between the annual level of American favorability toward these countries and the Freedom House (2018) civil liberties indicator ($r = 0.87$, $p < 0.001$), the Freedom House political rights indicator ($r = 0.82$, $p < 0.001$) and the V-dem (Coppedge et al., 2018) liberal democracy indicator ($r = 0.82$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, Americans' feeling of affect is likely stronger for countries that score higher on indicators of liberal democracy and weaker for those who score lower on these indicators.

Shared Strategic Interests

Israel is an important ally of the United States, and the two countries share strong military ties (Eisenstadt & Pollock, 2012; Freilich, 2018; Lewis, 1999; Melman & Raviv, 1994; Organski, 1990; Reich, 1984). During the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict was viewed as a theater of the war where the US-backed Israel fought the Soviet-backed Arab countries. During this period, Israel was not only associated with the American West in its battle with communism but at times was also an important asset. For example, in 1970, Jordan used military forces against Palestinian refugees who had become a problem for Jordanian sovereignty. In response, Syrian forces entered Jordan, and Jordan turned to the United States for assistance. The United States, too deeply involved in Vietnam at the time, asked Israel to assist. Israel in turn, moved forces along the Syrian

border as a signal to Syria, which ultimately retreated from Jordan (Garfinkle, 1985).

In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, the United States aided Israel, and Israel was commended for its endurance of Iraqi missiles and its patience in letting the United States solve the conflict (Collins, 2019; Mahnken, 2011). Some even suggested that had Israel not acted unilaterally in 1981 to destroy Iraqi nuclear reactors (Operation Opera), the United States would have had a much tougher time in 1991 (Tamsett, 2004). Finally, following 9/11 and the war on terror, many Americans see Israel in solidarity given its experience with terrorism. Despite no official defense treaty between the two countries, there is a great deal of military cooperation between the two, from joint military exercises and shared intelligence to the co-development of military equipment such as Iron Dome (the missile-defense system in place to protect Israeli citizens from rockets launched from the Gaza strip; see Freilich, 2018). These examples illustrate Israel's loyalty and value as a strategic ally, which Americans appreciate (Page & Bouton, 2006).

Pro-Israel Lobby

A common and controversial theme in American political culture is that Israel enjoys strong pro-Israeli sentiments because of an influential pro-Israeli lobby (Bard, 1991; Fleshler, 2009; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009; Rynhold, 2010). This argument, however, focuses on the effect of the pro-Israeli lobby on US policy rather than on American public opinion. In fact, it is unlikely that the lobby influences public opinion. The pro-Israel lobby is often criticized for having too much influence on American policies (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009), and Americans are traditionally suspicious of powerful lobbies (Rosenthal, 2000). If anything, Americans view Israel favorably in spite of a strong pro-Israel lobby, and those who view Israel in a negative light because of a powerful lobby are, in fact, a minority (Bickerton, 2009; Thomas, 2007). Based on seven surveys from 1981 to 2002, roughly a third of Americans think Israel has too much influence over American foreign policy (on average, 38%)[6] as do pro-Israel groups (35%).[7] But these percentages are in fact quite low. In comparison, recent polls suggest the American public attributes far more influence to other lobbying groups. For example, according to a 2011 survey, 84 percent of the public felt political lobbyists in general had too much influence over Washington, and 55 percent felt labor unions had too much influence.[8] In 2018, 52 percent felt the NRA had too much influence.[9]

American Jewry

As for American Jews, people who are themselves Jewish or have acquaintances who are Jewish might be more inclined to view Israel favorably. But American Jews are a small minority in the United States. Estimates range from 1–2.5% of

the population (Pew Research Center, 2013; United States Census Bureau, 2018), and so it is unlikely for this to be a major influence on the opinions of the majority of Americans. An argument that Americans have a pro-Israeli sentiment because of the Jewish religious minority is plausible yet seems to have little theoretical value.

Business Relations

Finally, business relations with Israel may also positively impact Americans' views toward Israel (Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012). The US-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was the first US FTA to enter into force (US International Trade Administration, 2011). Perspectives influenced by business relations may also relate to Israel's status as a start-up nation with a booming high-tech industry. Many Israelis find work in the United States, particularly in this field. And many American companies—Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Google, Intel and others—have development centers in Israel. This may contribute to the positive interaction between people from the two countries and might help foster an image of a self-sustaining, innovative country that many Americans may appreciate.

Examining How Americans Justify Their Support for Israel

We examine empirically the theoretical explanations for supporting Israel, using an original survey from May 2017 ($N = 705$). The survey, conducted as a two-wave panel study via the Amazon MTurk platform, was devoted to examining American attitudes toward Israel during President Trump's visit to Israel (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of important changes since Trump's election). Respondents were asked about their favorability toward Israel. Fifty-eight percent had a favorable opinion of Israel. Respondents who reported a favorable opinion toward Israel were then presented with an open-ended follow-up question asking them to explain why they felt that way. The advantage of the open-ended question is that it allows respondents to justify their opinion however they choose; therefore, responses are not likely to be biased by the survey instrument and they may even include additional categories than those presented in multi-choice items.

We classified responses into categories that correspond to the theoretical explanations detailed earlier and recorded the percent of responses that referenced each category. Because the categories are not mutually exclusive and some responses referenced more than one category (for example: "They have been an *ally of the US* for a while and are also trying to combat international *terrorism*," emphasis added), the sum of percentages is greater than 100 percent. We plot the categorized responses in Figure 3.6 based on 690 responses from both waves of the study. Each bar represents the percent of responses that referenced a particular category.



FIGURE 3.6 Reasons for Having a Favorable View of Israel

Note: *N* = 690, national adult survey conducted by the authors in May 2017, using the mTurk platform.

First, note at the bottom of the figure the high percentage of responses that expressed a general affinity toward Israel and/or did not provide an explanation for their preference at all—56 percent. This may be evidence of a "gut" feeling of favorability toward Israel, without having a specific explanation for it. Some responses explicitly demonstrate it, for instance, "I am not sure really. I guess it is just something we Americans are born into thinking" or "I am not sure. that's my gut feeling." Of course, it may also suggest that some respondents have a difficult time answering this open-ended question, and it is impossible to distinguish the two. Note that 14 percent explain that they can't think of anything negative about Israel. This is an interesting response that may require further investigation into how affect operates in political behavior and foreign policy—perhaps Americans have a generally positive disposition toward most countries, and this weakens based on the availability (another important heuristic) of negative associations. One response seems to suggest this is the case: "No one should be considered an enemy until proven."

Of the substantive categories, Israel's role as an important strategic and loyal ally to the United States is by far the most frequent reason people provide (51%) for favorable views of Israel. Another large category, shared democratic values

and the belief that Israel strives for peace, is referenced in 28 percent of responses. Religious justifications—either personal Christian beliefs or statements that Jews are the chosen people—are next (19%), closely followed by respect towards Israel's military success in the face of war and the shared threat of terrorism (15%). Finally, Jewish history, business and trade considerations and the positive role of American Jews are the weakest reasons (8%, 4% and 3%, respectively). The reason dubbed American Jews refers either to respondents who cite that they themselves are Jewish as a reason for their favorable attitude or to people who have Jewish friends. It is clear that this is a reason for favorable attitudes only among a small share of Americans. Much more frequent are the reasons of shared strategic interests, war and terrorism, shared democratic values and religious considerations.

The findings here are suggestive. They are based on only one sample, during a presidential trip to Israel that emphasized the strong relationship between the two countries. Additionally, although widely used in social science research, mTurk samples cannot be treated as sufficiently representative.[10] Specifically, we found that our mTurk sample is representative on most demographic divides, but it is politically skewed toward respondents identified as Democrats. Given that our primary argument in this book is that Americans are increasingly divided along partisan lines, we should be especially cautious in generalizing to the entire population from a sample that is politically biased.[11] Despite these limitations, the survey provides some information about how Americans view and justify their views of Israel. While this is an important issue to investigate further, we do not claim to answer it in the book. Our objective is to examine overall and group trends in public attitudes toward Israel, not to examine the causes for these attitudes.

Conclusion

Our data suggest that two prominent features of American public opinion are true for Israel. Americans have a strong positive affect toward Israel and see it as a close ally and friend. Though some countries are ranked higher than Israel, in both respects, Israel's high ranking is nonetheless important and relatively unique. It is higher than most countries, and most of Israel's own adversaries are ranked at the very bottom in Americans eyes. Israel's history as a close and loyal American ally—one that shares many strategic interests with the United States and has experienced many similar threats of war and terrorism—has earned it a place in the public eye that is far closer to the American in-group than the out-group. Its democratic nature coupled with its religious significance contribute to this view as well.

These findings lay the foundations for the remainder of the book. It provides a backdrop to the strong support that Americans express toward Israel by reminding the reader of the strong "gut" feeling Americans have toward Israel. This

will be explored further in the next chapters. The current chapter examined the extent to which Americans like Israel, while Chapter 4 examines the extent to which they support Israel, in what ways they support it and what the limits of this support are. In Chapters 5 and 6, we will return to the favorability measure of affect to assess the demographic and political sources of this positive affect, as well as other measures of support for Israel. In Chapters 7 and 8, we move affect to the other side of our causal model—testing how well affect explains variation in a wide range of measures of support for Israel and whether it mediates the emerging partisan gap.

Notes

1. Thermometer ratings, like we used in Figure 2.1, are another excellent measure of affect. Unfortunately, survey data using thermometer ratings of Israel specifically and of various other international actors more broadly are not as frequently asked in the last three decades as favorability. We therefore do not analyze thermometer ratings in this chapter.
2. This is the starting point for most countries, and it excludes a single observation for only six countries: Great Britain (1951), France (1954), Cuba (1977), Japan (1978), China (1985) and the UN (1988). Results remain unchanged when these observations are included in the figure.
3. Unfortunately, going further back reduces the number of countries with sufficient data. Even in this period, however, some countries may have missing data for some years. In such instances, we plug in the average rating for a country with missing data. Results remain unchanged when using methods for *k*-means clustering on partial data without plugging in values for missing data points (Displayr, 2017). They also remain unchanged when estimating the model only on the last decade (2010–2019), so it is unlikely that temporal developments are of importance here.
4. We estimate our model using the packages "cluster" and "factoextra" in R (Kassambara & Mundt, 2019; Maechler, Rousseeuw, Struyf, Hubert, & Hornik, 2019).
5. The Israel Democracy Institute and the AVI CHAI Israel Foundation. 2009. A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews.
6. CBS News/New York Times. September 22–27, 1981. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT.092881.29B. ABC News/Washington Post. March 30–April 3, 1989. Roper question ID: USABCWP.89APR.R45. ABC News, September 13–15, 1991. Roper question ID: USABC.091691.R29. Gallup Organization. September 26–29, 1991. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.222017.Q05. CBS News/New York Times. October 5–7, 1991. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT.101091.R53. New York Times. April 15–20, 1998. Roper question ID: USNYT.98004B.Q63. CBS News. April 1–2, 2002. Roper question ID: USCBS.040302.R20.
7. CBS News/New York Times. October 1–3, 1988. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT. 888810A.Q20. Associated Press/Media General. January 4–12, 1989. Roper question ID: USAPMGEN.24–2.RB10. Marttila & Kiley. April 29–May 1, 1992. Roper question ID: USMARTIL.ANTSEM.Q114.
8. Harris Interactive. April 12–18, 2011. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.060111.R1D.
9. Social Science Research Solutions. March 8–13, 2018. Roper question ID: USSSRS.032318K.R06A.

10. See discussion in Berinsky et al. (2012), Huff and Tingley (2015), Lewis, Djupe, Mockabee, and Su-Ya Wu (2015), and Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese (2015).
11. In most demographic respects, the sample is largely representative with some expected deviations: 51% of respondents were female, 13% below the age of 24, 39% aged 25–44, 31% aged 45–64, 17% aged 65 or older, 13% African-American, 19% Hispanic, 62% white, 26% Protestant, 17% Catholic, 2% Jewish, 44% no religion, 17% identified as born-again or evangelical, 20% sampled from the Northeast, 18% from the Midwest, 37% from the South and 25% from the West. It is not, however, politically representative as 56% identify as Democrats, only 26% as Republicans and 17% as independents.

4

ATTITUDES ABOUT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND US INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION

In the previous chapter, we examined questions that ask Americans about their general attitudes toward Israel: Do they have a favorable view of Israel, and do they see Israel as an ally or friend? We treated these questions as a measure of affect. We showed that Americans have a positive affect toward Israel, an affect that is comparable to some of the United States' strongest allies. This, we argue, is an important element in the special relationship between the United States and Israel, a relationship that is untenable without a favorable public opinion. Yet when assessing attitudes about Israel, we need to consider a wider range of attitudes about Israel that also includes the views of Americans about the Arab-Israeli conflict and US involvement in the conflict and the region.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict, on its myriad appearances, is a dominant issue in the public discourse about Israel (Rynhold, 2015)—it is overwhelmingly covered by the US media (Yarchi, Cavari, & Pindyck, 2017), it is repeatedly discussed by political elites (Cavari & Nyer, 2014) and on campaign trails (Cavari & Freedman, 2017), and it draws much attention and involvement of the US government (Quandt, 2010; Ross, 2004). It is therefore important to assess how Americans view the conflict. Which side in the conflict do Americans support? How do Americans see the use of force by Israel and its contemporary rivals? How do Americans view the peace negotiations and the prospects of peace? How do Americans view and support US diplomatic, military and economic involvement in the conflict and the region? And how have these attitudes developed over time as the conflict and American involvement in the region have both unfolded?

The views of Americans about the conflict may have an important effect on US foreign policy in the region. An extant body of work demonstrates that

policymakers in the United States—as in other democratic governments—are as beholden to what the public wants in foreign policy as they are in domestic policy (Baum & Potter, 2008; Canes-Wrone, 2015; Sobel, 2001). Policymakers want to be seen as acting consistently with the preferences of the public lest they are not reelected (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006; Maestas, 2000, 2003; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien, 1995). Hence, the positive affect discussed in Chapter 3 is a necessary ingredient in the special relationship, and the particular views about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the United States in it set the boundaries of US foreign policy toward Israel.

Ever since the diplomatic and military struggle over Israel's independence, the United States government has had to take a side in this conflict and act upon it. Among the many considerations that each administration weighed, it seems that public opinion has often been a relevant factor, at least in justifying a position. This can be tracked to early decisions of the United States government regarding the conflict. Soon after taking office, President Truman voiced his support for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. In October 1946, following the adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London, President Truman issued a statement in support of statehood rather than limited autonomy. In the statement, he justified his position using the supportive American public sentiment (Truman, 1946).

> The British Government presented to the Conference the so-called Morrison plan for provincial autonomy and stated that the Conference was open to other proposals. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. *From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States*. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and good will. To such a solution our Government could give its support.
>
> *(emphasis added)*

Consistent with his position and against an unsupportive national security establishment and most of his top aides, President Truman supported the UN resolution that called for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states (Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly, November 29, 1947). On May 14, 1948, 11 minutes after the provisional government of Israel declared independence, President Truman, again acting unilaterally without consulting with

top State Department officials, was the first to publicly recognize the provisional government of Israel as the de facto authority of the Jewish State (Cohen, 1990; Hahn, 2004; Radosh & Radosh, 2009; Ross, 2015).

Survey data from that period indicate that President Truman's decision was consistent with the views of the American public. Table 4.1 summarizes these views using four early surveys that ask Americans if they support Jewish statehood. The surveys are spread over more than three years—during the final months of World War II (December 1944 and March 1945), during the debate over the UN partition plan (November 1947) and during Israel's War of Independence (March 1948), which erupted immediately after the UN resolution. In accordance with the course of events and the development of the conflict in the region, the wording of the questions varies considerably—responding to

TABLE 4.1 Support for Establishing a Jewish State in Israel

Date	*Question*	*Support for a State*	*Oppose*	*DK/ Refuse*
December 1944[1]	There are over a million Arabs and over a half-million Jews in Palestine. Do you think the British, who control Palestine, should do what some Jews ask and set up a Jewish state there, or should they do what some Arabs ask and not set up a Jewish state?	36%	22%	42%
March 1945[2]	The people who are urging the creation of a Jewish state believe it is the best way to save the lives of many European Jews persecuted and made homeless by the Nazis. They say that if the Jews have a national homeland they will be better able to help themselves. People opposed to the plan point out that there are already more Arabs than Jews in Palestine, that Arabs do not want the Jews in Palestine and that open conflict would probably break out. They say that anyway the creation of a Jewish state is not the best way to help the Jews. How do you feel about it—do you favor or oppose the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine?	59	19	22
October 1947[3]	The U.N. (United Nations) has recommended that Palestine be divided into two states—one for the Arabs and one for the Jews—and that 150,000 Jews be permitted now to enter the Jewish state. Do you favor or oppose this idea?	65	10	25
March 1948[4]	There has been much talk about dividing Palestine into two countries—one for the Jews and one for the Arabs. . . . At the present time, are you personally in favor of this idea or against it?	49	27	24

the request of Jews in Palestine (December 1944), considering Jewish persecution in the Holocaust (March 1945), following the UN partition plan (November 1947) or answering a simple two-state solution question (March 1948).

The course of events and the difference in wording make it difficult to assess trends or changes in public support for Jewish statehood over time. Yet the four questions demonstrate the strong public support for an independent Jewish state. First, except for the first survey, which was conducted during the war, a majority of Americans was relatively opinionated about the issue (three quarters of Americans voiced a position). Second, in all surveys, throughout the debate over the partition plan—before it passed in the United Nations and during the 1948 War of Israel's independence—the rate of support for Jewish statehood in Palestine was significantly higher than the rate of opposition.

There are several explanations for Truman's decision to support the UN resolution and to recognize Israel. These include Truman's personal relationship with American Jewish leaders, his admiration of Chaim Weizmann, his personal horror from firsthand exposure to the humanitarian crisis of post-Holocaust Jewry, and the electoral importance of key states with sizeable Jewish votes (Karabell, 2001; Ross, 2015). And yet, even if public opinion was not the main cause for his decision, it seems safe to suggest that, at a minimum, the backing of the American public made Truman's commitment possible, especially with the crucial 1948 presidential election lurking that year (Sobel, 2001).

Israeli independence all but ended the conflict. None of the Arab countries came to terms with Israel's existence. Palestinians did not establish an independent state, and, at the end of the 1948 War, Arab countries (Jordan and Egypt) and Israel controlled parts of the territory that was assigned to the Palestinians under the UN Partition Plan, and refugees fleeing from the area of Mandatory Palestine settled in provisional camps in neighboring countries. Since then, the Arab-Israeli conflict has manifested itself in wars (1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006), in numerous violent conflicts with Arab nations, militant groups in neighboring countries and in the West Bank and Gaza, and in an everlasting peace process, which generated several agreements (Egypt, 1979; Oslo Accords 1993–2000; Jordan 1994) but has yet to end the conflict.

In this and the following chapters, we are concerned with the attitudes of Americans over time about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its different manifestations. Do Americans support Israel in the conflict? Who do they blame for the conflict? How do they see the peace negotiations and the suggested solutions to the conflict? Do Americans favor American involvement in this conflict? In the present chapter, we provide a broad overview of the attitudes of Americans about the conflict by assessing a wide range of questions—including longitudinal time series data of the same questions and repeated questions on specific events. Chapters 5 and 6 take a more rigorous approach to examine the variation in public support based on demographic and political divides. We argue and demonstrate that the once consensual support across most existing demographic divides in American public, has

gradually turned into a partisan issue. In Chapter 7, we combine our focus on positive affect (discussed in Chapter 3) and attitudes about the conflict. In Chapter 8, we focus on one issue—establishing an independent Palestinian state.

We begin our discussion in this chapter with an analysis of general longitudinal series about taking a side in the conflict—which side do Americans sympathize with, to whom do they attribute blame for the conflict, and with whom they think the United States should side. Next, we analyze support for use of force in the region—by either side. We then examine attitudes of Americans about the peace process—prospects of peace and views of specific questions that are at the heart of the debate. Finally, we examine how Americans view the role of the United States in the conflict—whether they want the United States to be involved and to make diplomatic efforts, commit troops and provide foreign aid, most of which is in the form of military aid. Together, these questions offer an important image of the attitudes of Americans about the conflict. Americans overwhelmingly side with Israel and are willing to back their support with extensive funding (US aid), but they are critical of its actions and of the role that the United States plays in solving or attending to the conflict.

Table 4.2 summarizes the series included in the analysis: The number of surveys in each series, the time frame covered by the data for each series and an example of the wording of a general question in each series. A more detailed list of the surveys is included in the Appendix to the book.

TABLE 4.2 Longitudinal Series, Topline Data

Topic	*Number of Surveys*	*Years Available*	*Example Wording*
American Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict	209	1948–1949, 1956, 1967, 1969–1971, 1973–1975, 1977–1993, 1996–2019	In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?[5]
Attributing Blame for the Conflict	32	1953, 1955–1957, 1977, 1989–1990, 1997–1998, 2000–2002, 2006, 2009, 2014	Regardless of your overall feelings toward Israel and the Palestinians, who do you think is more to blame for the recent violence—Israel or the Palestinians?[6]
Who Should the United States Side With?	29	1981–1982, 1988, 1998, 2000–2004, 2006, 2008, 2013–2017	In the Middle East conflict, do you think the United States should take Israel's side, take the Palestinians' side or not take either side?[7]
Approve of the Use of Force (Israel/Arabs)	58	1956, 1981–1983, 1988–1990, 2000–2002, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2014	Do you think Israel was justified or unjustified in taking military action against Hamas and the Palestinians in the area known as Gaza?[8]

(*Continued*)

TABLE 4.2 (Continued)

Topic	*Number of Surveys*	*Years Available*	*Example Wording*
American Attitudes Regarding Prospects of Peace	28	1988, 1990–1991, 1997–2013, 2017	Do you think there will or will not come a time when Israel and the Arab nations will be able to settle their differences and live in peace?[9]
Likelihood of Israel and a Palestinian State Coexisting Peacefully	8	2013–2014, 2016–2018	Do you think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other, or not?[10]
Favoring an Independent Palestinian State	58	1977, 1979, 1981–1982, 1988–1991, 1993–1994, 1998–2003, 2009, 2011–2019	Do you favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip?[11]
Attitudes toward Israeli Settlements	7	1977, 1981–1982, 1986, 1988, 1991, 2002, 2009, 2010	Do you think it is all right for Israel to build settlements in Palestinian Territories, or do you think they should not?[12]
Support for Possible Solutions to the Jerusalem Question	7	1967, 1978, 2001–2004, 2017	Do you approve or disapprove of the Trump administration's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?[13]
Support for US Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict	32	1985, 1988, 1991, 2000–2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014	In terms of resolving the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, do you think the United States should be more involved, less involved or as involved as it currently is?[14]
Support for Deploying American Troops to Aid Israel	72	1956, 1967–1968, 1970–1971, 1973–1974, 1978–1983, 1985–1988, 1990–1991, 1993–1995, 1997–1998, 2002–2004, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2015	(There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US (United States) troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations.) Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops . . . if Arab forces invaded Israel?[15]
Support for Foreign Aid, in General and to Specific Countries	131	1950, 1955, 1957, 1971, 1973–1996, 1998–2006, 2008–2014, 2016, 2018	Thinking about the military aid the United States provides Israel for military purposes, do you think US military aid to Israel should be increased, kept the same or decreased?[16]

Choosing a Side in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict positions Israel against its contemporary rival—from Arab nations (in general) or a specific country (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon), to the Palestinian people, to the Palestinian Authority, or to specific militant groups in the West Bank and Gaza and in neighboring countries (Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad or Hezbollah). Therefore, when assessing the views of Americans about the Arab-Israeli conflict, we need to contrast the views of Israel with those of its rivals. We examine separately three such series that ask Americans to take a side: Who do Americans sympathize with? Who do Americans blame or find responsible for the conflict? And which side do Americans believe the United States should side with (if at all)?

Sympathies

A question about sympathies in the conflict was first asked by Gallup in the days leading to the United Nations vote on the partition plan in November 1947—then still between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, a territory under the British Mandate. The question asked Americans, "If war breaks out between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, which side would you sympathize with?" Americans were offered two substantial options—Jews or Arabs. Only 36 percent of respondents voiced an opinion, of which 24 percent sympathized more with the Jews and 12 percent with Arabs. Among the 64 percent who refused to take a side, 26 percent said they have no opinion, and, though not offered as a possible response, 38 percent voluntary reported that they sympathize with neither.

The question was repeated throughout the 1948 war of Israeli independence. Table 4.3 summarizes the distributions of these surveys. In most surveys, respondents were offered only the two sides in the conflict—Jews and Arabs—as valid responses. In some surveys, interviewers also coded the voluntary response of sympathizing with neither or sympathizing with both. Because these are voluntary responses and are not consistently recorded, we coded all answers of both and neither as "no opinion" and treated them as item nonresponse.

The trend is consistent. More than half of all respondents had no opinion. Of those who provided a position, more sympathized with the Jews compared to Arabs. As the war progressed, the gap between the two positions increased from about two to one to nearly three to one.

A similar question—now Israel against its contemporary rival—has been repeatedly added to surveys ever since. Although the wording of the question has changed over time and between pollsters, the basic structure is relatively constant: Asking respondents who they sympathize with in the conflict—Israel/Jews or Arabs/Arab countries/Palestinians. The question consistently pits two sides in the contemporary conflict asking respondents to choose one side or the

TABLE 4.3 Sympathies in the Conflict Over Palestine, the 1948 War of Independence

Date	*Item Wording*	*Arabs*	*Jews*	*No Opinion*
October 1947[17]	If war breaks out between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, which side would you sympathize with?	12%	24%	64%
February 1948[18]	(The United Nations has recommended that Palestine be divided between the Jews and the Arabs.) The Arabs say they will not agree to have Palestine divided, and fighting has broken out between the Jews and Arabs. Do you sympathize with the Arabs or with the Jews in this matter?	16	35	49
March 1948[19]	In the present fighting between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, which side do you sympathize with?	11	28	60
June 1948[20]	In the conflict in Palestine, do you sympathize with the Arabs or with the Jews?	14	36	51
October 1948[21]		11	33	56
March 1949[22]		13	32	55

other. Additional categories of sympathizing with both or neither are inconsistent and are mostly voluntary responses.[23]

The question has two important advantages over most questions about Israel. First, unlike the two series we examined in Chapter 3, this question asks respondents to take a side in the conflict—Israel or the contemporary rival, whether Arab countries (or a specific one), Palestinians or a non-country entity such as Hamas, Hezbollah or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This imposes a cost on one's answer—not simply to say that you have a favorable view of one side or another but that you weigh both sides and choose one over the other. This makes the question an excellent source for assessing overall views of Americans on the conflict. Second, this question is the single most asked question about any foreign entity in US polls and therefore provides an unmatched longitudinal indicator for trends in public opinion about Israel and about foreign policy more broadly (Cavari, 2013). Because of these advantages, this series is commonly examined in academic research and is commonly discussed in the news.

In Figure 4.1, we plot Americans' responses to 226 sympathies questions in 209 surveys from 1948 to 2019.[24] Each survey is marked with two markers representing the two sides in the contemporary conflict—Israel and its Arab counterpart. We plot all questions in one figure but distinguish between the identity of the Arab counterpart with different markers—generally referring to Arab nations (106 questions), Egypt (2 questions), Palestinians (105 questions), PLO (6 questions), Palestinian Authority (4 questions), Hezbollah (2 questions), and Hamas (1 question).[25]



FIGURE 4.1 Sympathies in the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict (1948–2019)

Note: *N* = 287,699 in 209 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.2.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (203 surveys) and national registered voters (6).

Polling organizations include Gallup (82), Roper (27), PSRA/SRBI (22), ABC/WP (14), Harris (14), CBS/NYT (11), and others, each with fewer surveys (39 overall).

The question was asked sporadically between 1948 and 1967—during the 1948 War of Israeli Independence and again during the 1956 War in the Sinai Peninsula. In these surveys, most Americans opted out by voicing no opinion or refusing to take a side. This is consistent with the administrations' policies at the time. Truman's and Eisenhower's administrations were both reluctant to take a side—first because of US concern that Israel would align with the Soviets (ended in 1950 when Israel sided with the United States on Korea) and then because of US attempts and interest to align with the Arab nations in the region (Druks, 2001; Ross, 2015).

Data are more frequent from 1967, allowing us to generate a local polynomial average line, which better represents the overall level of sympathies for each side. The trends from 1967 forward reveal that most Americans have a clear preference, with a clear majority in favor of Israel (Cavari, 2012, 2013; Gilboa, 1987; Rynhold, 2015). This is true regardless of which of Israel's adversaries Israel is pitted against in the question.

Going beyond the overall sympathies for Israel, the local regression line demonstrates three meaningful shifts in public opinion. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, sympathies with Israel remained steady at roughly 40 percent. During the first Intifada in 1987, sympathies with Israel increased slightly, though this trend subsided by the late 1990s. In 2001, 9/11 became a significant turning point in American foreign policy, and sympathies with Israel began to steadily rise to its current range between 50 percent and 60 percent (Cavari, 2013; Cavari & Freedman, 2019; Rynhold, 2015; Gilboa, 2009).

Sympathies for the Arab/Palestinian side have almost always remained below the 20 percent mark. From lows of less than 5 percent in 1967, they have risen to the high teens, where they have largely remained since. Thus, the margin in favor of Israel remained steady at 20–30 percentage points up to the late 1990s, due to the simultaneous increase in sympathies for both sides. From 2001 forward, the one-sided increase in sympathies toward Israel increased its margin to nearly 40 percentage points. This increase has marginally leveled off in recent years.

During the entire period, sympathies with Israel have remained significantly larger than with Arab nations or the Palestinians. But it seems that peace talks between Israel and its rivals elevate public sympathies for Israel's adversaries. This is evident in the late 1980s, with the break of the first Intifada, and more so in the early 1990s, during the peace talks that led to the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO (mutual recognition signed in September 1993) and the peace treaty with Jordan (October 1994).

The gradual increase in taking a side—sympathizing with Israel or with Arabs and Palestinians—attests to the dominant role of the issue in American politics and can be attributed to the interest in making it into a partisan issue. These changes, discussed more extensively in Chapter 6, have allowed for a greater share of the American public to form meaningful opinions on the issue (see also Cavari & Freedman, 2019).

Attributing Blame

The Arab-Israeli conflict is manifested in recurring episodes of violence, including wars, military operations and terrorist attacks. The identity of the instigator of each round of violent conflict is a matter we do not intend to address. Rather, our interest is in who *Americans* blame for the contemporary conflict.

In contrast to the relatively rich and periodic data available for the sympathies series, data about attributing blame is contingent on events of escalating violence or military conflicts between Israel and its rivals. Figure 4.2 summarizes the responses to the various questions asking about blame attribution for the conflict (32 surveys). Data are available for the Suez Canal Crisis (1956), violent conflicts with the Palestinians (first and second Intifada, 1987–1993, 2000–2005), the second



FIGURE 4.2 Attributing Blame for the Conflict

Note: *N* = 35,217 in 32 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.3.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (31 surveys) and national registered voters (1).

Polling organizations include Harris (11), NORC (6), ABC/WP (5), PSRA/SRBI (4), and others, each with fewer surveys (6 overall).

Lebanon War with Hezbollah (2006) and several rounds of military conflicts with the Hamas in Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal from there (operation Cast Lead in December 2008–January 2009 and Protective Edge in 2014; no data available for Pillar of Defense in 2012). In the Suez crisis, Israel fought Egypt alongside France and Britain but without the support of the United States. In all other conflicts, Israel fought alone against non-state militant groups in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon.

In all conflicts, Americans attribute more blame for the conflict to Israel's rivals than to Israel. The only conflicts in which Americans were relatively divided in their attribution of blame is during the early conflicts with Egypt, when the US government was still wary of Israel's actions and reached out to Arab nations as partners in the Middle East and during the violent events in the 1990s, following the collapse of Prime Minister Rabin's left coalition and the deterioration of the Oslo Accords (Ross, 2015). Over time, Americans attribute less blame to Israel.

Whom Should the United States Side With?

Our third series of interest asks respondents who they want the administration to side with: "In the Middle East conflict, do you think the United States should take Israel's side, take the Palestinians' side or not take either side?" (or similar). The question is different from the series we discussed earlier because it directly asks about the appropriate policy of the US government rather than respondents' personal attitudes about the conflict. Policy preferences may be directly linked to US policy in the region—supplying arms, providing aid or acting on Israel's behalf in international tribunes. We, therefore, expect most Americans to prefer that the United States will side with neither (this category is also more likely to be larger than in other series because it was explicitly offered to respondents in the question itself). Of those who believe that the United States should take a side, whom do they believe the United States should side with?

The question was asked a few times in the 1980s (in reference to Arab countries) and regularly since 2000 (in reference to Palestinians or Hezbollah). We summarize all responses in Figure 4.3, marking differences in the identity of the Arab counterpart.



FIGURE 4.3 Whom Should the United States Side With?

Note: *N* = 32,556 in 30 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (27 surveys) and national registered voters (2).

Polling organizations include Gallup (9), Knowledge Networks (6), and others each with fewer surveys (15 overall).

During the 1980s—War in Lebanon and the beginning of the first Intifada—nearly half of Americans wanted their administration to side with Israel, about a third preferred the US government would side with neither, and only a small minority wanted the United States to side with Arabs. Recall that the United States had sent military peacekeeping forces to Lebanon in the 1980s. In 1983 militant groups attacked the multinational forces and the US Embassy in Beirut. More than 250 Americans were killed in these attacks (Olson, 2002). It is, therefore, unsurprising to see a majority favoring siding with Israel at this point. This, however, changes at the turn of the century, from which we have rich data with repeated observations over time. Consistent with our expectation, the majority of Americans (63%, on average) want their government to side with neither. Among those who want the government to take a side, a clear and growing majority (26%) prefers Israel, and only a marginal minority prefers that the United States will side with the Palestinians (3%).

These trends should be read together with the series about sympathies. Since the turn of the century, although a sizeable minority of about 15 to 20 percent of Americans sympathize more with the Palestinians than with Israel, almost no one wants the United States to side with the Palestinians. A more careful examination of individual data from five surveys that ask both questions (December 1998, January 2000, July 2000, September 2001, and April 2002)[26] suggests that a substantial majority (80–85 percent) of those who sympathize with the Palestinians do not want the US government to intervene on their behalf. This is in contrast to sympathies with Israel—more than a third (35–40 percent) of those who sympathize with Israel want the United States to side with Israel. Americans are more willing to back their sympathies for Israel with US action than to follow up on their sympathies with the Palestinians with US action.

Use of Force

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a violent conflict in which Israel, Arab countries, militant groups, and individuals have used force. Data concerning views of Americans about the use of force in the region are available for only several incidents of military disputes between Israel and Palestinians or militant groups in Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, none of which amount to the major wars between Israel and neighboring Arab nations. The data include 75 questions in 58 surveys that cover the Suez Canal Crisis (1956), the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility (1981, Operation Opera), the (first) Lebanon War (1982–1985), violent conflicts with the Palestinians (first and second Intifada, 1987–1993, 2000–2005), the second Lebanon War with Hezbollah (2006) and several rounds of military conflicts with the Hamas in Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip in 2005 (2008, 2012, 2014). Most of the questions refer to Israeli use of force. Six surveys ask about use of force by Israel's cotemporary rival (Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Hamas). Figure 4.4 summarizes the two series (black dots



FIGURE 4.4 Approve of the Use of Force (Israel/Arabs)

Note: 67,109 in 58 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8 (Israel only).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Samples include national adults (54 surveys) and national registered voters (4).

Polling organizations include Gallup (14), ABC/WP (6), CBS/NYT (6), PSRA/SRBI (5) and others, each with fewer surveys (27 overall).

represent attitudes toward Israel's use of force and gray squares represent that of the Arab counterpart).

The data span different events that vary by the parties to the conflict, the magnitude of the use of force, the perceived cause of the use of force and the nature of media coverage of the conflict (Cavari, Yarchi, & Pindyck, 2017). Despite these differences, the overall trend is telling. First, Americans are divided on support for Israel's use of force—presenting two large camps on each side. Second, until the turn of the century, Americans were wary of Israeli use of force, but from 2000 forward, Americans are increasingly supportive of the use of force by Israel. The fact that in both periods, Israel used force against militant groups in Lebanon (first and second Lebanon War) and against Palestinians (first and second Intifada, as well as the violent conflicts with Hamas in the Gaza Strip), suggests that this trend is not affected by the identity of Israel's rival.

In contrast to their relatively divided view about Israel's use of force, Americans are extremely critical of the use of force by its rivals—Palestinians (first

Intifada), Hezbollah (second Lebanon War) and Hamas (Operation Protective Edge). The view of the use of force by Israel's rivals is not surprising given that all three entities do not represent a sovereign state, and the latter are listed by the US government as terrorist organizations (since 1997).[27] Although we should avoid generalizations from such limited data on controversial groups, the clear preference of Americans and its contrast to the response regarding Israeli use of force suggest that Americans may be critical of Israeli use of force, but they condemn any use of force by its rivals.

Peace Negotiations

All series discussed so far refer to the attitudes of Americans about the conflict—who they sympathize with, who they blame, whom they want the United States to side with and whether they approve of the use of force by either side to the conflict. Yet since the establishment of the state of Israel, there have been several attempts to reach peace between Israel and its rivals—Arab countries and the Palestinian people. These attempts resulted in two bilateral peace agreements (Israel-Egypt in 1979, and Israel-Jordan in 1994) and an ever-lasting peace process between Israel and the Palestinians (from 1993 with the Oslo Accords forward) that has yet to reach a final conclusion. The US administrations were involved in each one of these attempts (Ross, 2004). In this section, we examine how Americans view these processes: Their evaluation of the prospects of peace and their attitudes about issues at the core of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—support for an independent Palestinian state, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the fate of Jerusalem.

Prospects of Peace

The prospects of peace have commanded media and public attention (Yarchi et al., 2017). A survey in September 2000, during the presidential election campaign and the final attempts of President Clinton to bring the conflict to a peaceful end, asked Americans what they think is the most important foreign policy facing the new president. Fifteen percent of Americans chose the Middle East peace process, the third highest topic, following only drug trafficking (19%) and international terrorism (17%).[28] The events that started a year later shuffled the cards, yet the importance of this topic has never receded in the American public mind.

In earlier periods, Americans were relatively confident that peace can be achieved. For example, in 1955, during the conflict between Israel and Egypt, 48 percent of Americans believed that the two parties can work out their differences peacefully, and only 26 percent thought that a war was inevitable. Following the Suez Canal Crisis in April 1957, Americans were strongly divided about the same question—a third (34%) believed peace could be achieved,

a third (36%) believed another war was inevitable and nearly a third failed to offer an answer. A decade later, in June 1967, immediately after the Six-Day War, 70 percent of Americans had confidence in the ability of Israel and Arab countries to work out their differences peacefully. By 1969, during the War of Attrition along the border with Egypt, a smaller majority of 58 percent were confident in the ability of Israel and the Arab countries to work out their differences peacefully.[29]

This confidence soon deteriorated. Taking a more comprehensive look at the conflict, a Harris poll in 1976 asked Americans whether they believe a total peace in the region can be achieved and how likely it is that Israel would achieve peace with each of its rivals: Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).[30] Only 22 percent believed that the chances of total peace are positive (excellent or pretty good), compared to 65 percent who believed the chances are negative (fair or poor). Table 4.4 further summarizes the chances of peace between Israel and the four rivals in the 1976 survey. Beyond the limited variance between the four entities, the overall pattern is similar: Americans had little confidence in the prospects of peace between Israel and either party in the region.

The peace process with Egypt only slightly improved the outlook of Americans. In 1978, following Anwar Sadat's historical visit to Israel, a similar survey shows that 37 percent of Americans believed that there are positive chances for a total peace in the region.[31] But this positive outlook was short lived: By 1980, only 20 percent thought the same, and the prospects of peace (likely or somewhat likely) with Syria (42%) and with the PLO (29%) took another downturn.[32] The only confidence was with a peace with Jordan (73%). It took 14 more years for this peace agreement to materialize.

Since the late 1980s, Americans have been probed regularly whether they believe peace between Israel and the Arab nations will ever be possible. During the period covered in this series, a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was already in place, and a peace agreement was signed between Israel and Jordan. Public and secret talks with Syria did not materialize to an agreement and the Civil War in Syria halted any additional attempts. The peace negotiations with the Palestinians resulted in the creation of the Palestinian Authority

TABLE 4.4 Prospects of Peace Between Israel and Its Rivals (1976)

		Very Likely	*Only Somewhat Likely*	*Unlikely*
Peace Between Israel and. . . .	Egypt	17	36	23
	Jordan	13	42	18
	Syria	9	37	25
	PLO	7	36	35

with police and domestic responsibilities and the evacuation of Israeli military from highly populated areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In September 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza, evacuating all Israeli citizens from the strip. Yet Israel still occupies Palestinian territory, Israelis live in the West Bank and there are routine violent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian militant groups in Gaza and the West Bank. Given these developments along with the continuing violence, how do Americans see the prospects of Israel and Arabs living together in peace?

We plot responses to this survey item in Figure 4.5 (28 surveys). Throughout the entire period, Americans have been opinionated about this issue (on average, only 4% had no opinion on this issue) but were pessimistic about the prospects of peace between Israel and Arab nations. The only periods of relative confidence that peace can be achieved were in the early 1990s, following the Madrid Conference, and at the turn of the century with the relative push by President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak to advance peace with the Palestinians and with Syria. The failure of these talks gave rise to the Second Intifada, the establishment of a right-wing government in Israel and the near collapse of the



FIGURE 4.5 American Attitudes Regarding Prospects of Peace

Note: *N* = 28,529 in 28 surveys (national adults).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include Gallup (24) and others, each with fewer surveys (4 overall).

TABLE 4.5 Confidence in Peace Between Israel and the Palestinians

	Question	*Positive*	*Negative*	*No opinion*
March 1989[33]	How likely do you think it is that in the next 10 years Israel and the Palestinians will resolve their differences and live in peace: very likely, fairly likely, not too likely or not likely at all?	39	61	
March 1991[34]	How likely do you think it is that in the next 10 years Israel and the Palestinians will resolve their differences and live in peace: Very likely, fairly likely, not too likely or not likely at all?	39	59	1
September 1993[35]	Do you believe that the Palestinians and Israel will or will not be able to form a lasting peace agreement that will work?	31	59	10
July 1994[36]	Do you believe that the Palestinians and Israel will or will not be able to form a lasting peace agreement that will work?	24	66	10
February 2005[37]	Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the long-term chances for peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians?	50	44	6

peace process (Ross, 2004). Attitudes since the second Intifada have been pessimistic.

Table 4.5 further summarizes five surveys asking more specifically about the prospects of a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians (rather than Arabs). The first four surveys illustrate a very pessimistic view. An overwhelming majority of Americans believed that Israel and the Palestinians will never be able to form a lasting peace. The first three are during the First Intifada. The fourth, in July 1994, is after the Madrid Conference (1991), which started the indirect and direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians, culminating in the Oslo Accords (signed on August 20, 1993). The Oslo Agreement incited major violent incidents of Israelis and Palestinians that aimed to halt the progression of the Oslo Accords. Among the major incidents are the massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (February 25, 1994) in which a Jewish Israeli settler from nearby Kiryat Arba killed 29 Muslims and injured 125. The massacre ignited a series of terrorist attacks by Palestinians. The Israeli public was extremely divided over the prospects of peace, leading to extensive political unrest and even the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by a Jewish Israeli right-wing extremist. These events help explain Americans' pessimism even after the Oslo Accords.

The 2005 survey, during the disengagement from Gaza, is uniquely different. For the first time in our survey data, Americans are divided on this issue, with a marginal edge to an optimistic view of the prospects of peace. Yet because this question was not asked again, we cannot draw a clear conclusion whether Americans have become more optimistic about the prospects of peace.

Some indication of a slightly positive change to a more optimistic view can be found in another series that is based on a survey item asking respondents about the prospects of two states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side. This issue is at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Figure 4.6 summarizes the results of eight surveys in the series from 2013 to 2018. Americans are divided over this issue but may be showing a marginal edge to an optimistic view. In 2014, the two sides are evenly split. This is the only year in which there was a large-scale military conflict between Israel and the Palestinians (Hamas in Gaza, Operation Protective Edge, July 8–August 26).



FIGURE 4.6 Likelihood of Israel and a Palestinian State Coexisting Peacefully

Note: *N* = 11,127 in eight surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Samples include national adults (6 surveys) and national registered voters (2).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include PSRA/SRBI (6), and Quinnipiac University (2).

Attitudes About a Palestinian State

The peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have often reached a gridlock when trying to resolve the question of an independent Palestinian state and four core issues: borders, refugees, Jerusalem and settlements. Survey data are available for the main issue—an independent state—and two core issues: Israeli settlements and the fate of Jerusalem. These data suggest that Americans support an independent Palestinian state, oppose Israeli settlements and are willing to consider a bi-national solution to Jerusalem as long as it includes the international community.

Support for a Palestinian State

Over time, the question of Palestinian independence has become the major point of contention between the two sides. Initially, it concerned whether the Palestinians should form an independent state. More recently, and especially since the Oslo Accords, the question has become more specifically about where such a state would be established, the mutual conditions required for its establishment and how it may solve the conflict between the two nations, and between Israel and the Arab world (Heller, 1983; Lesch, 2018; Peters & Newman, 2013; Waxman, 2019).

Numerous surveys asked Americans whether they support a Palestinian state. The wording of this topic varies greatly. In some cases, Americans have been asked for their general attitude toward an independent Palestinian state (or in some earlier versions, a homeland) without specifying the location of this would-be state. In a few cases, especially when the issue first came up in the peace negotiations with Egypt, the location remained unspecified, but it was made clear that this would be an independent state separated from Israel and other Arab countries. Some items explicitly mentioned territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, and most items explicitly mentioned the West Bank and Gaza Strip (though it is likely that most Americans do not know exactly where these locations are and how they differ from Israel). In one item, the location provided was "someplace in the Middle East."

Despite the variation in question wording, plotting all questions together offers a fairly consistent trend of Americans' attitudes about an independent Palestinian state. Figure 4.7 demonstrates that, in almost all cases, regardless of the specified location, the majority of Americans favor an independent Palestinian state.[38] Beyond the relative variation between surveys, the overall average level of support remains relatively stable at 43 percent. In contrast to this relative stability, the level of opposition has increased over time—reaching 29 percent in recent years. Americans are sorting out on this issue—showing a stable plurality in favor for an independent Palestinian state and an increasing



FIGURE 4.7 Favoring an Independent Palestinian State

Note: *N* = 74,299 in 59 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.4.

