Maia Carter Hallward

# TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM *AND THE* ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Transnational Activism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This page intentionally left blank

Transnational Activism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Maia Carter Hallward

palgrave
macmillan

This book is dedicated to my children, who make me see the world anew each day, and to my husband, who makes everything possible.

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

CHAPTER 1

The History and Theory of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions

As a child growing up in a peace-minded Quaker household, I remember participating in consumer boycotts at an early age, from Nestlé products due to their promotion of infant formula in countries without clean drinking water to Wal-Mart for its treatment of employees and suppliers. I learned about Quakers' history of using economic measures to pursue a more just social order, from the use of fixed pricing systems that treated all buyers equally to the dye-free clothing of antislavery activist John Woolman.[1] Although I did not make the connection to economic activism at the time, I became a vegetarian at 13 after learning about the environmental consequences of corporate beef farming in the rainforest. In school, we read Mark Mathabane's *Kaffir Boy* and learned in graphic detail about apartheid rule; we all celebrated when South Africa had its first open, democratic elections in 1994. Boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS), which was part of the global campaign to end the apartheid era in South Africa, was seen as a successful, nonviolent method of applying pressure, and a way in which global civil society—including churches, universities, and private individuals—could exert its influence.

However, when 170 groups spanning the range of Palestinian civil society issued a call in 2005 to global civil society to engage in BDS, the response was polarized. The BDS Call was ground breaking in several regards: first, it signaled a clear break from the widespread use of violence in the second intifada by elements within the Palestinian national movement and affirmed the nonviolent methods used by Palestinians in the first intifada and by village committees resisting Israeli annexation and destruction of their lands for the construction of the separation barrier. Second, the call brought together not only Palestinians from

within the West Bank and Gaza Strip but also Palestinian refugees and Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, groups that have often distrusted one another or worked for disparate aims. Although Israeli leaders have long called for an end to Palestinian violence or asked "where is the Palestinian Gandhi?" the Israeli establishment quickly opposed the BDS Call, viewing it as a security threat and an effort to delegitimize the state of Israel. As a scholar of peace and justice movements in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I was intrigued by the passion found on both sides of the BDS issue, particularly the rival framings of BDS as either a "nonviolent struggle for Palestinian rights" or an instance of "war by other means" posing a grave security threat to the state of Israel. Why is BDS deemed a threat second only to that posed by Iran? (Reut 2010) What makes this "movement" (if indeed it can be called one) so powerful given that it is unarmed, self-funded, and volunteer driven? Given the opposing portrayals of BDS as either nonviolent or effectively violent, I set out to investigate *how* the BDS movement operates in practice to determine the extent to which it engages with the theory and practice of nonviolent resistance and to ascertain *why* BDS was so feared by Israeli officials and institutionalized American Jewry in particular.

Through interviews with pro- and anti-BDS activists in North America (primarily in the United States, and also a few in Canada)[2] and analysis of the discourse surrounding BDS in the press, on the web, and in activist and opponent publications, this book analyzes case studies of BDS to trace empirically *how* the movement works, *why* it is controversial, and *the extent to which* it is nonviolent. I do not seek to adjudicate between claims about BDS nor are questions of effectiveness the primary aim of this book; instead, the book examines how BDS activism unfolds in different local contexts to demonstrate how activists on opposite sides of the matter operate under very different sets of assumptions about the issues at hand in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, vary in their conception of "peace," and draw upon different forms of rhetorical, material, and relational power. Although opponents (and the press in general) refer to "the BDS movement," I suggest that what occurs on the ground is less a coherent, collectively organized global movement in the singular and more a network of local BDS movements, linked together via certain key activist nodes (like the Palestinian BDS National Committee or BNC), conferences, email listservs, and organizational websites. Palestinian initiators of the 2005 BDS Call have consistently emphasized "context sensitivity," that "activists should make decisions based on what makes the most sense in their particular context," while the BNC "connect[s] Palestinian civil

society with its global counterparts, facilitating the sharing of information, coordinating international campaigns, providing guidance and positions on political demands" (Jamjoum 2011, 141). Consequently, in order to understand the "global BDS movement," one needs to examine local and regional boycott and divestment campaigns. This book attempts to make an initial scholarly foray into this topic, and in doing so I hope to contribute not only to the empirical study of a relatively unstudied transnational social movement, but also to the literature on nonviolent resistance and specifically the tactics of boycott and divestment. By first placing the BDS movement against Israeli occupation in the context of historical boycott and divestment activism as well as strategies of nonviolent resistance, one can see that Palestine solidarity activists are not the first to forge links between local particularities and global causes; rather, this strategy has epitomized boycott efforts since the origin of the term in the 1880s.

Approaches to Studying Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions

Tactics of BDS are not new in the field of international relations. In fact, sanctions—economic, social, and political—are a long-established tool of statecraft, and are part of the contemporary diplomatic toolbox, as evidenced by international efforts to sanction Iran, Syria, Sudan, and other countries seen as violating international norms (Maller 2010; *Resource Center: Iran Sanctions* 2012). While boycott and divestment are tactics used by local and global civil society groups in their efforts at sociopolitical change, sanctions are the domain of states, although civil society groups can mobilize and put pressure on state governments to implement sanctions (Manby 1992). Although all three tactics are united in the name of the BDS movement, this book focuses primarily on boycott and divestment for a number of reasons. First, since sanctions are the purview of states, civil society actors can only indirectly pursue sanctions and must rely on a greater number of outside actors (public opinion, elected officials, etc.) to achieve campaign goals. Consequently, activists in the United States tend to focus on boycott and divestment for practical and strategic reasons given the political culture surrounding activism related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the strong culture of support for Israel in the US Congress (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).[3] Although there have been groups in the United States that have worked to end the billions of dollars in taxpayer money sent to Israel each year, their efforts have faced numerous obstacles. For example, billboards calling for an end to US foreign assistance

to Israel have been taken down in Denver and Los Angeles before the end of their contracted terms, likely due to outside pressure (JTA 2012; Robbins 2012). Second, the question of sanctions is more problematic from the perspective of nonviolence. Several activists interviewed for this project noted their discomfort with sanctions because of the negative repercussions of sanctions on civilian populations and their efforts to combat sanctions regimes elsewhere. Although sanctions are often used with the express purpose of avoiding military intervention, they can also be used coercively in the context of power politics, and can have a debilitating effect on civilian populations, as was the case in Iraq in the 1990s (Abu-Nimer 2003; Goodman and Gonzalez 2005; Mingst 2008, 32).[4] However, the term "sanctions" covers a range of actions and policies, many of which may legitimately be deemed nonviolent, such as making foreign aid conditional on compliance with US and international human rights laws, including the US Arms Export Control Act or the US Foreign Assistance Act. Because sanctions are not the primary focus of the BDS campaigns studied here (or for most US activists), for the sake of space and theoretical clarity, I generally bracket the (important) debates on sanctions in my empirical analysis of cases dealing with boycott and divestment.

Although the BDS movement[5] has received a great deal of political attention from the Israeli government and "pro-Israel" Jewish institutions in the United States in recent years,[6] the tactic of boycott has a long history in the United States, dating back to the American Revolution when colonists refused to purchase a range of British goods in protest of British policies. Boycott was historically used by the Zionist movement and is also used as a tactic today by American Jews in protest of what they deem "anti-Israel" actions (Friedman 1999, 139–141; Glickman 2009; Massad 2013). Boycotts are "usually conceptualized as instrumental—that is, as a tactic to influence the behavior of a firm (or other institution) by withholding purchase of their products" and not a goal in and of themselves (John and Klein 2003, 1197). While boycotts are generally studied through the lens of business and economics, focusing on practices of consumer behavior or the degree of economic impact on the target (Fershtman and Gandal 1998; Friedman 1999; Garrett 1987; Lundahl 1984), boycott and divestment are also studied through the lens of social movement theory (Glickman 2009; Sen et al. 2001; Soule 2009), as boycott success requires mobilization of sufficient numbers of people to have an economic, social, or political effect. In contrast to economic approaches, which tend to focus on market factors including sales, incomes, and labor conditions (Fershtman and Gandal 1998;

Friedman 1999; Lundahl 1984), social movement approaches to boycott and divestment are less motivated by activists' "perceptions of the boycott's likelihood of success" in strict financial terms (Sen et al. 2001, 399) and instead have a more socially oriented agenda in which activists "attempt to coerce their targets toward specific ethical or socially responsible actions" (Sen et al. 2001, 400).

Boycotts have increasingly focused less on classic consumer issues (such as price), and instead have turned toward special interest groups such as animal rights activists, ethnic and racial groups, and the environment (among other causes), many of whom use "surrogate" boycotts intended to target states (Friedman 1999, 217–218). Social movements often target corporations, such as McDonalds, Nike, Dow Chemical, Ford Motors, Nestlé, Gerber, Kodak, and Proctor and Gamble because of the many ties between government and big business, because mergers have resulted in fewer corporations controlling more of peoples' lives, and because the government has been seen as less responsive to particular social movements (Soule 2009, 4–8). Those engaging in consumer activism, including those using tactics of boycott and divestment, "have been guided by a relatively stable theory of moral action, even as they have disagreed over what constituted morality" (Glickman 2009, 5). The diversity of groups using such tactics, which span the political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right, underscores the contentiousness of the moral issues at the heart of debate (Friedman 1999; Soule 2009). While social movement approaches to boycott and divestment focus on civil society efforts for social and political change (the focus of this book), boycotts have also been studied as a tool of state coercion, effectively a form of government sanction, as leveraged against Israel, Cuba, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), among others (Losman 1972, 1979).

Corporate Social Responsibility

In recent decades, many studies of consumer activism and boycott have been conducted through the lens of corporate social responsibility (CSR) or socially responsible investment (SRI), where actors "strive to challenge corporate power and remedy perceived wrongdoings in the areas of human rights, labor standards and environmental concerns" (John and Klein 2003; Sen et al. 2001; Soederberg 2009, 211). While some scholars deem boycotts an "extreme case" of consumer activism in the field of CSR, "boycotts have become ever more relevant for management decision making" precisely because of the increased public attention paid to corporate image (Klein et al. 2004, 92). Boycott campaigns

focusing on CSR often take the form of what Monroe Friedman calls "media boycotts" although they often have a "market" dimension as well (Friedman 1999, 22). CSR's focus is "to assess and improve corporate operations in relation to a range of values beyond profit: human rights, environmental protection, contribution to local communities and workplace diversity among others" (Marihugh 2006, n.p.), all of which are broad, multidimensional, complex, interrelated, and contested. Ethical values and goals comprise a "gray area" with "ethical responsibilities…considerably more difficult to define and interpret" for both businesses and consumers (Pinkston and Carroll 1996, 200). While boycott is often seen as "a tool used to empower the disadvantaged…consumer, boycott can also be used to pursue conflicting ethical aims" (Glazer et al. 2010, 340). At times it is also questionable whether tools like business codes of ethics actually work, as there may be more incentives for corporations to cheat than to comply given lax, or nonexistent compliance regimes (Lim and Phillips 2008; Seidman 2007). Like with debates on child labor, one cannot always know the broader ramifications of a boycott effort, and whether imposed regulations without addressing broader structural issues may lead to worse circumstances, since once barred from regulated industry children may turn to black market jobs with worse conditions and lower pay (Drachman 2003). Such debates bring up the "tension between, moral concerns (such as genocide) and economic concerns (such as risk reduction and shareholder value)" (Soederberg 2009, 212) illustrating the various types of social movement impact (intended or otherwise) due to the "multilevel, nested system of opportunity" available to consumer activists and consequently the complex web of ethical ramifications involved in sociopolitical and economic activism (Glickman 2009, 5; Soule 2009, 49).

Questions of "impact" and "success" are often difficult to ascertain in CSR campaigns, given the nested goals of activists and the difficulty of isolating lines of causation. In a study of the boycott of infant formula, for example, Baker notes that the coalition of organizations that mobilized consumers against Nestlé were successful in "changing the marketing policies of an industry" but did not find "a solution to the fundamental causes of malnutrition and infant mortality in the Third World" (Baker 1985, 189). Success is also difficult to identify because consumer activists do not always identify a clear goal or definition of success, for strategic as well as practical reasons (Friedman 1999). Furthermore, as Soule discusses in her analysis of consumer activism and corporate responsibility, activists regularly engage in *scale shift*,

moving between multiple targets within a broader political opportunity structure (Soule 2009, 49). Rather than mobilizing around a primary goal related to a single target, activist movements are dynamic, with actors reframing their targets and goals and adjusting their tactics according to the political and social resources available to them. For instance, students in the United States reframed their broad goal of ending apartheid in South Africa "to the narrower goal of ending corporate investment in South Africa, to (eventually) the very specific goal of divestment *by their own universities* of holdings in corporations with ties to South Africa" (Soule 2009, 81, italics in original). Today many corporations have subscribed to the concept of CSR, in part due to the history of consumer activism on human rights and environmental issues (Seidman 2007). For example, the Free Burma Coalition brought together a number of activists, using a range of tactics, including, "organizing peaceful protests, publiciz[ing] consumer boycotts, and lobb[ying]for federal sanctions" to put pressure on the US government to change its policy toward Burma due in part to the human rights and environmental abuses linked to the Unocal gas pipeline (HBS 2000, 10). This ultimately led to the United States sanctions on Burma and a landmark court case against Unocal in which the California "court concluded that corporations and their executive officers can be held legally responsible under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international human rights norms in foreign countries, and that the US courts have the authority to adjudicate such claims" (ERI n.d.). Unocal's partner in Burma, Total, agreed to settle out of court, which was seen as possibly precedent setting "for similar lawsuits by victims of human rights violations against European companies operating in developing countries" (Schouten 2007, 20). The Kimberly Process, which is "the first international agreement in global trade politics that has been adopted in consensus by governments, industry, and NGOs" resulted in part from an NGO campaign that "strategically framed gems from war zones as 'conflict diamonds' or 'blood diamonds'" (Kantz 2007, 1, 10) and scandals surrounding sweatshop labor used in Kathie Lee Gifford's clothing line are other instances of consumer activism that have resulted in change (Jenkins 2005; Park-Poaps and Rees 2010). These multiple successes demonstrate "that corporations have both direct and indirect human rights responsibilities" and that consumer demands can result in economic and political change (Marihugh 2006, n.p.).

In a sweeping study of boycotts in historical perspective, Glickman notes that most boycotts historically have been "putative failures" in terms of their primary objectives, but that as "an enduring political

tactic and philosophy" consumer activism, including tactics of boycott, has "played an important role" in the key US social movements of the twentieth century and has "provided a remarkably consistent vision of the power of aggregate consumption and its withdrawal to promote… 'long-distance solidarity'" (Glickman 2009, 2–3). Despite this finding, other scholars assert that consumers choose to participate in boycotts based on their "perceptions of the boycott's likelihood of success" as well as issues of peer pressure and the costs associated with boycott as opposed to other tactics (Klein, et al. 2004, 93; Sen et al. 2001, 402). As the case of the Presbyterian Church (USA) studied in this book demonstrates, questions of social responsibility go beyond corporations and include nonprofit organizations like churches and universities, many of whom are invested in profit-making corporations for scholarship endowments, pensions, and covering operating expenses. The ethics involved in deciding how, where, and when to invest money is complex as it involves multiple relationships to a variety of constituencies (pastors, congregations, students, board members, international partners, etc.), and the debates involve not only competing ethical claims but also competing strategies for affecting change. As Glickman emphasizes, consumer activists historically have not "agreed about precisely how consumer power operated or about the meaning of justice," which compounds the contention already surrounding boycott and divestment initiatives (Glickman 2009, 5). Depending on the context, local actors not only define "justice" in different terms, but they may hold varying conceptions of "success," identify with different world views, and/or focus on different levels in a multitiered political opportunity structure. For example, although all of the commissioners professed to share the goals of "peace," "justice," and "security" for Israelis and Palestinians, in the July 2012 Presbyterian Church (USA) plenary debates surrounding whether to divest from Caterpillar, Motorola, and Hewlett Packard, some commissioners focused on overall economic impact (i.e., number of shares held), others emphasized the symbolic impact of divestment (i.e., impact on relationships with Jewish or Palestinian partners in the United States and globally), and others raised concerns about the ethical issues at stake (i.e. not wanting their pensions to be implicated in violence), and the final vote split the room evenly.

Forms of Consumer Activism

As scholars note, boycott and divestment are only a few of the many tools in consumer activists' repertoire of social action. Soule (2009) catalogs

a wide range of insider and outsider tactics available to consumer activists, including varieties of shareholder activism like bringing a non-binding resolution for a vote at annual shareholder meetings, or outside tactics such as publishing a scientific study dealing with a particular issue of concern, working with organizational elites to change corporate culture, or engaging in collective legal maneuvers. While the broader Palestinian-led campaign studied in this book calls explicitly for "boycott, divestment, and sanctions" to end the Israeli occupation, a wide range of tactics are used by local activists around the world to promote this end. For example, in July 2010 Jewish Voice for Peace brought a shareholder resolution to TIAA-CREF's annual meeting with the intent of having it divest from several corporations, including Caterpillar, due to Israel's use of Caterpillar equipment in the construction of the separation barrier, the demolition of Palestinian houses, and the 2003 death of Rachel Corrie, a US citizen in Gaza with the International Solidarity Movement (Horowitz 2010). In March 2012, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) decided to exclude Caterpillar from its World Socially Responsible Index, a list of SRIs, and in June 2012 TIAA-CREF, a leading financial services and retirement plan provider for educators and individuals in the nonprofit world, removed Caterpillar from its own Social Choices Funds portfolio (Murphy 2012). Also in 2012, the Friends Fiduciary Corporation, a financial body connected to the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) voted to divest from Caterpillar (End the Occupation 2012). However, in April 2013, TIAA-CREF sought permission from the Security and Exchange Commission to deny shareholders the opportunity to vote on a resolution submitted by 200 CREF shareholders that urges TIAA-CREF to "end investment in companies that . . . substantially contribute to or enable egregious violations of human rights, including companies whose business supports Israel's occupation" (*2013 CREF divestment shareholder resolution* 2013; WeDivest 2013). Illustrative of dynamics seen in other cases of BDS activism, the grassroots shareholder resolution was met with legal pressure from the Israel Law Center (Shurat HaDin), which claims that the resolution violates New York and Federal law and labels those filing the resolution as "anti-Israel" and the resolution itself as "malicious," and threatens TIAA-CREF with legal action if the resolution passes (Israel Law Center 2013). As discussed further in chapters to come, those for and against the TIAA-CREF shareholder resolution mobilize different identities, activate different forms of power, and deploy different frameworks for understanding the issues under contention. The resolution is framed in terms of "human rights" and speaks against "Israel's

occupation"; activists emphasize their rights as investors in democratic governance and the history of divestment efforts against Sudan and South Africa. While prodivestment groups view the BDS movement as a grassroots, civil society movement, the Israel Law Center frames the action in the context of the state-led Arab boycott of previous decades, views the resolution as "anti-Israel" rather than anti-occupation, and uses a punitive approach for applying pressure on TIAA-CREF.

Other consumer tactics that have been used in the broader BDS movement include a corporate campaign aimed at Africa Israel Investments, Ltd., whose majority shareholder Lev Leviev is known not only for his diamond companies but also for his investments in West Bank settlements. In addition to shareholder activism, groups like Adalah-NY targeted the company through appealing to Hollywood stars who were seen wearing Lev Leviev diamonds on the company website and who subsequently asked for their pictures to be taken down (Beinin 2012, 69). Activists have also engaged in classic social movement tactics, such as marches, demonstrations, leafleting, and targeting celebrities in order to gain media coverage for their boycott efforts (Glickman 2009; Soule 2009). Women involved with Code Pink's "Stolen Beauty" campaign have participated in flash mobs or have worn their bathrobes into department stores to raise attention to their cause, and musical celebrities including Elvis Costello and Roger Waters have been vocal in their opposition to Israeli policies by refusing to perform in Israel (Awwad 2012). Activists have engaged in "collective legal maneuvers" (Soule 2009, 17) to put pressure on corporations that profit from the Israeli occupation. For example, in 2008 activists filed a lawsuit with the Superior Court in Montreal, Quebec, against two Canadian companies, Green Park and Green Mount for their role in constructing settlements on land owned by the Palestinian village of Bil'in (Guterman 2009). Labor unions, including the British Association of University Teachers (AUT) (Bowen et al. 2005), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions have also participated in boycott, with dockworkers in various countries refusing to offload Israeli cargo ships (Barghouti 2011, 203; Elk 2010).

Selection of Targets

The question of the target of consumer activism is intimately connected to questions of ethics and tactics. Monroe Friedman (1999, 220) asserts that boycott targets should be visible, have a reputation that hinges on social responsibility and trust, have recent economic problems, be American-owned (for activists in the United States), and have

a producer and retailer that carry the same name (for simplicity of con-sumer identification). Furthermore, he suggests that activists should use creative slogans and parodies of corporate names, protest, civil disobe-dience, advertising, and graphic imagery to convey the boycott mes-sage. Having a target that is easy to identify and that has acceptable and comparably priced substitutes is also key (Friedman 1999, 222). As discussed further in the case studies, the issue of substitutes is of critical importance to many examining questions of boycott and divest-ment, out of an ethical concern for the physical, emotional, and mate-rial needs of one's customer base (i.e., the need for gluten-free products or good return on investments for pension plan holders). The selection of targets is strategic, and may, as Soule (2009) suggests, change over time. Activists desiring sociopolitical change target corporations rather than governments directly because of frustration with corporate power and influence over government, because targeting the government takes more time and greater resources, may be countered by opposi-tion with greater power and more financial resources, and because there is reduced likelihood of a violent police response from such protests (Soule 2009, 5–9).

The selection of a target, particularly in media-oriented boycotts, is often strategic and symbolic rather than comprehensive. Scholars and activists have noted that consumer boycotts based on voluntary con-sumer behavior rarely have an impact due in part to free-rider logic, and that collectively organized activism through institutions and other collectivities, is much more likely to go "beyond the symbolic or educa-tional levels" (Baum and Amir 2012, 43; Chavis and Leslie 2009; John and Klein 2003; Seidman 2007). BDS activists emphasize that targets should be based on *local* research and rooted in available resources at the local level, including potential partners and prevailing sociopolitical and economic issues of community concern. Selecting "an achievable, measurable goal" rather than seeking a blanket boycott, for example, is a strategic decision, as is centering a campaign on a target that is clearly implicated in human rights violations and one that consumers can eas-ily identify and do without (Baum and Amir 2012, 49). In speaking with activists in Canada and the United States, activists have regularly emphasized their decision to target a particular store or chain, such as Chapters bookstore in Montreal, due to its status (and/or accessi-bility) in the local community (Montreal Activist 1, 2011; Montreal Activist 3, 2011). A primary goal of BDS campaigns is *education* and *awareness raising* not economic impact per se. Activists interviewed noted again and again their goal of shifting the conversation within

the United States as it relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; hence, targets are selected with that goal in mind. Opponents to BDS tend to focus more on the economic impact (or lack thereof), often noting how integrated Israel and Israeli products are to the world economy, pointing to the widespread use of Intel processors, for example, and the extent to which "Israeli institutions, organizations, and corporations are interwoven at a very fundamental level with many of those in the United States" (Goldberg 2009, n.p.). This highlights a critical point related to the BDS movement—the variation in types of BDS activism. Although most BDS activists in the United States do not endorse a sweeping boycott of all Israeli goods, but rather select strategic targets, focusing on corporations and products where activists can move "beyond public education, protest and symbolic actions to using our collective power and leverage to apply real, discernible pressure" (Baum and Amir 2012, 49), some BDS activists call for a boycott of all Israeli goods, asserting that Israel's economy is so enmeshed with the occupation that it is impossible to separate the two.

The BNC calls for BDS aimed at Israel and Israeli institutions writ large and not just those corporations profiting from the occupation. The BNC (whose website, BDSmovement.net carries the full text of the BDS Call as well as statements and news updates) appeals for such "nonviolent punitive measures" until Israel ends its occupation and dismantles the Wall, recognizes the full equality of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, and promotes the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in accordance with UN resolution 194 (BNC 2011; PACBI 2005). Many Palestinians also call for an academic and cultural boycott aimed at Israeli institutions as a way of protesting the role of academic institutions in maintaining or justifying the occupation (PACBI 2005); while the campaign does not target individual Israeli academics, many of whom are outspoken critics of the occupation, the academic boycott can be misunderstood and misapplied.[7] Rabbi Michael Lerner, known as a spiritual progressive, calls BDS targeting Israel as a whole "a nonviolent, yet coercive strategy" and notes that it can help "generate a shift in consciousness and a higher level of awareness [about the conflict]; that is a necessary step in this situation" (Lerner 2012, 326). However, Lerner and others are critical of this form of BDS, which Lerner calls "BDS1," for a variety of reasons. First, some worry that broad efforts targeting Israel may be motivated by anti-Israel sentiment, and that its end goals are not clear enough vis-à-vis ending the "occupation," since the original BDS Call includes ending the occupation of all Arab lands, which might refer back to 1948 rather than 1967, and hence result in

the destruction of Israel. Furthermore, the call for the right of return for Palestinian refugees "could dismantle Israel as a Jewish state" (Beinart 2012b). Another common criticism is that BDS1 causes a "circle the wagons" response that empowers right wing elements within Israel and therefore is counterproductive to those seeking to strengthen Israeli and Palestinian peace efforts. Some members of the Israeli Left express a concern that BDS isolates Israeli civil society, and that in fact those working to end the occupation need to purposefully engage with Israeli civil society actors due to the lack of a progressive liberal political opposition in Israel. A second form of BDS activism, more prevalent in the United States, consists of what Rabbi Lerner calls "targeted, moral-witness BDS," or BDS2 (Lerner 2012, 326). This more "targeted" or "selective" BDS focuses explicitly on the Israeli occupation, selecting targets that profit from the occupation or products produced in Israeli settlements. Liberal Zionists such as Lerner and Peter Beinart endorse this latter form of BDS, provided it explicitly affirms Israel's existence, as a way to promote a democratic Israel and a two state solution (Beinart 2012b). Opponents of BDS dismiss even the more targeted form of boycott, suggesting that boycotts are "divisive and hurtful" and "won't help the Palestinians achieve their political or economic goals," (BDSCookbook n.d.). However, advocates of settlement boycotts suggest that they may be one of the only ways to relieve the systematic oppression of the occupation, which may lead Israel toward an apartheid-like system (Beinart 2012b). For many activists, BDS campaigns are avenues for informing the general public about the Israeli occupation, and the daily reality of the situation on the ground as a way of shifting public opinion and influencing US foreign policy in the region. Consequently, US activists often select products or corporations directly linked to the settlements or occupation because they provide a clear and logical target for a relatively uninformed population.

Because a strategic approach to consumer activism often selects a target that is achievable and has a broad reach (Baum et al. 2011), or that provides a useful platform for education and awareness-raising, activists do not always select the *worst* offender. As was noted in the controversy surrounding the boycott of infant formula, there are other, possibly worse culprits regarding international public health issues, than infant formula that have not been subject to boycott. While numerous reasons exist for this, the involvement of large multinational corporations (MNCs) and subsidies from major economic powers like the United States plays a role in constituting the political opportunity structure in which activists operate (Baker 1985; Soule 2009). In the case of

Israel, opponents of BDS point to the egregious human rights viola-
tions of Iran, Syria, the Sudan, and others to ask why Israel is singled
out (Janzen 2006). Many BDS opponents question why divestment and
boycott efforts are focused on Israel when there is "nothing similar to
be said regarding hundreds of far worse human rights abuses on the
planet" (Haber 2012c); consequently opposition groups often claim that
Israel is targeted not only to stop the occupation but in an "effort to
destroy Israel" through "misinformation and lies" (SWU n.d.). Zionist
supporter of targeted BDS Peter Beinart argues that "the relevant ques-
tion is not 'Are there worst offenders?' but rather, 'Is there systematic
oppression that a boycott might help relieve?' That Israel systematically
oppresses West Bank Palestinians has been acknowledged even by the
former Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert" (Beinart
2012b). Other supporters of BDS assert that sanctions regimes already
exist for the worst international violators, thereby rendering civil soci-
ety action less critical, and some suggest that Israel's concern with its
self-image as the "most moral army in the world" makes it more sus-
ceptible to image pressure through the media (Friedman 1999; Garrett
1987; McGreal 2004). A further line of response to the "why Israel?"
question emphasizes Israel's unique and privileged place in the interna-
tional community. Some suggest that Israel is a "special case" because
it receives "consistent backing [from] a Permanent Member in the UN
Security Council" and is the recipient of billions of dollars in foreign
assistance from the United States (Keller 2010).

The human rights argument launched at Israel is also distinct from
criticism of other, often more serious, human rights offenders because
it involves issues of international humanitarian law as a result of Israel's
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This body of international
law specifically prohibits countries engaged in a foreign occupation from
profiting from the occupied territory. For example, Stephen Zunes, a
scholar of Middle East studies and nonviolent resistance, argues that act-
ivists should focus specifically on the dynamics of occupation itself and
not solely Israel's occupation as a way of strengthening the moral appeal
of their cause and undermining claims of unfairly targeting Israel.
The United Nations and the international community recognize only
three countries as engaged in "a foreign belligerent occupation: Israel,
Morocco, and Armenia" (Zunes 2012). US corporations, such as Kosmos
Energy and fertilizer companies PCS and Mosaic are actively profiting
from the occupied Western Sahara, and US arms manufacturers have
supplied Morocco, like Israel, with weapons used for "gross and system-
atic human rights violations" and to "break up peaceful demonstrations

calling for the right to self-determination" (Zunes 2012). Zunes outlines many parallels between Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara and Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, from the existence of a separation wall, to UN resolutions supporting self-determination, to recognition of the occupied territories by international bodies. All of these issues could serve as a basis for joint activism targeting both occupations (LeVine 2012). There is a precedent for linking anti-occupation struggles and boycott efforts—prior to East Timor's independence, both East Timor and Western Sahara engaged in solidarity efforts (Ramos-Horta 2005), and international activists supporting both East Timor and Western Sahara have promoted tourist and product boycotts.

BDS activists also point to Israel's governance structure, and assert that it is precisely because Israel cares about its reputation as a democracy, and because it is so integrated in the global economy, that Israel is a target rather than the nondemocracies (like Sudan, Iran, or China) often named, many of which already have a series of sanctions or other measures placed against them by the international community. Boycott scholar Monroe Friedman notes, for example, that more image-conscious targets are more likely to yield to boycotter demands, and that if targets believe the media-oriented boycott will result in a sustained marketplace boycott, they are more likely to yield. However, Friedman also notes that targets are less likely to yield if they are capable of launching a successful counteraction to the boycott (Friedman 1999, 25–26). As discussed more throughout the book, Israel has poured millions of dollars into the Brand Israel campaign and works with Jewish American institutions to organize a network of media monitors, who act quickly to send letters in to newspapers, TV stations, and radio stations with talking points aimed at countering BDS and promoting Israel's image (Barghouti 2012b, 33; Beinart 2010; Guttman 2011; JCRC 2011; Tabachnick 2011; White 2010). Within five days of a CBS "60 Minutes" report about Palestinian Christians living under Israeli occupation, for example, pro-Israel activists had sent 29,000 emails complaining about the segment, a campaign that was countered by Jewish Voice for Peace, who gathered over 35,000 signatures applauding CBS for their coverage (JVP 2012).

While boycotts are rooted in local contexts, they are also situated in global communication, consumer, and solidarity networks that build on collective identities and conceptions of justice (Glickman 2009; Horn 2008; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Soule 2009). Historically, the question of "ever-widening" circles of boycott activism has been a bone of contention between activist supporters and opponents. From the

beginning, boycotters "moved beyond the immediate and the local and extended their moral focus via the use of market power. Even when its target appeared local and discrete, boycotters depended on the expanding rings beyond that particular target" (Glickman 2009, 134). The issue of local solidarity with people located halfway across the globe relies on knitting together networks of identity in order to craft a movement of activists, whether they are for or against BDS. Drawing on collective resources, whether they be symbolic, material, or ideational, these activists operate within structures of possibility rooted in local, regional, and international relationships of power, legitimacy, finance, and identity. As the case studies in the book illustrate, strategy, tactics, target, and framing of the movement emerge out of these local resources and contexts, and political contention in each case relies on the interactions between local and global actors, available resources, and relational structure.

Peace Studies, Nonviolent Resistance, and the Tactic of Boycott

Largely separate from the consumer activism literature, which tends to be grounded in economics and marketing, the peace studies approach to BDS emphasizes strategies and actions of nonviolent resistance. While the peace studies literature overlaps with the social movements approach to boycotts, questions posed by opponents regarding the "nonviolent" credentials of the BDS movement warrants explication of the theory and practice of nonviolence as it relates to tactics of boycott, divestment, and sanctions. In his seminal work on nonviolence, Gene Sharp identifies close to two hundred methods of nonviolent action, which he classifies into three major categories: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 1973). The first category includes largely symbolic acts, such as public speeches, petitions, leafleting, picketing, displays of symbols, prayer services, vigils, marches, teach-ins, and walk-outs, all tactics used broadly by social movements. The second category, noncooperation, may be legal or illegal, and requires deliberately withdrawing cooperation from normal social, economic, or political activities that contribute to structures of social, political, or economic violence. These tactics include engaging in a wide range of social, economic, or political boycotts, striking, staying at home, participating in a rent strike, refusing to pay fees, refusing to accept appointed officials, and civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws (Sharp 2005, 61). The third category, nonviolent intervention, is more disruptive and can be used offensively or defensively; in either

case, these tactics are harder to sustain and likely to bring a harsher response from authorities. Intervention tactics include fasting, sit-ins, nonviolent raids, nonviolent interjection of one's body between a person and his/her objective, guerrilla theater, establishing alternative social institutions, civil disobedience of "neutral" laws, defiance of blockades, and nonviolent land seizure (Sharp 2005, 62–64). The tactic of boycott is a form of nonviolent noncooperation, although the methods used by BDS activists to advance their political goals fall into all three of Sharp's categories. For example, students at UC Berkeley, both for and against the student government bill to divest from several US corporations whose weapons were used in documented human rights violations of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, issued statements, made speeches, created banners, and otherwise engaged in symbolic protest, and activists in Code Pink's Stolen Beauty campaign regularly perform in flash mobs, a type of guerrilla theater.

The question of whether boycott is a truly nonviolent tactic, however, has persisted throughout the history of its use. Without doubt, boycott is a form of contention, aimed at applying pressure to bring about sociopolitical and/or economic change (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2009; Soederberg 2009; Soule 2009). Indeed, nonviolent resistance emphasizes the nature of struggle in securing a better society, in bringing down dictators in the pursuit of democracy; consequently, there is no denying that nonviolent strategic action involves confrontation. Scholars of nonviolence freely admit that they are engaged in a form of "conflict" over the nature of social, economic, and political institutions, yet underscore the importance of unarmed, nonviolent means of social change (Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Helvey 2004; Sharp 2005). As peace studies scholars have often noted, those benefiting from the status quo have difficulty recognizing structures of violence built into social systems that may oppress certain members of society. Hence, activism is necessary to draw attention to this state of affairs, and such education and awareness-raising may initially raise levels of *conflict*, which differs from *violence*. In his *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*, Martin Luther King, Jr affirms that "nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored" (King 1963). Further, he responds to the criticism of "white moderates," including clergy members, stating that "we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already there." King counters the assertion "that our

actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence...[such criticism is] like condemning the robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery" (King 1963).

Debates regarding the extent to which the tactic of boycott is violent or nonviolent date back to the origin of the term. Boycott was deemed a "powerful and dreaded weapon" and a form of "bloodless war" (Glickman 2009, 136). In the past decade, largely in response to the US-led "war on terror" and Israel's reinvasion of the West Bank during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, Islamic scholars have advocated for boycott, which they deem an "economic" or "consumer" jihad. Boycott is selected not only because it is seen as effective but because it allows Muslims "'to punish the one who punish him in a peaceful way, without any violence'" (al-Qaradawi, cited in Halevi 2012, 53). Because of boycott's power, opponents of boycott often turned to their own boycotts, seeking to "boycott the boycotters" or legislate against them, which resulted in boycott being deemed a "double-edged weapon" and a "weapon that shoots at both ends" (Glickman 2009, 139). Boycott was labeled "a new form of terrorism" by *Harper's* magazine in the 1880s, a charge echoed in 2012 by Israeli authorities calling Palestinian efforts to encourage a cultural boycott of Israel by European bands a form of "cultural terrorism" (Glickman 2009, 138; Ya'ar 2012). Critics of boycott have long charged that boycott "aim[s] to harm and ultimately to kill" while advocates describe it as a "'purely peaceful' substitute for violence" (Glickman 2009, 147). Opponents note the historic use of boycotts against the Jewish people, which perpetuates Jewish insecurity regarding anti-Semitism, and some raise concerns about boycotts as "blunt instruments," although they may also be targeted, selective, and focused on discrete items clearly linked to violence (Halevi 2012, 58; JCPA 2012; Plitnick 2012a).

While prodivestment activists like Holocaust survivor Hedy Epstein differentiate between the Nazi boycott of Jewish shops (which she suggests was personal and racist) and the call for divestment from specific corporations engaged in nonpeaceful pursuits, BDS efforts are hampered by any use of boycott, divestment, or sanctions in connection with physical or psychological violence, such as the adoption of a boycott strategy by some Islamic scholars due to their inability to wage armed jihad successfully (Halevi 2012, 53). Interestingly enough, while most Palestinian proponents, as well as those Americans for and against BDS that I have interviewed, affirm that the tactic itself is nonviolent, a major study of the BDS movement written by the Grassroots Palestinian Antiapartheid Wall Campaign suggests that "characterizing

the struggle as a whole as 'nonviolent' does not necessarily equate with the values of the oppressed for whom BDS forms one part or mechanism of support for their struggle." Naming liberation movements including those in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, which were supported by the international community, including churches, despite their use of armed struggle due to the international "right to resist," and describing the evolution of the Palestinian struggle to obtain their rights, the authors assert that "the Palestinian struggle cannot be so simply defined as violent or nonviolent; it brings together a variety of strategies in its path of resistance to advance national goals" (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007, 11). As explored further in the case studies to follow, this mixed history of tactics by the Palestinian national movement, combined with the tendency of the media to highlight violent stories over peaceful ones and the Western public's skepticism regarding nonviolence, means that nonviolent efforts are either not reported or dismissed as untrue (Bröning 2011; Qumsiyeh 2011). Even if current BDS efforts are nonviolent, this historical legacy, which is part of the broader context in which BDS activists operate, as well as the loose network structure of the BDS "movement" (as opposed to a centralized, disciplined cadre of activists), means that any linkage of "BDS activism" with violence can delegitimize local campaigns and the "movement" as a whole. Peace scholar Michael Nagler stresses that "nonviolence plus violence equals violence," and as numerous peace scholars have demonstrated, failure to use nonviolent tactics exclusively can lead to distrust and/or a violent response (Kaufman 1992; Nagler 2010; Rigby 1991). Furthermore, violent and nonviolent campaigns have fundamentally different logics and dynamics, which should not be mixed (Sharp 2010). Consequently, even when BDS activists themselves do not engage in violent acts, strategic linking together of violence with commonplaces associated with the BDS movement by anti-BDS activists can have a deleterious effect.

Boycott and Power

Proponents of BDS affirm that the tactic of boycott uses the "logic of pressure" because tactics of diplomacy and persuasion have not yielded results and because "dialog does not promote change, but rather reinforces the status quo" (Taraki and LeVine 2012, 166). The call by Islamic scholars for consumer jihad through boycott also was justified in part by the fact that governments had done nothing, leaving the people to take action (Halevi 2012). Liberal Zionist Peter Beinart issued a call for a boycott of

Israeli settlement goods in the *New York Times* precisely because of the need to put pressure on an Israeli government that otherwise has failed to make necessary changes (Beinart 2012b). Indeed, the discourse surrounding the BDS movement aimed at ending the Israeli occupation illustrates "radical disagreement," the antithesis of "dialog for mutual understanding" and the linguistic conflict underscores vastly different conceptions of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 377–8). Speaking of linguistic intractability in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ramsbotham et al. note that facts, emotions, and values are intertwined and that "the whole of interpretive space is politicized and contested. This is not a gravitational war *between* worlds within some neutral third space. It is a war *for* and *within* the *one* world in which conceptual space itself is warped and familiar landmarks slide" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 378, emphasis in original). For such scholars, third party description and efforts to reconcile the two narratives is impossible because of their radical disagreement on fundamentals. One of the reasons why BDS efforts have gained more traction in Europe than in the United States is because of the extent to which the popular narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as portrayed in mainstream media differs, which leads to different discursive space for engagement in the issues. Some peace and conflict scholars argue that without deliberate involvement in the agonistic discourses of conflict, one cannot strategically engage with actors who are "moderates of means," using nonviolent tactics, even if they are "extremists of ends," as Gandhi and King were over British rule in India and racial discrimination in the United States (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 391). The shifting of the discourse in the United States as a result of boycott, divestment, and/or sanctions efforts is seen as threatening by those who are part of the institutionalized Jewish community, as evident by the resources leveraged against the Presbyterian Church (USA) vote on divestment from Caterpillar, Hewlett Packard (HP), and Motorola and the framing of the vote as an attack on the Jewish community (Cooper and Adlerstein 2012). Many antiboycott groups believed that if the divestment passed it "would represent the most significant victory ever for the so-called BDS movement, which is attempting to delegitimize Israel as a Jewish State" (Ainsman 2012).

The controversy surrounding boycott stems in part from its perceived power. However, if the vast majority of boycotts historically have been "putative failures" (Glickman 2009, 2), why have they been such a site of contention? Those who oppose boycott in one instance may use it in another, and those engaging in boycott do so in pursuit of a wide array of political, social, and economic causes. Although consumer

activists may "have disagreed about what constituted morality," they have "shared [their] belief in the power of organized consumption to work for opposing causes" (Glickman 2009, 5). Boycott has traditionally been considered a "weapon of the weak," a tactic accessible to the "downtrodden" and those low on the economic scale (Glickman 2009, 119, 125); this is also the conventional view of nonviolent resistance, which is seen as broadly available to people of all walks of life, a form of "people power" deployed by disciplined cadres of unsatisfied people (Dudouet 2008; Schell et al. 2009; West 2012). Consumer activism gives the ordinary consumer a form of power, through aggregate action, that they do not have on their own. Furthermore, it joins them in a web of activists locally and globally partnering in furthering shared objectives (Glickman 2009; Soule 2009), and BDS efforts, combined with other nonviolent tactics, such as what opponents deem "lawfare" cases, "can be a powerful catalyst for change" and cause "significant" damage (Parry 2010; Steinberg 2011, 38). While opponents of BDS may claim it is an ineffective tool, likely to fail in strict economic terms, their concern is often framed in terms of the "delegitimization" of Israel. Indeed, international human rights scholar and special rapporteur for Palestine Richard Falk has described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a "legitimacy war," with both sides trying to demonstrate the "legitimacy" and "morality" of their position (Falk 2010). This struggle in the realm of representation indicates the power of global connections and transnational relationships. As described by Omar Barghouti, a founding member of the BDS National Committee (BNC), "the BDS movement has dragged Israel and its well-financed, bullying lobby groups into a confrontation on a battlefield where the moral superiority of the Palestinian quest for self-determination, justice, and equality neutralizes and outweighs Israel's military power and financial prowess" (Barghouti 2011, 62). Chapters that follow discuss the dynamics of power as employed in the struggles over BDS, particularly emphasizing the linkage of identities, movements, and values that serve to motivate individuals and groups to act. The debates over BDS touch on peoples' sense of who they are and how their actions in the world convey their most important beliefs. Similar to the BDS movement against South African apartheid, which constructed "a shared sense of community among people dispersed over large geographical distances," activists for and against BDS bind together a range of movements, organizations, and loyalties at the local, national, and transnational levels (Thörn 2006, 295). At the same time, power dynamics "internal" to the BDS movement illustrate the challenges of international solidarity work given

global inequalities, which, when combined with the numerous external influences shaping the context in which Palestinians operate, results in the Palestinian activists' concern "that disparities between organizations do not result in most of the power, decision-making and strategizing [becoming] concentrated in the north" (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007, 10).

Historical Cases of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions

The use of BDS is perhaps most commonly associated with the international campaign against South Africa's apartheid policies, when citizen groups around the world put pressure on universities and corporations to divest their holdings from companies working in South Africa (Becker 1987; Seidman 2007). The South African antiapartheid movement included numerous forms of boycott (sports, consumer, academic, and cultural) as well as campaigns for university and corporate divestment (Manby 1992). Although the antiapartheid movement was characterized by a number of local or national efforts, they were loosely networked to create a global social movement (Thorn 2009). Although scholars disagree regarding the extent to which the fall of apartheid was due to the pressure of global BDS activists or shifts in the balance of power following the end of the Cold War, civil society actors played a substantive role in keeping the issue on the agenda and putting pressure on states to adjust their policies vis-à-vis the apartheid regime. As the case illustrates, global civil society actors engage with states and international organizations in their strategic efforts, with the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee, for example, playing key roles in the international effort to sanction South Africa for its official policy of racism (Manby 1992; Rosner and Low 2009). Similar to contemporary debates over BDS, arguments against divestment from South Africa varied based on the site of contention, with universities, for example, arguing about the actual and perceived costs of divestment, including high transaction costs for finding securities that were South Africa-free, pressure from alumni and corporate donors, and the fact that South African investments were large, successful, and relatively low risk (Soule 2009, 82–84). A number of arguments heard against divestment from South African companies are echoed today, including the concern that universities should be "neutral" and should focus on educating people, that divestment results in a loss of leverage for positive change, and that university holdings were not sufficient to yield any substantive effect (Soule 2009, 85–86).

The struggle to divest from South Africa took decades to yield substantive results, and although civil society efforts were generally perceived as nonviolent, there were debates regarding the most suitable methods for advancing the movement, particularly surrounding the cultural boycott, which prominent artists like Ray Charles and Frank Sinatra defied (Beaubien 1982; Drewett 2006). Activists were assisted by a national context in which the immorality of the apartheid system was widely accepted and widely reported in the mainstream media in the mid-1980s, and in which Congress passed a series of laws that included a prohibition on loans to new investments in South Africa and all loans to the South African government and businesses (Soule 2009, 90–91). Divestment efforts were more successful in universities with a large African-American student population and those with black studies programs, which again indicates the importance of local context in understanding the dynamics of contention (Soule 2009, 97).[8]

The significance of student demographics and the presence of black studies programs to the antiapartheid efforts on college campuses exhibit how past actions create resources for future activists to draw upon. African Americans have a history of being the subgroup in the United States most involved in boycotts historically (Friedman 1999, 90). Although the Montgomery bus boycott (December 1955–December 1956) is perhaps the best-known of the Civil Rights era boycotts, blacks in Baton Rouge stayed off the buses for ten days in June 1953, a mass action that successfully challenged racial segregation (Friedman 1999, 96). The Montgomery bus boycott initially sought to work within the system, but engaged in a "scale shift," by moving to overturn the system entirely, when the bus company rejected their compromise demands (Friedman 1999, 103; Soule 2009). The bus boycotts exhibited the importance of complex planning and organizing, as the boycotters created alternative transport systems, linked together networks of activists, and sought out leaders from the black churches who could attract a broad following. Ultimately, some argue, the victory of desegregated bus systems in Montgomery and Tallahassee (although not in Baton Rouge) came not from the direct action of the boycotters but from Supreme Court rulings (Friedman 1999, 107). The bus boycott gained extensive media attention, and the story of Rosa Parks refusing to give her seat to a white man is widely known (if not in its exact details) in US popular culture.

Other notable consumer boycotts in US history include the grape boycott led by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers Association to help improve the working conditions of migrant farm workers (Ganz

2000) and Jewish boycotts of stores doing business with Nazi Germany (Friedman 1999, 137). In these and other cases, a primary feature of the boycott tactic has been its use by civil society groups lacking traditional forms of coercive power in asymmetrical situations, as well as the linkage between economic and political goals. BDS includes a diverse array of tactics used by activists seeking sociopolitical and/or economic change; consequently BDS efforts aimed at ending the Israeli occupation should be explored in the broader context of that struggle in conjunction with other nonviolent mechanisms of social change. It is important to note that the efforts studied here are those undertaken by civil society actors, not governments, and this is a key distinction between the contemporary BDS movement and the efforts of the Arab states to boycott Israel from 1948 until the Oslo Process.[9] The Arab boycott was state-run, minimally enforced due to the integration of Israel in the world economy, and sometimes targeted Jews rather than the policies of concern; its use of "coercion and economic force shared little of the moral or ethical arguments that typically characterize solidarity work," a legacy that hurts BDS activists today (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007, 34–35). Furthermore, the Arab boycott was tarnished by the reputation of the states themselves, which "reflect little of the justice or morality that should be invoked by BDS solidarity work," a lack of transparency, and by the "lack of overall clarity and purpose" of its justification, aims, and goals (Brumer 2010; Stop the Wall Campaign 2007, 36–37).

Origins of the BDS Movement against Israeli Occupation

The 2005 Palestinian call for BDS against the Israeli occupation should be understood in the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can be traced back to the origins of European nationalism and particularly the rise of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century. While the history (and historiography) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is contested (Ghazi-Bouillon 2009), there is general consensus in the scholarly community that the conflict is not one of "ancient hatreds" dating back to biblical times as is often claimed by media pundits, but rather one of relatively recent creation, whether one traces the point of origin back to European nationalism and colonialism, World War I and the issuance of rival promises to European Jews and to the Arabs living under Ottoman rule, or to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 (Hallward 2011b; Khalidi 1997; Lesch 2008; Shlaim 2009). Implicit in debates over the BDS movement are rival interpretations

of the sources of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and accompanying assumptions regarding appropriate methods of conflict resolution or transformation. Many in the so-called "pro-Israel" camp frame the conflict in terms of anti-Israel sentiment in the Middle East, and are quick to note that Arab states attacked Israel on the day it was established in May 1948. They point to the failure of the Oslo peace process and repeat former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's claim that "there is no partner for peace." Their solution to the conflict, as illustrated in the case studies, is for the parties to engage in dialog and negotiation toward reaching a two-state solution, the boundaries of which are usually unspecified, but generally assumed to be consistent with the Clinton Parameters outlined at the end of his second term in December 2000, which allocate the West Bank settlement blocks to Israel, but specify that equivalent land swaps should occur, thereby using the pre-1967 boundary as a point of reference.[10]

Palestinians, and Palestinian solidarity activists, tend to frame the issues in terms of "occupation" and violation of Palestinian rights to self-determination; indeed, as discussed further, the BDS movement emphasizes that it is a "rights-based" as opposed to "solutions-based" approach, and thus it does not take a position on a one-state versus two-state solution, although many supporters of BDS are widely assumed to support a binational solution (Barghouti 2011). Palestinians point to their dispossession from their land, through Zionist immigration, the wars of 1948 and 1967 in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees, and Israeli state policies that have resulted in settlement construction, land confiscation, and further displacement of Palestinians (World Bank 2008; Baskin 2008; Morris 1999). Although it is somewhat of an over simplification, and there are many variations, one can identify two basic streams within the movement (earlier identified as BDS1 and BDS2), one of which focuses on Zionism and BDS from Israel itself due to the government's erasure of the Green Line (the internationally recognized boundary of Israel, based on the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Line, also called the pre-1967 boundary), and a second that focuses on the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which most countries in the world deem illegal and in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Barghouti 2012a; Barghouti and Waskow 2012; Plitnick 2012a). While the tactics used by activists engaged in these two types of BDS may be the same, the targets may differ (Israeli corporations versus corporations profiting from the occupation) and the assumptions regarding the conflict's source (broader ideological and political differences between the parties versus the

oppression of the military occupation) may also diverge, with activists focusing on the occupation usually calling explicitly for a two-state solution, and activists targeting Israel more broadly espousing a range of goals, and options, including an end to the Jewish character of the state of Israel and full equality for all citizens.

The Use of Boycott in Palestinian History

Palestinians have a long history of using boycotts, divestment, and sanctions as a means of resisting occupation and oppression. The 1936 general strike, protesting British Mandate policies supporting the Zionist movement and increasing waves of Jewish immigration, lasted several months and is one of the longest strikes in history (Rigby 1991; Stop the Wall Campaign 2007). Palestinians also boycotted Zionist goods, as distinct from Jewish goods, since Zionists were new settlers to the Ottoman Empire (and to the Palestinian Mandate after it was created in 1920), seeking an ethnic Jewish state to address the problem of anti-Semitism (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2009). Zionists were seen as foreign colonizers who not only displaced the local population, but who looked down on these inhabitants as "backward," a view also directed at the Arab Jews who had been living in the Ottoman Empire alongside other Arab Christians and Muslims for centuries (Campos 2007; Dajani 1995, 3–8; Pappé 2004, 52–53)—in protest of their gradual displacement from the land. Although the Palestinian resistance is most widely known in the West for its tactics of armed resistance, notably attention-grabbing acts such as airplane hijackings, ordinary Palestinians have long engaged in tactics of "popular" or "civil resistance," and since 1988 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)[11] has officially rescinded armed resistance in its quest for Palestinian statehood (Bröning 2011; Qumsiyeh 2011). Boycotts and labor strikes, as easily accessible "weapon[s] of the weak" have a long history among Palestinians (Pappé 2004, 106). During the first Palestinian intifada (1987–1993),[12] local committees organized at the village level created an alternative infrastructure for providing Palestinians with the basic services that had been administered by Israel. A general boycott of Israeli goods and services was instituted, and women focused on home economics and planting their own gardens. Some villages, like Beit Sahour, went as far as to institute a tax boycott, refusing to pay any taxes to the Israeli authorities (King 2007; Abu-Nimer 2003). Sanctions, in the form of government-administered boycotts, were called for by the PLO in exile and were seen most prominently in the Arab boycott,

although this was not always implemented in practice, and differed from the grassroots efforts of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2009; Jamjoum 2011).

