

# DEMOPHRENIA

ISRAEL AND THE  
MALAISE OF DEMOCRACY



PAUL EIDELBERG



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DEMOPHRENIA

by  
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Paul Eidelberg

Prescott Press, Inc.





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It only remains to add that I alone am responsible for the views expressed in this book.

Jerusalem  
June 1994

## PROLOGUE

This treatise breaks new ground in political science. It provides a critical analysis of the democratic mind using principles drawn from Ignacio Matte-Blanco's seminal work on conscious and unconscious thinking. Matte-Blanco's lifelong contribution to the study of mentality is one of the most original since Freud. Unlike Freud, however, Matte-Blanco's training in logic and mathematics endows his work with refreshing clarity and precision. Also, he avoids the fallacy of reducing ideas to subrational forces, a fallacy that would make psychology, indeed, any intellectual discipline, a species of autobiography.

As a logician and psychiatrist, Professor Matte-Blanco sheds new light on normal as well as abnormal mentality in logical, and not simply in dynamic, terms. So far as I am aware, the present inquiry is the first application of Matte-Blanco's work to the study of the democratic mind. A preliminary view of his theory of normal and abnormal thinking follows.

Ordinary thinking deals with things (objects, persons, or concepts) that are in some way distinguishable from one another and with the relations existing between them. The relations between things can be either "symmetrical" or "asymmetrical." Thus, if John is the brother of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the brother of John. The relation between them is symmetrical because the converse is identical with the direct relation. But, if John is the father of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the son of John. In this case the relation and the converse are not identical. This type of relation is "asymmetrical."

Now, according to Matte-Blanco, the "principle of symmetry:" not only is a defining characteristic of the unconscious, but *the unconscious treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical*. This means that the unconscious uses a symmetrical logic that renders everything equivalent to everything else. Thus, if John is the father of Peter, then Peter is the father of John. In formal logic, this is absurd; in the logic of the unconscious, it is normal. Indeed, the principle of symmetry is constantly in operation in unconscious thinking. (As in a dream, one thing can represent or symbolize anything and even contradictory things, for the unconscious does not know the law of contradiction.)

Given its universality, the principle of symmetry necessarily influences the thinking of democratic personalities—ininitely so. For democracies, in principle, treat diverse persons as well as their diverse and even contradictory opinions as equal (as "one person, one vote" and the notion

of "equal time" clearly indicate). In fact, the more democracies ignore the ideological differences between individuals, groups, and nations, the more conditioned their citizens become to treating asymmetrical things or relations as if they were symmetrical. This is exactly what occurs when the symmetrical logic of the unconscious displaces the differentiating logic of conscious thought. But what is more, the principle of symmetry can invade areas of conscious thought to such an extent as to produce in those areas a mental deficit affecting not only individuals but governments. I call this deficit or disorder "demophrenia"; and I shall show by logical and empirical means that democracy, notwithstanding its virtues, engenders this mental defect.

Before elaborating on the psychological symptoms and political manifestations of demophrenia, which will be done in Part II of this inquiry, it will be necessary in Part I to clarify those modern ideas and forces that have shaped the character of the democratic mind. For this purpose I shall resort to a more or less conventional mode of analysis without making use of Matte-Blanco's principles of symmetry and asymmetry. It will be here helpful, however, to examine briefly the kind of mentality that now dominates higher education in the democratic world, the better to appreciate the importance of the present inquiry.

Consider, for example, the provocative title of Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987). Clearly, the American mind is nothing if it is not democratic. What has closed the American mind, according to Bloom, is the university-bred doctrine of moral or cultural relativism, a doctrine that renders all values equal—as if their differences were of no objective significance. Dinesh D'Souza's *Illiberal Education* (1991), a study of multiculturalism on university campuses, provides case studies that support Bloom's dismal (but one-sided) conclusions. Cultural relativism, he sees, entails a dilemma discomfiting to any multi-ethnic democracy: Whose standards are to be used for designing college curriculums? "There is no knowledge, no standard, no choice that is objective," writes one modest academic.<sup>1</sup> If subjectivity is all, then the unconscious is the root of all things. If so, then the ideational products of the mind have no *intrinsic* value or validity, hence, are equal theoretically.

From this reasoning it should be obvious that while relativism thrives in democracy, it undermines any justification for democracy. Such is the pervasive influence of relativism in academia that a recent document of the American Council of Learned Societies, entitled *Speaking for the Humanities*, maintains that democracy cannot be justified as a system of government inherently superior to totalitarianism; it is simply an "ideological commitment" that the West has chosen to make.<sup>2</sup> This commitment to democracy, in other words, is based not on the findings of reason but on the epochal conditioning of people's emotions, precisely that aspect of the



human psyche which, unlike the intellect, obliterates moral or political distinctions.

Clearly, this moral egalitarianism cannot help but penetrate, however subtly, the mentality of those who shape a nation's foreign policies, be it a colossus like the United States bordered by benign democracies, or minuscule Israel bordered by hostile Arab autocracies.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, having studied the political and psychological consequences of relativism in the United States for twenty years, and having been close to the scene of democratic politics in Israel for sixteen years, I have come to the conclusion that a radically new theory concerning the democratic mind is necessary if the blessings of democracy are not to eventuate in its ruin.<sup>4</sup>

Let us begin with a truism. As all levels of education in the democratic world become permeated by moral relativism, that is, with the denial of objective standards by which to determine whether or not the values of one group or nation are intrinsically superior to those of another, democratic governments will become less capable of making moral distinctions and acting with confidence and consistency in relation thereto. This mental or moral deficit is symptomatic of "demophrenia."

Demophrenia is a democratic syndrome. It involves a compulsive application of the democratic principles of equality and freedom to moral problems that are exacerbated by those principles. The same compulsion drives democratic governments to apply the principles of equality and freedom to ideological conflicts in which one party opposes those principles.

The discovery of a pathological aspect of democracy may appear blasphemous, at least to those who exalt democracy's contribution to the alleviation of human misery. But the true friend of democracy does not transform it into a religion immune to questioning. To expose the shortcomings of democracy is not to advocate any form of autocracy. Unfortunately, the Churchillian adage that democracy is not the best form of government but all others are worse, has become a refuge for intellectual complacency. Notwithstanding the above mentioned document of the American Council of Learned Societies, even relativists genuflect to democracy. This complacency has been reinforced by the triumph of democracy over communism in Eastern Europe (a triumph which has erupted, regrettably, in ethnic conflict).<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile the increasing discord and demoralization of democratic societies, so blatant in their metropolitan centers, elicit the same conditioned responses: demands for greater equality, greater freedom, and, unsurprisingly, greater public expenditures. Alas, the avoidance of basic moral issues, poverty of thought, and lack of will or courage characterize democratic politics. The pretentious jargon of contemporary political science—"conflict resolution," "confidence-building"—is indicative of a



pathological state of affairs. A *medical* analysis of democracy must precede any therapy. Hence this inquiry into demophrenia.

Of course, this democratic disorder hardly can be alleviated while people from all walks of life applaud democracy's undeniable successes. But demophrenia afflicts all ranks of democratic society, permeating the entire political spectrum. Hence, it influences the policies of democratic governments no matter whether they are headed by parties of the Left, Right, or center. Demophrenia is rampant in the academic world and, by extension, in the news and entertainment media. It affects the emotions and behavior of religionists as well as secularists. This may be seen in present-day Israel, where demophrenia is most advanced and can best be studied.

I shall not, however, treat Israel merely as a case study of demophrenia. Involved in this inquiry is Israel's world-historical significance. Israel's ascendancy in this century of disintegrating world powers and her unheard-of progress even under the assault of war and terror is of profound importance (as the world's bizarre preoccupation with Israel indicates). If moral relativism is leading to the decay of Western civilization, as eminent scholars maintain, perhaps the rebirth of Israel heralds the possibility of an unprecedented intellectual and moral renaissance.

Modern Israel is called a "democracy." It is also called a "Jewish" state. For the serious and candid observer, the two appellations strike a dissonant note. The permissiveness of democratic freedom clashes with the ethical precepts of the Law, the Torah. The non-deferential character of democratic equality collides with reverence for the sage, the teacher of the law. Democracy insists on consent. The Law exalts wisdom. How to reconcile wisdom and consent does not disturb the ordinary democrat, since his mentors have replaced wisdom with "consensus."

Significantly, there is no solid consensus in democratic Israel—and no wonder, in a nation of immigrants that speak a hundred languages and evince the customs of a hundred nations. What a vast accumulation of diverse knowledge, talent, and experience! In any event, while Israel is fragmented, its diverse ethnic groups may be placed under three general and, roughly, equal categories: religionists, somewhat observant traditionalists, and secularists. While a large minority adheres to the austerity of the Law, a large minority emulates the laxity of democracy. What seems to hold the country together is the constant threat of war from Israel's Arab-Islamic neighbors.

How has Israel's predominantly secular government reacted to this threat? To answer this question in terms that transcend the stale categories of political science, a study of demophrenia is necessary. But this poses a problem of exposition for which I will need the kind patience of the reader.

To show that Israel's government is afflicted with the mental disorder here diagnosed as demophrenia, I must first explain why this government,

by virtue of its democratic principles, is *constitutionally* incapable of coping effectively with reality, especially with that life-threatening reality called the "Arab-Israeli conflict." In other words, before presenting an explicit and systematic treatment of demophrenia, it will be necessary to discuss in depth and detail the democratic mode of thought that has shaped the mentality of Israel's political and intellectual leaders. This will be done in chapters 1 and 2.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, to show that the behavior of Israel's government with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict is not merely ineffectual but pathological, two other preliminary inquiries are indispensable. First, it will be necessary to reveal the true nature of that conflict and how it is perceived by Israel's government. This will be done primarily in chapter 3. Second, it will be necessary to present a practical and humane alternative to Israel's futile policy *vis-a-vis* the Arab problem, an alternative that a Jewish government readily could have adopted, were its leaders not enthralled by a democratic mentality. This alternative will be discussed in chapter 4. Only thereafter will it be possible to elucidate the nature of demophrenia. This will be done in chapter 5, where it will become evident that this medical concept, articulated by means of simple symbolic logic, can reveal the psychological deficits of democracy in general, and of Israeli democracy in particular.<sup>7</sup>

## II

Although demophrenia is most advanced in modern-day Israel, there exists, in Israel's heritage, the means of overcoming this malady of the democratic world. The stark contradictions that exist in contemporary Israel are but the birthpangs of a nation whose people are still wandering in the wilderness. Another word about this people: Most Jews are secularists as well as democrats. So long as they live in the Diaspora, say in the United States, they need not suffer from any crippling psychological dissonance. But suppose these secular democratic Jews exercised ministerial power in Israel. They would be subject to dilemmas and tensions not found elsewhere. In Israel, in this ostensibly Jewish but secular democratic state, they would have the unparalleled problem of exercising political authority over 800,000 Arab citizens—a large minority—whose mentality is neither Jewish, nor secular, nor democratic. Moreover, they would have to rule some 1.6 million hostile Muslims residing in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, that is, in territory whose retention is essential to Israel's security, even according to many American generals. To complicate matters further, 250,000 Jews, mostly religious, have become deeply rooted in Judea and Samaria. They represent the "Zionist idea" and oppose the surrender of Israel's heartland.

These profound contradictions—where democratic principles clash not only with Zionism but with the prerequisites of Jewish survival—have produced among Israel's political and intellectual elites a state of mind and mode of behavior that defy conventional analysis. Because they are secular democrats, and because the pluralism of democracy tends to dissolve strong ideological commitment, these elites find it all the more difficult to cope with the ideologically animated hostility of Israel's Arab citizens and neighbors. Again and again, they have applied democratic principles and manifested unequalled benevolence to Arabs in the hope of overcoming Arab-Islamic antagonism to the existence of a Jewish state. Again and again, they have failed. But what is more, this same failure was evident throughout the period of Mandatory Palestine. As the British Peel Commission Report of 1937 indicated, Arab hostility increased in proportion to Jewish beneficence. Yet, despite a century of repeated failure, Israel's political and intellectual elites never have questioned the adequacy of their democratic mode of thought in dealing with the Arab problem.

It was this persistent state of affairs and my own personal contacts with various government officials that led me to conclude that Israel's leaders are suffering from a profound psychological and even historical syndrome. Indeed, I will present evidence indicating that, *more significant than the Arab problem is the Jewish problem, that the solution of the former ultimately depends on the solution of the latter*. This said, let me briefly outline the last five chapters of this inquiry.

Chapter 6 provides case studies of demophrenia involving prominent Israeli intellectuals and politicians. Chapter 7 applies the symbolic logic of demophrenia to semantic subversion and shows why democracies are susceptible to this subversion, though none more than Israel. Chapter 8 shows that Israel's political and intellectual elites, as a result of their own democratic mentality and lack of Jewish authenticity, unwittingly have conditioned the United States to expect Israel to conform to standards of freedom and equality unpracticed by any democracy. Chapter 9 offers a constructive critique of democratic freedom and equality from the perspective of Judaic law.<sup>8</sup> It distinguishes between two kinds of democracies. One is *random* and quantitative, the other is *rational* and qualitative. Unlike the latter, the former lacks the ethical and ethnic constraints essential to mental health and civic happiness.

Finally, chapter 10 shows that conventional modes of thought cannot explain the rebirth of Israel in 1948. The chapter reveals the historical function of the Arabs in relation to Israel, that is, how the Arabs unwittingly are contributing to the development in Israel of a nation in which freedom dwells with righteousness, equality with excellence, wealth with beauty, and the here and now with love of the Eternal.

## PART I



## “For Whom the Bells Toll”

Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell published a book in 1960 bearing the provocative title *The End of Ideology*. Although the book focused on social changes in America during the 1950s, Bell projected the end of ideology throughout the West. He attributed the demise of ideology to the waning of class cleavages on the one hand, and to socio-economic mobility on the other. The ascendancy of affluent consumer societies was relegating ideology to the dustbin of history. The masses in these democratic and middle-class societies no longer could be inspired by utopian ideas; they were preoccupied with commodious living, enjoying the fruits of science and technology in a thriving market economy. Communism, even then, intellectually was passé, and socialism were simply boring.<sup>1</sup>

Not capitalist exploitation, but the cold war—an issue that cut across class divisions—had become the central concern of politics. By 1990, however, the cold war was over: Suddenly, without a bang or hardly a whimper, the Soviet Union disintegrated. The United States was now the world's only superpower. A New World Order entered the lexicon of politicians and political scientists. Democracy, triumphantly, had put an end to ideology.

Such is the conventional wisdom, but there is another, more revealing reason for the end of ideology in the West, one that heralds the end of Western civilization. Bell and other social scientists derive their understanding of ideology from Karl Marx. Unknowingly, however, they have been engaged in a self-fulfilling prophecy. By propagating the Marxist, as well as Freudian reduction of morality, religion, and metaphysics to material interests (or subrational forces), these academics have been rendering more and more people ideologically blasé. Consider only this passage from Marx's *The German Ideology*:

We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes



and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of Consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence.<sup>2</sup>

If forms of consciousness or ideologies, merely correspond to material premises or modes of production, which change from epoch to epoch and from country to country, it would follow that human reason is incapable of discovering transhistorical truths or universally valid standards concerning how man should live.<sup>3</sup> The ideas of philosophers concerning the “best” regime then would be relative to, and determined by, material or subrational forces. Or as Thomas Hobbes put it, “Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions.”<sup>4</sup>

The moral or cultural relativism resulting from such doctrines has long permeated higher education in the West. Reflecting on this development, Professor Edward Shills writes:

There is abroad today a desire, more frequently expressed in the humanities and social sciences, to derogate or even to dissolve the idea that truths can be discovered and taught. Denial of the possibility of detachment . . . denial of the possibility of objective knowledge, which is true independently of the passions or desires or material interests of the discoverer or transmitter, have become more common in recent years in certain influential circles of academia. Some academics preach these denials day in and day out.<sup>5</sup>

The quest for the true, the good, and the beautiful has thus given way to a value-free empiricism, one which calls to mind William James' witticism that a Beethoven string quartet “is nothing more than a scraping of horses' tails on cats' bowels.” More *au courant* is the literary school of deconstructive criticism. Language, we are told, is nothing more than “random flights of signifiers,” without anything signified. A book—with the possible exception of those written by deconstructive critics—cannot be said to convey the thoughts or intentions of its author, for the reader can do no more than read into it his own moods and predilections. In other words—language, written or spoken—is from the start fictive or illusory, which indicates that reality is elusive or phantasmagoric: “Truth doesn't slip away; it isn't there at the outset.” Viewed in this light, deconstructive criticism reduces all humanistic studies of man to “a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”

And so a new consciousness has been manufactured by our most progressive educators, one that ascribes to a false consciousness to mankind in the past. Thanks to pedagogues tainted by historical or cultural relativism, television viewers are placed on a higher intellectual level than the authors of Psalms, Proverbs, and Job.

The influence of this relativism has been disseminated to society at large through the news and entertainment media. It has fostered a vulgar hedonism and egoism.<sup>6</sup> Once social scientists and their colleagues in the humanities broadcast the doctrine that all moral and metaphysical beliefs are “phantoms” of the brain or “sublimates” of man’s socioeconomic conditions, more and more people (whether affluent or not) will cease to believe in anything other than comfortable self-preservation. No longer will principles motivate politics or shape the goals of political life. Can it be that the end of ideology will eventuate in the *end of politics*?

Bell does not draw this conclusion, if only because politics, parties, and party government are ubiquitous in the democratic world. And yet, if the West has indeed reached the end of ideology, surely we should re-examine and redefine the Western notions of “politics,” “party,” and “party government.”

Let us begin with “politics.” Traditionally, the ultimate question of politics was: How should man live? Of course, opinions differ as to how man should live, which means that political opinions are disputable: They attract and repel, and they create partisans. Politics essentially is partisan.<sup>7</sup> But with the end of ideology in the West, conflicting opinions as to how man should live are not taken seriously in the democratic world. Nor should they be, if all moral opinions or “value-preferences” are relative and, therefore, theoretically equal.

But, if all such opinions are equal, public policy should be determined by opinion polls. The end of ideology has ushered in the Reign of Quantity.

Given the theoretical equivalence of all values, each individual is or should be free to pursue his own lifestyle—or so the vulgar believe. Yet, despite the pluralism of which democratic societies boast, an appalling sameness is spreading throughout the West via the shopping center and the mass entertainment media. Virtually everyone is pursuing the same goal: again, commodious living. Politics has thus become moribund; no longer does it arouse serious public controversy. This has profound consequences for the character of political parties. But what is a “party”?

The classic definition of *party* was set forth by that great, eighteenth-century philosophic statesman, Edmund Burke: “Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”

But in view of the cynicism generated by the end of ideology, any politician who offers his party's particular principle as conducive to the national interest is apt to be deemed a fraud or a fool. Any college student who has studied Machiavelli or Marx knows that such notions as the "public interest" or the "common good" are fictitious. Indeed, countless journalists have been taught by political scientists of behavioral or positivist persuasions that politicians use such ingratiating platitudes as facades for advancing their own self-interests. Thus, television anchorman Peter Jennings, influenced by the university-bred doctrine of moral relativism, once baldly declared, "There is no truth . . . only news."<sup>8</sup> Clearly, Burke's definition of *party* has been rendered obsolete by the regnant philosophy of the age: egoism. Today, *party* should be defined as an aggregation of individuals seeking to gain control of the offices of government in order to promote their own personal interests.

To be sure, a distinction could be made between the sincere politician—one who lives *for* politics—and the politician who lives *off* politics—the distinction of Max Weber, probably the most influential sociologist of this century. For Weber, the sincere politician is committed to some ideal cause or value. But, given the century-long impact of Weber's own value-relativism on the social sciences, the sincere politician has become an endangered species.<sup>9</sup>

It never seems to have occurred to Weber and his disciples that any social science propagating value-relativism removes a source of moral constraint on the politician's behavior—one might even say his "sincerity."<sup>10</sup> But, what is even more significant is the fact that a politician is sincere does not make the cause to which he is dedicated just or noble. I think it can be said that Hitler was sincerely devoted to the cause of Nazi Germany. But, whether that cause was just or unjust is beyond the knowledge of the social sciences, insofar as they are based on moral relativism. When sincerity or idealism takes the place of truth, one can be sure that fools and frauds will crowd the stage of politics. But all this is inevitable, given the demise of ideology.

That ideology plays a diminutive and diminishing role in political campaigns and party politics has become obvious to almost any television viewer. Meanwhile, virtually every textbook on the subject describes public policy or legislation as nothing more than a process of bargaining between politicians whose election or re-election requires them to placate a welter of interests, which inevitably are narrow, immediate, and mundane. Lack of principle has reduced politics to a paltry affair.<sup>11</sup>

If the end of ideology has emasculated political parties, it would follow that party government—on which the operation of modern democracy depends—is becoming obsolete. Let us reflect on this matter.



It is universally agreed that the modern democratic state requires a multiparty system. Competition between parties in national elections results in party government. But the party, or parties forming the government, as well as the party, or parties forming the opposition no longer consist of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. Devoid of such men, party government hardly can solve the enormous problems of contemporary society—spiraling crime rates, epidemic drug addiction, unbridled hedonism (the ignored cause of drug addiction), pornographic degradation of human nature, promiscuity and sex-related diseases, disintegration of the family, increasing mental disorders, moronizing influence of television, nihilism, and the decline of intellectual standards.<sup>12</sup>

Not that party government consisting of honest men of principle would be sufficient to overcome these malignancies. Indeed, because the above evils are aggravated by democracy itself—by its permissive freedom and levelling equality—one may argue that party government, even at its best, can no more than retard the process of decay. To understand why this is so, we must take a brief glance at the origin of party government in eighteenth-century England.

In the previous century, aristocratic statesmen had created the great Whig and Tory parties—great because they championed great causes or fought over great issues: To mention only one, the relationship between church and state. But so fundamental was their division over the religious issue that neither party was willing to tolerate the other. Nor did their leaders intend to preserve the party organization nor the discipline required to win the contest and, thereafter, to become institutionalized in Parliament.

But once the church-state issue ceased to divide and agitate the body politic, and, once the very ends of government were settled and religious toleration became the mode of public life, the two great parties transmuted into small, or let us say, mediocre, parties. Such parties are preoccupied with material interests, with details and party programs. Moreover, unlike great parties, mediocre parties alternate political rule with their opponents and become integral parts of the constitutional system. Thus did party government (and democracy) arise in England when religious toleration metamorphosed into political toleration.<sup>13</sup>

The separation of church and state and the removal of the religious issue from politics had profound consequences. It prepared the ground for the eventual separation of morality from politics—the separation anticipated in chapter 15 of *The Prince*. (Incidentally, two of Machiavelli's most subtle and serious readers were the seventeenth-century English political

philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.) Party government and nascent democracy must be understood in this light.

Of course, the early leaders and members of party government were raised and educated in a period still very much influenced by the Greco-Christian tradition. Although parties might no longer be great or be led by great statesmen, still they could be respectable and consist of honest men of principle, to use Burke's phrase. A moneyed class was gaining political ascendancy. Commercial and laissez-faire society requires party government, one whose primary function is to promote public safety and prosperity.

Still, one can hardly sever politics from morality without affecting the relationship between morality and economics or a free market economy. Not that sumptuary laws and prohibitions against usury were ever very effective. But such restraints on acquisitiveness became archaic with the rise of party government and democracy. True, even before the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776, various Protestant denominations had advocated the separation of morality from economics. With these inducements to laissez-faire, greed was given a moral license.<sup>14</sup>

Although government was still responsible for enforcing a welter of laws rooted in the moral precepts of the Bible, the cultivation of morality *per se* was no longer the proper business of the secular democratic state. Like religion, morality became a private matter, the concern of the church and the family. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the success of party government, as originally conceived, requires a society that advances honest men of principle to public office. Obviously, the character of such men will depend on their educators—in the family as well as at the university.

We have come a long way since the time when statesmen, influenced by religion, agreed with philosophers that party was evil. Not that the ruling class prior to the advent of party government was chaste, or that English politics in the seventeenth century was free of corruption. Winston Churchill writes of the period: "There was an undoubtedly easy commerce of the sexes, marked at times by actual immorality. Men and women who had obtained power were often venal . . . Even judges were occasionally, and members of the legislature frequently, corrupt." But he goes on to say, not without derision: "We in this happy and enlightened age must exercise our imagination to span the gulf which separates us from those lamentable, departed days. Securely established upon the rock of purity and virtue, ceaselessly cleansed by the strong tides of universal suffrage, we can afford to show tolerance and even indulgence towards the weaknesses and vices of those vanished generations without in any way compromising our own



integrity.” But to appreciate this tongue-in-cheek commentary, we must read further:

It is strange indeed that such a system should have produced for many generations a succession of . . . abler statesmen than all our widely extended education, competitive examination, and democratic system have put forth. Apart from the Church and the learned professions, the area of selection was restricted entirely to the circles of rank, wealth, and landed property. But these comprised several thousand families within which and among whom an extremely searching rivalry and appraisal prevailed. In this focus of the nation men were known and judged by their equals with intimate knowledge and a high degree of comprehension . . . Appointments and promotions went largely by favour: but favour went largely by merit.

The great statesman-historian concludes with this devastating commentary:

It is important to remember also the differences of feeling and outlook which separate the men and women of these times from ourselves. They gave a very high—indeed, a dominating—place in their minds to religion. It played as large a part in the seventeenth century as sport does now.<sup>15</sup>

No longer does the Old Testament with its eternal verities and examples of great men and women mold the family and link one generation to another. Ancestral pride and jealousy, which guarded family accomplishments, no longer exist to inspire statesmen and adorn politics.

With the demise of classical education, no longer are the thoughts of statesmen influenced by the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, or their speeches by the oratory of Demosthenes and Cicero. The Greco-Christian tradition has receded into the background, has given way to other doctrines that now dominate the mentality of the Western world. Secularism and moral relativism are very much in the foreground. They pervade democracy's educational and cultural institutions. They have undermined the family and family values.

In the family, children are taught self-control and concern for others. In the family, they learn modesty, honesty, and respect for authority. They later manifest these virtues as adults in society at large. Weaken the family and all the social evils mentioned above will mushroom. All efforts to remedy these evils will fail, given the conceptual limitations of modern politics. For again, morality is beyond the province of party government,

that is, of democracy. Or as semi-educated intellectuals are fond of saying: "It is not the function of government to legislate morality."

Although party government never was intended to legislate morality, neither was it intended to undermine morality by undermining the family. And yet, in our time—and thanks very much to the subtle and not-so-subtle influence of relativism on university graduates, hence on legislators and judges—the laws of the secular democratic state now protect pornography and promiscuity.<sup>16</sup>

The disintegration of the family proceeds apace. Self-indulgence and gross immodesty are rampant. Politics itself has become an instrument of naked greed and egoism.

In summing up, with the end of ideology and the ascendancy of relativism and egoism, the moral authority of the family has been severely impaired. It is but a short step from the moral obscurantism and levelling manifested in the college classroom to the vulgarity manifested by television in the living room: the pandering to youth by making parents appear ridiculous; the emphasis on sex and violence; the commercials that stultify the mind and arouse the most paltry, acquisitive desires. Party government is incapable of overcoming such decadence. But this means that we are approaching the demise of democratic politics.

## II

The decay of politics is symptomatic of the character of contemporary political science. It is commonly believed, even by its practitioners, that behavioral (as opposed to normative) political science is ethically neutral or value-free. In analyzing political conflict or diverse groups or political systems, the value-free political scientist discusses facts and desists from making value-judgments. Political scientists are consulted, not to determine the proper ends of government and society, but rather to formulate the means or policies by which these ends can be realized. Not justice, not the question of how men should live, but influence and the influential, or again, who gets what, when, and how—this is the stuff of empirical political science. The study of politics has thus been reduced to the study of power, meaning thinly disguised egoism.

The centrality of egoism clearly is implied by political scientists who, as noted above, deny the existence of the common good or of the public interest. Moreover, by teaching students that politicians use such notions as the public interest to cloak their own self-interest, these political scientists render more and more people cynical as well as self-seeking and less public-spirited. We have in this political science—if it may be called

such—another self-fulfilling prophecy. So long as this political science bases political oratory or behavior on egoism, it cannot help but diminish the dignity of politics. It might even be said that value-free political science is making politics, as well as itself, worthless.

Still, the value-free approach to politics is thought to be essential to objectivity. The political scientist must not intrude his own value preferences into his analysis of politics, lest his conclusions become tainted by subjectivism. Not that value-free political scientists never study values. But in so doing, they do not presume to determine whether the values of this or that group or nation are, in truth, virtues or vices. The proper subject of political science is, again, the struggle for power, not value preferences.

Thus, in their book *Political Power: USA/USSR*, Professors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington write: "We are students of politics; we write in that capacity. And here we are concerned not with vices and virtues but with strengths and weaknesses . . . In this volume we aim to keep our analyses free of our preference for constitutional democracy."<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, in his book, *The Middle East*, Israeli political scientist Yair Evron avows: "Only by avoiding questions of right and wrong and also by limiting oneself to an analysis of patterns of behavior and strategies in conflict, can we approach this complex [Arab-Israeli] conflict not in any emotional or apologetic way but scientifically and analytically."<sup>18</sup>

I shall now show that this political science, far from being scientific, is unwittingly subversive. Any approach to group or international conflict that is morally neutral places all parties to the conflict on the same moral level. Who has not heard the journalistic cynicism, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"? This moral equivalence was echoed when a journalist rhetorically asked: "What is the difference between the American invasion of Granada and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?"

Would the same journalist have had the temerity to ask former President George Herbert Walker Bush, "What is the difference between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990?" Surely Mr. Bush did not surpass his predecessor, former President Ronald Reagan, as a moralist. Indeed, even though PLO chief Yasir Arafat had supported Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait (a PLO benefactor), Mr. Bush, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, virtually exonerated Saddam's comrade-in-arms by the innocuous statement: "He bet on the wrong horse."

The moral outrage Bush evinced against Saddam Hussein was of course essential for galvanizing American and allied support in that war of good versus evil. However, to minimize Arab hostility toward the U.S.-led coalition against that Arab despot, it was deemed necessary by the Bush



Administration to appease Saddam's counterpart, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. This required Mr. Bush to ignore the culpability of Mr. Assad and his 'Alawite regime in (1) the destruction of the Syrian town of Hamma, slaughtering as many as 20,000 inhabitants; (2) the murder of Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt in February 1977; (3) the assassination, in September 1982, of Christian leader Bashir Gemayel, the newly elected president of Lebanon (who sought peace with Israel); (4) the blowing up of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, and the killing of 240 U.S. marines in their Beirut barracks in September of that year; (5) the blowing up of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in December 1988, killing 270 men, women, and children.

To appreciate the extent to which Bush's behavior exemplifies the end of ideology in the West, notice that while he opposed, and with awesome military power, Saddam's reduction of Kuwait to an Iraqi province, he virtually condoned Assad's reduction of Lebanon to a Syrian vassal. Indeed, Mr. Bush even supported the Syrian dictator's demand that Israel surrender the Golan Heights. Thus did the leader of the world's only superpower, a democracy, kowtow to a cunning tyrant against America's constant ally, democratic Israel.

And so, hardly had the Gulf War ended than the clouds of moral relativism or indifferentism returned. The Butcher of Baghdad was allowed to remain in power on the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. (Calling on the Iraqis to overthrow that tyrant was not deemed interference in Iraq's internal affairs.) Meanwhile, the Janus-faced PLO was rehabilitated, SCUD-cheering Palestinian leaders were honored in Washington; and Israel, having again been the victim of aggression, was treated as the aggressor: It would have to return to its precarious 1949 armistice lines. No wonder Machiavelli omitted justice as one of the qualities for which rulers are praised. But this only conforms to the tenets of value-free political science, to which I return.

By placing all groups or nations on the same moral level (at least during times of peace), the objective or even-handed political scientist legitimizes those that seek to change the status quo. Not that the status quo is necessarily just. But then, justice is not the object of behavioral political science. Notice, however, that while "value-free" political science dignifies, and thereby strengthens any opposition group, regardless of the group's goals or values, it tacitly places in question the justice of society's established values. Stated another way, the morally neutral political scientist does not concern himself with the question of whether or not the ideology of one group or nation is inherently preferable to that of another. To the contrary, he contends that any answer to this question is bound to



be subjective. But such a teaching cannot help but imbue the citizens of his country with skepticism regarding the validity, justice, and nobility of their own country's heritage, its long-established beliefs, and its values.

It is not accidental that this morally neutral political science will be found only in democratic societies. There the principle of equality invades the intellect to the extent that even the educated are prone to conclude that one person's opinion regarding how man should live is as valid as another's. From this *sociologically determined* doctrine it follows that the life of a Socrates is not intrinsically superior to that of a Marquis de Sade. It also follows that the goals of a country like Israel are no more commendable or worthy of support than the goals of the PLO.

Now, suppose this doctrine of moral equivalence infected every Jew in Israel. In other words, suppose every Jew in Israel, having been influenced by morally neutral political science, ceased to believe in the moral superiority of Israel's cause in the Arab-Israel conflict. Surely the Jews would be psychologically and morally disarmed. Surely they would become more disposed to negotiate with the PLO. Surely they would be less capable of persevering in a protracted conflict with nations whose educators do not propagate the doctrine of moral relativism, nations whose educators teach students that Israel is an evil regime, that it has usurped Arab land, and that it will and must be destroyed.

Morally neutral political scientists can and do teach in any university of the free world—Harvard, Oxford, the Sorbonne. Suppose they were to teach at universities in Israel; indeed, many do. They present to their students a political science that boasts of being objective, of having universal validity, which is why it can be taught, like physics, in diverse countries.

Armed with their political science, these morally neutral educators convey to Jewish students in Israel that Judaism is no more valid than any other system of ideas and values, including those that call for the destruction of the Jewish state. This moral egalitarianism cannot help but erode the moral fiber of Jews on the one hand, and aid and abet Israel's enemies on the other. Far from being value-free or ethically neutral, this political science is deadly.

### III

I have been describing what should be called *democratic* political science, the political science peculiar to egalitarian, pluralistic societies. We have seen that this political science denies the existence of a common good. Democratic political science is based, therefore, on egoism. The fact

that egoism is not commonly associated with democracy is to be attributed to the residual influence of an older tradition on contemporary mentality.

Let me not be misunderstood: Democracy has only two intrinsic principles—freedom and equality. Let us gratefully admit that *democratic* freedom and equality have facilitated man's conquest of nature; have spurred tremendous wealth and creature comforts; have eliminated slavery and unrelieved drudgery; and have liberated talents hitherto suppressed by economic scarcity and tyranny. But let us also admit that while men and women in democratic countries enjoy unprecedented freedom and equality and material abundance, a frightful number find their lives lonely and meaningless. The reason is not hard to grasp: Democracy is the dissolver of ideologies, of traditional beliefs and values, which alone, can endow people with a sense of solidarity and purpose.

The decency and civility still visible in contemporary democracy have nothing to do with democracy itself. They derive from the morality of the Bible and the urbanity of Greek philosophy, especially the former. Neither democratic equality nor democratic freedom provide any moral standards as to how man should live. Consider: What is there about democratic equality that would prompt a person to defer to wisdom or to show respect for teachers or parents? What is there about democratic freedom that would prompt him to restrain his passions, to be kind, honest, or just? To the contrary, as Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw, such has been the influence of equality on the intellect that democracy, including its savants, fosters a not very well-disguised form of egoism.<sup>19</sup> Our moral relativists have been taking decency, or civilization, for granted. Let me explain.

Philosophically speaking, relativism does not logically entail any specific political commitment, which is why, for a consistent relativist, all lifestyles theoretically are equal, including cannibalism. But there are hardly any logically consistent relativists. Virtually all relativists adopt the prevailing beliefs and values of their society: Nothing is more safe or convenient. This is true especially in democratic societies. The two cardinal principles of democracy, freedom and equality, readily lend themselves to relativism, which is why this doctrine thrives in the multiversities of the free world. It should be emphasized, however, that in democracies, relativists do not always appear as such. They may even appear as humanists, without realizing that their humanism is largely derived from the biblical tradition.

Meantime, the influence of the biblical tradition in the democratic world constantly is receding before secularism (except in Israel). By secularism I mean *humanism* as unambiguously and candidly defined by old Protagoras, that *man is the measure of all things*. This doctrine signifies

that all ideas concerning the true, the good, and the beautiful are human creations, hence relative to time and place. This is a denial of religious authority on the one hand, and an assertion of human autonomy on the other. It is hardly a revelation to say that the twentieth century, the bloodiest in human history, is the century of triumphant secularism. It is also the century of triumphant democracy. As the century draws to a close, however, even friends of democracy see signs of decay. Democracy, which enlarged freedom of thought, is witnessing an appalling decline of intellectual standards. Democracy, which exalted the principle of equality, is leveling all moral distinctions. Democracy, which championed human dignity, is yielding to abject vulgarity.

Significantly, the rise and decline of democracy coincides with the rise and decline of modern politics. The most obvious example of this decline is that of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The pundits who see in the decline of communism the triumph of democracy know not whereof they speak. The failure of communism represents the failure of Marxism, and hardly any political doctrine could be more democratic. Inasmuch as democracy has become the opium of the people as well as of their intellectual elites, another look at Marxism is necessary.

It was suggested above that the end of ideology is indicative of the end of politics. The one philosopher who projected the end of politics was Marx himself. Marx regarded politics in general, and democratic politics in particular, as manifestations of class conflict rooted in egoism. Hence, the linking of democracy to egoism did not originate with this author. But Marx's understanding of egoism is his own.

*Egoism*, or selfishness, is as old as mankind. It is condemned (along with moral relativism) in the Hebrew Bible, which urges love of one's neighbor and exhorts the children of Israel, saying, "you may not do everything as we do here today, [where] every individual [does] only that which seems right to himself" (Deut. 12:8). And, of course, egoism is clearly recognized in Plato's *Republic* and in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, as well as in the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith, et al.

The difference between the classics and the moderns just mentioned is that, whereas the former decry egoism and would regulate it by cultivating virtue, which they deemed the proper function of government, the latter regard egoism not only positively and as the ultimate principle of politics, but as one that can be self-regulating or regulated by institutional substitutes for virtue. In a commercial democracy, enlightened self-interest—meaning reason subjoined to the passions—replaces the traditional belief in virtue. In a free market and a competitive economy, avarice will guard



against avarice and prevent the liberation of acquisitiveness from running amuck. Such an economic system will require a government of divided powers, such that ambition will check ambition. *Private vices, public benefits* is the real meaning of the secular democratic state. Such a state can dispense with the restraints of any transcendent morality on egoism. Enter Marx.

Marx not only rejected all hitherto existing morality, but also the belief in the naturalistic foundation of egoism. According to Marx, egoism, no less than morality, is a historical product. And only with the simultaneous disappearance of egoism and morality will man achieve true freedom and equality—meaning genuine, as opposed to a factitious democracy. How is this to be understood?

Marx believed that man's exploitation of man is rooted not in any defect of human nature but in the poverty of physical nature. Nature simply does not provide sufficiently for human needs. In other words, not egoism, but economic scarcity is the original cause of human conflict and servitude, of human misery and inequality. But with the abolition of private property and the scientific conquest of nature, human exploitation will come to an end. Egoism, which is only a consequence of history, will dissolve, as will morality, which has ever been the morality of the ruling and exploiting class. Henceforth, man will be animated by his generic consciousness, which alone distinguishes human nature from that of mere animals. In other words, what will replace egoism and the restraints of morality will be a spontaneous fraternal disinterestedness. This, for Marx, is the only true humanism, the only true democracy. But this also means the end of politics.

Now, the first thing to be noted is that, consistent with Marx, communism rejects the idea of *natural* self-preference. It denies the existence of an instinctive and ineradicable preference for *one's own*, for one's own good. Therein is the supreme and fatal error of Marxism.

The preference for one's own originates with one's own body. A human being does not consist simply of thoughts he can share with others. Thus, when diverse individuals understand the same mathematical equation—that is, to take the clearest example—they are, in that respect, one. But when your friend is hungry, no matter how much you might sympathize with him, you cannot really feel his hunger.

The inexorable fact that human beings are bodies means that they cannot share their bodily feelings as they can share, in principle, their ideas and aspirations. *The body, the ultimately private, is the ultimate refutation of communism*; for the body is the ultimate reason why it is natural to prefer one's own—one's own good—to the good of others. Hence, the need for morality to temper natural self-preference. Viewed in this light, communism is contrary to nature, and this is why it failed and was bound to fail.



The failure of communism is, of course, a failure of Marxism. Marx's anti-empirical denial of natural self-preference on the one hand, and his reduction of moral and religious ideas to material premises, or class interests on the other, made it impossible for his followers (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) to develop a body of *practical wisdom* by which to manage economic, social, and political affairs in a competent, let alone in a just way.

But what a cruel irony! For despite its denial of natural self-preference, communism has generated an appalling egoism in the Soviet Union, and it has done this by its devastation of religion. Religion acknowledges natural self-preference but condemns its excesses, i.e., egoism. To combat egoism, religion inculcates morality, which means that the individual should act out of motives larger than self-interest. Hence, religion would impose moral restraints on rulers and the ruled alike.

Such restraints on rulers are inconsistent with communism, given its two-fold objective—the abolition of private property and the harnessing of all human energy for the conquest of nature. This task requires undivided loyalty to the Communist Party, which in turn, necessitates the suppression of religion.

It should be duly noted that, during the Enlightenment, of which Marxism is a product, the religious question took precedence over all other questions. Religion was modern philosophy's most powerful competitor for the minds of the multitude: Thus, Marx's adage, "Religion is the opium of the people." The Enlightenment was nothing if it was not democratic.

But religion, remember, had served as a restraint on egoism. Hence the repression of religion in the Soviet Union liberated egoism despite the contrary intention of Communism, whose denial of self-preference was false to begin with.

Egoism, however, not only is an attitude but a doctrine, one that regards all desires, including love, as self-regarding. The only natural good, as Machiavelli taught, is the private good. And as the vulgar say, what is good is a matter of personal taste or preference. Again, we see the doctrine of moral relativism. Nowhere is this doctrine more pronounced than in "Sovietized" Russia.

The Soviet Union, it should be borne in mind, was the first state based explicitly on atheism. There, education has been aggressively atheistic from the very outset of the regime. There, communism has fostered in the Russian people a moral relativism more corrosive than that found in liberal democracy, where Christianity, though largely secularized, has not been suppressed. In his monumental work, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Alexander Solzhenitsyn attributes the monstrous crimes of the Soviet Union to

Marxism. It was Marxism, he claims, that made morality relative—relative to class. He recalls the time, before the Bolshevik Revolution, “when morality was not considered relative and when the distinction between good and evil was very simply perceived by the heart.”<sup>20</sup>

This moral relativism and its most leveling consequences have been described by the Russian historian, Andrei Amalrik. Amalrik did not live to see the collapse of Soviet Communism, but his little book *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* virtually anticipates that momentous event. There, he deplores the impact of communism on the Russian people for whom justice had come to mean “nobody should live better than I do. This idea of justice,” he laments, “is motivated by hatred of everything that is outstanding, which we make no effort to imitate but, on the contrary, try to bring down to our level.”

But now for the denouement: “It is hard to tell,” writes Amalrik, “whether . . . the bulk of our people possess any kind of moral criteria—such as ‘honorable’ and ‘dishonorable,’ ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ the supposedly eternal principles which function as inhibiting and guiding factors when the mechanism of social constraint begins to fall apart and man is left to his own devices.”<sup>21</sup>

Those who see the failure of communism as a triumph of democracy should ponder the words of Amalrik. The bells that tolled for the Soviet Union are tolling also for the secular democratic state. Nowhere is this more evident than in the state of Israel, to which I now turn.

## The Demise of Political Zionism

The end of ideology involves the denial of objective truth concerning how man should live. This has profound consequences for mankind, especially Israel.

As we have seen in this century, nations wage war over ideologies. These wars have been perceived as conflicts between good and evil. With the end of ideology, however, an end to war might seem to be possible. Once people cease to believe in the absolute truth of their ideologies, or once the doctrine of moral or cultural relativism permeates mankind's consciousness, to fight and die for the sake of some political or religious creed will be deemed absurd. The end of ideology may therefore herald an era of universal peace, of mutual tolerance among nations.

There are at least four difficulties with this utopian view. First, even in an era of cultural relativism, nations will be divided by conflicting material interests. The end of ideology does not entail the end of man's acquisitive instincts. In fact, one study indicates that between 1945 and 1978 there were not more than twenty-six days in which there was no war of some kind somewhere in the world. About twelve wars were being fought on an average day, which suggests that more than ideology is at work in the conflicts of mankind.<sup>2</sup> "The story of the human race," wrote Churchill, "is War."

Second, relativism does not logically entail tolerance. For given the denial of universally valid moral standards, there are no rational grounds for preferring tolerance to intolerance, or even peace to war.

Third, cultural relativism does not preclude—it may even foment—wars between the ethnic groups comprising any nation. The Serbs and Croats of Yugoslavia are a case in point.

Fourth, and most important for this chapter, while democracies cease to take ideologies seriously and thus become inclined toward pacifism—unless vital economic interests are at stake—various anti-democratic and bellicose regimes might be slow to learn about the end of ideology. They

might not only regard pacifism and relativism as symptomatic of decadence, but they might exploit this democratic proclivity. That is, they might employ a phased strategy of peace to disarm and eventually destroy a democracy all the more readily if that democracy deems war or violent death as the greatest evil.

Only in democracies, where pacifism and the end of ideology flourish, did people hear the defeatist slogan "Better Red than dead." (This slogan, by the way, renders democracies susceptible to military blackmail.)

Now it so happens that the end of ideology in the West will be found also in the Middle East, but solely in democratic Israel. In Israel, however, the end of ideology would entail the end of Zionism, *the one and only justification for the existence of the Jewish state*. But what is Zionism?

Strictly speaking, the modern term *Zionism* is not an ideology, if by that is meant a comprehensive and coherent system of ideas. Rather, Zionism is a single idea, that of Jewish nationhood, an idea shared by individuals having diverse and even contradictory attitudes toward the Jewish heritage. Jewish nationhood gave birth in the nineteenth century to a political movement whose goal was threefold: the return of the Jewish people to Zion, meaning the Land of Israel; the restoration of the land; and the establishment of a sovereign state therein. To be sure, the yearning of religious Jews to return to their ancient homeland was as old as their dispersion some 1,800 years earlier. Indeed, during the century preceding the meeting of the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, thousands of Orthodox Jews already had made their way to Palestine.

The forces that gave rise to and modulated the Zionist movement may be stated in a few words. In Western Europe, the Enlightenment and Jewish assimilationism had failed to overcome anti-Semitism. The trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, the assimilated French Jew falsely accused of treason, aroused Frenchmen to clamor, not "death to the traitor," but "death to the Jews"—this, in a country that boasted of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia, Jews were victims of pogroms, hounded and slaughtered periodically by mobs, sometimes with the complicity of governments using the Jews as scapegoats. The Zionist movement was thus born of fear as well as of hope.

Why Zionism originated among Ashkenazi Jews in Europe rather than among oriental Jews in the Middle East is neatly clarified by Dr. Mordechai Nisan:

Eastern Jews living under Muslim rule could never turn their *dhimmi* [second class] existence, or imagine they could, into the stuff of revolutionary politics and national liberation. In addition, Mideastern Jews,



untouched by the impact of secularism and irreligion, were more attuned to awaiting direct divine intervention in history rather than haughtily assuming they could make it themselves.<sup>3</sup>

The Zionist movement was as diverse as its leading personalities. To survey this diversity is unnecessary. Instead, I shall divide Zionists into two fundamental categories: “religious” and “secular.”<sup>4</sup>

The distinction corresponds to those who do, and those who do not affirm the Torah as the ultimate basis for Jewish life, but who nonetheless were willing to cooperate in establishing a Jewish state on that crossroad of three continents: Palestine. It was primarily European secularists, however, who launched the World Zionist movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Significantly, the towering founder of this movement, Theodor Herzl, was at once utterly ignorant of the Jewish religion, yet animated by an infinite love of Jews.

In his utopian novel *Altneuland* (1902), Herzl summed up his Zionism in these words: “We shall found a state where matters of faith and the synagogue will once and for all be excluded from the public domain!” The future Jewish state was thus to imitate Christian Europe, where religion had very much become a private matter, separated from politics. Not the dialectical logic of Judaic jurisprudence, *Halakha*, but parliamentary politics was to become the *modus operandi* of Jewish revival in the Land of Israel. Accordingly, in this inquiry the notion of *secular* Zionism will be used interchangeably with that of *political* Zionism. Moreover, no distinction will be made between the latter and what is called *cultural* Zionism. Despite the desire of cultural Zionists to preserve various Jewish customs, their choice of observances is inevitably personal, variable, and arbitrary. That a cultural Zionist like Ahad Ha-am deplored Herzl's Zionism as shallow is of no relevance to the present inquiry. (Herzl's *Altneuland* describes a Jewish homeland devoid of Jewish culture. In fact, in his epoch-making tract *The Jewish State*, no mention is made of Zion.)<sup>5</sup>

Now, still speaking very generally, Zionism affirms the idea that the Jewish people have a basic right to their ancient homeland, the Land of Israel. Religious Zionism defines this right as God-given, rooted in the covenant between God and Abraham. In contrast, secular Zionism regards the Jewish people's right to the Land of Israel as historical as well as morally justifiable, if only because of the age-old persecution and decimation of the Jews by the gentile world. Only if the Jews had a state of their own—and where else but in Palestine—could they be secure and accepted as a nation like others. Or so most Zionists believed. Here, let us pause for

a brief sketch of Palestine, its name, and its most recent claimants, the so-called Palestinians.

## II

For thousands of years, Jews have called the country in question the Land of Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*). The Koran calls it the Holy Land (Sura 5:21). The West called it both the Holy Land (*Terra Sancta*) and also Palestine, following the Roman Emperor Hadrian who changed the original name of the country to *Syria Palestina* after suppressing a Jewish revolt in 135 A.D. Hadrian thereby erased the Jewish name of the country and made it a mere province of Syria. So it was called by Muslim writers in the Middle Ages, despite the Koranic name, the Holy Land. Moreover, under the centuries of the Ottoman Sultanate, the country was not even an administrative unit. Arab nationalists in the early years of British rule called Palestine, "Southern Syria."

There are hidden ironies in this metamorphosis. Palestine (or Falastin) was the name of the coastal strip on which the Philistines lived, a people that died out 3,000 years ago. Now, just as the Romans employed the name Palestine to obliterate the Jews' title to their ancient homeland, so have today's Arabs. In fact, the Arabs adopted the name Palestinians in 1964, the date of the Palestine National Covenant, which calls for the obliteration of the Zionist entity. The Arab strategy was simple enough. By propagating the notion that there exists a Palestinian people whose rights to the land go back hundreds of years, the Jewish return to the Land of Israel then would appear in the media of the democratic world as an unjust usurpation of an ancient people from the land of Palestine. The Arab-Israeli conflict then would be transformed into a conflict between Israelis and "Palestinians." No longer would the media portray the vast Arab world as threatening small and vulnerable Israel; instead, Israel would appear as the villain endangering the national existence of the "Palestinian people."

By embracing the name of the ancient Philistines, the Arab Palestinians have unwittingly incriminated themselves; for the term, Philistine, derives from the Hebrew root *falash*, which means to invade or trespass. And indeed, as Joan Peters has shown in *From Time Immemorial*, during the 1920s, Arabs from Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Egypt, and the Hejaz (Saudi Arabia today) settled illegally in what had been internationally recognized by the 1917 Balfour Declaration as the Jewish homeland. As will presently be seen, far from uprooting Arabs from Israel, the Zionist enterprise attracted them in large numbers in this century.

That Arabs, who are monotheists, should have borrowed the name of a people who were pagans is but one of the countless fallacies in which the

Arab world abounds. There is no such thing as a Palestinian language, culture, or history. The only authentic culture in Palestine is that of the Jews, who have lived there for more than 3,500 years. (See Gen. 23:15-18; 33:19, which records the actual purchase of land in Hebron and Shechem by the Patriarchs of the Jewish people.)

In his *Innocents Abroad*, published in 1869, that lovable genius Mark Twain travelled in Palestine and recorded this impression of the country:

Palestine sits in sackcloth and ashes. Over it broods the spell of a curse that has withered its fields and fettered its energies. Where Sodom and Gomorrah reared their domes and towers, the solemn sea now floods the plain, in whose bitter waters no living thing exists . . . [and] about whose borders nothing grows but weeds, and scattering tufts of cane, and that treacherous fruit that promises nourishment to parching lips, but turns to ashes at the touch. Nazareth is forlorn; about that ford of Jordan where the hosts of Israel entered the Promised Land with songs of rejoicing, one finds only a squalid camp of fantastic Bedouins of the desert; Jericho accursed lies a mouldering ruin today, even as Joshua's miracle left it more than three thousand years ago; Bethlehem [is] in poverty . . . Renowned Jerusalem itself, the stateliest name in history, has lost all its ancient grandeur, and is become a pauper village . . .

On November 17, 1930, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald presented this testimony on the floor of the House of Commons:

I happened to be in Palestine two years ago, and I went up and down the country. I must say that it is impossible for anyone who saw what I saw to be too extravagant in tributes to the Jewish colonizers in Palestine. I saw what was bog being turned into cultivable land. I saw the historical and very barren sides of the mountains of Gilboa being planted with olive trees. I saw the morass at the foot of the mountain—a morass that runs along the valley down which the defeated army of Saul fled. It was bog. I found it being drained and recovered . . . I saw not only labour but spirit and generosity. University graduates were working alongside day labourers, their hands getting hardened with the stones they were breaking in the making of roads . . . It was a wonderful sight.

“The transformation of Mark Twain's Palestine to Ramsay MacDonald's is essentially the achievement of one decade.” So wrote U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1931.<sup>6</sup> The seeds of this achievement had been planted nearly fifty years earlier by Jews who confirmed the biblical prophesy that, without the Jewish people, the Land of Israel would ever remain desolate (Lev. 26:27, 32).<sup>7</sup> “The seeds of this

accomplishment,” Frankfurter goes on to say, “have been nurtured by the most tenacious hopes and traditions of the Jewish people.” What makes this accomplishment all the more extraordinary is that the Jews then were only a small minority in this land that had been left desolate for almost 1,900 years. Except in Jerusalem, the majority of the land’s inhabitants were Arabs.

That Jews were only a small minority in Palestine did not disturb the early Zionists, notwithstanding their democratic predilections. At this point, democracy was subordinated to Zionism. It was only later, when the Jews became an overwhelming majority in the land—as can be seen today—that Zionism would be subordinated to democracy.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the future relationship between Jews and Arabs did not trouble the minds of the leading secular Zionists. They did not have to contend with the current myth of Palestinian-Arab rootedness and longevity in Palestine. The sparse and transient population of the land as well as its infertility were legendary. The 250,000 Arabs west of the Jordan were *fellahin*, i.e., peasant farmers; some were Bedouin. Steeped in poverty, illiteracy, and divisiveness, and subject to absentee landlords and Ottoman rapacity, the Arabs of Palestine had no national aspirations.<sup>8</sup> Given, moreover, the age-old presence of the Jews in Palestine, their majority status in Jerusalem, as well as the talents and worldwide resources of the Jewish people, the goal of establishing a nation-state in the Holy Land was neither a romantic fantasy nor a usurpation.

Not that the Zionists adequately understood the Arab problem. In his *Altneuland*, Herzl offers an idyllic view of a future Jewish state in which the entire population of Palestine—Jews and Arabs—live in peace and friendship. The Arabs participate in the life and institutions of the Jewish state on the basis of complete equality. There is no national discrimination. Indeed, for political Zionists the thought of national, i.e., religious antagonism between Jews and Arabs was virtually nonexistent. The fact that Islam borrowed much from Judaism encouraged many Zionists to believe that conflict with the Arabs could be avoided.

Of course, it was obvious, even to Herzl, that geographic separation between Jews and Arabs was desirable and would benefit all concerned. In his diaries, Herzl wrote: “We shall try to spirit the penniless [Arab] population across the border by acquiring work for them in the transfer countries, and by denying them work in our country. . . .”<sup>9</sup>

Israel Zangwill, on the other hand, recognized that the presence of the Arabs in Palestine would be an obstacle to the realization of Zionism. It was his hope in 1904 that the nomadic element in Arab life would facilitate their migration to other lands in the vast and underpopulated region of the Middle East. Besides, he held that the Arabs of Palestine had produced



neither a physical infrastructure, nor any distinctive spiritual culture. Hence, their relocation would entail no significant loss to the Islamic world. At a meeting of the Zionist leadership in May of 1936, Menachem Ussishkin raised the idea of a population exchange between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews of Iraq. During the 1930s, Berl Katznelson, a key figure in the Zionist labor movement, was troubled by the tens of thousands of Arabs streaming into Palestine, seeking employment in newly developed Jewish towns and villages. He believed that, in the long run, it would be to the mutual advantage of Jews and Arabs if the latter were encouraged to join their brethren in Syria and Iraq. Consistent with this idea, Moshe Sharett, head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department (and a future Foreign Minister), proposed, in 1939, that funds be raised to help the Arabs of Palestine migrate to neighboring countries. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Zionist Congress, volunteered to approach the President of the United States with this end in view.

Nevertheless, population transfer or exchange never became a public policy of the Zionist movement, even though the idea had been advanced independently by various British diplomats during the Mandate. No doubt it was felt that more urgent obstacles first had to be overcome simply to gain international approval of a Jewish homeland.

Herzl believed that, although the geographic separation of the Jews and the Arabs obviously was desirable, nonetheless by bringing modern science and economic prosperity to Palestine, the Zionists would uplift its Arab inhabitants and ease Arab-Jewish relations. Even the learned Dr. Arthur Ruppin, jurist and economist, who arrived in Palestine in 1907, saw no ideological or cultural reasons why the two peoples could not live together in peace and equality. Many Zionists really believed that the introduction of modern rationalism (read democratic secularism) in Palestine would purge the Holy Land of age-old superstition and rivalry.

Arab or pan-Arab nationalists had a very different view of Palestine. These nationalists regarded the Arab countries as constituting a single geographic and ethnic homeland that was carved into various artificial units after World War I to serve the interests of Western colonialism. They vehemently and violently opposed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its promise of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.<sup>10</sup>

The Zionists merely affirmed the obvious: Palestine was never an Arab country. No Arab nation ever set its historical roots in this soil, and no *national* claim was ever made to the land by any national group other than the Jews. This is why the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate, having affirmed the land as the National Home of the Jews, charged them with guaranteeing the civil and religious rights of other inhabitants. No mention was made of any *national* rights of other inhabit-

ants, if only because it was recognized that the only *national* claim to the area was that made by the Jewish people.

All this is irrelevant to the Islamic mind. Once land has been occupied or conquered by Muslims, then, apart from practical necessity, it cannot be surrendered to infidels. Conversely, Muslims cannot accept, on principle, the control of Arab land by non-believers. It should be emphasized also that geographic boundaries between Arab-Islamic states are not recognized by Islamic law. Such boundaries are temporary expedients or aberrations, for Islam is one *nation*, one *homeland*, one *civilization*.