Samples include national adults (55 surveys) and national registered voters (3).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include Gallup (25), CBS/NYT (12), ABC/WP (7), and others, each with fewer surveys (15 overall).

minority that opposes such a state. We discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 8.

Settlements

The issue of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has been a bone of contention between Israel and the United States since the end of the Six-Day War and the occupation of these territories. The issue has strained the relationship between the two allies more than any other topic. Almost every administration saw the settlements as illegal by international law and that they are an obstacle for peace. Public opinion data demonstrates that this is this is supported by overwhelming, increasing opposition of the American people to the settlement enterprise.

Figure 4.8 summarizes attitudes of American about the settlement enterprise. The question asks Americans if they believe it is all right for Israel to build Jewish settlements in territories beyond the 1967 border (10 surveys). The local regression



FIGURE 4.8 Attitudes Toward Israeli Settlements

Note: *N* = 10,126 in seven surveys (national adult).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include PIPA (2) and others, each with fewer surveys (5 overall).

line demonstrates that Americans have generally opposed Israel's settlement activity, an opposition that has grown over time. In most recent surveys, about 60 percent of Americans oppose further housing construction in the territories.

In two incidences—1986 and October 1991—the question informed respondents that the US government opposed Israeli settlements, but this seems to match the general pattern of public opposition. In the only case where the American public is split (July 1991), the survey item explicitly mentioned that Israel is building settlements in lands it captured in 1967 after having been attacked by Arab nations. This addendum to the question may explain why attitudes in this case are slightly different. It is interesting to note that even in 2002 and 2009, when Americans largely blamed the Palestinians (see Figure 4.2) and approved of Israel's use of force (Figure 4.4), they still strongly opposed settlements. This is testament that while Americans view Israel favorably and side with it in the conflict, they do not necessarily approve of its actions.

Fate of Jerusalem

On the topic of Jerusalem, data are sporadic and are spread over a long period, with different questions in 1967, 1978 and the 2000s. Figure 4.9 summarizes responses to five different questions that ask about possible



FIGURE 4.9 Support for Possible Solutions to the Jerusalem Question

Note: *N* = 7,112 in seven surveys.

Samples include national adults (6 surveys) and national likely voters (1).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include PIPA (3), Harris (2) and others, McLaughlin & Associates (1) and Social Science Research Solutions (1).

solutions to this question: Jerusalem as an international city (1967 and 2001), Jerusalem under UN control (2002 and 2003), Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty but with guaranteed religious freedoms to all (1978 and 2004), approval of President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital (2017), and attitudes toward Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem (2018).

Americans have supported assigning responsibility for Jerusalem to an international force or maintaining Israeli sovereignty as long as Muslims and Christians are provided full access to all holy places in the city. These patterns stand in stark contrast to Trump's decision in 2017, as Americans are completely split in their approval of his decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital (but Trump, explicitly mentioned in the question, may be a strong cue—for and against—this decision). Similarly, the 2018 survey suggests that Americans are completely split over Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem (note that this question does not mention President Trump), but a majority of Americans were unable or unwilling to offer an opinion on this issue—53% reporting don't know or haven't heard enough about the issue to say.

US Involvement

We began our discussion of American public opinion about the establishment of Israel. We then investigated public opinion about the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in its myriad forms: Between Israel and neighboring Arab nations, between Israel and the Palestinians (Palestinian authority or groups) and between Israel and militant groups in Lebanon. We examined which side Americans favored, whether Americans supported the use of force and what they thought about the prospects of peace in the region and about issues that stand at the core of the conflict. Yet voicing an opinion and taking a side is one thing, bearing a cost is another. When the government takes a side, there may be a cost—in diplomatic power, in funding or in deploying US troops. How do Americans view such costs? Are they willing to follow up on their favorable opinion of Israel and relative preference of Israel in the conflict with paying the cost of involvement? We referred briefly to the issue of involvement in our discussion of the series about attitudes of Americans on which side the United States should take (Figure 4.3). We showed there that a majority of Americans want their government to take no side. Among those who do want the government to take a side, a clear majority prefers siding with Israel. Here we go beyond the general question of taking sides and examine the views of Americans about different forms of involvement—diplomatic support, deploying troops and foreign aid.

Although Americans are accused of isolationism, public opinion data demonstrate that Americans support US involvement in world order, defense spending, commitments to US alliances, deploying troops and participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Consistent with the work on the structure of American public opinion, attitudes about US involvement are generally coherent, consistent and thoughtful. Americans are aware of the role of the United States in maintaining world order and support sensible US involvement in international affairs and on behalf of foreign countries (Kull & Destler, 1999; Page & Bouton, 2006; Wittkopf, 1990). To what extent do they support US involvement in the Middle East and on behalf of Israel?

Americans were always wary of US involvement in the region. In a 1945 survey, Americans were asked if they think the United States should use its influence to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Sixty-nine percent of Americans thought it should; 20 percent thought they should not.[39] This, however, was limited to diplomatic efforts. Americans opposed deployment of troops, unless if part of an international effort led by the United Nations; Americans opposed economic assistance (to both sides); and Americans opposed lifting the US embargo on selling arms.[40] This is consistent with American policies during that period—supporting statehood but avoiding any active part in the conflict.

Taking a systematic look at American public attitudes about US involvement in the region, we examine survey data on a general question about US involvement in the region (should or should not). We also inspect three specific forms of involvement: Backing Israel on the global stage, committing troops to the protection of Israel in an event of war or to take part in peacekeeping between Israel and its neighbors, and support for US foreign aid to Israel (most of which is in the form of military aid).

Support for US Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Our first two series include questions asking about US involvement in the conflict and whether the United States should pressure either (or both) sides to the conflict to solve the conflict. The involvement series is based on 32 survey questions asking whether respondents think the United States should be involved, active in or sponsor the negotiations between Israel and Arabs or Palestinians or, more specifically, whether the United States should act as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. The questions vary in the range of possible responses. Most questions (23) can be categorized into two responses—favor involvement or oppose involvement. The remaining surveys (9) offer three possible responses—more involved, involved at the current level, less involved. These two types cannot be combined because the middle category, "involved at current level," affects the rate and distribution of the two other categories. We therefore plot each separately and examine the combined trends.

The two-categories series goes back to 1985 and ends in 2012. The three-categories series starts in 2006 and ends in 2014. Although the series vary in the strength of attitudes about involvement—which is the reason we were not able to combine them—the trends of both series are similar. Over time, Americans are decreasingly favorable of US involvement in the region. During the first Intifada, a majority of Americans wanted the US government to play an active role in solving the conflict. From 2000 forward, we see a clear downward trend in support.

Next, we examine a series of questions in 13 surveys asking whether the United States should pressure the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to achieve peace. This question was asked in several versions—pressuring Israel, pressuring both sides, and who should the US pressure. We display in Table 4.6 a summary of all responses ordered by year. Five surveys—all with similar wording—were in 1991, during and after Operation Desert Storm and in preparation for the Madrid Conference. Thus, we aggregated them and present an annual mean.

Given the differences between the questions, it is difficult to draw conclusions about overall views and trends over time. And yet, taken together, the



FIGURE 4.10 Support for US Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Note: *N* = 38,313 in 32 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Samples include national adults (27 surveys) and national registered voters (5).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include PSRA (7), Gallup (6), Hart and Teeter (4), and others, each with fewer surveys (15 overall).

TABLE 4.6 Pressure Israel and the Palestinians

Year	*Question*	*Israel*	*Palestinians*
1990[41]	Israel	60	
1991[42]	Israel	48	
2002	Israel	74	
2002[43]	Palestinians		80
2002[44]	Israel	56	
2003[45]	Israel	49	
2007[46]	Israel/Palestinians	30	39
2008[47]	Israel/Palestinians	25	38
2013[48]	Israel/Palestinians	25	48

surveys indicate a similar trend to the one about US involvement—as the conflict progresses fewer Americans want their government to be involved—pressure Israel, the Palestinians or both. When they are asked about pressuring Israel and the Palestinians (separate questions), Americans support more pressure on the Palestinians. This is consistent also with the aforementioned trends of blaming Palestinians for the conflict (Figure 4.2) and siding with Israel (Figure 4.3).

Backing Israel on the International Stage

The importance of United States backing of Israel on the international stage cannot be overstated. The United States is actively engaged in diplomatic maneuvers and efforts to shield and support Israel. While it is difficult to measure the extent of US diplomatic support, existing work on voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly demonstrates the scope of UN preoccupation with Israel (Becker, Hillman, Potrafke, & Schwemmer, 2015), the unique dimension of Israel and Palestine in UN voting behavior (Kim & Russett, 1996), the extent that the United States finds itself isolated in UN votes, especially on the contentious issues referring to Israel (Voeten, 2004, 2015), and the cost the United States pays in economic aid to shore up alliances in the UN (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008). The 2001 UN World Conference against Racism in Durban illustrates the United States' commitment to standing by Israel in international tribunals. When the United States and Israel realized that the conference intended to adopt a declaration that equates Zionism with racism (a resolution that was passed in 1975 by the UN General Assembly but repealed in 1991), both countries abandoned the conference. The conference eventually passed a compromise resolution that does not refer to Israel (Voeten, 2015).

We find limited data about public opinion on US diplomatic efforts. Only a few questions are available about US voting behavior and actions in the United Nations. Also, the questions that ask about these decisions are focused more on public concurrence with US and UN actions than on the public's evaluation of US actions.

A good example that offers some indication of the public sentiment about the role of the United States in providing diplomatic support for Israel is a 1975 Roper survey asking Americans what should the US response do in case of a possible UN General Assembly resolution to unseat Israel from the General Assembly (there was no such vote). The survey asked Americans about their support for eight possible actions the United States can take in response to the hypothetical scenario.[49] We summarize these responses in Table 4.7.

A majority of respondents thought the United States should do something about such a vote (if passed). Only a quarter (24%) thought the United States should accept the majority vote and not make an issue of it. The public was divided about the nature of the response though. Most (58%) supported

TABLE 4.7 Preferred US Response to a Hypothetical Vote to Unseat Israel From the United Nations General Assembly (1975)

	US Should	*US Should Not*
Accept the majority vote and not make an issue of it	24%	56%
Accept the majority vote but keep working to persuade them to change their minds	58%	22%
Stop or reduce our financial support of the UN (the US provides one-fourth of the UN budget) until Israel gets full membership back	42%	39%
Withhold foreign aid from countries that voted against Israel until it gets full membership back	37%	43%
Stop trading with countries that voted against Israel, including not buying oil from or selling grain to these countries until Israel gets full membership back	25%	53%
Boycott the UN General Assembly and don't attend any of its sessions until Israel gets full membership back	25%	55%
Quit the UN if Israel is not restored to full membership	13%	67%

persuasion efforts. A plurality (42%) supported a financial penalty to the UN, and about one in three (37%) supported withholding foreign aid to countries that voted against Israel. A quarter of respondents supported boycotting the General Assembly and stopping trade with countries that voted against Israel. Very few (13%) supported more drastic measures, such as quitting the UN.

In addition to actions at the UN, the United States can affect how Israel is viewed in the world by responding to its actions—showing support or condemnation. To measure that, we collected surveys that asked Americans about the proper response to violent actions by Israel. The question was asked in eight surveys, all of which are relatively recent—during the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead. In all, Israel fought against militant groups in the Israeli-occupied territories or in Lebanon. On average, a very small percent of respondents thought the United States should publicly criticize Israel (mean = 10.5; SD = 2.7). Thirty-nine percent of respondents thought the United States should publicly support Israel, and 35 percent thought the United States should do nothing.[50] This is especially interesting when compared to public approval of the use of force (see discussion on Figure 4.4). Americans are wary of Israeli use of force but overwhelmingly disapprove criticizing Israel.

Committing Troops

The use of military force is one of the most important policy issues that the public weighs, and policymakers acknowledge that public support is an important element in the decision to deploy troops and the duration of

military intervention (Berinsky, 2009; Koch & Sullivan, 2010). A rich body of scholarly work finds that the public is sensible about the use of force (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2009; Jentleson, 1992). Among the dominant factors that the public weighs are the *interests* at stake (whether the action is of vital interest), the policy *objective* of the use of force (preferring purposes of foreign policy restraint and humanitarian intervention), the *multilateral* sentiment of the military operation, the strength and unity of *elite cues* and the *cost-benefit* calculations (Klarevas, 2002). Based on first two criteria, we should expect low levels of support for military intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict: (1) Israel has long been an ally of the United States, but military intervention has not been a vital American interest; (2) Israel, for the most part, has demonstrated its military superiority in the region; and (3) although the conflict involves substantive humanitarian questions, they do not amount to humanitarian crises. Based on the final criteria, we expect that support for military intervention would be stronger when the conflict is framed in terms of a multilateral effort, when elites are united and when the risk of military action is minimal.

Table 4.8 summarizes the views of Americans about military deployment during the struggle for independence. Americans were reluctant to deploy US troops into the region. But, concurring with the multilateral thesis, Americans were more supportive only when it was framed as part of an international mission led by the United Nations. The final survey, in October 1948, was after the declaration of Israeli independence (May 14, 1948), the invasion of four Arab countries into the territory (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria), the UN's attempt to mediate a ceasefire and propose a new partition plan (the Bernadotte Plan) and the assassination of Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, by an armed Jewish Zionist group (September 17, 1948). This was, perhaps, the darkest of times during the 1948 War. Intervention was viewed as a necessary action to avoid a humanitarian crisis for Jews and Palestinians.

Following Israel's independence, the use of American troops has been questioned with regard to protecting Israel in the event of war and in providing peacekeeping forces. As for the former, the United States has never deployed US troops to protect Israel directly, except as part of its own missions in the region (for example during Operation Desert Storm or the war against ISIS). These questions, therefore, have largely been hypothetical scenarios, asking Americans if they would favor or oppose US military action or the explicit use of American troops in the event of a war between Israel and its neighbors or an escalation between Israel and its militant rivals. Due to the hypothetical nature of the questions, they vary considerably in the identity of Israel's rival and the type of response. In terms of the identity of Israel's rival, questions ask whether the United States should send troops if Israel is attacked, if Israel is attacked by its neighbors, if an Arab country

TABLE 4.8 Support for Sending US Troops to Palestine to Keep the Peace Between Arabs and Jews

		Approve	*Disapprove*	*DK*
May 1946[51]	England has suggested that we send troops to Palestine to help keep order there if the Arabs oppose letting 100,000 Jews enter Palestine. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending troops to Palestine to help England keep order there?	21%	74%	5%
October 1947[52]	If England pulls her troops out of Palestine and war breaks out between the Arabs and the Jews, do you think the United States should sent troops to keep the peace, or should this be done by a United Nations volunteer army?	3% (Approval of US force)	83%	14%
February 1948[53]	It has been suggested that the United Nations send an international police force to keep order in Palestine. Suppose the United Nations does decide to send such a police force to Palestine. Would you approve or disapprove of having American soldiers take part in it?	43%	51%	7%
February 1948[54]	Suppose the United Nations cannot agree on sending an international police force (to keep order in Palestine). Do you think the United States itself should go ahead and send American troops to Palestine?	9%	83%	8%
March 1948[55]	Would you favor or oppose sending a UN (United Nations) army—made up of troops from the US (United States), Russia, France, and other member nations—to see that the UN decision to divide Palestine into two states is carried out?	40%	43%	17%
March-May 1948[56]	Would you favor or oppose sending a UN (United Nations) army—made up of troops from the US (United States), Russia, France and other member nations—to force the Arabs to accept the UN decision to divide Palestine?	41%	39%	19%
October 1948[57]	Would you approve or disapprove of having American soldiers take part in this police force (sent by the United Nations to keep order in Palestine)?	80%	17%	4%

attacks Israel, if Arab forces invaded Israel, if communists take over Israel, if Israel would be taken over or if Arabs would attack Israel with the support of the Russians. Some of the questions ask whether the United States should deploy troops; other questions explicitly mention that this would be a unilateral use of US forces; and others mention that involvement would be part of a multinational effort.

Deployment of troops was also asked in relation to peacekeeping efforts. This has taken on an instrumental role in ceasefire and peace negotiations where Israel favored an international, US-involved peacekeeping effort over UN-led missions (see, for example, Nelson, 1985 and Pelcovits, 1984 for a discussion about Israel's preference for US-led forces in the Sinai and Lebanon). Although not as consistent as the question about war-related troop deployment, several surveys ask about such US peacekeeping efforts in Israel. Again, the questions vary considerably and therefore there is much variation in public response.

Despite differences in the wording of each series—war or peace—and the nature of the contemporary conflict, we plot all questions together, though we separate between war and peacekeeping efforts with different marks and trend lines. Combining the questions together in Figure 4.11 offers an important illustration of trends in public support for troop deployment in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The pattern that emerges from Figure 4.11 is strongly tied to the development of American foreign policy. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, Americans were unwilling to commit American troops to a war between Israel and Arab nations/Arab nations with their Russian/Communist backed forces. Military intervention could have opened another direct military conflict with the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, the pattern is more mixed, and Americans are evenly split (as a reminder, "don't know" responses are not displayed but are included in calculating percentages). The only case where Americans were willing to commit US military action to protecting Israel was during Operation Desert Storm (1991), when the United States led a multinational coalition, including Arab countries, against Iraq. By firing Scud missiles into Israel, Iraq tried to incite an Israeli response, which they hoped would break the Arab-American alliance. To avoid that, the United States put immense pressure and offered military and economic guarantees so that Israel would not retaliate (Ross, 2015).

Support for deploying troops for peacekeeping efforts is relatively similar. Americans are split on this issue—wary of too much involvement in this troubled region. The data on this issue are extremely noisy and cluster to only a few events. This makes a comparison very difficult. Yet considering the attitudes during the second intifada and the second Lebanon War, we can suggest with some caution that Americans are less reluctant to provide troops for peacekeeping efforts than they are to assist Israel if attacked.



FIGURE 4.11 Support for Deploying American Troops to Aid Israel

Note: *N* = 98,895 in 72 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.4.

Samples include national adults (65 surveys) and national registered voters (7).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include Gallup (15), Harris (12), Roper (10) and others, each with fewer surveys (35 overall).

US Aid

Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II (as of 2017): $129 billion (in historical amounts, equivalent to nearly $228 billion in inflation-adjusted values). The next country, Egypt, received, in total, about 60 percent of the amount Israel received ($136 billion in inflation-adjusted values). Most US aid to Israel is granted in the form of military assistance, though some portions consist of economic aid as well. Figure 4.12 presents the annual amount of US foreign assistance to Israel between 1948 and 2017 (values are inflation-adjusted), broken down by type of aid—economic and military. Stacked bars represent total amount of aid in billions of dollars (shading distinguishes between economic and military aid). The overlaid line on the second y-axis is the total amount of aid provided to Israel (military and economic) as a percent of all US foreign assistance. Appropriations to Israel amount to a large



FIGURE 4.12 US Foreign Assistance to Israel, 1948–2017

Note: Data provided by the most up-to-date report of the US Agency for International Development (2018).

share of US foreign aid—ranging from highs of nearly 40 percent of all aid to little under 10 percent in recent years.

The stacked bars reveal that the dominant form of US aid is military aid. Israel received the highest amounts of military aid immediately after the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty (1979). Since then, the annual military funds have stabilized at roughly $3 billion. Throughout 2009–2018, Israel received $30 billion for military purposes, and in 2016, President Obama's request for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) amounted to 53 percent of the total FMF requested worldwide, which composes 20 percent of Israel's overall defense budget. This consistent level of support has allowed Israel to maintain its qualitative edge over its enemies. See Nathanson and Mandelbaum (2012) and Sharp (2015) for reviews on American aid to Israel.[58]

Apart from military assistance, Israel has also received extensive economic assistance from the United States in various forms, though this has declined over time, as is evident in Figure 4.12. Economic assistance to Israel has included migration and refugee assistance ($460 million between 1973–1991 and $559 million between 2000–2015); loan guarantees since 2003, which have ranged between $1.1 billion to $3.8 billion annually; nearly $42 million throughout 2000–2014 to Israeli institutions as part of the American School and Hospitals Abroad program (the largest recipient in the Middle East); US–Israeli

cooperation in the field of energy, totaling $9.7 million; and various grants for US–Israeli scientific and business cooperation.

Studies of public opinion about foreign aid reveal that at the aggregate, the public has fairly stable preferences about aid and that these are driven by both material and cultural factors (Milner & Tingley, 2013). By and large, empirical evidence among the American public point to strong reservations about foreign aid. This, however, is affected by misperceptions about actual spending. When respondents are provided information about actual spending or are asked about specific programs and countries, public support for foreign aid is stronger (Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, & van Heerde-Hudson, 2017; Williamson, 2019). Regarding the recipient of foreign aid, studies show that when evaluating foreign aid, Americans consider first their security and economic interests in providing aid to a recipient country, but are also conscious about human rights violations of the recipient regime (Heinrich & Kobayashi, 2020).

We therefore examine foreign aid to Israel in a comparative perspective—support for aid to Israel compared to general views about foreign aid and foreign aid to specific countries. Our data include all available survey data on support for foreign aid in general (78 surveys), to Israel (39) and to ten countries (23 surveys; only countries with three data points or more were included; the median number of questions per country is equal to two). For each survey, we coded the responses to three comparable categories: increase, keep the same, or decrease. We summarize the 12 series in Figure 4.13.

Consistent with existing work on foreign aid, the majority of Americans want to decrease foreign aid (63.97% on average); 23.81 percent of Americans support keeping foreign aid at the same level; and only 6.83 percent want to increase foreign aid. While trends over the last three decades point to some change in public resentment to foreign aid—the percent of respondents choosing to decrease foreign aid dropped from nearly 80 percent to about 50 percent in recent surveys—the majority of Americans still want it decreased, followed by some support for current levels of aid. During this time, economic and military aid have fluctuated until the turn of the century and then nearly doubled.

The contrast between these views and attitudes toward foreign aid to Israel are startling. Throughout most of the period examined, a majority or plurality of Americans support the current level of foreign aid to Israel (on average, 45.53%). Similar to overall support for foreign aid, only a small minority support an increase in foreign aid to Israel (on average, 9.95%). Nonetheless, the rate of people interested in decreasing foreign aid to Israel almost never reaches a majority (on average, 36.39%).

The unique case of Israel is further exemplified when compared to views about foreign aid to ten additional countries. Almost none of these countries follow the same pattern as the one we see for Israel—we find no consistent support for current levels of aid compared to decreasing aid (increasing aid is almost always a small minority). The only exception is support for foreign aid to African countries where a substantial minority support increasing aid and a



FIGURE 4.13 Support for Foreign Aid, in General and to Specific Countries

Note: *N* = 208,459 in 131 surveys.

Samples include national adults (122 surveys), national registered voters (8) and voters exiting polling stations (1).

Not displayed in the figure: percent of people who do not know, have no opinion or refuse to answer.

Polling organizations include NORC (32), Roper (18), Gallup (17), Yankelovich (11), PSRA (9), NBC/AP (7) and others, each with fewer surveys (37 overall).

plurality support current aid. Finally, of great interest is the comparison with Egypt and the Palestinians. Following Israel, Egypt is the second largest recipient of American aid. A majority of Americans call for a decrease in support for foreign aid to Egypt, but they do not for Israel. Support for foreign aid to Palestinians is among the lowest.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to expand our reach beyond the basic view of the general public favorability of Israel discussed in Chapter 3. Americans have a favorable view of Israel and see Israel as an important ally, but their support for Israel extends well beyond these measures of positive affect to clear and favorable views considering the Arab-Israeli conflict, in its myriad forms, and in US involvement in the region.

The chapter uses rich data to present a bird's-eye view of American public opinion regarding Israel. It is built on numerous questions that vary in wording and sampling design and are often asked in response to violent events. And yet

by looking at this grand picture, we try to separate between particular, contemporary views and the overall approach of Americans to this issue. We show that beyond the noise that can be attributed to events—and quality of available data—Americans are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel.

This support does not mean that they give a blank check to Israel. Americans are wary of Israel's use of force, though they are extremely critical of any use of force by Israeli rivals. Americans are pessimistic about the prospects of peace, are divided over the proper solution to the conflict and are critical of Israel's actions in the region (particularly regarding settlements). Americans are also wary of getting too involved in the region—they are split on deploying troops to the region, and, though they approve of it more than for any other country, they are split on maintaining the current level of aid the United States provides to Israel.

This chapter concludes our first part of the book—examining overall trends in public support for Israel. This part was mostly descriptive and relied on topline data. In the next part, we take several of the series presented in part one to examine the demographic and political divides in support for Israel. We argue and provide empirical evidence that the structure of overall support for Israel has changed in the last few decades—from demographic and political consensus to a partisan divide.

Notes

1. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. December, 1944. Roper question ID: USNORC.440231.R10.
2. Office of Public Opinion Research. March 22–27, 1945. Roper question ID: USOPOR.45–041.Q06B].
3. Gallup Organization. October 25–29, 1947. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.111947.RK12C.
4. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. March 26–April 3, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480156.R22A.
5. Gallup Organization. May 19–21, 2003. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.03MY019.R24.
6. ABC News/Washington Post. April 18–21, 2002. Roper question ID: USABCWP.042202A.R08.
7. Social Science Research Solutions, December 14–17, 2017. Roper question ID: USSSRS.122217ACNN.R30.
8. ORC International, July 18–20, 2014. Roper question ID: USORC.072114A.R25.
9. Gallup Organization. February 2–5, 2012. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.12FBR002.R21.
10. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. August 20–24, 2014. Roper question ID: USSRBI.082814.R63.
11. Gallup Organization. February 1–10, 2018. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.032018.R02.
12. Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland. March 25–April 6, 2009. Roper question ID: USUMARY.200903.Q37.
13. Cable News Network. December 14–17, 2017. Roper question ID: USSSRS.122217ACNN.R28.

14. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. July 7–August 4, 2014. Roper question ID: USSRBI.051315P.R26P.
15. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. October 29–November 6, 1982. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.CFR83G.R27F.
16. Cable News Network. July 18–20, 2014. Roper question ID: USORC.072114A.R27.
17. Gallup Organization. October 24–29, 1947. Roper ID: USGALLUP.111947.RK13B.
18. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. February 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480155.R07.
19. Gallup Organization. March 5–10, 1948. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.414T.QT03G.
20. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. June, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480158.R15.
21. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. October, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480161.R14.
22. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. March, 1949. Roper question ID: USNORC.490164.R18.
23. For a discussion of the item nonresponse category, see Cavari and Freedman (2019).
24. The 1947 survey refers to a hypothetical scenario in which a war breaks out and therefore is not included in our longitudinal trend.
25. Despite the differences in wording and contrast of rival, we find little variation in the strength of public sympathies for Israel vis-à-vis the identity of the Arab counterpart. See Cavari (2013) for a discussion of wording differences using these questions.
26. All five surveys conducted by Gallup Organization. Roper dataset IDs: USAIPOGNS 1998–9812046, USAIPOGNS2000–05, USAIPOGNS2000–27, USAIPOCNUS2001–33, USNBCWSJ2002–6024.
27. For the current list of terrorist organizations, see *www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/*
28. NBC News / Wall Street Journal. September 7–10, 2000. Roper question ID: USNBCWSJ.00SEP.R33
29. Gallup Organization. November 17–22, 1955. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.55–556.Q008C. Gallup Organization. April 6–11, 1957. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.57–581.Q037. Gallup Organization. June 22–27, 1967. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.747.Q12. Gallup Organization. September 17–22, 1969. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.788.Q004.
30. Louis Harris & Associates. December 17–December 23, 1976. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.020377.R2D.
31. Louis Harris & Associates. December 27, 1977–January 10, 1978. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.012378.R01.
32. Louis Harris & Associates. July 11–23, 1980. Roper question ID: USHARRIS.80MEG.R05B.
33. ABC News/Washington Post. March 30–April 3, 1989. Roper question ID: USABCWP.89APR.R56. Coding scheme: Positive = very likely + fairly likely. Negative = not too likely + not likely at all.
34. ABC News/Washington Post, March 1–4, 1991. Roper question ID: USABCWP.429.R47. Coding scheme: Positive = very likely + fairly likely. Negative = not too likely + not likely at all.
35. Hart and Teeter Research Companies. September 10–13, 1993. Roper question ID: USNBCWSJ.93SEPT.R21A. Coding scheme: Positive = Lasting Peace. Negative = Not Lasting Peace.

36. Hart and Teeter Research Companies. July 23–26, 1994. Roper question ID: USNBCWSJ.072894.R34. Coding scheme: Positive = Will be able to. Negative = Will not be able to.
37. Marist College Institute for Public Opinion. February 14–16, 2005. Roper question ID: USMARIST.022505.R11. Coding scheme: Positive = Optimistic. Negative = Pessimistic.
38. In the two cases in 1981 and 1982, where the percent of both those who favor and those who oppose are especially low, this is because these are the only two incidents where the option of "no opinion" or "don't know enough about this" were offered as legitimate responses, and the percent of nonresponses was therefore unusually high. It is well documented that the share of respondents who report don't know (DK) is influenced by the extent to which the question encourages or discourages doing so (Berinsky, 2004; Luskin & Bullock, 2011; Mondak, 2001; Schuman & Presser, 1980).
39. Office of Public Opinion Research. March 22–27, 1945. Roper question ID: USOPOR.45–041.Q06C.
40. Gallup Organization. March 19–24, 1948. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.415K.QK09A. Gallup Organization. July 16–21, 1948. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.48–421.QT12E.
41. Gallup Organization. October 11–12, 1990. Roper question ID: USGALNEW.105064.R15.
42. Average of five surveys. Standard deviation is 8.4. Associated Press, March 6–10, 1991. Roper question ID: USAP.91810G.Q04. Gallup Organization. January 24–25, 1991. Roper question ID: USGALNEW.105126.R04. NBC News/Wall Street Journal. February 26–27, 1991. Roper question ID: USNBCWSJ.030191.R14A2. Yankelovich Clancy Shulman. February 7, 1991. Roper question ID: USYANKCS.021291.R24. Yankelovich Clancy Shulman. March 7, 1991. Roper question ID: USYANKCS.031291.R13.
43. Gallup Organization. March 22–24, 2002. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.02MR22.R16B.
44. Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 1–5, 2002. Roper question ID: USUMARY.050802.R20.
45. Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland. May 14–18, 2003. Roper question ID: USUMARY.053003.R24.
46. Gallup Organization. February 1–4, 2007. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.031307.R30.
47. Gallup Organization. February 11–14, 2008. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.08FBUY11.R34.
48. Gallup Organization. February 7–10, 2013. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.13FBRY07.R21.
49. Roper Organization. August 23–30, 1975. Roper question ID: USROPER.75–8.R08F.
50. CBS. April 1–2, 2002. Roper question ID: USCBS.040302.R12; CBS. April 15–18, 2002. Roper question ID: USCBS.200204B.Q14; CBS/The New York Times. April 28–May 1, 2002. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT.050202.R03; CBS. May 13–14, 2002. Roper question ID: USCBS.051502D.R15; CBS/The New York Times. July 21–25, 2006. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT.072606A.R78; CBS. August 11–13, 2006. Roper question ID: USCBS.081406.R58; Pew. August 9–13, 2006. Roper question ID: USPSRA.081706.R64; Pew. January 7–11, 2009. Roper question ID: USPSRA.011309.R58.

51. Gallup Organization. May 17–22, 1946. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.061946.RK20.
52. Gallup Organization. October 24–29, 1947. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.111947.RK13A. 65% favored UN army. We included them with neither to reflect a disagreement with US troop deployment.
53. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. February, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480155.R09.
54. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. February, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480155.R10.
55. Gallup Organization. March 19–24, 1948. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.415K.QK09B.
56. Gallup Organization. March 5–May 10, 1948. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.414K.QK03E.
57. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. October, 1948. Roper question ID: USNORC.480161.R15A.
58. Additional military assistance includes 33 F-35 joint strike fighters to be transferred to Israel during 2016 at the cost of $5.5 billion; coproduction of various military equipment such as Namer armored personnel carriers, Iron Dome missile defense system as of 2014 (over $1.28 billion so far), David's Sling (AKA Magic Wand) missile defense system (over $840 million so far and an expected $286.9 million in 2016) and Arrow missile defense systems ($2.4 billion since 1990); and the use of emergency stockpiles of US munitions in Israel, for instance during the Second Lebanon War (2006) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

PART II

Assessing the Divide in Public Support

5

DEMOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS

In the first part of the book, we examined longitudinal trends of public opinion toward Israel to demonstrate that the American public, as a whole, holds uniquely favorable views of Israel, supports Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict and approves of US involvement in the region on Israel's behalf. Here and in subsequent chapters, we move from aggregate trends to assessing group-level variation in support for Israel. To what extent is support for Israel homogenously distributed across demographic and political groups that form the American public?

To illustrate the importance of this analysis, consider two surveys, nearly 30 years apart, one in 1988 (soon after the start of the First Intifada) and one in 2014 (during Operation Protective Edge, the most recent large-scale military conflict between Israel and the Palestinians). Each survey includes the sympathies question showing the overall trend of increasing support for Israel among mass Americans—from 71 percent in 1988 to 79 percent in 2014 (nonresponses are excluded, so sympathizing with the Palestinians is the reference category). This change, however, has not been homogenous across the Americans public. Table 5.1 summarizes the level of support (sympathize with Israel) among major demographic and political groups, and the difference between the average support of each group and the overall support in each survey.

All groups, in both surveys, sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians. Yet the structure of opinion is different, with several of the group-divides flipping in their relative support for Israel or demonstrating increasing gaps. Except for gender, we find a change in every demographic and political divide. In 1988, age differences were minimal, except for a relatively unsupportive older cohort. In 2014, the gap—reaching now 22 percentage points—has flipped—older

TABLE 5.1 The Changing Structure of Mass of Support for Israel

	1988 (Gallup)[1]		*2014 (Pew)*[2]	
	Percent Support	*Difference from Overall Average (percentage points)*	*Percent Support*	*Difference from Overall Average (percentage points)*
Overall	71%		79%	
Gender				
Male	72%	+1	80%	+1
Female	71%	0	78%	−1
Age				
18–29	71%	0	66%	−13
30–49	75%	+4	76%	−3
50–64	74%	+3	86%	+7
65+	60%	−11	88%	+9
Race				
African-American	71%	0	69%	−10
White	73%	+2	82%	+3
Education				
High School/Less	73%	+2	81%	+2
College/More	67%	−4	72%	−7
Religion				
Protestant (all)	71%	0	87%	+8
• Mainline	69%	−2	78%	−1
• Evangelical	74%	+3	90%	+11
Catholic	69%	−2	76%	−3
Jewish	97%	+26	92%	+21
Party				
Republican	73%	+2	91%	+12
Democrat	71%	0	66%	−13
Independent	62%	−9	71%	−8

cohorts became the most supportive age-group and younger cohorts the least supportive. Racial divides between whites and African-Americans in 1988 were negligible. By 2014, the gap reached 13 points with a significant advantage among whites. Differences in support among education groups have marginally increased as well—from 6 to 9 points. More dramatic are the differences among religious groups: While in 1988, differences between main Christian groups were small, by 2014, the gaps have increased, with evangelicals shooting up their support to 90 percent.

The most significant change, however, is that of partisan groups. In 1988, Republican support for Israel and Democratic support for Israel were indistinguishable. In 2014,

Democratic identifiers were the least supportive group among all other major demographic divisions (66%), whereas Republican support shot up to 91 percent. A change from no identifiable partisan difference to a partisan gap of 25 percentage points!

The table clearly reveals that what may have been a consensual issue that transcended most demographic and political divisions in the United States has taken a different path in recent years. Are these differences representative of growing divisions within the American public with respect to other issues regarding Israel? Where do we find systematic evidence of demographic divisions in support for Israel? How have these divisions developed over time? Which appear to be the most meaningful? And how do demographic differences fare in comparison to the partisan divide?

To answer these questions, we compiled five datasets of surveys that offer sufficient empirical data for individual-level analysis and hence allow us to examine group variation and apply rigorous statistical testing of individual preferences. Our five measures of support for Israel include the following series among those discussed in the first part of the book: Favorability toward Israel, sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which of the two sides to the conflict is to blame in the conflict, attitudes toward Israel's use of force and support for providing Israel with economic and military aid. These measures provide us with a unique opportunity to identify emerging divisions within the American public on the most dominant questions regarding attitudes of Americans toward Israel, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the United States toward them.

In this chapter, we analyze demographic differences in support for Israel (using each of these measures) across five dominant demographic cleavages in the United States: Gender, age and generational cohort, race, educational attainment, and religion. Following a description of the data included for this analysis, we present our theoretical expectations for each demographic cleavage. To form these expectations, we rely on literature about foreign policy attitudes in general and on Israel more specifically. We examine longitudinal trends of support for each demographic group and estimate the independent effect of each group on support for Israel using several regression models.

In Chapter 6, we focus on political divides in public opinion toward Israel, comparing the strength of the partisan divide over Israel to social and ideological divides on this issue. In Chapter 7, we propose and test a causal model for explaining the affective determinants of support for Israel. In Chapter 8, we examine separately another aspect of public opinion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - support for an independent Palestinian state.

Data and Method

To examine demographic and political divides in support for Israel, we need individual-level, raw data that we can aggregate into our demographic and political groups of interest for descriptive trends and to use as indicators in a

more rigorous analysis of the relative effect of each demographic and political identifier on support for Israel. Fortunately, the Roper iPoll archive offers full access to numerous surveys which provide such raw data. Although the number of surveys available for full access is not as extensive as the number of surveys available for topline analyses (used in Part I), the data are sufficient for longitudinal analysis and statistical estimation.

Of the numerous measures of support for Israel we discussed in the first part of the book, we focus in the next three chapters on five measures of support for Israel that offer sufficient data for longitudinal group analysis and meaningful statistical modeling and that incorporate a variety of aspects of support for Israel. Our first measure is favorability, which we examined in Chapter 3 (and will turn back to in Chapter 7). This measure indicates people's affect toward Israel, an important heuristic in explaining attitudes. We discussed the additional measures in Chapter 4. The second and third measures of support encompass a choice between the two sides in the conflict—sympathizing with Israel or with the Arabs/Palestinians and blaming the Arabs/Palestinians or Israel for events in the conflict. Given what we know about public perceptions both of Israel as an American ally and of most Arab nations (see Chapter 3) and given the strong support for Israel that we document in Chapter 4, we expect high and relatively consistent levels of public support for Israel across most demographic groups for each of these measures of support. A fourth measure of support assesses attitudes toward Israel's use of force in the conflict. As we demonstrated in Chapter 4, this is a contested issue, where we see the greatest variation in overall public support. We expect this variation to manifest itself in our comparison of demographic and political groups. Finally, we compare group differences in support for providing Israel with aid (economic, military, both or unspecified). This is a particularly interesting measure because most Americans usually oppose foreign aid but favor aid to Israel. Of all the measures, it is also the only one that captures a direct American involvement.

For each of these measures, we collected all surveys that are available for full, raw data, download and that include at least one demographic or political indicator of interest. Table 5.2 lists the scope of data for each measure of support. We list the number of surveys that are available for each measure and the range of years for which data are available. We also provide an example survey question for each measure of support, as a reminder of the items we are interested in.

Our dependent variable in our trend analyses and in all of our models is support for Israel—as defined by each of the five series. For each item, we code support for Israel responses as 1 and no support for Israel responses as 0 (item nonresponse excluded). This allows us to identify patterns that consistently emerge across measures as well as patterns that are unique to different types of support for Israel. As Table 5.2 reveals, all but the aid variable can easily be coded this way. Aid consists of three responses: increase, decrease or keep the same. As we demonstrated in Chapter 4, Israel is unique in that unlike their relative opposition to foreign aid, most Americans favor keeping aid to Israel the same or even increasing it. We therefore

TABLE 5.2 Individual-Level Data on Support for Israel

Measure	*Number Surveys*	*Years*	*Example Wording*	*Response Categories*[a]
Favorability	38	1982–1984, 1986, 1988–1989, 1991–1993, 1996, 1998–2001, 2006, 2009–2011, 2014	Is your overall opinion of Israel very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable?[3]	Very favorable; Mostly favorable; Mostly unfavorable; Very unfavorable
Sympathy	132	1948–1949, 1956, 1964, 1967, 1969–1970, 1973–1975, 1977–1986, 1988–1993, 1997–2007, 2009–2014, 2016, 2017	In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?[4]	Israelis; Palestinians
Blame	23	1989, 1991, 2000–2003, 2006, 2009, 2014	Regardless of your overall feelings toward Israel and the Palestinians, who do you think is more to blame for the recent violence—Israel or the Palestinians?[5]	Palestinians; Israel
Force	30	1956, 1978, 1988, 2000–2002, 2006, 2009–2010, 2012, 2014	Do you think Israel was justified or unjustified in taking military action against Hamas and the Palestinians in the area known as Gaza?[6]	Justified; Unjustified
Aid	37	1975, 1981–1982, 1985–1992, 1994, 1998–1999, 2001–2002, 2006, 2012, 2014	Thinking about the financial aid the United States provides Israel for military purposes, do you think US military aid to Israel should be—increased, kept the same or decreased?[7]	Increased; Kept the same; Decreased

a Nonresponse categories (both/neither/don't know/refused) excluded.

code both increase and keep the same—i.e., expressing support for aid to Israel—as 1 and code decrease—i.e., expressing no support for aid to Israel—as 0.[8]

As a robustness check of the generalizability of the subset of surveys used in this part of the book, we compare in Figure 5.1 the data in our topline series and the individual-level series for each of the five series. Hollow dots represent the percentage of respondents that expressed a pro-Israel position in each survey.



FIGURE 5.1 Five Measures of Support for Israel

Note: Topline data: *N* = 63,184 in 59 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 287,699 in 209 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 35,217 in 32 surveys (Blame); *N* = 66,105 in 57 surveys (Force); *N* = 72,860 in 49 surveys (Aid).

Individual-level data: *N* = 34,518 in 38 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 108,303 in 132 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 14,208 in 23 surveys (Blame); *N* = 24,343 in 30 surveys (Force); *N* = 42,456 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Light dots are surveys in topline series; dark dots are surveys in individual series. Reference group is the category showing no support for Israel (nonresponses are excluded). The lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8. Under each panel, we include the Pearson correlation coefficient of the two series and the *t* coefficient testing the mean difference between them.

The trends are very similar, correlations are high and significant and mean differences indicate insignificant differences in the level of support measured in most series. The only exception is the favorability series, where we see a weak significant difference despite an extremely strong correlation coefficient. This, however, is mostly a result of a substantial difference in one year (1998). When the surveys from that year are removed, the difference is not significant (and correlation remains high).

The similar trends and the statistical indications of similarities demonstrate that our individual series are sufficiently representative of the overall trend. This is important for our descriptive analysis of longitudinal trends of group support, where we separate between the discrete categories of each demographic indicator. For instance, with regard to gender, we plot the percentage of support for

Israel among men alongside the percentage of support among women for each of the six measures of support discussed earlier. These trends provide a first glance at group-level variation and how it develops over time.

In Table 5.3, we list the categories that we focus on for each demographic and political indicator (the latter two will be discussed in Chapter 6).

Several of the variables include additional categories that we dropped because the data do not allow them to adequately compare to other categories (there are too few respondents in each survey that fall into these categories). For example, on race, Asian-Americans appear only in the most recent surveys and are too small a group for comparison. Similarly, on education, because of the decline in the number of people with no high school diploma, we compare people without higher education (whether they completed high school or not) and people with some higher education.[9]

For each of the demographic divides, we first plot the support of each group and assess longitudinal differences. We then examine the independent additive effect of each group on support for Israel using a series of regression models that estimate support for Israel using the demographic and political predictors listed in Table 5.3, as well as several time varying indicators and measure-specific instruments, as described later. These models have the advantage of assessing the independent effect of each predictor while taking into account the potential effect of other important variables. We estimate a separate regression for each of the five measures of support: Favorability, sympathies, blame, use of force and foreign aid. Given the binary distribution of each of our measures, we estimate binary logistic regressions for each.

TABLE 5.3 Demographic Indicators

Demographic Indicator	*Categories*
Gender	Female, *Male*
Age Groups	18–29, *30–49*, 50–64, 65+
Race	Black, Hispanic, *White*
Education	College/More, *High School/Less*
Religion	Protestant, *Catholic*, All Other Christians, Jewish, All Else
Region[a]	Northeast, Midwest, *South*, West
Generations	GI (1901–1924), Silent (1925–1945), *Baby Boomers (1946–1960)*, X (1961–1980), Y (1981–1999)[b]
Protestant Denomination	*Mainline*, Evangelical
Party Identification	*Democrat*, Independent, Republican
Ideology	*Liberal*, Moderate, Conservative

Note: Categories in *italics* represent the reference category in the appropriate statistical model.

a Based on survey classification.

b Some definitions end Generation Y in 1995, at which point Generation Z begins. Since very few respondents in our data were born in 1996 onwards, we pool them together with Generation Y.

The data used in the statistical models are more limited than the data described in Table 5.2 and compared to the topline data in Figure 5.1 because the models include a series of indicators that are not available in all surveys (and are discussed later). Some of the datasets, therefore, are not representative of overall trends. Yet the interest in these models is not to examine longitudinal trends but to assess the independent marginal effect of a range of demographic and political indicators.

Throughout the chapter we will make use of three models, each applied separately to the five measures of support with minimal differences. The first series of models, upon which most of this and the following chapters rely, estimates support for Israel using the following predictors: Gender, age groups, race, education, religion, region and party. This chapter focuses on demographic differences. We devote the next chapter to evaluate the independent effect of political party and the association of party labels with other sources of divide.

In the second series of models, we replace age groups with generations, and discuss the differences between age and generation effects. Finally, we estimate a third series of models that compares mainline and evangelical Christians. Because only a quarter of the surveys include an instrument to measure evangelical faith (born-again Christian), this model is based on a more limited subset of the data.

In all models, we include several model-specific controls relating to biases that may be caused by variation in question wording. These vary by measure of support. In the sympathy model, we control for whether Israel is contrasted against the Palestinians or all other Arab mentions (see Chapter 4 for a full list). In the model predicting the allocation of blame, we control for whether blame is allocated for recent violence between Israel and the Palestinians, for recent violence between Israel and Hezbollah or for stagnation in the peace process. In the aid model, we control for whether the amount of aid that Israel receives was presented to respondents and whether the item in question referred to economic aid, military aid or both/unspecified.

Finally, because our data span a large range of years and surveys, we account for temporal changes using a continuous year indicator. Given that the data include numerous independent surveys, each of a random representative sample of American adults (or registered voters), we cluster standard errors by survey. Together, these two specifications of the models allow us to control and account for the effect of time.