After the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which led to the recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO's official recognition of Israel and renunciation of the use of violence, there was an upsurge in interest in Israeli-Palestinian peace work as a "people-to-people" complement to the official negotiating process (Hirschfield and Roling 2000). Not all Palestinians supported the Oslo process, however, because "the major issues that traditionally framed the Palestinian liberation struggle, particularly the rights of Palestinian refugees, the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the status of Jerusalem, were not discussed at Oslo or subsequent peace summits," and the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) only represented those Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Jamjoum 2011, 135). Although the Oslo era brought with it increased "normalization" of relations between Palestinians and Israelis, it also witnessed an explosion of Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and increased restrictions on Palestinian movement, both trends that, combined with previous Israeli policies hampering Palestinian trade in an effort to corner the Palestinian market, hindered the development of a viable Palestinian economy (Dajani 1995, 13–16; Roy 1999; Weizman 2007; Zertal and Eldar 2007). Throughout this period, a number of settlement boycott initiatives continued, including the Israeli group Gush Shalom and Palestinian NGO group Marsad (Gush Shalom, n.d.; Stop the Wall Campaign 2007).

With the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, the relative calm of the Oslo era was shattered, and Palestinians were subjected to ever-tightening restrictions on movement with hundreds of checkpoints concretized in the West Bank separating Palestinian communities from each other, military invasions such as 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, wreaked devastation on Palestinian civilians, and Palestinian farmers lost their agricultural land with the construction of Israel's separation barrier, also called the "security fence" or "apartheid wall" (Lein 2002; B'Tselem 2007). Suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians heightened Israeli fears and strengthened Israel's tendency for policies of unilateralism and separation (Hallward 2011b; Peled 2006). The current BDS campaign began in the early years of the second intifada, as a number of student groups in the United States launched divestment campaigns (Lim 2012). In 2004, several dozen federations, associations, and unions representing Palestinian

academics and intellectuals established the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), calling "upon our colleagues in the international community to comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural institutions as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's occupation, colonization and system of apartheid" (PACBI 2005). While some groups like the AUT responded to PACBI's call (a move later overturned), the cultural and academic boycott has been criticized, like the cultural boycott against South Africa before it, for violating academic freedom and serving as a form of censorship; in both cases advocates have stressed the incompatibility between emphasizing the academic freedom of one group while denying (and even censoring discussion about) the fundamental human rights of another (Drewett 2006; Barghouti 2010, 105).

The 2004 International Court of Justice advisory ruling on Israel's separation barrier, issued three days after PACBI's call, was a key turning point in the BDS movement, as it called for states to hold Israel accountable to upholding the Geneva Convention and declared that states were obliged to withhold any assistance in the barrier's construction, a form of international sanction (ICJ 2004; Jamjoum 2011). Little was done by the global community in response to the court's ruling, however, and the lack of pressure on Israel to comply with international law[13] from states and international institutions is one of the justifications given for global civil society to mobilize in support of Palestinian freedom and rights (BDS 2005). On the one-year anniversary of the ICJ ruling, in July 2005, over 170 Palestinian civil society organizations, spanning the full spectrum of Palestinian society, including Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, Palestinians under occupation, and Palestinian citizens of Israel, issued a unified, comprehensive appeal calling for a "comprehensive BDS campaign against Israel" (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007, 52). The 2005 call emphasizes that BDS involves "non-violent punitive measures" and was instituted because "all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine" (BDS 2005).

The BDS Call appeals specifically to members of international civil society and "conscientious Israelis," citing the example of the boycott and divestment initiatives that put pressure on the South African apartheid regime. Through its references to international law and concentration on international civil society actors, in conjunction with its invitation for solidarity with Palestinian civil society, the BDS campaign emphasizes

the power of the people to work for justice and peace if states are failing to do so (Jamjoum 2011). Members of the BNC, a Palestinian steering committee of the BDS movement established in 2008 that consists of a broad coalition of Palestinian civil society organizations, admit that "BDS is not an exact science" and that two important factors should be considered by international solidarity activists interested in starting their own campaign. One is that "the Palestinian majority, which supports BDS, knows what is in its best interest far better than those who stand in solidarity with us," that is, that efforts to "help" the Palestinian quest for freedom should be based on the call of Palestinians themselves (Barghouti 2011, 81). The second factor is that BDS is not "one size fits all," but rather that "diverse forms of BDS can be applied in accordance with specific contexts" (Barghouti 2011, 84). While the BDS campaign lacks a formal structure, independent groups of activists around the world often communicate with the BNC in the course of planning and conducting their actions (Barghouti 2010). Even though the BDS movement is quite loosely organized, the BNC does serve as a focal point for coordinating various BDS campaign efforts, since it organizes a yearly conference, formulates strategies and programs, and acts as the Palestinian reference point for global BDS activities (BNC 2011). On the seventh anniversary of the 2005 BDS Call, BDS organizers documented a number of "successes" in the "Palestinian civil and popular struggle for freedom, justice and human [rights]," particularly after the May 2010 attack on the Gaza-bound flotilla, with civil society pressure even resulting in some government sanctions, such as differential labeling for products produced in Israeli settlements (Barghouti 2012c; BNC 2010).

Structure of the Book

Although the focus of this book is not on whether the BDS movement is "effective" or "successful" but rather on how local campaigns operate in their respective contexts, the extent to which the movement is nonviolent, and why the movement is so contentious, questions of impact are inherent in analyzing the dynamics of contentious politics and the interaction between cases, given the connections between local campaigns and wider pro- and anti-divestment networks. Furthermore, while the BDS movement connects activists globally, including some activists within Israel who have endorsed the call to BDS, such as the group "Boycott from Within," this book focuses on the BDS movement in the United States as a means of "controlling" for the national context, which provides opportunities and constraints for BDS activists, and which influences

the available social, discursive, political, psychological, economic, and symbolic resources available to activists for and against BDS. The four case studies—Code Pink's Stolen Beauty campaign targeting Ahava cosmetics, the student divestment bill at UC Berkeley, the Olympia Food Co-op deshelving of Israeli goods, and the Presbyterian Church (USA)'s corporate engagement efforts with Caterpillar, Motorola, and HP, were selected for their accessibility, the extent of media coverage, diversity of tactics, and timeliness. I conducted several dozen formal and informal interviews, both by phone and in person with activists personally engaged in each of the cases, attended conferences and workshop sessions focusing on BDS, and observed the dynamics of the debates first hand when possible, as in the case of attending the 220th Presbyterian General Assembly in which divestment was a major item of business. In addition to interviews and first hand observation, the book draws heavily from the wealth of Internet sources—news reports, blogs, commentary, YouTube videos—that document the array of opinions and views of the movement. Ranging from Democracy Now to the Jon Stewart show, from Jewish Voices for Peace to StandWithUs, there is no shortage of material. Israeli actions in response to the BDS movement, including the 2010 passage of a law prohibiting engagement in BDS activity and the creation of the "Brand Israel" campaign, as well as the websites of the BNC and PACBI provide additional sources of material.

Book Outline

The book that follows examines in detail four case studies of boycott and divestment efforts by civil society groups within the United States. While each case differs in regard to the specific source of contention and the institutions involved in initiating the call to action, all four cases engage with similar discourses, boundaries, processes, and structures of power. Chapter 2 focuses on why the BDS movement is so contentious and identifies common mechanisms through which the BDS movement operates. In particular, the chapter argues that there are three primary reasons for the extreme polarization surrounding the movement: the deployment of identity-based fear, the use of rival moral frameworks for conceptualizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ways to address it, and competing views of power and process. After setting up the analytical context, the next four chapters delve into the case studies that comprise the substance of the book. Chapter 3 studies feminist organization Code Pink's Stolen Beauty campaign that targets Ahava cosmetics for its use of natural resources from the occupied West

Bank. This chapter looks at the efforts of a loose network of activists to raise awareness about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to reconfigure the issues through creative protest actions such as flash mobs and bathrobe brigades, using social media and email networks to raise awareness and effect change. The chapter discusses how personal identity and local context has shaped the actions undertaken by Code Pink activists and explores different conceptions of "success" held by supporters and opponents of the boycott. Chapter 4 analyzes the debates surrounding the 2010 UC Berkeley student government bill to divest from two US corporations selling weapons and other materials to Israel that were used in the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead and the 2006 Lebanon war. Although the bill originally passed the student senate, it was vetoed by the student government president and the effort to overturn the veto failed by one vote. In the lead up to the vote to override the veto, the student government held a series of open forums to which hundreds came from campus and the surrounding community. Drawing on interviews with student senators and community leaders for and against the bill, as well as the media surrounding the events, which were covered by Democracy Now and elicited letters from various groupings of Nobel Peace Prize laureates (both for and against the bill), this chapter wrestles with rival conceptions of "peace" and "nonviolence" articulated by individuals and organizations on either side of divestment. The chapter also examines the central role that contestation over the boundaries of Jewish identity played in the debates and the implications of that struggle not only for the case at hand but also for the broader BDS movement, as well as the unique features of BDS activism on college campuses.

Chapter 5 examines the contestation surrounding the decision to boycott (deshelve) all Israeli products from the Olympia, Washington Food Co-op in 2010. This chapter in particular illustrates the importance of local context in the structuring of BDS campaigns, given the city's culture of social activism, its status as the hometown of Rachel Corrie, who was killed by an Israeli Caterpillar bulldozer while defending a Palestinian home in the Gaza Strip in 2003, and the strategic networking and power mapping used by BDS organizers, all of which help explain why the Co-op board's decision held despite subsequent legal action by a few disgruntled members. Chapter 6 explores questions of local historical context, institutional process, and contending views of morality through study of the Presbyterian Church (USA)'s eight year examination of its investments in US corporations involved in the Israeli occupation. The case of PCUSA not only demonstrates

the rival views of justice and morality prevalent in the discourse surrounding the BDS movement, but it also explains the critical role of the media (and its selection of terminology and socially powerful tropes) in waging the BDS battle. Comparing the role of Jews for and against the recommendation of the Middle East Peacemaking Committee to divest from three US corporations (which also affirmed other Israeli and Palestinian investments engaged in peaceful pursuits) the chapter furthers the discussion begun in earlier chapters regarding the power of linking Jewish identity with activist efforts on either side of the issue, as well as rival categorizations of "Jewish" identity.

The concluding chapter engages in systematic comparison of themes raised across the four case studies, particularly examining the role of identity, the mechanisms through which activists and opponents mobilize and advance their views, and how competing conceptions of "peace" and "justice" affect the discourse on BDS. The types and uses of various forms of power, as well as different views of "success" used by proponents and opponents of BDS are explored. The conclusion also discusses answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the book regarding the extent to which the movement is nonviolent and how local contexts shape the contours of activism.

Explaining the Contentiousness of BDS: Rival Framings of Identity, Peace, and Power

Introduction

As discussed in chapter 1, the tactic of boycott has always been contentious, viewed by supporters and opponents as alternatively violent or nonviolent. The discourse surrounding the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against the Israeli occupation has also been extremely polarizing, with millions of dollars poured into counter-campaigns and extensive media coverage disproportionate to the scale of particular actions. This chapter explores the mechanisms through which the BDS movement against the Israeli occupation operates—primarily examining the methods of BDS supporters, and also examining the methods of BDS opponents for comparison—and analyzes why BDS is so polarizing in the US-based cases studied. I argue that the BDS movement is so contentious in the United States because of the centrality of debates about identity, and the mobilization of fear regarding the safety of the identities in question. Polarization surrounding BDS tactics is emphasized by opponents of BDS who portray pro-BDS activists as part of a coherent, homogenized "out-group" that poses a threat to a particular "in-group," be that a subset of a community (e.g., Caterpillar employees within the Presbyterian church, Jewish students on campus) or a more broadly constructed identity category (e.g. American Jews, the State of Israel).

Despite its portrayal as a "movement" by those against BDS, the 2005 Palestinian call for global civil society to engage in BDS has resulted in a loosely organized network grounded in the principle of context sensitivity (Jamjoum 2011), in which activists devise campaigns based on

local needs and values, often acting as brokers between groups with related goals and moral frameworks. Consequently, networks of BDS activists are often diverse, multicultural, and concerned with a variety of social justice issues. While decentralization and diversity allow campaigns to be rooted in local realities, the lack of coherence across campaigns—particularly the lack of a common set of aims, goals, and discipline—has limitations. For example, polarization mobilized by fear can result when the use of violent (or nonpeaceful) tactics by BDS activists anywhere in the world are portrayed as illustrative of the "movement" as a whole, even if the event was completely disconnected from a local group that has been fastidious in its commitment to nonviolence. Opponents also mobilize fear related to the call for Palestinian refugees' "right of return," suggesting that BDS activists seek to wipe Israel off the map and destroy the character of Israel as a Jewish majority state; however, not all activists engaging in BDS have endorsed the BDS Call.[1]

In the United States, debates over the character of Jewish identity and the relationship between US Jews and the state of Israel feature prominently in BDS (and anti-BDS) campaigns, and activists and opponents actively engage in negotiating this categorical identity. As noted by Peter Beinart (2012a, 8), the younger generation of American Jews increasingly questions Israeli policies that "violate democratic ideals" or run counter to Jewish teachings of social justice. Groups like Young, Jewish, and Proud speak out against the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and challenge its traditional institutional views regarding Israel. Offering a different view of what it means to be "pro-Israel" or to live in accordance with Jewish values, Jewish supporters of BDS often have a position of power in defining the debate or legitimizing criticism of Israel, even as they are marginalized in their own communities for these same actions (JVP 2013). At times, Palestinian and Muslim voices are marginalized in the focus on intra-Jewish debates over BDS, further indicating the interplay between debates over Jewish identity, discourses of power, and broader debates regarding morality and ethics.

Identity politics contributes to the contentiousness of the debates over BDS not only because of perceived threats to (Jewish) identity but also because of the desire of activists on both sides of the issue to be associated with the "right" side of history, aligned with forces for "justice," "peace," and "human rights," albeit conceptualized differently by the parties involved. As the issues of abortion and gay marriage illustrate, debates over morality can be particularly polarizing,

and, as happens in these other debates, members of the same family and/or religious group can find themselves on opposite sides of the dividing line regarding BDS. Tied up with the debates over morality and identity are associated questions of appropriate process, shaped by differing conceptions of "peace" and "nonviolence" as well as varying approaches to understanding "effectiveness," "impact," and "success." Within the US context, most activists identify success in educational and symbolic terms, seeking to challenge AIPAC's domination of the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to inform audiences of on-the-ground realities not covered in the mainstream US media. In contrast, opponents of BDS (paradoxically, considering their portrayals of the BDS movement as a threat), point to the "ineffectiveness" of BDS tactics given the global reach of Israeli companies or the insignificant percentage of stock owned in particular companies.

Related to and integrated within all the above-mentioned concepts is the role of power. While the conventional definition draws on Max Weber's (1964, 152) conception of power as "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance," peace and conflict studies tends to approach power differently. Peace and conflict studies generally focuses on the idea of "power with" rather than "power over," seeking integrative solutions to conflict through cooperation (Boulding 1990). And in the study of nonviolence, scholar-practitioners emphasize the bottom-up nature of power, through which the masses give leaders power via their consent to obey (Sharp 2010). As will be discussed in greater depth below, just as opponents and supporters of BDS tend to use different moral frameworks for advocating their positions and legitimizing their goals, they also tend to conceptualize power differently, with BDS supporters generally focusing on the "people power" of grassroots advocacy networks and opponents pursuing a more top-down approach to power rooted in positional authority and material resources. While both opponents and supporters of BDS tactics engage in coercive tactics, seeking to force behavioral shifts in their targets, the manner in which power is conceptualized and the mechanisms through which it is deployed vary between them.

Polarization and the Power of Identity-Based Fear

The debates over the BDS movement in the United States have been especially polemical, drawing attention disproportionate to the scale of

the action. One of the major reasons for this is that opponents of BDS have drawn on collective memories of Jewish victimhood and trauma to frame BDS efforts as a threat not only to Jewish identity but also to the State of Israel as well. A number of social-psychological theories explain the relationship between identity and threat perception. Social Identity Theory (SIT), for example, posits that individuals seek membership in groups as a way to gain security and positive self-esteem, and to reduce uncertainty. Individuals "have a deep-seated cognitive imperative to perceive their in-groups as favorable" even in experiments with randomly assigned identities (Demmers 2012, 41; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, 747). According to the theory, actors engage in conflict due to a perceived threat to their identity, or to a perceived attack on other in-group members, which is then interpreted as a threat to one's self, consequently "enhancing processes of group closure and group think" (Demmers 2012, 44). According to SIT, people are not born into categories automatically, and categories do not exist *a priori*; the creation of collective identities is based on a boundary-drawing process through which a number of sites of difference are yoked together in an active negotiation process (Abbott 1995; Tilly 2002). Individuals belong to multiple, overlapping categories, categories that are (re)created and modified based on interaction and relationships within and across the boundaries of collective identities. Collective identities are embedded in stories, reliant on available cultural resources, and contingent upon the availability of patterns, narratives, and "rhetorical commonplaces," which limit potential conceptions of identity and relations among actors (Emirbayer 1997, 285–288; Jackson 2006; Shotter 1993; Tilly 2002, xii). The process of articulating, challenging, and (re) drawing boundaries is contentious, particularly for boundaries like gender, race, and political affiliation that are assumed to be stable, in part because people categorize in order to maintain and perpetuate power (Volkan 1985, 224). In the context of the BDS campaigns studied for this book, the boundary of American Jewish identity, particularly as defined by "Jewish" values and the relationship with Israel, is especially contentious.

BDS and Threats to Israeli Identity

Fear is expressed in at least two ways by those opposed to the BDS movement. Opponents of BDS portray it as a large, cohesive movement aimed at "delegitimizing" Israel. For example, at the 2009 AIPAC Policy Conference, Executive Director Howard Kohr warned of a burgeoning

BDS movement that "is a conscious campaign to shift policy, to trans-form the way Israel is treated by its friends to a state that deserves not our support, but our contempt; not our protection, but pressured to change its essential nature." Kohr continued, noting that "there is a battle for basic perception underway, a fight to focus the lens through which our policy makers will receive and perceive all events in Israel and the broader Middle East. And the stakes in that battle are nothing less than the survival of Israel" (cited in Horowitz 2009). In his speech, Kohr draws on tropes of fear, isolation, and victimhood, arguing that BDS efforts threaten Israel's very existence, not because of the economic pressure of the movement, but because of how Israel's identity would be perceived by outside supporters. Ringmar (1996, 189–90) argues, "when our self-descriptions are threatened . . . we do what it takes to protect them. Without a story we simply cannot be." Consequently, opponents to BDS seek to protect their representation of Israel in the US discourse. Explaining why portrayals of Israel as a human rights violator are so threatening, a BDS activist stated that "Israel prides itself on being seen as a Western country with a rising scientific and aca-demic and technological [capacity] and so this [its international image] is really a weak spot" (National BDS Activist 2011). The activist empha-sized, "the main point of BDS is about pressure and isolating Israel, about really forcing it to change its policies. So it's not really as much about economics as it is about putting pressure on Israel . . . if you can create fear and concern then you are really achieving your objective" (National BDS Activist 2011). In contrast to Howard Kohr's portrayal of the BDS movement, activists emphasize that BDS efforts to shift the discourse are not aimed at destroying Israel, but rather ending policies of occupation and apartheid and upholding Palestinians' human rights. However, the general public often does not know about Israel's occupa-tion or the Palestinian narrative of the war of 1948. Because the BDS movement is not a unified, coherent movement, but rather a collection of global civil society campaigns grounded in local contexts, opponents of a local BDS campaign can misrepresent local BDS activists by con-necting their efforts to those of activists elsewhere in the country or world who may or may not be pursuing the same goals; for example, although not all US campaigns endorse all three pillars of the BDS Call, opponents often reframe the demand for the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 for Palestinian refugees as an existential threat. Although the state itself would not be destroyed or its people killed, Israel would lose its identity as a Jewish majority state if all the refugees returned.

Variations in BDS Activism

While the BDS National Committee (BNC) serves as the coordinating center of the BDS movement in Palestine, local activist groups do not necessarily coordinate with the BNC on their campaigns. Some of those I interviewed indicated that they had consulted with the BNC on their campaigns, whereas others did not. From the research conducted for this book, it is not clear that local US-based campaigns (apart from some key actors) consult as much with the BNC as they would like, and even groups working ostensibly on the same campaign may conduct their activities in parallel. The locally controlled nature of BDS campaigns provides activists with a great deal of flexibility and autonomy, and it also results in a lack of movement discipline, which makes it easier for opponents to mobilize fear. As one BDS activist noted, "decisions [of boycott targets] are made partly by individual groups . . . those choices, if they work well or if they don't, have effects and repercussions for everyone" (Montreal Activist 1 2011). The variety of targets and campaigns can work to the advantage of the BDS movement by providing more points of leverage, but the lack of a coherent set of end goals apart from the three broad statements of Palestinian rights can allow opponents of BDS to mobilize fear. The existence of many different BDS activists articulating a range of campaign goals combined with the lack of a clearly stated end goal by the BNC, which maintains that BDS is a rights-based and not a solution-based approach, provides space for opponents of BDS to mobilize fear by suggesting the desired end game is Israel's destruction. BNC member Omar Barghouti differentiates between those who have endorsed the BDS Call, "allies," who may not be fully on board with the BDS Call but who are active in BDS campaigns, and "strategic partners" who agree with the principles of the BDS Call but may conduct a more narrowly focused campaign (Barghouti 2011, 219); this roughly correlates to Lerner's BDS1 and BDS2, with an intermediary category engaged in a targeted campaign but endorsing the broader goals. Along with the lack of specified end goals, the wording of the BDS Call, while allowing a wide range of Palestinian civil society groups to reach unity, also contributes to opponents' fear.

The original statement calls for "ending [Israel's] occupation and colonization of all Arab lands" (Barghouti 2010, 6), which some in Europe and Palestine interpret in terms of 1948—when Israel was created—versus 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, consequently giving grounds to concerns that BDS "seeks to end Israel's existence" (Lerner 2012, 327). For groups like J-Street,

a Jewish lobby working for a two-state solution, BDS "has become a convenient mantle for thinly disguised anti-Semitism," at least for some, particularly because it "fails explicitly to recognize Israel's right to exist and it ignores or rejects Israel's role as a national home for the Jewish people" (J Street U n.d.). Even though some BDS activists do explicitly recognize Israel's right to live in secure borders in a two-state solution, the fact that some BDS activists, notably members of the BNC, seen as the hub of the BDS movement by opponents, challenge the hegemony of Jews over non-Jews within Israel, is used by BDS opponents to suggest that all BDS activists reject not only Israel as a Jewish state but also Israel more broadly.

Contested Formations of Jewish Identity

The mobilization of identity-based fear, particularly on the part of Jewish Americans, is a powerful force in the contestation over BDS campaigns. Opponents to BDS draw on collective Jewish memories of suffering and persecution to reframe the arguments posed by BDS activists. In contrast to material- or resource-based explanations of conflict, the polarization surrounding BDS activism often stems not from an economic threat to Israel, but rather a symbolic threat to identity, particularly to those Jewish Americans who strongly identify with Israel: "We act, not in defence of our interests, but in defence of our identity" (Ringmar 1996, 4). However, "Jewish" identity itself is contested. Members of Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), which advocates for BDS, make their claims in the name of Judaism (and claim to be pro-Israel) just as anti-BDS groups such as the Jewish Community Relations Council do.[2] The difference, of course, lies in what individuals and organizations consider "pro-Israel" activism and the extent to which they see Jewish values as overlapping with secular humanist universalism versus Jewish particularism.

At the center of BDS debates are contested views on Israel's identity—both what it *is* and what it *should* be. Identity "draw[s] deeply at the well of community memories, those shared histories constructed through storytelling that serve to define memberships within groups and relations among them" (Roy 1994, 3). For Jewish Americans, the "well of community memories" is heavily influenced by what Rabbi Michael Lerner (2012, 260) calls the "internalized consequence of a traumatic and painful psychological history." These "shared memories . . . give rise to reverberations that are held in common by large groups of people" and

are "strongly grounded in institutional arrangements" (Ringmar 1996, 70; Roy 1994, 140). Social groups actively shape communal narratives by helping to "determine what is 'memorable'" (Peter Burke, quoted in Roy 1994, 187). Peter Beinart (2012a, 40), for example, argues that Jewish institutions have helped shape US Jewish identity, and its relationship to Israel, through explicit reference to the Holocaust, while downplaying other aspects of Jewish identity; the American Jewish establishment has "embrace[d] . . . victimhood as a strategy." Because emotion, particularly fear, drives group polarization, with "the greater the fear, the greater the polarization" (McDoom 2012, 153), the deployment of emotionally ridden metaphors such as the Holocaust in the course of anti-BDS activism elicits powerful negative reactions. Diaspora organizations, such as the American Jewish establishment, often mobilize fear and perpetuate conflict in their "homeland" (Israel, in this case), as a way of maintaining power to define the identity and political agenda of the diaspora community (Shain 2002); consequently, challenges to either the mainstream conception of the Israel-Palestinian conflict or the identity of American Jews threaten the power of these organizations.

In the context of BDS, Jewish groups in the diaspora and in Israel are engaged in the struggle over communal boundaries, and relationship to Israel is one key element of difference that creates that boundary. According to Yossi Shain (2002, 128–29), "threat to the homeland's survival from conflict serves as an important mobilizing force for diasporic communities, enabling them to build institutions, raise funds, and promote activism among community members who might otherwise allow their ethnic identity to fade." In other words, "peace itself can threaten diasporic identity" (Shain 2002, 129). Peter Beinart (2012a, 40,44) adds that American Jewish donors are interested in "Iran, anti-Semitism, and something that someone said about Israel that was bad," a tendency linked to the Jewish establishment's present focus on victimhood and more exclusively "Jewish" causes compared with the more liberal-universalist tendencies of earlier decades. One of the Jewish supporters of BDS I interviewed challenged the Zionist narrative of the Jewish establishment, asserting that she "see[s] Zionism as a perversion of Judaism" precisely because of its mobilization of fear for its own ends. She recalled,

> When I was growing up in Canada, anti-Semitism was openly espoused. There were Nazi rallies all over Canada and over the United States. There were Jewish groups who wanted to boycott Nazi Germany, but the World Zionist Organization didn't want them to because Nazi Germany

was proof that Jews weren't welcome everywhere, and they even worked with Nazi Germany to try to get Jews out. (Montreal Activist 2 2011)

While this activist differentiated between "Zionism" and "Judaism" and was critical of the behind the scenes actions of diaspora organizations, not all Jews make such a distinction, and many see Zionism as the self-determination movement of the Jewish people, a central part of Jewish identity rather than an ideology.

Intra-Jewish Debates over BDS

In each of the four cases discussed in this book, intra-Jewish debates over what it means to be a Jew, particularly in relationship to Israel, played a major part in the contention. Research on ethnic conflict indicates that group solidarity often relies "more on accusations of disloyalty" than on positive appeals to patriotism. Those deemed "disloyal" to the in-group were excluded and reclassified as members of the out-group (McDoom 2012, 152). In the diaspora, this phenomenon is seen when Jews critical of the Israeli government or the American Jewish establishment are labeled "self-hating Jews" or as a "radical fringe." Leading Jewish advocates of peace, human rights, and supporters of BDS, such as Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb have been targeted and slandered by the American Jewish establishment. Rabbi David Wolpe argues that "Jews who support BDS, or deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel, have no place at the table . . . They should have the same intellectual status as Klansmen: purveyors of hate" (Wolpe 2011).[3] JVP was listed as one of the top ten anti-Israel groups by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and was particularly targeted because "JVP uses its Jewish identity to shield the anti-Israel movement from allegations of anti-Semitism and provide a greater degree of credibility to the anti-Israel movement" (ADL 2012). If the diaspora establishment is motivated to sustain homeland conflict in order to retain political and financial power, the quest of other Jewish groups to promote peace may be viewed as a threat. As the deputy director of JVP writes, "it has always been clear that these efforts to shut down criticism are driven by fear: fear that the simplistic narrative of Israel as innocent victim surrounded by hatemongers would be challenged and rewritten" (Surasky 2013, 1). In addition, the rising numbers of young Jews who do not identify with the Jewish establishment poses an extreme threat to such groups; contention surrounding cases of BDS activism in the United States highlights the divides within Jewish youth particularly, who represent potential future members of

and donors to Jewish organizations. For example, many Jewish supporters of BDS claim to do so out of their love for Israel, arguing that pressure is needed to end the occupation in order for Israel to remain a Jewish and democratic state; in so doing they challenge conventional definitions of what constitutes "pro-Israel" activism.

While BDS highlights Jewish divides, it also provides an external impetus for a Jewish "rally around the flag" effect. As a rabbi speaking about a petition against divestment at the 2012 Presbyterian Church, USA General Assembly (where I was in attendance) noted, "your [divestment] work brings Jews together; never in US history have 1500 rabbis signed onto anything." The process of creating categories involves knitting together social actors by creating a boundary distinguishing them from others (Abbott 1995; McAdam et al. 2001, 157). In the case of the Jewish community, these boundaries emerge from a host of differences; increasingly, separate Jewish categories within the United States stem from articulated differences in how values are understood and expressed and whether individuals are members (or not) in a variety of different Jewish and non-Jewish organizations. Rabbi Wolpe, for example, excludes Jewish supporters of BDS as well as those calling for the expulsion of Arabs from Israel (the borders of which he does not define) from "the ring of acceptable discourse" because, he argues, their "agenda is destruction" (Wolpe 2011). Jewish activists engaged in the work of BDS, however, see themselves not on the side of destruction, but of human rights and universal liberal values. Supporters of BDS campaigns often go beyond the "Jewish tent" to forge ties with those working on issues of colonialism, race, gay and lesbian concerns, and women's rights (Surasky 2013), identifying sites of difference related to where one stands on these and other human rights-related topics.

As the case studies illustrate, BDS supporters tend to build inclusive categories that tie together disparate groups connected to social justice, human rights, and minority concerns. In contrast, opponents of BDS tend to draw more exclusive categories of Jewish identity. The act of brokerage, or bringing together disparate groups to form a collective identity, is emblematic of the BDS movement, since the BDS Call brought together an inclusive array of over 170 Palestinian organizations from the diaspora, within Israel, and the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The linking together of these "three facets of the Palestinian struggle" (Montreal Activist 1 2011) represents a significant shift from traditional patterns of interaction between Palestinians in the diaspora, the Occupied Territories, and those with Israeli citizenship; often they disbelieved the others' loyalty

as Palestinians and questioned the extent of the others' suffering. This act of brokerage, which challenges historical divide-and-rule tactics levied at the Palestinians to reforge a collective identity, threatens BDS opponents' conception of Israel as a Jewish state, particularly the call for the Palestinian refugees right of return as stipulated in UN Resolution 194, but also the call for full equality of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, a population that has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure by the Israeli government in recent years (Laor 2012; Levy 2012). These contending views of state identity also reflect contending views of peace. While BDS activists see the right of return as a critical step for peace in the region, many opponents of BDS would argue that "if they are in favor of the right of return, they are against peace between the Jewish state of Israel and an Arab state of Palestine. Their vision of peace is different than mine" (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). As this quote illustrates, supporters and opponents of BDS use rival frameworks to promote the "same" values of justice, peace, and human rights.

Legitimacy and Delegitimization

Contention surrounding BDS results not only from differentiation into rival in-groups and out-groups but also struggles to align those identity groups with the "right" side of history. Questions of "rightness" are bound up in moral claims regarding the "legitimacy" of a particular position; the BDS movement is often dismissed as an effort to "delegitimize" Israel, a rhetorical move that ignores rival claims regarding the sources and basis of legitimacy. Constitutive stories, those stories that inscribe identities, are inherently about "making a claim to legitimacy" by offering rights and meaning to a subject (Ringmar 1996, 78). Opponents and supporters of BDS tell (at least) two different versions when recounting the "stories" of the four case studies discussed in this book. In the telling, they yoke together different values and perspectives of morality, seek legitimacy through comparison to a range of historical and contemporary events, and seek certification of their views from outside actors. As one BDS supporter suggested, both supporters and opponents of BDS would likely identify the same sets of values; however, "the difference is how you go about attaining these values or how do you go about advancing these values and creating a world in which people can lead lives in which those values are meaningful" (Montreal Activist 1 2011). This section explores some of those rival frameworks and how they are advanced in the course of contention.

Competing uses of the term "delegitimization" exemplifies the rival patterns of meaning making found in the pro- and anti-BDS camps (to oversimplify two rather diverse bodies). The concept of legitimacy stems from the work of Max Weber, who argued that legitimacy "confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise" (Weber 1964, 327). However, legitimacy of authority is a collective process, not based solely on individual consent (Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000, 303); consequently, legitimacy is always contingent on the social relations between the parties in question. In a legitimate system, rules and norms are seen as desirable and proper, and actors believe they are obliged to follow them, even if they personally do not approve. Researchers have demonstrated that concepts of legitimacy and justice are interrelated and that systems of (in)justice that are externally legitimized are more likely to be accepted (Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000; Mueller and Landsman 2004). Both supporters and opponents of BDS seek external legitimation, often from Jewish groups and also from Nobel Peace Prize laureates or other prominent figures, to authorize or endorse their positions (Mueller and Landsman 2004). When actors engage in this kind of legitimation process through appealing to outside authorities to endorse or recognize their positions as valid and moral—like in the case of Berkeley's Student Government's 2010 divestment vote—they deploy what McAdam et al. (2001, 121) call the mechanism of certification.

Rival claims of "delegitimization" are not surprising given the contending moral frameworks deployed by activists and the history of Israelis and Palestinians deploying competing conceptions of legitimacy over the land of Israel/Palestine, with Jewish Israelis pointing to the Bible as well as historical and religious bonds, and Palestinians pointing to their demographic majority and the right of self-determination (Maoz 2013). The 170 Palestinian civil society groups issuing the BDS Call challenge Israel's legitimacy as a "Jewish" state using moral frameworks rooted in international law. More specifically, they question Israel's de facto sovereignty over Palestinians in the occupied territories and its treatment of Arab-Palestinian Israelis as second-class citizens. The scholarship on state legitimacy notes that it is hard to develop a political system deemed universally legitimate in plural and divided societies (as Israel is with its 20 percent Arab-Palestinian population); the concerns raised by Israel's Arab-Palestinian citizens are also consistent with scholarship that points to good governance, civil liberties, political rights, and consent as major factors in contributing to state legitimacy (Gilley 2006, 51–52).

In addition to contention over the legitimacy of Israel's self-defined Jewish nature, which Palestinians see as exclusionary, the parties debate the appropriate approach for constituting "the people" of the state. Israel is defined as the state of the Jewish people, and Jews from all over the world can "return" to Israel under the Law of Return and become Israeli citizens. In contrast, Palestinian refugees who either fled or were forced out of their homes in 1948 are prevented from returning even to visit, and non-Israeli spouses of Arab-Palestinian citizens cannot automatically receive citizenship (Lis 2013). Palestinians argue that the state should be defined by its citizens, and not by an ethnic diaspora. When evaluating state legitimacy on the basis of consent of the governed, political philosophers often take "the people" as a given. Some challenge this approach, however, arguing against those who say the boundaries of "the people" is a historical question based on the outcome of wars (Näsström 2007). Instead, as Näsström (2007, 645) argues, "the constitution of the people ... is an ongoing claim that we make" and should be determined through democratic mechanisms rather than by exclusionary strategies that stifle disagreement. Relying on history "benefits those who possess power, status, and force by lending them the opportunity to operate freely in the world without any demands of legitimacy in return" (Näsström 2007, 646). Indeed, Palestinians appeal to global civil society in the BDS Call precisely because they lack the formal power of statehood; instead, they demonstrate their legitimacy through international law and their broad-based coalition, claiming to be more representative of the Palestinian people than the narrowly defined Palestinian National Authority, with its limited governing power over Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[4]

For many Jews in Israel and the diaspora, Israel is the realization of the Zionist movement's quest for self-determination of the Jewish people, and defining "the people" in terms of all Jews is fitting given centuries of Jewish persecution and exclusion. The self-identity of many American Jews (particularly in the older generations who experienced exclusion from US institutions or more directly experienced the Holocaust) is tied to diaspora organizations and their relationship to Israel (Beinart 2012a). This means that Israel's legitimacy may be intimately entwined with members' own self-identities, as well as their sense of existential security. As one psychologist explains,

> Because participants are involved in a reciprocal identity relationship with the groups and organizations in which they participate, they exhibit a normative acceptance of the rightness of these entities to exist. In other

words, organizations offer individuals and groups the opportunity to share in the means by which their self-esteem may be continuously recreated and sustained in ways that make it motivationally compelling for them to accept their organization as desirable, proper, and appropriate—that is, as legitimate. (Brown 1997, 664)

This connection between legitimacy and self-esteem, when combined with what Lerner (2012) deems the collective post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) of the Jewish people, helps explain why allegations that BDS is a "delegitimization" campaign elicits such a strong response from the American Jewish community, and why questioning Israel's existence as a *Jewish* state (as opposed to a state of its citizens) is perceived as a threat to Israel's existence.

The process of legitimation, by which certain paths of action are deemed acceptable, "make[s] it possible for certain policies to be enacted" (Jackson 2006, 16). Consequently, when opponents of BDS portray it as a "delegitimization campaign," they not only mobilize fear in order to rally support, but they also demonstrate their concern that BDS campaigns might shift the discourse surrounding Israel, and thereby threaten Israel's ability to exert legitimate authority in the eyes of the international community and undermine its ability to enact certain policies. Israel's standing has been built rhetorically on the premise that it is the "only democracy in the Middle East" and a bastion of Western values in an otherwise hostile environment. Consequently, showing Israel to be otherwise undermines its legitimacy and credibility in the society of nations. Supporters of BDS vary in their response to the delegitimization allegation. Some of those engaging in BDS1 do, as explained earlier, seek to delegitimize Israel's status as a state for Jews and not for all its citizens. In contrast, supporters of BDS2 affirm that they are trying to "delegitimize" Israeli policies supporting the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but not question the existence of the state of Israel itself. As one BDS activist commented, "if the skeptics of BDS are saying that by asking for equal rights you are trying to delegitimize Israel then I think we should repeat their words back to them and say, so you're saying full rights for Palestinians is the end to Israel, and does that mean anything to you?" (National BDS Activist 2011) Another BDS activist contended that, "delegitimization is the same old thing in new clothes...oh, you're an anti-Semite, you can't say that if you are critical of Israel...We're not focused on Israel as a whole, we're focused on the occupation, and increasingly, on inequality. We don't want this idea that that we seek to delegitimize Israel" (Community

Leader Supporter 1 2010). These activists aim to raise awareness about Israeli policies contributing to human rights violations and inequality and in so doing intentionally create cognitive dissonance so that those Israeli actions are no longer seen as "legitimate." In seeking to end Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, BDS activists challenge Israel's "legitimate authority" over these areas, particularly given Israel's emphasis on its identity as a democracy. BDS activists suggest that opponents' delegitimization claims reflect a desire to shift attention away from the rights-based claims of the BDS movement and instead activate Jewish fears of being unfairly targeted. In this way, opponents deploy what McAdam et al. (2001, 144) call the object shift mechanism by altering the relationship between claimants and objects of claims.

The question of legitimacy is also related to the question of nonviolence. International law generally prohibits the use of force, except in situations of self-defense and unlawful occupation, in which case occupied peoples have the right to resist with force of arms. These two exceptions to the use of force have historically been at odds in Israel/ Palestine, precisely because of conflicting conceptions of the territory and its legal status as well as conflicting views of actors and their aims. Traditionally, the state "upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" within its territory (Weber 1964, 154); however, Israel does not have officially defined boundaries. While many Israelis include the West Bank (which they call Judea and Samaria) in their conception of Israel (school textbooks, for example, do not show the Green Line, or pre-1967 border), and argue that they no longer rule over Gaza, Palestinians—and the international community—see the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupied territories according to international humanitarian law. Consequently, the parties have at times debated what constitutes legitimate resistance and what constitutes legitimate self-defense.

This debate has been overshadowed by the targeting of civilians by some Palestinian groups and by Israeli policies of "targeted assassinations" and collective punishment. The leadership of the BNC and the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) has sought to strengthen its legitimacy as a movement by carefully distancing themselves from the use of violence and by focusing on nonviolent efforts for Palestinian rights. Palestinian BDS activists "very explicitly state that this is a nonviolent approach to the liberation of Palestine, and I think that removes from the range of arguments that have been made against the Palestinian liberation movement as one that

has been by definition violent and associated with terrorism" (Montreal Activist 1 2011). By using nonviolent means, Palestinians "delegitimize" the Israeli use of force under international law and restrict the options available to Israel for combatting the BDS movement. It is no coincidence that BDS efforts received a huge boost in momentum after nine activists were killed by Israeli forces who boarded the Mavi Marmara and other ships in the Freedom Flotilla in May 2010. "Israel's reaction to the flotilla . . . was so outrageous that it . . . made it easier for performing artists to cancel their concerts in Israel and for people to participate in the cultural boycott" (Arraf and Shapiro 2011, 154; Horowitz and Weiss 2010). Because nonviolent efforts "remove from the range of arguments that have been used to disqualify Palestinian struggle that it's just bent on destruction of Israel or that it seeks to achieve its main aims . . . through violent means" (Montreal Activist 1 2011), opponents must reframe the nonviolent activism of the BDS movement in violent, threatening terms order to more easily combat it.

By focusing on "delegitimization" and by calling the BDS movement a "war by other means" (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010) or a "soft war" (Horowitz and Weiss 2010), opponents of BDS seek to regain the position of moral legitimacy for Israel as a state besieged by violent foes. Ringmar (1996, 82) suggests that when others do not recognize an entity's desired identity, they have three choices: internalize and accept others' definitions, come up with a new story, or stand by the original story and take action to convince others it applies. Israel's response to BDS, particularly its portrayal of the movement as a "delegitimization" campaign, illustrates the third of Ringmar's options; Israel has sought to convince the world of its story by dedicating $4 million to the "Brand Israel" campaign to improve Israel's image abroad and creating an "Internet warfare team" tasked with making Israel-friendly web postings (Beinin 2012; Cook 2009; White 2010). Rather than accept its portrayal as a violator of Palestinian human rights, Israel advocates have stood by their image of Israel as a democratic state with the "most moral army in the world," and have sought to promote this story through targeted events and exhibitions around the world that tell stories of Israel unrelated to the conflict with the Palestinians.

Peace versus Nonviolence

One of the puzzles that led me to investigate the BDS movement was the competing portrayals of the movement by opponents and supporters as both "nonviolent" and a "war by other means." When one looks

more closely, however, these disparate viewpoints are not so surprising, but simply reflect different orientations to the concepts of "peace" and "nonviolence." Although some may refer to the actions of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr as "passive resistance," nonviolence is not simply a platform of belief or a form of passivism (although some nonviolent activists may indeed be pacifists). Instead, many proponents of nonviolence prefer the term "nonviolent resistance" or "civil resistance" because it underscores that those using nonviolent tactics are engaged in a struggle for freedom and rights, although they use civil rather than armed methods. Indeed, some have noted the "revolutionary" dimension of nonviolent resistance, which seeks to transform systems of oppression, discrimination, and authoritarianism (Abu-Nimer 2003; Dudouet 2008). As a result of its use in situations of asymmetric power, where structural violence may be "invisible" to those benefiting from the status quo, nonviolent activists may initially increase conflict in order to have structural violence acknowledged and addressed. As one scholar has noted, nonviolence is "especially relevant for the early transitional stage of latent asymmetrical conflicts, as a strategy for empowering grievance groups (oppressed minorities or disempowered majorities) looking for constructive and efficient ways to attain justice, human rights, and democracy without recourse to violence" (Dudouet 2008, 2).

In this sense, nonviolent resistance differs fundamentally from the approach of dialog, which seeks to "break down the barriers of mistrust, misunderstanding, and stereotyping" (Rothman 1998, 219) between adversaries, rather than promoting major structural change in the status quo power structure. Although forms of dialog vary, their focus tends to be on communication and understanding, whereas nonviolent resistance aims at changing relationships and structures of power. Furthermore, while dialog processes do not generally seek political change, and may in fact support the status quo, nonviolent activists often take great risks to rearrange power relationships in asymmetric contexts. As a result, they may be physically assaulted, imprisoned, injured, or even killed (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

One of the major goals of nonviolent movements is to undermine the "pillars of support" that "permit and sustain the day-to-day operations of government." These pillars include not only the police and military but also the media, the business community, youth, workers, religious organizations, and NGOs (Helvey 2004, 8). Nonviolence scholar Gene Sharp (2005, 29) includes authority (legitimacy), human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors such as ideology or a psychology

of obedience, material resources, and the ability to punish as additional elements of support. By strategically withdrawing their consent, obedience, and cooperation, a population can topple a regime, as happened in Serbia in 2000. Consequently, from a perspective of nonviolence, when BDS activists attempt to "delegitimize" Israeli policies, they are engaging in nonviolent resistance, working to undermine the power of the Israeli government to maintain its occupation of the Palestinian territories, or to undermine the legitimacy of the idea that a state can be both "Jewish" and "democratic" simultaneously.

Even though nonviolent activists may "instigate . . . conflict rather than . . . seek peace," they must refrain from using even small amounts of violence (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 466). It takes only a small violent incident, even if it is overshadowed by the violence of the response, to change the tenor of a movement from nonviolent to violent. For example, Palestinian stone throwing at otherwise nonviolent demonstrations becomes the focus of any news coverage and the basis for violent retribution; for Israelis, stone throwing can hurt or kill and thus is a violent act (Lerner 2012, 312; Kaufman 1992). Some Palestinians, in contrast, see stone throwing as a symbolic act of resistance, practically nonviolent due to the disparity in force between that act and the Israeli soldiers with their armored tank and automatic weapons (Sherwood 2013). The decentralization of the BDS "movement" across many countries and continents makes it difficult to create and enforce a common discipline of nonviolence. Media attention given to an act of property destruction or a hostile confrontation, even if no physical blows are exchanged, allows the media to portray an action as violent rather than nonviolent. And given the propensity of BDS adversaries to capitalize on fear, this undermines the capacity of nonviolent activists to "convert" opponents to their cause (Kaufman 1992; Rigby 1991).

For some, the practice of nonviolence is antithetical to the cause of peace (as the absence of conflict) because "as soon as nonviolence becomes a tactic in the service of social change, it is a means to an end and therefore a form of coercion. And then someone ends up getting hurt, either physically, economically, or psychologically" (Chernus n.d.). While BDS activists assert that coercion is necessary due to the lack of enforcement of international law relevant to Palestinian rights and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that nonviolent coercion is morally superior to the military coercion and structural violence that Palestinians living under occupation face on a daily basis, others argue that BDS is likely to elicit "a defensive and paranoid response in Israeli PTSD victims, which is most of the society," due to its psychological

impact (Lerner 2012, 327). Here too, however, the existence of different strands of BDS discussed in chapter 1, which Lerner calls BDS1 and BDS2, leads to differing evaluations of the movement's moral authority, as well as the likely effectiveness of BDS campaigns. While Lerner supports the "softer" targeted boycott that explicitly affirms Israel's existence, he states, "I do not believe that any set of coercive tactics is likely to move us closer [to a peace agreement], as decades of violence and coercion by Israel have proven" (Lerner 2012, 329). In contrast, BDS advocates note,

> We know from professionals who have followed international negotiations . . . for decades that you cannot have an enduring durable real peace negotiation when you have incredibly unequal partners sitting at the table. And if you have the illusion of a peace negotiation where one group gets everything and the other gets nothing . . . [that] peace negotiation will fail . . . BDS . . . is our way to have a seat at the table. It's our way to be present to help equalize what now is a massive power differential, which is why peace talks are now failing. (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010)

J Street, which identifies as pro-Israel and pro-peace, affirms the importance of Palestinian nonviolent action and urges other pro-Israeli groups to "distinguish carefully between the use of nonviolent tactics to oppose Israeli policy and the violence that has so plagued the region in the past" (J-Street n.d.). At the same time, however, they see BDS as a divisive and one-sided effort that poses a "genuine threat to conflict resolution" because it encourages polarization rather than reconciliation and deepens divides (Ben-Ami 2012). J Street believes that "an alternative path based on negotiations is necessary for achieving peace" (J Street U n.d.). Opponents of BDS suggest that peace is better attained by listening to the narratives of both sides and not by inflaming passions or pointing to Israel as the solely culpable party (Burston 2009). However, BDS advocates suggest that "you have to take a stand, and it's not anymore about communication or bringing people together. It's about justice, and there's no discussion with that" (Montreal Activist 3 2011), illustrating a different orientation to conceptualizing and achieving peace.

For many Palestinians, dialog for dialog's sake without an explicit anti-occupation orientation is a form of "normalization" that obscures the power differential between the occupier and the occupied by treating both parties as "equal" and by focusing on "understanding" rather

than power, rights, and injustice. Approaches to peace and conflict resolution stem not only from different values, because members of J Street also say they value justice, but also from different views of desirable (and possible) outcomes. In fact, the main webpage of J Street U prominently displays the terms "ProIsrael: ProPeace, ProDemocracy, ProTwoStates, ProJustice, ProHumanRights, ProPalestinian," indicating how justice fits into their overall orientation to values and outcome (J StreetU 2013). Tikkun, another liberal Zionist organization, also stresses the importance of justice, and their Israel/Palestine page states, "We are committed to full and complete reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian people within the context of social justice for the Palestinians and security for Israel" (Tikkun n.d.). Both organizations, however, also emphasize the importance of a Jewish identity for the state of Israel and caution against coercive measures that may undermine peace efforts. For example, many opponents of BDS note that "BDS is sapping the resources of those working for peace by creating new and deep divisions among those who should be allies working together for a peaceful resolution to the conflict" (Ben-Ami 2012), where that resolution is conceptualized as a two-state solution, with a Jewish Israeli state and an Arab Palestinian state. While supporters of BDS vary in their views on the desired outcome of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, some leading proponents advocate for a one-state solution, and the demands for refugee return and full equality for Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel are consistent with historical Palestinian calls for a binational state. While perhaps ending armed conflict, the one-state option represents the elimination of Israel for many Jews, although some argue that it is the continuing expansion of settlements, and not the BDS movement, that threatens the two-state solution by making a viable Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders increasingly impossible (Beinart 2012b; Butler 2013; Simon 2009).

These two different approaches to peace also represent varying understandings of the conflict and its dynamics. For those who consider themselves pro-peace but anti-BDS (like J Street), the conflict is between two relatively equally culpable parties, and the way to address the conflict is through diplomacy, economic development, and joint programs that foster reconciliation. For BDS advocates, the problem between Israelis and Palestinians, as one respondent told me, is not a "conflict," but rather Israel's occupation, oppression, and dispossession of the Palestinians. According to this view, negotiations are unlikely to work since they favor the powerful and those benefiting from the status quo and thus are not suitable when question of justice are on the line

(King 1963; Sharp 2010). Before negotiations can be effective, such BDS advocates (and nonviolence scholars) argue, pressure from global civil society is necessary to effect pressure for change. While BDS activists champion partnerships between Jews and Muslims, Israelis and Palestinians (as evident in their broad-based networks), they assert that joint efforts should be committed to opposing structures of subjugation if they are to prefigure the possibility of "a just and peaceable form of coexistence" (Butler 2013). Otherwise, BDS activists question the efficacy of coexistence projects as envisioned by BDS opponents, wondering whether joint development projects in the context of structural violence do more than provide a window dressing for the Israeli occupation.

Moral Debates over Jewish Identity

The debates over BDS deal not merely with rival political stances, but rather are part of a broader discourse that shapes the construction and deployment of actors' identities. Not only is rhetoric a primary vector for deploying claims about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly in the Jewish diaspora (Sucharov 2011), but these discourses also impact social relations by situating actors and entities within patterns of interaction. Not all actors have the same power to frame the terms of debate; some social actors have greater power in determining the discourse, especially given that patterns of discourse are embedded in broader social relations. For example, in a classroom discussion, teachers and students do not typically have equal rights and obligations; instead, asymmetrical power relations are part of a socializing process that produces social subjects (Fairclough 1992, 19). Similarly, Israel advocacy groups have demonstrated significant power in defining the discourse on Israel within the United States due to their connections in the US Congress and the role of Israel advocates in presidential administrations (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Sucharov 2011). Consequently, a major part of the BDS movement is education and awareness raising aimed at shifting the discourse on Israel in the United States, and for pro-BDS Jewish activists, this involves reframing what it means to be "pro-Israel" and how Jews should engage with Israel. Given the major role that identification with Israel has played for American Jews, particularly those raised during the early decades of Israeli statehood, those seeking to shift the discourse on Israel are engaged in a major process of reconstituting relational patterns.

While Palestinians also face questions of identity and belonging and dispute the best way to approach their continued lack of self-determination

(as evidenced by Palestinian debates over the Palestinian Authority's bid for enhanced status at the United Nations in 2012), intra-Jewish debate played a more prominent role within the case studies discussed in this book. Although the BDS Call was issued by Palestinians and promotes Palestinian rights and is actively opposed by the Israeli government and major diaspora Jewish instiutions, Jews, including Israeli Jews, were critically involved in all four BDS campaigns studied in this book. Jews on opposing sides of the BDS debate belong to different "geographies of affection," with different communities and locales where they feel "at home" or as "foreigners" (Ringmar 1996, 78). For example, while the UC Berkeley divestment debate made some Jewish students feel more fully a part of the community, others felt isolated and excluded. In another example, JVP launched a major advertising campaign in the Washington, DC, metro system during the 2013 AIPAC conference announcing that "AIPAC does not speak for me," indicating that not all Jews felt at home in AIPAC, particularly due to different views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Vilkomerson 2013).

Those on both sides of the BDS debate recognize the trauma that Israelis and Palestinians have experienced as a result of the conflict, but they differ in terms of what is the morally appropriate response to addressing this trauma. Speaking of pain (as Jews, Israelis, Palestinians) is "part of a language game, which is expressed in a relationship (who harmed who) and a moral order (an acknowledgement or denial of blame, innocence, or complicity)" (Fierke 2004, 490). The politics of this language game plays out differently in each of the case studies, but the general contours are similar, as parties on both sides of the divide make strategic choices that flow out of their collective values (Sucharov 2011, 362), which both sides argue are rooted in concerns of "peace" and "human rights," even as they differ in their interpretations. BDS opponents, for example, argue that when BDS supporters use the language of peace and human rights it is a misrepresentation that unfairly targets an Israel that has taken risks for peace that have been rejected by its neighbors (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010).

Jewish advocates of BDS point out the tensions between Israeli policies and Jewish values, noting, for example, that "there have always been Jewish traditions that oppose state violence, that affirm multicultural co-habitation, and defend principles of equality, and this vital ethical tradition is forgotten or sidelined when any of us accept Israel as the basis of Jewish identification or values" (Butler 2012). Another BDS advocate encourages Jews to "refuse to cooperate with the mythical Jewish consensus that to be a good Jew, one must not mourn

Palestinians as one mourns Jews, and one must not hold Israel up to those same standards" (Surasky 2012). Debates over the awarding of the Adorno Prize for excellence in philosophy to Jewish scholar and acclaimed critical theorist Judith Butler due to her open criticism of Israeli policies and her support for BDS are another indication of rival "Jewish" beliefs related not only to freedom of speech but also contending views of peace and freedom and what it means to be "pro-Israel" (Landes and Weinthal 2012). As part of the education and discourse-changing function mentioned earlier, BDS activists seek to raise the level of cognitive dissonance experienced by other US Jews, as well as by non-Jews concerned with accusations of anti-Semitism, by highlighting the tensions between Jewish values of social justice, peace, and human rights, with Israeli policies.

While scholars have long noted the tensions between values such as peace and justice (Albin 2009; Lederach 1997), one study of intra-Jewish debates suggests that perhaps Israel advocacy groups like AIPAC and StandWithUs "are guided more by the imperative to maintain group cohesion and ethno-national identity than they are by any particular set of value clusters pertaining to the specific case" (Sucharov 2011, 375). The tendency to focus on group cohesion and adherence to party lines rather than traditional Jewish (and minority) values and concerns is evident in disagreements over whether to bring civil rights complaints against universities for unfavorable speech against Israel that may make Jewish students uncomfortable (Abunimah 2011c). When Brooklyn College was faced with intense pressure, including threats to cut college funding, by the ADL, Harvard professor and Israel advocate Alan Dershowitz, and New York legislators, for holding panel on BDS in February 2013, Mayor Michael Bloomberg expressed his violent disagreement with BDS but affirmed the importance of free speech. Bloomberg engaged in an object shift when he suggested that those wishing to curtail debate on college campuses move to North Korea (Taylor 2013), thereby shifting the parameters of debate away from specific beliefs and desires of pro-Israel advocates to a comparison between US values of free speech and the closed society of North Korea, forcing BDS opponents to reconsider the alignment of their values and identity.

Power from Below, Power from Above: Rival Frameworks for Mobilizing Change and Achieving Success

The example of Brooklyn College illustrates a significant difference in approaches to power demonstrated by those for and against BDS.

Those supporting BDS in the four cases presented here seek to mobilize grassroots community power through broad coalitions aimed at shifting US discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through symbolic action and awareness-raising efforts. In contrast, opponents of BDS, particularly those aligned with the Jewish establishment, tend to use positional power aimed at nodes of authority. While both supporters and opponents of BDS use soft power, defined by Joseph Nye (2001, 354) as "the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion ... by convincing others to follow you or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that provide desired behavior," using appeals to culture, ideas, and values, opponents of BDS are more likely to use hard power than proponents of BDS in the four cases observed.[5] Debates over conceptions of peace and justice are critical to BDS precisely because appeals to such values provides activists with a form of power. However, to be able to leverage soft power effectively, individuals and groups must have cultural resources available to deploy; "if the appropriate resources are not present, practical and discursive work is required in order to produce and disseminate them in advance" (Jackson 2006, 497). Consequently, local and national conceptions of peace, as well as conceptions of the issues at hand in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shape the possibilities of BDS activism. As one activist noted, a major challenge of BDS organizing is "achieving an understanding within the population about this situation" when the general public only has "casual knowledge of the conflict," knowledge that may be flawed and incomplete (Montreal Activist 1 2011). Because the power of value-based arguments depends on the availability of cultural resources, BDS organizing in the United States has involved not only efforts to put pressure on corporations profiting from occupation or engaging in human rights violations but also raising awareness about the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip so that US citizens begin to think differently about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the US role in sustaining it through three billion dollars in annual aid to Israel and its military. For pro-BDS activists, the spread of information is a form of power through knowledge, and they seek to disrupt the discursive regime that has controlled "knowledge" and "truth" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in US politics and society (Foucault 1980, 131).

Educational efforts are one way BDS campaigns undermine the pillars of support for the Israeli occupation and violations of international law, and reflect the bottom-up rather than top-down approach to power of those engaged in nonviolent resistance. Within the BDS movement,

activists draw on multiple forms of power to leverage social change. They draw upon organizational and creative skills as well as knowledge of their communities and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to craft campaigns suitable to the context and to target their messages to issues of concern to the local population. Recognizing that regimes cannot stay in power without the consent of the population, they seek to lay the groundwork for people to remove their consent by refusing to be complicit with US support for the Israeli occupation. They seek partnerships and support from those imbued with authority, such as Nobel Prize laureates, respected scholars, or prominent Jewish figures, and they draw on human resources, working to develop networks of people and groups and find activists with necessary skills. As discerned by one BDS activist, "what's wonderful [about BDS] is that ordinary people who don't have any other form of power can take part in it and it's a way of trying to do something. Feeling that you have agency to do it. And that's the beauty of it" (Montreal Activist 2 2011). Another noted that the BDS movement is

> our way to be present to help equalize what is now a massive power differential [between Israel and the Palestinians] . . . we still have a situation in which Israel holds most of the cards, the U.S. is enabling Israel, so there's no real pressure on them to be more even handed . . . what do the Palestinians have? They have a global civil society movement of students and churches and Jewish groups and all kinds of folks like us who are saying, no, we want these [negotiations] to work but it needs to be more even. (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010)

Power is a relative concept, one assessed in comparison to the power held by the various actors in a social setting (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, 746). Power is also variable, and for changes in power relations to shift, the power of the dominant party must be undermined and/or the power of the weaker parties must be strengthened through mobilization (Sharp 2005). One of the major forms of power held by the American Jewish establishment, and partly why it feels so threatened by the BDS movement, is the power to set the agenda and the terms of discourse related to Israel. It has also circumscribed the discussion of power such that Jewish power is discussed only in terms of survival, and the power of Jews as exemplified in the military might of the state of Israel is not discussed. According to Peter Beinart (2012a, 38), "American Jewish leaders began insisting that even to acknowledge the misuse of Jewish power was to deny Jewish victimhood and thus victimize Jews anew."

This power over discourse is related to the use of the Holocaust and accusations of anti-Semitism as potent tools for silencing opposition or delegitimizing dissent or criticism of Israel. Yet those advocating for BDS note that using the Holocaust to stigmatize those with opposing views "not only demeans and instrumentalizes the memory of the Nazi genocide, but it produces general cynicism about both accusations of anti-Semitism and predictions of new genocidal possibilities" (Butler 2013). This comment illustrates the power of such concepts to be used for eliciting positive or negative outcomes, as well as the power behind withdrawing one's obedience or consent to dominant discourses and policies. The concept of withholding support from dominant narratives is also illustrated by the group "Not in My Name," which believes that despite the challenge for Jews of criticizing the State of Israel, it is a form of important moral action when those criticisms are warranted. In the case studies that follow, I seek to "explore the ways people who are relatively powerless take power, or, more accurately, negotiate it, within the limitations of institutional arrangements they cannot effectively challenge" (Roy 1994, 132). In each case, actors engage in an analysis of the resources at their disposal, make strategic partnerships in an effort to mobilize greater resources and human capital, and devise context-specific strategies aimed at sociopolitical change in their local communities, the United States, and in Israel/Palestine. Often, these low-budget actions are challenged by a well-financed opposition that may have more political power resources, but who are challenged by the ability of local actors to leverage moral authority and knowledge-based discursive power.

Conclusion

This chapter explored some of the reasons why the BDS movement is so contentious and why it draws so much attention from opponents despite the fact that BDS campaigns are generally small, local, and lack the financial and political resources of the American Jewish establishment and the state of Israel. Because the BDS movement challenges the conventional discourse on Israel and standard arguments for why Israel should be the beneficiary of a special relationship with the United States, a relationship that includes three billion dollars a year in funding, it poses a threat to the American Jewish establishment, particularly when Jewish activists are asking such questions. BDS supporters engage in awareness raising and educational endeavors to try to shift this

discourse and to mobilize knowledge as power to alter the status quo in Israel/Palestine.

Discourse provides one lever of power in the debates over BDS; drawing on moral arguments and tropes available in society is another. Both proponents and opponents of BDS seek to frame their positions in moral terms, asserting that their position is aligned with peace, justice, and human rights, although those concepts are framed differently by diverse actors for their assorted audiences. Because each BDS campaign studied in this book unfolds in a different sociopolitical and institutional context, those arguments resonate differently, with more or less success, and are faced by a range of institutional opportunities and obstacles due to their constituency and environment.

As will be evidenced in the case studies to follow, activists on both sides of the issue use mechanisms including object shift, certification, category formation, and brokerage in the course of their activism (McAdam et al. 2001). Activists seek outside experts and figures with moral authority to certify and legitimate their political and moral viewpoints, and they act as brokers to link together disparate movements and groups to leverage grassroots people power. Operating from a justice-oriented framework that seeks to ensure human rights and the application of international law rather than one rooted in diplomacy and dialog, BDS activists frame their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not in terms of "peace" but in terms of ending the occupation through nonviolent pressure. Given that nonviolent action is contentious and not simply passive, a form of active resistance seeking to shift relationships of power, there is little surprise that BDS campaigns are provocative and controversial. When the struggle for a rearrangement of power relations is combined with debates over identity and moral values, the situation becomes even more charged. As one activist noted, those for and against BDS have fundamentally different worldviews on a host of issues, not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also neoliberal capitalism, general orientation to the use of the force of arms, and racial hierarchy (Montreal Activist 1 2011). They also demonstrate different approaches to power and authority, with BDS activists often directing their attention to the grassroots level, working to raise awareness and mobilize change from the bottom up, whereas opponents of BDS tend to focus their attention at the power centers and people in positions of authority, such as the Berkeley student body president. While this difference in orientation may be partly ideological in nature, reflecting the horizontal structure of activist organizing at the US Social Forum and

other more left-leaning bodies, it also reflects established patterns of relationships within the US political system and the existing strong ties between established Jewish organizations, leading opponents of BDS, and political leaders.

The chapters that follow examine how these themes—the mobilization of fear, rival claims on values, and varying approaches to power—play out in four different contexts: a university student government, a feminist peace group, a food co-op, and a mainstream US church. Each case explores how certain arguments and concepts have been deployed in specific contexts, drawing on the local resources at hand. By focusing on processes, rather than content, as well as studying how the resources of the various communities are put into action, scholars and activists can better understand why certain positions and perspectives carry the day in some places but not others.

CodePink's "Stolen Beauty" Campaign: Creativity in Action

Introduction

In the wake of the 2008–2009 period of intensified conflict known as "Operation Cast Lead," activists from the US feminist antiwar group CodePink organized delegations to the Gaza Strip in partnership with the Israeli Coalition of Women for Peace to bring humanitarian aid and hear the stories of those affected by the violence. CodePink also visited Israel where they "met with Palestinians and Israelis who were working for a just peace for both their peoples" (CodePink n.d. a). During one of these delegations, Israeli and Palestinian women encouraged CodePink activists to also visit the West Bank and to consider taking on a piece of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) call to action. Using the Who Profits (www.whoprofits.org) database of companies profiting from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as a starting point, CodePink cofounder Medea Benjamin and Rae Abileah took an exploratory trip to the West Bank, where they visited Mitzpe Shalem, the Israeli settlement where the cosmetics company Ahava has its factory. The activists "saw firsthand what was going on there and saw that yes, this is a settlement north of the Green Line" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). After doing some additional fact-finding work, CodePink decided to launch the Stolen Beauty campaign targeting Ahava cosmetics because "we wanted to look for a product that is used by women, that markets to women and [that] . . . clearly violated international law and human rights" (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012). Although the Stolen Beauty campaign is a targeted one, clearly aimed at a corporation profiting from the occupation—it is based in a settlement and uses mud from the occupied Palestinian territories

for making its products (WhoProfits 2012)—and therefore a form of BDS2, CodePink has officially signed onto the 2005 Palestinian Call for BDS, and therefore is connected to those involved in what Rabbi Lerner calls BDS1. CodePink has roughly one hundred thousand people on its mailing list, although it has no formal membership or dues structure (CodePink Interview 9 2012); for many CodePink activists, however, the Stolen Beauty campaign is of peripheral interest, and their energies are focused on other CodePink campaigns (CodePink Interview 9 2012).

The Stolen Beauty campaign differs from others studied in this book because it is an ongoing campaign organized by an activist organization more explicitly aimed at education and awareness-raising and not a campaign to effect a particular policy change within an institution, as is the case in the other three cases: UC Berkeley and the Presbyterian Church (USA) seeking to pass divestment resolutions, and the Olympia Food Co-op voting to deshelve Israeli goods under its boycott policy. CodePink, in contrast, has endorsed the BDS Call and its activists are seeking to inform others, rather than effect change within CodePink itself; the Stolen Beauty campaign seeks primarily to promote individual-level change among consumers, while also seeking to influence corporate policy through activist engagement with management in stores like Nordstrom's, where Ahava cosmetics are sold. From the beginning, the Stolen Beauty campaign has used creative protest actions to draw attention to their cause and to educate people about the Israeli occupation. CodePink activists inform on-lookers that according to international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, it is illegal for Ahava to make a profit through exploiting natural resources from occupied territory. Since Israel has not annexed the West Bank, and Ahava's main factory and visitor center are located on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, Ahava cosmetics should not be labeled of "Israeli origin" (CodePink Interview 7; WhoProfts 2012). Deploying their identity as women and using the loosely organized network of international activists associated with CodePink, campaign organizers created the "bikini brigade" or "bathrobe brigade" costuming idea, and provided fact sheets, talking points, song sheets, and other ready-to-use materials to enable local groups to take action (CodePink Interview 7 2012). The Stolen Beauty website has an editable letter to store managers of locations that carry Ahava products, and provides a step-by-step guide for planning an action, including a sample press release, examples of what other CodePink activists have done, and contacts for obtaining additional assistance from CodePink staff and organizers (CodePink n.d.).

Although some opponents of BDS have dismissed the Stolen Beauty campaign as having minimal impact, interpretations of "impact" vary between opponents and supporters of the campaign. Campaign organizers recognize that "success" in terms of having Ahava close its factory in the West Bank, which would be a multimillion dollar endeavor, is unlikely; consequently, as one organizer noted, "we just accept that we are like a biting horsefly on the rump of this company and keep working" (CodePink Interview 7 2012). Consequently, the movement focuses on "public education, building pressure, and illustrating Israel's war crimes" (CodePink Interview 1 2012) as a way of working to shift US public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As in other cases of BDS activism illustrated in this book, these rival views of "success" reflect fundamentally different conceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which subsequently means their understanding of how to best address the conflict differs as well. While opponents of BDS tend to view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the "conflict resolution" lens, in which two equal parties simply need to come together, talk, adjust their perception of the other, and find a "compromise," proponents of BDS tend to view the conflict through an "occupation" and "injustice" lens, in which asymmetrical parties need to rectify oppression and power imbalance. To do this, activists support strategies and tactics of nonviolent resistance to raise awareness regarding these imbalances and to put pressure on the more powerful party. As discussed in this case study, proponents of both perspectives activate assumptions about the identities of the Self and Other and how they, as concerned third parties, best intervene and/or apply influence in order to move toward a "peaceful" solution to the conflict. After exploring how identity is deployed in the case of CodePink's Stolen Beauty campaign, this chapter uses the concept of linguistic intractability to explore the rival moral frameworks supporters and opponents of BDS use to express their views. The chapter also addresses how the decentralized nature of the BDS movement impacts regional campaigns and varying conceptions of success.

Creative Deployment of Identity for Change

Because of the nature of CodePink activism, the Stolen Beauty campaigns tend to deploy identity in a creative, attention-grabbing, often humorous manner, drawing on tropes available to protesters as women and as cosmetics consumers. Rather than working as members inside an institution to change policy based on an interpretation of that

institution's values, CodePink activists primarily seek to raise awareness about the Israeli occupation through informing store managers and the general public about Ahava's business practices. In the process, Stolen Beauty campaign activists hope to shift their audiences' frame of reference so that they view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in new ways. In particular, in the spirit of nonviolent action, the Stolen Beauty campaign seeks to educate people about how they are complicit in Israel's ongoing occupation through individual choices regarding which companies to support. As one activist explained, the Stolen Beauty campaign against Ahava cosmetics "spoke to those of us [who] use beauty products . . . it was something we could concretely get our arms around" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Besides general awareness raising tactics intended to inform audiences (store managers, general public) about an alternative narrative regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than that heard in the mainstream US media, CodePink activists also seek to engage cognitive dissonance, to challenge commonly held perceptions, and to demonstrate how the reality conflicts with articulated values. Activists do this in a number of ways, such as changing the words to well-known Christmas carols and other holiday songs and serenading shoppers while they inform them why they should boycott Ahava.

Awareness Raising

One of the mechanisms through which CodePink activists seek to enact change is that of awareness raising. Through street theater performances, fliers, and other creative protests, activists challenge the public's preconceived ideas about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as rooted in timeless ethnic hatred or a response to terrorism. A CodePink activist noted that, "one of the goals of this kind of campaign is to do community education about the conflict and about the occupation . . . a lot of Americans are very uninformed about what is going on much more so than Europeans for example" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Another commented that "by and large most people in the United States don't know what's happening and don't believe it . . . they don't even realize that it's Israelis that are the occupiers; they think of the Israelis as being the victims" (CodePink Interview 9 2012). One of the CodePink organizers admitted that "I always saw it as a conflict with two equal sides that were both violent with each other, and never as an occupation. Really my whole sense of that shifted with Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Another activist involved with the Stolen Beauty campaign shared that until he was forty "I had

very typical US ideas about poor little Israel surrounded by all of those savage Arabs" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). Those involved in the Stolen Beauty campaign use flashy costumes to grab peoples' attention so that they hear activists' message and then through cognitive dissonance begin to question the framing of the conflict as portrayed by mainstream media outlets. Scholars of peace studies and conflict transformation assert that in many latent conflicts, or in situations of oppression, it is often necessary to begin with a process of conscientization, so that people become cognizant of power imbalances and injustices that affect their lives; at times this may increase levels of overt conflict as parties begin to question the status quo. One of the goals of nonviolent activism is to use nonmilitary ("soft") forms of power to shift asymmetrical relationships of latent (or overt) conflict "into peaceful and dynamic ones" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 24–25). For CodePink activists, part of this conscientization or awareness raising process involves informing people about the Israeli occupation and Ahava's violation of international law due to its production location and labeling practices (CodePink Interview 9 2012). As one activist noted,

> most people don't even realize that there is an occupation and they don't realize that the Israelis are the occupiers, and so there is a lot of education that goes into this. And so certainly there are many many people that don't realize Ahava is breaking international law by being in that place and stamping its products as being made in Israel. (CodePink Interview 9 2012)

As another activist remarked the Stolen Beauty campaign is

> unlike corporate campaigns that . . . [we] have had in the past, like say trying to get Starbucks to carry fair-trade coffee. It's a specific act, it was winnable . . . or like trying to get Nike to have stricter regulations, to not have sweatshop labor. In this case there aren't piecemeal things that the company could do that would make them compliant with [international] law short of moving their factory . . . so it's much more about public education and it's about building up pressure and illustrating Israel's war crimes. (CodePink Interview 1 2012)

CodePink activists clearly affirmed that the campaign's short-term goal is primarily educational, although it also seeks to influence Ahava through the economic pressure of boycott. Activists explained their goal was "to sully Ahava's reputation by getting the word out about its illegal practices" (CodePink Interview 7 2012) and noted that "this

is an international sustained strategic plan to shine a spotlight and to really work to get this particular company to stop what they're doing because it's illegal" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Activists use materials available on the CodePink website in their campaign efforts, but craft their specific actions to their local context. For example, activists in the Pacific Northwest have targeted Nordstrom's, a major department store carrying Ahava, due to the fact that their headquarters is located outside Seattle, whereas Chicago-area activists have focused on Ulta, a cosmetics retailer that has its headquarters there (CodePink Interview 2 2012; CodePink Interview 5 2012). In addition, CodePink activists have drawn upon the WhoProfits database maintained by the Israeli Coalition of Women for Peace, seeking to certify their information by using well-documented, Israeli-based sources.

The decentralized nature of CodePink means that most CodePink actions, although flashy and attention-grabbing, are small and local. However, when local actions have national reach, CodePink activists' actions are amplified beyond their immediate context. One of CodePink's most notable awareness raising successes resulted from its deployment of what McAdam et al. call the "brokerage" mechanism, which "is the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site" (McAdam et al. 2001, 142). Through an educational campaign and appealing to shared concerns for international law, CodePink pressured the international humanitarian organization Oxfam to suspend Sex and the City star Kristen Davis as an Oxfam Goodwill Ambassador for the duration of her contract with Ahava; this news was published on the gossip page of the New York Post, thereby creating a media splash at a time when Ahava was seeking to secure additional capital (CodePink Interview 7 2012). By connecting Oxfam and the Stolen Beauty campaign through ties of common values and concern for international law, CodePink activists were able to sever the link between Oxfam and Davis due to Davis' own links to Ahava, and also have a negative financial impact on the corporation. The use of a nationally circulated newspaper to broadcast the news broadened the scope of the action beyond the players immediately involved. The Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) seeks to help play a similar brokerage function on a wider scale, by helping connect activists working on similar campaigns or issues in different locales, and by informing international activists of BDS campaign victories around the world, thereby amplifying their success. While some BDS activists interviewed for this project were not directly connected to the BNC and did not communicate with it regularly (if at

all), other activists, like the student organizers for the divestment bill at UC Berkeley communicated with and received assistance from the BNC in the course of their campaign. CodePink clearly affirmed the "autonomous" status of its Stolen Beauty campaign, although it acknowledged that other groups around the world use the campaign materials available on its website (CodePink Interview 7 2012).

CodePink activists try "to bring human rights consciousness [to] the public and also [to] the employees of the stores [selling Ahava products] because then they know what they are selling and where it comes from" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Street theater, social media efforts like Twitter, and attendance at conferences like the 2012 BDS conference at the University of Pennsylvania are all avenues for spreading the word about the Stolen Beauty campaign. Ironically, the staunch opposition raised to the Penn conference by several Zionist groups led to increased coverage for the BDS conference, which may have spread their message further than if the conference had gone unchallenged. As one activist suggested, "there was enough hoopla that perhaps some people said, 'I wonder what this is all about.' And maybe they read a little about [BDS] and tried to educate themselves" (CodePink Activist 9 2012). A Twitter contest to win Ahava cosmetics from the Birchbox beauty and fashion blog was flooded by CodePink activists with creative tweets about Ahava, such as "putting Ahava on your face is the same as putting poison on it" or "There is nothing lovely about Ahava" (Birchbox 2011). Thus, the contest had a similar awareness-raising impact because "a lot of people noticed, and a lot of people said, 'wait, what's this, what's happening.' And once people start questioning and talking, that's ultimately going to be the end of the Israeli occupation because when people really know what is happening . . . they won't pay for it here in the US" (CodePink Interview 7 2012; CodePink Interview 9 2012). BDS activism is a "way to get attention to a really serious heart-wrenching critical problem" and for at least one activist, CodePink's approach of using "a little bit of humor and a little bit of street theater" while also being "very clear about where we were going and what we wanted to do" was an effective way of engaging in awareness raising (CodePink Interview 5 2012).

Deploying Gender Identity

As a feminist organization, CodePink's primary audience is women, and therefore many of their campaign tactics and actions are explicitly aimed at women and activists deploy feminist tropes in an effort to

appeal directly to that audience. Ahava was selected as a target precisely because "it was a cosmetic company, which seemed like a good fit for a women's peace group" (CodePink Interview 7 2012). Several activists noted that the Stolen Beauty campaign was especially appealing because it epitomized "concretely" what they could do in response to the call to BDS issued by Palestinian civil society. Although "maybe people have this concept of activists as non-make-up wearing and so on . . . that's not the case. We're just like everyone else . . . [this campaign] spoke to those of us that use beauty products" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Activists were keen to emphasize that Ahava was not selected because as an organization CodePink hates Ahava, but rather it was a strategic choice due to the company's marketing to women and it's "clear" violation of international law and human rights due to the production in a settlement and the harvesting of mud from occupied territory (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 5 2012). As one CodePink activist remarked, "the Stolen Beauty campaign is a tactic and a strategy to help people get equality and become equal partners in their own country and have power in their own country. It's not that we don't like the product Ahava has and so we want to cause the company grief, because that's not the point of this" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). In true feminist fashion, Ahava was selected because of the concept of the "personal" being "political" in terms of the political ramifications of individual purchasing choices relating to one's appearance. As one activist remarked, engaging in the boycott gives women the "feeling that their little bit of not buying and their little bit of talking about it to their friends gives them power" (CodePink Interview 6 2012). Another noted that "if someone chooses not to buy Ahava beauty products, they have quietly made a teeny little moral choice that has involved them in the campaign for equal rights" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). Several members of the core organizing team admitted that part of the appeal for the Ahava campaign was the fact that they themselves used the product. One stated that her mother-in-law regularly gave her Ahava bath salts as a gift, and another that she used to use Ahava and "loved it" (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012). While for many "boycotting" Ahava was a symbolic action because they never used their products, for others, boycotting the company was a personal, political statement.

Beyond the selection of target, the methods used by CodePink are not only "women-friendly," they actively deploy gender through their themes and symbols. Most of those interviewed highlighted the fact that CodePink actions were "creative and fun" and that they were "positive" rather than "solemn" or "fists in the air, screaming protests"

(CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 5 2012; CodePink Interview 6 2012). The effort to have fun, seek positive change, and to build community through their antiwar activism was a common thread expressed by CodePink activists, themes commonly associated with the "women's" approach to peace work. Playing off Ahava's corporate identity as a maker of beauty products made from Dead Sea mud, CodePink activists have staged "bikini brigades" of women smeared in mud, and organized flash mobs wearing bathrobes and singing about Ahava to the tune of "I'm going to wash that man right out of my hair."[1] One popular script, called "BDS Brides" is a parody of a wedding ceremony that was "silly and serious at the same time. The brides were vowing to honor international law and respect human rights and not register for their weddings at Bed, Bath and Beyond until that particular store dropped its settlement products" (CodePink Interview 9 2012). While the deployment of gender identity in creative skits and flash mob actions was largely fun and well received by audiences, who were often "intrigued, [wondering] hey, what are they doing over there, that looks interesting" and therefore came over to look and take the proffered fliers (CodePink Interview 8 2012), CodePink activism has also at times been the subject of attack, with opponents claiming that boycott efforts are an example of anti-Israel bias or anti-Semitism.

Reframing "Anti-Israel" and "Anti-Semitic"

Although CodePink is a secular group and members are united by their feminism and antiwar stance, Jewish identity has played a role in the Stolen Beauty campaign, with several activists and staff members crediting their understanding of Judaism as a major impetus for their involvement in the campaign. One activist shared, for example, that she "grew up in the container of basic Zionism. Not fervent Zionism, but I have family that are Israeli, and I always was concerned with peace and justice in Israel and for Israelis and Palestinians" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Another conveyed that earlier in her life she "absolutely fell in love with Judaism...so I studied every Thursday afternoon with the rabbi." In 2001, after the outbreak of the second intifada, she "came to realize that Israel was violating every commandment and every tenet of Judaism that I learned to love. And so [this feeling of total betrayal] is part of what moved me to activism (CodePink Interview 2 2012). Ironically, opponents of the campaign also frame their activism in 'Jewish' terms, which illustrates the contested nature of Jewish identity vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As has been pointed out by

scholars of ethnic and nationalist violence, often "*inter*-ethnic violence is conditioned and fostered by *intra*-ethnic processes" (Brubaker and Laitin 1998, 433). In this case, the identity of the Jewish-American diaspora shapes and is shaped by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yossi Shain argues that Jewish diaspora organizations, particularly those engaged in political efforts within the United States, are threatened by peace because recruitment would decline "if the danger to Israel receded" (Shain 2002, 129). As the debates surrounding the BDS movement generally, and the CodePink Stolen Beauty campaign particularly, illustrate, much effort has been made on the part of Zionist diaspora organizations in the US (and elsewhere) to portray the BDS movement as anti-Semitic and as a threat not only to Jewish identity but also to the state of Israel. Support for BDS activities, regardless of the target, is a red line for many diaspora Jews. As one Jewish activist revealed,

> I was recently in a situation where I was not allowed to speak at a Jewish facility because I'm affiliated with CodePink and I'm affiliated with a campaign that's about a boycott of settlements, which is ridiculous because even Israeli political parties have endorsed boycott of settlement products. It's not really that radical of a position outside of the United States, but I think that sometimes the institutional, organized, funded Jewish community has reacted with so much fear mongering that there's just this attempt to completely silence dissent. (CodePink Interview 1, 2012)

Groups like the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) have sought to portray those who support the boycott of Ahava as "anti-Semitic," a tactic that organizations like the Israel/Palestine Mission Network (IPMN) of the Presbyterian Church have suggested is a "slanderous smear campaign" to prevent "open and free dialog" about Israeli government policies such as illegal occupation and the violation of Palestinian human rights (Staff 2012). A CodePink organizer commented that

> we hear on a daily basis that the Israelis are under threat and we don't hear about the threatening that the Israelis do . . . And we look at how difficult it is for anyone to be critical of government regardless of its policies that when people are critical of it brings up the Holocaust and calls people anti-Semitic for speaking out against that government and its policies. It's very difficult because those are really painful accusations and painful words for people. And it's dangerous territory emotionally and politically for almost everyone. (CodePink Interview 9, 2012)

This sentiment was affirmed by another activist who noted that people "have been taught to think that this issue is just so complex and confusing and there's two sides and how do you know who to believe and there is a lot of fear surrounding it, especially for people in the Jewish and Christian religious communities (CodePink Interview 9 2012). Another activist affiliated with the Stolen Beauty campaign offered a complementary explanation, one in keeping with the mobilization based on identity-based fear but from a different angle:

> The state of Israel has always depended on the good will of the world. That was the whole nature of its founding . . . the state was founded so quickly after the Nazi Holocaust that by and large people in the world wish them well . . . so I think the people running Israel have always seen themselves as the good guys, as the good people, as the shining light and so forth . . . so when people are telling them, no, actually you are one of the key oppressor states in the world right now, then it shakes them to their moral core. (CodePink Interview 8 2012)

BDS may indeed provoke fear on the part of Israelis and Jews in the diaspora who believe "when that goodwill of the world is jeopardized . . . their [financial and military] support might be jeopardized" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). A British Jew involved in counterprotests outside the Ahava store in Covent Garden, a major target for BDS activists in the United Kingdom, asserted his desire to counter the "misinformation" of the UK boycotters, arguing that boycotters "are anti-Semites since they treat Israel differently from countries that genuinely DO violate human rights." He emphasized that Israel is a democracy with full voting rights for its Arab citizens, that companies like Ahava create jobs for Palestinian workers, and further attested to Israel's moral standing in the world community by claiming that "there is no evidence that Israel committed war crimes in Gaza" and that "Israel has done nothing to deserve a boycott" (CodePink Interview 4 2012).

More broadly, the understanding of Jewish-Americans' relationship with the state of Israel, and what constitutes "anti-Semitic" or "anti-Israel" behavior is hotly contested between activists in the Stolen Beauty campaign and its opponents, with many suggesting that an Israeli state with a better human rights record would in fact be more secure than one that violates Palestinian human rights (CodePink Interview 5 2012; CodePink Interview 6 2012). Activists challenged opponents' negative framing and wondered why they are accused of being "anti-Israel" rather than "pro-Palestine." As one shared, "I am not anti-Semitic nor

am I anti-Israel. I want Israel to thrive just like I would like Palestine to thrive" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Another activist noted her efforts to shift the discourse by "making the link . . . to the human rights issue and get[ting] away from the Muslim, Jew, Christian, whatever other religion people want to throw into any argument" (CodePink Interview 6 2012). In her educational outreach efforts, she also emphasizes personal parallels that resonate with the audience, such as the fact she lives on a peninsula exactly the size of Gaza. She encourages people to "imagine not being able to leave this area for five or six years. Not only can you not leave but people cannot come in, you can't fish, you can't farm, you get shot" (CodePink Interview 6 2012). Activists also seek to break the connection between the Stolen Beauty boycott campaign and "anti-Israel" by emphasizing the economic importance of the issue to the United States, given that Israel is the largest recipient of foreign aid and uses those funds in ways that violate international law. As one activist attested, it is important to ask "where do we want to put our money and how does where we put our money connect with our values," particularly in a time of economic recession when people say "why should I care what is happening to Palestinians when I'm struggling to keep a job or I'm unemployed or I'm dealing with . . . health care, the cost of education, and so on" (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 6 2012). By making connections between one's personal life and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whether through explaining the amount of US foreign aid that goes to Israel every year at a time when the US government is making substantial budget cuts, or through drawing explicit parallels between the situation facing Palestinians and peoples' own lives, CodePink activists help to reshape the relationship of individuals to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reframe their identity as "pro-Israel" to "pro-justice" or "pro-peace."

Stolen Beauty activists acknowledge the fear of Jewish Israelis (as well as diaspora Jews) regarding BDS, particularly that the "equality piece [of the broader BDS campaign] is really scary for Jewish hegemony or majority in Israel" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). A CodePink activist noted that the nonviolent tactics of boycott were preferable to violent tactics of rage, explaining "I understand the concern that people have about the state of Israel and wanting that state to thrive, survive, and I would agree with that . . . But the other side is failing to look at the Palestinian question. You can't subjugate a people forever . . . I would rather see a diplomatic solution" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). When asked if boycott might be considered a form of economic war, the activist responded,

that's what free trade and capitalism is, right? I understand the feeling and I appreciate the passion of people who think that BDS is another way to wage war on Israel, but I think that type of rhetoric doesn't do anybody any good. We're not waging war on Israel. Nobody is dying because we're boycotting a cosmetic company . . . but can the government of Israel say the same thing about Palestine? (CodePink Interview 5 2012)

A few activists suggested that because the Stolen Beauty campaign advocates for equality and human rights and against policies that benefit Jews at the expense of others, it is seen as threatening by those who believe that the state of Israel should only be for the Jewish people. As one suggested, the tactic of attacking policies that are "only for Jewish people" is interpreted by some as being "anti-Jew" even though the campaigners are seeking to dismantle the policy rather than target Jews or destroy the state of Israel (CodePink Interview 6 2012). Ironically, in an example of linguistic intractability, both sides of the issue portray the other as "discriminatory," that Jews are unduly targeted, either for privileges at the expense of others, or for persecution over and above others. While CodePink protests are nonviolent, the threat of full Palestinian equality in Israel is a threat to Jewish majoritarian identity, and some of the responses to CodePink activists by opponents have been physically violent. For example, one CodePink activist was assaulted in Congress by AIPAC lobbyists because of her stance on BDS with the Stolen Beauty campaign (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Activists who interrupted Netanyahu's speech at the AIPAC gala were also assaulted for "speak[ing] out against Netanyahu's claim that returning to the 1967 borders would be 'indefensible' when it is Israeli policies that are really indefensible." As a CodePink activist writing about the assaults attested, "young Jews like me hear stories [of Palestinians living under occupation] and we see clearly that Israel's actions do not embody our deepest Jewish and humanistic values, which have taught us to love our neighbors and to work for justice" (Abileah 2011). Such statements challenge opponents' views that boycotters are anti-Semites because they appeal directly to Jewish values and teachings in justifying their activism.

Consistent with the idea that the "war by other means" is a battle over legitimacy, several activists suggested that the threat to Israel stemmed neither from economic distress nor alleged anti-Semitism, but rather from a shift in its international image, as mentioned earlier, from being one of the "good guys" to being seen as an "oppressor state," a description Israel denies (CodePink Interview 8 2012). Activists underscored the importance of Israel's image to Israeli citizens and diaspora

Jews, suggesting that those opposed to BDS see the campaign as a threat because it is "gaining support...they might see themselves as being in the unpopular position and BDS in the popular position so they want to play victim or feel victimized," thereby deploying tropes of Jewish persecution that resonate strongly in the Jewish diaspora as well as in Western nations who feel guilt regarding their failure to stop the Holocaust (CodePink Interview 8 2012; CodePink Interview 9 2012). A Jewish counterdemonstrator in support of Ahava's Covent Garden store, for example, went word for word through a judge's ruling, pointing out what he claimed to be anti-Semitic tropes in its discussion of Operation Cast Lead and Israel's attack on the 2010 flotilla to Gaza; he also criticized activists for "feel[ing] that Jews need to be educated on the atrocities their fellow Jews are committing in the 'name of *never again*'"(Hoffman 2010, 2011). It is perhaps to accentuate the Jewish narrative of suffering that boycott activists are framed as "anti-Israel" or "anti-Semitic." As one activist observed, "they never accuse us of being pro-Palestinian, it's always accusations of being anti-Israel, and I think that perception is the biggest challenge we have, and that is fueled by AIPAC-type lobbyists" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). By framing the action of boycotters in negative terms, opponents use social identity theory to their advantage, leveraging the threat of a hostile external 'other' to rally support for Jewish diasporic organizations and the "homeland" of Israel.[2] Although opponents regularly frame boycott activists as part of the BDS "movement," as if it was one coherent entity, in reality the "movement" is intentionally decentralized and only very loosely networked. Although the BNC acts as a reference point for groups around the world, it is not a central nervous system for an organized and coordinated body. For example, while CodePink activists interviewed pointed to the success of British activists in closing down Ahava's store in Covent Garden after two years of protests, they also noted that "those people are not part of CodePink, but we're all working on the same project together" (CodePink Interview 9 2012). Although campaigns to boycott Ahava are not coordinated, activists share information via email listservs. However, they sometimes "only hear[ing] about an action because of a press report" (CodePink Interview 6 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012). While sharing the story of the British activists' success, one CodePink activist remarked that

> they were willing to risk multiple arrests and do some more radical things than we do in Seattle...we've had people arrested for other actions, but with Nordstrom's here our tactic is that we want to be a presence,

we want to make it known that the store is violating their social responsibility policy. We don't want to make it uncomfortable for the shoppers to the degree that they find us repugnant; better that they find the stores' policy repugnant...but in London it worked, their tactics definitely worked. (CodePink Interview 2 2012)

In their use of different tactics in the broader campaign to boycott Ahava cosmetics, CodePink activists and British activists illustrate the implications of context sensitivity.

Linguistic Intractability and Rival Moral Frameworks

Supporters and opponents of BDS stake their claims regarding the relationship between BDS activities and "peace" in radically different ways, with supporters advocating that BDS is a nonviolent path toward freedom and justice, and opponents deeming it a form of "war by other means" (Hallward and Shaver 2012). This divergence is not unique to the BDS movement, but rather reflects a philosophical debate within the field of peace and conflict studies. Those engaged in the pursuit of dialog and conflict resolution through communication, including techniques of mediation, negotiation, and problem solving workshops, tend to emphasize the goal of seeking to understand the Other's perspective (Deutsch 2000; Fisher 1997). Scholars in the peace studies camp, in contrast, highlight relationships of power and "invisible" structures of violence that prevent humans from reaching their full potential (Curle 1995; Galtung 1996), arguing that dialog efforts seeking "understanding" and "compromise" aim to "immediately displace and transcend" disagreements between parties rather than explore them (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 375). Ramsbotham argues that scholars should intentionally engage with radical disagreement, a tendency evident in the debates surrounding BDS, and that scholars and peacemakers should explore the sources of linguistic intractability (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 377).

Proponents of BDS tend to look at the structural dimensions of conflict as conceptualized by Johan Galtung, who examines forms of oppression and domination built into social and political systems that prevent humans from reaching their potential (Galtung 1969, 1990). As a CodePink activist noted, "we would like international law to be observed and respected and we would like for the Ahava company to stop taking things out of Palestinian land...but the big picture of what we want in the Stolen Beauty campaign...is to give the Palestinians equal rights in their country" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). Using

a framework rooted in peace studies that advocates for justice, BDS activists acknowledge that sometimes increasing conflict (not violence) is a necessary component of raising awareness about an injustice invisible to those benefiting from status quo power relations (Curle 1995; Lederach 1997, 70). Activists in the United States and United Kingdom alike emphasized the illegality of Israeli settlements under international law and highlighted the displacement of Palestinians and the destruction of the Palestinian economy as a result of settlement expansion and the settlement economy (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 3 2012). Proponents and opponents also differ in their orientations toward conflict and violence; opponents of BDS tend to view conflict as something to be avoided and suppressed, and view peace in "negative" terms as the absence of direct violence. In contrast, supporters of BDS tend to view conflict as an inevitable, even valuable, component of social life and seek to engage conflict for constructive purposes (Kriesberg and Dayton 2012, 2–3). For example, as one CodePink activist noted, "being creative and getting information out is critical and that's what CodePink does so well. And even if it's distasteful to so many people because it might be a little too brash, it still gets the attention and that's what needs to happen because people just don't know. And when they do know they take action" (CodePink Interview 6 2012).

Approaches to Conflict: Dialog versus Nonviolent Coercion

Within typologies of nonviolent resistance, boycott falls in the category of nonviolent noncooperation, and is sometimes considered a form of nonviolent coercion, to indicate that actors are involved in a struggle for sociopolitical change, and seek to deploy nonmilitary forms of power to that end (Kriesberg and Dayton 2012, 100; Sharp 2005, 54–56). Theories of nonviolence emphasize the capacity of ordinary people to undermine a regime's power by removing their support for policies and practices in which they are complicit. As one Stolen Beauty activist noted,

> if no one will financially support a regime or a place, a government...then it will lose its legs. It can't keep going...I think a person would be hard pressed to use Israeli settlement products if they really wanted human rights for Palestinians and were thinking about those two things together. It's a clear call. And I think that the lens [of boycott] has a lot of possibilities for success. (CodePink Interview 9 2012)

As this example illustrates, activists intentionally seek to change power relationships through BDS, although they recognize the struggle will be long and slow, with modest, context-specific successes. The example also illustrates CodePink's focus on matters of justice and human rights. One CodePink activist shared her frustration with a Nordstrom's manager who said their job as a retailer is to give customers what they want; she wondered what the purpose of Nordstrom's social responsibility was if the company acted according to the rules of the marketplace rather than according to their conscience (CodePink Interview 2 2012). Another activist emphasized their approach was grounded in human rights rather than ideology, remarking that "we try to really stick to the facts which are grounded in international law" (CodePink Interview 9 2012). In providing a different lens for interpreting the "facts" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, CodePink activists are challenging the discursive power of the "pro-Israel" community within the United States to define both the parameters of the conflict and appropriate approaches toward "peace." As one activist noted, "we're not looking for lots of trouble, we're looking for lots of truth, and so we tell it as best we can while keeping ourselves intact" (CodePink Interview 9 2012).

Discursive power is manifest in "stories about signification (what value things have, what is their meaning) and legitimation (what is considered 'normal' and 'acceptable' and not), and in the tangible products of the institutionalization of these values and norms" (Demmers 2012, 121). Through their nonviolent actions, CodePink activists seek to challenge the dominant discourse, and to challenge "deeply embedded discourses centered around concepts such as militarism, statehood, nationalism and masculinity [that] have conditioned us, through time and across space, to see war as normality" (Demmers 2012, 123) Because they challenge deeply held discourses that render war (and other concepts such as free market capitalism) acceptable and necessary, groups like CodePink are often categorized as "traitors" deserving of censure (Demmers 2012, 123). CodePink activists respond by documenting human rights abuses and by pointing to religious teachings such as the golden rule, which "you find in essentially every faith tradition," including "Rabbi Hillel [who said] don't do to someone else that which you yourself would find abhorrent" (CodePink Interview 2 2012). Activists hope that the new and different information they share with their audiences will not simply be filtered out by the psychological mechanism of cognitive consistency, but rather that cognitive dissonance will spur individuals to question the status quo narrative and be motivated to take action in order to align one's values with one's actions. By framing

their protests in the visual language of beauty and social traditions such as marriage, activists seek to tap into discourses that resonate with their target audience, and hope to increase their likelihood of activating cognitive dissonance.

Approaches to Power and Process: Evaluating Campaign "Success"

When examining the extent to which the Stolen Beauty campaign has been "successful," it is important to first examine the goals of the campaign, as well as CodePink's underlying assumptions of power and process relative to other social organizations or institutions. CodePink is a "horizontal organization" without any formal membership structure; those who show up at meetings and engage in scheduled actions are the members. Apart from a few paid staff in California and Washington, DC, all CodePink members are volunteers (CodePink Interview 5 2012; CodePink Interview 9 2012). CodePink operates on the principle of people power, that individuals, even without a lot of resources, can have an impact on local, national, and international policy by making their voices heard and by seeking to influence their neighbors as well as their elected officials. Engaging in the Stolen Beauty campaign is one way concerned citizens can act, since "many of us don't have those types of resources" as those lobbying Congress to "keep the Palestinian people subjugated" (CodePink Interview 5 2012).

Activists deploy their power in several ways. One way is by gathering signatures on petitions that can be delivered to store managers and to corporate headquarters asking them to stop carrying Ahava products in their stores. Activists in Chicago, for example, dressed in business attire (in stark contrast to protest attire of bathrobes and mud) to deliver 2,500 signatures and speak with officials at Ulta's corporate offices (CodePink Interview 5 2012). In the United Kingdom, activists deployed their power not only through the regular protests outside Ahava's Covent Garden store but also by making a complaint against Ahava's labeling practices in relation to the Camden trading standards, questioning the made in Israel label for a product made in a settlement, and raising the question of the import of Ahava products and "the preferential tax breaks…from the EU-Israeli association agreement" (CodePink Interview 3 2012). Activists noted that even though "we're a very small organization, very small staff nationally, [and] pretty new to working on this issue…we have this tiny little boycott campaign and what is it really going to do against this relatively small company in the grand scheme of the world" that "it's been a really effective campaign

and has had a lot of victories" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Boycotting provides everyday citizens "a way of concretely impacting policy in ways that many of us don't have the power or money to do . . . by affecting the economic situation of a business or a company or a country" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). As a target, "the Israeli economy is so small that these little campaigns can actually have a real impact. And because Israel is so dependent on imports and on support from the global economy and global political community, it is a really threatening form of activism" (CodePink Interview 1 2012).

Because they are aware of the economic impact of boycott—both of the boycott of Ahava products and also of the potential counterboycotts of stores launched by opposition forces if a store did deshelve Ahava products—CodePink activists intentionally target "big box stores," even though they know it will be harder to get such stores to stop carrying Ahava products (CodePink has also recently added Soda Stream to its boycott list). Not only are such stores "a better place for large protests and ongoing actions," but because they are located across the country it also provides an opportunity for coordinated actions "where everyone goes to Bed, Bath and Beyond and tells about why Ahava and Soda Stream shouldn't be sold as illegal products" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). At the same time, CodePink does not want to target small stores that "also carry other really good products, like sustainable local things or are small independent women-owned shops . . . [particularly] in the middle of an economic recession" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Behind the scenes work with small (and large) stores has resulted in Ahava products being removed from some store shelves, although often this is done quietly, without any reason being given. Thus, while this may be a small-scale economic success, it does not contribute to the campaign's awareness raising goals.

CodePink activists repeatedly mentioned the power of grassroots efforts for change, and how eventually, with enough persistence, efforts on behalf of human rights and justice will have an impact. As one said, BDS "is far from the only way, but it's one way that people can participate in various ways at various levels . . . similar to the boycott in South Africa, the economic damage that the boycott did was quite small, but the effect of isolating South Africa was very large and already they are feeling that in Israel" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). Others noted that "BDS is something people can really get involved in . . . you can be involved 24 hours a day or once a month and there is room for a lot of different people to participate and I think that is part of its power as well" (CodePink Interview 9 2012) and that "BDS comes from the people, it

comes from the oppressed, you know, Palestinian civil society called for it . . . it's a grassroots movement, and I love Howard Zinn's books . . . his main focus is that any . . . sustainable and worthwhile change usually comes from the ground up and that's what this is" (CodePink Interview 6 2012). In a time when many people feel powerless, the "Stolen Beauty campaign give[s] people that power, and we need it and we own it, and we need to take it back . . . and then use it in sustainable loving ways" (CodePink Interview 6 2012).

CodePink activists affirm that "it's just these little things that add up, eventually they add up. And I know in one fell swoop the occupation is not going to end, but this is the way it goes, this is the way you get there" (CodePink Interview 9 2012). When talking about movement success, activists refer to three different types of outcomes: (1) public awareness of Israeli occupation in the West Bank and how Ahava's presence in the occupied territories violates international laws and the rights of the Palestinian people; (2) Ahava's response to the BDS movement against it; and, (3) the Stolen Beauty campaign's effectiveness in discouraging the public from purchasing Ahava's products. Awareness raising is perhaps the most difficult element of "success" to measure, given that much of it has to do with individual-level change. Consequently, "success" in this arena stems from the Stolen Beauty campaign's ability to create media attention on the issue of settlement products and the illegality of profiting from the occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The failure of Kristen Davis to renew her contract with Ahava, for example, is claimed as a success by the Stolen Beauty campaign, although no mention of boycott or illegality was made in the decision (CodePink Interview 1 2012).

Activists have used creative protest, both in social media outlets as well as street theater, to gain the public's attention and thereby educate them regarding Ahava's location in the Israeli occupied West Bank. Leafleting at demonstrations outside of stores carrying Ahava products as well as the lyrics of songs performed by CodePink flash mobs are all efforts to raise the public's awareness. Yet Stolen Beauty campaign activists have also intentionally targeted corporate decision-makers in an effort to raise their awareness of the legal (as opposed to political) issues involved in selling Ahava products. One activist emphasized the success she had with "getting a global company that is on the stock exchange to have their legal team inquiring with Ahava" when Nordstrom's CEO instructed his legal team to ask questions after she sent him documentation regarding human rights violations that contradicted the company's social responsibility policy (CodePink Interview 2 2012). Although the

legal team decided that Ahava's products were cultivated in Israeli waters and the CEO reported that he was following the desire of consumers and would continue to do so, the activist noted that Nordstrom's had been dropped from the Calvert Fund's socially responsible investment portfolio for human rights-related issues (CodePink Interview 2 2012). Many retailers, including the National Cathedral in Washington, DC, have stopped carrying Ahava products, the "Dutch Foreign Ministry conducted an investigation into Ahava's fraudulent labeling practices," individuals have stated they will no longer buy the products, and numerous groups and individuals, including over a dozen rabbis, have endorsed the Stolen Beauty campaign (CodePink Interview 7 2012). Such "success" is difficult to quantify, however, because stores often do not identify the reason why they take the products off their shelves because they "want to avoid the trouble that we're making for them, but they don't want to take a political stand" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). Activists do, however, point to anecdotal evidence that suggests that "public opinion in the United States has moved in a good direction, and [the public] understands much more about the truth over there [in Israel/Palestine]" (CodePink Interview 8 2012). In the London protests that eventually shut down Ahava's Covent Garden store, activists also noted that the protests and boycott efforts have been successful in "changing public opinion about the situation in Palestine" as evidenced by public reaction to "a very public campaign, in a very crowded shopping area in Central London" (CodePink Interview 3 2012).

Stolen Beauty campaign activists also point to the response of Ahava executives as an indication of success. As one organizer stated, "you can also measure your success by what the target or opponent does in response. And our partners in South Africa actually were able to find a leaked document that the Ahava CEO had sent to all of the distributers of Ahava . . . trying to educate them, like an FAQ about our campaign and why we're wrong. And the claims that they made are ridiculous" (CodePink Interview 1 2012). CodePink activists note that the "lie-filled letter" put out by CEO Yaacov Ellis included mistruths such as "saying Mitzpe Shalem is NOT an illegal settlement, saying that they source materials from inside the Green Line, etc." (CodePink Interview 7 2012) In the memo, Ellis also argued that Ahava's presence in Mitzpe Shalem did not interfere with the Palestinian population and is located in "undisputed territory," and that the use of the Mitzpe Shalem facility "does not violate any provision of International Law, especially as there is not recognized right of any people other than Israel to the West Bank" (Ellis 2010). At the same time, however, Ellis affirms that

"sovereignty over the West Bank has been in dispute for more than 60 years. It is expected that the future of the West Bank, and in particular of that part where Mitzpe Shalem is situated, will be finally decided as part of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians" (Ellis 2010). CodePink activists wrote a letter to distribute to Ahava retailers contesting Ellis's claims, asserting that all West Bank settlements are illegal, highlighting the legality of CodePink's boycott campaign, and emphasizing that "despite Yaacov Ellis's claims to the contrary, Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories is an Israeli profiteer in Occupied Palestinian Territory" (CodePink 2010). While his letter may have been full of erroneous information, the fact that the CEO felt the need to issue such a statement means CodePink's message was having impact enough that it warranted a response.

A third area of "success" involves the economic impact of boycott campaigns on Ahava, which ultimately activists hope will decrease the profitability of settlement companies and the ability of the Israeli government to sustain the occupation of the West Bank. In particular, the fact that boycott efforts such as the Stolen Beauty campaign are loosely coordinated as part of a broader, global campaign, activists are able to have a greater impact than if they were simply conducting a number of small individual protests around the United States (CodePink Interview 1 2012). Perhaps the most notable success of the campaign against Ahava was the result of two years of protests by British activists outside the flagship store in London's Covent Garden. Owing to complaints from neighboring shops whose businesses suffered from the noise and disturbance resulting from the protests, Ahava's landlord, Shaftesbury PLC, did not renew Ahava's lease (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 3 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012). At the end of 2009, Ahava United Kingdom's accounts indicated a total loss of more than 250,000 pounds. Although the decision to close the Covent Garden store was the decision of the landlord and not the company itself, which reportedly was seeking another London locale, such financial information indicates that the boycott may be having an impact (Rosen 2011). Furthermore, one of the cases brought to court against the activists (for aggravated trespassing and disrupting lawful businesses) was dropped because when "the activists argued the business carried out by Ahava was not lawful because their business was located in the settlements, the Director of Ahava didn't turn up to court" (CodePink Interview 3 2012).

Ironically, at times the opposition credits the movement with more success than its organizers might claim. As one activist recalled, in

2009 she was at the American Israel Public Affairs Council (AIPAC) Conference and the executive director Howard Kohr was

> speaking about BDS and other nonviolent movements for human rights, and Palestine and Israel and he said something like not only is this a movement on college campuses but also in mainstream newspapers, and it's not just mainstream newspapers, it's celebrities, and it's not just celebrities, it's governments, and it's Europe and he went on and on and on and it, he made it sounds so mainstream, and of course he made it sound like it was a threat to Jewish people or Israel, but it just sounded like such an exciting movement and I remember thinking, wow that's a movement that I want to be part of, so sometimes the opposition frames the movement and it's actually very positive. (CodePink Interview 1 2012)

Again, in this case, the installation of a negative, threatening "Other" encourages the unification and solidification of the "Self," in this case the diaspora Jewish community in the United States. By painting the BDS movement as victorious and gaining in strength, there is a greater likelihood that those feeling threatened will contribute to the organizations working on their behalf, thereby supporting Shain's argument that diasporic groups often work against "peace" (Shain 2002).

Conclusion

CodePink's Stolen Beauty campaign targeting Ahava cosmetics is distinct from many voluntary consumer boycotts because its immediate aim is not economic harm to the Ahava corporation, but rather a shift in the US public's general understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Stolen Beauty activists seek a discursive shift in the narrative surrounding the conflict from the mainstream conception of a violent conflict between equal parties (and even a story of Palestinian terrorism or "ancient hatreds") to one of Israeli occupation and systemic violation of Palestinian human rights. Campaign organizers recognize that economically, they are a small group (three national staff people plus volunteers waging a variety of different antiwar campaigns) struggling against large retail stores (e.g., Bed, Bath and Beyond, Nordstrom's); as several remarked, their efforts are a little like playing "whack-a-mole" (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012). Economists concur that boycotts of particular firms' products have "negligible effects" on company profits, and that "free-riding logic suggests consumers are unlikely to voluntarily participate" (Chavis and Leslie 2009,

p.38). Furthermore, scholars indicate that consumer boycotts are a "puzzling phenomenon to the modern theory of collective action. Consumers are not part of an existing identifiable group or social network, nor do they share a common identity or social activities…in addition, there are no readily available selective incentives, the social benefits of a boycott are not exclusionary, and there usually is no repeated interaction among participants" (Diermeier and Van Mieghem 2008, 1497). The analysis of the Stolen Beauty campaign, however, indicates that campaign goals are "more expressive than instrumental in function," intending an awareness raising function and a brokering function that challenges the US publics, particularly cosmetics-wearing women, to think differently about how their personal choices have implicit political impact (Friedman 1985, 106). Those involved in the Stolen Beauty campaign deployed their identity as women through creative actions that accentuated their bonds with potential Ahava customers, such as the BDS brides skit. By using similar storylines for actions across the United States, CodePink activists sought to create a common identity not only among CodePink activists who otherwise did not know each other but also between themselves and the public.

Losman argues that "economic sanctions must be effective (i.e., cause economic damage) in order to succeed; however, it is quite possible, indeed, often probable, that boycotts may be effective without being successful" (Losman 1972, 99). Although opponents of BDS suggest that campaigns like Stolen Beauty are merely "'stuntwork' designed to create a buzz among BDS activists vs. accomplishing the goals associated with a traditional boycott'" (Haber 2012c), it is precisely the combination of guerrilla theater tactics and behind the scenes lobbying that account for the "successes" identified by campaign organizers in which they have been able to cause a media "splash" and thereby shape the discourse surrounding the policy and practices of Ahava as well as the broader nature of Israeli economic ventures vis-à-vis Palestinians. The effort of Ahava's President and CEO to discredit the campaign, by labeling it "insidious," "abhorrent," and "illegal," and consisting of "patently false claims" (despite supporting evidence that has been provided through the research conducted by Who Profits), indicates that the boycott campaign is sufficiently threatening that it needs to be dismissed as the work of "radical fringe groups" engaging in "commercial blackmail to achieve political objectives" (CodePink Interview 1 2012; Ellis 2010; Staff 2011; Whoprofits 2012). In addition, the company's emphasis on its "unique brand identity that is synonymous with the richness, purity and natural goodness that define [the Dead

Sea]" and its environmental statement that underscores its "nonpollut-ing and environmentally conscious" manufacturing processes, under-scores the importance of sustaining the corporation's image in the eyes of socially concerned consumers (Ahava n.d.a, n.d.b). By highlighting their socially responsible credentials in the environmental sector and by altering their product labeling to diminish the prominence of their production locale, Ahava seeks to offset elements of their corporate practices that may be less desirable to socially concerned consumers (CodePink Interview 1 2012; CodePink Interview 7 2012; Diermeier and Van Mieghem 2008, p.1498). This tactic of shifting focus from political and human rights issues to environmental issues, deemed "green-washing" by Stolen Beauty activists and the broader BDS move-ment, is relatively common among settlement industries. For example, a number of West Bank settlements market their eggs, chicken, and vegetables as "organic," forcing consumers to choose between different values they may hold dear.

Even if Ahava has not felt the economic pinch from the Stolen Beauty campaign, a fact difficult to determine without access to the company's financial records, the Israeli government and diasporic Jewish organiza-tions have condemned efforts by South Africa to "label products from West Bank settlements as coming from the occupied Palestinian ter-ritories," deeming the move "discriminatory, divisive...[and] seriously flawed," reflective of "political bias against the state of Israel" despite the fact that South Africa bases its claim in its recognition of Israel within "the 1948 borders delineated by the United Nations" (Smith 2012). A similar push by the EU to "clearly label products originating in Israeli settlements" is generating "fear" among Israeli officials, who have used a variety of tactics, consistent with efforts documented in the scholarship for defusing boycotts, including suggesting that a boycott would hurt Palestinians rather than help them, amplifying fear tactics, by suggesting this is the first step in targeting all Israeli goods, and suggesting it is a "political" decision, as if to imply government officials should not engage in politics (Ravid 2012). Israeli officials have consis-tently side-stepped the political nature of labeling practices that have created their own "facts on the ground" by erasing the Green Line and ignoring the provision of the 2005 free trade agreement between Israel and the EU that specifies that "products originating from beyond the Green Line will not be granted exemption from customs duties" (Ravid 2012). By dismissing the efforts of BDS activists and even EU officials as "political," Israeli and diaspora elites attempt to portray their own actions and objectives as "value-neutral" and thereby superior to those

of others, where the idea of "political" is implicitly equated with "anti-Israel," which is equated with "anti-Semitic," the ultimate offense in the eyes of those for whom the lessons of World War II are ever-present.

In many ways, the war over language and competition over how "political" is defined (for Stolen Beauty activists do not deny that their efforts are political, but simply view "political" activity in a different light), indicates, as previously noted, a situation of linguistic intractability. In such situations, Ramsbotham suggests that third parties should support dialog for strategic engagement that analyzes options, keeps communication open across the spectrum of opinions within parties, and seeks to satisfy parties on issues where there are "extremists of ends" in order to minimize support for those who are "extremists of means" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 394–395). Although the institutional Jewish community in the United States largely discredits the BDS movement as "extreme," those involved in BDS activism are overwhelmingly moderates of means. While some BDS activists may be considered extremists of ends due to the call for the right of return of Palestinian refugees, which critics of BDS assert is the same as calling for the end of Israel as a Jewish state, the BDS movement as a whole is a rights-based approach and consequently does not advocate for a particular "solution" to the conflict. Discrediting and dismissing BDS activists as "extremists," however, ultimately does a disservice to Israel and to those seeking a nonmilitary solution to the conflict as it emboldens those voices who say Israel only understand the language of violent force. By removing tactics of BDS from the toolbox of "legitimate" avenues for sociopolitical change, opponents of BDS implicitly legitimize extremists of means who use violent tactics to advance the Palestinian cause.

While opponents and supporters of BDS differ dramatically on their views regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those involved on each side of the issue believe they have the "truth" about the situation, and frame their approach in the language of values. Although an opponent of the boycott claimed his job was to counter the misinformation being spread by boycotters and to provide the truth about Israel (CodePink Interview 4 2012), CodePink activists provide a different "truth." As one activist described,

> Once you've read something, once you've heard something, once you've seen an action, [the truth] is triggered in your mind, in your head and in your heart, and you don't go back once you've known, once you've really known the truth, and the facts; you know, truth is power." (CodePink Interview 6 2012)

In a similar vein, another activist shared that

> I have to believe...that each of our individual acts will eventually cre-
> ate a critical mass. That we'll snap the public's attention to this issue
> and then ultimately the universe. Because that's how the BDS movement
> worked in South Africa...Congress initially resisted until it became so
> much of a public issue that they could no longer ignore it." (CodePink
> Interview 2 2012)

Ultimately, Stolen Beauty activists believe that even though there are
few of them and they are spread thin, there is value in working together
on a concerted campaign (CodePink Interview 2 2012). On the most
basic level, the campaign "is a tactic and a strategy to help people get
equality and become equal partners in their own country and have
power in their own country" (CodePink Interview 5 2012). By refram-
ing the issue away from "anti-Semitism" and claims that the conflict is
"too complicated," CodePink activists underscore how the personal is
the political, and that by engaging in creative, contentious, and con-
troversial communication, they can help enact shifts in public opinion,
which in turn can impact policy.

CodePink protests and actions as part of the Stolen Beauty cam-
paign provide a different format for BDS activism than the other three
cases studied in this book, which are associated with efforts to pass
particular policies or resolutions at the level of an institutional govern-
ing body. In contrast to those efforts to institutionalize BDS, which
are focused on particular times and places, and consequently easier for
opposition to mobilize around as well, the Stolen Beauty campaign is
more loosely coordinated, and protests occur in cities across the country
at times and locations determined by the local volunteer organizers.
At times the national campaign coordinator (who is also a volunteer)
will organize a national day of action, such as Valentine's Day, or will
coordinate an email campaign, such as happened when she found that
the Lonely Planet guidebook "had written Ahava as a place to stop and
see in the Jordan Valley...she wrote an email and sent it out and I
think Lonely Planet got thousands of emails" (CodePink Interview 2
2012). While opponents may still label their activities as "anti-Semitic,"
no organized opposition to CodePink's campaign exists in the same
way as the other cases studied here. As an individual consumer boy-
cott, the Stolen Beauty campaign does not have the same economic
"teeth" as an institutional one, but the combination of pressure on store
managers and engagement with organizations like Oxfam International

in regards to Kristen Davis' contract illustrate that the campaign is about more than just impacting individual consumers' choices. Indeed, CodePink activists emphasize the educational goals of the campaign, and the importance of awareness raising in the United States, where the general public is uninformed about the Israeli occupation. The case also provides an example of how the line between "BDS1" and "BDS2" is not always clear cut. While CodePink's activism focuses explicitly on products created in Israeli settlements, the group has endorsed the 2005 BDS Call and therefore supports the three pillars of rights called for by Palestinian civil society, including the implementation of Palestinian refugee rights as articulated in UN General Assembly resolution 194. Even as an endorser, however, CodePink organizers clearly articulated that they were an autonomous movement and did not coordinate with the broader BDS movement. Furthermore, although CodePink activists pointed to successes against Ahava elsewhere in the world when asked about the impact of the boycott campaign, they themselves were not involved in those efforts, and even in the United States campaign actions were only loosely coordinated across cities. This indicates that while opponents may point to a BDS "movement," the autonomy and context specificity of individual campaigns and their goals seems to outweigh classic social movement definitions that describe "a set of people who voluntarily and deliberately commit themselves to a shared identity, a unifying belief, a common program, and a collective struggle to realize that program" (Tilly 1984, 303).

UC Berkeley's Student Government Divestment Bill: Power, Identity, and Fear

Introduction

The student government at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), the Associated Studies of the University of California (ASUC), became the focus of international attention and debate in Spring 2010 as a result of passionate debates over bill number 118 entitled "In Support of ASUC Divestment from War Crimes" (Pessah and Huet-Vaughn 2010). The bill aimed to divest the University's holdings from two US companies whose products were used by Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. This was not the first time students at UC Berkeley attempted to raise the issue of divestment from corporations profiting from their activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; in fact, UC Berkeley students called for divestment from "Israeli Apartheid" in the early days of the second intifada, starting with the day Ariel Sharon was elected Israeli prime minister in 2001 (Erekat 2012). It was also not the first time divestment was a major issue at a US college campus. In February 2009, due to the efforts of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Hampshire College's board of trustees voted to divest from a number of companies supporting the Israeli occupation—Caterpillar, United Technologies, General Electric, ITT, and Terex—although the board denied the decision was due to Israeli human rights abuses (Erekat 2012, 95).

Why did a student government bill, which was vetoed by the student body president, and would likely hold little actual weight due to the lack of student control over the University's financial holdings, draw

such international attention? Why did ASUC forums on draw hundreds of attendees from campus and the wider community in the middle of the final exam period? This case seeks to explore these questions, as well as the debates surrounding the nature of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) activities on college campuses. Opponents to the bill mobilized identity-based fear, specifically for Jewish students on campus; the talking points circulated by Tikvah encouraged anti-divestment students to be emotional and focus on how the divestment bill was an attack on individual student's identities as Jews, rather than debate the issues of the case (Bohmer 2010). Rival moral frameworks and contending conceptions of "peace" and "nonviolence" are evident as well, as are the internal Jewish debates over how Jewish values and beliefs are connected to activism surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The case also illustrates the different dynamics of power and process at play in a college-level debate as opposed to those taking place within organizations like the Olympia Food Co-op or the Presbyterian Church. The transitory nature of ASUC membership, the age of the main protagonists, and the potential for a college divestment success to spread to other college campuses in the UC system (and beyond), all provide additional dynamics unique to the local context. Although a student government resolution bears only symbolic weight and has no actual economic impact on Israel, its symbolic importance is significant enough that in August 2012 the California State Assembly passed HR35, which "calls upon [California postsecondary educational] institutions to increase their efforts to swiftly and unequivocally condemn acts of anti-Semitism on their campuses" such as "student- and faculty-sponsored boycott, divestment, and sanction campaigns against Israel that are a means of demonizing Israel and seek to harm the Jewish state" (California State Legislature 2012; Robbins and Taylor 2012).

Boycott and Divestment: A Closer Look at Campus Activism

College campuses have an extensive history of social justice activism, and divestment has long been a tool in the student activist handbook. The use of BDS is perhaps most commonly associated with the international campaign against South Africa's apartheid policies, when citizen groups around the world put pressure on universities and corporations to divest their holdings from companies working in South Africa (Becker 1987; Seidman 2007). By the 1970s, students at Princeton, Cornell, Wesleyan, and Union Theological Seminary were calling for divestment from apartheid South Africa (Martin 2007). In 1977, three educational institutions

divested, and over seven hundred US students were arrested in antiapartheid protests (Martin 2007, 334). On April 24, 1982, students on 60 campuses engaged in divestment protests for "National Anti-Apartheid Day," including over one thousand students each at UCLA and UC Berkeley; student activists expressed their moral concern to ensure their money was not helping "prop up the evil system" (Martin 2007, 337–38). In 1985, Columbia University students protested for three weeks and sparked divestment protests on college campuses all over the country (Altbach and Cohen 1990). In July 1986, the University of California Board of Regents "voted to sell all $3.1 million of its stock in companies that do business in South Africa" (Weiner 1986, 337). Students at UC Berkeley were active in the divestment movement, fiercely resisting police attacks as they protested with two dozen shanties built to evoke the conditions of apartheid South Africa. Eventually the city council voted to stop sending police, and over ten thousand students joined a one-day strike protesting the arrest of 158 divestment activists (Altbach and Cohen 1990, 40). By 1986, 120 college campuses totally or partially divested, including Duke University, which voted for complete divestment in part due to the history of the civil rights movement in the South. One professor who helped draft the divestment proposal argued that "university actions should be based on the conduct of the South African government and not the behavior of the corporations themselves," and a trustee agreed that total (as opposed to selective) divestment "makes clear what we actually desire—a real change in the government system in South Africa" (Weiner 1986, 338).

The debate over total (unqualified) and selective (qualified) divestment in South Africa is mirrored in the debate over what Lerner (2012) calls BDS1 and BDS2. Those advocating for unqualified divestment called for pressuring all US corporations to stop doing business in South Africa and therefore send a strong political message to the South African government in Pretoria; likewise, advocates of BDS1 argue that the Israeli economy and political system is all enmeshed in the perpetuation of the occupation, and therefore the state and economy as a whole should be targeted. In contrast, qualified divestment focused on pressuring US companies that were not "doing enough to promote fair and equal treatment of nonwhites in South Africa" (Ennis and Parkhill 1986, 31). This is similar to the BDS2 argument focusing only on those corporations engaged in promoting or enabling the Israeli occupation. Unlike the current BDS efforts against the Israeli occupation, however, where California officials have passed legislation equating criticism of Israeli government policies with anti-Semitism, several

California state legislators endorsed student protests at UCLA and UC Berkeley and "warned the university that its budget would get bottled up in Sacramento unless it divested" (Altbach and Cohen 1990, 43). Ultimately the student divestment movement against apartheid South Africa was successful not due to its economic impact on South Africa, however, but because it "helped transform public opinion sufficiently so that even President Reagan had been forced to modify his position" (Altbach and Cohen 1990, 46).

This symbolic, educational impact is perhaps the more threatening aspect of bills such as that passed by the ASUC in 2010. Students at UC San Diego, for example, spent four years trying to pass a divestment resolution before they passed one in March 2013. Regardless, SJP members on campus emphasized that "despite the fact that divestment had failed in the past, the introduction of resolutions over the years, combined with coalition building, educated people on campus about the issue" (Kane 2013c). The controversial and highly publicized divestment debate at UC Berkeley in 2010, although divestment was ultimately vetoed, helped set the stage for the passage of divestment bills at UC Berkeley, UC San Diego, UC Riverside, and UC Irvine in the 2012–2013 academic year. The changing tone of debate on Israel/Palestine on college campuses, combined with "an increasingly impossible situation" for youth due to skyrocketing tuition prices and high rates of youth unemployment, have meant that student protests are of increasing concern to California state officials (Carter 2012). Government officials have not only passed legislation to limit free speech but also sent paramilitary police squads to stop student protests, and UC Davis students protesting tuition hikes "were pepper sprayed by police in cold blood" (Carter 2012).

The 2010 Berkeley Student Government Motion to Divest

In the Spring 2010, a small group of students from SJP presented a piece of student legislation to the ASUC asking to divest student funds from two US companies engaged in selling arms manufactures to Israel. The bill was passed with an initial vote of sixteen senators supporting and four opposed (Student Supporting 1 2010). This decision was overturned at the last possible minute by the president of the ASUC, Will Smelko. In explaining his decision to veto, Smelko acknowledged that the bill did not target Israel broadly, noting that it called for divestment "from two companies materially supporting the Israeli government and the occupation of Palestinian territories," but emphasized that meaningful

divestment strategies are not built in "one week's time" and that more time was needed to analyze the ramifications of the decision (Smelko 2010). Although Smelko was concerned about the "haste" with which this bill was passed, the issue of divestment was not new to UC Berkeley. The idea for divestment from companies doing business in Israel had been "floating around" in SJP since 2000 (Student Supporter 4 2010), and Palestinian BDS activist Omar Barghouti had visited the campus several times, including in March 2010, which SJP members and student supporters suggested was an inspiration to the bill's authors (Student Supporter 1 2010; Student Supporter 2 2010; Student Supporter 3 2010; Student Supporter 4 2010). The students' connection to Barghouti (and consequently to the Palestinian BDS National Committee, or BNC), helped UC Berkeley activists spread the word about the presidential veto and subsequent hearings to a wide network of concerned activists and BDS supporters (Student Supporter 4 2010).

It was not until after the president's veto, when the ASUC held several open hearings to allow student input into the revote on whether to over-turn the veto, that this issue attracted worldwide attention. Hundreds of activists for and against the bill—students, professors, local community activists, and government officials—gathered over the course of three separate hearings of six to nine hours despite the fact the hearings were in the middle of the exam period. One of these debates drew over four hundred attendees and lasted all night (Bidwell and Myers 2010). The first two debates involved primarily Jewish speakers on either side of the issue, which some characterized as the Jewish community having "a forum to debate their identity vis-à-vis the state of Israel" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010; Student Supporter 1 2010). The third night of debates focused on the Palestinian and Arab narrative, including the airing of a video of interviews with current students living in Palestine (Student Supporter 4 2010). In the course of the hearings, major news outlets including *Democracy Now!* began to cover the events at UC Berkeley (Hamilton 2010). Thousands of letters of support for each side, including letters from Nobel Laureates, raised the stakes and internationalized the discourse surrounding the campus debates (Ebadi et al. 2010; Hoffman et al. 2010). Groups opposed to divestment used Facebook ads and paid for a full-page ad in *The Daily Californian*, the UC Berkeley student newspaper (Senator Supporter 3 2010). In addition to these open and public forums, student senators were also invited to a closed-door meeting with Akiva Tor, the Consul General of Israel for the Pacific Northwest (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010; Dann 2010). In this meeting, Tor, Professor Hanan Alexander, and several

other speakers called divestment part of a "radical agenda" and equated the bill itself with racism and hate speech (Senator Recording 2010). The existence of local, regional, and international networks for (and against) BDS is one reason why local campus debates went global so quickly. The contention surrounding conceptions of identity and rival moral frameworks for understanding concepts such as "peace" and "nonviolence" help explain the heightened level of debate, while different approaches to power and process explain why both opponents and supporters of divestment claimed success despite the veto being upheld.

Deployments of Identity and Identity-Based Fear

According to those interviewed, UC Berkeley has a history of tension between Jewish and Muslim groups on campus, with demonstrated hostility at each other's campus events. While some said, "Berkeley already had this notorious reputation for not being friendly for Jewish students" (Student Opposing 2 2010), others told stories of Palestinian students who had been physically and verbally attacked by Jews (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010; Student Supporter 1 2010). Mobilization around categories of identity was a central theme in the UC Berkeley debates, and fear-based mobilization in particular. Opponents of the divestment bill argued that it was "divisive" and that it created an atmosphere in which Jewish students felt under attack. Student governments, opponents argued, should work on bringing students together instead of fueling conflict.

Although the divestment bill that was passed by the ASUC was very specific and targeted two US companies—GE and United Technologies—that were referenced by numerous international human rights organizations as violating international human rights (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010), opponents saw the action as a threat to the existence of Israel, specifically the Jewish character of Israel due to the emphasis on the Palestinian refugee right of return emphasized in the broader BDS movement (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). In fact, much of the debate over the divestment bill dealt less with the substance of the bill itself—or the human rights records of the two companies in question—but rather focused on broader questions related to Israel's identity as a Jewish state and the relationship between Jews on campus and Israel. As one student opponent noted, if the Palestinian refugees returned, "it would destroy some of the nature or character of Israel," (Student Opposing 1 2010) and another suggested that those

who supported the bill were "totally against everything about Israel and its existence" (Student Opposing 2 2010). Several student opponents felt that the debates "singled out Jewish students . . . even if there *were* Jews that were for BDS" (Student Opposing 1 2010). Another student opponent shared that "by trying to divest from Israel it was kind of an attack on the people of Israel, not on a hostile government . . . and Jews on this campus felt like their student government was taking a stance against them . . . one girl . . . actually transferred from Berkeley [because] she was so emotionally distraught by these meetings" (Student Opposing 2 2010). Supporters of divestment, while not denying the emotions of Jewish students, pointed out, that "there's no way to quantify the amount of trauma [experienced] by students who were from Palestine and also Lebanon . . . you would have a very privileged white kid who's in a fraternity saying they don't feel safe because they saw a poster about the BDS measure on a wall standing next to someone who's literally lost a limb at a checkpoint or has lost their family in Gaza" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010).

Intra-Jewish Identity Debates

A major component of the open hearings on the divestment bill involved intra-Jewish debates over the nature of Jewish identity, particularly as it related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A Jewish student supporter of the bill remarked that "I know one of the senators who voted for divestment is Jewish and she was afraid to vote for it even though she wasn't as involved in the Jewish community as I was" (Student Supporter 2 2010). Another Jewish student reported that she was going to transfer because she felt isolated as a Near Eastern studies major in classes that were predominantly Muslim or Arab (Senator Opposing 1 2010). At the same time, "progressive Jewish students said that actually for the first time in my life, I feel safe on this campus because of this bill because it's the first time I feel like I can be out as a progressive Jew on this issue . . . the irony is progressive Jews felt incredibly unsafe in the Jewish community" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). Jewish identity became even more of a central factor in the debates because of the talking points issued by Tikvah, a Zionist pro-Israel student group on campus, which urged students to "emphasize feelings of personal attack. BE EMOTIONAL," encouraged students to assert that "an unjustified attack on Israel is an attack on my Jewish identity. It is attacking ME," and underscored that Jewish dissenters "don't represent the voice of the Jewish community. WE are the voice of the Jewish community at Cal"

(posted by anonymous 2010, emphasis in original). The same talking points urged students to avoid talking about the specifics of the bill and encouraged them to avoid a general debate on the Middle East. Consequently, debate was shifted away from the merits and limits of the bill at hand and instead focused on matters of Jewish identity.

One of the bill's supporters stated that Hillel and affiliated groups conflated the bill, which was targeted specifically at two US arms manufacturers with well-documented instances of human rights violations according to leading human rights institutions, with a cut of all commercial ties with Israel and a return to the 1930s Germany. The student suggested that this conflation occurred in part because "it was easier to mobilize people against [the bill] by labeling it as something anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic, and sort of obscure the fact that we were focusing on two American companies" (Student Supporter 4 2010). As a result of this focus, the second of the three debates was "dominated by Jewish voices" and "challenged the idea that the Jewish community is united on these issues" (Student Supporter 4 2010). Professor Judith Butler, members of JVP, and some Jewish students brave enough to resist the pressure of Hillel, spoke in favor of divestment, while Hillel, Stand With Us, Tikvah, and the Israeli Consulate spoke against divestment. Those involved in the debates pointed to a real shift in the tenor of the opposition to the bill from the first vote, when opponents argued that "you're stupid and don't know the facts" or that "Israel's the good guy and they're defending themselves" to "you're demonizing the Jewish population on campus; you're marginalizing us, you're attacking us" (Student Supporter 3 2010). Supporters of the bill pointed to their broad-based, multiethnic coalition, as well as the many Jewish supporters on their side (including one of the coauthors of the bill, who was an Israeli Jew), as evidence "that that line of attack was vehemently false and disingenuous" (Student Supporter 3 2010).

The debate over Jewish identity on campus was further illustrated in disparate views of Kesher Enoshi, a student group that partnered with SJP and the Arab Student Union. One opponent of divestment stated the Jewish Student Union was conflicted about Kesher Enoshi "because you always want to have a quote unquote united front, but you have a minority within the Jewish student union that is against it" (Student Opposing 1 2010). Another opponent called Kesher Enoshi "questionable" and suggested that they "crossed the line" and "marginalized" themselves by "siding with people that were inflicting a lot of damage and hurt on our community" (Student Opposing 2 2010). Supporters of divestment, in contrast, simply noted that Kesher Enoshi came out in support of the

resolution and that "students for progressive activism in Israel is their tagline" (Senator Supporter 1 2010). Supporters also noted that SJP had many Jewish voices, even more than Palestinian ones, challenging the attacks of "divisiveness" and allegations that if you criticize Israeli policies "you're not being a good Jew or you're not being true to yourself of you're being a traitor" (Senator Supporter 1 2010). A Jewish student senator who voted in favor of the bill "got a lot of hate mail [saying] you're a bad Jew, how could you possibly be doing this . . . you're false. How can you call yourself a Jew" (Senator Supporter 3 2010).

While debates over belonging, and tales of being marginalized at campus parties due to one's position on the divestment bill were more unique to UC Berkeley being a college campus, other intra-Jewish arguments were consistent with themes heard in other cases of BDS activism. For example, a Jewish community leader noted that "the entire BDS movement . . . at its core, is a manifestation of anti-Semitism," pointing to Natan Sharansky's "3D definition of anti-Semitism, which involves delegitimization of Israel, demonization of Israel, and double standards applied to Israel" (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). Some students asked why Israel was being targeted when other countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia were engaged in human rights abuses, arguing that the bill was in fact "a mission to delegitimize and vilify the Jewish state" (Student Opposing 2 2010) and that supporters of the bill were denying "Israel's right to defend itself" (Senator Opposing 1 2010).

In contrast, many Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of divestment repeatedly argued, "This bill is not an attack on the Jewish community. It is not anti-Semitic to criticize the Israeli government because it has committed war crimes. This is about rejecting acts of violence that violate international laws and not about denouncing a people" (Noguchi 2010). Jews speaking in favor of divestment shared how "progressive Jews everywhere are starting to question the legitimacy of Israel's policy toward the Palestinians," and that "the best thing to do for the state of Israel to make it a more legitimate state is divest in order to put pressure on them to stop their war crimes" (Student Supporting1 2010). Several Jewish supporters of divestment reframed what it meant to be "pro-Israel" and questioned opponents' deployment of "anti-Semitism." As one Jewish community leader shared, the terms "delegitimization" and "anti-Semitism" are often used to deflect criticisms of Israel, and many Jews engage in BDS activism precisely because they care about Israel and fear that the status quo is much more damaging to Israel and its existence than BDS (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). Supporters also suggested that opponents were "denying the facts on the ground

that Israel is engaged in settlement expansion and stealing peoples' land and . . . discriminat[ing] against people based on their nationality" (Student Supporter 3 2010). One Jewish supporter lamented the role of Jewish communal organizers in "deliberately making [students] feel unsafe," in particular due to the dynamics in the SJP-led coalition of divestment supporters, where "I saw time and again Jewish and Muslim students who were friends and holding hands and hugging and supporting each other. it's one of the most amazing things I've seen and those students are really the future we're trying to create" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010).

Despite the mobilization of identity-based fear, however, both supporters and opponents of divestment affirmed that their coalitions felt more united as a result of the intense mobilization. As one student opposed to the divestment bill remarked, their organization grew and strengthened due to the debates, noting that "this really brought everybody out of hiding" (Student Opposing 2 2010). In addition, supporters of divestment emphasized the broad-based, diverse coalition that they built, with 30–40 different organizations that endorsed the resolution "from all over the map," including not only SJP and the Muslim Students Association but also groups such as the Hispanic Student Engineers Society, Pacific Islanders, LBTQ Association, and the Armenian Students Association, which was unusual given their tendency to side with Jewish groups (Senator Supporter 1 2010; Senator Supporter 2 2010).

The case also indicates the power of one small act of violence—verbal or otherwise—in undermining an otherwise nonviolent effort. One opponent of the bill reported how during the first open debate someone called "you killed Jesus" into the crowd, suggesting that "if there's an environment where someone would yell that, it's not healthy for anything" (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010). Supporters of divestment, however, noted this was a single incident, committed by an outside individual, which was quickly and strongly condemned by the organizers, and not reflective of the tone of the 30 plus hours of discussions and testimony. The incident provided ammunition for those denouncing the BDS movement, however, as it contradicted the nonviolent framework articulated by those supporting divestment.

Rival Moral Frameworks: "Peace" versus "Nonviolence"

Supporters and opponents of the divestment bill viewed the divestment process through very different paradigms regarding the nature and sources of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as how concerned

individuals should best address it. These undergirding paradigms—alternatively rooted in conceptions of peace through nonviolence and human rights or peace through dialog and understanding—were evident in how individuals framed their perspectives on the divestment bill and associated events. For example, one student remarked that, in contrast the tenor of hostility usually present between groups like SJP and Tikvah, the hearings surrounding the divestment bill "fostered much more effective dialogue than any student groups have . . . for a very long time on the Berkeley campus pertaining to this issue . . . you had everyone in one room listening to each other's stories, testimonies, opinions on the matter" (Student Supporter 1 2010). An opponent of the bill disagreed, however, stating that "[the hearings] didn't open up space for anything positive . . . it was the furthest thing from dialogue" (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010).

Views on the bill were also influenced by conceptions of the nature of Israel. Opponents drew a strong link between Jewish identity and Israel as a Jewish state, and some equated the narrowly targeted divestment bill with the broader BDS movement, thereby raising the threat of Palestinian refugee return and the loss of Israel's Jewish identity. Supporters of the bill pointed to the possibility of the bill to effect real change by having a specific focus and particular action items and argued that "our student body and our school should be acting consistently with the human rights values that we claim to uphold" (Student Supporter 3 2010).

The BDS movement is framed positively by its supporters in terms of nonviolence and support for international law (particularly regarding human rights issues). Its detractors, in contrast, portray the movement in a more negative light, sometimes equating it with anti-Semitism, delegitimization of Israel, or using terminology implying violence or the threat of violence. One opponent of the bill, for example, said that "Israel's opponents have moved . . . from warfare to lawfare, and what they are trying to do is continue the war by means that are yes indeed on their surface nonviolent . . . but it's still a war against the Jewish state" (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). These rival framings are evident in the widespread debate that surrounded ASUC bill number 118, March 2010, entitled "In Support of ASUC Divestment from War Crimes" (Pessah and Huet-Vaughn 2010). The bill explicitly focused on international human rights law and referenced numerous international human rights organizations and United Nations (UN) documents in making its claim for divestment from two US companies—General Electric and United Technologies—for their corporate role in supplying Israel with

military technology and equipment used in attacks on Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. The bill's authors stated that the bill should "not be interpreted as the taking of sides in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, but instead as a principled expression of support for universal human rights and equality" (Pessah and Huet-Vaughn 2010). In his veto of the bill, the ASUC president, like the bill's authors, noted the history of UC Berkeley with regards to social justice, concern for human rights, and a critical examination of world affairs. However, he suggested that the bill failed to "strive for peace, discourse, reconciliation," in part due to the fact that it "singl[es] out Israel" and that the bill is perceived "as a symbolic attack on a specific community of our fellow students" and stokes "fears of the bill being used as a tool to delegitimize the state of Israel" (Smelko 2010). Smelko emphasized his support for human rights and ethical investment, making claim to the same values deployed by the bill's authors, but stated he preferred broad guidelines that do not target any specific country. In a rhetorical move that cast a negative light on BDS supporters by echoing the allegations of "divisiveness," Smelko suggested the ASUC should "not discriminate unfairly" and should "maintain a positive campus climate that seeks to promote peace, harmony, honesty, and academic freedom above all else" (Smelko 2010). Smelko's comments equated peace with harmony; in contrast, scholars and practitioners of nonviolence emphasize the importance at times of increasing conflict to raise awareness in a conscientization period in asymmetrical or latent conflicts (Lederach 1997, 64–65). Smelko's remarks, in keeping with the Tikvah talking points, also shifted the focus away from the substance of the bill, which deals with two US arms manufacturers, to concern for "a specific community of our fellow students" who felt under "attack," another rhetorical shift implying violence.

While the basic framing tropes are evident in a simple reading of the bill's text and its response, the extensive local, national, and international attention drawn to the debates surrounding the efforts to overturn the president's veto indicate the extent to which debates over BDS strike a chord of passion in supporters and opponents alike, in part because the debates engage with individuals' sense of identity and core values. Those emphasizing the nonviolent aspect of BDS in general and the divestment bill in particular took one of two tracks. The first focused on the principles and tactics involved in the bill itself, while the second focused on the behavior and comportment of those supporting the bill. Several senators referenced Martin Luther King, Jr, Desmond Tutu, Mohandas Gandhi, and others in explaining how BDS provides an opportunity to stand up for justice without resorting to violence. As

one student supporter noted, "Economic pressure is the only thing we have left. It's powerful and has teeth but not in a violent way, so no one gets hurt" (Senator Supporter 2 2010). Another supporter stated that "that's the best part about a BDS campaign . . . the idea is nonviolence in response to violence" (Senator Supporter 3 2010), while still another emphasized that they were involved in the issue precisely because "it's very conscientious . . . I don't want my tuition money to go [to arm the Israeli army and build settlements]" (Student Supporting 2 2010). Student supporters of the bill not only focused on the unarmed tactics of BDS and their desire to end physical violence but also emphasized the need to address structural violence that violates human rights and can contribute to future physical violence (Student Supporter 1 2010; Senator Supporter 1 2010). As one student noted, "the political solution only starts the process, and the goal of the process is to reach a healthy, functioning, growing society that is not riddled by socioeconomic problems stemming from political misdeeds" (Student Supporter 2 2010).

National and international supporters of the divestment bill, including Nobel Prize laureates, advocated for the nonviolent nature of BDS campaigns (Ebadi et al. 2010). Naomi Klein, for instance, wrote a letter affirming that the divestment bill helps "to build a grassroots, nonviolent movement to end Israel's violations of international law" (Klein 2010), while in a speech made during the course of the open forums on the bill UC Berkeley professor Judith Butler insisted on the nonviolent nature of divestment as a tactic. She noted, as did Klein, that opponents would accuse supporters of hatred, but went on to argue that "the point is not to enter that cycle of threat and fear and hatred—that is the hellish cycle of war itself. The point is to leave the discourse of war and affirm what is right . . . [and make] a step toward the realization of peace—the principles of nonviolence and cohabitation that alone can serve as the foundation of peace" (Butler 2010).

Indeed, as many of the student senators interviewed stated, "the way students rallied in support of this bill, it did put a lot of nonviolent theory into practice—just with the way they behaved and the way they encouraged their supporters to behave" (Senator Supporter 1 2010; Senator Supporter 2 2010; Student Supporter 4 2010). Student supporters also emphasized the limited nature of the bill and its specific emphasis on human rights violations, stressing that it was not a blanket targeting of Israel, but rather a targeting of actions that were anti-peace: "We're not talking about withdrawing aid for education; we're not talking about withdrawing money for any of that. We're talking about money for arms, money for weapons, money for things that kill people.

And those weapons...are not going to help little Israeli children bond with their neighbors" (Senator Supporter 3 2010).

While those opposed to the divestment bill did not dispute the unarmed nature of BDS, they were quick to note that "the tactics chosen alone don't dictate nonviolence." Furthermore, this same respondent suggested that the BDS movement was not necessarily the "heir to Nelson Mandela,...Gandhi, and MLK," thereby planting doubt regarding the nonviolent credentials of the BDS movement (Community Leader Opposing 3 2010). However, this particular respondent overlooks the diversity of approaches to nonviolent resistance, as well as the fact that all three men were reviled by some of their contemporaries and spent time in jail for their efforts. In addition, other opponents of divestment argued that in fact the goals and objectives of BDS are not consistent with nonviolence, suggesting that BDS activists "are still promoting perpetual hostility against Israel," and that even though "it is nonviolent in that they don't use rockets and missiles and suicide bombs, yes, but it's...a war under a different method" (Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). Specifically, some opponents of BDS viewed the campaign as a war against Israel's existence, aiming to end of the Jewish state of Israel (Bernstein 2010; Community Leader Opposing 1 2010; Community Leader Opposing 2 2010). As one anti-divestment activist noted, "'nonviolence' and 'peace' are not synonymous. BDS supporters may be using 'nonviolent' tactics but they are not advocating for a peaceful two state resolution[1] that recognizes the legitimate rights of both parties" (Bernstein 2010).

However, statements such as these conflated the action of the UC Berkeley student government, which was seeking to pass a bill narrowly targeting two US arms manufacturers (a form of BDS2) with the three pillars of the BDS movement (BDS1). It further conflated BDS activism with a call for a one-state solution, which is not an official platform of the rights-based BDS movement. One student articulated that his opposition to the bill was the result of a fear that supporters of BDS "wanted to see Israel be defined not as a Jewish state but a bi-national state with Jews and Arabs...I feel like one of the most important characteristics of Israel is that it is a Jewish state and the biblical homeland of the Jewish people" (Student Opposing 1 2010). Furthermore, while divestment opponents talked about "dialog" and listening to both parties, the arguments against divestment focused narrowly on the emotions and feelings of Jewish students on campus to the neglect of those Palestinian and Lebanese students whose lives had been directly affected by the weapons produced by the two US companies in question in the 2006 war with

Lebanon and the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead. Opponents calling the bill a one-sided attack on Israel also overlooked the bill's statement that "just as the ASUC condemns Israel's war crimes it condemns the rocket attacks on civilians by Hamas...while noting the key distinction that the university already does not and may not under US law hold investments which directly support the Palestinian militant group" (Pessah and Huet-Vaughn 2010). A number of opponents questioned why other states like China, Iran, and Sudan were not being targeted, and Smelko's veto also criticized the bill for narrowly focusing on Israel rather than broadly on human rights abuses in general.

Supporters noted, however, that not only does the US government have limits on what can be invested in some of the countries in question, but that the divestment bill was the result of "years of research on the University of Cal investments and years of research on the UN and their respective accountability agencies" and that "this bill did really incredible things including creating a human rights task force which looked at the UC and ASUC investments" (Senator Supporter 3 2010). Another supporter of the divestment bill noted that "there are a lot of other moral issues that I think are also of great concern...but sometimes the solution is more complicated...[this act of aggressive theft of land] seems like something that most people agree is pretty awful and that's what I saw when I was there" (Student Supporter 3 2010).

The divergent views on the divestment bill stemmed in part from different conceptions regarding the source of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In response to an opponent's suggestion that the divestment debate "was the furthest thing from dialog" (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010), a divestment supporter countered that "the point isn't lack of acquaintance [between Palestinians and Israelis], and the point isn't stereotypes. The point is interests and...there are strong interests which are profiting from this. We need a strong counterweight, and BDS is a strong counterweight...[In South Africa] it wasn't enough for people to dialogue between whites and blacks" (Student Supporter 4 2010). The first statement reflects a traditional conflict resolution orientation rooted in assumptions of symmetrical parties and a problem of communication or misunderstanding, with solutions that seeks to ameliorate conflict but otherwise preserve the status quo. In contrast, the second reflects a more revolutionary nonviolence approach that assumes power asymmetry and seeks social change. A student supporter criticized the conventional approach to peace, commenting that "the Israeli peace process relegates Palestinians to the sidelines of history and tells us to shut up and lie down for the bulldozers to run over us...Palestinians

don't just want peace, they want a just peace, a peace that recognizes that they are equal to Israelis and Jews. This is what divestment strives to achieve" (Student Supporter 1 2010). The bill's opponents operated under different guiding assumptions, emphasizing that "[BDS is] not a message that promotes peace and promotes compromise and promotes understanding" (Student Opposing 2 2010); however, divestment supporters emphasized that the issue was not about understanding, but about injustice, and that Palestinians should not compromise on their human rights. As an example, one supporter pointed to the limitations of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, saying "it was insufficient . . . it was designed in some ways to help forget and put to rest the unspeakable horrors that had taken place . . . there was a denial of accountability" (Student Supporter 2 2010). A Jewish supporter argued that "I just have a moral obligation—my grandparents lived through the Holocaust—I'm fighting for human rights every day; I would be remiss if I didn't vote for this bill that not only addresses the immediate concern of human rights violations going on in Israel, but also creates a task force to address other problems going on worldwide" (Senator Supporter 3 2010). Another student supporter remarked that it was precisely the focus of those promoting divestment for "a victory for all the righteous and conscience in one end over backward and sectarian forces in the other" that motivated him to join; he noted how "it was very clear to me that this group of people are founding their work and activism very squarely on human rights, on universal principles, on justice, and very keen on broadening their base to include everyone" (Student Supporter 2 2010). Regardless, opponents of the bill continued to feel that the bill "singled out Israel" and should have been written more broadly to divest from all military companies or from all human right violations (Student Opposing 1 2010; Senator Opposing 1 2010). Supporters, however, suggested that no matter what, the Zionist Jews opposed to the bill "could not give good reasons for why they were opposed to it" and suggested that "I don't think any argument [for nonviolence] would have been particularly persuasive to those folks [Zionist Jews and Hillel members]"(Student Supporter 2 2010; Student Supporter 4 2010).

Competing Approaches to Power and Process

The two sides to the divestment debate not only held different views of peace—with opponents of divestment deploying a concept of negative peace, or the absence of violence, and supporters deploying that of positive

peace, or peace with justice and human rights—but they also held differ-ent orientations to power and social change that reflected these divergent paradigms. Nonviolence theory is, at its base, about an alternative concep-tion of power, in which people remove the power of consent from oppressive regimes, or use the power of love to convert or persuade their opponent to make desired sociopolitical changes (Boulding 1990; Helvey 2004; Sharp 2005). Nonviolent resistance tends to seek fundamental system-level change and generally operates in situations of asymmetric power. Consequently, the focus and language of nonviolence is different from that used for dialog and conflict resolution, which often presumes symmetrical parties and often seeks to preserve the status quo with slight modifications to end overt con-flict. While nonviolence tends to emphasize issues of structural violence, human rights, and power distribution, conflict resolution tends to focus on attitudes, beliefs, and communication.

Those advocating the bill emphasized how divestment provided ordi-nary citizens with a power usually denied to them. One supporter noted that "we are responding . . . with the only power that we have, which is to deny arms," (Senator Supporter 2 2010), and another suggested that "[the Israeli government] won't listen to us, but stockholders of compa-nies would maybe listen to us . . . and if enough companies [listen], then maybe governments or trade will listen to them, and if there's enough of that, maybe that will start affecting the situation on the ground" (Student Supporter 2). Supporters of the bill sought to mobilize people power and to indicate broad-based support for divestment. They did this in part through coalition building, and also through making their campaign visible. Pro-divestment organizers created green stickers that supporters around the world could fill out with their names and loca-tions, and which UC Berkeley students would wear, so that they could be symbolically present in the room of the debates. A community supporter of the bill remarked, "it was the first time in my activist career . . . to be in a room full of up to seven, eight, nine hundred people where we had the vast majority clearly supporting this measure. We also twittered, and people around the world were following our twitters all night long" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). Supporters of the bill engaged in a "phenomenal" amount of organizing within student organizations in a way that "built a lot of community" (Senator Supporter 1 2010); the process created a lot of new activists in the broader community not only on campus but also with high school students expressing interest (Student Supporter 4 2010).

Student supporters of divestment relied on grassroots organizing because that was a form of power accessible to them; however, they

were up against "a very well-funded, very well-experienced, very well-oiled publicity . . . [and] political action machine represented in the Israeli Consulate . . . [and] Berkeley Hillel" (Student Supporter 2 2010). Opposition to divestment targeted positions of authority and sought to put pressure on key senators to affect their vote. Most notable was a closed-door session with Israeli Consul General Akiva Tor, several professors, and several additional outside officials, where the Consul General underscored that Israel was a "decent state" (as opposed to a "liberal" one) in keeping with John Rawls' definition[2] in contrast to its neighbors, that Israel was genuinely working for peace with the Palestinians, that Israel "will not survive in our region" without armed forces, and emphasized how Israel "made citizens out of" the Jewish refugees from Arab states. In a question and answer session, those facilitating the meeting, including UC Berkeley professor Hanan Alexander, minimized Jewish criticism of Israel, stating, "you're looking at pathology . . . a lot of Jews [at Berkeley] are radicals," some of whom define themselves "as an anti-Zionist Jew and they hate Israel" (Senator Recording 2010). Professor Alexander also emphasized the "anti-Semitic themes that are laced in [the bill]" and argued that the Civil Rights protests and antiapartheid protests that occurred on college campuses were fundamentally different; while those were for equality, this one was racially biased. The group also included a law professor who made a legal case against the bill, suggesting it claimed Palestinians had a right to a state but Jews did not (Senator Recording 2010). While the closed-door session was supposed to be hosted by "experts" who could share their stories and their firsthand knowledge, some of the students interviewed reported that it was intimidating for those on the fence.

Student organizers in support of divestment characterized their side as "students versus political operatives. We did not have the resources or capacity or authority to effectively summon student senators to a closed door meeting with representatives of a foreign government and use the mixed effect of being awed, flattered, and intimidated . . . we were lots of people who were trying to observe a room and write letters and update the website and go to class and take exams and write papers" (Student Supporter 2 2010). While JVP helped organize the pro-divestment side, particularly by connecting UC Berkeley activists with high profile, outside activists who could speak on their behalf, like Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky, and Holocaust survivor Hedy Epstein, the anti-divestment forces mobilized the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC), local rabbis, Hillel, international support (including the Israel consulate), Israel Campus Coalition, and StandWithUs, among others (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010). Students connected with the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) also reached out to area congressional offices, to have them write letters against BDS, and Jewish parents from the Bay area approached the UC Berkeley administration saying, "we're starting to rethink Berkeley because the student climate might not be for [their child]" (Senator Opposing 1 2010). Student senators reported that Tikvah received money from AIPAC to set up a website that automatically emailed all the senators with a message praising Smelko's veto. One remarked, "I can tell you this because I received thousands of these emails and a lot of emails; those from Muslims across the country and around the word . . . those were all handwritten and then we had this auto-mailing spam crap, wasting my time, flooding our inboxes every day." The student went on to note she got a lot of hate mail saying, "how can you call yourself a Jew, how can you possibly vote for this bill?" (Senator Supporter 3 2010).

Although student supporters of divestment did not have the same institutional resources and capacity as those opposed to divestment, both sides engaged experts in a process of "certification" of their argument, seeking to gain additional legitimacy through association with esteemed individuals. A pro-divestment student organizer noted their efforts to have "so many moral leaders and public intellectuals speak out in support of this" by writing op-eds in support of divestment or otherwise speaking out on the issue (Student Supporter 4 2010). Nobel prize laureates spoke out on either side of the issue. The Nobel Women Peace Laureates wrote a letter to the ASUC Senate in which they advocated that "no amount of dialogue without economic pressure can motivate Israel to change its policy of using overwhelming force against Palestinian civilians" and stated, "we reject portrayals of this action as anti-Semitic, and maintain that it does not make a choice between Palestinians and Israelis, but between universal freedom and oppression" (Ebadi et al. 2010). Six Nobel Laureates affiliated with Scholars for Peace in the Middle East expressed disparate views in two letters to the ASUC Senate. The first urged the students not to pass the resolution, which they called "one-sided and unjust." These Laureates highlighted Israel's democratic status and the fact that "its very existence has been threatened ever since its inception." The letter emphasized Palestinian rejection of peace proposals, their "campaign of pure terrorism" in the second intifada, and pointed out that "the world is full of states with abominable records on human rights, including most of Israel's neighbors" (Arrow 2010). The second letter further underscored Israel's credentials as a "liberal and democratic state" and suggested the students should seek to make "correct, not ideological and radicalized, choices" (Hoffman et al. 2010). Consistent with the themes of those

arguing against divestment, the Laureates emphasized the unfairness of singling out Israel as opposed to "any of the myriad real human rights offenders in the world." Further, they argued, "In no way can your resolution advance peace, as it is an expression of the very radicalism and historical blindness that drives the conflict and blocks reconciliation" (Hoffman et al. 2010).

These letters, along with contradictory remarks by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel, underscore the differing frameworks on peace as well as opposing paradigms for conceptualizing the causes of the conflict in the Middle East and interpreting Israeli actions. Tutu affirmed, "despite what detractors may allege, you are doing the right thing. You are doing the moral thing," and thanked students for playing a leading role in the struggle for divestment that helped end apartheid in South Africa. He further asserted that "no person should be offended by principled, morally consistent, non-violent acts to oppose" Israel's occupation and "unequal treatment of the Palestinian people." He declared that "true peace must be anchored in justice and an unwavering commitment to universal rights for all humans" and praised the students for "helping to pave that path to a just peace" (Tutu 2010). Wiesel, in contrast, denied the comparison between South Africa and Israel, affirming that "in the days of Apartheid in South Africa, divestment was appropriate and totally just. In the case of Israel, divestment would be inappropriate and totally unjust." Wiesel suggested those making such commissions are "malicious and untrue," and he urged Berkeley students "not to listen to those who preach hatred toward Israel" (Wiesel 2010). Tutu and Wiesel, along with the other Nobel Laureates, disagreed not only on the parameters of justice but also on the motivations of those seeking divestment. While supporters of the resolution saw the move as one aiming for a true peace, opponents saw it as rooted in hatred.

Supporters of divestment also appealed to international law and international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, the UN, and the Goldstone Commission's report on Operation Cast Lead to legitimize their findings and to provide documentation for the human rights violations of General Electric and United Technologies. Opponents, however, found these to be biased sources, and therefore the use of UN reports did not provide legitimation as the divestment advocates had hoped. As one opponent to the bill argued, "the UN is known to be anti-Israel. The day the flotilla happened, eight hundred people died in Sudan. The UN has over 170 condemnations of Israel . . . and the same day that happened eight hundred people died in the Sudan, and you didn't hear the UN say anything. I think that's a biased source, and

I'm not willing to listen to what the UN has to say" (Senator Opposing 1 2010). Opposition members also decried Human Rights Watch and the Goldstone Report as biased sources. This position of delegitimizing the UN and human rights organizations is part of a broader strategy used by anti-divestment groups. One of the talking points put together in an anti-divestment handbook created by the JCRC, for example, says, *Information and data from the United Nations is relied upon to support the author's resolution, however, the UN is not an objective source on the conflict* (Bernstein 2010, 13 emphasis in original). This handbook itself is an example of the organized Jewish community's dedication of time and resources to fighting BDS, and its suggested strategies explicitly advocate focusing on "people of influence on campus, including members of the administration" as well as consulting with campus professionals and lining up people of "significant influence" in the general community to issue statements (Bernstein 2010, 11).

Student organizers focused instead on broad-based coalition and on setting an example that other student governments could copy. As one divestment supporter indicated, "once you started doing this it could serve as a model for other universities. It could very easily serve as a model for universities in the UC system . . . it creates kind of a snowball" (Student Supporter 4 2010). Another student suggested, "we created a much larger credibility for divestment and nonviolent activity being able to reach something," and that students have since been consulted by other groups seeking to move beyond marches and colorful demonstrations to "build toward concrete goals," including groups in Richmond and San Francisco that passed resolutions after the flotilla that were inspired by UC Berkeley's efforts (Student Supporter 2 2010). As another supporter noted, "because we took seriously making this story a national and international story, we immediately started getting calls from other students saying we want to do the same thing . . . win or lose the actual votes, just having the debate is a huge win for us" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). By building a broad, grassroots base of support and by encouraging others to also engage in BDS work, supporters sought to offset their limited access to "official" sources of power.

Conclusion

The debate over the divestment bill at UC Berkeley illustrates the rival paradigms undergirding the narratives for and against the BDS movement. It also illustrates the opposition strategy of engaging in an object shift away from the substance of the divestment bill to a focus

on emotions, divisiveness, and concern for students feeling targeted. Public hearings and the media debates surrounding the bill rapidly moved away from the targeted focus of the bill, which looked at two US -owned companies of which UC Berkeley was a shareholder, General Electric and United Technologies, and became a much broader debate about Jewish identity and the character of Israel. Aspects of this debate involved who speaks for Israel, what is/should be Israel's identity and what threats are most pressing to Israel. While some Jewish community members felt that the status quo of Israeli occupation and militarized action against Palestinians is more threatening to Israel in the long term than BDS, other Jewish community members saw BDS as posing an existential threat to Israel as a Jewish state due to the affirmation of the right of return in the BDS Call. Both of these questions, while important for intra-Jewish debate, were not directly related to the question at hand in the UC Berkeley student senate bill, which dealt with two specific companies with documented involvement in the killing of civilians. While some of the opponents did focus on the issue of human rights abuses and called for expanding the focus to Iran, Hamas, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such calls again shifted the discourse away from what was targeted at US companies and not countries; furthermore, it overlooked the fact that the United States already has a series of sanctions placed against Iran and Hamas and thus civil society pressure in those areas is not needed as much in order to force governments to act.

Most of those interviewed (with a few exceptions) agreed that the tactics of boycott and divestment are nonviolent in themselves. The question becomes whether their goal or aim is reflective of an overall commitment to nonviolence or whether it is "war by another name." For a number of opponents, the inclusion of the right of return in the BDS Call poses an existential threat to the state of Israel as a state with a Jewish majority. While supporters of the divestment bill at UC Berkeley were not focusing on issues of Palestinian refugees and were instead focusing specifically on the actions of two companies, the link to the broader BDS networks made some self-described "pro-Israel" activists uneasy. Indeed, as one of the divestment organizers noted, the bill itself was very targeted, but "sooner or later it will turn total" because of the difficulty of doing the careful research required for targeted BDS compared with relative ease of simply not buying any Israeli products (Student Supporter 4 2010). The difficulty of distinguishing corporations profiting from the occupation from the general Israeli economy due to the general government underwriting of the occupation is one

of the reasons why other campaigns, such as Olympia BDS (discussed in chapter 5), called for a boycott of all Israeli goods. Opponents of divestment at UC Berkeley criticized the "divisiveness" of the debates, and suggested they did not promote an atmosphere of dialog. However, nonviolent theory itself suggests that in the course of a nonviolent campaign conflict, as opposed to violence, may increase since it threatens the status quo and exposes oppression, discontent, or other power asymmetries that were previously unnoticed. In contrast to mainstream conflict management approaches, which seek to reduce conflict, nonviolent activists are not afraid of conflict and even argue that constructive conflict can improve relations and lead to better outcomes for all. This different orientation to conflict and debate is reflected in the different viewpoints provided on the campus hearings regarding the divestment bill; supporters suggested that the broad exposure of the debates was itself a victory, because "the other side doesn't want anyone to even talk about it. They want it to go away. And for us what's toxic to this movement is silence" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010).

Proponents and opponents differed in their approaches to power. Opponents of the bill in the Jewish community on and off campus focused their efforts on the power hierarchy, targeting the president of the ASUC, the president of the University, and parents of upcoming seniors who may be considering the university in the future. In contrast, supporters of the divestment bill were more focused on the grassroots, on the campus community, on networks within the broader Bay Area, such as the dockworkers who later on refused to unload an Israeli ship. Supporters of the bill repeatedly emphasized that BDS was one of the small steps they could take due to their lack of power in the conventional sense, and they reached out to those with positional power or influence (like Nobel Prize Laureates, like Desmond Tutu, and others) to try to strengthen their cause. In addition, by reaching out to a broad coalition of minority groups on campus, seeking to engage Muslims and Jews, Latinos and African-Americans, the supporters of divestment sought to build a force for change in the name of justice. This coalition building across ethnic and other lines of division parallels the strategies used by UC Berkeley students during the antiapartheid era (Activist from Berkeley 2011).

Anti-divestment Jewish groups on campus, like Tikvah Students for Israel, also created networks of support by joining forces with Evangelical Christians, orthodox Jewish students, and the Berkeley College Republicans in a call for ending divisive debates and ensuring that Jewish students feel safe and not marginalized on campus. These

two rival coalitions of students used very different language to discuss the issues at hand and to frame the debate, with supporters emphasizing the human rights abuses of the occupation and the US corporations supplying weapons, and opponents focusing on dialog, Israel's democracy and "peace." Regardless, the power of BDS was clearly indicated in the size of the crowds attending the debates and their willingness to endure all night sessions, as well as the extent of involvement of the Israeli Consul for the Northwest. As a community supporter of the divestment effort put it, "we're movement oriented . . . it was about people and votes and we always won the majority. Groups like AIPAC are power politics oriented . . . they got to the president who vetoed it and it lost on a technicality . . . they make change through the power connections" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010).

Although the effort to defeat the veto fell short by a one vote margin with a 13–5-1 vote, supporters of divestment claimed success due to the impact of the debates on the local, national, and international community. Since the UC Berkeley divestment case held the spotlight, numerous other college campuses around the United States have initiated divestment votes and other local BDS campaigns of their own, including Evergreen University, where Rachel Corrie was a student, University of Massachusetts-Boston's student government voting to divest from Boeing (Barrows-Friedman 2012b), and the student government at Arizona State University voting to "divest from and blacklist companies that continue to provide the [Israeli army] with weapons and militarized equipment or are complicit with the genocidal regime in Darfur" (Barrows-Friedman 2012a). In the 2012–2013 academic year, several California universities debated divestment measures. While the resolution to divest from companies profiting from the Israeli occupation failed to pass at Stanford, despite two years of organizing efforts, student governments at UC Irvine, UC Riverside, and UC San Diego all passed divestment bills, as did UC Berkeley (Kane 2013a, 2013c). The passage of a divestment bill at UC Berkeley, three years after the earlier bill's veto, illustrates the power of student organizing and a shift in the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict occurring in the United States and on college campuses. After the 2010 veto, AIPAC vowed to "take over" the Berkeley student government (Nathan-Kazis 2010), and AIPAC "has been currying favor with [the] student government by offering ASUC officials free trips to Washington, DC" (Bhatti 2013).

In 2013, as in 2010, both Muslims and Jews stood on the side of divestment, and they focused on the human rights violations of corporations like Caterpillar, Hewlett-Packard, and Cement Roadstone Holdings

that "provide equipment, materials, and technology to the Israeli military" (Gordon and Chen 2013). Opponents of the bill, as occurred in the 2012 debates over divestment at the Presbyterian Church (USA) General Assembly, offered up an alternative bill, SB 158, that "seeks investment opportunities that strengthen Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in pursuit of a two-state solution to the conflict." Opponents suggested that "divestment does nothing to better the lives of the Palestinians" and argued that it is one-sided against the Jewish state and a two-state solution (Gordon and Chen 2013). As in 2010, divestment opponents, like the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, put pressure on the ASUC president, Connor Landgraf, to veto the resolution. The JCRC put out a letter calling on all of its constituents to write to Connor Landgraf and provided a form letter that alleged the "one-sided and biased bill . . . is already being co-opted by the international BDS movement, whose sole aim is to delegitimize the state of Israel" (Weiss 2013). While Landgraf ultimately decided not to veto the bill, he asserted, "I firmly reject its one-sided narrative, and the bill's utter failure to create any constructive discussion or dialogue on a complex and multifaceted issue. This bill has served to do nothing more than divide our campus, foster anger, and encourage divisiveness" (Robbins and Horowitz 2013). At the same time, Landgraf clearly stated that SB 160 "is not linked to the international Boycott Divestment Sanctions movement" and justified his decision by explaining that "a veto of this bill would only serve to prolong this campus conflict" (Robbins and Horowitz 2013). Landgraf's statement, including his endorsement of SB 158 for positive investment and his emphasis on "dialog" rather than "divisiveness" reiterates the themes of the 2010 debates and reflects the rival frameworks of conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance undergirding the two sides of the debates.

The case of UC Berkeley's divestment bill raises a few additional issues related to the context specificity of BDS campaigns. Dynamics unique to college campuses influenced the course of debate and the repercussions of the vote. As one senator noted, there was a lot of "pettiness" that occurred among senators during the course of the debates, explaining,

> We're setting up a meeting, you put your backpack down, save your spot, sit every other seat, and then one of the super Zionist senators comes and moves a backpack and sits in that spot so that the abstainer, Minji, would [have opponents] sit next to her, basically on either side, so that she couldn't talk to any of us. Then, we would try to squeeze a chair in,

and it dissolved really quickly to a sort of a childish petty fight over the front seat. (Senator Supporter 2 2010)

Students shared about the importance of peer pressure, speculating that one of the students who switched her votes did so due to her friendship with two of the main opposition senators. One noted that "a lot of my closest friends . . . even some of the people who lived in my house were really hostile toward me. It's hard to deal with when you're twenty years old" (Senator Supporter 2 2010). A leading opponent of the bill reiterated the fact that "as open minded as students are, they are still very closed minded in a way and there are issues of friends and how they thought they should be treated; again, they're college students and we can't forget that when we're looking at this." He went on to state that students, including ASUC president Will Smelko, "talk to their parents and some of their politics are based on their parents' politics. They ask their parents, what do you think I should do? And some of that is not necessarily informed" (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010).

While peer pressure, concerns about popularity and the stress of needing to pass exams while engaging in contentious all-night debates are unique to college campuses, the case of Berkeley also illustrates the impact of a small group of organized individuals and the impact they can have on mobilizing international attention, frightening the pro-Israel forces into anti-divestment mobilization, and contributing to a restrictive bill passed by the California state legislature against "anti-Israel" organizing on college campuses. The case also illustrates that the main goal of the BDS movement on college campuses is not necessarily to have a direct economic impact, although that is ultimately an objective, but rather to open space for debate and education on the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to provide an alternative perspective to that heard in the mainstream US media and in the US political discourse. Students at UC Berkeley and elsewhere have claimed success in terms of "the level of organizing, the level of dialogue, and the level of media attention that this issue started receiving" (Senator Supporter 1 2010), and students at UC San Diego noted that although the resolution is symbolic, "divestment has the potential to spark a conversation about Palestine on campus and inspire other student groups to resolve to divest as well" (Kane 2013c). Thus, even though the UC Chancellor underscored that the ASUC vote "will not change investment policy established by the Regents of the University of California," and asserted that "targeting a single nation or state in this highly complex world is not appropriate and does little to advance the cause of peace and

coexistence" (Birgeneau 2013), the power of grassroots student activism, strengthened by informal links between SJP groups across the country (via conferences, listservs, and other tools), was evident. This power is illustrated not only in the growing number of college campuses involved in divestment efforts, but the perceived threat is indicated by the observed need of the California State Legislature to combat "campus anti-Semitism" with examples cited including Israel Apartheid Week activities and student divestment efforts (California State Legislature 2012). More importantly, the power of campus activism opens space for new discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that challenge the "echo chamber whereby a network of partisan, Israel-aligned organizations and activists repeat the same claims, often unchallenged, before official bodies that simply take their word as truth" (Robbins and Taylor 2012).

The Olympia Food Co-op Boycott: Brokerage, Networks, and Local Culture

Introduction

Board members from the Olympia Food Co-op (OFC) in Washington state voted on July 15, 2010 to boycott Israeli-made products in their two grocery stores, and with that action became the first US grocery store to deshelve Israeli goods (OFC 2010b). Although the co-op is a small store in a small city, and only nine products were deshelved, the boycott hit the international airwaves, spurred conversations in the Israeli Knesset, and even led to a lawsuit against the board members (Abunimah 2011a; Silverstein 2012). The worldwide response that this case received, which far exceeded the scale of the OFC's action, raises the question, why did this boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign cause so much controversy and generate so much attention? The controversy is particularly interesting given that this small BDS "success" was seen by both local and international opponents simultaneously as a threat with larger intentions, and a "failure" at impacting the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rival interpretations of the case's "success" or "failure" reflect different paradigms toward peace and conflict resolution that impact how actors envision "peace" and how to reach it. Boycott supporters point to the rights-based approach of the 2005 Palestinian civil society call for BDS aimed at ending the Israeli occupation and highlight the time-tested credentials of boycott as a nonviolent tactic used in movements for justice and equality. Opponents highlight the confrontational nature of the boycott effort and challenge the co-op board's decision-making process. These two positions reflect broader debates in the field regarding the relationship between "peace"

and "justice," most commonly seen in the wake of violent conflict when considering appropriate measures for transitional justice (Albin 2009). Contending approaches to the boycott effort also implicated actors' identities: as "progressives," as Jews, and as co-op members. The case of the OFC boycott illustrates that tensions between these theoretical paradigms of conflict resolution are not simply abstract or academic debates, but have practical, real-world ramifications, even in small, "progressive" communities far from situations of violent conflict. Local, regional, and international politics and identities intersected in the case of the Olympia Co-op board's decision to deshelve Israeli goods, indicating that in an increasingly globalized world transnational activism is a powerful force.

The Background of the Boycott Effort

The OFC is a member-owned institution that "strive[s] to make human effects on the earth and its inhabitants positive and renewing and to encourage economic and social justice" (OFC 2010b). As part of this mission, the co-op established a boycott policy in 1993 for ensuring its inventory is in line with its stated values (OFC 1993). As of March 2009, when several co-op members submitted requests to boycott Israeli products (IJVC 2011; PeaceWorks 2011; SPSC 2010), the co-op already had boycotts in place on Chinese goods, whaling, and Coca-Cola; the co-op also boycotted South Africa during the apartheid era. As per co-op procedure, the boycott proposal was presented to the co-op staff, and when the staff failed to reach consensus on the issue, the merchandising team turned it over to the board of directors, who discussed the matter at the May 2010 board meeting. The staff was requested once again to give feedback, but working group meetings failed to reach agreement. Those opposed to the boycott claim that the boycott proposal should have stopped there; that the proposal failed due to lack of staff consensus (Olympia Power & Light 2010). However, in July 2010, the OFC board voted to implement the boycott themselves and called for a member forum to discuss the boycott further, a procedure that had never happened before at the co-op (OFC 2010a).

The effort to deshelve Israeli goods from the OFC was marshaled by the Olympia BDS group (OlyBDS), a self-described "grassroots network of community members in Olympia, WA, joining in the call by Palestinian civil society for a nonviolent, global movement of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) of Israel, until it meets the requirements of human rights and international law" (Olympia BDS n.d.). Many of the

activists involved in organizing the boycott at the OFC were long-time activists, engaged in a number of causes besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Social movement theorists have long suggested that "movements depend intimately on the social networks in which their participants are already embedded . . . that movements operate within frames set by a historical accumulation of shared understandings" (Tilly 1998b, 455–56). While Olympia activists initiated the boycott proposal in part due to the BDS Call, their action was also the result of an "accumulation of shared understandings" based on prior activism in the city as well the influence of local institutions like the Rachel Corrie Foundation and Evergreen College.

Since 2003, Olympia, Washington has had a particular affinity for activism in support of Palestinian freedom and self-determination. It is the hometown of Rachel Corrie, a 23-year-old International Solidarity Movement (ISM) activist and Evergreen College student killed by an Israeli bulldozer while trying to prevent the demolition of a Palestinian house in Rafah City, Gaza Strip (Mozgovaya 2010). Rachel's parents founded the Rachel Corrie Foundation to honor their child posthumously and dedicate much time and energy advocating for peace and justice, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, working with local and global communities to support "grassroots efforts in pursuit of human rights and social, economic, and environmental justice, which we view as prerequisites for world peace"(Corrie and Corrie n.d.). In 2010, the Corrie Foundation decided to support the 2005 BDS Call, asserting that the international community had thus far been unable and/or unwilling "to secure freedom, equality, self-determination and security for all in Israel/Palestine" and that it was thus important for global civil society to work with Palestinians and Israelis to "build support for justice and equality for all in Israel/Palestine" (RCF n.d.b). Although the Corrie Foundation was not involved in organizing or implementing the boycott, the Foundation's work has impacted the local community, and several of the activists involved in OlyBDS have past or present connections to the foundation. The activism of students at Evergreen College, a state institution with about 4,500 students, has also shaped the community. As one activist noted, "Evergreen thinks of itself as the radical fringe, the leading edge of activism in Olympia . . . but a lot of Evergreen graduates have moved into Olympia and are important parts of the activist community here (Olympia Activist 1 2011). In June 2010, the student body at Evergreen passed two resolutions, one calling on the Evergreen State College Foundation to create a socially responsible investment policy and to divest from companies profiting from Israel's occupation.

The second resolution called for the college to be a "CAT-free Campus" by refraining from using Caterpillar equipment anywhere on the premises "until Caterpillar, Inc. ends its complicity in human rights violations." Both resolutions were passed by over 70 percent of the student body, and were later unanimously supported by the Geoduck Student Union (TESCDivest 2010). No action has been taken at the university level, however, and when the student-run Flaming Eggplant Café announced it was signing on to the BDS movement in June 2012, the administration promptly issued a response indicating that "the Flaming Eggplant does not have the authority to participate in a boycott of Israeli goods. The Flaming Eggplant must follow college policy and the college is not endorsing nor participating in such a boycott" (Wettstein 2012).

The decision to launch a boycott campaign at the OFC was inspired by a mix of local and international factors. Organizers referenced the 2005 BDS Call and the importance of following the lead of Palestinian activists on the ground, and also the commitment of the OFC to social justice and progressive values. The boycott campaign was also influenced by a number of previous activist efforts that shaped organizers' tactics and strategies. For example, in 2003 a group of activists tried to make Rafah and Olympia official "sister cities" through Sister Cities International (Lyons 2007). Even though the application met all the requirements of City Hall and Sister Cities International, and the majority of the 300 residents in attendance supported the proposal, in April 2007 Olympia city council voted it down 4–2 because the city was in the Gaza Strip rather than in Israel. After four years of public organizing without any real opposition, in the final month of the campaign, opponents claimed the proposal was "divisive" but did not provide substantive arguments against the proposal itself (Lyons 2007). From this unexpected failure, Palestinian solidarity activists became wary of long public campaigns and learned of the importance of developing a collective identity linked to the movement objective (Olympia Activist 3 2011; Tilly 1998b, 455–56). A second influential episode in Olympia was the 2007 Port Militarization Resistance (PMR), where activists against the Iraq war blocked army vehicles from accessing the port for 17 days (Olympia Activist 4 2011). While the action was ultimately successful in preventing large striker brigades from using Olympia's port, it was an incredibly draining form of activism that resulted in years of court battles for many involved parties, and the discovery of a spy planted among the activists instilled a sense of caution in local organizers (Olympia Activist 4 2011). This historical context, combined with the socially conscious identity of Olympia residents influenced the

"shared understandings" of local activists leading up to the boycott. As one OlyBDS organizer noted, after the Sister City project and PMR, they were looking "for a different way to try doing activism" (Olympia Activist 1 2011).

Identity in Action: Bounding Communal Identities

At the heart of international debates over the BDS movement are debates over the identity of Palestinians and the identity of Israelis, including debates over who constitutes the Palestinian people and contention regarding the self-definition of Israel as a Jewish state and home to Jews everywhere in the world. These debates did not originate with the BDS movement—Israel's lack of a constitution reflects internal debates over the nature of its identity—but contention surrounding the BDS movement has accentuated these tensions. The three pillars of the BDS Call, for example, "clearly demonstrate the desire of the Palestinian people to be viewed as one community, albeit affected differently by the Israeli regime" (Jamjoum 2011, 140). Identity also plays a role in local debates surrounding BDS, however, and identity categories played a critical role in the extensive debates that erupted in the wake of the board's decision to boycott Israeli goods. OlyBDS organizers sought intentionally to mobilize particular facets of co-op members' identities as well as those of other members of the Olympia community in preparation for the board's vote and in the aftermath of its decision. OlyBDS activists purposefully acted as brokers, seeking to make linkages between individuals' and groups' "progressive" identities working for a variety of social justice causes and the rationale of the boycott campaign. Such work was not only educational, but also helped build a movement in support of the OFC boycott; as discussed more later, this coordinating work illustrates how "boundary work can be deliberate and strategic" and "subject to ongoing negotiation and struggle" (Fuller 2003, 4). BDS organizers intentionally sought to engage with the multiple, overlapping identities of members of the Olympia community; organizers sought to redraw boundaries so that progressive activists viewed themselves and their causes on the same "side" as the boycott campaign (Tilly 1998a, 62). In this process of actively linking groups together, OlyBDS activist were seeking to build movement allies by engaging with "the complex construction of an individual's location in the community and her ties with others" (Roy 1994, 3). For example, BDS organizers linked environmental groups with the boycott campaign by informing them about Israel's "green-washing" tactics, whereby organizations such as

the Jewish National Fund (JNF) highlight the environmental benefits of their work, such as planting forests, while silencing the social consequences of their efforts to displace Palestinians in order to build those very parks (Olympia Activist 3 2011). Although a number of different identities were deployed during the course of the contention surrounding the OFC board's decision, two particular identity clusters were especially important. Opponents of the decision sought to portray the decision as the work of "outsiders," while on the other hand a number of OFC members felt they had been excluded from the process despite their participation in the OFC community. As in the other cases studied in this book, Jewish identity was particularly salient in the debates as well, and discussions over Jewish identity, Jewish fears, and the relationship between Jews and Israel played an important role.

Scholars have long pointed to the connections between identity, organizations, and action. As Ringmar notes, people act "not in defense of [their] interests, but in defense of [their] identity" (Ringmar 1996, 4). Individuals belong to groups in part to further amplify their identities and also identify themselves in part from group membership. Consequently, some argue that "organizational boundaries should…achieve *coherence between the identity of the organization and its activities*" (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005, 500, emphasis in original). As Shotter (1993, 4) argues, "talk that undermines the boundaries between our categories of things in the world, undermines 'us', the stability of the kind of beings we take ourselves to be and the shape of the desires, impulses, and urges we have; thus such talk is dangerous." While the broader campaign against BDS sees the threat explicitly in terms of Israel's identity as a Jewish state, the "danger" felt from the OFC board's decision was expressed in terms closer to home. Some felt that the board's action was not consistent with the OFC's identity, either because of how the process was carried out (questioning whether it fit the democratic, participatory identity of the Co-op) or because the decision itself somehow made them feel excluded from an organization that they identified with.

Defining the "Outsider"

As has occurred in other BDS campaigns, contention surrounding the boycott extended beyond those immediately affected (i.e., OFC members) to other groups and individuals concerned with the debates at hand. StandWithUs (SWU), a self-described pro-Israel advocacy

group that also actively opposed the Berkeley Student government resolution to divest from GE and United Technologies, arrived in Olympia from California with a campaign to overturn the boycott. A main message of SWU's campaign was that the boycott campaign was orchestrated by "outside agitators," and not by those who shared the identity of other Olympians. As a result, OlyBDS activists organized a series of educational events not only to educate the Olympia community about the reasons for the boycott but also to emphasize their identities as individuals integral not only to the community of the OFC but also to the city as a whole. As one boycott organizer shared,

> I was cashier at the Co-op for years, so everyone who had anything to do with the Co-op knew my face, and a lot of us were those kinds of folks in the community and so we'd be up on stage [at an educational event] and people would say "oh I know these people." So then when they read the pamphlets handed to them by a stranger [from SWU] that said "this is a group of outside agitators," they knew that wasn't true. (Olympia Activist 3 2011)

The complexity of the debates surrounding the boycott was emphasized by some local opponents to the boycott measure who also opposed the involvement of SWU because, in part, they did not understand the "Olympia dynamic." Here, identity as an "Olympian" seemed to hold more weight than a particular position on the issue at hand, in part due to the way broader identity boundaries were configured. As a member of the organized Jewish community noted, "I was not interested in having outside groups come in here. *They* were interested in coming" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). For this boycott opponent, the issue was related to a sense of belonging, an identity concern; he opined that "there were some real problems there . . . [particularly] the lack of [the board's] engagement with the membership over this issue"(Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). For their part, boycott activists sought to connect the boycott campaign to the explicitly stated values of the OFC. As one explained, that "if you look at [the Olympia Food Co-op's] mission statement, one of the components is social and economic justice . . . and so . . . it seemed like an obvious clear first target locally" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Boycott organizers pointed to other boycott efforts undertaken by the Co-op, such as boycotts of products made in China and Coca-Cola products (OFC 2010b). Not all agreed with this perspective, however, and for

many in Olympia's Jewish community, this was an act of exclusion from communal boundaries. Suddenly an

> institution that you supported and felt a part of doesn't include you to some degree, and that was . . . [the] feeling within the organized Jewish community . . . Jews live as a minority everywhere, . . . [which is] sometimes not the most comfortable [position] and . . . here's another instance in which we're reminded of [our minority status] and feeling excluded from an institution or a part of the community we originally felt a part of. (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011)

This feeling of exclusion from the board's decision to boycott Israeli goods, even as he also decried StandWithUs's involvement in the opposition to the boycott measure, illustrates that "identity formation cannot be simply explained by the salience of a group designation" (Huddy 2001, 130), but that identity is locally negotiated, resulting from patterns of social ties and the alignment of a number of "sites of difference" (Abbott 1995, 863). As is evident in the divides within the Jewish community, identity consists of much more than ascribed membership categories (Huddy 2001, 142).

Identity and Fear

Fear was triggered in activists and community members on both sides of the boycott issue in the aftermath of the board's decision. One interview subject noted how when he came out in support of BDS at the OFC community forum, he was "sad or scared that it might mean I lose my friends and connections [in the Jewish community]" (Olympia Activist 1 2011). His friends made comments like "I just don't think these people realize how much it means to boycott a country," even though, as the activist noted, "we boycotted China and Chinese products in our co-op." However, as the activist remarked, that boycott was not nearly as controversial (Olympia Activist 1 2011). The emotional nature of identity, as well as the fact that "what something means *to us* is not a matter of how something is inserted into the dictionary's context of words, but instead a matter of how something is inserted into the context of our lives" (Ringmar 1996, 69–70), helps explain why some OFC members responded negatively to the boycott, while others applauded it.

One explanation provided for the strong reaction against the boycott was that the topic of Israel is "very deeply emotional both personally

for individuals, but also for the sense of Jewish community . . . because it's a very emotional issue for people in terms . . . of Jewish history" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Although Olympia BDS explicitly rejected the idea "that Jewish identity necessitates unconditional support for the government of Israel and for its human rights abuses" (Olympia BDS n.d.), Olympia's Jewish community felt the issue was more nuanced than simply supporting Israel's human rights abuses or not. While this statement resonated for Jewish activists already supportive of boycott as a tactic, other Olympia Jews were not convinced, in part because "both identity and ideology-making draw deeply at the well of community memories, those shared histories constructed through storytelling that serve to define memberships within groups and relations among them, and that bound the formulation of protest" (Roy 1994, 3). Different degrees of connection to the synagogue, different personal experiences of marginalization, people's personal relationship and connection to the Holocaust, and different degrees of involvement in establishment Jewish organizations focusing on the "victimhood" narrative (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011; Beinart 2012a) contribute to the "well of community memories" available for individuals to draw upon, and influence the series of metaphors people apply to themselves (Ringmar 1996, 75). For example, "most of the Jews who came out in opposition to the boycott are affiliated with the synagogue in some way, whereas many of the Jews who are in support of the boycott are not" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Collective memories and shared stories are not the exclusive purview of the Jewish community, of course; Olympia has a multitude of different "communities" with their respective repositories of experiences, and, as discussed later, OlyBDS activists sought to tap into these explicitly. Overall, however, the boycott issue was particularly sensitive because of Olympia's collective history related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to Rachel Corrie's death and the impact of the Rachel Corrie Foundation on the Olympia community. As one interview subject observed, activism related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "is a very emotional issue in the Olympia community specifically . . . and not just the Jewish community . . . a lot of people carry a lot of emotional connection to this particular conflict in this particular place" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Some even referred to Rachel as Olympia's "local martyr" (candio 2004; Friedman 2012).

As occurred in other BDS cases examined in this book, activists argued over the nature of Jewish identity and its relationship to Israel. A boycott opponent criticized the rhetoric surrounding Jewish identity

on both sides of the debate, suggesting it was "ridiculous...to label Jews who are in support of the boycott as self-hating or against Jewishness and unfounded" while also problematic for boycott supporters to "assume... that Jewish institutions as a norm are either extremely right wing when it comes to Israel or support Israel no matter what" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Jewish voices were sought out by those unsure of their opinion on the boycott issue in a way that privileged their voices over those of Muslims or Arabs in the community (Olympia Activist 3 2011). As one OlyBDS activist remarked, "there was this strange tendency to kind of turn the anti-oppression discourse on its head and say, 'well, I don't know how to feel about this so I'm going...to defer to my Jewish friends to tell me how to take a stand on this issue'... there were some really vocal Zionist voices that were really connected in the community that I felt had way more power than they should have changing people's opinions and mainly because of this kind of anti-oppression [discourse]" that overlooked the "really diverse Jewish opinion" on the issue (Olympia Activist 2 2011).

Jews on both sides of the issue admitted to the "deep-seated" fears that were triggered by the OFC's decision to deshelve Israeli goods. As one OlyBDS activist shared, "I think that a lot of folks who would consider themselves really progressive were really surprised by the kind of feelings—the deep-seated feelings that came up when they started talking about...what they think and believe about Israel and its place for Jews" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). Some OFC members "saw this as sort of a wide anti-Israel stance and thought this is the thing we've been told to watch for, this is how it begins" and reverted to the idea of Israel "as the place that we Jews in the world retreat to in the event that we need to retreat" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). Juxtaposed to these fears was the "intellectual want for change in the Middle East and understanding that what's going on in Israel-Palestine is wrong" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). An opponent of boycott shared a similar sentiment that "Israel is a cultural center for Judaism and Jewish life and an intellectual and spiritual center...so I think part of the mixed emotions comes from wanting to support this place because of those things I mentioned, but also feeling very upset about what's going on and what Israel is doing" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011).

OlyBDS organizers noted that "there was some framing done that the boycott was anti-Jewish and that the organized Jewish voice in town coming out of the synagogue should be listened to and obeyed around the response" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). And while others affirmed that most of the Jews against the boycott were members of the synagogue,

the synagogue did not take an official position on the boycott, and some were critical of what they saw as an artificial division between Jewish institutions and nonaffiliated Jews (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). In response to the broader discourse framing BDS activism as "anti-Semitic" or "anti-Israel," the boycott organizers arranged for Jewish speakers, such as Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb, in some of their earliest educational forums. While some members of the opposition felt this was a "deliberate" effort to create a division between "the Jews that are on the right side of history and the Jews who are human rights abusers" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011), organizers saw it as a way to demonstrate the diversity of Jewish opinion on the matter and to challenge the "anti-Semitic canard" (Silverstein 2011). In a "Facts on BDS" handout created by BDS organizers, significant attention was given to the accusations of anti-Semitism. The authors note the marginalization inflicted on pro-boycott Jews, point out that 20 percent of Israeli citizens are Palestinian, and suggest that "it is tokenizing and reductive to consider Jews in one's community to be the arbiters of acceptable discourse and action on Palestine/Israel" (Olympia BDS n.d.e). Some Jewish community members refused to engage in the boycott debates precisely for fear of being "tokenized." A Jewish friend of a BDS activist refused to sign on to a Jewish letter of support that was being circulated around Olympia for precisely this reason (Olympia Activist 4 2011).

A number of sessions were organized for intra-Jewish dialog, providing a safe space for Jews to express their thoughts and feelings; because of Israel's self-professed identity as state for Jews, issues surrounding Israel "impact people who are Jewish because of their identity and in connection with things that get carried out within the name of Jews and Judaism" (Olympia Activist 4 2011). These conversations brought together "progressives" and conservatives alike and allowed for "some very illuminating experiences" regarding the role of Israel in Jewish identity. As a Jewish boycott supporter noted, "it's okay to recognize that part of what Israel's stance in the Middle East does to American Jews . . . is that it forces us into this us-and-them kind of position, and it can make even folks who don't really stand for this kind of thing hold beliefs deep down that they don't even realize or wouldn't want" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). This already complicated experience of the boycott for Olympia's Jewish community was further complicated when two Jewish supporters of the boycott, one an OlyBDS organizer and one an OFC board member, received death threats from Israeli phone numbers (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Groups like StandWithUS had mobilized their "*huge* networks around the country" with misinformation about

the OFC, resulting in the Co-op receiving over one thousand hateful, incensed phone calls per day. In an effort to divert pressure from the Food Co-op staff, Olympia BDS created a press release with these two individuals' statements of support for the boycott as Jews. Opposition activists found their phone numbers online, and both were barraged with threatening phone calls in the middle of the night. Fortunately, caller ID indicated that the death threats were coming from an Israeli number, which helped relieve the sense of imminent threat, but both men's lives were dramatically affected by the boycott in a very real way and one had to move out of his house for a while (Olympia Activist 3 2011).

Contending Approaches: Peace, Nonviolence, and Conflict Resolution

Complementary to the contending views on Jewish identity and the OFC boycott were contending frameworks on peace and nonviolence and how to best work to end Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights. Most members of the OFC share a set of values and principles that include a desire for peace, justice, and the preservation of human rights. However, as is indicated by the extent of the controversy over the board's decision to deshelve Israeli products, the major parties to the conflict hold different implicit assumptions regarding the process of peace and conflict resolution, a divide that reflects ongoing debates within the broader field of study. Within the field of peace and conflict resolution, scholars differ in their views regarding the extent to which "attaining justice and satisfying basic needs for the contending parties is crucial for an enduring peace" (Kriesberg 2007, 39). BDS activism is situated within a framework that assumes a third party should exert pressure on behalf of the weaker party in an asymmetric conflict. The rights-based approach of the BDS Call explicitly roots the campaign in claims for justice as opposed to "peace"; it calls on global civil society to act because states have failed to hold Israel accountable to international law (Barghouti 2010).

Traditional methods of conflict resolution are oriented toward reducing conflict and finding a mutually agreed-upon solution. Popular texts on conflict resolution have emphasized the idea of a "win-win" solution, which has been criticized for "express[ing] superficial niceness while papering over differences and creating sublimated frustration." (Cope and Kalantizis, cited in Tidwell 1998, 27). The array of differing definitions of "conflict resolution," from "victory in battle, an opponent

simply vanishing, or other such conclusive events . . . [to] a very specific kind of an end to conflict, where the means and methods are prescribed to be non-violent, participatory and voluntary" (Tidwell 1998, 147) contribute to the divergence of views regarding the OFC's boycott decision. However, those involved in Olympia BDS were engaging in nonviolent resistance, an active, grassroots process for sociopolitical change. Nonviolent resistance, while avoiding *violence*, may raise *conflict* levels in a quest to "invoke nonviolent pressure or nonviolent coercion in contentious action between opposing groups" (Cortwright 2008, 219–221; Schock 2005, 7). Boycott organizers sought explicitly to combat Israel's "whitewashing of the injustice of the occupation" (Olympia Activist 1 2011) and viewed boycott as an effort to exert pressure for change. As a core activist explained,

> It's not "I hate Israel therefore I'm going to boycott it." It's actually "we love Israel and we love Palestine and we want to see a change to all the human rights abuses that are happening and this is the way that we're going to bring awareness and we're not going to continue supporting the status quo as it stands." You know, I think that's an important misconception that needs to be addressed. (Olympia Activist 2 2011)

Boycott activists sought to keep their message "positive" even as they sought to raise awareness and exert pressure. They had a lead person working to keep the message focused on positive values such as human rights and "that [boycott] is obviously in line already with that and these are the ways in which [it is consistent] and this is for Palestinian freedom" rather than "getting caught in this situation where you make people feel guilty and tell them about all the atrocities" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). At the same time, activists stressed their selection of boycott as a tactic that could exert pressure for change since "we have exhausted everything else . . . [and] something had to be done" (Olympia Activist 4 2011). Overall, OlyBDS activists emphasized themes of justice, human rights, and international law in their framework of nonviolent resistance. For example, in a Frequently Asked Questions document posted on the Olympia BDS website, organizers repeatedly refer to international law and human rights. In one response, they comment on opponents' efforts to "reframe the message to imply that abiding by international law and human rights standards is somehow harmful to Isarel, with no acknowledgment of how Israel's noncompliance is oppressive to Palestinians" (Olympia BDS 2011).

Apart from the process-related claims, which are discussed in the next section, arguments opposing the boycott often deployed a different framework toward addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast to the more coercive, justice-oriented approach of nonviolent resistance, boycott opponents often sought less confrontational methods for resolving conflicts. Common responses to the boycott from opponents included

> "you know, I support the two state solution, and I'm not a radical, and I believe in self-determination' and all these kinds of things, 'and I just don't think boycott's the right way to do it.' And what I hear in that is 'either whatever peace process that's of the moment is happening, and is going to work,' or 'I just don't really feel the urgency of this." (Olympia Activist 1 2011)

Some suggested that "you're just going to move Israel farther to the right if you do BDS" or that "I don't feel this is a constructive thing to do" (Olympia Activist 4 2011). Opponents often emphasized their support of the two-state solution and Palestinian human rights even as they disagreed with the boycott. As one shared, "[boycott] gets people talking here and that's the positive thing, but my interest . . . is in things that promote coexistence and cooperation rather than division" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). The respondent went on to explain that "how we build bridges is by meeting each other and knowing each other, and so [I support] things that draw people closer in terms of positive engagement [for] coexistence rather than drive people apart by creating boundaries or opposition" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Boycott organizers countered that the OFC, and the United States more broadly, was not neutral in the conflict and that the parties were not equal; consequently, trying to "bring people together" without addressing the power disparities was a recipe for continued violence. An informational sheet about the boycott noted that the United States gives Israel three billion dollars a year and that "Israel actually prevents Gaza from developing and exporting goods. This means that Israel prevents the world from purchasing products from Gaza" (Olympia BDS 2010). Part of the impetus for launching the boycott effort came from noticing that the OFC was selling a product that announced on the box that six cents from its sale would go to the Jewish National Fund (Olympia Activist 2 2011). One BDS activist noted that many people in the community did not understand the use of boycotts as a tactic, commenting that "it's funny even with the Civil Rights movement people don't really understand that history very well even though that was important, you know,

the bus boycott. It wasn't about hating the bus company or harming the people who ran the bus company" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Instead, boycott is used as a tactic because "there is no change happening and we need to push. It's dire enough and timely enough that we need to push for change in any way that we can and this is one way" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). Olympia BDS sought to educate the OFC community about the boycott tactic and to shift the focus to the positive desire for human rights. BDS activists emphasized that the OFC was still selling Jewish products to deflect the "anti-Semitic" argument and pointed out that no one construed the OFC's China boycott as "anti-Chinese" but rather "recognized that the China boycott was directed at the abhorrent actions of the Chinese government" (Olympia BDS 2011). Olympia BDS also reiterated that "the point [of the boycott] is not to reject all things Israeli. The point is to employ nonviolent consumer-based activism within an international campaign in order to induce Israel to change its destructive policies." Reflecting the nonviolent paradigm, organizers stated that "BDS is nonviolent international pressure" (Olympia BDS 2011).

Approaches to Power and Process

The paradigm of nonviolent resistance used by Olympia BDS activists is reflected not only in their justice-oriented approach to peace but also in their use of grassroots mobilization to bring pressure for change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their strategy of power-mapping to engage large segments of the Olympia community in the boycott campaign. For nonviolent theorists like Gene Sharp (2005) and Robert Helvey (2004), power is rooted in the grassroots, in the ordinary people who withdraw their consent from governing institutions; it also involves strategic examinations of power and relationships of authority and control in order to best determine a course of action for social change. Olympia BDS activists recognized that they were up against well-funded, well-organized national opposition and that they needed to be strategic in doing "connecting and homework and educating" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Activists drew on their previous experiences (and challenges) with the Sister Cities project, the PMR campaign, and the Olympia Rafah Solidarity Mural project to craft their boycott campaign and designed a closed campaign of core organizers that engaged in a strategic power mapping exercise to reach out to key constituencies in the Olympia activist community. Organizers built a core team that was "a third Jewish and a third Arab-Muslim and a third sort of other. And so it was a nice cross-section of folks with investment in this

issue and also a . . . diverse cross section of Olympia" (Olympia Activist 2 2011; Olympia Activist 3 2011). Early on in the campaign the core organizers made a power map of important people in the Olympia community. As one core activist explained,

> we sat down and made this big map of the sort of social, and professional, and organizational sort of sub-communities in Olympia and then we tried to identify at least one person in each of those groups that we listed that somebody in our group knew well. And because Olympia is fairly small and also fairly tight knit, we were able to identify somebody in almost all the little subset groups that we could think of, and then, you know, with that information we compiled, we had this incredible tool when we wanted to disseminate information about the campaign, or we wanted to correct false information that was out there, or we wanted to ask groups to sign on to things. (Olympia Activist 3 2011)

Once they identified the nodes of power within the Olympia Community and explored their own positions within their power map, activists discussed ways to best engage with key community stakeholders on the issue (Olympia Activist 2 2011; Olympia Activist 3 2011). Unlike most grassroots organizing, Olympia BDS ran their campaign more like a political campaign, seeking to counter powerful pro-Israel networks existing through the Israeli embassy staff in the United States and large NGOs (like StandWithUs and the JCRC). Another core activist suggested that advance strategic planning was essential: "the number one mistake is just going really public right away when you want to do this . . . people are so misinformed on this issue . . . that you're all the sudden at a massive disadvantage when the other side . . . comes to town with all this money and fancy materials and mobilizing all these people to call and make threats" (Olympia Activist 2 2011).

As evidenced in other cases of BDS activism, particularly the Berkeley Student government divestment bill, BDS organizers built a broad campaign rooted in common values and concerns. As one activist noted, the organizing group "really tried to use both our preexisting networks and build strong relationships like with the mosque and other potential allies around this issue" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). New core members were invited based on their skills and membership in core constituencies within the Olympia community; selection was based on a consideration of relational forms of power, with the core team seeking members connected to different subnetworks within Olympia. As one organizer observed, "to handle the very well-funded and mobilized opposition, you just really have to be really connected to your community because

that tends to be their weakness—that they don't have all those connections" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Activists tried to get "a lot of supporters from different circles who could speak to their circles in the language that they would most relate to and understand . . . I think hearing from people you trust is always the easiest way to feel like you can get behind something" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Rather than treating power as a resource for leveraging control *over* others, the BDS activists "employed and exercised [power] through a net-like organization... [serving as] the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (Foucault 1980, 98). In addition to building up a network of support, members of OlyBDS also used their power map to exert leverage over Food Co-op board members, ensuring that "within five days before the board decision all of the board members had gotten phone calls supporting the boycott from friends of theirs" (Olympia Activist 3 2011).

Organizers did a lot of advance preparation work with the board, but because the broader membership did not check the agenda, they did not know that the boycott discussion was occurring at the July board meeting. Olympia BDS arranged for 50 Palestinian Solidarity Activists to be present to provide a community presence as they gave their 20 minute presentation to the board; it was the most-attended board meeting since the 1970s (PeaceWorks 2011). Even though the strategic decision to run a closed, under the radar, political-style campaign was logical given the existence of an organized opposition with significant power resources (financial, relational, and institutional) on a national scale (Guttman 2011b), it opened the OFC board and BDS activists to criticism from those advocating a consensus-based process involving all concerned stakeholders.

One of the major arguments against the boycott was that the process was flawed, that the broader membership was not consulted, and that the board did not follow the boycott policy appropriately. One opponent noted, "there wasn't that engagement or conversation before the boycott happened. I think people would feel differently if they had a year of engagement for study and conversation of speakers before the board made the decision one way or the other . . . the decision was made without the ability to voice one's opinion in advance . . . [which is why] I always felt it wasn't acknowledging of the Israeli or Jewish experience" (Olympia Activist 4 2011). Co-op members said repeatedly "this is just never the way it's worked before." However, as a BDS activist noted,

> I understand that people were upset that they weren't a part of it, but a
> piece of that was that people I don't think had been thinking about the

co-op's process and official structure much at all; board positions had been largely symbolic really. [The board] pretty much rubber stamped anything that the staff had suggested up until that point and so I think also the staff were angry there too because they did not expect the board to make a decision on something that they had not been able to reach a consensus on. Despite the fact that, you know, it's written in there that the board has that authority. (Olympia Activist 1 2011)

The role of the Co-op's staff in the boycott decision illustrates the importance of local institutional structures and cultures in BDS campaigns. Traditionally, the Co-op staff has played a leading role in managing the Co-op and conducting day to day operations; as one boycott activist noted, the Co-op "holds very true to being member owned, but also it's a collective worker environment" (Olympia Activist 1 2011). When the boycott resolution was brought to the staff, they were not able to reach consensus, although others suggested they had a consensus but someone blocked it, and so the resolution was sent back to the board for consideration. As a result, the staff felt they had been left out, skipped, or overridden (Olympia Activist 1 2011; Olympia Activist 4 2011). As one opponent noted, the OFC's boycott policy "talks about having staff consensus, and [there are] real questions as to whether the staff actually consented, and the board us[ed] its power to override any decision or non-decisions by the staff in passing a boycott policy" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Organizers acknowledged that they "weren't really sure how to engage with the staff at the Co-op…that was definitely a place that we didn't do the work that needed to happen" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). However, boycott activists argued that process had not been violated; as one remarked, "I genuinely don't believe it was a breakdown in process…perhaps, sure, the decision was made more quickly than some people would have liked, but it was made within the best understanding of a policy at that time" (Olympia Activist 1 2011). Organizers were not expecting the vote to pass so quickly, but had expected it to go to member election and not be decided right there at the board meeting (Olympia Activist 1 2011). Consequently, the boycott organizers "weren't as prepared" and were not able to be as "proactive" in responding to the process critique; this meant the opposition was able to successfully convince some people to be against the boycott (Olympia Activist 2 2011). At the same time, it meant that many OFC members did not find out about the boycott policy until after the board voted. As an opponent asserted,

there are definitely times in the life of a membership based nonprofit organization that you [seek out the advice of the membership or

disseminate information] for the sake of your membership and it's up
to the board to have the receptivity and the ear to the ground . . . in this
case there seems to be either a lack of sensitivity or ignorance on the
part of the board to realize that this is an issue that would have impact
and importance and whether or not they were vested in that authority
to go ahead and institute the boycott to not go back to the community
over the course of the time that they were considering it and seek inputs.
(Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011)

Some members felt strongly enough about the boycott decision that
they turned in their membership, while others kept their member-
ship but boycotted the Co-op (Olympia Activist 4 2011; PeaceWorks
2011). Opponents held a two-week sit-in outside the OFC in protest
of the board's decision; however, despite this pressure and hundreds of
phone calls to board members, the board did not overturn the decision.
Although the board was afraid that the OFC would experience a drop
in sales, the organizers conducted a successful "buy-in" and did mas-
sive outreach to the local community, the mosque, and their broader
network to encourage them to shop at the Co-op. As a result, the OFC
had record high sales for a few weeks after the boycott (PeaceWorks
2011). Furthermore, when new board elections were held in November
2010, over one thousand people voted as opposed to the usual turnout
of around two hundred. The five people who ran on a pro-boycott plat-
form won solidly, with a margin of over two hundred votes between
the pro-boycott candidate with the least votes and the antiboycott can-
didate with the most votes (PeaceWorks 2011). These elections legiti-
mated the previous board's decision and provided popular endorsement
of the boycott.

Supporters and opponents of the boycott took two very different
approaches to power in the wake of the board's decision. Organizers
launched a tabling effort to spread information and to educate the OFC
community. They invited speakers such as Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb, Ali
Abunimah, and Jewish theologian Marc Ellis to speak at public edu-
cational events, and they issued press releases about the board's deci-
sion and the BDS campaign more broadly (PeaceWorks 2011). OlyBDS
also distributed creative coupons and "collector's cards" with support-
ive statements from high-profile international figures such as Desmond
Tutu, Naomi Klein, and Mairead Macguire to provide "certification"
for their campaign and to affirm that boycotting was not "counterpro-
ductive to a true and lasting peace in the Middle East" (Boone 2010). In
addition to the boycott and sit-in tactics mentioned already, three of the
candidates who were not elected were part of the September 2011 lawsuit

filed by five OFC members against the Board of Directors (Abunimah 2011b; CCR 2011). The lawsuit demonstrates not only the struggle to control the OFC as an institution but also the transnational linkages of the anti-BDS campaign, since the regional director of StandWithUs and Akiva Tor, the Israeli Consul General for the Pacific Northwest, met in May 2011 to discuss the lawsuit, and several of those involved in the lawsuit were featured in a SWU promotional video (Guttman 2011b; Nguyen 2012; WAFA 2011). Supporters of the boycott view the court case as an indicator of the power of boycott; it also demonstrates the preference for punitive power and power hierarchies on the part of BDS opponents rather than the grassroots cooperative power favored by supporters of BDS. As one of the attorneys representing the board members observed, "allegations that the OFC Board acted beyond its power are a thinly veiled attempt to stop concerned citizens from using a nonviolent and historical tool for social change" (Olympia BDS 2011).

In February 2012, the lawsuit was dismissed for violating the 2010 Washington state SLAPP laws protecting freedom of speech and expression (Abunimah 2012), an indicator that perhaps the process claim was indeed, as activists assert, a "red herring" to distract from the substantive reasons for the boycott. Similar to debates surrounding the Berkeley student government's divestment bill, BDS opponents sought to divert attention from the reasons for using BDS tactics and instead focused on issues of procedure and "divisiveness," although ironically the court case provided publicity to the OFC's boycott and its rationale. One board member hopes that "this judgment will open up the door for more businesses and organizations to heed the call and join this movement for human dignity" (WAFA 2012), while another affirmed the OFC's desire to be a catalyst, suggesting that "each additional organizational entity that joins may have a very small effect on the big picture, but drop by drop fills the tub," (JTA 2010). Indeed, despite the fact that the OFC only deshelved nine Israeli products from its shelves, the Israeli Consul General visited Olympia "a dozen times since the boycott [and has gotten] very involved in other BDS campaigns to try to make sure that it doesn't spread," including a massive descent upon the nearby community of Port Townsend to stop its co-op from passing a similar resolution (Olympia Activist 3 2011). StandWithUs threatened to poison the bulk foods at the Rainbow Food Co-op in San Francisco if a boycott measure went through, and activists in another co-op in California were banned from even tabling on Palestinian issues in front of the co-op due to fear of retaliation (PeaceWorks 2011). In part due to the massive pressure exerted by boycott opponents, to date other

boycott measures have failed, including the highly publicized March 2012 vote in Brooklyn, NY's Park Slope Food Co-op. However, due to the large debate generated, which included a response from Mayor Michael Bloomberg, BDS supporters have viewed the Park Slope case as a success. As one supporter said, "B.D.S. has entered into the consciousness of thousands of co-op members and has even made it into mainstream conversations" (Semple and Kuntzman 2012). Although many assume that the goal of boycott is economic impact, for Olympia BDS organizers, as noted in the quote above, the goal of "boycott as a tactic . . . is actually about shifting international opinion around what's happening and that's really where the power lies" (Olympia Activist 2 2011).

Conclusion

The different orientations of community members regarding how to best be "progressive" and "pro-peace" as third party activists and observers of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict impact the extent to which one might evaluate the "success" of the boycott initiative. Part of the framework of nonviolent struggle involves raising awareness of latent sociopolitical conflict as well as a process of "conversion" by which opponents come to see the conflict differently and join the side of those working for change. The international coverage of the boycott provided an opportunity for discussing *why* the OFC was engaging in boycott; activists felt they were successful due to the amount of attention garnered by the incident. Success was measured not by the boycott's economic impact, but by its symbolic influence and educational effect. The conflict-raising, status-quo challenging, and social change orientation of the BDS activists was perceived as a threat by Israeli officials. At the Israeli government's urging, the Jewish Federation of North America and the Jewish Council for Public Affairs put six million dollars into a campaign to combat BDS, seeking to mobilize the power of major American Jewish networks to combat "the second most dangerous threat to Israel, after Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons" (Kane 2010; Reut 2010).[1] A 2011 Israeli law making it illegal to advocate boycotts was touted by some as a "defensive response to the growing support for boycott initiatives" (Rothschild 2011) that "demonstrates the growing success and effectiveness of BDS" (CWP 2011; Haber 2011).

Two factors are at play in activists' remarks regarding the "success" and impact of the OFC boycott. One indicator of success is that the boycott effort has remained in place since July 2010; given the failure

of other co-ops to pass such a measure, this in itself might be seen as an accomplishment. An opponent, however, noted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues, suggesting that the "boycott's either failed or it's really not going to have much of an impact" (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). Yet organizers pointed to ways that the OFC boycott did have both an educational and an economic impact. As one activist recounted,

> I remember hearing from a co-op employee that got a call from the consulate general in San Francisco . . . asking ,"so what's your volume of sales over the year and how many people members do you have?" Basically trying to figure out what the impact was going to be and once they realized it was a pretty big institution with pretty big sales numbers every year and that this could have a pretty significant effect, then the international attention came. (Olympia Activist 1 2011)

Although the OFC is a sizeable institution in the small town of Olympia, activists conceded its relatively minor impact in the scheme of the global economy. As one shared, "I think people think immediately in their minds that we're looking for the economic impact, that it's the economic impact that will make the difference and so it seems silly in the Olympia Food Co-op. What impact is nine food products going to have on Israel?" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). However, as activists noted and as the response of Israeli officials indicated, "sometimes the actual statement of boycott is more powerful than the actual deshelving" (PeaceWorks 2011). So much of the power of the BDS movement and boycott actions like the one at the OFC stems from "the symbolic speaking to that issue of Israel self-consciousness" and by "creating this outside pressure to give legitimacy to those people working within their own countries to impact change, and if there's not that international pressure . . . folks in [Israeli] organizations like WhoProfits and others just don't have the weight, no one takes them seriously" (Olympia Activist 1 2011).

By taking a stand as an institution rather than as individual consumers deciding not to buy Israeli products, the Food Co-op boycott helped build the broader movement against the Israeli occupation (Olympia Activist 2 2011). As argued in the literature on boycotts, institutional boycotts exert more pressure and leverage than do those of individual consumers (Seidman 2007), a fact evident in the response of one BDS activist who commented ironically on the response of boycott opponents that "it's no surprise, but [opponents said] go ahead and do your

organizing, make your little murals, have your cute little time, but if you're going to affect institutions of our community, then you're tearing us apart, you're outside agitators, you're not following proper process" (Olympia Activist 1 2011). Activists noted how

> we were so excited about BDS [because] there are so few things from afar that really have an impact that you can really see . . . the occupation's been going on for so many years so it's exciting to see that there's something you can do . . . there has really been a lot of comments from Israeli government leadership about BDS and delegitimizing and you can tell that there's really an impact. (Olympia Activist 2 2011)

As indicated by the quotes mentioned above, despite the lack of economic impact of the Olympia boycott on Israel's economy, major organizations in the United States and Israel have taken note of BDS and are treating it as a serious threat. Not only have the presidents of the major Jewish organizations in the United States come out with a statement against BDS, but the annual Israeli Herzliya conference has also focused time and attention on combatting BDS (White 2010). This concerted action, combined with the focus on "delegitimization" suggests that perhaps Israel feels its identity as a democracy is threatened and that this, more than material interests, explains the extent of its reaction (Ringmar 1996).

The contentiousness of the boycott does not originate in either the financial or political impact of the OFC's decision to boycott. Instead, it comes from rival conceptions of how third party activists should work for a sustainable peace in Israel/Palestine. While boycott supporters assert that nonviolent pressure from civil society is needed to offset power imbalances and to raise the issue of injustice toward Palestinians due to the inaction of the international community of states, local opponents of boycott suggest that such antagonistic measures are divisive and exclude others who want peace but who want dialog and "balance." Despite this call for dialog, however, some opponents of the boycott, combined with national Israeli advocacy networks, used coercive legal measures in a quest to reverse the boycott decision. The power of the discourse surrounding the debate reflects the power of social identities and the desire to be connected to the "good," the "peaceful" and the "just" and the importance of feeling one belongs in one's local community. Whether BDS is a "success" or not depends on one's perspective and goals; the case of Olympia indicates that even small "victories" can yield international reverberations, even if at the macrolevel there was no

change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, the case of Olympia illustrates the importance of local culture and history in shaping the possibilities for activism. Olympia is a community known for its progressive activism on numerous fronts, is particularly concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has a progressive Jewish community concerned with Palestinian human rights (Olympia Boycott Opponent 2011). As one boycott organizer queried,

> how much of what we did was successful because of the strategies that we used, and the experience that we had organizing, and all the sort of good stuff that we did, and how much of it was really because of the unique set of qualities of the community that we were working in? . . . I know we did some really good smart activism that we would have failed without, but also we were given some breaks because of the sort of makeup of the community. (Olympia Activist 3 2011)

The OFC provided a model of success that other institutions could adapt and change to their own circumstances; because it was an institution that put in place an actual policy of deshelving Israeli products rather than a call for individual consumers to stop buying from a list of specified goods, the boycott effort constituted more of a threat than CodePink's street theater, and therefore elicited more of a response from pro-Israel institutions. At the same time, the response to the boycott illustrated ongoing debates within the Jewish community over Jewish identity and its relationship to Israel, with divides evident among those opposing the boycott regarding Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, as well as shared deep-seated fears resulting from centuries of Jewish persecution among both those for and against the boycott. Although organizers lamented the privileging of Jewish voices over Muslim and Arab ones in the discourse surrounding the boycott, the Jewish narrative continues to give legitimacy to both sides of the boycott debates.

The Presbyterian Church USA: Institutions, Justice, and History

Introduction

Since 2004, the Presbyterian Church (USA), or PCUSA, has been engaged in a process of corporate engagement with several US companies widely documented as engaged in military or surveillance activities in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. Although a major uproar ensued when the mainstream press reported that the Presbyterians had "divested" from Israel at the 2004 General Assembly (GA), the PCUSA had actually initiated a long-standing Church process of Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI), the final step of which—if corporations are not forthcoming with changes after the dialog—is divestment. The organized Jewish community was particularly outraged by the PCUSA's resolution, despite the fact that Jewish leaders and organizations appealed to Presbyterians both *for* and *against* divestment, a division also reflected within the Presbyterian Church. At the 220th GA in July 2012, the MRTI committee recommended that PCUSA divest from Caterpillar (CAT), Hewlett Packard (HP), and Motorola Solutions due to the refusal of these corporations to respond to PCUSA's ethical concerns. After extensive debate, the Middle East Peacemaking Committee (Committee 15) voted in favor of this resolution by a three to one margin. However, on the plenary floor divestment was defeated by a 333–331–2 vote. This chapter traces the divestment debates through several different Presbyterian GA sessions, examining how conceptions of identity and values are mobilized by each side of the issue and exploring how institutional structures and processes provide both opportunities and obstacles to those pursuing divestment from "corporations that may be profiting from involvement in any of the obstacles to a just peace" (Niva 2010; MRTI 2011, 1). In particular, the chapter

explores how historical patterns of relations between Presbyterians and Jews and between Presbyterians in the United States and Middle East, along with different framings of Christians' moral obligations, shape current debate. Actors involved on both sides of the debate, as in other cases studied, seek to promote peace and justice and express their concern for the human rights of Israelis and Palestinians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims involved in the conflict. However, these actors put forth differing conceptions regarding how to pursue these goals morally and pragmatically with the best chance of success.

The Historic Role of the Church in Boycott Efforts

Historically, the Church has played a leading role in civil rights efforts around the world.[1] From the efforts of Archbishop Óscar Romero in advocating "liberation theology" (BBC 2011) to the role of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the campaign against South African apartheid and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr, in the US Civil Rights movement, Christians have drawn on the teachings of Jesus to advocate for justice for the oppressed and disadvantaged. Local black churches were critical in the organization of the Civil Rights movement in the United States, and pastors worked as community organizers during the Montgomery Bus Boycott. The involvement of church leaders was not only strategic, due to their influence and connections in their communities, but also provided moral legitimacy to the antisegregation activists (Kuumba 2002; Skinner 2009; Stockton 2006). Priests and missionaries within South Africa and elsewhere helped make connections between the different political and cultural contexts involved in the antiapartheid movement (Thorn 2009). Father Trevor Huddleston, an Anglican minister, provided a strong voice that influenced British supporters of the movement during his time as a missionary outside Johannesburg. He published a series of letters in *The Observer* starting in the mid-1950s that called out to Christians to share in the suffering of black South Africans and to become a part of the voices speaking out against apartheid. In addition, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, addressed his assembly early in 1954 saying that the "detailed application of the policy of apartheid seems to us a fresh violation of Christian principle and common justice" ("Fisher Papers" 1954 cited in Skinner 2009, 407–408). The sentiment of "fear" that a failure to react to this situation would delegitimize Christians within Africa was built up by the calls to action disseminated in the media and through channels of communication between churches (Skinner 2009). In this way, church

leaders acted as brokers, yoking disparate efforts into a church "movement" against apartheid.

The Church was not always unified in its views and actions vis-à-vis apartheid, however. English-speaking churches in South Africa (unlike the Dutch Reformed Church, which was aligned with the Afrikaner government) were critical of apartheid policies starting in the 1940s but were constrained by church-state relations and a fear of totalitarian crackdown on religious freedom if churches and missionaries spoke out too strongly (The Israel Divestment Debate 2006; Skinner 2009). Differences between the various churches, their theologies, and their organizational structures meant that it took a while for the churches to work together or speak out against what was widely seen as an unjust system. The 1985 Kairos Document, which came out of a meeting of Christian activists from the National Forum, the Black Consciousness Movement, and the United Democratic Front, provided a critical analysis of the role of the Church vis-à-vis the situation in South Africa and provided recommendations for Church action. The Kairos Document concluded that merely recognizing the problem of apartheid was not enough and that radical action needed to be taken since inaction lent legitimacy to the "racial genocide" (Goba 1987, 315). As a result, the Kairos Document called upon fellow Christian churches and individuals to move beyond recognition to involvement and participation in the liberation struggle in cooperation with the already existing people's movement in South Africa. The document called upon Christians to take action: "Christians, if they are not doing so already, must quite simply participate in the struggle for liberation and for a just society. The campaigns of the people, from consumer boycotts to stayaways, need to be supported and encouraged by the Church" (see "Challenge to the Church The Kairos Document: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa" in Leonard 2010, 31).

Even before the Kairos Document was issued, some churches responded to the situation in South Africa through corporate activism. In the spring of 1980 some Protestant and Roman Catholic churches disinvested $250 million from banks doing business with South Africa. Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopal, and Catholic churches also divested from firms that operated in South Africa and those that did not comply with antiapartheid policies (Teoh et al. 1999). In the 1980s, the United Methodist Church General Board of Pension and Health Benefits, for example, divested $77 million from more than 17 companies doing business with South Africa (UMKR n.d), and the Presbyterian Church placed 14 companies on its divestment list between 1985 and 1991,

including Mobil, Texaco, Citicorp, British Petroleum, General Motors, and the Union Bank of Switzerland (Somplatsky-Jarman 2013). The divestment of 500,000 shares of Mobil Oil and Newmont Mining in 1985 amounted to two billion dollars (UPI 1985). At the 196th GA in 1984, the PCUSA created a divestment strategy outlining principles and criteria for when and how to divest, and documented its corporate engagement process and the rationale for it, grounded in theological commitments to trusteeship, social witness, and stewardship. While the document was drafted in the context of considering how the Church should respond to apartheid South Africa, the guidelines cover the entire investment process, as well as related ethical questions, in a detailed and comprehensive manner. The divestment strategy documents PCUSA's standing practice on divestment from "sin stocks," such as alcohol and tobacco, and from military production, while also documenting other cases of divestment, such as from Duke Power in the 1970s in response to a mining disaster, and describes the Church's history of concern for investment as a form of social witness (PCUSA 1984).

Drawing on the example of the churches in the case of South Africa, the Palestinian ecumenical center Sabeel issued a call for "morally responsible investment" in 2005, grounding this call in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 as well as the July 9, 2004 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" that called on states "not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by [the wall's] construction" (CWP 2011). Sabeel challenged churches to have "clean hands" by ending their investment in corporations that have well-documented violations of international law and human rights by Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations. The Sabeel document applauds the February 2005 Central Committee of the World Council of Churches gathering that called on churches to "work for peace in new ways and to give serious consideration to economic measures that are equitable, transparent, and nonviolent" and encouraged churches to "move . . . from statements to direct action and adopting appropriate financial policies that are in line with their moral and theological stance" (CWP 2011). Although some US churches, such as the PCUSA and the US Episcopal Church, tasked their MRTI and Social Responsibility in Investments (SRI) committees to investigate the situation, there was a limited response from the international Christian community. Consequently, in 2009, building on the model of South Africa's Kairos Document, a diverse gathering of leading Palestinian Christians published Kairos Palestine, calling churches

worldwide to action on behalf of Palestinians living under Israeli occu-
pation. Palestinian religious leaders argue for churches to be involved

> because today we have reached a dead end in the tragedy of the Palestinian
> people. The decision-makers content themselves with managing the cri-
> sis rather than committing themselves to the serious task of finding a
> way to resolve it . . . The problem is not just a political one. It is a policy
> in which human beings are destroyed, and this must be of concern to the
> Church. (Elia and King 2011, 5)

Unlike in South Africa, churches are historically connected to Israel/
Palestine because it is the birthplace of Christianity. Pilgrims from
all over the world converge on Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth
to pay homage to the life and teachings of Jesus. In addition, most
churches support missionary projects, including schools, in the region.
Kairos Palestine speaks directly to Christians around the world, call-
ing on them to "revisit fundamentalist theological positions that sup-
port certain unjust political options with regard to the Palestinian
people . . . God is not the ally of one against the other, nor the opponent
of one in the face of the other" (Elia and King 2011, 14). Using the
language of prayer and repeated reference to scripture, the Palestinian
church leaders seek to bind together all church leaders in a common
cause. They remind others that "the mission of the Church is prophetic,
to speak the Word of God courageously, honestly and lovingly in the
local context and in the midst of daily events. If she does take sides, it is
with the oppressed, to stand alongside them, just as Christ [did]" (Elia
and King 2011, 11). Although the document makes a number of appeals
to different categories of people, religious and secular, leaders and gen-
eral public, local and international, the call for "a system of economic
sanctions and boycott to be applied against Israel" is highlighted as "a
serious action in order to reach a just and definitive peace that will put
an end to Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories and will
guarantee security and peace for all" (Elia and King 2011, 15).

The Origin of the "Divestment" Debate in PCUSA

The PCUSA was the first mainstream US denomination to consider
divestment from US companies profiting from the Israeli occupation
and is considered by other denominations to be the pioneer in divest-
ment work (Interfaith Activist 2011). PCUSA consists of 2.3 million
people spread across ten thousand congregations and 173 presbyteries

(local governing bodies) in all fifty states and Puerto Rico. The PCUSA also has a long history of engagement in the Middle East, evident in its numerous partner and mission churches, health facilities, and educational institutions, most notably the American University of Beirut (founded in 1866) and the American University in Cairo (Presbyterian Mission Agency Middle East Background n.d.a; Stockton 2005). From the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Presbyterian Church has made statements addressing the appropriate role of the Church in promoting peace. Since the 1967 Six Day War, the PCUSA has reiterated United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Middle East and has consistently spoken in favor of a shared Jerusalem, for a secure and internationally recognized Israel, and against the military occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. In 1995 the GA also urged US leaders to "renew efforts to make US aid to Israel conditional upon the cessation of the appropriation of Palestinian land in and around Jerusalem and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories" (Breaking Down the Walls 2010, 49; Interview with MESC Member 2 2011).

The business of the PCUSA is carried out at the GA gatherings, which occur every two years. Local congregations can write overtures to the GA asking the body to take particular action or endorse particular resolutions of concern to the whole Church. These overtures, which include a rationale and then a series of recommendations, must be approved first by a local church governing board (a session), a district governing body (presbytery), and a regional body, the synod (PCUSA 2012b). If an overture or report is passed within the GA, then it becomes an official stance of the PCUSA, and the various committees assigned will move forward to study and take action on it. The GA is constituted by commissioners representing local presbyteries; these commissioners are newly elected every two years (The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (USA): The Book of Order 2009). The GA in 2012 consisted of 688 commissioners, 344 teaching elders (ministers) and 344 ruling elders (from congregations) elected by 173 presbyteries, plus 160 Young Adult Advisory Delegates (YAADs), 24 Theological Student Advisory Delegates (TSADs), 8 Missionary Advisory Delegates (MADs), and 15 Ecumenical Advisory Delegates (EADs), who do not have official votes (Baltzer 2012b; IPMN-PCUSA 2012; PCUSA 2012b). As a general rule, commissioners tend to be older, with time to dedicate to GA service; most have been involved in the Church for a long time (CWP 2011). The conservative nature of church bureaucracy in general and the slow process of change inherent in such institutions

reflect both the demography and the procedures of the GA (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011).

The so-called 2004 "divestment overture" brought to the 216th GA originated from a presbytery in St. Augustine, Florida, and was written by a member of a recent delegation to Israel/Palestine who was so disturbed by what he witnessed that he started to rally for a way to hold Israel accountable the way that apartheid South Africa was held accountable (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). The original wording of the overture, which called for divesting from companies investing over $1 million dollars in Israel, was modified at the GA to allow for corporate engagement, consistent with Church policy, and give room for negotiation with the identified companies (Stockton 2005). There was very little debate over the overture, in part due to the fact that overtures for the 2004 GA were prepared during "one of the really dark periods of the second intifada" (Interview with MESC Member 2 2011). In 2003 alone, for example, over six hundred Palestinian and two hundred Israeli deaths were reported by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem (B'Tselem 2007; Brym and Maoz-Shai 2009). The decision was passed by a vote of 431 to 62, passing by an 87 percent margin, and the recommendations regarding Israel were forwarded on to the Peacemaking Committee (Smith, 2004). The overture read as follows:

> Refers to the Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI) Committee with instructions to initiate a process of phased, selective divestment in multinational corporations operating in Israel, in accordance to General Assembly policy on social investing, and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly Council for Action. (Olzak and Shanahan 2004)

The divestment overture was not the only motion regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to emerge out of the 216th GA. The body also called for the United States to be an "even-handed" mediator in the peace process and expressed its "grave alarm" at the construction of the separation barrier, citing its fear that it would pose further obstacles to the "dwindling remnant" of the Palestinian Christian community (Olzak and Shanahan 2004; Stockton 2006). The timing of the GA, coinciding with the July 2004 advisory opinion of the ICJ that the construction of Israel's separation barrier (the court called it a wall) was illegal under international law, contributed to a sense of urgency and also provided a cover of international—and moral—legitimacy (ICJ 2004).

PCUSA did not expect the firestorm that erupted in the Jewish community in response to the passage of the "divestment" resolution. The commissioners had made clear that they continued their support for Israel's right to exist within "permanent, recognized and secure borders" (Olzak and Shanahan 2004), and when the Middle East coordinator was asked, "how will our Jewish brothers, sisters, partners react to this? He said 'well, we've been really critical of Israeli policy before, this shouldn't be a surprise'" (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). A Presbyterian opponent of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) stated the GA was "stunned by the incredibly negative response they got from the Jewish community" and the divisive press debate that ensued (Interview with Interfaith Dialogue Advocate 2011). A member of the MRTI committee commented that although the overture called for "possible, phased selective divestment of corporations and Israel, the newspapers and the church news made it sound like it was already a done deal" (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). As a Presbyterian pastor involved with writing the 2010 *Breaking Down Walls* report noted, "all hell broke loose," starting with an "attack" launched by Harvard University's Alan Dershowitz, that was "actually rooted more on the original wording that came out of Florida than the wording that came out of the GA" (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). However, not all Presbyterians were surprised by the media firestorm. Reflecting on his response to the 2004 decision, a Presbyterian pastor remembered asking himself,

> Do they have any idea what they just did? And the answer is no, they didn't because they were stunned by the incredibly negative response that they got from the Jewish community...Jews have suffered at the hands of Christians for 2000 years. We have targeted them over and over again both for physical violence, as well as economic violence and various kinds of discriminatory behavior. (Interview with Interfaith Dialogue Advocate 2011)

Another noted, "Most Jews both Israeli and American hear BDS as reminiscent of thousands of years of boycotting and demonizing Jews...so it sets off all of those alarms in the Jewish community. Whether or not you agree with the analogy is immaterial, the fact is that American Jews see BDS as analogous to those pogroms...that's where the anti-Semitism charge comes from" (Interview with MESC Member 2 2011). In an op-ed piece in the *Los Angeles Times,* Dershowitz condemned the divestment decision as a "moral sin" that was altogether "immoral, sinful, and bigoted." He suggested the decision "encourages

the continued use of terrorism by Palestinian leaders" and argued that the statement contradicted earlier Church statements against participating in any action that would "allow the persecution or denigration of Jews" (Dershowitz 2004). Others within the Jewish community agreed that this measure presented a "real threat to the economic life and security of Israel" (Dershowitz 2004; Heilman 2004). Diana Appelbaum (2006a, 2006b) wrote two op-eds in the conservative *American Thinker* accusing the Presbyterians of anti-Semitism and false allegations against Israel. The decision also made international news. The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* ran the headline "Presbyterians divest themselves from Israel" the day after the GA completed its meeting, even though this was not accurate (Guttman 2004). An opinion piece in the *Jewish World Review* entitled "Presbyterian Church defames Christianity" accused the Presbyterians of committing a sin against God (Prager 2004). Not all Jewish groups were against the measure, however. JVP praised the resolution and saw it as the best way to support the cause of ending the Israeli occupation and thereby of being "allies" of Jews (Stockton 2005).

Most of these media accounts misrepresented the GA's decision, however; the PCUSA had not voted for divestment from Israel, but rather called for divestment from American multinational companies profiting from the Israeli occupation in excess of $1 million, and then only if a process of corporate engagement with those corporations failed to establish a settlement (Interview with IPMN member 2011). Specifically, the 216th GA referred the divestment overture to the MRTI committee "to initiate a process of phased selective divestment" according to GA policy on social investing; it did not call for immediate divestment, and it explicitly did not call for divestment from Israel itself (DeYoe 2012). This misrepresentation was furthered by what one critic of divestment called "sloppy" language around BDS, which this individual viewed as particularly problematic given that although Presbyterians have "gone for a selective divestment solely around the occupation," the waters are muddied by the existence of "a BDS movement that's for more comprehensive boycott and divestment, and most Americans in general on some level support the idea of Israel existing as a Jewish majority state" (Interview with MESC Member 2 2011). A resolution in 2006 clarified the focus on "corporate engagement" and highlighted that the goal was not divestment per se, but rather ensuring that PCUSA's financial investments are only engaged in "peaceful pursuits" as per MRTI standard procedure, with divestment as a last resort (DeYoe 2012).

The controversy placed a particularly heavy burden on MRTI, which received "very ugly, hateful emails and letters and phone calls"

from the American Jewish community (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). The committee members were forced into the awkward place of being unclear how to proceed with their typical process of corporate engagement due to accusations of anti-Semitism and the broader assumption that PCUSA had already divested from companies like Caterpillar. MRTI is tasked with implementing Church policies on socially responsible investing "through correspondence, dialogs, voting shareholder proxies...and occasionally filing shareholder resolutions." The committee engages in positive and negative screens, shareholder advocacy and community investing in the course of carrying out its mission (*Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI): What is MRTI?* 2011). PCUSA has a standing policy of "divestment and/or proscription of some corporations due to their involvement in military-related production, tobacco or human rights violations." The 2013 divestment list includes 41 corporations or securities (PCUSA 2012a). Generally, the MRTI process is seen as uncontroversial, but the 2004 decision meant that the committee's "really sleepy, quiet meetings" became a focal point for outside observers (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). In its deliberations over which corporations to engage with—a process that took an entire year—MRTI used the same criteria the Church had used in South Africa and then "took the first five on the list which included CAT [Caterpillar], ITT, Motorola, Citibank, United Technologies" (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). The selection of Caterpillar, while perhaps "the most obvious for many, many reasons" was also "the most problematic for the Presbyterian Church since there are many Presbyterians who work in Peoria, Iowa for Caterpillar" (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). Caterpillar also posed a challenge because of the "corporate culture of CAT. CAT never stopped supplying South Africa. Their defense has been and still is hey, we just sell bulldozers and have no control over what people do with those bulldozers" (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). MRTI was, however, able to secure meetings with three of the five companies—Citigroup, ITT Industries (ITT), and Motorola—and kept in communication with the presbyteries where these corporations were headquartered as well as with other church bodies engaged in similar processes (MRTI 2011). Individuals speaking on behalf of divestment from Caterpillar, such as Cindy Corrie, whose daughter Rachel was killed by a Caterpillar bulldozer in 2003, attested that "at its military applications webpage, CAT celebrates its ability to modify equipment to meet military needs...CAT militarized bulldozers financed with US dollars are key Israeli weapons. US attorneys say manufacturers are

encouraged to sell to states that receive US funds but they do not say they are compelled to sell. CAT has a choice" (Corrie 2012).

A second body caught up in the maelstrom of the divestment debate was the newly commissioned Israel/Palestine Mission Network (IPMN), created by the 216th GA.[2] The IPMN is one of approximately 38 networks within the Church; these bodies do not speak *for* the Church, but are tasked with speaking *to* the Church, in the case of IPMN regarding the rights of Palestinians and Israelis (Interview with MESC Member 2011). The network's mandate calls for it to "seek solidarity, educate about the facts on the round, and change the conditions that erode the humanity of both Israelis and Palestinians" as well as to support Church partners in Palestine through programs of social and economic development (*Israel/Palestine Mission Network (IPMN): Who We Are* 2011). IPMN is a grassroots organization with no paid staff; its activities are funded by member pledges. Its work has consisted of educational activities and the development of study resources, helping facilitate travel to the region for Church members to witness the situation firsthand, developing partnerships with other groups working on these issues, and engaging in advocacy work (IPMN n.d.). The IPMN is distinct from, and differs in its views from, another Church body, the Presbyterians for Middle East Peace (PFMEP), a grassroots group of Presbyterian lay and clergy volunteers that came together after the 2004 GA and was established prior to the 2008 GA. PFMEP is staunchly against divestment, which they believe will hinder rather than promote peace. Instead, PFMEP calls for "investing in peace" through "grassroots dialog between Palestinians and Israelis" as well as "economic investment in the future of a peaceful and independent Palestinian state" (PFMEP 2012a).

Evolution of the Debate: Identity, Morality, and Process

As could be expected due to the outcry over the 2004 "divestment" resolution, and because the MRTI committee was tasked with reporting back to the GA on the corporate engagement process, the question of how to best engage in Middle East peacemaking continued to come before the GA. Although previous years' resolutions and decisions influenced subsequent years, each GA brought with it a new batch of commissioners and new committee members. A significant amount of committee time in July 2012 was spent discussing the MRTI process to date, as well as the reaction of the Jewish and broader church community to previous decisions of the Church. However, Jack Baca, Moderator of the Middle East Peacemaking Committee in 2012, reminded committee members,

that "we are now the GA" and that "history is important but not the only question." Each year, those present shape the debates and make the decisions based on their own understanding of the issues, even if it is the first time they have considered such matters. At the same time, however, the history of the Church—particularly divisive struggles such as desegregation and women's ordination, as well as the Church's history related to the antiapartheid struggle and it relationship with Jews—were all referenced by activists on either side of the divestment debate. As in the other cases of BDS discussed in this book, three major themes came to the forefront of the discussions surrounding divestment: debates over the identity of the Church and its relations with key partners (particularly Middle Eastern Christians and American Jews), rival conceptions of how the Church can best work for peace in the Middle East, and differing approaches to power and process.

Clarifying Language: The 217th GA (2006)

In response to the uproar over the 2004 "divestment resolution," the 217th GA in 2006 voted that "financial investments of the Presbyterian Church (USA), as they pertain to Israel, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, be invested in only peaceful pursuits, and affirm that the customary corporate engagement process of the Committee on Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI) of our denomination is the proper vehicle for achieving this goal" (Hill 2006a). Furthermore, the body questioned the decision making process (rather than the substantive issues) at the previous GA, emphasizing the need for discussion and dialog before votes should be taken in the future on "theological and social positions . . . that might reasonably be expected to damage the relationship with Jews . . . and accept responsibility for the flaws in our process and ask for a new season of mutual understanding" (Minutes of the 217th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA) 2006). Presbyterians were divided on the meaning of this resolution. While some viewed the re-visiting of the divestment overture as a reversal of the earlier decision, and therefore a victory for those opposed to divestment, the Stated Clerk of the GA, Clifton Kirkpatrick, affirmed that the shift in the language to a "corporate engagement process" rather than "phased, selective investment" "does not overturn the actions of the 216th GA," but rather reflected the standard MRTI process and the work in which that committee was already engaged (Hill 2006b). However, in 2012, committee members (and plenary delegates) often

remained confused as to the implications of the 2006 resolution regarding the question of divestment.

Revisiting "Divestment": The 218th GA (2008)

Divides in PCUSA and within the Jewish community over matters regarding divestment and how to best work for peace in the Middle East came to a head in May 2008, shortly before the convening of the 218th GA, in regard to a statement entitled "Vigilance Against Anti-Jewish Ideas and Bias" posted on the PCUSA website. The article emphasized the commitment of the Church to its policies rejecting anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish teaching, and suggested that some of the 2004 business had "anti-Jewish overtones." The document repeatedly referenced the "complexity" of the issues surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cautioned Presbyterians to always be "alert to any and all anti-Jewish ideas and bias," and was particularly critical of Palestinian liberation theology (Braverman 2010a, 334–35). Mark Braverman, author of *Fatal Embrace*, which chronicles the history of Christian-Jewish relations, strongly criticized the statement and argued that "Christians . . . must not be intimidated by Jews who use [anti-Semitism] to muzzle legitimate protest against injustice" (Braverman 2010a, 339). He suggested that Christians should be "wary" when cautioned against the appearance of anti-Semitism when they are working on the issue of Israel's actions toward the Palestinians. When the Office of Interfaith Relations revised the statement, however, it caused further hue and cry, with leaders of more than a dozen national Jewish agencies claiming the new statement "is infused with the very bias that the original document condemned" (Dunigan n.d.). In a letter to the Stated Clerk of the GA, three Jewish leaders from the Reconstructionist, Reform, and Conservative traditions argued that the revised statement "does more to excuse anti-Semitism and foster anti-Jewish motifs than it does to dispel them" and "is completely unbalanced in its appraisal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" (cited in Braverman 2010a, 344). Sydney Levy of JVP disagreed, stating that the revised document reflects "the commitment of the PCUSA to seek justice by rejecting anti-Semitism, and anti-Jewish ideas and bias" (cited in Dunigan 2008).

The debate surrounding this letter highlights the division within the Church (and within the Jewish community) over how to best address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: taking a "balanced" or neutral approach, or taking a justice-based approach. The Jewish agencies resent the Presbyterian's focus on the Israeli occupation as "at the root

of evil acts committed against innocent people on both sides of the conflict" and assert that the Church policy of corporate "engagement" (their quotation marks) is not a "viable approach to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No recent church policy has caused greater harm to Presbyterian-Jewish relations" (*Jewish Agencies Express Profound Hurt by Presbyterian Church Actions* 2008). Like PFMEP, the Jewish agencies call for more dialog and understanding, and see divestment as an obstacle to peacemaking efforts.

The debate over the PCUSA statement served as a precursor to the debates at the 218th GA, where issues concerning peace in the Middle East took up much of the agenda. In a vote of 504–171–7, the GA voted to affirm the prophetic role of the Church and to endorse the 2007 Amman Call by the World Council of Churches (Whisler 2008). Much of the Amman Call was consistent with existing PCUSA policy, re-iterating a commitment to UN resolutions, to a two-state solution, and to the security of both Palestinians and Israelis. The Amman Call also called for the "Separation Barrier" to "be removed from the occupied territory" and noted that peacemaking efforts include "defining and promoting measures, including economic ones, that could help end the occupation and enhance sustainable growth and development" (*The Amman Call* 2007). The focus on economic measures provided space for the possibility of pressure-based tactics like BDS as well as the concept of "positive investment." In terms of approaches to peace, however, the Amman Call does not advocate a "balanced" approach, but rather challenges the Church to "speak 'truth to power' and name with courage the injustices we see and experience" and also to "risk the curses and abuse that will be aimed at you and stand in solidarity with us and with our Palestinian brothers and sisters of all faiths as we defiantly reject the possibility that the occupation will continue" (*The Amman Call* 2007). By endorsing the Amman Call, PCUSA affirmed its long-standing ties with its Christian partners in the Middle East and advocated for justice.

Two other significant decisions were made by the 2008 GA in regard to the Middle East conflict, both of which were aimed at increasing awareness and bringing further light to the issue through focused study. First, the GA created a Middle East Study Committee (MESC) to prepare a comprehensive study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to bring recommendations back to the next GA. Second, the GA called for Presbyterians to take pilgrimages to the Holy Land and to spend "significant time in the Occupied Territories (witnessing conditions, helping sustain isolated and impoverished local economies)." In the

same resolution, the GA called on MRTI "to report regularly to the GA Council on its communication and compliance, or lack thereof, by Caterpillar, Motorola, and other corporations involved with regard to GA guidelines and concerns for justice and human rights" (218th GA 2008). Through such efforts, the Church hoped to respond to claims that it was insufficiently aware of the "complexity" of the situation, while continuing with its time-tested corporate engagement policy.

Breaking Down Walls: The 219th GA (2010)

The 219th GA dealt with two major items of business related to Middle East peacemaking and the question of divestment, both of which illustrated the differing views within the Church regarding appropriate ways to pursue peace and to remain true to PCUSA's historic commitments to Middle Eastern Christians and American Jews. PCUSA approved a recommendation to "study" the Kairos Palestine Document, and it tasked the newly created monitoring group for the Middle East with the creation of a study guide to accompany the document (*Middle East Study Committee Recommendations-Final* 2010). The 219th GA also "received" the lengthy "Breaking Down Walls" report put forth by the MESC formed after the 218th GA. The 80-page report called on the PCUSA to take urgent action due to the "rapidly closing window of opportunity for action" regarding peace in Israel/Palestine (Breaking Down the Walls 2010, 1). Although the report sought to provide "balance" in its coverage of the issues, and "call[ed] on all parties in the Middle East to cease rhetoric and actions that demonize others, whether that take the form of anti-Semitism or Islamophobia," and condemned actions taken by Iran and Syria as well as Israelis and Palestinians (Banks 2010, 41), one large Chicago-area Presbytery criticized it for being "unbalanced and overwhelmingly biased against Israel." They argued, "we, as concerned and invested outsiders, must listen equally to both perspectives" (*A Statement from the Session of the Fourth Presbyterian Church of Chicago* 2010, 2).

   "Breaking Down the Walls" acknowledged the two unparalleled psycho-traumas that affect Israelis and Palestinians and their conflict: the trauma of the Holocaust and the trauma of the Nakba, and opened with a series of letters to concerned constituencies and church partners. In its original recommendations, the MESC report also endorsed the Kairos Palestine document, which calls for BDS, although the authors noted that "we struggle with its call for solidarity in this area and confess that we have not fully answered it" (Breaking Down the Walls 2010,

29). Upon reaching the 219th GA, the report was modified considerably. In response to those calling for more "balance" in the report, the GA deleted Part Three of the report, which consisted of "Notes from a Humanistic, Liberal Zionist" and "A Plea for Justice: A Historical Analysis," and created a new monitoring group on the Middle East tasked with, among other things, replacing this section with "a series of eight narratives of comparable length, four arising from the range of authentically Palestinian perspectives, and four arising from the range of authentically Israeli perspectives," along with an "authentically pro-justice and pro-peace" annotated bibliography to provide even greater breadth and depth (*Middle East Study Committee Recommendations-Final* 2010). As the committee worked to gather the narratives, however, they realized, as was discussed in Chapter 2, that terms like "pro-justice" and "pro-peace" "were more complex and/or vague than what would be indicated at first glance" (PCUSA 2012c, 39). Further amendments of note included a shift from endorsing Kairos Palestine to commending the document for study, while "endors[ing] the document's emphasis on hope for liberation, nonviolence, love of enemy, and reconciliation" (PCUSA 2010).

The report, particularly as amended, sought to balance concerns for "balance" and hearing all sides with the PCUSA's history of social witness and anti-occupation stance. It affirmed a series of principled statements based on previous Church policies, including calls for "the reaffirmation of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation within secure and internationally recognized borders in accordance with United Nations resolutions," "the end of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and diversion of water resources," and "an immediate cessation of all violence, whether perpetrated by Israelis or Palestinians" (PCUSA 2010). The report called for 2010–2012 to be a "time of Presbyterian prayer and action for the Middle East" and outlined a series of actions including local dialogs with American Jews and Muslims and travel opportunities to meet with Palestinian Christians. The report also highlighted the divide between approaches to peacemaking through "divestment" and through "positive investment," authorizing the continued corporate engagement activities of MRTI and "denounc[ing] Caterpillar's continued profit-making from non-peaceful uses of its products," while also calling for Presbyterians "to invest positively, after due vetting, in sustainable economic development projects for the West Bank and Gaza" (*Middle East Study Committee Recommendations-Final* 2010). The MESC report was seen as "critically so important" because it succinctly reiterated existing Presbyterian positions and placed "a spotlight on the issue that hasn't really existed prior to that" (Interview with

MESC Member 2011). As one Jewish supporter of the report noted, "the issues are not in question. What is in question...is the proper method for action" (Braverman 2010b). However, Rabbi Yitzhock Adlerstein, director of interfaith affairs at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, suggested that the MESC report "threw the book at Israel," not only through its endorsement of Kairos Palestine (although, as noted above, the GA did not endorse the document as a whole), but also because it "reverts to replacement theology" and "blamed all woes on Israel's 'occupation'" (Adlerstein 2010). Notably, Rabbi Adlerstein observed that of his time at the GA, "most painful was listening to Jews who came to passionately endorse every anti-Israel initiative. Our community needs to work harder to understand how to retrieve Jews who today stand at the forefront of delegitimizing Israel efforts" (Adlerstein 2010). These remarks indicate a central theme in BDS debates: that Jews are divided on the issue of divestment and its implications for Christian-Jewish relations, and the fact that even those who agree on "the issues" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differ on how to address them. The MESC further reiterated the "disagreement between narratives" in the eight "pro-justice, pro-peace" narratives they collected; the goal of the collection was to "show the diversity of opinion among the primary stakeholders in the conflict" (although the committee noted many key stakeholders were missing and that those stakeholders who were not "pro-justice, pro-peace" were not heard at all), and not to endorse particular viewpoints (PCUSA 2012c, 40).

The "Breaking Down Walls" report was approved as amended unanimously in committee, and approved as amended by a 558–119–7 vote in the GA plenary. The 82 percent approval of the report was deemed the "miracle in Minneapolis" because the Middle East had somehow united the PCUSA (Interview with MESC Member 2 2011). However, the MESC report and its recommendations did not become Church policy; instead, the GA "received" Part One of the report, which included letters to Our Church, Partners, and Engaged Parties and a section engaging in theological reflection on the issues, "as rationale for recommendations only." The revised and approved recommendations, almost ten pages in length, re-state moral principles, affirm previous GA Policies and Statements, and make recommendations for PCUSA Church action (*Middle East Study Committee Recommendations-Final* 2010). The MESC report recommendations and the tasks assigned to the monitoring group on the Middle East set the stage for the 220th GA, underscoring the PCUSA's unity of concern for peace and justice in the region, while highlighting divides regarding how to best achieve those goals. Differences of opinion

over Kairos Palestine, as well as concern over how to best respond to Caterpillar's policies, also foreshadowed 2012 debates. While the MESC report raised the possibility of divestment and sanctions, it was not until the October 2010 IPMN conference that the term boycott was raised in any official Presbyterian gatherings (Interview with MESC Member 2011). By the time of the conference, more Presbyterians had visited the region and met with Israelis and Palestinians, contributing to a "more experienced-based eye-witness view or voice" to Middle East issues, and there was "less of a fear factor" in terms of Church members "seeing a difference between criticism of the Israeli government and criticism of the [Jewish] faith" (Interview with Advocacy leader 2011). Nevertheless, the "fear factor" continued to play a role in Presbyterian discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how to best advocate for peace and justice in the region.

A Church Divided: Divestment Narrowly Defeated but Boycott Proceeds: The 220th GA (2012)

MRTI came to the 220th GA calling for divestment from Caterpillar, HP, and Motorola Solutions as a result of eight years of working with ecumenical partners "diligently to engage [these companies] about their involvement and complicity in non-peaceful pursuits and human rights violations." In its report to the 2012 PCUSA GA, MRTI chronicles the various dialog efforts, shareholder resolutions, and other activities undertaken by MRTI and its ecumenical partners and observes that even as they worked to engage with those corporations, "the obstacles to a just peace identified in 2004 remain, and have become more intractable" (MRTI 2011, 11). Those involved expressed frustration with the engagement process, noting that "engagement with Caterpillar has been very elusive, very misleading" due to the company agreeing in principle to talk with MRTI "but then they don't send the right people and they don't talk about what we want to talk about" (Interview with MRTI Member 2011). In addition to Caterpillar, MRTI observed, "Motorola Solutions is unresponsive to all efforts by religious shareholders to engage in serious discussions about its involvement in non-peaceful pursuits" and remarked that HP "declines to engage the serious issues of its involvement in non-peaceful pursuit" (MRTI 2011, 12). The specific resolution brought by MRTI stated,

> The Committee on Mission Responsibility Through Investment has been seeking to engage companies profiting from non-peaceful pursuits

> in Israel-Palestine since the directive of the 216th General Assembly (2004) and the reaffirmations and actions of each subsequent Assembly. This process of engagement has, in the case of three companies, produced no substantive change and, in the judgment of this Assembly, is likely not to do so in the future. Under the church's regular process of corporate engagement (approved by the 116th General Assembly of the PCUS (1976) and reaffirmed as policy after reunion), the final step is to recommend divestment from companies where engagement is not resulting in any change. Therefore, in accordance with the actions of prior Assemblies, we direct that Caterpillar, Hewlett Packard, and Motorola Solutions be placed on the General Assembly Divestment List until such time as they have ceased profiting from non-peaceful pursuits in Israel-Palestine, as defined by prior General Assembly actions. (MRTI 2011, 13)

Due to changes in the corporation's structure, ITT was placed on the military contractor list, and therefore automatically placed on a divestment screen; MRTI recommended continued engagement with United Technologies. Despite the fact that MRTI has been making recommendations on investing consistent with the Church's social witness policy for decades, and despite the fact that MRTI's work on this specific issue was continually affirmed by the GA since 2004, the resulting discussions in committee and on the plenary floor were contentious. As in other BDS cases documented in this book, the themes of identity-related fear, rival moral frameworks for conceptualizing the divestment debate, and differing approaches to power were evident in the debates surrounding the 2012 GA held in Pittsburgh and help explain this contentiousness.

In addition to these common themes, the case of the PCUSA divestment debate highlights the importance of local context and institutional structure in mediating the debates and the process through which questions of boycott and divestment were engaged. Often, questions of process obscured the issues at hand, and some commissioners questioned whether the confusing voting procedure on the plenary floor was responsible for the final outcome of the divestment vote. The case also highlights the difference in public response to what Rabbi Michael Lerner (2012) terms BDS1 and BDS2. Although MRTI's proposal for divesting from HP, Motorola, and Caterpillar was focused on their policies and practices related to the Israeli occupation (and members of MRTI repeatedly emphasized PCUSA's continued investments in Israel proper), the coercive nature of the action, as well as some commissioners' doubts regarding the causal linkages between the corporations (especially Caterpillar) and the occupation meant that many

conflated the proposal with BDS1. In contrast, the proposal to boycott settlement products was very clearly a form of BDS2, and passed without controversy.

Unless otherwise noted, the discussion that follows of the 220th GA draws on the author's observations of the Middle East Peacemaking Committee (Committee 15) and the plenary sessions dealing with the business of this committee in July 2012.

Conception of Who "We" Are

Debates over the character and personality of PCUSA were central to the contention over the divestment issue at the 220th GA. While not all of these debates were motivated by fear, the opposition to the divestment overture mobilized two identity-based fears. The first fear dealt with the threat of losing interfaith relations with Jews, a relationship cultivated over 35 years to mend a legacy of anti-Semitism in the Church. Presbyterians, all too cognizant of the history of Jewish suffering at the hands of Christians, did not want to be deemed anti-Semitic. This theme of Jewish partnerships and Jewish relationships was raised repeatedly by those speaking against the divestment overture, and many suggested partnering with Jewish synagogues for deeper discernment around the issue, arguing that American Jews can help with leverage for peace in the Middle East and therefore should not be alienated, as they would be by the passage of the divestment overture.

Establishment Jewish organizations sent letters and wrote op-eds against divestment, and exerted pressure that one Jewish divestment advocate called "heavy-handed fear-mongering" (Mozgovaya 2012b). Others countered this fear tactic, stating that although "church commissioners were swayed by a fear that divestment would cause irreparable harm to Jewish-Christian relations…in reality the divestment motion was supported by a broad alliance of Jews, Christians, and others" (Kaleem 2012). Anna Baltzer, serving as a resource person for the Advisory Committee for Racial and Ethnic Concerns, asserted that although "you are being told that action against the occupation will estrange you from the Jewish people…the occupation is fundamentally contrary to our shared values of equality and justice…and to claim that ending cooperation with these human rights violations means ending cooperation with Judaism, or Jews, draws a very dangerous parallel" (Baltzer 2012a). Yet, as one member of Committee 15 remarked, "I feel I've been threatened with relations breaking by Jews and Christians." This sentiment continued an observed trend from previous GAs, where

the debate was not about the substance of the issues, but "about the relationship with the Jews" (Interview with Jewish scholar-activist 2011). In his remarks to Committee 15 in support of the divestment overture, Bill Plitt sought to shift the conversation away from external relations to a focus on Presbyterians themselves, emphasizing that

> there is still good reason to fear anti-Semitism's ugly head amidst a world of hate, and we should continue to educate people of the world about such conditions. But this meeting in Pittsburgh is not about Christians, Jews, and Muslims. It isn't even about U.S and the State of Israel, nor is it about BDS as a bundle. It is about a conversation that members of our denomination must have with one another about injustice and our responsibility to put an end to our complicity in maintaining such treatment of an occupied people of 50 plus years. (Plitt 2012)

The second threat related to identity-based fear that was raised, which was often rhetorically connected to the first, was that by passing the divestment overture the Presbyterian Church would, as one Committee 15 speaker suggested, "lose millions of church members and 50–100 churches." Others at the committee sessions worried that divestment would "divide the Church and precipitate division with synagogues in our communities who we work with." A divestment opponent commenting on the GA proclaimed that "the ultimate price seems about to be paid by the church as a whole which . . . looks ready to continue to divide into smaller and smaller units, just so one part can join the BDS movement without being bothered by those pesky Presbyterians who have other opinions" (Haber 2012f). Those for and against divestment made reference to past struggles in the Church over slavery, desegregation, and women's ordination, all of which were controversial and divided the Church. A church member stated that we "need to do the ethical thing regardless of who stays or goes."

Divestment from Caterpillar in particular was seen as a direct threat to the identity of Church members who were long-term employees of the company. One speaker admonished Committee 15 to "think about those who work for CAT, divestment will drive members out," and a Caterpillar employee maintained that Israel retrofits the bulldozers, and so Caterpillar is a false target since the machines used in the West Bank are different than those made in the United States. Another commissioner reiterated this point, asserting, "different companies in Israel militarize the bulldozers. Caterpillar can't stop building at the West Bank" (Mozgovaya 2012a). Seeking to be on the side of morality, Caterpillar

employees spoke both in Committee 15 and on the plenary floor about the humanitarian side of the company, which "usually responds to disasters, to the earthquake in Haiti, to 9/11," and, as another stated, was "helping rebuild Henryville, IN, was helping in Charlotte to build a new road . . . CAT is used in many worthwhile ways for many worthwhile projects." A number of other Presbyterians felt differently, however. As one pastor stated, "I don't want my pension invested in ethnic cleansing," and an MRTI representative speaking to the plenary session noted that Caterpillar has provided directives on how to use its equipment to its suppliers in Iran, which suggests it could do the same in Israel if it so chose.

The issue of Church identity was also raised by those concerned with PCUSA's relationship with its partners in the Middle East. Amgad Beblawi, the coordinator of PCUSA's mission work in the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia pointed to the Kairos Palestine document as reflective of the Palestinian and Arab Christian viewpoint, and reminded commissioners of the hundreds of mission personnel working alongside indigenous Christians in the region. One divestment advocated queried, "How do you do 'mission in partnership'? Today your partners are asking you for something, listen to them if you want to be partners. Not listening to the voices of the oppressed is patronizing." Rick Ufford-Chase, former Moderator of the PCUSA urged people to consider how decisions "would impact our global partners," and another spoke as to how he was "troubled by the minimization of the suffering of our Palestinian brothers and sisters." Commissioners were reminded that not only Jewish partners had opinions about divestment, but that their Middle Eastern Christian partners were asking them to heed their call for justice.

A final identity-related thread found in the PCUSA debates deals with the role of social witness as a cornerstone of Church character. For many involved in the debates over divestment, the question was not just about whether to pursue a particular policy, but rather how to remain faithful to Church values and practice. As Brian Ellison from MRTI articulated to the GA, the MRTI process is based on the idea of "good stewardship" and using Church resources to advance social witness. He emphasized that "if we are to follow the directives of previous GAs we have no choice for us other than to recommend divestment" from HP, Motorola, and Caterpillar and that "not to divest at this point is against Church policy and also forty years of history . . . it's the normal conclusion to the normal process." In other words, voting to divest from these three companies was an affirmation of Church policy and its history of social witness.

Rival Moral Frameworks

In the divestment debates, issues of morality are intimately tied up with issues of effectiveness and impact. Often, those for and against divestment have conflated claims for justness with claims of efficacy in advocating for a particular policy. For example, in 2005 Rabbi Abraham Cooper, speaking against the corporate engagement practice of PCUSA, argued that it was a "brilliantly organized political campaign to hurt Israel, and it's not going to help a single Palestinian," seeking to emphasize not only that the divestment action was "functionally anti-Semitic" (and hence immoral), but also that it ignored the "reality on the ground" (Goodstein 2005). In the Middle East peacemaking debates, a representative from MRTI noted that divesting the Church's 118 shares (worth $10,000) in Caterpillar was "not about economic impact on CAT, but about social witness," underscoring the primacy of moral principles. Just as in the other cases studied, moral debates encompassed not only principles of human rights and security, but also contending perspectives on how to best pursue peace and conflict resolution. Within the course of the PCUSA debates, a major portion of the time was spent debating the relative morality and efficacy of "positive investment" versus "divestment," with those opposed to divestment pushing for "positive" as opposed to "punitive" action.

Those supporting divestment articulated the importance of maintaining a social witness, asserting that as shareholders they could use leverage for corporate change for a while, but Church policy calls for divestment as a last resort if the usual course of engagement bears no fruit. Divestment is a way to "align mission with finance and make a loud voice for negotiation," to create an incentive, via external pressure, for Israel to create a Palestinian state. Others added that divestment is not new nor specific to Israel; PCUSA automatically divests from military contractors, for example. As one speaker asked, "what does it mean for our own faith if we are profiting from violence?" Drawing on their faith tradition, a number of speakers drew parallels to the story of Jesus cleansing the Temple, stating that the Church should act "with integrity to divest from companies whose purposes are unpeaceful . . . Jesus stood with the outcasts and those needing healing, he didn't worry about his relationships with the Pharisees." Divestment advocates noted that although divestment is a symbolic act given the percentage of stock owned in the three companies in question, "symbolic acts matter" because "people around the world are watching." Another affirmed, "divestment is hoped to be a loud voice—to get Israel's attention" while

it was also noted that people are most afraid of economic sanctions like divestment because "they can actually be effective."

Opponents to divestment, however, differed in their views not only of the morality of divestment, but also of its impact. As one speaker noted in Committee 15, "no one cares about our symbolic action . . . it will achieve nothing except alienation" because it "privileges Palestinians over Israelis." Another BDS opponent said, "we talk and nothing we do will change the lives of Palestinian and Israeli kids; this is only a symbolic gesture . . . it won't do any difference but it will do great harm." Both sides of the divestment issue referred to Jesus to legitimize their claim making. As one divestment opponent suggested, "selling securities won't solve the problem. Christ did not disengage from non-believers and we shouldn't either." Many opposed the divestment overture due to the nature of the target as well, suggesting that by targeting US companies and not Israel or the US government the measure "hurts innocent companies." Ironically, this criticism, also leveraged by a commissioner in the plenary who self-identified as a member of the corporate world, spins the criticism that the divestment overture unjustly targets Israel. The corporate executive argued, "it's not reasonable to ask companies to control how people use their products," suggesting that the Presbyterian Church should be focusing instead on the US and Israeli governments.[3] Another argument dealt with the "unbalanced" nature of divestment, which ignores the suffering on both sides. For example, in the Committee 15 meetings former Moderator Susan Andrews said "we need to honor two moral imperatives, to stand in solidarity with the pain and oppression of Palestinians and end occupation . . . and to stand in solidarity with historical partners in Israel and the US Jewish community . . . we need to honor both moral imperatives, build bridges not burn them."

Approaches to Peace and Nonviolence

Debates on the efficacy and morality of divestment are inherently linked to frameworks for operationalizing the commonly espoused goal of Presbyterians for peace and justice in the Middle East. Reverend Geoff Browning articulated one of two rival approaches to peace in a statement to Committee 15 supporting the divestment overture, saying, "let us not be like the white moderates who prefer a negative peace of coerced occupation rather than the positive peace of justice and human rights," articulating support for "positive" peace while also drawing a direct link between the Palestinian struggle and the US civil rights movement

through his reference to King's 1963 Letter from a Birmingham Jail. In contrast, opponents viewed divestment as a "judgment" and "oversimplification" of a "complex" issue, arguing that negotiation and interfaith dialog is a better approach to resolving the conflict. Often opponents and supporters used similar examples to make disparate points, further underscoring the different underlying frameworks of the problem at hand and the best way to address it.

For example, in a speech to Committee 15 one divestment opponent described a joint water project sponsored by USAID using Caterpillar equipment, claiming that divestment hurts such peace-promoting projects. In response, a divestment advocate contended that such projects do not work in the broader structure of the occupation, sharing the example of a cistern project in the South Hebron hills later destroyed when Israeli soldiers filled 20 cisterns with sheep dung, old cars and other detritus. Supporters of divestment underscored its nonviolent credentials, noting it is a "time-honored, faithful, nonviolent act." Rami Khoury pointed to the examples of Steve Biko, Rosa Parks and Aung San Suu Kyi, claiming, "this is a just cause, grounded in legal rights." Opponents like Ethan Felsen, however, declared that "divestment is only one narrative, and peacemaking needs to hear multiple narratives," while another opponent insisted that Presbyterians should be "repairers of the breach," lamenting, as did opponents of the UC Berkeley divestment bill, that "divestment creates division."

As a Church, the PCUSA has a stated policy against the Israeli occupation and in favor of a two-state solution. As one interview subject noted, the debate over BDS in part is about "the best way to achieve this same goal that all of us have" (Interview with MESC Member 2 2011). At the end of his report to the GA plenary, Committee 15 Moderator Rev. Jack Baca noted, "we have disagreed about strategy and tactics but have not disagreed upon our goal, which is peace in the Middle East." However, these views of "peace" are rooted in some fundamental differences. Speaking in favor of overture 15–10 on positive investment, Rev. Bill Borror, for example, argued that divestment "contradicts the cause of peace" by putting "Israel in a corner" and isolating them. Many opposing divestment advised commissioners that "peace is not to take sides," whereas those advocating divestment and framing it in terms of nonviolence advocated the importance precisely of "standing with the oppressed."

The internal debate among Jews at the Committee 15 hearings also echoed these dividing lines, with young Jewish activists articulating the need to take a stance against injustice. When speaking to the committee

members, one young activist described how nonviolent demonstrations in Palestine are met with violence and how "do no harm means divesting from harm" because Israel will not change without outside pressure. In addition, several rabbis spoke out in favor of divestment, including Rabbi Alissa Wise, who read a passage from Leviticus that calls on people to remind friends of their values when they forget. Numerous Jews from JVP spoke in favor of divestment during the sessions, linking it with concerns for justice and peace, and encouraging members of the PCUSA to "follow its own conscience on divestment." These appeals echoed several statements made by Christians to Committee 15, including "committing to nonviolence means committing to faithfulness."

Positive Investment

The debate over "positive investment" is another example of how the divestment debates are grounded in different conceptual frameworks. According to James M. Wall, former editor of *The Christian Century* and noted blogger on issues of Middle East politics and religion, the positive investment proposal was a "stalking horse" that provided "a positive sounding action for those who worship the market, versus divestment, a negative sounding word because it is a non-violent action that goes to the heart of the sin of occupation" (Wall 2012). It was evident from the committee debates as well as the statements on the floor of the plenary session that Presbyterians want to make a difference, even if they differ in their views of how best to do so. Committee 15 members spent hours trying to find a way to reconcile overtures 15–10, which denounced divestment and called for positive investment, and 15–11, which called for divestment from HP, Motorola, and Caterpillar as a result of the MRTI process of corporate engagement. Because commissioners are chosen every two years to sit on the GA and are randomly assigned to committees, they may not only be new to learning about issues in the Middle East, but they may also have little understanding of the financial workings of the Church. In order to reconcile the divergent views on divestment, the commissioners sought ways to move the money to be divested from the three companies to a fund for investment in peaceful pursuits in Israel/Palestine. As one committee member stated, we should "challenge and direct like we do elsewhere" by divesting and re-investing in peaceful projects. However, members of the PCUSA's financial institutions repeatedly explained that was not possible due to the way the funds were set up and the charge of the financial bodies to carefully invest the money so as to have funds to pay pensions.

Divestment advocates noted the pitfalls of the "positive investment" approach, including the fact that Palestinian Christians, PCUSA's mission partners, were calling for divestment, not investment, because, as one divestment advocate noted, "no positive investment will ever have impact if we don't dismantle the occupation." James Wall caricaturized positive investment as a strategy that will "bring American money into the prisons that are the West Bank and Gaza. This will make life a little easier for the prisoners, extra desserts for lunch, you know, that sort of thing" (Wall 2012). Several pro-divestment individuals called positive investment a "whitewash," and Noushin Framke of the Advocacy Committee for Racial and Ethnic Relations asserted, "positive investment as framed supports the infrastructure of occupation." Anna Baltzer, Resource Person for the Advocacy Committee, noted, "today you are not neutral because you are invested in one side," seeking to offset claims by anti-divestment advocates that divestment was "taking sides." Divestment supporters challenged those who said "there is no evidence that divestment will help economic development" and that "disinvestment will hurt Palestinians, why not investment in Palestine" by emphasizing that Palestinians themselves, through Kairos Palestine, were calling on the international community to exert economic pressure, and that the MRTI process itself calls for divestment as the final step in the corporate engagement process.

Divestment advocates also emphasized the need to change the overall structure of the occupation rather than tinkering with the status quo, highlighting the fact that Israel maintains control over the mechanisms for Palestinian economic growth and development. As one Palestinian businessman said, "we Palestinians don't want a more beautiful prison to live in. We want the prison walls to come down, and that won't happen unless pressure is placed on Israel to end the occupation" (Baltzer 2012b). This view was echoed by Nahida Gordon, ruling elder and Palestinian-American, in her testimony before the committee, when she asserted that "what the Palestinians need is not a gilding of their cage or prison, but freedom to access their own natural resources, freedom of movement, and freedom to interact with other countries to develop trade and their economy" (Gordon 2012). Divestment advocates also emphasized that investment, even in a "good" cause, must be done with precaution because "unless they are done in a context that challenges the occupation of the West Bank, they simply provide a cover enabling that occupation to continue and to spread" (Mead 2012).

While many committee members[4] were convinced of the importance of investment in peacemaking efforts, they did not see it as a substitute

for divestment and sought to provide a "both-and" message to the GA. However, by approving both the divestment overture (36–11 with one abstention) and the positive investment overture (36–8 with one abstention) and sending both to the GA, the committee members provided an opening for divestment opponents to substitute the resolution for positive investment in place of the divestment resolution. In fact, the critical divestment vote in the GA was not over whether or not to divest from the three companies (the MRTI recommendation), but rather whether or not to accept the positive investment motion, submitted as a minority report from Committee 15, as a substitute for the original divestment motion. Although a number of committee members saw the concepts of divestment and positive investment as "complementary," from the moment 15–10 was discussed, those opposed to divestment began asking the Committee Moderator Jack Baca about the procedure for making 15–10 a minority report, since minority reports can be substituted for majority reports on the plenary floor.

Power and Process

Similar to other cases of BDS activism studied in this book, supporters and opponents mobilized different forms of power. Activists involved in the IPMN sought to build a broad coalition of supporters inside the Church along with supporters from JVP to help convince the commissioners to stand on the side of the Palestinians and exert the pressure of global civil society to achieve PCUSA's stated objective of an end to the occupation and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As one divestment advocate shared in the Committee 15 hearings, the power of divestment stems from "nonviolence, spiritual power, ethical power, moral power. Our power is not from money." Another divestment supporter noted, "when pressure is applied to the companies that are providing support for the occupation, it is possible for these companies to withdraw their involvement . . . We are encouraging companies to move out and the threat of divestment is one way to accomplish that." As an example, the same divestment supporter noted that Heineken, Unilever, and several other major companies have moved production facilities out of the West Bank. This economic pressure can make a difference because "there is no incentive for Israel to change its behavior" since it is the status quo power (Interview with Interfaith Activist 2011).

In contrast to the volunteer-based efforts of IPMN, the Jewish establishment and anti-divestment forces have significant resources at their disposal. The Jewish Federation of North America and the Jewish

Council for Public Affairs invested $6 million to combat BDS efforts through the Israel Action Network, and just months after divestment resolutions failed at the Presbyterian and United Methodist Church assemblies, the Jewish Committee Relations Council (JCRC) organized an invitation-only anti-divestment conference in Burlingame, California to begin organizing against church divestment initiatives (Kane 2013b). Despite the efforts taken by anti-divestment advocates and the apparent shift in US public opinion on the issue, one Presbyterian divestment opponent noted, "I think people that are promoting the BDS strategy have an incredibly grandiose vision of themselves and the power and the leverage that they might bring to bear on this thing. I think they have no power and no leverage" (Interview with Interfaith Dialogue Advocate 2011).

In contrast to this portrayal, most divestment activists viewed themselves as lacking the material resources of the anti-divestment camp, but having power through the force of justice, morality, and grassroots pressure. Divestment supporters pointed to other ways that anti-divestment advocates held power over Church process as well. For example, one interview subject noted how a large Presbyterian congregation in Chicago wanted to build a high rise on their property and "the Jewish alderman who is over their area holds the power to permit or deny the permission to do that would not give them the permission to do it. That's one way they exert pressure" (Interview with IPMN member 2011). While this is mere anecdote, and there may be many other reasons for the denial of permission, there is a perception that those opposed to divestment hold power and leverage over members of the Church, whether through the threat of broken interfaith relations, church walkouts, or obstruction in matters of local government.

Church process and the institutionalized structures of PCUSA also impacted the narrow vote against divestment, illustrating how local context shapes the contours of divestment debates. Those for and against divestment sought to use Church process to their own advantage, with the minority report strategy ultimately resulting in a defeat of the divestment overture. Members of MRTI noted in the sessions that their mandate was given to them by the GA, that they faithfully pursued that mandate, and that never before had their work been challenged in this way. During committee sessions, several committee members actively questioned the work of MRTI, even questioning the report's veracity by asking why other Protestant denominations have not made the same decision. One committee member went so far as to suggest that the MRTI process was "flawed, false and a lie", asserting, "they are inviting you to play the GA." Speaking for MRTI, Brian Ellison

emphasized that other denominations do their work differently and that not all have the equivalent of MRTI. Furthermore, he noted that the corporate engagement process only results in divestment if you have gone through the entire process; it is not a matter of being anti-Israel. As in the case of the Olympia Food Co-op, where the process was called into question as a way to delegitimize the board's decision to de-shelve Israeli goods, much time was spent in committee questioning (and then explaining) the process undertaken by MRTI. Furthermore, as divestment supporter and Advocacy Director of IPMN Rev. Dr. Jeffrey DeYoe reminded Presbyterians, MRTI's corporate engagement process actually helped Citibank "identify where its business practices aided and abetted terrorists seeking to harm Israel," thereby strengthening Israel's security. Because Citibank changed its procedures, it was taken off of MRTI's corporate engagement list, although this success is not mentioned by opponents of divestment (DeYoe 2012).

Divestment advocates were critical of how Committee 15 process impacted the course of discussion over the issue, with one commenting to me informally that the Committee Moderator was appointed by the previous Moderator of the GA who is anti-divestment. This was of particular concern regarding the handling of the extensive stalling tactics orchestrated by anti-divestment members of the committee and audience on the first night of committee debates when the committee went in circles over how money can be used and invested, whether the term "divestment" should be replaced with "initiate divestment process," and frustration in the crowded room mounted as the same territory was charted and re-charted until the meeting finally adjourned after 10:30 p.m. with no decisions made. On the second day of committee meetings, a great deal of time was spent on process and procedure, explaining how the investment bodies of PCUSA operate, and how "divestment" would really equate to adding a negative screen so that future money would not be invested in those corporations. Because many committee members were new to the GA or to the Middle East issues, or both, much education had to be done not only in terms of substantive matters, but also in terms of the very formal process and procedure followed by the Church.

This formal, often confusing, conservative process and procedure is partly responsible for the failure of the divestment motion on the GA level, despite its passage by more than a three to one majority in committee. First, while Young Adult and other advisory delegates (Theological Student Advisory Delegates, Mission Advisory Delegates and Ecumenical Advisory Delegates) may vote in committee, they do not have an official vote on the plenary floor. Although they can speak on the plenary floor during business sessions, they provide an "advisory"

vote prior to the official vote by the commissioners in order to high-light the viewpoints of these distinct constituencies. The majority of the 221 advisory delegates at the 220th GA opposed the substitution of the minority report for the divestment overture, with Mission Advisory Delegates voting one hundred percent against the substitute motion and only the Ecumenical Advisory Delegates voting to support it. The GA Mission Council, Advocacy Committee for Racial and Ethnic Concerns, and some members of the Board of Pensions also supported the divest-ment resolution, casting their votes in support to the recommendations made by MRTI (Baltzer 2012b).

In the end, the 333–331–2 vote was on whether to take the minority report on positive investment as the main report in place of the divest-ment recommendation. This voting procedure confused a number of commissioners, some of whom came forward afterward to express the fact that they voted incorrectly due to misunderstanding of what a "yes" and "no" vote constituted. During the next business session several com-missioners tried to bring the divestment resolution 15–11 back to the floor. As one said, expressing concern over those who shared that they pushed the wrong button, "we do not have the will of Christ," while another "implored" those who abstained to "search their hearts and to vote." Throughout the discussion of whether 15–11 could be reconsid-ered, the Moderator had to stop to clarify process on multiple occasions. Eventually 62 percent voted against reconsidering the motion.

This extensive debate and push to reconsider the divestment motion indicated the soul-searching that was going on within the Church body. It may also explain why a separate overture, which originally called for the boycott of the settlement products Ahava Dead Sea Mineral Skincare and Hadikliam Dates, but was expanded in committee to include all settlement products, passed with a 71 percent vote. Perhaps because the boycott motion was so clearly in line with stated Church policy against settlements, against the occupation, and in favor of a two-state solution, or because the same fear tactics were not leveraged against the boycott overture, there was little controversy or discussion over this latter decision. At the same time, the boycott overture was legitimized in the plenary session by outside parties, which gave com-missioners moral cover. When asked to comment on the motion to the plenary, the Advisory Committee for Racial and Ethnic Concerns referenced Peter Beinart, a liberal Zionist who had recently called for a boycott of settlement goods to save Israel in a *New York Times* op-ed, and noted that the Methodists had also recently approved a blanket boycott of all settlement goods.

Object Shift Mechanism

Opponents of the divestment motion repeatedly sought to deploy an object shift mechanism, shifting the debate away from issues of morality and Church corporate engagement procedure by seeking to link the divestment overture to the broader BDS movement. For example, in materials they circulated to commissioners, PFMEP argued that the divestment and related proposals "are being advanced globally by a movement referred to as BDS . . . you will be asked to endorse divestment of three companies doing business with Israel, with the purpose being to pressure the government of Israel to remove unilaterally all Israeli security forces and settlers from the West Bank" (PFMEP 2012). Such statements not only shift focus to a "global" movement, which implies the call for divestment stems from outsiders rather than Presbyterian insiders following established Church procedure, but the language also shifts the focus from companies supporting the occupation (engaged in "non-peaceful pursuits") to a focus on "doing business with Israel," thereby suggesting PCUSA is divesting from Israel more broadly. As evidenced in other cases, the alleged existence of a broader "movement," implied to have sinister aims, was used against the specific resolution targeting three companies. Repeatedly, representatives of MRTI and other Church officials supporting the divestment resolution emphasized that they were not part of a broader boycott or divestment movement but were focusing on these three US companies whose practices were not in line with PCUSA's policy of social investment. Furthermore, in the plenary session MRTI underscored that it had pursued the full range of PCUSA's corporate engagement policy and had reached "the end of the line," such that further engagement would not yield results. Furthermore, although supporters of the resolution repeatedly emphasized the many investments PCUSA has in Israel, opponents framed the resolution as one-sided or as unjustly targeting Israel.

Consequently, opponents shifted the frame of reference away from internal Presbyterian debates over established Church policy and concern for investment in line with Church principles to a debate over the Church's relationship with Jews, targeting a knowingly sensitive subject due to the Church's concern for its interfaith relations and its principled stance against anti-Semitism. The rhetorical shift moving debate from targeted divestment from three US companies to the "BDS movement," and the shift from companies profiting from the occupation to companies doing business with Israel stimulated such fears. This is evident in one divestment opponent's blog, which states,

Church members can't quite bring themselves to fully understand that, far from being a "peace movement," BDS is the propaganda arm of a war movement that will quote scripture and subvert the vocabulary of human rights to get its way, the saner wing of the Presbyterian Church seems to know enough to avoid handing their name and reputation over to a third party that shares none of their interests (Haber 2012e).

Divestment supporters, however, sought to re-frame the conversation, with one challenging an AP report on the PCUSA debates that described the issue as one of divestment from "companies that do business in Israel" rather than "companies that directly support Israel's occupation" (Wall 2012) and another emphasizing that "it is not about boycott, sanctions and divestment from Israel. It is about divestment from American companies, who have been invited for 'engagement' and discussions . . . and have either not participated in meaningful conversations, or not responded to appeals for such engagement" (Plitt 2012).

Opponents of divestment also engaged in other object shift tactics, moving the topic away from divestment to other issues, such as the role of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, or recalling stories of Jewish suffering in the ghettoes. While divestment supporters reemphasized the Church's stance against all violence in the region, including that carried out by Hamas, they also brought in Holocaust survivor Hedy Epstein and Presbyterians from South Africa who could speak to issues of Jewish suffering and comparisons to apartheid from firsthand experience to counter such shifts and legitimize their arguments. Divestment advocates sought to de-link the connection between critique of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism; they tried to create space for debating the issues at hand and sought to dispel the all too usual "climate of fear" for speaking out against Israeli policies (Ratner and Jay 2013). Jewish supporters of divestment provided alternative moral arguments, rooted in their own religious, moral, and cultural traditions to counter the charge of anti-Semitism and to lift up the diversity of Jewish moral tradition, reclaiming their own voice from those claiming to speak in the name of all Jews.[5] Although the divestment resolution was not voted on in the plenary, and the minority report on positive investment passed as a substitute by a thread, the high degree of support for the divestment resolution in the Middle East Peacemaking Committee—where extensive discussion was held and committee members were informed not only about the issue, but also about MRTI process and how the Church handles its investments—indicates that such object shift mechanisms worked in the plenary because many commissioners were new to the GA,

did not know the history of MRTI engagement, and/or were focused on other key concerns facing the Church in 2012, such as issues of immigration and marriage equality. The narrow margin of the divestment vote, combined with the almost unchallenged passage of the boycott resolution, indicates the possibility of divestment in the future.

Conclusion

The case of divestment at the 220th Presbyterian GA highlights several important factors in the debates surrounding BDS. In the case of the PCUSA, one sees different factions within the Church, notably IPMN and PFMEP, articulating rival positions on divestment, claiming to speak on behalf of Church values and a history of Church commitments. While IPMN focuses on the Israeli occupation as a major obstacle to peace, PFMEP points the finger at Hamas and Islamic Jihad, arguing that "Israel attempted to unilaterally implement the 'two-state solution' with a policy called Disengagement," only to come under rocket attacks by Hamas in Gaza (PFMEP 2012). Advocates for and against divestment speak in the name of "peace" but frame the vision of peace and the path to reaching it differently, either through a focus on justice for Palestinians and an end to all violence, or in terms of Israeli security. Both parties also sought external certification for their activities from outside parties, specifically looking to Jewish groups for verification, particularly due to Church concerns for allegations of anti-Semitism. While Jewish establishment groups such as the JCRC as well as more "progressive" US Jewish groups like J Street and Americans for Peace Now spoke openly against boycott and divestment (PFMEP 2012), JVP advocated strongly for both boycott and divestment, telling the commissioners that "Jews are divided" on this issue, and that the PCUSA is doing "sacred work" and committing a great act of friendship to Israel and the Jewish people by "remind[ing] one's friends of their values when they have forgotten them" (Wise 2012).

Beyond the importance of debates over how to pursue peace and how to best demonstrate friendship to the Jewish people, the debates at the PCUSA illustrated the importance of local process and procedure. One of these issues is the fact that "the GA itself usually takes a matter of minutes to debate these things, not hours and so people who are also uneducated about the issue are going to take a vote based on a recommendation from a committee [picked out of a lottery] and nobody is really all that knowledgeable about it" (Interview with Interfaith Dialogue Advocate 2011). A second issue is that churches by nature

are conservative, slow moving organizations due to their demography and bureaucracy: "regardless of political positions, churches operate around a set of conservative principles almost by default" (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). It took eight years, from 2004 when the corporate engagement process was authorized, until 2012 for MRTI to recommend divestment. Consequently, even if the Church holds very little actual stock in Caterpillar, Motorola, and HP, a decision to divest has symbolic weight. As one divestment supporter noted, "if a conservative institution like a church chooses to take a moral stance of divestment, this has a significant impact" (Interview with Presbyterian Pastor 2011). An opponent of divestment also noted the potential impact of even a symbolic divestment victory, stating that "the BDSer's goal is to get an institution like the church to take a position, any position, which would allow the boycotters to brag in their next set of press releases that 'PCUSA agrees with us that Israel is an Apartheid state, which is why you should boycott Israel too!'" (Haber 2012f).

Just as Presbyterians were divided over divestment, they were also divided in their reactions to the vote. Ethan Felson, vice president of the Jewish Council for Public Affairs claimed, "It's clearly a milestone when yet again, an American church rejects divestment" (Thornburgh 2012), and Jon Haber of the *Divest This!* blog noted it was "not the first, second or even third but fourth time the Presbyterians have rejected proposals to divest from Israel" (Haber 2012b). Others, however, noted that "the narrow margin of defeat . . . provided substantial encouragement to some BDS activists" (Plitnick 2012b), and Rev. Katherine Cunningham, IPMN Vice-Moderator, asserted that since 2004 "the church has moved slowly but steadily toward the positions advocated by the IPMN" (IPMN-PCUSA 2012). The continued movement of the Church on these issues can be seen in the October 2012 letter signed by 15 leaders of Christian churches, including PCUSA's Stated Clerk of the GA Rev. Gradye Parsons, calling for Congress to investigate "possible violations by Israel of the US Foreign Assistance Act and the US Arms Export Control Act which respectively prohibit assistance to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of human rights violations."[6] PFMEP was appalled at the letter, and many Jewish groups protested it as well, with groups like the ADL cancelling a Christian-Jewish Round Table in response (Goodstein 2012; Marans 2012). Jewish leaders asked why Israel was being targeted when Syria was massacring its own people; Church leaders responded that Israel is not only "the largest recipient of American foreign aid," but that US aid to Israel is given "without conditions or accountability" (Goodstein

2012). Despite the pressure placed on Church leaders, they stood firm behind the letter, indicating that threats alone would not move them.

Finally, the PCUSA case indicates the substantive difference between divestment and boycott. While extensive attention was focused on the divestment debate and on defeating the divestment overture by PFMEP and the Jewish establishment, much less attention was given to the boycott measure, which passed by a sizeable majority. Why was this the case? For one, the boycott measure was less controversial in terms of established Church policy given that the measure explicitly targeted settlement goods, and PCUSA is on the record against the occupation. Not only was Church policy clear, but the existence of many leading Jewish public voices speaking out against the settlements and expressing their concern regarding the obstacle posed by the settlements to a two-state solution were also factors at play. The boycott resolution definitively fit into the category of "targeted, moral-witness BDS," or BDS2, as it was explicitly focused on the occupation and settlement enterprise (Lerner 2012, 326). The passage of a similar boycott resolution by the United Methodists just a few months earlier also provided legitimacy to Presbyterians fearful of taking an unpopular stand. An alternative explanation, however, is the fact that divestment has real "teeth" and would initiate action on the part of the Church to withdraw investments from the three companies, sending a powerful signal and raising parallels to the BDS movement targeting South African apartheid. Although the $17 million in investments PCUSA holds in the three companies is comparatively minor, it would send a signal that could initiate other churches or institutions to take similar moves to pressure companies involved in the Israeli occupation. A boycott measure is difficult to enforce, and relies on individuals to know which products to avoid and then to refrain from purchasing them. Consequently, the decision to boycott poses less of a threat than divestment, although it too carries symbolic import and helps set the stage for the 2014 GA by adding one more Church policy and decision to the BDS file.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Introduction

The four cases studied in this book illustrate the importance of local context in shaping activist strategies, tactics, narratives, and goals. They also indicate that the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) "movement," while it has key bodies that help coordinate actors and campaigns in various parts of the world, does not fit classic definitions of social movements as "a set of people who voluntarily and deliberately commit themselves to a shared identity, a unifying belief, a common program, and a collective struggle to realize that program" (Tilly 1984, 303) or "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow 1994, 3–4). While the over 170 Palestinian groups who signed on to the BDS Call have committed themselves to a shared identity and a common platform, not all BDS activists have endorsed the BDS Call, nor do all campaigns engage in collective, sustained struggle to achieve the three articulated goals. As one activist explained, "BDS is sort of a tactic and not a movement in and of itself; it's a tactic in the larger Palestinian rights and antioccupation movement" (Olympia Activist 3 2011). The four campaigns studied here suggest a loosely connected array of activists working in their home environments to affect change in US public perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to exert pressure for policy change aimed primarily at ending Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In many ways, the activists studied fit the "boomerang pattern" of transnational activism described by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 12–13), since Palestinian activists seek to put pressure on Israel indirectly through mobilizing international pressure (Schock 2005, 20). However, the BDS (or anti-occupation) movement does not have large, well-known gatekeeper organizations as does the transnational human rights advocacy network, for example, and much

BDS activism focuses on corporate, rather than government targets. The use of corporate targets is consistent with the literature on boycott, which suggests targeting the government is more difficult for smaller, grassroots campaigns (Soule 2009). While some activists, particularly those connected with the PCUSA case, did also seek engagement with government targets, with a highly "pro-Israel" Congress, most US activists sought to shift public opinion as a first step toward shifting US government policy toward Israel. Through their educational activities, activists seek to gain broader legitimacy for their struggle, since, as peace scholar and economist Kenneth Boulding observes, "without legitimacy neither threat power nor economic power is very effective" (Boulding 1999, 15-16).

The disparity of goals and objectives articulated by actors engaged in BDS campaigns, as well as the range of tactics used by BDS activists in different locales, is both a strength and a weakness of the movement. Schock (2005) has noted the benefits of decentralization in nonviolent movements; the existence of multiple campaigns and actors engaged in BDS activities not only allows for local ownership, context-specificity, and leadership development, but it means there is no centralized target for opponents to pursue (a reverse "whack-a-mole"). At the same time, however, there is also no coherently articulated and shared identity, collective goal, or enforced nonviolent discipline across all transnational groups. According to Wendy Pearlman (2011), however, coherence is a critical factor for the success of protest movements, and fragmented movements are less likely to have the collective discipline to maintain a nonviolent strategy. Although the presence of both moderate and radical wings[1] can serve movements favourably by increasing the perceived reasonableness of moderates and thereby increasing their leverage, at the same time a radical flank can discredit a movement entirely and undermine the activities and goals of moderates (Schock 2005, 157). Consequently, actions perceived as violent or anti-Semitic cast a negative light on all those engaged in BDS activism regardless of whether any connection exists between groups carrying out different forms of activism. Furthermore, the conflation of BDS as *tactics* with the three international law-based demands of the BDS Call by BDS opponents often resulted in debates that centered on existential threats to Israel or Jewish insecurity rather than the substantive issues of particular BDS campaigns. While two of the pro-BDS groups studied for this book, CodePink and Olympia BDS, explicitly endorsed the BDS Call and thus were technically part of the global BDS movement boycotting Israel more generally, what Lerner (2012) calls BDS1, two of the groups,

UC Berkeley's student government and the PCUSA, did not explicitly endorse the call, and were engaged in targeted campaigns aimed at US companies profiting from the Israeli occupation or involved in violations of Palestinian human rights, which Lerner calls BDS2. Even though the PCUSA explicitly disassociated itself from the global BDS movement and reaffirmed its continued investment in Israel, opponents of divestment drew on materials produced by the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) and others associated with the BDS Call in their effort to discredit the targeted divestment resolution. Consequently, the diversity and decentralization of the movement was at times used against activists by opponents who were able to mobilize the community's fear and ignorance (of the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and specifics about the campaign in question) by lifting up positions viewed more "radical," thereby undermining the "moderates."

Centrality of Identity to the Debates

As has been argued throughout the book, identity plays a central role in BDS campaigns, not only identity-based fears related to a history of Jewish persecution mobilized by opponents of the BDS campaigns but also local and institutional identities. CodePink's Stolen Beauty campaign, for example, reflects the creative, dynamic, women-centered activism of the feminist group. CodePink activists repeatedly emphasized the group's unique approach to activism, contrasting the bikini brigades, skits, and humorous songs with "gloom and doom" demonstrations (CodePink Interview 5 2012). By deploying their gender identities in a clever and eye-catching way, and by choosing a target that specifically spoke to women's everyday lives, CodePink activists felt they were engaged in something that not only had a concrete impact but also spoke to who they are.

CodePink activists also noted the difference between their campaign against Ahava cosmetics and that of British activists. While both groups of activists were targeting the same Israeli company, their methods and tactics reflected very different identities. British activists were arrested when they chained themselves to a concrete block inside the store; their noisy protests were termed "riots" and described "like a scene of a terrorist attack" by local shopkeepers (Halily 2011; Rosen 2011). While both groups sought to raise awareness about Israel's occupation and about corporate complicity in violations of Palestinian human rights, they did so in very different ways. The differences between these two groups underscore the importance of context sensitivity in the broader

BDS movement, as well as the impact of protestors' personalities in shaping the course of a boycott campaign. In addition, while CodePink activists were not in direct communication with British activists about campaign strategies or goals, when asked to share successes of their BDS activism, many of those interviewed pointed to the closing of Ahava's flagship store in London. Thus, even though the CodePink activists in the United States and the British anti-Ahava activists in London expressed distinct identities in the course of their activism, emphasized their autonomy, and had different short-term campaign goals (closing the Ahava store versus raising awareness), both groups also self-identified as part of the broader movement to stop Ahava from profiting from the Israeli occupation.

In the case of the UC Berkeley student government's divestment bill, the activists' student identity played an influential role in the course of protest and debates. The all-night marathon sessions that led up the final vote could only be held on a college campus; in the case of the debates on the Presbyterian Church (USA)'s divestment resolution, for example, time was carefully monitored, and even sessions that went "late" were over before 11:00 p.m. College students are often portrayed as passionate and idealistic, known for their dreams and their commitment to "making the world a better place." Students at UC Berkeley on both sides of the divestment debate expressed just such passion and idealism, expressed pride in their university's history of social justice activism, and sought to build on that tradition, even as they differed in how best to perpetuate it. At the same time, students were influenced by the opinions (and sometimes pressure) of classmates, friends, and social cliques, and influential adults, including professors, parents, and outside officials. All these factors impacted the final outcome of the 2010 vote, which was just one vote shy of overriding Student President Will Smelko's veto. Interview respondents and coverage of the events in the *Daily Californian* noted the pressure of the situation, the late night sessions lasting until 4:00 a.m. in one case, the mental anguish of certain swing senators, and the role of friends in convincing a few key senators to change their votes (Bidwell and Myers 2010; Student Opposing 2 2010).

Boycott activists in Olympia, Washington, similar to student senators at UC Berkeley, who received tens of thousands of emails from opponents and supporters of divestment, were bombarded with calls from the United States and Israel after the Food Co-op board voted to deshelve nine Israeli products. However, different institutional contexts and different activist identities meant that these emails and calls had different effects. UC Berkeley

students were regularly informed that they did not run for office on the basis of Middle East issues, were not Middle East experts, and were not qualified to make decisions on such complex matters. In contrast, Olympia BDS activists had a history of Palestinian Solidarity activism, had experienced threats during their previous work, and were selected precisely because of their activist skills and connections; in the November 2010 board elections, elected candidates ran explicitly on a proboycott platform (Olympia Activist 2 2011; Olympia Activist 3 2011). Furthermore, threatened activists in Olympia had a support network; they were part of an activist group that had been planning the boycott campaign for several years before its launch. In contrast, the ASUC is newly elected every year, and so although UC Berkeley students built a broad-based network supporting BDS, senators did not have the same close personal connections and high degree of trust as those within the select, closed Olympia BDS group.

Both UC Berkeley's ASUC and the Olympia Food Co-op are located in progressive, activist-oriented environments known for their progressive, socially conscious orientation. In contrast, the PCUSA is a mainstream religious organization with a sizeable bureaucracy headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky (as opposed to the West Coast), and consequently is more conservative in its orientation to change. Although the PCUSA, like other US Christian denominations, divested from apartheid South Africa and has a standing order not to invest in companies profiting from alcohol, tobacco, or military sales, a long history of Christian anti-Semitism makes churches more hesitant to take action that may be construed as anti-Semitic. At the same time, the PCUSA has numerous policy statements against the Israeli occupation and in favor of a two-state solution. Church members identify with Palestinian and other Middle Eastern Christians affected by the conflict, even as they also identify with US Jewish groups with whom they have dialoged for years. The identity question within the PCUSA is compounded not only by broader theological questions of how to best live out religious beliefs of peace and social justice but also by more "mundane" questions related to the specific divestment resolution, which listed Caterpillar (CAT) as one of the targeted corporations. A sizeable number of Presbyterians are Caterpillar employees or live in communities where Caterpillar has an active presence. Consequently, these individuals felt a vote against Caterpillar's conduct was a vote against their own standing as upright and moral community members. The Christian identity of the major actors in the PCUSA debates was evident in their language about "moral imperatives," references to the scriptures, and calls to engage in moral witness.

The Role of Jewish Identity in BDS Debates

Although only the PCUSA debates engaged explicitly with questions of Christian identity, debates over Jewish identity and its relationship to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were present in all four case studies examined for this book. Although two of the cases, UC Berkeley and the PCUSA, were focused on the Israeli occupation and Israeli human rights violations, and targeted US-based companies— General Electric, United Technologies, Caterpillar, Motorola Solutions, and Hewlett Packard—for divestment, and a third case, CodePink's Stolen Beauty campaign, targeted settlement-made products, opponents to BDS in all four cases reframed the activism as being "anti-Israel" and "anti-Semitic." The allegation of anti-Semitism is a serious one; mindful of the history of Jewish persecution, activists interviewed for this book explicitly denounced the allegation and articulated their activism as based on human rights, international law, freedom, and justice. Yet the allegations persisted, in part due to the conflation of Israel with the Jewish people on the part of opponents. Activists sought diligently to break apart the conflation of "Jew" with "Israel," pointing to the Jewish organizers and supporters of their BDS campaigns, and emphasizing, in the UC Berkeley and PCUSA cases, that they were not targeting all of Israel but rather specific US-based companies engaged in human rights violations via their products. As a rejection of the allegations levied at them by opponents to BDS, representatives of Mission Responsibility Through Investing (MRTI) underscored the many investments the PCUSA has in Israeli companies as well as companies doing business in Israel; they noted that the corporate engagement process in one case had helped identify and end banking practices that were aiding anti-Israel terrorist groups (DeYoe 2012). Olympia BDS published a lengthy FAQ document rejecting claims that the Food Co-op boycott was "intent on destroying Israel through the boycott" and affirming that the "boycott calls for compliance with international law and human rights" and that "international law does not call for the destruction of Israel" (Olympia BDS n.d.a).

In part to combat the anti-Semitic allegations launched at activists by BDS opponents, and partly as a result of the long history of Jewish social justice activism, many Jews have actively participated in the boycott campaigns studied here, often as core organizers. One of the coauthors of the 2010 UC Berkeley divestment bill was an Israeli Jew, a third of the core organizing team in Olympia was Jewish, and a leading figure at CodePink's first bikini brigade action in Tel Aviv was Jewish. Although the PCUSA divestment resolution was brought by MRTI, an internal

church committee, a sizeable contingent of Jewish activists from Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) voiced their support for the divestment resolution at the 2012 PCUSA General Assembly. BDS activists also collected and prominently displayed statements of support from leading Jewish individuals and rabbis on websites and information tables (JVP 2010; Olympia BDS n.d.b, n.d.c).

Anti-BDS activists often targeted those Jews speaking out in favor of BDS campaigns. Olympia Jewish activists received death threats, and the Jewish credentials of student group Kesher Enoshi at UC Berkeley were questioned. Many were called "self-hating Jews" or were otherwise marginalized by the broader Jewish community; one was not allowed to speak at the local synagogue, for example. Although Jewish students in support of BDS mentioned that they had never felt so safe or empowered as when the divestment debates were occurring (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010), such Jewish student voices are often discounted by opponents. For example, in a letter protesting a BDS conference held at the University of Pennsylvania in February 2012, an opponent to BDS argued (as others argued in the case of UC Berkeley), "this all creates a dangerous and extremely uncomfortable atmosphere for Jewish students studying at the University of Pennsylvania . . . it's time that we start taking America's campuses back from the anti-Semites and Israel-bashers" (Berney 2012). Despite the participation of Jews in the event, this same opponent suggested such "anti-Israel events" were organized by "radical Muslims and their co-conspirators" (Berney 2012).

Precisely because of this anti-Muslim bias and the negative stereotypes of Muslims especially prevalent in the United States since the September 11, 2001, attacks, Jewish voices were often privileged over Muslim and Arab ones in BDS debates. BDS activists noted this tendency and were self-critical about what one termed "turn[ing] the anti-oppression discourse on its head" (Olympia Activist 2 2011). Jews were frequently sought out for their opinions on BDS campaigns, whereas Muslim and Arab community members often felt silenced (Olympia BDS 2010). During the debates at UC Berkeley, Palestinian, Arab, and Lebanese students expressed their unease at the amount of time and attention spent on intra-Jewish debate and fears of anti-Semitism when the primary focus of the divestment bill was on human rights violations committed against their friends, families, and compatriots; the Arab students asserted that "this is not just about the Jews—it's not made legitimate because the Jews say it is" (Student Supporter 4 2010; Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). A Jewish community leader who

provided support to the UC Berkeley students noted, "this is a movement that is led by every race and ethnicity and culture. And even in the peace movement there's a lot of wielding to Jewish privilege, and so what we say matters more, and it doesn't and it shouldn't" (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010).

Despite the recognition by the BDS organizers of the need to hear from Muslim and Arab voices, Jewish voices remained dominant. Extensive time was spent in consideration of the impact of the proposed divestment resolution on Jewish-Christian dialog efforts in Committee 15 considerations at the 2012 PCUSA GA, and many pro- and anti-divestment Jews were present. Although the lack of Muslim voices was acknowledged and lamented, their absence remained a reality, indicative of the "privileging" of Jewish voices in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the ongoing discrimination of Muslim and Arab communities in the United States. As one of the UC Berkeley student organizers noted, there was "an East/West/Brown/White mentality" evident in the framing of debates (Student Supporter 3 2010). However, the intra-Jewish debates provided an important platform for illustrating that the Jewish community is divided on the issue of BDS and that many Jews disagree with establishment of Jewish organizations' unquestioning support of Israel and its policies. The presence of Jewish voices speaking out in favor of BDS campaigns provided space for non-Jewish activists to act and speak with a little more freedom, although it did not always prevent Jewish and non-Jewish activists alike from being labeled "anti-Semitic." It also contributed to the widening of space for progressive Jews to raise their voice in opposition to establishment Jewish positions, and to claim a seat "under the tent" (Wolpe 2011).

Rival Frameworks for Examining BDS

As indicated at the outset of this book, BDS campaigns are often described alternatively as a form of nonviolent activism for human rights and as a form of war by other means. As I engaged in the research for this book, looking not only at materials for the four case studies but also at a wide array of op-eds, blogs, commentaries, and reports dealing with BDS from both supporters and opponents, it became clear that there are two primary reasons why BDS activism is portrayed in such oppositional terminology. The first reason stems from different paradigms for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how to address it. The second stems from different conceptions about the goals of BDS campaigns and/or the broader BDS movement. At the same

time, the oppositional terminology was consistent with the nonviolent action campaigns waged by activists in the four case studies.

The Palestinians who issued the BDS Call explicitly framed their appeal to civil society in terms of nonviolent resistance, rooting their three rights-based claims in international law, and comparing the Palestinian situation to that of South Africa under apartheid. While Palestinians seek an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they see this conflict as rooted in the violation of Palestinian rights to freedom and self-determination, and by engaging in nonviolent action, they intentionally raise the level of conflict to attract attention to their claims. Nonviolent resistance seeks explicitly to exert pressure for change, particularly in situations of injustice and asymmetrical power relations, without resort to the force of arms. While there are many different forms of nonviolent resistance (Sharp 1959), the basic premise is to empower ordinary people by withdrawing their consent for oppressive regimes through noninstitutional methods; Kurt Schock calls it "politics by other means" and notes that it "should be distinguished from means of conflict resolution" (Schock 2005, xv, 8). Some of the arguments surrounding the BDS debates mirror criticism and misconceptions of the broader field of nonviolence studies that conflate "conflict" with "violence" or that question the role of coercion in nonviolent activism, as well as tension between two "types" of nonviolence, particularly debates over nonviolence as a strategic form of waging unarmed conflict (pragmatic nonviolence) and those conceptualizing nonviolence as transformative approach to conflict that embraces the humanity of the opponent and in which means and ends are consistent (principled nonviolence).

The activists interviewed emphasized repeatedly that they chose BDS tactics because they were readily available to members of civil society, because other methods had not worked, and because it was a time-tested tool. As one activist noted, "the status quo stays in place until there's real international pressure to make change" (Olympia Activist 3 2011), and another argued that "economic pressure is the only thing we have left. It's powerful and it has teeth but not in a violent way" (Student Supporter 2 2010). When making the case for nonviolent pressure on Israel to change its policies, BDS activists highlighted not only the physical violence against Palestinians, such as the intense attacks during Operation Cast Lead when over 1400 Palestinians were killed in a few weeks, but also structural violence such as "denial of access to education, denial of access to healthcare," seeking to "raise awareness about it and start a movement" (Senator Supporter 3 2010). In keeping

with the scholarship on peacemaking in situations of latent and asymmetrical conflict, activists increased conflict through a conscientization process that drew attention to the Israeli occupation and called for a rebalancing of power in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (Curle 1971; Lederach 1997).

When opponents criticized BDS efforts as being "one-sided" or unfairly singling out Israel rather than other, worse human rights offenders, supporters of BDS often noted that they were standing on the side of justice, and affirmed statements from Martin Luther King, Jr (1963) and others, such as "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." Like BDS activists in Olympia, King (1963) decried claims that civil rights demonstrations were caused by "outside agitators" and asserted that "the white power structure left the Negro community with no alternative." Palestinian BDS activists similarly claim that "all forms of international intervention and peace making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights, and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine" (BDSMovement 2005).

While BDS activists portray Israel as the more powerful party in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, opponents of BDS often portray Israel as a victim, surrounded by enemies and on the defensive for all of its existence. They expressed their desire for a two-state solution, without necessarily defining whether that two-state solution was based on UN Resolutions or whether it was the segmented, demilitarized, encircled "state" described by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his 2009 address (Kershner 2009). Rather than calling for justice, opponents called for dialog or for negotiations. Like King (1963) in his critique of the "white moderate," and assertion that "we have not made a single gain in civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure," BDS activists criticized those who suggested they were "progressive" on the Israeli-Palestinian issue but disagreed with boycott; as Olympia BDS activists asserted, "opponents to the boycott have so far offered no viable alternatives for working toward peace. We need to stop congratulating ourselves for our political positions and start considering things we can actually do to work for change" (Olympia BDS 2010). In the debates on the divestment resolution at the 2012 PCUSA GA, one divestment advocate said it was time for Presbyterians to get their hands "dirty" on the issue, move out of their comfort zones, and take a stand for justice in accordance with their beliefs.

While debates over BDS revealed different paradigms for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—BDS advocates pointing to the Israeli occupation and violations of international law and arguing for a "positive peace" rooted in justice, and BDS opponents pointing to terrorism and Israel's need to defend itself from its many enemies and emphasizing a "negative peace" rooted in an absence of violence—they also indicated different conceptions of the goals of BDS. Supporters of BDS clearly articulated that BDS was simply a tactic and not an end in and of itself, whereas opponents of BDS often equated the tactics of BDS with a broad, powerful network intent on destroying or "delegitimizing" Israel. The lack of a clearly stated goal or outcome of the BDS movement, while providing an umbrella for a wide array of Palestinian and global civil society actors to participate, also provides the opposition with space to claim that those advocating BDS in line with the BDS Call and the statements on BDSmovement.net, the main website for the BNC, seek the end of the Jewish state. While supporters of BDS argue that abiding by international law should not threaten Israel's existence, opponents assert Israel's existence as a Jewish state would be destroyed if Palestinian refugees were to return; this reflects different views regarding the legitimacy of Israel's standing as a state specifically for Jews. While some critics of BDS argue the inclusion of the refugee question means that BDS activists seek a one-state solution, Palestinian BDS activists emphasize that they are a rights-based and not a solution-based campaign. At the same time, increasing numbers of scholars and activists point to the closing window of opportunity for a two-state solution due to Israel's continued settlement expansion. This is one reason why Zionist Jews have endorsed boycott efforts, particularly those that target settlement products and those corporations profiting from the Israeli occupation—to save the possibility of a Jewish Israel (Beinart 2012b).

The ambiguity within the broader BDS movement in terms of its desired outcome poses a problem for those engaged explicitly in BDS2 campaigns, like the PCUSA. Although the PCUSA is on record in support of a two-state solution and the divestment resolution was based on an eight year engagement process with US (not Israeli) corporations, opponents still argued the move was anti-Semitic and anti-Israel. Contending views on whether Israel should be a state for the Jews or a state for its citizens shape the course of debates around BDS. Although Palestinians argue that recognizing Israel as a Jewish state negates the presence of Israel's one million Palestinians citizens, and that Egypt and Jordan simply recognized the state of Israel and not its right to exist as an

explicitly Jewish state in their peace treaties, many Jews, even progressive ones, suggest that due to the trauma experienced by Jews over the years, it is important for them to have a place of refuge (Lerner 2012). Opponents of BDS asserted the movement sought to delegitimize Israel, a contention that some BDS activists embraced, affirming that having a state based on a narrow ethnoreligious identity was anti-democratic and impinged on minority rights. In my research, Jewish activists acknowledged their mixed feelings regarding Israel, and also asserted their view that the worst threat to Israel was the continued occupation and not the BDS movement (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010; Olympia Activist 3 2011). The diversity of opinion among those engaged in BDS activism on this issue reflects the lack of coherence within the "movement" as well as the organizing principle of context sensitivity. Although most US activists focus on settlement products and the Israeli occupation rather than all three pillars of the BDS Call, a fact criticized by some members of the BNC (Barghouti 2008; Jamjoum 2011), opponents conflated the goals of these campaigns, and used claims of "delegitimization" and the absence of a statement by the BNC in favor of a (two-state) political resolution as evidence that BDS activists did not want peace. All these debates, while they reflect different frameworks for understanding Israel and how to approach a solution to the conflict, do not detract from the BDS movement's status as a nonviolent movement, however, since nonviolent activists need not be pacifists nor reformists, but may be radical and militant (Schock 2005, 9).

Matters of Power and Process

BDS activists engage in a wide range of mechanisms for change in the course of their campaigns, including awareness raising, brokerage, certification, and object shift, seeking primarily to reconfigure US public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the educational dimension of their campaigns while also exerting economic pressure on companies engaged in supporting Israel's occupation, which violates international law. Activists challenged dominant discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the United States, Israel's largest supporter, whether through bikini brigades in Nordstrom's, Secret Cafés held in people's homes (Peaceworks 2011), all night teach-ins at Berkeley, or educational witness trips to meet with Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers organized by the PCUSA. By connecting the values of their audiences—peace, justice, environmental sustainability, and human rights—with their BDS campaigns, activists hoped their audiences

would experience cognitive dissonance, rethink their views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the US role in sustaining Israel's occupation, and engage in concrete action for change. Activists took a nonviolent approach to power, seeking to remove pillars of support from the Israeli occupation regime, most notably by challenging Israel's status as the "only democracy in the Middle East."

BDS activists drew on grassroots power, acting as brokers to link networks and movements together in order to amplify their voice and resources. As was mentioned by activists across the cases, they could not compete materially with the well-organized and well-funded opposition, but they did often have numbers on their side. At UC Berkeley, for example, a wide array of student groups joined with Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) in support of the divestment resolution, and although the veto was not overridden, a majority of senators voted in support of the divestment resolution. Likewise, in Olympia, organizers carefully constructed a power map of their community and tapped into available networks and resources using their personal connections and activist histories. CodePink activists tapped into social and organizational networks and activated cognitive dissonance in their behind the scenes efforts to have Oxfam International drop Kristin Davis as a humanitarian ambassador for the duration of her contract with Ahava. Activists were able to convince Oxfam International that the business practices of Ahava cosmetics were not consistent with the values and mission of their organization.

In several of the cases studied, JVP served as a broker, supporting local activists in their efforts to mobilize support for their BDS campaign by helping arrange speakers or by soliciting letters of support from their board members or contacts (Community Leader Supporter 1 2010). JVP was invited by UC Berkeley's SJP to help organize their response to the veto, and it also provided support to activists in Olympia and at the Presbyterian Church. The BNC also served as a broker at times, most notably in the UC Berkeley case. BNC member Omar Barghouti spoke with SJP members in advance of their divestment initiative, and student organizers were in contact with the BNC as they sought to mobilize external support for their efforts. Some groups, however, notably CodePink's Stolen Beauty campaign, emphasized the autonomy of their campaign, despite having endorsed the BDS Call.

Opponents and supporters of BDS alike engaged in certification, seeking outside experts, including Nobel laureates, to speak on their behalf. In the case of UC Berkeley, groups of Nobel laureates spoke both for and against the divestment bill, illustrating how the same set

of values could be deployed to very different ends due to different conceptualizations of the problem at hand and the appropriate approach to addressing it. South Africans were often invited to "certify" descriptions of the Israeli occupation as apartheid through their recognition of the comparison as valid; in the Committee 15 debates at the 2012 PCUSA GA, for example, a South African testified to his own experience as a white South African and expressed his gratefulness to the PCUSA for its divestment from apartheid in the 1980s, thereby opening space for the PCUSA to divest from the Israeli occupation. As discussed previously, Jewish speakers, particularly rabbis and Holocaust survivors, were often sought out for their certification of BDS resolutions as nonviolent, human rights focused approaches consistent with Jewish and universal teachings of social justice. Rabbis for and against the Presbyterians' divestment resolution submitted letters to Committee 15, and Olympia hosted a series of educational forums where outside "experts" shared their views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more generally and BDS more particularly.

Opponents of BDS were more likely to use tactics of power politics, although the more political-style campaign of Olympia BDS intentionally targeted board members in advance of the board's vote on the boycott proposal. Opponents of BDS sent messages not only to the president of UC Berkeley's student government but also to the president of the University; they encouraged Jewish parents to tell the administration that they would enroll their children elsewhere. In an op-ed protesting the 2012 BDS conference at University of Pennsylvania, a BDS opponent exemplified the coercive approach seen in a number of the cases, stating her "hope that readers of this article and their friends...will cut their contributions off to U[niversity] of Penn[sylvania] (and let President Guttman know why) and contact the University of Pennsylvania to excoriate this weekend's outrageous, malevolent national 'PennBDS' conference" (Berney 2012). The Israeli Consul General for the Northwest visited Olympia "a dozen times since the boycott" and "bombarded" the neighboring community of Port Townsend when their food co-op launched a boycott campaign (Olympia Activist 1 2011; Olympia Activist 3 2011). The Consul General also visited UC Berkeley in an effort to sway student senators' opinions with a special closed-door session organized in partnership with the campus Hillel, and the Israeli government and StandWithUs were involved in the lawsuit filed against the Olympia Food Co-op board in protest of the boycott. The Israel Law Center has also threatened a lawsuit against pension giant TIAA-CREF if it allows

a shareholder vote on a resolution to divest from companies engaged in human rights violations as part of Israel's occupation (WeDivest 2013). In another form of coercion, both the Israeli government and the California state legislature passed measures condemning and punishing those engaged in BDS activities, seeking to deter BDS activism (Kepler 2010; California State Legislature 2012). In contrast to the other two cases, the PCUSA and CodePink have not been the targets of the Israeli government or legal action, perhaps because of CodePink's dispersed network of activists and nonconventional form of street protest and the size and stature of the PCUSA as an institution, although rabbis and Jewish organizations like the Jewish Community Relations Council have threatened to cut off Jewish-Christian dialog.

Opponents of BDS often engaged in the object shift mechanism, seeking to rearrange patterns of relationships and discourse in order to shift the focus from the Israeli occupation and human rights issues to, as previously mentioned, anti-Semitism or to the emotional impact of the divestment debates on Jewish students, as occurred in the UC Berkeley case. In the case of the PCUSA, opponents of the divestment resolution sought to shift the discourse to "positive investment," portraying the divestment resolution as "negative," "one-sided," and against the cause of peace. Another object shift tactic involved diverting the focus from the substantive issues at hand and critiquing the process of the decision itself or the capacity of the actors involved to make a decision due to the "complexity" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To counter these arguments, Olympia activists sought to resist the appeals to "positive investment" or "constructive engagement" through historical illustrations from the apartheid era (Olympia BDS 2010), and divestment supporters at the GA spoke to the structure of the occupation that stifles the Palestinian economy. Activists also responded to opponents' efforts to shift the discourse to matters of process. Olympia BDS referred back to the OFC's policy guidelines and shared that "no previous boycott has ever been presented to Co-op members prior to implementation" (Olympia BDS 2010), responding not only to the specific process critique at hand but also indirectly responding to the criticism that Israel was being held to a double-standard (given other human rights abusing countries) by pointing out that boycott opponents were themselves seeking a different standard for Israel.[2] Divestment opponents in the PCUSA questioned the process of the MRTI committee, which resulted in lengthy conversations regarding eight years of corporate engagement that served to both tire and distract committee members from the substantive matters at hand.

Just as local identities shaped the nature of BDS campaigns, institutional structures and processes affected how BDS campaigns were received. For example, the student government at UC Berkeley has no real control over the University's investment portfolio, and so even if the bill had passed in 2010, it would have been largely symbolic. When the ASUC passed a similar divestment bill in 2013, the university president clearly stated that it would not affect UC Berkeley investments in any way. Lessons learned from the previous divestment bill, along with shifts in public opinion, may help explain why the divestment bill passed in 2013 and not in 2010, but the nature of universities as institutions with an ever-changing population is an additional factor. As one campus observer noted, "the campus shifts very quickly, as you know. Semester to semester there is something different and it takes over" (Community Leader Opposing 1 2010). The PCUSA GA also experiences a high turnover rate, as new commissioners are selected for every GA and then randomly assigned to committees. However, unlike the ASUC senators, many commissioners have been involved in the Presbyterian Church all of their adult lives; consequently, some individuals at the divestment debate lived through decisions to desegregate and to divest from apartheid. While UC Berkeley students knew about and referenced their University's divestment during the apartheid era, none of them had lived the experience. While many commissioners, like many senators, did not have a background in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, organized networks and issue-oriented groups within the PCUSA such as the Israel/Palestine Mission Network (IPMN), the Advocacy Committee for Racial and Ethnic Concerns, and Presbyterians for Middle East Peace, focus on the issues year round, speak to the PCUSA on matters of concern, and help shape resolutions to appear before each GA. This is unlike SJP, which helped write the divestment bill, but which has no authority within the ASUC. A large institution like the PCUSA has an established bureaucracy, tasked with keeping operations in line, recording and storing minutes from business sessions, and ensuring that resolutions are implemented. The existence of a paid staff, for whom serving the church is a vocation and not merely a job, contrasts with the UC Berkeley case, where students are not full time senators, but rather juggle multiple responsibilities and commitments and often rely on the University administration for the implementation of their resolutions. While a GA vote for divestment from particular companies serves as a directive to the PCUSA, student government resolutions are easily ignored or overturned by university administrations, as was evident in the cases of both UC Berkeley and Evergreen.

The sheer difference in size between the GA, which had over six hundred commissioners from all over the United States in 2012 and the ASUC, which has twenty student senators, also impacts the nature of debates, the tenor of conversation, and amount of pressure placed on each individual. Student senators knew each other personally, took classes together, were friends outside classes, whereas most Commissioners have never met each other before and, given the size of the GA, the formal process, and the stadium seating of plenary sessions, do not interact in the same way as student senators who have met together all year. Commissioners also tend to be several decades older than UC Berkeley students, which impacts both the tone and process of debates; while there are Young Adult Advisory Delegates participating in committees, they do not have a formal vote in the plenary sessions. Despite the vast difference in size, both divestment votes were narrowly defeated; the vote to override Smelko's veto was one vote shy of the fourteen votes needed (Omar 2010); and the minority report was accepted instead of the divestment resolution by a 333–331–2 vote (Zaimov 2012). Just as the 2010 defeat at UC Berkeley did not prevent the ASUC from passing a divestment bill in 2013, future PCUSA GA's could similarly pass divestment resolutions.

Significantly, as a decision making body of a Christian denomination, the GA is guided by a series of beliefs, morals, and religious teachings; it seeks to carry out its moral witness through the decisions it makes. UC Berkeley's ASUC makes no such moral claims; it is a strictly secular institution aimed at serving the student body. Although the ASUC, like the Olympia Food Co-op, points to a history of social justice activism, neither body has the same degree of unity of moral principles, though the PCUSA membership is quite diverse in its views. Furthermore, although the Olympia Food Co-op has many ties to Israel/Palestine due to the history of Palestine Solidarity activism in the Olympia community, the PCUSA espouses a religious connection to Israel/Palestine as the birthplace of Christ and possesses a long history of institutional connections to Middle Eastern Christians. Consequently, allegations that Israel was being singled out over other countries like Kenya and Nigeria ignores not only the official PCUSA policy of moral witness through its investments, but also the PCUSA's connection to the birthplace of Jesus and indigenous Christians (Zaimov 2012).

Institutional processes played an important role in how both the PCUSA and Olympia Food Co-op decisions were made. Co-op members were critical of their lack of involvement in the decision and questioned whether appropriate process was followed; the PCUSA procedure

in which a minority report can be substituted for a majority report meant that Commissioners did not vote on divestment itself, but rather on whether to substitute the minority report on positive investment coming out of Committee 15 for the majority report recommending divestment. Consequently, many Commissioners were not sure whether a "yes" vote was for or against divestment, and several came forth later to admit they had mistakenly voted the wrong way.

Impact of the Movement

It is notoriously difficult to identify success in boycott campaigns as a general rule; activists do not always articulate a clear goal, and campaigns often engage in scale shift and move between multiple targets (Soule 2009). This is also the case in the BDS campaigns studied for this book, which are diverse in their goals and targets and which operate within the constraints of their own local institutions. Success is especially difficult to determine for the "movement" more broadly due to the lack of a "shared identity, a unifying belief, a common program" (Tilly 1984, 303). As one PCUSA activist shared, "we do have some cross-movement pollination but it's not done in any formal way" (Interview with MESC Member 2011). Conferences, such as CodePink's 2011 Move Over AIPAC conference, timed to coincide with AIPAC's annual Washington, DC convention, or the Rachel Corrie Foundation's Peaceworks conference, bring together a wide range of BDS activists to give workshops, speak on panels, and provide an opportunity for cross-campaign strategizing; the US Social Forum also provides a venue for activists to gather and share information on BDS activities. Numerous listservs exist for communication and announcements of campaign activities; some of these are constituency-specific, such as the Stolen Beauty campaign and SJP listservs, while others are issue-focused, such as the Derail Veolia campaign listserv. While these conferences and listservs provide connections, they do not generally seek to create a common program of action but rather share strategies and best practices from a range of diverse campaigns.

Despite the lack of a unified message, BDS activists *are* "signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers. They are deeply embroiled . . . in what has been referred to as 'the politics of signification'" (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). BDS activists seek to reframe the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, as a result, they perform some of the functions of a social movement. As one BDS

supporter suggests, "Most campaigns cannot demonstrate their work's impact in measurable units. Instead, the virtue of BDS has been its ability to challenge Israel's moral authority—arguably the most coveted weapon in its arsenal" (Erekat 2012, 95). Although critics of BDS minimize the impact of BDS activists on shifting the discourse, and suggest that BDS activists point to "trivial or fake 'victories'" due to the defeat of BDS measures in colleges and churches and the rejection of boycott efforts by major retailers (Haber 2012c, 2012g), BDS activists repeatedly emphasize their goal of educating a relatively "uninformed" American public, so that Americans rethink their complicity in human rights violations that occur as a result of the Israeli occupation (CodePink Interview 1 2012; Olympia BDS 2010).

Yet, apart from the individual campaign targets and specific goals of local activists to raise awareness about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Israeli occupation in particular, veteran Israeli peace activist Jeff Halper has remarked that the BDS campaign lacks an overall strategy or coordinated plan for ending the occupation (Halper 2013). Part of this problem stems from a lack of clearly articulated goals apart from the three pillars of the BDS Call and the challenge of measuring success in terms of these three rights-based goals; how does one evaluate when Palestinian Arab citizens have reached full equality, for example? The lack of a political process to tie into further compounds the challenge of translating BDS campaign "success" into political achievements (Jamjoum 2011, 145), while also suggesting, in keeping with King's (1963) admonitions, the continuing need for a nonviolent struggle to make the parties feel the urgency of finding a political solution.

While the local orientation and loose coordination of BDS campaigns in the United States may be perceived as a negative, some organizers have also described it positively, noting that the lack of a centralized campaign means that it is difficult for BDS opponents to target lead organizers or shut down BDS activism completely. In a way, just as CodePink activists described their efforts targeting Ahava cosmetics as a game of "whack-a-mole" (CodePink Interview 1 2012), BDS opponents are similarly forced to chase down the many BDS campaigns occurring on college campuses, in local municipalities, and in religious institutions (Baltzer 2013). The decentralized nature of the BDS campaigns in the United States is consistent with the nature of horizontal grassroots organizing; the desire of some organizers to remain underground due to the highly organized opposition and the likelihood of network infiltration and threats to BDS activists also make the coordination of the movement difficult to track.

Questions for Further Study

This book studied four case studies of US-based BDS activism and consequently examines only a slice of the BDS movement. Although I learned about many other campaigns while attending conferences and conducting research, these four campaigns were selected to maximize variation across institutional settings and because of their prominence in the media at the time I began the project. During the course of the research project, the BDS movement has grown and evolved, both within the United States and internationally. The BDSmovement.net webpage, for example, lists a series of campaign victories and chronicles successes against different targets around the world. BDS continues to receive mainstream international press coverage, such as the media firestorm surrounding the controversial decision of noted scientist Stephen Hawking to withdraw from Israel's President Conference in May 2013 (Avineri 2013; Blum 2013; Ziadeh 2013). However, Israelis and Palestinians are as far as ever from reaching a peace agreement, and the Israeli government continues to expand settlements.

Due to the massive amounts of information on the BDS movement and the highly dispersed nature of BDS activism, there is much I was not able to address in this project. For example, more research and attention could be spent examining whether and how BDS activism shifts public opinion and whether and how any such shifts impact governing bodies and national foreign policy decisions relative to Israel. To date, the US Congress remains firmly committed to Israel and was highly critical of the Palestinian statehood bid, a nonviolent effort to raise attention to the failures of the peace process, at the United Nations. The impact of external support for protest groups, as well as questions regarding the impact of international sanctions on nonviolent revolutionary movements remains unclear. Studies by Nepstad (2011) and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) suggest that international intervention by state actors in conflicts may either have no impact or might undermine the efforts of nonviolent movements. However, the BDS movement seeks to mobilize civil society actors, and the question remains whether this form of external intervention, particularly selected due to the asymmetry of the conflict and the failure of state actors to uphold international law, might have a different impact than state intervention, particularly due to the battles waged over identity and "legitimacy." Research could also be done to compare the different processes, mechanisms, and impact of international campaigns such as Veolia that involve multiple groups that are loosely coordinated across time and space to target a major

international corporation with local campaigns such as the Olympia Food Co-op boycott that focus intensely on one particular local institution. This project did not examine the cultural and academic boycott of Israel, choosing to examine four economic-oriented campaigns for comparative purposes. However, the cultural and academic boycott campaign is both more controversial and higher profile than economic-based campaigns and is worthy of study. An additional area of research that exceeded the scope of this study but that merits attention is the impact of different political and cultural contexts on BDS activism. European BDS activism functions in a very different environment than US-based activism due to the different nature of European politics and a different relationship with Israel. European activists I have met at conferences have remarked that BDS is often taken for granted in Europe, whereas it continues to be viewed as too radical in parts of the US peace community.

Finally, more could be studied regarding the difference between campaigns focused on boycotts versus those focusing on divestment. Despite the long history of boycott as a contentious tactic, at the 2012 PCUSA GA, a boycott measure passed with little discussion, whereas the divestment resolution drew heated commentary from many different internal and external critics. The vote against divestment was interpreted as a rejection of BDS by the PCUSA by at least one critical opponent, even though the GA passed the boycott measure (Haber 2012g). Perhaps the lack of controversy reflects the fact that a blanket boycott of settlement products lacks a visible corporate target and is hard to enforce, especially given Israel's labeling practices (Friedman 1999). Are boycott measures seen as simply less effective given that they rely on individuals and lack institutional teeth? Yet by all accounts, PCUSA divestment from the companies in question would have a minimal economic impact as well. Perhaps the question is more of institutional versus individual measures and the precedent divestment sets for other similar institutions, ones with possibly greater investment portfolios, to follow suit. Hence the uproar over the Olympia Food Co-op's institutional boycott of Israeli products through deshelving. The heavy resistance to divestment may also have to do with the equation of divestment with the South African example. BDS opponents not only reject descriptions of Israel as an apartheid state (despite a former Israeli prime minister making similar claims) but also fear the one-state solution, which they hold would destroy Israel as a Jewish state.

Regardless of one's position on the effectiveness of BDS activism, it will remain on the activist agenda as long as there is no political

process for peace and justice they can support. The BDS movement raises attention to the issue of Palestinian statelessness and calls upon global civil society to take action in support of Palestinian rights and against the Israeli occupation. Those activists interviewed who had endorsed the BDS Call recognized that their role as international solidarity activists was to support the Palestinians in their own determination of Palestinian needs, regardless of whether they agreed with the exact wording. While not all US activists have endorsed the BDS Call, BDS tactics provide an accessible mechanism for awareness raising and institutional policy change for individuals at many different levels of involvement. And, as activists repeatedly noted, BDS is a time-tested tool that has worked throughout history. Will it work in the case of Palestine? Only time will tell.

Notes

1 The History and Theory of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions

1. John Woolman dressed almost entirely in white/cream because many of the dyes of the day, including indigo, were produced by slave labor.

2. There are many active BDS networks in Europe, which operate in a completely different sociopolitical and economic context. Because of the focus on local configurations and how local context shapes the social change mechanisms used by activists (as well as due to practical considerations), I selected cases in the United States to provide at least a measure of "control" for comparing thematically between them. After speaking with European scholars, BDS is not viewed as radical and controversial in the same way as it is in the United States.

3. There are many instances of the US Congress issuing unsolicited statements indicating their strong support of Israeli government policies and actions, not all of which are factually accurate, and some of which are seen as too "pro-Israel" even by Israelis. For example, Congress issued a strong statement against the Goldstone Report in 2009 (Goldstone 2009), in support of Israeli armed action against the Gaza Flotilla in 2010 (Zunes 2010), and against the Palestinian bid for statehood in 2011 (Guttman 2011a).

4. To be clear, the BDS movement is not calling for sanctions like those that were placed on Iraq, but for targeted, limited sanctions.

5. For simplicity sake I refer to the collection of activists and groups engaged in boycott and divestment activities as the "BDS movement", although as discussed in this book, it is not a coherent, monolithic, tightly knit social movement in the traditional sense, particularly since the European and American variants are quite different due to very different socioeconomic and political contexts. Furthermore, some groups, like the Presbyterian Church (USA) were careful to differentiate their call for divestment from three specific companies from the broader BDS movement, even though opposition sought to lump them together.

6. The concept of "pro-Israel" is contested, and Jewish groups on both sides of the BDS issue assert that they are "pro-Israel." Conventionally, "pro-Israel" has been associated with the Israel lobby in the United States, which tends to stand behind the policies and practices of the Israeli government without question. This issue of what it means to be "pro-Israel" is discussed more in the various case studies, as it is a highly salient issue.

7. I have seen multiple email discussions that illustrate this misunderstanding; while PACBI repeatedly emphasizes the focus on institutions, individual Israeli academics report being targeted independent of institutional affiliation, and many Israeli academics face pressure from their home institutions and broader society for their political activism, such as Neve Gordon at Ben Gurion University (Flusfeder 2012).

8. As discussed more in the case study of UC Berkeley, the history of divestment activism against South African apartheid has influenced student activism regarding the BDS campaign against Israeli occupation. For example, Hampshire College in Massachusetts was one of the first to divest from South Africa and was again the first to divest from military corporations profiting from the occupation (Horowitz and Weiss 2010; Soule 2009, 81). UC Berkeley, likewise, played an active role in the struggle to end apartheid.

9. While the boycott still exists on the books of some states, overall most governments in the region engage in trade with Israel (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007).

10. There are many excellent accounts of the history of the Oslo Accords and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the debates surrounding the "no partner" narrative and what actually occurred at the July 2000 Camp David meeting between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat are widely available. The Geneva Initiative of 2002 demonstrated that there was indeed a Palestinian partner, as have subsequent Palestinian efforts at state building and reform in the Salam Fayyad era. In addition to histories of the conflict by acclaimed scholars such as Avi Shlaim and David Lesch, for more on the conflict and the Oslo process, see Bröning (2011); Agha and Malley (2001); Miller (2008); Meital (2006); Said (1995); Karsh (1996); and Milton-Edwards (2009).

11. The PLO was first created by the Arab League in 1964, but after the 1967 war in which Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (along with the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt), Palestinian nationalists sought to take control of their destiny rather than rely on Arab states. The umbrella organization, which includes representatives from numerous political factions and other key Palestinian constituencies, like trade and agricultural unions, included a quasi-government, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) as well as armed elements such as the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). It is worth mentioning that Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, is not a part of the PLO because it did not exist at the time of the PLO's formation, and negotiations for Hamas to join the PLO in the wake of the 2005 Cairo agreement have not ever been finalized due to the worsening of relations between Hamas and Fatah in the aftermath of the 2006 Parliamentary elections, when Hamas won a majority of seats (Milton-Edwards 2009, 131–133; Caridi 2012, 333).

12. The Arabic word "intifada" is usually translated as "uprising" but literally means "shaking off."

13. It is important to note that Israelis and Palestinians differ in their interpretation and application of international law, particularly regarding the law as it

applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which Israel refers to as "Judea and Samaria" or else as the "disputed territories," denying the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention even as they assert that they uphold its requirements (Hajjar 2005). Similarly, Israel deems the Gaza Strip free from occupation, whereas the international community, particularly those engaged in international humanitarian organizations, consider the Gaza Strip to be occupied, consistent with the definition of occupation as "effective control" (Hallward 2011a; ICRC 2004).

2 Explaining the Contentiousness of BDS: Rival Framings of Identity, Peace, and Power

1. While there may be some activists who do wish to change the nature of Israel so that the state is not defined by its Jewish identity, there are many activists engaging in tactics of BDS who specifically endorse a two-state solution.
2. While an interesting question, it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate why it is that some Jews find themselves critical of Israeli policies as a result of their Jewish identity and why others feel unable to criticize Israel because of their Jewish identity. However, based on conversations over the years, it seems that part of it has to do with how that "Jewish" identity was constructed. Those whose families focused on the social teachings of the Jewish prophets, and who were involved in engaged, "progressive" communities are more likely to be involved in BDS activism than those whose families focused on strict adherence to *kashrut* and were less involved in organizing around socioeconomic and political issues beyond a narrowly defined Jewish community.
3. This statement of course equates BDS with denying the legitimacy of the State of Israel, which is not necessarily the case, depending on one's approach to BDS.
4. Since June 2007, the PNA has had minimal control in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.
5. It is worth emphasizing again that because of the different strands of opposition to BDS, as well as different strands of BDS activism, power dynamics are exactly that, dynamic, and specific to each context. Some BDS campaigns are more coercive than others, seeking to prevent corporations from attaining contracts, for example, whereas others are more symbolic and would have very little actual economic impact on a target, but would harm the corporate image or raise awareness about an issue.

3 CodePink's "Stolen Beauty" Campaign: Creativity in Action

1. Video clips and narrative descriptions of Stolen Beauty campaign actions are available on the Stolen Beauty webpage, http://www.codepinkalert.org/article. php?id=5006 (accessed October 11, 2012).

2. Although he does not explicitly discuss the BDS movement, Yossi Shain discusses this same phenomenon in Jewish and Armenian diaspora organizations (Shain 2002).

4 UC Berkeley's Student Government Divestment Bill: Power, Identity, and Fear

1. Many peace activists interviewed by the author for this and other projects note that the issue of one or two states is less important than the *type* of state(s) resulting vis-à-vis the rights and freedoms of the states' occupants. For example, a single state could be an apartheid regime with one party dominating the other or a state for all its citizens with equal standing.
2. Rawls categorizes decent peoples as not having aggressive aims, using peaceful means such as diplomacy and trade to achieve their objectives, having a judiciary committed to the rule of law, extending human rights to all members of society, and regarding all citizens as moral (Avila 2007, 95–96).

5 The Olympia Food Co-op Boycott: Brokerage, Networks, and Local Culture

1. Groups like StandWithUs have anti-BDS fliers readily available on their website, and the Jewish Community Relations Council has a "rapid response team" ready to "monitor print, radio, and television media" and write letters to the editor with talking points provided by the JCRC (JCRC n.d.).

6 The Presbyterian Church USA: Institutions, Justice, and History

1. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Church is also a conservative institution, and there is a great deal of variation within and across denominations. One need not look far to find instances of official Church bodies standing silent in the face of atrocities (as occurred in the Holocaust, for example), or supporting dictatorial regimes.
2. The network was originally named the Palestine Mission Network and tasked with advocating for Palestinian rights, but the group renamed itself, seeing its role as important for the rights of both Palestinians and Israelis (IPMN n.d.a).
3. The MESC report includes a number of recommendations for how Presbyterians could and should engage with the US government.
4. Committees are comprised of both commissioners and advisory delegates; consequently, not all who vote in committee have a vote in the plenary sessions.
5. Often Jews use the same historical examples to reach very different moral conclusions, using both faith and Jewish identities to justify their positions. For example, Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights

said after a visit to Israel's Holocaust museum Yad Veshem, that "the powerful narrative of the Holocaust that the museum was trying to make me (as a Jew) accept, or at least justify, what was unacceptable: Israel's apartheid state .… To truly honor the lessons of the Holocaust would be to end the apartheid system that is the Israel of today" (PCUSA 2013a).

6. The full text of the letter is available via a link in Laurie Goodstein's article discussing Jewish groups' reactions http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/us/church-appeal-on-israel-angers-jewish-groups.html?_r=0 (accessed March 29, 2013).

7   Conclusion

1. Of course the terms "moderate" and "radical" are relative and subjective terms, often imposed by outside parties who have their own interests.

2. Israeli peace activist Adam Keller also challenges claims that Israel is singled out by its adversaries, pointing to international sanctions against Iran, legal proceedings against Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir, and the many ways Israel advocates demand special treatment or benefit from their close relationship with the United States (Keller 2010).

Bibliography

218th GA. 2012. *11–01 On Peace and Justice in Palestine and Israel*. PCUSA Office of the General Assembly 2008. Accesssed December 20, 2012. http://www.pc-biz.org/IOBView.aspx?m=ro&id=507.

2013 CREF Divestment Shareholder Resolution. 2013. Jewish Voice for Peace – WeDivest.org 2013. Accessed April 29, 2013. http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/301/p/salsa/web/common/public/content?content_item_KEY=12204.

Abbott, Andrew. 1995. "Things of Boundaries." *Social Research* 62 (4):857–882.

Abileah, Rae. 2011. "Why Did I Disrupt?" *Mondoweiss*, May 26. Accessed May 26, 2011. http://mondoweiss.net/2011/05/why-did-i-disrupt.html.

Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2003. *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Abunimah, Ali. 2011a. "Olympia Food Co-op Fights Back Against Israel-Backed Anti-Boycott Lawsuit." *The Electronic Intifada*, February 11. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/blog/ali-abunimah/olympia-food-co-op-fights-back-against-israel-backed-anti-boycott-lawsuit.

———. 2011b. "Uncovered: Israel's Role in Planned Us Lawsuit to Fight BDS." *The Electronic Intifada*, September 6. Accessed January 26, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/content/uncovered-israels-role-planned-us-lawsuit-fight-bds/10350.

———. 2011c. "US Zionists Sharply Divided Over How to Censor Palestine Speech on Campus." *The Electronic Intifada*.October 17. Accessed March 2, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/blog/ali-abunimah/us-zionists-sharply-divided-over-how-censor-palestine-speech-campus.

———. 2012. "Judge Throws Out Israel-Backed Lawsuit Against Olympia Food Co-op, Upholds Right to Boycott." *The Electronic Intifada*, February 27. Accessed February 28, 2012.http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/judge-throws-out-israel-backed-lawsuit-against-olympia-food-co-op-upholds-right.

Ackerman, Peter and Jack Duvall. 2000. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Palgrave.

Activist from Berkeley. 2011. Interview by Author. Atlanta, GA, November 13, 2011.

ADL. 2012. The Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in America. Anti-Defamation League. New York, NY.

Adlerstein, Rabbi Yitzchok. 2010. "Lessons One Rabbi Learned from Presbyterian Church (USA)." *Jewish Journal*, July 13. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/lessons_one_rabbi_learned_from_presbyterian_church_usa_20100713/.

Agha, Hussein and Robert Malley. 2001. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." *The New York Review of Books* 48 (13). Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/aug/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/?pagination=false.

Ahava. n.d.a "Environmental Statement." Accessed October 13, 2012. http://www.ahavaus.com/discover-ahava/environmental.

Ahava. n.d.b "Our Story." Accessed October 13, 2012. http://www.ahavaus.com/discover-ahava/our-story/.

Ainsman, David. 2012. "Anti-Israel divestment moving toward passage at Presbyterian general assembly". *Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh*. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.elabs10.com/functions/message_view.html?mid=1823098&mlid=205813&siteid=2010001863&uid=f7acb77901.

Albin, Cecilia. 2009. "Peace vs. Justice—and Beyond." In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (Eds), 580–594. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Altbach, Philip and Robert Cohen. 1990. "American Student Activism: The Post-Sixties Transformation." *The Journal of Higher Education* 61 (1):32–49.

"The Amman Call." 2007. *World Council of Churches*, June 20. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/public-witness-addressing-power-affirming-peace/middle-east-peace/the-amman-call.html.

Anonymous. 2010. Tikvah Talking Points on Divestment-Why All Our Speeches Sound the Same! In *Indybay*. Indybay. Accessed May 26, 2013. http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/04/15/18644754.php.

Appelbaum, Diana. 2006a. "Presbyterians Bearing False Witness." *American Thinker*, June 3. Accessed May 28, 2013. http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/06/presbyterians_bearing_false_wi.html.

———. 2006b. "The Anti-Semitism of the Presbyterian Church, USA." *American Thinker*, March 24. Accessed May 28, 2013. http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/03/the_antisemitism_of_the_presby.html.

Arraf, Huwaida, and Adam Shapiro. 2011. "The Free Gaza Movement." In *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy*, M. C. Hallward and J. M. Norman (Eds), 153–162. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Arrow, Kenneth J. 2010. "Nobel Laureate Letter." *PRNewsWire*, 2010. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/six-nobel-laureates-connected-with-scholars-for-peace-in-the-middle-east-and-elie-wiesel-counter-desmond-tutu-and-noam-chomskys-statements-on-israel-divestment-issue-at-uc-berkeley-91203369.html.

Avila, Mitchell. 2007. "Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples." *The Journal of Ethics* 11 (1):87–124.

Avineri, Shlomo. 2013. "Stephen Hawking's Hypocrisy." *Haaretz*, May 13. Accessed May 25. http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/stephen-hawking-s-hypocrisy.premium-1.523601.

Awwad, Hind. 2012. "Six Years for BDS: Success!" In *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*, Audrea Lim (Ed.), 77–83. London: Verso.

B'Tselem. 2007. "Restrictions on Movement: Checkpoints and Forbidden Roads." Last modified March 12, 2013. Accessed 7 May, 2007. http://www.btselem.org/english/Freedom_of_Movement/Checkpoints_and_Forbidden_Roads.asp.

Bakan, Abigail B. and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. 2009. "Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: the BDS Campaign." *Race & Class* 51 (1):29–54.

Baker, James C. 1985. "The International Infant Formula Controversy: A Dilemma in Corporate Social Responsibility." *Journal of Business Ethics* 4 (3):181–190.

Baltzer, Anna. 2012a. "Message to Presbyterians: 'If You Truly Want to Help the Palestinian People, I Urge You to Listen to What They Are Asking for'." *Mondoweiss*, July 8. Accessed July 31, 2012. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/07/message-to-presbyterians-if-you-truly-want-to-help-the-palestinian-people-i-urge-you-to-listen-to-what-they-are-asking-for.html.

———. 2012b. "The Pendulum Swings & a New Era Has Begun: Presbyterian Church (USA) Endorses Boycott, Splits on Divestment." *Jadaliyya*, July 12. Accessed March 25, 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6420/the-pendulum-swings-and-a-new-era-has-begun_presby.

———. 2013. "The Future of Our Movement: The Occupation on Trial Across the Nation." *End The Occupation: US Campaign to End to End the Israeli Occupation*, February 15. Accessed March 7. http://www.endtheoccupation.org/article.php?id=3459.

Barghouti, Omar. 2008. "Boycotting Israeli Settlement Products: Tactic vs. Strategy." *The Electronic Intifada*, November 11. Accessed May 2, 2013. http://electronicintifada.net/content/boycotting-israeli-settlement-products-tactic-vs-strategy/7801.

———. 2010. "BDS: A Global Movement for Freedom & Justice." *Al Shabaka*, May 5. Accessed July 7, 2010. http://al-shabaka.org/policy-brief/civil-society/bds-global-movement-freedom-justice?page=show.

———. 2011. *Boycott Divestment Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.

———. 2012a. "BDS for Palestinian Rights: 'Equality or Nothing!'" *The Nation*, May 3. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/blog/167708/opinionnation-forum-boycott-divestment-sanctions-bds#.

———. 2012b. "The Cultural Boycott: Israel vs. South Africa." In *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*, Audrea Lim (Ed.), 25–38. London: Verso.

———. 2012c. "Palestinians Want the 'Full Menu of Rights.'" *Mail and Guardian*, June 24. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://mg.co.za/article/2012–06–24-ns-want-the-full-menu-of-rights.

Barghouti, Mustafa and Rabbi Arthur Waskow. 2012. "Boycotting Israel: Mustafa Barghouti vs. Rabbi Arthur Waskow on BDS Movement, Palestinian Solidarity."

Democracy Now, March 26. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.democracy-now.org/2012/3/26/boycotting_israel_mustafa_barghouti_vs_rabbi.

Barrows-Friedman, Nora. 2012a. "BDS Roundup: Arizona State University Student Government Votes to Divest from Israel." *The Electronic Intifada*, June 6. Accessed June 8. http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora/bds-roundup-arizona-state-university-student-government-votes-divest-israel.

———. 2012b. "BDS Roundup: Major Divestment Victory at UMass Boston." *The Electronic Intifada*, April 24. Accessed May 8. http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora/bds-roundup-major-divestment-victory-umass-boston.

Baskin, Gershon. 2008. "Encountering Peace: The Emerging Bi-National Reality." *The Jerusalem Post*, December 15. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Encountering-Peace-The-emerging-bi-national-reality.

Baum, Dalit and Merav Amir. 2012. "Economic Activism Against the Occupation: Working from Within." In *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*, Audrea Lim (Ed.), 39–49. London: Verso.

Baum, Dalit, et al. 2011. Move over AIPAC Conference – BDS Workshop (session I). Washington, DC, May 21, 2011.

BBC. 2011. "Liberation Theology." July 18. Accessed August 24, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/beliefs/liberationtheology.shtml.

BDS Cookbook. n.d. "'Targeted Boycott' and Why It's a Bad Idea." Accessed July 10, 2012. http://www.stopbds.com/?page_id=1383.

BDSMovement. n.d. "About the BNC." Accessed February 13, 2011. http://www.bdsmovement.net/BNC.

BDSMovement. "Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS: Palestinian Civil Society Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Against Israel Until It Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights." Palestinian BDS National Committee 2005. Accessed February 13, 2011. http://www.bds-movement.net/call.

Beaubien, Michael C. 1982. "The Cultural Boycott of South Africa." *Africa Today* 29 (4):5–16.

Becker, Charles M. 1987. "Economic Sanctions Against South Africa." *World Politics* 39 (2):147–173.

Beinart, Peter. 2010. "The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment." *The New York Review of Books*, June 10. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/failure-american-jewish-establishment/?pagination=false.

———. 2012a. *The Crisis of Zionism*. New York NY: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company.

———. 2012b. "To Save Israel, Boycott the Settlements." *The New York Times*, March 18. Accessed March 19, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/opinion/to-save-israel-boycott-the-settlements.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Beinin, Joel. 2012. "North American Colleges and Universities and BDS." In *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*, Audrea Lim (Ed.), 61–75. London: Verso.

Ben-Ami, Jeremy. 2012. "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Put Allies at Odds." July 2. Accessed July 4, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-benami/

boycott-divestment-and-sanctions-puts-allies-at-odds_b_1640476.html?utm_hp_ref=world&ir=World.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:611–639.

Bernstein, Julie L. 2010. "Handbook for Pro-Israel Activists: Combating Anti-Israel Divestment Resolutions on Campus." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.jewishpublicaffairs.org/IAI/CombatingAnti-IsraelDivestmentResolutionsonCampus.pdf.

Bhatti, Waj. 2013. "Divestment Debate: Our University is Complicit in Human Rights Violations: Perspectives on Israel-Related Divestment as the ASUC Considers Bills Connected to the Topic." *The Daily Californian*, April 16. Accessed May 8. http://www.dailycal.org/2013/04/16/end-israeli-apartheid/.

Bidwell, Allie and Nick Meyers. 2010. "ASUC Fails to Override Divestment Veto." *The Daily Californian*, April 15. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.dailycal.org/article/109108/asuc_fails_to_override_divestment_bill_veto.

Birchbox. 2011. "AHAVA Twitter contest! Win $300 Worth of Mineral Magical Skincare." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://blog.birchbox.com/post/5243881997/ahava-twitter-contest-win-300-worth-of-mineral.

Birgeneau, Robert J. 2013. "Chancellor Responds to ASUC Divestment Vote." *UC Berkeley News Center*, April 18. Accessed May 15. http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/04/18/chancellor-responds-to-divestment-vote/.

Blum, Ruthie. 2013. "Why Stephen Hawking's Israel Boycott Matters." *The Washington Times*, May 11. Accessed May 25. http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/right-angles/2013/may/11/why-stephen-hawkings-israel-boycott-matters/.

BNC. 2010. "Palestinian BDS National Committee Marks Five Years of Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions." Ramallah: Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC). July 9. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1305.

BNC. 2011. "About the BNC." Last updated January 31. Accessed February 13. http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/126

Bohmer, Peter. 2010. "Why I Support the Boycott of Israeli Goods from the Olympia Food Co-op." *Evergreen Blogs*, August 23. Accessed February 9, 2012. http://blogs.evergreen.edu/bohmerp/files/2010/08/BDSmysupport.pdf.

Boone, Rolf. 2010. "Olympia Food Co-op Boycotts Israel, Pulls Products: Olympia Food Co-op: Products Pulled After Board Decides to Boycott Nation." *The Olympian*, July 21. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://www.theolympian.com/2010/07/21/1310754/israel-cleaned-from-co-op-shelves.html.

Boulding, Kenneth. 1990. *Three Faces of Power*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

———. 1999. "Nonviolence and Power in the Twentieth Century." In *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective,* Stephen Zunes, et al. (Eds), 9–17. Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing.

Bowen, Roger W., et al. 2005. "A British Union Reverses a Boycott: 3 Responses." *Chronicle of Higher Education* 51 (41):B13–B13.

Braverman, Mark. 2010a. *Fatal Embrace: Christians, Jews, and the Search for Peace in the Holy Land*. Austin, TX: Synergy Books.

———. 2010b. "Report from the General Assembly – Part 1." (July 12). Accessed March 23, 2013. http://markbraverman.org/2010/07/report-from-the-presbyterian-general-assembly-part-1/.

Breaking Down the Walls. 2010. "Presbyterian Church (USA)." Accessed March 10, 2011. http://www.pcusa.org/resource/breaking-down-walls-approved-219th-ga/.

Bröning, Michael. 2011. *The Politics of Change in Palestine: State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance*. London: Pluto Press.

Brown, Andrew D. 1997. "Narcissism, Identity, and Legitimacy." *The Academy of Management Review* 22 (3):643–686.

Brubaker, Rogers and David Laitin. 1998. "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:423–452.

Brumer, David. 2010. "Of Boycotts, Selective Products and Selective Memory: published as long lte in Seattle's JT News" August 20. Accessed August 22, 2013. http://brumspeak.blogspot.com/2010/08/of-boycotts-selective-products-and_20.html.

Brym, Robert J. and Yael Maoz-Shai. 2009. "Israeli State Violence during the Second Intifada: Combining New Institutionalist and Rational Choice Approaches." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:611–626.

Burston, Bradley. 2009. "The Cowardice, the Vanity, the Sin of Boycotting Israel." *Haaretz.* Jerusalem. Septmeber 28. Accessed November 3, 2009. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1117129.html.

Butler, Judith. 2010. "You Will Not Be Alone." *The Nation*, April 14. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/you-will-not-be-alone#.

Butler, Judith. 2012. "Judith Butler Responds to Attack: 'I affirm a Judaism that is not Associated with State Violence.'" *Mondoweiss*. August 27. Accessed August 31, 2012. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/08/judith-butler-responds-to-attack-i-affirm-a-judaism-that-is-not-associated-with-state-violence.html.

———. 2013. "Judith Butler's Remarks to Brooklyn College on BDS." *The Nation*, February 7. Accessed March 5. http://www.thenation.com/article/172752/judith-butlers-remarks-brooklyn-college-bds#.

California State Legislature. 2012. "HR 35: Relative to Anti-Semitism." California State Assembly, August 23. Accessed May 27, 2013. http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11–12/bill/asm/ab_0001–0050/hr_35_bill_20120823_amended_asm_v98.html.

Campos, Michelle. 2007. "Remembering Jewish-Arab contact and conflict." In *Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel-Palestine*, Mark Levine and Sandy Sufian (Eds), 41–65. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

candio. 2004. "In Our Hearts and in Our Work: The Continuing Influence of Rachel Corrie in Olympia." *Dissident Voice*, June 9. Accessed February 3, 2012. http://dissidentvoice.org/June04/candio0609.htm.

Caridi, Paola. 2012. *Hamas: From Resistance to Government*. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.

Carter, Tom. 2012. "California Passes Resolution Defining Criticism of Israel as Anti-Semitism." *Global Research*, September 4. Accessed September 7. http://www.globalresearch.ca/california-passes-resolution-defining-criticism-of-israel-as-anti-semitism/.

CCR. 2011. "Food Co-op board of Directors Fights Back Against Lawsuit Brought by Five Members over Boycott of Israeli Goods." *Center for Constitutional Rights*, November 2. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.ccrjustice.org/news-room/press-releases/food-co-op-board-of-directors-fights-back-against-lawsuit-brought-five-members-over-boycott-of-israe.

Chavis, Larry and Phillip Leslie. 2009. "Consumer Boycotts: The Impact of the Iraq War on French Wine Sales in the U.S." *Quantitative Marketing & Economics* 7 (1):37–67.

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria Stephan. 2011. "Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare." In *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, Bruce Hoffman (Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Chernus, Ira. n.d.. "Reinhold Neibuhr's Critique of Nonviolence" n.d. Accessed March 16, 2013. http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/Niebuhr.htm.

CodePink. 2013. "Letter to Retailers in Response to Ahava CEO Yaakov Ellis's Dubious Claims" (October). StolenBeauty website 2010. Accessed May 17, 2013. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/article.php?id=5584.

CodePink. n.d. "CODEPINK and the Boycott, Divesment and Sanctions Movement." Accessed May 15, 2013. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/section.php?id=442.

CodePink. n.d. "Take Action at AHAVA Stores!" Accessed May 15, 2013. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/section.php?id=444.

CodePink Interview 1. 2012. Author Interview with Code Pink Activist. Kennesaw, GA, February 22.

CodePink Interview 2. 2012. Author Interview with Code Pink Activist. Kennesaw, GA, February 22.

CodePink Interview 3. 2012. Author Interview with British Activist, September 18.

CodePink Interview 4. 2012. Author Interview with UK Boycott Opponent. Kennesaw, GA, September 14.

CodePink Interview 5. 2012. Author Interview with Code Pink Activist, February 29.

CodePink Interview 6. 2012. Author Interview with Code Pink Activist. Kennesaw, GA, February 29.

CodePink Interview 7. 2012. Author Interview with Code Pink Activist. Kennesaw, GA, January 29.

CodePink Interview 8. 2012. Author Interview with Palestine Solidarity Activist Affiliated with CodePink. Kennesaw, GA, August 29.

CodePink Interview 9. 2012. Author Interview with CodePink Activist. Kennesaw, GA, February 15.

Community Leader Opposing 1. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Community Leader Opposed to Divestment. Kennesaw, September 22, 2010.

Community Leader Opposing 2. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Community Leader Opposed to Divestment. Kennesaw, October 11, 2010.

Community Leader Opposing 3. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Community Leader Opposed to Divestment, November 8, 2010.

Community Leader Supporter 1. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Community Leader Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, September 30, 2010.

The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (USA): The Book of Order. 2009. Louisville: The Office of the General Assembly.

Cook, Jonathan. (2009). "Israel Deploys Cyber Team to Spread Positive Spin." *The National*. Abu Dhabi. July 21. Accessed July 22, 2009. http://www.thenational. ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090721/FOREIGN/707209856/1002.

Cooper, Abraham and Yitzchok Adlerstein. 2012. "PCUSA Could Mean End of Jewish-Presbyterian Dialogue." *The Jerusalem Post*, July 2. Accessed July 4. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=276039.

Corrie, Cindy. 2012. Divestment MRTI Recommendation: Cindy Corrie. Pittsburgh, PA, July 2–3, 2012. Pro-divestment speeches circulated via email.

Corrie, Craig and Cindy Corrie. n.d. "About the Rachel Corrie Foundation." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://rachelcorriefoundation.org/about.

Cortwright, David. 2008. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Curle, Adam. 1971. *Making Peace*. London: Tavistock Press.

———. 1995. *Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Violence*. Oxford: John Carpenter.

CWP (Coalition of Women for Peace). 2011. "Knesset to Promote Anti-Boycott Bill to Second and Third Reading." *BDS Movement*, June 19. Accessed March 14, 2012. http://www.bdsmovement.net/2011/knesset-to-promote-anti-boycott-bill-to-second-and-third-reading-7373#.T2FEOvWttvI.

Dajani, Souad. 1995. *Eyes Without Country: Search for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dann, Moshe. 2010. "War of Words: Israel's Fight Against Delegitimization." *Canada Free Press*, December 14. Accessed March 14, 2012. http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/31088.

Demmers, Jolle. 2012. *Theories of Violent Conflict*. New York: Routledge.

Dershowitz, Alan. 2004. "Presbyterians Shameful Boycott." *The Los Angeles Times*, August 4. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/04/opinion/oe-dershowitz4.

Deutsch, Morton. 2000. "Cooperation and Competition." In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman (Eds), 21–40. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

DeYoe, Rev. Dr. Jeffrey. 2012. "Investment, Divestment and the Collective Amnesia of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)." *Israel/Palestine Mission Network*

of the Presbyterian Chuch (U.S.A.), July 24. Accessed March 26, 2013. http://www.israelpalestinemissionnetwork.org/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=234.

Diermeier, Daniel and Jan A. Van Mieghem. 2008. "Voting with Your Pocketbook—A Stochastic Model of Consumer Boycotts." *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 48 (9–10):1497–1509.

Drachman, Edward. 2003. "Is Child Labor A Necessary Evil?" In *You Decide! Controversial Global Issues*, Edward Drachman and Alan Shank (Eds), 137–158. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Drewett, Michael. 2006. "The Cultural Boycott against Apartheid South Africa: A Case of Defensible Censorship." In *Popular Censorship in Africa*, Martin Cloonin (Ed.), 23–38. London: Ashgate Publishing.

Dudouet, Veronique. 2008. "Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries." *Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management*. Accessed February 13, 2010. http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dudouet_handbook.pdf.

Dunigan, Erin. n.d." Revisions to 'Vigilance Against Anti-Jewish Ideas and Bias' Unleashes Criticism and Support." *The Presbyterian Outlook*. Accessed April 23, 2013. http://www.pres-outlook.com/component/content/article/44-breaking-news/7469-revisions-to-vigilance-against-anti-jewish-ideas-and-bias-unleashes-criticism-and-support.html.

Ebadi, Shirin, et al. 2010. "Statement of Support from Nobel Women Peace Laureates." *Cal Divest from Apartheid*, April 28. Accessed February 21, 2011. http://www.caldivestfromapartheid.com/2010/04/28/statement-of-support-from-nobel-peace-laureates/.

Elia, Nada and Laurie King. 2011. "Is Entertaining Dictators worse than Normalizing Apartheid?" *The Electronic Intifada*, March 3. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://electronicintifada.net/content/entertaining-dictators-worse-normalizing-apartheid/9255.

Elizabeth (Liz) Berney, Esq. 2012. "Op-Ed: It's Time to Take Back Our Campuses- Like Univ. of Pa." *Israel National News*, February 6. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/11236.

Elk, Mike. 2010. "Around the World, Dockworkers Blockade Israeli Ships." In *These Times*, August 4. Accessed July 7, 2012. http://www.inthesetimes.com/working/entry/6286/dockworkers_around_the_world_create_a_worker_blockade_of_israeli_ships/.

Ellis, Yaakov. 2010. "Ahava: Setting the Record Straight." Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/article.php?id=5548.

Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (2):281–317.

End the Occupation. n.d. "Quakers Divest from Caterpillar!" Accessed June 6, 2012. http://endtheoccupation.org/article.php?id=3210.

Ennis, Richard and Roberta Parkhill. 1986. "South African Divestment; Social Responsibility or Fiduciary Folly?" *Financial Analysts Journal* 42 (4):30–38.

Erekat, Noura. 2012. "BDS in the USA, 2001–2010." In *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*, A. Lim (Ed.). London: Verso Books.

ERI. n.d. "Doe v. Unocal Case History." *Earthrights International*. http://www.earthrights.org/legal/doe-v-unocal-case-history.

The Evergreen State College. 2012. "Clarifying Statement, Re: The Flaming Eggplant Cafe and Boycott of Israeli Goods." Last Modified June 8. Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.evergreen.edu/news/archive/2011/06/flamingeggplant.htm.

Fairclough, Norman. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Falk, Richard. 2009. "Winning and Losing in Gaza." *The Nation*, 22 January.

———. 2010. "The Palestinians are Winning the Legitimacy War: Will It Matter?" Redress Information and Analysis, April 5, 2010 [cited April 14, 2010]. http://www.redress.cc/palestine/rfalk20100405.

"Fatalities Since the Outbreak of the Second Intifada and Until Operation 'Cast Lead'." n.d. *B'Tselem*. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/casualties.asp?sD=29&sM=09&sY=2000&eD=26&eM=12&eY=2008&filterby=event&oferet_stat=before.

Fershtman, Chaim and Neil Gandal. 1998. "The Effect of the Arab Boycott on Israel: The Automobile Market." *The RAND Journal of Economics* 29 (1):193–214.

Fierke, K. M. 2004. "Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War." *Review of International Studies* 30 (4):471–491.

Fisher, Ronald. 1997. *Interactive Conflict Resolution*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Flusfeder, Helena. 2012. "Official Move to Close Politics Department Threatens Academic Freedom." *University World News*, October 7. Accessed October 12. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20121005145913726.

Foucault, Michel. (1972) 1980. *Power/Knowledge.* Translated and edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fourth Presbyterian Church. 2010. *A Statement from the Session of the Fourth Presbyterian Church of Chicago*. Fourth Presbyterian Church. Accessed April 23, 2013. http://www.pfmep.org/docs/Fourth_Presbyterian_Church_Statement.pdf.

Friedman, Matti. 2012. "Rachel Corrie: a Life Lost Amid a Clash of Symbols." *The Times of Israel*, August 28. Accessed August 28. http://www.timesofisrael.com/rachel-corrie-a-life-lost-amid-a-clash-of-symbols/.

Friedman, Monroe. 1985. "Consumer Boycotts in the United States, 1970–1980: Contemporary Events in Historical Perspective." *Journal of Consumer Affairs* 19 (1):96.

———. 1999. *Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change through the Marketplace and Media*. New York: Routledge.

Fuller, Sylvia. 2003. "Creating and Contesting Boundaries: Exploring the Dynamics of Conflict and Classification." *Sociological Forum* 18 (1):3–30.

Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6:109–134.

———. 1990. "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (3):291–305.

———. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Ganz, Marshall. 2000. "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966." *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (4):1003.

Garrett, Dennis E. 1987. "The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts: Environmental Opposition to Marketing." *Journal of Marketing* 51 (2):46–57.

Ghazi-Bouillon, Asima A. 2009. *Understanding the Middle East Peace Process: Israeli Academia and the Struggle for Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Gilley, Bruce. 2006. "The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries." *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique* 27 (1):47–71.

Glazer, Amihai, et al. 2010. "Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling." *European Journal of Political Economy* 26 (3):340–350.

Glickman, Lawrence B. 2009. *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goba, Bonganjalo. 1987. "The Kairos Document and Its Implications for Liberation in South Africa." *Journal of Law and Religion* 5 (2):313–325.

Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2009. "Hussein Ibish on the Fantasy World of One-Staters." *The Atlantic*, November 3. Accessed January 2, 2010. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/11/hussein-ibish-on-the-fantasy-world-of-one-staters/29425/.

Goldstone, Richard. 2009. "Letter to US House of Representatives about Resolution 867." October 29. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://mondoweiss.net/2009/10/goldstone-attacks-house-resolution-on-his-report-as-sweeping-and-unfair-devoid-of-truth.html.

Goodman, Amy and Juan Gonzalez. 2005. "Governor Richardson Calls for an Exit Strategy in Iraq and Stands by the Clinton-Era sanctions." *Democracy Now!*, September 22. Accessed June 15, 2012. http://www.democracynow.org/2005/9/22/governor_richardson_calls_for_an_exit.

Goodstein, Laurie. 2005. "Threat to Divest is Church Tool in Israeli Fight." *The New York Times*, August 6. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/06/national/06church.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.

———. 2012. "Church Appeal on Israel Angers Jewish Groups." *The New York Times*, October 20. Accessed October 23. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/us/church-appeal-on-israel-angers-jewish-groups.html?hp&_r=1&.

Gordon, