









# American Policy Toward Palestine



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# AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD PALESTINE

By Carl J. Friedrich

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WITHDRAWN



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## CHAPTER I

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

There can be little doubt that the government of Palestine under the British Mandate from the League of Nations had in effect broken down by 1939. The attempt of the British Government to extricate itself from the situation by appeasing the Arabs was not accepted by a large part of the British public, including Winston Churchill, who was already thoroughly aroused over the policy of yielding to aggression. Nor has either the League of Nations or the United States ever assented to the Palestine policy adopted in 1939. On March 9, 1944, the President of the United States made this clear again when he told Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise that "the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are open today to Jewish refugees."<sup>2</sup>

While a certain latitude may be granted under emergency conditions, the acts of the British mandatory, abrogating basic provisions of the Mandate under which it governs Palestine, lack a sound legal foundation.<sup>2a</sup> As Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons on May 23, 1939, in commenting upon the White Paper submitted to the House five days earlier: "We

are now asked to submit to an agitation which is fed with foreign money and ceaselessly inflamed by Nazi and Fascist propaganda." And again: "I select the one point which is plainly a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration—the provision that Jewish immigration can be stopped in five years' time by the decision of an Arab majority."<sup>3</sup> There has been concern in some quarters lest such quoting of Winston Churchill's views of 1939 may stir up anti-British sentiment. To such misgivings, if caused by genuine concern and not by a desire to confuse the issue, the following may be offered as a partial answer: (1) Churchill himself is reliably reported to have permitted such quoting and to have explained his views to President Roosevelt; (2) failure to straighten out the Palestine situation will probably stir up more anti-British sentiment than frank expressions of sympathy with a change of policy desired by a large part of the British public as well.

It would be little short of absurd to undertake even a sketchy history of the Palestinian Mandate in this paper. Nor is there any need for it. A number of fairly comprehensive treatments of this difficult subject are readily available, the most recent—and perhaps the best—being *British Policy in Palestine*, a study by Paul H. Hanna published by the American Council on Public Affairs.<sup>4</sup> Also very useful and well-documented are the recurrent analyses in Arnold Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs*, notably in 1930, 1936, 1937, and 1938.<sup>5</sup>

Even a casual glance at the problem suggests, of course, that American policy toward Palestine has been influenced by the general international outlook prevailing in the United States. The evolution of both that policy and outlook may be divided roughly into six periods. These periods are not sharply separated from one another, but they are clearly marked by their

dominant characteristics. The first, lasting approximately from 1916 to 1920, is permeated by the spirit of crusading internationalism which President Woodrow Wilson injected into American foreign policy. The second period, from 1921 to 1925, saw the slow ebbing away of this spirit and the substitution of a mere lip service to these ideals. The period from 1925 to 1929, during which the illusion was widespread that real peace had at last been achieved, reinforced the prevailing indifference. In the fourth period, 1929-1933, when the economic depression robbed Americans of their sense of security, genuine isolationism came to the fore. In the fifth period, 1933-1939, which might be dubbed the period of gangsters and ostriches, appeasement captured the imagination of Americans as a method of dealing with the rising threat to their world's security. In the sixth period, beginning in 1939, an increasing recognition of the common enemy occurred, until the actual outbreak of war revealed the true nature of the conflict.

It is important to bear in mind these successive frames of mind of America at large, for it is only within their general setting that a minor policy, such as that toward the Jewish National Home in Palestine, can be fully understood. At no time during the entire period did this policy toward Palestine become a major concern of the American people or the American government. Intense as was and remains the feeling of Jewish people on the subject, there is no question that their concern affected their fellow Americans only to a very limited extent.

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<sup>1</sup>In order to forestall misunderstandings the author wishes to draw attention emphatically to certain limitations of this study. First, it focuses attention upon "the Jewish National Home." Second, it is restricted to a discussion of *American* policy toward that home; all other issues such as British policy are treated only insofar as they have a bearing upon American policy. Third, the discussion is based upon the assumption that American public policy consists of those actions,

including declarations, of governmental authorities which are meant to influence the course of events. Failure to act is, of course, also a part of policy if it is the result of deliberate decision. Presumably such deliberate decision has been arrived at in all those instances where some group of weight has requested action of the governmental authorities, but has done so without appreciable success. Because of this latter circumstance, the activities of non-governmental groups and associations, such as the Zionist movement or the Arab League, also become part of the congeries of facts which together constitute the story of American policy toward the Jewish National Home.

<sup>2</sup>For the text of the full statement see page 102.

<sup>2a</sup>Under the Mandate system of the League of Nations, basic changes in the policy of the mandatory power require the approval of the League upon recommendation of the Mandates Commission. See Quincy Wright, *The Mandates under the League of Nations*.

<sup>3</sup>See House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 347, No. 108, p. 2172.

<sup>4</sup>This study was published in 1942. Ernest Main's *Palestine at the Crossroads* (London, 1937) is also an authoritative account of the problem, sympathetic to both Jews and Arabs, but taking the Jewish side on the whole. A useful and thorough treatment of a special problem is found in Abraham Granovsky's *Land Policy in Palestine* (New York, 1940).

<sup>5</sup>These volumes were fiercely criticized, however, by a leading, if partial, authority, L. B. Namier, who pointed out numerous inaccuracies. See *The Nineteenth Century and After*, March, 1942.



## CHAPTER II

# Wilson and the Balfour Declaration

The first period, as previously stated, was permeated by the spirit of crusading internationalism of which President Wilson was the world-wide protagonist. It is only natural that this period should have brought forward a plan for giving the Jewish people a homeland in which they might develop without restrictions the genius of their national culture. The ideal of the self-determination of nations seemed to call for such a plan. The Balfour Declaration, issued on November 2, 1917, as a communication from Lord Arthur James Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Walter Rothschild, then Vice-President of the British Zionist Federation, broadly defined the aim. It reads as follows:

“I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.

“His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done

which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."<sup>1</sup>

It has lately become the fashion in certain quarters to belittle the Balfour Declaration as a casual act of the British, resulting from wartime pressure. All the evidence shows that, on the contrary, the Declaration was worked out with extreme care and that every word in it was weighed upon a gold scale. What is more important, American policy with regard to it was based upon explicit presidential approval. The attitude of Wilson and other American statesmen was ascertained by the British and given careful consideration in the formulation of the Declaration. Balfour, on his visit to America in the spring of 1917, discussed the matter with leading Americans, although there seems to be no evidence that he took the matter up with Wilson.<sup>2</sup> But Brandeis and others did so. On September 4, 1917, Colonel Edward House reported to the President that Lord Robert Cecil, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had cabled as follows: "We are being pressed here for a declaration of sympathy with the Zionist Movement, and I should be very grateful if you felt able to ascertain unofficially if the President favors such a declaration. . . ."

Now President Wilson for quite a number of years—in fact, ever since 1911—had been known to have a genuine interest in the Zionist idea. He was, therefore, quite ready to support the Declaration and the several drafts were submitted to the White House. Colonel House does not seem to have been equally convinced. He wrote to Wilson, after receiving the communication from Lord Robert Cecil (under the same date): "Have you made up your mind regarding what answer you will



make to Cecil concerning the Zionist Movement? It seems to me that there are many dangers lurking in it, and if I were British, I would be chary about going too definitely into that question."

Wilson did not reply until more than a month later, but then rather positively: "I find in my pocket the memorandum you gave me about the Zionist Movement. I am afraid I did not say to you that I concurred in the formula suggested by the other side. I do, and would be obliged if you would let them know it."<sup>3</sup> After the issuance of the Declaration, Wilson on March 3, 1919, stated that "the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth."<sup>4</sup>

Evidently the State Department began to worry about the meaning of what Wilson had called a "formula." Hence, "when Lansing, on December 15, 1917, instructed Ambassador Page to 'investigate discreetly' the reasons for this statement, Page replied that the French and British governments had an understanding that Palestine should be internationalized. Balfour's statement merely indicated British determination that Jews should be on the same footing as other nationalities,"<sup>5</sup> an obvious misrepresentation.

Half a year later, Wilson reaffirmed his general sentiments, though without explicit commitment, in a letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs.<sup>6</sup> This letter, dated August 31st, showing as it does Wilson's complete approval of the Balfour Declaration, nevertheless seems in retrospect noteworthy for being more cautious than the earlier statement. Probably because the United States was not at war with Turkey, the President's letter avoided mentioning any specific steps or actions the

American government would be prepared to take to convert the general sentiments of the Declaration into concrete action. He also failed to reiterate the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth.

A year later the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence of the American delegation to the Peace Conference prepared an outline of a tentative report and recommendations for President Wilson (dated January 21, 1919) which urged, among other things, "that there be established a separate state of Palestine and that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there . . . being assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish State as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact."<sup>7</sup> This document, far from being oblivious to the Arab problem, recognized that a unique situation existed here: "It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish State, if the Jews, being given the full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect unique among significant peoples."

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<sup>1</sup>For a general discussion of the background of the Balfour Declaration, see Hanna, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff. For Wilson's role, compare Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. II (1932), pp. 205 ff. For Balfour's part, see Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour, 1906-1930* (1937), Ch. XI.

<sup>2</sup>See Dugdale, *op. cit.* II, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup>Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 256 and 305.

<sup>4</sup>See Jacob de Haas, *Louis D. Brandeis* (1929), p. 109.

<sup>5</sup>Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 337.

<sup>6</sup>Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 372.

<sup>7</sup>This section of the document is found in David Hunter Miller, *My Diary* (1924), Vol. 4, pp. 263-264, and is reprinted in Nathan Feinberg's *Some Problems of the Palestine Mandate* (1936), pp. 28-30. See also M. Laserson's *On the Mandate* (Tel Aviv, 1937).

### CHAPTER III

## Arab "Self-Determination"

But soon afterward, other views and influences must have been asserting themselves. This fact may be inferred from the appointment of the King-Crane Commission. The dispatch of this American body resulted from the President's dismay over the failure of the "Big Three" to agree on sending an international commission. Although submitted too late for consideration by the Peace Conference and never seriously considered or acted upon by the President, the King-Crane Commission report became, nevertheless, a document of some importance, since it was incorporated in the archives of the State Department. The reason the appointment of this Commission was of significance is the fact that its purpose was to ascertain the wishes of the local populations in the former Turkish Empire, particularly with reference to the mandates and mandatories. Since, as far as Palestine is concerned, the local population was predominantly Arab, the "frame of reference" within which the Commission worked was bound to produce complicating results. It thus reveals the inherent difficulty of British and American policy in Palestine ever since: trying to remain faithful to their commitments to the Zionists in the face of a hostile local population.

Unhappily, a sacred symbol, the self-determination of peoples, was being put in jeopardy.<sup>1</sup>

The Commission evidently approached its task with its mind largely made up. This is shown by a telegram it dispatched almost immediately after its arrival to the President, reporting firm opposition to Zionist plans for a separate Palestine.<sup>2</sup> After hearing all kinds of Syrian delegations, the representative character of which it was admittedly not in a position to judge (it spent only forty days in visiting thirty-six towns), the Commission reiterated its preconceived notions adverse to the Zionist cause: "With a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish Commonwealth should be given up."<sup>3</sup> It is worth noting that of the three experts attached to the Commission, two submitted strongly dissenting reports, questioning the findings of the Commission.<sup>4</sup> These experts were more familiar with the conditions in the Near East than either of the two Commissioners.<sup>5</sup>

In short, the Commissioners asked for a definite reversal in American policy toward Palestine. They expressed themselves as disturbed by the violation of the principle of self-determination as they saw it.<sup>6</sup> The earlier report of the Peace Conference Intelligence Section had not seemed troubled by this aspect. Nor did the Intelligence Section consider it necessary that physical violence should be used to effectuate the program, as the King-Crane Commission seemed to think when it reported that "no British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms."