The first part of the chapter is divided into five sections, one per demographic predictor of interest (age and generation are examined together). In each section, we present our expectations for how the particular demographic indicator may influence support for Israel. Our expectations are based on the rich body of literature discussing group-level variation in attitudes toward foreign policy, and where possible, we incorporate existing research on such variation in attitudes specifically toward Israel. Gilboa (1987) offers the most comprehensive analysis of demographic variation on the issue of Israel. Very few additional studies provide us with sufficient empirical evidence about the demographic sources of

American attitudes toward Israel. We therefore rely on and draw from existing work when we can, sometimes using only anecdotal evidence that is available.

The second part examines temporal changes over time. We discuss temporal changes for only three demographic divides for which we found some evidence of change: race, education and religion (evangelicals). We estimate the change only on sympathies, our richest and longest series.

This chapter provides the reader with an updated rich, and systematic analysis of group variation in support for Israel on a wide range of issues relating to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict over time. The marginal differences we find here serve as a strong baseline to Chapter 6, where we assess the increasing partisan divide that currently characterizes American public opinion toward Israel.

Assessing Group Differences in Support for Israel

In each of the following sections, we present a descriptive plot illustrating the longitudinal trends across all five measures of support for Israel, broken down by demographic groups. These descriptive trends offer strong evidence for any existing divide over time. Further to demonstrate the difference between each demographic group, we estimate statistically the independent effect of the various predictors on support for Israel. In the interest of simplifying the discussion, we discuss and present in the text only the predicted probabilities of supporting Israel of each group across our five measures of support following our regression models.

Predicted probabilities provide an indication of how likely a given respondent is to report a pro-Israel response across our five measures. For each probability, we hold all other predictors constant at their mean and vary only the variable of interest. For example, in the first section, we compare the predicted probability of men and women to report a pro-Israel response, holding all else—age, race, education, religion, party, region, year and question wording—at their mean. Substantially, a useful way of thinking about these probabilities is to imagine groups that are defined by certain characteristics (our predictors). If the probability of group A to support Israel is 0.70 and the probability of group B to support Israel is 0.60, this would be equivalent to saying that for every 10 people in group A, 7 support Israel, and for every 10 people in group B, 6 support Israel.[10] Thus, an increase of 0.1 is a full extra person who is likely to express support for Israel. Overlaying these probabilities with 95 percent confidence intervals provides a useful indicator of the uncertainty of the probabilities.[11] For the interested readers, all models are summarized in the Appendix for this chapter.

Gender

Originally believed to be one of the strongest predictors of attitudes toward foreign policy (Fite, Genest, & Wilcox, 1990; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986), recent studies find that the gender gap on most issues in foreign policy has narrowed.

Scholars find significant difference between men and women today only on the use of force and involvement in war. Generally, women are more likely to support dovish policies, and men more likely to support hawkish policies that involve the use of military force (Andersen, 1997; Berinsky, 2009; Caprioli, 2000; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Eichenberg, 2003, 2016, 2019; Holsti, 2004; Nincic & Nincic, 2002; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Wittkopf, 1990). For example, women were less supportive of many of the American war efforts since World War II (Berinsky, 2009; Mueller, 1973, 1994). This is true unless the use of force is sanctioned by the UN or is used for humanitarian purposes, in which case women often support the use of force more than men (Brooks & Valentino, 2011).

Gilboa suggests that as a political minority with a history of exclusion, women are sometimes more likely to side with the weaker side to a particular conflict, which is evident in greater sympathies toward Israel (Gilboa, 1987). Yet Israel has changed over time from a weak country in a hostile neighborhood to a strong country occupying territories and people.

We therefore expect to find negligible differences between men and women (women showing weaker support for Israel). We expect to find the largest differences on support for the use of force, where women tend to be less supportive.

In Figure 5.2, we plot the longitudinal trends of female and male responses to the five measures of support for Israel. Hollow dots represent the percentage of respondents within each group that expressed a pro-Israel position in each survey (women in black, men in gray). The lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8. We use similar conventions for all plots throughout the chapter.

Differences in support for Israel between men and women are neither common nor large. Even on issues such as sympathy, where women seemed slightly less sympathetic to Israel in its first few decades, the gap has since disappeared. Only two issues show a meaningful difference: Favorability and Israel's use of force. Consistent with the parallel publics thesis (Page & Shapiro, 1992), favorability toward Israel has increased for both men and women, and the percent of favorable views among men has consistently been slightly higher compared to women (on average a little over 4 percentage points). This is even more pronounced on the question of Israel's use of force (aside from the 1956 data point), where the average difference is about eight percentage points and is fairly consistent.

Figure 5.3 summarizes the predicted probabilities of men and women that we calculated following the logistic regressions. All other factors and variables are held constant at their means. The bars represent the predicted value, which is listed above each bar, and the vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.



FIGURE 5.2 Longitudinal Trends of Gender Differences in Support for Israel

Note: N = 34,513 in 38 surveys (Favorability); N = 107,243 in 131 surveys (Sympathy); N = 13,230 in 21 surveys (Blame); N = 23,189 in 28 surveys (Force); N = 42,258 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.3 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Gender

Note: Gender differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

This figure illustrates that on most items, differences are negligible, and both men and women are almost always more likely to support Israel than they are to oppose it. Favorability is 4 points lower among women compared to men. As expected, the most meaningful difference is on Israel's use of force. Not only is the expected female support 12 points lower than their male counterparts, but this is the only item where the uncertainty of the effect, illustrated by the 95 percent confidence intervals, crosses the 0.5 threshold. In other words, women may be equally likely to support Israel's use of force as to oppose it.

Age & Generation

There is little reason to expect major differences between age groups concerning Israel. Most studies of foreign policy attitudes suggest that such differences are small, rare, and inconsistent (Holsti, 2004). In other words, no single age group has been consistently more or less militant, nor more or less interventionist. As Page and Shapiro (1992, p. 303) put it (referencing studies by Mueller, 1973, and Rosenberg, Verba, & Converse, 1970):

> On the one hand, the youngest cohort in the post-Vietnam period has been the most opposed to the draft or national service—by as much as 20% or more. On the other hand, during important periods in recent history, the young were actually the most enthusiastic backers of an activist (even militant) foreign policy.

Others suggest that while age may not affect attitudes, generational differences do. People's attitudes are largely shaped by contemporary political and environmental conditions that they experienced as young adults, usually ages 17 to 25 (Billingsley & Tucker, 1987; Campbell, 1971; Mannheim, 1964; Neumann, 1939). Yet, evidence of such differences on foreign issues is inconsistent. Several studies (Converse & Schuman, 1970; Erskine, 1970; Mueller, 1973; Lunch & Sperlich, 1979; Mayer, 1992) suggest that generation gaps in foreign policy attitudes are "not unambiguously supported by empirical evidence" (Holsti, 2004, p. 159). Generation gaps hardly exist according to empirical data and when they do, they often disappear when controlling for other indicators, such as occupation (Holsti & Rosenau, 1980). This body of literature suggests two important points about foreign affairs. First, to answer the question of the influence of personal time, we should examine differences in both life-cycles (age) and generations. Second, differences on both accounts, if exist, should be small.

The studies surveyed earlier relate specifically to wars in which the United States was directly involved—and were met by large domestic opposition, at least in their later stages. Supporting Israel involves little American involvement, and when

it does, it is in the form of aid rather than the use of American troops or military action. Attitudes about Israel may be related to different values, world perspectives or social identities that vary between age groups and generations rather than views that relate more specifically to America's role in the world.

There is, however, a clear gap in the literature regarding age and generational differences on the issue of Israel. Gilboa (1987, p. 288) finds that, on the topic of Israel, "young adults, more than any other age groups, have sympathized with Israel and have supported its policies and the granting of U.S. aid to that country." His data, however, end in 1985, and therefore the difference Gilboa finds among the young generation of that time may be a life cycle effect or a generational effect. This is supported by more recent work suggesting that younger Americans are withdrawing their support for Israel (Cavari, 2012).

If it is a life cycle effect, we may find that as people age, their opinion toward Israel changes (declining support). We argue instead that a generation effect better explains time variation in public support for Israel. Baby boomers were born after World War II and the Holocaust, witnessed Israel's establishment as a democracy and came to political maturation in the 1960s and 1970s when Israel's part in the Cold War was at its peak. Later generations matured toward the end of the Cold War or even after it, during a time when Israel's complicated relationship with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination stands at the center of the conflict. We therefore expect baby boomers to have higher levels of support for Israel compared to the subsequent generations (X and Y). The youngest cohort (Y) matured during the height of militant conflicts between Israel and Palestinian groups, mostly in Gaza. We expect this generation to have the weakest support for Israel.

Figure 5.4 plots the longitudinal trends of our five measures of support for Israel divided by four age-groups: 18–29, 30–49, 50–64 and 65 or older. Differences between age groups are small. Similar to Gilboa's findings, the group that sticks out as most different is the youngest group, aged 18–29. But contrary to Gilboa's findings, this group consistently reports weaker support for Israel: Less favorable of Israel, weaker sympathies toward Israel, lower rates of blame for Israel's adversaries, more divided on support for Israel's use of force and marginally smaller support for US aid to Israel. Other age groups exhibit less-consistent differences.

The differences are also illustrated using predicted probabilities following our regression model. Figure 5.5 illustrates the high levels of support for Israel among all four age groups, along with a relatively consistent pattern: The probability of support is usually highest among the two middle-aged groups and usually lowest among the youngest age group (18–29). The uncertainty of the probabilities, indicated by the 95 percent confidence intervals, points to an almost split probability of supporting Israel among 18–29 on both favorability and the use of force.



FIGURE 5.4 Longitudinal Trends of Age Differences in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 33,210 in 38 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 101,134 in 127 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 13,989 in 23 surveys (Blame); *N* = 22,405 in 28 surveys (Force); *N* = 42,218 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.5 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Age Group

Note: Age differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

These patterns are somewhat different than those that Gilboa (1987) finds, and we argue that this is because the 1985 data captured a generational effect, not a life cycle one. That is, the young cohort in 1985 supported Israel not because they were young (age effect) but because the events that this cohort was exposed to when they were maturing (politically) affected their views of Israel in a way that made them the most supportive cohort in the United States. Growing up in the late 1960s and 1970s, this group was coming to political maturity when Israel was viewed as a small democratic country able to fight strong and large enemies and retain its liberal values (Mitelpunkt, 2018). To test this, we estimate the same models as before, but instead of age indicators, we use generation indicators (Pew Research Center, 2020), as described in Table 5.3. The full regression table is available in the Appendix for this chapter.

In Figure 5.6, we plot the longitudinal trends of support for Israel along the same five issues, by generation. With five categories and a great deal of overlap, it is difficult to identify meaningful differences, and most seem small. Still, the plot illustrates that the Silent Generation and the baby boomers are usually more supportive of Israel compared to later generations. More importantly, later generations, specifically X and Y, are less supportive of Israel, especially on the use of force and aid.



FIGURE 5.6 Longitudinal Trends of Generational Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 33,210 in 38 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 101,005 in 127 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 13,989 in 23 surveys (Blame); *N* = 22,405 in 28 surveys (Force); *N* = 42,118 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.7 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Generation

Note: Generational differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.5 in the Appendix for this chapter.

The predicted probabilities following our regression models, summarized in Figure 5.7, are consistent with the descriptive trends.[12] Support for Israel among the GI generation is significantly lower than that of the baby boomers on three topics: Sympathy, blame and Israel's use of force. The Silent Generation largely resembles the baby boomers, except on Israel's use of force, where it is significantly less supportive. As for the generations following the baby boomers, both Generation X and Y exhibit significantly lower levels of support for Israel on sympathies and approval of Israel's use of force, although the difference is substantially larger for Generation Y. Generation X also shows significantly lower levels of favorability, and Generation Y is significantly lower on the question of blame. Only on aid both of these generations are statistically similar to the baby boomers in their support for Israel. (For statistical comparisons, see Table 5.3 in the Appendix for this chapter.)

This analysis suggests that generational differences are much more meaningful for support for Israel than are life cycles (age). While differences remain small, the trend is clear—younger generations are less supportive of Israel compared to older generations. This raises important questions on how support for Israel will progress in the future, as older generations who grew up in the shadow of WWII, the Holocaust and Israel's initial struggle to exist among strong countries

supported by Russia, take up smaller shares of American society. Younger generations who do not share these memories and are less supportive of Israel will slowly become the majority of American society. This may alter the structure and strength of public support for Israel. We suggest this with great caution because generational views depend on future events, both in Israel and in the United States, events that can alter the direction of future trends, especially among younger generations. (See, for example, Cavari & Freedman, 2019, on the impact of 9/11 on public attitudes toward Israel specifically; and Powlick & Katz, 1998, on the role of events in activating latent opinions on foreign policy more broadly).

Race

Race represents one of the most pervasive cleavages in American society, which is evident in diverging preferences on most national issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001). While foreign policy isn't commonly linked to the issues that usually characterize racial divides (discrimination, inequality, immigration, welfare, etc.), attitudes toward foreign policy nonetheless differ along racial lines by greater margins than the indicators we have discussed thus far.

We focus on three of the largest racial groups in the United States: White, African-Americans and Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Available survey data offer very limited samples to adequately assess attitudes among other, smaller, racial minorities.

A rich body of work suggests that African-Americans prefer isolationist policies (Hero, 1959; Holsti, 2004; Hughes, 1978; Watts & Free, 1973; Wittkopf, 1990; see also Nincic & Nincic, 2002). This is explained by the disproportionate representation of African-Americans in the military and greater numbers of African-American casualties in wars (Holsti, 2004; Page & Shapiro, 1992). Hispanics report similar attitudes as whites, though they support more interventionist policies compared to the white population (see Abrajano & Alvarez, 2011, for an analysis of Hispanic attitudes toward foreign policy).

Existing work suggests a similar pattern with respect to support for Israel: Highest support among whites, lowest support among African-Americans and Hispanics somewhere in between (Page & Shapiro, 1992). Page and Shapiro (1992, p. 300) suggest that some of the factors that contributed to this are the "declining rapport between blacks and Jews in the United States and more identification by blacks with the Palestinians' cause." Many African-Americans identify with the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and view the Israeli-Palestinian relationship through the lens of white-black oppression (Gilboa, 1987). To be clear, they do not oppose Israel, but their expected support for Israel is lower than that of the American white population.

As a minority, Hispanics are also expected to show lower levels of support for the stronger Israeli side. Furthermore, Hispanics who are new immigrants

may have carried with them the cultural views of Israel from their country of origin, views that are usually less supportive of Israel (BenLevi, Cavari, & Terris, 2019). Assimilation processes suggest these differences are usually smaller compared to African-Americans, and Hispanics often develop attitudes that resemble the white majority (Cain, Kiewiet, & Uhlaner, 1991; Marom Melnik & Cavari, 2015; Smeltz & Kafura, 2015). We therefore expect their support for Israel to vary between the lower margin of African-Americans and the higher margin of whites.

Figure 5.8 demonstrates the longitudinal trends of these three groups across the five measures of support for Israel. Aside from aid where all three groups are similar, all of the remaining measures exhibit a similar pattern: Support for Israel among white respondents is consistently higher compared to African-Americans. The trend for Hispanic respondents is less consistent. On favorability, blame, use of force and aid, they resemble the African-American population. On sympathy, they are somewhat closer to the white population.

The results of the statistical models and the predicted probabilities (Figure 5.9) support the divide as illustrated by the overall trend lines. Aside from aid, the expected level of support for Israel among the African-American population is significantly lower than white respondents on all of the remaining five



FIGURE 5.8 Longitudinal Trends of Racial Differences in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 33,070 in 38 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 102,024 in 130 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 13,469 in 23 surveys (Blame); *N* = 22,368 in 30 surveys (Force); *N* = 41,122 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.9 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Race

Note: Racial differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

measures, and this difference is often large, ranging from 3 to 16 points. Moreover, on two measures, African-Americans are not necessarily likely to express a pro-Israel position: They are likely to disapprove of Israel's use of force and are equally likely to hold a favorable view of Israel as they are to hold an unfavorable view.

The Hispanic population is consistently situated between the two groups (aside from aid, where there is no significant difference). This group is likely to support Israel on all measures, although the uncertainty regarding Israel's use of force is large enough to suggest they may be split on this issue. Even so, their support is significantly lower compared to the white population on all measures aside from aid and Israel's use of force, and either equal to that of the African-American population or slightly higher.

Education

The link between education and foreign policy attitudes has been validated repeatedly in scholarly work, all pointing to a consistent trend in which higher levels of education—college or more—are associated with greater support for increased American involvement in international affairs. This is especially true for cooperative internationalism, that is, using diplomacy, treaties, international organizations

and foreign aid to solve international problems. Educated respondents are not as supportive of militant internationalism and of relying on military force to solve international problems as are less educated respondents (Bruner, 1944; Hero, 1959, 1969; Hughes, 1978; Watts & Free, 1973; Wittkopf, 1990 in Holsti, 2004; see also Page & Bouton, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Schneider, 1974).

Examining attitudes toward Israel, Gilboa (1987) finds that more educated respondents exhibit higher levels of support for Israel across several measures. Nevertheless, any analysis up to 1987 may be substantively different than after 1987 when Palestinians took part in their first major popular uprising (the First Intifada). The conflict has since transitioned from one between Israel and several Arab states to a conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people. As our analysis of the effect of age and generation reveals, this change in the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict can explain why some of Gilboa's (1987) findings may no longer hold in the twenty-first century.

Drawing from the broader work on foreign policy listed previously, we may expect a different pattern than the one found by Gilboa. Specifically, we expect that people with higher levels of education are likely to express greater support for Israel in the form of aid—a means of cooperative internationalism—but are less likely to support Israel's use of force—a militant form of internationalism. Higher education may also be associated with stronger critique of Israel: More educated respondents may be more critical of Israel's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict regarding human rights, the Palestinians' right to self-determination and territorial occupation disputes (Gries, 2014; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1987).

In Figure 5.10 we present the trends of support for Israel divided by educational attainment. We distinguish between those with a college education (or higher) and those without a college education.[13] Differences based on education are very small. On most issues, there appears to be no difference at all. On favorability, respondents with a college degree have a more favorable opinion of Israel than those without academic education. On sympathy, we see a shift in the education gap. Until the mid-1980s, people with higher education had, on average, more favorable views of Israel (which is consistent with Gilboa's findings). Since then, people with no academic education have increasingly showed more favorable opinions. On all other issues, we find no clear pattern of an education gap.

Figure 5.11 illustrates these differences using predicted probabilities generated from our regression models. The most striking finding is the difference between favorability and all other measures of support. People with higher education are *more* likely to have a favorable view of Israel than people without academic education. Yet people with higher education are *less* likely to support Israel on most other measures of support. Although the differences are small, the consistency calls for attention. What explains this discrepancy?

We suggest that this discrepancy may be explained by the interrelation between education and information and their effect on policy positions (Price & Zaller, 1993; Zaller, 1992). As we discussed in Chapter 3 (and will assess in greater



FIGURE 5.10 Longitudinal Trends of Educational Differences in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 34,267 in 38 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 104,811 in 128 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 14,113 in 23 surveys (Blame); *N* = 23,629 in 29 surveys (Force); *N* = 42,066 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.11 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Education

Note: Educational differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

detail in Chapter 7), favorability can serve as a heuristic shortcut for taking a position on Israel when knowledge is scarce: People rely on their affect for Israel when asked about specific policies in the region. This, however, takes a different form among the educated, who rely more on systematic processing of information, than the non-educated, who hold less information and revert to their cues. Educated respondents are likely to hold more information about politics in general (Delli-Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Page & Shapiro, 1992) and about the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically because they are more likely to consume relevant news (Baum, 2003; Gilboa, 1987; Holsti, 2004). Knowledgeable respondents may, therefore, simultaneously view Israel favorably—because they appreciate its democratic nature, take into consideration its history or are better aware of its role as a US ally—and hold critical views of specific policies, especially when these might infringe on the rights of others or involve militant action. In contrast, unknowledgeable respondents may compensate for their lack of knowledge by relying on their positive affect toward Israel to form their opinions about specific policies.

We test this hypothesis empirically using a mediation model, which allows us to examine the direct effect of education on the various policy measures of support for Israel and the indirect effect that is mediated by favorability (Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010; Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2010, 2011; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014). We summarize the model in Figure 5.12 (left panel). The direct path represents the effect of education on policy preferences that is not mediated by the affect heuristic (and therefore, information is presumably responsible for the effect). The indirect path represents the effect of education on support for Israel that is mediated through the affect heuristic (measured using favorability).

To test this theoretical model, we use a subset of the data that includes all surveys that ask the favorability measure and one of the four remaining measures. In our models, we control for sex, age, race, religion, party, region and year (as well as any model-specific controls accounting for variation in question wording).[14]

If our hypothesis is correct, the indirect path should either be positive (and significant)—suggesting that part of the effect of education on support for Israel is positively mediated through the affect heuristic—or insignificant, suggesting that affect is not important for explaining educational differences. More important for this purpose is the direct path: We should expect a significant negative effect here, because this represents the effect of education on support for Israel that is not mediated through affect. This is the effect of knowledge that may translate into a stronger critique. The results are summarized in the middle and right panel of Figure 5.12.

The middle panel illustrates the results of the mediation model. Bars represent the effect, and 95 percent confidence intervals are presented using the horizontal lines (a significant effect is one in which the 95% CI do not include 0). The average causal mediation effect (ACME) captures the indirect effect in each model. The average direct effect (ADE) captures the direct effect in each model. The panel on the right summarizes the proportion of the effect that is mediated.



FIGURE 5.12 The Role of Affect in Explaining Educational Differences

Note: Mediation model estimated using the "mediation" package in R (Imai et al., 2010; Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014). Models estimated while controlling for gender, age, race, religion, party, region and year (as well as any model-specific controls accounting for variation on question wording).

ACME (average causal mediation effect) captures the indirect effect that is mediated through affect. ADE is the average direct effect of education on measures of support for Israel. Bars represent the effects. Horizontal lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect.

N = 9,501 in nine surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 1,559 in two surveys (Blame); *N* = 786 in one survey (Force); *N* = 4,214 in three surveys (Aid).

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

As the figure suggests, the indirect effect is positive and significant only on sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict and on providing aid to Israel. On these two measures, favorability is a useful heuristic: Educated respondents have a more favorable opinion of Israel, which translates to support for Israel. The proportion of the effect that is mediated indicates that roughly a third of the difference between education levels is mediated through favorability (0.37 on sympathy and 0.29 on aid). The mediation effect on the two additional measures—blame[15] and Israel's use of force—is not significant (middle panel), and the proportion mediated is statistically 0 (right panel).

Most important for the discussion here is the average direct effect (ADE). On the four measures, the direct effect of education is consistently negative and significant. Thus, after distinguishing between a possible heuristic-based effect (ACME) and an information effect (ADE), the more educated respondents—those who likely know more about the conflict—are less likely to support Israel.

These results confirm our expectation that education is inversely associated with support for Israel and help explain the somewhat contradictory results in Figure 5.10: The more educated respondents have a more favorable opinion of Israel but express lower levels of support for Israel since they rely less on heuristics and more on information. When they rely on heuristics—roughly a third of the time—it operates in the expected direction.

Religion

There are two particularly important religious groups in American society with respect to Israel. The first, of course, is Jewish Americans. The second is evangelical Christians. We review each and test their effect on support for Israel.

Although Jewish Americans are a small minority in the United States (roughly 1.5–2% of the population, see Pew Research Center, 2013), they are important because of their unique attachment to Israel. The attachment that many American Jews have to Israel and its status as the home of the Jewish people suggests that support for Israel among Jewish Americans should be the highest among all other American religious groups. We find that this is indeed the case but that it has declined somewhat in recent years, probably due to two major changes. First, the transformation of the issue from a bipartisan one to a partisan one, which may have created a conflict of opinions for many Jews (Druks, 2001; Goren, 1999; Stein, 2011). Jewish Americans have traditionally been a strong Democratic voter-base and show high levels of support for several liberal policies, foreign and domestic (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Campbell, Green, & Layman, 2011; Forman, 2001). Recent partisan differences in support for Israel among party elites (Cavari & Freedman, 2019) may create a tension between Jewish liberal inclinations and their support for Israel (Becker, 2016; Kotler-Berkowitz, 2005; Sasson, 2009). We discuss this further in Chapter 6. Second, younger Jewish generations increasingly feel detached from Israel culturally, religiously and politically (Cohen & Kelman, 2010) and are less politically deferential to Israel and more divided over policy issues (Rynhold, 2015; Waxman, 2017).

The second important religious group is evangelical Christians. The demographic and political emergence of this group has had several important implications for American politics (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Spector, 2009). Regarding foreign policy, evangelicals often support hawkish views, especially on Islam, terrorism and the Middle East conflict (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Boyer, 2005; Smidt, 2005). According to the modern beliefs among many evangelicals, Israel, a land given to the Jewish people by God, is a confirmation of biblical prophecies that reinforce the belief in Christ's return. Therefore, support for Israel is particularly high among this group because of Israel's central role in their religious doctrine (Carenen, 2012; Cavari, 2013; Davies, 2018; Goldman, 2018; Hummel, 2019; Mayer, 2004; Spector, 2009).

We begin by plotting in Figure 5.13 attitudes toward Israel by major religious groups—for now not dividing evangelicals from mainline Protestants. American Jews are represented by the black solid line, which is consistently and substantially higher than any other religious group throughout most of the period examined and across most issues. Note, however, that on some issues there is a clear decline over time. This is particularly evident on favorability and sympathy, where this decline is not occurring in parallel to the trends of other religious groups. Support among Protestants is generally higher than other groups, especially Catholics. The margin is much smaller, though.



FIGURE 5.13 Longitudinal Trends of Religious Differences in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 24,261 in 25 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 89,700 in 106 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 10,681 in 17 surveys (Blame); *N* = 13,258 in 16 surveys (Force); *N* = 41,652 in 24 surveys (Aid). We exclude other Christian denominations from the figure. Other/none refers to all non-Christian, non-Jewish religions or to identifying as agnostic/atheist.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

According to our statistical model, Jewish Americans are significantly more likely to support Israel across all measures. Protestants are more likely to do so on three of the five measures—favorability, sympathies and aid. We illustrate these differences in Figure 5.14 using predicted probabilities following the regression model.

Jewish support for Israel towers above all other religious groups, ranging from a low probability of 0.83 on Israel's use of force (which has proven in this chapter to be the most controversial issue) to a high of 0.97 on sympathies. The figure also illustrates the relatively consistent difference between Protestants and Catholics, with Protestant support slightly higher than that of Catholics. Support for Israel among the catch-all category for other religions, including Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists, is significantly lower in each category. Differences on aid are again smallest, except for the overwhelming support among Jewish Americans.

In Figure 5.15, we distinguish between evangelical Protestants and mainline Protestants (i.e., Protestants who did not identify as evangelicals). For this comparison, we use a subset of the data that includes only surveys that probe respondents whether they consider themselves evangelical or born-again Christians.[16]

The data are clearly not as rich as other indicators in this chapter. Nonetheless, for the most part, they illustrate the tendency for greater support for Israel among evangelicals than among mainline Protestants. Using the subset of the



FIGURE 5.14 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Religion

Note: Religious differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. We exclude other Christian denominations from the figure. Other/none refers to all non-Christian, non-Jewish religions or to identifying as agnostic/atheist. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.



FIGURE 5.15 Comparing Mainline and Evangelical Trends of Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 2,615 in six surveys (Favorability); *N* = 13,228 in 29 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 3,131 in 11 surveys (Blame); *N* = 2,214 in six surveys (Force); *N* = 3,546 in five surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.



FIGURE 5.16 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Protestant Denomination

Note: Differences between evangelical Christians and mainline Protestants in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.6 in the Appendix for this chapter.

data that includes an evangelical indicator, we estimate the same model on four of the issues using the same predictors—gender, age, race, education, party, religion, region and model-specific controls—but our religious indicators now distinguish between evangelicals and mainline Protestants.[17]

As expected, support for Israel among evangelical Protestants is significantly and substantially higher than that of mainline Protestants on all measures. We illustrate this using predicted probabilities in Figure 5.16 (see also the regression table in the Appendix for this chapter). For ease of comparison, we only plot the predicted probabilities of mainline and evangelical Protestants. On average, evangelical support is 6–12 points higher than mainline Protestants.

Of particular interest is favorability. The descriptive trends on favorability did not point to a large difference, but it is quite large, according to the predicted probabilities. This may be due to the inclusion of other influential variables.

A Brief Summary

Reviewing demographic sources of attitudes toward Israel suggests that gender, age and education do not divide Americans in support for Israel, at least not strongly. Many of the differences we found among these groups were inconsistent across various measures of support for Israel. Moreover, even when we find differences, they are often small and do not point to a clear divide.

Three demographic sources, however, are meaningful for understanding the divide on attitudes toward Israel: Religion, race and generation. Religion has

become the most important demographic source of attitudes toward Israel, with significantly high levels of support among Protestants, especially evangelical Protestants, and, of course, American Jews. Racial differences suggest that support is usually higher among whites compared to African-Americans and Hispanics. Finally, generations that reached adulthood in the 1980s onwards express lower levels of support for Israel compared to earlier generations. As older generations exit the population, this may have dire consequences for future American public support for Israel.

Temporal Changes

While we find only little overall average differences between most demographic groups, these may mask changes in public support where some groups are becoming more supportive of Israel over time. For the most part, the descriptive trends mentioned do not support this conclusion. Religious, racial, generational and other small differences have been relatively consistent and have tended to vary in parallel (Page & Shapiro, 1992). But we require an empirical test of temporal changes that is more rigourous than descriptive plots.

To test the temporal changes statistically, we estimate our original models on each survey separately and save the coefficient (along with 95% confidence intervals) to examine if and how the coefficient changes over time. We do this only for the sympathy measure, because it is the only one that provides a sufficiently long time period with frequent measurements (favorability is also a frequently measured item, but we find no temporal changes in it for demographic groups).

We present here only three cases of interest where we find some minimal temporal changes: Race, education and religion. Consistent with most descriptive trends, we find no differences for all other demographics. For the most part, within-group change over time is rare. In most cases, coefficients remain relatively the same, and movement is minimal.

Race

Figure 5.17 illustrates this trend for race. The dots represent the effect (coefficient) from the logistic model of African-Americans and of Hispanics (whites serve as the reference category). The solid line is a Lowess smoothing line, which better illustrate the underlying trend of the coefficeint. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals.

The left panel plots the coeefficients for African-Americans (vs. whites). Symapthies with Israel among African-Americans have usually been lower than that of the white population. The coefficient becomes smaller over time, suggesting the large and relatively consistent gap between African-Americans and white Americans in the 1970s–1980s has, in the early 2000s, narrowed, becoming less significant over time.

The right panel plots the coefficients for Hispanic (vs. whites). Here, the gap is smaller and shows minimal change over time. Most surveys, in fact,



FIGURE 5.17 The Changing Effect of Race, Over Time

Note: Dependent variable: Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Dots represent the coefficients in a single survey for African-Americans (left) and Hispanics (right) compared to the white population. Solid line represents a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.8. Dashed lines represent upper and lower bound of the 95 percent CI associated with each coefficient.

indicate no significant effect between Hispanics and whites, and the negative coefficient we witnessed in previous models is a result of a few surveys, especially in the early 2000s, which are negative and significantly different from zero.

Education

The pattern for education is particularly interesting. Recall that the descriptive trends on sympathies suggest that the two education groups—with or without academic education—flip in their sympathies toward Israel. Naturally, the average predicted probabilities indicate no significant difference between the two groups. The change in coefficient for educated respondents, illustrated in Figure 5.18, reveal the changing effect of education. Consistent with Gilboa (1987), educated Americans tended to symapthize more with Israel than with Arabs. Gradually, over time, educated respondents shifted, and they have become *less* likely to sympathize with Israel, especially in the last two decades.

Religion

Perhaps the most important trend is in the change in coefficient for evangelical Protestants. Figure 5.19 illustrates the difference between evangelical Protestants and mainline Protestants over time. The difference between evangelicals and mainline Protestants seems to grow gradually over time. Thus, evangelical



FIGURE 5.18 The Changing Effect of Education, Over Time

Note: Dependent variable: Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Dots represent the coefficients in a single survey for college-educated respondents compared to respondents with a high school education or less. Solid line represents a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.8. Dashed lines represent upper and lower bound of the 95 percent CI associated with each coefficient.



FIGURE 5.19 The Changing Effect of Evangelical Protestants, Over Time

Note: Dependent variable: Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Dots represent the coefficients in a single survey for evangelical respondents compared to mainline Protestants. Solid line represents a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.8. Dashed lines represent upper and lower bound of the 95 percent CI associated with each coefficient.

Christians are increasingly becoming more supportive of Israel compared to mainline Protestants. This is the only demographic divide we find that is growing over time. The results are consistent with the rich scholarly work on the emerging role of the Christian Right in support for Israel (Clark, 2007; Goldman, 2018; Spector, 2009).

Conclusion

Consistent with existing work on foreign policy (Holsti, 2004; Page & Bouton, 2006), we find little variation in support for Israel across most demographic groups. Most differences are small and often inconsistent, and even when variation exists, support for Israel usually remains high across almost all groups over almost all issues. Differences in support for foreign aid are usually smallest. Americans are wary of support for foreign aid, and most of the variation, when it exists, is through partisan differences (Page & Bouton, 2006, p. 197; and see Chapter 6 for partisan differences in support for US foreign aid to Israel). In addition, support for Israel's use of force is usually lower than other measures, and some groups appear somewhat reluctant to support Israel on this topic (women, Generation Y, African-Americans, Hispanics, college educated and non-Christian/Jewish religions).

And yet beyond the overall similarities on most issues, some meaningful differences between demographic groups do stand out: Religious affiliation is particularly important in explaining variation in support for Israel, with the highest levels of support among Jews and evangelical Protestants. We also find that the gap between evangelical Protestants and mainline Protestants has increased over time.

Generational distinctions matter as well: Younger generations (Generation X and especially Generation Y) demonstrate weaker support for Israel compared to older cohorts (especially the generations born immediately before/after WWII, the Silent Generation and the baby boomers).

We find other, weaker, differences, most of which are less consistent: Men are more supportive of Israel than women, college educated are less supportive of Israel than respondents with a high school diploma or less, and whites are more supportive than African-Americans and Hispanics. These gaps, however, are either marginal or have narrowed over time.

In Chapter 6, we turn to political divisions and examine partisan and ideological differences in support for Israel. We also examine the interaction between the effect of social and ideological commitments and the effect of party labels. In Chapter 7, we build on these chapters and assess the nature of affect in explaining partisan support for Israel.

APPENDIX

Throughout the chapter, we made use of three models for each of the five measures of support for Israel. We relied on predicted probabilities following each of the models to illustrate the demographic differences in a clear and visually appealing way. We offer here the full regression tables for the interested and more statistically trained reader. Table 5.4 lists the results of our baseline models, in which our demographic predictors include gender, age, race, education, religion and region, along with party identification and model-specific controls. Table 5.5 lists our model in which we replace age groups with generations. Finally, in Table 5.6 we use a subset of the data and distinguish between evangelical and mainline Protestants. In all models, we use the following reference categories: Male (gender), 30–49 (age), baby boomers (generation), white (race), high school/less (education), Catholic (religion), South (region) and Democrat (party). In Table 5.6, we replace the Catholic reference category for religion with mainline Protestants in order to directly compare them to evangelicals. In all three sets of models, we also control for year as an indicator of temporal change and cluster standard errors by survey.

TABLE 5.4 Modeling Demographic Divisions in Support for Israel

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*	*(3) Blame*	*(4) Force*	*(5) Aid*
Female	−0.210***	0.101**	−0.142	−0.519***	−0.049
	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.098)	(0.048)	(0.052)
18–29	−0.264***	−0.149***	−0.288***	−0.298***	−0.121**
	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.085)	(0.068)	(0.042)
50–64	0.135*	−0.093*	0.040	0.030	−0.151*
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.075)
65+	−0.072	−0.129*	−0.132	−0.155	−0.092
	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.067)
African-American	−0.419***	−0.656***	−0.351*	−0.677***	−0.086
	(0.075)	(0.048)	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.117)
Hispanic	−0.246**	−0.189**	−0.271*	−0.302*	0.107
	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.057)
College/More	0.128**	−0.262***	−0.213**	−0.344***	−0.130*
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.055)
Protestant	0.224***	0.298***	0.230*	0.165*	0.193***
	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.104)	(0.080)	(0.038)
Other Christian	0.232	0.341***	0.208	0.271	0.279**
	(0.202)	(0.066)	(0.116)	(0.189)	(0.100)
Jewish	2.072***	2.504***	2.146***	1.350***	2.251***
	(0.237)	(0.179)	(0.446)	(0.261)	(0.379)
Other Religion	−0.118	−0.243***	−0.293**	−0.370***	0.010
	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.087)
Northeast	−0.011	−0.342***	−0.570***	−0.399***	−0.133**
	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.051)
Midwest	−0.114	−0.234***	−0.366***	−0.377***	−0.205***
	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.051)
West	−0.067	−0.148***	−0.331***	−0.267***	−0.187***
	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.087)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Republican	0.322***	0.466***	0.639***	0.550***	0.286***
	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.046)
Independent	−0.134*	0.072	0.073	0.237	−0.153**
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.147)	(0.121)	(0.052)
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.260*			
		(0.130)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah			0.324		
			(0.234)		
Blame: No Peace			0.042		
			(0.077)		

(*Continued*)

TABLE 5.4 (Continued)

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*	*(3) Blame*	*(4) Force*	*(5) Aid*
Amount of Aid not Mentioned					0.630**
					(0.243)
Economic Aid					−0.463
					(0.309)
Military Aid					−0.551
					(0.321)
Year	0.062***	0.003	0.046***	−0.018	0.018
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.036)	(0.010)
Constant	−122.250***	−4.975	−90.698***	36.544	−35.176
	(23.342)	(11.304)	(5.735)	(71.825)	(20.190)
N	18,216	68,487	9,060	9,863	34,056
Surveys	20	85	15	12	20

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

TABLE 5.5 Modeling Generational Divisions in Support for Israel

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*	*(3) Blame*	*(4) Force*	*(5) Aid*
Female	−0.208***	0.096**	−0.131	−0.524***	−0.047
	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.102)	(0.048)	(0.051)
GI (1901–1924)	−0.148	−0.230***	−0.593***	−0.291*	0.014
	(0.087)	(0.054)	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.060)
Silent (1925–1945)	0.059	0.026	−0.077	−0.247**	−0.071
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.040)
X (1961–1980)	−0.207***	−0.129**	−0.070	−0.093**	0.040
	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.096)	(0.030)	(0.074)
Y (1981–1999)	−0.401	−0.198*	−0.568***	−0.589***	−0.232
	(0.271)	(0.088)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.185)
African-American	−0.424***	−0.658***	−0.327*	−0.693***	−0.089
	(0.075)	(0.049)	(0.155)	(0.145)	(0.117)
Hispanic	−0.251**	−0.159*	−0.304*	−0.310*	0.114*
	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.139)	(0.126)	(0.057)
College/More	0.125**	−0.269***	−0.255***	−0.361***	−0.116*
	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.055)
Protestant	0.230***	0.304***	0.229*	0.169*	0.196***
	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.116)	(0.080)	(0.038)

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*	*(3) Blame*	*(4) Force*	*(5) Aid*
Other Christian	0.234	0.359***	0.080	0.272	0.291**
	(0.204)	(0.067)	(0.211)	(0.191)	(0.099)
Jewish	2.065***	2.501***	2.190***	1.368***	2.241***
	(0.236)	(0.179)	(0.407)	(0.256)	(0.375)
Other Religion	−0.127	−0.241***	−0.199	−0.386***	0.012
	(0.079)	(0.056)	(0.127)	(0.103)	(0.087)
Northeast	−0.008	−0.341***	−0.568***	−0.399***	−0.132**
	(0.073)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.051)
Midwest	−0.114	−0.241***	−0.345***	−0.379***	−0.204***
	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.080)	(0.036)	(0.050)
West	−0.067	−0.153***	−0.343***	−0.261***	−0.188***
	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.097)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Republican	0.321***	0.471***	0.640***	0.542***	0.283***
	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.146)	(0.159)	(0.047)
Independent	−0.154*	0.062	0.193	0.241*	−0.148**
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.165)	(0.121)	(0.051)
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.245			
		(0.132)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah			0.866*		
			(0.368)		
Blame: No Peace			0.476		
			(0.255)		
Amount of Aid not Mentioned					0.638**
					(0.243)
Economic Aid					−0.475
					(0.308)
Military Aid					−0.550
					(0.318)
Year	0.068***	0.003	−0.010	−0.014	0.019
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.010)
Constant	−135.880***	−4.333	20.937	28.890	−36.882
	(26.067)	(11.655)	(80.242)	(70.681)	(20.441)
N	18,210	67,578	7,988	9,863	34,026
Surveys	20	85	15	12	20

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

TABLE 5.6 Modeling Religious Divisions in Support for Israel

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*	*(3) Blame*	*(4) Force*	*(5) Aid*
Female	−0.413***	−0.011	−0.254*	−0.558***	−0.121
	(0.066)	(0.044)	(0.102)	(0.071)	(0.138)
18–29	−0.259*	−0.124	−0.362***	−0.099	0.105
	(0.131)	(0.070)	(0.102)	(0.165)	(0.068)
50–64	0.253	0.060	0.233	0.074	0.104
	(0.170)	(0.057)	(0.149)	(0.068)	(0.115)
65+	0.185	−0.036	−0.013	−0.124	0.042
	(0.207)	(0.084)	(0.120)	(0.145)	(0.104)
African-American	−0.637***	−0.581***	−0.694*	−0.780*	0.349
	(0.167)	(0.064)	(0.328)	(0.311)	(0.217)
Hispanic	0.005	−0.317**	−0.180	−0.297*	0.131
	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.168)	(0.131)	(0.088)
College/More	0.284***	−0.298***	−0.104	−0.246*	0.026
	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.053)
Catholic	0.036	0.246**	−0.163	0.003	−0.092
	(0.109)	(0.077)	(0.144)	(0.094)	(0.177)
Other Christian	0.687*	−0.015	−0.273	−0.158	−0.160
	(0.310)	(0.078)	(0.233)	(0.138)	(0.090)
Jewish	2.525***	2.887***	2.512**	1.401***	
	(0.560)	(0.457)	(0.826)	(0.143)	
Other Religion	−0.227**	−0.171	−0.011	−0.522***	0.196
	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.269)	(0.069)	(0.166)
Born-Again	0.426***	0.880***	0.460**	0.422***	0.480***
	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.141)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Northeast	−0.059	−0.408***	−0.607***	−0.284**	−0.110
	(0.140)	(0.074)	(0.115)	(0.088)	(0.080)
Midwest	0.077	−0.151*	−0.208**	−0.273**	−0.135
	(0.105)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.069)
West	0.135	−0.158**	−0.302**	−0.245***	−0.018
	(0.135)	(0.061)	(0.113)	(0.071)	(0.065)
Republican	0.476***	0.956***	0.562*	0.374	0.309**
	(0.089)	(0.111)	(0.259)	(0.374)	(0.116)
Independent	0.058	0.303**	0.032	−0.049	−0.014
	(0.147)	(0.098)	(0.183)	(0.135)	(0.123)
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.623***			
		(0.136)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah			1.979***		
			(0.257)		

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*	*(3)* *Blame*	*(4)* *Force*	*(5)* *Aid*
Amount of Aid not Mentioned					0.383
					(0.263)
Economic Aid					−0.082
					(0.107)
year	0.064***	0.025***	−0.344***	−0.018	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Constant	−128.553***	−48.002**	689.500***	37.269	−1.797
	(35.951)	(14.658)	(80.367)	(32.536)	(23.358)
N	3,564	16,870	3,200	3,347	4,591
Surveys	6	26	10	6	5

Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Notes

1. Gallup Organization. May 13–15, 1988. Roper dataset ID: USAIPOSPAI1988–871.
2. Pew Research Center. July 8–14, 2014. Roper dataset ID: USPEW2014–07POL
3. CBS News/New York Times. April 28–May 2, 2010. Roper question ID: USCBSNYT.050310.R07.
4. Gallup Organization. May 19–21, 2003. Roper question ID: USGALLUP.03MY019.R24.
5. ABC News/Washington Post. April 18–21, 2002. Roper question ID: USABCWP.042202A.R08.
6. ORC International. July 18–20, 2014. Roper question ID: USORC.072114A.R25.
7. Princeton Survey Research Associates. October 15–21, 2001. Roper question ID: USPSRA.102401.R11.
8. For robustness purposes, we estimate an additional model in which we use the original three-category item and estimate a multinomial logistic regression. Because the share of respondents who prefer increasing aid is relatively small, and the share of respondents who prefer keeping it the same are very large, we find similar effects for the latter in comparison to decreasing as those we found using the binary version. Comparing the probability of increasing to decreasing, we find two minor changes: Women are less likely to support increasing and Hispanics are more likely to do so.
9. This is also important for backward compatibility, as some older surveys do not always provide a detailed distinction beyond college or higher education and high school education.
10. Of course, the ratio between these probabilities would provide the odds ratios, which are often used to interpret the log-odds coefficients produced by logistic regressions.
11. Given the large datasets, we also do not find any value in discussing significance levels of each coefficient but list these in the regression tables in the Appendix.
12. We use the baby boomer generation as a reference category because, theoretically, it is most likely to show the highest levels of support (as a generation born after the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel) and because it is the largest group in our data.

13. The number of respondents without a high school education is too small to analyze separately, and since our theoretical expectations relate specifically to acquiring a college education, we pool together respondents with or without a high school education and contrast them against respondents with a college education or higher.
14. We refer the reader to Chapter 7, which uses a series of mediation models to test the mediating role of affect on the relationship between party identification and support for Israel. We offer there a more detailed explanation of the theoretical foundations of this model, as well as its empirical application.
15. The subset of the data for blame includes only two surveys, one in 1989 and another in 2006. Estimating the model separately for each year yields similar results.
16. For a discussion of the operational definition of evangelical denominations, see Burge and Lewis (2018).
17. We also change the reference group from Catholics to mainline Protestants, in order to directly compare evangelical and mainline Protestants. Using Catholics in the first model allowed for a direct comparison between Protestants and Jews to Catholics.

6

PARTISAN DIVIDE

The previous chapters demonstrated that Americans are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel, that this support has increased over time and that the support is consistent among most conventional demographic groups, on most issues. This strong and broad support has fueled the conventional wisdom that US public support for Israel is deeply rooted in American society; a support so strong that it transcends most demographic divides. In this chapter, we introduce a major transformation in American public opinion toward Israel—the rising divide in public support along partisan lines. A 2018 report by the Pew Research Center points to partisan polarization over Israel. An overwhelming majority of 79 percent of Republicans sympathize with Israel. Yet only 27 percent of Democrats report a similar position (these numbers are calculated while treating both/neither/don't know as valid responses, see Cavari & Freedman, 2019 on the increased tendency among Democrats to opt out of choosing a side). This dazzling gap stands in stark contrast to the trends witnessed throughout the second half of the twentieth century, when little to no difference existed between the two parties. The Pew report aptly illustrates a crucial change in partisan attitudes toward Israel. Put simply, once a bipartisan, consensual issue, attitudes toward Israel are increasingly divided along party lines.

Readers of American politics should not be surprised to see an increasing divide between the parties. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is a well-agreed convention that Democrats and Republicans today are overwhelmingly divided over policy and that this divide has extended to foreign policy (Gries, 2014). Despite early expectations that Israel would be a special case of consensus, this trend did not bypass the attitudes of Americans toward Israel (Cavari, 2013). To illustrate this shift, Figure 6.1 summarizes the attitudes of Republicans, Democrats and independents on the five measures of support for Israel that we discussed in Chapter 5.



FIGURE 6.1 Longitudinal Trends of Partisan Differences in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 32,301 in 36 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 102,483 in 126 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 13,369 in 22 surveys (Blame); *N* = 22,717 in 29 surveys (Force); *N* = 41,663 in 24 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

The first and perhaps most important observation is that on most issues, overall support of all three groups is above the 50 percent line. Americans, across political divides, are supportive of Israel. Differences between the parties are, therefore, not about whether each partisan group supports Israel but the extent or strength of support.

The second observation is that on all measures, overall support of Republicans is higher than that of Democrats (and independents). Differences are not constant, though. Over time, and consistent with the main argument of this book, Republicans and Democrats have been growing further apart. On most issues, Republicans are increasing their support for Israel and Democrats are decreasing their support. In some instances, the gap in recent years is over 30 percentage points.

Partisan differences in support for the use of force (by Israel) are most striking: Republicans are overwhelmingly (and increasingly) supportive of Israel, while Democrats have been consistently split on this issue, with a recent average that is below 50 percent. Though marginally, on this issue, partisan majorities are on opposing sides.

In this chapter, we investigate this change in attitudes toward Israel. We assess the strength of the divide and assess variation within partisan groups. We then

explain the rise of the partisan divide by demonstrating the effect of social change of the parties, increased ideological cohesion and more clear and available cues from party elites. We demonstrate support for each proposition yet argue that the latter is the most alarming and consequential one. Party labels, which did not have any effect in the past, are today a strong predictor of support for Israel, above and beyond any social (religious) and ideological divide. With the alignment of ideology, religion and party, divisions over Israel have reached unprecedented levels.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we assess the divide concerning the five dimensions of support for Israel. Adding to Figure 6.1, we illustrate the change by plotting the growth of partisan divide. Assessing this divide more rigorously, we rely on our regression models (presented in Chapter 5) to assess the average independent effect of party on support, overall and over time, while controlling for demographic differences. Second, we test three competing explanations of the determinants of the partisan divide—social alignment, ideological alignment, and elite divide (providing clearer cues). We present descriptive trends of these groups and test the three theoretical arguments using a series of interaction models. In Chapter 7, we examine further the effect of party identification on support for Israel by assessing the mechanism through which partisanship affects support for Israel. Mainly, we demonstrate how affect mediates the relationship between partisanship and support for Israel.

Partisan Divide on Support for Israel

An emerging body of work points to the growing divide in support for Israel along *party* and *ideological* lines—with Republicans and conservatives demonstrating more pro-Israel views and Democrats presenting more critical views of Israel. Cavari (2013) identifies this changing partisan landscape—from bipartisan agreement to polarization. Examining attitudes about a single question asked repeatedly over time (from 1967 to 2009), Cavari shows that Republicans and Democrats have grown apart, reaching a gap of about 30 percentage points—more than any other gap along any demographic and political dimension. Using limited aggregate data, Cavari shows that the trend of increasing divide is explained by social change of the parties (alignment of evangelicals with the Republican Party) and an increasing divide among party elites (examining the correlation of this divide with voting behavior in Congress).

Rynhold (2015) also demonstrates the partisan divide on several policy issues about the conflict during the last decade and connects this divide to a more fundamental ideological divide among party elites. The book expertly illustrates the increasing ideological divide between liberals and conservatives on foreign policy and its application to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rynhold presents—but does not test—a top-down model of opinion change and combines elite

discourse (as illustrated in liberal and conservative magazines) with public opinion data to demonstrate this change.

Both studies suggest that the decline of the consensus on Israel did not happen overnight but rather reflects a gradual change throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. Still, they point to the 9/11 attacks, the events that followed these attacks and the increasing partisan divide they generated as a helpful reference point. Rynhold connects the change to the effect of 9/11 and the increase in perception of threat regarding radical Islam (Rynhold, 2015). This was reinforced by the simultaneity of 9/11 and the Second Intifada in Israel—Israel fighting a similar terrorist threat as the United States. Cavari and Freedman (2019) find empirical support for 2001 as a turning point from consensus to divide. They also connect this turning point to a change in elite rhetoric about Israel—with Republicans increasingly voicing unequivocal support for Israel and Democrats taking a more nuanced approach that tries to balance between conflicting interests and commitments in the region.

Adding to our illustration of the emerging partisan divide in Figure 6.1, we illustrate in Figure 6.2 the partisan gap between Republican and Democratic support for Israel (leaners included in their partisan group; independents are not



FIGURE 6.2 Partisan Gap in Support for Israel

Note: Difference between Republicans and Democrats. Positive values indicate greater support among Republicans; negative values indicate greater support among Democrats.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8. Vertical dotted line marks September 11, 2001.

included). For instance, in 2017, 87 percent of Republicans sympathized with Israel vs. 55 percent of Democrats feeling the same, yielding a gap of 32 percentage points. Because of variation in the length of the time span of each series, we make it easier to compare the series across time by using the same scale in our x-axis (years, 1956–2019). We add a zero-gap reference line marked by a dotted line in each graph—points above the line indicate a Republican advantage (in support for Israel) whereas points below the line indicate a Democratic advantage. We also include a vertical line to mark 9/11—the common turning point in existing literature.

The figure provides descriptive evidence of our main argument that American public opinion toward Israel has shifted from relative consensus to a divide along partisan lines. In all series, until the 1990s the gap between Republicans and Democrats was negligible. Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the gap increases in most series—sympathy, blame and the use of force. The only exception is favorability, where we see a consistent gap across time and only a recent more moderate increase. The evidence of change regarding aid is limited to one data point. Still, the fact that the trend is consistent with the other series and that the trend of increasing divide conforms with existing work on the increasing divide on foreign aid (Gries, 2016; Milner & Tingley, 2010) give confidence to our conclusion.

Going beyond the descriptive change, we assess the relative effect of party labels on support for Israel. Using the same models described and discussed in Chapter 5 (and summarized in Table 5.4), we calculate the predicted probabilities of supporting Israel of the three partisan groups: Republicans, Democrats and independents. The model controls for gender, age, race, education, religion and region and accounts for time and wording of questions. Given the multiple surveys included in each model, we cluster the standard errors by survey. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the models. Predicted probabilities of support for Israel are summarized in Figure 6.3. We remind the reader that the probabilities here reflect an average difference across time.

In all models, party affiliation is a significant predictor of support for Israel—Republicans are more supportive of Israel compared to Democrats and compared to independents. Differences between the two partisan groups range from 6 points (aid) to 13 points (use of force). Differences between Democrats and independents are small and insignificant in all but two categories—favorability and aid.

In two measures—sympathy and blame—all three partisan groups are more supportive of Israel than not. Democrats and independents are statistically equally divided between support and opposition on Israel's use of force and on providing it with aid, illustrated by the 95 percent CI that cross the 0.50 threshold. For independents, this is true for favorability as well.

Figure 6.3 illustrates the average divide, pooling all data together. Yet as Figures 6.1 and 6.2 suggest, the partisan divide has increased over time.



FIGURE 6.3 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Israel, by Party

Note: Partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following five binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 in the Appendix to Chapter 5.

We should therefore expect that the average divide that is depicted in the model and illustrated in Figure 6.3 underestimates the role of party identification as a predictor of public support for Israel in contemporary politics.

Following the method employed in Chapter 5, we examine temporal changes by estimating the independent effect of party identification on support for Israel in every survey in our data and plotting our coefficient estimates over time. Our analysis in this stage focuses on our two most extensive series—favorability and sympathy. For each series, we estimate our model on each survey separately and plot in Figure 6.4 the vector of coefficients for Republicans, compared to Democrats. Dots represent the coefficient for Republicans (compared to Democrats) in each survey. We use a Lowess smoothing line (with a bandwidth of 0.8) to illustrate the upward change in the coefficients (gray solid line). The dashed lines smooth the 95 percent confidence intervals of the coefficients.

The trend in both series is similar, yet with a different strength. The effect of party is marginal or zero until the turn of the twenty-first century. This is replaced with a gradually increasing partisan divide, pointing to a greater likelihood of Republicans to support Israel—compared to Democrats—that is increasing over time. The favorability series has fewer surveys and the change is small, yet the party coefficient in the four available surveys in the 21st century are



FIGURE 6.4 The Changing Effect of Party Identification, Over Time

Note: Dots represent the coefficients in a single survey for Republicans compared to Democrats. Solid line represents a Lowess smoothing line with a bandwidth of 0.8. Dashed lines represent upper and lower bound of the 95 percent CI associated with each coefficient.

positive and significant, with a confidence interval that is above zero. The rich data available for the sympathy series demonstrate the strength of this trend—Republicans from 2001 forward increasingly sympathize more with Israel (compared to Arabs/Palestinians) than Democrats do. Consistent with existing work discussed earlier, the partisan divide on Israel started in full earnest at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Although the data are not as rich for a longitudinal analysis for all series, we take 9/11 as a turning point and summarize the predicted probabilities of Republicans and Democrats before and after September 2001 for each series. In effect, we break Figure 6.3 into two periods—before and after September 2001. Because of insufficient data on surveys asking about support for Israeli use of force, we cannot make this comparison for this measure of support. The results of the four remaining measures are summarized in Figure 6.5.

A comparison of the predicted probabilities of each partisan group pre- and post-2001 yields a very different pattern. The predicted probabilities of Republicans go up after 2001 for each measure of support for Israel in comparison to the predicted probabilities before 2001—ranging from a change of .04 (aid, .63 to .67) to .16 (sympathy, .63 to .79). After 9/11, Republicans demonstrate a strong



FIGURE 6.5 Predicted Probabilities of Republicans and Democrats, Pre- and Post-9/11

Note: Partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position (following a binary logistic regression), across time. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

support for Israel. Across our four measures of support, approximately seven or more of every ten Republicans supports Israel. Lowest is aid, with .67, and highest are sympathy and blame, with .90 and .84, respectively. In contrast, the change among Democrats is substantially smaller (favorability, blame), null (aid), or negative (sympathy). After 9/11, support for Israel among Democrats is substantially smaller than Republicans on every measure of support for Israel, in all showing a partisan gap of at least .10.

The different pattern of change among each partisan group results in a partisan gap. Following 9/11, on all measures of support for Israel, for each group of ten Republicans and ten Democrats, one more Republican supports Israel. For example, the favorability model yields that nearly eight (7.9) of every ten Republicans are likely to have a favorable view of Israel; whereas less than seven (6.5) of every ten Democrats are likely to have a favorable view of Israel.

The accumulated evidence demonstrates the strength of partisan divide. We do not see the parties aligned as pro- or against Israel. Nevertheless, as the comparison figure (Figure 6.5) and the temporal change of favorability and sympathies (Figure 6.4) show, the parties are moving apart—Republicans increasingly supporting Israel and Democrats, more gradually and selectively, decreasing their support. Indeed, what used to be a consensual, bipartisan issue is now increasingly taking a partisan tone.

Assessing the Partisan Divide

The contrast of the findings on the partisan divide for Israel and the relatively small and insignificant divide between most demographic groups we find in Chapter 5 suggests that we take a closer look at the determinants of the partisan divide. We propose three explanations, each suggesting different empirical expectations.

- Social alignment—the political parties are becoming demographically homogenous, and the divide is a reflection of a secular alignment of these groups and the different preferences that these demographic groups carry with them.
- Ideological alignment—the political parties are becoming more ideologically coherent, and the divide is a reflection of ideological differences of each partisan group.
- Elite polarization—party elites are increasingly providing clear diverging cues about Israel that partisan Americans rely on when asked about their views on the conflict.

Each of these explanations relies on extensive scholarly work about the nature of party polarization in the United States. In the remaining parts of this chapter, we discuss the theoretical argument of each explanation and test it empirically. For each explanation, we introduce a variable that allows us to test the explanation—respectively, born again evangelicals, ideology and attention to news about the conflict. Our empirical strategy for these tests includes a descriptive illustration of the gap between relevant groups—social, ideological or partisan—and a series of interaction models identifying the moderating effect of party identification on the alternative explanations. Because of our expectation that partisan divide has increased over time, we also account for the time change (pre- and post-2001).

Our theoretical model is illustrated in the following diagram (Figure 6.6). We propose that each of the factors—born again, ideology and elite divide—affect support for Israel, but that from 2001 forward, this effect is moderated by party affiliation. Statistically, we therefore estimate a three-way interaction model for each explanation.

By introducing additional variables, we reduce our available data (limited to surveys that included all of our standard predictors *and* a variable corresponding to each of the three possible explanations). Because of this limitation, our statistical tests in this part of the book are focused on two series—favorability and sympathies. These series offer the most extensive longitudinal trends, with longer time-series and more frequent observations. To simplify the statistical discussion, we summarize the results by plotting the predicted probabilities. Tables summarizing the full models are included in the Appendix for this chapter.



FIGURE 6.6 Model of Partisan Moderation

Social Alignment

Political parties are a coalition of social groups (Axelrod, 1972; Bawn et al., 2012; Manza & Brooks, 1999; but see Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016 about the asymmetry of party coalitions). Individuals are simultaneously members of a number of groups. For example, females, evangelicals, young, urban—a person can be in all groups, some or none. Each of these groups may have a very different perspective on politics. The groups, however, vary in the extent that they serve as political reference groups in the formation of attitudes—some group memberships are politicized while others are not (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Donald, 1960; Stanley, Bianco, & Niemi, 1986). These groups are also nonstable. Over time, dominant social groups in the United States have changed in size, in the strength of their partisan attachment or in turnout rate, thus altering the composition of the party. Zingher (2014) examines these trends from 1952 to 2008 by applying a measure of group contribution developed by Robert Axelrod (1972). Group contribution is defined as a function of group size, group turnout and group loyalty divided by the national turnout and national loyalty. Zingher demonstrates that the two parties held their group coalitions, but the contribution of each group to the party coalition—in either size, loyalty or turnout, or a combination of them—has changed. Mainly, the Democratic Party, a party that is organized around group coalitions (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016), has been acquiring an increasing proportion of their total votes

from African-Americans, Latinos, the non-religious, college graduates and women. In contrast, the Republican Party draws its mass support from constituencies that are more populous than pro-Democratic groups but usually tilt less decisively toward their favored party (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016).

As the parties change in their demographic composition, the divide between the parties over policy may increase for issues that are aligned with specific demographic groups. Regarding Israel, Chapter 5 reveals very limited and inconsistent variation between most demographic groups. The primary exception is religion, where we find that Jewish Americans and evangelical Americans are significantly more supportive of Israel than other religious groups. Therefore, a change in the size of these groups in the American population and an alignment of these groups with one party can explain the partisan divide.

Regarding the first group, namely Jewish Americans, there is little variation over time in all three measures—group size, group turnout and group loyalty. The relative share of Jewish Americans in the United States is small and has been gradually declining over time from about 3 percent in the 1950s to about 2 percent today (Sheskin & Dashefsky, 2020). Turnout among Jewish Americans is higher than the general public but not very different than groups with similar socioeconomic status, and we find limited change in turnout over time (Abrams & Cohen, 2015). Finally, the clear majority of Jewish Americans identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. Jewish Americans consistently vote for Democratic candidates, demonstrating a large and consistent gap over time (Weisberg, 2019).

Although we do not see a change in the group's party alignment, we find a marginal decline in the group's support for Israel, which can affect the partisan divide over Israel: A group that is strongly aligned with the party is demonstrating a decline in support (Rynhold, 2015; Waxman, 2017; Weisberg, 2019). This change may indeed explain some of the variation in partisan views, but its effect cannot be large. The group is relatively small (in general and also within the Democratic Party), the change in the group's support for Israel is marginal and, perhaps more importantly, it is weaker than the attitudinal change we find among other groups associated with the Democratic Party. In fact, if anything, this group with its still overwhelming support for Israel serves as a small moderating force in the rapid decline of support among the Democratic Party.

In contrast to the limited changes among Jewish Americans, the alignment of evangelical Christians with the Republican Party is perhaps the most dominant transformation of the political parties in the last few decades, a change that may have had a strong effect on the party divide on Israel. During the second half of the twentieth century, the share of evangelical Christians has rapidly increased (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Over the last three decades, there has been little change in the percentage of Americans who identify as "born-again or evangelical" (Newport, 2018), but because of higher turnout rates, their share in the electorate has increased. Most important is the strong alignment of this

demographic group with the Republican Party. Starting with Ronald Reagan's candidacy in the 1980s, evangelical Christians have increasingly aligned with Republican causes and candidates. Although the influence of the so-called "Moral Majority" on elections was limited in the 1984 presidential election and played almost no role in the 1988 elections (Smidt & Kellstedt, 1992; Wilcox, 1992), evangelical support for Republican causes and candidates grew significantly in the following decade (Brooks & Manza, 2004). Most recently, nearly 80 percent of evangelicals voted for the Republican presidential candidate in 2012 (Steensland & Goff, 2013), and even Donald Trump, a man not commonly associated with Christian values and practice, enjoyed overwhelming support among evangelicals during the 2016 election (Marti, 2019; Whitehead, Perry, & Baker, 2018).

This alignment has had vast consequences for electoral politics as well as policy choices (Green, 2007). Recent research shows that while evangelicals are generally conservative across domestic and foreign issues, their political engagement is driven more by social issues than by economic and foreign policy concerns (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Smidt, 2013). Evangelicals are more likely than members of other religious groups to hold conservative opinions on matters concerning homosexuality, abortion, extramarital sex and traditional gender roles (Brint & Abrutyn, 2010; Gaines & Garand, 2010; Lewis & de Bernardo, 2010).

While foreign policies are not the most important issues to evangelicals, they are more likely to hold conservative foreign policy views than members of other religious groups (Taydas, Kentmen, & Olson, 2012). This is especially true regarding Israel and the Middle East. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, evangelical support for Zionism has combined with a fear of radical Islam to provide support for an increasingly militarist US foreign policy (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Durham, 2004). To the extent that evangelicals demonstrate a distinct interest in foreign policy, it appears to be tied to the dual goals of preserving Israel's Judeo-Christian foothold in the Middle East and securing the United States against foreign enemies (Steensland & Wright, 2014). According to the modern beliefs among many evangelicals, Israel, a land given to the Jews by God, is a confirmation of biblical prophecies that reinforce the belief in Christ's return. Therefore, support for Israel is particularly high among this group because of Israel's central role in their religious doctrine (Carenen, 2012; Davies, 2018; Goldman, 2018; Hummel, 2019; Inbari, Bumin, & Byrd, 2020; Mayer, 2004; Spector, 2009).

In Chapter 5, we demonstrated the strength of association between evangelical denominations and support for Israel. Using a subset of our data, which includes a conventional identifier for evangelicals (self-identification as a born-again Christian), we reveal that this demographic group is perhaps the most supportive of Israel across all demographic groups, except for the relatively small group of American Jews. By aligning with the Republican Party, evangelicals may have restructured the partisan

support for Israel. Given their hawkish views of foreign policy and their strong support for Israel, the alignment of evangelical Christians with the Republican Party brought into the party a deeply rooted pro-Israeli constituency that may explain the increased support for Israel among Republicans.

Our estimation strategy in our general models discussed in Chapter 5 provides some evidence that social alignment, including the alignment of evangelical Christians, does not sufficiently explain the partisan gap. Our models control for all relevant demographic and political groups showing the strong and significant association between Jews and evangelicals with support for Israel. Still, despite this strong control, party identification remains the strongest predictor of support for Israel. This is illustrated well in Figure 6.3. We find similar results in models that also include the born again indicator (see Table 5.6 in Chapter 5). Party plays an important independent effect on attitudes toward Israel, even when we control for the dominant effect of religion.

To examine further the possible explanation of social alignment, we explore the conditional effects of party and evangelical affiliation. We first illustrate this relationship in Figure 6.7—plotting separately views of Republicans and Democrats divided into evangelicals and mainline Protestants. Note that the data for this analysis are substantively reduced to surveys that include a party identification question and a



FIGURE 6.7 Support for Israel Among Evangelicals and Non-Evangelical Partisans

Note: N = 3,310 in six surveys (Favorability); N = 19,210 in 28 surveys (Sympathy); N = 4,101 in 11 surveys (Blame); N = 3,168 in six surveys (Force); N = 4,180 in five surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

born-again question. Only the sympathies series offers multiple surveys over time. Favorability offers some more limited surveys over time. All other series offer either too few surveys or are predominately from more recent periods.

A comparison of the four party-religious groups across our five measures of support demonstrates that party identification is an important determinant of support for Israel. Though we find variation across issues, in most measures of support, Republicans—evangelicals or not—are more supportive of Israel than Democrats. This is best illustrated in the sympathies series but also in favorability and blame. Data for the other two measures are more limited, and differences are not as consistent.

To test this empirically further, we estimate the moderating effect of party identification and time on the association between evangelical affiliation and support for Israel. We test this model using our two longest and richest series—favorability and sympathies. For both series, we use our evangelical model discussed in Chapter 5, to which we add a three-way interaction between party identification, evangelical affiliation and time (pre- and post-2001). Based on these models (included in Table 6.1 in the Appendix for this chapter), we plot in Figure 6.8 the predicted probabilities of



FIGURE 6.8 Assessing the Interactive Effect of Party (Republican) and Religion (Evangelical Christians), by Time

Note: Partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position (following two binary logistic regressions) across religious denomination and time. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 6.1 in the Appendix for this chapter.

support for Israel—favorability and sympathies—of eight groups over time that are formed by the pairwise comparisons of the following three dichotomies: Republicans vs. Democrats, evangelicals vs. non-evangelicals, and pre- vs. post-2001.

The top panels summarize the predicted probabilities for favoring Israel among the four party-religious groups by time. The top-left panel summarizes the predicted probabilities of Republicans and Democrats who are *not* evangelicals before and after 2001. Among these groups of people who are not predisposed to support Israel on religious grounds, we see no difference between Republicans and Democrats before 2001 but a significant difference after 2001. Since religion is not at play here, the conditional effect of time can be attributed to the party label.

The top-right panel summarizes the predicted probabilities of Republicans and Democrats who are evangelicals pre- and post-2001. Consistent with our discussion in Chapter 5, evangelicals, across party and time, are more likely to have a favorable view of Israel (comparing the two panels at the top row). Yet here, too, among people who are religiously predisposed to have a favorable view of Israel, party affiliation matters. Partisan differences are significant in both periods—Republicans demonstrating higher favorability than Democrats—but after 2001, the gap has increased substantively from .13 to .17. After 2001, 7 out of 10 evangelical Democrats are likely to support Israel, compared to nearly 9 out of 10 evangelical Republicans.

The bottom panel summarizes the predicted probabilities for the sympathies series. The results reveal a similar pattern but with stronger marginal effects (note that the data are richer for this series). Here we find minimal differences between Democrats and Republicans among non-evangelicals and evangelicals before 2001 (gaps between Republicans and Democrats are .05 and .09 for non-evangelicals and evangelicals, respectively) but large and significant differences after 2001 (.20 and .14, respectively).

In sum, party affiliation has an additive effect on support for Israel among people who are predisposed to support Israel because of religious affiliation *and* among people who are not religiously predisposed to support Israel. This effect, however, is conditioned on time—occurring only after 2001.

Adding to this, we examine the conditional effect of subjective religious fundamentalist views and party affiliation. To do so, we use data from YouGov collected by Peter Hays Gries in 2011 that include a question about biblical literalism (support for the statement that the "Bible is literally true, from Genesis to Revelations, from Adam and Eve to Armageddon," offering a scale from 1, weak agreement, to 7, strong agreement). Our dependent variable in this model is an Israeli thermometer question, which is commonly used as a measure of affect (see discussion in Chapter 2). Unfortunately, the data do not include a sympathies question.

In this model, we interact the measure of biblical literalism with party affiliation. All other explanatory variables are adjusted to match our model specifications



FIGURE 6.9 Assessing the Conditional Effect of Party (Republican) and Religious Fundamentalism

Note: Partisan differences in the estimated marginal means of reporting a pro-Israel position (following a linear regression), across three levels of support for biblical literalism—at the mean (3.95) and one standard deviation above (6.21) and below the mean (1.69). Bars represent the predicted values, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in column 3 of Table 6.2 in the Appendix for this chapter.

in this book. Because biblical literalism is a scale variable, we report our results by presenting three reference points—mean agreement and one standard deviation on either side—for Republicans and Democrats. Figure 6.9 summarizes the results using the estimated marginal mean following our model. Table 6.2 in the Appendix summarizes the regression coefficients and provides more information about our model specifications.

The results support the findings using the objective measure of religion. Religious fundamentalism has a conditional effect on feelings toward Israel. Among Republicans, an increased belief in biblical literalism is positively associated with warmer views of Israel. Among Democrats, we find no such effect. These estimated values are achieved while holding all demographic variables, including identifying as evangelical Christians, constant at their mean.

Ideological Alignment

Another possibility is that the political parties are becoming more homogenous ideologically and that this has an effect on views toward Israel. That the parties are polarizing ideologically is supported by a rich body of work showing an

increasing alignment between ideology and party affiliation: Republicans are increasingly conservative, and Democrats are increasingly liberal (Abramowitz, 2018; Campbell, 2016; but see Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016 on differences between the parties in the extent of ideological divide, and Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017 on the strength of ideological beliefs among mass Americans). Our data confirm the claim of increasing party-ideology alignment. We calculate the correlation coefficient between the two variables and find a relatively linear increase from .2 in the 1970s to nearly .4 in recent years.[1]

Against a common perception of ideological agreement over foreign policy, Gries (2014) demonstrates how ideology divides liberals and conservatives over foreign affairs. In fact, Gries argues that the same ideological divisions that explain attitudes on domestic issues explain attitudes about foreign policy. American liberals and conservatives differ in their foreign (and domestic) policy preferences in that their moral values differ: "Liberals tend to esteem the 'individualizing' moral values of compassion and fairness more than conservatives do. Conservatives, by contrast, prize the 'binding' moral values of authority, loyalty, and purity more than liberals do." These moral values help account for liberal-conservative differences in overall feelings towards foreign countries and in foreign policy preferences. "Compassion and justice motivate liberals to approach the world (at home or abroad) to provide for it, while greater contamination disgust and desires for order motivate conservatives to avoid the world and protect a narrower in-group" (Gries, 2014, p. 87).

Among his several case studies, Gries (2014) demonstrates the effect of ideological divide on attitudes about different issues in the Middle East, including US policy toward Israel, views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and views about Iran's nuclear weapons program. He shows that ideology accounts for 20 percent of the variance in Israel policy preferences—a massive effect in any regression model. Using thermometer questions about Israel and Palestinians, Gries finds that ideology systematically divides Americans in their feelings toward Middle Eastern countries and peoples: American conservatives feel warmer than liberals do toward Israel and cooler than liberals do towards the Palestinians and Muslims. He also shows that feelings toward both sides—but mostly toward Israel—affect policy attitudes toward Israel and the conflict. We add to this discussion in the following chapter.

Rynhold (2015) surveys and analyzes the development of conservative and liberal approaches to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He finds opposing trends among conservatives and liberals—from old right isolationist views to new-conservative interventionism among conservatives and from liberal interventionism to isolationist views among liberals. These developments also affect views toward Israel—shifting conservatives from pro-Arab to pro-Israel and liberals from pro-Israeli to pro-Palestinian. In his analysis of public opinion, however, Rynhold equates party identification with ideology and focuses only on data after 2001. Our goal in this section is to assess the conditional effects of ideology and party.



FIGURE 6.10 Ideological Divide in Support for Israel

Note: *N* = 27,960 in 32 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 67,386 in 82 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 10,842 in 17 surveys (Blame); *N* = 18,209 in 24 surveys (Force); *N* = 31,390 in 19 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

To illustrate how ideology affects attitudes toward Israel over time, we plot in Figure 6.10 the attitudes of the three ideological groups on each of our measures of support for Israel.

Differences in support for Israel between conservatives, moderates and liberals are consistent with Rynhold's argument of a shift in ideological approaches toward Israel—conservatives taking a more pro-Israeli approach and liberals a more pro-Arab/Palestinian approach. Nonetheless, the results are very similar to the difference we find along party lines (compare to Figure 6.1). This, of course, is consistent with the rich work on the increasing alignment of party and ideology discussed earlier. What, then, is the interrelated effect of party and ideology on attitudes toward Israel? Is the partisan gap simply an ideological one?

To assess the interrelated effect of ideology and party on support for Israel, we examine differences between six groups formed by the interaction of party and ideology: Republicans and Democrats, conservatives, moderates and liberals. Figure 6.11 summarizes the views of these groups over time with regard to the five measures of support for Israel. The trends here are based on a subset of our data because they are limited to surveys that ask a party question and a question about ideological self-placement. To simplify the figure, we drop independents (we include them in the models).



FIGURE 6.11 Ideological Divide in Support for Israel, by Partisan Groups

Note: *N* = 22,803 in 31 surveys (Favorability); *N* = 66,036 in 82 surveys (Sympathy); *N* = 8,925 in 16 surveys (Blame); *N* = 15,191 in 24 surveys (Force); *N* = 29,503 in 19 surveys (Aid).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

The three Republican groups are marked with solid lines—ranging from conservative (dark) to liberal (light). The three Democratic groups are marked with dashed lines using opposite shades—ranging from liberal (dark) to conservatives (light). Darker color indicates a stronger party-ideology fit.

In all series, the divide is strongest among the ideological partisans—conservative Republicans vs. liberal Democrats. Though the trends are not clear in all series, moderates also divide along partisan affiliation. This is especially strong regarding the first three series—favorability, sympathies and blame.

To test the independent effect of party, we estimate our basic model for favorability and sympathy, this time using all surveys that ask both ideology and partisanship. Similar to our previously discussed estimation strategy, we add a three-way interaction between ideology, party affiliation and time. Based on this model, we calculate the predicted probabilities of each ideology-party-time group: Liberals, moderates and conservatives, divided into Republicans and Democrats, before and after September 11, 2001. Figure 6.12 summarize the predicted probabilities of our six groups for both measures of support for Israel (not including independents). The full models are presented in Table 6.3 in the Appendix for this chapter.



FIGURE 6.12 Interactive Effect of Ideology and Party

Note: Partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position (following two binary logistic regressions), across ideology and time. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 6.3 in the Appendix for this chapter.

The top three panels (1–3) summarize the predicted probabilities for favoring Israel, from left to right among the three ideological groups—liberals, moderates and conservatives. Each panel is further divided to the two partisan groups (bars)—Democrats and Republicans—and to our two theoretical time frames (x-axis)—before and after September 2001. Our interest is in the conditional effect of party across ideological groups, over time. This comparison yields strong support for our expectations. We find small differences between Democrats and Republicans in each ideological camp before 2001. In contrast, we find systematic differences along partisan lines in each ideological camp in the post-2001 period. Among moderates and conservatives, Democrats are less supportive of Israel than Republicans. The gap between Democrats and Republicans is .12 among moderates and .17 among conservatives. The effect is reversed among liberals (panel 1): Republicans are less supportive than Democrats. Differences, however, are small: .08 between Democrats and Republicans. We should interpret this panel with great caution, since the number of observations in our sample of liberal Republicans in the post-2001 period is small. Yet this difference is consistent with Rynhold's argument of the range of approaches within each ideological camp and gives empirical support for his argument.

We estimate that these liberal Republicans are old establishment Republicans who see Israel as a liability, find a moral equivalence between Israel and the Palestinians, blame Israel for the conflict and support neutrality in the region (Rynhold, 2015).

The bottom panels summarize the predicted probabilities of sympathizing with Israel among the six party-ideology-time groups. Results are similar. We find very little effect for party affiliation among all ideological groups in the pre-2001 period. In contrast, following September 2001, Republicans across every ideological group sympathize more with Israel than Democrats. Differences range from .18 among liberals, .11 among moderates and .12 among conservatives. The fact that even among conservatives, the group that is supposedly predisposed to sympathize with Israel, party affiliation plays a significant role, is the strongest evidence for our argument—party labels are an important factor in explaining the partisan divide over Israel, even beyond ideological differences.

Elite Polarization

In the previous sections, we demonstrated that religion and ideology explain some of the variation in the partisan divide over Israel. Evangelicals are supportive of Israel and are overwhelmingly Republican. Conservatives are more favorable of Israel than liberals and, similarly, are predominately Republican. Yet we show that even when we account for these changes, partisan affiliation has an additive effect on support for Israel. This supports the core argument in this book, that the divide is a partisan one that extends beyond the (increasing) demographic and ideological divide that characterizes contemporary American politics. We argue that Israel has turned into a political issue and that, given the strong attention it receives from party elites, it is increasingly owned by the Republican party (Egan, 2013). In that process, we can identify a response of mass Americans to the developing partisan labels to this issue—Republicans are increasingly in favor of Israel and Democrats are decreasingly so.

Patterns of elite discourse play an important role in determining the balance of public opinion (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Berinsky, 2009; Zaller, 1992). When elite positions are available, citizens can rely on elite cues to form an opinion. If elites are unified, informed citizens adopt that position; if elites disagree, the informed minorities will mirror that split along their political attachments (Zaller, 1992), even if only one party takes the lead on this divide (Berinsky, 2009).

The relationship between elite cues and public opinion is best exemplified in the attitudes of Americans about foreign affairs. Most Americans are poorly informed about foreign affairs (Delli-Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Holsti, 2004) and therefore may strongly depend on elite cues (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Powlick & Katz, 1998; Saunders, 2015). The association between elite cues and mass opinion is conditioned on the issue-context, the strength of party conflict and

the distribution of mass opinion on the issue (Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Party elites provide the strongest and most accessible cues, especially when the parties are polarized on the issue. Yet such cues have not always been available. During the Cold War period, the two parties in the United States rarely provided clear positions on foreign affairs, and when they did—mainly in the realm of war and military actions—they were often uncontested (Holsti, 2004). In the last two decades, however, the two parties have increasingly offered diverging views on a wide range of issues within the realm of foreign policy (Beinart, 2008; Jeong & Quirk, 2019).

Research reveals that the bipartisan support for Israel that once characterized the actions and rhetoric of American elites has changed considerably over the last two decades. Studies of lawmaking in the US Congress challenge the long standing conclusion that Congress presents a bipartisan view on Israel (Feuerwerger, 1979; Garnham, 1977; Trice, 1977) and reveal increasing partisan differences in congressional action—Republicans demonstrating a stronger and clearer view toward Israel compared to Democrats (Cavari & Nyer, 2014, 2016; Oldmixon, Rosenson, & Wald, 2005; Rosenson, Oldmixon, & Wald, 2009). Other studies demonstrate a more recent change in partisan debate about Israel in electoral campaigns (Cavari & Freedman, 2017), in elite discourse (Rynhold, 2015) and in partisan presence in media coverage of Israel (Cavari & Freedman, 2019). Cavari and Freedman (2019) demonstrate that this divide among elites affects the attitudes of individuals by providing clearer cues that make it easier for them to take more extreme and diverging views. The strength and clarity of cues, however, is not the same across parties. In our previous work on media coverage of Israel (Cavari & Freedman, 2019) and of campaign rhetoric about Israel (Cavari & Freedman, 2017), we demonstrate that Republicans are talking more about Israel and are offering clearer views about it, while Democrats talk less and offer more balanced and/or ambiguous views.

To test the independent effect of party cues, we incorporate an indicator of attention to the news about the conflict. We expect that people who are tuned to the news about Israel will be exposed to party cues if those are available. The effect of exposure, therefore, should be evident more in recent years when party elites began to consistently present clear and diverging cues. To assess the interrelated effect of attention (exposure to cues), party and time, we first plot longitudinal differences between people who are following the news about Israel (attentive) and people who are not following the news (non-attentive). We then estimate a model that includes a three-way interaction between the variables of interest—party, attention and time (pre- and post-2001).

We measure attention using a self-reported question that is frequently asked in these surveys: Whether respondents follow the news regarding Israel and the Arab or Palestinian conflict or have heard of recent events on this topic in the news. This is a more specific question than the more common question about news regarding foreign affairs. Yet given our interest in direct exposure to elite



FIGURE 6.13 Trends in News Interest in the Israel—Arab/Palestinian Conflict, Overall and by Party

Note: *N* = 203,939 in 136 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

discourse about Israel, we use this more specific question. The question was asked in 134 surveys spread throughout our time frame.

In Figure 6.13 we summarize the responses in each survey. Each dot represents the percent of people who said that they follow the news about the conflict in one survey. The trend line is a Lowess smoothing line representing the average interest. The figure includes two panels. The panel on the left summarizes the overall attention. The panel on the right summarizes the attention of our two partisan groups—Republicans and Democrats.

On average, about 60 percent said they are following the news about the conflict, yet with a large variation over time ranging from lows of 20 percent to a near unanimous interest (97%). The variation suggests that Americans are tuned to the news as a function of events and interest. This variation offers us good leverage to assess the effect of exposure to the news on attitudes and partisan differences in these effects. Although Republicans are, on average, more attuned to the news about Israel, differences are small and variation is strong. The relative similarities across parties demonstrates that attention is not associated with party identification.

Dividing support for Israel by attention, illustrated in Figure 6.14, yields limited results. On favorability, blame and force, we see an increasing divide in



FIGURE 6.14 Support for Israel by Attention to the News

Note: N = 8,172 in eight surveys (Favorability); N = 45,050 in 52 surveys (Sympathy); S = 5,717 in eight surveys (Blame); N = 11,097 in 14 surveys (Force).

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

support—people who are attentive are more supportive of Israel than people who are not. We see no such divide in our sympathies series.

The limited findings may, however, be attributed to the correlation between attention to the news and several other explanatory variables—especially education, party and religious affiliation. We account for these in our regression model by including pairwise and a triple interactions between party identification, attention to the news and period (pre-/post-2001). Coefficient estimates are available in Table 6.4 in the Appendix for this chapter. In Figure 6.15, we summarize the results by plotting the predicted probabilities of Republicans and Democrats who report that they follow or do not follow the news, over time (pre- and post-September 2001).

The top panels summarize the predicted probabilities for favoring Israel: Top-left for people who do not follow the news, top-right for people who follow the news. Before September 2001, differences between parties were insignificant. In contrast, after September 2001, differences between parties are evident only among people who are exposed to political cues—those following the news. Our estimation of the sympathy models yields very similar results (and in contrast to the descriptive trends in Figure 6.14). The results provide a strong support to our claim that party labels have an independent effect on support for Israel among those who are exposed to party cues.



FIGURE 6.15 The Effect of Following the News About the Conflict on Support for Israel

Note: Partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position (following two binary logistic regressions), across attention to relevant news and time. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 6.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

Conclusion

The chapter reveals and analyzes the change in public consensus on Israel, as well as the extent of the current partisan divide over Israel. Until the turn of the twenty-first century, there was no clear partisan divide over Israel. Like most demographic divides, Israel enjoyed a relative consensus in public support. This has changed in the last two decades. Americans today are strongly divided along party lines in the strength of their support for Israel. On average, Republicans are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel—they have a favorable view of Israel, they sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians, they blame Israel's adversaries for the violent conflict, they support Israel's use of force and they support maintaining (or increasing) US aid to Israel. On most issues, Democrats, on average, are also supportive of Israel. The difference between the partisan groups does not contrast them as pro- or against Israel. Instead, it is about the strength of overall support. Republicans are more likely to be supportive of Israel compared to Democrats. Yet the fact that this is a relatively recent and growing transformation suggests that the trend may lead to a more dramatic contrast.

In assessing the nature of this divide, we reveal that social and ideological alignment, as well as an increasing elite divide contribute to the change. Over

the last few decades, party attachments have aligned with a religious divide where the Republican party became the home of evangelical Christians. The fact that this group carries a strong sentiment about Israel contributes to the divide. Furthermore, over the last few decades, the political parties have become ideologically homogenous, solidifying partisan views about foreign policy in general and about Israel in particular.

We further suggest that party elites are increasingly providing clear and frequent cues about attitudes toward Israel. In doing so, the public debate about Israel has transformed from a one-dimensional information flow that promotes consensus to a two-dimensional information flow that generates divide in public opinion (Zaller, 1992). Most of this change is among Republican elites (Cavari & Freedman, 2019). Yet, consistent with Berinsky's elite cue theory (Berinsky, 2009), mass polarization can occur in the absence of vocal opposition, provided a strong cue-giver takes a clear position on that policy. In previous research, we demonstrated that Republicans have become a single strong cue-giver on this topic. We also demonstrated empirically that the elite divide affects mass attitudes—driving Republicans and Democrats increasingly apart.

APPENDIX

In all models, we use the following reference categories: Male (gender), 30–49 (age), baby boomers (generation), white (race), high school/less (education), Catholic (religion), South (region) and Democrat (party).

TABLE 6.1 Conditional Effects of Party and Religious Affiliation (Evangelicals)

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*
Republican	0.153	0.246***
	(0.127)	(0.064)
Independent	−0.402	−0.035
	(0.220)	(0.205)
Evangelical	0.181	0.496***
	(0.151)	(0.054)
Post-2001	0.570	−0.094
	(0.315)	(0.153)
Republican × Evangelical	0.419**	0.259***
	(0.133)	(0.035)
Independent × Evangelical	0.189	0.306
	(0.300)	(0.188)
Republican × Post-2001	0.259	0.917***
	(0.147)	(0.128)
Independent × Post-2001	0.532*	0.311
	(0.222)	(0.232)
Evangelical × Post-2001	0.058	0.424***
	(0.174)	(0.104)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 6.1 (Continued)

	(1) Favorability	*(2) Sympathy*
Republican × Evangelical × Post-2001	0.210	−0.162
	(0.348)	(0.121)
Independent × Evangelical × Post-2001	0.234	−0.061
	(0.448)	(0.251)
Female	−0.419***	−0.012
	(0.067)	(0.046)
18–29	−0.275	−0.112
	(0.142)	(0.067)
50–64	0.285	0.080
	(0.167)	(0.059)
65+	0.235	−0.003
	(0.195)	(0.085)
African-American	−0.564***	−0.541***
	(0.159)	(0.066)
Hispanic	0.064	−0.304***
	(0.116)	(0.087)
College/More	0.355***	−0.283**
	(0.086)	(0.044)
Catholic	0.029	0.254**
	(0.111)	(0.083)
Other Christian	0.884*	−0.036
	(0.389)	(0.101)
Jewish	2.478***	2.726***
	(0.569)	(0.409)
Other Religion	−0.232	−0.165
	(0.094)	(0.092)
Northeast	−0.048	−0.413***
	(0.152)	(0.074)
Midwest	0.089	−0.137
	(0.109)	(0.079)
West	0.133	−0.147
	(0.137)	(0.061)*
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.422**
		(0.128)
Constant	0.088	1.398***
	(0.319)	(0.169)
N	3,564	16,870
Surveys	6	26

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (clustered standard errors in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Survey data, courtesy of Gries (2014) offer a unique opportunity for examining the role of religious fundamentalism and the conditional effect of party with respect toward Israel. The survey was conducted between March 31, 2011–April 6, 2011 and consisted of 1,050 interviews using the YouGov panel (nationally representative of American adults matched on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest).

In column 1 of Table 6.2 we list the results of a linear regression. The dependent variable is a thermometer rating of Israel, ranging from 0 (very cold feelings) to 100 (very warm feelings). Our two main predictors are party identification and attitudes toward the Bible. For the latter, respondents were asked to rate their agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) with the following statement: "The bible is literally true, from Genesis to Revelations, from Adam and Eve to Armageddon." To test the conditional effect of party and attitudes toward the Bible, we include an interaction term between the two. In the second model, we add all conventional demographic control variables—gender, age, race, education, religion and region. In the third model, we include an indicator for evangelical Christians.

The most important coefficient for our interest is the interaction term between party identification (specifically, Republican) and attitudes toward the Bible. The coefficient is positive and significant in all three models, suggesting that while holding all other variables constant, the warmth that Republicans feel toward Israel (compared to Democrats, the reference category) increases the more they agree that the Bible should be taken literally. Figure 6.9 in the main body of the chapter illustrates these results using the predicted values estimated based on the model in column 3.

TABLE 6.2 The Nonadditive Effect of Party and Bible Attitudes

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*
Republican	8.519*	6.495	6.534
	(3.875)	(3.952)	(3.946)
Independent	−8.731	−4.474	−4.257
	(5.487)	(5.737)	(5.730)
Bible Literally	0.745	0.956	0.581
	(0.555)	(0.651)	(0.679)
Republican * Bible Literally	2.144*	1.893*	1.809*
	(0.833)	(0.880)	(0.880)
Independent * Bible Literally	3.064*	1.758	1.688
	(1.253)	(1.314)	(1.313)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 6.2 (Continued)

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*
Female		−6.711***	−6.729***
		(1.748)	(1.745)
18–29		3.685	3.193
		(2.989)	(2.996)
50–64		6.572**	6.322**
		(2.112)	(2.113)
65+		5.454*	5.374*
		(2.466)	(2.463)
African-American		−1.455	−1.642
		(3.194)	(3.191)
Hispanic		2.282	2.370
		(2.891)	(2.887)
College/More		3.681	3.535
		(1.894)	(1.893)
Catholic		−4.078	−2.126
		(2.272)	(2.488)
Other Christian		−4.220	−1.636
		(6.338)	(6.472)
Jewish		22.443***	24.335***
		(6.382)	(6.449)
Other Religion		−5.759*	−4.394
		(2.542)	(2.637)
Northeast		−4.371	−3.873
		(2.508)	(2.518)
Midwest		−6.360**	−5.998*
		(2.348)	(2.352)
West		1.379	1.417
		(2.305)	(2.302)
Evangelical			4.786
			(2.503)
Constant	49.596***	51.734***	50.966***
	(2.225)	(3.730)	(3.746)
N	981	915	915
Adjusted R^2	0.135	0.180	0.183

Note: Dependent variable: Thermometer ratings of Israel (0 = very cold; 100 = very warm). *Coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) using an OLS estimator.*

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0001$

TABLE 6.3 Conditional Effects of Party and Ideology

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*
Republican	0.364***	0.051
	(0.087)	(0.084)
Independent	−0.349***	−0.200
	(0.082)	(0.105)
Conservative	0.069	0.121
	(0.090)	(0.066)
Moderate	0.175*	0.098
	(0.083)	(0.065)
Post-2001	0.532	−0.560***
	(0.164)**	(0.136)
Republican × Conservative	−0.003	0.124
	(0.098)	(0.096)
Republican × Moderate	−0.187	0.018
	(0.090)	(0.095)
Independent × Conservative	0.061	0.105
	(0.169)	(0.129)
Independent × Moderate	0.003	−0.001
	(0.123)	(0.101)
Republican × Post-2001	−0.721**	0.770***
	(0.219)	(0.216)
Independent × Post-2001	0.216	0.798***
	(0.154)	(0.179)
Conservative × Post-2001	−0.106	0.889***
	(0.132)	(0.118)
Moderate × Post-2001	−0.318*	0.506***
	(0.147)	(0.100)
Republican × Conservative × Post-2001	1.286***	0.157
	(0.331)	(0.217)
Republican × Moderate × Post-2001	1.109***	−0.174
	0.274	(0.184)
Independent × Conservative × Post-2001	0.601*	−0.617**
	(0.249)	(0.212)
Independent × Moderate × Post-2001	0.442	−0.484**
	(0.236)	(0.158)
Female	−0.188***	0.110**
	(0.046)	(0.037)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 6.3 (Continued)

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*
18–29	−0.367***	−0.106*
	(0.086)	(0.045)
50–64	0.214***	−0.030
	(0.061)	(0.049)
65+	0.111	−0.102
	(0.128)	(0.077)
African-American	−0.382***	−0.584***
	(0.077)	(0.056)
Hispanic	−0.131	−0.148**
	(0.076)	(0.053)
College/More	0.220***	−0.206***
	(0.051)	(0.046)
Catholic	−0.220***	−0.288***
	(0.045)	(0.040)
Other Christian	0.069	−0.022
	(0.261)	(0.083)
Jewish	1.889***	2.116***
	(0.306)	(0.174)
Other Religion	−0.227*	−0.456***
	(0.103)	(0.054)
Northeast	0.004	−0.283***
	(0.083)	(0.045)
Midwest	−0.096	−0.245***
	(0.083)	(0.043)
West	−0.095	−0.141***
	(0.054)	(0.037)
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.216
		(0.152)
Constant	0.330*	1.528***
	(0.156)	(0.150)
N	16,879	47,061
Surveys	19	58

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (clustered standard errors in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

TABLE 6.4 Conditional Effects of Party and Attention (Exposure to Elite Cues)

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*
Republican	−0.121	0.084
	(0.125)	(0.088)
Independent	−0.173	−0.234
	(0.214)	(0.148)
Attention	0.415***	0.196
	(0.081)	(0.201)
Post-2001	−0.208	0.496**
	(0.215)	(0.169)
Republican × Attention	0.356*	−0.026
	(0.147)	(0.096)
Independent × Attention	0.196	0.140
	(0.328)	(0.172)
Republican × Post-2001	0.297	−0.044
	(0.159)	(0.191)
Independent × Post-2001	0.517	0.565
	(0.336)	(0.351)
Attention × Post-2001	0.045	−0.511*
	(0.146)	(0.221)
Republican × Attention × Post-2001	0.486**	0.926**
	(0.181)	(0.277)
Independent × Attention × Post-2001	−0.264	−0.171
	(0.479)	(0.499)
Female	−0.182*	0.132**
	(0.092)	(0.051)
18–29	−0.126	−0.077
	(0.127)	(0.047)
50–64	0.177*	−0.278***
	(0.073)	(0.048)
65+	0.004	−0.335***
	(0.179)	(0.063)
African-American	−0.249*	−0.751***
	(0.105)	(0.078)
Hispanic	−0.379*	−0.272*
	(0.178)	(0.123)
College/More	0.149	−0.177***
	(0.076)	(0.048)
Catholic	−0.249***	−0.327***
	(0.067)	(0.049)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 6.4 (Continued)

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Sympathy*
Other Christian	−0.218	−0.298*
	(0.119)	(0.126)
Jewish	2.288***	2.430***
	(0.368)	(0.2341)
Other Religion	−0.306*	−0.519***
	(0.150)	(0.060)
Northeast	−0.234*	−0.333***
	(0.108)	(0.065)
Midwest	−0.037	−0.132**
	(0.060)	(0.045)
West	0.141	−0.082
	(0.098)	(0.054)
Sympathy: Palestinians		−0.365
		(0.189)
Constant	0.695**	1.791***
	(0.205)	(0.286)
N	5,959	32,300
Surveys	6	39

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (clustered standard errors in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note

1. Cramer's V correlation coefficient for categorical data, using three categories for party and three categories for ideology.

7

AFFECTIVE SOURCES OF ATTITUDES

In Chapters 5 and 6, we illustrated the variation between demographic and political groups across five measures of support for Israel. In Chapter 5, we found limited gaps between most demographic divides, except for religion and generational cohorts. In contrast, in Chapter 6 we found large and significant gaps among partisan groups. Republicans are more likely to have pro-Israeli attitudes compared to Democrats: Republicans feel a greater positive affect toward Israel, and they are more likely to sympathize with Israel than with its rivals and blame these rivals for the violence in the region. Republicans are also more likely to support Israel's use of force and to provide it with aid.

In Chapter 6, we further examined the determinants of the partisan divide—social alignment, ideological alignment or adherence to the elite divide. Although we find support for each explanation, we argue that party labels matter above and beyond what can be explained by changes in the demographic composition of the parties or by ideological homogeneity of mass partisans. This, we argue, is strongly affected by the increasing divide among party elites, which provides clearer cues in support (or not) for Israel.

Yet one may question the mechanism of the partisan divide in explaining attitudes toward Israel. Several of our measures of support are complex and require a great deal of knowledge. Without knowledge, it is difficult to provide consistent and reliable responses to questions about who is to blame in the conflict or whether Israel's use of force was justified. Given what we know about the level of knowledge Americans have about foreign affairs (Converse, 1964; Delli-Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Page & Bouton, 2006), it is unlikely that most Americans are aware of the details each of these issues demand.

We propose instead that Republicans and Democrats differ in their broad, general feeling toward Israel and that these feelings explain specific preferences

regarding the conflict and US policy. Individuals may not have knowledge about a specific event, conflict or the level of foreign aid, but they have a favorable feeling of Israel and, therefore, when asked about the conflict, they side with Israel. In Chapter 3, we suggested that this broad feeling is captured by the notion of positive affect. Using two operational definitions (favorability and viewing Israel as an ally), we demonstrated that Israel enjoys a high level of positive affect among the American public, which has steadily increased over time. This positive affect is relatively unique in comparison to most countries, and especially when compared to Israel's adversaries.

In Chapter 6, we showed that Republicans and Democrats vary in their positive affect; looking only at favorability, Republicans are more favorable toward Israel than Democrats, especially from 2001 forward. We also show that Republicans and Democrats vary in their attitudes toward Israel on a wide range of policy preferences. In this chapter, we reconstruct the causal arrow and suggest that affect serves as an endogenous factor and an exogenous one, connecting between partisan attachments and our wide range of policy preferences about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Due to religious denomination, ideological commitments or elite party cues, Republicans have favorable views of Israel, which translate to favorable attitudes on a broad range of issues. In other words, positive affect mediates the relationship between party identification and support for Israel.

This approach is consistent with a rich body of literature that views affect as a heuristic for attitudes about complex issues, especially in low information environments (Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1982; Lodge & Stroh, 1993; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Morris et al., 2003; Slovic et al., 2007; Sniderman et al., 1991). Sniderman et al. (1991), for example, offer a series of judgmental heuristics that allow an uninformed citizenry to overcome knowledge deficits and adopt clear positions on a range of political issues. They attribute specific importance to affect, the likeability factor, in political decisions. Simply put, people, especially when lacking sufficient information, reduce complex political questions to simpler ones, relying on "gut" feelings toward political objects. This line of research illustrates, for example, that vote choice may be influenced by how much voters like a particular candidate (Lodge & Stroh, 1993) and emphasize the role of a "liking heuristic to guide future behavior" (Lodge & Taber, 2005, p. 476).

Recent studies demonstrate that citizens compensate for their lack of knowledge about foreign affairs by relying on other more readily available information to form their attitudes about foreign policy. Page and Bouton (2006) suggest that citizens organize their foreign policy beliefs and attitudes in a purposeful, goal-oriented instrumental fashion. They argue that

> [b]asic needs, values, and beliefs work together with several other political attitudes and predispositions—including political ideological and party

> loyalties, perception of international threats and problems, specific foreign policy goals, and beliefs and feelings about specific foreign countries and leaders—to affect individual's preferences concerning what sorts of foreign policies to pursue.
>
> *(p. 29)*

Concerning the role of affect, they suggest that political predispositions influence beliefs and feelings about particular foreign countries and leaders, which in turn influence specific foreign policy preferences. In contrast to their theoretical model of a "*hierarchical, means-ends chain*," however, they test only the additive effect of affect. Using CCGA data on a wide range of policies, they find that, among other factors, beliefs and feelings about particular countries and leaders influence specific foreign policy preferences.[1]

Gries (2014) takes on the task put forward by Page and Bouton and examines the causal mechanism between political predispositions, beliefs and feelings about foreign countries and foreign policy preferences. Using a survey from 2011, Gries demonstrates that "gut feelings" toward foreign countries mediate the relationship between political ideology and a wide range of policy preferences. This includes also policy preferences toward Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other issues in the Middle East. Specifically, warmth toward Palestinians and Muslims and toward Israel mediate the association between ideology and support for tougher Israel policy: Conservatives have warmer feelings toward Israel, which in turn are associated with opposition to tougher Israel policy.

Consistent with the studies of Page and Bouton (2006), Gries (2014) and our own findings in previous chapters, we test the hypothesized relationship of party identification, affect and policy preferences using our longitudinal data about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Specifically, we test how positive affect toward Israel mediates the association between party identification and policy preferences on the Arab-Israeli conflict across time and issues. This theoretical model is illustrated in Figure 7.1.

We expect that party identification will have a direct *and* indirect association with the various measures of support for Israel. Republicans and Democrats vary in their views about the conflict. Some of this variation is explained by different attitudes about what they think about the conflict (direct effect). Some of this variation is explained by a difference in "gut" feeling toward Israel, a more abstract measure of positive affect toward Israel that determines their support for Israel on a wide and complex series of questions about the conflict (indirect effect). The direct and indirect effects explain the variation in partisan attitudes.

To test this model, we first use favorability as an exogenous variable predicting support for Israel in our remaining four policy series: Sympathies, blame, Israeli use of force and foreign aid to Israel. When we compare the probability of supporting Israel between respondents who view Israel favorably and those who do



FIGURE 7.1 Theoretical Model of Affect as Mediator of Partisan Differences

Note: Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016). Covariates that are included in predicting both the mediator and the dependent variable are not displayed in the figure. Covariates include gender, age, race, religion, region and question wording.

not, we find significant differences: A high probability of support among those who feel a positive affect and a lower probability among those who do not. This effect holds when we control for demographic and political predictors. We then test the mediation effect of affect on the association between party identification and support for Israel. Our results confirm our expectations that at least some of the partisan variation in support for Israel is mediated through affect.

Data and Method

To examine the role of affect, we build on existing work (Gries, 2014) and our analysis in previous chapters. We operationalize affect using the favorability item we presented in Chapter 3. In Figure 3.1, we plot the longitudinal trends of favorability toward Israel. These trends suggest that a majority of the American public consistently has a favorable opinion toward Israel, a majority that has steadily increased from roughly 50 percent in 1989 to over 70 percent in recent years. The share of Americans who have an unfavorable view of Israel has dropped from 40 percent to about 20 percent in the same period. Moreover, as we demonstrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.4, such high levels of favorability are unique compared to most countries, and especially compared to Israel's rivals.

In Chapter 6, we discuss the rising partisan divide on this issue. In Figure 6.2, we showcase that favorability has risen for both Republicans and Democrats,

TABLE 7.1 Measures of Support for Israel

Measure	*Number of Surveys*	*Years*
Sympathy	9	1982–1984, 1989, 1991–1992, 1998, 2000–2001, 2011[a]
Blame	3	1989, 1991, 2006
Force	1	2006
Aid	3	1989, 1992, 1998

a Data for 2011, as well as three additional surveys in 1989, 2000 and 2001, are available only if religion is excluded from the list of covariates.

but more so for Republicans. In the last decade, Republican favorability has averaged 74 percent (SD = 5.50) compared to 65 percent for Democrats (with double the variation, SD = 10.33).

To test the effect of favorability on the different policy questions, we use a subset of the survey data that we collected in previous chapters, which ask about Israel favorability *and* one of the four measures of support for Israel (along with our full list of predictors—gender, age, race, education, religion, region and party identification). Table 7.1 summarizes the items we examine, the number of surveys included in our subset and the years they cover. In some instances, we find insufficient data due to spotty availability of our additional covariates, especially religion. We, therefore, examine our models twice, with and without religion in the list of covariates, to provide a test of more recent data, especially given the important changes in partisan attitudes after 2001 (see previous chapter). We use the same coding scheme specified in Chapter 5 for all variables in the models estimated here. In each of the dependent variables, and in favorability, we code responses into two categories—expressing support for Israel or opposition to Israel (nonresponses excluded; see Chapter 5 for the full wording of each item, as well as the coding scheme of response categories).

As a robustness check, we first examine how well this subset of data that include a favorability indicator, captures the effects we found in Chapters 5 and 6 using the full series of data. For each measure, we estimate the same binary logistic regression models that we estimated in Chapters 5 and 6, but now using the subset of the data. Our results (summarized in Table 7.3 in the Appendix for this chapter) confirm that the subset of data is relatively representative of the entire dataset, though some important differences are evident (and discussed in the Appendix).

Our empirical strategy is divided into two parts. First, we estimate the additive effect of favorability by adding favorability to our models as an exogenous variable. This allows us to assess the unique contribution of affect to supportive attitudes toward Israel, independent of all other explanatory variables. Second, we test the mediating role of favorability on the association between political predispositions and policy preferences in each of our models.[2] That is, while controlling for all other variables, we examine a causal process in which party identification influences affect, and affect influences support for Israel.

Affect as a Source of Policy Preferences

Our first step is assessing the additive effect of favorability on support for Israel. We estimate the same models estimated in Chapter 5 but add favorability as an exogenous factor. Favorability is coded as a binary indicator comparing respondents with a favorable view of Israel to those with an unfavorable view of Israel. We review the estimated coefficients of favorability for each measure of support for Israel, and plot predicted probabilities to illustrate these effects. The full regression estimates are summarized in Table 7.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

The most important finding in these models is the significant and positive effect of favorability as a predictor in all four measures of support for Israel. Respondents who hold a favorable view of Israel are significantly more likely to sympathize with Israel than with Arabs or Palestinians, to blame Israel's rivals for the conflict, to support Israel's use of force and to support US aid to Israel (compared to respondents who do not have a favorable view of Israel).

To illustrate the positive and significant effect of favorability, we follow the procedure we used in previous chapters and plot the predicted probability of supporting Israel across the four attitudinal measures, distinguishing between respondents who view Israel favorably and those who do not. We present these probabilities in Figure 7.2.



FIGURE 7.2 Probability of Supporting Israel, by Favorability

Note: Affective differences in the predicted probabilities of reporting a pro-Israel position, following six binary logistic regressions. Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 7.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

On all four measures, respondents who view Israel favorably are very likely to support Israel: 9 out of 10 Americans who view Israel favorably are likely to sympathize with Israel (0.88), 8 out of 10 are likely to blame the Arab side (0.79), 8 out of 10 are likely to approve of Israel's use of force (0.79) and 7 out of 10 are likely to support providing Israel with aid (0.73). The question of use of force is particularly interesting. It is a controversial issue that usually receives lower support, as we demonstrated in previous chapters. Yet here, Americans with a favorable view of Israel are very supportive of its use of force.

The minority of Americans who hold unfavorable views of Israel—20–30% of the population (see Figure 3.1)—behaves as expected. Not only is support for Israel significantly lower among this group, but the 95 percent confidence intervals reveal that on most issues, support for Israel is not guaranteed. Sympathy is the only measure in which members of this group are still more likely to support Israel, but at much lower rates (0.59, or 6 out of 10) compared to those with favorable views of Israel. On blame, the uncertainty illustrated by the 95 percent confidence intervals suggests that respondents with unfavorable opinion may be equally likely to support or not support Israel. Finally, these respondents are, in fact, more likely to disapprove of Israel's use of force (the probability of approving is 0.45) and are split on the question of aid (0.52). In comparison to all the demographic and political sources of attitudes we discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, affect constitutes the largest effect on attitudes toward Israel.

We also find that when we include favorability in our models, we improve our prediction considerably. We show this by measuring the change in pseudo R^2 (McFadden Adjusted) in each model as a result of adding an indicator for favorability.[3] The comparison for each pair of models is summarized in Table 7.2.

Adding an indicator for favorability increases the explained variance in every model. In two policy questions (sympathy and use of force), adding favorability more than doubles the share of explained variance. In the other two, blame and aid to Israel, the change in explained variance is smaller yet substantial and significant in all four measures.[4]

TABLE 7.2 Increase in Pseudo R^2 (McFadden Adjusted)

Dependent Variable	*Pseudo* R^2 *(favorability excluded)*	*Pseudo* R^2 *(favorability included)*	*Pseudo* R^2 *Increase*	*Wald Test*
Sympathy	0.060	0.153	0.093	$\chi^2(1) = 292.82^{***}$
Blame	0.103	0.141	0.038	$\chi^2(1) = 5.68^{*}$
Israel's use of Force	0.067	0.157	0.090	$\chi^2(1) = 84.17^{***}$
Aid to Israel	0.058	0.090	0.032	$\chi^2(1) = 41.34^{***}$

$^{*}p < 0.05$ $^{**}p < 0.01$ $^{***}p < 0.001$

The effects of most other variables in the models remain unchanged in terms of direction and significance, though differences do exist in the size of the coefficients and standard errors. We refer the reader to the table in the Appendix for this chapter to review these results. For our purpose, we point to a notable change in the coefficient for party identification: After accounting for favorability, the significant coefficient for Republicans on all of the measures is now smaller. This is suggestive evidence that at least some of the effect of party is explained by or mediated through favorability. We turn to this in the following analysis.

Affect: The Mediating Mechanism in the Partisan Divide Over Israel

The large differences between respondents with favorable and unfavorable views of Israel may be rooted in the different feelings of affect that partisans feel toward Israel. If, as we propose, demographic and political sources of attitudes such as party identification explain affect, and affect explains preferences, then affect may be mediating the relationship between sources and attitudes. This is suggested by Page and Bouton (2006) and tested on a range of issues by Gries (2014). We test this proposition, illustrated earlier in Figure 7.1, using our data on the four measures of support for Israel: Sympathies, blame, use of force and foreign aid.

We use the "mediation" package in R (Imai et al., 2010; Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014), which provides a comprehensive framework for examining mediation effects in various statistical models, including, for our purposes, binary logistic regressions. As input for this test, we provide the package with two models for each measure of support. The first model estimates favorability as endogenous to our list of demographic and political predictors. The second model estimates a particular measure of support as endogenous to the same list of predictors, plus the addition of favorability. The models are summarized and explained further in Tables 7.4–7.5 in the Appendix for this chapter. Both models are estimated on the same identical observations.[5]

In Figure 7.3 we plot the results of the tests for mediation. The left panel plots the indirect effect of party, through favorability, for each measure of support for Israel. On the right panel, we illustrate the proportion of the effect of party that is mediated through favorability. This is a useful indication of magnitude, pointing to the importance of favorability as a mediator.

The mediation analysis yields an average causal mediation effect (ACME), capturing the indirect effect of party identification. Specifically, we compare the indirect effect of Republicans that is mediated through affect to that of Democrats, while holding all other variables constant. The bars on the left panel summarize the ACME. The black horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The results reveal a significant indirect effect on three of four measures of support. That is, favorability mediates the relationship between party



FIGURE 7.3 The Mediating Role of Affect

Note: Mediation model estimated using the "mediation" package in R (Imai et al., 2010; Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014). Models estimated while controlling for gender, age, race, religion, party, region and year (as well as any model-specific controls accounting for variation on question wording). The figure includes bootstrapped standard errors for 1,000 samples. Results remain largely unchanged using clustered standard errors by survey (not displayed). Regression estimates are summarized in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 in the Appendix for this chapter.

ACME (average causal mediation effect) captures the indirect effect that is mediated through affect. ADE is the average direct effect of party identification on measures of support for Israel. Bars represent the effects. Horizontal lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect.

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

identification and support for Israel measured in sympathies, Israel's use of force and providing Israel with aid. The only exception is blame.

The coefficients are small, but given the logistic model, this is unimportant. Rather, the extent to which it is significantly different from zero is important, and perhaps even more so is the magnitude of the mediation, which is captured by the proportion of the effect of party that is mediated through favorability. This is illustrated on the panel on the right. Over half (0.52) of the effect of party on sympathy is mediated through favorability. In other words, so strong is the affect that Republicans feel toward Israel, compared to that of Democrats, that half of the partisan differences in sympathies toward Israel are accounted for through favorability.[6]

The proportion of the mediated effect on other issues is lower but is nonetheless meaningful. On aid and Israel's use of force, about a quarter (0.26 and 0.27, respectively) of the effect is mediated through favorability.

It is curious that we find no significant effect for blame. Given the significant and large effect of favorability on blame we found earlier in the chapter, we



FIGURE 7.4 Moderating Effect of Year on the Relationship between Affect, Party and Blaming Israel's Adversaries

Note: Mediation model estimated using the "mediation" package in R (Imai et al., 2010; Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014). Models estimated while controlling for gender, age, race, religion, party, region and year (as well as any model-specific controls accounting for variation on question wording). Regression estimates are summarized in Table 7.6 in the Appendix for this chapter.

ACME (average causal mediation effect) captures the indirect effect that is mediated through affect. ADE is the average direct effect of party identification on measures of support for Israel. Bars represent the effects. Horizontal lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect (calculated using nonparametric bootstrapping for 1,000 samples).

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

attribute this to the first part of the mediation model. In these data, party has no significant effect on favorability, which is unusual. However, data that include both favorability and a measure of blame are rare, and this model relies on only two surveys—one in 1989, when a meaningful difference between Republicans and Democrats was yet to emerge, and a second in 2006 soon after the emergence of partisan differences. Moreover, the majority of observations in this model originate in the earlier survey (1,121 compared to 438 in 2006). When interacting party identification with year,[7] estimating a moderated mediation model, we find no mediation effect in 1989 but a significant mediation effect in 2006 (see Figure 7.4). In other words, the 1989 data are skewing the results, and favorability does, in fact, mediate the relationship between party and blame in more recent years, when party differences have become more meaningful. According to the 2006 data, 15 percent of the effect of party on blame is mediated through favorability. We list the regression models for this particular test in the Appendix for this chapter as well (Table 7.6).

Conclusion

The findings of this chapter provide an important explanation of how the partisan divide over support for Israel is manifested. We provide empirical validation of a widely accepted theory of public opinion: Heuristic formation of opinions. While Americans might not have sufficient knowledge on all aspects that relate to Israel and American foreign policy toward Israel, the majority of them view Israel in favorable terms and express strong support for Israel on a wide range of issues and over long periods of time. The tendency to hold a favorable view

of Israel is stronger among Republicans, and—as the results of this chapter show—they are, therefore, more likely to express support for Israel on a wide range of issues. That is, favorability serves as a heuristic that mediates the association between political predispositions and policy preferences.

We concede that it is possible that the causal arrow is in reverse—Republicans' strong support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict could explain their affect toward Israel. This directional relationship would suggest that they have a favorable view of Israel because they sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians, because they blame Palestinians for the conflict, because they support Israel's use of force or because they think the United States should provide aid to Israel. Israel, especially after 2001 and especially among Republicans, is fighting a war against Islamist terrorism that is aligned with the US war on terror in neighboring countries, most of which are not Israeli allies (Rynhold, 2015). This generates strong sympathies that may affect how Americans view Israel.

Though possible, we believe reverse causality in this case to be theoretically weaker than our suggested path. First, while the argument may be stronger with concern to sympathies, it is unclear what the logic of the reverse causation on other measures of support is. How does support for providing aid increase favorability? Second, such a reverse causation is not consistent with the extensive literature on heuristics and the several studies suggesting (and testing) that affect serves as a useful heuristic in preference formation. Given this literature and the consistency of our findings across issues and time, we are confident in these empirical findings, which reveal the mediating role of affect as a manifestation of the partisan divide.

In the next chapter, we analyze variation in an important and contemporary issue in the conflict that does not explicitly involve support for Israel—the issue of an independent Palestinian state. As such, we demonstrate that affect is far less useful in explaining the partisan divide on this issue. These findings further support the results we find here. Affect mediates the relationship between party and policy preferences but only on issues that can be defined as pro- or against Israel.

APPENDIX

Robustness Check of Subsample

Table 7.3 lists the results of the four logistic regression models predicting attitudes toward Israel, using the subset of data that includes an indicator for favorability. We do not add favorability yet. We estimate these models as a robustness check for using our subset of the data. Our list of predictors remains the same: Demographic indicators (gender, age, race, education, religion and region), party identification, and relevant controls (year and variation in question wordings on sympathy, blame and aid). When multiple surveys exist in one year, we cluster standard errors by survey.

In all models, we use the following reference categories: Male (gender), 30–49 (age), white (race), high school/less (education), Catholic (religion), South (region) and Democrat (party).

Overall, the effects in these models echo the patterns of those estimated in the full data (Table 7.3), with some differences. First, the difference between Republicans and Democrats on sympathy now only verges on conventional levels of significance ($p = 0.051$). This is likely caused by the limited data, ending in 2001, when the partisan gap fully emerged (Cavari & Freedman, 2019). The difference does, however, remain significant on all other measures—Republicans are more likely to support Israel.

Second, the difference between Protestants and Catholics is in the expected direction, but is only significant on sympathy. In addition, fewer age differences are significant, and on aid the youngest age group is, in fact, more supportive of aid to Israel than those aged 30–49. Finally, women are significantly more supportive of Israel than men on all measures except for Israel's use of force.

These changes in the models do point to some issues in the extent to which the subset of data is representative of the full dataset. However, our empirical goal in his chapter is not to model support for Israel, a task fulfilled in Chapters 5 and 6, but to examine how favorability explains variation in each of the dependent variables.

TABLE 7.3 Demographic and Political Sources of Attitudes (Using the Subset of Data That Include a Favorability Question)

	(1) Sympathy	*(2) Blame*	*(3) Force*	*(4) Aid*
Female	0.179**	0.252*	−0.787***	0.141***
	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.174)	(0.026)
18–29	−0.121*	0.001	−0.013	0.115***
	(0.049)	(0.186)	(0.320)	(0.021)
50–64	−0.048	0.030	−0.026	0.133**
	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.202)	(0.040)
65+	−0.315*	−0.459**	0.242	0.267***
	(0.131)	(0.160)	(0.239)	(0.059)
African-American	−0.769***	−0.393	−0.010	0.216*
	(0.046)	(0.234)	(0.299)	(0.102)
Hispanic	−0.496***	−0.424***	−0.510	0.124
	(0.118)	(0.039)	(0.328)	(0.214)
College/More	−0.188**	−0.419*	−0.493**	−0.258***
	(0.059)	(0.186)	(0.171)	(0.022)
Protestant	0.275***	−0.151	0.392	−0.101
	(0.075)	(0.092)	(0.209)	(0.057)
Other Christian	0.280	−0.206		0.336***
	(0.161)	(0.201)		(0.054)
Jewish	2.735***	1.917***	1.675*	1.994***
	(0.264)	(0.245)	(0.662)	(0.093)
Other Religion	−0.145	−0.210	−0.390	−0.065
	(0.125)	(0.184)	(0.258)	(0.177)
Northeast	−0.287***	−0.400***	−0.402	−0.109
	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.234)	(0.142)
Midwest	−0.228	−0.393***	−0.413	−0.044
	(0.134)	(0.018)	(0.228)	(0.091)
West	−0.092	−0.441***	−0.422	−0.225***
	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.239)	(0.066)
Republican	0.199	0.260*	1.028***	0.197***
	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.217)	(0.049)
Independent	−0.279	−0.617**	0.332	−0.168
	(0.181)	(0.203)	(0.200)	(0.135)
Sympathy: Palestinians	−0.399**			
	(0.133)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah		2.082***		
		(0.215)		

(*Continued*)

TABLE 7.3 (Continued)

	(1) Sympathy	*(2) Blame*	*(3) Force*	*(4) Aid*
Amount of Aid not Mentioned				0.940***
				(0.012)
Economic Aid				−0.399***
				(0.070)
Military Aid				0.082
				(0.071)
Year	0.036**			−0.040***
	(0.011)			(0.005)
Constant	−70.177**	1.004***	1.140***	79.911***
	(22.463)	(0.123)	(0.326)	(9.833)
N	9,501	1,559	786	4,214
Surveys	9	2	1	3

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

None of the respondents in the model predicting approval of Israel's use of force identified as "Other Christian"; Year was dropped from the models predicting blame and force because of multicollinearity in the case of the former (the identity of the Arab counterpart—Hezbollah or Palestinians—captures the same effect) and because only one survey was included in the case of the latter.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Additive Effect of Affect

Table 7.4 replicates the basic models (Table 7.3) but adds favorability as an indicator. Favorability is coded as a binary variable taking favorable view of Israel as 1, and 0 otherwise.

TABLE 7.4 Modeling the Role of Affect

	(1) Sympathy	*(2) Blame*	*(3) Force*	*(4) Aid*
Favorability	1.677***	1.069*	1.748***	0.980***
	(0.098)	(0.449)	(0.191)	(0.152)
Female	0.282***	0.311***	−0.642***	0.195***
	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.187)	(0.018)
18–29	−0.004	0.031	0.196	0.213***
	(0.077)	(0.160)	(0.345)	(0.063)
50–64	−0.135*	0.011	−0.056	0.095*
	(0.057)	(0.106)	(0.217)	(0.046)

	(1) *Sympathy*	*(2)* *Blame*	*(3)* *Force*	*(4)* *Aid*
65+	−0.348*	−0.484***	0.166	0.265***
	(0.141)	(0.126)	(0.256)	(0.076)
African-American	−0.558***	−0.332	0.247	0.281**
	(0.054)	(0.225)	(0.329)	(0.098)
Hispanic	−0.349***	−0.380***	−0.668	0.237
	(0.095)	(0.012)	(0.354)	(0.184)
College/More	−0.286***	−0.511***	−0.567**	−0.355***
	(0.049)	(0.149)	(0.185)	(0.034)
Protestant	0.223**	−0.271***	0.264	−0.126*
	(0.083)	(0.032)	(0.227)	(0.062)
Other Christian	0.090	−0.308*		0.340***
	(0.113)	(0.154)		(0.060)
Jewish	2.270***	1.587***	0.931	1.741***
	(0.254)	(0.118)	(0.670)	(0.101)
Other Religion	−0.062	−0.196	−0.467	−0.043
	(0.158)	(0.150)	(0.277)	(0.226)
Northeast	−0.307***	−0.398***	−0.282	−0.078
	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.254)	(0.126)
Midwest	−0.249*	−0.407***	−0.472	−0.052
	(0.115)	(0.037)	(0.244)	(0.100)
West	−0.069	−0.423***	−0.528*	−0.241***
	(0.058)	(0.108)	(0.257)	(0.049)
Republican	0.108	0.253*	0.843***	0.156*
	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.233)	(0.074)
Independent	−0.298	−0.558*	0.274	−0.146
	(0.166)	(0.223)	(0.215)	(0.146)
Sympathy: Palestinians	−0.512***			
	(0.092)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah		1.888***		
		(0.258)		
Amount of Aid not Mentioned				1.003***
				(0.028)
Economic Aid				−0.062
				(0.140)
Military Aid				0.437**
				(0.148)
Year	0.013			−0.089***
	(0.009)			(0.015)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 7.4 (Continued)

	(1) Sympathy	*(2) Blame*	*(3) Force*	*(4) Aid*
Constant	−26.059	0.444	0.114	177.260***
	(17.587)	(0.331)	(0.364)	(28.932)
N	9,501	1,559	786	4,214
Surveys	9	2	1	3

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses). None of the respondents in the model predicting approval of Israel's use of force identified as "Other Christian"; Year was dropped from the models predicting blame and force because of multicollinearity in the case of the former (the identity of the Arab counterpart—Hezbollah or Palestinians—captures the same effect), and because only one survey was included in the case of the latter.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Mediation Model

Each mediation model presented in this chapter is composed of two regressions. Using the same subset of data, the first regression predicts affect and the second regression predicts a relevant measure of support for Israel. In Table 7.5 we list the series of models that compose the first part of the mediation model—predicting affect (favorability) on the subset of data that also include an indicator for support for Israel. The relevant subset of data is listed at the bottom of the table. The second part (predicting the various measures of support while including affect as an exogenous factor) is summarized in Table 7.4. A summary of the direct and indirect effects is discussed in the primary text and in Figure 7.3.

TABLE 7.5 Explaining Affect in Subsets of Data on Support for Israel

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Female	−0.215***	−0.246	−0.651***	−0.226***
	(0.051)	(0.234)	(0.175)	(0.052)
18–29	−0.317***	−0.119	−0.447	−0.400*
	(0.073)	(0.118)	(0.304)	(0.190)
50–64	0.177	0.090***	0.091	0.210***
	(0.092)	(0.000)	(0.205)	(0.039)
65+	0.006	0.010	0.331	0.124*
	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.244)	(0.054)
African-American	−0.747***	−0.338***	−0.521	−0.231
	(0.171)	(0.024)	(0.283)	(0.156)
Hispanic	−0.511***	−0.145	0.170	−0.441*
	(0.130)	(0.396)	(0.353)	(0.196)
College/More	0.191*	0.262***	0.029	0.399***
	(0.081)	(0.020)	(0.174)	(0.108)

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Protestant	0.199***	0.443***	0.412	0.086**
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.212)	(0.032)
Other Christian	0.494**	0.337***		0.094***
	(0.178)	(0.048)		(0.011)
Jewish	2.028***	2.281***	.	2.370***
	(0.366)	(0.517)	.	(0.509)
Other Religion	−0.240	−0.108	0.013	−0.118
	(0.164)	(0.094)	(0.264)	(0.199)
Northeast	−0.065	−0.127	−0.415	−0.187
	(0.124)	(0.093)	(0.231)	(0.208)
Midwest	−0.032	−0.022	−0.026	0.017
	(0.120)	(0.035)	(0.232)	(0.055)
West	−0.064	−0.129	0.073	−0.006
	(0.066)	(0.165)	(0.250)	(0.121)
Republican	0.262**	0.142	0.842***	0.241*
	(0.096)	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.123)
Independent	−0.038	−0.458***	0.253	−0.148***
	(0.112)	(0.009)	(0.201)	(0.034)
Sympathy: Palestinians	0.151			
	(0.165)			
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah		1.252***		
		(0.057)		
Amount of aid not Mentioned				−0.032**
				(0.010)
Economic Aid				−1.567***
				(0.098)
Military Aid				−1.555***
				(0.097)
Year	0.066***			0.207***
	(0.013)			(0.007)
Constant	−131.264***	0.323***	0.735*	−411.906***
	(25.917)	(0.029)	(0.324)	(13.291)
Data Subset:	Sympathy	Blame	Force	Aid
N	9,501	1,559	762	4,214
Surveys	9	2	1	3

Note: Dependent variable: Holding a favorable opinion toward Israel, estimated in five subsets of data.

Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

None of the respondents in the model predicting approval of Israel's use of force identified as "Other Christian"; Year was dropped from the models predicting blame and force because of multicollinearity in the case of the former (the identity of the Arab counterpart—Hezbollah or Palestinians—captures the same effect) and because only one survey was included in the case of the latter.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Assessing the Moderated Effect of Time on Blame

In Table 7.6 we present the regression coefficients of the first and second stage of the moderated mediation, in which blame for Israel's rival (Palestinians in 1989, Hezbollah in 2006; see note 7 in this chapter) is interacted with party identification. The significant interaction suggests that partisan differences on affect were evident only in the later survey (2006), and therefore, the mediation effect is only evident in this time period as well.

TABLE 7.6 Regression Models Used to Assess Moderated Mediation

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Blame*
Favorability		1.058***
		(0.128)
Republican	0.018	0.180
	(0.132)	(0.139)
Independent	−0.427	−0.760*
	(0.305)	(0.320)
Blame: Violence vs. Hezbollah	0.758**	1.327***
	(0.259)	(0.319)
Republican × Blame Violence vs. Hezbollah	1.049**	0.963*
	(0.383)	(0.491)
Independent × Blame Violence vs. Hezbollah	0.361	0.838
	(0.439)	(0.509)
Female	−0.240*	0.316*
	(0.115)	(0.125)
18–29	−0.108	0.039
	(0.154)	(0.167)
50–64	0.107	0.020
	(0.155)	(0.170)
65+	0.018	−0.467*
	(0.183)	(0.195)
African-American	−0.334	−0.330
	(0.200)	(0.215)
Hispanic	−0.170	−0.406
	(0.279)	(0.304)
College/More	0.255*	−0.514***
	(0.126)	(0.134)
Protestant	0.429**	−0.282
	(0.140)	(0.155)
Other Christian	0.338	−0.311
	(0.189)	(0.204)

	(1) *Favorability*	*(2)* *Blame*
Jewish	2.334**	1.642*
	(0.739)	(0.752)
Other/None	−0.071	−0.184
	(0.244)	(0.283)
Northeast	−0.115	−0.390*
	(0.161)	(0.176)
Midwest	−0.015	−0.402*
	(0.155)	(0.168)
West	−0.150	−0.435*
	(0.166)	(0.180)
Constant	0.370	0.488*
	(0.194)	(0.221)
N	1,559	1,559
Surveys	2	2

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).

Year was dropped from the models because of multicollinearity in the case of the former (the identity of the Arab counterpart—Hezbollah or Palestinians—captures the same effect).

* $p < 0.0$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table constructed in R using the stargazer package (Hlavac, 2018).

Notes

1. Similarly, Kim (2014) demonstrates that individuals' affect—feelings toward a country—play a significant role in accounting for their support for US troop deployment to defend allies. He adds to Page and Bouton (2006) by examining the moderating effect of political sophistication (knowledge) on the effect of affect on policy preferences.
2. Presumably, affect may mediate any one of the variables listed in the list of predictors, but since the most meaningful divide is along party lines, we examine the mediation of partisan differences.
3. Measures of R^2 have been questioned for assessing model fit because of problems relating to standardization, variance in the independent variables and a lack of a relevant population parameter (King, 1986). We are not interested in how well the models used in this chapter fit the data and wish to avoid common mistakes in the use of R^2. Therefore, we do not examine whether model fit seems high or low, and our analysis focuses only on the change in the dependent variable as a function of favorability. Despite its faults, examining the change in R^2 in linear models is a useful way of determining how two different sets of explanatory variables compare, when the dependent variable and the observations remain the same (King, 1986). Because of the nature of the binary logistic model, we apply this logic to a measure of pseudo R^2 instead. We use the McFadden adjusted pseudo R^2 because it compares the observed model with a saturated one, essentially answering the question of whether a better model

exists. Using the adjusted measure—i.e., penalizing the measure for model complexity due to multiple predictors—allows a comparison of the measure as a result of adding another predictor (Shtatland, Kleinman, & Cain, 2002). McFadden adjusted pseudo R^2 is calculated based on model likelihoods as $R^2_{\text{McFadden}} = 1 - \frac{\log(L_c)}{\log(L_{\text{null}})}$ where L_c denotes the (maximized) likelihood value from the current fitted model and L_{null} denotes the corresponding value but for the model with only an intercept and no-covariates (the null model).

4. The Wald test uses a χ^2 distribution to examine the change in explained variance due to the addition of favorability to the list of predictors.
5. We estimate the models using two separate calculations of standard errors. First, we cluster standard errors by survey, as we did throughout this book, to minimize bias in the standard errors that is introduced by observations originating from the same survey. However, it is best to assess the indirect effect in a mediation model using non-parametric bootstrapping (Bollen & Stine, 1990; Kenny, 2018; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), and unfortunately, the "mediation" package allows only one or the other (clustering or bootstrapping). We therefore estimate the effect a second time using bootstrapping for 1,000 samples. We use the percentile bootstrap, which is appropriate when samples are sufficiently large, as is the case here, because statistical power is of little concern and type I errors (mistakenly rejecting null hypotheses) become a larger concern (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). Results are largely similar in both models, yet because bootstrapping is the preferred method for mediation analysis, and the bias without using clustered standard errors is relatively small (see regression tables in the appendix), we attribute greater reliability to the estimates from the bootstrapping model. In Figure 7.3, we present only the preferred method of bootstrapped standard errors.
6. The data including all relevant variables for the sympathy models (favorability, party, and the remaining covariates) are limited and end in 2001. Given the emergence of a partisan divide since 2001 (Cavari & Freedman, 2019), it is important to verify these results using later data as well. This is possible only with the exclusion of religion from our models, which adds an additional survey in 2011 (as well as three additional surveys in 1989, 2000 and 2001). Estimating the mediation effect using these data yield similar results: ACME = 0.014 [95% CI 0.01, 0.02], and the proportion of the effect that is mediated is equal to 0.48 [95% CI 0.23,1.04].
7. The two surveys also measure blame for different events. The 1989 data ask respondents who is to blame for violence between Israel and the Palestinians, while the 2006 data ask respondents who is to blame for violence between Israel and the Hezbollah. We control for this in both models, but while this may have an effect on the distribution of blame, it should not have any bearing on the partisan differences in affect. Note, however, that we cannot include an indicator for year in the model because year (1989/2006) and topic (violence vs. Palestinians/violence vs. Hezbollah) are perfectly collinear. Therefore, in the moderated mediation analysis we interact party with the topic to (also) address the differences between the two periods.

8

THE NATURE OF THE PARTISAN DIVIDE OVER PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE

We would be remiss to write a book on American attitudes toward Israel, in the scope and temporal perspective that we have adopted here, without addressing the question of partisan divide over Palestinian statehood. It is no surprise, of course, that partisan divisions have manifested over this issue as well. In a survey from 2018, we find that 68 percent of Democrats favor an independent Palestinian state, but only 37 percent of Republicans hold a similar position (nonresponse excluded).[1] More than on any other issue we examined so far, partisan majorities are sorted at opposing ends on Palestinian independence. We devote an entire chapter to this issue alone for two reasons. First, as we discuss later, because support for an independent Palestinian state is not equivalent to supporting/opposing Israel (unlike the five measures used in Chapters 5–7). Second, because of the importance of this issue in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The fates of Israel and the Palestinians have been intertwined since the rise of the Zionist movement in the nineteenth century and return (immigration) of Jews to Palestine with the hopes of establishing a national home. From the War of Independence, the primary conflict was between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries—mainly Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Subsequent events switched the conflict from an Arab-Israeli conflict to an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These include the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel gained control over the West Bank and the Gaza strip without annexing the territories or offering citizenship to their inhabitants; the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979, which ended the primary rivalry in the region and brought to the diplomatic table a need to deal with the occupied territories and the Palestinians; the First Intifada in 1987 (the Palestinian popular uprising), which clarified for many Israelis as well as people and governments worldwide that a solution for the Palestinian people is needed; the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993 that started the peace process;

and the several rounds of violent engagements between Israel and Palestinian militant groups as well as the several rounds of multilateral and bilateral peace talks. Over time, the question of Palestinian independence has become the major point of contention between the two sides. Initially, it concerned whether the Palestinians should form an independent state. More recently, the question has become more specifically about the territory of the Palestinian state, the mutual conditions required for its establishment and how it may solve the conflict between the two nations and between Israel and the Arab world (Heller, 1983; Lesch, 2018; Peters & Newman, 2013; Waxman, 2019). Every administration from Carter (Camp David negotiations over Palestinian limited autonomy) to Trump (Deal of the Century) has been strongly involved in settling this issue (see excellent reviews by Quandt, 2010; Ross, 2004, 2015; Spiegel, 1986).

According to public opinion data from 1977 to 2019, a majority of Americans are in favor of a Palestinian state (Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4; see also Page & Shapiro, 1992, pp. 159–161). Support for an independent Palestinian state rose steadily from 40 percent in the late 1970s to 50–60 percent in recent years. At the same time, public opposition to establishing an independent Palestinian state rose as well, though it remained under 30 percent. The increase in both trends occurs at the expense of the rate of people who say they do not know or refuse. Indeed, as we found on other related topics, more Americans are opinionated about this issue and are increasingly divided about it.

Partisan divisions have extended to the question of Palestinian statehood as well. Figure 8.1 plots the percent of Americans in favor of an independent



FIGURE 8.1 The Partisan Divide on Palestinian Independence

Note: *N* = 40,362 in 49 surveys.

Lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.8.

Palestinian state divided by party identification. Dots represent the percent of each partisan group that is in favor of an independent Palestinian state in a single survey. Percentages are recalculated to exclude item nonresponse, so the reference is the percent of the public that opposes an independent Palestinian state. Lowess smoothing lines (0.8 bandwidth) make the trends more clearly visible.

Up until the turn of the century, differences between the parties were nearly indistinguishable. From a starting point of a little over 40 percent, support for an independent Palestinian state among all three partisan groups increased steadily to 60 percent in the early 1990s. Two important events during this period were the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords, which laid the foundation for an independent Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution to the conflict. The partisan consensus held until the early years of the twenty-first century with support among all three groups averaging a little higher than 60 percent.

Several events since then have made way for a breakdown of the partisan consensus. On the American side, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror changed how many Americans view foreign policy and the threat of terrorism (Holsti, 2011). On the Israeli side, in July 2000, the Camp David peace talks collapsed and the Second Intifada erupted soon after, the height of which was felt during 2001–2002 with a series of violent terrorist activities on the part of Palestinian organizations (namely, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine) as well as substantial Israeli military operations into Palestinian territory (Operation Defensive Shield in the spring of 2002). Since then, support for the Palestinian state declined somewhat for all three partisan groups, but the decline was much steeper among Republicans. By 2018, a small majority of 56 percent of Democrats still favored an independent Palestinian state, but only 37 percent of Republicans favored it (for independents, the trend is similar to that of Democrats).

Assessing the Divide Over Support for an Independent Palestinian State

To assess the partisan divide over Palestinian statehood, we first follow the same procedure as in previous chapters. Using attitudes toward Palestinian independence as a dependent variable (favoring an independent Palestinian state is coded 1, opposing it is coded 0), we estimate a binary logistic regression where we include the same set of predictors as before—gender, age, race, education, religion, region, party identification and year. Twenty-eight surveys are available for individual-level analysis in this model, conducted sporadically from 1977–2018 (specifically, 1977–1984, 1988–1991, 1993, 1998, 2001–2003, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2018). We cluster standard errors by survey to avoid biasing our estimates. The results are included in column 1 of Table 8.3 in the Appendix for this chapter. In Figure 8.2, we plot the predicted probabilities of the main demographic predictors, as well as party identification.



FIGURE 8.2 Probability of Favoring an Independent Palestinian State

Note: Demographic and partisan differences in the predicted probabilities of supporting an independent Palestinian state following a binary logistic regression (see Appendix for this chapter). Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 8.3 (column 1) in the Appendix.

Most differences are small, and three of the demographic variables yield results that do not coincide with their effects on dependent variables that measure support for Israel (see Chapter 5). Women are significantly less favorable of Palestinian independence than men are; older age groups (50–64 and 65+) are significantly more favorable of it compared to the younger reference group, ages 30–49 (no significant difference between ages 18–29 and 30–49); and Hispanics are significantly less favorable of it compared to whites, but African-Americans are equally as likely as whites to favor it. These differences may themselves be testament to the fact that Palestinian independence is conceptually different from the issues examined thus far.

There is a large difference on education: College-educated respondents are significantly more likely to favor an independent Palestinian state. On religion, Protestants and Jews are significantly less likely to support a Palestinian state compared to Catholics and all other religions. Note that across all predictors, Jews are the only group more likely to oppose a Palestinian state. As for party, Republicans are less likely than Democrats to support a Palestinian state. Party differences appear small, but this is due to the fact that until the turn of the century there were few differences between the two parties. These have only emerged in the last two decades.

Can Affect Serve as a Heuristic Shortcut?

In the previous chapter, we suggested that the effect of party on support for Israel is mediated through positive affect. People differ in their "gut feelings" toward Israel, which, in turn, affect their policy preferences toward Israel. We argue that this mediation process does not fit well with assessing the nature of partisan split over support for a Palestinians state. This topic is conceptually different from the measures of support for Israel examined previously, because it is not clear that favoring or opposing a Palestinian state neatly corresponds to opposing or supporting Israel. Favoring an independent Palestinian state does not explicitly represent taking an anti-Israel position, and supporting Israel does not automatically translate into opposing Palestinian independence (Page & Bouton, 2006, pp. 151–152).

It is true that some respondents may translate Palestinian statehood into such a dichotomy. They may see an independent Palestinian state as a threat to Israel's security or find the implied compromise over territory, unacceptable. But many—among elites and the public—may view it as a compromise that is in the interest of the state of Israel: A two-state solution that divides the territory between Israel and the Palestinians, thereby ending the conflict. In fact, American efforts to resolve the conflict have pursued a solution along these lines (Eisenberg & Caplan, 2010; Hilal, 2007; Inbar, 2009; Indyk, 2009; Miller, 2008), and it has been endorsed by Republican and Democratic presidents alike (Bush, 2002; Clinton, 1995; Obama, 2016). Most recently, President Trump announced his plan for peace in the Middle East, which also includes a two-state solution and a partition of territory (Amr & Goldenberg, 2020), a plan he refers to as the "Deal of the Century."

Others may view it as a question of fulfilling a right to self-determination, without even relating the question to Israel or resolving the conflict. For them, opposing a Palestinian state does not necessarily stem from a strong positive affect toward Israel and may be related to other considerations, such as world order and stability, or a feeling of negative affect toward the Palestinians (in Chapter 3 we demonstrate that very few Americans have a positive view of the Palestinians; see also Page & Bouton, 2006).

This issue is contested within Israel as well, and there is no single consensus on whether a Palestinian state is desired from an Israeli point of view (Al-Haj, Katz, & Shye, 1993; Fielding & Penny, 2009). According to the Israeli peace index, a recurring national survey of Israeli Jews on questions relating to the peace process, in the years 2002–2018,[2] a majority of Israeli Jews support a two-state solution, but with large variation, ranging from a low of 45.5 percent in 2002 to a high of 73 percent in 2008 (mean = 59.73, SD = 10.44, N = 3,745 in eight surveys).[3] Israeli Jews who oppose a two state solution are not any more favorable or supportive of Israel than people who are in favor of a two-state solution.

In short, favoring a Palestinian state may be an expression of support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination in their own sovereign nation, but in

the correct context, it may also be an expression of support for a peaceful solution for those who care about Israel and its safety. Thus, favoring or opposing a Palestinian state is not synonymous with opposing or supporting Israel. Affect, as we have shown, is a useful heuristic through which much of the partisan disagreement is manifested, but only when the policy at hand can be formalized as a question of supporting Israel. In such cases, as illustrated in the preceding chapters, Republican affect and support has become much higher than that of Democrats. But when it becomes unclear if and how a policy promotes support for Israel, affect may no longer be a useful heuristic.

If affect toward Israel plays a part in explaining partisan divisions on Palestinian independence, we should find similar empirical evidence to the findings in the previous chapter. That is, affect toward Israel should play a large, if not the largest, part in explaining variation in attitudes toward Palestinian independence, and it should mediate the relationship between party identification and preferences regarding Palestinian independence. If affect does not play a similar role, as we propose here, then the additive and conditional effects of affect should be negligible, if at all.

We examine our proposition by exploring the explanatory power of favorability using three different models. In all, we add indicators of favorability to our model predicting support for an independent Palestinian state (Table 8.2, column 1, in the Appendix for this chapter). The models vary by our favorability indicators: favorability toward Israel (columns 2 and 3 in Table 8.2), favorability toward the Palestinians (columns 4 and 5), and, finally, including both indicators (column 6).[4]

Our analysis confirms our expectations. Figure 8.3 summarizes the predicted probabilities of support for a Palestinian state among respondents who have or do not have a favorable view of Israel and among respondents who have or do



FIGURE 8.3 Probability of Favoring an Independent Palestinian State, by Favorability

Note: Affective differences in the predicted probabilities of supporting an independent Palestinian state following a series of binary logistic regressions (full tables available in the Appendix for this chapter), using affect toward Israel only (left), affect toward the Palestinians only (right) and affect toward Israel and the Palestinians (right). Bars represent the predicted value, and vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 8.3 (columns 3, 5 and 6) in the Appendix.

not have a favorable view of the Palestinians. On the left, we plot the probability of favoring an independent Palestinian state, separating between respondents who hold a favorable view of Israel and those who do not. These probabilities are based on a model where only affect toward Israel is added to the list of predictors. The coefficient for favorability is negative and significant, suggesting that holding a favorable view of Israel reduces the probability of favoring a Palestinian state by 9 points. While the difference is significant, recall that on other dependent variables, measuring support for Israel, the difference was much larger, ranging from 20 to 35 points (Figure 7.2).

Next, we estimate an additional model, adding only affect toward the Palestinians to our list of predictors. The middle panel of Figure 8.3 illustrates the difference in the predicted probabilities based on this indicator—holding a favorable view of the Palestinians makes one 22 points more likely to favor an independent Palestinian state.

Finally, when we include both indicators of affect in the same model, the difference based on affect toward the Palestinians remains significant, yet the difference based on affect toward Israel is no longer significant. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 8.3, where the probabilities based on affect toward the Palestinians are unchanged compared to the previous model, yet based on affect toward Israel, there is no significant difference between the probabilities of the two groups (note the 95 percent confidence intervals, which substantially overlap one another).

In Table 8.1, we list the change in pseudo R^2 (McFadden Adjusted) in the dependent variable, as a result of adding each of the indicators of favorability to the same set of observations (we refer the reader to a discussion of this method in the previous chapter). In both models that include an indicator of affect toward Israel, the pseudo R^2 barely changes. This is in stark contrast to the models explaining support for Israel in Chapter 7, where affect toward Israel often doubled the measure of pseudo R^2. Instead, it is affect toward the Palestinians that doubles this measure.

What do these results mean? Clearly, in explaining attitudes about an independent Palestinian state, affect toward Israel is no longer important, but affect

TABLE 8.1 Increase in Pseudo R^2 (McFadden Adjusted)

Model	*Affect Indicator*	*Pseudo* R^2 *(affect excluded)*	*Pseudo* R^2 *(affect included)*	*Pseudo* R^2 *increase*	*Wald Test*
Israel only	Israel	0.038	0.044	0.006	$\chi^2(1) = 9.43$**
Palestinians only	Palestinians	0.019	0.039	0.020	$\chi^2(1) = 67.02$***
Israel & Palestinians	Israel	0.021	0.023	0.002	$\chi^2(1) = 2.11$
	Palestinians	0.023	0.044	0.021	$\chi^2(1) = 64.88$***

* $p<0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

toward the Palestinians is. This makes sense given that the "gut feeling" here may be stronger concerning the Palestinians. Though interesting in and of itself, our goal here is to understand the nature of the partisan divide on this issue. The weak effect of favorability toward Israel suggests that on this topic, it is unlikely that affect toward Israel mediates the relationship between party identification and preferences concerning an independent Palestinian state. This, we argue, is true for affect toward Israel and toward the Palestinians.

One indication that affect does not mediate attitudes on this issue is the negligible change in the coefficient for Republicans (compared to Democrats) we find in our model estimates (Table 8.2). Usually, when a mediator (affect) is present in the same model as the predictor (party) it is mediating, the statistical effect of the mediator comes at the expense of the predictor. Simply put, if mediation occurs, the effect of the predictor is weakened (see our results in Chapter 7). Yet in our models, the change in the coefficient for Republicans is negligible—it remains negative, significant and largely the same, despite the addition of these measures of affect.

We do not rely solely on such indications, however. We test a similar mediation model as we did in the previous chapter, in which affect—either toward Israel or the Palestinians—mediates the relationship between party identification and preferences. The model and results are summarized in Figure 8.4. The left panel summarizes the theoretical model we test (covariates are included in the model but are not listed in the diagram). We include the results for a mediation model that includes either indicator—Israel or Palestinians—or both in the same



FIGURE 8.4 Weak Evidence for the Mediating Role of Affect on Support for an Independent Palestinian State

Note: Mediation model estimated using the "mediation" package in R (Imai et al., 2010; Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014). Models estimated while controlling for sex, age, race, religion, party, region and year. Regression estimates are summarized in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 (columns 3, 5 and 6) in the Appendix for this chapter.

ACME (average causal mediation effect) captures the indirect effect that is mediated through affect. Bars represent the effects. Horizontal lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect.

Figure plotted using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham, 2016).

model. The full model estimates can be found in Table 8.2 (first step) and in Table 8.3 (second step) in the Appendix for this chapter. See Chapter 7 for a discussion on estimating mediation models of this sort.

Israel. When used as a single indicator (light gray bars), affect toward Israel mediates about 14 percent of the effect of party on attitudes toward Palestinian independence, lower than all other measures of support for Israel we discussed in Chapter 7. This effect disappears completely when including an indicator of affect toward the Palestinians as an exogenous variable in the same model.

Palestinians. Despite its importance in explaining attitudes toward a Palestinian state, affect toward the Palestinians plays no significant mediation role (dark gray bars). That is, the partisan divide on this issue is not manifested through affect toward the Palestinians. This is true both when we include affect toward the Palestinians as a single indicator and when we include it together with affect toward Israel.

Taken together, these results offer very weak evidence that affect plays a role in the partisan divide on this issue. Affect is useful when alternatives easily map onto supporting or opposing the object of affect, such that positive feelings can be easily equated with favoring the object and negative feelings with opposite it. We find strong evidence for this in the previous chapter, regarding supporting Israel. Yet here, supporting or opposing an independent Palestinian state does not correspond to the feelings of affect that Republicans and Democrats harbor toward Israel or the Palestinians. A better explanation is required for the partisan gap on this issue.

Partisan Priorities

We propose an alternative mechanism to the divide between Republicans and Democrats, one that relies on the idea that partisans approach the question of Palestinian independence with different considerations in mind. Our argument is this: Democrats favor a Palestinian state because it achieves two goals that they care about—a people's right to self-determination and a peaceful resolution to the conflict that will benefit both Israel and the Palestinians (Page & Bouton, 2006); Republicans oppose it because they are unsure what it means for the existence of their ally (Israel) and, therefore, see it as a threat.

A rich body of literature addresses the goal-oriented structure of Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Chittick et al., 1995; Goren, Schoen, Reifler, Scotto, & Chittick, 2016; Hinckley, 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Knopf, 1998; Nincic & Ramos, 2010; Page & Bouton, 2006; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Richman et al., 1997; Wittkopf, 1990). These studies suggest that the broad set of goals that people prioritize for American foreign policy inform their policy preferences. Although their labelling may differ, recent studies distinguish between two major considerations (Goren et al., 2016; Nincic & Ramos, 2010; Page & Bouton, 2006): Prioritizing policies

that benefit the United States (such as maintaining American military superiority or protecting American allies) and prioritizing policies that benefit the global community (for instance, combating world hunger or protecting human rights). These have been aptly named self-regarding and other regarding, respectively (Nincic & Ramos, 2010). Nincic and Ramos (2010) provide evidence of partisan differences on this structure as well—Republicans prioritize self-regarding goals more than Democrats, and Democrats place a higher importance on other-regarding goals compared to Republicans. Of course, this argument is more directly relevant for preferences about American policy itself—favoring isolationism vs. interventionism, militaristic intervention vs. diplomatic approaches, etc., but we believe they may be extended to a question of this nature as well.

Building on this notion of varying partisan priorities for American foreign policy, we argue that Democrats support an independent Palestinian state because they view it as part of a two-state solution that simultaneously serves Israel's interests and respects the Palestinians' right to self-determination and sovereignty. For them, the benefit of a Palestinian state applies to both Israel and the Palestinians, and they prioritize it as part of their tendency to support other-regarding goals. For Republicans, the main interest in foreign affairs is self-regarding, which in this context means protecting one of America's closest allies—Israel. For them, the question is reduced to a simple consideration: "Is a Palestinian state good for Israel?" This question is not clearly addressed by the standard survey question because it provides respondents with no clear signal about how a Palestinian state would affect Israel. Republicans find it harder to support an independent Palestinian state when Israel's fate is unclear. If this is true, we may expect that by making it clear—even only slightly clearer—that Israel would be safe alongside the Palestinian state, Republican opposition to the Palestinian state should subside.

We test this argument with an original survey administered by the Qualtrics online panel in October 2016 (field dates: October 20–November 1, 2016). Our survey consists of 1,085 US national adults randomly selected and stratified by age, gender, and region. We embed an experiment into the question about Palestinian independence. Respondents were randomly exposed to one of two conditions. The first condition resembles the item that appears in most surveys and asks respondents about an independent Palestinian state. In the second version of the question, we include two additional words—alongside Israel. Here is the exact wording of the two conditions:

(1) "On a scale from 1 (oppose) to 7 (favor), to what extent do you favor an independent Palestinian state?"
(2) "On a scale from 1 (oppose) to 7 (favor), to what extent do you favor an independent Palestinian state *alongside Israel*?"

(emphasis added here)

Without mentioning Israel, Israel's fate remains ambiguous, much like in the standard survey question plotted earlier in Figure 8.1. By emphasizing that the would-be Palestinian state will be established alongside Israel, we relax Republican concerns and make it clear to them that a Palestinian state is planned to exist alongside Israel (and not, perhaps, instead of it). When presented this way, we may expect partisan differences to decline. Note, that the advantage of a seven-point scale is that respondents are not forced to sort into one of two opposing positions and have the option of expressing only weak support for or opposition to the Palestinian state.

Figure 8.5 plots the distribution of responses on Palestinian independence under the two conditions. Overall, both distributions echo the broader pattern of American attitudes toward Palestinian independence: 55 percent of respondents support a Palestinian state when Israel is not mentioned, and 58 percent support it when the state is to be created alongside Israel (tallying up levels 5–7, compared to all else). More importantly, there are clear differences in the overall distribution when the Palestinian state is mentioned alongside Israel. Under this condition, the entire distribution shifts rightward, toward favoring the Palestinian state: Opposition is lower (1–3), the middle category is higher (4) and support is higher (5–7).



FIGURE 8.5 Attitudes Toward an Independent Palestinian State

Note: Distribution of support for an independent Palestinian state (N = 891), separated by the randomized condition respondents were exposed to: A Palestinian state mentioned alongside Israel (light gray bars) or the standard version, in which Israel is not mentioned at all (dark gray bars).

To test the conditional effect of party and priorities, we estimate two models (summarized in Table 8.4 in the Appendix for this chapter). The first includes party identification and an indicator distinguishing between the two questions: Adding the words "alongside Israel" (as before, we control for important demographic variables—gender, age, race, education, religion and region). In the second model, we add an interaction between party and the wording condition of "alongside Israel" to identify the moderating role of question wording on partisan preferences. Due to the nature of the dependent variable, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator in these models.

Results of the first model follow conventional patterns. Republicans are significantly less supportive than Democrats of an independent Palestinian state—on a scale from 1–7 they are nearly a full point lower than Democrats (−0.766). Overall, support for a Palestinian state shows a slight but significant increase of 0.267 when it is clear that it is to be established alongside Israel. Most control variables are not significant, but religion behaves as expected: Support among evangelical Christians is 0.787 lower than mainline Protestants, support among Jews is 1.048 lower than mainline Protestants and we find no significant differences between Catholics and mainline Protestants.

Adding the interaction term to test how question wording (a Palestinian state alongside Israel vs. Israel not mentioned at all) moderates the partisan effect on this issue suggests that for Republicans, mentioning the state alongside Israel increases their support for an independent Palestinian state. For Democrats, mentioning "alongside Israel" has no significant effect on their support for an independent Palestinian state (because of the structure of the interaction terms, this is captured in the coefficient of mentioning the Palestinian state alongside Israel).

This is best illustrated when contrasting the predicted values for each partisan group under the two conditions, following these regression models (Figure 8.6). Dots represent the predicted value for each partisan group under each of the two conditions. Vertical lines illustrate the uncertainty of the predicted value using 95 percent confidence intervals. When Israel is not mentioned in the question, Republican support is at the middle of the scale (3.95), a full point below the supportive stance expressed by Democrats (5.01). Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons suggest that this difference is significant (mean difference = 1.06, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [0.49,1.64]).

Note the change in these patterns when the Palestinian state is mentioned alongside Israel: Republican support increases to 4.47 and Democrats remain unchanged at 4.93. Most importantly, the difference between Republicans and Democrats under this condition is no longer significant (mean difference = 0.46, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [−0.12,1.04]).[5] In sum, when priorities are triggered, support for an independent Palestinian state is similar across partisan groups.



FIGURE 8.6 The Effect of Mentioning Israel on Partisan Support for a Palestinian State

Note: Predicted values of support for an independent Palestinian state following a linear regression (N = 741). Vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates are summarized in Table 8.4 in the Appendix for this chapter.

Conclusion

Throughout this book we have traced the development of the partisan divide within the American public on the topic of Israel. Although majorities in both parties agree on their support for Israel, a strong divide has emerged and the future of this consensus is no longer guaranteed. Ideological and social cleavages contribute to this divide, and through these, partisan disagreement has reached record levels.

In this chapter, we focused on a particular aspect of the partisan divide that does not explicitly measure Americans' attitudes toward Israel but that may be crucial to American involvement in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An independent Palestinian state is not simply a one-sided Palestinian ambition for sovereignty. It is also a central and inseparable part of resolving the conflict. Since the early 1990s, Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the international community, have pursued this solution, and its viability has diminished as several attempts at bridging the disagreements between Israel and the Palestinians have failed.

While the broader partisan divide may have several repercussions for resolving the conflict and for US-Israel relations, the partisan divide on Palestinian independence may be detrimental to promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict

with US involvement. This pessimistic view is further exacerbated given the different considerations that Democrats and Republicans have when evaluating this question—the former focusing on mutual benefits for Israel and the Palestinians, the latter considering only what is important to them, supporting Israel. In a related piece of evidence, the Trump administration has been critiqued for excluding the Palestinians from the process of designing the "Deal of the Century" peace proposal (Amr & Goldenberg, 2020).

At the same time, the results in this chapter also provide an optimistic outlook. At least in some respects, understanding what it is that divides Democrats and Republicans may be useful in reframing issues and policies to regain bipartisan consensus. The two parties may care about different things and may prioritize them differently, but addressing their unique concerns could in some cases yield a similar preference for policy. In the context of resolving the conflict, regaining the bipartisan consensus on Palestinian independence as part of a two-state solution that benefits both Israel and the Palestinians is an important policy outcome.

APPENDIX

The Additive Effect of Favorability on Support for an Independent Palestinian State

In Tables 8.2 and 8.3 we list the results of the regression models used for the mediation analysis. Mediation models comprise of two steps: First, a regression predicting the mediator (in this case, favorability toward Israel or the Palestinians). Second, a regression predicting the dependent variable. Covariates and observations are to remain identical in both steps. The results of the first step appear in Table 8.2.

In all models, we use the following reference categories: Male (gender), 30–49 (age), white (race), high school/less (education), Catholic (religion), South (region) and Democrat (party).

Next, Table 8.3 lists the results of six binary logistic regressions used to test the role of affect in explaining the partisan divide on Palestinian independence. These models comprise the second step in the mediation analysis (specifically, columns 3, 5 and 6). In the first column, we estimate the model using the full dataset, consisting of 28 surveys from 1977–2018. This model illustrates the lower support that Republicans afford the notion of Palestinian independence (coefficient is negative and significant). In columns 2 and 3, we reduce the dataset to include only surveys in which respondents were asked about their favorability toward Israel. The indicator itself is added only in column 3. It is significant and negative, as expected.

In columns 4 and 5, we reduce the dataset to include only surveys in which respondents were asked about their favorability toward the Palestinians. This indicator is positive and significant, as expected.

Finally, in column 6, using the same subset of data, we add the indicator of favorability toward Israel, which is no longer significant in the presence of favorability toward the Palestinians. Across all models, the coefficient for Republicans hardly changes. This fits with our mediation analysis, suggesting that affect plays little to no role in the partisan divide on Palestinian independence.

TABLE 8.2 Explaining Affect in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

	(1) Favorability: Israel	*(2) Favorability: Palestinians*
Republican	0.294***	0.027
	(0.060)	(0.098)
Independent	−0.121	−0.222
	(0.085)	(0.194)
Female	−0.137*	−0.019
	(0.055)	(0.092)
18–29	−0.278***	0.396***
	(0.066)	(0.118)
50–64	0.078	0.115
	(0.079)	(0.132)
65+	0.029	0.626***
	(0.098)	(0.139)
African-American	−0.355***	0.632***
	(0.098)	(0.151)
Hispanic	−0.420**	0.578**
	(0.132)	(0.183)
College/More	0.099	−0.009
	(0.060)	(0.101)
Protestant	0.199**	−0.240*
	(0.067)	(0.117)
Other Christian	0.239*	−0.103
	(0.104)	(0.155)
Jewish	2.120***	−1.193***
	(0.201)	(0.267)
Other Religion	−0.057	0.208
	(0.104)	(0.176)
Northeast	−0.061	0.286*
	(0.078)	(0.126)
Midwest	−0.155*	−0.065
	(0.073)	(0.129)
West	−0.065	0.096
	(0.078)	(0.132)
Year	0.086***	0.033*
	(0.006)	(0.014)
Constant	−170.771***	−68.338*
	(11.426)	(28.776)
N	6,439	3,725
Surveys	9	4

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

TABLE 8.3 Modeling the Role of Affect on Support for Palestinian Independence

	(1) Full Data	*(2) Israel Subset*	*(3) Israel Subset*	*(4) Palestinians Subset*	*(5) Palestinians Subset*	*(6) Israel & Palestinians Subset*
Favorability: Israel			−0.392**			−0.259
			(0.128)			(0.178)
Favorability: Palestinians					1.040***	1.061***
					(0.127)	(0.132)
Republican	−0.211**	−0.182***	−0.159***	−0.111**	−0.119**	−0.130**
	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Independent	−0.072	0.146	0.135	0.118	0.144	0.200
	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.210)	(0.218)	(0.202)
Female	−0.165**	−0.167**	−0.180**	−0.162**	−0.166**	−0.178*
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.080)
18–29	−0.067	−0.099	−0.126	−0.195	−0.255	−0.280
	(0.078)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.178)
50–64	0.155*	0.236*	0.242*	0.052	0.040	0.061
	(0.060)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.105)
65+	0.286**	0.501***	0.508***	0.343*	0.276	0.304
	(0.052)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.173)	(0.182)	(0.179)
African-American	−0.106	−0.038	−0.069	0.015	−0.081	−0.118
	(0.085)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.158)
Hispanic	−0.297**	−0.389***	−0.430***	−0.268***	−0.368***	−0.421***
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.067)
College/More	0.532***	0.472***	0.483***	0.408***	0.422***	0.448***
	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.074)
Protestant	−0.186***	−0.256***	−0.242***	−0.181	−0.159	−0.142
	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.121)	(0.111)	(0.105)
Other Christian	−0.032	−0.004	0.018	−0.027	−0.014	0.023
	(0.141)	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.122)
Jewish	−1.060***	−1.286***	−1.183***	−0.954***	−0.864***	−0.809***
	(0.164)	(0.235)	(0.220)	(0.234)	(0.200)	(0.186)
Other Religion	0.100	−0.017	−0.023	−0.126	−0.164	−0.164
	(0.068)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.151)	(0.147)	(0.154)
Northeast	0.254***	0.229***	0.227***	0.215**	0.187*	0.204*
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Midwest	0.153*	0.223*	0.211*	0.065	0.077	0.070
	(0.060)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.104)
West	0.158**	0.276***	0.274***	0.261*	0.261	0.297*
	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Year	0.021	0.045**	0.053**	0.041	0.038	0.042
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Constant	−40.640**	−90.100**	−104.820**	−80.343	−74.583	−83.720
	(20.837)	(33.194)	(35.360)	(76.734)	(63.403)	(65.758)
N	19,440	6,439	6,439	3,725	3,725	3,633
Surveys	28	9	9	4	4	4

Note: Binary logistic regression. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors, clustered by survey, in parentheses).

*$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Assessing the Effect of Foreign Policy Priorities on Support for a Palestinian State

In Table 8.4, we test the role of foreign policy priorities in explaining the divide over Palestinian independence. The significant and positive effect of the interaction between the wording of the question and party identification is evidence of the different considerations that Republicans and Democrats have when approaching this question and that the gap between them may be closed when addressing these separate considerations.

TABLE 8.4 Partisan Differences in Support for a Palestinian State

	(1)	*(2)*
Palestinian State Alongside Israel	*0.267⋆*	*−0.078*
	(0.122)	(0.179)
Republican	−0.766⋆⋆⋆	−1.063⋆⋆⋆
	(0.144)	(0.196)
Independent	−0.417⋆	−0.828⋆⋆
	(0.180)	(0.264)
Republican × Alongside Israel		0.600⋆
		(0.269)
Independent × Alongside Israel		0.760⋆
		(0.355)
Female	0.004	−0.011
	(0.132)	(0.131)
18–29	−0.360⋆	−0.369⋆
	(0.179)	(0.179)
50–64	0.012	0.016
	(0.153)	(0.153)
65+	0.017	0.024
	(0.198)	(0.197)
African-American	−0.290	−0.276
	(0.177)	(0.177)
Hispanic	0.278	0.314
	(0.213)	(0.213)
College/More	0.124	0.110
	(0.126)	(0.126)
Evangelical	−0.787⋆⋆⋆	−0.800⋆⋆⋆
	(0.229)	(0.228)
Catholic	−0.205	−0.226
	(0.232)	(0.231)
Other Christian	−0.605⋆	−0.613⋆
	(0.266)	(0.265)

	(1)	*(2)*
Jewish	−1.048⋆	−1.053⋆
	(0.428)	(0.426)
Other Religion	0.053	0.050
	(0.235)	(0.234)
Northeast	−0.144	−0.142
	(0.166)	(0.165)
Midwest	0.439⋆⋆	0.461⋆⋆
	(0.170)	(0.169)
West	0.084	0.110
	(0.183)	(0.182)
Constant	5.113⋆⋆⋆	5.299⋆⋆⋆
	(0.288)	(0.296)
N	741	741

Note: OLS Estimator. Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).

⋆ $p < 0.05$, ⋆⋆ $p < 0.01$, ⋆⋆⋆ $p < 0.001$

Notes

1. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. July 12–31, 2018. Roper dataset ID: 31116769.
2. Data are available for the following years: 2002, 2007–2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
3. Survey results retrieved from *https://dataisrael.idi.org.il* using a Hebrew Boolean search engine for items that include both the Hebrew term for people (*amim*) and states (*medinot*).
4. In each of these models, the number of available surveys is reduced—nine including Israel favorability and four including Palestinian favorability. Despite this change, the coefficient for Republicans remains significant, negative and largely of the same magnitude when subsetting the data and including the different indicators of favorability.
5. These comparisons remain unchanged when no correction for multiple comparisons is applied.

9

CONCLUSION: A CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIP?

Few countries have drawn as much attention in academic and commercial surveys of the American public as Israel has. As early as the 1940s, pollsters asked Americans about their feelings toward Israel and the Israeli people, what they think should be the solution to the Middle East conflict and what role the United States should take in solving the conflict. Over the last 75 years, pollsters have continuously asked questions about Israel, responding to events in the region and maintaining recurring series of identical questions. We have taken upon ourselves the ambitious task of putting together these rich data and using them to trace the development of American attitudes toward Israel. In doing so, we are the first to take a systematic and comprehensive approach to this topic in decades.

We build on existing work and suggest that the historical perspective we take in this book demonstrates a change in American public opinion toward Israel. Several factors contribute to this change. First, with the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world that dominated international relations was replaced with a unipolar world that was led by the United States, at least for a brief period, followed by a more regional or multipolar world order (Acharya, 2018).

Second, significant regional developments have changed the level of US involvement and global focus and interest in the region. American military presence in the Middle East escalated during the Gulf War (1991) and peaked following the 9/11 attacks and the war on terror. It has become involved in Afghanistan, in Iraq and most recently in Syria. The Arab Spring destabilized several countries, including Syria and Egypt, two leading countries that border with Israel.

Third, the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict itself has fundamentally changed. The conflict transitioned from one that focuses on a multinational conflict

between Arab nation states and Israel—two of which established diplomatic ties with Israel—to one that focuses on Israel's relationship with a stateless nation, the Palestinians. Starting in 1987, Israel and the Palestinians have gone through several cycles of violent conflicts. Throughout the last three decades, the two parties to the conflict have also made several attempts to resolve their differences, usually with American brokerage. Some attempts appeared hopeful, but ultimately, none successfully ended the conflict.

Finally, though not less important, the political environment in the United States has changed considerably. Elite and mass polarization have escalated since the 1980s, and polarization has extended to foreign affairs—an area previously considered to enjoy strong bipartisan agreement.

In this book we provide a longitudinal, comprehensive fresh look at American public opinion toward Israel that accounts for the changing world order and political environment in the United States. We suggest and examine empirically that the changes—each alone and all of them combined—affect how Americans view and evaluate Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. We summarize below what we found—*a partisan divide*—and discuss how this partisan divide has affected the political debate over Israel—*turning it into a heated political conflict*—and what may be the consequences of these changes—*a possible decline in the strength of the special relationship between the two countries*.

What We Found

The preceding chapters offer the reader several important takeaways. Part I demonstrates the strength of aggregate public support for Israel. Americans see Israel in a positive light. They have a favorable view of Israel, and a majority of Americans consistently choose to support Israel. Americans are unique in how much they support Israel compared to the support for Israel we find in other nations. Moreover, the affinity of Americans toward Israel is second only to the affinity they have for some of America's closest allies.

Moving beyond the general questions of favorability, we find strong support for Israel in the American public across time and across several different issues. Although contexts differ and measurement error may vary among survey items, a latent pattern of public support for Israel emerges throughout. On most issues, the majority supporting Israel has been consistent—if not increasing—and substantially higher than the share who opposes Israel (or, better framed, opposes its actions). Americans sympathize more with Israel than with Israel's rivals—Arab nations or the Palestinians—and they attribute blame for the conflict to Israel's rivals and want their government to side with Israel.

But the support of Americans is not limitless. Americans have clear red lines: They are loath to approve of Israel's use of force, disapprove of Israeli settlements

and are wary of America becoming too involved in the conflict, especially if it requires deployment of troops. Even on the question of providing Israel with American aid, which is unusually high compared to most countries, the majority in favor leads by only a small margin.

In Part II of the book, we break down the aggregate, overall measures of support for Israel to assess group variation in support for Israel and the individual demographic and political determinants of that support. In our attempt to demonstrate and understand the decline of public consensus toward Israel and what we argue to be an emerging partisan gap on Israel, we ruled out most demographic sources of division. Some shifts have occurred over time, but most demographic groups consistently exhibit similar levels of support for Israel and often change in the same direction at a similar pace. Of all demographic cleavages, religion stands out as the most meaningful source of divisions over Israel. American Jews and evangelical Christians are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel. The latter are especially important for aggregate changes because they represent a sizeable portion of the population, their support for Israel has steadily increased and they have strongly aligned with the Republican party in recent decades. This alignment has contributed greatly to the emergence of partisan differences over Israel.

In addition to the demographic cleavages, we find substantial ideological alignment of the parties and in relation to Israel. Over time, the parties have become more homogenous ideologically. Democrats are increasingly identifying themselves as liberals and taking liberal positions, and Republicans identifying with and taking conservative positions. This is important because conservatives and liberals differ in their foreign policy goals and preferences, a difference that is aligned with views of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Gries, 2014). Thus, the alignment of ideology and party identification positions a majority of people with favorable views of Israel on the Republican side and a large part of the population who holds more critical views of Israel on the Democratic side.

The partisan gap, however, extends beyond religion and ideology. In Chapter 6, we provided strong empirical evidence that neither demographic alignment, nor ideological divide, sufficiently explain the strength of the current partisan divide over Israel. Within each of the religious and ideological groups, party identification pushes differences over Israel even further. The strength of partisan differences on Israel outshines all other intersecting components. Republicans are almost guaranteed to support Israel. Support of Democrats is far less obvious or stable. We argue that much of the variation is explained by the extension of party conflict to foreign policy and Israel. Party elites today are increasingly divided over Israel—Republicans taking a strong and clear supportive view of Israel, and Democrats taking a more critical view of Israel and its actions. Mass partisans who are tuned to elite information take these cues as considerations in their attitudes about Israel.

We concede that the effect of elite cues cannot be on specific policies, most of which are complex and require a great deal of knowledge, which the majority of Americans do not have. Instead, we argue that the difference between partisan groups is manifested in a difference in the general perception of Israel. We demonstrate in Chapter 6 that a large part of the partisan gap on questions relating to Israel is rooted in their different feelings of affect toward Israel. Building on existing research showing that affect is often a useful heuristic shortcut that allows people to form opinions on complex matters, we demonstrate that Republicans and Democrats differ in their positive affect toward Israel and on the strength that this shortcut is utilized to form attitudes about policy preferences. Republicans are much more likely to feel positively about Israel than Democrats. For Republicans, these feelings are used to form pro-Israel preferences.

Finally, in Chapter 8, we make two additional contributions to this discussion. We illustrate that the partisan gap has extended to an issue that only implicitly relates to support for Israel—Palestinian independence. We suggest that affect is not useful in explaining the partisan gap on this issue. Instead, we propose that the two partisan camps differ in the set of goals that they prioritize in foreign policy. Democrats are concerned with global questions of human rights, equality and diplomatic solutions to international problems. Republicans are concerned with America's security and the protection of its allies. Republicans and Democrats weigh these goals when evaluating policy questions. Palestinian independence on its own offers no meaningful cue to Republicans about what they care about in this case—Israel's safety—and therefore they oppose it. When we add such a cue, assuring Republicans of Israel's security, partisan differences on this issue disappear.

What Does It Mean and What Does the Future Hold?

Where do we expect these trends to go from here? We approach this question with caution. Social scientists are far better at explaining outcomes in retrospect than making accurate predictions (Pierson, 2000). Americans' views on foreign policy and on Israel specifically are particularly sensitive to events. We have seen throughout this book how American attitudes have followed the progression of wars, terrorist activities, peace negotiations (and failures) and institutional changes in the political systems—in the United States, in Israel and in Arab countries. Similar events in the future may alter the trends we have witnessed in public opinion data, widening the gap (for example, if Israel uses excessive force in future wars) or reversing the trend of partisan differences (perhaps if certain international threats to US security emerge).

Yet our findings suggest a clear change in public opinion toward Israel. Partisan differences, which did not exist in the past, are now real and strong. Some surveys suggest differences as high as 30 or even 40 percentage points

between the two parties. Despite the magnitude of these differences, for the most part, Republican and Democratic majorities have so far remained on the same side of the debate: Majorities in both parties continue to support Israel. Only on two issues do we find clear opposing majorities. On the question of Israel's use of force, Republicans are steadfast in their support for Israel, but a small majority of Democrats have come to disapprove of Israel. On the question of Palestinian independence, Democrats have remained supportive, yet a majority of Republicans have come to oppose it (although, as we show in Chapter 8, they maintain a supportive stance when Israel's security is guaranteed alongside the would-be Palestinian state). The most recent surveys suggest that this increasing divide may have extended to other issues as well.[1] It is too soon to tell if this is a temporary drop or an indication of the emergence of opposing partisan majorities.

We should therefore ask: Barring special major events, what are the consequences of the widening partisan divide? What are the consequences of this increasing divide for American public opinion toward Israel, to elite views and actions toward Israel and, arguably, to the nature of the special relationship between the United States and Israel?

Polarization in America can, to some extent, be attributed to each party's attempt to distinguish itself from the other party and provide voters with clearer choices between political and policy alternatives. The extension of party polarization to foreign policy makes it all the more likely that we will see opposing majorities on the issue of Israel as well. That is, if the trends we outlined in this book continue in the same trajectory, we may expect the development of opposing majorities in the two parties on most questions relating to Israel. As Republicans become more supportive of Israel (almost unanimously so) and Democrats become less supportive, we should expect the gap to widen some more. Eventually, a majority of Democrats who prefer not to support Israel—on more than just its use of force—may become a reality.

Once such clear divisions appear, we may find even stronger political reference to this issue. Whether elites drive public opinion or represent it, diverging public attitudes toward Israel may offer political elites different incentives for prioritizing Israel and the policies they choose to enact with respect to Israel. Israel will become a wedge issue in American electoral politics and policy preferences.

Elsewhere (Cavari & Freedman, 2017), we analyzed party platforms as well as transcripts of party debates between candidates for their party's presidential nominee from 2000–2016. We found two important trends. Republican candidates often reference Israel and emphasize the need to support it (in 2016, the only country in the world that was mentioned more times than Israel in the Republican party platform was China). The Palestinians are hardly ever mentioned, and if they are, it is usually in a negative way, such as calling on

them to end terrorism (in the 2016 platform, Palestinians were not mentioned, except as a justification to withdraw from the Paris treaty on climate change). Democrats, on the other hand, usually shy away from the issue of Israel, and when they mention it, they usually offer a more balanced view, mentioning the Palestinians in tandem and emphasizing the need for a solution that will address Israel's security concerns and respect the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump embraced this divide arguing that "Israel, our great friend and the one true democracy in the Middle East, has been snubbed and criticized by an administration that lacks moral clarity" (Trump, 2016).

The debate over Israel does not determine elections in the United States and will not draw fierce political battles. Yet what used to be an easy one-sided political issue is now a two-sided issue that has strong constituencies on both sides: Pro-Israeli evangelicals aligned with the Republican Party taking the lead on one side, and young nonreligious and minority groups aligned with the Democratic Party, who question Israel and the US policy in the region taking the lead on the other. In his actions, in his rhetoric, in his use of new media, President Trump takes advantage of this divide and frames the debate over Israel in strong partisan terms.

Across the Atlantic, Israelis are aware of the political divide. A survey conducted by the American Public Opinion toward Israel (APOI) center in May 2017 during the President's visit to Israel shows that 63 percent of Israelis believed that US-Israel relations had deteriorated during Obama's terms in office. Fifty-one percent of Israelis blamed President Obama for this change (and 28% equally blamed Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu). Trump's visit to Israel provided an important cue for the Israeli public as well. Prior to the visit, 54 percent of Israelis believed that President Trump will strengthen the relationship between the two countries; after the visit, 69 percent believed this. Moreover, prior to Trump's visit, 38 percent believed the Republican party was more committed to Israel while only 15 percent believed the Democratic party was more committed (47% viewed the two parties as equally supportive). Following the visit, 45 percent of our Israeli sample saw the Republican party as more committed, compared to only 17 percent who viewed the Democratic party as more committed (and 38% who viewed them as equally supportive).[2]

While it is early to determine, we may find the partisan divide in the United States even stronger following the presidential election of 2020. The strong policies of the Trump administration have been met with somewhat of a counterresponse from Democrats, especially some presidential candidates, to the point where Democrats are divided. This is especially true when it comes to the idea of cutting aid to Israel, with some strongly supporting such a policy if Israel were to annex the West Bank—Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth

Warren—while others have lambasted such an idea and called it "bizarre"—former Vice President Joe Biden (Barrow, 2019).

Making Israel a wedge issue in American politics could be detrimental. Inserting the question of support for Israel into the inter- and intra- party conflict within the United States may fundamentally change the political relations between the two countries. As long as the Republican party controls the White House, Israel may expect American support on the international stage to continue. But how would the increasing divide affect the relationship during Democratic administrations? We suggest that actions of the two recent administrations demonstrate the effects of the partisan divide and the political conflict over this issue (Freedman, 2017; Saltzman, 2017; Cavari, 2021).

The relationship between the Obama administration and the Israeli government has been contentious. Freedman (2017) posits that there were five main factors responsible for this, namely the expansion of settlements by Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Israel's refusal to support Secretary Kerry's peace initiative, Israel's failure to support the United States as part of its UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea and the formation of a national unity government between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas, as well as the decision by the United States to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Throughout Obama's presidency, and especially during the second term, elite support for Israel became extremely partisan, with Republicans in Congress overwhelmingly backing Israel and repeatedly denouncing the Obama administration's policies toward Israel and Democrats becoming less active on this issue (Cavari & Freedman, 2019).

The contrast with the Trump administration is alarming. Consider for example the difference between President Obama and President Trump on Israeli settlements and the partisan conflict it created (Freedman, 2017). President Obama pressured Netanyahu to publicly agree to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to freeze housing construction in the occupied territories. The administration viewed housing construction in the occupied territories as an obstacle for peace and the Netanyahu government's recurring housing plans as a slap in the face of the administration's attempts to bring the conflict to a peaceful end. In 2014, after a new housing plan was released, White House spokesman Josh Earnest scolded Israel (Chandler, 2014):

> This development will only draw condemnation from the international community, distance Israel from even its closest allies, poison the atmosphere, not only with the Palestinians but also with the very Arab governments with which Prime Minister Netanyahu said he wanted to build relations.

In addition, in response to Netanyahu's backing away from his commitment to a two-state solution during the 2015 election in Israel, President Obama said that there was a "real policy difference" between himself and Netanyahu when it came to the need to establish a Palestinian state and that this dispute will have "ramifications for US policy regarding the Middle East process." US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman even warned Jewish leaders that if the new Israeli government did not demonstrate its commitment to the two-state solution, the United States would have a difficult time continuing to assist its efforts to halt international initiatives on the Palestinian issue at the United Nations (Ravid, 2015).

In December 2016, just before leaving office, President Obama did exactly that when he decided not to veto UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which states that Israel's settlement activities constitute a "flagrant violation" of international law. Without the US veto, the resolution passed in a 14–0 vote. Explaining the US abstention, the US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, said the Israeli settlement "seriously undermines Israel's security," adding: "The United States has been sending a message that the settlements must stop privately and publicly for nearly five decades" (Sengupta & Gladstone, 2016).

In response, Donald Trump, the president-elect, tweeted the following:

> We cannot continue to let Israel be treated with such total disdain and disrespect. They used to have a great friend in the U.S., but not anymore. The beginning of the end was the horrible Iran deal, and now this (U.N.)! Stay strong Israel, January 20th is fast approaching!
>
> *(@realDonaldTrump, December 28, 2016)*

Members of Congress responded as well and passed on January 5, 2017 a House Resolution (H.Res 11) that denounces the UN resolution.[3] The House Resolution was sponsored by Representative Ed Royce (R-CA) and cosponsored by 134 Representatives: 99 Republicans and 35 Democrats. It passed with bi-partisan support (432 Yeas), but most of the Nays were Democrats (76 of total 80 Nays). The difference in partisan action reflects the partisan divide in Congress on this issue.

President Trump followed up on his promise and never demanded any freeze on housing construction. According to a 2019 report by Peace Now, a monitoring group that opposes the settlements, Israel's average annual construction rate has risen 25 percent since President Donald Trump took office in 2017. A change of policy soon followed. On November 18, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the Trump administration had determined that Israel's West Bank settlements do not violate international law.

Democrats in Congress disavowed the move. A group of 106 Democrats signed a letter to Pompeo decrying the administration's decision to reverse US policy on the legality of Israeli settlement. On December 6, 2019, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives passed a resolution (H.Res 326) that expresses its continuing support for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and warns

against any Israeli annexation of territory in the occupied West Bank.[4] The resolution passed largely along partisan lines (266 supported the resolution—all but five were Democrats—and 188 opposed, including four Democrats).

Taking an even stronger step, on January 28, 2020, President Trump unveiled his long-in-the-making plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the "Deal of the Century"—in a White House ceremony with Prime Minister Netanyahu at his side and with no Palestinian present. Perhaps the most important aspects of the plan are its recognition of Palestinian statehood in 70 percent of the territories and Israel's sovereignty over the remaining 30 percent, including all existing settlements.

Once again, Democrats responded with a strong critique of the plan itself and for omitting the Palestinians from the process. Joe Biden, the former vice president and (then) leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidate, said that "a peace plan requires two sides to come together. This is a political stunt that could spark unilateral moves to annex territory and set back peace even more" (Kampeas, 2020). A group of 12 Democratic senators, including three presidential candidates at the time, Senators Warren, Sanders and Klobuchar, sent a letter to Mr. Trump expressing their concern with the plan, writing that "previous presidents of both parties successfully maintained the respect of both Israelis and the Palestinians for the United States' role in difficult negotiations" and that "this latest White House effort is not a legitimate attempt to advance peace." They called it "a recipe for renewed division and conflict in the region" (Crowley & Halbfinger, 2020).

This example adds to several incidents throughout the last two administrations that unveil the strength of partisan conflict among political elites, the increasing use of Israel as a political issue and the attempt of Republican leaders to gain an advantage and claim ownership over support for Israel. This includes President Obama's decision not to visit Israel on his first trip to the Middle East, compared to President Trump's visit to Israel on his first foreign trip. Another example is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on nuclear Iran. In an attempt to pressure President Obama from signing the agreement, Republicans invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress, where he lambasted the Iran deal. After entering office, President Trump withdrew from the agreement and publicly justified his decision to withdraw from it because it endangers the world and, especially, Israel.

In addition, President Trump distanced himself from all his predecessors with three major decisions long-sought by Israeli governments: He recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moved the US embassy to Jerusalem; he recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights; and, as discussed above, he reversed the US position on the legality of the settlement enterprise. In doing so, President Trump capitalized on support for Israel for political gains. By demonstrating his strong support for Israel, President Trump fulfills his campaign promises and delivers on his commitments to his political base, which public opinion data show are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel. The fact that Democrats question his unilateral

actions allows Trump to highlight his actions and criticize Democrats on an issue that still enjoys an uneven pro-Israeli bias among Americans.

In a speech announcing his candidacy for the Republican Presidential nomination in 2020, President Trump mentioned his policies toward Israel as one of his major foreign policy accomplishments (Trump, 2019b).

> We've repaired America's friendship with our cherished ally, the State of Israel, and . . . we recognized the true capital of Israel and opened the American embassy in Jerusalem. And we recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. And I withdrew the United States from the disastrous, just a disaster, a disaster, the disastrous Iran nuclear deal, and imposed the toughest-ever sanctions on the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism. We're charting a path to stability and peace in the Middle East, because great nations do not want to fight endless wars. They've been going on forever. Starting to remove a lot of troops. We're finally putting America first.

There is no doubt that President Trump sees himself as a strong supporter of Israel. In a tweet from August 21, 2019, President Trump thanked the conservative talk show host Wayne Allyn Root for his remarks about him:

> President Trump is the greatest President for Jews and for Israel in the history of the world, not just America, he is the best President for Israel in the history of the world . . . and the Jewish people in Israel love him . . . like he's the King of Israel. They love him like he is the second coming of God.
> *(@realDonaldTrump, August 21, 2019a)*

President Trump seizes on rifts within the Democratic Party to distance the Republican Party from the Democratic Party on Israel, pitting himself and the party as pro-Israel and the Democratic Party as anti-Israel. This is exemplified well in Trump's reaction to the debate over remarks made by Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN) about the influence of AIPAC on American policy, remarks that suggested dual loyalty of American Jews and were widely viewed as anti-Semitic. In an effort to tamp down the uproar over these comments, Democrats in the House proposed a resolution that condemned anti-Semitic rhetoric. Yet in response to pressures within the Democratic Party, the resolution broadened its scope to condemn "anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, racism and other forms of bigotry." President Trump took political advantage of this internal rift. In an exchange with reporters on March 8, 2019, following a vote in Congress, the President stated that Democrats are anti-Jewish and anti-Israel:

> I thought yesterday's vote by the House was disgraceful, because it's become—the Democrats have become an anti-Israel party. They've become

> an anti-Jewish party. And I thought that vote was a disgrace, and so does everybody else, if you get an honest answer. If you get an honest answer from politicians, they thought it was a disgrace. The Democrats have become an anti-Israel party. They've become an anti-Jewish party, and that's too bad.
>
> *(Trump, 2019c)*

The incident that perhaps best summarizes the divide concerns Israel's refusal to allow entry to two members of the US Congress, Representatives Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Talib (R-MI). The two newly elected Muslim members of Congress, among the more vocal critics of Israel in the US Congress and outright supporters of the BDS movement, were scheduled to visit Israel apart from a US Congress delegation. Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer, said Israel would not prevent the legislators from entering: "Out of respect for the US Congress and the great alliance between Israel and America, we would not deny entry to any member of Congress into Israel" (Ahren, 2019). Then the Trump administration began to pressure Israel. On August 15, 2019, President Trump tweeted about his objection to a planned official trip to Israel of the two members of Congress.

> It would show great weakness if Israel allowed Rep. Omar and Rep. Tlaib to visit. They hate Israel & all Jewish people, & there is nothing that can be said or done to change their minds. Minnesota and Michigan will have a hard time putting them back in office. They are a disgrace!
>
> *(@realDonaldTrump, August 15, 2019)*

In response to the pressure from the Trump administration, and in contrast to its earlier decision, the Israeli government barred the two representatives from entering Israel, relying on a 2017 law that prohibits the entry into Israel of those who call for and work to impose boycotts on Israel.[5] Prime Minister Netanyahu defended his decision in public remarks on August 18:

> This was a principled, not a partisan, decision. We respect all political parties in the US equally; however, we also respect ourselves. Whoever comes to impose boycotts on us and to deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel, we will not allow them entry.
>
> *(Times of Israel Staff & Ahren, 2019)*

Israel's decision was strongly condemned by leading Democrats—for example, the House Majority Leader, Steny Hoyer, released a statement calling the decision "outrageous" (Hoyer, August 15, 2019), and former Vice President Biden tweeted that "[n]o democracy should deny entry to visitors based on the content of their ideas—even ideas they strongly object to" (@JoeBiden, August 15, 2019). This

partisan feud, however, fueled President Trump's critique of the Democratic Party's position on Israel asking "[w]here has the Democratic Party gone? Where have they gone where they are defending these two people over the state of Israel?" (Montanaro & Keith, 2019). In public statements and on Twitter he equated the Democratic Party with hate for Israel.

> Representatives Omar and Tlaib are the face of the Democrat Party, and they HATE Israel!
>
> *(@realDonaldTrump, August 15, 2019)*

Worried about the consequences of this incident, the president of Israel (a mostly ceremonial position), Mr. Reuven Rivlin, called House Speaker, Ms. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) on August 21, 2019, to say that "[w]e must keep the State of Israel above political disputes and make every effort to ensure that support for Israel does not become a political issue" (Tibon, 2019).

These incidents illustrate the state of the current divide over Israel in American politics that is the focus of this book. What was commonly viewed as a matter of political consensus that is above the political fray has, in recent years, aligned with other partisan conflicts and has taken a partisan dimension among political elites and mass Americans. The divide, as we show throughout the book, precedes President Trump. But President Trump has taken advantage of the existing divide and exploits it for partisan political gains, which, in turn, may intensify the party divide on this issue. The consequences of this divide may be dire to the special relationship between the two countries, a relationship that, in the words of President Rivlin during his conversation with Speaker Pelosi, "is a link between peoples, which relies on historical ties, deep and strong friendships and shared values that are not dependent on the relationship with one particular party." The data presented in this book question whether this proposition still holds. Attitudes of Americans toward Israel are no longer independent of partisan politics. Given that the special relations between Israel and the United States cannot be attained without a supportive public opinion, we may expect a less stable relationship when the public is as divided as it is today and the issue is part of the political conflict.

Notes

1. Much of this depends on how scholars treat item nonresponse, that is, whether don't know/no opinion is treated as a valid category. In Part II of this book, we excluded all nonresponse options because they unnecessarily complicate our statistical models. Of those who make a choice between Israel and the Palestinians, majorities in support for Israel remain in both parties. However, Democratic support for Israel is substantially lower when including nonresponse. We have demonstrated elsewhere that most Democrats who no longer sympathize with Israel currently report that

they do not know and find it harder to choose between the two sides (Cavari & Freedman, 2019).

2. Survey conducted on May 24–25, 2017, by the American Public Opinion toward Israel (APOI) Center using the Midgam online panel. Sample of 823 who are a politically representative sample of Israeli Jews.
3. Objecting to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 as an obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace, and for other purposes. H.Res 11. 115th Congress. (2017). https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-resolution/11
4. Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding United States efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a negotiated two-state solution. H.Res 326. 116th Congress. (2019). https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/326
5. Entry to Israel Law, 1952. Article 2(d). Amendment 27 (March 6, 2017).

APPENDIX

Surveys Used Throughout the Book

In writing this book, we rely on large and diverse data. We firmly believe in the value of transparent and reproducible research. For these purposes, we offer a comprehensive online Appendix as well as an abbreviated version in the following pages. The online Appendix includes full information on all surveys used throughout the book, including the relevant Roper/ICPSR ID, the survey organization, sample description, survey dates and item wording where relevant.

Following is a shortened version of the Appendix where we list only surveys used to construct figures and statistical models. The shortened version also excludes sample description (nearly all samples are US national adult) and item wording. In addition, in cases where we compare attitudes toward Israel to attitudes toward several other countries (Figures 2.2, 2.4 and 3.13), we include here only the questions that pertain to Israel. For all other surveys that appear in the text of the book, we include appropriate references as notes at the end of each chapter.

Part I

Chapter 1

Survey Data Used in Figure 1.1: Israel Favorability Ratings in 13 Countries

ICPSR ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
4243	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2004–06–06	2004–06–26
4605	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2005–05–30	2005–06–17
20302	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2006–06–05	2006–06–24
28187	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2007–06–04	2007–06–23
26501	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2008–06–04	2008–06–24
34715	The Transatlantic Trends Survey	2012–06–02	2012–06–27

Note: The 2012 ICPSR data do not include the American sample. This is available via Roper iPoll. Roper ID: USTNS.12TRANS.R05L.

Survey Data Used in Figure 1.2: Global Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (2007 and 2013)

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USPSRA.062707.R17	Pew Global Attitudes Project	2007–04–23	2007–05–06
USPSRA.050913G.R110	Pew Global Attitudes Project	2013–03–04	2013–03–18

Survey Data Used in Figure 1.3: Increasing Partisan Divide in Public Attitudes About Foreign Policy

Roper Dataset ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS1974–2436G	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	1974–12–06	1974–12–14
USAIPOSPGO1986–86195G	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USAIPOSPGO1990–925032G	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USAIPOSP1998-CCFR-GP	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USHARRISINT2002-CCFR	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USMISC2004-CCFR	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2004–07–06	2004–07–12
USUMARY2005–09	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2005–09–15	2005–09–21
MCMISC2006-CCFR	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2006–06–23	2006–07–09
USMISC2008-CCGA07	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2008–07–03	2008–07–15
USMISC2010-CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2010–06–11	2010–06–22
USMISC2012-CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2012–05–25	2012–06–08
USMISC2014-CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2014–05–06	2014–05–29
USMISC2015-CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2015–05–28	2015–06–17
USCCGA2016–0626	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2016–06–10	2016–06–26
31115027	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2017–06–27	2017–07–19
31116769	Chicago Council on Global Affairs	2018–07–12	2018–12–31

Chapter 2

For data used in Figures 2.2 and 2.4, comparing attitudes toward Israel to attitudes toward other countries, see online Appendix.

Survey Data used in Figure 2.1: Favorability Toward Israel, 1989–2019

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USABCWP.89JAPN.R35J	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–02–10	1989–02–14
USGALLUP.040689.R1F	Gallup Organization	1989–02–28	1989–03–02
USABCWP.89APR.R41C	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USLAT.187.R08	Los Angeles Times	1989–06–14	1989–06–15
USGALLUP.081689.R02D	Gallup Organization	1989–08–10	1989–08–13
USPSRA.90TM2B.R07B	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1990–08–19	1990–08–25
USABCWP.90399.R40	ABC News/Washington Post	1990–10–10	1990–10–14
USGALLUP.90OCT2.R13	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–14
USCBS.012991.R20	CBS News	1991–01–27	1991–01–28
USGALLUP.020691.R1B	Gallup Organization	1991–01–30	1991–02–02
USGALLUP.032191.R01A	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USABC.435.R035D	ABC News	1991–07–25	1991–07–28
USGALLUP.0891W2.R11A	Gallup Organization	1991–08–08	1991–08–11
USGALLUP.100291.R4	Gallup Organization	1991–09–26	1991–09–29
USGALLUP.1191W4.R07	Gallup Organization	1991–11–21	1991–11–24
USGALLUP.0292W1.R09E	Gallup Organization	1992–02–06	1992–02–09
USABC.092093.R30	ABC News	1993–09–16	1993–09–19
USGALLUP.96MAR8.R21C	Gallup Organization	1996–03–08	1996–03–10
USZOGBY.98JULC.R1I	Zogby International	1998–05–01	1998–05–01
USGALLUP.99FEB8.R02C	Gallup Organization	1999–02–08	1999–02–09
USGALLUP.99M07.R23	Gallup Organization	1999–05–07	1999–05–09
USGALLUP.200005.Q06B	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USGALLUP.00MC17.R17F	Gallup Organization	2000–03–17	2000–03–19
USGALLUP.01FYR1.R27N	Gallup Organization	2001–02–01	2001–02–04
USCBSNYT.102901.R15	CBS News/New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USCBSNYT.200112A.Q28	CBS News/New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USGALLUP.02FBR04.R33M	Gallup Organization	2002–02–04	2002–02–06
USFMA.052202.R2B	Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates	2002–05–14	2002–05–16
USGALLUP.03FEB3.R25L	Gallup Organization	2003–02–03	2003–02–06
USGALLUP.04FBY09.R23E	Gallup Organization	2004–02–09	2004–02–12
USGALLUP.05FEBY7.R26M	Gallup Organization	2005–02–07	2005–02–10
USGALLUP.06FE006.R22L	Gallup Organization	2006–02–06	2006–02–09
USCBSNYT.072606A.R31	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USCBSNYT.200609A.Q70	CBS News/New York Times	2006–09–15	2006–09–19
USGALLUP.07FBR01.R26N	Gallup Organization	2007–02–01	2007–02–04

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.08FUY011.R26L	Gallup Organization	2008–02–11	2008–02–14
USGALLUP.09FBRY9.R18L	Gallup Organization	2009–02–09	2009–02–12
USORC.040709A.R20K	Opinion Research Corporation	2009–04–03	2009–04–05
USGALLUP.10FBR001.R17L	Gallup Organization	2010–02–01	2010–02–03
USORC.062110.R14D	Opinion Research Corporation	2010–06–16	2010–06–16
USGALLUP.11FB002.R16L	Gallup Organization	2011–02–02	2011–02–05
USUMARY.041111.R11C	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2011–04–01	2011–04–05
USORC.053111.R11D	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–05–24	2011–05–26
USUMARY.090811.R02C	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2011–08–19	2011–08–25
USGALLUP.12FB002.R16N	Gallup Organization	2012–02–02	2012–02–05
USTNS.12TRANS.R05L	TNS Opinion and Social Institutes	2012–06–04	2012–06–24
USGALLUP.13FBUY07.R12L	Gallup Organization	2013–02–07	2013–02–10
USPSRA.050913G.R009I	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2013–03–04	2013–03–18
USPSRA.120313.R12NF2	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2013–10–30	2013–11–06
USORC.020514A.R30C	ORC International	2014–01–31	2014–02–02
USGALLUP.021814.R15L	Gallup Organization	2014–02–06	2014–02–09
USORC.072114A.R12D	ORC International	2014–07–18	2014–07–20
USGALLUP.031315.R18L	Gallup Organization	2015–02–08	2015–02–11
USASFOX.030415.R03	Anderson Robbins Research/ Shaw & Co. Research	2015–03–01	2015–03–03
USGALLUP.022916.R18M	Gallup Organization	2016–02–03	2016–02–07
USGALLUP.021517.R19L	Gallup Organization	2017–02–01	2017–02–05
USGALLUP.022818.R17L	Gallup Organization	2018–02–01	2018–02–10
31116081.00021	Gallup Organization	2019–02–01	2019–02–10
31116128.00063	Gallup Organization	2019–02–12	2019–02–28

Survey Data Used in Figure 2.3: From Friend to Ally

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.111477.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1977–10–08	1977–10–16
USABCHS.040279.R3A	ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates	1979–03–22	1979–03–27
USHARRIS.80ME-G. R04A08	Louis Harris & Associates	1980–07–11	1980–07–23
USHARRIS.020182.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–01–08	1982–01–12
USHARRIS.062882.R6	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–06–18	1982–06–22
USHARRIS.071282.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–06–18	1982–06–22
USHARRIS.082382.R4	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–08–05	1982–08–10

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.111582.R1B	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–10–29	1982–11–01
USHARRIS.022083.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1983–02–11	1983–02–16
USLAT.68.R87	Los Angeles Times	1983–05–08	1983–05–12
USHARRIS.092283.R6	Louis Harris & Associates	1983–09–09	1983–09–14
USHARRIS.122784.R1D	Louis Harris & Associates	1984–11–09	1984–11–13
USHARRIS.070885.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1985–06–28	1985–06–30
USHARRIS.071185.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1985–06–28	1985–06–30
USHARRIS.112185.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1985–10–23	1985–10–27
USHARRIS.022086.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1986–01–31	1986–02–03
USHARRIS.041387.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1987–02–20	1987–02–24
USHARRIS.013188.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–26
USMARTIL.88AJC.R04D	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USMARTIL.88AJC.R05	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USHARRIS.121089.R5	Louis Harris & Associates	1989–08–25	1989–08–29
USHARRIS.032590.R01A	Louis Harris & Associates	1990–03–08	1990–03–13
USHARRIS.090290.R1H	Louis Harris & Associates	1990–08–17	1990–08–21
USHARRIS.020391.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1991–01–24	1991–01–26
USHARRIS.031091.R1A	Louis Harris & Associates	1991–02–21	1991–02–24
USHARRIS.092291.R3A	Louis Harris & Associates	1991–08–02	1991–08–12
USHARRIS.053193.R1B	Louis Harris & Associates	1993–04–28	1993–05–04
USHARRIS.030394.R1E	Louis Harris & Associates	1994–02–02	1994–02–06
USHARRIS.100295.R1E	Louis Harris & Associates	1995–08–31	1995–09–03
USHARRIS.112896.R1H	Louis Harris & Associates	1996–11–08	1996–11–11
USHARRIS.091597.R1F	Louis Harris & Associates	1997–08–20	1997–08–26
USHARRIS.090298.R1F	Louis Harris & Associates	1998–08–12	1998–08–17
USGALLUP.00MC17.R18F	Gallup Organization	2000–03–17	2000–03–19
USGALLUP.00MY18.R33N	Gallup Organization	2000–05–18	2000–05–21
USHARRIS.083000.R1E	Harris Interactive	2000–08–10	2000–08–14
USGALLUP.01AP20.R24D	Gallup Organization	2001–04–20	2001–04–22
USHARRIS.103101.R1G	Harris Interactive	2001–10–17	2001–10–22
USHARRIS.090104.R1D	Harris Interactive	2004–08–10	2004–08–15
USHARRIS.091405.R1D	Harris Interactive	2005–08–09	2005–08–16
USHARRIS.080306.R1E	Harris Interactive	2006–07–05	2006–07–11
USORC.080406.R24	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03
USORC.122106.R24A	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–12–15	2006–12–17
USHARRIS.080707.R1D	Harris Interactive	2007–07–10	2007–07–16
USORC.032310.R38	Opinion Research Corporation	2010–03–19	2010–03–21
USORC.053111.R12D	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–05–24	2011–05–26
USCBS.111111B.R65	CBS News	2011–11–06	2011–11–10
USORC.031913A.R22	ORC International	2013–03–15	2013–03–17

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.060613.R16G	Gallup Organization	2013–06–01	2013–06–04
USGALLUP.091813A.R01D	Gallup Organization	2013–09–15	2013–09–16
USGALLUP.032714.R01D	Gallup Organization	2014–03–22	2014–03–23
USCBS.030315.R01F	CBS News	2015–02–18	2015–02–22
USAP.072115G.R02F	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–07–09	2015–07–13
31115332.00008	Gallup Organization	2018–07–02	2018–07–08
31115414.00032	SSRS	2018–08–09	2018–08–12

Chapter 3

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.1: Sympathies in the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict (1948–2019)

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USNORC.480155.R07	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–02–01	1948–02–01
USGALLUP.414K.QK03D	Gallup Organization	1948–03–05	1948–05–10
USGALLUP.414T.QT03G	Gallup Organization	1948–03–05	1948–03–10
USNORC.480158.R15	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–06–01	1948–06–01
USNORC.480159.R19	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–06–01	1948–06–01
USNORC.480161.R14	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–10–01	1948–10–01
USNORC.490164.R18	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1949–03–01	1949–03–01
USGALLUP.56–565.R15	Gallup Organization	1956–05–31	1956–06–05
USHARRIS.061067.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1967–06–01	1967–06–01
USGALLUP.746.Q04D	Gallup Organization	1967–06–02	1967–06–07
USGALLUP.774.Q008C	Gallup Organization	1969–01–23	1969–01–28
USGALLUP.775.Q008B	Gallup Organization	1969–02–20	1969–02–25
USGALLUP.800.Q004C	Gallup Organization	1970–02–27	1970–03–02
USHARRIS.70AUG.R06	Louis Harris & Associates	1970–08–01	1970–08–01
USHARRIS.70OCT.R12	Louis Harris & Associates	1970–10–01	1970–10–01
USHARRIS.71JUN.R06	Louis Harris & Associates	1971–06–01	1971–06–01
USHARRIS.71JUL.R06	Louis Harris & Associates	1971–07–01	1971–07–01
USGALLUP.880.Q02B	Gallup Organization	1973–10–05	1973–10–08
USGALLUP.882.Q03B	Gallup Organization	1973–10–19	1973–10–22
USORC.102873.R10	Opinion Research Corporation	1973–10–27	1973–10–28
USROPER.73–10.R05	Roper Organization	1973–11–03	1973–11–17
USROPER.74–1.R21	Roper Organization	1973–12–01	1973–12–15

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.885.Q06B	Gallup Organization	1973–12–07	1973–12–10
USORC.123073.R08	Opinion Research Corporation	1973–12–19	1973–12–30
USROPER.74–6.R04	Roper Organization	1974–06–06	1974–06–15
USROPER.75–1.R05	Roper Organization	1974–12–06	1974–12–14
USGALLUP.116–1.R01	Gallup Organization	1975–01–10	1975–01–15
USHARRIS.021075.R3	Louis Harris & Associates	1975–01–16	1975–01–20
USROPER.75–3.R06	Roper Organization	1975–02–15	1975–03–01
USGALLUP.927.Q08	Gallup Organization	1975–04–04	1975–04–07
USROPER.75–4.RX	Roper Organization	1975–04–05	1975–04–12
USROPER.75–6.R06	Roper Organization	1975–06–14	1975–06–21
USROPER.77–4.R12	Roper Organization	1977–03–19	1977–03–26
USGALLUP.977.Q009B	Gallup Organization	1977–06–03	1977–06–06
USGALLUP.985.Q005	Gallup Organization	1977–10–14	1977–10–17
USGALLUP.990.Q3B	Gallup Organization	1977–12–09	1977–12–12
USROPER.78–2.R06	Roper Organization	1978–01–07	1978–01–21
USGALLUP.993.Q006G	Gallup Organization	1978–02–10	1978–02–13
USGALLUP.995.Q002B	Gallup Organization	1978–03–03	1978–03–06
USROPER.78–5.R07	Roper Organization	1978–04–22	1978–05–03
USGALLUP.1101.Q03B	Gallup Organization	1978–04–28	1978–05–01
USGALLUP.1108.Q04B	Gallup Organization	1978–08–04	1978–08–07
USGALLUP.1111.Q03C	Gallup Organization	1978–09–08	1978–09–11
USGALLUP.112678.R3	Gallup Organization	1978–11–10	1978–11–13
USGALLUP.78CFR.R46	Gallup Organization	1978–11–17	1978–11–26
USGALLUP.78CFR.R47	Gallup Organization	1978–11–17	1978–11–26
USGALLUP.1119.Q002B	Gallup Organization	1979–01–05	1979–01–08
USGALLUP.1124.Q04B	Gallup Organization	1979–03–16	1979–03–19
USROPER.79–4.R16	Roper Organization	1979–03–24	1979–03–31
USABCHS.082779.R2	ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates	1979–08–21	1979–08–22
USLAT.79SEP09.R53	Los Angeles Times	1979–09–09	1979–09–14
USYANK.798184.Q14D	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1979–12–10	1979–12–12
USYANK.798184.Q14E	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1979–12–10	1979–12–12
USROPER.80–4.R05	Roper Organization	1980–03–29	1980–04–05
USHARRIS.80ME-G.R05A	Louis Harris & Associates	1980–07–11	1980–07–23
USHARRIS.80ME-G.R11A	Louis Harris & Associates	1980–07–11	1980–07–23
USHARRIS.80ME-G.R11B	Louis Harris & Associates	1980–07–11	1980–07–23
USROPER.81–7.R03	Roper Organization	1981–07–11	1981–07–18
USGALLUP.1180.Q08B	Gallup Organization	1981–07–31	1981–08–03
USHARRIS.091081.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1981–08–11	1981–08–16
USHARRIS.091081.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1981–08–11	1981–08–16
USROPER.81–8.R05	Roper Organization	1981–08–15	1981–08–22

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.1187.Q08	Gallup Organization	1981–12–11	1981–12–14
USGALLUP.1188.Q08	Gallup Organization	1982–01–08	1982–01–11
USABCWP.0050.R62	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–03–03	1982–03–08
USGALLUP.052482.R2	Gallup Organization	1982–04–30	1982–05–03
USROPER.82–6.R6	Roper Organization	1982–06–05	1982–06–12
USGALLUP.070482.R2	Gallup Organization	1982–06–11	1982–06–14
USHARRIS.062882.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–06–18	1982–06–22
USLAT.58.R51	Los Angeles Times	1982–07–04	1982–07–08
USGALLUP.203–5.R2	Gallup Organization	1982–07–23	1982–07–26
USHARRIS.082382.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–08–05	1982–08–10
USABCWP.57.R27	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–08–17	1982–08–17
USLAT.59.R045	Los Angeles Times	1982–08–22	1982–08–26
USROPER.82–9.R8	Roper Organization	1982–09–11	1982–09–18
USGALNEW.100482.R1	Gallup Organization	1982–09–22	1982–09–23
USABCWP.61.R17	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–09–24	1982–09–26
USROPER.82–10.R06	Roper Organization	1982–10–23	1982–10–30
USGALLUP.CFR83G.R40	Gallup Organization	1982–10–29	1982–11–06
USGALLUP.CFR83G.R42	Gallup Organization	1982–10–29	1982–11–06
USABCWP.68.R40A	ABC News/Washington Post	1983–01–18	1983–01–22
USGALLUP.83MIDE.R01	Gallup Organization	1983–01–21	1983–01–30
USABCWP.72.R44	ABC News/Washington Post	1983–02–25	1983–03–02
USGALLUP.1211.R02B	Gallup Organization	1983–03–11	1983–03–14
USROPER.83–7.R05	Roper Organization	1983–07–09	1983–07–16
USABCWP.84.R35	ABC News/Washington Post	1983–09–22	1983–09–26
USROPER.84AJC.R2	Roper Organization	1984–01–07	1984–01–21
USROPER.84–4.R04	Roper Organization	1984–03–17	1984–03–24
USROPER.84–10.R06	Roper Organization	1984–10–27	1984–11–03
USROPER.85AJC.R2	Roper Organization	1985–04–27	1985–05–04
USABCWP.197.R11	ABC News/Washington Post	1985–06–30	1985–07–01
USROPER.85–8.R04	Roper Organization	1985–08–17	1985–08–24
USHARRIS.111285.R04	Louis Harris & Associates	1985–10–23	1985–10–27
USROPER.86AJC.R2	Roper Organization	1986–05–31	1986–06–07
USABCWP.866542.Q08	ABC News/Washington Post	1986–06–19	1986–06–24
USGALLUP.86CFRP.R37	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USROPER.AJC487.R02	Roper Organization	1987–02–14	1987–02–28
USHARRIS.033087.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1987–02–20	1987–02–24
USPENN.88MIDE.R01	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USPENN.88MIDE.R02	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USROPER.AJC488.R92	Roper Organization	1988–04–16	1988–04–29
USMARTIL.88AJC.R27	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USMARTIL.88AJC.R28	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USMARTIL.88AJC.R37	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USGALLUP.052988.R2	Gallup Organization	1988–05–02	1988–05–08
USGALLUP.871AI.Q009B	Gallup Organization	1988–05–13	1988–05–15
USGALLUP.011589.R5	Gallup Organization	1988–12–27	1988–12–29
USABCWP.89APR.R48	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USABCWP.89APR.R49	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USROPER.89AJC.R1	Roper Organization	1989–04–15	1989–04–22
USROPER.89AJC.R2	Roper Organization	1989–04–15	1989–04–22
USGALLUP.081689.R03	Gallup Organization	1989–08–10	1989–08–13
USHARRIS.032590.R02	Louis Harris & Associates	1990–03–08	1990–03–13
USCBSNYT.070890.R58	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USGALLUP.90OCT2.R14	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–14
USGALNEW.105064.R11	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–12
USGALLUP.90CFRP.R35	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USGALLUP.01JAN27.R15	Gallup Organization	1991–01–23	1991–01–26
USGALNEW.105126.R03	Gallup Organization	1991–01–24	1991–01–25
USCBSNYT.030791.R23	CBS News/New York Times	1991–03–04	1991–03–06
USGALLUP.032191.R03	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USNBCWSJ.032991.R21E	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	1991–03–15	1991–03–19
USHARRIS.092291.R1	Louis Harris & Associates	1991–08–02	1991–08–12
USGALLUP.0891W2.R13	Gallup Organization	1991–08–08	1991–08–11
USABC.091691.R26	ABC News	1991–09–13	1991–09–15
USCBSNYT.101091.R50	CBS News/New York Times	1991–10–05	1991–10–07
USMARTIL.92ANT.R104	Marttila & Kiley	1992–04–28	1992–05–01
USMARTIL.92ANT.R105	Marttila & Kiley	1992–04–28	1992–05–01
USPSRA.93SEPT.R25	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1993–09–09	1993–09–15
USGALLUP.93SEP1.Q34	Gallup Organization	1993–09–10	1993–09–12
USGALLUP.96NV21.R16	Gallup Organization	1996–11–21	1996–11–24
USGALLUP.97AG12.R10	Gallup Organization	1997–08–12	1997–08–13
USPSRA.101097.R31	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1997–09–04	1997–09–11
USLAT.98406.R54	Los Angeles Times	1998–01–29	1998–01–31
USGALLUP.98DC04.R14	Gallup Organization	1998–12–04	1998–12–06
USGALLUP.080299.R3	Gallup Organization	1999–07–22	1999–07–25
USGALLUP.00JU25.R19	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USGALLUP.00JL06.R13	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USGALLUP.00OC12.R29C	Gallup Organization	2000–10–12	2000–10–14
USCBSNYT.102200.R52	CBS News/New York Times	2000–10–18	2000–10–21
USGALLUP.01FEB01.R33	Gallup Organization	2001–02–01	2001–02–04

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.01AG10.R20	Gallup Organization	2001–08–10	2001–08–12
USLAT.091601.R34	Los Angeles Times	2001–09–13	2001–09–14
USGALLUP.01SP14.R31	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USABC.101101.R11	ABC News	2001–10–08	2001–10–09
USPSRA.01APWCB.QB35	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–10–15	2001–10–21
USPSRA.102401.R10	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–10–15	2001–10–21
USCBSNYT.102901.R19	CBS News/New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USQUINN.121201.R52	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2001–11–29	2001–12–05
USCBSNYT.121101.R29	CBS News/New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USGALLUP.01DC14.R49	Gallup Organization	2001–12–14	2001–12–16
USGALLUP.02FBR04.R36	Gallup Organization	2002–02–04	2002–02–06
USGALLUP.02MCH08.R04	Gallup Organization	2002–03–08	2002–03–09
USCBS.040302.R04	CBS News	2002–04–01	2002–04–02
USABC.040802.R146	ABC News	2002–04–03	2002–04–07
USPSRA.041702.R11	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–04–03	2002–04–08
USGALLUP.02APR5.R18	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USNBCWSJ.02APRIL.R23A	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USNBCWSJ.02APRIL.R23B	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USCBS.200204B.Q06	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USABCWP.042202A.R07	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USGALLUP.02AP22.R40	Gallup Organization	2002–04–22	2002–04–24
USGALLUP.02AP22.R40A	Gallup Organization	2002–04–22	2002–04–24
USGALLUP.02AP22.R41	Gallup Organization	2002–04–22	2002–04–24
USCBS.051502D.R11	CBS News	2002–05–13	2002–05–14
USGALLUP.02MA20.R43	Gallup Organization	2002–05–20	2002–05–22
USPSRA.062702.R21	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–06–19	2002–06–23
USGALLUP.02JUN21.R25	Gallup Organization	2002–06–21	2002–06–23
USCBS.080802.R21	CBS News	2002–08–06	2002–08–07
USGALLUP.02SPT02.R15	Gallup Organization	2002–09–02	2002–09–04
USGALLUP.03FURY3.R27	Gallup Organization	2003–02–03	2003–02–06
USGALLUP.03MY019.R24	Gallup Organization	2003–05–19	2003–05–21
USPSRA.072403.R13	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2003–06–24	2003–07–08
USGALLUP.071806TR1.R1	Gallup Organization	2004–02–09	2004–02–12
USPSRA.031604.R028	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2004–02–24	2004–02–29

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USPSRA.081804.R47	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2004–07–08	2004–07–18
USGALLUP.05FEBY7.R30	Gallup Organization	2005–02–07	2005–02–10
USPSRA.083005.R06F1	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2005–07–07	2005–07–17
USPSRA.111705.R24	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2005–10–12	2005–10–24
USGALLUP.06FB006.R24	Gallup Organization	2006–02–06	2006–02–09
USPSRA.061306.R46	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–05–02	2006–05–14
USSRBI.072606P.R26F1	Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas	2006–07–06	2006–07–19
USSRBI.082406P.R26F1	Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas	2006–07–06	2006–07–19
USORC.200618.Q02	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–07–19	2006–07–19
USNBCWSJ.06JULY.R24A	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2006–07–21	2006–07–24
USNBCWSJ.06JULY.R24B	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2006–07–21	2006–07–24
USORC.080406.R21	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03
USPSRA.081706.R28	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USGALLUP.07FBRY1.R27	Gallup Organization	2007–02–01	2007–02–04
USPSRA.062707.R17	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2007–04–23	2007–05–06
USGALLUP.08FBUY11.R31	Gallup Organization	2008–02–11	2008–02–14
USPSRA.011309.RA03	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USGALLUP.09FU009.R22	Gallup Organization	2009–02–09	2009–02–12
USSRBI.120309P.R59	Abt SRBI	2009–10–28	2009–11–08
USGALLUP.10FUY001.R18	Gallup Organization	2010–02–01	2010–02–03
USQUINN.042210.R49	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2010–04–14	2010–04–19
USPSRA.042810.R23	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2010–04–21	2010–04–26
USNBCWSJ.10JUN.R35	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2010–06–17	2010–06–21
USORC.053111.R21	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–05–24	2011–05–26
USPSRA.061011.R45	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2011–05–25	2011–05–29
USPSRA.092011.R01	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2011–09–15	2011–09–18
USQUINN.100611.R53	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2011–09–27	2011–10–03

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.12FBR002.R20	Gallup Organization	2012–02–02	2012–02–05
USORC.111912.R25	ORC International	2012–11–16	2012–11–18
USSRBI.121412.R60	Abt SRBI	2012–12–05	2012–12–09
USGALLUP.13FUBY007.R19	Gallup Organization	2013–02–07	2013–02–10
USNBCWSJ.13FEB.R26	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2013–02–21	2013–02–24
USPSRA.050913G.R110	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2013–03–04	2013–03–18
USABCWP.031813.R19	ABC News/Washington Post	2013–03–07	2013–03–10
USSRBI.031913.R70F1	Abt SRBI	2013–03–13	2013–03–17
USGALLUP.022714A.R02	Gallup Organization	2014–02–06	2014–02–09
USPSRA.042914.R50	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–04–23	2014–04–27
USPSRA.071514.R53	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–07–08	2014–07–14
USMARIST.080314N.R01	Marist College Institute for Public Opinion	2014–07–28	2014–07–31
USMARIST.080314N.R02	Marist College Institute for Public Opinion	2014–07–28	2014–07–31
USCBS.080614A.R57	CBS News	2014–07–29	2014–08–04
USGALLUP.022315.R01	Gallup Organization	2015–02–08	2015–02–11
USGALLUP.022916.R22	Gallup Organization	2016–02–03	2016–02–07
USSRBI.050516.R52	Abt SRBI	2016–04–12	2016–04–19
USPSRA.011217.R61	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2017–01–04	2017–01–09
USQUINN.011317.R65	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2017–01–05	2017–01–09
USGALLUP.021317.R22	Gallup Organization	2017–02–01	2017–02–05
USSRBI.012318AP.R80	Abt Associates	2018–01–10	2018–01–15
USGALLUP.031318.R01	Gallup Organization	2018–02–01	2018–02–10
31116081	Gallup Organization	2019–02–01	2019–02–10
31116194	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2019–03–21	2019–03–25

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.2: Attributing Blame for the Conflict

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USNORC.530349.R16A	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1953–11–01	1953–11–01
USNORC.550376.R17	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1955–09–01	1955–09–01

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USNORC.550379.R24	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1955–11–24	1955–11–30
USNORC.560386.R15A	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1956–04–21	1956–04–30
USNORC.560399.R10	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1956–11–01	1956–11–01
USNORC.570404.R15	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1957–04–01	1957–04–01
USCBSNYT.110177.R36	CBS News/New York Times	1977–10–23	1977–10–26
USABCWP.89APR.R58	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USABCWP.90399.R46	ABC News/Washington Post	1990–10–10	1990–10–14
USHARRIS.040397.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1997–03–26	1997–04–01
USNBCWSJ.97AP26.R28	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	1997–04–26	1997–04–28
USHARRIS.090897.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1997–08–20	1997–08–26
USHARRIS.061098.R2	Louis Harris & Associates	1998–05–21	1998–05–28
USPSRNEW.101400.R15	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USHARRIS.110100.R1	Harris Interactive	2000–10–19	2000–10–26
USHARRIS.080301.R1	Harris Interactive	2001–07–12	2001–07–16
USPSRNEW.120801.R05	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–12–06	2001–12–07
USHARRIS.032302.R01	Harris Interactive	2002–03–13	2002–03–19
USPSRNEW.032302.R06	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–03–21	2002–03–22
USABC.040802.R147	ABC News	2002–04–03	2002–04–07
USHARRIS.041902.R1	Harris Interactive	2002–04–09	2002–04–15
USABCWP.042202A.R08	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USHARRIS.052202.R1	Harris Interactive	2002–05–15	2002–05–21
USHARRIS.062202.R1	Harris Interactive	2002–06–14	2002–06–17
USHARRIS.073102.R1	Harris Interactive	2002–07–18	2002–07–22
USHARRIS.082802.R1	Harris Interactive	2002–08–15	2002–08–19
USCBSNYT.072606A.R77	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USABCWP.080706A.R19	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06
USABCWP.080706A.R22	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06
USSRBI.20063897.Q03	Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas	2006–08–09	2006–08–10
USIPSOSR.011409M.R3	Ipsos-Public Affairs	2009–01–06	2009–01–12
USODFOX.011609.R25	Opinion Dynamics	2009–01–13	2009–01–14
USCBS.080614.R60	CBS News	2014–07–29	2014–08–04

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.3: Who Should the US Side With?

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USPENN.81MIDE.R01	Penn & Schoen Associates	1981–08–08	1981–08–09
USPENN.82MIDE.R01	Penn & Schoen Associates	1982–05–08	1982–05–10
USPENN.88MIDE.R03	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USGALLUP.98MY10.R29	Gallup Organization	1998–05–08	1998–05–10
USGALLUP.98DC04.R13	Gallup Organization	1998–12–04	1998–12–06
USGALLUP.00JU25.R18	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USGALLUP.00JL06.R14	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USGALLUP.00JL06.R15	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USODFOX.082701.R2	Opinion Dynamics	2001–08–22	2001–08–23
USGALLUP.01SP14.R32	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USGALLUP.02APR5.R19	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USGALLUP.02APR29.R17	Gallup Organization	2002–04–29	2002–05–01
USUMARY.050802.R10	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USHARRIS.02CCFRC.R0715	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USKN.02GLOBAL.R220	Knowledge Networks	2002–07–19	2002–07–23
USUMARY.053003.R10	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18
USGALLUP.061703.R3	Gallup Organization	2003–06–12	2003–06–15
USKN.04GLOBE.R220	Knowledge Networks	2004–07–06	2004–07–12
USUMARY.011805.R08	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2004–12–21	2004–12–26
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R21	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USODFOX.081006.R35	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09
USSRBI.20063897.Q04A	Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas	2006–08–09	2006–08–10
USUMARY.010207.R39	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2006–12–06	2006–12–12
USUMARY.070108.R31	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2008–01–18	2008–01–27
USUMARY.200801.Q31	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2008–01–18	2008–01–27
USNBCWSJ.13FEB.R25	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2013–02–21	2013–02–24
USNBCWSJ.080314.R27A	Hart Research Associates/ Public Opinion Strategies	2014–07–30	2014–08–03
USORC.021715.R26	ORC International	2015–02–12	2015–02–15
USKN.071116CC.R230	GfK Knowledge Networks	2016–06–10	2016–06–27
USSSRS.122217ACNN.R30	Social Science Research Solutions	2017–12–14	2017–12–17
31116769.00156	GfK Group	2018–07–12	2018–07–31

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.4: Approve of the Use of Force (Israel/Arabs)

Roper Question ID	*Identity*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.02APL03.R02	Arab Side	Gallup Organization	2002–04–03	2002–04–03
USGALLUP.02APR5.R25	Arab Side	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R17	Arab Side	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USUMARY.012407A.R24A	Arab Side	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2006–12–06	2006–12–11
USGALLUP.072414A.R02	Arab Side	Gallup Organization	2014–07–22	2014–07–23
USGALLUP.080514.R02	Arab Side	Gallup Organization	2014–08–02	2014–08–03
USNORC.560399.R12	Israel	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1956–11–01	1956–11–01
USGALLUP.56–574.Q003	Israel	Gallup Organization	1956–11–09	1956–11–14
USGALLUP.1175.Q02B	Israel	Gallup Organization	1981–06–19	1981–06–22
USCBSNYT.063081.R31B	Israel	CBS News/New York Times	1981–06–22	1981–06–27
USCBSNYT.063081.R31C	Israel	CBS News/New York Times	1981–06–22	1981–06–27
USROPER.81–7.R06	Israel	Roper Organization	1981–07–11	1981–07–18
USROPER.81–7.R05	Israel	Roper Organization	1981–07–11	1981–07–18
USPENN.81MIDE.R11	Israel	Penn & Schoen Associates	1981–08–08	1981–08–09
USGALLUP.070482.R3	Israel	Gallup Organization	1982–06–11	1982–06–14
USNBCAP.80.R1	Israel	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–06–14	1982–06–15
USNBCAP.80.R2A	Israel	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–06–14	1982–06–15
USCBS.062882.R14B	Israel	CBS News	1982–06–26	1982–06–27
USLAT.58.R48	Israel	Los Angeles Times	1982–07–04	1982–07–08
USAS.22.R02	Israel	Audits & Surveys	1982–07–13	1982–07–18
USGALLUP.203–5.R3	Israel	Gallup Organization	1982–07–23	1982–07–26
USGALNEW.081682.R4	Israel	Gallup Organization	1982–08–04	1982–08–05
USGALNEW.081682.R5	Israel	Gallup Organization	1982–08–04	1982–08–05
USABCWP.57.R30	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–08–17	1982–08–17
USABCWP.61.R22	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–09–24	1982–09–26
USABCWP.82SEPT.R22	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	1982–09–24	1982–09–26
USYANK.828612.R57	Israel	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1982–10–05	1982–10–07
USNBCAP.83.R8	Israel	NBC News/Associated Press	1983–08–09	1983–08–10

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Roper Question ID	*Identity*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USYANKCS.011488.R02	Israel	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–03	1988–01–06
USPENN.88MIDE.R33	Israel	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USGALLUP.021488.R1	Israel	Gallup Organization	1988–02–03	1988–02–04
USROPER.AJC488.R94	Israel	Roper Organization	1988–04–16	1988–04–29
USMARTIL.88AJC.R42	Israel	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USYANKCS.884711.Q03A	Israel	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–04–20	1988–04–21
USCBSNYT.88MAY.R12	Israel	CBS News/New York Times	1988–05–09	1988–05–12
USROPER.89AJC.R4	Israel	Roper Organization	1989–04–15	1989–04–22
USCBSNYT.070890.R59	Israel	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USABCWP.90399.R44	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	1990–10–10	1990–10–14
USGALNEW.105064.R18	Israel	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–12
USGALLUP.90OCT2.R16	Israel	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–14
USPSRNEW.101400.R16	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USYANKP.101400.R31	Israel	Yankelovich Partners	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USPSRNEW.120801.R06	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–12–06	2001–12–07
USHARRIS.Y031502.R26	Israel	Harris Interactive	2002–03–13	2002–03–14
USGALLUP.02APL03.R01	Israel	Gallup Organization	2002–04–03	2002–04–03
USGALLUP.02APR5.R24	Israel	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USHARRIS.Y041202.R11	Israel	Harris Interactive	2002–04–10	2002–04–11
USCBS.200204B.Q12	Israel	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USABCWP.042202A.R20	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USORC.072006.R03	Israel	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–07–19	2006–07–19
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R16	Israel	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R15	Israel	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R20	Israel	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USCBSNYT.072606A.R75	Israel	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R19	Israel	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USWG.06JUL22.R23	Israel	Winston Group	2006–07–22	2006–07–23
USGALLUP.06JULY28.R09	Israel	Gallup Organization	2006–07–28	2006–07–30
USLAT.080206.R42	Israel	Los Angeles Times	2006–07–28	2006–08–01
USORC.080406.R22	Israel	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03

Roper Question ID	*Identity*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USABCWP.080706A.R20	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06
USABCWP.080706A.R21	Israel	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06
USODFOX.081006.R32	Israel	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09
USODFOX.081006.R34	Israel	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09
USPSRA.081706.R65F1	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USPSRA.081706.R66F2	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USIPSOSR.011409M.R1B	Israel	Ipsos-Public Affairs	2009–01–06	2009–01–12
USPSRA.011309.R59F1	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USPSRA.011309.R60F2	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USORC.111912.R26	Israel	ORC International	2012–11–16	2012–11–18
USORC.072114A.R25	Israel	ORC International	2014–07–18	2014–07–20
USORC.072114A.R26	Israel	ORC International	2014–07–18	2014–07–20
USGALLUP.072414A.R01	Israel	Gallup Organization	2014–07–22	2014–07–23
USPSRA.072814.R07	Israel	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–07–24	2014–07–27
USNBCWSJ.080314.R27B	Israel	Hart Research Associates/ Public Opinion Strategies	2014–07–30	2014–08–03
USGALLUP.080514.R01	Israel	Gallup Organization	2014–08–02	2014–08–03

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.5: American Attitudes Regarding Prospects of Peace

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.871AI.Q009D	Gallup Organization	1988–05–13	1988–05–15
USGALLUP.90OCT2.R17	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–14
USGALLUP.0891W2.R14	Gallup Organization	1991–08–08	1991–08–11
USGALLUP.97AG12.R11	Gallup Organization	1997–08–12	1997–08–13
USGALLUP.98DC04.R15	Gallup Organization	1998–12–04	1998–12–06
USGALLUP.080299.R4	Gallup Organization	1999–07–22	1999–07–25
USGALLUP.00JU25.R20	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USGALLUP.01FEB01.R34	Gallup Organization	2001–02–01	2001–02–04
USGALLUP.01AG10.R21	Gallup Organization	2001–08–10	2001–08–12

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.02FBR04.R37	Gallup Organization	2002–02–04	2002–02–06
USGALLUP.02APR5.R20	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USGALLUP.03MY019.R25	Gallup Organization	2003–05–19	2003–05–21
USGALLUP.061703.R2	Gallup Organization	2003–06–12	2003–06–15
USGALLUP.04NOV19.R35	Gallup Organization	2004–11–19	2004–11–21
USGALLUP.05FEBY7.R31	Gallup Organization	2005–02–07	2005–02–10
USGALLUP.05FEBY25.R12	Gallup Organization	2005–02–25	2005–02–27
USGALLUP.06FB006.R25	Gallup Organization	2006–02–06	2006–02–09
USCBSNYT.072606A.R70	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USGALLUP.06JULY21.R11	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USCBSNYT.082206.R20	CBS News/New York Times	2006–08–17	2006–08–21
USGALLUP.07FBRY1.R28	Gallup Organization	2007–02–01	2007–02–04
USGALLUP.07NMBR30.R15	Gallup Organization	2007–11–30	2007–12–02
USGALLUP.08FBUY11.R32	Gallup Organization	2008–02–11	2008–02–14
USGALLUP.09MY0029.R22	Gallup Organization	2009–05–29	2009–05–31
USGALLUP.10FUY001.R19	Gallup Organization	2010–02–01	2010–02–03
USGALLUP.12FBR002.R21	Gallup Organization	2012–02–02	2012–02–05
USORC.031913A.R23	ORC International	2013–03–15	2013–03–17
USSSRS.122217ACNN.R31	Social Science Research Solutions	2017–12–14	2017–12–17

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.6: Likelihood of Israel & a Palestinian State Coexisting Peacefully

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USPSRA.050913G.R111	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2013–03–04	2013–03–18
USPSRA.042914.R52	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–04–23	2014–04–27
USSRBI.082814.R63	Abt SRBI	2014–08–20	2014–08–24
USSRBI.050516.R53	Abt SRBI	2016–04–12	2016–04–19
USPSRA.011217.R63	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2017–01–04	2017–01–09
USQUINN.011317.R68	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2017–01–05	2017–01–09
USQUINN.122017.R49	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2017–12–06	2017–12–11
USSRBI.012318AP.R82	Abt Associates	2018–01–10	2018–01–15

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.7: Favoring an Independent Palestinian State

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.985.Q007A	Gallup Organization	1977–10–14	1977–10–17
USGALLUP.990.Q3D	Gallup Organization	1977–12–09	1977–12–12
USGALLUP.1124.Q04E	Gallup Organization	1979–03–16	1979–03–19
USNBCAP.71–1.R34	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–10–25	1981–10–26
USNBCAP.80.R5	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–06–14	1982–06–15
USGALLUP.203–5.R5	Gallup Organization	1982–07–23	1982–07–26
USYANKCS.011488.R06	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–03	1988–01–06
USYANKCS.011488.R05	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–03	1988–01–06
USYANKCS.884705.R17BN	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–27	1988–01–28
USYANKCS.884705.R17AN	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–27	1988–01–28
USLAT.149.R59	Los Angeles Times	1988–03–25	1988–04–07
USGALLUP.052988.R3	Gallup Organization	1988–05–02	1988–05–08
USGALLUP.871AI.Q009C	Gallup Organization	1988–05–13	1988–05–15
USLAT.158.R26	Los Angeles Times	1988–07–05	1988–07–10
USABCWP.89APR.R51	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USNBCWSJ.042089.R44	NBC News/Wall Street Journal	1989–04–16	1989–04–18
USCBSNYT.070890.R61	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USABCWP.90399.R47	ABC News/Washington Post	1990–10–10	1990–10–14
USGALLUP.90OCT2.R15	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–14
USABCWP.429.R46	ABC News/Washington Post	1991–03–01	1991–03–04
USCBSNYT.030791.R24	CBS News/New York Times	1991–03–04	1991–03–06
USGALLUP.032191.R04	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USABC.435.R049	ABC News	1991–07–25	1991–07–28
USCBSNYT.101091.R55	CBS News/New York Times	1991–10–05	1991–10–07
USGALLUP.93SEP1.Q40	Gallup Organization	1993–09–10	1993–09–12
USABC.092093.R33	ABC News	1993–09–16	1993–09–19
USGALLUP.94CFRP.R34	Gallup Organization	1994–10–07	1994–10–25
USNYT.98004B.Q39	New York Times	1998–04–15	1998–04–20
USGALLUP.98CCFRP.R33	Gallup Organization	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USGALLUP.99M07.R27B	Gallup Organization	1999–05–07	1999–05–09
USGALLUP.99M07.R27A	Gallup Organization	1999–05–07	1999–05–09
USGALLUP.00JL06.R18	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USGALLUP.00JL06.R17	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USCBSNYT.102901.R20	CBS News/New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USCBSNYT.121101.R30	CBS News/New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USCBS.200204B.Q07	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USCBS.051502D.R12	CBS News	2002–05–13	2002–05–14
USGALLUP.02MA20.R45	Gallup Organization	2002–05–20	2002–05–22

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.02MA20.R44	Gallup Organization	2002–05–20	2002–05–22
USHARRIS.02CCFRC.R0700	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USCBS.062102A.R16	CBS News	2002–06–18	2002–06–20
USABC.062402A.R1	ABC News	2002–06–21	2002–06–23
USGALLUP.2002027.Q107	Gallup Organization	2002–07–05	2002–07–08
USGALLUP.2002027.Q110	Gallup Organization	2002–07–05	2002–07–08
USCBS.071002D.R09	CBS News	2002–07–08	2002–07–09
USCBSNYT.200207B.Q47	CBS News/New York Times	2002–07–13	2002–07–16
USCBSNYT.200207B.Q48	CBS News/New York Times	2002–07–13	2002–07–16
USGALLUP.03MAY30.R24	Gallup Organization	2003–05–30	2003–06–01
USODFOX.011609.R26	Opinion Dynamics	2009–01–13	2009–01–14
USGALLUP.09MY0029.R23	Gallup Organization	2009–05–29	2009–05–31
USORC.092811A.R16	ORC International	2011–09–23	2011–09–25
USQUINN.100611.R56	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2011–09–27	2011–10–03
USCBS.111111B.R73	CBS News	2011–11–06	2011–11–10
USGALLUP.12FBR002.R22	Gallup Organization	2012–02–02	2012–02–05
USGALLUP.13FBRY07.R20	Gallup Organization	2013–02–07	2013–02–10
USGALLUP.022714A.R01	Gallup Organization	2014–02–06	2014–02–09
USGALLUP.022415.R01	Gallup Organization	2015–02–08	2015–02–11
USABCWP.033015.R12	ABC News/Washington Post	2015–03–26	2015–03–29
USKN.061215CC.R700A	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–05–28	2015–06–17
USKN.061215CC.R700B	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–05–28	2015–06–17
USGALLUP.022916.R25	Gallup Organization	2016–02–03	2016–02–07
USQUINN.011317.R69	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2017–01–05	2017–01–09
USGALLUP.021317.R23	Gallup Organization	2017–02–01	2017–02–05
USCBS.022317A.R56	CBS News	2017–02–17	2017–02–21
USGALLUP.032018.R02	Gallup Organization	2018–02–01	2018–02–10
31116769.00157	GfK Group	2018–07–12	2018–07–31
31116081.00048	Gallup Organization	2019–02–01	2019–02–10

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.8: Attitudes Toward Israeli Settlements

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.111477.R3C	Louis Harris & Associates	1977–10–08	1977–10–16
USPENN.81MIDE.R04	Penn & Schoen Associates	1981–08–08	1981–08–09
USPENN.82MIDE.R05	Penn & Schoen Associates	1982–05–08	1982–05–10
USGALLUP.86CFRP.R39	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USPENN.88MIDE.R21	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USABC.435.R048	ABC News	1991–07–25	1991–07–28

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USCBSNYT.101091.R51	CBS News/New York Times	1991–10–05	1991–10–07
USUMARY.050802.R30	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.050802.R35	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.200903.Q34	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2009–03–25	2009–04–06
USUMARY.200903.Q37	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2009–03–25	2009–04–06
USKN.10GLOBALV.R0232	Knowledge Networks	2010–06–11	2010–06–22

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.9: Support for Possible Solutions to the Jerusalem Question

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.071067.R1E	Louis Harris & Associates	1967–06–01	1967–06–01
USHARRIS.071067.R1E	Louis Harris & Associates	1967–06–01	1967–06–01
USHARRIS.071067.R1E	Louis Harris & Associates	1967–06–01	1967–06–01
USHARRIS.102678.R05	Louis Harris & Associates	1978–09–19	1978–09–21
USHARRIS.102678.R05	Louis Harris & Associates	1978–09–19	1978–09–21
USHARRIS.102678.R05	Louis Harris & Associates	1978–09–19	1978–09–21
USUMARY.01TERR.R21	Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2001–11–01	2001–11–04
USUMARY.01TERR.R21	Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2001–11–01	2001–11–04
USUMARY.01TERR.R21	Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2001–11–01	2001–11–04
USUMARY.01TERR.R21	Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2001–11–01	2001–11–04
USUMARY.050802.R29	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.050802.R29	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.050802.R29	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.050802.R29	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.050802.R29	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USUMARY.053003.R25	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18
USUMARY.053003.R25	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USUMARY.053003.R25	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18
USUMARY.053003.R25	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18
USMCLAUG.022704.R03	McLaughlin & Associates	2004–02–23	2004–02–24
USMCLAUG.022704.R03	McLaughlin & Associates	2004–02–23	2004–02–24
USMCLAUG.022704.R03	McLaughlin & Associates	2004–02–23	2004–02–24
USSSRS.122217ACNN.R28	Social Science Research Solutions	2017–12–14	2017–12–17
USSSRS.122217ACNN.R28	Social Science Research Solutions	2017–12–14	2017–12–17
USSSRS.122217ACNN.R28	Social Science Research Solutions	2017–12–14	2017–12–17

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.10: Support for US Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.112185.R3D	Louis Harris & Associates	1985–10–23	1985–10–27
USMARTIL.88AJC.R44D	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USNBCWSJ.030191.R14A8	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	1991–02–26	1991–02–27
USNBCWSJ.91DEC.R25B	Peter Hart and Research/Strategy/Management	1991–12–06	1991–12–09
USNBCWSJ.00OCT.R26B	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2000–10–13	2000–10–15
USGALLUP.01AG10.R22	Gallup Organization	2001–08–10	2001–08–12
USLAT.091601.R05	Los Angeles Times	2001–09–13	2001–09–14
USQUINN.121201.R49	Quinnipiac University Polling Institute	2001–11–29	2001–12–05
USGALLUP.02APL03.R08	Gallup Organization	2002–04–03	2002–04–03
USNBCWSJ.02APRIL.R26A	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USABCWP.042202A.R17	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USNBCWSJ.02JUNE.R19	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–06–08	2002–06–10
USUMARY.011805.R09	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2004–12–21	2004–12–26
USORC.072006.R05	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–07–19	2006–07–19
USCBSNYT.072606A.R79	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USGALLUP.06JULY28.R10	Gallup Organization	2006–07–28	2006–07–30
USODFOX.081006.R36	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USODFOX.081006.R37	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09
USPSRA.081706.R68	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USGALLUP.06AGST18.R20	Gallup Organization	2006–08–18	2006–08–20
USUMARY.010207.R40	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2006–12–06	2006–12–12
USGALLUP.09JAN6.R01	Gallup Organization	2009–01–06	2009–01–07
USGALLUP.09JAN6.R02	Gallup Organization	2009–01–06	2009–01–07
USPSRA.011309.R62	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USABCWP.031813.R21	ABC News/Washington Post	2013–03–07	2013–03–10
USPSRA.120313.R44F2	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2013–10–30	2013–11–06
USSRBI.051315P.R26P	Abt SRBI	2014–07–07	2014–08–04
USSRBI.051315P.R26W	Abt SRBI	2014–07–07	2014–08–04
USAP.092714AG.R01	GfK Knowledge Networks	2014–07–24	2014–07–28
USREASON.081414.R13	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–08–06	2014–08–10

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.11: Support for Deploying American Troops to Aid Israel

Roper Question ID	*Type*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.56–563.Q09D	Peacekeeping	Gallup Organization	1956–04–19	1956–04–24
USGALLUP.56–574.Q007	Peacekeeping	Gallup Organization	1956–11–09	1956–11–14
USHARRIS.042781.R06	Peacekeeping	Louis Harris & Associates	1981–03–27	1981–04–02
USROPER.81–5.R19F	Peacekeeping	Roper Organization	1981–04–25	1981–05–02
USHARRIS.271982.R7	Peacekeeping	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–06–18	1982–06–22
USLAT.58.R49	Peacekeeping	Los Angeles Times	1982–07–04	1982–07–08
USHARRIS.071982.R6	Peacekeeping	Louis Harris & Associates	1982–07–09	1982–07–14
USROPER.82–7.R8	Peacekeeping	Roper Organization	1982–07–10	1982–07–17
USAS.22.R01	Peacekeeping	Audits & Surveys	1982–07–13	1982–07–18
USABCWP.57.R24	Peacekeeping	ABC News/ Washington Post	1982–08–17	1982–08–17
USHARRIS.092283.R1	Peacekeeping	Louis Harris & Associates	1983–09–09	1983–09–14
USGALNEW.110783.R3	Peacekeeping	Gallup Organization	1983–10–26	1983–10–27

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Roper Question ID	*Type*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USUMARY.95UNO.R39	Peacekeeping	Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	1995–04–19	1995–04–23
USPSRNEW.032302.R17B	Peacekeeping	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–03–21	2002–03–22
USCBS.040302.R29	Peacekeeping	CBS News	2002–04–01	2002–04–02
USGALLUP.02APR5.R34	Peacekeeping	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USGALLUP.02APR5.R33	Peacekeeping	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USTIPP.041602.R36	Peacekeeping	TIPP—Techno Metrica Institute of Policy and Politics	2002–04–09	2002–04–14
USHARRIS.Y041202.R19	Peacekeeping	Harris Interactive	2002–04–10	2002–04–11
USHARRIS.Y041202.R18	Peacekeeping	Harris Interactive	2002–04–10	2002–04–11
USUMARY.050802.R22	Peacekeeping	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2002–05–01	2002–05–05
USTIPP.051502.R30	Peacekeeping	TIPP—Techno Metrica Institute of Policy and Politics	2002–05–08	2002–05–13
USHARRIS.02CCFRB.R0540G	Peacekeeping	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USUMARY.053003.R61	Peacekeeping	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2003–05–14	2003–05–18
USODFOX.061903.R20	Peacekeeping	Opinion Dynamics	2003–06–17	2003–06–18
USKN.04GLOBE.R025H	Peacekeeping	Knowledge Networks	2004–07–06	2004–07–12
USKN.06GLOBEV.R130D	Peacekeeping	Knowledge Networks	2006–06–23	2006–07–09
USORC.072006.R07	Peacekeeping	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–07–19	2006–07–19
USCBSNYT.072606A.R80	Peacekeeping	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USORC.080406.R27	Peacekeeping	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03
USODFOX.081006.R38	Peacekeeping	Opinion Dynamics	2006–08–08	2006–08–09
USKN.08GLOBAL.R0090C	Peacekeeping	Knowledge Networks	2008–07–03	2008–07–15

Roper Question ID	*Type*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USHARRIS.061067.R5	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1967–06–01	1967–06–01
USGALLUP.764.Q22A	War	Gallup Organization	1968–06–26	1968–07–01
USHARRIS.70AUG.R10H	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1970–08–01	1970–08–01
USHARRIS.70AUG.R10G	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1970–08–01	1970–08–01
USHARRIS.70OCT.R14	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1970–10–01	1970–10–01
USHARRIS.71JAN.R16	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1971–01–01	1971–01–01
USHARRIS.71JUL.R07	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1971–07–01	1971–07–01
USHARRIS.032673.R1I	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1973–02–14	1973–02–18
USORC.123073.R16	War	Opinion Research Corporation	1973–12–19	1973–12–30
USHARRIS.74CFR.Q08D	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1974–12–06	1974–12–14
USROPER.78–7.R04C	War	Roper Organization	1978–07–08	1978–07–15
USGALNEW.121779.R12D	War	Gallup Organization	1979–12–05	1979–12–06
USGALNEW.030380.R3A	War	Gallup Organization	1980–02–01	1980–02–11
USROPER.80–3.R11B	War	Roper Organization	1980–02–09	1980–02–23
USHARRIS.80ME-G.R07A11	War	Louis Harris & Associates	1980–07–11	1980–07–23
USGALNEW.102780.R2B	War	Gallup Organization	1980–10–08	1980–10–15
USROPER.81–3.R14B	War	Roper Organization	1981–02–14	1981–02–28
USABCWP.42.R31C	War	ABC News/ Washington Post	1981–10–14	1981–10–18
USROPER.82–2.R4C	War	Roper Organization	1982–01–09	1982–01–23
USGALLUP.CFR83G.R27F	War	Gallup Organization	1982–10–29	1982–11–06
USROPER.8310.R04YC	War	Roper Organization	1983–10–29	1983–11–05
USCBSNYT.FEB852.R40	War	CBS News/New York Times	1985–02–23	1985–02–27
USROPER.85–4.R03C	War	Roper Organization	1985–03–23	1985–03–30
USLAT.96.R019	War	Los Angeles Times	1985–04–20	1985–04–26
USROPER.86–8.R04C	War	Roper Organization	1986–08–16	1986–08–23
USGALLUP.86CFRP.R20G	War	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USROPER.87–8.R02C	War	Roper Organization	1987–08–22	1987–08–29

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Roper Question ID	*Type*	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USMARTIL.88AJC.R46	War	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USMOR.ATS12.R33	War	Market Opinion Research	1988–12–10	1988–12–13
USABC.908692.Q36B	War	ABC News	1990–08–17	1990–08–20
USGALNEW.105064.R19	War	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–12
USGALLUP.90CFRP.R22D	War	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USGALLUP.922022.R28D	War	Gallup Organization	1990–11–08	1990–11–11
USNBCWSJ.90DEC.R20I	War	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	1990–12–08	1990–12–11
USWASHP.91911G.Q5AD	War	Washington Post	1991–03–15	1991–03–19
USPSRA.93SEPT.R27E	War	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1993–09–09	1993–09–15
USGALLUP.94CFRP.R20C	War	Gallup Organization	1994–10–07	1994–10–25
USPSRA.101097.R34D	War	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1997–09–04	1997–09–11
USGALLUP.98CCFRP.R23C	War	Gallup Organization	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USHARRIS.02CCFRB.R0535C	War	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USKN.04GLOBE.R025B	War	Knowledge Networks	2004–07–06	2004–07–12
USKN.06GLOBEV.R130I	War	Knowledge Networks	2006–06–23	2006–07–09
USNBCWSJ.06JULY.R26	War	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2006–07–21	2006–07–24
USASFOX.021012.R45	War	Anderson Robbins Research/Shaw & Co. Research	2012–02–06	2012–02–09
USKN.201304CCGA.Q17C	War	GfK Knowledge Networks	2013–04–12	2013–04–15
USKN.061215CC.R030D2	War	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–05–28	2015–06–17
USKN.061215CC.R030D3	War	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–05–28	2015–06–17
USKN.061215CC.R030D1	War	GfK Knowledge Networks	2015–05–28	2015–06–17

Survey Data Used in Figure 3.13: Support for Foreign Aid, in General and to Specific Countries

The data here include survey questions about Israel only. For data used in the figure, comparing attitudes toward Israel to attitudes toward other countries, see online Appendix.

Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USYANK.758430.Q07A	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1975–01–01	1975–01–01
USNBCAP.28A.R15	NBC News/Associated Press	1978–03–21	1978–03–22
USNBCAP.67.R15	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–05–18	1981–05–19
USPENN.81MIDE.R09	Penn & Schoen Associates	1981–08–08	1981–08–09
USNBCAP.69.R22	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–08–10	1981–08–11
USABCWP.42.R14	ABC News/Washington Post	1981–10–14	1981–10–18
USNBCAP.74–1–1.R27	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–01–18	1982–01–19
USPENN.82MIDE.R11	Penn & Schoen Associates	1982–05–08	1982–05–10
USROPER.82–9.R11	Roper Organization	1982–09–11	1982–09–18
USYANK.828612.R43	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1982–10–05	1982–10–07
USNBCAP.85.R29	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–10–18	1982–10–19
USGALLUP.CFR83G.R41	Gallup Organization	1982–10–29	1982–11–06
USNBCAP.82ELEC.R19	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–11–02	1982–11–02
USYANK.828613.R25	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1982–12–08	1982–12–09
USNBCAP.83.R10	NBC News/Associated Press	1983–08–09	1983–08–10
USYANK.855731.Q40	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1985–07–23	1985–07–25
USABCWP.866542.Q19	ABC News/Washington Post	1986–06–19	1986–06–24
USGALLUP.86CFRP.R38	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USGALLUP.86CFRF.R7	Gallup Organization	1987–01–14	1987–01–18
USPENN.88MIDE.R11	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USPENN.88MIDE.R12	Penn & Schoen Associates	1988–01–20	1988–01–24
USMARTIL.88AJC.R15	Marttila & Kiley	1988–04–18	1988–04–24
USMARTIL.ATS8.R22A	Marttila & Kiley	1988–07–31	1988–08–07
USABCWP.89APR.R46	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USABCWP.89APR.R47	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USGALNEW.925059.Q01A	Gallup Organization	1990–04–05	1990–04–06
USCBSNYT.070890.R57	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USGALLUP.90CFRP.R09AC	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USGALLUP.90CFRP.R10AC	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USGALLUP.90CFRP.R11AC	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USCBSNYT.012191.R17	CBS News/New York Times	1991–01–20	1991–01–20
USABC.091691.R30	ABC News	1991–09–13	1991–09–15
USMARTIL.92ANT.R112	Marttila & Kiley	1992–04–28	1992–05–01

(*Continued*)

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Roper Question ID	*Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USGALLUP.94CFRP.R09BC	Gallup Organization	1994–10–07	1994–10–25
USGALLUP.98CCFRP.R12C	Gallup Organization	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USGALLUP.080299.R5	Gallup Organization	1999–07–22	1999–07–25
USGALLUP.080299.R6	Gallup Organization	1999–07–22	1999–07–25
USGALLUP.01SP14.R33	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USGALLUP.01SP14.R34	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USGALLUP.01SP14.R35	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USGALLUP.01SP14.R36	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USPSRNEW.100601.R10A	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–10–04	2001–10–05
USPSRA.102401.R11	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–10–15	2001–10–21
USHARRIS.02CCFRA.R0390C	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USORC.080406.R28	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03
USORC.080406.R29	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03
USORC.112111B.R20	ORC International	2011–11–18	2011–11–20
USORC.112111B.R22	ORC International	2011–11–18	2011–11–20
USORC.072114A.R27	ORC International	2014–07–18	2014–07–20

Part II

Chapters 4–7

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of Favorability

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USLAT1982–058	Los Angeles Times	1982–06–27	1982–07–08
USRPRR1982–10	The Roper Organization	1982–10–23	1982–10–30
USRPRR1983–07	The Roper Organization	1983–07–09	1983–07–16
USRPRR1984–04	The Roper Organization	1984–03–17	1984–03–24
USLAT1986–112	Los Angeles Times	1986–12–06	1986–12–09
USLAT1988–149	Los Angeles Times	1988–03–25	1988–04–07
USABCWASH1989–7992	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–02–10	1989–02–14
USAIPOSPAI1989–878	Gallup Organization	1989–02–28	1989–03–02
USABCWASH1989–8025	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USLAT1989–187	Los Angeles Times	1989–06–14	1989–06–15
USAIPOGNS1989–89137-W1	Gallup Organization	1989–08–10	1989–08–13
USCBS1991-JAN91D	CBS News	1991–01–27	1991–01–28
USAIPOGNS1991–122021	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USABC1991–9039	ABC News	1991–07–25	1991–07–28
USAIPOGNS1991–222010	Gallup Organization	1991–08–08	1991–08–11
USAIPOGNS1991–222017	Gallup Organization	1991–09–26	1991–09–29
USAIPOGNS1991–222025	Gallup Organization	1991–11–21	1991–11–24
USAIPOGNS1992–222040	Gallup Organization	1992–02–06	1992–02–09
USMAKI1992-ANTISEM	Marttila & Kiley, Inc.	1992–04–28	1992–05–01
USABC1993–5000	ABC News	1993–09–16	1993–09–19
USAIPOCNUS1996–9603007	Gallup Organization	1996–03–08	1996–03–10
USNYT1998–98004B	The New York Times	1998–04–15	1998–04–20
USAIPOGNS1999–9902009	Gallup Organization	1999–02–08	1999–02–09
USAIPOGNS1999–9905026	Gallup Organization	1999–05–07	1999–05–09
USAIPOGNS2000–05	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USAIPOCNUS2000–13	Gallup Organization	2000–03–17	2000–03–19
USCBSNYT2001–10D	CBS News and The New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USCBSNYT2001–12A	CBS News and The New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USCBSNYT2006–07A	CBS News and The New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USCBSNYT2006–09A	CBS News and The New York Times	2006–09–15	2006–09–19
USORCCNN2009–006	Opinion Research Corporation	2009–04–03	2009–04–05
USCBSNYT2010–04B	CBS News and The New York Times	2010–04–28	2010–05–02
USORCCNN2010–009	Opinion Research Corporation	2010–06–16	2010–06–16
USUMARY2011–04	Knowledge Networks	2011–04–01	2011–04–05
USORCCNN2011–009	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–05–24	2011–05–26
USUMARY2011–08	Program On International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland	2011–08–19	2011–08–25
USORCCNN2014–003	ORC International	2014–01–31	2014–02–02
USORCCNN2014–007	Opinion Research Corporation	2014–07–18	2014–07–20

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of Sympathy

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USNORC1948–0155	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–02–01	1948–02–01
USNORC1948–0158	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–06–01	1948–06–01
USNORC1948–0159	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–06–01	1948–06–01
USNORC1948–0161	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1948–10–01	1948–10–01
USNORC1949–0164	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1949–03–01	1949–03–01
USAIPO1956–0565	Gallup Organization	1956–05–31	1956–06–05
USMISC1964-ANTISEM	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1964–01–01	1964–01–01
USAIPO1967–0746	Gallup Organization	1967–06–02	1967–06–07
USAIPO1969–0774	Gallup Organization	1969–01–23	1969–01–28
USAIPO1969–0775	Gallup Organization	1969–02–20	1969–02–25
USAIPO1970–0800	Gallup Organization	1970–02–27	1970–03–02
USAIPO1973–0880	Gallup Organization	1973–10–05	1973–10–08
USAIPO1973–0882	Gallup Organization	1973–10–19	1973–10–22
USRPRR1973–10	Roper Organization	1973–11–03	1973–11–17
USRPRR1974–01	Roper Organization	1973–12–01	1973–12–15
USAIPO1973–0885	Gallup Organization	1973–12–07	1973–12–10
USRPRR1974–06	Roper Organization	1974–06–06	1974–06–15
USRPRR1975–01	Roper Organization	1974–12–06	1974–12–14
USRPRR1975–03	Roper Organization	1975–02–15	1975–03–01
USAIPO1975–0927	Gallup Organization	1975–04–04	1975–04–07
USRPRR1975–04	Roper Organization	1975–04–05	1975–04–12
USRPRR1975–06	Roper Organization	1975–06–14	1975–06–21
USRPRR1977–02	The Roper Organization	1977–01–08	1977–01–22
USRPRR1977–04	Roper Organization	1977–03–19	1977–03–26
USAIPO1977–0977	Gallup Organization	1977–06–03	1977–06–06
USAIPO1977–0985	Gallup Organization	1977–10–14	1977–10–17
USAIPO1977–0990	Gallup Organization	1977–12–09	1977–12–12
USRPRR1978–02	Roper Organization	1978–01–07	1978–01–21
USAIPO1978–0995	Gallup Organization	1978–03–03	1978–03–06
USRPRR1978–05	Roper Organization	1978–04–22	1978–05–03

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USAIPO1978–1101G	Gallup Organization	1978–04–28	1978–05–01
USAIPO1978–1108G	Gallup Organization	1978–08–04	1978–08–07
USAIPO1978–1111G	The Gallup Organization	1978–09–08	1978–09–11
USAIPOSPGO1978–78175G	Gallup Organization	1978–11–17	1978–11–26
USAIPO1979–1119G	The Gallup Organization	1979–01–05	1979–01–08
USAIPO1979–1124G	The Gallup Organization	1979–03–16	1979–03–19
USRPRR1979–04	Roper Organization	1979–03–24	1979–03–31
USLAT1979–018	Los Angeles Times	1979–09–09	1979–09–14
USYANK1979–8184	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1979–12–10	1979–12–12
USRPRR1980–04	Roper Organization	1980–03–29	1980–04–05
USRPRR1981–07	Roper Organization	1981–07–11	1981–07–18
USAIPO1981–1180G	The Gallup Organization	1981–07–31	1981–08–03
USRPRR1981–08	Roper Organization	1981–08–15	1981–08–22
USAIPO1981–1187G	The Gallup Organization	1981–12–11	1981–12–14
USAIPO1982–1188G	Gallup Organization	1982–01–08	1982–01–11
USABCWASH1982–763250	ABC News/The Washington Post	1982–03–03	1982–03–08
USAIPO1982–1194G	The Gallup Organization	1982–04–30	1982–05–03
USRPRR1982–06	The Roper Organization	1982–06–05	1982–06–12
USAIPO1982–1196G	The Gallup Organization	1982–06–11	1982–06–14
USLAT1982–058	Los Angeles Times	1982–06–27	1982–07–08
USAIPO1982–1198G	The Gallup Organization	1982–07–23	1982–07–26
USABCWASH1982–7782	ABC News/The Washington Post	1982–08–17	1982–08–17
USRPRR1982–09	The Roper Organization	1982–09–11	1982–09–18
USRPRR1982–10	The Roper Organization	1982–10–23	1982–10–30
USAIPOSPGO1982–82130G	The Gallup Organization	1982–10–29	1982–11–06
USABCWASH1983–7925	ABC News/The Washington Post	1983–01–18	1983–01–22
USABCWASH1983–7947	ABC News/The Washington Post	1983–02–25	1983–03–02
USAIPO1983–1211G	Gallup Organization	1983–03–11	1983–03–14
USRPRR1983–07	The Roper Organization	1983–07–09	1983–07–16
USRPRR1984–04	Roper Organization	1984–03–17	1984–03–24
USRPRR1984–10	Roper Organization	1984–10–27	1984–11–03
USABCWASH1985–9029	ABC News/Washington Post	1985–06–30	1985–07–01
USABCWASH1986–6542	ABC News/Washington Post	1986–06–19	1986–06–24
USAIPOSPGO1986–86195G	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USLAT1988–149	Los Angeles Times	1988–03–25	1988–04–07

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Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USAIPOSPAI1988–871	Gallup Organization	1988–05–13	1988–05–15
USABCWASH1989–8025	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USAIPOGNS1989–89137-W1	Gallup Organization	1989–08–10	1989–08–13
USCBSNYTTBS1990-JUN	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USAIPOSPGONEW1990–105064	Gallup Organization	1990–10–11	1990–10–12
USAIPOSPGO1990–925032G	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USAIPOSPGONEW1991–105126	Gallup Organization	1991–01–24	1991–01–25
USCBSNYT1991-MAR91A	CBS News/New York Times	1991–03–04	1991–03–06
USAIPOGNS1991–122021	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USNBCWSJ1991-MAR	NBC News and the Wall Street Journal	1991–03–15	1991–03–19
USAIPOGNS1991–222010	Gallup Organization	1991–08–08	1991–08–11
USABC1991–9103	ABC News	1991–09–13	1991–09–15
USCBSNYT1991-OCT91A	CBS News/New York Times	1991–10–05	1991–10–07
USMAKI1992-ANTISEM	Marttila & Kiley	1992–04–28	1992–05–01
USTM1993-PS0993	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1993–09–09	1993–09–15
USAIPOCNUS1993–422010	Gallup Organization	1993–09–10	1993–09–12
USAIPOCNUS1997–9708018	Gallup Organization	1997–08–12	1997–08–13
USPEW1997-APW	Princeton Survey Research Associates	1997–09–04	1997–09–11
USLAT1998–406	Los Angeles Times	1998–01–29	1998–01–31
USNYT1998–98004B	The New York Times	1998–04–15	1998–04–20
USAIPOGNS1998–9812046	Gallup Organization	1998–12–04	1998–12–06
USAIPOGNS1999–9907035	Gallup Organization	1999–07–22	1999–07–25
USAIPOGNS2000–05	Gallup Organization	2000–01–25	2000–01–26
USAIPOGNS2000–27	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USAIPOCNUS2001–29	Gallup Organization	2001–08–10	2001–08–12
USLAT2001–462	Los Angeles Times	2001–09–13	2001–09–14
USAIPOCNUS2001–33	Gallup Organization	2001–09–14	2001–09–15
USABC2001–18499	ABC News	2001–10–08	2001–10–09
USCBSNYT2001–10D	CBS News/New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USCBSNYT2001–12A	CBS News/New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USAIPOCNUS2001–46	Gallup Organization	2001–12–14	2001–12–16
USAIPOCNUS2002–10	Gallup Organization	2002–03–08	2002–03–09

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USCBS2002–04A	CBS News	2002–04–01	2002–04–02
MCPEW2002–04INT	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–04–03	2002–04–08
USNBCWSJ2002–6024	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USAIPOCNUS2002–13	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USCBS2002–04B	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USABCWASH2002–880	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USPEW2002–06NII	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–06–19	2002–06–23
USAIPOCNUS2002–25	Gallup Organization	2002–06–21	2002–06–23
USCBS2002–08A	CBS News	2002–08–06	2002–08–07
USAIPOCNUS2002–34	Gallup Organization	2002–09–02	2002–09–04
USAIPOGNS2003–31	Gallup Organization	2003–05–19	2003–05–21
USPEW2003-RELIG	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2003–06–24	2003–07–08
MCPEW2004–9NAT	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2004–02–24	2004–02–29
USPEW2004–07FP	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2004–07–08	2004–07–18
USPEW2005-RELIG	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2005–07–07	2005–07–17
USPEW2005-APW	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2005–10–12	2005–10–24
MCPEW2006–15NAT	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–05–02	2006–05–14
MCPEW2006–10NAT	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–05–05	2006–09–07
USNBCWSJ2006–6064	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2006–07–21	2006–07–24
USPEW2006–08NII	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
MCPEW2007–47NAT	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2007–04–23	2007–05–06
USPEW2009–01POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USORCCNN2009–001	Opinion Research Corporation	2009–01–12	2009–01–15
USPEW2009-APW	Abt SRBI	2009–10–28	2009–11–08
USPEW2010–04POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2010–04–21	2010–04–26
USNBCWSJ2010–10435	Hart and McInturff Research Companies	2010–06–17	2010–06–21

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Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USORCCNN2011–009	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–05–24	2011–05–26
USPEW2011-WK0915	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2011–09–15	2011–09–18
USORCCNN2012–017	ORC International	2012–11–16	2012–11–18
USPEW2013–03POL	Abt SRBI	2013–03–13	2013–03–17
USPEW2014–04POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–04–23	2014–04–27
USPEW2014–07POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–07–08	2014–07–14
USCBS2014–0804	CBS News	2014–07–29	2014–08–04
USPEW2016–0419	Abt SRBI	2016–04–12	2016–04–19
	PEW Research Center	2017–01–04	2017–01–07

Note: The January 2017 Pew dataset is unavailable on Roper iPoll and can be downloaded directly from the Pew website.

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of Blame

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USABCWASH1989–8025	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USYANK1991–45415	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1991–04–10	1991–04–11
USAIPOGNS1991–222017	Gallup Organization	1991–09–26	1991–09–29
USPSRA2000-NW30	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USNBCWSJ2000–6009	NBC News and the Wall Street Journal	2000–10–13	2000–10–15
USPSRA2001-NW21	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–12–06	2001–12–07
USNBCWSJ2001–6022	NBC News and the Wall Street Journal	2001–12–08	2001–12–10
USHARRISINT2002–02	Harris Interactive	2002–03–13	2002–03–14
USPSRA2002-NW02	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2002–03–21	2002–03–22
USNBCWSJ2002–6024	NBC News and the Wall Street Journal	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USHARRISINT2002–04	Harris Interactive	2002–04–10	2002–04–11
USABCWASH2002–880	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USUMARY2003–05	Program on International Policy Attitudes	2003–05–13	2003–05–18
USHARRISINT2003–08	Harris Interactive	2003–09–03	2003–09–04
USCBSNYT2006–07A	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USABCWASH2006–1018	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USSRBI2006–3897	Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas	2006–08–09	2006–08–10
USPEW2006–08NII	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USPEW2009–01POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USNBCWSJ2009–6092	NBC News and The Wall Street Journal	2009–01–09	2009–01–12
USPEW2014-WK0724	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–07–24	2014–07–27
USCBS2014–0804	CBS News	2014–07–29	2014–08–04

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of Use of Force

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USNORC1956–0399	National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago	1956–11–01	1956–11–01
USCBSNYT1978-APR	CBS News and The New York Times	1978–04–03	1978–04–04
USYANK1988–4705	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–27	1988–01–28
USAIPOSPGONEW1988–88053	Gallup Organization	1988–02–03	1988–02–04
USYANK1988–4711	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–04–20	1988–04–21
USPSRA2000-NW30	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USYANK2000–14	Yankelovich Partners	2000–10–12	2000–10–13
USPSRA2001-NW21	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–12–06	2001–12–07
USHARRISINT2002–02	Harris Interactive	2002–03–13	2002–03–14
USHARRISINT2002–02	Harris Interactive	2002–03–13	2002–03–14
USCBS2002–04A	CBS News	2002–04–01	2002–04–02
USAIPOCNUS2002–13	Gallup Organization	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USHARRISINT2002–04	Harris Interactive	2002–04–10	2002–04–11
USCBS2002–04B	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USABCWASH2002–880	ABC News/Washington Post	2002–04–18	2002–04–21
USORCCNN2006–018	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–07–19	2006–07–19
USAIPOUSA2006–27	Gallup Organization	2006–07–21	2006–07–23
USCBSNYT2006–07A	CBS News/New York Times	2006–07–21	2006–07–25
USAIPOUSA2006–29	Gallup Organization	2006–07–28	2006–07–30
USLAT2006–533	Los Angeles Times	2006–07–28	2006–08–01
USORCCNN2006–019	Opinion Research Corporation	2006–08–02	2006–08–03

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Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USABCWASH2006–1018	ABC News/Washington Post	2006–08–03	2006–08–06
USPEW2006–08NII	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2006–08–09	2006–08–13
USPEW2009–01POL	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2009–01–07	2009–01–11
USORCCNN2009–001	Opinion Research Corporation	2009–01–12	2009–01–15
USNBCWSJ2010–10435	NBC News and the Wall Street Journal	2010–06–17	2010–06–21
USORCCNN2012–017	ORC International	2012–11–16	2012–11–18
USORCCNN2014–007	ORC International	2014–07–18	2014–07–20
USAIPOGNS2014-TR0722	Gallup Organization	2014–07–22	2014–07–23
USPEW2014-WK0724	Princeton Survey Research Associates International	2014–07–24	2014–07–27

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of Aid

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USYANK1975–8430	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1975–01–01	1975–01–01
USYANKANTISEM1981–8225	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1981–01–28	1981–03–06
USNBCAP1981-MAY	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–05–18	1981–05–19
USNBCAP1981-AUG	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–08–10	1981–08–11
USABCWASH1981–8999	ABC News/Washington Post	1981–10–14	1981–10–18
USNBCAP1982-JAN1	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–01–18	1982–01–19
USRPRR1982–09	The Roper Organization	1982–09–11	1982–09–18
USYANK1982–8612	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1982–10–05	1982–10–07
USNBCAP1982-OCT	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–10–18	1982–10–19
USNBCAP1982-NATELEC	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–11–02	1982–11–02
USYANK1982–8613	Yankelovich, Skelly & White	1982–12–08	1982–09–12
USABCWASH1986–6542	ABC News/Washington Post	1986–06–19	1986–06–24
USAIPOSPGO1986–86195G	Gallup Organization	1986–10–30	1986–11–12
USLAT1988–149	Los Angeles Times	1988–03–25	1988–04–07
USMISCATS1988-NATLSEC8	Marttila & Kiley	1988–07–31	1988–08–07
USABCWASH1989–8025	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USAIPOSPGO1990–925032G	Gallup Organization	1990–10–23	1990–11–15
USCBSNYT1991-JAN91C20	CBS News/New York Times	1991–01–20	1991–01–20
USMAKI1992-ANTISEM	Marttila & Kiley	1992–04–28	1992–05–01
USNYT1998–98004B	New York Times	1998–04–15	1998–04–20
USAIPOSP1998-CCFR-GP	Gallup Organization	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USPEW2001-APWCB	Princeton Survey Research Associates	2001–10–15	2001–10–21
USHARRISINT2002-CCFR	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30
USMISC2012-CCGA	Gfk Knowledge Networks	2012–05–25	2012–06–08

Survey Data Used in Individual Analysis of a Palestinian State

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USRPRR1977–07	The Roper Organization	1977–07–09	1977–09–16
USAIPO1977–0985	Gallup Organization	1977–10–14	1977–10–17
USRPRR1977–10	The Roper Organization	1977–10–29	1977–11–05
USAIPO1977–0990	Gallup Organization	1977–12–09	1977–12–12
USAIPO1979–1124G	The Gallup Organization	1979–03–16	1979–03–19
USRPRR1979–10	The Roper Organization	1979–10–27	1979–11–03
USRPRR1980–08	The Roper Organization	1980–08–16	1980–08–23
USRPRR1981–08	Roper Organization	1981–08–15	1981–08–22
USNBCAP1981-OCT	NBC News/Associated Press	1981–10–25	1981–10–26
USNBCAP1982-JUN	NBC News/Associated Press	1982–06–14	1982–06–15
USAIPO1982–1198G	The Gallup Organization	1982–07–23	1982–07–26
USRPRR1982–08	The Roper Organization	1982–08–14	1982–08–21
USRPRR1982–10	The Roper Organization	1982–10–23	1982–10–30
USRPRR1983–07	The Roper Organization	1983–07–09	1983–07–16
USRPRR1984–04	The Roper Organization	1984–03–17	1984–03–24
USYANK1988–4704GP	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–03	1988–01–06
USYANK1988–4705	Yankelovich Clancy Shulman	1988–01–27	1988–01–28
USLAT1988–149	Los Angeles Times	1988–03–25	1988–04–07
USAIPOSPAI1988–871	Gallup Organization	1988–05–13	1988–05–15
USLAT1988–158	Los Angeles Times	1988–07–05	1988–07–10
USABCWASH1989–8025	ABC News/Washington Post	1989–03–30	1989–04–03
USCBSNYTTBS1990-JUN	CBS News/New York Times	1990–06–05	1990–06–08
USCBSNYT1991-MAR91A	CBS News/New York Times	1991–03–04	1991–03–06
USAIPOGNS1991–122021	Gallup Organization	1991–03–14	1991–03–17
USABC1991–9039	ABC News	1991–07–25	1991–07–28
USCBSNYT1991-OCT91A	CBS News/New York Times	1991–10–05	1991–10–07
USAIPOCNUS1993–422010	Gallup Organization	1993–09–10	1993–09–12
USABC1993–5000	ABC News	1993–09–16	1993–09–19
USNYT1998–98004B	The New York Times	1998–04–15	1998–04–20
USAIPOSP1998-CCFR/GP	Gallup Organization	1998–10–15	1998–11–10
USAIPOGNS1999–9905026	Gallup Organization	1999–05–07	1999–05–09
USAIPOGNS2000–27	Gallup Organization	2000–07–06	2000–07–09
USCBSNYT2001–10D	CBS News/New York Times	2001–10–25	2001–10–28
USUMARY2001-TERRORISM2	Program on International Policy Attitudes	2001–11–01	2001–11–04
USCBSNYT2001–12A	CBS News/New York Times	2001–12–07	2001–12–10
USNBCWSJ2002–6024	Hart and Teeter Research Companies	2002–04–05	2002–04–07
USCBS2002–04B	CBS News	2002–04–15	2002–04–18
USHARRiSINT2002-CCFR	Harris Interactive	2002–06–01	2002–06–30

(*Continued*)

(Continued)

Roper Dataset ID	*Survey Organization*	*Start Date*	*End Date*
USAIPOCNUS2002–25	Gallup Organization	2002–06–21	2002–06–23
USAIPOCNUS2002–27	Gallup Organization	2002–07–05	2002–07–08
USCBS2002–07A	CBS News	2002–07–08	2002–07–09
USCBSNYT2002–07B	CBS News and The New York Times	2002–07–13	2002–07–16
USAIPOCNUS2003–32	Gallup Organization	2003–05–30	2003–06–01
USAIPOUSA2009–10	Gallup Organization	2009–05–29	2009–05–31
USORCCNN2011–016	Opinion Research Corporation	2011–09–23	2011–09–25
USCBS2011–11A	CBS News	2011–11–06	2011–11–10
USABCWASH2015–1167	ABC News/The Washington Post	2015–03–26	2015–03–29
31114253	CBS News	2017–02–17	2017–02–21
31116769	GfK Group	2018–07–12	2018–07–31

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