Unlike the Jewish nationalists mentioned earlier, most Arab nationalists take religion seriously. They abhor those who reduce religion to faith and morals and, thereby, separate religion from law. They reject as insolent and shallow the Western secularists who draw boundaries around God's commandments and say to Him: "Up to this point, you are sovereign, but beyond these bounds begins the sovereignty of the state."<sup>11</sup>

Islam, which originated in the seventh century, is a world religion whose humblest adherents are among the proudest people on earth. In its meteoric ascendancy, Islam destroyed primitive idolatry throughout the Arabian peninsula and in much of North Africa and Southern Asia. The two greatest Arab philosophers of the Middle Ages, al-Farabi and Averroes (who were Muslims in dress only), helped preserve and transmit to the West the writings of classical Greece, of Plato and Aristotle. Islam brought light to peoples submerged in darkness. Professor Bernard Lewis, the renowned expert on Islam, touches on this theme when he says of Islam: "It has given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives."<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, it should be emphasized that Islam (unlike Judaism) is a proselytizing and warrior religion. Muslims venerate Muhammad not only as a prophet but as a soldier and ruler (which is why Islamic regimes are usually ruled by military men). Moreover, like Christianity and Manicheanism, Islam is a religion whose founder forms an integral part of the faith. It is not sufficient to believe in the gospels of these messengers, but in the messengers themselves. This is one reason why Muslims have wielded the sword to spread the faith and to send myriads of infidels to eternal rest.

As Professor Lewis explains:

In the classical Islamic view . . . the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam. [For Muslims] What is truly evil and unacceptable is the dominion of infidels over true believers. For true

believers to rule misbelievers is proper and natural, since this provides for the maintenance of the holy law, and gives misbelievers both the opportunity and the incentive to embrace the true faith. But for misbelievers to rule over true believers is blasphemous and unnatural, since it leads to the corruption of religion and morality in society, and to the flouting or even the abrogation of God's law.<sup>13</sup>

Lewis adds: "This may help us to understand the current troubles in such diverse places as Ethiopian Eritrea, Indian Kashmir, Chinese Sinkiang, and Yugoslav Kossovo, in all of which Muslim populations are ruled by non-Muslim government." He might have added Israel.

What Lewis fails to see, however, is that Islam's antipathy to Western civilization has some rational justification. The moral decay of democracy mentioned in the previous chapter is rooted in the separation of law from religion and morality. This separation has deprived law of its sacred character and has demoralized, as it were, the social and economic life of the individual and the collective life of society. Man has been artificially split into two domains, religious and secular, where the religious has ceased to have relevance in man's everyday life. This is actually the Orthodox Jewish view, the sobriety of which is lost in Islamic fundamentalism.

Contrary to Herzl and Ruppin's fond wishes, it was not going to be easy for Jews and Muslims to live in peace and equality in a Jewish homeland, especially one governed by secular Zionists.

### III

In December, 1922, the League of Nations, in pursuance of the provisions of the Balfour Declaration, marked out for the Jewish homeland a 43,075 square mile area from the eastern shore of the Mediterranean to the desert on both sides of the Jordan River. Britain was named the Mandatory Power.

In May of the previous year, however, Britain had authorized, as a six-month "temporary arrangement," the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan on the eastern side of historical Palestine (Israel). This area of 32,460 square miles was three-fourths of the land promised and set aside for the Jewish homeland. When the "temporary arrangement" continued beyond the December 1922 commencement of the Mandate, the Zionists failed to protest, despite the support they enjoyed from fifty-two members the League of Nations and from the United States. The "temporary arrangement" assumed a permanent texture, for it was on this land that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was established in 1946, thanks to the patronage (some would say perfidy) of the British. Thus, an artificial Arab



state, sparsely populated by Bedouins, became the inheritor of the eastern section of Palestine.

In the western section, the Arab population in 1922 was approximately 550,000 (of whom 480,000 were Muslim Arabs, while 70,000 were Christian Arabs). By 1946, the total Arab population grew to 1.2 million as a result of natural increase, a great drop in the infant mortality rate (among Muslims, from 199 deaths per thousand live births in 1923 to 91 per thousand in 1946), and a rise in life expectation (increasing from thirty-seven years in 1926 to forty-nine years in 1943).<sup>14</sup> Arab life expectancy increased to seventy-two years in the mid-1980s. In contrast, the Jewish population in 1922 was only 84,000 but exceeded 650,000 in 1947, largely as a consequence of immigration.

During this period, the Jews established an economic and quasi-political infrastructure.<sup>15</sup> Lands were purchased and settled, particularly on the coastal plain, the Jezreel Valley, the Jordan Valley, and the Galilee. Urban centers, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa, were developed. Political articulation of the Zionist enterprise led to the formation of various political parties, the most powerful being the Socialist *Mapai* (now known as the Labor Party). In 1920 Labor Zionist leaders established the *Histadrut* or General Federation of Labor. The *Histadrut* was, and remains, far more than a labor union. It embraced agricultural settlements and urban work groups, cooperative societies and construction firms, a major bank and health fund, sports and recreation facilities, newspapers and periodicals, schools and cultural organizations. Meanwhile, universities, hospitals, and scientific research centers were established. All bore the stamp of secular Zionism, which is not to say that religious Zionists did not contribute to the formation and operation of these institutions.

In all this remarkable activity and productivity, the Zionists harnessed the financial resources of world Jewry. Given, therefore, the institutional structure of the Zionist Congress, its Executive Committee and People's Council, one may say that, by the 1930s, a Jewish "shadow state and government" was consolidated in Palestine. But what rendered this Zionist accomplishment all the more astonishing is that it witnessed the resuscitation of the Hebrew language as the spoken tongue throughout the country. The ancient vernacular of the Jewish people was reborn.

And so, thanks to the Zionist movement, the Jews—unlike the Kurds, the Copts, the Berbers, and other oppressed minorities in the Middle East—are the only ones to have gained independent statehood in this, by no means monolithic, Arab-Islamic sea. The revolutionary significance of this fact and the fear and hatred it evokes in the dominant and overbearing Sunni-Arab-Muslim world should be borne in mind as we proceed in this inquiry.



The progress of the Jews during the twenty-five year period of the Mandate inevitably and immensely improved the economic standards, health, and longevity of the Arabs. Not only did their per capita income greatly exceed that of any Arab country, but the rate of natural increase of Arabs in western Palestine was the highest in the Arab world. The rapid growth of the Arab wages and population in Palestine was particularly striking in those areas of Jewish settlement and development. This was acknowledged by the British Peel Commission report of 1937. And yet, the report noted that, "Although the Arabs have benefitted from the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improvement in the economic situation in Palestine has meant the deterioration of the political situation."<sup>16</sup>

The ideological significance of this fact seems never to have penetrated the democratic mind, be it Socialist or Capitalist. To this day, it is widely believed that the ultimate cause of conflict is economic scarcity. The end of ideology has reinforced this Marxist prejudice, one that very much influenced the Socialists who founded modern Israel.

Clearly, the Peel Commission report indicates that the Arabs were animated primarily by ideological motives. Capitalism did not exist in Palestine and neither Muslim nor Christian Arabs were Marxists. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 was directed against Zionism and the concomitant influx of Jews to Palestine. With the year 1939, however, the long night of World War II descended on mankind, including the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust. The Arabs supported Hitler. The Zionists formed the Jewish Brigade which fought alongside Britain and the United States.

From the ashes of the Holocaust, a Jewish polity came into existence. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed the "Partition Resolution" which divided the western section of Palestine into two states, one Jewish, the other Arab. The Zionists accepted the Resolution, though not without reluctance, in view of the original Mandate of the League of Nations. The Arabs rejected the Resolution and rioted throughout the country. Between December 1947 and March 1948, hundreds of Jews were killed, though not without reprisals. In April, Arab military units from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq invaded the country and sought to drive the Jews out of the Negev in the south and the Galilee in the north. Then, on May 14, 1948, when the British Mandate expired, the Jews published a Proclamation of the State of Israel. The following day, Arab armies from Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia joined forces with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to destroy the one-day-old state.

The United States, regretting its vote for the Partition Resolution, tried to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state by imposing an arms

embargo against Israel. The American embargo continued throughout Israel's War of Independence. Nevertheless, with the help of arms from Czechoslovakia, the infant state managed to repulse the invaders. Indeed, were it not for American and British pressure, the Israeli defense forces would have destroyed the Egyptian Army.<sup>17</sup> Yielding to this pressure, Israel withdrew from Gaza, parts of Judea and Samaria, as well as from southern Lebanon. The April 1949 armistice demarcation lines left the Jordanian army in control of Judea and Samaria, which Jordan annexed the following year.

It should be borne in mind that what Western media repeatedly refer to as the "West Bank" was the term coined by the Jordanian government to replace and erase from the map the historical names of Judea and Samaria (*Yehuda* and *Shomron*). This land happens to be the heartland of historic Israel. (Judea includes eastern Jerusalem, the cite of the Temple Mount, as well as Hebron, the burial place of the Patriarchs.) Judea-Samaria is seventy-five miles long and roughly thirty-five miles wide. Its strategically important mountain ridges overlook the eight to fifteen-mile-wide coastal plain on which Israel's population centers are situated. The 1949 armistice lines thus reduced Israel to a most vulnerable ministate of 8,000 square miles, less than 20 percent of the original League of Nations Mandate.

Nevertheless, Israel was reborn. During the first three years of its re-establishment, this fledgling country doubled its population by opening its doors to 700,000 impoverished Jews scattered throughout North Africa and Asia, religious Jews seeking to return to their ancient homeland. A biblical prophecy was in process of being fulfilled. (See Deut. 30:4-5; Isa. 11: 11-12; Jer. 30:3, 31:8; Ezek. 28:25.) This was hardly the manner in which the founders of the new State regarded Israel's rebirth.

#### IV

These secular Zionists possessed a paradoxical mentality. Influenced by the cosmopolitan and egalitarian ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, they regarded man from an abstract point of view, as independent of ethnicity or nationality. Yet, they regarded themselves as Jews and the Jews as a nation. They performed this intellectual legerdemain by reducing the Torah to a "religion," a mere matter of private conscience, and by severing it from Jewish nationhood. This means that Jews can comprise a nation without Judaism, that is, without being distinctively Jewish!

In other words, these Zionists wished to remain "subjectively" Jewish and "objectively" secular humanists—a questionable dichotomy. "A secular vision of the Bible," wrote David Ben-Gurion, "must examine the

postulate of the Jews as a Chosen People. I believe firmly that the true situation in history was the reverse of what the phrase implies. I think the Jews chose their God and not, as the Torah puts it, that He chose us." Another Ben-Gurion inversion: "Of course, speaking personally as one who is non-religious, I believe that theology reverses the true sequence of events. To me it is clear that God was 'created' in the image of man as the latter's explanation to himself of the mystery of his own earthly presence."<sup>18</sup> Given the atheism of leading secular Zionists—some believed Zionism *had* to be atheistic—one wonders why they wanted to remain "subjectively" Jewish (whatever that means). They could hardly believe that the Judaic way of life represents the height of human perfection. They deplored such an idea as "chauvinistic."

In any event, and as suggested earlier, the humanism and cosmopolitan attitude of these Zionists should be understood as a reaction to the anti-Semitism spawned by nineteenth-century European nationalism. Nationalism in the form of national chauvinism was a threat to the Jew (as it has been with the disintegration of the Soviet Union). Let a Jew be the most loyal Frenchman or German, still he is a "foreign element." And so many Zionists became cosmopolitans, which is not entirely consistent with Zionism. Whatever its form, Zionism affirms the idea of Jewish nationhood. The question is, what does Jewish nationhood consist of for secular Zionists, and how does this differ from the position of religious Zionists?

To answer this question with some precision, note that European nationalism was the model of secular Zionism. As a reaction, in part, to the horrendous religious wars of the seventeenth century, European nationalism was a secular movement in which patriotism, or the sense of nationhood, gradually supplanted unqualified devotion to Christianity. This is the clear meaning and consequence of the separation of church and state. Consistent therewith, secular Zionists believed that Jewish nationhood could be separated from what they understood to be the Jewish "religion."<sup>19</sup>

The goal of these Zionists was to establish a Jewish state without the observance of Jewish law. In such a state, the Torah and the Talmud would be relegated to practical as well as theoretical insignificance. But this means that Israeli legislation and institutions would differ in no essential respect, say, from those of England or France. Religious and non-religious Jews would find a haven in this State; and, although secular legislation might support certain Jewish institutions and practices, the government itself would be based on gentile principles.<sup>20</sup>

The secular orientation of the Zionists who founded modern Israel was subtly announced in their Proclamation of the State on May 14, 1948, a document commonly referred to as Israel's "Declaration of Indepen-



dence.” Unlike its American counterpart, the Zionist document makes no reference to God.<sup>21</sup> Its opening sentence is no less revealing. “The Land of Israel,” it avows, “was the birthplace of the Jewish people.” This statement tacitly denies the Scriptural origin and foundation of Judaism and of Jewish peoplehood. It suggests that the Jews did not become a people until the conquest of the land of Canaan by Joshua, hence, only *after* the Law-Giving at Mount Sinai. Yet, Scripture repeatedly refers to the Children of Israel as a people and also as a nation *prior* to their exodus from Egypt, as well as during their wanderings in the Great Wilderness. (See Exod. 1:9, 3:7, 5:3, 6:2-7; Deut. 4:8, 27:9.) In other words, the Jewish people, like no other, was constituted a nation *before* they received a land of their own. The physical possession of a country is not the condition for their existence as a nation. Rather, the faithful fulfillment of their task as a “light unto the nations” is the condition for their physical possession of a country.<sup>22</sup> Leaving aside the Covenant with Abraham, what made the Jews a people was not the Land of Israel so much as was their “portable homeland,” the Torah. It was only the Torah that preserved them as a nation despite their having been without a land of their own for nineteen centuries.

In positing the Land of Israel as the origin of Jewish nationhood, the political Zionists were simply imitating the territorial nationalism of the non-Jewish world. The French cannot be Frenchmen, or Poles cannot be Polish, without the existence of a territory called France or Poland. Contrast the traditional Jewish view beginning with the Scriptural verse “Behold an *ahm* that dwells alone and shall not consider itself [as merely one] among [other] *goyim*” (Num. 23:9).

As various commentators have noted, whereas *ahm* signifies a collectivity united by a religious heritage, *goy* signifies a collectivity united only on the basis of a common territory or homeland. Scripture designates the Jews an *ahm* as well as a *goy*. This distinction, in secular terms, corresponds to the difference between a people and a nation. To elaborate, a people is monocultural: it is united not only by language, but by endogamous patterns of marriage and by shared beliefs and values rooted in a common and immemorial past. A nation, on the other hand, can be multicultural as well as monocultural. Indeed, contrary to the conventional view, ethnic multiplicity is widespread in the Middle East. For example, the Iraqi Kurds are Muslims but not Arabs. Like Iraq's ruling Sunni Arab majority, they are citizens of the state. Nevertheless, the Kurds' singular ethnic loyalty is far more meaningful and stronger than their political loyalty. But what is more, their ethnic identity is also stronger than their religious identity, else they would not seek separate nationhood vis-à-vis the Arab Muslims of Iraq. Much the same may be said of the Druzes in



Lebanon and Syria, the Baluch of Pakistan, and the Berbers in Morocco and Algeria.<sup>23</sup>

The same sort of tensions may be seen in Eastern Europe, where nationalism based on ethnicity transcends Christianity. For example, Poles and Lithuanians have historically put their national interests ahead of their common religion, in this case Catholic Christianity. And, surely, this subordination of religion to nationalism is to be attributed to the fact that both peoples had nationhood long before they were forced to accept Christianity. What distinguishes the Jews, however, is *religious* nationhood. The Old Testament, unlike the New Testament, does not record the source of a religion, but rather the divine founding of a people-cum-nation, and prior to the establishment of its territorial domain.

To be sure, the Land of Israel is essential for the moral and intellectual perfection of the Jewish people. One reason is this: The supreme organ of Jewish government, the Great Sanhedrin, can operate only in Israel, more precisely, from the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Without the Sanhedrin, an institution that unites legislative and judicial functions, the nation of Israel would lack the comprehensiveness and rationality of Judaic law. But the Land of Israel is only one of the three pillars of Jewish nationhood. The second is the Jewish people themselves, a designation that obviously excludes non-Jews (who, if they wish and qualify, may reside in the Land of Israel or even convert to Judaism). The third pillar of Jewish nationhood is, of course, the Torah itself. If Jewish nationhood means anything it means a distinctive way of life, namely that illuminated by the laws and teachings of the Torah.

For example, of the many laws that distinguish Jews from non-Jews, suffice to mention those pertaining to the Sabbath, the dietary laws, and those governing marriage and family purity. These laws preserved the identity of the Jewish people down through the ages. They not only distinguished the Jewish nation from all other nations, but spared them from the fate of nations whose existence depended on having a land of their own. Some nations have been conquered and eradicated. Others have been amalgamated with their conquerors. Still, other nations have undergone evolutions and revolutions that fundamentally altered their character. Only the Jews have preserved their 3,500 year-old national identity. This they could do because, in whichever country they lived, regardless of its beliefs and customs, they adhered to the laws of their Torah, such as those just mentioned.

As we have seen, however, secular Zionism separated these laws from Jewish nationhood. The separation is not only arbitrary; it can subvert Jewish nationhood, even in the diluted sense of political Zionism. This may be seen in another provision of Israel's Proclamation of the State.

While the Proclamation repeatedly refers to Israel as a "Jewish" state, it prescribes "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex . . . ." This egalitarian principle obviously is in tension with Jewish nationhood and even with the existence of the Jewish state as conceived by secular Zionists. For given the democratic principle of "one person, one vote," if the Jews of Israel were outnumbered by Muslims, the State of Israel would cease to be Jewish in any sense of the term. Hence, a basic contradiction exists not only between democracy and Jewish nationhood, but even between democracy and political Zionism.

If only to obtain a Jewish majority in the State of Israel, Israel's Knesset enacted, in 1950, the Law of Return, the cornerstone of political Zionism. The law acknowledges an *inherent* right of Jews to settle in the Land of Israel where they may automatically become citizens. Yet various Jewish politicians and intellectuals in Israel would annul the Law of Return on the grounds that it is "anti-democratic" and "chauvinistic." Even in their own country these Jews are anti-nationalist, fearing that the affirmation of Jewish nationhood implicit in the Law of Return would arouse anti-Semitism abroad! (As we shall see in chapter 3, the government, in 1992, introduced a "Bill of Human Rights" that negates the Law of Return by removing all distinctions between Jewish and Arab citizens even though the latter, with few exceptions, do not perform military service.)

Moral—perhaps one should say immoral—egalitarianism has thus become the credo of Israel's political and intellectual elites. By some perverse and compulsive logic, they have sacrificed Zionism on the altar of democracy. Whatever else this means, clearly political Zionism lacks the intellectual and moral power to compete with the world-historical forces of democracy. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first and most charismatic Prime Minister, was the champion of the Law of Return. Yet, he penned this piece of Zionist or Jewish self-effacement for posterity: "An Arab should also have the right to be elected President of Israel."<sup>24</sup> Nothing could better presage the demise of political Zionism. But let us probe a little deeper into this bizarre phenomenon.

Notwithstanding its great accomplishments, the shallowness of political Zionism may be largely attributed to the influence of European philosophy, especially of Marxism, on the founders of modern Israel. Many Zionists adopted a socialist ideology if only to counter the anti-Semitic canard about Jewish capitalists exploiting the working class. But by adopting a Marxist mode of thought, they harbored a doctrine that is in fundamental tension with nationalism—any nationalism. And it goes without saying that Marxism, an atheistic creed, is utterly contrary to Judaism.

European education profoundly influenced the founders and faculties of Israel's academic institutions. Historical or cultural relativism has ever flourished in Israel's secular universities. Martin Buber put it quite simply: "There is no scale of values for the [world-historical] function of peoples. One cannot be ranked above another."<sup>25</sup> It is in this light that we are to understand why this Hebrew University professor and his colleague, Dr. Judah Magnes (the university's first president), favored a bi-national Arab-Jewish state in the Land of Israel. Thus, in 1947, they declared in a joint statement:

We do not favour Palestine as a Jewish country or Palestine as an Arab country, but a bi-national Palestine as the common country of two peoples . . . Palestine is not just an Arab land like any other Arab land, or just a Jewish land. For one thing, it is a Holy Land for three monotheistic religious, of which two—Judaism and Christianity—had their origin here, while the third, Islam regards Jerusalem as next in holiness to Mecca and Medinah.

Notice that Buber and Magnes purvey each of these three claims to the Holy Land as self-justifying. Such is their cultural relativism or neutrality that they do not consider the possibility that the Jewish claim might be more valid than that of Christianity or of Islam. They surely knew that in the past 2,500 years, none of the peoples or nations that conquered or occupied the land of Israel—whether Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Seleucids, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Seljuks, Fatimids, Latin Crusaders, Mamluks, or Turks—ever established a national dominion or functional capital in this strange land. (Indeed, were it not for this providential fact the Jews never could have returned to Palestine.)<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, scholars of their repute surely knew that Jerusalem is not even mentioned in the Koran. Juxtaposing this revealing truth with the paramount significance of Jerusalem in Judaism, and given their own admission that Islam regards Jerusalem "as next in holiness to Mecca and Medinah," one would think that Buber and Magnes would assert the priority of the Jewish claim over that of Islam and Christianity. Until the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish restoration of Palestine, no *national* claim ever had been made to the land by any national group other than the Jews. Buber and Magnes admit that "The very idea of Palestine as a modern entity is the result of Jewish activity." They also knew also that it was precisely this "Jewish activity" that had attracted many Arabs to Palestine and whose presence in the land was recent compared to that of the Jews. Yet, they conclude by saying: "We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natural rights of the Arabs [based on their presence and labor on the

land] as . . . of equal validity . . . ”<sup>27</sup> Clearly, the Torah view of the issue was utterly discarded, for like all secular Zionists, neither Buber nor Magnes regarded Israel, by virtue of the Bible, as the truth-bearing nation.

This leads me to probe a bit deeper into Buber's statement that one nation cannot be ranked above another. Evident here is the attitude of a morally neutral spectator, which is exactly the posture of the German school of historical relativism. In reality, however, every great nation does indeed rank itself above others, at least until its learned men become relativists or mere spectators of history. Contrast Dostoevski:

If a great people does not believe that the truth is only to be found in itself alone . . . ; if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to raise up and save all the rest by its truth, it would at once sink into being ethnographic material. A really great people can never accept a secondary part in the history of humanity, nor even one of the first, but it will have the first part. A nation that loses this belief ceases to be a nation.

Notice that Buber's cultural egalitarianism logically denies the election of Israel as the “light unto the nations.” This denial permeated the mentality of those who founded the modern State of Israel. They accepted, uncritically, the historical and democratic relativism that has dominated the modern era, in consequence of which they harbored no exalted view of the concept of Israel, of Israel as the truth-bearing nation. Consider, therefore, the German philosopher, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's view of Israel. In his *Dawn of Day*, Nietzsche extols Israel and the Jewish people as follows:

In Europe they have gone through a school of eighteen centuries, such as no other nation can boast of . . . In consequence whereof the resourcefulness in soul and intellect of our modern Jews is extraordinary. In times of extremity they, least of all the inhabitants of Europe, try to escape any great dilemma by recourse to drink or to suicide—which less gifted people are so apt to fly to. Each Jew finds in the history of his fathers and grandfathers a voluminous record of instances of the greatest coolness and perseverance in terrible positions, of the most artful and clever fencing with misfortune and chance; their bravery under the cloak of wretched submissiveness, their heroism in the *spernere se sperni* [despising their despisers] surpass the virtues of all the saints.

Nietzsche continues:

People wanted to make them contemptible by treating them scornfully for twenty centuries, by refusing to them the approach to all dignities and



honorable positions, and by pushing them all the deeper down into the mean trades—and, indeed, they have not become genteel under this process. But contemptible? They have never ceased believing themselves qualified for the highest functions; neither have the virtues of all suffering people ever failed to adorn them. Their manner of honoring parents and children, the reasonableness of their marriages and marriage customs make them conspicuous among Europeans. Besides, they know how to derive a sense of power and lasting revenge from the very trades which were left to them (or to which they were abandoned) . . . Yet their vengeance never carries them too far, for they all have that liberality even of the soul in which the frequent change of place, climate, customs, neighbors, and oppressors schools man; they have by far the greatest experience in human relationships . . .

Now Nietzsche concludes his encomium:

Where shall this accumulated wealth of great impressions, which forms the Jewish history in every Jewish family, this wealth of passions, virtues, resolutions, resignations, struggles, victories of all sorts—where shall it find an outlet, if not in great intellectual people and accomplishments? On the day when the Jews will be able to show as their handiwork such jewels and golden vessels as the European nations of shorter and less thorough experience neither can nor could produce, when Israel will have turned its eternal vengeance into an eternal blessing of Europe: then once more that seventh day will appear, when the God of the Jews may rejoice in Himself, His creation, and His chosen people—and all of us will rejoice with Him! <sup>28</sup>

Nietzsche notwithstanding, Israel's political and intellectual elites deplore nothing more than national, which is to say Jewish, pride. Fearful of anti-Semitism, their cultural egalitarianism is unequalled. It was not enough for Israel to require the teaching of Arabic in its public schools. Arabic had to be made an *official* language of the “Jewish” state!

This democratic mentality of Israel's political and intellectual leaders stands in striking contrast with the anything but democratic mentality of Israel's Arab-Islamic neighbors. What is more, Islamic universities, unaffected by the end of ideology, do not propagate cultural relativism or egalitarianism. To the contrary, Muslims are taught that Islam is the absolute and only truth. Muslim theologians, publicists, and the state-controlled media denigrate Jews as the “Sons of Satan” and Israel as the incarnation of “evil.”<sup>29</sup>

Psychologically, it is extremely difficult for humanists or non-religious Zionists to cope with this ideologically motivated venom. Despite the Arab massacres and mutilations of Jews in 1929 and between 1936 and

1939, no less a "rightwing" Zionist than Vladimir Jabotinsky advocated this genial policy—and here he anticipated Ben-Gurion: "In every Cabinet where the Prime Minister is a Jew the Vice-Premiership shall be offered to an Arab, and vice-versa."<sup>30</sup> The ascendancy of democracy over political Zionism thus was in evidence well before Israel's rebirth in 1948.

It can even be said that this ecumenical ideology ceased to be a vital force after Israel's victorious War of Independence. True, Israel's political leaders were then, more apt than now, to speak the language of Zionism. But as Nisan has observed, Zionist ideology has never had much operational significance in defining national priorities or guiding national policies. In fact, Ben-Gurion had largely accommodated himself to the 1949 armistice lines as Israel's final borders. He reportedly said that Zionist thought is dead.<sup>31</sup>

## V

One might think, however, that the Six Day War of June 1967 would have breathed new life into Zionism. After all, in a miraculous victory over its enemies, Israel captured Judea and Samaria from Jordan, the Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. But the war was unexpected. The Labor government had been oblivious to the possibility of war prior to May 1967. Hence, it was ideologically unprepared for the war's extraordinary consequences. Indeed, despite the frequency of border clashes with Jordan, of terrorist attacks from Gaza and the Sinai, and of military artillery shelling from the Golan Heights, territorial expansion played no part in the government's foreign policy. The government was preoccupied with domestic problems. A senior aide to Yitzhak Rabin writes:

On the morning of the Six Day War, June 6, 1967, there was no operational plan at General Staff Headquarters for the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to conquer the Jordan-held areas west of the River Jordan, not even [eastern] Jerusalem.

From the outset, there was no intention to seize the areas. Levi Eshkol, as Prime Minister, and Yitzhak Rabin, as chief of the general staff, sent a message to King Hussein which said explicitly that no harm would befall him and his kingdom if he sat still. The outcome is known . . .

Even before then, in the early 1960s, there was only one IDF general who spoke at military gatherings of "the heritage of our forefathers" and "the captive City of David," and expressed vociferous yearning to see the Temple Mount in our hands.

Most ironically in today's context, he was Ezer Weizman. He was harshly rebuked for this at the time by our first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion.<sup>32</sup>

Even the rightwing *Herut* movement and the two religious parties, *Mafdal* and *Agudat Yisrael*, which affirmed the right of the Jewish people to the entire, historic Land of Israel, were willing to accept the territorial status quo.<sup>33</sup>

Israel's stunning victory in the war seems to have left its political elites—notably Levy Eshkol, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, and Yigal Allon—ideologically dumbfounded. So decrepit was their Zionism that, eastern Jerusalem aside, the thought of retaining control of Judea and Samaria was based primarily on security, not on ideological considerations. In fact, all but Dayan were prepared to give up Judea and Samaria for peace with Jordan.<sup>34</sup>

Consider only this. On June 8, when the IDF captured the Temple Mount, Muslim clergymen, emerging from the Dome of the Rock, surrendered and asked that the Muslim shrines be unharmed. The request was granted on the spot. They then asked to be taken captive, in response to which they were told by the officer in charge that they were free to go home. When Dayan arrived on the scene, he ordered the removal of the Israeli flag from the Mount. A few days later he gave orders that control of the Temple Mount—the most sacred site of the Jewish people—be returned to the Waqf, the Muslim religious trust. Dayan's decision was ratified by the Cabinet, which included Menachem Begin and the National Religious Party! The effect was to limit Jewish sovereignty to the Wailing Wall below.

No one was more surprised by this Jewish self-abnegation than the Muslims, who fully expected their conquerors to reap the fruits of their victory. Indeed, it may well be argued that that the government could have incorporated Judea and Samaria (and Gaza) safely into the State of Israel. How this could have been accomplished will be revealed in chapter 4. What needs to be emphasized here is this: The Six-Day War, Israel's greatest military victory, was followed by a policy of territorial self-denial. The political Zionism of the Ben-Gurion generation not only was dead; it was in the process of metamorphosing into anti-Zionism. Israel's enemies were quick to exploit the ideological anemia of Israel's leaders. Let us see how.

### 3

## The Eclipse of Truth

I have never doubted for an instant that the true aim of the Arab states has always been, and still is, the total destruction of the State of Israel, or that even if we had gone back far beyond the 1967 lines to some miniature enclave, they would not still have tried to eradicate it and us . . . .

It is our duty to realize this truth; it is our duty to make it clear to all men of good will who tend to ignore it. We need to [face] this truth in all its gravity, so that we may continue to mobilize from among ourselves and the Jewish people all the resources necessary to overcome our enemies . . .

Golda Meir, *My Life* (1975)

Harvard Professor Richard Pipes is one of the foremost authorities on the (former) Soviet Union. In 1972, at the behest of the late Senator Henry Jackson, he prepared a paper containing the following passage alluding to the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Two powers—let us call them A and B—are at odds. War breaks out, country B defeats A, occupying in the process A's territory. At this juncture, in normal international practice, sooner or later negotiations begin. In the peace settlement which results, the defeated party usually has to make some concessions to the victor, among them, possibly, territorial ones. If for the defeated party A we substitute, say, France in 1870-71 or Finland in 1939-40, and for the victorious party B, respectively, Prussia and the Soviet Union, the pattern becomes clear. In both instances, the victor secured from the vanquished some territory and returned the remainder.

This practice, Professor Pipes explains, accords with the dictates of logic and precedent as well as with the interests of the countries involved. The same practice, he continues, ought to have been the outcome of the Six-Day War. That this was not and has not been the outcome of that conflict is to be attributed, initially, to the Arab refusal to recognize Israel as a sovereign state. So much is well known. But then Pipes adds: "The peculiar feature of this conflict is that whereas the real issue at stake is negotiation between belligerents, Soviet [and Arab] propaganda has managed to make the main issue appear [as] Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in



the course of the war. Thus, a matter which should be part of the final settlement of the conflict becomes a precondition of negotiations leading to a settlement.”<sup>1</sup>

Actually, the success of this diplomatic legerdemain—now known as the policy of “territory for peace”—was not a victory of Arab and Soviet cunning. In reality, the Arab success is only symptomatic of a fundamental defect in the democratic mentality of Israel's political and intellectual elites. Chapter 5 will show that these elites are afflicted by a dysfunction peculiar to our democratic age. One of the symptoms of this dysfunction was alluded to earlier, namely, the inability of those tainted by moral or cultural relativism to take ideologies seriously. The psychological consequences of this malady will be elucidated later. Here it will only be necessary to juxtapose two facts: (1) the inherent inability of the relativistic mind to regard any all-embracing ideology as even partly evil; and (2) the inherent reluctance of the relativistic mind to tell the truth about nations animated by such ideologies. (As will be seen in the chapter 5, this reluctance can be so powerful as to impair even the instinct of self-preservation.)

Now, let us reexamine Pipes' remarks. Pipes is well aware of the refusal of Arab nations to recognize Israel as a sovereign state. However, it would be more accurate to say that these nations refuse to accord Israel diplomatic recognition because Israel is a *Jewish* state. And if that were not enough, this Jewish state, as we saw above, is occupying what Muslims regard as Arab land, something intolerable to the Islamic religion. From the Muslim perspective, the Arab-Israel conflict is fundamentally ideological. Yet, Professor Pipes chooses to emphasize that the peculiar feature of this conflict is that, “whereas the real issue at stake is negotiation between belligerents, Soviet [and Arab] propaganda has managed to make the main issue appear [as] Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the course of the war.” In truth, however, the issue is not negotiation between belligerents so much as it is the belligerent nature of Islam; and this is not a subject matter for negotiation.

Inasmuch as Islamic belligerence is not the ideal subject matter for morally neutral historians and political scientists, it will be necessary to review the Arab-Israel conflict in an unconventional way. Only by so doing will it be possible to understand with any profundity why the mentality of Israel's political leaders renders them incapable of dealing with this conflict. But let us begin with some simple, conventional facts concerning the Six-Day War of June 1967—the better to appreciate the bizarre character of the policy of “territory for peace.”

First, as we have seen, Judea and Samaria did not belong, as of right, to Jordan. Its declaration of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria in 1950 was recognized only by Pakistan and Britain. Second, Egypt had no sovereign claim to Gaza. No country today has any claims of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza that are better, or even equal to Israel's. In an editorial for the *American Journal of International Law*, Dr. Stephen M. Schwebel, then Legal Advisor of the American State Department, wrote:

The facts of the June 1967 Six-Day War demonstrate that Israel acted self-defensively against the threat and use of force against her by her Arab neighbors . . . The facts of the 1948 hostilities between the Arab invaders of Palestine and the nascent state of Israel further demonstrate that Egypt's seizure of the Gaza Strip, and Jordan's seizure and subsequent annexation of the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem, were unlawful . . . It follows that the Egyptian occupation of Gaza, and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank and Jerusalem, could not vest in Egypt and Jordan lawful, indefinite control, whether as an occupying power or sovereign: *ex injuria jus non oritur*.

In fact, Egyptian sovereignty over any land east of the Suez Canal, hence the Sinai—which bears a Hebrew name—was questionable, to say the least.

Third, it is incontrovertible that Israel was the victim of aggression in the Six-Day War, indeed, that it was threatened with *total annihilation* by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, aided by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Fourth, the territory Israel wrested from the aggressors was not only a basic means of their aggression, but given the country's "shoestring" dimension, the control of that territory by Arab-Islamic regimes cannot help but be a mortal danger to the Jewish state.

Nevertheless, no government of Israel, including that of Golda Meir, has ever exposed or dealt with the ideological or *religious* dimension of this danger. None has set forth a declaratory policy to the effect that Israel will not recognize or negotiate with any Arab regime that practices or condones the vilification of Jews and plots any violence against the Jewish state. Such a policy would require Israel's government to quote passages in the Koran which exhort Muslims to hate and kill Jews. The democratic-relativistic mentality of Israel's political leaders has ever hindered them from exposing the simple truth that the Islamic doctrine of *jihad*—of holy war—violates the UN Charter as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prescribes "tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial, or religious groups."

Contrary to Professor Pipes' otherwise perceptive analysis, Israel's geopolitical predicament after the June 1967 war was not the result of the

Arab refusal to recognize the Jewish state until it withdrew to the 1949 armistice lines. Rather, it was the result of the government's failure to unite might with right, that is, to crown Israel's military victory with a foreign policy based on truth, on moral and legal principles that would have solidified domestic public opinion while putting Israel's enemies on the defensive.

Tainted by democratic relativism, Israel's political leaders failed to enunciate this most obvious and compelling truth: The idea that the victim of aggression should restore the means of aggression to the aggressor not only is unprecedented, but preposterous and immoral. If this were made a principle of international law and practice the aggressor would have nothing to lose and everything to gain. It would encourage aggression, especially in the Middle East. But this means that the policy of "territory for peace" is not only immoral, but an incitement to war.<sup>2</sup>

Prime Minister Golda Meir was aware of the truth under discussion, as may be seen in Henry Kissinger's account of his efforts to negotiate an Israel-Syrian armistice line on the Golan Heights in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Even though Syria started the war and lost more territory on the Golan, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad insisted that his country be rewarded with a line better than the one from which the war had started! Kissinger conveyed Assad's demand to Mrs. Meir, whose response was vehement:

I can never accept that there is no difference between the attacker and the attacked . . . I can't make peace with the idea that [we had] two wars in seven years, with the price we paid for it. Then Assad says he must get his territory back. I mean, that is *chutzpah* of the *n*th degree . . . Isn't it an encouragement for our neighbors to go on fighting when the fighting does not lose anything?

Kissinger then begged the question: "Had Assad been present, he would have replied that Golda's inability to conceive of the territory as Syrian was at the heart of the problem. He saw no choice except to go on fighting for territory he considered historically Syrian . . ."<sup>3</sup> But then he would eventually fight for the remainder of the Golan and more, since for Assad all of Palestine is part of Syria. Hence, there was no sound reason to believe that he (or his successor) would rest content with Israel's yielding to such outrageous demands. To the contrary, that Washington could be used to pressure Israel's government into surrendering even territory conquered in the Six-Day War could not help but encourage (as well as facilitate) an Arab attack in the future. The end of ideology, however, has subordinated the future to the present. Had Israel's government been



animated by Zionism at the end of the Six-Day War, the Arab-Israeli conflict might have taken an entirely different turn. This same policy led to Czechoslovakia's destruction, World War II, and the Holocaust. These simple, moral truths involve nothing more than common sense, which seems to be beyond the cognitive powers of contemporary political science.

Another simple truth Israel's government failed to elucidate is this: If the victim of aggression succeeds in repelling the aggressor and holds the territory he has conquered, as Israel did after the Six-Day War, it is only reasonable and just that he should retain that territory until he is ready to negotiate a treaty of peace with the aggressor. And in such negotiations it is the victim who decides his security needs, as witness U.S. retention, after World War II, of the Japanese Island of Okinawa, some 5,000 miles from the American mainland.<sup>4</sup>

Viewed in the above light, the policy of territory for peace is symptomatic of a profound and widespread mental disorder.

There are, of course, conventional ways of explaining why Israel's political and intellectual elites have embraced this policy. Here I shall mention only three. Some commentators point to *Jewish pacifism or wishful thinking*. Others single out the *government's fear of alienating the United States*. Still others emphasize *Jewish fear of another war*. Interestingly, in an interview published in the January 14, 1978 issue of the Egyptian magazine *October*—this was almost two months after Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977—Sadat scornfully declared, "Fear is the second layer of skin of every Israeli or Jew."<sup>5</sup>

To be sure, the Jewish people, so few in number, so vulnerable, so often the victim of unprovoked aggression, and above all, so mindful of human life, look upon the possibility of another war with horror. But this does not get to the heart of things. The policy of territory for peace must be understood from a perspective that transcends conventional wisdom, along with contemporary political science and psychology.

This policy is rooted in the secular mentality of our age. The politics of the West takes its bearing from Hobbes' *summum malum*, the fear of violent death, hence of war. Although a secular faith in one's country can overcome this fear, such patriotism is difficult to sustain in a protracted conflict. This especially is true of a democracy steeped in relativism—unless basic economic interests are involved. Relativism erodes conviction in the justice of one's cause and the willingness to die for the sake of that cause. Dying for the glory of God, and thereby earning eternal life, no longer can rally the West, where democratic relativism has long flourished. Israel's enemies, however, are neither democrats nor relativists. They are quite willing to die for a cause which, because it is the cause of Allah, will earn them paradise.



The democratic relativism that modulates Israel's political and intellectual elites does not, by itself, prevent them from recognizing these facts about Muslims. But because relativists cannot accept Islam or any ideology as true—as grounded in the ultimate nature of things—or because relativists believe that every ideology is the product of historical evolution or accident, they see no reason why Muslims cannot change enough to overcome their hatred of Jews and accept the existence of the Jewish state of Israel.

This crypto-Marxist mentality of the West not only has dominated Israel's political and intellectual leaders. This mentality, which permeates the foreign policies and political science of the democratic West, manifests a profound inability to face the true nature of Islam and the Arab-Israel conflict. Islam, as Bernard Lewis has persuasively shown, is full or proud of its own perfection and is, thus, impervious to external stimuli. The hermetically sealed character of Islamic life is evident today in France, which has a Muslim community of over 3 million people. Of this closed community Mordechai Nisan writes: “Oblivious to the cultural environment which is French and Catholic, modern and permissive in value-orientation, the Muslims conduct their life within their own religious and social space . . . *Arabe c'est toujours l'Arabe*”<sup>6</sup> This insularity obviously is reinforced in the Arab Middle East.

Islam's traditional and collective quest for *being* is unaffected by the individualistic lust for *having* that is fostered by modern science and democracy. Thus, to use Western, i.e., secular democratic categories such as “conflict resolution” in dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict is provincialism garbed in cosmopolitanism. Let us examine the Islamic view of this metapolitical conflict.

## II

Thanks very much to Marx's reduction of ideology to “material premises” and to his own historical relativism, a smug skepticism reigns in the West, where the study of history is widely ignored or trivialized.

This is not so in Islam. For Muslims believe, and with good reason, that the reestablishment of the State of Israel in 1948, when viewed in the light of the Koran—to say nothing of Hebraic prophecy—challenges the validity of the Islamic religion. The Jews, according to Allah, should be in a permanent state of humbleness; they should be paying tribute to the faithful (Sura 9:29). Instead, the Jews now have an independent state of their own. Moreover, these infidels, in contradiction to the Koran, repeatedly have conquered the armies of the faithful (Sura 3:112; 8:66). Were this

not enough, Muslims also look upon Israel as a conduit for a secular, Western and especially American democratic lifestyle, which they regard not only as decadent but as subversive of Islamic values.

Furthermore, Zionism poses a subtle and not widely recognized threat to the monocultural nationalism of the Arab-Islamic world. Thus, in a lecture sponsored by the Arab League in Cairo, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, Professor of Law at the University of Baghdad, who later became Iraq's Prime Minister, declared:

The great danger of Israel is due to its being an ideological threat to our nationalism which challenges our entire national existence in the entire region. The existence of Israel nullifies the unity of our homeland, the unity of our nation and the unity of our civilization, which embraces the whole of this one region. Moreover, the existence of Israel is a flagrant challenge to our philosophy of life and the ideals for which we live, and a total barrier against the values and aims to which we aspire in the world.<sup>7</sup>

The antagonism portrayed in this passage conceals as much as it reveals. As pointed out in the previous chapter, Zionism is the only successful national liberation movement in the Middle East. The State of Israel stands as a model and even a potential ally of oppressed non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities of the Middle East. The Jews, together with these minorities, writes Mordechai Nisan, "share a basic objective goal: preventing Arabism and Islam, in their onward rush to imprint a monolithic stamp on all Mideastern peoples, from smothering them." But this means that successful Zionist movements among the Iraqi Kurds and Assyrians, the Lebanese Druze and Maronite Christians, the Baluch and the Coptic Christians, the Berbers and the Sudanese Christians, etc., would splinter the Arab-Islamic world—and relieve the tyranny that extends over most of the Middle East and North Africa. Several of these minorities are pro-Israel, and even show signs of Jewish origin. Indeed, some have been aided by Israel's government (but without the persistence of grand strategy). The dismantling of Israel would dim any hope they have of achieving, if not independent statehood, at least respected cultural autonomy, to say nothing of survival. But then, given the Arab-cum-Muslim's fanatical will to rule—contrast the liberal democrat's fanatical permissiveness—Israel's destruction is a civilizational, as well as a political imperative. And, the Muslim is not impatient.

Hence, Anwar Sadat could promise, in an interview with *al-Anwar* on June 22, 1975, that "The effort of our generation is to return to the 1967 borders. Afterward, the next generation will carry the responsibility."<sup>8</sup> Sadat fulfilled part of that promise: He regained the Sinai, in exchange for

which he signed a treaty of peace with Israel. How are we to understand this peace treaty?

Let us consult Cairo's al-Azhar University, reputedly the most influential university in Islamdom, and with close ties to the government of Egypt. Ponder the salient points of the following al-Azhar pronouncement published in Egypt's leading and semi-official newspaper, *al-Ahram*, on May 10, 1979, some six weeks *after* Anwar Sadat signed the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty:

It is the obligation of Egypt's ruler to be concerned about her defense, and if he thinks that the good of Muslims requires accommodation and truce [*sic*] with the enemies, he has a right to do so . . .

Since the period of prophecy Islam has given clear examples concerning treaties signed between Muslims and their enemies. The Koran commanded us to make peace with the enemy when the imam sees there is some advantage for the Muslims in it, as Allah clearly says: "If they are turning towards peace, then you likewise do so, and depend on Allah."

The Muslim authorities concluded that this verse complements the verses which talk about fighting the enemy and is not abrogated by them, because here fighting the enemy is an obligation . . .<sup>9</sup>

The enemy is, of course, Israel. Consider, therefore, the following facts about the one Muslim country that has made "peace" with Israel.

In violation of the March 1979 treaty, Egypt's state-controlled media spew the most obscene vilification of Jews and Israel. Bernard Lewis documents how even the Old Testament is now the object of Islamic defamation, and how this unrelieved denigration of anything Jewish was encouraged by Sadat both before and after the treaty and has been continued by his successor, Hosni Mubarak.<sup>10</sup> Consistent therewith, Egypt opposed efforts to rescind the UN Resolution equating Zionism with racism. Egypt attempted to stop Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. When to these and other violations of the letter and spirit of the March 1979 treaty, one adds the strategically significant tunnels Egypt has constructed under the Suez Canal and the tremendous military buildup going on in that poverty-stricken country, one is obliged to ask: How does the relationship between Egypt and Israel differ, in truth, not in theater, from what it was prior to the March 1979 treaty? Or rather, how did Egyptian rulers perceive this relationship after they signed that treaty?<sup>11</sup>

In an interview with the *New York Times* dated October 19, 1980, Anwar Sadat baldly declared: "Poor Menachem [Begin], he has his problems . . . After all, I got back 90 percent of the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and what has Menachem got? A piece of paper."



If the meaning of this boast is unclear, ponder a statement Sadat made a year after he signed the “peace” treaty with Israel: “Despite the present differences with the Arab ‘rejectionist’ rulers over the Egyptian peace initiative, the fact remains that these differences are only tactical not strategic, temporary not permanent.”<sup>12</sup>

Four-and-a-half years later, President Mubarak renewed diplomatic relations with Jordan, one of the two most strategically situated “rejectionist” states. While Mubarak praised King Hussein and called for “a united stand and a new struggle within the framework of a peaceful strategy,” his ally, deposed Sudanese President Jaafer Numeiri, explained that “we can only DEFEAT Israel through the method of peace.”<sup>13</sup> This may be termed a “peace-and-war” strategy. Hence, Egypt's former Defense Minister, Abdel-Halim Abu Gazala, could say in January 1987 that war with Israel is inevitable, that together with Syria, Egypt will destroy the Jewish state.<sup>14</sup> Predictably, Israel's government made no discernible public protest.

But let us correlate a more recent set of events. On October 31, 1991, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud entourage attended the U.S.-sponsored Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. Participating were delegates from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (together with a Palestinian delegation). While the delegates from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan were preparing for this “peace” conference, other delegates from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as from fifty-seven other Islamic countries—400 in all—were attending the International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution of Palestine held in Teheran from October 19 to October 22.

All the delegates in Teheran, without exception or qualification, signed the twenty-eight resolutions issued by the conference, resolutions hostile not only to Israel but to the United States. For example, whereas Resolution 3 calls for the “elimination of the Zionist existence,” Resolution 11 “condemns the efforts of the United States to hold the so-called Middle East peace conference”; Resolution 15 “strongly condemns the extensive presence of the U.S. in the sensitive region of the Persian Gulf.” Resolution 16 “considers the migration of the Soviet and other Jews to Palestine . . . an attempt to alter its democratic fabric and its Islamic identity.” Resolution 22 emphasizes “the need for an all-out *jihad* (holy war) against the Zionist regime.”<sup>15</sup>

Among the countries that signed these resolutions was Egypt (a supposed ally of the United States, which had erased \$7 billion of Egyptian debt in exchange for Egypt's nominal participation in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War). Moreover, Egypt's “semi-official” newspaper *Al-Ahram* saw fit to publish the conference's resolutions in full and



without a word of government condemnation—this, despite Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.

Israel's government refrained from lodging a formal protest in Cairo, or from exposing the Janus-faced character of the imminent Madrid conference. Why this self-effacement? Was it because of pressure from the Bush administration, which had invested so much political capital in that conference? So the public was given to believe by "sources close to the government." It was a convenient way for politicians to avoid the truth or shirk their responsibilities.

Fully cognizant of the bellicose intentions of the Arab-Islamic world, but trapped by their own rhetoric or "politics of peace," Israel's political leaders use the bogeyman of American pressure to excuse their own ineptitude or paralysis.

Here, they were given a marvelous opportunity to explode the Middle East peace charade. All the Prime Minister had to do was appear on CNN, read the *anti-American* and *jihad* resolutions of the Teheran conference, and ask: "How can Israel attend a peace conference in Madrid with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, when these same Arab regimes have denounced this peace conference in Teheran, indeed, have called for Israel's annihilation and have even condemned America's presence in the Middle East?"

Surely, such a statement would have nonplused the Bush administration and won to Israel's cause the support of a democratic Congress. Of course, such a statement would have been embarrassing to all concerned, and not the least to Israel's government. It would have required a degree of political courage not to be expected from a government that had sacrificed the Sinai and its untold treasure to Egypt for a "piece of paper."

How futile it was, therefore, when the government, almost six months after the Teheran conference, allowed the Director General of its Defense Ministry, Maj. General (ret.) David Ivri, to utter this whisper of truth at a symposium in Tel Aviv on April 13, 1992: "The peace with Egypt is not peace. It is actually a cease-fire that has continued for 15 years . . ." Ivri went so far as to admit that "Mubarak has not created any Egyptian interest in Israel's continued existence."<sup>16</sup>

At this point it is worth noting that a few months before Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Major General George Keegan, former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence, warned that a

profound change in Arab strategy is now underway . . . I have seen intelligence which very few Americans have access to, that persuades me that the first element of that strategy is that the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly remains committed, Messianically, to the extermi-

nation of Israel as a nation and as a people. What has changed about that Messianic determination . . . is the apparent Arab realization that after four futile wars, the direct [i.e., military] approach now appears to be one of such high risk that they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach.<sup>17</sup>

### III

The “indirect” approach corresponds to what I have termed a peace-and-war strategy. It is an incremental strategy, a strategy of stages, requiring the piecemeal dismemberment of Israel. The first stage, as Sadat saw it, required the Arabs to regain the Sinai. The second (but not final) stage requires the Arabs to regain Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. How? By means of economic power and political deception directed at the West in general, and at the United States in particular. The major elements of Arab economic power are (1) Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil; (2) reciprocal multibillion dollar capital investments in Arab and Western countries; and (3) enormous Arab purchases of military hardware from Western corporations.<sup>18</sup> Among the elements of political deception, it will be sufficient to mention Arab manipulation of public opinion in the West, employing the democratic slogan of “self-determination of the Palestinian people” to provide a moral fig leaf for pressuring Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders.

Accordingly, and in the name of that democratic soporific, twenty-one Arab autocracies or dictatorships have pressed for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state located in Israel's heartland, Judea and Samaria, plus an overland corridor to the Gaza Strip on the Mediterranean Sea.

No such idea was broached in 1949, at the end of Israel's War of Independence. In fact, before the war, the Arab residents of Judea and Samaria refused the appellation “Palestinian” because it was thought to describe the Jews. They preferred to be known simply as “Arabs.” In any event, Jordan, for reasons to be seen in a moment, regarded an independent Palestinian state as a threat to its existence. Egypt is another story. When Gamal Abdul Nasser seized power in 1954, pan-Arabism became the cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy. In 1958, President Nasser formed the United Arab Republic, Egypt's short-lived union with Syria.<sup>19</sup> In 1964, three years *before* the Six-Day War, Nasser—not the so-called Palestinian people—created the PLO. Its purpose was not to establish a Palestinian state but to serve Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions.<sup>20</sup> Even after the June war of 1967, Arab rulers by no means wished to see an independent Palestinian political entity. In fact, the PLO, at its Fourth Congress in Cairo in July 1968, strongly denounced the idea of a Palestinian state on the West Bank.<sup>21</sup>

Here, the PLO merely was following its patron President Nasser who continued to champion pan-Arabism and pose as the personification of Arab Unity. Palestine was an integral part of the Arab “nation,” or “homeland,” which had to be purged of Jews and restored to its Arab inhabitants.

Nasser died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, whose strategy toward Israel was more subtle. After the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, Sadat began to propagate the notion of the Palestinian right to national self-determination and to promote the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. A year later, Sadat's designation of the PLO was adopted by the Arab League. An independent Palestinian state thus was placed on the agenda of Middle East politics. Let us examine the terminology of this agenda.

First, who are the Palestinians—really the “new Palestinians”? One way of delineating these Palestinians is by their family names, which refer to their places of origin, such as: *Masri* (Egyptian), *Mugrabi* (Moroccan), *Ajami* (Persian), *Haurani* (Syrian), *Halabi* (Aleppan), *Kurdi* (Kurdish), *Hindi* (Indian), and many more. Some of these migrant groups, such as the Circassian Muslims and Armenian Christians, did not even attempt to assimilate into the local Palestinian society. As thus defined, the “new Palestinians” are of multifarious character. This manifests itself in family, tribal, and sectarian rivalry. These facts seldom are heard.

The Palestinians commonly are referred to as the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. They are portrayed as an oppressed minority seeking national self-determination. But—not only do most of these Arabs carry Jordanian passports, their brethren, the “Palestinian” citizens of Jordan, comprise a large majority of Jordan's population. Mention also should be made of their kinsmen, the Palestinians who happen to be citizens of Israel. Nor should we forget the Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria, many of whom have become naturalized citizens.<sup>22</sup>

But even this information obscures the true identity and significance of the Palestinians. Far from being an oppressed minority, the Palestinians are part of the Arab Nation and of the Sunni-Arab-Muslim majority, which ever has aimed to smother the non-Muslim and non-Arab minorities of the Middle East. It thus should be evident that however much the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza may regard themselves, or be deemed by others, as a people, they do not comprise a *distinct* people.<sup>23</sup>

But leaving the question of Palestinian *peoplehood* open—it is only peripheral to this inquiry—let us raise a seemingly less complicated question: Who speaks for the far-flung Palestinians mentioned above? The simple answer is the PLO. But the PLO consists of many factions. Its



dominant faction is *Al-Fatah*, headed by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat (an Egyptian, not a Palestinian). The PLO's military arm, the Palestinian Liberation Army, has brigades attached to the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies. Further complicating matters, the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties, which are pan-Arabist, established their own PLO wings, respectively, *Al-Saiqa* and the *Arab Liberation Front*. Then there is the *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (DFLP), a pro-Syrian and Marxist faction headed by Naif Hawatmeh (born to a Christian Arab family in Jordan). Splitting off from the DFLP is the DFLP-General Command, the *Ahmed Jibril* group. Still another PLO faction is the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (PFLP) led by George Habash (who is of Greek Orthodox origin).

The PLO does indeed represent the Palestinians, but not only those living in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. What is more, the PLO embodies pan-Arab aspirations transcending the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. No doubt King Hussein had this fact in mind when he said that the disparate groups of the PLO "always identified themselves with all the contradictions that exist in the Arab world—much more than they identified with the Palestinian cause itself."<sup>24</sup> One contradiction is that of territorial nationalism versus pan-Arab nationalism. Hence Egypt's former deputy premier for foreign affairs, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, could say in 1975: "Palestine is first of all the heart of the Arab homeland (*Qalb Al-Watan Al-'Arabi*) before it is the homeland of the Palestinians."<sup>25</sup>

To be still more specific—but now we must put aside the soporifics of contemporary politics—to refer to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" is to refer to a consortium of terrorist groups allied with, and used by, various Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Because these states have either regional or pan-Arab objectives, they are only tactically, not strategically, committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. Far from being an independent organization, the PLO shuffles with the shifting interests and rivalries of the Arab world.<sup>26</sup>

But to further illuminate the Middle East charade for which Israel's political and intellectual elites are largely responsible, consider the following: If the PLO represents the Palestinians, it also must represent most of Jordan's population, two-thirds of which are Palestinians who hail from Judea and Samaria. (Perhaps this is one reason why, in August 1988, with the intifada in full swing, King Hussein renounced any claim to the West Bank as well as any responsibility for its Arab inhabitants.) But given its catholicity, the PLO must also represent the 800,000 Palestinian Arab citizens who are citizens of Israel! This would explain why the insignia-



map on PLO stationary, like Egyptian tourist maps, portrays *all* of Israel as "Palestine."

Israel's government knows all this and more. It knows that, since late in 1988, the PLO has been pursuing a phased plan of conquest. Thus, Arafat's top deputy, Abu Iyad (who was assassinated while this chapter was being written), declared: "Setting up a Palestinian state on a portion of the soil of Palestine is a phase towards the final objective—to establish a state in all of Palestine."<sup>27</sup> Arafat himself has admitted: "The Palestinians are not fighting merely for the sake of fighting, but for a political objective, namely, the liberation of the Palestinian soil and the establishment of a Palestinian state over every part of it from which Israel will be removed."<sup>28</sup> PLO foreign minister Farouk Kadoumi has stated unequivocally: "The recovery of but part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land . . . We will build our tent in those places which our bullets can reach . . . This tent will then form the base from which we will later pursue the next phase."<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, George Habash was equally unambiguous when he vowed: "The Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza will be the beginning of the downfall of the Zionist enterprise. We will be able to rely on this defeat in order to complete the struggle to realize our entire goal, which is the complete liberation of the national Palestinian soil."<sup>30</sup> Although the PLO has recently adopted a public mask of moderation, it never has renounced the use of terrorism.<sup>31</sup> Instead, it pursues a two-track strategy of overt political activity and covert armed struggle. It merely has shifted responsibility for terrorist activity to "deniable" units within the PLO itself, such as Black September and Force 17.

It was Black September that carried out the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the July 1972 Munich Olympics, as well as the murder of the U.S. ambassador and deputy chief of mission in Khartoum in March 1973. Abu Iyad, the dark side of Yasir Arafat, was involved in the planning and execution of these covert operations.<sup>32</sup> Apparently disbanded in 1973, Black September seems to have been succeeded by the notorious Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council.

Force 17 serves both as Arafat's personal bodyguard and as the "enforcer" of his will. It maintains cadres not only in Tunis, North Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, but in Madrid, London, Berlin, and Marseilles. Indeed, Force 17 personnel are attached to every PLO embassy and mission throughout the world.<sup>33</sup> After the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, a clandestine Force 17 cadre remained. It funds the Hezbollah (the "Party of God"), which was responsible for the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on October 23, 1982 in which 241 Americans were killed.

Finally, among the 400 delegates at the October 1991 Teheran conference calling for Israel's destruction were leaders of these terrorist groups, including Sheikh Abdel Hamid el-Saikh, Chairman of the Palestinian National Council, the ruling body of the PLO.

The facts documented above—and many more of the same portent—are of course known to Israel's government. Some of its advisors have resigned because of the government's failure to respond appropriately to the obvious and ominous significance of these facts.<sup>34</sup>

The end of ideology seems to have rendered the government ideologically speechless, which may account for its political paralysis. Indeed, I shall eventually show, and in *medical* terms, that the government is psychologically incapable of pursuing a domestic and foreign policy based on the truth regarding the ideological dimension of Arab hostility. Its fear of truth prevents it from coping with Arab duplicity.<sup>35</sup> Therein is the basic reason why the hoax of a distinct Palestinian people has spread far and wide and deeply into the mentality of the democratic world, even into the minds of innumerable political scientists who should know better. Incessantly trumpeted in the media by Arab propagandists, the hoax has become a *political*, as opposed, to an *ethnic* reality. Thus has a fiction become politically more relevant than truth.

The government of Israel became a party to this fiction when Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Agreement of September 1978. This international accord was the first of any significance to designate the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as a "people," indeed, as the "Palestinian people." Moreover, the document officially designates Judea and Samaria as the "West Bank."<sup>36</sup> It called for a five-year transitional period of autonomy designed "to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority" to the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, after which the question of territorial sovereignty was to be decided in a final settlement. But so broad is the specified scope of Arab authority over these areas during the transition period that any subsequent claim to sovereignty by Israel would be laughable.<sup>37</sup>

The hoax of a Palestinian people thus was made a legal convention. It would be pointless to persist in saying that such a people does not exist, which means that an ardent Zionist had compromised the heartland of the Jewish people. The conventional explanation of this outcome of Camp David is that it was unavoidable, that it was the price Israel had to pay for bringing Egypt or Anwar Sadat into the peace process, that no prime minister of Israel possibly could have withstood American pressure to sign that ominous agreement. Perhaps. But if this outcome was unavoidable, it was made unavoidable by a government which, at the peak of Israel's

greatest military victory—again, the Six-Day War—had reached, paradoxically, the nadir of Zionism.

## IV

One would think that the evidence presented thus far would have a discernible effect on government policy or at least on public controversy. Truth actually does not flourish in a democracy, despite its vaunted freedom of speech and press. The end of ideology in the West, or the ascendancy of democratic relativism in the free world, has cast a pall of silence over the truth. Despite the differences between Israel's political parties, they seem to be involved in a conspiracy of silence regarding the true nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This may be seen by examining the controversy between the Right and the Left over Israel's heartland.

Given Israel's profusion of political parties, I shall include in the category of the Right all those who wish to maintain Israel's control over Judea and Samaria (as well as Gaza, hereafter subsumed). In the category of the Left, I shall include all those parties that favor Israel's withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. It should be borne in mind, however, that even though both camps include religious members, I shall treat the Right-Left controversy primarily as a secular phenomenon, if only because the religious parties have taken an equivocal stand on the issue.<sup>38</sup>

Although the Right sometimes may resort to historical and legal arguments in support of Israel's retention of Judea and Samaria, invariably it emphasizes the security factor: "Without control of her heartland Israel would be defenseless."<sup>39</sup> This emphasis on security as opposed to ideology conforms to the narrow and mundane function of modern day politics in general, and of political Zionism in particular.

The Left also is concerned about security, which it hopes to achieve by Israel's withdrawing from Judea and Samaria. "The Arab states will never make peace with us," the Left contends, "so long as we rule over Muslims in the 'West Bank.' Besides, ruling these Muslims against their wishes is contrary to democracy."<sup>40</sup> And were we to make them citizens, then, such is their birthrate that Muslims eventually would outnumber Jews, in consequence of which Israel would cease to be a Jewish state and, by implication, a democratic one.

By its demographic rejoinder, the Left is entangled in a web of contradictions of which the Right is curiously silent. To say that the extension of Israeli citizenship to Muslims in the West Bank and Gaza eventually would transform Israel into an Islamic state is to admit that democracy, in this case, is in conflict with itself as well as with Judaism.



Clearly, in the absence of a great wave of Jewish immigrants to Judea and Samaria, the democratic principle of one person, one vote, applied to the Arabs in question, would, in the course of time, lead to a Muslim-dominated Knesset.<sup>41</sup>

Such a legislature would nullify the country's Declaration of Independence which, we saw, proclaims Israel as a *Jewish* state.<sup>42</sup> But to imply, as the Left does, that the demographic transformation of Israel into an Islamic state would put an end to the only democracy in the Middle East is a commentary on Islam and on the Arab-Israel conflict. I am alluding to Islam's militant and autocratic character, the frank recognition of which seems to be resisted by spokesmen of the Left.<sup>43</sup> This militancy points to a conclusion quite opposite that suggested by the Left in public, as well as that in academic discourse.

To be sure, spokesmen of the Left were shaken temporarily from their dogmatic slumbers when Arabs in Judea and Samaria and Gaza demonstrated support for Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. In his book *Saddam Hussein*, eastern Jerusalem author Muhammed Abu Shilbaya writes: "I, along with other Palestinians, support the Arab-Muslim president Saddam Hussein. In the past we supported Gamal Abdul Nasser, then we supported Khomeini, and now we support Saddam."<sup>44</sup> It was an embarrassing confession. Here, the Left had been urging Israel to negotiate with the PLO—many had even advocated (and still advocate) the establishment of a Palestinian state—and now, not only did the PLO champion Saddam Hussein's cause, but so did the Palestinians! If these Palestinians could support Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a state ruled by Muslims, it would be more than naive—it might even be symptomatic of some unrecognized mental disorder—to insist that a Palestinian state would not encourage and facilitate an Arab invasion of a state ruled by Jews. One would think that the Right, in its controversy with the Left, would repeatedly broadcast this obvious and devastating point. It has not.

Also absent in this controversy is the following consideration: Ignoring the Islamic character of the twenty-one states that comprise the Arab world—all of these regimes are dictatorships. It seems to have been forgotten, however, that no form of dictatorship can feel secure in the proximity of a democracy, as the twentieth-century, indeed as world history testifies. A democracy contiguous to a dictatorship should feel even less secure. For to resolve disputes, the one relies primarily on intimidation and coercion, the other on diplomacy and accommodation.

The Left is reluctant to make such ideological and invidious distinctions, else it would not be indifferent to the kind of regime that would replace Israel were the latter to withdraw from Judea and Samaria to avoid the demographic problem.



And so the Left, by its demographic argument, unwittingly confirms the silent fears and tacit position of the Right. The Muslims cannot be relied upon to maintain genuine and abiding peace with Israel because to do so would violate the basic tenets of the Islamic religion. This ideological language will not be heard in Israel. Indeed, Israeli law proscribes such language as “racism” and “incitement.” In other words, *the law forbids any member of the Knesset as well as any private citizen from telling the truth about the Arab-Israeli conflict!* Could the end of ideology and the decay of democratic politics be more transparent?

Curiously, the Right does not expose the illogical and anti-empirical fantasies of the Left. Why not? The Right cannot reveal the contradictions between democracy and Judaism, and between both and Islam, without compromising its own democratic credentials and laying itself open to the facile charge of “fascism” and anti-Arab “racism.” The Right, it seems, has been influenced by the pacifism and rhetoric of the liberal Left. One can scarcely be a genuine democrat, nowadays, without proclaiming peace as the highest value. The meaning of peace, however, has been emptied of much of its moral content. One may well doubt whether genuine and abiding peace—that is, that mutual trust, respect, and friendship can exist between democratic and anti-democratic regimes and between those who love individual liberty and those who do not.

There is another reason why the Right does not expose the contradictions of the Left. I refer now to a potentially explosive reality: the prolific Muslim population residing within Israel's pre-1967 borders. In the religious convictions of these Muslims, we touch the heart of the Arab-Israel conflict.

As if silence and the passage of time will make the problem go away, politicians and intellectuals obscure the fact that the Arab-Israel conflict is not merely political or secular. It should be called by the only word that fits reality: It is a *metaphysical* conflict, one that began thirteen centuries ago when Islam set out to conquer the world. Muslim rulers and educators have not forgotten or forsaken the past glory of Islam. This is why the Muslims who live in democratic Israel, and who enjoy all the political and civil rights of Jews, deny Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. *This is exactly the reason why Arabs are not inducted into Israel's army.* Neither the Left nor the Right can deal realistically and constructively with these stubborn, ideological facts. Clearly, these facts will not be removed by the policy, territory for peace; but this is to say that secular discourse—which means *politics*—is incapable of dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict.

Further evidence of this fact surfaced in 1989 when 1,500 Muslim students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, whose education is subsidized by the government, voted overwhelmingly for student represen-

tatives who oppose Israel's right to exist as an independent and sovereign state. There was no reaction from the political-academic establishment.

Still more chilling: Polls in August 1990 indicated that sixty-two percent of Israel's Arab citizens supported Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait, even though his threat to incinerate Israel would entail their own destruction. The government was silent, rendered impotent by the democratic relativism or cultural egalitarianism that leavened the founding of the modern State of Israel.

Because Israel's government cannot transcend politics, it cannot speak candidly of, or deal effectively with, the Arabs' implacable hostility toward the Jewish state. The government, whether led by the Left or the Right, or both, is forever intoning the slogan, *peaceful coexistence*. The Left especially speaks glowingly of toleration. But this call for mutual toleration is based on cosmopolitan contempt for Islam. Again, the policy of territory for peace is a refusal to take Islam and Arab culture seriously. It probably never occurs to secular humanists that Muslim leaders might feel insulted by the suggestion that they can be bought in this way.

The truth is known but hardly ever avowed, let alone made the basis of party programs by either the Left or the Right. Those who dare say that violence, along with dissimulation, is the norm of Arab-Islamic culture lay themselves open to the charge of racism. Of course the canard is groundless, not to say mindless.<sup>45</sup> Day after day, year after year, the media report Arab violence and bloodshed. Arabs have been slaughtering each other in Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, and also in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Moreover, and as various historians have shown, Arab rulers can easily inflame the Muslim masses, who add to a religious fanaticism an inborn, if latent, hatred for the Jew.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, while the Arab world is steeped in fratricidal war, Israel's political and intellectual leaders—Right and Left—speak and act as if there were no great ideological or cultural obstacles preventing Jews and Arabs from living together in lasting peace and harmony. They would have us believe that democracy or democratic politics can solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Let us subject this dogma to detailed analysis, because the basic characteristics of democracy are diametrically opposed to Arab-Islamic culture.<sup>47</sup>

First of all, democracy had its origin in Periclean Athens, where rhetoric first became an art. Despite the stupefying influence of television, it is still correct to say that democracy, in principle, is based on the primacy of persuasion and consent. Democracy is thereby adorned with a certain easy-goingness and civility. Not only are past grievances readily swept aside, but political opponents can be friends despite their differences.

Differences are resolved by mutual concessions or compromise, and agreements are usually abiding. In contrast, Arab-Islamic culture is based on the primacy of coercion and even violence. Agreements between rival factions do not really terminate animosities, which is why such agreements are so short-lived.

Second, thanks to the biblical influence on the West, democracy is based on the primacy of the individual, notwithstanding the democratic tendency toward majoritarianism. Conversely, Arab-Islamic culture is based on the primacy of the group—be it the village or the extended family. The individual Muslim has no identity outside the group; it is to the group that he owes all his loyalty. This is one reason why internecine, or mutually destructive, conflict has been endemic among Arabs throughout Islamic history.

Third, freedom, including freedom of speech, is one of the two cardinal principles of democracy. This is not the case in Arab-Islamic culture, which is strictly authoritarian and whose media, as noted earlier, are government-controlled.

Fourth, unlike democracy, whose other cardinal principle is equality, Arab-Islamic culture is strictly hierarchical. Top-down leadership is a fundamental principle of Islamic theology. Authority runs down from Allah to Muhammad and from Muhammad to the *imam*, the ruler of the regime. Consider, too, the patriarchal character of Islam and the subordinate role of women.

Fifth, democracy generally is regarded as a process by which various individuals pursue their private interests and have diverse lifestyles. This is not the case in Arab-Islamic culture, which binds everyone to the set of substantive values prescribed in the Koran. As for the current attitude of Arab leaders toward democracy, this merely is a ploy to disarm, truncate, and eventually annihilate Israel.

Sixth, and as noted earlier, whereas democracy is given to relativism, Islam is based on absolutism. The mere existence of a multiplicity of parties in a democracy means that no party has a monopoly on the truth (or on power). This is why tolerance is the *modus operandi* of democratic societies. To be sure, Islamic regimes will tolerate non-Islamic minorities, but only as *dhimmi*s or second-class citizens.

Seventh, whereas democratic societies are preoccupied with the present the—"now"—Arab-Islamic culture exists under the aspect of eternity. In fact, what dominates Islamic mentality is the past and the future, which is why the concept of revenge for past injuries is a dominant motif of the Arab world.<sup>48</sup>



Eighth, the openness or publicity found in democracy stands in striking contrast to the hiddenness, secrecy, and dissimulation characteristic of Islam.

Finally, it needs to be reiterated that, whereas democracy is steeped in secularism, Arab-Islamic culture is rooted in religion. Even Arab leaders who are not devout Muslims identify with the basic goals of Islam. The radical separation of religion and politics found in democracy is foreign to Islamic regimes.

In view of the above considerations, only doctrinaire democrats can believe that democratic politics can solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. To the contrary, the above considerations suggest that democratic politics is a manifest obstacle to overcoming that conflict. Moreover, as will be seen in chapter 5, when we study the intifada, democracy has become an omnipresent danger to the people of Israel. Except for those who have eyes but cannot see, democracy is reaching its nadir.

## Epilogue

The program of the political Zionists, to repeat, was to facilitate the ingathering of the Jews to the Land of Israel, to restore the land, and to establish a secular democratic state therein. This they did, and millions of Jews owe them profound gratitude. But it also should be remembered that those political Zionists believed that by establishing a secular democratic state the Jews would obtain security, would be free from the ravages of anti-Semitism, and indeed, would be accepted among the nations of mankind. With regard to this aspiration, the Zionists failed and had to fail. But their failure is not well understood, least of all by their political and intellectual heirs. It is not well understood because secularism and democratic relativism have limited the heirs' mentality. Arab leaders rightly perceive the secularism and democratic relativism of the West as the greatest threat to Islamic civilization.

Of course, exacerbating Islamic hostility is Israel's residual Jewish character. Can it be that the Arabs' hatred of Israel, unknown to the Arabs, is serving a world-historical function, namely, to prevent the success of a merely nominal Jewish state? Can it be that when Israel ceases to be a merely nominal Jewish state, Islam will reform itself and cease to inspire its followers with hatred of the Jews? The Arabs insist that their conflict with the Jews is a religious one. Israel's political and intellectual leaders refuse to deal with this truth in Jewish terms (whatever these may be). Religion is a topic they avoid, or seek to escape. There is precedence for this secular dogmatism.



Many secular Zionists of the nineteenth century felt that the Jews had suffered enough because of their religion. This religion, they believed, had emasculated them. It had confined them in ghettos where they lived in demeaning subservience to the gentile world. With the best of intentions, these secular Zionists wanted to emancipate the Jews from their ghetto mentality as well as from anti-Semitism. Animated by the democratic humanism of the Enlightenment, these Zionists believed that the Jews would regain their (allegedly lost) self-respect and escape anti-Semitism by establishing a secular democratic state in the Land of Israel, a state open to Jews of all persuasions. Their descendants formed such a state in 1948, thanks in part to the United Nations. Yet Israel has become the whipping boy of that international body. Anti-Semitism is very much alive, and now it is focused on the one-and-only Jewish state and not simply on individual Jews or Jewish ghettos.

Israel's political and intellectual elites have long been imprisoned in a ghetto of their own: some ersatz version of European humanism. They have yet to be emancipated from that ghetto. They ignore or make nothing of the fact that Europe, the home of humanism, was the home of the Holocaust. In this Europe, no country was more advanced than Germany, whether in the natural and social sciences or in the humanities. Indeed, Germany was the heart and soul of humanism: Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Herder, Schelling, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel were German. Philosophy meant German philosophy. Yet, Hiedegger, deemed by many as the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, was a Nazi. Sad to say, Germany was not alone in its genocidal crime against the Jewish people. The complicity—not merely the indifference—of the democratic world now has been documented. But there also is this: Secular democracies aside, three of the six million Holocaust victims were murdered in Catholic Poland. Slaughter on such a scale could not have been accomplished without the cooperation of the Church. In all fairness, it must be stated that the lapses of the Church extend to its own flock.<sup>49</sup> As for the Vatican, not only did it issue passports to thousands of Nazis seeking asylum, but more recently, Pope John Paul II granted an audience to the successor of the Nazis, PLO chief Yasir Arafat, whose villains murdered and raped Maronite Christians in Lebanon. Ponder, therefore, the reflections of Elie Wiesel, a survivor of the death camps:

Wiesel notes how he had been “struck by a harsh truth: in Auschwitz all the Jews were victims, all the killers were Christians.” He apologizes for embarrassing his Christian friends, but he is morally bound to tell the truth. He asks:

How is one to explain that neither Hitler nor Himmler was never excommunicated by the Church? That Pius XII never thought it necessary, not to say indispensable, to condemn Auschwitz and Treblinka? That among the SS a large proportion were believers who remained faithful to their Christian ties to the end? That there were killers who went to confession between massacres? And that all came from Christian families and had received a Christian education?<sup>50</sup>

Wiesel does not forget the few hundred brave Christians who came to the aid of the Jews. But, he tacitly asks without answering, why only a few hundred among hundreds of millions in all of Europe, the home of humanism?

Israel's political and intellectual leaders have been suffering from progressive amnesia. In October 1973, when democratic Israel was threatened with extinction by Arab autocracies, democratic and Christian Europe refused to allow the United States to use NATO airfields for resupplying the Jewish state. It will be said that Europe in 1973 was intimidated by the threat of an Arab oil embargo, that anti-Semitism was not the motivating factor. Even if this were true, it would only confirm the Marxist and positivist doctrine that explains human behavior in terms of material interests—hardly flattering to democratic humanists. Although Israel's political and intellectual leaders have been influenced by a Marxist and positivist mode of thought, they fail to draw its logical conclusion, namely, that democratic humanism is a myth, a phantom of the brain. To draw such a conclusion is difficult for half-hearted cultural relativists who, without a stitch of logic, take decency for granted.

This intellectual complacency of Israel's leaders was not shattered when, in November 1974, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," even though fifteen of the thirty-three articles of the PLO National Covenant are devoted to the destruction of Zionism, i.e., Israel. More recently, in December 1988, the representatives of 153 nations, including those of democratic and Christian Europe, gave Yasir Arafat a standing ovation as he walked to the podium to address a special session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva. What can be said of this thundering silence of democratic humanism? It would be insulting the intelligence of those European ambassadors to believe they regarded Arafat as a man of his word when he professed, condescendingly, to accept Israel's existence and renounce terrorism. During 1987 and 1988, there appeared in various European languages, *Red Horizons*, a book written by former head of Rumanian intelligence, Ion Pacepa, a book which, after describing Arafat's love-making with his latest bodyguard, has this to say about the PLO

chairman: "I've never before seen so much cleverness, blood, and filth all together in one man."<sup>51</sup>

Pacepa's intimate details about Arafat and the PLO did not come as a sudden revelation. Pacepa defected in July 1978. He was debriefed for three years by the CIA. Judging only from the contents of his book, which reveals the PLO's treacherous character, it is hardly credible that Europe's foreign offices—let alone the American State Department—were ignorant of the PLO's undeviating commitment to Israel's destruction. They did not have to see the insignia-map of *Palestine* on PLO stationery to know of that organization's final solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It will be said (as already indicated) that Europe's pandering to the PLO is motivated by the West's economic interests in the Arab world, especially in the Persian Gulf. Year after year, Europe has been selling huge quantities of weapons to all the dictatorships of the Middle East—Iraq, Syria, Libya—while denying the same weapons to Israel. European (and American) appeasement of the PLO assumed grotesque proportions after the Gulf War. During the war, Europe refrained from pressuring Israel to withdraw from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. One commentator writes:

But soon after the shooting ended, the steamroller was activated again to squeeze Israel in cynical disregard of Arafat's close collaboration with Saddam until the bitter end of the war. The impression was left in the Middle East that the West, having ended the war prematurely with most of its war aims unaccomplished, regarded the perennial question of Palestine as the easiest one to revert to in order to show Western public opinion that something positive had come out of that inconclusive conflict. That this would be done at the expense of Israel that had stood fast with the West during the war, in order to benefit the PLO that had opposed the West, was of no consequence to [Western] policy makers.<sup>52</sup>

But more than material interests are at work here. The oil-producing Arab states are very much dependent on the democratic world for their food and industrial infrastructure. They cannot blackmail the West unless democratic policy makers find it convenient, for internal political reasons, to accede to the wishes of Arab despots. (To be sure, it is politically profitable for democratic politicians to yield to the blandishments of domestic arms manufacturers and other corporations that do business in the Arab world.) But there are no compelling reasons for any government of the free world to appease the PLO, an international gang of narcoterrorists. Yet, the PLO enjoys diplomatic standing in the capitals of democratic Europe.



Also discernible is the old hydra of anti-Semitism, which political Zionists thought they could escape by establishing a secular democratic state in the land of Israel. True, the Holocaust had discredited overt anti-Semitism, but as one writer has pointed out, "The Palestinian grievance (i.e., the Palestinian Arab claim to self-determination) has enabled latent anti-Semitism to be channeled discreetly into 'respectable' criticism of Israel—which was shrewdly distinguished from world Jewry."<sup>53</sup>

The moral infirmity of democracy was never more blatant. For fifty years the peoples of the Soviet Union, from the Baltic to the Caucasus, and from the Urals to Central Asia, cried out for self-determination. No Western power dared to come to their support. Against little Israel, however, it is quite safe for democratic Europe to be the hero of self-determination. Notice, however, that Europe has supported the claim of a fictional people, the Palestinians, to self-determination, even though the PLO National Covenant denies the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. But what about democratic Israel?

When the UN General Assembly, in 1975, equated Zionism (read Judaism) with racism, one might think that Israel's government would resign (and perhaps call upon others to resign) from that anti-Semitic body out of consideration of national honor. Or, if this were too much, one would think that the government would have no desire to establish diplomatic relations with Arab states, which plot Israel's destruction and whose government-controlled media denigrate the Jewish people. Conspicuously lacking here is a due sense of Jewish or national pride, the restoration of which was one of the aims of secular Zionism. Such pride hardly can fill the hearts of nominal Jews who strive to be "like unto the nations." Jewish pride will be found, not among those who have abandoned the Jewish heritage, but among those who treasure and live according to that heritage.

Today, the ghetto mentality is to be found, not in the Jewish *shtetl*, but in the so-called free world, the world of democratic secularism. Israel's political and intellectual elites are ensconced in that ghetto. This is why anti-Semitism flourishes, and this is why the Jews of Israel are threatened with destruction. But Israel's leaders do not and cannot see this. They, along with many religious Jews, blame the *goyim* for anti-Semitism, failing to see that despite its viciousness, anti-Semitism also has served a salutary function. Have we not seen that anti-Semitism prompted political Zionists to establish the modern state of Israel? To this extent, anti-Semitism served to prevent the complete assimilation of the Jewish people. Never in nineteen hundred years of dispersion have so many Jews returned to traditional Judaism—and from every profession and walk of life. Never have so many Jewish academies flourished as now do in Israel.



Nevertheless, so long as Israel remains a secular democratic state, anti-Semitism will continue, which means that ultimate responsibility for this evil lies not with gentiles, but with Jews themselves—and this includes many who count themselves among the religious. Not until Israel becomes a truly Jewish nation, one that overcomes the dichotomy of religion and politics (now drawing a curtain over the West) will anti-Semitism come to an end. To overcome this dichotomy is to transcend religion as well as politics.

In the meantime, Zionism virtually has ceased to be the justification of the Jewish state of Israel. It has been superseded by *democracy*. It seems never to have occurred to Israel's political and intellectual leaders that their secular democratic state can only intensify and prolong Islamic hatred; hence, that it is they—these assimilated Jews—who must change before any salutary change will occur in the attitude of the Islamic world. This is not to suggest that Israel should become a theocracy—a form of government, we shall see, that is foreign to Torah Judaism. But, eventually to think a truly Jewish republic might lessen and dissolve Islamic hostility toward Israel (and toward Western civilization) simply is beyond the mentality of Israel's political and intellectual elites.

Unaware that democratic thought actually is parochial and irrelevant in the Middle East, these elites cannot contemplate the possibility that Islamic hostility serves a metapolitical function, namely to prevent a secular democratic state in Israel ever from achieving peace. They cling desperately to democracy as drowning men to a raft. "Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East"—this has become their sole claim to legitimacy and respectability.

## Territorial Self-denial: A Democratic Deficit

For 2,000 years the Jewish people refused to relinquish any part of the Land of Israel. In order to do that, it turns out, it had to establish a Jewish state first.

Elyakim HaEtzni (June 1993)  
Former Knesset Member

It was precisely Israel's secular democratic mentality that prevented their political leaders from declaring Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in June 1967. Before showing how this might have been accomplished, it will be necessary to show how democracy can affect the will and the emotions of people via the intellect. In so doing I shall reverse the modern tendency, since Hobbes, to explain thought in terms of subrational forces. I shall thereby turn modern psychology on its head.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Israel's political and intellectual leaders were tainted by democratic relativism. By itself, relativism does not logically entail any specific political commitment. It provides no objective grounds for supporting any cause or kind of regime, indeed, for preferring humanism to cannibalism. Logical rigor, however, will not be found in the typical relativist. He finds himself more or less comfortable with the prevailing beliefs and values of his society. This intellectual complacency is especially evident in democracies. There, freedom (living as you like) and equality (one opinion, one vote) generate relativism or reinforce the relativism propagated by the multicultural universities of the democratic world. It needs to be reiterated, however, that while moral relativism flourishes in democratic societies, most relativists do not always appear as such. As a matter of fact, they usually appear as moralists or as vociferous pacifists or humanitarians. The reason is as follows:

Inasmuch as relativism denies the existence of any universally valid or objective standards by which to determine whether the way of life of one individual, group, or nation is superior to that of another, democratic or egalitarian relativists preach cultural pluralism and tolerance on the one

hand, and peace and benevolence on the other. However, *because* of the influence of relativism on their intellects, they are emotionally incapable of an all-consuming love for any cause—recall Weber's error—for they cannot regard any cause as intrinsically good or noble. Conversely, one ought not expect from democratic relativists an all-consuming hatred, for no cause is intrinsically evil. Indeed, soon after the June 1967 war, various Jewish academics advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state centered in Israel's heartland, and they justified the proposal in terms of democracy and expediency. Such a state, they claimed, would serve as bridge between Israel and the rest of the Arab world.<sup>1</sup>

It was as if Egypt and Syria, aided by other Arab states, had harbored no intention of annihilating Israel.<sup>2</sup> Or only if Israel would relinquish Judea and Samaria, etc., would this magnanimous gesture disarm the Arabs. It would erase Islamic contempt for infidels and render Arab autocrats as peace-loving as these Jewish democrats. Thus would a proud civilization change its 1,300-year-old attitudes and progress into the twentieth century!

Change and progress are, of course, motifs of the democratic world. Conditioned by these motifs, Israel's intellectual and political leaders see no reason why ideological change and progress cannot be engendered in the Islamic world. Indeed, with end of the Cold War, the public has been given to believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict is nearing resolution: The demise of the Soviet Union signals the beginning of the end of dictatorships throughout the world and the ultimate triumph of democracy; no longer can millions of people be deprived of their right to freedom of expression as well as their right to vote for political institutions responsive to public opinion; the expansion of worldwide communication is making it impossible for Middle East governments to conceal the superior living standards in the West and the benefits of liberal democracy; secular influences on Arab intellectuals are changing their attitude toward the West; and technological and economic developments in the region are ushering in a new era of cooperation and peace.

This para-Marxist attitude on the part of Israel's secular elites, as well as their democratic complacency, dulls their ability to take Islam seriously. One would think that the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism would awaken them from their dogmatic slumbers. As for the prospects of democracy in the Middle East, suffice it to mention Algeria's experiment with multi-party elections in December 1991. The Fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a landslide victory in its regional elections. Anticipating that the FIS would have a large enough majority to form a government after the run-off elections scheduled the next month, a coup was orchestrated by the army, the elections were cancelled, and the FIS was

crushed—much to the relief of the most peace-loving democrats in the West.

If anything is certain in the Middle East it is this: Jewish pacifism does not promote Arab pacifism. During the eighteen months following the Six-Day War, Israeli sources reported 1,288 terrorist acts—920 on the Jordanian front, 166 on the Egyptian border, thirty-seven on the cease-fire line with Syria, thirty-five on the Lebanese border, and 130 in Gaza. “Israeli losses,” writes Henry Kissinger, “were reported as 234 dead and 765 wounded among military personnel and forty-seven dead and 330 wounded among civilians—a staggering total for a country with a population of 2.5 million, equivalent to over 20,000 dead and 100,000 wounded for a nation the size of America.”<sup>3</sup> But Israel sustained far greater losses from terrorist attacks *before* the Six-Day War, that is, when the Arabs controlled Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, as well as the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Hence, only those suffering from a mental disorder more profound than naivete or wishful thinking could believe that by relinquishing territory, Israel will obtain genuine and abiding peace from her neighbors. (In this connection, recall the October 1991 Teheran Conference, when sixty Arab-Islamic states, including Egypt, called for Israel's destruction.)

To illustrate the immense asymmetry between Jews and Arabs, as well as the unreality enveloping the Arab-Israeli conflict, consider the liturgical formula *territory for peace*. When Jews invoke this formula, they do so because they value peace more than territory. But when Arabs pronounce this soporific, they do so because they value territory more than peace—which is why they have gone to war over territory.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, to exchange territory for peace is to exchange something tangible for something intangible. Whereas yielding territory is irrevocable, peace can be repudiated. All this is so obvious that only minds out of touch with reality can fail to see that territory for peace is a formula for national suicide. Carried to its logical conclusion, this puerile formula would require the Jews to yield territory whenever Arabs threaten war.

Of course, the Jews want a binding peace. But as Henry Kissinger wrote in 1979: “What is a binding peace among sovereign nations when one of the attributes of sovereignty is the right to change one's mind? For three centuries France and Germany had fought wars in almost every generation; each one was ended by a formal ‘binding’ peace treaty that did nothing to prevent the next war.”<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Lawrence Beilenson has shown in an exhaustive historical study that treaties for keeping the peace or guaranteeing the territorial integrity of a nation are useless to the guaranteed nation, and worse than useless insofar as they engender a false sense of security. Such treaties, he concludes, can benefit only nations governed



by rulers intending to violate them whenever expedient.<sup>6</sup> This obviously applies more to dictatorships than to democracies, hence, more to Arab-Islamic regimes than to Israel.

Why is this palpable asymmetry systematically obscured by Israel's political and intellectual leaders, especially by advocates of territory for peace? One reason has been anticipated: The Zionism of Israel's secular elites has been eroded by democratic relativism. Contrast the attitude of an American religious Zionist:

Zionism is based on the belief that the Land of Israel is the eternal inheritance of the entire Jewish people. It never accepted the notion that the fate of the Land of Israel was to be determined solely by those who were actually residing there. How could it have been? When Theodor Herzl launched the modern Zionist movement in the 1890s, the Land of Israel had a large Arab majority. Certainly there was an important Jewish community in the country, one that had clung tenaciously to the land despite centuries of misery and deprivation . . . Had the land been regarded as being only the business of those living there, Zionism would never have arisen, and the Jewish State would never have been reborn.

Instead, the early modern Zionists, secular and religious, regarded the Land of Israel as the property of the entire Jewish people, even if they were in exile:

The establishment of the State of Israel does not change the status of the Land of Israel. It did not suddenly become the exclusive property of those Jews who have chosen to live there. On the contrary, it remains the property of Jews everywhere . . .

That's why Israel gives automatic citizenship to Jewish immigrants (but not to non-Jews)—because it's their land, too. That's why religious Jews still pray, three times daily, for Jews in the Diaspora to return to the Holy Land—because it's their land too.

And that's why pollsters do not have the moral right even to ask Israelis if they are willing to surrender portions of the land of Israel to the Arabs.<sup>7,8</sup>

The policy of territory for peace is symptomatic of the gradual erosion of ideology wrought by the ascendancy of democratic relativism in the twentieth century. This said, we can better understand why Israel's political leaders failed to declare Jewish sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Tainted by relativism, they viewed Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War merely in secular, i.e., military terms, and not as a victory of good over evil. As secularists, therefore, they could congratulate only

themselves and the Israeli Defense Forces.<sup>9</sup> Contrast King David: "... let Israel proclaim: Had it not been the Lord who was on our side, when men rose up against us..." (Ps. 124:1-2). Had the Arabs been the victors in the Six-Day War, every Muslim would have bowed in gratitude to Allah.

Stated another way: Israel's leaders did not declare Jewish sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza because, unlike those who regarded the rebirth of Israel in 1948 as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, they did not believe in the Jewish people's God-given title to that land. (Incidentally, it was not the government but religious Jews who initiated civilian settlements in Israel's heartland. The settlements, at first consisting of a handful of families, were located on barren public ground and received meager support from a reluctant government.)

But let us ignore the biblical aspect of the territorial issue. Still, such was the corrosive influence of democratic relativism on their sense of *justice* that Israel's leaders offered to surrender the territorial fruits of victory to Arab autocrats who had vowed, unequivocally, to destroy Israel and slaughter the Jews as mercilessly as they had been slaughtered during the Holocaust. Now we are prepared to consider alternative scenarios to the policy of *territory for peace*.

## II

Recall the British Peel Commission Report of 1937. Investigating the Arab Revolt in 1936, the report recommended the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Jewish, the other Arab, with a population exchange to secure the cultural unity of each state. The report cited the precedent of the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923, involving the relocation of 1.3 million Greeks and 400,000 Turks. The report declared: "In view of the present antagonism between the two races and the manifest advantages to both of them of reducing opportunities of further friction to the utmost, it is to be hoped that the Arab and the Jewish leaders might show the same high statesmanship as that of the Turks and the Greeks and make the same bold decision for the sake of peace." In the last resort, however, "the exchange would be compulsory," according to the report.<sup>10</sup> This meant the removal of approximately 400,000 Arabs from the territory of the proposed Jewish state.

Ben-Gurion regarded the report's recommendation as comparable in importance to the founding of political Zionism in 1897. "If we are not able to remove the Arabs within and transfer them to Arab terrain—as the British Royal Commission has recommended to England—it will not easily be possible, or perhaps not possible at all after the state is established.... And all of the hostile world will examine us with seven eyes, regarding

our behavior towards our minority.”<sup>11</sup> In the War of Independence, when Arabs fled from various towns of the country, Ben-Gurion was asked what should be done with them. The “Old Man” answered: “Expel them!”<sup>12</sup> He was dismayed upon discovering that his order had been ignored. Yet the same realist averred that an Arab should have a right to be president of the State of Israel.

Is it not puzzling that this democratic notion should emanate from a man who understood, as the Peel Commission understood, that geographic separation of Jews and Arabs would be to their mutual advantage? It were as if Ben-Gurion's mind were split between realism and democratic dogmatism. For even if circumstances later made it imprudent to expel the Arabs, surely it is ludicrous to make explicit what is implied in Israel's Declaration of Independence, namely, the oxymoron that an Arab has a right to become the head of the Jewish state. Did Ben-Gurion believe that the Jewish state—and a secular state at that—would render any Arab president of Israel utterly mindless of Allah's decrees regarding infidels?

Assuming that the Peel Commission recommendation regarding population transfer was not practical in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, was there no humane alternative possible? After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Yitzhak Rabin, who is not noted for his religiosity, admitted that he would like to see the smallest number of Arabs in the West Bank. This could be done, he said, “on a basis other than through the use of force. I want to create conditions, such that during the next ten to twenty years, there will be a natural population migration to the East Bank.”<sup>13</sup> Such a policy was never undertaken by Israel's government. To the contrary, the government gave the Arabs in question every reason to remain. Indeed, it actually prepared the ground for the policy of exchanging Judea, Samaria, and Gaza for “peace.” I now shall set forth an alternative to this policy, not only for its own sake, but rather to show—as I will in the next chapter—that the government's policy of territorial self-denial was primarily the result of a *psychical disorder* and not of an external, material reality.

Suppose the government had incorporated Judea, Samaria, and Gaza into the State of Israel in June 1967. The time was most propitious for such a *fait accompli*. The United States, bogged down in Vietnam, was very much concerned about Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Egypt and Syria (as well as Libya) were Soviet clients. Israel's incredible military victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had awakened the United States to Israel's strategic value.<sup>14</sup> The United States needed a strong and stable ally in the volatile region of the Middle East. In a (now declassified) secret memorandum dated June 27, 1967, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Israel retain control of the Judean and Samaritan mountain



ridges overlooking her vulnerable population centers on the coastal plain. The report also recommended that Israel should retain Gaza, the Golan Heights, and a portion of the southern Sinai to secure its access to the Red Sea through the Strait of Tiran.

Moreover, Israel's victory in the Six-Day War resulted in the closing of the Suez Canal to the Soviet Black Sea fleet. This important arm of the Soviet navy then was compelled to sail through the Straits of Gibraltar and around the Cape of Good Hope in order to project Soviet power along the east African littoral and in the Indian Ocean, the sea lanes of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf. Thus, Israel had become a valuable strategic asset. It could help protect American interests in the Middle East, and its superior air force could contribute to the security of NATO's southern flank in the eastern Mediterranean.

Furthermore, and as we have already seen, Israel could make valid claims to the land it had conquered in a war of self-defense. To repeat, Jordan's annexation of Judea and Samaria in 1950 never was recognized by any state except Pakistan and Britain. Egypt had no claim to Gaza (and even its claim to the Sinai was dubious).<sup>15</sup> Jordan and Egypt had invested nothing in these desolate territories, and any state formed thereon would have no economic viability. It would have to expand, if it could, at the expense of its neighbors.

Now, to ensure Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, a wise government (even if it were not animated by religious Zionism) would have moved the prime minister's (or the president's) office to the Old City in eastern Jerusalem. It would have transferred certain ministries to Hebron and other cities in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It would have passed a homestead act comparable to the one enacted by the Congress of the United States in 1862. Small plots of public land then would be sold at low prices to Jews both in Israel and abroad, with the proviso that they settle on the land, say for a period of six or seven years. This would help diminish the dangerous population density of Israel's large cities and, at the same time, it would encourage Jewish immigration to Israel. Model cities would be built in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, facilitated by foreign investments on terms favorable to investors. Had such moves been made, the Arabs unequivocally would have recognized that the Jews were there to stay. It would have been clearly understood at home and abroad that justice (to say nothing of Zionism) was not about to be perverted by Arab manipulation of media journalists whose alleged objectivity is but the reflection of the moral relativism that permeates academia in the democratic world.

As a result of the above measures, many Arabs, without any prompting by the government, would have emigrated to Jordan and the Persian



Gulf states. Because they had formed no distinct culture or solid infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, their attachment to the land was superficial—contemporary avowals to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, while Jordan ruled the area from 1949 to 1967, close to 400,000 Arabs moved from Judea and Samaria to the eastern side of the Jordan River. During and immediately after the 1967 war, 200,000 more Arabs—about one of every five inhabitants—moved to the East Bank.<sup>16</sup>

The move involved no great inconvenience. Recall that Judea-Samaria is roughly thirty-five miles wide. The distance from Nablus (Shechem) to Amman is only forty-five miles, which means the Arabs in Judea and Samaria can commute—or move—to Jordan as readily as they can drive to work in Israel, as 60,000 do every day. Many more Arabs could have been induced to leave Judea and Samaria by monetary incentives and by simply maintaining the economic status quo, that is, by not creating job opportunities for them within Israel's pre-1967 borders. The idea of an Arab Palestinian state would have died before it was born.

The exodus of many Arabs from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would have profoundly affected Israel's own Arab citizens, the more so if they were required to perform military service on the same basis as Israel's Jewish citizens. Thus far (and unlike Israel's Druze citizens, who serve on a voluntary basis) these Arabs have been exempted from military service because they rightly are regarded as disloyal to the State of Israel. To arm such citizens and train them for combat would appear as an invitation to insurrection. But the political attitude and behavior of Israel's Arab citizens has been conditioned, in part, by the timidity and territorial self-denial of the government. Before discussing the consequences of requiring Arab citizens to perform military service, we must examine Israeli law concerning citizenship.

### III

As previously mentioned, by the Law of Return only Jews possess the right to settle in the Land of Israel, where they automatically may become, if they wish, citizens of the state. In introducing this law to the Knesset, David Ben-Gurion explained its unique nature: "This Law does not provide for the State to bestow the right to settle in Israel upon the Jew living abroad; it affirms that this right is inherent in him from the very fact of his being a Jew; the State does not grant the right of return to the Jews of the Diaspora. This right preceded the State; this right built the State; its source is to be found in the historic and never-broken connection between the Jewish people and the homeland."<sup>17</sup> In other words, in passing the Law of Return, the Knesset did not in itself confer on Jews the right of automatic citizenship

in the State of Israel, but only acknowledged their inherent and pre-existing right to such citizenship.

It follows that whereas the citizenship of Jews is based on an inherent right that transcends parliamentary law, the citizenship of non-Jews is based on a *contingent* right or privilege conferred by the state. Consistent therewith, Israel's Nationality Law of 1952 imposes stringent requirements for non-Jewish citizenship. For non-Jews, acquisition of citizenship by birth and residence depends on five factors: (1) birth in Israel after the establishment of the state; (2) five years residence prior to submission of the application; (3) the applicant may never have been a national of any country; (4) submission of an application during the period between the applicant's eighteenth and twenty-first birthdays; and (5) absence of conviction for security offenses.<sup>18</sup>

In contrast, the Nationality Law confirms the noncontingent character of the citizenship of any Jew born in Israel prior to the establishment of the state, or coming to the country as an immigrant after its establishment. Clearly, Israel's Knesset intended to make the country a predominantly Jewish one, which, after all, was the only reason for the state's establishment in the first place.

Finally, it should be emphasized that Part II, Section 11.a.3 of the Nationality Law—which to my knowledge never has been enforced by the government—provides for the revocation of citizenship of *any* Israel national who “has committed an act involving disloyalty to the State of Israel.” This said, we are prepared to discuss the consequences that might have ensued had Israel's government required Arab citizens, upon reaching the age of eighteen, to serve in the army for a three-year period, the tour of duty required of Jewish soldiers.

It should be evident that many Arabs would have refused to serve if only because they would be branded as “collaborators,” a stigma, we shall see, having rather unpleasant consequences. Refusal to serve, however, would make them subject to the penalties of the law, which could include forfeiture of citizenship. Perhaps this would require amendment of that section of the Nationality Law dealing with any “act of disloyalty to the State of Israel.” The term “act” is terribly vague. A wise government would have defined the term to include the following: (1) refusing to perform military service or, if exempted therefrom, refusing to perform civilian national service; (2) impairing Israel's security or welfare by sabotage; (3) serving in a terrorist organization whose aim is to destroy life and property in Israel; (4) aiding or abetting any terrorist who committed, or plans to commit, an act of violence against the State of Israel; (5) advocating, in speech or in writing, or supporting any individual, group, or nation that advocates the destruction of the State of Israel; and (6) participating in any

anti-Israel propaganda campaign or in acts intended to impair Israel's relations with other nations.

Had such a provision of the Nationality Law been applied against disloyal citizens of Israel, many Arab families would have left the country; and they could have been encouraged to do so by compensation for property left behind. (This would not put a heavy burden on Israel's treasury, for the houses of these Arabs could be sold at public auction.)

A government animated by simple justice, let alone by religious Zionist conviction, would have put an end to a situation in which Arabs enjoy the political and civil rights of Jews, yet are exempt from fulfilling their duties as citizens of the State of Israel. That drafting Arabs into the army would entail risks and difficulties goes without saying. It also goes without saying that democratic politics seldom attract statesmen with courage and wisdom enough to cope with such risks and difficulties (which become part of the national debt, magnified and transmitted to posterity). But if Israel's government was incapable of formulating a national policy for dealing effectively with its Arab citizens, it certainly was incapable of declaring sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

#### IV

Even if Israel's government in 1967 were composed of undaunted Zionists, still the democratic mind, so easily intimidated by size and number, remains incredulous. How could minute Israel defy the United States by incorporating the territories it had conquered in the Six-Day War? But recall Israel's War of Independence, when it defeated the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan—despite the American arms embargo. At that time the Jews numbered little more than 600,000. Israel had no high-tech economy and no foreign trade. Its military power was nothing compared to what it was in 1967. Yet, in 1948, its rudimentary government, under David Ben-Gurion, almost doubled the size of the territory assigned to the Jewish state by the UN Partition Resolution—and this, in the face of U.S. opposition.<sup>19</sup> The point is, that facts on the ground had been established and could not be undone by Washington so long as Israel's government stood resolute, convinced of the justice of its cause.

Not only was Israel's victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the 1967 war infinitely more devastating and decisive than it was in 1948, but Israel was in a much better position, strategically, to withstand American opposition to the extension of Israeli law over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Lacking was a government with the courage of moral, to say nothing of religious, conviction.



This analysis rejects the entire effort of modernity to reduce moral and religious ideas to subrational forces. It reverses the mode of causality long purveyed by the social sciences. Indeed, I shall show at greater length in the next chapter that the territorial self-denial of Israel's government can best be understood as a consequence of a functional disorder rooted in democratic relativism.

Now, to anticipate further objections to the above scenario, no doubt the American administration would have loudly condemned Israel had its government done what any normal government would have done in June 1967, when it wrested from autocratic regimes the territorial means of their aggression. Perhaps Washington would have suspended some loans to Israel if only to mollify Saudi Arabia and other Arab sheikdoms. It should be noted, however, that Israel did not receive significant economic and military assistance from the United States until after the Yom Kippur War.<sup>20</sup>

By then, Israel was supplying priceless intelligence to the Pentagon as well as technical data on Soviet weaponry far exceeding in value everything Israel was receiving from America. The late General George Keegan once declared: "[Having served] six years as chief of [U.S.] Air Force Intelligence, I can say without reservation that for every dollar of support which this country has given Israel, we have gotten a thousand dollars' worth of benefits in return, which are incalculable in their value to the U.S. armed services."<sup>21</sup>

It will nonetheless be objected that once the United States became Israel's main military supplier, Jerusalem could ill-afford to alienate Washington. American foreign policy in the Middle East is complicated, however, by a variety of domestic interests. For example, United States military aid to Israel creates a demand for, and the purchase of, tens of billions of dollars worth of American military hardware by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab regimes. American arms manufacturers thus have a vested interest in opposing any reduction in military aid to Israel—and so do their representatives in Congress. Directly and indirectly, Israel not only has enriched a welter of American corporations, but has created tens if not hundreds of thousands of jobs for American workers. For this reason alone, most American congressmen, irrespective of their attitude toward Israel, would oppose cuts in military aid to the Jewish state. *A fortiori* given a low U.S. growth rate compared to that of Israel in recent years. In fact, the prestigious journal *Euromoney*, which expresses the views of many EEC economists, recently elevated Israel's credit rating from sixty to thirty-eight of 126 countries, far ahead of the United States. Israel has been America's greatest strategic bargain—which calls to mind a remark of former U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco



to Israeli author Shmuel Katz on February 3, 1989: "I want to assure you, Mr. Katz, that if we were not getting full value for our money, you would not get a cent from us."

Israel's government has not been ignorant of this "special" and symbiotic relationship with the United States. Its fear of arousing much more than verbal denunciation by incorporating Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is to be attributed to its democratic mentality, one tainted by relativism. Because it cannot transcend this mentality, the government is psychologically incapable of asserting the preeminence of Jewish rights to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Note the subtle influence of relativism in this statement of Dr. Eliahu Ben-Elissar, Likud chairman of the Knesset foreign affairs committee: "In *our* eyes we have a right to this land."<sup>22</sup> A government whose leaders have been infected by democratic relativism will feel that the Arabs also have a right to this land (precisely the position fostered by such prominent intellectuals as Martin Buber and Judah Magnes). And they will harbor this egalitarian and ostensibly humanistic sentiment despite the fact that the Arabs are anything but egalitarians or humanists. Which means that Israel's political elites will be incapable of dealing rationally with the Arabs' ideologically animated hostility. It is in this light that we are to understand why the government offered to exchange almost all the land conquered in the Six-Day War for peace with nations that had used that land as a springboard to destroy the Jewish state.<sup>23</sup>

This ostensibly magnanimous offer was of course rejected. Humiliated in war, the rulers of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were too proud to accept the apparent generosity of Jewish infidels (who thought so little of their own patrimony). That these Jews should think Israel could buy peace with territorial pottage was an insult to Islam. The *jihad* waged against the Jewish state was not for territory but for the termination of Israel's existence. Israel's offer to exchange territory for peace was a mockery of the Islamic religion and of the hatred which the Koran demands of Muslims toward the usurpers of Arab land. The inability of Israel's government to face the reality of this ideologically inspired hatred is symptomatic of escapism. The same may be said of its territorial self-denial. An anti-ideological mentality on the one hand, and loss of will on the other, are clearly evident.

And so Israel's government was stuck with the land it had conquered as well as with the land's inhabitants. Instead of encouraging the Arabs to emigrate, it gave them every reason to remain. The mere fact that a national unity government declined, in the flush of an astonishing military victory, to restore Hebron to its rightful Jewish owners, whose families were butchered by Arabs in 1929, signalled political impotence and moral

indifference. The Arabs thus were encouraged to persevere. And so, having failed to pacify Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the government decided to try and pacify the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It will be sufficient to speak only of Judea and Samaria.

If only because Jordan had seized Judea and Samaria illegally, the government of Israel does not regard this land as occupied territory. Nevertheless, shortly after the Six-Day War, the then attorney general of Israel declared that local Jordanian law would for the most part remain in force in Judea and Samaria. What is more, he announced that the civil and military agencies to be established in Judea and Samaria would be governed *de facto* by the humanitarian provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, even though these international conventions are not binding on Israel *de jure*.<sup>24</sup> This is also the position of Israel's Supreme Court.

Moreover, the Court (without Knesset authority), assumed judicial review over the agencies in question, and began to test the legality of their legislative and administrative acts according to both Israeli law and the rules of international law. As a consequence, the Court declared, "not every action that the court would consider lawful if carried out in Israel will necessarily be considered lawful if carried out in the Region." Furthermore, the Court decreed that it "will grant any petitioner, irrespective of nationality, domicile and status, enemy or otherwise, all such effective and immediate remedies as it may consider necessary in order that justice be done . . ." <sup>25</sup> Israel's Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, often applies the libertarian and egalitarian principles of American jurisprudence.<sup>26</sup> This judicial policy is unprecedented in the history of nations. Also it is radically egalitarian. This said, let us briefly examine the condition of the Arabs in Judea and Samaria before and after June 1967.

During the nineteen years in which it illegally occupied Judea and Samaria, the Jordanian government deliberately curtailed the economic and educational development of the Arab inhabitants. Amman did not want the West Bank to challenge the primacy of the East Bank. As a result of Jordan's deliberate policy of impoverishment, agriculture in Judea and Samaria was kept at a subsistence level. Industry was virtually nonexistent, and no infrastructure was developed. Also, not a single institution of higher education existed on the West Bank. Moreover, the Jordanian occupation authorities oppressed the local population and brutally suppressed the riots that broke out at frequent intervals.

The situation changed dramatically after June 1967. Thanks to Israel's benevolent attempt to pacify the Arab residents, Judea and Samaria soon boasted of no less than four universities. Higher education enlarged

the Palestinian Arab's mind beyond family and clan. It helped him interact with Arab as well as non-Arab nations. While it aroused his ambitions, the university became a most efficient means of penetrating the socio-political power structure of the Arab-Islamic world.<sup>27</sup>

Unsurprisingly, at least to any student of European history, all of these universities became hotbeds of revolution. When one or another became too obstreperous, the government would close it down for a while—predictably arousing the protestations of relativistic professors in Israel's own universities. For these repositories of civilization, preaching hatred of Jews and inciting Arabs to murder and insurrection are legitimate exercises of academic freedom, not violations of domestic and international law. Of course, if the government were not itself afflicted by democratic relativism, it would have shut down permanently any Arab university after one or two serious infractions. But such firmness would require a sense of justice or degree of moral indignation uncharacteristic of such governments.

In any event, far from pacifying the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, the government succeeded in educating, enriching, and arming Israel's enemies. It established a system of primary and secondary schools, which greatly multiplied the number of girls and boys attending classes. Many eventually learned how to make fire bombs as part of their extra-curricular activities.

The government also established new hospitals, health centers, and nursing schools. Infant mortality was greatly reduced, and the standard of health improved beyond recognition (reminiscent of what Jewish medical facilities had done for the Arabs during the Mandate). Also, roads as well as water and electric power facilities were constructed. Modern methods of agriculture were introduced. Eventually, and as indicated above, tens of thousands of West Bank Arabs were employed in Israel. The Arabs' standard of living doubled and quadrupled. Tourists were amazed to see so many large and luxurious mansions in Arab towns and villages. Still, hatred of Israel flourished more vigorously than ever, recalling the Peel Commission Report of 1937.<sup>28</sup> Despite all evidence to the contrary, an official government publication expressed the bourgeois dogma that, "If one wants to prevent a potential outbreak of social unrest, the only way is to work consistently to raise the standard of living and the standard of services in this backward society."<sup>29</sup>

Here a word from Ibn Hazm of Cordova (994-1064): "The height of goodness is that you should neither oppress your enemy nor abandon him to oppression. To treat him as a friend is the work of a fool whose end is near . . . . Magnanimity is not to befriend the enemy, but to spare them, and to remain on your guard against them."<sup>30</sup>



By raising the standard of living and of education in Judea and Samaria, the government raised the mobility and competence of Israel's enemies and even produced new and radical elites. In the West Bank Arab municipal elections of April 1976—supervised by democratic Israel—candidates who identified with Arafat and the PLO won out against the old guard that had identified with King Hussein and Jordan. PLO supporters were elected to govern the three principal towns in Judea and Samaria—Hebron, Nablus (Shechem), and Ramallah.<sup>31</sup> The ultimate consequence of this manifestation of Israeli democracy is *democracide*.

And so, by not extending Israeli law over Judea and Samaria, by educating and enriching the Arabs in these areas and thereby making them less dependent on Jordan, the government of Israel unwittingly prepared the ground for Palestinian peoplehood—fiction or not—as well as the demand for Palestinian statehood. Having been recognized by the democratic world as a people, the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza found the democratic principle of self-determination a convenient instrument for achieving statehood. It matters not to those who are animated and limited by democratism that Judea and Samaria are separated territorially from Gaza, or that any state formed in this small and still largely barren area would be economically nonviable. Nor does it matter to people so animated and limited that the Arabs in question are anything but democrats. The logic of democratic equality demands that the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have a state of their own—even if such a state would undermine the ability of the only democracy in the Middle East to defend itself against its Arab-Islamic neighbors. I have especially in mind Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, whose purchases of sophisticated military hardware far exceed those of the major European powers.

The Camp David Accords capped a decade of democratic folly on the part of Israel's government. Democracy had eroded the Zionist idea of Jewish settlement over the Land of Israel. The democratic mentality and benevolence of Israel's political leaders were scorned by the Arabs they sought to appease. Unlike these Jews, the Arabs had not lost their identity.

Having refrained from incorporating Judea and Samaria, and having failed to mollify their Arab inhabitants, but having instead helped to create the myth of Palestinian peoplehood, the government was at an impasse. True, at the end of June 1967, Jerusalem was united and the Old City was incorporated into the State of Israel.<sup>32</sup> In a basic law enacted by the Knesset in 1980, united Jerusalem was explicitly declared the capital of Israel. As already noted, thanks to religious Zionists, small Jewish settlements were established on stony, public land. But meanwhile the government allowed 100,000 Arabs to enter the “territories” from abroad. Prime Minister



Yitzhak Shamir even boasted of this display of Jewish benevolence in a rather untimely article published in the influential journal, *Foreign Affairs*—untimely because the article appeared just before the outbreak of the intifada!<sup>33</sup> No doubt Mr. Shamir wished to assure America's foreign policy elite that Zionism, far from being racism, is, or has become, the purest form of democratic humanism. Needless to say, this manifestation of humanism only succeeded in introducing more Jew-hating antihumanists west of the Jordan River.

A chilling portrait of this hatred was published in Paris by Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian poet in charge of cultural affairs for the PLO. The poem was translated and printed in *The Jerusalem Post* on April 4, 1988. A few lines suffice:

Live where you wish but do not live among us  
It is time for you to get out  
and die where you wish but do not die among us.

The poem ends with these lines:

Get out of our land  
our continent, our sea  
our wheat, our salt, our sore  
our everything, and get out  
of the memory of memories.

The poem upset leftwing Israeli intellectuals. Because Darwish had sometimes preached peaceful coexistence (from Paris), they regarded—it would be more accurate to say they *portrayed*—him as a moderate. It seems that the wishes of these intellectuals were the fathers of their thoughts.

Consider, for example, Israel's famous novelist Amos Oz. Some years ago he told a Los Angeles audience: "In private conversations with prominent Palestinians in Europe and the administered territories [sic], I have learned to my sorrow that often the same people who privately, in English, over a cup of coffee in London or Paris, talk sense, repeat the wildest ideas of the PLO about the need to exterminate Israel the very next day in a speech to their own people. To my regret, I have learned over the years that the statements they make in Arabic are a thousand times more important than what they are likely to whisper in the ears of people who are eager for peace."<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, Oz remained an ardent supporter of Peace Now and of Palestinian statehood!

In view of the preceding discussion, the reader surely will have wondered about Israel's political Right and its supposedly strong Zionist

attitude toward Judea and Samaria. It may be thought that what I have said applies exclusively to the Left. After all, in 1981, the reputedly rightwing government of Menachem Begin extended Israeli law over the Golan Heights, much to Washington's displeasure. But unlike the sparsely inhabited Golan, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have a large Arab population. To incorporate this land without enfranchising its Arab occupants would violate the democratic principle of equality. Israel would appear to the democratic world as a fascist state, something no Israeli government can endure. And so the Right also is trapped in the mentality of democracy.

This mentality renders Israel's existence precarious in the anti-democratic world of the Middle East. In fact, I now shall show that what passes for democratic politics in Israel is a mental disorder.

## PART II

## Demophrenia: Symptomatology

If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our intellect,  
we are surrounded by madness.

Ludwig Wittgenstein  
*Notebook on Culture and Value*, 1944

From its inception in 1948, the government of Israel, regardless of which party or coalition was at the helm, has been afflicted by "demophrenia." Demophrenia is a deeply rooted malady of national, and even of world historical significance. As indicated in the Prologue, demophrenia involves an antilogical and compulsive application of the democratic principles of freedom and equality to moral problems and ideological conflicts, which are impervious to, and even exacerbated by those principles. This disorder is most advanced in Israel, for its government is animated by a democratic mentality in conflict with Zionism, and ineffectual against the anti-democratic mentality of Israel's Arab inhabitants and neighbors.

To show that demophrenia is indeed a widespread, but hitherto unrecognized mental disorder, I first shall review, by way of this introduction, some of the literature on schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia is regarded as the core concept of modern psychiatry. Yet, after one hundred years of research, there is no commonly recognized causal explanation of this mental malady. In fact, the editor of a 1990 collection of essays written by clinical psychologists suggests that schizophrenia is not a meaningful scientific concept, that it does not refer to any empirically verifiable and naturally occurring entity, and hence, that it should be abandoned.<sup>1</sup>

Various researchers distinguish between positive- and negative-symptom schizophrenia. The former includes hallucinations, delusions, and thought disorders; the latter includes autism, escapism, apathy, depersonalization, stereotypic behaviors, flattened emotional or affective reactions, impairment of volition, lack of self-esteem, paranoia, etc. Obviously, these negative symptoms exist on a continuum with normal behavior. (I ignore the pathological antitheses of some of these symptoms.) Indeed, some psychologists contend that mental illnesses merely form the



end-points of continuously variable behavior—a provocative position given the apparent discontinuity of function in auditory hallucinations and mutism.<sup>2</sup> In any event, it should be borne in mind that schizophrenia is not necessarily a unitary or all-encompassing illness which sets the patient apart from his fellow man.<sup>3</sup> A World Health Organization (WHO) study concludes that schizophrenics, “for all their vulnerabilities, are in the full sense responsive social beings like the rest of us.”<sup>4</sup>

Still, those vulnerabilities can and do result in bizarre behavior. The renowned clinical psychologist, Dr. David Shakow, seemingly distinguishes four types of schizophrenic responses to diverse stimuli which, to my initial surprise, accurately describe the reactions of countless democrats to the characteristically bellicose behavior of Arab-Islamic leaders on the one hand, and to the occasionally pacific utterances of those leaders on the other:

- (1) The central, directly meaningful stimulus is avoided, apparently because it is disturbing; instead the peripheral is endowed with meaning.
- (2) A casual attitude appears in which [only] part of the field is accepted as the stimulus.
- (3) The subject has a ‘fixed’ idea and resorts to it without regard for the [central and contradictory] stimulus.
- (4) The peripheral is . . . selectively attended to, captures attention, and is adhered to.<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, a schizophrenic's response to his false perception may be appropriate or inappropriate to that perception. Alternatively, his perception may be veridical but his response will be inappropriate. The consequence, of course, is maladapted responses to reality.

The most pressing reality, at least to serious people in the West, is the stress and violence and disorder so evident in contemporary democratic society. Although WHO studies have shown that the prognosis of schizophrenia is worse in the urbanized and industrialized West than in the Third World,<sup>6</sup> no systematic attempt has been made to determine whether the moral relativism and chaotic pluralism engendered by democracy contributes to schizophrenia. This lacuna may be attributed to the relativism that modulates the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, as well as to the tendency of the medical profession to trace schizophrenia to biophysical causes.<sup>7</sup>

The absence of research on the possible adverse effects of moral relativism on mental health is all the more curious when one considers that psychologists include “alienation,” “anxiety,” and “loss of identity” among the symptoms of schizophrenia. These symptoms are conspicuous in

secular, egalitarian societies where moral relativism thrives. Surely a loss of belief in objective moral standards has emotional and behavioral consequences, some of which may be deleterious. Indeed, many psychotherapists maintain that "belief-modification" can mitigate various schizophrenic symptoms.<sup>8</sup> But if relativism or moral egalitarianism has adverse effects on the mental health of individuals, it also may impair, imperceptibly, the rationality of their government in matters of vital public concern.

A unique analysis of schizophrenia, with far-reaching significance for contemporary democracy, will be found in Ignacio Matte-Blanco's "Basic Logico-Mathematical Structures in Schizophrenia."<sup>9</sup> A profound student of Freud, Matte-Blanco takes his bearing (as does Shakow above) from the Freudian insight that the unconscious, as manifested in dreams, obliterates differences as if it were governed by an egalitarian logic, which is anything but logical. Freud writes: ". . . the most insignificant points in common between two elements is enough to enable the dream-work to replace one by the other for any other purpose." Indeed, Freud said even "contraries are not kept apart but are treated as though they were identical, so that in the manifest dream [and also according to Matte-Blanco, in the productions of more important psychical structures] any element may also stand for its contrary." "The governing laws of logic have no sway in the unconscious; it might be called the Kingdom of the Illogical."<sup>10</sup> Using Blanconian principles, I shall relate this "Kingdom of the Illogical" to the mentality and behavior of Israel's intellectual and political elites.

As indicated in the Prologue, Matte-Blanco (a practicing psychoanalyst) examines schizophrenic as well as normal mentality in *logical*, and not simply in *dynamic*, terms.

Ordinary thinking, it was said, deals with things (objects, persons, or concepts) which are in some way distinguishable from one another and with the relations existing between them. To be more precise, the mind recognizes, or makes propositions about one thing, about another thing, and their relation. The relation between things, using Matte-Blanco's terminology, can be either "symmetrical" or "asymmetrical." For example, in the proposition "A is different from B," the relation is symmetrical, whereas in the proposition "A is part of B," the relation is asymmetrical. Underlying such propositions are certain logical assumptions or principles, such as: (1) *the principle of identity*: A is identical to A; (2) *the concept of two-valued or Aristotelian logic*: either A or not A (either proposition A is true or not true); (3) *the principle of formal contradiction*: two contradictory assertions cannot both be true at the same time; (4) *the principle of incompatibility*: A cannot be different from and totally equal to B.<sup>11</sup>

This said, let us examine Matte-Blanco's examples of symmetrical and asymmetrical relations:

If John is the brother of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the brother of John. The relation which exists between them is symmetrical, because the converse is identical with the direct relation. But if John is the father of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the son of John. In this case the relation and the converse are not identical. This type of relation which is always different from its converse is called asymmetrical . . .”<sup>12</sup>

Now, according to Matte-Blanco, the “principle of symmetry” not only is a defining characteristic of the unconscious, but *the unconscious treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical*. This means that the unconscious uses a symmetrical logic that homogenizes the differences between things. Thus:

If John is the father of Peter, then Peter is the father of John. In Aristotelian logic this is absurd; in the logic of the unconscious it is normal . . . [In other words], the principle of symmetry represents the most formidable departure from the logic upon which all the scientific and philosophical thinking of mankind has been based. We see it constantly in operation in schizophrenic and unconscious thinking.<sup>13</sup>

To appreciate the political significance of the principle of symmetry, we must first note that in classifying diverse things (objects, persons, or concepts), the logical mind selects some characteristic which they have in common without negating their differences. To illustrate: Jacob (a Jew) is a member of a set or class of Israelis, and so is Ahmed (a Muslim). This means that both satisfy some characteristic—say born in Israel—which defines or determines the class (which characteristic does not *logically* negate Jacob's and Ahmed's religious or other differences.) But in view of Matte-Blanco's understanding of schizophrenia,

When the principle of symmetry is applied, all members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set or class, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the propositional function [hereafter “characteristic”] which defines the class and also with respect to all the characteristics which differentiate them.

In Aristotelian logic each member of a class fully expresses the characteristic of the class, but it also expresses other characteristics as well, and it is in these other characteristics that the members of a class are different from one another. But if the principle of symmetry is applied this is no longer so.<sup>14</sup>

For example—and here I shall only substitute my own individuals and classes for those used by Matte-Blanco: Jacob is a member of the class of



Israelis and so is Ahmed; this means that both satisfy the attribute which defines the class. But Jacob may be also a member of a number of other classes, such as Zionists, secularists, humanists, etc. Ahmed, on the other hand, is not an element of these classes to which Jacob belongs. The difference between them can be described precisely in terms of these characteristics, which they do not have in common. If Ahmed were an element of *all* the classes to which Jacob belongs, then there would be no difference whatsoever between them. But if the principle of symmetry is applied it is sufficient that both are elements of one class (Israelis) to be identical. In scientific logic, this is absurd.<sup>15</sup>

It follows that when the principle of symmetry is applied to the members of the class of Israelis, it negates Jacob's and Ahmed's ideological differences, which differences may well involve diametrically opposed goals or loyalties. Clearly, the principle of symmetry is a logical extension of the democratic principle of equality, one corollary of which is moral egalitarianism.

This may be illustrated by an example of "semantic subversion" (a theme to be discussed in chapter 7). Thus, **A**, **B**, and **C** belong to a set of people that the democratic media designate as activists. But whereas **A** and **B** advocate armed struggle, **C** advocates political struggle, to achieve their respective goals. Moreover, whereas **A**'s goal is to establish an autocracy, **B**'s and **C**'s goal is to establish a democracy. When the principle of symmetry is applied, all members of the set of activists are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the characteristic that defines the set and also with respect to all the characteristics that differentiate them. Similarly, in the universe of discourse structured by moral egalitarianism, if **A** uses violence to destroy a democracy and **B** uses violence against **A** to preserve that democracy, both will be called terrorists. We now are prepared to examine the relationship between the principle of symmetry and the negative symptoms of schizophrenia, in particular those involving the affective reactions.

When, as a consequence of the principle of symmetry, all members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another regardless of their ideological antagonisms, a leveling of affects occurs. For as Shakow also saw, there can be no distinctions between the affects if there are no perceived distinctions between stimuli. Matte-Blanco's analysis by means of the principle of symmetry is more revealing. To paraphrase:

The subtlety of responses to diverse stimuli presupposes the subtlety of differentiation. Confronted by an ensemble or set which contains everything, the individual's affective reactions or contacts should be diverse



and contain contradictory affects. But under the influence of the principle of symmetry, instead of sharp contacts in small "zones" of affects, the contacts are of a "global" quality. Any sudden changes of affect can be understood as flashes of "asymmetrization" in the midst of a world immersed in "symmetrical unity." <sup>16</sup>

In such a world a patient may identify himself with any person, object, or concept.<sup>17</sup> The loss of intellectual or moral discrimination, Matte-Blanco asserts, may be accompanied by a loss of identity and self-esteem on the one hand, and by apathy and volitional impairment on the other:

*[T]he principle of symmetry puts a total, absolute end to the possibility of logic-thinking in any 'zone' [or any political domain] of thinking-logic where it is applied. For this reason we may say that within its radius of action the principle of symmetry dissolves all logic: it is antilogical. It is obvious that it has no antilogical intentions, but only effects. We may more accurately say that the principle of symmetry is a logical way of describing an aspect of man which is completely alien to logic: an alogical component of man.* <sup>18</sup>

For example, those afflicted by moral egalitarianism or democratic relativism tend to dissolve the ideological difference between A, who uses force as a means of destroying a democracy, and B, who uses force as a means of preserving a democracy. They focus on the means and disregard the ends. This mode of thinking conforms to what Harry Stack Sullivan termed "selective inattention." It exemplifies the symmetrical and therefore alogical mentality of schizophrenia. Here again the members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set or class, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the characteristic that defines the class and also with respect to all the characteristics that differentiate them. This antilogical leveling of moral distinctions, so prominent in democracies, conforms to schizophrenia. Or as Dr. Blanco puts it:

If we study the essential structural aspects of schizophrenic manifestations and the characteristics of the unconscious processes we find that all of them constitute examples of *different degrees* of this process of unification and homogenization . . . [Hence] there is not only in schizophrenia but in all normal human beings, an aspect which tends to treat reality as though it were homogeneous and indivisible. This contrasts with the thinking-logical aspect of man, which tends to distinguish things from one another.<sup>19</sup>

It follows from Dr. Blanco's ideas that schizophrenia is a misnomer, that the classical term *splitting* [of the personality] "is hardly appropriate to what is observed in this respect," that it actually corresponds to an *invasion* or to an *increase of symmetrical relations* in areas of life where such symmetries do not exist or appear in a lesser degree. What happens in schizophrenia is not splitting but the exact opposite, namely the formation of more inclusive classes or sets, to which the principle of symmetry is applied: as a result, everything becomes a transparent, unstructured, colossal unity.<sup>20</sup> Might not the term *demophrenia*, in the horizontal or classless societies of the democratic world, be a more accurate designation for negative-symptom schizophrenia?

Like many schizophrenics, those afflicted by demophrenia are capable of dealing effectively with various areas of social reality. In other areas, however, they suffer from a lack of congruity between the three elements that form the personality: intellect, will, and the affective reactions. This classical understanding of schizophrenia, modified by the Blanconian principle of symmetry, may best be studied in the *Jewish* and *democratic* State of Israel, a state ensconced in a hostile Arab-Islamic sea. There demophrenics exhibit selective inattention to, as well as symmetrization of, contradictory aspects of cultural reality. While they ordinarily treat all the members of a set or population as identical to one another with respect to the general characteristic defining the set or population, they typically ignore those characteristics that radically differentiate the members of that population. The result, as we shall see, is cognitive, volitional, and emotional impairment.

Although demophrenia encompasses these and other negative symptoms associated with schizophrenia, the malady is far more complex and difficult to recognize, if only because it involves the dominant and democratic mentality of our age, one that has produced many blessings. Some evidence of demophrenia was presented in the previous chapters. The present chapter and the sequel will show, in a more vivid and systematic way, that demophrenia is very far advanced in the State of Israel.

## I

On December 9, 1987, Arab violence broke out in Gaza and quickly spread to Judea and Samaria and even to Israel's pre-1967 borders, especially Jerusalem. Arabs threw stones, building-blocks, iron bars, fire bombs, and other deadly objects at Jewish civilians, police, and soldiers. Thus began the *intifada*—barbarism, which the media have glamorized or sanitized as the "uprising."

Encouraged by the government's apathy and supine reaction to the terrorist acts just mentioned, the Arabs went further. Arabs threw rocks at moving vehicles (a crime classified as attempted murder in the United States as well as in Israel). Trucks driven by Arabs forced Jewish cars off the highways, into ditches and ravines. Also, Arabs threw fire bombs at buses traveling with passengers, and poured oil on the curves of roads leading to Jewish villages. As in the past, precious forests and orchards in Israel were set ablaze by Arab arsonists. Knifings and kidnappings ending in the sexual mutilations of Jews by Arabs became more frequent.

Moreover, to demoralize Jewish soldiers and gain world attention through the media, adult Arab men, in keeping with the centuries-old Muslim tradition of *shabab* (youth) fighting, endangered *their own* children and wives by placing them in the forefront of rock-throwing demonstrations, many of which were staged for Western television.<sup>21</sup> Here let us pause.

Because its government boasts of being the only democracy in the Middle East, embattled Israel, a minuscule state, has to be more liberal than sheltered America, a continental superpower. Accordingly, whereas the American government imposed a media blackout during its invasion of Grenada and severely restricted and even manipulated the media during the Gulf War, the government of Israel placed few constraints on the movement of foreign television crews and journalists covering the intifada. The media's defamation of the Jewish state thus was facilitated by Israel's own government.<sup>22</sup>

What is even more astonishing, Israel Television joined the chorus of foreign abuse and disinformation. It repeatedly portrayed the Arabs and the intifada in a sympathetic light, the effect of which was to delegitimize Jewish retention of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Similarly, various local newspapers, in English as well as in Hebrew, published statements and articles by prominent Jewish citizens of Israel who likened their country to Nazi Germany, and the West Bank to a concentration camp; they called for Israel's withdrawal from the "occupied" territories.<sup>23</sup>

And so, day after day, wittingly or unwittingly, Israel's own media actually justified, and thereby incited, Arab violence; yet the government behaved as if it were suffering from aphasia. It was rendered speechless by the principle of freedom of speech and press. This dogma of democracy—more immune to questioning than any dogma of religion—has produced the most ludicrous anomaly: The only place in the Middle East (excluding Cyprus) where the PLO is permitted to have its own press is in Jerusalem! And what is more, the Arab press was free to publish pro-Iraqi and anti-



American propaganda during the Gulf war while Israel was being bombed by SCUD missiles!<sup>24</sup>

Of course this morally neutral freedom of speech and press (which logically entails the freedom to lie) serves the people's right to know. Accordingly, leaders of the intifada were allowed to roam at large, given access to the foreign media, appeared on prime-time television, and offered lecture and other speaking engagements. Thus was the security and survival of a nation treated as a media event, something to titillate the jaded appetites of the masses.

Some old-fashioned liberals called this policy of Israel's government "democracy gone mad." One critic called it "permissive subversion." In medical terms, this degree of democratic permissiveness—which surpasses that of the American Civil Liberties Union—is symptomatic of advanced demophrenia.

Here, demophrenic individuals do not respond to the concrete meaning and moral requirements of life-threatening events but to some fixed, democratic abstraction (which exemplifies Shakow's classification of schizophrenic responses to diverse stimuli). In Blanconian terms, they react not to that which differentiates reality but to some homogenized or symmetrical preconception of reality. This egalitarian behavior negates or trivializes ideological conflict and inclines the demophrenic personality to tolerate, hence foster, what uncorrupted common sense or two-valued logic simply would regard as evil.

To appreciate the extent to which Israel's government tolerated the evil of Arab terrorism, some quantitative data is necessary. The Center for Information, Documentation, and Media in Jerusalem summarized some of the key facts occurring during the first three years of the intifada: 122,218 incidents of rock-throwing, road blocks, demonstrations, and rioting in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; some 2,495 firebomb attacks; 157 sniper attacks using live ammunition; fifty-eight grenade attacks; 1,004 reported cases of arson; close to 4,000 Jews injured and fifty-seven killed.<sup>25</sup> During the three-year period in question, of the tens of thousands of rioting Arabs, 390 were killed by Israeli police and soldiers. During this same period, some 300 Arabs were murdered by other Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This number of Arabs murdered by Arabs rose to more than 900 by August 1993. How did Israel's courts deal with these cases of actual and attempted murder? Here is how a career officer of the Israel Defense Forces put it:

In most civilized countries, punishments reflect the severity of the crime they are supposed to deter others from committing. Justice in the military courts of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, however, is meted out somewhat



differently. Every legal expert would agree that throwing a rock at a moving vehicle can kill a person—and often does. The crime: attempted murder. The penalty: a 2500 shekel fine [roughly \$1,250] for first offenders.

With the PLO pouring in money to finance those fined for revolting, this type of penalty does little to deter deadly violence; rather, it encourages Arabs to spend their spare time taking pot shots at killing Jews. Most of the perpetrators never get caught anyway, and if they do—what's a mere 2,500 shekels for attempting to crush somebody's head? . . . Not only does such a penalty deviate from all standards of criminal justice the world over, it's morally repugnant, especially when handed down by a Jewish court that should respect traditional Jewish values regarding the sanctity of human life.<sup>26</sup>

Given this democratic or demophrenic leniency, it is unsurprising that by April 1993, the number of Jewish men, women, and children killed by Arabs jumped to 170. But inasmuch as Israel's judicial system exemplifies or fosters this pathological state of affairs, it cannot be said that demophrenia is merely a matter of political ineptitude. When a Haifa court acquits an Israeli Arab of incitement to violence who, in his poem, repeatedly urges Muslims "to smash the heads of Jews"; or when an Israeli Arab newspaper (*al-Sirat*) can with impunity call upon the "heroes of the intifada . . . to uproot the venomous fangs of the crusader snakes," and "to silence the barks of the Jewish dogs with a knife," referring to them as "murderers and drug dealers from the darkened alleyways of New York," we have here something more than examples of libertarianism. We have here an incredible mental disorder, where ostensibly normal people—judges and politicians—virtually encourage Arabs to incite other Arabs to murder Jews and to uproot the Jewish state.<sup>27</sup>

If it is not evident already, it increasingly will become so that those afflicted by demophrenia are incapable of coping with ideologically motivated hatred.

## II

In 1985, Israel's Army Radio, which has a mass audience, conducted a sixteen-hour talkathon. Politicians from every party, mayors, generals, labor leaders, university professors, and the cultural elite appeared on the program. Speaker after speaker emphasized a single message—that the Arab governments and terrorist organizations are the enemy, not the Arabs of Israel or the West Bank Arabs.<sup>28</sup> This is a familiar refrain.

Thus, referring to the Jewish community (the *Yishuv*) in the pre-state period, Professor Gil Carl AlRoy observed: "One cannot help being

astounded at the sheer determination with which the *Yishuv* for so long denied conflict with Arabs—in the face of conflict. There was an extraordinary tension here between the empirical world and personal and group conceptualization.” Even when conflict was admitted, secular Zionists explained it away by saying the “Arabs did not truly wish it, but were put up to it by others [their leaders]”; or that Arab hostility, while real, “was contrary to the essence of the [brotherly] relationship [between Semitic peoples]” and the “historic alliance of Jews and Muslims.”<sup>29</sup>

In this spirit Menachem Begin's Irgun addressed the local Arabs in June 1944: “We do not consider you enemies—we want to see you as good neighbors . . . . The Hebrew government [to be established] will give you full, equal rights [as the Proclamation of the State of Israel was indeed to do] . . . . We stretch out our hand to you in peace and brotherly love [this, despite the Arab pogroms in Jerusalem and Hebron].” Mordechai Nisan comments:

Both the Right and the Left in the Zionist camp refused to see the Arabs of the land as an unrepentant, dangerous and hostile element.

In comparison with this posture, the founders of America did not refrain in their Declaration of Independence from addressing themselves to the dangerous and hostile domestic element obstructing their progress. The document refers to “the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.” The Zionists might have described their domestic adversary in like terms, and if not in their own words, then by quoting those of Ibn Khaldun, the Arab historian. He had written long ago that “. . . the Arabs are people who plunder and cause damage. . . Savagery has become their character and nature.” Unlike the Americans who demonstrated courage in words and actions, the Zionists cowered low and kept quiet . . . <sup>30</sup>

The meekness and escapist mentality of these Zionists—their inability to respond appropriately to Arab-Islamic hostility and savagery—is typical among secular humanists. One even may call this mentality “secularized Christianity,” insofar as it preaches self-effacement and benevolence toward those who hate you. In contrast, Islamic mentality is not only religious, but its most humble adherents are incredibly proud. Writes AlRoy:

That the illiterate Muslim, living in squalor and filth, presumed to be grateful for what the modern [Zionist] settler would do for him—some even went so far as to promise him a nominal half of power in binationalism—that that wretch, as seen by the Jew with his water toilets, soap, Beethoven and Bach, was actually feeling as naturally superior to

the Jew as English aristocrats would in olden days feel toward Cockneys—surely that was not the most obvious thing to the average individual in the Yishuv.<sup>31</sup>

Ironically, the Zionists pitied the Muslim. Because Jews are the perennial victims of injustice, how could they not sympathize with the demands of Arabs who purvey themselves as victims of injustice? Demophrenics tend to identify with their enemies and feel compelled to yield to their demands even when, by so doing, they jeopardize their own interests.

Of course, their enemies couch their demands in democratic language—in terms of “rights” or “legitimate rights”—knowing that such language disarms the political and intellectual leaders of democratic, that is, of demophrenic regimes. Demophrenic personalities never challenge the alleged rights of their enemies. Instead, they try to understand their enemies, to see things from their point of view.<sup>32</sup> This empathic attitude incites their enemies to even greater hatred, especially if the hatred is based on a religious ideology. The reason is this. The demophrenic personality is imbued with the moral egalitarianism and cultural pluralism inherent in this democratic era. Wishing to live in peace and equality with others, the demophrenic urges on others an attitude of tolerance, of mutual respect and equality. But this symmetrizing attitude tacitly denies the validity of any religious ideology that claims to possess the absolute truth, and whose followers see no *logical* reason why they should tolerate error or live in peace and equality with skeptics or unbelievers.

Although demophrenic personalities may be superficially aware of their enemy's ideological hatred, they themselves are incapable of such hatred if only because their relativism prevents them from regarding the enemy as evil. Relativism impairs the demophrenic's capacity for hatred or prevents this emotion from attaining ideological intensity. Thus, Israeli journalist Uri Avineri, reflecting the moral poverty that parades as objectivity in the democratic media, could write about his intimate relationship with the PLO and Yasser Arafat in a sentimental tract entitled *My Friend, the Enemy*.

A more serious example is Shimon Peres, foreign minister during the Thirteenth Knesset. Questioned during a February 2, 1993 radio interview about the fate of Jewish settlers on the Golan Heights if the latter were surrendered to Syria, Peres replied: “I don't understand what's wrong with this. Arab settlements exist under Jewish rule, and Jewish settlements will exist under Syrian rule.” Notice the moral egalitarianism or relativism: as if living under a democracy were equivalent to living under a tyranny. (One



can only wonder why Israeli governments have tried to gain the freedom of the 1,400 Jews still living in Syria!)

An even more malignant manifestation of moral equivalence occurred when Prime Minister Rabin likened rioting Jewish settlers, who protested the brutal murder of a Jewish resident of Judea, to Arab (actually Fatah) terrorists. The same Rabin callously declared: "I couldn't care less [about the protests of residents of Judea and Samaria]." <sup>33</sup>

Clearly, relativism diminishes moral sensitivity. Since nothing is intrinsically evil, so nothing is intrinsically good, an idea that cannot help but erode a government's ability to persevere in a conflict fraught with death and destruction. Also, the demophrenic's inability to hate his country's enemies tends to impair the love he may bear for his own people, or to diminish his anger or indignation should his people be the targets of violence or vilification.

As democratic humanists and relativists, demophrenic personalities minimize the evil of their enemies by regarding them either as the innocent victims of ambitious leaders, or as the wretches of historical accident. <sup>34</sup> The consequence of their humanism is to "humanize" their enemies, that is, to excuse their evil acts and hatred.

Hated by their enemies, Jewish demophrenics succumb to self-hatred. The explanation will be found in Judaism itself. The Torah designates the Jews as the chosen people, "a people that shall dwell apart and not reckon itself among the nations." To dwell apart, intellectually and morally, to derive one's identity and self-respect from the Torah rather than from the acceptance of the nations—this aristocratic attitude is too difficult and threatening for democratized Jews, especially in Israel. Their self-hatred is rooted in the dim awareness that they lack the courage to stand alone. Many of them are not oblivious to the majestic character of the Hebrew Bible, the magnificence of their patriarchs and prophets, the grandeur that once was Israel—the Israel of King David and King Solomon. But they are far more conscious of how the Jewish people have been maligned, tortured, and decimated. Hence they harbor paranoid fear. They have no desire to be the suffering servants of the Lord. They wish to be like others, to live in peace and security, and in a pluralistic yet homogenized society. What tremendous irony!

For no matter how much these Jews—Israel's political and intellectual leaders—assimilate, the bulk of mankind remains antagonistic. *It is as if this anti-Semitism exists only to ensure the failure of assimilation or of any secular democratic regime in Israel.*

Still, the persistence of anti-Semitism reinforces the self-hatred of demophrenic Jews. This self-hatred is compounded by guilt. The guilt arises from their symmetrical logic: as egalitarians, they have no grounds



for denying self-determination to the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; and as secularists they have no claim to *any* part of the Land of Israel that is morally superior to that of the Arabs. Having abandoned traditional Judaism, they have forsaken the only solid justification for Jewish sovereignty over the land of their fathers.

This guilt-laden self-hatred prevents demophrenic Jews from upholding their own rights or from making any demands on their enemies. They prefer to appease their enemies either by meekness or by acts of kindness. Their enemies include their own fellow citizens, the Arabs of Israel to whom I must now turn.

These Arabs number some 800,000. They naturally identify with their kinsmen, the so-called Palestinians residing in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. To this extent Israel's Arab citizens identify with the PLO—as we have seen, a terrorist organization committed to Israel's destruction.

Now, in the mid-1980s, that is, even before the official date of the intifada, “Israeli” Arab violence increased in dramatic fashion, including the kidnapping, the murder and the rape of Jewish men, women, and children, the planting of bombs on busses and in open-air food markets, and the knifing of Jews, young and old. This upsurge in Arab violence may be attributed, at least in part, to an unprecedented decision of Israel's cabinet in May 1985, when a government of national unity *unanimously* agreed to exchange 1,150 Arab terrorists for three Jewish soldiers captured in Lebanon by the PLO, and to allow 600, *many of whom had been convicted of murder*, to return to their homes in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza!<sup>35</sup>

This flagrant disregard of justice and the rule of law—of course in the name of “saving” Jewish life—could not but incite contempt for Israel's government, undermine the deterrent power of its penal system, and encourage Arab violence. Brazen attacks on Jews increased in the heart of the country. To cite only one example, in July 1985 an Israeli Arab slashed the faces of five small Jewish children in broad daylight in downtown Jerusalem. An early 1986 police report found a fifty percent increase in ideologically motivated violence by Israeli Arab youth.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, when the intifada erupted, ostensibly in December 1987, only those afflicted by demophrenia were shocked when Arab citizens of Israel were heard screaming, “*Itbach el yehud!*”—“Slaughter the Jews!” (Living in a make-believe world, they again were shocked in 1990 when Israel's Arab citizens applauded Saddam Hussein's threat to incinerate the Jewish state.) A normal government, one might think, would take action to nullify the citizenship of at least some of these insurrectionary citizens, as may be done by enforcing the Nationality Law of 1952, which applies to Jews and Arabs alike.<sup>37</sup> Its failure to do so made Arabs more contemptuous of Jews

and made a mockery of Israeli citizenship. Unsurprisingly, an April 1992 survey indicated that only twenty-four percent of Arab high school youth saw themselves as "Israeli" Arabs.<sup>38</sup>

Of this 24 percent, one may well doubt their sincerity or depth of patriotism, when their Arab representatives in the Knesset openly support the intifada. For example, Hashim Mahameed brazenly told Arabs in Gaza: "By the intifada we mean not only the stone, but the war . . . Palestinians must fight the conquerors with all the means they have." For this act of incitement—some would call it sedition—the Knesset, by a vote of 54 to 48, did nothing more than suspend for three months Mahameed's parliamentary privilege of unrestricted access to all areas of the country. Significantly, some Likud MKs would have overlooked this incitement to kill Jews had an unrepentant Mahameed simply apologized.<sup>39</sup> There virtually is nothing Israel's demophrenic government would not do to appease its Arab citizens.

For example, in November 1992, a Labor government introduced into the Knesset a bill entitled "Basic Law: Human Rights," a bill that would eliminate all distinctions between Jewish and Arab citizens. This seemingly innocuous bill—what democrat could oppose it?—would nullify, in principle, the Law of Return and the very idea of Israel as a Jewish state!

Under the provisions of this bill Arabs would be entitled to (1) purchase land anywhere in Israel (the more readily with money from Saudi Arabia); (2) build mosques and houses in Jewish neighborhoods; (3) send their children to any Jewish school; (4) receive the material benefits granted to Jews immigrating to Israel; and (5) have Arabic, already an official language of the state, placed on an equal footing with Hebrew in all the media, education, etc.

To anyone unaffected by demophrenia, it should be obvious that this bill would eventuate in a thousandfold increase in Arab-Jewish tension and conflict and that it would transform Israel into a blood-soaked Lebanon.

The authors of the bill obviously were animated by hostility toward anything distinctively Jewish. But something far more profound is at work here than secular bias, however fanatical. The bill is a demophrenic escape from reality. Its supporters—and some are religious—utterly ignore the attitude and behavior of Israel's Arab citizens, specifically: (1) their well-known religious animosity toward Israel's existence; (2) their blatant indifference to the laws of the Knesset, even though they are represented therein by Arab members; (3) their notorious evasion of taxes; (4) their exemption from military service for reasons of national security; and (5) their overt identification with, and support of the PLO and the intifada.

Such is the perverse logic of this bill that it would justify what already has been promised by the Labor Party, namely, the extension to large Arab families (with more than four children) the annual child-allowance payments granted to Jewish families, notwithstanding the fundamental difference between Arabs and Jews on the military service issue. Since the Arab birthrate far exceeds that of the Jews, such payments—and they are considerable—not only would further strain Israel's strained economy; it also would multiply Israel's potential enemies, and it would do this by means of public funds drawn primarily from hard-pressed Jewish taxpayers.

In the name of equality, Israel's government would make—nay already has made—its Arab citizens a privileged class. Jews thus have become second-class citizens in their own country.

In truth, this democratic bill of rights cheapens the value of Israeli citizenship by its failure to discriminate between Jews and Arabs. It disregards the fact that while Arabs enjoy the rights of Israeli citizenship, they do not, as a rule, fulfill—as do Jews—the most important duties of citizenship. Indeed, the bill grants to Arabs, who would destroy Israel, the rights and benefits of Jews, some of whom sacrifice their life for Israel. Thus, to say, as in chapter 2, that such equality is illogical and morally inadmissible does not go to the root of things. This egalitarianism is pathological. It is symptomatic not only of Jewish self-abasement or of an utter lack of Jewish pride. Evident here is a death wish of national proportions.

I say of *national proportions* because not only was a similar “human” rights bill advocated by former Likud Minister of Justice Dan Meridor, but the Labor government's version received support even from rightwing secular nationalists!

Viewed in political terms, this bill of human rights represents the ultimate manifestation of democracy's pervasive influence on the intellect and emotions of Israel's political and intellectual elites. In medical terms the bill is symptomatic of national demophrenia, a malady that afflicts not only leftwing and rightwing secularists but faint-hearted religionists. Autism and paranoia, modulated by Jewish benevolence and Jewish self-contempt, prevent them from seeing that the bill of human rights is a bill of national suicide. The bill logically entails nothing less than the abandonment of Zionism—say, rather, of Jewish nationhood or the right of the Jewish people to have a sovereign and independent state of their own in the land of Israel.<sup>40</sup>

At this point the question arises: Is there something in Judaism itself that renders assimilated Jews more or less susceptible to demophrenia?



## III

To answer this question, let us consider certain character traits associated with the fathers of the Jewish people. Abraham personifies graciousness or kindness (*hesed*). Judaic thought regards *hesed* as a qualitative law of existence, one that prompts human beings to be concerned about the existence, the good, and the self-identity of others.

To answer this question, let us consider certain character traits associated with the fathers of the Jewish people. Abraham personifies graciousness or kindness (*hesed*). Judaic thoughts regard *hesed* as a qualitative law of existence, one that prompts human beings to be concerned about the existence, the good, and the self-identity of others. Isaac personifies strength or severity (*gevura*). This complementary law prompts us to be concerned about our own existence, our own good and self-identity.<sup>41</sup> Clearly, one cannot deal rightly or effectively with the real world solely by means of either *hesed* or *gevura*. Unless modulated by severity, kindness, severity can degenerate into self-exaltation and the negation of others. To deal correctly with individuals or nations, both graciousness and severity, in varying proportions, are required. In Judaism, these two qualities unite Jacob who personifies completeness or truth (*emet*). This is why his name was changed to "Israel" (*Yisrael*), one meaning of which is "to follow in the ways of God."

Now it so happens that the conflict between Jews and Arabs may be described as a conflict between perverse forms of *hesed* and *gevura*, that is, of kindness and severity divorced from reason and truth. The evidence brought to light in this and in previous chapters clearly indicates that, contrary instances notwithstanding, Israel's government has been animated by a maudlin and self-destructive form of *hesed*. Golda Meir once said: "When peace comes we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons."<sup>42</sup> This demophrenic attitude cannot help but incite Arabs animated by a perverse form of *gevura*, perverse in that they act not with a view to what is good for themselves so much as with a view to what is bad for the Jews.<sup>43</sup> This perversity, however, is exceeded by Israel's government. Its bill of human rights, as well as its policy of permissive subversion, clearly demonstrate that this government has a pathological tendency to undermine the interests of Jews while advancing the interests of Arabs.

If further proof is wanting, a Labor government, which came to power in July 1992, decided that national insurance payments, which are monthly government grants given to families whose sons have served in the Israeli



Army (or have performed an alternative form of national service), also would be given to those who have performed no national service, hence to Arabs—even to Arab families whose sons have engaged in terrorist activities!

## IV

By treating Jews and Arabs as morally equal, Israel's political leaders obscure or minimize the differences between Jews who identify with democracy, and Arabs who identify with autocracy. This moral egalitarianism undermines Jewish self-respect on the one hand, and fosters Jewish appeasement of Arabs and of Arab dictatorships on the other.

In contrast, for Jews who take their bearing from the Torah—which can provide logical and salutary constraints on democracy—only those individuals and nations are worthy of consideration, which abide by the Seven Noahide Laws of ethical monotheism. These universal laws prohibit murder, theft, immorality, and cruelty; forbid idolatry and blasphemy; and require the establishment of courts of justice to try cases involving these offenses.

Now it is a fact, that since 1948, but as in the past, Arabs have pillaged and destroyed many synagogues; burned sacred books and Torah scrolls; denigrated the Old Testament; desecrated many Jewish cemeteries; murdered, dismembered, and sexually mutilated many Jewish men, women, and children. These are not merely sporadic and spontaneous acts of sacrilege and barbarism. They are systematically encouraged by Islamic rulers, educators, and “holy” men (who instill in Muslims, from infancy on, hatred of Jews). Yet Israel's government seeks their peace and even their friendship.<sup>44</sup> Such demophrenic self-debasement cannot help but arouse the contempt of Muslims and spur their desire to erase the Jewish state from the map of the Middle East.

This is not to suggest that Israel's government should imitate Iranian justice, which called for the assassination of a minor author who slandered Islam. But when Jews are butchered, their sacred writings destroyed, their places of worship ravaged, then surely their government, if it were normal, would manifest more than a moment of verbal outrage. Surely, a normal government would not seek the recognition of nations that hate and defame it. Against those who savage its people, it would not turn the other cheek but exact, so far as it could, just retribution. But the government of Israel is not normal. It suffers from chronic demophrenia.

It will be objected that Israel's government is suffering not from a psychic disorder but merely from a lack of pride resulting from 1,900 years of Jewish dispersion, humiliation, and subjugation. This most emphatically

does not apply to Jews who have remained faithful to their tradition, or who have not sacrificed their intellects to democracy. (Recall Mark Twain's and Nietzsche's admiration of the Jews, of their intellectual creativity, magnanimity, and tenacity—rational manifestations of *hesed* and *gevura* that have enabled them to persevere and progress under the greatest hardship and, though humiliated, to despise their despisers.) To be sure, Israel's government lacks a due sense of pride, a symptom of schizophrenia which, as in demophrenia, is usually accompanied by intellectual debility, moral obtuseness, and loss of will.

This lack of Jewish pride on the part of Israel's egalitarian government is confronted by the overweening pride of Muslims who cannot abide equality with "infidels," but must lord it over them whenever possible. The phenomenon of Islamic pride, well-known to orientalists and clearly manifested throughout the Arab world, stirs Islam's world-historical ambitions. Hence, for Israel's government to continue to think that Jewish benevolence and self-effacement can dissolve Arab malevolence and self-exaltation betrays not an error in judgment—which experience might correct—but a syndrome. This syndrome renders it impossible to confront, with intelligence and courage, Arab-Islamic hatred of Jews (and the West). How indeed can secular Jews mired in self-blame—it is their form of moral superiority—stand up to a civilization animated by self-praise? Will not the servility of the former continue to excuse and thereby incite the unmitigated violence of the latter?

Perhaps the most pathetic or pathological example of Jewish self-effacement involves the government's, and even the Supreme Court's attitude toward the Temple Mount. We saw in chapter 2 that despite the readiness of Muslim clergymen to surrender the Temple Mount (and themselves) in the June war of 1967, Israel's government virtually relinquished control of this holiest of Jewish sites to the Muslim themselves. Shortly thereafter, the Knesset enacted "A Law for the Protection of the Holy Places." This law guarantees freedom of access to the members of the different religions who regard these sites as holy. (Violation of the law is punishable by up to five years in prison.) Nevertheless, in more than a dozen separate judgments since 1970, Israel's Supreme Court consistently has refused to force the government to uphold this law for Jews who wish to pray on the Temple Mount. The reason? Jewish presence there might offend Muslim sensibilities and arouse Arab violence.

In their own country, therefore, Jews do not have the freedom of access to their most sacred site, which any gentile tourist has when visiting Israel! Indeed, in June 1993, the Rabin government, in a fatuous gesture of good will, permitted 192 citizens from Libya, a country formally at war

with Israel, to enter the Holy Land and ascend the Temple Mount. And if this were not enough, these same Libyans were given free access to Israel's media on which they called for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine! The government, while granting freedom of speech to its implacable enemies, remained speechless—this incitement to Arab violence and the intifada notwithstanding.

#### IV

At this point allow me to present a more or less conventional analysis of the attitude and behavior of Israel's government toward the leaders of the intifada.

As indicated above, it was a government of national unity, one representing almost the entire political and religious spectrum, that released 1,150 Arab terrorists and allowed 600 of them to return to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. That particular government was formed in November 1984 as a result of Israel's inconclusive elections to the Eleventh Knesset. The major parties, Labor and Likud, agreed to rotate the premiership. For the first two years, Labor party leader Shimon Peres presided as prime minister, while Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir served as Israel's foreign minister. For the second two years, Mr. Shamir assumed the premiership, while Mr. Peres took over as minister of foreign affairs. The entire four-year period saw Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party as minister of defense. Which means that the intifada commenced under a government each of whose principal leaders had decades of experience with the Arab-Islamic world.

Elections to the Twelfth Knesset took place in November 1988. Another national unity government was formed when the Likud won a narrow victory over Labor. Mr. Shamir remained prime minister, while Mr. Rabin continued to serve as Israel's minister of defense, despite his failure to suppress the intifada. The policy of permissive subversion continued, which means that the people of Israel were being slowly conditioned to brutal Arab violence.<sup>45</sup> What makes this all the more bizarre is that in January 1989, Rabin publicly admitted that the intifada "is a political struggle with far-reaching goals that in my opinion endanger the future and the security of the State of Israel."<sup>46</sup>

Despite his acknowledging the deadly goals of the intifada, Rabin failed to arrest its main leaders (which any rational and responsible government would have done long before 1989).<sup>47</sup>

For example, during 1989, various bills of indictment were issued in a military court by the military prosecutor against seven subordinate leaders of the intifada. Whereas these subordinates were indicted, two of



the top leadership, Bir Zeit University professor Sari Nusseibeh, and Radwan Abu Ayyash, head of the Arab Journalists' Association in eastern Jerusalem, remained free to continue their work of inciting terrorism and insurrection despite their having been named in these indictments.

In one indictment, the military prosecutor ascribed to Nusseibeh (whose home and office are in eastern Jerusalem) the delivery of \$220,000 to one Radi Gira'i, for financing intifada activities. The transfer of these funds is said to have been carried out in five meetings (during December 1988 and January 1989).<sup>48</sup>

In another indictment, Nusseibeh was said to have drawn up various leaflets calling for throwing stones and fire bombs at Israeli vehicles, non-payment of taxes, wounding Israeli soldiers, fighting with knives, and joining the army of the "State of Palestine."

In still another bill of indictment, Abu Ayyash, who served as a PLO (Fatah) delegate of the intifada's Unified Leadership, was named as having composed insurrectionary leaflets distributed in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.<sup>49</sup>

When Justice Minister Dan Meridor was asked, in a Knesset interpolation, to explain why the seven subordinate leaders of the intifada were indicted while the two top leaders were not, Meridor referred the questioner to the attorney general and the chief military prosecutor, thus evading his statutory responsibility. For inasmuch as the criminal acts attributed to Nusseibeh and Abu Ayyash were carried out in eastern Jerusalem, both men could have been put on trial in Jerusalem in accordance with Knesset legislation. Responsibility for prosecuting such cases rests with the attorney general and the minister of justice. Alternatively, the accused could have been tried by a military court, in which case responsibility lies with the chief military prosecutor, but ultimately with the minister of defense, then Yitzhak Rabin.<sup>50</sup>

These examples of permissive subversion (which one observer characterized as government-licensed insurrection) raise disturbing questions. Why did the government permit the leaders of the intifada to roam at large and incite the Arab masses to kill Jews (while lecturing left wing civil rights organizations about peaceful coexistence)? In other words, why did the government fail to uphold the rule of law of which democracies so often boast? Why did democratic permissiveness prevail when at stake was Israel's ability to retain control over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza? It should be obvious that the Israel's army was physically capable of quelling the intifada. And yet, when rioting Arabs hurled stones and iron stakes at Jewish soldiers, why were these soldiers constrained by government orders not to use lethal force unless their lives clearly were in danger—as if such



clarity is always obvious to those in the thick and uncertainties of mob violence? In short, why did the Shamir-Rabin government refrain from arresting and/or deporting the leaders of the intifada who were responsible not only for the murder of Jews, but for assassinating Palestinian Arabs who failed to cooperate with the Unified Leadership?

To answer this question, it first should be noted that on 17 January 1989, after more than twelve months of the intifada, and under pressure from Washington, Prime Minister Shamir proposed a peace plan offering autonomy to the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The plan called for Arab elections with the object of establishing a self-governing Palestinian authority that would oversee all aspects of life except security and foreign relations. The elections would be followed by a transition period leading to negotiations on the final status of these areas. (Like the Camp David Agreement, however, the Shamir plan could readily lead to *territorial* autonomy and, as Henry Kissinger warned, to the establishment of a Palestinian state.)<sup>51</sup>

It should be apparent, however, that any election plan required the cooperation of Palestinian Arabs, hence the leaders of the intifada. Now, to negotiate with criminals, with men who incited Arabs to murder Jews and wage war against the Jewish state would, under any circumstances, be a questionable gambit or gamble, to put it mildly. But these men identified also with the PLO, that is, with a multi-headed organization variously linked, as we saw, to Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, regimes nurturing hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. This is one reason why the PLO was anathema to Shamir and his Likud Party.

But could, perhaps, a wedge be driven between the leaders of the intifada and the PLO? Perhaps, the government of Israel could cultivate among Palestinian Arabs a leadership that was independent of the PLO? Would, perhaps, democratic elections in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza magnify the personal ambitions of successful candidates on the one hand, and mitigate their hostility toward the Jewish state on the other? But this means that Israel's government would have to abstain from suppressing the intifada or from incarcerating its top leaders. Shamir's Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin agreed. Another word about Rabin is now in order.

Perhaps it was fated that the intifada should have commenced under Rabin's tenure as defense minister. Although Mr. Rabin professed a desire (after the Yom Kippur War) to create conditions that would bring about a voluntary exodus of many Arabs from Judea and Samaria to Jordan, he failed to create such conditions when he succeeded Golda Meir as prime minister in 1974. To the contrary, he eventually advocated Israel's withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines. Israel's first native-born prime minister

harbored no ideological commitment to Jewish retention of what he casually called the West Bank.

Bearing this indifferent attitude in mind, we can better understand why Rabin did not order the prosecution of two of the top leaders of the intifada mentioned above. In fact, less than two weeks after Prime Minister Shamir announced his peace plan, Rabin released from administrative detention the intifada's most notorious leader, Faisal Husseini, the senior representative of the PLO in the "territories." Surely, Mr. Rabin would not have released this Arab notable without the consent of the prime minister. Indeed, Husseini continued to remain at large after Rabin was succeeded as defense minister, in June 1990, by Moshe Arens of Shamir's own Likud Party. He even was permitted to be interviewed on television during the Persian Gulf War and to express his support for Saddam Hussein!<sup>52</sup>

Now, juxtaposing Rabin's non-Zionist attitude toward Judea and Samaria with the timing of his release of Husseini (and failure to indict Sari Nusseibeh and Abu Ayyash), it should be obvious that he had no intention of suppressing the intifada. The same may be said of Prime Minister Shamir. The leadership of the intifada had to remain free, else there would be no negotiating partner to work out the details of Shamir's peace plan.<sup>53</sup>

Besides, PLO cooperation might be necessary, and inasmuch as the United States was then meeting with the PLO in Tunis, Husseini could serve as an important partner in this complicated negotiating process.<sup>54</sup>

Hence, in Rabin's and Shamir's judgment—so contrary to Judaism and Judaic law—it was necessary to allow the intifada to persist at some tolerable level of violence. In this way the Palestinian Arabs would gain self-confidence and become less dependent on foreign influences dangerous to Israel. But this means that Jewish blood would have to be shed in order to promote the self-confidence of these Arabs. It means that Jews would have to be sacrificed on the altar of Palestinian independence.

The Rabin-Shamir strategy—if it may be called that—produced astonishing results. Husseini held several talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The immediate purpose of those talks was to organize the Middle East peace conference mentioned in chapter 3. Husseini, who had been coordinating his activities with the PLO in Tunis, headed an unofficial advisory group to the Palestinian delegation. As (former) Knesset member Elyakim HaEtzni pointed out: "Some of the delegation members, former inmates of Israeli prisons, served as field commanders of the intifada. But they are only puppets, manipulated by 'PLO-Jerusalem'—Husseini, [Hanan] Ashrawi and their cohorts—who in turn are attached by strings to [PLO headquarters in] Tunis."<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile, the intifada continued, except that, with the convening of the Middle East peace conference, first in Madrid and later in Washington, the Arabs resorted more frequently to firearms. So much for a political analysis of the government's attitude toward the intifada. I now must return to a deeper level of analysis by means of the concept of demophrenia.

## V

The intifada has been portrayed incessantly by Arab leaders as a "national uprising of the Palestinian people" against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. It is publicized also by the media as "the struggle of the Palestinians for national self-determination." This language appeals to the democratic mind. First, it wins to the Arab cause the support of the democratic world, especially the United States, Israel's primary military supplier. Second, it divides public opinion in Israel itself. Recall the controversy between the Left and the Right. The Left favors withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, partly on the grounds that for Israel to rule Arabs against their wishes is contrary to democracy. Meanwhile, even though the Right rejects withdrawal, its spokesmen cannot expose the metapolitical nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict without compromising their own democratic credentials. They, too, are afraid of alienating democratic America. They, too, have been conditioned intellectually and impoverished spiritually by the dogmas of democracy, especially by egalitarianism. In other words, they lack the concepts and convictions that transcend democracy, which could energize and direct their will and emotions so as to heighten, rather than lower their self-confidence or national pride.

What appears externally as a disjunction between intellect and will, or between truth and action, is a demophrenic inability to deal with ideologically motivated hatred and violence. Israel's government cannot even cope with the disloyalty of its own Arab citizens because the egalitarian or symmetrical logic of demophrenia impairs the mind's ability to make black-and-white moral distinctions *and* to act consistently and vigorously therewith.

Animated, or so they think, by reason, demophrenics cannot understand why reason, graced by benevolence, fails to overcome the malice and violence of their adversaries. Even when their assailants falsify reality and defame them, they desist from exposing their calumniators as vicious liars. This self-effacing attitude compels them to engage in the rhetoric of peace, hence to lie to their own people. This tortured or twisted mentality emasculates them. Their very instinct of self-preservation is bungled, as the following will further demonstrate.



The Middle East rhetoric of peace is of course a means of gaining or retaining power, whether used by Arabs or Israelis. Both may be called "Machiavellian doves." But while the use of this rhetoric by Machiavellian doves in Israel is functional (i.e., effective) vis-a-vis naive, peace-loving Jews, it is dysfunctional, nay, suicidal, vis-a-vis *jihad*-committed Muslims.

Thus, consider the June 1992 Knesset elections that brought Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin to power. Although his party was identified with the policy of "territory for peace," Labor's party platform and Rabin's campaign rhetoric were constrained, not only by opinion polls overwhelmingly opposed to territorial withdrawal, but by two Knesset laws related thereto. One was an amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance enacted on August 5, 1986 (under the national unity government headed by Shimon Peres). The amendment forbade any citizen of Israel from establishing contact with a terrorist organization aimed at the downfall of the state or the impairment of its security. Consistent therewith, Rabin rejected negotiation with the PLO, for such negotiation—the question of personal and national honor aside—almost would certainly eventuate in Israel's withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Nevertheless, soon after the June elections, Rabin authorized contacts with that terrorist organization.<sup>56</sup> (The result of these unlawful contacts will be discussed in a moment.)

A second law, clause 97(b) of the criminal code, laid down that: "Whoever, with a view to the transfer of territory from the sovereignty of the state to the sovereignty of a foreign state, has taken action which is liable to bring this about, will suffer the death penalty or life imprisonment." Without making reference to this law, the 1992 Labor Party platform declared: "Israel sees in the Golan Heights an area of great importance for its security, its safety and the ensuring of its water resources, even in times of peace. Consequently, in every peace agreement with Syria and in the security arrangements, Israel's settlements and military control will be maintained on the Heights—on which Israel's jurisdiction, law and administration have been applied." Consistent therewith, Rabin told a Golan audience, "It is inconceivable that even in peacetime we should go down from the Golan. Whoever even thinks of leaving the Golan wantonly abandons the security of Israel."<sup>57</sup>

Hardly were the elections over, however, before Rabin offered to yield the Golan to Syria for "full peace." Whether or not he was aware of having thereby violating a law imposing the death penalty or life imprisonment may be left open. The point is that the rhetoric of the territory for peace policy requires its Israeli advocates, once in power, to deliver—despite their knowledge that yielding territory cannot help but endanger



Israel's security. But now, to cover themselves, they must revert to their previous campaign of deception.

Thus, having played the role of a "hawk" to win the June 1992 Knesset elections—incidentally, by a narrow plurality of the votes cast—Rabin now had to metamorphose into a "dove" and prepare the public for territorial withdrawal. Accordingly, he allowed Faisal Husseini, who was Arafat's key representative, to openly head the Arab Palestinian delegation in the Middle East peace talks. (Rabin's decision, by the way, violated the diplomatic ground rules of this international conference, which excludes Arab residents of eastern Jerusalem, lest Jerusalem become—as it since has—a negotiable issue). Husseini had therefore to be portrayed as an Arab moderate. (The same moderate baldly declared in the Jordanian newspaper *Al-Ra'i* on November 12, 1992: "Sooner or later, we will force Israeli society to join in a larger society, that is, our Arab society, and we will thereby bring about the dissolving of the Zionist entity in stages.")<sup>58</sup>

But inasmuch as Husseini obviously was taking orders from Arafat in Tunis, the PLO had to be portrayed also as moderate. Needed for this purpose was an ostensibly more fanatical group of terrorists: Enter Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalists.<sup>59</sup> Now the Rabin government could rescind the law prohibiting meetings with the PLO, which it did on January 19, 1993. With Hamas terrorist attacks preoccupying the media, the public could the more readily be conditioned to accept the government's tacit recognition of the PLO, despite the many clauses of the PLO Covenant calling for Israel's destruction. This asymmetry, however, had to be rectified, at least for public consumption.

Accordingly, on September 9, 1993 Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat exchanged letters of mutual recognition. Whereas Arafat declared that the "PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security . . . [and] renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence," Rabin replied, "The Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people." (It were as if Arafat was speaking, not on behalf of a gang of terrorists, but of a sovereign state bestowing on Israel the boon of formal recognition.) The stage was set for the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement of September 13, 1993.

Nothing so clearly illustrates the malaise of democratic politics, especially its lack of honor, than that September 13 ceremony on the White House lawn which saw Prime Minister Rabin shake hands with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, of whom General Ion Pacepa, head of Rumanian Intelligence under the Ceaucescu regime has written: "I've never before seen so much cleverness, blood, and filth all together in one man."<sup>60</sup>

It is no secret that Arafat presided over the brutal murder not only of innocent Jewish men, women, and children, but of helpless American diplomats in Khartoum. Such is the depth of his depravity that when he visited Ceausescu's Rumania—a regime not known for fastidiousness—some officials with whom he shook hands could not wait to cleanse themselves of the touch of this Arab terrorist whose bodyguards also served as his lovers.<sup>61</sup> Yet, not only did Rabin shake hands and sign a covenant with Arafat, but that covenant was sanctified by American presidents and congressmen, the champions of democracy and of human dignity.

If these words appear strident, it should be noted that while Arafat was being lionized in Washington, the democratic media of the West sanitized that villain who, on various occasions, has expressed utter contempt for Western civilization as well as obscene hatred of the Jewish people.

Lest it be thought that Arafat or the PLO had undergone a spiritual conversion and was now committed to peace with the Jewish state, two things should be noted: First, Arafat's ruling wing of the PLO, Fatah, continued its murderous attacks on Jews after September 13 and disseminated leaflets calling for an escalation of intifada violence.<sup>62</sup> Second, no sooner was the agreement announced than Arafat brazenly declared, in a broadcast viewed on Israel television: "We are on our way to establish a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem." Here, a word about the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement:

The agreement grants the Arabs police powers and legislative jurisdiction that "will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory." The accord not only required Israel's military redeployment from Judea and Samaria, but also complete military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Moreover, and as Dr. Dore Gold of the Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University has put it: "The agreement does not call on the PLO to renounce its 1988 declaration of statehood or for any change in its international network of embassies. Thus it is virtually inevitable that Gaza-Jericho will rapidly evolve to statehood and the PLO will seek to extend its jurisdiction through most of the West Bank"—surely an understatement.<sup>63</sup>

To facilitate that goal, Dr. Ahmed Tibi, a full Israeli Arab citizen, became Arafat's political adviser. And why not? Inasmuch as Israel's government has recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, then, as stated in chapter 3, the PLO also represents Israel's 800,000 Arab citizens. Many are concentrated in the Galilee, and now they too can be heard demanding "self-determination."<sup>64</sup>

## Conclusion

Israel's leaders know the truth about the deadly intentions of the Arab-Islamic world. But to act in a manner commensurate with this truth they would have to believe in the Jewish people's God-given right and duty to maintain exclusive possession and control of the Land of Israel. Such dedication has been undermined, however, by the end of ideology.

As a democratic phenomenon, the end of ideology permeates the mentality of Israel's democratic elites. There it wages war with Zionism. This inner conflict between the end of ideology and democracy on the one hand, and the end of ideology and Zionism on the other is exacerbated by the anti-democratic and anti-Zionist environment of the Middle East. The result is political schizophrenia. Israel's government is paralyzed by compounded contradictions. It tries to escape this bedlam by yielding, as it were, to symmetrical logic. But reality, that of Islam, refuses to make peace with this demophrenic government. The latter's occasional acts of self-assertiveness may be understood as flashes of "asymmetrization" in the midst of a world immersed in "symmetrical unity." Fragmented by conflicting ideas and emotions, this pathological government stands transfixed by the single-minded goal and deviousness of the enemy. Alone in a hostile Arab sea, it broods about its image in the democratic world. The irony is of biblical proportions: *Because Israel's demophrenic government cannot base its Arab policy on truth, it is constantly the victim of lies. Yearning for the acceptance and approval of the nations, it repeatedly is condemned by the United Nations.*

Truth demands the exposure of lies and of those who slander you. But this requires a sense of honor, of intellectual and moral integrity that presupposes a basic congruity between reason, emotion, and volition. All this is lacking in demophrenic personalities and governments. The Arab hoax of a distinct Palestinian people, the fraudulent use of the democratic principle of self-determination to dignify the Palestinian struggle for national independence, the mendacious description of Judea and Samaria as the West Bank or as occupied Arab land, the vilification of Jews as "oppressors"—of Jews who have treated their Arabs enemies with greater kindness than will be found in any Arab-Islamic regime—these Arab lies and slanders go virtually unchallenged by Israel's political and intellectual elites. Indeed, one of the unwritten rules of the so-called Middle East peace process is that Israel's government must not tell the truth about its adversaries. To this rule it faithfully adheres, and must if there is to be any "peace" conference.

By attending such charades, Israel places itself on the same moral level as Arab dictatorships. The "good" and the "bad," apparently asymmetrical, become equal or symmetrical, or so it seems. However, the symmetrical logic of demophrenia compels the good to yield to the bad, for the logic of the latter is utterly asymmetrical. The bad do not suffer from the moral egalitarianism or relativism that afflicts the good.

It has been said that those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first drive mad. In Isaiah 5:20 we read: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil." Relativism leads to folly, ultimately to madness, the madness of demophrenia. The subject is elaborated further in the next chapter.



## Demophrenia: Case Studies

The Arab world is a sink. It's a sink of corruption and mediocrity and the most appalling and murderous tyrannies.

Dr. Edward Said,  
Columbia University<sup>1</sup>

Despite the fundamentally asymmetric relations between Jews and Arabs, Israel's political and intellectual leaders persist in applying symmetrical logic to the "Arab problem," and with destructive consequences for all concerned. Although symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking are, according to Matte-Blanco, two modes of being, still, "in . . . normal psychical life it seems that the homogeneous mode needs to be toned down or dissimulated more than the asymmetrical mode. . . ." Indeed, continues Mr. Blanco, the asymmetrical mode which, "in its pure state probably appears only in mathematical reasonings . . . need not be dissimulated."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, when the differences between people are more central or significant than that which they have in common, it is futile and even pathological to persist in trying to dissolve their differences into the unconscious sea of symmetry. Selective inattention to the profound asymmetry or cultural antagonism between Jews and Muslims, is a demophrenic escape from reality or an autistic flight into the world of symmetrical or homogeneous being. Otherwise sane people create a world that does not exist. I am alluding to democratic secularists who fancy a world in which they live harmoniously with people whose tradition is utterly anti-democratic and fanatically religious.

Afflicted by demophrenia, the secularists who have ever dominated the modern State of Israel invariably minimize the all-important religious dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As one Arab commentator puts it: "The propagandists of secularism, who leave out of account the religious factor in the Palestine problem, ignore the fact that this is the only bone of contention in the world which has persisted for thirty centuries. . . ." Another Arab spokesman declares: ". . . apart from the political conflict, there is a basic philosophical and spiritual incompatibility between the two

contending nationalisms. Even if all political disputes were to be resolved, the two movements, Zionism and Arab Nationalism, would remain, spiritually and ideologically, worlds apart—living in separate ‘universes of discourse’ which are incapable of communication or meaningful dialogue.” Neither of these Arab spokesmen regard territory or geographical boundaries as a decisive issue in the Arab-Israel conflict. In fact, both statements were made before 1967.

Now, it so happens that, these two statements will be found in Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi's book, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (pp. 98-99). The book was written in Hebrew just before the Six-Day War of June 1967. The English edition appeared in 1972, that is, before the Yom Kippur War. The book is replete with hundreds of quotes from diverse Arab sources, all vilifying Jews and Israel in the most lurid terms and promising the eventual annihilation of the Jewish state. In some 500 pages, one finds not a single exception to this ventilation of Arab hatred—not even from Islamic scholars. Yet Harkabi was convinced before the Six-Day War as well as before the Yom Kippur War that a peaceful and political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was possible.

I single out Professor Harkabi because, he is not only an internationally prominent academic and reputed expert on Islam and on the Arab-Israeli conflict; but he also is a former head of Israeli Military Intelligence. With all due respect, I know of no one who better exemplifies the demophrenic mentality of Israel's political and intellectual elites. His (unconscious) application of symmetrical logic to the Arab-Israeli conflict is starkly evident in *Arab Attitudes to Israel*: the book is dedicated to Jews and Arabs alike. Its central and directly meaningful stimulus—that of unmitigated Arab hostility—is selectively negated, or wrapped in symmetrical unity, in the idea of peace. This idea has become a fixation to which Harkabi resorts despite incessant contradictory Arab stimuli.

In his more recent book, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (1988), which also is dedicated to Jews and Arabs, Harkabi urged Israel's government to negotiate with the PLO and permit the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. “Human history,” he writes, “repeatedly demonstrates the ability of peoples to transcend the negative characteristics that were once justifiably ascribed to them.”<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately, Professor Harkabi does not offer any examples of such peoples. Hence he does not permit us to know *how* they transcended their negative characteristics. It makes all the difference in the world to know whether the peoples he has in mind were conquered in war (like Nazi Germany and Japan), or whether their “negative characteristics” were overcome as a result of evolution or of revolution. Nor does Harkabi

enlighten us about these negative characteristics. We are left to wonder whether they were part of a people's religious mentality or whether they were of a political and therefore of a more pliable and transient nature. But, inasmuch as Harkabi advocates the establishment of a PLO-Palestinian state, he obviously is alluding to Muslims on the one hand, and to certain "negative characteristics" they have or had on the other.

He reveals these negative characteristics in *Arab Attitudes to Israel*. Writing at a time when one did not have to fear the mindless charge of racism, Harkabi refers to Islam as a combatant, expansionist, and authoritarian creed. He admits, "The idea of the *Jihad* is fundamental in Islam," in consequence of which hatred, hostility, and conflict are endemic to Arab culture.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, he informs us, "There are many examples in Arab national literature of comparisons between the Arabs and other peoples, of self-glorification by denigration of others."<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, and of profound significance, he acknowledges that the use of falsehood, distortions of the truth, and "misleading slogans" are typical of Arab political life. "Political scientists, sociologists and historians," he musingly writes, "seem to feel reluctant to mention this aspect of their analysis of the Arab world."<sup>6</sup> He nonetheless cites one "balanced observer" who refers to Arab achievements in the reinterpretation of the truth, if only because of the Arab's inordinate pride and national aspirations, "defeats become victories, history is rewritten . . . and slogans for the future are endowed with hypnotic power." Harkabi goes so far as to suggest that mendacity is second nature to the Arabs, that one may rightly regard "falsehood as an expression of [Arab] national character." For support he quotes Arab sociologist Sonia Hamady: "Lying is a widespread habit among the Arabs, and they have a low idea of truth."<sup>7</sup>

Consider, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Arab spokesman who happens to be a Coptic Christian. Ghali, who served in the Egyptian delegation to the UN during the Gulf War (and subsequently was elected UN Secretary-General), declared, "there is no difference between Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights and the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait . . . The principle is exactly the same in the case of Israel's control of areas captured in 1967, and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait."<sup>8</sup> Apart from the fact that Israel did not "annex" the Golan Heights, notice how Dr. Ghali, a historian, obscures the difference between Iraq's war of aggression and Israel's war of self-defense. (This, by the way, is a petty example of semantic subversion, which the spokesmen of dictatorships readily use against democracies steeped in the moral egalitarianism of demophrenia.)

Now we can better appreciate Harkabi's conclusion (especially as it was written *before* Ghali's statement):



If an 'elastic' attitude to truth and falsehoods is adopted in internal affairs, how much easier it is to resort to lies and distortions about the external enemy, especially as the Arab authorities can utilize their control of mass communications media . . . . In previous chapters, we have given examples of [Arab] exaggerations and the development of a demonology of Zionism, the Jews and Israel, which contain many elements of distortion and falsehood. It is only natural that the disseminator of lies may unwittingly come to believe in his own statements, but it may be reasonably assumed that Arab spokesmen also make use of deliberate misstatements and falsehoods.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, Maj. Gen. Harkabi (ret.) is convinced that the Arabs in question either have transcended these "negative characteristics," or will readily shed them, if Israel will but withdraw from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and permit the PLO to establish thereon a Palestinian state. The fact that Israel's own Arab citizens, along with the Palestinian Arabs, applauded Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait—with all its attendant horrors—has not made Harkabi recant.

But even if it be granted that Arabs can transcend their negative characteristics—a petty insult—common sense would dictate that Israel should not withdraw to its vulnerable 1949 armistice lines until Muslim leaders not only preach peace instead of war, but show tangible evidence that they are not engaging in prevarication. After all, deception is a basic principle of war, *a fortiori* of warlike regimes. Hence, it may be argued that Israel's withdrawal would only encourage the bellicose and disdainful qualities Harkabi attributes to Arabs and Islam.

Finally, it should be noted that for Harkabi to speak of the negative characteristics of any people is paradoxical, inasmuch as he is a self-professed moral relativist.<sup>10</sup> It should be emphasized that moral relativism is a secular doctrine. Hence, those tainted by moral relativism understand the Arab-Israeli conflict in secular, i.e., political terms. The fact that Islam is a religion is no more than a minor detail or nuance of political analysis. Just as Jews of Harkabi's persuasion do not take Islam seriously, so they do not take Judaism seriously.

Lest I be accused of engaging in polemics, let me add that Harkabi's virtual indifference to the Arabs' ideologically animated hatred of the Jews is typical, even of those who do not go so far as to advocate Israel's withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. A blasé attitude toward Arab hatred prevails among Israel's intellectual and political leaders, and largely because they have been tainted by democratic relativism or moral egalitarianism. If not in thought, then at least in behavior, they seem incapable of



transcending the democratic idea that Jews and Arabs can live in peace and equality in the Land of Israel.

Let me not be misunderstood. I believe that Israel itself eventually will bring about a metamorphosis in Islam such that Muslims will overcome their 1,300-year-old hatred of Jews (and of Western civilization). But those of Harkabi's persuasion offer not a shred of evidence as to how and when this hoped-for event will occur. It never occurs to them to relate their optimism regarding Islamic anti-Semitism to the anti-Semitism still very much alive in the democracies of Christian Europe. Despite European anti-Semitism, and even though Harkabi himself has documented Islam's unequalled vituperation, contempt, and hatred of Jews and of Israel; and further, even though he is aware of the barbarism perpetrated by Muslims against their own kindred, let alone against Jews—still he refuses to take these “negative characteristics” of Islam seriously. On this point, he has many followers, including right wing and religious members of the former Shamir government.<sup>11</sup>

## II

The power of the human mind to ignore reality, to disregard the truth, and to find or fabricate reasons to justify this escapism truly is amazing. Consider, for example, Shimon Peres. In an interview with *The Jerusalem Post*, the foreign minister declared that “most of the [Arab] countries are being governed by . . . brutal authoritarians.”<sup>12</sup> Recalling what was said of Syria in chapter 1, Mr. Peres would surely include Hafez al-Assad under this category. In fact, his reference to “brutal authoritarians” occurred in the context of Israeli negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights.

Now, as noted in the previous chapter, when Peres was asked what would happen to the Jewish residents on the Golan, were Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines, the foreign minister said he saw nothing wrong with this: just as there are Arabs living under Jewish rule [but in a democracy], so there will be Jews living under Syrian rule [hence under a tyranny]. Perhaps Peres was being cynical. This cynicism, however, is indistinguishable from the language of moral egalitarianism or relativism. What we see here is that despite his awareness that Assad's regime is a ruthless military dictatorship, relativism modulates Peres' mentality and provides him with an excuse for abandoning 12,500 Jews to Arab despotism.

This contradiction between Peres' relativism and his awareness of Syrian tyranny results in a bizarre distortion of reality. Thus, in the above mentioned interview he recognizes that “by having tension with Israel, he [Assad] justifies his own rule.” But immediately thereafter Peres says of Assad: “I think he realizes the time has come for peace. He wants an

impossible negotiation. Namely, Israel first of all, hand over everything he requests and then [he] will negotiate about what Israel gets in return. That is really illogical."

Note the oxymoron. If Assad, as Peres admits, justifies his rule over Syria by having tension with Israel, then for Assad to make peace with Israel is to commit political suicide. On the other hand, if Assad, in Peres' words, "wants an impossible negotiation," the only prudent conclusion to be drawn is *not* that the Syrian dictator is being illogical, but that he does not really want peace with Israel. Peres manifests the split and escapist mentality involved in demophrenia.

A more revealing case is that of Yossi Sarid, a leading spokesman of the Meretz Party with experience on the important Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs:

Mr. Sarid long had advocated negotiations with the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Hence he was taken aback when Yasir Arafat, along with the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza supported Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait. He was all the more discomfited when Israel's own Arab citizens applauded the Iraqi dictator. In view of these politically embarrassing developments, he felt compelled to reassess his position. This he did on August 17, 1990 in an article published in *Ha'aretz*, Israel's elitist newspaper. "It has always been my position," he wrote (in the spirit of Buber and Magnes), "that two peoples have rights to the land of Israel-Palestine, Jews and Palestinians, and that the alternatives are therefore clear: either compromise and partition or endless war."

Clearly this never has been the real position of the Arabs. Their religious doctrines and convictions oblige them to reject any permanent partition of Palestine, which is part of the Arab nation and homeland. Moreover, these Arabs do not shudder at the thought of war, as Mr. Sarid does; and they are confident that, in the end, they shall eliminate the Jews from what he calls "Israel-Palestine." One might therefore think that the Arab support of Saddam Hussein would have prompted Sarid to alter his position in some significant way. It did not. He continues:

The endorsement of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by the PLO, by supposedly moderate Palestinians not affiliated with the PLO, and even by many Arabs who live inside Israel and hold Israeli citizenship has put a knife in the back of the peace process . . . .

The PLO has dedicated the past two years to convincing Israelis and others that it has changed, that it has reconciled itself to the existence of the State of Israel and has abandoned terrorism. The PLO has kicked the bucket over.

It simply is not credible that Mr. Sarid was oblivious to the statements of Arafat, Abu Iyyad, and Farouk Kadoumi, cited in chapter 3. Public statements concerning the PLO's peace-and-war strategy had been made by ranking members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This suggests that Sarid's mentality prompted him to accept the benign pronouncements of the PLO and to ignore those which were hostile—and this, despite numerous terrorist acts against Israel by the PLO *after* Arafat's renunciation of terrorism before the United Nations in December 1988.

This escape-from-reality syndrome exemplifies what Professor AlRoy said of the *Yishuv*, and which bears repeating: "One cannot help being astounded at the sheer determination with which the *Yishuv* for so long denied conflict with Arabs—in the face of conflict. There was an extraordinary tension here between the empirical world and personal and group conceptualization." It took the PLO's public support of Saddam Hussein's August 1990 conquest of Kuwait for Mr. Sarid to admit, tacitly, that he had been misled by the PLO's Janus-faced statements.<sup>13</sup>

Following the line of Anwar Sadat's speech to Israel's Knesset in November 1977, PLO spokesmen had played on the theme that the Palestinian problem was the core of the Middle East conflict. As an earnest of their pacific intentions they had proposed a two-state solution to this conflict, to which they gave the name "Israel-Palestine." Mr. Sarid's article parrots this PLO language. By so doing, however, he clearly implies that the claims of Jews and Arabs to this land are morally equal.<sup>14</sup> The taint of cultural relativism and its effect on his behavior are obvious. He continues:

Saddam Hussein has already initiated two wars against his neighbours. He who has gored a Muslim country . . . will most certainly be willing to gore the Jewish State. The Israeli Arabs must be aware of this imminent danger or they would not demand to be supplied with gas masks for their defense. And yet, polls suggest that 62 percent of these Arab Israeli citizens support Saddam Hussein.

Apparently, Mr. Sarid was surprised by this lack of patriotism on the part of Israel's Arab citizens. But surely he was not ignorant of the reason why Arab citizens of Israel are not inducted into the army. Surely, he was cognizant of the report of Israel's internal security service that in 1988 and 1989—that is, before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait—Arab citizens of Israel committed 442 politically motivated assaults including stabbings, shootings, arson, and sabotage. The report also indicated that Arab terrorist cells within Israel's pre-1967 borders were working with PLO counterparts in Judea and Samaria. But if Israel cannot count on the loyalty of its own Arab citizens, Mr. Sarid's belief in the possibility of a territorial compromise



with the Arabs of Judea and Samaria is the symptomatic of a *sacrificio dell' intelletto* or of demophrenia. He continues:

Two Knesset Members, Abdul Wahab Darawsheh and Muhammed Miari, have publicly backed Saddam as well. How can these people find a kind word to say about a man who threatens to use chemical weapons against the country in which they live—and in which they claim to want to continue to live? For the first time [?] Mr. Darawsheh and Mr. Miari have thrown doubt [!] upon their loyalty to the state in which they claim citizenship.

Both of these Arab Knesset members long have been known to be PLO supporters.<sup>15</sup> Hence, for Mr. Sarid to suggest that he did not doubt their loyalty to the State of Israel before August 1990 is to be attributed to one or more of the following causes: (1) disingenuousness; (2) a functional inability to cope with the Arabs' hatred of the Jews and of Israel; (3) a diluted sense of what constitutes loyalty to one's country; and (4) a tenuous appreciation of Israel's world-historical significance.

But what is truly remarkable and indicative of demophrenia is this: Despite Mr. Sarid's belated recognition of the PLO's treacherous character, the unreliability of what he calls "moderate" Arab Palestinians, the questionable loyalty of the aforementioned Arab Knesset members, and the identification of so many Arab Israeli citizens with Saddam Hussein—despite all this relentless hatred and what it portends for Israel, Sarid concludes by affirming his support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. His reason:

Had I supported the establishment of a Palestinian state only because the Palestinians deserve a state I would now withdraw that support. However, I continue to demand their right to self-determination and an independent state because it is my right to rid myself of the occupation and its evil influence. The Palestinians perhaps deserve the occupation, but we Israelis do not.

Notice that Sarid no longer seems to support the demand of the Palestinians for an independent state on grounds of principle but only for reasons of expediency. Israel's control of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza has had an evil influence on Israel itself. Whatever truth there may be to this contention, Sarid obscures other truths.

First, he conveniently ignores the countless terrorist attacks that were launched against Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza between 1949 and 1967—and now terrorists have deadlier weapons. The murderous consequences of such attacks are no less evil, to say the least, than any evil he sees



in Israel's control of these areas. Second, he forgets about the disloyalty of his Arab colleagues in the Knesset, as well as the palpable hostility of Israel's Arab citizens. Third, he never seriously considers any alternative to Israel's withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—such as their eventual incorporation into the Jewish state. And he does not seriously consider this alternative, because he is trapped in the democratic relativism of demophrenia.

In a second article published in *Ha'aretz* on 14 February 1991, that is, while Saddam Hussein's missile attack on Israel was being applauded by the Palestinian Arabs, Sarid persisted in his support of a Palestinian state. Only now he jettisons expediency and reverts to principle: that the right to self-determination is an absolute. Moreover, whereas his first article clearly implies that the Palestinian Arabs do not deserve a state of their own because of their support for Saddam Hussein, his second article offers this political *non sequitur*: "It is impossible to change a people, but sometimes possible and necessary to change its leadership. True, we are not the ones to choose that leadership; the Palestinians themselves will select it."

But surely Mr. Sarid was aware that every Arab state is a dictatorship. Thus, for him to expect the Palestinian Arabs to choose freely, *and democratically retain* a leadership amenable to democratic Israel is not merely a piece of naivete. Evident here is a compulsive syndrome, or a sacrifice of the intellect. For he himself had placed in question the loyalty of two of his Arab colleagues. He himself expressed dismay when a very large percentage of Israeli Arabs, all who enjoy the blessings of a democracy, nonetheless exalted a dictator who threatened to incinerate half of Israel. But given his demophrenic mentality, Sarid can think of no alternative to the democratic principle of self-determination, a principle that would fractionize not only central and eastern Europe, Great Britain, Canada, and Spain, but any country in which diverse ethnic or religious groups refuse to accept their minority status. The Palestinian Arabs must have a state of their own even if they do not deserve it, and even if they establish a hostile dictatorship on Israel's doorstep.

Democracy was supposed to be the home of intellectual freedom, of self-determination. For many people it has become an idol to which they have sacrificed their intellects.

### III

The futility of applying democratic principles to the Arab-Israeli conflict again is obvious. The secular democratic mind cannot cope

intelligently with this metaphysical conflict. The separation between politics and religion has stultified the intellect and has resulted in a lack of congruity between intellect, emotion, and will. Israel's enemies do not suffer from this dysfunction. To see this more clearly, let us compare the most relevant Islamic doctrines with recent Muslim deeds. But first another word from Bernard Lewis.

Professor Lewis notes, "There is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired, in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equalled in other civilizations." But he hastens to add that, "in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the *deeper passions* are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred . . ."<sup>16</sup> Why this rage and hatred; and how do these passions manifest themselves in deeds?

By now virtually everyone knows (but blinks at the fact) that the *jihad* is a basic religious obligation for Muslims. The Koran teaches them: "Believers, take neither Jews nor Christians for your friends" (Sura 5:50). "Allah does not forbid you to be kind and equitable to those who have neither made war on your religion nor driven you from your homes . . . . But he forbids you to make friends with those who have fought against you . . . or abetted others who do so" (Sura 60:8-9). From this passage comes the necessity on the part of Arabs to describe Jews—but not only Jews—as "aggressors." The Koran's imperative on dealing with aggressors? "Kill them wherever you find them" (Sura 2:190).<sup>17</sup> So much for this doctrine of war and hatred in which Muslims are imbued from childhood on; turn now to deeds.

Rather than elaborate on the atrocities committed by Syrian and Iraqi leaders against their own people as well as against other nations, let us focus on Lebanon (before it became a Syrian satrapy in 1991, that is, during the Gulf War).

In 1932 a census indicated that Christians—mostly Maronites—comprised slightly more than half of Lebanon's population, with the remainder divided mainly between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Eleven years later, these confessional groups concluded a power-sharing pact based on the 1932 census. It was agreed that the ratio of the national assembly representatives would be six to five in favor of the Christians, that the country's president would be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the assembly a Shiite. No provision was made for amending the pact in the event of demographic changes. Despite sectarian discord, and even violence—which led to the formation of private militias—the country prospered, thanks largely to the favorable position of

the Maronites, whose Western humanism rendered them naturally opposed to union with Syria or with any pan-Arab political system.

In 1969, Lebanon's democratic, and delicately balanced government, signed the Cairo Agreement that granted the PLO extra-territorial rights in the south, especially in the Palestinian refugee camps. Thereafter southern Lebanon became "Fatahland," a PLO sanctuary for terrorist attacks on Israel. Despite government protestations to Yasir Arafat, PLO units roamed freely, even in Beirut. By 1973, the PLO had established a "state within a state." Beirut, serving as a PLO headquarters, became a center for global terrorism. Moreover, just as the PLO had sought to overthrow Jordan in 1970, so it became an insurrectionary power in Lebanon. By augmenting the Muslim forces against the Christians, the PLO-Palestinians further polarized the country. The government, unstable to begin with, collapsed in 1975: the long night of civil war descended on Lebanon. Not only did Muslims and Christians begin butchering each other, fratricidal war broke out between Sunnis and Shiites as well as with the Druze community. The PLO was very much in the conflict, as was Syria, whose army entered Lebanon in 1976.

Now for a few details of the war as reported by British journalist Patrick Sills in the *London Observer*. And to more fully appreciate the world's reaction to this fratricidal war, I shall include a running commentary on Sill's report by one of Israel's leading writers, Eliyahu Amiqam:

In the streets of Beirut [writes Sill], small children exhibit bottles which contain human ears dunked in acid, like pickles or artichokes in vinegar. Bodies are laying in the streets immersed in their coagulated blood, some lacking their procreative organs, which were cut off and put in acid for exhibition by children . . .

"This report," writes Amiqam, "was printed not in June 1982, during Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee. It was printed on January 25, 1976, during the Civil War in Lebanon. We read further" [in Sill's report]:

The number of those killed and wounded, and worse than anything, the kidnapped whose fate was usually horrible and awesome, reached about 40,000, with both sides [Muslim and Christian Arabs] competing between themselves for the most ferocious actions. Complete villages were pillaged, set on fire, and all their populations eliminated. The Palestinian terrorists were the most extreme and cruelly vicious of all . . .

Now Amiqam asks and comments:

What did the world say at that time to this frightening situation? Nothing. What did Pope Paul VI say when nuns were raped in front of their parents and brothers and afterwards had their elbows cut? His holiness did not say anything. He was busy at the time protesting against construction that was going on in Jerusalem . . . <sup>18</sup> What did the world do at the time to stop the carnage and the horror in Lebanon? Nothing. But six years later [during Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee], the world saw various attempts [by the United States and Western Europe] to allow the [PLO] terrorists to remain in their positions where they had succeeded in destroying Lebanon, slaughtering tens of thousands of its population, while establishing a central base for exporting murder on a worldwide scale [all this with the arms of the Soviet Union, the money of Saudi Arabia, the military cooperation of Syria, and the diplomatic patronage of Egypt].<sup>19</sup>

The kinsmen of the Muslims in Lebanon will be found in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. They are animated by the same negative characteristics (to use Professor Harkabi's academic language). Here is their doctrine: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it . . ." Thus, begins the deadly covenant of the intifada, officially known as *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement*.

The Covenant refers to the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as but a single squadron of the "vast Islamic world." The Covenant reads, "Our struggle against the Jews is very great," and says this struggle will go on "until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realized." The Covenant refers also to the Islamic Resistance movement as "one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine." It calls upon all Muslims to "raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their uncleanness, vileness and evils."

Contrary to the puerilities of the media, the Palestine Muslim Brotherhood (also known as Hamas) is not a fanatical sect of Islam; it is Islam authentic and resurgent. Again: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Islam over every inch of Palestine." (Interestingly, when Egyptians took over Taba from the Israelis in 1989, they raised banners declaring "TABA TODAY, PALESTINE TOMORROW.")

Yet Israel's political leaders profess the belief that the Palestinian Arabs will, in effect, renounce their religion—will forsake their covenant with Allah—for the pottage of autonomy. These politicians project their transient, secular interests onto Muslims who think in terms of eternity and



who baldly proclaim: "The Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realization of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah has said: 'The Day of Judgment will not come about until Muslims fight and kill the Jews'."

Unlike pacifists, so many of whom regard war or violent death as the greatest evil, Muslims proclaim "Death for the sake of Allah the loftiest of wishes." This is why Muslims are prepared to drench Palestine with blood. They are not about to be bought off with the bourgeois policy of "territory for peace." Indeed, this policy arouses in Muslims contempt for Jews and even is an incitement to Arab violence.

In contrast to those Jews who believe in a peaceful and political solution to the Palestinian question, the Islamic Covenant proclaims: "There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors."

Contrary to the efforts of Israel's government, the Palestinian question—which is but a part of the Arab-Jewish conflict—transcends politics and therefore cannot be solved by political means. The Islamic Covenant makes this clear: "It is necessary to instill in the minds of the Muslim generations that the Palestinian problem is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis." Hence the Covenant enjoins upon Muslims the following oath: "I swear by the holder of Muhammed's soul that I would like to invade and be killed for the sake of Allah, then invade and be killed, and then invade again and be killed."

Next to such fanaticism the PLO appears moderate, or so various democratic politicians and intellectuals would like to believe. The authors of the Islamic Covenant know better: "The Palestine Liberation Organization is the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement." Consistent therewith, the Covenant concludes by emphasizing the *jihad* as "the only way to liberate Palestine. There is no doubt about the testimony of history. It is one of the laws of the universe and one of the rules of existence. Nothing can overcome iron except iron."

At this point, it may be objected that I have selected the most extreme representatives of Islam—the fundamentalists—to prove that the Arab-Israeli conflict primarily is a metaphysical one. But during the Gulf War, moderate Palestinians like Faisal Husseini were blessing the SCUD missiles striking Israel—missiles endangering the lives of Arabs as well as Jews. But let us go back to a calmer moment in time and quote an Arab moderate.

In December 1980, less than a year *after* the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Dr. Mustapha Khalil, then Egypt's deputy prime

minister, addressed a group of Israeli academics at Tel Aviv University. There he boldly declared: "Now, since we are here speaking frankly and scientifically, I have to draw a very real distinction . . . When we speak of the Jews, we never regard them as constituting a national entity through their religion . . . Consequently, in the process of making peace with Israel, we think of Israel as our neighbor, with whom we wish to have normal, peaceful, friendly relations, but we bear in mind that this Israel, which at present comprises Jews and Arabs, may well undergo changes altering the whole nature of its society—changes which alone the future will reveal."<sup>20</sup> (Now, it can be still better understood why Egyptian tourist maps designate Israel as "Falastin.")

The irony is remarkable. Whereas secular Zionists rejected the Jewish religion in the name of Jewish nationhood, here Dr. Khalil rejects Jewish nationhood in the name of the Jewish religion. But note his audacity. That he should then contemplate Israel's eventual demise and allude to this before an audience of Jewish academics—who did not react—is indicative of the Muslim's unmitigated disdain of Jews.

But not only of Jews. On May 20, 1971, six months after taking office, Anwar Sadat addressed the National Assembly and proclaimed Egypt an Islamic state.<sup>21</sup> In 1980, the *sharia*, Islamic law, was defined as the principal source of Egyptian legislation. Islamic law, we saw in chapter 2, requires Muslims to rule misbelievers so that they may have "the incentive to embrace the true faith." Among Egypt's "misbelievers" are 8 million Coptic Christians. To instill in these Christians "the incentive to embrace the true faith," they must be demeaned and made inferior to Muslims. The Koran itself decrees that *dhimmi*s must be humiliated as a sign of their stubborn rejection of Muhammad's revelation. Accordingly, Muslim violence against Copts and destruction of Coptic property, including churches, have been persistent. Since 1980, no presidential permits were issued for the construction of new Coptic churches or even the repair of old ones. The government repeatedly confiscated Coptic trust lands and schools. Discrimination against Copts in education has been blatant. Copts were denied admission to al-Azhar University even though they had higher grades than Muslims. Moreover, Coptic Christians were not allowed to establish their own university. True, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, who served as minister of state for foreign affairs under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, is a Coptic Christian. Nevertheless, Copts remain *dhimmi*s. Indeed, when the grand sheikh of Islam at al-Azhar declared that Islam is a *nationality* (and not merely a religion), Egypt's Christians tacitly were stripped of their national identity. Ironically, Ghali, like Khalil, has rejected the idea of Jewish nationhood.

Summing up: The evidence is overwhelming that a merely secular or political approach to the Muslim-Jewish conflict is futile and even counterproductive. Yet, decade after decade, one Israeli government after another has been animated by the same sterile attitude. Israel's leaders persist in a secular approach to what essentially is a metaphysical problem. This democratic incapacity to face Islamic reality is a compulsive syndrome.

#### IV

It may be objected that dependence on U.S. military and economic aid restricts Israel's latitude in dealing with the Arab problem. The objection begs the issue. At question here is the government's secular approach to the Arab problem, and this is not a consequence—it may be a cause—of Israel's perceived dependence on America. It is highly significant that the government invariably uses Israel's real and/or imagined dependence on U.S. aid as an excuse for appeasing the Arabs and for its policy of territorial self-denial. “We must not alienate the United States” is a constant refrain of Israeli politicians, even of those who are observant Jews. It is a convenient way to avoid the truth about the metaphysical nature of the Jewish-Muslim conflict. This is symptomatic of demophrenia.

Israel's political and intellectual elites are trapped in a mental straitjacket. They are preoccupied with the “Arab problem.” Why? Because they never have been committed to the goal of constructing a truly Jewish commonwealth, which, to repeat, would not be a theocracy. Israel's most fundamental problem is the “Jewish problem.” This problem consists, not in changing the hostile attitude of the Arabs, so much as in changing the un-Jewish attitude of Jews. As already indicated, the Arabs' relentless hostility toward Israel actually is serving a world-historical function, which is to prevent the success of a secular democratic state in the Holy Land, where conventional democracy has very limited applicability. What most threatens Islam and arouses Arab hatred is not authentic Judaism so much as the *ersatz* Judaism of politicians and intellectuals tainted by democratic relativism. Muslims despise and hate this soulless and meaningless relativism, and not without good reason. The writings of Harvard-educated Professor Seyyed H. Nasr, one of the most brilliant Muslim scholars, convey Islam's contempt for the secularism of the West and its democratic relativism.<sup>22</sup>

Wrapped in the principle of symmetrical unity, political scientists in the West offer solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict as if Muslims were animated by the same mentality or basic desires as any American professor. Of course, Western pundits are aware of the phenomenon of Islamic hatred



of non-believers, but then they trivialize this hatred and unwittingly insult Muslims by speaking of "confidence-building" measures. The same political scientists who define politics as a struggle for power and who recognize Islam as a militant creed, nonetheless offer their expertise on behalf of "conflict resolution," i.e., peace. But inasmuch as conflict, or war, is the norm of international relations, one would think that these political scientists would instruct politicians that the choice for any nation is not between peace and war but between war with victory and war with defeat. The paramount issue then would be the intelligent use of force—and not for the sake of justice, for justice has no metaphysical foundation for social scientists infected by relativism.

Here we touch upon some of the deepest reasons Israel's government failed to quell the intifada. That the government feared adverse world opinion (which it aroused anyway), and that it was morally disinclined to resort to overpowering force, may be admitted. But there are more profound reasons, including one that is symptomatic of demophrenia.

Unlike Muslims, democrats have a Whiggish attitude toward power: they loathe to rule. Consistent therewith, Israel's government, we saw, offered the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza self-rule or autonomy. We also saw how a Likud-led government was reluctant to use force to quell the Arab insurrection in these areas. Such constraint may be explained by the democratic tendency to regard might in defense of right as morally suspect. This tendency first may be related to the idea that democracy is based on consent, not on coercion, on the primacy of speech, not on force. Democrats naturally believe that conflicts may be resolved if only the parties involved are open to reason and animated by good will. This is why such notions as "conflict resolution" and "confidence building" are peculiar to democracy. Actually, these notions are peculiar to an advanced stage of democracy, the stage called "the end of ideology." In this stage, might in defense of right becomes morally suspect because morality itself has become problematic. As a consequence, democracies, more than ever before, are animated not by moral principles but by material interests. This is one reason democratic politicians are dismayed and confused by ideologues who are not so motivated. There is another.

Contemporary social science unconsciously applies the Blanconian principle of symmetry to the nations of mankind. When this is done, all nations are treated as identical to one another and to mankind as a whole and are, therefore, interchangeable *with respect to whatever characteristic is selected to define mankind* and also with respect to those characteristics that differentiate them. Thus, if the characteristic selected to define mankind is the desire for "peace" or "commodious living" or "comfortable self-



preservation,” the hostile characteristics of mankind will be submerged in symmetrical unity (unless they appear in television travelogues).

While political and intellectual leaders of the democratic world are immersed in symmetry, those of the Arab-Islamic world are immersed in asymmetry. Contrast the Muslim hatred of the Jews with the humanism of Jabotinsky, a secular Zionist who insisted that all of Mandatory Palestine belonged, as of right, to the Jewish people. Not even the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt against Jewish immigration to Palestine, when Arabs slaughtered hundreds of Jews, could diminish his faith in cultural egalitarianism: he still believed that an Arab, no less than a Jew, should have the right to be prime minister of the future State of Israel.

This inability of democratized Jews to face the profundity of Islamic animosity, even in the aftermath of the above-mentioned bloodshed, is a demophrenic flight from reality. Operative among Jews afflicted by demophrenia is a most profound fear: the fear engendered by the refutation of one's self-identity as a secular Jewish humanist. Such a humanist *must* believe that Jews and Arabs can live together in peace and equality in the land of Israel, else somewhere in his psyche, he must despair of the minimalist Zionist vision of Israel as a haven for Jews against anti-Semitism.<sup>23</sup>

Let me offer two other examples of this mentality, one of a scholar, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the other of a soldier, General Moshe Dayan.

Between 1907, when he arrived in Palestine, and 1936, Dr. Ruppin's Zionism underwent a rather profound evolution, one that reveals some of the conceptual and psychological limitations of the movement that led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. To better appreciate those limitations, I shall review three phases of Ruppin's views on the “Arab question” as summarized by Dayan in a speech to the Israel Army Staff and Command College in 1968.<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that Ruppin dissociated himself from political Zionism, which he feared would degenerate into shallow chauvinism.<sup>25</sup> I shall add only, in parentheses, some clarifying contextual remarks.

In 1920 (three years after the Balfour Declaration), Ruppin was put in charge of Zionist settlement. This presented him with a profound intellectual and moral problem. For Ruppin not only was a secular Zionist but a humanist. And as a humanist, he “wanted to be persuaded that Zionism could be fulfilled without detriment to the Arabs of Palestine.” Notwithstanding the 1920-21 Arab attacks on Jews in Palestine, Ruppin wanted to believe that Jews and Arabs could live together in peace and equality. Because Jews and Arabs are “racial cousins”—or so he maintained in 1923—integration between the two should be possible. *The idea*

*of integration represents the first phase of Ruppin's attitude toward the Arab question.*

Two years later, Ruppin came to the realization that the supposedly common racial origins of Jews and Arabs did not constitute an adequate basis on which to construct a new Near East cultural community. *This marked the beginning of a second phase of Ruppin's views on the Arab question—his bi-national phase.* Thus, in 1926, Ruppin founded the Brit Shalom movement to foster the idea that Palestine should be a common state for two nations. The Jews and Arabs each would preserve their own nationality. They would have a parliament, or upper chamber, in which they would be represented equally, such that neither side will be in the majority (1929).

But inasmuch as Ruppin advocated expanded Jewish settlement, he hardly could escape the contradiction between Zionism and the Arab question. Indeed, as early as 1928, Ruppin said, "It became clear how difficult it is to realize Zionism and still bring it continually into line with the demands of general ethics." (The Arabs, of course, were not afflicted by this moral dilemma.) Indeed, by then he wrote that he had become convinced "that there exist very serious conflicts of interests between the Jews and the Arabs. At this moment I cannot see how these conflicts of interest can be solved so that the Jews will have the possibilities of unrestricted immigration and unrestricted economic and cultural development in Palestine, which are absolutely essential to Zionism, and will nonetheless not encroach upon the interests of the Arabs."

He hoped these conflicts could be overcome, if only the Arabs could see the economic advantages of bi-nationalism. But here again he was disillusioned. (The 1929 Arab massacre of fifty-nine Jewish men, women, and children in Hebron—twenty-three of whom were dismembered—must surely have shattered the hopes of this humanist.) That year he resigned from Brit Shalom.

Finally, in 1936 (when Arabs murdered and maimed scores of Jews, destroyed Jewish homes and shops, killed Jewish-owned cattle, burned Jewish-owned fields, and torched and uprooted tens of thousands of trees planted by Jews throughout Palestine), Ruppin came to the rather obvious conclusion: "It is our destiny to be in a state of continual warfare with the Arabs." He had arrived at a third phase regarding the Arab question.<sup>26</sup>

"To my mind no negotiations with the Arabs today can help us move forward, since the Arabs still hope to be able to get rid of us." Nevertheless, it was Ruppin's hope that by creating "facts"—a strong economy and a large Jewish population—tensions might diminish and the Arabs might

eventually accept Jewish existence in Palestine. So much for Dayan's summary of Arthur Ruppin's views on the "Arab question."

Notice that while Ruppin saw a contradiction between Zionism and "general ethics," he makes no mention of a possible contradiction between general ethics and Islam—for example, Islam's insistence on *jihad*. This contradiction, he might have concluded, gives Zionism a morally superior claim to the Land of Israel. It would follow from this that the Jews have a right to expel Arabs who do not renounce at least one Islamic imperative, namely, that which enjoins Muslims to kill infidels. But such reasoning was beyond the humanistic tendency of secular and other Zionists, at least of those infected by democratic relativism.<sup>27</sup>

Dayan himself remarks that the "facts" Ruppin hoped for—economic strength and increasing Jewish numbers—have come to pass and still have not convinced the Arabs to accept Israel's political existence. And he adds: "Perhaps Ruppin's error on this point stemmed from the fact that he thought in rational categories, whereas Arab opposition stems from emotions."

The exact opposite is closer to the truth. It is rational for Arabs to oppose Jewish settlement on land they deem (rightly or wrongly) their own. Conversely, having conquered this land, it is irrational, if not autistic, but certainly a surrender to emotion, for Jews to expect Arab friendship. Indeed, viewed from a rational perspective, "at the base of emotion," writes Matte-Blanco, "is the alogical work of symmetrical logic, which means that emotion, without the modulation of discriminating reason, behaves as if its objects were equal or undifferentiated."<sup>28</sup> Thus, when Likud Knesset Member Benny Begin (son of the former prime minister) declared, "There is no reasonable explanation why Saudi Arabia, for example, is still in a state of war with Israel," he was obscuring the manifest reality of Islamic hatred of Israel as well as its obvious cause: Once again, that Israel's existence threatens Islamic civilization or the religio-political power structure or of the Arab world.<sup>29</sup> This reality is intolerable to demophrenic Jews. It never occurs to them that the democratic fantasy that Jews and Arabs can live together in peace and equality *logically* requires Muslims to surrender, intellectually and morally, to homogenic pluralism, hence to accept the terms and priorities of secular or assimilated Jews.

Finally, consider Ruppin's anticipation of Dayan's own pessimistic view of the Arab question: "What we can get today from the Arabs we don't need. What we need—we can't get."<sup>30</sup>

Is this true? May it not be argued that so long as Israel's leaders believe they need Arab acceptance it will not be forthcoming? The expression of this need betrays weakness, which Arabs despise. The Arabs respect



strength—not only strength of arms, but also strength of character, which includes wisdom and virtue, national pride and self-confidence. Of course, to speak of wisdom and virtue will appear quixotic to those steeped in democratic relativism, the doctrinal dimension of demophrenia. But without wisdom and virtue there is only folly and vice or mere apathy—hardly qualities that equip a nation to persevere in a protracted ideological conflict.

### Summary and Conclusion

We have examined in this and in the preceding chapter the mentality of some of Israel's political and intellectual elites. To say they are suffering from demophrenia is to say they suffer from a syndrome that is more or less evident in every democracy, for demophrenia is a compulsive and antilogical application of the democratic principles of equality and freedom to ideological conflicts in which one party denies those principles.

Typically, the democratic principle of equality is imposed on unequal, indeed, radically different political regimes or ideological realities. For example, during the Cold War, various theorists of international relations assured us that the conflict between American democracy and Soviet tyranny would fade as the two superpowers “converged” ideologically into some comfortable conformity of opinions, interests, and institutions. As in schizophrenia, these theorists assiduously avoided the stressful reality of ideological conflict and substituted their own fixed ideas or calming illusions for perception. “Convergence,” is one thing, “conflict resolution” another. Evident here is the moral egalitarianism of demophrenia.

The world has seen, however, that the end of U.S.-Soviet conflict required some sort of democratic transformation of a Communist dictatorship. It should therefore be obvious that a salutary end to the Israel-Arab conflict will require a democratic transformation of the Arab-Islamic dictatorships of the Middle East. Yet, despite the sudden and shocking collapse of Soviet tyranny—which no “convergence” theorist possibly could anticipate—political scientists (and policy-makers) in the free world continue to impose their fixed ideas about “conflict resolution” and “confidence-building measures” on the even greater ideological antagonism that underlies the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Now, confidence-building measures between Israel and her Arab neighbors imply moral equality between these ideological adversaries. But since Arabs are not pacifists and do not suffer from the egalitarianism of demophrenia, confidence-building measures inevitably lead to unilateral concessions on Israel's part, which means appeasement. This is the consequence of applying democratic principles to ideological conflicts in



which one party rejects those principles. As George Orwell and Winston Churchill understood in the 1930s and 1940s, one cannot oppose totalitarianism—rightist, leftist, or Islamic—with indiscriminate egalitarianism and libertarianism that never gets ready to stand up and fight against the enemies of democracy. Indeed, demophrenics busy themselves inventing apologies for their enemies—explaining Arab stoning and stabbing of Jews as mere “frustrations,” rather than as manifestations of implacable hatred, let alone of evil. By ignoring evil, those afflicted by the moral egalitarianism of demophrenia diminish love of country and a willingness to sacrifice for it, which is indispensable to any decent nation.

Consider Henry Kissinger. Shortly before the Israeli-PLO agreement signed in Washington in September 1993, Kissinger declared: “. . . when Arafat comes to the White House, a Palestinian state is absolutely inevitable.” And yet, despite his approval of the Israeli-PLO accord, he went on to say: “How do you fit two states into a territory that is 50 miles wide . . . ?”<sup>31</sup> It would have taken uncommon intellectual and moral probity for Kissinger to have admitted that the Israeli-PLO agreement is a fraud that threatens Israel’s existence. But such probity is not to be expected from scholar-diplomats who have lived in the demophrenic world of moral egalitarianism.

Contrast the scholar-statesmen who founded the American republic. While they proclaimed, in the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal, they also affirmed, in word and in deed, that all ideologies (e.g., Toryism, surely less militant than Islam) most emphatically are not equal. Only a “genial orthodoxy” based on truth (*emet*), something not subject to negotiation, can enable a people to combine, in right proportions, kindness and severity (*hesed* and *gevura*). Neither kindness nor severity can exist in a mind steeped in democratic relativism—only sentimentality and animosity.

The relativism that, by turns, tries to tolerate enemies of democracy and malign democracy’s nonrelativistic friends or friendly critics is, perhaps, the most prominent symptom of demophrenia among the educated.<sup>32</sup> This moral relativism makes the latter all the more susceptible to the blandishments of democracy’s enemies, as we shall see in the next chapter.

## Semantic Subversion

It is hardly original to say, in this Orwellian age, that semantic subversion has become the norm of international politics. Nevertheless, the logic of semantic subversion and the democratic susceptibility to this phenomenon have yet to be explored with philosophical depth and clarity. Nor has it been shown why, of all democracies, the modern State of Israel is the most vulnerable to this dangerous cognitive impairment.

We have seen that demophrenic personalities treat asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical. As a consequence, all members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set or class, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the characteristic which defines the class and also with respect to all the characteristics which differentiate them. For example, **A** and **Q** constitute a set or class of governments whose defining characteristic is the "profession of peace" (**p**). But **A** is also a member of other classes and subclasses of which **Q** is not a member. Thus, whereas **A** is a democracy, **Q** is a dictatorship. Accordingly, while the principle of civilian supremacy prevails in **A**, the principle of military supremacy (**q/1**) prevails in **Q**. Moreover, whereas a free press, publicity, and political candor are subclasses of **A**, a controlled press (**q/1**), secrecy (**q/2**), and political deviousness (**q/3**) are subclasses of **Q**. Nevertheless, the demophrenic type of personality, a type common to **A**, will ignore these differentiating (and disturbing) characteristics of **Q** and fixate on **Q**'s (comforting) "professions of peace" (**p**), the one characteristic that renders **Q** ostensibly identical to **A**. **Q**'s ruler, cognizant of this tendency of **A**, repeatedly professes a desire for "peace" as a means of disarming **A** via **A**'s opinion-makers. This is semantic subversion.

This antilogical process may be formulated in terms of the symmetrical logic of demophrenia. Consider the relation "**p** is part of **Q**." If the converse of this relation is identical with it, that is, if the relation is symmetrical, we may say "**p** is a part of **Q** = **Q** is a part of **p**." In other words, the part is identical with the whole, from which it follows logically that it is also identical with any other part. To express this again in symbolic

logic:  $p$ ,  $q/1$ ,  $q/2$ , and  $q/3$  are subclasses of  $Q$ . If  $Q$  is identical to  $p$ , then  $p$  is identical to  $q/1$ ,  $q/2$ , and  $q/3$  (even though these other subclasses of  $Q$  may be inconsistent with  $p$ ). Of course, that a subclass may be identical with any other subclass of the same class is absurd.<sup>1</sup> But this conforms to the "logic" of symmetrical thinking involved in semantic subversion. Stated still another way: By fixating on  $Q$ 's professions of peace ( $p$ ), the contradictory significance of  $Q$ 's militant and devious characteristics ( $q/1$ ,  $q/2$ , and  $q/3$ ) becomes lost in symmetrical unity. In fact, the law of contradiction is negated by symmetrical logic.

The antilogical foundation of semantic subversion is endemic in egalitarian societies. Consider the class of citizens of a democracy who are "eighteen years of age or older." Age alone qualifies any member of that class to vote in national elections. He may be illiterate, indecent, or, he even may be opposed (as many Arab citizens of Israel are) to the existence of the state. Nevertheless, his having reached the age of eighteen qualifies him to vote on the all-important question of who should rule, hence, of what should be the character and ends of society. (In Israel's parliament, Arab members have voted on the religious conversion issue of "Who is a Jew?") The purely quantitative principle of "one person one vote" virtually implies that contradictory opinions are politically equal, an implication that reinforces the antilogical character of symmetrical thought. Perhaps this is the ultimate logical reason why demophrenia and semantic subversion thrive in egalitarian societies.

Now, when opinion rules, as it does in any democracy, it is only necessary to examine, not its truth, but the number of those who express this opinion. It is not even necessary to examine whether any individual who expresses this opinion is serious or frivolous, whether his opinion is the result of reflection or of impulse, whether it is an abiding conviction or a passing fancy. As a consequence, wherever the quantification of opinions rules, rather than truth or the verification of opinions, people are less apt to take opinions seriously. Hence, they will be less likely to develop the habit of critical thinking or of making logical and moral distinctions. Feelings or the emotions thus will tend to supplant bivalent logic. The symmetrical logic at work at the base of the emotions then will overwhelm the asymmetrical logic of scientific thought. People will become more susceptible to propaganda, whose target is the emotions.

Because democracies, more than other regimes, are ruled by quantified public opinion, they constitutionally are prone to semantic subversion, especially in this age of mass communications. The adepts of semantic subversion use the media of democracy to concentrate public attention on emotionally appealing and simplistic solutions to complex problems. For

example, we have seen that the Arab-Israeli conflict is more than a political conflict: politics is but one aspect of that conflict, because politics is only one aspect (or subset) of civilization. Yet, the political formula of "territory for peace" is bandied about as the key to solving the conflict. A *psychical* reality, "peace," thus is made equivalent to an external, *material* reality, "territory." This displacement or transference—to use psychoanalytical language—is typical of demophrenic (and schizophrenic) behavior.<sup>2</sup> But by making peace and territory interchangeable, the language of "peace" can be used as an instrument of war, for territory—its semantic equivalent—is precisely such an instrument.

By intoning the word "peace," Arab autocrats stimulate the emotions of democrats; the symmetrical logic underlying the emotions can then dissolve or homogenize the ideological differences or asymmetrical relations between democracies and autocracies.

The same sort of semantic manipulation is practiced by many Israeli politicians and intellectuals. Although they sincerely desire peace, they also desire power and prestige (to employ the psychological reductionism of conventional political science). Indeed, the "politics of peace" has become a basic ingredient of Israeli democracy. Its practitioners use the lure and language of peace to discredit their opponents, whom they typically disparage as "hawks" or "hard-liners," people who may have reason to distrust the peace offerings of autocratic regimes. It was hardly a hawk or war-monger who castigated those who "Cry 'peace, peace,' when there is no peace" (Jer. 6:14). In the 2500 years that have elapsed since the Prophet Jeremiah's unheeded warning, Western nations alone have been engaged in more than 1,000 wars, the bloodiest of which have occurred in this century of ingenuous as well as disingenuous pacifism.<sup>3</sup>

But the hawks in any democracy may promote semantic subversion also, perhaps unwittingly. Thus, recall the tendency of many democrats to believe that right cannot remain right when invested with force, that the use of force on behalf of justice makes one morally suspect.<sup>4</sup> People of this persuasion usually identify justice with benevolence. Democracies, they believe, should display good will to all nations regardless of their political or ideological character. This symmetrical attitude, which hawks share with doves, requires democratic governments to hobnob with dictatorships. But to do this is to dignify unjust regimes, as if to call evil "good." This demophrenic leveling of moral distinctions facilitates semantic subversion.

And yet, contrary to this leveling tendency, the ordinary citizen of a democracy usually does not identify justice with benevolence. Nor does he deplore the application of might in defense of right. He distrusts foreigners



and has no use for dictatorships. Lacking a university education, he disdains the cosmopolitanism of "eggheads." Who, then, is more susceptible to semantic subversion, the more educated or the less educated? The former, I shall argue.

First, consider a study reported by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington:

The more educated people are, the less likely they are to think that Communism is the worst form of government . . . In line with this belief, the more educated are less likely than the less educated to believe that the United States should be stronger than the Soviets: in a 1979 poll, for example, 35% of those with a college education thought that it was necessary for the United States to be stronger than the Soviet Union, as compared with 47% and 59% of those with high-school and eighth-grade educations. Consequently, those with more education are much more favorably disposed to cutting the defense budget than those with less education: in 1974, for instance, 60% of those with post-graduate educations and 28% of high-school graduates supported a defense-spending cut.<sup>5</sup>

These results may be attributed, in part, to the neo-Marxism then titillating American campuses. More significant, however, is the related doctrine of moral relativism which, as we have seen, has long dominated higher education throughout the democratic world. Relativism disposes democracy—especially the educated—to semantic subversion.

This may be illustrated by George Orwell's insights into the attitude of England's left-wing intelligentsia. Writing during the Battle of Britain, Orwell saw that these intellectuals tended to be "pacifists" and "defeatists" in "marked contrast to the common people, who either had not woken up to the fact that England was in danger, or were determined to resist to the last ditch."<sup>6</sup>

What is more, the author of *1984* saw in England's intelligentsia palpable evidence of moral relativism: "When I first read D. H. Lawrence's novels, at the age of about twenty, I was puzzled by the fact that there did not seem to be any classification of the characters into 'good' and 'bad.' Lawrence seemed to sympathize with all of them equally, and this was so unusual as to give me the feeling of having lost my bearings. Today no one would think of looking for heroes and villains in a serious novel, but in lowbrow fiction one still expects to find a sharp distinction between right and wrong . . . The common people, on the whole, are still living in the world of absolute good and evil from which intellectuals have long since escaped."<sup>7</sup> The logical extension of homogenizing "good" and "bad"

individuals is to homogenize “good” and “bad” regimes. The consequence of this moral equivalence is to facilitate semantic subversion to which the literati succumb more readily than those they term “philistines.”

Although the media render democracies more susceptible to semantic subversion by virtue of the moral equivalence underlying their vaunted objectivity or “even-handedness,” flashes of moral judgment (or of asymmetry) occasionally intervene, as in the Gulf War. In wartime, relativism must give way to old-fashioned notions of good and evil if the soldiers and civilians of a democracy are to persevere in the struggle and prevail over the enemy. With peace, however, the clouds of relativism return, obscuring the moral and ideological dimensions of international conflict. Black and white distinctions dissolve into monotonous gray. The good and the bad, the just and the unjust, shade into each other. In this gray world the concept of truth, like that of honor, gives way to crass, material interests.

Thus, in the Gulf War, the utility of morality expired when Iraq was expelled from Kuwait. Saddam was allowed to remain in power and massacre fleeing Kurdish refugees from helicopter gunships while American, British, and French fighter aircraft were within easy striking distance. This sort of behavior by democratic nations engenders cynicism and moral laxity. It renders democracies, especially their leaders, more susceptible to semantic subversion. Other things being equal, it is far more difficult to deceive principled than unprincipled men. But as we have seen, men of principle do not rule in a era marked by the end of ideology and the ascendancy of moral relativism.

Even before the guns had fallen silent in the Gulf War, nay more, even while the Palestinians were cheering Saddam Hussein, democratic spokesmen were chanting the rite of “self-determination for the Palestinian people.” Let us examine this semantic ritual in terms of the symmetrical logic of demophrenia.

To begin with, it should be noted that the democratic principle of self-determination contradicts the fatalism of Islamic mentality. *Islam* itself means subjection, not freedom—one reason why every Arab-Islamic regime is an autocracy. But given the pervasiveness of demophrenia in the democratic world, Arab leaders unabashedly intone the language of self-determination and even of Lincoln’s “by the people, of the people, and for the people” to give color of legitimacy to the establishment of another Arab autocracy on the vulnerable border of a democracy. This democratic incantation dissolves, in the minds of the susceptible, the ideological differences between democratic Israel and her anti-democratic adversaries. Again we see how a part of a whole becomes identical to the whole. Expressed in symbolic logic: there are two classes, A and Q. Let A

represent Israel and **Q** represent Arab Palestinians. **s**, **q/1**, **q/2**, and **q/3** are subclasses of **Q** and refer, respectively, to **Q**'s political statements, religious beliefs, historical practices, and dependency on autocratic Arab regimes. **s** refers specifically to "Palestinian self-determination" and a "two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict." Not only is **s** inconsistent with **q/1** and **q/2**, but these subclasses of **Q**, together with **q/3**, endanger the existence (or "self-determination") of class **A**. The psychic effect of semantic subversion is to fixate **A**'s attention on **s**, hence to discount **q/1**, **q/2**, and **q/3**, and thereby make the part **s** appear identical to the whole **Q**. This semantic legerdemain is facilitated by moral relativism, which disposes the democratic mind to ignore the negative characteristics of **Q**, exactly as in the case of Professor Harkabi who, we saw, is a relativist.

A propos of the preceding, consider Harkabi's assessment of a statement made by Arafat's top aide Bassam Abu Sharif who, in May 1988, declared: "We believe that all peoples—the Jews and the Palestinians included—have the right to [self-determination, i.e., to] run their own affairs . . . . The key to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement lies in talks between Palestinians and the Israelis . . . . The Palestinians would accept, indeed insist, on international guarantees for the security of all states in the region, including Palestine and Israel." Harkabi evaluates this statement as indicative of a significant transformation in the PLO's character because Sharif had hitherto been identified with one of its extremist groups. He accepts Sharif's statement at face value and describes it as "humane and sensible."<sup>8</sup> One would think that a former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, the author of *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, would be more skeptical about such PLO pronouncements. But if we view Harkabi's response in terms of Dr. Shakow's four-fold classification of responses to diverse stimuli as well as in terms of the principle of symmetry, it will be evident that Harkabi's fixation on **s** has relegated **q/1**, **q/2**, and **q/3** to the oblivion of symmetrical unity. And his moral relativism facilitated the process.

Incidentally, the principle of symmetry underlies the phenomenon of "mirror-imaging" peculiar to egalitarian societies. The absence of hierarchy in such societies levels or simplifies thinking about international relations. Certainly the formulation of foreign policy is made much easier if the people on the "other side" think and feel as we do. As Orwell saw, however, the ordinary man, less exposed than intellectuals to academic relativism, is less susceptible to the peace ploys of dictators. This especially is true in Israel where roughly half the population are Sephardi Jews, while another fifty percent—Sephardi and Ashkenazi—are more or less religious. These ethnic and religious factors explain why, even though the media are dominated by the left-wing intelligentsia, seventy-four percent



of the Jewish population affirm that the land of Israel belongs exclusively to the Jews.<sup>9</sup> Moral egalitarianism or relativism seems to have had little influence on these Jews.

*It is precisely the moral relativism of the democratic world that enables dictators to employ the language of democracy to disarm and destroy democracies.* Thus Hitler demanded self-determination for the Sudeten Germans to subvert democratic Czechoslovakia—which he did with the compliance of democratic England and France, and at a time when relativism was gaining ascendancy among their intelligentsia.

## II

Unfortunately, more than semantic subversion and moral relativism are at work when the democratic West insists upon “self-determination for the Palestinian people.” Sufficient evidence already has been presented to indicate that this slogan, along with that of “territory for peace” (even when voiced by certain Israeli politicians and intellectuals), is also a facade for anti-Semitism. But, to appreciate the grotesque character of this state of affairs, consider the following geostrategic facts:

The twenty-one Arab League countries, taken together, have 485 times more territory than the State of Israel, including what was “occupied” in 1967. They have 1.3 times more territory than the entire continent of Europe and 1.5 times more than the United States. Today, Israel plus its “occupied” territories, comprises an area of 10,891 square miles. Former Secretary of State James Baker termed this area, which is 1/25 the size of his home state of Texas, “Greater Israel.” But that 10,891 squares miles of “Greater Israel” should be contrasted with the 5,282,135 square miles belonging to the countries of the Arab League. These Arab countries occupy one-eighth of the earth's land surface.

Moreover, whereas Arab regimes, usually led by colonels dressed in civilian garb, *have no peace of their own to give Israel, peace-loving Israel has no territory of its own to give the Arabs.* Indeed, were Israel to withdraw from Judea and Samaria, its present width in the central sector of the country would be reduced from roughly fifty miles to an average of twelve miles. One American military expert has pointed out that modern weapon systems, “most of them with components which require line-of-sight emplacement, if deployed in the (Judean and Samaritan) mountains overlooking Israel's population and industrial centers in the coastal strip below, would render the country indefensible.”<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, while the media now portrays the David of the Six-Day War as the Goliath of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, experts in “conflict resolution” and “confidence building” see no reason why 4.2 million Jews,



surrounded by 180 million Muslims, should make so much of this demographic, territorial, and strategic disparity. It would be naive to think that semantic subversion is the only actor in this drama. Indeed, the name of the drama is "Anti-Semitism."

It is only by ignoring the oppressive characteristics of Arab regimes that democratized political scientists can speak of applying such non-Islamic concepts as "conflict resolution" to the war—and it is a war—between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Whatever Israel and her neighbors have in common is trivial compared to their differences. The fear of violent death (the foundation of Hobbesian political science) will not homogenize those differences. Such is their militancy and contempt for human life—the Mohammedan paradise, the *houris*, promises Muslims the fulfillment of all their sensual desires—that fear of war does not pacify Arab-Islamic autocracies as it does secular democracies. This asymmetry is commonly ignored by political scientists. So is this: While Arab masses live in abject poverty—in Egypt's cities thousands of children rummage through piles of garbage—their peace-professing rulers wallow in luxury. While Israel opens its doors to hundreds of thousands of penniless Jewish immigrants, the Arab world allows their brethren to fester in refugee camps as a political weapon against the Jewish State. Meanwhile, sparsely populated, oil-rich Saudi Arabia stockpiles arms far exceeding the arsenals of nations like England and France. Given the end of ideology, however, it is beyond the mentality of conventional political scientists to pronounce Arab regimes as inherently unjust and unworthy of trust. "Conflict resolution" and "confidence building" indeed! These linguistic fantasies are an escape from the reality of the Middle East, a semantic con-game employed by "value-free" political scientists immersed in the symmetrical unity of demophrenia.

### III

If moral relativism were merely an academic doctrine that predisposes democracies to semantic subversion, philosophical refutation of that doctrine might mitigate, if not remedy the danger. But as we have seen, the two basic principles of democracy, equality and freedom, lend themselves to relativism, hence to semantic subversion. The idea of equality pervades every aspect of democratic life. Equality shapes the minds of the educated as well as the uneducated. It prompts them to extend equality to all domains, including moral values or opinions as to how man should live. It thereby extends to a deeper level of the unconscious the homogenizing logic at work in demophrenia.

Equality also reinforces, and is reinforced by, democracy's other basic principle, *freedom*—commonly defined as "living as you like." The

exaltation of "self-actualization" in psychology and of "self-determination" in politics follows. The absence of ethical or conceptual constraints on self-actualization and self-determination cannot but eventuate in mental disorders and political anarchy. Obvious as this may seem, the idea of *ethical* self-determination is absent from the political terminology and political science of the democratic world.<sup>11</sup>

From this it will be evident that moral relativism is not only an academic doctrine; it is also the logical and psychological extension of democratic freedom and equality. This is why democracy provides fertile soil for semantic subversion. Democracy was not always so.

In the youth of democracy, when the influence of a religious and aristocratic age still was felt, moral relativism had no easy foothold. So long as a strong religious or even secular faith inspired people, democracy could thrive and resist semantic subversion. But with the end of ideology in the West, a morally neutral foreign policy has made democracies more susceptible to the blandishments and peace offensives of democracy's enemies. Today, democracy's political and intellectual elites believe that genuine and abiding peace should be possible among nations regardless of their ideological character. It was not always so. For sixteen years, the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union, a country having the largest land mass on earth. It will be instructive to learn why four American administrations, including that of Woodrow Wilson, would have no truck with the rulers of the Kremlin, whose mastery of semantic subversion inspired such Orwellian neologisms as "newspeak" and "doublethink." But first a word from Elihu Root (a distinguished professor of law as well as U.S. Secretary of State between 1905 and 1909):

The recognition of one government by another is not a mere courtesy. It is an act having a specific meaning, and involves an acceptance by the recognizing government of the principles, purposes, and avowed intentions of the recognized government as being in conformity of civilized nations towards each other.

Now consider the following official statements:

The Bolsheviks . . . openly propose to excite revolutions in all countries against existing governments; they are hostile to democracy as they are to autocracy. If we should recognize them in Russia, we would encourage them and their followers in other lands . . . To recognize them would give them an exalted idea of their power, make them more insolent and impossible, and win their contempt, not their friendship . . . . As to Lenin

and Trotsky I am in doubt . . . . For national and personal honor, for truth and for individual rights of life, liberty and property they seem to have no regard. (Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 1917)

The existing regime in Russia is based on the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals. (Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, 1920)

The American government . . . is not prepared to barter away its principles. . . . If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decrees repudiating Russia's obligations to this country, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results which can be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith . . . . Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned. (Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, 1923)

The experiences of various European Governments which have recognized and entered into relations with the Soviet regime have demonstrated conclusively the wisdom of the policy to which the Government of the United States has consistently adhered. Recognition of the Soviet regime has not brought about any cessation of interference by the Bolshevik leaders in the internal affairs of any recognizing country, nor has it led to the acceptance by them of other fundamental obligations of international intercourse. (Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, 1928)

Russia is (a) inclined to a more reasonable attitude towards nations that have not accorded the recognition she seeks than towards those that have, and (b) after eagerly seeking and obtaining recognition she becomes more indifferent to her obligations than theretofore. (Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore, 1933)

Finally, ponder this remarkable observation:

The case [of the Soviet Union] is without precedent, for there has never before in the history of civilization been a government which, on the one hand, openly proclaimed its intent and purpose to be the overturning and destruction of the social and political institutions and economic systems of other nations, while, on the other hand, it demanded that the governments of those other nations accord it recognition as a friendly power, grant it diplomatic privileges and advantages which are universally reserved for friendly powers and universally withdrawn from any power

which commits unfriendly acts. It is futile and vain to argue the matter; recognition of Soviet Russia would be shameful self-abasement. (John Spargo, *Socialist Party of America*, 1930)

It was not until 1933 and the administration of Franklin Roosevelt that the United States accorded diplomatic recognition to the USSR.<sup>12</sup> Since then Washington has recognized terrorist states such as Iraq and Syria and even the PLO.

In imitation of the U.S. and democratic Europe, every Israeli government, whether led by Ben-Gurion or Begin, Shamir or Rabin, has sought the recognition of Arab states, meaning Arab despotisms. And this it has done despite the fact that every Arab regime disseminates the most obscene vilification of Jews and of Israel. To have recognized the PLO, however—because Yasir Arafat pledged, in his letter to Prime Minister Rabin of 9 September 1993, that “the PLO recognizes the right of Israel to exist”—this is the ultimate in self-debasement. Such lack of honor will of course be found in all democracies that hobnob with dictatorships. But it is of unique significance in the case of Israel.

If it is asked: “Why has every government of Israel lacked such national pride or honor?” I answer as follows. The modern State of Israel, animated primarily by a secular democratic mode of thought, has from the outset been afflicted by chronic demophobia. Its government manifests the symptomatology of schizophrenia mentioned in chapter 5: lack of self-esteem, paranoia (i.e., fear of anti-Semitism), escapism, poverty of thought, stereotyped behaviors, flattened affective reactions, impotence, loss of identity. The cause of this malaise was anticipated in chapter 2. Israel's political elites have abandoned Jewish particularism for democratic universalism. Hence they have become expatriates in their own country. Lacking any strong sense of national identity and of national purpose, they are all the more susceptible to semantic subversion. Not that they are unaware of Arab hatred. But it leaves them mute. They never publicize and condemn Arab hatred as evil, disgusting, or pathological. Instead, they try, publicly, to appease this hatred. That is, they play the role of benevolence. But having assumed this role, and having no will or identity of their own, they must go on playing the part. By so doing they shed any vestige of honor or of personhood. In Israel, therefore, semantic subversion is not only induced but self-induced. It finds two kinds of victims: one benighted, the other cynical. But both suffer from the cognitive and volitional impairment stemming from the abandonment of Judaism.

Of course, what it means to abandon Judaism requires an understanding of Judaism from within, that is, by its practitioners. The outsider may know a great deal about Judaism. But unless he enters the world of the



Torah, sits at the feet of its Sages, studies their wisdom, and relates their mode of reasoning to the needs and desires and activities that constitute daily life, his knowledge of Judaism will be more or less superficial (as is the case with not a few rabbis). Although I shall refer later to certain aspects of Judaism, elaborated in a previous work and further developed in the sequel to the present inquiry, here I can only assert that the secular democratic mentality of Israel's political and intellectual leaders has prevented them from deeply appreciating the grandeur of the Torah. Should this remark occasion the scorn of skeptics, allow me to digress a moment and quote one of the greatest skeptics in history. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Friedrich Nietzsche writes:

In the Jewish "Old Testament," the book of divine justice, there are human beings, things, and speeches in so grand a style that Greek and Indian literature have nothing to compare with it. With terror and reverence one stands before these tremendous remnants of what man once was, and will have sad thoughts about ancient Asia and its protruding little peninsula Europe, which wants by all means to signify as against Asia the "progress of man." To be sure, whoever is himself merely a meager, tame domestic animal (like our educated people of today, including the Christians of "educated" Christianity) has no cause for amazement or sorrow among these ruins—the taste of the Old Testament is a touchstone for "great" and "small"—perhaps he will find the *New Testament* . . . rather more after his heart . . . To have glued this New Testament, a kind of rococo taste in every respect, to the Old Testament to make one book, as the "Bible," as "the book par excellence"—that is perhaps the greatest audacity and "sin against the spirit" that literary Europe has on its conscience.<sup>13</sup>

Unknown to Nietzsche, indispensable to understanding the Old Testament, which is eternally young, are the hermeneutical rules and logical explications of the Talmud, the transmission of which endowed the Jewish people with their extraordinary rationality. Again Nietzsche: "Wherever the Jews have attained to influence, they have taught to analyze more subtly, to argue more acutely, to write more clearly and purely: it has always been their problem to bring people 'to *raison*.'" <sup>14</sup>

But no secular democratic government of Israel truly can appreciate the intellectual and moral grandeur of the people who gave mankind the Book that has ever fructified and elevated the laws and literature of nations. This statement may offend the sensibilities of Jewish intellectuals and politicians enthralled by the dogma of cultural egalitarianism, but who nonetheless would feel honored if democratic Israel were recognized by Arab despots.

As evidence of this Jewish self-abasement, no less than David Ben-Gurion felt pleased to say: "I see no reason not to sit down tomorrow with the Mufti" (Haj Amin al-Husseini, chief instigator of the pogroms in Israel).<sup>15</sup>

First, they betray a chronic inability on the part of Israel's leaders to distance themselves from evil men and to denounce them as such publicly. No doubt such public condemnation would arouse passions. But the rabid hatred of Arabs hardly can be overcome by Jewish benevolence. Moreover, to quote Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are *implanting* it, and it will rise up a thousand-fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are . . . ripping the foundations of justice beneath new generations."<sup>16</sup> By being silent about evil, indeed, by seeking the recognition of despotic regimes, Israel's government cannot help but disarm many of its citizens. It exposes them to the anesthesia of semantic subversion, specifically, to the wishful thinking mentality promoted by the cunning purveyors of "peace."

## Conclusion

From its very outset the government of Israel has failed to expose and reiterate, as a fundamental principle of domestic and foreign policy, the implacable hostility and deadly intentions of the Arab-Islamic world. As a consequence of this official reticence or timidity, no government of Israel ever has conducted a foreign policy consistent and commensurate with the true nature of the Arab-Jewish conflict. Israel's political and intellectual leaders have trivialized the all-important religious dimension of this conflict. In other words, Israel's foreign policy thus far has been couched in political and territorial terms, which cannot possibly satisfy the metapolitical objectives or theological imperatives of Arab-Islamic civilization.

The root cause of Israel's dilemma is hidden from democratic leaders because it is nothing less than the democratic character of their mentality. Evident here is the basic malady of our secular-democratic era, an era in which the absence of truth has spawned demophobia.

Today, countless intellectuals have been liberated from the "delusion of truth" by relativism, in consequence of which they have succumbed to the delusions of falsehood. This especially is true of those in Israel who have abandoned the Book of Truth. They are the most susceptible victims of semantic subversion. Having embraced democracy, they have lost authenticity. The subject is elaborated in the next chapter.

## Democracy or Authenticity ?

Revolutionary regimes aside, it is a truism to say that well-established governments act more or less in conformity with the national heritage of their people. Such is not the case, however, of the government of Israel. The reason is simple enough. As we have seen, the founders of modern Israel were animated by a democratic mode of thought, more precisely, by socialism and secular Zionism. Having embraced modernity, and fearful of anti-Semitism, they had no intention of restoring the sovereignty of Judaic law—the core of authentic Judaism—in the Land of Israel.

Consistent with Pauline antinomianism, they relegated most of the 365 negative and the 248 positive commandments of the Torah to what has been called “ceremonial laws,” which they disparaged and discarded as “empty forms.” Only the “moral laws” of the Torah had a justified claim to continued observance. But as Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch has shown, it is precisely those laws dubbed “ceremonial”—like the Sabbath, the festivals, circumcision, and the dietary laws, to mention the most obvious—that have contributed to the lofty moral character of the Jewish people.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, these are the very laws that have endowed Jews with their distinct sense of national consciousness.

To be sure, the rationality and comprehensiveness, as well as the abiding relevance of Judaic law, were known only to the learned and observant, and few of these were willing to join the cause of secular Zionists. Animated by “humanism,” the architects of the modern State of Israel wished to purge Judaism of its “particularism,” that is, to reduce the incredibly rich mosaic of Jewish life and thought to the simple, universal moral values which the Bible bestowed on mankind. Thus would the Jews become a “normal” people acceptable to others. Thus did these humanists (vainly) expect to overcome the scourge of anti-Semitism. But this means that a fundamental tension was bound to exist between the government they established and traditional Judaism.

Admittedly, the government, whose formation has usually depended on the cooperation of the religious parties, provides various kinds of support for the country's Orthodox Jewish communities. But government

support is also extended to Israel's Arab citizens, despite their denial of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. The truth is, and as will be shown presently, the government actively has fostered the development of a bi-national state and society in the land of Israel. Hence it hardly is an exaggeration to say that nothing, apart from its considerable charity—its greatest virtue—and an unavoidable commitment to Jewish immigration, is preeminently Jewish in the policies and pronouncements of Israel's government, especially in the domain of Arab affairs.<sup>2</sup>

From this demonstrable fact, radical implications and hitherto unrecognized consequences follow. The government of Israel, regardless of its past composition and the presence of religious ministers in the cabinet, is more or less alienated from the nation's heritage. Afflicted by demophrenia, it lacks *authenticity*, the *sine qua non* of a nation's inner strength, confidence, and dignity. Israel's government is only superficially Jewish. This, I contend, is the ultimate reason why gentile nations (unknown to themselves) so often treat modern Israel with a mixture of contempt and animosity. Indeed, I shall show that it is precisely the lack of an authentic Jewish government that underlies Israel's woes and weakness.

# I

Many Jews, even among the religious, harbor the fear that if the government of Israel were to act distinctively Jewish, it would irritate the nations and arouse their hostility. But such antipathy toward Israel already exists, despite the utterly diluted Jewish character of its government.

Again, we must recall the refusal of democratic Europe to allow the United States to use NATO landing fields for resupplying Israel during the Yom Kippur War; the United Nations recognition of the PLO in 1974, even though the PLO Covenant calls for the destruction of Israel, a UN member; the repeated condemnations of Israel by the Security Counsel with either U.S. cooperation or abstention.

And so, contrary to prevailing notions, it is by no means obvious that Israel's situation would be worse under a government consisting of "stiff-necked" Jews, to recall their biblical appellation. Curiously enough, modern Israel also is called stiff-necked—"intransigence" is the current label—even though its government has been pathetically yielding. Whatever one may think about its treaty with Egypt (now armed more than ever), to have surrendered the Sinai that includes its Israeli-developed oil fields, strategic air bases, and fifteen billion dollar infrastructure without even retaining the tiny Jewish settlement of Yamit that is located only a few meters beyond the pre-1967 borders—hence, to have expelled Yamit's



2,200 settlers and to have sacrificed the treasures of the Sinai for what Anwar Sadat scornfully called "a piece of paper"—this hardly is a mark of intransigence. Had Israel's government been more stiff-necked, had it not sacrificed so much to a dictatorship that has made a mockery of that "piece of paper," perhaps Israel would not now be pressed to sacrifice her heartland, Judea and Samaria.

What arouses the nations is not Jewish intransigence so much as Jewish infirmity. To tell the nations, as Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir have done, that "everything is negotiable," is to confess that nothing is sacred, indeed, that Israel can be bought—a posture hardly consistent with authentic Judaism. But then to drag out negotiations when everyone knows that, given your initial gambit, you will eventually retreat from pillar to post (as the Rabin government did in the Gaza-Jericho agreement with the PLO, when even Jerusalem was made a negotiable issue), surely must arouse irritation and hostility. Such self-abasement alienates friends who admire strength, and incites enemies who exploit weakness. It might even make enemies of one's friends.

For the government of Israel to cultivate a reputation for intransigence concerning its people's heritage, and to be worthy of that reputation, need not arouse the enmity of democratic nations, certainly not if such intransigence were modulated with a measure of Biblical wisdom. Consider.

When the government of France behaves distinctively French—cynical and condescending, some would say—no other nation is agitated by the fact. Nor is any foreign office disturbed by that which long has distinguished England's foreign policy: unconscious self-righteousness and hypocrisy. Again, when a Muslim in Saudi Arabia has his hand cut off for theft, not a word will be heard from the American State Department. Cutting off the hands of thieves is recognized and accepted as the Saudi way.

The reason underlying this sublime indifference was anticipated: Governments are expected to conform to the heritage of their people. This is an obvious precondition of international understanding, of stable and cordial relations among independent sovereign states. When any government fails to act authentically, that is, in accordance with its nation's tradition, it causes confusion and sometimes hostility in foreign capitals.

Contrast the government of Israel. Far from acting distinctively Jewish, it emulates democratic America. Only let it deviate one iota from the egalitarian and libertarian principles of the United States, and the wrath of Washington is heaped upon the nominally Jewish state of Israel.

By exalting democratic values, Israel's political leaders have established, in the minds of American policy-makers and opinion-makers, a set of democratic expectations, any departure from which causes, and is bound

to cause, annoyance and even animosity in Washington. Conversely, having from the outset failed to act authentically, as a government whose policies and pronouncements are preeminently Jewish, Israel's leaders have laid the foundation for their country's humiliation and for much of the world's antagonism against the so-called Jewish state.

(The Bush Administration had a talent for humiliating Israel. Secretary of State James Baker offered his phone number to the Shamir government, "should it be interested in peace." On more than one occasion during his Middle East diplomatic ventures, Mr. Baker would peremptorily arrive in Israel on the eve of Jewish holidays. Indeed, without consulting Israel, and hardly twenty-four hours prior to a scheduled meeting between Prime Minister Shamir and President Bush, the State Department summarily announced that a Middle East peace conference would take place in Washington on December 4, 1991. The venue, for ideological and tactical reasons, was preferred by the Arabs, who knew, as did the Bush Administration, that December 4 was a Jewish holiday. Although the leaders of the Israeli delegation did not arrive until December 9—to Washington's and the media's displeasure—the Shamir government refrained from expressing umbrage at this undiplomatic and contemptuous behavior. But it is precisely the government's lack of Jewish authenticity, submerged in democratic secularism, that provokes such indignities—to which no Arab-Islamic autocracy is subjected by the democratic government of the United States.)

No less ironic is this: By emulating a democracy that pays lip service to Christianity, Israel's government has unwittingly conditioned Gentiles to expect the Jews to abide by the most unassertive or self-effacing Christian precepts: turn the other cheek, love your enemies, do not resist evil. And to the extent that this government has adhered to these benign and apolitical Christian precepts—unpracticed by any gentile nation—it not only has forsaken Judaism, it has also repressed the sense of outrage among Jews whose loved ones have been the victims of Arab terrorists. (The only schools in Israel that require guards at their entrances are Jewish schools, which means that in this Jewish state, Arabs are safer than Jews!) Animated by humanism, the government of Israel has been dehumanizing its own people. Far from making the Jews "normal," like other nations, it has made them pathetically abnormal. Even their instinct of self-preservation has been sacrificed on the altar of democracy.

Contrary to the expectations of demophrenic Jewish politicians and intellectuals who, out of fear of anti-Semitism, constantly portray Israel as a democracy so as to endow it (and themselves) with legitimacy and respectability, it is precisely this lack of national authenticity—this mindless adulation of democratic values—that underlies international contempt

for Israel. Paradoxical as it may seem, nothing so much diminishes Israel in the eyes of the nations than its government's anemic Jewish identity. Nothing causes so much misunderstanding, annoyance, and antagonism toward Israel than its government's emasculated Judaism and adulation of democracy.

Israel's political and intellectual leaders are oblivious to the harm they do boasting that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. *For the more Israel is flaunted and perceived as a democracy, the more it is expected to make concessions to Arab autocracies.*

The same folly is manifested by apologetic rabbis who tendentiously portray the Torah as democratic. By obscuring the fundamental differences between democracy and Judaism, these rabbis increase the disdain and irritation of gentile nations whenever peace-loving Israel, assailed by  *Jihad*-loving Muslims, appeases the latter or deviates ever so slightly from the moral egalitarianism and pluralism characteristic of American society.

## II

The claim that Judaism is consistent with democracy would have astonished Spinoza. Spinoza is not only the founder of modern "biblical criticism," but as may be seen in the sixteenth and twentieth chapters of his *Theological-political Treatise*, he is the father of liberal democracy. The *Treatise* rejects Judaism and regards democracy as "the most natural form of government," for there "every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks."<sup>3</sup> Although Spinoza's biblical criticism has been refuted, the contradictions he saw between Judaism and democracy are transparent to any candid observer.<sup>4</sup>

In any event, when apologetic rabbis gloss over the contradictions between Torah Judaism and the libertarianism and egalitarianism of the secular democratic state, they provide the color of legitimacy to Israeli politicians estranged from the heritage of their people. Inauthenticity thus receives the blessings of rabbis whose religious professions stand in stark contrast with the vulgarity and materialism rampant in contemporary democracies. Let us take another brief but unprejudiced look at democracy and its two cardinal principles, freedom and equality.

Democratic freedom and equality have facilitated man's conquest of nature, have produced tremendous wealth and creature comforts, have eliminated slavery and unrelieved drudgery, have liberated talents hitherto suppressed by economic scarcity as well as by tyranny. And yet, while men and women in democratic societies enjoy unprecedented freedom and equality and material abundance, a frightful number find their lives empty and meaningless. Why? Primarily because freedom and equality, whose



meaning should be derived from man's creation in the image of God—the only rational foundation for humanism—have been severed from reason and morality. Freedom now means “living as you like,” and all lifestyles have become morally equal. Hence the maladies of the age mentioned in chapter 1: unbridled hedonism and drug addiction; spiraling rates of crime and mental disorders; loveless sex and pornography; the disintegration of the family; the moronizing influence of television; and the decline of intellectual standards. Indeed, cheating and stealing have become accepted norms among various strata of democratic society; infidelity and perversion find support in respectable circles; and much of this immorality is sanctioned by law.

Clearly, democratic freedom and equality, together with affluence, do not ensure private and public happiness or virtue. Nor have they adorned the life of democracy with grace and beauty.

That freedom and equality are important Torah principles is not here at issue. But no prophet of Israel ever advocated the unrestrained freedom of expression fostered in contemporary democracy. (See Isaiah 9:16, which deplores obscenity.) As for equality, “You shall not respect the person of the poor, nor favor the person of the mighty; but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Lev. 19:15). But no prophet ever advocated “one person, one vote,” a principle that endows idiots, perverts, criminals, and even the disloyal with the same voting rights as intelligent, decent, law-abiding, and patriotic citizens. All this being obvious, let us probe a little deeper.

Whereas democracy is a generic form of government, Judaism is a unique *nationality*, indeed, a civilization with its own system of governance. In addition to endogamous marriage laws and ethical precepts, Judaism has its own institutions, its own holy days, its own system of education, its own literature. All this is foreign to democracy.

As previously indicated, political scientists define democracy as a mere “process”—the “rules of the game” by which diverse individuals and groups pursue their private interests, more or less random and by definition egoistic. *In contrast, Judaism is a coherent way of life that extols charity, righteousness, and intellectual excellence. Judaism teaches modesty in speech and conduct, respect for parents, deference to wisdom—hardly the fare of democracy's entertainment media.*

Finally, unlike Judaism, democracies separate religion and public law. Liberals, following Spinoza, regard religion a “private” matter, and insist “it is not the function of government to legislate morality.” For them, the highest function of government is to maximize wealth and security.

No more need be said here to expose the ignorance or intellectual dishonesty of those who contend that Judaism is consistent with contem-



porary democratic thought and practice—which is not to say that democracy cannot be rectified by Judaism and incorporated therein as a subordinate principle. Before enlarging on this subject in the next chapter, let us see how to avoid the error of doctrinaire democrats who render democracy into a totalitarian principle that dissolves all distinctions among men and nations.

While everyone knows that “democracy” means the “rule of the people,” few ask what is a “people”? A people is not something amorphous or polyglot as in “one person, one vote” America. The essence of peoplehood is *particularism* as opposed to universalism or cosmopolitan humanism. Depending on its substantive character, a body of universal ideas or ideals (such as ethical monotheism) may provide a foundation on which diverse peoples can live in mutual peace. But to merit the name, a people must have a distinct ethnic character or way of life. Whatever the differences among the individuals composing a people, these will not be as important as their shared beliefs and values derived from a common past called tradition. A living and vibrant people must have a vivid sense of national consciousness and even of national pride, sustained by the memory of national triumphs and tragedies. Therein is the heart of a people’s authenticity and the reason why their government will not readily bestow on heterogeneous elements dwelling in their midst citizenship or equal rights, unless these elements swear loyalty to, and act in accordance with, the basic convictions and aspirations of their benefactors.<sup>5</sup>

The secular humanists who founded the modern State of Israel did not incorporate this ethnic aspect of democracy. In seeking to make the Jewish people “normal,” they deprived many Jews of peoplehood—the basic reason why hundreds of thousands of secular Jews have abandoned Israel for America, a multicultural society.

All honor to those who founded this state: their accomplishments are remarkable. But in honoring them, let us not conceal their shortcomings and the bitter fruit of their labors. When Ben-Gurion avowed, “An Arab should also have the right to be elected President of Israel,” he was sacrificing Jewish particularism for self-effacing universalism. Let us transfer this misplaced humanism and egalitarianism from the cauldron of the Middle East to its only proper venue, America.

In the United States it is unquestionably right and legitimate for any native-born American, be he or she black or white, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, to become the country’s president. This is the way of a multicultural nation like America, where individualism and a belief in abstract rights precluded the development of a strong sense of national consciousness. But America is *sui generis*. It is the unique home of democratic universalism.

It is supposed to represent to mankind the example of a nation in which diverse peoples can live together in abiding peace and friendship, *and without negating the particularism of other nations*. This means that America, at its best and to the glory of its founding fathers, is to provide the pragmatic test of various universal laws of morality, those very laws which the Jews bestowed upon America and mankind.<sup>6</sup> Clearly, if all nations adhered to these laws there would be universal and abiding peace.

Now, in order for America to represent the one nation in which people of diverse ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds can thrive in peace under the same laws and institutions, there must exist, of logical necessity, a welter of nations having significantly different ways of life. Conversely, if all nations were to imitate America, they would cease to be distinct nations (and the world would be infinitely poorer as a consequence). It may even be said that America's world-historical function is to preserve the political independence and integrity of other nations against any imperialistic power that would obliterate their particularity by means of any universalist ideology.

America errs profoundly, therefore, when it expects Israel to subordinate its particularism to the universalism that Israel's own Torah prescribes for humanity. (Incidentally, the failure of the Soviet Union to impose a universalistic creed on a diversity of nations is not a victory of democracy so much as a victory of nationhood.)

But let us be more precise: *America violates its world-historical function when it seeks to impose on Israel a secularized set of democratic principles that can only distort Israel's unique character or hinder Israel's restoration as a Jewish commonwealth.*

Clearly, the State of Israel is supposed to be Jewish and not fractionally Jewish. This was the *raison d'être* of its reestablishment in 1948 and the only moral and rational justification for its continued existence. Hence, it is grossly immoral and illegal, as well as irrational and suicidal, for Israel's government to foster a bi-national state and society in the land of Israel. But given its egalitarian and unauthentic character, the government has no rational grounds for denying absolute equality to an inherently disloyal Muslim Arab population, one that rejects egalitarianism except as a means of gaining political ascendancy (as in Lebanon). To be sure, and as already indicated, the government exempts these Arabs from military service—which gives the lie to unauthentic (or demophrenic) Jews who blink at the veiled and unveiled hatred of authentic Muslims.

Again, all this is not to deny the virtues of democracy or to advocate any form of autocracy. Nevertheless, after reflecting on the obvious decline of moral and intellectual standards in freedom-loving and egalitarian societies like America, the candid observer will admit that democracy does

foster some vices. Only add to that observer's candor a measure of courage and he will confess that in Israel, democracy, American-style, is a destructive fraud.

By imitating American democracy, Israel's political leaders are imitating a permissive society, one whose government tolerates an inordinate amount of domestic crime and violence. This is one reason why Israel's government is expected to tolerate Arab terrorism glamorized in the world's media as the intifada. Recall how this government has permitted the most prominent intifada leaders to roam at large and incite the Arabs to murder and insurrection.

Of course, American permissiveness, like the number of a person's "other cheeks," has limits. Christianity aside, it was manifestly proper, i.e., democratic, for the United States to invade Panama and kill scores of Panamanians in order to remove a tin-pot dictator like General Noreiga. But how manifestly improper, i.e., undemocratic, it is, or would be, for the government of Israel to employ sufficient force to quell the violence of Arabs dedicated to the destruction of this absurd outpost of democracy in the Middle East. But having embraced the secular dogma of democracy—more immune to questioning than religion—Israel, harassed by a hostile Arab population and surrounded by militant, autocratic Islamic regimes, is expected to be more democratic, i.e., more permissive, than the American colossus.

Turn, now, to the "peace process." Notice how annoyed Washington becomes whenever Israel's government hesitates to endanger the lives of its people by trading "land for peace." Hardly visible on a map of the Middle East, Israel is expected to take "risks for peace" that no other government would dare demand of its people. But the vexation and one-sided expectations of sheltered Americans are understandable, given Israel's democratic credentials. After all, democracies parade peace as the highest value. For the sake of peace, therefore, democratic Israel should be willing to sacrifice Judea, Samaria, and Gaza to an Arab population whose religion preaches war.

To effectuate this sacrifice, democratic America prodded democratic Israel to propose Arab elections in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The Arabs, thought Washington, would be delighted. They now would shed the religion of Islam for the religion of democracy. Again, we see how, by substituting American democratic values for distinctively Jewish ones, the government of Israel unwittingly fosters the dangerous expectations of friends and the hostile designs of foes.



## III

Clearly, what most enfeebls this government is its democratic mode of thought. Pride in being democratic has taken the place of pride in being Jewish. This was inevitable given the use or abuse of the term "Zionism" by the founders of this secular democratic state. Let me explain.

The term *Zionism* is derived from *Zion*, one of the most sacred words in the dictionary of authentic Judaism. Zion is the dwelling place of God's glory. It is the sanctuary of the Torah, the Holy City that surrounds it, the Holy Land of which Jerusalem is the eternal capital. From Zion, from Jerusalem, the Word of God—the Truth—shall come forth. The people chosen to possess this land were chosen to become the only *non-sovereign* nation on earth. They were chosen to serve God, to live by His commandments, that is, to reveal the infinite wisdom, power, and graciousness of God in every domain of existence—intellectual, moral, and physical—and thus to be a blessing to all the families of mankind.<sup>7</sup>

Secular Zionism rejected this fundamental principle of authentic Judaism. Ben-Gurion could admit: "Without our Book of Books, we . . . would be as extinct as the ancient Mesopotamian peoples." He could admit: "Hebrew, and with it, the knowledge of its greatest written works, Torah and Talmud, are the matrix in which Jewishness is embedded. These elements kept the Jews true to themselves in dispersion . . ."<sup>8</sup> But with the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Torah and the Talmud, for Ben-Gurion, were relegated to the realm of "religion," comforting for believers, but obsolete otherwise.

It was obvious to religious Zionists that political Zionists like Ben-Gurion actually were ignorant of authentic Judaism. One such religious Zionist was Dr. Isaac Breuer, an Orthodox rabbi and one of the greatest exponents of Jewish thought in the first half of the twentieth century. Dr. Breuer studied philosophy and law at the universities of Berlin and Strasbourg, where he received a doctorate in jurisprudence. Although he admired Theodor Herzl, he maintained that only observant Jews can be true nationalists, that political Zionism is not only a distorted form of Jewish nationalism, but by having "turned the Torah into a mere religion, a matter of private conscience," it has become "the most terrible enemy that has ever risen against the Jewish nation." His illustrious grandfather, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, often had indicated that the term "religion" is the greatest obstacle to understanding authentic Judaism. Consistent therewith, Breuer saw in Judaism and Judaic law the epitome of rationality. Hence he could say, with great erudition, that Judaic law "is as comprehensive as any codification of the whole complex of private and public law of a living modern state can possibly be."<sup>9</sup>



The rationality and comprehensiveness of Judaic law suggest that the particularism attributed to Judaism is not well understood. Judaic law not only fructified the legal systems of the Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, but its salutary influence was felt throughout Europe during the Middle Ages. In no country, moreover, has the influence of Judaic law been more evident than in eighteenth-century America, whose jurisprudence was based very much on the Seven Laws of Noah.<sup>10</sup> (Strange as it may seem, in 1991, the Seven Noahide Laws were incorporated in Public Law 102-14 by a Congressional Joint Resolution!) This is not to minimize the particularism of Judaic law. But a most important aspect of this particularism concerns Israel's universal mission. Here is how Dr. Leo Jung relates the singularity and universality of Judaism:

Had Judaism been entrusted to all nations, it would have lost color and intensity. As everybody's concern it would have remained nobody's concern . . . . Ideals are better entrusted to minorities as their differentiating asset, because of which they live . . . Judaism, given at once to the shapeless multitudes of the world, would have become a meaningless phrase . . . Hence it was bestowed upon one nation as its heirloom, as the single reason for its existence, as the single argument of its national life, as the aim and end of its struggles and labors. The Jewish people thus received a charge that was to inspire its life, but the benefit of which was to accrue to all the world. At the beginning of Jewish history, Abraham, the first Jew, received the universal call, 'And thou shalt be a blessing to all the nations of the world.' For the consummation of this ideal, Israel is to walk apart. It will not be counted among the nations . . . Guided exclusively by the will of God, living by His commandments and dying if need be for the sanctification of His name, Israel is to present the example of a whole nation elevated, ennobled, illumined by the life in God and encouraging thereby a universal *Imitatio Dei*.<sup>11</sup>

This world-historical function of Judaism was denied by the secular Zionists who founded the modern State of Israel. Their Zionism has succumbed to democracy, the religion of the age.

The conflict between democracy and Jewish authenticity can be mitigated, but only when democracy's cardinal principles, again, freedom and equality, are defined in terms of the rational and ethical principles of Judaic law. It is hardly necessary to elaborate on the fact that "living as you like," the egotistical and hedonistic definition of democratic freedom now prevailing in the West, is incompatible with Jewish ethics. As for democratic equality, it tends to level all moral and intellectual distinctions. It is time to examine democracy from a Torah perspective and thereby reveal, in a more concrete way, some of the principles of authentic Judaism. In the process, we shall show how to save democracy from its nihilistic tendencies.

## Conceptual Therapy

Modern Israel is referred to as a democracy. It is also called a state. And, of course, public life in this reputedly democratic state is dominated by politics. But to practice politics in Israel, or to conceive of Israel as a democracy or as a state, is to enter a world of thought and action utterly foreign to Torah Judaism. When the great philosopher-scientist, Alfred North Whitehead, said, "The Jews are the first example of [a] refusal to worship the state," he was unaware of the fact that he was superimposing on Judaic thought a gentile concept.<sup>1</sup> Let us explore this and other political concepts from a Judaic perspective.<sup>2</sup>

To begin with, the modern concept of "state" may be traced to Machiavelli.<sup>3</sup> The state is wholly a human product, one based on the autonomy of human will. Hence there is no essential difference in proclaiming *L'etat c'est moi* and saying *Vox populi vox Dei*. In both cases, the laws of the state depend solely on the will of the sovereign, be it the one, the few, or the many. The separation of religion and the state follows, where religion is reduced to a private matter. Obviously this idea of the state—of the sovereign state—is fundamentally opposed to the Torah, which proclaims the sovereignty of God.

Consider, now, "democracy." As noted earlier, democracy literally means the "rule of the people" or popular sovereignty. But as just implied, the notion of popular sovereignty is foreign to the Torah. Moreover, the rule of the people reduces to the rule of the majority. Although majority rule is an important Torah principle (See Exod. 23:2 and *Sanhedrin* 3b.), its operation is limited by higher principles, such as the Ten Commandments. Furthermore, in Judaic law the meaning of majority rule is *rational* rather than *volitional*, which is to say it must be consistent with truth and man's cognitive nature.<sup>4</sup> But let us examine the relevant concept.

Although the Hebrew word *rov* can be translated literally as "majority," the term "probability" most often conveys its operational meaning.<sup>5</sup> What is decisive in talmudic disputation is not the *will* but the *judgment* of the majority, for it is more likely to accord with truth. Moreover, the

majority principle applies only in cases of doubt and only among equals in scholarship. (See *Yevamot* 14a.) To clinch the point, there are many cases in Judaic law when the conclusion of an outstanding individual jurist or scholar was accepted against the rest of his colleagues.<sup>6</sup>

Turning to “politics,” as we have seen, political scientists reduce it to a struggle for power. What this really means is that those engaged in political activity are animated by egoism. And if this is so, one should expect the political struggle to be dominated by various forms of deception, bribery, and coercion. Whatever the case, democratic politics features a multiplicity of individuals and groups competing for place and profit. The scene is not edifying. Perhaps political science itself is partly to blame, given its understanding of what motivates human behavior. In other words, the debased character of contemporary politics, obvious to the meanest intellect, well may be a reflection, if not the self-fulfilling prophecy of political science, insofar as it is morally neutral. The flim-flam, vulgarity, and corruption of democratic politics ought to be of central concern to political scientists. It is not. Politics, therefore, is devoid of three basic Torah principles: Truth (*Emet*), Justice (*Tsedek*), and Graciousness (*Hesed*). This has profound consequences for Jews living in any democracy.

Having suffered from persecution and the tortures of tyranny, it is only natural for Jews to feel grateful for the blessings of freedom and equality found in democratic societies. Many Jews identify these basic democratic principles with their counterparts in the Torah. This distorts the Torah and prevents it from elevating democracy. For the Torah's conception of man's creation in the likeness of God—the only solid and rational source of intellectual and moral freedom—can save democracy's cardinal principles from contemporary nihilism and hedonism. Needed are conceptual as well as ethical constraints on democratic freedom and equality, for neither principle can teach us how man should live or even to distinguish what is noble from what is base.

### Judaic Freedom

Freedom is one of the most precious jewels of Torah Judaism. Again and again, the Torah refers to the deliverance of the Israelites from Egyptian servitude. But the freedom attained in the Exodus was not merely freedom from Egyptian bondage, which is negative, so much as the positive freedom to serve God, meaning, to live in accordance with truth, with veridical laws of morality. (See *Exod.* 7:16, 8:16, 21-22.) Judaic freedom therefore involves dependence solely on God, on the truths enunciated in the written and oral law. It is this dependence that enabled Nietzsche to



regard the Jews as the most independent, the most moral, and the most rational of men.

Significantly, the deliverance of the Jews from Egyptian bondage repeatedly is associated with God's ineffable name (the Tetragrammaton) as may be seen in the First Commandment. This means that God, as the Creator, is the ultimate source of freedom, but a freedom conceptually related to eternal laws of morality. The relationship between human freedom and laws of morality is intimately linked to the idea of man's creation in the image of God. To appreciate what this relationship entails, let us contrast various democratic definitions of freedom.

To be consistent with man's creation in the image of God, freedom cannot be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realization of one's desires, the prevalent view of freedom in the most progressive democratic societies. Nor will true freedom be found in the interstices of the law, such that one may do whatever the law does not forbid. The latter view of freedom, like the former, can justify the neo-paganism now rampant in much of the democratic world. Nor again does freedom consist in obedience to laws in whose formulation one has merged his will with the will of others, such as Rousseau's "general will." The general will can be as frivolous or as unjust as the will of a tyrant. Finally, freedom will not be found in Kant's "autonomous moral will," where morality consists in abstract, universal categories of reason. Obedience to one's own will, even if couched in universal terms, can be as arbitrary or as foolish as obedience to the will of a multitude.

To be consistent with man's creation in the image of God, *freedom must be the voluntary and rational observance of laws which are independent of human volition.*

Since the ultimate source of human freedom is the Creator of heaven and earth, to understand and willingly obey His laws is to achieve the height of human freedom, for only those laws are wholly just and rational. This is why it has been said that "where justice and reason reign, 'tis freedom to obey."

In Judaism "He who is commanded and does stands higher than he who is not commanded and does" (*Avoda Zara* 3a). It requires a more powerful will and intellect to obey intelligently the will of God than to obey one's own will, which is but to follow one's natural inclination or pleasure. Contrary to modernity, Torah Judaism does not exalt the autonomous will.<sup>7</sup> "Do God's Will as you would do your own will, so that He may do your will as if it were His" (*Avot* 2:4).

Clearly, Judaic man and Judaic freedom fundamentally differ from democratic man and democratic freedom. As is well known, democracies



tend to sever freedom from reason and morality. Contemporary democratic societies have removed virtually all restraints on freedom of speech. Obscene speech now is a staple of entertainment. True, in democracy's youth, when the influence of religion on the laws was still manifest, freedom of speech did not require toleration of obscenity. Speech, which elevates humanity above brute nature, and which is inseparable from reason, was linked to public inquiry and criticism, to man's quest for truth and justice. In contrast, obscenity, it was universally understood, reduces the distinctively human to the subhuman and fosters not the quest for truth but vulgarity, not concern for justice or the common good but self-indulgence.

Because obscenity arouses the passions, it diminishes the domain of asymmetrical logic: reason sinks into symmetrical unity. Some modern psychologists nonetheless regard obscenity as a form of catharsis. Torah Judaism views it as a form of degradation: a reduction of the distinctively human, speech, to the merely animal or biological level.<sup>8</sup>

Turning from speech to deeds, democratic freedom, as noted earlier, has come to mean the absence of obstacles to the realization of desire or pleasure. It should be obvious, however, that the pleasure principle is self-destructive when unopposed by organically felt restrictions. One need only think of hunger and thirst to recognize that if we only surfeited ourselves, pleasure itself would disappear. Generally speaking, pleasure depends on the pain of privation. Excessive pleasure or overenjoyment results in unwanted pain. Applied to the problem of freedom, he who does as he pleases ends up enslaved to his passions. Drug addiction and sex-related diseases are obvious cases in point.

Unfortunately, many psychologists unwittingly foster self-indulgence by overemphasizing the pathological consequences of "repression of the instincts" while ignoring its positive function in relation to human rationality. The positive function of repression of the instincts involves the "injection" of discriminating or asymmetrical logic into the indiscriminate nature of instinctual desires. For example, mere sexual desire, be it human or canine, is very democratic in that it does not discriminate between objects. (Nor does sexual desire *per se* care for the well-being of its object. Therein is one of the basic differences between lust and love. The physical or unidimensional pleasure of animal lust is nothing compared to the multidimensional enjoyment of human love.)

Pleasure-seeking has become the fixation of contemporary democracy. This fixation leads to rising expectations, disillusionment, and despair. Functional impoverishment, mental illness, and social disintegra-

tion follow. And there is no relief in sight so long as democratic freedom lacks conceptual and ethical constraints.

Ignored is the Torah principle of opposition (See Eccles. 3:1-8.). Applied to psychology, emotional releases and satisfactions require restrictions and dissatisfactions.<sup>9</sup>

This applies to freedom. The enjoyment of freedom ultimately depends on its opposite, the restraints of authority. The purpose of authority, when exercised over the young, is to enable them, as they mature, to exercise self-restraint, hence to dispense with the need for externally imposed authority. Authority, metamorphosed as self-restraint, therefore is the precondition of freedom. Once the Torah principle of opposition is denied, or once the symmetrical logic of demophrenia oversteps its bounds, all desires, noble and base, become equal. This leads me to the Judaic view of democracy's second cardinal principle, equality.

### Judaic Equality

As with freedom, the only solid and rational justification for the principle of equality is the concept of man's creation in the image or likeness of God. This equality, however, is not to be construed by the habits of thought cultivated in secular democratic societies. In Judaism the status of one person *vis-a-vis* another is determined by how he stands in relation to the Torah. Thus, a gentile who observes the Seven Noahide Laws of Morality is superior to a Jew who is an atheist. On the other hand, a Jew who observes the Torah has a higher status than a gentile. This said, let us turn to a constructive exposition of the Torah view of equality beginning with a famous statement in the Jerusalem Talmud.

Given man's creation in the likeness of God, the Jerusalem Talmud declares with perfectly logical consistency: "If gentiles [surrounding Israel] demand, 'Surrender one of yourselves to us and we will kill him; otherwise we shall kill all of you,' they must all suffer death rather than surrender a single Israelite to them" (*Terumot* 8, 9).<sup>10</sup> According to Judaic law, no individual may be sacrificed for the sake of his society. With respect to human life, therefore, all Jews—learned and unlearned, rich and poor—are equal. This equality, however, should not be confused with its democratic or secular counterpart. For as concerns danger to life, the conclusion that all Jews are equal is based on the premise that all souls belong to God, that the soul of an individual and his purpose in world history is known only to his Creator.

Furthermore, unlike the symmetrical logic of democratic equality manifested, for example, in the principle of one person, one vote, Judaic equality has nothing to do with equal rights or claims that one abstract

individual may make against another. A person's rights depend on who or what he or she is in relation to Judaic law. For instance, in procuring their release from captivity, "A Kohane (i.e., priest) takes precedence over a Levite, a Levite over an Israelite, and an Israelite over a bastard . . . This applies when they are all (otherwise) equal; but if the bastard is learned in the Torah and the Kohane is ignorant of the Torah, the learned bastard takes precedence over the ignorant Kohane" (Mishnah, *Horayot* 3:8). Similarly, under Judaic law, "a scholar takes precedence over a king of Israel" (*B.T. Horayot* 23a). Finally: "If a man and his father and his teacher were in captivity [for ransom], he takes precedence over his teacher and his teacher takes precedence over his father, while his mother takes precedence over them all [if only because of her greater vulnerability]."

Clearly, the order of precedence is determined by learning, unless a woman's life or honor is at stake. This is true also in less precarious situations. Thus, when a court has many cases on its docket, then, as Maimonides points out, the case of a widow is tried before that of a scholar, a scholar's before an illiterate's, and the suit of a woman before that of a man, because the humiliation is greater in the case of a woman. Moreover, if a man has not left enough to provide for both his sons and his daughters, the first claim on the estate is that of his daughters.<sup>11</sup> These examples clearly indicate that Judaic equality does not involve the leveling of distinctions characteristic of democratic equality (a leveling magnified by the doctrine of moral relativism). Nothing could be further removed from the symmetrical unity of demophrenia than the asymmetric logic of Judaic law.

Because of its leveling tendencies, the first casualty of democratic equality is honor. Let us examine honor (*kavod*) from the Torah perspective.

In Judaic law, the honor due a person depends not only on his status but on his relationship to you. Again, you are obliged to honor your teacher more than your father (unless he is also a scholar). Also, you owe more honor to your father than to your mother (unless they are divorced, in which case the honor a son owes his mother is equal to that which he owes his father, and in the event of conflict, he may choose for himself who should take precedence). In Torah jurisprudence, a person's honor is relational and contingent. Talmudic law addresses itself primarily to the asymmetrical character of reality, to the acts and accomplishments of living men, not to moral abstractions or symmetries such as the dignity of the individual.

Because man is created in the image of God, a person's merit is logically proportional to his study and observance of the Torah. A person merits honor to the extent that he reveals the infinite wisdom, power, and kindness of his Creator in every domain of existence. But in honoring that



person, we really are honoring the Torah, the ultimate source of what misleadingly is called "human dignity."

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that whereas the so-called dignity of the (abstract) individual is a symmetrical and absolutist concept divorced from conscious reality, honor, as delineated in the Torah, is existential and addressed to the real differences among men. The difference may be seen more clearly by examining cases of Judaic law involving humiliation. In such cases, the assessment of monetary compensation, says Maimonides, "depends upon the relative status of the one who causes the humiliation and the one who is humiliated. Humiliation caused by an insignificant person cannot be compared with the humiliation caused by a great and eminent person. The humiliation caused by the lesser individual is greater." For example:

If one humiliates an imbecile, he is exempt, but if one humiliates a deaf-mute . . . or a slave, he is liable. If one humiliates a minor, the rule is as follows: If the minor feels ashamed when insulted, the offender is liable; if not, he is exempt. Nevertheless, there is no comparison between one who humiliates a minor and one who humiliates an adult . . . If one insults [ordinary persons] in speech . . . he is exempt, but the court should institute preventive measures in this matter [for derogatory speech is culpable in the judgment of Heaven] . . . If [however,] one humiliates a scholar, the offender must pay him full compensation [that is, thirty-five denar in gold], even if he humiliates him merely in speech.<sup>12</sup>

Now it so happens that the Hebrew word for "honor" (*kavod*) also denotes understanding, above all, of the Torah. Thus, to humiliate a scholar is to depreciate the Torah, just as to honor a scholar is to honor the Torah. The personal dimension is secondary. If, therefore, a person is compensated for humiliation, it will not be because he falls under the abstraction called the "dignity of the individual," but because his mental faculties are matured enough to render him susceptible to shame. Shame, of course, is the other side of honor. It presupposes the capacity to make moral distinctions, that is, to distinguish what is noble from what is base.

Were it not for this capacity of asymmetrical logic, everything would sink into symmetrical unity. There would be no succession in time and no contiguity in space. Subject and object would be one. Absolute equality would reign. But God created heaven and earth. He created light and He created darkness. These asymmetries make reason (*ratiocination*) and choice possible. But unless reason and choice have boundaries defined by law—just as nature has boundaries defined by law—men then will try to create the world in their own image. We need not dwell on the consequences.



It will be obvious from the preceding that even though the democratic principle of equality finds no easy home in the Torah, it is only there that this principle can be enriched and elevated. To see this more clearly, consider again the precept, "You shall not give special consideration to the poor nor favor the person of the mighty . . ." (Lev. 19:15). This precept appears very egalitarian. Its correct application, however, requires thorough knowledge of the Halakha. Thus, if the parties to a dispute agree to arbitration, the judge may well favor the claims of the poor. He also may give special consideration to the poor where the adversarial party is a scholar. A famous example of this is recounted in the Talmud (*Baba Metzia* 83a):

Some porters negligently broke a barrel of wine belonging to the scholar, Raba ben Huna. In accordance with the strict letter of the law, he confiscated the porters' coats as security for its value. The porters complained to the court, and Rav, the judge, told Raba ben Huna to return the coats. "Is that really the law?" he asked. "Yes indeed," replied Rav, 'so that you may walk in the way of good men' (Prov. 2:20). The porters spoke up again: "We are poor men, have worked all day, and are in need; are we to get nothing?" "Give them their wages." Again Raba ben Huna asked, "Is that the law?" And Rav replied, "Yes—'and keep to the path of the righteous.'" <sup>13</sup>

This judgment should not be construed in moralistic terms as going beyond the letter of the law. For as Rav clearly stated, he was in fact applying the law. But in this case, the applicable law was the law appropriate for a scholar, not for the ordinary man. (Incidentally, Raba ben Huna was Rav's student and succeeded his master as the head of the great Sura Yeshiva in Babylon.)

As the above case demonstrates, the Torah provides no warrant for egalitarianism, a doctrine that subordinates all values to the principle of equality. One of the basic principles of Judaism is to demand higher standards of conduct from the leaders, especially the educators, of the community.<sup>14</sup> The reason is simple enough: They set the example and the standards for the community as a whole, and not only for the living but for posterity. Hence, they possess the power to do great harm as well as great good. In the Torah world, the more elevated a person, the higher is the level of conduct required of him.

Clearly, Torah Judaism presents an asymmetrical view of equality. To illustrate, imagine a ladder of 100 rungs.<sup>15</sup> One person may start out in life on rung eighty and, with effort, ascend to rung eighty-one. Another person may start out on rung twenty and, with effort, ascend to rung twenty-one. Both advance one step, to which extent they are equal. For what counts

is their struggle to take that one step upwards, that one step that distinguishes the vertical striving of man from the horizontal peregrination of beasts. And so, while men are born unequal in absolute terms, they may be equal in relative terms. Indeed, one person, absolutely inferior to another, may become, relatively speaking, his superior in God's infinite judgment. (Here I am reminded of Schiller's aphorism: "No one shall be like another, yet all shall equal the highest. How such a thing might be done? Each one perfect his own self."<sup>16</sup> The Torah provides the means as well as the rational foundation for such perfection.)

This may be seen even in the institution of slavery, a concept extrinsic to Torah jurisprudence. (The Hebrew term *eved*, usually translated as "slave," has no counterpart in the non-Torah world, as we shall now see.)<sup>17</sup>

To begin with, there is no such thing as corporate slavery in the Torah. No Jew can make another human being a slave. He can only acquire, by purchase, someone who already had become a slave, *de facto* or *de jure*. He might purchase a Canaanite slave, say, from Egypt. Or he might purchase a Hebrew who had been declared a slave by a Jewish court as a result of his having committed a theft for which he was unable to make restitution to his victim.

The most remarkable thing about the Canaanite slave is that he cannot be retained in a Jewish household unless he fulfills all the negative commandments of the Torah as well as all those positive commandments which do not depend on time for their performance. (If he refuses to fulfill these precepts, he is released after a maximum probationary period of one year.) One may say, therefore, that a Canaanite slave is half Jewish. Moreover, if his master should inadvertently inflict upon him some palpable blemish, not only is the slave automatically emancipated, but he must be accepted into the community as a Jew (*Kiddushin* 24a, b).<sup>18</sup>

Although a Canaanite slave cannot liberate himself, he may be emancipated through the agency of others.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, his master may not sell him to a non-Jew or even to a Jew outside the Land of Israel. (In either case the slave would go free.) Finally, Judaic law prohibits the extradition of a non-Jewish slave who had fled from his Jewish master living abroad. Nothing like this can be found in any other ancient code. In the Code of Hammurabi, which is the product of a well-advanced civilization, harboring or aiding a runaway slave was a crime punishable by death. The Torah commands: "You shall not deliver a slave to his master who has escaped from his master to you. He shall dwell with you in your midst in the place which he shall choose within one of your gates [towns] which he likes best" (Deut. 23:16-17, and see *Gittin* 45a). Indeed, the runaway Canaanite slave must be given a certificate of manumission and be accepted

into the Jewish community where he attains the full rights of a Jew. This law clearly tends in the direction of the virtual abolition of slavery.

Consider, now, the slavery of a Jew for theft.<sup>20</sup> A Jew who cannot restore the value of his theft to his victim is sold into servitude by the court (he is not imprisoned) to help him make this restitution. Such sale is imposed on male thieves only, not females. In no case is the period of service to exceed six years, and even during this period the slave may at any time acquire his freedom by paying off the proportionate value of the remaining period of his service. The only kind of work that can be demanded of him by his master is that which had been his usual occupation, be it as a cobbler or as a woodchopper. (In fact, if the amount of his theft is less than the value of six years of service in his normal occupation, he cannot be sold into servitude, and he still cannot be imprisoned. Of course, the victim of his theft may be compensated by confiscation of the malefactor's property, so long as this does not leave him destitute or incapable of earning an honest living.)

In any event, the case of the Hebrew slave, writes Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, "*is the one and only case in which the Torah orders deprivation of freedom as a punishment [if punishment it may be called]*":

[The Torah] orders the criminal to be brought into the life of a family as we might order a refractory child to be brought under the influence of Jewish family life. How careful it is that the self-confidence of the criminal should not be broken, that, in spite of the degradation he has brought on himself, he should still feel himself considered and treated as a brother . . . [Moreover, the Torah] insists that he may not be separated from his wife and family, and . . . that his family should not be left in distress through his crime and its results. In depriving him of liberty, and thereby the means to provide for his dependents, the Torah puts the responsibility of caring for them, on those who, for the duration of his lack of freedom, have the benefit of his labor.

Punishments of imprisonment, with all the attendant despair and moral degradation that dwell behind prison bars [where criminals become even more hardened], with all the worry and distress that it entails for wife and child [the wife usually divorces her husband], are unknown in Torah jurisprudence.

During his service, Judaic law requires complete equality of the slave with his master and the rest of the household in food, clothing, and bedding. (In fact, the slave must be fed before his master!) And after his term of service has been completed, he must be *liberally* provided for by his master so that he is not returned to independence empty-handed but is instead equipped to earn an honest living. Hence the popular saying, "Who buys



a Hebrew slave for himself has bought for himself a master" (*Kiddushin* 22a).

It thus should be evident that, although servitude for theft theoretically is permissible under the Torah, its practical tendency is toward desuetude. In fact, it ceased with the rise of the Second Commonwealth. (See *Arachin* 29a.) It even may be said that the terms of slavery under Jewish law are so restrictive on the master and so protective of the slave, that this institution was intended partly to rehabilitate certain malefactors, to bring them within the saving and generous embrace of the Torah.

### Governing Principles of a Torah Community

Thus far, I have examined freedom and equality without reference to the governance of a Torah community. Although a Torah government, under the unqualified rule of the Halakha, would be a kingship, and its supreme organ of governance would be the Great Sanhedrin or Supreme Court. But rather than examine the institutions of a Torah government (which I have done elsewhere), I shall discuss here some of the basic principles and laws that apply to any Jewish community, wherever it may exist.<sup>21</sup>

It is often said that if Israel were governed by Jewish law it would be a theocracy. This is more a semantic than a substantial issue. If "theocracy" signifies a regime ruled by a church or by priests, Judaism is not theocratic. There is no church in Judaism—neither theologically, since there is no mediation between God and the individual Jew, nor institutionally, since there is no papacy or ecclesiastical hierarchy. But if the word "theocracy" is construed literally as "the rule of God," then Judaism is theocratic, for God is the ultimate source of law and authority. Still, what does this mean operationally? We have seen that no priesthood, but only publicly tested scholarship, can lay claim to any validity regarding the laws of the Torah. This means the Torah belongs to every Jew, whether he is a Kohane, Levite, or Israelite. But let us examine these three classes in relation to the principle of equality.

The first thing to be noted is that they are hereditary but not closed. The daughter of an Israelite or of a Levite may marry a Kohane and her children will be Kohanes, since class status is patrilineal. Hence, even though Kohanes, Levites, and Israelites have distinct duties and privileges, there is no separation of classes. Nor is there a ruling class. Who rules is based, first and foremost, on intellectual and moral qualifications: Those who are most learned in the Torah and the sciences receive the highest honors. Moreover, unlike the practice of any so-called aristocracy, education in Israel is open to, and even required of all members of the community.



Thus, thousands of years before any democracy thought of providing (compulsory) education for all its citizens, all the people of Israel were being highly educated as a matter of course. (This is why Aristotle's disciple, Theophrastus, could describe Israel as a "nation of philosophers.") Far from separating or stratifying the three classes (as in Plato's *Republic*) Torah education is the great unifying force of the Jewish people who, we saw, honor scholars more than kings.<sup>22</sup>

It should be noted also that, of the three hereditary ranks of Israel, the Levites have more public duties to perform than Israelites, while Kohanes are held to even higher standards of public service. Moreover, neither of these two classes can own any land, for their paramount responsibility is to supervise all activities involving public education. The Torah was not given to eliminate inequality (save those resulting from injustice). Rather, it provides a framework of laws by which unequal men can live in genuine and abiding friendship while perfecting their different intellectual and moral endowments.

This should dispel the prejudice that a Torah government would be a theocracy, a state ruled by a priestly caste.<sup>23</sup> In Judaism, there is no clergy and no laity. Indeed, the most authentic form of Jewish leadership is that of the teacher, whose power is not political but intellectual and moral.

Any appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, a Torah community should not be confused with even the most enlightened democracy. For despite the fact that the center of gravity of a Jewish community lies not in any ruling class but in the body of the people; the people, as Jews, have subordinated themselves willingly to the Torah, that is, to the laws of God. What is more, in a true Torah community, the authority of a Rabbi resides not in his knowledge of the Torah, but in the knowledge of the Torah possessed by the people. Indeed, the leaders of a Jewish community are acting consistently with the Torah when they make themselves superfluous. As Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch writes: "See to it that the peasant behind the plough, the herdsman with his cattle, the weaver at his loom can be your judges and masters, the critics of your conduct and teaching; then at the same time will they be your pupils and friends, they will willingly and joyfully follow your teachings and regulations; they will understand and appreciate the spirit in which you speak and by which you are guided."<sup>24</sup> This is what is meant by a "kingdom of priests," a people wholly animated by the teachings of the Torah.

Because the Torah belongs to the people as a whole, no hierarchical power can impose any rules or regulations or any officials on a Jewish community without first obtaining its consent. As the sages themselves teach, "We must not appoint a leader over the community without first

consulting it" (*Berachot* 55a). They teach also that every regulation made by a Jewish court that has not been accepted by the majority has no binding force. This should not be construed in terms of democratic or majoritarian voluntarism. Just as there is no simplistic libertarianism in Judaic law, so there is no simplistic egalitarianism. Hence, just as it is grossly misleading to characterize a Torah community as a theocracy, so it is grossly misleading to describe such a community as a democracy.

## Two Kinds of Democracy

It goes without saying that Israel today is far from the ideal of a Torah community. But just what is this entity called "Israel"? It is reputed to be a Jewish state, and it boasts of being a democracy—a contradiction in terms. For a state hardly can be *Jewish* if it is merely a state for Jews and nonJews alike—the case of any democracy.

On the other hand, insofar as Israel is a democracy, it is very much a bi-cultural democracy. Israel's Arab citizens not only make up an increasingly significant minority of the country's population (18 percent by the 1990 census), but Arabic is an official language of the state. Indeed, given their prolific birthrate, Arabs eventually may become a majority of the electorate. In that case—because of freedom and equality—the Arabs would dominate Israel's government and establish an Islamic state which, following the pattern of all other Arab-Islamic regimes, would be a dictatorship.

This illustrates the fact that freedom and equality are not normative principles. They are principles of pure potentiality, bearing the possibility of goods but not good themselves, since they are devoid of any ethnic connotations or any ethico-religious constraints. This is why there are no ethnic or ethico-religious qualifications for voting or holding office in democratic regimes. But if democracy, via majority rule, *lawfully* can spawn a dictatorship (which is exactly what happened in Weimar, Germany), or if that principle can *legitimize* the surrender of territory vital to a country's existence (think of Czechoslovakia's Sudetanland and Israel's West Bank), the literal definition of democracy as "the rule of the people" needs to be reexamined, but from a Torah perspective.

Recall the verse cited in chapter Two: "Behold an *ahm* that dwells alone and shall not consider itself [as merely one] among [other] *goyim*." It was there said that whereas *ahm* signifies a collectivity united by an ethico-religious heritage, *goy* signifies a collectivity united only on the basis of a common territory or homeland. Thus Americans cannot be Americans without the existence of a territory called America. In contrast, Scripture designates the Jews an *ahm* as well as a *goy*. This distinction, for

our purposes, will be correlated to the difference between a "people" and a "nation," even though these terms are not clearly delineated in conventional usage.<sup>25</sup>

Accordingly, as previously indicated, I shall define a people as monocultural, as united not only by language, but by endogamous patterns of marriage and by shared beliefs and values rooted in a common and immemorial past. In contrast, a nation is a geo-political collectivity, which can be multicultural as well as monocultural. (A multicultural nation might more accurately be called a "political society.") Of course, in Judaism, nationhood and peoplehood overlap, for many religious precepts and institutions of Judaism presuppose Jewish possession of the Land of Israel.

Let us now juxtapose "peoplehood" with "democracy," i.e., the "rule of the people." A people, it was just said, is not a multicultural entity. To belong to a people is to possess a distinctive history, a history of memorable events and great men, a history of customs, tales, and stories that move the hearts of people to compassion and grief, to delight and reverence, that awaken in them the spirit of initiative along with the desire to preserve their heritage and transmit it to posterity. This is why an authentic government will not bestow citizenship or equal rights on foreign residents who do not ardently wish to become part of that people's heritage.

To say that democracy requires the absence of such ethnic distinctions is to say that democracy means not the rule of the "people" but the rule of a "non-people," that is, of a random aggregation of groups and individuals. I shall therefore call such an aggregation a *random* or *quantitative* democracy, in contradistinction to a *rational* or *qualitative* democracy. The groups composing a random democracy may coexist in complete equality despite their diverse and even antagonistic ethnic loyalties, religious beliefs, and moral values. Contrast a rational democracy.

Rational democracy—I have in mind the early American republic—avoids *indiscriminate* egalitarianism and uncritical libertarianism. To this extent, a rational or qualitative democracy is consistent with Judaism. (America originally was based on the Seven Noahide Laws of Universal Morality.) In contrast, random democracy rejects moral as well as ethnic distinctions. Such a democracy can only assert a welter of "human" rights, kowtowing to the vehemence with which those assertions are made. The humanists who assert these rights—the ruling class of a quantitative democracy—do not and cannot be wholly identified with any ethnic group. As cosmopolitans, they must not outwardly regard the way of life of one ethnic group as intrinsically preferable to that of another. Hence, they must foster moral egalitarianism or cultural relativism. Moreover, since they disdain ethnocentrism and must patronize, for political reasons, a variety

of ethnic groups, they also must pose as "pluralists." Ruled by such elites, a random democracy will lack any distinctive national character or national pride and purpose. This very much describes contemporary Israel.

But this should dismay no one who understands that the Jewish people still bear the influence of 2,000 years of dispersion and humiliation. The rebirth of Israel, however, coincides with the political ascendancy and moral decay of democracy. Rational democracy having ceased to exist long ago, there remains only random democracy—that demophrenic form of democracy that can only self-destruct.

Democracy has fulfilled, or is in the process of fulfilling, its world-historical function: It has facilitated man's precarious mastery over nature on the one hand, while rendering him a slave to his own impulses and passions on the other. It remains for Israel to save mankind before mankind destroys itself. This will require Israel to transcend not only democracy, but the dichotomy of science and religion. Before discussing this subject, however, we must explore the extraordinary character of Israel's rebirth.



## The Restoration of Israel

We have seen that the Zionist movement never intended to bring about a restoration of Israel such as that achieved in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah. It never entered the minds of political Zionists that the return of the Jews to the land of Israel was to culminate in the construction of the Third Temple and the restoration of Judaic law. The founders of political Zionism, such as Herzl and Pinsker, started from the failure of liberalism to solve the Jewish problem, but continued to see the solution in liberal terms, as a merely human problem. As Leo Strauss has written:

The terrible fate of the Jews was in no sense to be understood any longer as connected with divine punishment for the sins of our fathers or with the providential mission of the chosen people and hence to be borne with the meek fortitude of martyrs. It was to be understood in merely human terms: as constituting a purely political problem which as such cannot be solved by appealing to the justice or generosity of the nations . . . Accordingly, political Zionism was concerned primarily with nothing but the cleansing of the Jews from millennial degradation or with the recovery of Jewish dignity, honor, or pride. The failure of the liberal solution meant that Jews could not regain their honor by assimilating themselves as individuals to the nations among which they lived or becoming citizens like all the other citizens of the liberal states: the liberal solution brought at best legal equality, but not social equality; as a demand of reason it had no effect on the feelings of the non-Jews. . . Only through securing the honor of the Jewish nation could the individual Jew's honor be secured. The true solution of the Jewish problem requires that the Jews become "like all the nations" (I Sam. 8:20), that the Jewish nation assimilate itself to the nations of the world or that it establish a modern, liberal, secular . . . state . . .<sup>1</sup>

The political elite who led this movement succeeded in establishing a democratic state, but have yet to solve the Jewish problem or restore the honor of the Jewish people. Political Zionism could not solve the Jewish

problem because of the narrowness of its original conception. This was understood by cultural Zionism, which saw that political Zionism lacks historical and cultural perspective. The community of descent, Strauss writes, “must also be a community of the mind, of the national mind; the Jewish state will be an empty shell without a Jewish culture which has its roots in the Jewish heritage.” But as Strauss continues:

One could not have taken this step unless one had previously interpreted the Jewish heritage itself as a culture, that is, as a product of a national mind, of the national genius. Yet the foundation, the authoritative layer, of the Jewish heritage presents itself, not as the product of the human mind, but as a divine gift, as divine revelation. Did not one completely distort the meaning of the heritage to which one claimed to be loyal by interpreting it as a culture like any other high culture? Cultural Zionism believed to have found a safe middle ground between politics (power politics) and divine revelation ... but it lacked the sternness of the two extremes. When cultural Zionism understands itself, it turns into religious Zionism.<sup>2</sup>

Although the establishment of the State of Israel is the most profound modification of the Galut, the secular democratic State of Israel is itself a part of the Galut (Diaspora). But far from creating a normal state—“like all the nations”—Israel’s political elites created a demophrenic state, one whose infirmity is embarrassing to record. What are we to say of a Jewish state in which the votes of Arabs members of the Knesset can determine—and, in 1988, did in fact determine—the conversion issue of “Who is a Jew”? Demophrenia has grotesque consequences, especially in a nominally Jewish state.

That such a state should often be humiliated and condemned by the nations is providential, *for the malice of these nations prevents Jews from forgetting they are Jews, which prevents Israel from becoming a conventional state—contrary to the intentions of her political and intellectual elites*. “That which comes into your mind shall not be at all; in that you say, We shall be as the nations . . .” (Ezek. 20:32). It thus appears that Israel defies conventional modes of analysis. To see this more clearly, let us go back to 1948.

# I

The rebirth of Israel in that year well may be regarded as one of the most significant events in history. Certainly that event has had, and continues to have profound repercussions for a very large part of mankind. Stunned and embarrassed, Christian and Islamic theologians have had to

perform all sorts of mental gymnastics to account for the return of the Jewish people to their ancient homeland. Catholic Christianity has been especially discomfited. For millennia, the Church has propagated the theological doctrine that the Jews are eternally damned, rejected by the Almighty for having refused to recognize the Nazarene. (Strange that the Vatican should decide to recognize Israel only after the Rabin government recognized the PLO.) In any event, consider this passage from the Jesuit revue *Civiltà Cattolica*, known for its anti-Semitic leanings:

1827 years have passed since Jesus of Nazereth's prophecy that Jerusalem would be destroyed, that the Jews would be exiled as slaves among the nations and remain scattered to the end of time . . . According to the holy scriptures, it is incumbent on the Jewish people to live forever scattered and wandering among the gentile nations, in order to provide testimony to Jesus, not only via the writings, *but by means of their very existence*. Being that Jerusalem has now been rebuilt, to become a center for the renewed Israeli State, we are duly bound to add this is a direct contradiction to Jesus' own prophecy.<sup>3</sup>

In 1948, the Vatican, in an English radio program, hailed the new Jewish state by describing Zionism as a "new Nazism" and Israel as "a grave menace to Christianity"—a remarkable statement in view of the fact that the Roman Catholic Church itself was guilty of, or a party to, genocide by its participation in the persecution and slaughter of millions of innocent Jewish men, women, and children in this and in previous centuries.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, Protestant Christianity awaits the "Second Coming," which requires the return of all Jews to the Land of Israel and their conversion to the "true faith." Nachmanides' scintillating refutation of the "First Coming" has had no impact on the faithful.<sup>5</sup>

As for Muslims, including those who are citizens of the State of Israel, they cannot accept a sovereign and independent Jewish commonwealth without violating the Koran and Islamic theology. They reject the Hebrew prophecies concerning the return of the Jews to the Land of Israel. As may be seen from their fratricidal wars in Lebanon and elsewhere, a conspicuous character flaw, prophesied in Genesis 16:12, prevents the descendants of Ishamael from making peace with the truth.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, however, confusion reigns among the Jews themselves. Religious as well as secular Jews are in a quandary regarding the meaning of Israel's rebirth. They harbor conflicting views as to what is a Jew and what should be the character of the Jewish "state." They are divided over the "Arab problem." Many would sacrifice much of the Land of Israel in the belief that this would solve that tormenting problem. Is it not obvious, however, that neither democratic politics nor political science nor

any other secular discipline can deal adequately with these issues? This being so, the time has come for an unconventional approach. What is more appropriate than to examine these Jewish issues from a Torah perspective? Let us do so, beginning with the Torah understanding of the Land of Israel, the bone of contention between Jews and Arabs.

## II

Scripture repeatedly declares that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people. And what is more, we are told that this land is the permanent possession of the Jewish people whether they occupy it or not. God promised Abraham: "And I will give unto you and to your seed after you, the land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession." (See Gen. 17:8, 26:3 and 28:13 for a reaffirmation of this promise to Isaac and Jacob.) As for the Land of Israel itself: "I shall bring Israel, who are precious to Me, into the land that is precious to Me" (*Bamidbar Rabbah* 23.7). "The Wilderness and the parched land will be glad; and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as a rose" (Isa. 35:1). This land, it should be borne in mind, is the chosen land (Gen. 12:1; Deut. 11:12), chosen by God so that His ways would be made known to the world by His chosen people. "This people have I formed for Myself, that they shall relate My praise (Isa. 43:21)." This means that it is the function of Israel to reveal the infinite wisdom, power, and kindness of the Creator in every domain of existence—physical, intellectual, and moral. "For out of Zion shall go forth the Law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem" (Isa. 2:3). It follows that any loss of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel can only be temporary. For "God is not a man that He should lie; nor a human being that he should change his mind. Shall He say something and not do it, or speak and not fulfill?" (Num. 23:19).

Now, when the people of Israel transgressed the laws of the Torah, they were expelled from the land. They became a "byword among all the nations" (Deut. 28:37), scorned, tormented, and decimated, the hapless victims of anti-Semitism. Hence, their tortured exile and temporary loss of sovereignty over the land constituted a punishment prescribed in the Torah itself. "You shall therefore keep all my laws and social rules and fulfill them, so that the land to which I bring you to settle in will not spue you out" (Lev. 20:22). "I, Myself, will bring the land into desolation, and your enemies that settle in it will become astonished at it. But you I will scatter among the nations" (Lev. 26:27, 32). Remarkably, the word "astonished" (*shamemu*) was understood by the Jewish sages, more than two thousand years ago, to mean that Israel's *enemies* "shall be desolate" while occupy-



ing this strange land.<sup>7</sup> In other words, any nation that supplants the Jews in the Land of Israel will not prosper there.

History has confirmed this prophecy. As noted earlier, during the last twenty-five hundred years, the land of Israel has been conquered many times by many different nations. Yet, despite its extraordinary fertility, this land remained desolate and neglected no matter which foreign nation occupied or controlled it. Recall Mark Twain's mournful portrayal of Palestine, and contrast its description by Josephus, the first-century Jewish historian:

"The whole area is excellent for crops and pasturage and rich in trees of every kind, so that by its fertility it invites even those least inclined to work on the land. In fact, every inch of it has been cultivated by the inhabitants and not a parcel goes to waste. It is thickly covered by towns, and thanks to the natural abundance of the soil, the many villages are so densely populated that the smallest of them has more than fifteen thousand inhabitants."<sup>8</sup>

Especially significant or providential is the nomadic character of the Arabs who have lived in the land of Israel and who left it in the most sorrowful desolation. Obviously, had they developed the land and formed thereon a sovereign state with a distinct national culture, Jewish immigration to the land would have been out of the question. It were as if the Arabs had been placed there as temporary residents, until the Jews, having passed through the fires of exile, could reclaim the land and, once again, make its deserts bloom.

To be sure, and as we have seen, the descendants of Ishmael condemn the Jews as "aggressors" for having usurped the land of Palestine. This denunciation is anticipated in Rashi's commentary to Genesis 1:1. There the question arises: Why does the Torah begin with Creation and not with the first commandment given to the Jewish people? The prince of commentators writes:

So that if the nations of the world should [question the validity of Israel's title to the Holy Land] and say: "You are robbers in that you have seized by force the territories of the seven nations" [of Canaan that had previously occupied the land], Israel can retort: "The entire world belongs to the Holy One, Blessed be He. He created it and gave it to whomsoever it was right in His eyes. It was His will to give it to them and it was His will to take it from them and give it to us."

Of course, Rashi's commentary hardly will recommend itself to nations, which are no more disposed to recognize the truth of biblical

prophecy than to abide by the Seven Noahide Laws of Universal Morality. And why should it be otherwise, seeing that the secular Zionists who founded the State of Israel in 1948 dismissed the Torah, the only rational justification for Jewish possession of the land of Israel?<sup>9</sup> What needs to be shown and understood, however, is that these secularists, like the Arabs, unwittingly are serving a world-historical function. It required Jewish secularists, deniers of the Torah, to establish the State of Israel, and it required the presence of a large, hostile Arab population in and outside Israel to ensure the failure of those secularists. Let us see how this is so.

### III

Without going into the details of Judaic law governing the issue, it first should be noted that *observant Jews were prohibited from engaging in a bloody and uncertain war to regain sovereign control over the land of Israel*.<sup>10</sup> Only secular Zionists, led by men trained in military combat and prepared to die in the struggle for freedom, could have fought and won Israel's War of Independence. There is no question of their great merit, despite their secular intentions.

Now, these freedom-fighters controlled the levers of political and economic power in the pre-state period of the Yishuv. It was they who formed and dominated the State of Israel. Being secularists, however, they could do nothing more than initiate Israel's *physical* restoration. Severed from the roots of the Torah, their Zionism lacked creativity and profundity of thought. Ignorant of the theoretical levels of Judaic law, they were incapable of transcending the flaws of Western civilization, all of which are absent in authentic Judaism. (I have in mind such Western dichotomies as the individual *versus* society, freedom *versus* authority, reason *versus* revelation, law *versus* morality.) Without an exception, they embraced modernity uncritically, in consequence of which they saw Judaism through gentile, especially democratic, modes of thought.

Thus, for the Zionists who founded the State of Israel in 1948, Judaism *ceased* to be a comprehensive system of rational law, encompassing the public as well as the private concerns of men. Not Judaic law but the secular state would regulate the socio-economic activities of citizens. But given the bureaucratic character of the state, this means that the relationship between citizens would be subject to impersonal forces: their socio-economic activities no longer would be elevated or constrained by the moral law. (In this respect, the Zionists were carrying out the Lutheran-inspired Reform Movement of nineteenth-century Germany, except that, unlike the Reformers, the Zionists insisted that the Jews constitute a nationality whose preservation requires their return to the Land of Israel.)

Ironically, and as we have seen, Muslim rulers insist that Judaism is only a "religion" and not a "nationality." This is why they do not recognize the nation of Israel. But Israel's own leaders have made this dichotomy of "religion" and "nationality" in imitation of the nations of Christian Europe. They, too, would separate "religion" from "politics"; and to the extent that they have done so, Israel has experienced many of the insoluble moral problems of democracies like the United States. But contrary to the wishes of secularists, life in Israel defies the Western dichotomy of religion and politics. Why?

Israel has a parliamentary form of government based on proportional representation. This conforms to the system that prevailed in the Zionist Congress of the pre-state period. Proportional representation in that Congress was necessary if the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in the Land of Israel was to win the active support of disparate Zionist groups throughout the world. The Zionist Congress consisted, therefore, of a multiplicity of parties, and this multiplicity was represented in, and had to be accommodated by, the Zionist Executive, the precursor of Israel's present Cabinet.

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 did not diminish the necessity of proportional representation in the newly formed Knesset. It still was needed to encourage large-scale Jewish immigration from diverse countries on the one hand, and to counterbalance the large Arab population on the other. In other words, proportional representation was required to establish a Jewish majority in the land of Israel. At the same time, however, proportional representation could not help but spawn a welter of political parties and that motley species known as "coalition cabinet government." Consisting of the leaders of various parties and factions in the Knesset, the Cabinet institutionally is incapable of dealing with the Arab problem—really the Jewish problem—hence of formulating and executing coherent, comprehensive, and long-range national policies. But as we saw in chapter 1, party government inherently is incapable of solving any of the major moral problems of our time. A word about the Judaic view of political parties is now in order, and by way of Burke's classic definition.

Let us examine more closely his definition, "Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." This actually implies that no political party, *ex hypothesi*, has an all-comprehensive understanding of the "national interest," presumably because modern society consists of a welter of competing groups biased in their own interests. Political parties, therefore, are not the bearers of truth, else they would have no logical reason to tolerate error.



On the other hand, the mutual toleration of diverse parties indicates also that no party has a monopoly of *power*. It is only the lack of such power by any single party that underlies the pluralism and the toleration of which democracies boast. This is exactly the implication of contemporary political science insofar as it regards the “national interest” or the “common good” as a myth that politicians use to conceal their quest for prestige, place, and profit. Hence we concluded that *party* should be defined as *an aggregation of individuals seeking to gain control of the offices of government in order to promote their own personal or partisan interests*. This happens to be the Judaic view of parties, belatedly recognized by political science.

Thus, consider these words of the twentieth-century sage, Rav Elchonon Wasserman: “A city must appoint a rabbi. There are two competing candidates. When no parties exist, it is taken for granted that the more qualified candidate will be elected. When parties are involved, however, the [party] members must support the party's candidate without examining the qualifications of other candidates. Such conduct is at variance with the Torah.”<sup>11</sup> And yet, the multiplicity of parties in Israel resulting from proportional representation is providential, as we shall now see by reflecting on the historical function of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Let us proceed from a scientific perspective. Science deals with isolated systems. By removing one element from a compound the scientist can better understand the function of that element by examining resultant changes in the remainder of the compound. Accordingly, let us make a thought-experiment by going back to 1948 and “removing” the Arabs from the population then occupying the Land of Israel, indeed, from the Arab-Jewish conflict. Obviously, the character of Israel today would be very different. But in what fundamental way?

In pursuing this question, it should be borne in mind that the secular elite that founded the State of Israel were committed to the establishment of a thoroughly egalitarian society.<sup>12</sup> These secularists dominated not only the political and economic institutions of nascent Israel, but also its educational, cultural, and mass communications facilities. As secularists, and as Israel's Proclamation of the State implies, they rejected the Torah as the ultimate source of Jewish authority. Considerations of power, and not only of ideology, governed the anti-Torah attitude of the secular elite.

Now, what is ironic about this secular elite is that its own ideology and ambition complicated its task of establishing in Israel an ostensibly Jewish state in the presence of a then predominantly Arab population. Its egalitarianism required the elite to confer citizenship on the Arabs living within the



armistice lines established after the War of Independence. This could not but render precarious the elite's electoral power base and voting strength in the Knesset. Desperately needed, as already indicated, was a large Jewish majority in the land of Israel. Needed, therefore, was a great influx of Jews not only from war-torn Europe, but from Asia and Africa. But this posed its own dilemma for the secular elite.

The vast majority of Jews from Asia and Africa were religious, and thus constituted an obvious threat to the elite's political power. The secular elite needed these Jews to counterbalance the Arab population and, at the same time, to endow the State of Israel with "legitimacy" as being overwhelmingly Jewish. But the addition of hundreds of thousands of religious voters obviously would eventuate in the elite's political decline.

Thus, if the elite was not to commit political suicide and renounce its goal of creating a thoroughly egalitarian society in the land of Israel, it had to secularize the Sephardi and oriental Jews. This it did to no small extent and in unconscionable ways. Immigrant parents who sent their children to religious schools were denied employment until they transferred their children to secular schools. Thousands of Yemenite children, who were brought to Israel by Youth Aliya (their parents came later), were herded into kibbutzim and other anti-religious institutions. Meanwhile, immigrant transit camps were the scenes of political and anti-religious propaganda designed to turn youth away from their parents. Thus, by means of coercion, segregation, and indoctrination, the secular elite undermined the structure and intense loyalties of countless impoverished Sephardi and oriental Jewish families on the one hand, and their dedication to Torah values on the other.

Nevertheless, because the secularists as a whole were divided such that no single political party, under the system of proportional representation, could obtain a majority in the Knesset, the secular elite had to make concessions to the religious parties. For example, public transportation and places of entertainment were put under Sabbath restrictions in Jerusalem (and elsewhere). The powers of the Chief Rabbinate under the British Mandate were left intact, as were laws governing marriage and personal status. Exemption from military service was given to yeshiva students. Public religious schools were established, and public funds were dispensed to yeshivot.

Without these laws and arrangements, many religious Jews would have left Israel and none but the most desperate would have made *aliya*. Thus were it not for the Arabs and the need to establish an overwhelming Jewish majority, Israel would have developed into a thoroughly secular and conventional society, one comprising of Hebrew-speaking gentiles!

Moreover, because of the hostility of the Arab world, Israel has had to spend enormous sums for the country's defense. This has forced the government to impose on its citizens the highest taxes, certainly in the democratic world. The consequences are well-known: a depressed economy and low productivity and capital investment, all of which have contributed greatly to the emigration of many Jews, the bulk of whom, however, are secularists.

Having received no spiritual legacy from the secular elite, and seeing the country drift from crisis to crisis while pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp goal of "peace"—*something Islam will never give any secular government of Israel*—many young people saw no solid reason for remaining in the land of their fathers or for not seeking their fortune elsewhere, especially in the United States.

But meantime, while the secular elite (which dominates the government of Israel) grows more inept and decrepit, the "return to Torah" movement has been flourishing, along with more and more yeshivot. A virtual renaissance has occurred in the study of Judaic law, revealing its rational, humane, and comprehensive character. Add to this the burgeoning interest of scientists in the Torah and their rigorous attempts to decodify its hidden wisdom.

Thus, while the secular democratic elite has declined, the Torah has been gaining ascendancy. But all this never would have happened, had there been no Arabs in the Land of Israel. It thus appears that the historical function of the Arabs is to make possible the spiritual rebirth of Israel, one might almost say to compel Jews to become Jews!<sup>13</sup>

## Epilogue:

### Torah, Science, and the Computer

The fact that Arab Knesset members can decide the issue of "Who is a Jew?" confirms the proposition that politics and democracy in Israel are in the most advanced state of decay.<sup>14</sup> This decay is providential; for one of the world-historical functions of democracy is to destroy all man-made ideologies, and then to self-destruct.

It will be objected: "But democracy via relativism also undermines belief in the Torah." Although this applies to many Jews, there are nonetheless an increasing number of Jewish mathematicians and scientists who are beginning to reveal the Torah as the paradigm of knowledge. What prevents most people from so regarding the Torah is the prejudice that it exemplifies a religion, a prejudice I have elsewhere refuted.<sup>15</sup> The refutation may be summarized as follows.

Religion is usually contrasted with philosophy and science. Whereas religion is based on *revelation*, philosophy is based on *reason*; and whereas religion is rooted in the particularity and subjectivity of *faith*, science is based on the universality and objectivity of *verifiable knowledge*. Such is the conventional view of things.

It so happens, however, that various modern philosophers have come to the conclusion that philosophy, once defined as purely objective and final knowledge of the moral and metaphysical universe, is inherently impossible. Major schools of twentieth-century philosophy limit its subject matter to logic and linguistic analysis. More remarkable is the admission of prominent scientists that "physics can never be certain of its postulates," and that modern physics is in a state of confusion, of "conceptual disarray." All this places in question the dichotomy of reason and revelation and of knowledge and faith. Let us therefore examine these concepts from a Judaic perspective.

The Torah, contrary to religion, is not based on "faith."<sup>16</sup> The concept of "faith," unlike the concept of reason, is not logically related to the idea of man's creation in the image of God. Actually, "faith" is a misleading translation of the Hebrew word *emunah*, for in Torah Judaism "there is no *emunah* without truth."<sup>17</sup>

As Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook has put it:

*Emunah* isn't something which can be condensed to the expression, "I believe" . . . *Emunah* is something which must be learned . . . until we possess total understanding and knowledge in our inner beings, during every breath of our lives . . . *Emunah* is the greatest learning, the greatest wisdom . . . the broadest approach to the world, encompassing all of man, and all of the universe . . .

*Emunah* encompasses all knowledge, creating a universal bond between all the disciplines . . . Its inner vitality brings life to society, to the foundations of ethical conduct, and to the life of the individual . . .

Clearly, there are different degrees or levels of *emunah*, just as there are different levels of Torah and of scientific knowledge. But it is only the search for truth that leads to genuine *emunah*.

It follows that the *emunah* of Judaic man crystallizes not at the beginning, but at the end, of a process of observation and experience informed by rational contemplation, a process that results in clear-eyed and unwavering conviction and confidence. (See Exod. 14:31, 19:4-8.) Torah Judaism begins with either inquiry or practice, one proceeding toward the other. The aim is to understand the totality of existence and to live in



accordance with the laws thereof. Hence the Torah, like scientific inquiry, must and can be tested by its internal logical consistency and by its power to elucidate history and nature.

This last statement opposes the simplistic dichotomy between reason and revelation.<sup>18</sup> What is decisive in revelation (or prophecy) and in scientific insight alike is not the subjective *process* by which the mind gains knowledge of some reality, but the linguistic *product* of that process, which alone can be communicated and tested by logical and empirical means.<sup>19</sup> Obviously the Torah is a linguistic product. And lo and behold, scientists versed in biblical Hebrew are taking a new look at that Book of Books.

For example, physicists Nathan Aviezer and Gerald Schroeder contend that the Genesis account of creation is consistent with contemporary science. In a 1990 study entitled *In the Beginning*, Dr. Aviezer writes: "Everyone with an awareness of science recognizes that there seem to be a large number of contradictions between the 'facts' as represented by scientific knowledge and the 'facts' implied by a literal reading of the first chapter of Genesis." Nevertheless, Aviezer raises the question as to whether it is possible to understand the Genesis account of creation "as a record of events that actually occurred in the past." To answer this question, he made a detailed comparison between the biblical text and current scientific knowledge and concluded that, "contrary to the widespread misconception, there is in fact remarkable agreement between many biblical passages and recently discovered scientific facts in the fields of cosmology, astronomy, geology, meteorology, paleontology, anthropology, and archaeology." Indeed, these disciplines, he shows, provide us with the opportunity to "discover new and deeper insights into numerous biblical passages that otherwise seem enigmatic. Far from being the antagonist of the book of Genesis, science has become an important tool for its understanding."<sup>20</sup>

Dr. Schroeder offers a startling example of this in *Genesis and the Big Bang*, also published in 1990. Using Einstein's equation for gravitational time dilation, he shows, "The duration and events of the billions of years that, according to cosmologists, have followed the Big Bang and those events of the first six days of Genesis are in fact one and the same."<sup>21</sup> The modern dichotomy between science and religion, or rather, between science and the Torah, has thus been placed in question by means of science itself. But this is not all.

Some seven years before the publication of Aviezer's and Schroeder's research, mathematicians and computer experts at the Technion—the Israel Institute of Technology—one of the most respected scientific institutions in the world, employed computer technology to the study of the



Torah. Based on the hypothesis that the Torah is a giant cipher, the Five Books of Moses were stored, not word by word, but letter by letter into a powerful computer. This entire continuum was scanned by skipping letters at equal intervals, and in a wide range of numbers. The objective was to search for the existence of any systematic structures, key words, or names encoded in the text in equidistant letter sequences. The findings then underwent statistical analysis to determine whether or not any positive results were merely fortuitous. These findings have been published in Doron Witztum's *The Additional Dimension*.<sup>22</sup>

The first thing to be noted is that the Technion studies discovered a profound linguistic systematicity in the Torah, suggesting that it had only one author. This contradicts, of course, the school of biblical criticism, which claims that various passages of the Torah were written by different authors at different periods and edited into their final version during or after the Babylonian exile and then canonized.<sup>23</sup> More astonishing is the claim that encoded in the text is evidence of names, concepts, and events occurring in the present era.<sup>24</sup> As a result of these and other revolutionary studies of the Torah, it has become increasingly evident to more and more members of the scientific community of Israel that the Torah is not a human product. As this understanding takes greater hold on the people of Israel, that is, as more and more people in Israel recognize the Torah as a paradigm of knowledge and of how man should live, the dichotomy of religion and secularism will be overcome. The laws of God will govern the public as well as the private domain, but in ways hitherto unknown to the bulk of mankind.

Israel will show the way to transcend democracy and politics. For it is Israel's world-historical function to reveal to mankind the example of a nation in which freedom dwells with righteousness, equality with excellence, wealth with beauty, the here and now with love of the Eternal.

# Endnotes

## Prologue

1. See Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education*, pp. 157, 159, 174, 190; Bill Moyers, "Old News and the New Civil War," *New York Times*, March 22, 1992, Op-Ed, p. 7: "The anthropologist Marvin Harris says the attack against reason and objectivity in America 'is fast reaching the proportion of a crusade. [America] urgently needs to reaffirm the principle that it is possible to carry out any analysis of social life which rational human beings recognize as true, regardless of whether they happen to be women or men, whites or blacks, straights or gays . . . ' Lacking such an understanding of social life 'we will tear the United States apart in the name of four separate realities.'"

2. Cited in D'Souza, p. 159.

3. For the influence of the university-bred doctrine of moral relativism on American foreign policy, see Paul Eidelberg, *On the Silence of the Declaration of Independence*, ch. 3; *Beyond Detente*, ch. 5. See also Paul Eidelberg and Will Morrissey, *Our Culture 'Left' or 'Right': Litt rateurs Confront Nihilism*, for diverse studies on relativism.

4. See Paul Eidelberg, "The Crisis of Our Times," *Congressional Record*, July 1, 1968, pp. E7150-E7157; "Intellectual and Moral Anarchy in American Society," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Jan. 1970, pp. 32-50; *A Discourse on Statesmanship*, ch. 11; *Beyond the Secular Mind: A Judaic Response to the Problems of Modernity*, Part I; "The Malaise of Modern Psychology," *The Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 126, No. 2 (March 1992), pp. 109-120.

5. A Gallup poll commissioned by the European Community reveals that those nations of Eastern Europe with the longest experience of Western-style democracy and market reform, such as Poland and Hungary, were the most disillusioned about the democratic developments in their countries. See *The Jerusalem Post*, Jan. 29, 1992, p. 4.

Czech President Vaclav Havel deplored the increase of crime and violence that has taken place since his country's "Velvet Revolution" replaced communism with democracy: "The return of freedom into a society of moral decay [has] brought about . . . a dazzling visible explosion of all kinds of bad human qualities." *The Jerusalem Post*, Oct. 29, 1991, p. 5.

See Roberta S. Sigel & Marilyn Hoskin (eds.), *Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Challenge for Multi-Ethnic Societies*, for the simplistic idea that democracy can solve ethnic conflict. The authors and contributors, tainted by moral relativism, seem oblivious of the ethical dimension of the problem.

6. An early version of chapter I was published under the title "The End of Ideology and the Decay of Politics," *Perspectives on Political Science*, Fall 1991,

Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 203-210. A section of chapter 2 entitled "Two-and-a-Half Types of Diplomacy" appeared in *Crossroads*, No. 33, 1991, pp. 45-55.

7. Parts of chapter 5 have appeared in the Hebrew-language journals *Nativ: Politics and the Arts*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (May 1991), pp. 46-51, and *Ha'Umma*, No. 108 (Summer 1992), pp. 399-409.

8. Chapter 9 is based on a paper presented by the author at the 1990 American Political Science Association in San Francisco.

### Chapter 1

1. Although Bell did not anticipate the New Left, socialism was very much an academic affair that ended, significantly, with the Vietnam War. Careerism, which to say, egoism, had taken the place of campus idealism.

Incidentally, polls in Spain indicate that fewer and fewer young people bother to vote in national elections. "Mammon so dominates the new Spain that in one poll 88 percent of the respondents said that all Spaniards think about is living better and making money. What was once cultural excitement has become, for many who can afford it, a hedonistic treadmill." What an interesting commentary on a Catholic country with a Socialist government! *Newsweek* (International Edition), Oct. 30, 1989, p.14.

2. Compare Machiavelli, *The Prince* (ch. 15): "... since it is my intention to write a useful thing for him who understands, it seemed to me more profitable to go behind to the effectual truth of the thing, than to the imagination thereof. And many have imagined republics and principates that have never been seen or known to be in truth; because there is such a distance between how one lives and how one should live that he who lets go of that which is done for that which ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation . . ."

3. Of course, Marx exempts himself from this conclusion. He must therefore place himself in a privileged position in history, one that has enabled him to achieve a unique and transcendent insight into the previous historicity of all human thought. This reminds me of the sign at the circus: THE LARGEST ELEPHANT IN THE WORLD EXCEPT HIMSELF TO BE SEEN HERE.

4. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 46.

5. Edward Shills, *The Academic Ethic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 3.

6. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1971, pp. 93, 285) where former President Carter's national security adviser succumbs to historicism and to Bell's view regarding the end of ideology. Noteworthy is his saying: "Yet though Stalinism *may have been* a needless tragedy for both the Russian people and communism as an ideal, there is the intellectually tantalizing possibility that for the world at large it was, as we shall see, a blessing in disguise" (p. 134 my emphasis).

Evidently, Brzezinski has changed his mind about the blessings of Stalinism. See his *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), pp. 7, 19-20, 23-27, 44, 237-242. After condemning Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Union for the enormous suffering inflicted upon countless millions of people, in the end, Brzezinski relapses into relativism (p. 251).

For a critique of historicism, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Rights and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) ch. 1.

7. See Harvey Mansfield, Jr., *Statesmanship and Party Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 1.

8. See Robert Loewenberg, "The Manipulative Powers of Journalism," *Scholarly Review* (December 1982), p. 12.

9. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946)

p. 84. For a refutation of Weber, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, ch. 2.

10. See David Edwards, *The American Political Experience* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 4th ed., p. 373. "At least 1000 federal, state, and local officials were convicted on federal corruption charges in the years from 1970 to 1975, and the rate has risen since then."

11. Some ten years after Bell published *The End of Ideology*, Theodore Lowi published *The End of Liberalism*, which also focuses on the United States, liberalism's paradise. "Interest-group liberalism," he writes, "combines all the worst traits of pluralistic society." "Pluralistic, bargain-oriented politics" undermines the rule of law and offers no more than "increments of justice." Such is the influence of interest groups on government that it cannot formulate and execute comprehensive, coherent, and long-range policies. Interest-group liberalism thus prevents the articulation of any public philosophy, one that fosters national solidarity or a sense of national purpose.

Consistent therewith, former Vice President Walter Mondale is reported as having said during the 1992 American presidential primary campaigns that in his long political career he had never seen the public so disgusted with politics and politicians (*New York Times*, April 12, 1992, p. E1). Meanwhile, seven senators and more than forty-five representatives (several with safe seats) announced they would not seek reelection, and many cited "disillusionment with a political system that accomplishes so little of value" (ibid., April 19, 1992, p. E1).

See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Season of Voter Discontent in Europe Too," *The Jewish Press*, April 17, 1992, p. M1.

12. A National Institute of Mental Health study indicates that one out of every five adult Americans suffers from some mental disorder. This compares with an estimated rate of one-in-ten in the 1960s and one-in-twenty in the 1940s. See Paul Eidelberg, "The Malaise of Modern Psychology," *The Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 126, No. 2 (March 1992), pp. 109-120.

Regarding crime, Edwards reports that "The median sentence served for murder is less than six years, while the median term served by all inmates [convicted of serious crimes] is only 16 months. . . . The fact is that only about a third of all serious crimes



(murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny over \$50, and auto theft) are ever even reported to the police by the victims. Of all serious crimes reported, in only 19 percent of the cases is a suspect ever arrested, although the figure can go as high as 78 percent for murder. Only half of all suspects arrested are ever convicted. And only about a quarter of those convicted actually do time for their crime" (p.373). Also, "A congressional subcommittee investigating violence in the public schools in the 1970s found that 10,000 rapes occur every year in schools—many of them rapes of female teachers" (p. 372).

13. See Mansfield, pp. 4-6.

14. See R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926), chs. 2-4, *passim.*, and see Weber, cited earlier. It should be noted that for Hobbes, "covetousness" is not a vice.

15. Winston S. Churchill, *Marlborough* (4 vols.; New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1968), I, 13-14, H.S. Commager, ed.)

16. Moral relativism is transparent in the late Associate Justice of the Supreme Court William O. Douglas' dissenting opinion in the *Ginzburg* case involving obscene publications: "I do not think it is permissible to draw lines between the 'good' and the 'bad' and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone." "Government," he continued, "does not sit to reveal where the 'truth' is." Moreover, masochists and homosexuals are nothing more than "somewhat offbeat, non-conformist and odd." Their desires are just as legitimate as those of "normal" people. To prefer the mode of life of one to that of another is merely a matter of personal "taste." *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 489, 491, 492 (1966). Douglas' dissenting opinion has become the position of the Court. See my "Intellectual and Moral Anarchy in American Society," *The Review of Politics*, 32:1 (Jan. 1970), pp.32-33.

17. *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 4. See my refutation in "Brzezinski: A Case Study of Political Anemia," *Intercollegiate Review*, Winter 1985-86, p. 18: "No great wisdom is required to see that America's cardinal virtues, freedom and equality, are sources of strength as well as of weakness. Hence, once cannot provide an adequate analysis of a nation's political power without discussing its virtues and vices." Moreover, given the corrosive influence of Brzezinski's moral relativism, it would have to be included among America's various weaknesses.

18. Yair Evron, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 9.

19. See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. (2 vols.; New York: Vintage Books, 1945), II, 90-93, 104.

20. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 46, 161.

21. Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 35, 36-37.

## Chapter 2

1. See J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power*, p. 5.

2. Cited in Frederic S. Pearson & J. Martin Rochester, *International Relations*, p. 252.

3. Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East*, p. 277 (cited hereafter as *Minorities*).

4. It should be noted that such concepts as "secular" and "religious" are foreign to traditional, by which I mean Orthodox, Judaism. The eminent Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch has written:

People thoughtlessly choose to include what they so unfittingly call "the Jewish Religion" in the category of religions generally, as being also a kind of religion, and then afterwards they are surprised to find so much within the purview of this "religion" which lies outside the sphere of ordinary "religions." . . . In Judaism we do find also what is generally understood by religion, but the idea of Judaism is something infinitely broader and different. In "religions," God has only temples, churches, priesthoods, congregations, etc. . . . But [in Judaism] God founds not a Church, but a Nation, a whole national way of life . . .

*Commentary on the Pentateuch*, II, 68 (cited hereafter as *Hirsch* and by chapter and verse). See also his *Judaism Eternal*, I, 89-90.

5. For some opinions of Herzl's Zionism, see Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, p. 88; Arthur Ruppin, *Memoirs, Diaries, Letters*, p. 244.

6. See Paul Goodman (ed.), *The Jewish National Home*, pp. 47-49.

7. See Yehuda Elizur, "Eretz Israel: The Biblical Concept," in Avner Tomaschoff (ed.), *Whose Homeland*, pp. 92-96; Nosson Scherman and Meir Zlotowitz (eds.), *Bereshis* (Genesis), II, 406-415.

8. See Nisan, *Minorities*, pp. 224-225.

9. Raphael Patai (ed.), *Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, p. 88. The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Mordechai Nisan for the references to the Zionist leaders mentioned in this paragraph. See his *Toward a New Israel: The Jewish State and the Arab Question*, pp. 135-139.

10. See Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, pp. 122-123 (revised version of the Hebrew edition published in 1964 with preface by Martin Buber), who contends that the Balfour Declaration was an instrument of British foreign policy in World War I. Its primary purpose was to entice influential American Zionists to persuade the United States to come into the war on the side of the Allies. For a contrary view, see Weizmann, p. 177. On January 28, 1919, a rally of Arab notables was held in Jerusalem and proclaimed: "Palestine is part of Syria, and the Arabs of Palestine are part of the Arab nation." Cohen, p. 147. See Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.), *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict* (cited hereafter as Ben-Dor): "The tension between nationalism in the sense of loyalty to a single nation state (*wataniyya*—literally 'patriotism') on the one hand, and Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*) espousing pan-Arabism, the oneness of the Arab nation, Arab unity and the pursuit of political goals common to all Arabs, on the other hand, has been unquestionably one of the key

themes in recent Arab political history" (p. 143). Syria's and Lebanon's modern state-system was formed in 1920, Transjordan's and Iraq's in 1921, Egypt's in 1922, and Saudi Arabia's in 1925.

11. See Martin Buber, *Israel and the World*, p. 247.

12. Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266:3 (Sept. 1990), p. 48 *et passim*, for a brilliant and somewhat sympathetic analysis of Islam's profound hatred of the West, especially of America.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

14. See Cohen, p. 224. Arab life-expectancy increased to 72 years in the mid-1980s. In contrast, the Jewish population in 1922 was only 84,000 but exceeded 650,000 in 1947 largely as a consequence of immigration.

15. This and the following paragraph are largely indebted to Nisan, *Minorities*, pp. 226-227.

16. Cited in Cohen, p. 229.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 446. See Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, Book 1.

18. David Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs*, pp. 18-9, 112, and contrast p. 120 where he professes belief in the God of Jeremiah and Elijah—as if these prophets (like the sages of the Talmud), who certainly believed in the God of Moses, were either fools or frauds. This depreciation is implied by the German Bible critics as well as by their followers. Consider, however, the following:

Computer experts at the Israel Institute of Technology (the Technion), as well as in other academic institutions in Israel, have discovered a profound linguistic systematicity in the Book of Genesis, indicating that it had only one author. My colleague, Dr. Moshe Katz, who participated in the Technion program, has published (in Hebrew) his own computer studies, the results of which will astonish the most thick-skinned skeptic. See my forthcoming book, *Judaic Man*, ch. 10.

19. Unlike the secular Zionists, Arab nationalists, even if they were secularists, did not divorce nationalism from Islam, not even to the extent Turkey had done. It should also be noted that Martin Buber, though far from being an Orthodox Jew—he married a gentile—regarded the nationalism of the secular Zionists as "shallow." He writes: "Israel is not a nation like other nations . . . Israel is a people like no other, for it is the only people in the world which, from its earliest beginnings, has been both a nation and a religious community. . . . [I]t is this unity which enabled it to survive in an exile no other nation had to suffer, an exile which lasted much longer than the period of its independence. He who severs this bond severs the life of Israel." *Israel and the World*, pp. 248-249. One should not construe this to mean that Buber regarded Israel as superior to any other nation.

20. See Weizmann, p. 176.

21. The document's peroration does mention the "Rock" of Israel, an allusion to God. Also to be noted is that Theodor Herzl, the only name mentioned in the document, is referred to as the "spiritual father" of Zionism.

22. Adapted from Hirsch, Exod. 6:7



23. See Nisan, *Minorities*, pp. 7-11. Consider, too, Egypt's Coptic Christians and the Christians of Sudan. Incidentally, some of the customs of the Kurds, Baluch, and Berbers suggest not only a Jewish influence, but a Jewish origin. See *Ibid.*, pp. 240-243.

24. David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, p. 151.

25. *Israel and the World*, p. 223. Buber's historicism is obscured by his apparent identification with the "Old Testament." According to Buber, the Torah teaches man to correlate the living present with "origin and goal." This involves a "decision" of the individual unguided by any permanent "laws" (*ibid.*, p.95). Here Buber tacitly denies the immutability of the Oral Law. This is the position of the nineteenth-century Reform Movement as articulated, for example, by Heinrich Graetz. For a thorough and meticulous refutation of Graetz, see Samson Raphael Hirsch, *The Origin of the Oral Law, Collected Writings*, Vol.5. For a further critique, see my *Beyond the Secular Mind*, ch. 4 *passim*, esp. p. 61n 11.

26. See *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, pp. 367-370, 374-383, regarding the Sinai, El Arish, Egypt, Cyprus, Australia, and Uganda as possible locations for a Jewish homeland.

27. See *Arab-Jewish Unity: Testimony before the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission for the Ihud (Unity) Association* by Judah Magnes and Martin Buber, pp. 12-14, 50. See also Martin Buber (ed.), *Towards Union in Palestine*, pp. 7-21.

28. Friederich Nietzsche, *The Dawn of Day*, pp. 203-206.

29. See D.F. Green, *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel*; Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*; Bernard Lewis, *Semites & Anti-Semites*, ch. 8 *passim*.

30. Vladimir Jabotinski, *The Jewish War Front*, p. 217. "The Hebrew and Arabic language," he also wrote, "shall enjoy equal rights and equal legal validity."

31. See Mordechai Nisan, *Israel and the Territories*, p. 7; Buber, *Israel and the World*, p. 263.

32. Eitan Haber, *The Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 28, 1990, p. 4. Weizman, elected Israel's president in 1993 by a Labor-dominated Knesset, had once been a "hawk."

33. See Nisan, *Israel and the Territories*, pp. 4, 13.

34. See *Ibid.*, pp. 59-80; Mordechai Nisan, "The Search for an Israeli Ethos," *Global Affairs* (Summer 1987), pp. 147-148.

### Chapter 3

1. Richard Pipes, *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Detente* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 36.

2. See Samuel Katz, *Battleground, Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), pp. 187-188.

3. See Henry Kissinger's book, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), 1054.

4. Katz, p. 188.

5. Quoted in Katz, *The Hollow Peace* (Jerusalem: Dvir, 1981), pp. 231-232.



6. Mordechai Nisan, unpublished essay, "Civilization and Identity." For the reference to Lewis, see *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), p. 300.

7. Cited in Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, p. 97. See also Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," pp. 48-60.

8. See Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*. (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 55.

9. Quoted more fully in Ronald Nettler, "Muslim Scholars on Peace with Israel," *Midstream*, Nov. 1980, p. 15.

10. Even while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak continued Sadat's policy of encouraging Jew-hatred, Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Arens praised Mubarak as genuinely committed to the peace process—a nice way to disarm one's own people.

11. To appreciate the scope and significance of Egypt's violations of its treaty with Israel, see Mordechai Nisan, "The Moment of Truth," *Midstream*, Dec. 1981, pp. 12-18, and his more recent essay, "The Camp David Legacy," pp. 107-114.

12. *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), April 16, 1980. See my *Sadat's Strategy*, pp. 78-80, for more explicit statements of Sadat's objectives vis-a-vis Israel.

13. For Mubarak's statement, see *Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 10, 1984, p. 8. For Numeiri's statement, see Yosef Goell, "The Illusion of Peace," *The Jerusalem Post*, Oct. 20, 1984. As Goell notes: "[Numeiri] is justly considered to be an important spokesman for the 'moderate' [really the pragmatic] camp in the Arab world on the issue of the attitude towards Israel. As an ally . . . of Egypt, Numeiri often says openly what the Egyptians are thinking but prefer not to say . . ."

14. See *The Jerusalem Post*, Feb. 1, 1987, p. 4.

15. *Teheran Times*, October 23, 1991.

16. *Jerusalem Post*, April 14, 1992.

17. *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, Aug. 5, 1977, p. 5.

18. See Charles B. Perkins, *The Arab Military Buildup Since 1973* (Washington, D.C.: American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1989).

19. The UAR disintegrated in 1961. The following year, when a civil war broke out in Yemen, Nasser dispatched tens of thousands of troops to that country. His ultimate target was oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Incidentally, the Egyptians used poison gas in that Arab imbroglio.

20. See Mordechai Nisan, "The PLO and the Palestinian Issue," *Middle East Review*, 18:2 (Winter 1985/86): "In its original 1964 formulation the PLO Covenant conveyed the Palestinian national identity through the term *qawmi* in order to stress the linkage between the Palestinians and the Arab world as a whole. In 1986 the pan-Arab *qawmi* term was replaced by the national territorial one of *watani*." This change was a consequence of the June 1967 war, when Israel gained control of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. But as we shall presently see, the role of the PLO extends far beyond the Palestinian-*watani* objective.

21. See Shlomo Avineri (ed.), *Israel and the Palestinians*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 13.

22. See Dan Nimrod, "Inflation and the Refugee Problem," *The Jerusalem Post*, May 11, 1992, p. 6, which shows how the PLO inflates the number of "Palestinian" refugees. The Palestinian Arabs inflate their number to six million, perhaps to evoke in the public the idea of the six million Jews who perished in the Nazi Holocaust. See Adam Garfinkie, "Israeli and Palestinian Proposals for the West Bank," *Orbis*, Summer 1992, p. 436.

The number of 4.5 million "Palestinians" is purveyed by Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinian People," in A.R. Norton and M.H. Greenberg (eds.), *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization* (Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p.66.

Incidentally, Khalidi, a professor of Middle East History at the University of Chicago, is typical of Arab propagandists teaching in prestigious American universities. Consider his views on the intifada: "According to the *al-Fajr* poll taken before the uprising began in December 1987, 47.5% of those questioned, had been subject to administrative detention, that is without trial, 50.7% had been beaten or threatened by the authorities, 57.7% had been maltreated by Israeli soldiers, 22.8% had had property confiscated, and 37.6% had been fined or punished by military courts" (pp.70-71).

The Oxford-educated Khalidi neglects to say that *al-Fajr* is a PLO organ. Moreover, even if the poll were not a fabrication, for which that Arab newspaper is notorious. Khalidi would have us believe that the Arabs in question were innocent lambs, that none had committed any crimes against Israeli soldiers and civilians during the twenty years preceding the date of the poll. Yet he refers to another *al-Fajr* poll which indicated that 77.9% of the Arabs were for a state in all of Palestine, which means that four out of five wished to see Israel erased from the map of the Middle East (*ibid.*, p.65)!

To compound his obscurantism, Khalidi tries to portray the Arabs as moderates who, when "Asked whether bomb attacks on civilian airliners were justified, 79.3% replied negatively" (*ibid.*). It thus appears that 20.7% were not opposed to blowing up civilian airliners. This being the case, how might the 79.3% (privately) feel about the knifing of Jewish civilians? See chapter 6 below on Arab veracity.

23. See Mordechai Nisan, "The Palestinian Features of Jordan," in Daniel Elazar (ed.), *Judea, Samaria, and Gaza*. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 204. For a contrary view, see John E. Hoffman & Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "The Palestinian Identity and Israel's Arabs," in Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.), *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict*, pp. 215-222.

24. See Raphael Israeli (ed.), *The PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1983), pp. 182-185; Neil C. Livingston & David Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), pp. 72-79, 289-294.

25. Cited in Mordechai Nisan, "Islam and Ideologies in the Twentieth-Century Middle East," *Crossroads*, No. 31, p. 57. See also Nisan, "The Camp David Legacy," pp. 107-113.

26. See Dan Schueftan, "Inter-Arab Relations," in Ben-Dor, pp. 129-141, 143-163. Contrast Livingston and Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (p. 42), who regard the PLO as more independent than I have suggested.

27. December 18, 1988, *Al-Siyassa*, Kuwait daily.

28. March 6, 1989, Qatar News Agency.

29. April 5, 1989, BBC Arabic service.

30. June 9, 1989, "Voice of the Mountain," Radio, Lebanon.

31. See *ibid.*, pp. 102, 290, 294.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 133, 279-288.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 121.

34. I have especially in mind Professor Moshe Sharon, who was Prime Minister Begin's advisor on Arab affairs, as well as Mr. Shmuel Katz, who served as Mr. Begin's information advisor. Both advisors eventually resigned out of frustration.

The present writer was perhaps the first to caution the government about Anwar Sadat's intentions even before the Egyptian dictator arrived in Israel in November 1977. In any event, in September 1978, two days before Menachem Begin flew to the United States for his historic meeting at Camp David with President Jimmy Carter and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, I told the Prime Minister that I was in the process of writing a book that would expose Sadat's two-stage strategy. The first stage was to maneuver Israel back to its pre-1967 borders with the avuncular assistance of the United States. The second stage was to undo Israel's War of Independence. After a remark of mine concerning Sadat's cunning, Mr. Begin said, gesticulating with his hand—and these are his exact words: "Sadat will stab me in the back!" I did not grasp the full meaning of this statement until I read Katz, *The Hollow Peace*, pp. 235-236.

Five other academics were present at that meeting, including my colleague Professor Harold Fisch of Bar Ilan University and Dr. Ze'ev Perlman of the Technion. The book I was then writing, *Sadat's Strategy*, was published in June 1979. The Hebrew version was published earlier, in December 1978.

35. Consulted by the political advisor of one of Israel's former Defense Ministers, the present writer was told: "We just can't lie as well as the Arabs." To which I replied: "But Israel's greatest weapon is the truth!"

Of course the truth must be repeatedly enunciated, above all by Israel's Prime Minister. The most important audience is the people of Israel, followed by the Americans.

There is an abundance of evidence showing how the PLO strategy of phases is merely a replay of Anwar Sadat's. See, for example, Aryeh Y. Yodfat & Yuval Amnon-Ohanna, *PLO Strategy and Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 61-65, and, more recently, Livingston and Halevy, *Inside the PLO*, pp. 290, 294.

36. See Golda Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1973), p. 451, where Israel's then prime minister did not deem it unwise to designate Judea and Samaria as the "West Bank"—this, in America's most prestigious quarterly.



37. Furthermore, the document stipulates that "Egypt, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects" (emphasis added).

38. Two religious parties, SHAS and Degel HaTorah, ostensibly advocate the policy of "territory for peace," but only on the condition that Israel's withdrawal from Judea and Samaria would prevent the shedding of Jewish blood. Former Chief Sephardi Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual leader of SHAS, has advanced this position, but has also admitted that "all of the Arabs want to destroy Israel," and that the possibility of Arab-Jewish coexistence is "an illusion." See *The Jewish Press*, Dec. 22, 1988, p. 64. Meanwhile, the policy of "territory for peace" is opposed by various members of the other religious parties, as well as by Israel's current Chief Rabbis.

39. See Israel Eldad, *The Jewish Revolution* (New York: Shengold Publishers, 1971), chs. 12-14.

40. Yigal Allon held that controlling Judea and Samaria and not offering Israeli citizenship to the local inhabitants "is an immoral and repulsive model that no member of the Labor Party would support." Cited in Nisan, *Israel and the Territories*, p. 63.

41. The demographic impact of the great immigration of Jews to Israel from the Soviet Union (400,000 in 1990-1991) should not be exaggerated. The large number of old people in this aliya indicates that it will not reproduce itself in the next generation. Besides, only a minute fraction of these Jews from Russia have settled in Judea and Samaria.

42. See my "Foundations of the State of Israel: An Analysis of Israel's Declaration of Independence," *Judaism* (Fall 1987), pp. 391-399, first published in the Hebrew-language quarterly *The Nation*, No. 83/84 (1986).

43. For a prominent example of an Israeli relativist, see the following writings of Harkabi: *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, p. 473; *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, p. 39; *Israel's Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), p. 179 (where Harkabi has the audacity to attribute relativism to the sages of Judaism).

44. Quoted in *The Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 14, 1990, p. 6.

45. Gil AlRoy, *Behind the Middle East Conflict*. (New York: Capricorn Book, 1975), pp. 93, 106-108; Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, p. 132; John Laffin, *The Arab Mind Considered* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1975), p. 60; Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), chs. 3, 4, 9 *passim*.

46. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 361.

47. The following analysis is based partly on a lecture delivered by Dr. Mordechai Nisan of the Hebrew University at The New Leadership Academy in Jerusalem, Jan. 1, 1990.

48. Hasannin Haykal, a former editor of *al-Ahram* (and a confidant of the late Anwar Sadat) has written: "Israelis and Americans have always been at fault in approaching situations in what they believe to be a strictly pragmatic way. They have dealt only with what they could see, concentrating on the present to the almost total exclusion of the past. How often in talks with Rogers, Kissinger, Sisco, and others



has Egypt heard Americans say, in effect, 'We're not interested in raking over the past: Let's look at the situation as it is today.' But today's situation," Haykal reminds his readers, "is the creation of yesterday."

Contrast Sadat. In an interview with *al-Anwar* on June 22, 1975, the Egyptian president declared that "The effort of our generation is to return to the 1967 borders. Afterward the next generation will carry the responsibility." See Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, p. 55. (The Druse regard forty years as too short a period for revenge.) And given their loyalty to the group, they are religiously bound to wreak vengeance against those who have slighted the honor of any Muslim. (It is in this light that we are able to understand the Yom Kippur War.)

49. See Armando Valladares, *Against All Hope: The Prison Memoirs of Armando Valladares* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985) who claims that after 1961, "never again did the Catholic Church in Cuba raise its voice against the crimes and tortures or demand that the firing squads be abolished. During that time it was not only a silent Church, but something much worse, a Church in complicity." As quoted in *Commentary*, Aug. 1986, p. 58.

50. Elie Wiesel, *A Jew Today*. (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 11. For an answer to Wiesel's questions, see my *Beyond the Secular Mind*, pp. 34-36.

51. See Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1990), p. 36. For Pacepa's account of Nicolae Ceausescu's contribution to PLO duplicity, see pp. 25-28, 33-34, 166-167.

52. Raphael Israeli, "Can the West Lead Peace Efforts in the Middle East?" *Crossroads*, No. 34, 1991, pp. 78-79.

53. See Ben-Dor, p. 304.

#### Chapter Four

1. See Shlomo Avineri (ed.), *Israel and the Palestinians*.

2. Egyptian President Nasser declared that "the road to the liberation of Palestine is strewn not with roses but blood." Syrian President Hafez Assad hurled this threat at the Jewish state: "We shall never call for, or accept peace. We shall only accept war and the restoration of our usurped land. We have resolved to drench this land with our blood, to oust you aggressors and throw you into the sea for good." Meanwhile, King Hussein of Jordan urged Arabs to "kill Jews wherever you find them, kill them with your hands, with your nails and teeth." Cited in Laffin, *Fedayeen*, p. 173.

3. Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 349.

4. It may be objected that Jews who oppose the policy of "territory for peace" are land-lovers more than peace-lovers. The objection is specious. For Jewish opponents of "territory for peace" contend that this policy will eventually lead to war, a war, moreover, that would place Israel at a grave, geostrategic disadvantage.

5. Kissinger, *ibid.*, p. 346.

6. See Lawrence W. Beilenson, *The Treaty Trap*, pp. 198-200, 208-221, *passim*.

7. Irving Moscowitz, "You Can't Give Away Someone Else's Land, *The Jewish Press*, Nov. 22, 1991.

8. It should be noted that there is a religious obligation for Jews to live in Eretz Israel. See *Torat Eretz Yisrael: The Teachings of HaRav Tzvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook*, pp. 155-164, 233-239. Incidentally, the founders of renewed Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, of Gush Emunim, were the students of Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook (p. 155).

9. See Herzog, pp. 189-190. The future president of Israel gives special praise to the Israel Air Force and comments on the mistakes of Israel's enemies in what he calls "A Vindication" of the Six Day War.

10. See *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Part I, Ch. xxii, pp. 389-391 (italics added).

11. Cited in Nisan, *Toward a New Israel*, p. 140.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Israel's superb air force, it was understood, could help protect NATO's southern flank in the eastern Mediterranean. It could also prevent the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet from using the Suez Canal as a short cut to the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. It was not until after 1970, when Israel, at the behest of Washington, prevented Syria from overrunning Jordan, that the United States offered Israel significant loans and became its primary military supplier.

15. See Laffin, *Fedayeen*, p. 80, for Egypt's use or abuse of Gaza.

16. See Nisan, "The Palestinian Features of Jordan," pp. 195, 204; *Toward a New Israel*, pp. 146-148. In its proposed "Interim Self-Governing Authority" of March 3, 1992, the Arab Palestinian delegation at the March 3, 1992 Washington peace conference declared: "Throughout the centuries, Palestine has been the cradle where our people's identity was shaped, the homeland of its collective soul. The attachment of the people of Palestine to the land of Palestine is a permanent feature of their ancient as well as contemporary history." See Garfinkle, p. 436 on Arab mendacity.

17. Cited in M.D. Gouldman, *Israel Nationality Law*, p. 19.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 41.

19. Recall that in the Sinai campaign, which began at the end of October 1956, Ben-Gurion, despite American pressure, did not withdraw from the Sinai until March the following year. And it could be argued that he never had to withdraw, if only because, at the time, France was Israel's military supplier.

20. See Mordechai Gazit, "Israeli Military Procurement from the United States," in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *Dynamics of Dependence*, pp. 83-85. Gazit's study is obsolete. With a growth rate of 6% in 1991, Israel ranked fourth among industrialized states (just behind South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). As a consequence, the \$1.8 billion Israel annually received from the U.S. in military aid dropped from 7.4% of its GNP in 1986 to 3% in 1991. See Arie Stav and Ezra Zohar,

"The Economy of Israel 1986-1991: General Trends," *Nativ Center for Policy Research*, No. 4, May 1992.

21. *The Jerusalem Post* (Magazine Section), August 5, 1977, p. 6.

22. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 5, 1992, p. 5a (italics added).

23. See Evron, *The Middle East*, p. 84, who writes: "On the whole, the initial position [of the Labor Party] after the war tended to favor a complete withdrawal except from Jerusalem and possibly the Golan Heights."

24. On the inapplicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see the statements of Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, Yehuda Z. Blum, to the U.N. Security Council (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), March 13, 19, 1979 (not paginated). For a more recent statement of Professor Blum, see *The Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 28, 1990, p. 7.

25. See *The Israel Section of the International Commission of Jurists*, "The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by Israel," (Tel Aviv, TZATZ, 1981), pp. 40-41.

26. See *ibid.*, pp. 68-71, 76-79.

27. See Sammy Khalil Mar'i, "Higher Education Among Palestinians With Special Reference to the West Bank," in Ben-Dor, pp. 446-447.

28. Nevertheless, one Arab commentator acknowledged that "The Arabs feel, not only that they live better than before 1967, but say also that they will not choose to live again under a dictatorship after having experienced the liberal Israeli regime." Cited in Nisan, *Israel and the Territories*, p. 119.

29. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 89.

30. *The Book of Morals and Conduct*, cited in Bernard Lewis, "Friends and Enemies," *Encounter* (Feb. 1968), p. 3.

31. See Dan Peretz, "Palestinian Social Stratification—The Political Implication," in Ben-Dor, p. 424.

32. See Yehuda Zvi Blum, "The Judicial Status of Jerusalem," *The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1974).

33. See Yitzhak Shamir, "Israel at 40: Looking Back, Looking Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 66:3 (1987/88), p. 581.

34. See Katz, *The Jerusalem Post*, September 15, 1993, p. 6.

### Chapter Five

1. Richard B. Bentall (ed.), *Reconstructing Schizophrenia*, pp. xiii, xv, 24, 284. See also D. G. Garan, *Our Sciences Ruled by Human Prejudice*, pp. 119-122; Daniel R. Weinberger and Richard Jed Wyatt, "Structural Brain Abnormalities in Chronic Schizophrenia: Computed Tomography Findings," in Claude F. Baxter and Theodore Melnechuk (eds.), *Perspectives in Schizophrenia Research*: "One of the oldest issues in schizophrenia research is whether the brains of schizophrenic patients are morphologically different from the brains of normal individuals. Despite 70 years of research, the question remains unresolved" (pp. 29-30); Joseph Zubin, "Chronic

Schizophrenia from the Standpoint of Vulnerability," (ibid): "Despite the notable advances made with each of these models [genetic, internal environment, neurophysiological, ecological, developmental, learning theory], we have not yet found any necessary or sufficient causes for schizophrenia" (277). Even of those psychiatrists who regard schizophrenia as a neurological disorder or brain deficit, few claim that its causes are known (24, 229).

2. Ibid., pp. 91, 161, 169.

3. Ibid., p. 61.

4. Ibid., p. 63.

5. David Shakow, *Adaptation in Schizophrenia: The Theory of Segmental Set*, p. 67. Shakow cites Freud: "Protection against stimuli is an almost more important function of the living organism than reception of stimuli" (ibid., pp. 8-9).

6. Bentall, p. 66.

7. Bentall, pp. 83, 93, 286.

8. Ibid., pp. 244, 274.

9. In D. Kemali *et al.* (eds.), *Schizophrenia Today*, pp. 211-232. For a fuller analysis, see Ignacio Matte-Blanco, *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets*, ch. 2 *et passim*.

10. Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 30-31.

11. See Ignacio Matte-Blanco, *Thinking, Feeling, and Being*, p. 7.

12. Ibid., p. 213.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., pp. 213-214.

15. Ibid., p. 214.

16. Ibid., p. 219.

17. Ibid., p. 220.

18. Ibid., p. 224

19. Ibid., p. 224-225.

20. Ibid., p. 223.

21. That the Arabs won Western sympathy rather than revulsion by endangering their own women and children was never seen or exposed by the government of Israel as an example of the West's dubious moral standards.

This insouciance or silence of the government persisted even after the West excoriated Saddam Hussein for using foreign nationals as a "human shield" to deter an attack on Iraq's military installations. For example, in August 1990, then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher scornfully condemned Saddam for having "hidden behind the skirts of women and children." But inasmuch Hussein hid behind foreign nationals, the government of Israel might have all the more justly denounced and taunted the leaders of the intifada for hiding behind the skirts of their own women and children.

No government spokesman was heard saying: "Some critics of Israel have adopted a curious set of moral standards. On the one hand, for Saddam Hussein to use American women and children to inhibit American forces is deemed cowardly and



barbaric. But for the leaders of the intifada to use Arab women and children to inhibit Israeli forces is deemed heroic."

22. The same thing happened in 1982, when the government allowed hundreds of foreign journalists to cover the Peace for Galilee operation in Lebanon. Israel was portrayed as having committed "genocide." See Edward Alexander, "Israel and the News Media," in Robert Loewenberg and Edward Alexander (eds.), *The Israeli Fate of Jewish Liberalism*, pp. 47-58; Stephen Karetzky, *The Canons of Journalism: The New York Times Propaganda War Against Israel*; Yedidya Atlas, "Israel Bashing and the Media," *Nativ: A Journal of Politics and the Arts*, 1:1 (English edition), 1990, pp. 26-32.

23. See Yisrael Harel, "People Against the Media," *The Jerusalem Report*, Nov. 29, 1990, p. 56, who writes:

The roots of the widespread, almost general hatred of the media in Israel seems to be that the press has in recent years divorced itself from the national, Zionist aspirations and consensus . . . In the eyes of many Israelis—apparently the majority—the media, and the state-run electronic media in particular, no longer represent the national interest. More and more Israelis . . . agree that the Israeli media are more sympathetic to some PLO leaders in Jerusalem than to, say MK Rehavam Ze'evi (Moledet) and Rabbi Moshe Levinger of Hebron . . .

In recent years, and especially since the outbreak of the intifada, the PLO has succeeded in carving out a propaganda route directly to the Israeli public. The means: Israel TV's (monopolistic) newscasts. All kinds of flagrant propaganda gimmicks of PLO leaders, particularly Arafat, get favorable, broad coverage, and in some instances sympathetic commentary to boot. The PLO has learned to exploit this.

24. On August 12, 1990, ten days after the Iraqi invasion of Muslim Kuwait, *Al-Fajr* published the following letter of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Saad Al-Din Al-Alam, to Saddam Hussein: "From the God-favored Al-Aqsa Mosque . . . and in the name of the Muslim world and Muslim religious law, we call on you to drive the contamination of the U.S. armed forces and their helpers out of the Arabian Peninsula. May you purge these sanctified Muslim lands of the American armed forces . . . May God help you against your enemies and the enemies of Islam and Muslims. All the Muslim peoples are behind you . . ." The editor of *Al-Fajr*, Hanna Siniora, is one of the top leaders of the intifada.

The following are some front-page headlines that appeared in Jerusalem's Arab press after the outbreak of the Gulf War:

- "Helplessness and depression in Washington as lies about war are revealed." Another front-page headline calls on Arabs not to be neutral when the multinational forces bomb Arab land, and urges them to act against regimes like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco.

- "Iraq stands fast despite bombings of aggressor"; "Israel investigates Patriot failure," and "American and British in Saudi Arabia want out."

•“America sinks in the Gulf War.” The front page also featured casualty figures according to Iraqi releases: 160 Coalition planes down, etc. See *The Jerusalem Post*, February 1, 1991, p. 11.

25. See Nisan, *Toward a New Israel*, p. 120.

26. See Yehuda Aharoni, “An End to the Intifada Revelry,” *The Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 4, 1990, p. 4. Aharoni is the pen name of a career officer of the Israeli Defense Forces. A complex maze of rules and regulations govern the use of different types of firearms against the Arabs in question. “Unfortunately, by the time a soldier or police officer decides whether he’s legally entitled to rubber bullets, plastic bullets, live bullets, or just run away, he might as well be dead.”

27. See *Nativ: A Journal of Politics and the Arts*, 6:2 (March 1993), p. 25 (Hebrew). The libertarianism of Israel’s Supreme Court encourages Arabs to test the limits of the law by subtle and not-so-subtle forms of insurrection.

The same may be said of Arab newspapers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which are subject to the liberal censorship system with which all Israeli newspapers must comply. PLO newspapers frequently refrain from submitting articles to censorship prior to publication, knowing they would suffer nothing worse than a one- or two-week suspension. Given such leniency, these newspapers have published headlines encouraging Arab terrorism and calling for “armed struggle” against the Jewish state. And since acts of the military commanders in the “administered areas” are subject to judicial review, the libertarianism of the Supreme Court renders it almost impossible to deter Arab violence.

Such judicial manifestations of permissive subversion—others will appear presently—indicates that we are dealing here with a national pathology and not merely with some random instances of obtuseness on the part of Israeli politicians.

28. See Ze’ev Chafetz, *Heroes & Hustlers, Hard Hats & Holy Men*, pp. 245-246. The broadcast was staged to counter Rabbi Meir Kahane’s influence in the army. He had just recently been elected to the Knesset with the help of the soldier vote.

Like the media in general, Israel’s Army Radio is dominated by the leftwing. Yisrael Harel (in the above cited article) writes: “Listeners to Army Radio sometimes wonder which army it represents—and similar opinions have been voiced in the past by chiefs of staff and defense ministers. When the previous Chief of Staff, Moshe Levy, tried to do away with the station’s newscasts and newsreels, he was savaged by the entire Israel media; that dauntless paratrooper was forced to retreat.”

29. Gil Carl Alroy, “Zionist Attitudes Towards the Arabs in Palestine,” in Ben-Dor, pp. 120-121.

30. Nisan, *Toward a New Israel*, p. 32.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

32. See Buber, *Israel and the World*, p. 257, who writes: “But he who will serve the spirit . . . must seek to free the blocked path to an understanding with the Arab peoples.”

Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, pp. 65-69, 141, 536-547, minimizes Islamic hatred of Israel and concludes by favoring the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state as a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict.

Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," concludes an otherwise masterly analysis of Islamic hostility toward Western civilization and America by saying: "... we must strive to achieve a better appreciation of other religions and political cultures, through study of their history, their literature, and their achievements" (p.60). This statement obscures the issue of whether Islam contains any principles which are false or vicious. Apparently, it is beyond the domain of objectivity for a scholar of Lewis' reputation to address himself to this issue.

33. *The Jerusalem Post*, November 1 & 3, 1993.

34. See Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, which is dedicated "To the victims of this conflict--Jews and Arabs." Professor Harkabi's more recent book, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (1988), is dedicated "To the victims of their leaders—Jews and Arabs." More on Harkabi in chapter 6.

35. In an article entitled "Maudlin Madness" (*The Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 1985), the present writer declared:

Defending the government's decision... Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin emphasized his responsibility for the welfare of Israel's soldiers, including those held in captivity. What he seems to have forgotten, however, is that the foremost duty of [Israel's] soldiers is to protect the civilian population, which is precisely why Mr. Rabin is called Israel's Minister of Defense.

Indeed, the principle of military subordination to civilian authority requires Mr. Rabin to understand that his paramount responsibility is not to [Israel's] soldiers but to its civilians (so many of whom, of course, are soldiers out of uniform). Nevertheless, the government has knowingly endangered Israel's civilian population by releasing into its midst hundreds of Arab terrorists, murderers of men, women, and children. Nor is this all.

These terrorists have been welcomed as heroes by their friends and families... We can be certain that many of them will resume their murderous activities. We can be equally certain that they will inspire and encourage many others to join them in their villany.

One of these terrorists, Ibrahim Awaidah, had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the deaths of six Jews in the June 1978 bombing of a Jerusalem bus. The same Awaidah, along with two other of the released terrorists, were subsequently involved in the murder of a Jewish woman and an English tourist in eastern Jerusalem. Future intifada leaders would not be lacking.

36. See Nisan, *Toward a New Israel*, pp. 118-120. Haifa University researcher Sammy Smooha reported in 1986 that some three-quarters of "Israeli" Arabs identified themselves as "Palestinians" (ibid., p. 197).



37. As previously noted, Part II, Section 11.a.3 of the Nationality Law provides for the revocation of citizenship of any Israel national who "has committed an act involving disloyalty to the State of Israel."

38. See *The Jerusalem Post*, April 29, 1992.

39. See *The Jerusalem Post*, January 5, 7, 1993. The incident was quickly hushed up by the media. See *Nativ: A Journal of Politics and the Arts*, 6:2 (March 1993), p. 24 (Hebrew). Contrast the ban on Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach party for the 1988 Knesset elections.

40. Secular Zionism has thus become the greatest enemy of the Jewish people, as was foreseen by one of the foremost religious Zionists of this century, Dr. Isaac Breuer, of whom, more later.

41. In the sacrifice of Isaac, father and son acted in utter opposition to their own distinctive traits of character. This is intended to signify, *inter aliya*, that man stands above nature, that his will and intellect can overcome the deepest emotions. See Paul Eidelberg, *Jerusalem vs. Athens*, pp. 34-35.

42. Marie Serkin, *Golda Meir Speaks Out*, p. 242.

43. See Golda Meir, *My Life*, p. 126.

44. Again, contrast Ibn Hazm of Cordova (994-1064): "The height of goodness is that you should neither oppress your enemy nor abandon him to oppression. To treat him as a friend is the work of a fool whose end is near . . . Magnanimity is not to befriend the enemy, but to spare them, and to remain on your guard against them." Cited more fully in Paul Eidelberg, *Beyond Detente*, p. 49.

45. In fairness to Mr. Shamir, it should be noted that the policy of permissive subversion was initiated by a 1974-77 Labor party government headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It was Labor that permitted the April 1976 Arab municipal elections in Judea and Samaria. Not only were pro-PLO candidates swept into office, but they eventually established an anti-Israel infrastructure under a PLO-front organization called the National Guidance Committee. By 1980 the NGC, by virtue of the benign neglect of Mr. Begin's Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman, controlled all facets of community life, including all levels of education. Having assumed virtually unchecked power, the NGC openly incited terror against Jews. See Paul Eidelberg, "Of Moles and Men," *Morasha*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 16-24.

46. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1989. "The Palestinian community," said Mr. Rabin on October 27, 1988, "has its more extreme elements and less extreme elements, and argue among themselves over almost every issue. But there is no argument over the final goal." Cited in Livingston & Halevy, p. 294.

47. In December 1992, after a week in which six Jews were brutally murdered, Yitzhak Rabin's Labor government deported 415 terrorists associated with Hamas, an Islamic fundamentalist group to be discussed in chapter 6. Had 415 Arab terrorists, including their leaders, been deported in December 1987, the intifada would very likely have been a non-starter. But lest it be thought that the deportation of these Hamas fundamentalists marked a basic change in government policy, it appears that the deportation was designed to make the PLO acceptable to Israeli public opinion



as a negotiating partner in the "peace process." See Aharon Ben-Ami, "The Hamas Expulsion as a Ploy to Legitimize the PLO," *Nativ: A Journal of Politics and the Arts*, 30:1 (January 1993), p. 5-12 (Hebrew). Consistent therewith, the Knesset, in January 1993, rescinded the law prohibiting Israelis from meeting with PLO members. See Howard Adelson, "Towards a More Rational Foreign Policy," *The Jewish Press*, January 15, 1993, p. 10. Incidentally, the deportation of 415 Hamas terrorists—the media called them "activists"—may be explained in Blanconian terms: "Any sudden changes of affect can be understood as flashes of 'asymmetrization' in the midst of a world immersed in 'symmetrical unity' " (219). Symmetrical unity, however, has had the last word in this affair, for in July 1993, the Rabin government decided to allow all the deportees to return to Israel!

48. The intifada was financed primarily by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The funds were distributed by the PLO via Israel's "open bridges" policy with Jordan.

To fully appreciate the consequences of this permissive subversion, one must refer to the Gulf War, when Israel was under attack by Iraqi SCUD missiles. Thus, on January 23, 1991, *Al-Fajr* published an article by Nusseibeh in which he scorned the U.S.-led coalition for using the war to test new weapons and to revive their industries and profits. He writes: "The forces of the treacherous, criminal aggression have banded together . . . in order to humiliate the Arab world." A week later the Oxford- and Harvard-educated Nusseibeh was temporarily placed under administrative detention on a charge of forwarding security information to Iraq. See David Bar-Illan, "Eye on the Media," *The Jerusalem Post*, (Feb. 1, 1991).

49. On November 13, 1990, the defense ministry, then headed by Moshe Arens, placed Ayyash under administrative detention on the grounds that he was a leading Fatah operative in the "West Bank," and that within the framework of the PLO-allied "United Command of the Leadership of the Uprising," had engaged in "incitement to terror and organization of terror." See *The Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 14, 1990. The arrest of Ayyash was condemned by Israel's leftwing parties and Peace Now. He was subsequently released.

50. Mention should also be made of left-wing Knesset members and private citizens who violated an August 5, 1986 amendment to Sect. 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance which prohibited any citizen of Israel from establishing contact with any person belonging to a terrorist organization committed to the downfall of the State or the impairment of its security. Yet, even though such contacts could not help but dignify such terrorist organizations and undermine Israel's retention of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Shamir government refrained from prosecuting these self-appointed foreign ministers.

One exception was the pacifist Abbie Nathan, who, during a three month incarceration, was invited to the Knesset by the leftwing Citizens Rights Movement (a pretty example of how advanced demophrenia is in Israel). But consider the following: During the 1989 summer session of the Knesset, a heated exchange took place between Prime Minister Shamir and the dovish Yossi Sarid (formerly of the Citizens Rights Movement). Reacting to Shamir's denunciation of politicians who

undermine the efforts of the government to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, Sarid shouted: "I hear you talking about traitors and defeatists. In which country is it heard that a prime minister speaks in such a manner about public elected personalities who are his political rivals, calling them traitors?"

To this Shamir responded: "I see documents and from them I learn that there are those amongst us who talk about peace but practice treason. I know very well how to distinguish between opponents and traitors!" (*Ma'ariv*, Aug. 1, 1989 Hebrew), italics added.

By "documents" Shamir was alluding to intelligence reports ascribing clandestine and treasonable activities on the part of various doves or leftists, reports furnished by the Mossad, the intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister's authority. But if Mr. Shamir had documentary evidence showing that certain cabinet ministers and/or members of the Knesset were guilty of treasonable activity, it was his duty to bring this evidence to the attention of the Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General. And if the evidence warranted, the accused should have been indicted for treason against the State of Israel. No such indictments were issued.

However, on December 31, 1989, Mr. Shamir dismissed cabinet minister Ezer Weizman on the grounds of his having had meetings and phone conversations with PLO spokesmen during June, July, and December 1989. Indeed, intelligence information was leaked to the press alleging that Weizman had informed the PLO of the attitudes of various ministers and of how decisions were reached in the cabinet. It was also alleged that Weizman had advised the PLO to use a "stage-by-stage" strategy by which to achieve its objective of establishing a Palestinian state.

Not only did Weizman not deny the allegation, but claimed that other ministers had spoken to the PLO, and that Shimon Peres himself was a party to a Weizman phone conversation with PLO leaders in Tunis. Despite the gravity of this charge—collaboration with the enemy—Shamir rescinded his dismissal decision when the Labor Party, of which Weizman was a member, threatened to break up the national unity government. Weizman was allowed to remain in the government, but not in the ten-member inner cabinet.

Four years later, more precisely, on January 19, 1993, the Labor-led government of Yitzhak Rabin rescinded the law mentioned above. It should be noted, however, that the Rabin government, more specifically Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, undertook negotiations with the PLO prior to the rescinding of the law prohibiting such contacts. A documentary program presented on Israel television on October 10, 1993 revealed that by December 1992, the talks were being mediated by the late Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgan Holst—which means that the Israel-PLO agreement of September 13, 1993 was *ultra vires*.

51. Kissinger declared: "Historical experience teaches that a people [sic] that holds elections always obtains independence." See *Ma'ariv*, May 21, 1989 (Hebrew).

52. See *The Jerusalem Post*, January 31, 1991.

53. The following report appeared in the Hebrew language daily *Yediot Aharanot* on May 30, 1989:

Knesset Member Abdul Darawsheh met with [Defense] Minister Rabin and received the main points of his [Rabin's own peace] plan. "I asked permission to transmit them to others, and he knew whom I meant" . . .

Darawsheh travelled to Cairo on April 15 [and] met with Yasser Arafat and two close assistants, Abu-Mazen and Abu-Iyyad . . . At the end of the meeting, Darawsheh received a document which was the first of its kind: "Notes and Clarifications of the PLO Top Leadership: What is Requested and What is Necessary" . . . which was directed to Minister Rabin . . .

[To a reporter's question] how did the chances seem to him of reaching a solution, Darawsheh [replied]: "The Shamir Plan does not satisfy the Palestinians . . . On the other hand, the Rabin plan sides with the right of the Arabs in East Jerusalem to vote, and agrees to international observers and to negotiations with 'other Palestinians,' not only with residents of the territories . . . It is possible to bridge over differences . . . Arafat and his assistants treated Rabin's ideas with full seriousness and formulated a letter of response in the clear knowledge that I would transmit their letter to him."

It should be noted that Darawsheh was never charged for violating the law prohibiting meetings with the PLO. It should also be noted that Mr. Rabin's office confirmed the facts and receipt of the PLO documents. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Shamir remained publicly silent.

54. "Rabin's decision to release prominent Palestinian leader Faisal el-Husseini . . . could play an important role in furthering his [Rabin's peace] initiative. It is felt that Hussein's intimate ties with the PLO and his key role in the intifada, the very reasons why he has been kept in administrative detention for most of the duration, make him a valuable potential partner . . . Rabin has also made it clear . . . that he has no qualms about local leaders seeking counsel from the PLO and even travelling abroad to do so." *The Jerusalem Post*, January 30, 1989.

It should also be noted that according to a leaked intelligence report submitted by the Mossad to the cabinet in March 1989, the PLO was in "undisputed control of the Arabs in the territories and there is no alternative leadership." *The Nation*, March 29, 1989. See Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour*, p. xii.

55. *The Jerusalem Post*, April 16, 1992.

56. See Yosef-Ben-Aharon, "Rabin's Dishonest Dealing," *The Jerusalem Post*, October 1, 1993, p. 7. Ben-Aharon was director-general of the prime minister's office under the Shamir government.

57. See Shmuel Katz, "Rabin's Giving Away the Golan," *The Jerusalem Post*, December 3, 1993, p. A4.



58. See *The Jerusalem Post*, November 24, 1993, p. 1 where Faisal Husseini insisted that Jerusalem will be the capital of "Palestine."

59. In December 1992, after a week in which six Jews were brutally murdered, the Rabin government deported 415 Hamas terrorists. It appears that the deportation of these Hamas terrorists, far from signifying a basic change in policy, was designed to make the PLO acceptable to Israeli public opinion as a negotiating partner in the "peace process." See Aharon Ben-Ami, "The Hamas Expulsion as a Ploy to Legitimize the PLO," *Nativ: A Journal of Politics and the Arts*, 30:1 (January 1993), pp. 5-12 (Hebrew). See also Howard Adelson, "Towards a More Rational Foreign Policy," *The Jewish Press*, January 15, 1993, p. 10.

The deportation of 415 Hamas terrorists—the media called them "activists"—may be explained in Blanconian terms: "Any sudden changes of affect can be understood as flases of 'asymmetrization' in the midst of a world immersed in 'symmetrical unity'" (219). Symmetrical unity, however, had the last word in this affair, for the Rabin government eventually allowed the deportees to return to Israel.

60. Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons*, p. 36.

61. *Ibid.*

62. See *The Jerusalem Post*, November 19, 1993, p. 1.

63. The *Jerusalem Post*, September 3, 1993, p. 4. See the London-based Intelligence Digest, 17 September 1993, p. 3, which cites Egypt's "semi-official" newspaper *al-Ahram* as stating that the Arafat-Rabin accord "gives the Palestinians a foothold in Palestine that can expand to realize their greatest aspirations." See also *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1993, Magazine Section, pp. 4-7, which reveals the government's plans to return to the pre-1967 borders. Indeed, on December 23, the government issued an environmental map of Israel without the "territories"! Arafat had reason to feel confident when he said, "We are on our way to establish a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem."

64. According to Col. (Res.) Yigal Carmon, an Arabic scholar and formerly the adviser on terrorism to both Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir, the PLO "strategy of stages is alive and well." He warns (1) there will be a massive flow of arms into the territories, hence an increase of Arab violence against Jews; (2) the IDF will not use massive force against the Arab population, i.e., it will not be our tanks but "our soldiers on the ground against the terrorists . . . house to house, like in Lebanon"; (3) there will be a radicalization of Israeli Arabs . . . calling for their own autonomy and more"; and (4) if the "[Arab] right of return exists, Israel has no future as a Jewish state." See *The Jerusalem Post*, November 3, 1993, p. 8.

### Chapter Six

1. Member of the PLO's Palestine National Council, speaking to Pakistan's *The Herald* (February 1992).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 231

3. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 133.



5. Ibid., p. 138.

6. Ibid., p. 337.

7. Ibid., p. 348

8. *The Jerusalem Post*, April 20, 1992.p.6.

9. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, pp. 348-349.

10. See, for example, Harkabi's *Israel's Fateful Hour*, p. 179.

11. Even before the Gulf War was over, then Foreign Minister David Levy (Likud) announced that he was prepared to negotiate even with the Palestinians who, from their rooftops, cheered as SCUD missiles fell on Israel! Meanwhile, Minister of Religious Affairs Professor Avner Shaki (National Religious Party) advocated negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the major financial backers of the PLO. The mere fact that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had been betrayed by their lackeys was sufficient for Shaki to succumb to the symmetrical logic or selective inattention of demophrenia.

12. *The Jerusalem Post*, April 23, 1993.

13. I shall ignore the fact that the PLO had its headquarters in Baghdad in April 1990 when Hussein threatened to destroy half of Israel.

14. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, p. 471, where he contends that the claims of the Jews and the Arabs are equally just. See, also, *Israel's Fateful Hour*, p. 41, where Harkabi accepts at face value, and describes as "humane," this statement of Arafat's top aide Bassam Abu Sharif: "We believe that all peoples—Jews and the Palestinians included—have a right to run their own affairs."

15. Mr. Miari was then a member of the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), a PLO-front party. An attempt was made by certain Knesset members to remove his parliamentary immunity. It failed even though the so-called right-wing Likud Party controlled the government and could therefore have secured a Knesset majority against Miari.

It should be noted that Israel's Supreme Court, by a vote of three to two, nullified an attempt to disqualify the PLP from participating in the November 1988 elections. The same Court unanimously disqualified the Kach Party led by the late Rabbi Meir Kahane.

16. Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 59 (emphasis added).

17. The Koran, pp. 393, 267, 352.

18. Harold Fisch, *The Zionist Revolution*, pp. 133-134, who writes: "To the astonishment of Israel's [secular] leaders, the Vatican and the Churches did not seem to be overwhelmingly concerned at the onslaught made on the Christians in Lebanon by the extreme Muslim groups in 1975 and 1976. It seemed as though the Jewish occupation of Jerusalem was somehow more important than the fate of entire Christian communities threatened with destruction! And of course it was." It was, Professor Fisch might have added, because the re-establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 contradicts Catholic theology, specifically, that God abandoned the Jews to damnation for refusing to recognize the Christian messiah.

19. Eliyahu Amiqam, *Yediot Aharanot*, June 18, 1982, cited in and adapted from Chaim Zimmerman, *Torah and Existence*, pp. 349-350.

20. Cited in Ronald L. Nettler, "The Ambivalence of Camp David Rhetoric," *Encounter*, June-July 1982, p. 106.

21. This paragraph is based largely on Nisan, *Minorities*, pp. 127-28, 213.

22. Seyyed H. Nasr, *Islam and the Plight of Modern Man*, chs. 1, 2, 10.

23. After describing the 1936 Arab massacres on page 118 of her autobiography, *My Life*, Golda Meir declares on page 121: "... there were no times during the thirties that I did not hope eventually the Arabs of Palestine would live with us in peace and equality as citizens of a Jewish homeland..." Yet on page 364 she concludes: "I have never doubted for an instant that the true aim of the Arab states has always been, and still is, the total destruction of the State of Israel or that even if we had gone back far beyond the 1967 lines to some miniature enclave, they would not still have tried to eradicate it and us." Of course, the statement on page 121 refers to the Arabs in Israel proper, while the statement on page 363 refers to Arab states themselves.

24. Alex Bein (ed.) *Arthur Ruppin: Memoirs, Diaries, Letters* (Afterword by Moshe Dayan), pp. 315-323.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-236.

26. Between 1936 and 1939, some 500 Jews had fallen victim to Arab terrorism. Yet there were virtually no acts of retaliation by the Haganah, the Jewish self-defense organization led by David Ben-Gurion. This self-immolation was rationalized as a policy of "self-restraint" (*havлага*), as the moral and humanistic response of Jews to Arab hatred and violence. Few Arabs were killed during those three years in which 500 Jews were sacrificed on the altar of humanism.

27. See *Ibid.*, p. 258, where Ruppin writes in December 1931: "Perhaps as a result of reading Freud's *The Future of an Illusion* in which he represents religion as a great illusion, I think that history has contained a whole sequence of such illusions and they have been of tremendous importance, perhaps of greater importance than the conditions of production on which Marx placed so much emphasis." Evidently, Ruppin's reading of the Pentateuch was as slipshod as Freud's.

For example, in *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud attributes the origin of religion to fear of nature, which he identifies with fear of the father. But there is not a shred of evidence in Genesis that Abraham, the first Jew, feared his father. Moreover, when Moses saw the burning bush which was not consumed by the fire, instead of running away in fear at this extraordinary phenomenon, he approached the bush as might a scientist (Exod. 3:2-3). That Ruppin should give any credence to this incredibly shoddy work of Freud is indicative of the shallowness of secular Zionism.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

29. *The Jerusalem Post*, April 28, 1991.

30. See Dayan's radio address of December 28, 1968 in Shlomo Avinceri, *Israel and the Palestinians*, p. 71, where he speaks of "coexistence even in a situation of conflict."

31. See *The Jerusalem Post*, September 15, 1993, sect. 2, p. 2.

32. See Harkabi's *Israel's Fateful Hour*, p. 154, where he attributes to his colleague Mordechai Nisan a "tribal morality." For a critique of this *argumentum ad hominem*, see Eidelberg & Morrissey, *Our Culture 'Left' or 'Right,'* p. xiv.

### Chapter Seven

1. See Matte Blanco, *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets*, p. 43.

2. Ibid.

3. See Pitirim Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, pp. 213-216.

4. See Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, p. 188. (originally published in 1928 under the title *La Trahison des Clercs*). Benda was aware of the moral relativism then gaining ascendancy among French intellectuals.

5. Samuel Huntington, "American Foreign Policy," *The Washington Quarterly*, 2:4 (Aug. 1979), p. 35.

6. Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. II, 53, 103. England's leftwing intellectuals, writes Orwell, "take their cookery from Paris and their opinions from Moscow. In the general patriotism of the country they form a sort of island of dissident thought. England is perhaps the only great country whose intellectuals are ashamed of their own nationality" (ibid., II, 74-75). This describes almost perfectly Israel's leftwing intellectuals who wish to abrogate the Law of Return because it smacks of "national chauvinism"! (Orwell, it should be borne in mind, was a socialist of uncommon intellectual integrity.)

7. Ibid., III, 223. See also Ibid., IV, 153-155, where Orwell takes a Professor J.D. Bernal to task for his moral relativism.

8. Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour*, p. 41. One would think that a former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, the author of *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, would be more skeptical about such PLO pronouncements.

9. See Yochanan Peres, "Religious Adherence and Political Attitudes," *Sociological Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Oct. 1992), p. 18 regarding a poll taken in July 1992.

10. Edward Saar, "The West Bank and Modern Arms," *Nativ* 1:1 (1990, English edition). Edward Saar is the pen name of an American professor.

11. The absence of the idea of ethical self-determination surely makes it easier for terrorist groups, which have murdered not only Israelis, but Americans and Europeans, to market the rite of "self-determination for the Palestinian people." Their task of semantic subversion is made easier still by the United Nations General Assembly, whose membership includes several terrorist states. Indeed, because the General Assembly is based on the egalitarian principle of "one nation one vote," it contains far more dictatorships than democracies. So long as the members of the United Nations do not abide by the Seven Noahide Laws of universal morality, the formula "one nation one vote" conduces to cultural relativism.

12. See my *Beyond Detent*, ch. 5.

13. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 52. Contrast Ben-Gurion: "Our new Torah is being written now, but its best chapters are still to come. It is my conviction that they will tell the story of our taming of the desert." *Memoirs*, p. 131.



14. *The Joyful Wisdom*, p. 289.

15. Quoted in Shabtí Teveth, *Ben Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p. 105. There is reason to believe that the mufti sought an alliance with Nazi Germany to accomplish the final solution of the Jewish problem. See Lewis, *Semites & Anti-Semites*, pp. 146-147, 156-160.

16. Solzhenitsyn, p. 178.

### Chapter Eight

1. See Samson Raphael Hirsch, *Horeb*, p. xlviii.

2. It should be noted that the government has never addressed itself to the domestic Arab demographic problem. Nor has it ever developed a national plan to achieve economic independence from the United States, a precondition of political, but let us rather say Jewish, independence. Israel's economy is based on a hodge-podge of doctrines borrowed from socialism and capitalism, both of which foster materialism, the one by way of statism, the other by way of egotism. Nothing could be more destructive to the family, the heart of Judaism.

3. *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-political Treatise*, 1, 207, 257, 263, 265.

4. See below ch. 10, Epilogue, on computer studies of the Torah.

5. So far as I know, and as previously noted, the government of Israel has never enforced the loyalty provision of the Nationality Law of 1952.

6. Thus George Washington could say in his "Farewell Address": "Observe good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin in? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant point, a great nation, to give mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence." For an extended commentary, see my *Beyond Detente*, ch. 3.

7. See Shimon Schwab, *Selected Writings*, pp. 148-151, to whom this paragraph is indebted.

8. Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs*, pp. 27, 128.

9. See Isaac Breuer, *Concepts of Judaism*, pp. 6, 31, 309.

10. See Abraham Katsh, *The Biblical Heritage of American Democracy*, ch. 2.

11. Leo Jung, *Judaism in a Changing World*, pp. 15-16.

### Chapter Nine

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and Philosophy*, p. 75.

2. This chapter is based on my *Beyond the Secular Mind*, chapters 6 and 7.

3. See *The Prince*, ch. 3, where Machiavelli identified Louis XII as "France." For a detailed analysis, see my *Beyond the Secular Mind*, pp. 7-15.

4. Exodus 23:2 refers to judicial proceedings in criminal cases. The plain meaning of the verse is, "Do not go with the [bare] majority to do evil [that is, to

convict, but otherwise] incline toward the majority." See Hirsch on the verse in question.

5. See Louis Jacobs, *The Talmudic Argument: A Study in Talmudic Reasoning and Methodology*, p. 50.

6. See *Berachot* 37a, *Kiddushin* 59b, *Yevamot* 108b, *Gittin* 15a, 47a. To clarify the issue even further: If the truth or falsity of some theory concerning subatomic processes were to be decided by the vote of a scientific convention, the outcome would obviously depend not on the will but on the reasoning of the majority. In a democracy, however, what is decisive is not reason or truth but the will or rights of the majority, which is why decisions are made on the basis of "one man, one vote," regardless of the intellectual caliber of those voting. See Chaim Zimmerman, *Torah and Existence*, pp. 115-116.

A democracy would cease to be a democracy if the majority were to recognize and defer to the wisdom of some outstanding individual. Deference to wisdom is distinctive of a Torah community. This cannot be said of any regime dominated by politics where men of mediocre character put themselves forward as candidates for the highest public office.

7. See Breuer, *Concepts of Judaism*, pp. 53-81, for a brilliant essay on "The Philosophical Foundations of Jewish and Modern Law."

8. "Therefore God will not rejoice over their youths . . . for they are all flatterers and speakers of evil, and every mouth utters obscenities." (Isa. 9:16) "This verse," Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto, points out, "mentions neither idol worship, nor illicit relations, nor murder, but flattery and slander and obscene utterance, all sins of the mouth in its capacity of speech . . ." Moshe Chaim Luzzatto, *The Path of the Just*, p. 129.

9. See D.G. Garan, *The Key to the Sciences of Man*, pp. 146-148, *et passim*. Garan wisely points out that:

Before the modern, liberal era poverty was a scarcity which created increased motivations to work hard, out of it. Greatest men and most capable groups, in every nation, have been formed of such poverty. The main present problems of the urban poor are the exact reverse: use of drugs instead of lack of means, truancy from schools that are free, avoidance of hard work, lowest morals and dissolute family life. Instead of "liberation" these people need more difficulties and restrictions . . . But nothing of this can work in our liberal and scientific era, least of all in our cities. The result is motivational deterioration, even worse than among other groups (p. 496).

10. *Terumot* 8,9. If, however, an Israelite had been convicted by a Jewish court of a capital offense, it would not be a violation of the Halakha to turn him over to the enemy, although, according to the Maimonides, it would not be noble to do so.

11. To appreciate the exalted role of the woman in Judaism, see Hirsch, *Judaism Eternal*, II, 49-89.

12. *The Code of Maimonides (Book of Torts)*, pp. 169-170.

13. *Ibid.*

14. This was a principle in American Constitutional Law until *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967), and *Spevack v. Klein*, 17 L. Ed. 574 (1967).

15. The author is indebted to Professor Dale Gottlieb for this illustration.

16. Friedrich Schiller: *An Anthology of Our Time*, p. 137.

17. The following analysis should be compared with Thomas More's discussion of slavery and of punishment for theft in *Utopia*. See note 18 below.

18. See Hirsch, Exodus 21:26-27.

19. *Ibid.*, 23a.

20. The following discussion is partly based on Hirsch, Exodus 21:2-3 and Deuteronomy 15:12, 23:16. See also Isaac Herzog, *The Main Institutions of Jewish Law*, I, 45. After reflecting on the laws of the Torah regarding servitude for theft, the reader should compare the perverse, not to say slanderous, treatment of Jewish law by Thomas More in his *Utopia*, (p. 12), who surely must have known better. Indeed, contrast his discussion of the utopians' policy on punishment for theft (pp. 23-24) with the infinitely more humane and enlightened policy of the Torah. Compare, too, the utopians' harsh policy towards slaves (p. 56).

21. See my *Beyond the Secular Mind*, ch. 11.

22. It follows from these considerations that the term "hierarchy," as applied to a Torah community, is misleading, and should only be used to distinguish such a community from an egalitarian society. So far is the Torah being egalitarian that it conceives of every realm of existence as "hierarchic." Thus, different metals have different levels of value. Scripture uses the metaphors of gold and silver, copper and iron, to signify qualities of purity and impurity, of strength and durability. See *Collected Writings of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch*, III, 169-173. Similarly, Jewish law takes cognizance of "hierarchy" in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Finally, considering the "holy" days and the different levels of "holiness" associated with the Land of Israel, it will be apparent that "hierarchy" governs the domain of time as well as of space.

23. Commenting on the scriptural verse "You will be a kingdom of priests and a holy nation unto Me" (Exod. 19:6), Eliezer Berkovits writes: "This kingdom of priests is not a society in which a priestly caste rules over an unpriestly populace in the name of some god. A holy nation is a realm in which all are priests. [Note the misleading translation of the term *kohanim*, better rendered as "servants"]. But where all are priests, all are servants—God alone rules. 'A kingdom of priests and a holy nation is not a theocracy, but a God-centered republic.' *God, Man, and History*, p. 136. This idea calls to mind the Puritans, who not only rejected the English Church or ecclesiastical authority, but identified themselves with the children of Israel and transplanted Hebraic laws and institutions to the New World.

24. Hirsch, *Judaism Eternal*, II, 134.

25. The term "people," as used in the American Declaration of Independence, partakes of the character of an *ahm* insofar as it is Christian. But the diverse religious and ethnic divisions of the American people render the latter a *goy* or (territorial ) nation. In contrast, Muslims, despite divisions, constitute a "people," as here defined,



even though they describe themselves as a "nation" and do not recognize territorial boundaries.

### Chapter Ten

1. Leo Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern*, pp. 228-229.

2. Ibid., pp. 229-230.

3. Cited in *Pathways to the Torah*, Sect. A27.3.

4. See *ibid.*, Sect. A14, for a brief survey of some 1,900 years of venomous hatred of the Jewish people by such Christian divines as Tertullian, St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory, Pope Innocent III, Pope Paul IV, Martin Luther, and Pope Pius VII. Consider the horrifying slaughter of Jews perpetrated by Lithuanian Catholics on June 25, 1941. More than 10,000 were torched, axed, shot, or burned alive. See Aaron Sorasky, *Reb Elchonon*, p. 407.

In February 1992, Argentina opened its files on Nazi war criminals. The files reveal how the Catholic Church aided the escape of these Nazis. Much the same may be said of the hierarchy of France's Roman Catholic Church. See *The Jerusalem Post*, Feb. 9, 1992, p. 10.

5. See his courageous "Disputation at Barcelona" in Ramban (Nachmanides), *Writings and Discourses*, II, 656-696.

6. See Abraham Geiger, *Judaism and Islam*, who writes:

At first, simply and solely on account of the Jews, the Qubla, or place towards which prayer was to be made, was changed by Muhammad to Jerusalem from Mecca, the spot which the ancient Arabs had always regarded as holy; and it was only when he recognized the fruitlessness of attempting to conciliate the Israelites [i.e., to win them to Islam] that he changed it back to the former direction. . .

The order in which he [Muhammad] gives the prophets [sic] is interesting, for immediately after the patriarchs he places first Jesus, then Job, Jonah, Aaron, Solomon, and last of all David [Sura 4:161]. In another passage [Sura 6:84-86] the order is still more ridiculous, for here we have David, Solomon, Job, Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Zachariah, John, Jesus, Elijah, Ishmael, Elisha, Jonah, and Lot! The incorrect spellings of the names of these prophets [sic], as well as the parts which [Muhammad] assigns to them in history, proves that he had never even looked into the Hebrew Scriptures. (p. 19).

7. See Yehuda Elizur, "Eretz Israel: The Biblical Concept," in Avner Tomaschoff (ed.), *Whose Homeland*, pp. 92-96; Nosson Scherman and Meir Zlotowitz (eds.), *Bereshis* (Genesis), II, 406-415.

8. Flavius Josephus, *The Jewish Wars*, Book III 3:2. See also *Pathways to the Torah*, Sect. A24-26, for biblical and other descriptions of the Land of Israel.

9. The reader should bear in mind that wherever the term "State of Israel" appears, it refers to the state formed and so named in 1948. Precisely because the concept of the "state" is foreign to the Torah, it would be misleading to refer to the

“modern” State of Israel. Again, to simplify the exposition, I am compelled to use contemporary terminology.

10. See Chaim Zimmerman, *Torah and Existence*, ch. 1.

11. *Reb Elchonon*, p. 258.

12. I have in mind the Mapai Party and such notables as David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, and Golda Meir. The Mapai metamorphosed into the Labor Party whose initial leaders included Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Chaim Herzog.

13. The fact that the Arabs reject the existence of the “state” of Israel is unwittingly serving the world-historical function of nullifying this anti-Torah concept and thereby facilitating Israel’s complete intellectual-moral restoration.

14. The democratic transformations occurring in Eastern and Central Europe will not and cannot solve the maladies of democracy mentioned in chapter 1. Even Czechoslovakia, which had some experience in democracy, discovered that freedom and equality did not solve, but instead exacerbated, its nationalities problem.

See *The Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 11, 1990, p. 3.

15. See *Beyond the Secular Mind*, ch. 4.

16. See Martin Buber, *Two Kinds of Faith*. Buber suggests that the concept of “faith” in Christianity involves the believer in a fundamental tension because the concept connotes its opposite, the denial of God’s existence, leaving to the individual the choice between belief and unbelief (p. 38). He exaggerates, however, when he says that “The supposition for a decision between faith or unbelief is lacking in the world of Israel . . .” (p. 40). King David, who was certainly part of that world, declared: “The fool [alternatively, the scoundrel] said in his heart: ‘There is no God.’” (Ps. 14:1). Here, as elsewhere, Buber is an unreliable commentator on Judaism. Thus, it is misleading and I dare say tendentious on his part to aver: “In the Hebrew Bible Torah does not mean law, but direction, instruction, information . . . It includes laws, and laws are indeed its most vigorous objectivizations, but the Torah itself is *essentially* not law” (p. 57, *italics added*).

Not only is this view belied by the Law-Giving at Mount Sinai, but it is contradicted by Judaism’s greatest codifier, Maimonides, and the entire rabbinic tradition to which Buber was personally opposed. Torah does mean “direction” and “instruction,” but it is the direction and instruction derived from the teaching of the laws, i.e., the Halakha. Buber rejected the Halakha (of which he had no substantial knowledge), having married out of the “faith” and having denied the Jewish people’s exclusive title to the Land of Israel. See Samson Raphael Hirsch, *Judaism Eternal*, II, 230, who notes that Moses Mendelssohn held that what is most distinctive of Judaism is not articles of faith but the law, that is, the Halakha. And the laws of the Torah, like the laws of nature, “cannot suffer abbreviation” or truncation, every part of them being essential.

17. See Aryeh Carmell (ed.), *Strive for Truth: Selected Writings of Rabbi E.E. Dessler*, II, 224.

18. In his *Kuzari*, Yehuda Halevi writes: "God forbid that there should be anything in the Torah that contradicts reason." Consistent therewith, principles based on logical reasoning have the validity of a biblical statement and therefore do not require biblical proof. (See *Ketuvot* 22a.) If, by logical reasoning, one arrives at a biblical statement, the latter must have additional meanings which can be rendered explicit by various hermeneutical rules contained in the Talmud.

19. Mental processes are not in themselves communicable because, unlike language, they transcend space and time. Language is the tangible means by which thought links the non-finite to the infinite. Here an analogy with quantum physics may be helpful. According to quantum physics, the macrophysical world—the world of sense perception—is a derived world. Though real, it is not, physically speaking, the ultimately real. To discover the latter we must grasp the microphysical world, the world of subatomic processes. But because the mind can only think in terms of space and time, we can only know about the microphysical world indirectly, that is, by its macrophysical or observable effects. The spatial and temporal concepts used to describe these effects are really metaphors or anthropomorphisms. They do not literally describe the microphysical world in itself—just as the anthropomorphisms in the Torah do not describe God in Himself, but only His tangible manifestations. (From this it should be evident that skeptics who mock the Torah for its anthropomorphisms are very old-fashioned indeed, having failed to keep abreast of twentieth-century physics.)

20. Nathan Aviezer, *In the Beginning: Biblical Creation and Science*, p. 1 (partly paraphrased). For references to contemporary biologists, mathematicians, and physicists who refute the neo-Darwinian doctrine of evolution of chance mutation and natural selection, see Lawrence Keleman, *Permission to Believe: Four Rational Approaches to God's Existence*, pp. 54-65.

21. Gerald L. Schroeder, *Genesis and the Big Bang: The Discovery of Harmony Between Modern Science and the Bible*, p. 26.

22. Witzum's book is in Hebrew and was published privately. The program for this computer research was designed by Professor of Mathematics Ilya Rips of the Hebrew University, working in cooperation with biblical scholar Dr. Moshe Katz and computer expert Dr. Menachem Wiener of the Technion.

For English-language extracts of the Technion studies, see Daniel Michelson, "Codes in the Torah," *B'Or Ha' Torah*. (Jerusalem: "Shamir," 1987), No.6, pp.7-39; Aryeh Carmell, in "The Discovery of Hidden Numerical Structures in the Pentateuch," *Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academy of Jewish Studies), Summer 1987, pp.34-41.

In 1991, Dr. Katz privately published a book-length, Hebrew version of these computer studies under the title *In the Letters of the Torah*, an English rendition of which is in process.

23. For example, Bible critics contend that Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 were written by different authors because the former uses the name Elohim for God while the latter uses the Tetragrammaton. In addition to Witzum's book, see B.T. Radday *et al*,



"Genesis, Wellhausen, and the Computer," in *Zeitschrift Fur Die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, pp. 467-482, which uses cluster analysis to refute Wellhausen's hypothesis regarding multiple authorship of the Book of Genesis.

For a non-mathematical but nonetheless compelling refutation of biblical criticism, see A. Cohen, "The Challenges of Biblical Criticism," in Leo Jung (ed.), *Judaism in a Changing World*, pp. 193-210.

24. Before the publication of *The Additional Dimension*, its data were submitted to other mathematicians, namely, Professor H. Furstenberg, also of the Hebrew University, Professor I. Piatetski-Shapiro of Tel Aviv University, and Professor D. Kazhdan and I. Bernstein, both of Harvard University. These reknowned mathematicians have formally declared that , "The phenomenon in question [that the Torah contains encoded information] is a real one, i.e. that its prevalence cannot be explained purely on the basis of fortuitous circumstance" (p.1.). This is confirmed by Professor Gerald Goodhart in *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, vol. 151, Part I (1988), p. 165.

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# DEMOPHRENIA

## ISRAEL AND THE MALAISE OF DEMOCRACY

*Demophrenia* represents a breakthrough in political science by means of a new understanding of democracy. It provides a critical analysis of the democratic mind using the principles drawn from Ignacio Matte-Blanco's seminal work on conscious and unconscious thought. In *Demophrenia*, Paul Eidelberg demonstrates that as all levels of education become permeated by moral relativism, democratic governments become less capable of making moral distinctions and acting with confidence and consistency regarding moral matters. This moral deficit, says Eidelberg, is symptomatic of the term he coins "demophrenia." It involves a compulsive application of the democratic principles of equality and freedom to moral problems and ideological conflicts which are exacerbated by those very principles.

Eidelberg, as well as having authored nine other books, is a professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat-Gan, Israel. Eidelberg uses Israel as an example of demophrenia, using case studies to show what it is and how it works in democratic societies. He explains how the behavior of Israel's government, with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, is not merely ineffectual, but pathological. He presents some practical and humane alternatives to Israel's problem, offering a constructive critique of democratic freedom and equality in the process.

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