What does all this seesaw, then and later, add up to? Noble

as was the spirit of the Balfour Declaration and of the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of nations, there was lacking the will to decide which should prevail and then to take the necessary measures. Thus, the ultimate arrangements for Palestine failed to settle the real issues with sufficient clarity and singleness of purpose. The wills of people clashed and the real issue was whose will would prevail.<sup>7</sup>

As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter has put it: "The presence of the existing Arab population, of course, made the establishment of a Jewish National Home more difficult than if Palestine had been wholly empty. The difficulties of the undertaking were, however, fully canvassed before the Declaration was made or Mandate issued; the undertaking was assumed with full knowledge of its implications."<sup>8</sup>

In this connection, it cannot be repeated too often that the proposals submitted to the Peace Conference by the Zionist Organization on February 27, 1919, were officially approved by the Arab delegation, speaking through their chief, Emir Feisal. "We regard them as moderate and proper," he said. "We will do our best . . . to help them through. . . . We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another." Feisal insisted that both movements were national, not imperialist, and that "there is room in Syria for us both."<sup>9</sup> This viewpoint, so completely contrary to the findings of the King-Crane Commission, provided a reasonable basis for American policy toward a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It is not clear from the record just what forces were behind the findings which the King-Crane Commission so hurriedly gathered together.<sup>10</sup>

Many years later, the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations was obliged to remind the world of the difficulties inherent in this "settlement." In 1937, the Commission opined:



“What people could be expected to agree wholeheartedly that its country should be used for the establishment of a national home for another people, even if it were thereby to reap appreciable material benefits? And again, is it surprising that a people which for nearly two thousand years has been scattered over the face of the earth should have hastened to welcome an offer made to it to reconstruct a national home in the land of its forefathers, under the protection of a mighty empire? It was inevitable from the outset that there would be a conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs of Palestine, desirous of remaining or rather becoming complete masters in their own house, and the Jews, desirous of constituting or rather reconstituting a national home in Palestine.

“The very wording of the Balfour Declaration and of the Palestine Mandate clearly shows that this inevitable antagonism had been realized by the authors of these documents.”<sup>11</sup>

The record clearly shows the justice of these observations. The evidence is overwhelming that both the British and American governments realized that the Zionist aspirations for which the Declaration expressed sympathy meant large-scale Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish State. And when, in 1920, the British Colonial Office was at work whittling down the boundaries of Palestine, the Cabinet received “from the stricken American President a cabled letter tensely worded as to the honor of Christendom being involved in providing the Jewish homeland with adequate boundaries.”<sup>12</sup>

Unhappily, the ever-shifting balance of democratic politics was going against both Balfour and Wilson. In Britain, it was the Colonial versus the Foreign Office, while in America, it was the collapse of Wilsonian idealism and the “return to normalcy.” It was unfortunate that Zionist leaders were perhaps a

little too ready to accommodate themselves to the changes of policy dictated by expediency.

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<sup>1</sup>See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (1934); Shane Leslie, *Mark Sykes, His Life and Letters* (1923); T. E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert* (1927); Liddell Hart, *Colonel Lawrence* (1943); J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine, The Reality* (1939).

<sup>2</sup>See Harry Howard, "The King-Crane Commission" in *The Moslem World*, April, 1942, p. 133. I cannot agree with the general conclusion of the author.

<sup>3</sup>This quotation is from the extended extracts in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. II, p. 216. See Ch. XXXIV, dealing with Syria, Palestine, and Zionism. Baker is inclined to agree with the Commission's findings and maintains that they should be given "at least consideration in the determination of our policy toward these questions." Both the Commission and Mr. Baker are preoccupied with the principle of self-determination of nations.

<sup>4</sup>See Howard, *op. cit.* pp. 134-5.

<sup>5</sup>See also *The Times* (London) Oct. 8, 1919, where Capt. Yale's ideas were anonymously published.

<sup>6</sup>On that see Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>7</sup>A penetrating analysis of the difficulties presented by these dilemmas is offered by Erich Hula in "National Self-Determination Reconsidered," *Social Research*, Vol. X (1943): "There is no hope that Europe's danger zone will finally be pacified, unless democracy reasserts the universal idea over against the principle of nationalities, its illegitimate offspring." This is just as true of Palestine, of course.

<sup>8</sup>"The Palestine Situation Restated," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1931, p. 414.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>There are indications that Dr. Bliss of the American University at Beyrout, in association with various missionary groups active among the Arabs, played an important role in this.

<sup>11</sup>Preliminary Opinion of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations on the Partition Plan. See C. 330.M.222. 1937. VI. p. 228.

<sup>12</sup>See Jacob de Haas, *Louis D. Brandeis* (1929), p. 125. Cf., however, the adverse comments, suggesting that it was a Jewish maneuver, by the strongly partial J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine, The Reality* (1939), pp. 385-6.

## CHAPTER IV

# Congress' Resolution of 1922

The decision to administer Palestine (as well as Syria and Transjordan) by Mandate under the League of Nations having been taken with the full approval of both Jewish and Arab delegations, it is surprising to find that it took more than two years to bring the Mandate into being. The British have officially taken the view that this delay was owing largely to the intervention of the United States Government.<sup>1</sup> The facts do not bear out this contention, although the United States did contribute to the delay.

The Mandate was given to Great Britain by the Allied Conference at San Remo on April 25, 1920. It required approval by the League. In order to secure this approval, the mandatory power had to be specific concerning its plans, and these specific plans were not forthcoming until June 3, 1922, when Britain issued a White Paper through the Colonial Office—at that time headed by Winston Churchill. The noteworthy feature of this White Paper was its insistence upon a restrictive interpretation of the phrase, “a Jewish National Home *in* Palestine,” though it also stressed that the Jewish people “should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.” Said the document:



“[His Majesty’s Government] would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the [Balfour] Declaration . . . do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine . . . that Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres, is not susceptible of change. . . . When it is asked what is meant by the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of the Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connections.”<sup>2</sup>

There are considerable uncertainties involved in this phrasing of the White Paper of 1922. As the Palestine Commission Report of 1937 put it:<sup>3</sup>

“This definition of the National Home has sometimes been taken to preclude the establishment of a Jewish State. But, though the phraseology was clearly intended to conciliate, as far as might be, Arab antagonism to the National Home, there is nothing in it to prohibit the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State, *and Mr. Churchill himself has told us in evidence that no such prohibition was intended.*” (Italics mine.)

As a leading student has commented, "The cabinet refused to adopt either a pro-Zionist policy, contemplating the early creation of a Jewish state, or a pro-Arab policy, involving a recognition of Palestinian independence and abrogation of the Balfour Declaration. Instead, it sought to reconcile Arab opinion to the creation of a modified Jewish home."<sup>4</sup> In this purpose, Britain failed utterly. Indeed, so apparent was the impossibility of securing that kind of compromise that the doubt has persisted as to whether the British colonial administration was genuine in its adoption of this policy.

But what of the Americans? They, too, were involved in the Balfour Declaration. Could they re-interpret as readily as the British the meaning of the principles therein contained? Tactically, of course, the United States government was in a difficult position. By rejecting the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, America had put herself in the position of an outsider as far as mandates under the League were concerned. Palestine, from that standpoint, is one of the many conflict areas created by the World War, which the United States was abandoning to their fate. In that spirit of selfish isolation which dominated the entire foreign policy of the United States, the government concentrated upon "American rights," meaning essentially the rights of American citizens in the mandated areas.<sup>5</sup>

It has been a persistent Zionist claim that "American participation in settling the terms of the British Trusteeship for Palestine was by no means limited to safeguarding the interests of its nationals."<sup>6</sup> But the evidence in support of this claim unfortunately is limited to showing that the United States proved willing to waive the policy of "the open door" in order to facilitate the development of a Jewish National Home. Hence, the negative assertion is true. But it does not follow positively

that American participation extended to safeguarding the interests of others besides American nationals. In short, the United States government failed, through inaction, to interest itself in maintaining the positive commitments made in the Balfour Declaration.

Nothing shows this withdrawal from responsibility more vividly than the debate in the Sixty-seventh Congress at the time the oft-quoted resolution of 1922 was adopted. This joint resolution, dated June 30, 1922, reads as follows:

“Favoring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.”

In short, the joint resolution, signed by President Harding on September 21, reiterates the Balfour Declaration, thus committing the United States officially to the principles therein enunciated. However, in the light of the fact that on June 3 the British Colonial Office had reinterpreted the Balfour Declaration as recited above, laying stress on the formula “national home *in Palestine*,” the retention of this phrase in the joint resolution *might* be read as an explicit acknowledgment of the British change of mind. This impression is to some extent borne out by a study of the Congressional debate, which betrays considerable timidity. Yet the fact remains that the Congressional resolution committed the United States to the Balfour Declaration.

Characteristically, in the course of the debate on Capitol Hill, it was argued that the resolution “merely voices American favorable opinion and will not involve the United States in any possible manner.” The Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs likewise insisted that the resolution was of a purely moral significance: “It commits us to no foreign obligations or entanglement. . . . We may feel assured no unfortunate diplomatic complications can or will occur.” Jewish achievements in all fields of endeavor were recited at great length, and the contributions of American Jews to the upbuilding of Palestine were pointed out. All such oratory should not have hidden the fact that, essentially, Congress was using brave words without a willingness to assume responsibility for the actions involved. America was launched on her policy of big words and little deeds so trenchantly analyzed by Walter Lippmann recently.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately, most Zionist literature ignored these symptoms and adopted an attitude of wishful thinking. While Britain moved toward appeasement or reaction, America withdrew into her shell of ignominious isolation. The resolution of 1922, far from being used as the foundation stone of a bold and vigorous American policy in Palestine proved in fact the swan song of a period of international idealism then rapidly drawing to a close. This does not, of course, alter the fact that the United States, through the Congressional resolution, is committed to the principles of the Balfour Declaration. Indeed, this type of resolution is by no means a usual step for Congress to take.

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<sup>1</sup>*Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479, July, 1937, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>*Parliamentary Papers*, 1922, Cmd. 1700, pp. 18-19.

<sup>3</sup>*Parliamentary Papers*, 1937, Cmd. 5479, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup>Paul L. Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine* (1942), p. 69.

<sup>5</sup>See the study, *Mandate for Palestine* (1931), prepared by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department and published as Near Eastern Series, No. 1. Cf. also, Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (1930), pp. 48 ff., pp. 486 ff., where the American claims are discussed from the legal standpoint.

<sup>6</sup>See, e. g., *Memorandum Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission on American Interest in the Administration of the Palestine Mandate*, February 15, 1936, p. 15.

<sup>7</sup>Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic* (1943). It seems very unfortunate that Lippmann's just criticism of big words should have led him on to advocacy of the policy of the cold heart.



## CHAPTER V

# The American-British Convention of 1924

We have already mentioned the American government's claims in connection with the mandates under the League. These claims were based upon the proposition that America had acquired a vested interest in those areas of the world which were freed as a result of her war effort. The United States insisted that her citizens were entitled to the same rights and privileges as the citizens of members of the League. It was a policy resented sharply by members of the League, who inclined to feel that America desired to enjoy the advantages of League membership without shouldering any of its burdens and responsibilities. The Convention of 1924 concluded with Britain concerning the Palestine Mandate is no exception. There is no point in going into the details here. The important features of the Treaty from the standpoint of American policy were as follows: (1) The preamble recited the entire provisions of the Mandate, including the Balfour Declaration, thereby making the United States a signatory to these instruments; (2) American citizens were given rights and privileges equal to those of citizens of the states-members of the League of Nations; (3) The Mandatory would neither seek nor consent to any altera-

tion in the terms of the Mandate without having first obtained the consent of the United States.

The latter provision appears startling at first. Since it has often been recited in Zionist literature in general form, it is important to cite Article 7 of the Treaty in its entirety: "*Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.*" That means that the consent of the United States is called for only if the proposed change affects the rights of American citizens as dealt with in the Treaty. Nor was there any intimation that such consent would be denied if it were found that the alterations proposed did not affect the rights of American citizens.<sup>1</sup>

Is it too much to argue that the 1924 Convention actually represents a further step backward and away from the commitments of the Balfour Declaration as originally conceived? To be sure, the Balfour Declaration was embodied in this Treaty, but it was the Balfour Declaration as interpreted by the British government at that time, a Balfour Declaration as interpreted by the White Paper of 1922 and limited to a Jewish National Home *in Palestine*. Many years later, David Lloyd George was to point out that the original Balfour Declaration was meant to bring into existence a Jewish Commonwealth. "It was contemplated," he said in 1939, "that . . . if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth."<sup>2</sup> This position was shared by Wilson and the American government as shown by a statement of the President quoted above. Unfortunately no explicit recognition of this earlier position was given at this time. Yet the American government

seems to have retained at least a general interest in the broader issues of the future of Palestine, as attested to by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long recently when he stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "But the question of Palestine has a larger significance . . . We have been interested and will continue to be interested from the point of view of the larger aspects of world security and of world peace, as well as the rights of humans and humanitarian sympathies and the religious sentiments involved."<sup>3</sup>

What is worse, the explicit limitation placed upon the American government by Article 7, namely, to be concerned only with such changes in the Mandate as affect the particular American rights covered by the treaty, could be interpreted as amounting to a formal recognition of the political *desinteressement* of the American government in the future development of the Mandate. The treaty, in other words, instead of safeguarding the Jewish National Home by insuring it the active diplomatic support of the United States government, finagled this commitment and guardedly initiated the policy of abandoning the Jews in Palestine to their fate, except in so far as they could claim a clear connection with American treaty rights. It is not here implied that the American government was really free to control the situation effectively once it had declined to join the League of Nations. Perhaps the only effective alternative to the treaty would have been for the United States to insist that she be granted a condominium under the League (unless she wanted to claim Palestine altogether.) But the treaty did provide the United States with a sufficient status to enable her to participate in the shaping of the future of the National Home, should she desire to do so. However, she was not ready to avail herself of this opportunity at that time. Moreover, the Zionists themselves were committed to British administration



and had energetically opposed any form of international administration.

It was not necessarily a wise policy to interpret this development as favorably as most Zionist literature has been inclined to do. Apparently no effective attempt was made to introduce other safeguards. The developments of the next decade were to show that the United States had actually abandoned Palestine and the Jewish National Home to Britain and her good offices.

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<sup>1</sup>On October 14, 1938, the State Department, in a press release, said: "None of these articles empower the Government of the United States to prevent the modification of any of the mandates. Under their provisions, however, this government can decline to recognize the validity of the application to American interests of any modification of the mandates unless such modification has been assented to by the Government of the United States."

<sup>2</sup>David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, Vol. II (1939), p. 736.

<sup>3</sup>For Wilson see p. 5ff and footnote 1, ch. II. See also the document cited above, p. 8, and footnote 7, Ch. II. For Long, see *Hearings*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Congress, Session on H. Res. 350 and 352.

## CHAPTER VI

### American Indifference, 1924-1933

The passive acquiescence of the American government in policies which moved further and further away from the Balfour Declaration obliges one to question the view expressed by Josephus Daniels in 1942: "From that time [Wilson's administration] to this the sentiments of the American people and the attitude of the American government have never changed or faltered."<sup>1</sup> This is rather misleading. For while America continued to express *in words* the sentiments which led her, under Wilson, to support the Balfour Declaration, her government was no longer disposed to express them *in action*. Only very recently, with the re-awakening of an international conscience, have substantial numbers of non-Jewish Americans returned to a frame of mind where they are sufficiently aroused to demand concrete and definite action. Meanwhile, the conduct of the American government underwent a continuous change from warm sympathy, to uncertainty, to indifference, to undeclared hostility toward the idea of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people as of right and not on sufferance of the Arabs.

The period from 1924 to 1936—the Arab rebellion started in earnest in the latter year—is one of ups and downs, but with

a fairly continuous over-all deterioration in the relations between the three major partners in Palestine: the British, the Arabs, and the Jews. To be sure, all three were represented by particularly interested groups with well-crystallized leadership—the British by their Colonial Office, the Arabs by the Mufti and his entourage of big landowners, and the Jews by the Zionist Executive. Perhaps this rather selective leadership contributed toward the difficulties. Certainly, it can be asserted that of all the organizations of which the British government is composed, the Colonial Office was perhaps least suited, in terms of background and general outlook, to find a lasting solution to Palestine's problems. Without going into detail, it is permissible to refer to the tradition of imperialism deeply rooted in that organization; it is also relevant to remark upon the lack of popular support for this imperialism, which forced the bureaucracy of the Colonial Office to rely increasingly upon subterfuge and equivocation to achieve its traditional objectives. While self-government was looming as a goal for Palestine, it could not appear an especially desirable goal to men whose primary concern was the maintenance of British controls in all parts of the world. What would be more natural than to be struck by the inherent incapacity of Arabs and Jews to get along with each other, thus requiring the presence of a neutral umpire to keep the peace?<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the Mufti and his following, while undoubtedly representative of considerable sections of the Arab people in Palestine, must be considered politicians whose personal fortunes are bound up with the maintenance of intransigent agitation. Not only the moderate sentiments of the Emir Feisal, above referred to, but other evidence is at hand to suggest that considerable sections of the Palestinian Arabs have

been quite ready to recognize the advantages Palestine was deriving from Jewish immigration and interest.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, Zionist leadership, too, has from time to time shown an inclination to be "nationalist" in the more uncompromising sense. To be sure, the wisdom and moderation of Dr. Chaim Weizmann and others have kept these tendencies in check; yet, the difficulties of doing so have been demonstrated by the rise of the so-called "Revisionists," who took a more extreme and uncompromising position.<sup>4</sup> Still, the British have freely admitted that relations with the Jews "are better than the relations of the Arabs with the government." The Jewish Agency "has carried controversy to the point of challenging the government's authority . . . Under very great provocation, they have shown a notable capacity for discipline and self-restraint." One of the reasons is fairly obvious. Jewish "extremist" nationalism cannot "go all out" for freedom, since at present a free Palestine means an Arab state.<sup>5</sup> But there are other reasons, closely bound up with Jewish culture and tradition.

With this much said about the leadership of British, Arab, and Jewish interests, we can turn to the story of the repercussions of Palestinian developments in American policy. The Palestinian Mandate had formally gone into effect on September 29, 1923. It differed from other mandates in that it stated specific and positive obligations for the mandatory to create the National Home for the Jewish people; yet the British continued to insist that it remain a major object to promote the well-being and development of the mandated territory as a whole.<sup>6</sup> The Arabs, or rather the Arab Executive (created by Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner to correspond to the Zionist Executive), never really accepted the Mandate in either respect. As early as 1922 it described the British government as "holding authority by an occupying force" and as-

serted that "no constitution which would fall short of giving the people of Palestine full control of their own affairs could be acceptable."<sup>7</sup> They rested their claim that the British were committed to this policy on a controversial interpretation of a secret treaty between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein, an interpretation which has never been accepted by the British government.

The American government, uninformed of the existence of the so-called secret treaty, could naturally not be expected to be concerned with it in contravention of its openly avowed pledge in connection with the Balfour Declaration. On the other hand, the United States was more deeply involved in the principle of the self-determination of nations, as previously stated. In any case, the American government was not officially approached and therefore had no occasion to concern itself with the Arab claims. If it had, a dilemma might have presented itself; for a national self-government could not be established in Palestine so long as it would be used to frustrate the purpose of the Balfour Declaration. But since the Arabs declared, "The people of Palestine cannot accept the creation of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine," action should have followed—if the policy thus challenged had really been a policy upon which the United States government was prepared to insist. No such action, nor indeed the suggestion of action, has ever been forthcoming.

It has been a persistent feature of the problem of Palestine that it cannot be "self-contained." As the Royal Commission of Inquiry Report has stated: "The Jewish community in Palestine could not be free from its association with the hopes and fears and sufferings of Jews elsewhere, nor could the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs be secluded from those of the Arab world around it." As far as American policy is con-



cerned, one significant feature of this situation was the fact that the Jews were more numerous and therefore perhaps more influential in the democratic United States, while Arabs were a grave concern to the British Empire. Had the United States adopted a vigorous policy of maintaining the commitments of the Balfour Declaration, she might have had to face the prospect of a serious controversy with the British Empire. Yet this was not inevitable by any means. American policy might have sufficed to reinforce sympathetic British elements who were anxious to see the policy of the Declaration and the Mandate carried out. But there was no sign of any disposition for that at all. If it was true, as the Peel Commission said in 1937, that "a conflict has been created between two national ideals, and that under the system imposed by the Mandate it could only be resolved if one or both of these ideals were abandoned," the United States government was not ready to face that dilemma in 1926, or at any time before or after.

In the second half of the twenties, from 1926 to 1928, a local depression, which was a reflection of a developing economic crisis in Europe and, more specifically, in Poland, troubled Palestine. People who are hostile to Jewish aspirations in Palestine like to point to that period as "proving" that Palestine is no solution to the Jewish problem. Immigration fell, and in one year, 1927, emigration even exceeded immigration. But the Jewish population actually rose from 121,000 to 151,000 between 1925 and 1928, and in no year since that time has Jewish immigration fallen as low even as 4,000. Nor is it true that depression brought conflict; indeed, 1926-1929 were years of peace in Palestine. Perhaps the Arabs began to wonder whether this was not the beginning of the end of the National Home.

When the tide turned and Jewish development was resumed,

the old antagonism returned with redoubled vigor. A sanguinary outburst occurred in 1929 and was forcibly suppressed by the British. More than 300 Jews were killed by the Arabs and more than 200 Arabs by the British police. Did this new and dangerous development lead to any new policy or action on the part of the United States? Not at all; America remained a spectator.

These riots caused an American-Jewish delegation to call upon President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson, handing the latter a memorandum asking for intervention and protection.<sup>8</sup> It is the impression of Dr. Emanuel Neumann, who headed the delegation, that the State Department at the time sent a note to the British government calling attention to the loss of lives and property of American nationals and the danger to other American nationals, and suggesting the availability of American forces to restore order.<sup>9</sup> It is not known what answer was received or whether any further action was taken. From the standpoint of this analysis, the half-hearted limiting of this intervention to American nationals and their property appears in line with the general inclination to evade the obligations toward the National Home, as such, under the Balfour Declaration.

In October, 1930, the British government published a White Paper, based on the findings of two commissions which had investigated the causes of the disturbances of 1929. Proposing to restrict Jewish immigration severely, because it was alleged to be the cause of Arab unemployment, this White Paper aroused a storm of protest<sup>10</sup> among Jews and non-Jews in Britain and in the United States. Dr. Weizmann and other Zionist leaders resigned, and the British government found itself obliged to back water. Had the British government sought the consent of the United States government to this proposed restric-

tion? We have no knowledge of such a move. Did the United States government take any steps to seek a clarification of the issues or did it demand that the proposals be kept within the formerly stated policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate? As far as the public knows, no such steps were taken.

Contrary to her commitments under the Balfour Declaration, the United States left the entire matter to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. In June, 1930 this body reasserted the policy of the Declaration by stating to the Council of the League of Nations the objects of the Mandate as: (1) the establishment of the Jewish National Home; (2) the establishment of self-governing institutions. It also recalled that the immediate obligation of the Mandatory is defined in the Mandate as placing the country under such conditions as will secure these objectives.<sup>11</sup> These statements follow a rather pointed general criticism of the conduct of the Mandatory, whom the Commission charged with failing to act with sufficient vigor to "place the country under such conditions" as would achieve the objectives of the Mandate. "The Mandates Commission ventures to think that had the Mandatory Government concerned itself more closely with the social and economic adaptation of the Arab population to the new conditions due to Jewish immigration, it would have served the interests of both sections of the population."<sup>12</sup>

Thus, while the League of Nations had vigorously criticized the British government for its policy, the United States, true to its isolationist policy, did not, through any known action, acknowledge any interest whatsoever in the matter.<sup>13</sup> To the ardent appeals of Jewish organizations, the government turned a deaf ear, and the public in general was on the whole apathetic. Within the framework of isolationist thinking there was no room for any distinctive policy.



<sup>1</sup>In his admirable introduction to Paul H. Hanna's volume, already cited, p. XI.

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., the able study of colonial administration by Rupert Emerson, *Malaysia* (1937). On p. 484 this author says, in assessing the attitude of the British colonial official: "For the bulk even of the most enlightened and sympathetic colonial civil servants the fact is ever present that they are rulers of a dependency: their role is to govern, while that of the people is to obey . . . it is an uprooted and traitorous native who himself claims the right to guide his people toward the new goals." See also *ibid.*, p. 474, 280 ff. The passionate reactions contained in William B. Ziff's attack on the colonial civil servants in Palestine are a vivid reminder of the results of such an attitude. Cf. *The Rape of Palestine* (1938), p. 192 ff. "Bureaucracy looks at Jews." The background of popular sentiment and imperialist ideas of race superiority is dispassionately described in John M. Gaus, *Great Britain, A Study of Civic Loyalty*, Ch. V.

<sup>3</sup>See note 6 in chapter II.

<sup>4</sup>For their views see *Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Vol. X (article by Benjamin Akzin).

<sup>5</sup>*Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937, pp. 120-121. Cmd. 5479.

<sup>6</sup>*Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937, ch. II; see also the series of Reports from the British Government to the League of Nations, printed in Great Britain, Colonial Office Reports, 1925 to date, and the Minutes of Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, especially those of June 3rd to 21st, 1930 (C. 355.M.147. 1939 VI.) and of June 15th to 17th, 1939 (C.170.M.100. 1939. VI).

<sup>7</sup>J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine, The Reality* (1939), pp. 521 ff.

<sup>8</sup>*New York Times*, August 27, 1929.

<sup>9</sup>Letter from Dr. Neumann to the author.

<sup>10</sup>Cmd. 3692.

<sup>11</sup>See League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extraordinary) Session*, Geneva, 1930, p. 145.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>13</sup>A flaming appeal was issued by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, assisted by Jacob de Haas, entitled *The Great Betrayal* (1930).

## CHAPTER VII

# The Coming of the Nazis

The conquest of Germany by the Nazis in 1933, while not immediately reflected in new developments in Palestine, nevertheless exercised a profound influence upon the progress of the Jewish National Home. The anti-Semitic laws and the unprecedented ferocity of Jewish persecution inside Germany, followed by waves of intensified anti-Semitic activities in Central and Eastern Europe, swelled the stream of refugees seeking a home in Palestine. Germany itself had in the past been a haven of refuge for the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe. Now Western European countries, notably France and Britain, were disinclined to welcome the Jews fleeing the Hitler terror. The United States, while somewhat more hospitable, nevertheless tightened the anti-immigration policy through administrative methods. In this situation, it would have been natural and necessary to have the gates of Palestine thrown wide open to Jewish immigration. But the propagandists of National Socialism, while occasionally rendering lip service to the idea of a Jewish National Home, actually proceeded to stir up Arab nationalist sentiment further.

It has been alleged repeatedly (as we mentioned before)

that Arab opposition leaders were financially aided by the Fascist powers. It is impossible at this time to furnish concrete evidence in support of this contention, yet our general knowledge of Nazi-Fascist techniques makes such support more than probable.<sup>1</sup> In any case, tension mounted continually as official Jewish immigration climbed from 4,944 in 1930 to 61,854 in 1933<sup>2</sup>, with rumors circulating that illegal immigration was a multiple of this figure.

In 1936, Arab nationalist extremists led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, al Husseini, took drastic action; they rebelled and initiated a reign of terror. Never having acknowledged the principles of the Balfour Declaration or of the Mandate incorporating those principles, these Arabs evidently felt that the day had come to strike. The action came as something of a surprise to many who had been deceived by the continued economic progress of Palestine and had come to disregard the persistent political unrest.<sup>3</sup> Fascist aggression in Ethiopia set off the spark. There then followed a "general strike" of the Arabs, directed by a new Arab Higher Committee. This strike lasted from April to October and was accompanied by much violence and bloodshed. It was abandoned only after large contingents of the British Army had been moved into Palestine; the princes of the surrounding Arab states joined in urging its discontinuance. Since the back of the strike had been broken, this last looks like a face-saving device.

The strike had three objectives: (1) the cessation of Jewish immigration; (2) the prohibition of the sale of Arab land to Jews; (3) the establishment of an independent government responsible to an elected legislature. In short, the Arabs wanted the abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate.

Did the United States government or Congress take any ac-

tion in the matter? Did it, for example, use its good offices with the other Arab states to secure an abandonment of these policies, which contravened its own international commitments? If so, the public has not been informed about such steps.

The British government, urged on by critical public opinion at home and a hostile Mandates Commission abroad, dispatched a new Royal Commission to Palestine under the chairmanship of Lord Peel. This Commission eventually recommended the partition of Palestine—a recommendation adopted by the government in its White Paper of July 7, 1937,<sup>4</sup> which declared: "In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission they [the British Government] are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock." There is here a clear admission of a distinct alteration of policy recommended to Parliament and to the League of Nations.

What was the American policy toward this alteration of policy? From a memorandum issued by the Department of State on October 18, 1938,<sup>5</sup> it would appear that the United States government limited itself to following developments and insisting upon the formality of being informed in advance of proposed alterations so as to enable it "to make observations . . . with a view to the preservation of American rights in Palestine." But at the same time it asserted, as previously noted, that none of the articles in treaties concerning the mandates "empower the government of the United States to prevent the modification of the terms of any of the mandates"—an interpretation that has been questioned by scholars. In other words, the United

States government disinterested itself by implication in any infringement of the Balfour Declaration or of the Mandate which embodies the Declaration in its preamble. All the State Department promised was that it would "continue to follow the situation closely" and "to take all necessary measures for the protection of American rights and interests in Palestine." It is perfectly clear, however, that the only "rights" which it was prepared to protect were the particular rights and the material interests of individual Americans, and that "American rights" did not comprise broader national interests, such as the pacification of that part of the world or the development of the Jewish National Home.

It is noteworthy that this restrictive and "isolationist" statement of policy was issued in response to a large number of telegrams and letters from individuals and organizations in the United States concerning Palestine, "with particular reference to the reported possibility of the application by the British government of a new policy with regard to that country." In February, seven nation-wide Jewish organizations had submitted to the Peel Commission a memorandum dealing with "American Interest in the Administration of the Palestine Mandate." In this document, the contributions American citizens have made to the development of Palestine were recited in detail. The Zionist Organization, Hadassah, Palestine Foundation Fund, Jewish National Fund of America, Palestine Economic Corporation, American Economic Committee for Palestine, and the Palestine Endowment Funds were associated in this effort to have the government point out to the British why Palestine was a concern of Americans. In another memorandum, entitled "A Brief Statement of the Basis and Scope of the Right of the United States to Participate in any Disposition of Palestine," they appealed to the State Department for a broad interpreta-



tion of American interests. But the State Department took a very narrow view of the situation. From the record it is not clear why, but the attitude is generally in line with the policy of acquiescing in appeasement which dominated American foreign policy at the time.

Thus the consequences of America's failure to adhere to the League of Nations and to participate in the instrumentalities created by the League to carry out the policies initiated during the first World War were once more brought vividly forward. Though perhaps on a minor front, Palestine was not without importance in the world-wide Fascist attack. The inactivity of the American government and people in combating the divisive strategy of the Axis and their readiness to acquiesce in the British policy of appeasing the aggressors helped to prepare the ground for the disasters which were to follow. Though voices were raised for a more stalwart policy within the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, they could not hope to achieve their goal without the effective support of Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, the Mandates Commission declared itself "opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent states."<sup>6</sup> At the same time, criticism of the White Paper of October, 1938, both in Britain and abroad, especially among Arabs, continued to be so fierce that the British government eventually decided to abandon partition as a solution of the problems of Palestine and returned to the policy of seeking a compromise between Arab and Jewish demands.

All through this period, one of the principal arguments brought forward by those who wished to oppose further Jewish immigration into Palestine was "limited absorptive capacity." A special report by Sir John Hope Simpson had been gathered in the early thirties. Estimate after estimate had to be revised



upward, as Jewish enterprise developed the economic resources of a once barren waste. Fortunately, we are today possessed of more adequate information furnished by an American expert who has studied the situation from the unbiased standpoint of an American soil conservationist. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, has shown that the absorptive capacity of Palestine is ample for all present immigration prospects. He writes: "I shall not attempt to estimate the final absorptive capacity of Palestine. That would be impossible, for the absorptive capacity of any country is a dynamic and expanding conception. It changes with the ability of the population to make the maximum use of its land. . . . It is clear, however, . . . that full utilization of the Jordan Valley depression for reclamation and power will in time make possible the absorption of at least four million Jewish refugees from Europe. . . ."<sup>7</sup> "Limited absorptive capacity," then, may be looked upon as a "red herring" drawn across the trail of those who are trying to design a sound policy for the United States to pursue in relation to Palestine. Such arguments are entirely contrary to American tradition; for the American people have always believed in the creative ability of man to master his destiny by new economic development through invention and enterprise. Unfortunately, this spirit was not brought to bear upon American policy in the period here under review. Instead, timidity reigned supreme. We had no answer to the problems created by the coming of the Nazis, here as elsewhere.

The period following the coming of the Nazis was marked by greatly increased trouble in Palestine, due in part to their anti-Semitic terror, in part to the Fascist support of Arab extremism, and in part to the policy of appeasement, unhappily adopted by the British government in the face of these chal-

lenges. The United States government here, as elsewhere, passively acquiesced in British appeasement and its results.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*The Times* (London), July 16, 1943, p. 5, carried a rather startling item. In reporting on the enlistment of foreigners in the Waffen S.S., it stated: "A Moslem S.S. division has been formed in Bosnia, to which the Mufti of Jerusalem is reported to have been attached as propagandist." There is also the claim that Arab extremists were financed by Moscow.

<sup>2</sup>See Report, *Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1938*, Colonial No. 166 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), p. 68.

<sup>3</sup>See Paul L. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 109. Exports rose from 1,572,061 to 4,215,486 pounds between 1931 and 1935. Report, *Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1936*, Colonial No. 133 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 182.

<sup>4</sup>*Parliamentary Papers*, 1937, Cmd. 5479 and Cmd. 5513.

<sup>5</sup>See *Documents on American Foreign Relations, January 1938-June 1939*, edited by A. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1939), p. 447.

<sup>6</sup>League of Nations, C. 330.M.222. 1937. VI. p. 228.

<sup>7</sup>Walter C. Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of Promise* (1944), p. 227.

<sup>8</sup>See for critical appraisals of this policy Carl J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (1938), and Frederick L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe* (1941).

## CHAPTER VIII

# The White Paper of 1939 and the War

In September, 1938, the Chamberlain government surrendered to Fascist aggression. The Munich pact, while the most dramatic step in appeasing the Fascists, was only one of many similar moves on the road toward war. And since the Arab Nationalist leadership had allied itself openly with the Fascist powers, it was only logical for the British Conservatives to try to appease them, as they had tried to appease Mussolini. Untaught by the recurrent experience that every concession brought more intransigent demands, the British Colonial Office now prepared to surrender to Arab nationalist insistence: it prepared for a Palestinian Munich Pact. In 1937, the Mandates Commission had already pointed out that "the vacillation of British policy" had "helped to encourage the Arabs in the belief that by resorting to violence they could succeed in stopping Jewish immigration."<sup>1</sup> In the meantime, the American government pursued its parallel course of flamboyant verbal protests against aggression, designed to hide from the uninitiated the cold fact of acquiescence in and acceptance of Fascist violence. It is a sad record, morally as despicable as the frank British avowal of surrender.

Thus the extreme measure of appeasement was reached in the White Paper of May, 1939. This paper embodied earlier proposals which had been the basis of protracted conferences in London. It amounted to a definite abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate's constitution.<sup>2</sup> Apart from a general statement disclaiming any obligation beyond what had already been done to foster the establishment of a Jewish National Home, the White Paper proposed to bring Jewish immigration into Palestine to an end within a five-year period and to place upon land purchase by Jews such restrictions as the government saw fit. During the five-year period the total Jewish immigration was not to exceed 75,000. There was, to follow some time after 1944 the establishment of a "Palestinian" state in which the Arabs, by that time possessed of a two-thirds majority, would presumably have political, if not administrative, control. Such independence was to be conditional upon an agreement between Britain and Palestine which would provide for "the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries."

The reaction to this proposal in America was immediate and sharp. In a substantial number of papers editorials appeared protesting the policy outlined in the White Paper. These included the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Baltimore Sun*, and many others.<sup>3</sup> But while sympathetic enough, most of the editorials lacked a concrete and specific focus of suggested policy. Typically, the *New York Times* remarked, "Great Britain must protect these people to the end." And even those who went farther and recognized an American interest, generally stopped short of practical policy. Thus the *Chicago Daily News* merely asked: "Was our assent secured?

Was an effort made to secure it? If not, why not? These are questions in which both Congress and the State Department should take an immediate interest." The *News* of Birmingham, Alabama, rather timidly suggested that "the United States is not without duty under the circumstances . . ."

On the other hand, American Jews did suggest policy. They asked definite action on the part of the government. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise appeared before Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the head of a delegation of 250 leaders and submitted a petition which said, in part: "We, therefore, respectfully request that the United States Government . . . make representation to the British Government (a) that no action be taken for the implementation of the new White Paper on Palestine until this government shall have had an opportunity to examine its terms and to pass judgment on its bearing on American rights; and (b) that the United States Government, on the basis of its convention with Great Britain, cannot recognize action taken under the new White Paper in view of the jeopardy created for American interests."<sup>4</sup>

The National Council of Jewish Women appealed directly to President Roosevelt "to prevent this further tragedy."<sup>5</sup> Even before this, the Zionist Organization of America, speaking through its president, Dr. Solomon Goldman, had appealed to the government to take action. But although the government "studied" the problem and expressed general sympathy, no action crystallized. Even the intercession of twenty-seven prominent writers had no apparent effect, couched as it was in vague general terms. As far as the record shows, nothing happened, and the British Government proceeded to implement the policy of the White Paper by restricting immigration, land purchase, and industrial development.

The inactivity of the American Government during the sum-



mer of 1939 is undoubtedly to be explained in part by the tense international situation preceding the outbreak of the World War. It was evidently felt in official quarters that any action on this issue at the time might have played into the hands of isolationists and strengthened anti-British sentiment. It is, nevertheless, surprising that no move whatever was made. The United States had little to lose from antagonizing the Arabs. Why should she not have gone at least as far as the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and stated it as her opinion that the proposal was contrary to her understanding of commitments solemnly entered into by both governments?<sup>6</sup> This is the period, it will be recalled, when the United States was engaged in reminding other powers of their failure to live up to their agreements. It was in this period that Cordell Hull had stated the philosophy of the sanctity of treaty commitments in no uncertain terms.<sup>7</sup> Here in the policy of the White Paper was a clear breach, sharply criticized by many leading Britishers, including Winston Churchill. Britain was vulnerable to pressure from the United States; there is every indication that a decided stand would have produced marked reactions and perhaps positive results.

In the absence of any such stand by the United States, the only pressure was that exerted by the Moslem world. Inasmuch as Britain was in a perilous position, what else could be expected than that she would yield ground to the Arab nationalists, who were in a position to make trouble in the Near East? As the *New York Herald Tribune* commented: "It is an act of power politics. But any other settlement would have been an act of power politics; and when the appeal must be in any event to brute power, one must expect considerations of imperial power and interest to be overruling."<sup>8</sup>

Great Britain, in mortal danger from the Nazi assault upon



her empire, knowing that the Jews would willy-nilly have to support her, has proceeded to carry out the policy of the White Paper in the years since its publication. Even in the face of the most decided support given to the war effort by Palestinian Jews,<sup>9</sup> the British have continued to restrict immigration and land purchase. What is worse, the five-year period is now running out. By April, 1944, according to schedule, all Jewish immigration was to cease,<sup>10</sup> except for the holders of unused certificates within the 75,000 quota of the White Paper.

The Arabs, meanwhile, are pushing a Pan-Arab Federation, and it has been alleged that the British Colonial Office is nurturing these developments in the hope of taking Syria from France and Libya from Italy under the disguise of such a federation.<sup>11</sup> The idea supposedly is that an Arab Federation would fall under British influence because of its internal weakness, torn as it would be between the several Arab factions. Furthermore, as in India, the beneficiaries of the decaying feudal system would depend upon British support for the maintenance of their control. This surely is a form of imperialism linked with social reaction which the United States would not wish to be associated with.

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<sup>1</sup>C. 330.M.222. 1937. VI. p. 228.

<sup>2</sup>For further detail, see Hanna, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff. The latter point was made emphatically by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in an advisory opinion to the Council in which it stated that "the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the mandatory power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine mandate." C. 170.M.100. 1939. VI. p. 275.

<sup>3</sup>See *American Public Opinion on British Policy in Palestine*, issued by the American Zionist Bureau.

<sup>4</sup>*New York Times*, May 23, 1939.

<sup>5</sup>*New York Times*, May 20, 1939.

<sup>6</sup>See the statement of the Mandates Commission, cited above, as well as the entire debate between June 8th and 29th, 1939, especially that of June 29th.

<sup>7</sup>See Appendix II to Carl J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (1938), especially pp. 283-284.

<sup>8</sup>Editorial of May 19, 1939.

<sup>9</sup>See Chaim Weizmann's "Palestine's Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1942), and the recent volume by Pierre van Paassen, *The Forgotten Ally* (1943).

<sup>10</sup>According to a recent dispatch in the *New York Times*, November 11, 1943, the British Government, in announcing that it would admit 31,078 Jews who were legally entitled to enter Palestine, even after the deadline, at the same time reasserted its determination, speaking through its Colonial Secretary, Col. Oliver Stanley, that there would be no change in the basic policy laid down in the White Paper of May, 1939.

<sup>11</sup>Pierre van Paassen. *op. cit.*, p. 304 ff.

## CHAPTER IX

# America's Future Policy

What should be the policy of the United States toward the Jewish National Home in Palestine? Clearly, the White Paper of 1939 violated even the narrowly defined American interest in Palestine as covered by the Convention of 1924. The White Paper states: "The objective of His Majesty's Government is establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future." It was, as we have seen, the purpose of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 to ensure America and American interests equality of opportunity in the mandated territory. Her position was to be analagous to that of Britain and other states-members of the League. The policy set forth in the White Paper points in precisely the opposite direction: Palestine is to be bound to Great Britain by treaties which will ensure to the latter special commercial and strategic advantages. One wonders whether the Convention is supposed to be presently abrogated. But this aspect is really of minor importance. There are much broader issues involved, as well.

There are signs that the American people are awakening to the world-wide implications of the problem of Palestine. During

1943 and early 1944 seventeen state legislatures adopted resolutions favoring the continued development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The legislature of Connecticut even went so far as to speak of a Jewish Commonwealth. The states include Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. In Massachusetts a similar resolution was adopted in 1939. These states comprise some 58.1 per cent of the population of the United States.

Christian groups have also taken an increasing interest in the situation.

The American Palestine Committee, for example, comprises many hundreds of leading Americans from all walks of life and considers itself "the vehicle for the expression of the sympathy and good will of Christian America for the movement to re-establish the Jewish National Home in Palestine." In its literature, this Committee stresses the fact that "the Jewish community of Palestine, by its valiant contributions in manpower, industry, and science, has become a tower of strength to the cause of the United Nations in the Near East." They declare that the Jewish National Home in Palestine "must be protected and cherished today as an outpost of freedom and social justice." They add that "its continued upbuilding must be a vital part of a just world order when the present conflict is over."

Another organization of national scope interested in this issue is the Christian Council on Palestine. This organization is composed of approximately 1,500 Christian clergymen and is even more specific in demanding American policy of a concrete and practical kind. Its executive committee has recommended that "plans be made now to place Palestine under an international mandate of the United Nations" and that "the doors of Palestine

be opened at once to admit tens of thousands more of the persecuted Jewish people from war-torn Europe."

The great labor organizations also have recently adopted resolutions in support of the Jewish National Home. On October 4, 1943, the A.F.L. unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"The American Federation of Labor urges that the restrictions on Jewish immigration and settlement contained in the British White Paper of 1939 be withdrawn, and that the Balfour Declaration be so implemented that the hopes and aspirations of the Jewish people to build their own Commonwealth in Palestine may be realized. Thus will this ancient people be enabled to take its rightful place among the democratic nations of the world, and make its full contribution to that progressive world which we all pray will emerge from the horrible sufferings of this global war."

Likewise, the C.I.O. on November 5, 1943, declared:

"We support the demands of Palestinian Jews for all opportunity for unrestricted participation on the battlefield and for the unrestricted opportunity to make an agricultural and industrial contribution to the war effort. We join in their demands for the abrogation of the so-called Chamberlain White Paper which would close all Jewish immigration into Palestine by April, 1944, as discriminatory, unfair, unjust and a hindrance to the war effort."

Many other civic, professional, and fraternal organizations have adopted similar resolutions recently.

It is worth noting that these and similar organized attempts to build support for an American policy toward Palestine are premised upon two major considerations: (1) that the Nazi persecution of the Jews requires us to consider Palestine as an international rather than a local problem, and (2) that the Bal-



four Declaration constitutes an American commitment which we are obliged to carry through, because the Jews relying upon it have made great sacrifices and have built up industry and agriculture in Palestine at an amazing rate. In the light of this growing public support for a positive policy, it is not surprising that Representative Emanuel Celler (New York) should have taken issue with the inactivity of the State Department. Shortly after threatening an investigation of the Department, he wrote to President Roosevelt:

"I cannot remain silent in the face of the brazen betrayal of Palestine by the British Foreign Office. I cannot bide my tongue any longer while Jew-haters, who are also Roosevelt-baiters, grin like Cheshire cats at the abetting of this betrayal by some of our own officials in the State Department."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Celler named Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, Special Envoy to the Middle East, Harold Hoskins of the State Department, and Wallace Murray, an adviser on political relations.

Some British friends of the Jewish homeland feel strongly that the United States should undertake the administration of Palestine.<sup>2</sup> It certainly would remove Palestine from the power politics of imperial interests in the Near East, and in the light of the American record in handling other outlying territories, there may even be hope that the Arabs would recognize the likelihood of eventual independence. However, many hold that America should not enter upon such a course. There is no doubt whatever, in the light of the record, that the handling of the Palestinian situation would require a very firm hand, that the idea that terrorism can secure concessions would have to be eradicated without shrinking from radical measures, and that severe penalties, such as long-term disability to participate in self-government, would have to be imposed upon those who would try to sabotage the development of self-government by



non-cooperation. Propagandists would undoubtedly swamp this country with claims and counterclaims, but a really aggressive policy of economic development could probably hope to overcome a good part of the agitation by positive measures.

In any case, there is as yet little indication that the American people have been persuaded that they should assume such a responsibility or should even participate in an international mandate. However, a resolution brought before Congress in the spring of 1944 and calling for more active participation of the American government in the future policy concerning Palestine gathered very substantial support. The text of the resolution was as follows:

“Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved ‘that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected;’ and

“Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

“*Resolved*, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.”

This resolution would have passed in both Houses but for a warning from the Secretary of War, who expressed fear, in a

closed executive session, that such a move might endanger the war effort. Since the public was not apprised of what caused the Secretary of War to entertain such strange fears, it is not possible to examine the validity of his views at the present time. With the progress of the war, these objections should become untenable and the path for the adoption of the resolution cleared.

As far as the Arabs are concerned, it would be foolish to enter upon a consideration of their claims within this context. There can be no question that America is alive to their demands. Quoting Josephus Daniels once again, "there is every reason to believe that, as at the end of the previous war, we shall again uphold the just claims of the Arabs. But, as in the previous case, America will also insist on justice for the Jews."<sup>3</sup> There are no very definite indications that this prediction will come true. In spite of the fact that Arab leadership conspired with the Axis in endangering the United Nations in the Near East, the Arabs shifted their position after the Allied victories in North Africa. British and American military commanders were much troubled by these problems. What is more, the traditional *effendi* class shares with the British Empire the paramount interest of keeping the Soviet Union out of the Near Eastern oil fields. And while the Jews of Palestine are by no means uniformly anti-capitalist, the conception of the Palestinian economy, shaped as it was by men like Brandeis, does not fit into the pattern of exploitative imperialism. Imperialists have usually found it easier to collaborate with a small group of native beneficiaries than with a democratic population as a whole. One cannot help feeling that the Arab people have never yet had a chance to show their hand.

Nor will another international commission to study and analyze the problems necessarily be very helpful. There have already been many commissions, and they have not helped, but

have stirred up further trouble as did our own King-Crane Commission. This is not to say that the problem should not be attacked within an international framework; of course it should be. For only within an international framework can the relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine be sufficiently attenuated to allow of a permanent settlement. This means that both Jews and Arabs will be obliged to abandon seeking the absolute sovereign status for Palestine which was formerly the goal of all states. Even existing states are facing the limitation of sovereignty involved in effective international organization. By clamoring for absolute sovereignty, the dependent peoples are liable to alienate those very forces of internationalism and tolerance which they most need for the achievement of local autonomy.

The goal which an increasing number of broad-minded Zionists are now striving for is that of a self-governing Palestinian commonwealth fully participating as an autonomous member of a supra-national government. If there is any American policy toward Palestine emerging from this war, it is likely to be a policy of giving vigorous support to those who seek the fulfillment of this task. It certainly is the only policy compatible with the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the Four Freedoms, and the Congressional Resolution of 1922.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*New York Herald Tribune*, August 18, 1943.

<sup>2</sup>See the address of Baron Wedgwood of Barlaston to the second annual dinner of the American Palestine Committee, May 25, 1942: "Therefore seek to get your America to act, to press for arms and justice, to accept the Mandate, to build another free land with open doors and open hearts . . . I have tried to save for my countrymen the glory of rebuilding Jerusalem—of doing justice and creating freedom. It's no use. They won't do it!" He added: "We may look forward to the day . . . when, joined in a Federal Union of the free, the Jews of Palestine may be partners . . ."

<sup>3</sup>Paul L. Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine* (1942), Introduction, p. XIII.

<sup>4</sup>For the text of the Atlantic Charter and other Allied declarations see *United Nations Agreements* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944). For the Declaration of the Four Freedoms see Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Belief in the Common Man*, Ch. X.

## CHAPTER X

# Summary and Conclusions

It is clear then that the American policy toward the National Home was defective and has aggravated the Palestine problem. The background for our mistakes was provided by the failure of the British to carry out the purposes underlying the Balfour Declaration with firm resolve and their adoption, instead, of a wavering policy and a progressive whittling down of the idea of the National Home in a futile attempt to satisfy Arab nationalists as well as Jews. The core of *our* policy consisted in this: the United States, after having, through President Wilson, given approval and support to the original policy and officially re-endorsed the Balfour Declaration by the resolution of Congress, withdrew from all responsibility for this policy and contented itself with occasional expressions of sympathy meant largely for home consumption, while declining to take concrete and practical steps giving the Jews such diplomatic support as lay in our power to give. The Zionists on their part failed to take the full measure of the unwillingness of the American Government to come to their aid and were partly inhibited by the extent of their commitment to British control of Palestine, with the result that no effective pressure was exerted upon the

American government or by the American government upon the British government. This was a result inherent in the policy of short-sighted isolationism which gripped America and prevented it from dealing with the issues confronting it in more than one theater.

However, an entirely new situation has now arisen, new in almost every important respect. In Europe, the position of the Jewish people has been jeopardized to such an extent as to call imperatively for a solution. In the Near East and North Africa, political conditions are fluid once more and the stage is set for a revision of policy, including the possibility of satisfying Arab nationalism by according a greater degree of freedom and unity to Arab peoples outside of Palestine. In America, there is a break with the isolationist past and a new awakening of the sense of international responsibility such as has not been witnessed since the days of Wilson. Finally, the Jews and the Zionists on their part are presumably more keenly aware than ever before of the need for ensuring clear-cut decisions, definite and explicit in character, and the need for a greater measure of international responsibility for the future of Palestine.

So far as America is concerned, it has a substantial interest in the question not only because, as has been said by an English observer, the "fact that the Jewish population of the United States is four and a half million makes plain the extent of that country's interest in the 'great purpose of a national Jewish Home in Palestine' ";<sup>1</sup> but for other reasons. These reasons are first, the growing acuteness of the Jewish problem in Europe; secondly, the pressure which is bound to be exerted on America to admit large numbers of refugees, unless they can be settled elsewhere; thirdly, the fact that conditions in the Near East are bound to remain unsettled and a source of future international rivalries and troubles unless there are clear-cut decisions and a



firm policy with respect to *each* of the Near Eastern countries, backed by strong international action.<sup>2</sup> Fourth, the substantial economic interests of Americans in Palestine, as well as the oil resources of the Near East, call for increased American participation in that part of the world.<sup>3</sup> To the extent to which the United States will and ought to be concerned with the Jewish problem in Europe, she will be concerned with the Palestine problem. The two are intimately related and cannot be severed.

Now is therefore the time for the United States to decide upon a definite and constructive policy toward the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It should be a policy in keeping with our general objectives, and it should be one which we are prepared to back and see through. In this, as in other international questions, the United States, instead of trailing behind other powers, needs to develop her own approach. This approach is clearly indicated by our interest in peace, our belief in democracy, and our stake in world prosperity and economic development.<sup>4</sup> Whatever furthers these broad ends, the United States should be for. Whatever hinders them, she should be against. The new American policy with respect to the National Home might therefore be put as follows:

- (1) The removal of present restrictions on the movement of people into and out of Palestine;

- (2) The removal of restrictions to settlement and reclamation, such as restrictions on land purchase;

- (3) The removal of restrictions on the movement of goods into and out of Palestine, as far as practicable;

- (4) A program of rapid and large-scale economic development, including basic reclamation and irrigation works, industrial development, and the like, with a view to maximizing absorptive capacity;

- (5) Opposition to all efforts to use political maneuvers,



especially terror, for the purpose of preventing the development of a Jewish majority, should the Jews throughout the world continue to back development in Palestine and thus bring this about;

(6) Participation in such international authorities as may be required to insure an unimpeded implementation of natural economic trends.

While such a policy runs counter to present British policy toward Palestine and the Jewish National Home, it is more than likely that a firm American stand, if diplomatically presented, would mobilize liberal British opinion. We have had occasion a number of times in the course of this memorandum to dwell upon sharp British criticism of official policy. Even staunchly conservative statesmen, such as Churchill, have been caustic in their castigations of the bureaucrats in the Colonial Office. In fact, sections of the British public have appealed to American sympathizers to help them in their efforts to bring about a change of policy. As in so many other fields of international policy, so here also, the issue is not between nations, but between emerging world democracy and the forces of reaction and special interest.

If it be objected that such a policy will encounter Arab resistance, the answer is that any policy in so controversial a field will meet with risks, but that the events of the last twenty-five years have taught us that inaction is even more risky. Altogether, American policy rests upon the conviction that problem areas such as Palestine call for recognition of their world-wide significance, rather than narrow local considerations.

The policy here sketched leaves out of account the ultimate political status of the country and the form which its government will take. It is clear, however, that if the measures indicated are carried out, Palestine might well become a Jewish Commonwealth in the sense that it would be a self-governing country with an established Jewish majority as the preponderant

factor in its future development. It is assumed, of course that constitutional guarantees will be provided, insuring equal rights for all sections of the population. It is also assumed that such a self-governing Palestine, when established, will be linked with a larger supra-national organization which will not deprive Palestine of its freedom but will associate it with a wider international democratic structure.

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<sup>1</sup>See *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1936*, p. 92, for a similar sentiment.

<sup>2</sup>For the striking about-face of the Soviet Union concerning Palestine and Zionism, see the revealing article in *Harper's Magazine*, April, 1944, by Eliahu Ben-Horin, "The Soviet Wooing of Palestine."

<sup>3</sup>The Near Eastern oil question has recently entered a rather active phase through the U. S. Government's proposal for an oil pipeline in Arabia. It is alleged to have affected American interests in relation to the Jewish National Home in Palestine, owing in part to King Ibn Saud's opposition.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Lowdermilk, *op. cit.*, Chs. VII and XI.

## Appendix A

### The Balfour Declaration\*

*The Balfour Declaration was presented in the following communication, dated November 2, 1917, from Lord Arthur James Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Walter Rothschild, then Vice President of the British Zionist Federation.*

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this Declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

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\**The Times* (London), Nov. 9, 1917.

## Appendix B

### Congress Resolution of 1922\*

*This resolution was unanimously adopted by the House and the Senate on June 30, 1922, and signed by President Harding on September 21 of the same year.*

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.

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\**Congressional Record*, June 30, 1922.

## Appendix C

### Peace Conference Recommendations\*

*The document here reproduced is the work of the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence appointed by President Wilson to prepare recommendations for the American delegation to the Peace Conference. It appeared in the report submitted to the delegation on January 21, 1919, at the President's request. The Section was composed of Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Dr. James T. Shotwell, Dr. Sidney Mezes, Dr. William Westerman and, for a time, Walter Lippmann as secretary.*

(1) It is recommended that there be established a separate state of Palestine.

The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the religious experience of mankind. The Jewish and Christian churches were born in Palestine, and Jerusalem was for long years at different periods the capital of each. And while the relation of the Mohammedans to Palestine is not so intimate, from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a holy place. Only by establishing Palestine as a separate state can justice be done to these great facts.

As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of great importance since the success of the new state would depend upon the possibilities of agricultural development.

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\*David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Peace Conference*, Vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

(2) It is recommended that this state be placed under Great Britain as a mandatory of the League of Nations.

Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance. Its population is without political experience, is radically composite, and could easily become distracted by fanaticism and bitter religious differences.

The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations, her relations to Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine from the Turk, all indicate her as the logical mandatory.

(3) It is recommended that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there, being assured by the Conference of all proper assistance in so doing that may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious) and the property rights of the non-Jewish population and being further assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact.

It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given the full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect unique among significant peoples.

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality, of the population in the future state remains uncertain. Palestine, in short, is far from being a Jewish country now. England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of non-Jews.



(4) It is recommended that the holy places and religious rights of all creeds in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its mandatory.

The basis for this recommendation is self-evident.

## Appendix D

### League of Nations Mandate\*

*The terms of the Mandate for Palestine, as reproduced below, were defined and approved by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, and came into force on September 29, 1923.*

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the

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\*O. J. League of Nations, August, 1922, pp. 1007 ff.

grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

#### ARTICLE 1

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

#### ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

## ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

## ARTICLE 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

## ARTICLE 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

## ARTICLE 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on the 1st August, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 9

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

## ARTICLE 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services, and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

## ARTICLE 12

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

## ARTICLE 13

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of pre-



serving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites, and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

#### ARTICLE 14

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define, and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition, and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

#### ARTICLE 15

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion, or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools

for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

#### ARTICLE 16

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

#### ARTICLE 17

The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defense of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval, or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways, and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

#### ARTICLE 18

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State member of the

League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory, or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce, or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

#### ARTICLE 19

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunitions, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic, and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

#### ARTICLE 20

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social, and other condi-

tions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

#### ARTICLE 21

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of, a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A. D. 1700.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export license from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

#### ARTICLE 22

English, Arabic, and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

#### ARTICLE 23

The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

#### ARTICLE 24

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

#### ARTICLE 25

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the



existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

#### ARTICLE 26

The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

#### ARTICLE 27

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

#### ARTICLE 28

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Article 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations, and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.



## Appendix E

### Anglo-American Convention of 1924\*

*The following is the essence of the 1924 Convention between United States and Great Britain with respect to the rights of the two Governments and their nationals in Palestine. It was signed in London on Dec. 2, 1924, by Frank B. Kellogg, then American Ambassador to Great Britain, and Joseph Austen Chamberlain, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Ratification of the Convention was advised by the Senate on February 20, 1925. In the following month ratification was made by President Coolidge (March 2) and Great Britain (March 18). The ratifications were exchanged at London on December 3, 1925.*

#### ARTICLE 1

Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States consents to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the mandate recited above.

#### ARTICLE 2

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

#### ARTICLE 3

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

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\**The Jewish National Home in Palestine*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Eighth Congress, 2nd Session, 1944.

## ARTICLE 4

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the Mandatory under Article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

## ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of any local laws for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic, and religious institutions in the mandated territory, to receive voluntary applicants, and to teach in the English language.

## ARTICLE 6

The extradition treaties and conventions which are, or may be, in force between the United States and Great Britain, and the provisions of any treaties which are, or may be, in force between the two countries which relate to extradition or consular rights shall apply to the mandated territory.

## ARTICLE 7

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

## ARTICLE 8

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. The present convention shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

## Appendix F

### Summary of the 1939 White Paper\*

*Embodying proposals which had been the subject of conferences held earlier in London, the White Paper of 1939 (Cmd. 6019) was prepared by the British Colonial Office and presented to the House of Commons on May 17. The following summary was issued by the British Information Services, an agency of the British Government.*

1. The London Conferences did not result in an agreement. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration have decided to adhere generally to the proposals finally submitted to the Arab and Jewish delegations.

2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, to facili-

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\**Britain's Mandate for Palestine*, British Information Services, March, 1944.

tate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.

(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

3. It has been held that the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy, have been a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. A clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. Since the partition proposal has been found to be impracticable, it has been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, (III) Land.

## I. THE CONSTITUTION

4. It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view that the Zionist leaders in 1917 recognized that a Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Balfour Declaration. But His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate

could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. The 1922 Command Paper (Cmd. 1700) should have removed doubts on this point by its statement that the Balfour Declaration meant not that "Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*"; but since it did not, His Majesty's Government now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to previous assurances to the Arabs, that the Arab population should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the 1922 Paper as follows:

"... The Jewish community (in Palestine) already has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew and a Hebrew press serves its needs. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious, and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. . . . A Jewish National Home means the further development of the existing Jewish community (on these lines) and not the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole. But for free development, the Jewish people must know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. . . ."

6. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the



fact that, since the 1922 Paper was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, raising the Jewish population to 450,000. Nor has the Jewish population failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

7. In recent discussion, the Arab Delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included in the area in which Sir Henry McMahon (on behalf of the British Government) undertook in 1915 to support Arab independence. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen but adhere to the view that the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was excluded, and that therefore there is no just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

8. His Majesty's Government are charged by the Mandate "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. They desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two people in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved. It will be the constant endeavor of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and Jews so that understanding and cooperation, necessary for good government, may grow.

10. The following are the intentions of His Majesty's Government:

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the estab-



lishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out the policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as Heads of Departments (with British advisers) approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number will be increased until all heads are Palestinians, serving on the High Commissioner's Executive Council, and then consideration will be given to changing this Council into a Council of Ministers.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless, they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine

hereafter show itself in favor of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the Constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the Constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for: (a) The security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies. (b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home. (c) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing. His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) If, at the end of ten years, it appears, contrary to the hopes of His Majesty's Government, that the establishment of the independent State should be postponed, they will consult with the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations, and the neighboring Arab States before deciding on such postponement, and invite their cooperation for framing plans to achieve the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

## II. IMMIGRATION

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. But in the 1922 White Paper, it was laid down that "immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

In practice, until recent times, economic absorptive capacity has been treated as the sole limiting factor. But His Majesty's Government does not accept that, for all time and in all circumstances, economic absorptive capacity must be the sole criterion. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy to support the view that the establishment of the Jewish National Home cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Though the large number of Jewish immigrants may have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike

must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that the fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread among the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the



whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year (1939), of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate

provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

### III. LAND

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further



transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this Statement of Policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavored to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practice mutual tolerance, good will, and cooperation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in

friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to cooperate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews, and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

## Appendix G

### Churchill on the 1939 White Paper\*

*On May 23, 1939, five days after the White Paper had been issued, Winston Churchill made the following statement in the House of Commons.*

I say quite frankly that I find this a melancholy occasion. Like my . . . Friend the Member for Sparkbrook [Mr. Leopold Amery], I feel bound to vote against the proposals of His Majesty's Government. As one intimately and responsibly concerned in the earlier stages of our Palestine policy, I could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or—and it will be a vain hope—for the sake of a quiet life. Like my Right Hon. Friend, I should feel personally embarrassed in the most acute manner if I lent myself, by silence or inaction, to what I must regard as an act of repudiation. I can understand that others take a different view. There are many views which may be taken. Some may consider themselves less involved in the declarations of former Governments. Some may feel that the burden of keeping faith weighs upon them rather oppressively. Some may be pro-Arab and some may be anti-Semite. None of these motives offers me any means of escape because I was from the beginning a sincere advocate of the Balfour Declaration, and I have made repeated public statements to that effect.

It is often supposed that the Balfour Declaration was an

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\*House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 347, Nos. 107 and 108.

ill-considered, sentimental act largely concerned with the Right Hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs [Mr. Lloyd George], for which the Conservative party had no real responsibility, and that, as the Secretary of State said yesterday, it was a thing done in the tumult of the War. But hardly any step was taken with greater deliberation and responsibility. I was glad to hear the account which my Right Hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook gave, derived from the days when he was working in the Secretariat of the War Cabinet, of the care and pains with which the whole field was explored at that time. Not only did the War Cabinet of those days take the decision, but all Cabinets of every party after the War, after examining it in the varying circumstances which have arisen, have endorsed the decision and taken the fullest responsibility for it. It was also endorsed in the most cordial and enthusiastic terms by many of the ablest Conservative Private Members who came into the House when a great Conservative majority arrived after the General Election at the end of 1918. It was endorsed from the very beginning by my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

I make him my apologies for going back as far as 20 years, but when you are dealing with matters which affect the history of two or three thousand years, there is no reason why the continuity of opinion should not be displayed. My Right Hon. Friend, on 13th October, 1918, said:

“The sympathy of the British Government with Zionist aspirations does not date from yesterday. . . . My father was anxious to find such a territory within the limits of the British Constitution. . . . Today the opportunity has come. I have no hesitation in saying that were my father alive today he would be among the first to welcome it and to give it his hearty support.”

Then other members of the Government, most distinguished

members who were then Private Members in the House—a brilliant crop, if I may say so, in their young first fresh flight—made a strong effort. The Dominion Secretary, quite a slim figure on the benches up here, was heavily engaged. There were also the Minister of Health, the Home Secretary and, above all, the Prime Minister; and this is the memorial they sent us. I abridge it, but not in such a way as to alter its sense. I may in abridging it diminish its force, but its force is evident from the extract:

“We, the undersigned, having cordially welcomed the historic Declaration made on 2nd November, 1917, by His Majesty’s Government” [that is, the Balfour Declaration] “that it would use its best endeavors to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine . . . now respectfully and solemnly urge upon His Majesty’s Government the necessity of redeeming this pledge by the acceptance of a Mandate under the League of Nations.”

Here was this statement which was made and which was put forward, and while I say I do not compare the responsibility of private Members with that exercised by Ministers of the Crown or by the head of the Government, nevertheless I think, when all is said and done, that Zionists have a right to look to the Prime Minister to stand by them in the days of his power. They had a special right to look to him because he was not only giving effect to his own deep convictions, but was carrying forward the large conceptions of his father whose memory he reveres and whose renown he has revived. I was not a member of the War Cabinet in the days when this pledge was given. I was serving under it as a high functionary. That was the position of the Secretaries of State. I found myself in entire agreement with those sentiments so well expressed by the Prime Minister and his friends when they were sending in their memorial.



When I went to the Colonial Office it was in this spirit that I wrote this dispatch, under the authority of the Cabinet, which is quoted so much in the White Paper now before us. Great use is made of this dispatch of 1922 in the White Paper. It is sought to found the argument of the White Paper largely upon it. I stand by every word in those lengthy quotations which have been made from what I wrote. I would not alter a sentence after the 16 years that have passed, but I must say I think it rather misleading to quote so extensively from one part of the dispatch without indicating what was its main purpose. The particular paragraph would do little to cool down the ardour of the Zionist and little to reassure the apprehensions of the Arabs. The main purpose of the dispatch was clear. This is what I said in paragraph (1): "His Majesty's Government have no intention of repudiating the obligations into which they entered towards the Jewish people." I then proceeded to say that the Government would refuse to discuss the future of Palestine on any basis other than the basis of the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, the whole tenor of the dispatch was to make it clear that the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine was to be subordinated to the paramount pledge and obligation of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In taking up this position on behalf of the Government of the day I really was not going any further than the views which were ardently expressed by some of the ablest and most promising of our backbenchers at that time. The fact that they are leading Ministers today should, I think, have gained for the problem of Palestine a more considered and more sympathetic treatment than it has received.

Last night the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs used a surprising argument. He suggested that the obligation to introduce self-governing institutions into Palestine ranked



equally with the obligation to establish a Jewish National Home. In this very dispatch of mine, which represented the views of the entire Government of the day, the greatest pains were taken to make it clear that the paramount duty was the establishment of a National Home. It was said on page 6:

“The position is that His Majesty’s Government are bound by a pledge which is antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they cannot allow a constitutional position to develop in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the principal Allied Powers which may make it impracticable to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies.”

There is much more to the same effect. It seems to me that the Under-Secretary of State had some reason to complain of the manner in which he had been briefed on this subject, because his argument was exactly contrary to the tenor of the dispatch from which the Government have quoted with a strong expression of approval and agreement wherever they have found it possible to assist their case.

Now I come to the gravamen of the case. I regret very much that the pledge of the Balfour Declaration, endorsed as it has been by successive Governments, and the conditions under which we obtained the Mandate, have both been violated by the Government’s proposals. There is much in this White Paper which is alien to the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, but I will not trouble about that. I select the one point upon which there is plainly a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration—the provision that Jewish immigration can be stopped in five years’ time by the decision of an Arab majority. That is a plain breach of a solemn obligation. I am astonished that my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister, of all others, and at this mo-

ment above all others, should have lent himself to this new and sudden default.

To whom was the pledge of the Balfour Declaration made? It was not made to the Jews of Palestine, it was not made to those who were actually living in Palestine. It was made to world Jewry and in particular to the Zionist associations. It was in consequence of and on the basis of this pledge that we received important help in the War, and that after the War we received from the Allied and Associated Powers the Mandate for Palestine. This pledge of a home of refuge, of an asylum, was not made to the Jews in Palestine but to the Jews outside Palestine, to that vast, unhappy mass of scattered, persecuted, wandering Jews whose intense, unchanging, unconquerable desire has been for a National Home—to quote the words to which my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister subscribed in the Memorial which he and others sent to us: “the Jewish people who have through centuries of dispersion and persecution patiently awaited the hour of its restoration to its ancestral home.” Those are the words. They were the people outside, not the people in. It is not with the Jews in Palestine that we have now or at any future time to deal, but with world Jewry, with Jews all over the world. That is the pledge which was given, and that is the pledge which we are now asked to break, for how can this pledge be kept, I want to know, if in five years’ time the National Home is to be barred and no more Jews are to be allowed in without the permission of the Arabs?

I entirely accept the distinction between making a Jewish National Home in Palestine and making Palestine a Jewish National Home. I think I was one of the first to draw that distinction. The Government quote me, and they seem to associate me with them on this subject in their White Paper, but what sort of National Home is offered to the Jews of the world when

we are asked to declare that in five years' time the door of that home is to be shut and barred in their faces? The idea of home to wanderers is, surely, a place to which they can resort. When grievous and painful words like "breach of pledge," "repudiation" and "default" are used in respect of the public action of men and Ministers who in private life observe a stainless honour—the country must discuss these matters as they present themselves in their public aspect—it is necessary to be precise, and to do them justice His Majesty's Government have been brutally precise. On page II of the White Paper, in Sub-section (3) of paragraph 14 there is this provision: "After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it." Now, there is the breach; there is the violation of the pledge; there is the abandonment of the Balfour Declaration; there is the end of the vision, of the hope, of the dream. If you leave out those words this White Paper is no more than one of the several experiments and essays in Palestinian constitution-making which we have had of recent years, but put in those three lines and there is the crux, the peccant point, the breach, and we must have an answer to it.

My Right Hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs may use his great legal ability. He is full of knowledge and power and ingenuity, but unless this can be answered, and repulsed, and repudiated, a very great slur rests upon British administration. It is said specifically on page 10 of the White Paper that Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if the economic absorptive capacity allows, will bring the population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. After that the Arab majority, twice as numerous as the Jews, will have control, and all further Jewish immigration will be subject to their acquiescence, which

is only another way of saying that it will be on sufferance. What is that but the destruction of the Balfour Declaration? What is that but a breach of faith? What is it but a one-sided denunciation—what is called in the jargon of the present time a unilateral denunciation—of an engagement?

There need be no dispute about this phrase “economic absorptive capacity.” It represented the intentions of the Government and their desire to carry out the Palestinian Mandate in an efficient and in a prudent manner. As I am the author of the phrase, perhaps I may be allowed to state that economic absorptive capacity was never intended to rule without regard to any other consideration. It has always rested with the Mandatory Power to vary the influx of the Jews in accordance with what was best for Palestine and for the sincere fulfillment—one must presuppose the sincere fulfillment—of our purpose in establishing a Jewish National Home there. It was never suggested at any time that the decision about the quota to be admitted should rest with the Jews or should rest with the Arabs. It rested, and could only rest at any time, with the Mandatory Power which was responsible for carrying out the high purpose of the then victorious Allies. The Mandatory Commission of the League of Nations, as was mentioned by the spokesman for the Opposition when he opened the Debate this afternoon, has recognized fully that the Mandatory Power was entitled to control the flow of immigration, or even to suspend it in an emergency. What they are not entitled to do, at least not entitled to do without reproach—grave, public and worldwide reproach, and I trust self-reproach as well—is to bring the immigration to an end so far as they are concerned, to wash their hands of it, to close the door. That they have no right whatever to do.

I cannot feel that we have accorded to the Arab race unfair treatment after the support which they gave us in the late war.



The Palestinian Arabs, of course, were for the most part fighting against us, but elsewhere over vast regions inhabited by the Arabs independent Arab kingdoms and principalities have come into being such as had never been known in Arab history before. Some have been established by Great Britain and others by France. When I wrote this despatch in 1922 I was advised by, among others, Colonel Lawrence, the truest champion of Arab rights whom modern times have known. He has recorded his opinion that the settlement was fair and just—his definite, settled opinion. Together we placed the Emir Abdulla in Transjordan, where he remains faithful and prosperous to this day. Together, under the responsibility of the Prime Minister of those days, King Feisal was placed upon the throne of Iraq, where his descendants now rule. But we also showed ourselves continually resolved to close no door upon the ultimate development of a Jewish National Home, fed by continued Jewish immigration into Palestine. Colonel Lawrence thought this was fair then. Why should it be pretended that it is unfair now?

I cannot understand what are the credentials of the Government in this matter of Palestine. It is less than two years—about 18 months if I remember aright—since they came forward and on their faith and reputation, with all their knowledge and concerted action, urged us to adopt a wholly different solution from that which they now place before us. The House persuaded them then not to force us into an incontinent acceptance of their partition plan, and within a few months, though they did not thank us for it, they had themselves abandoned and discarded it as precipitately as they had adopted it. Why, now, should they thrust this far more questionable bundle of expedients upon us? Surely it would only be prudent and decent for the Government, following the advice given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was a private Member in 1930,

following the opinion of the jurists of those days, to ascertain the view taken by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, before whom these proposals are to go, before claiming a parliamentary decision in their favor.

I cannot understand why this course has been taken. I search around for the answer. The first question one would ask oneself is foreshadowed in a reference made in the speech of my Hon. Friend, and is this: Is our condition so parlous and our state so poor that we must, in our weakness, make this sacrifice of our declared purpose? Although I have been very anxious that we should strengthen our armaments and spread our alliances and so increase the force of our position, I must say that I have not taken such a low view of the strength of the British Empire or of the very many powerful countries who desire to walk in association with us; but if the Government, with their superior knowledge of the deficiencies in our armaments which have arisen during their stewardship, really feel that we are too weak to carry out our obligations and wish to file a petition in moral and physical bankruptcy, that is an argument which, however ignominious, should certainly weigh with the House in these dangerous times. But is it true? I do not believe it is true. I cannot believe that the task to which we set our hand 20 years ago in Palestine is beyond our strength, or that faithful perseverance will not, in the end, bring that task through to a glorious success. I am sure of this, that to cast the plan aside and show yourselves infirm of will and unable to pursue a long, clear and considered purpose, bending and twisting under the crush and pressure of events—I am sure that this is going to do us a most serious and grave injury at a time like this.

We must ask ourselves another question, which arises out of this: Can we—and this is the question—strengthen ourselves by this repudiation? Shall we relieve ourselves by this repudia-



tion? I should have thought that the plan put forward by the Colonial Secretary in his White Paper, with its arid constitutional ideas and safety catches at every point, and with vagueness overlaying it and through all of it, combines, so far as one can understand it at present, the disadvantages of all courses without the advantages of any. The triumphant Arabs have rejected it. They are not going to put up with it. The despairing Jews will resist it. What will the world think about it? What will our friends say? What will be the opinion of the United States of America? Shall we not lose more—and this is a question to be considered maturely—in the growing support and sympathy of the United States than we shall gain in local administrative convenience, if gain at all indeed we do?

What will our potential enemies think? What will those who have been stirring up these Arab agitators think? Will they not be encouraged by our confession of recoil? Will they not be tempted to say: "They're on the run again. This is another Munich," and be the more stimulated in their aggression by these very unpleasant reflections which they may make? After all, we were asked by the Secretary of State to approach this question in a spirit of realism and to face the real facts, and I ask seriously of the Government: Shall we not undo by this very act of abjection some of the good which we have gained by our guarantees to Poland and to Rumania, by our admirable Turkish Alliance and by what we hope and expect will be our Russian Alliance? You must consider these matters. May not this be a contributory factor—and every factor is a contributory factor now—by which our potential enemies may be emboldened to take some irrevocable action and then find out, only after it is all too late, that it is not this Government, with their tired Ministers and flagging purpose, that they have to face, but the might of Britain and all that Britain means? . . . .

It is hoped to obtain five years of easement in Palestine by this proposal; surely the consequences will be entirely the opposite. A sense of moral weakness in the mandatory Power, whose many years of vacillation and uncertainty have, as the Right Hon Gentleman admitted yesterday, largely provoked the evils from which we suffer, will rouse all the violent elements in Palestine to the utmost degree. In order to avoid the reproach, the bitter reproach, of shutting out refugees during this time of brutal persecution, the quota of immigration may be raised, as we were told by the Secretary of State, and may be continued at an even higher level in the next five years. Thus, irritation will continue and the incentive to resist will be aggravated. What about these five years? Who shall say where we are going to be five years from now? Europe is more than two-thirds mobilized tonight. The ruinous race of armaments now carries whole populations into the military machine. That cannot possibly continue for five years, nor for four, nor for three years. It may be that it will not continue beyond the present year. Long before those five years are past, either there will be a Britain which knows how to keep its word on the Balfour Declaration and is not afraid to do so, or, believe me, we shall find ourselves relieved of many overseas responsibilities other than those comprised within the Palestine Mandate.

Some of us hold that our safety at this juncture resides in being bold and strong. We urge that the reputation for fidelity of execution, a strict execution, of public contracts, is a shield and buckler which the British Empire, however it may arm, cannot dispense with and cannot desire to dispense with. Never was the need for fidelity and firmness more urgent than now. You are not going to found and forge the fabric of a grand alliance to resist aggression, except by showing continued examples of your firmness in carrying out, even under difficulties, and in the teeth

of difficulties, the obligations into which you have entered. I warn the Conservative party—and some of my warnings have not, alas, been ill-founded—that by committing themselves to this lamentable act of default, they will cast our country, and all that it stands for, one more step downward in its fortunes, which step will later on have to be retrieved, as it will be retrieved, by additional hard exertions. That is why I say that upon the large aspect of this matter the policy which you think is a relief and an easement you will find afterwards you will have to retrieve, in suffering and greater exertions than those we are making.

I end upon the land of Palestine. It is strange indeed that we should turn away from our task in Palestine at the moment when, as the Secretary of State told us yesterday, the local disorders have been largely mastered. It is stranger still that we should turn away when the great experiment and bright dream has proved its power to succeed. Yesterday the Minister responsible descanted eloquently in glowing passages upon the magnificent work which the Jewish colonists have done. They have made the desert bloom. They have started a score of thriving industries, he said. They have founded a great city on the barren shore. They have harnessed the Jordan and spread its electricity throughout the land. So far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population. Now we are asked to decree that all this is to stop and all this is to come to an end. We are now asked to submit—and this is what rankles most with me—to an agitation which is fed with foreign money and ceaselessly inflamed by Nazi and by Fascist propaganda.

It is 20 years ago since my Right Hon. Friend used these stirring words:

“A great responsibility will rest upon the Zionists, who, before long, will be proceeding, with joy in their hearts, to the ancient seat of their people. Theirs will be the task to build up a new prosperity and a new civilization in old Palestine, so long neglected and mis-ruled.”

Well, they have answered his call. They have fulfilled his hopes. How can he find it in his heart to strike them this mortal blow?

## Appendix H

### Proposed Congress Resolution of 1944\*

*This resolution was placed before the House of Representatives on January 27, 1944, and before the Senate on February 1.*

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved “that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine shall be adequately protected”; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

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\**The Jewish National Home in Palestine*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, 1944.



## Appendix I

### President Roosevelt's Views\*

*On March 9, 1944, President Roosevelt authorized Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, representatives of American Zionist leadership, to make the following statement public in his behalf.*

The President has authorized us to say that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939.

The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees and that when future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our Government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy, today more than ever in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees.

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\* *Palestine*, March 1944, p. 3.

## Appendix J

### Democratic and Republican Platform Planks

*The following appeared in the platform of the Republican National Convention as adopted on June 27, 1944:*

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be reconstituted as a free and democratic commonwealth.

*The following appeared in the platform of the Democratic National Convention as adopted on July 24, 1944:*

We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

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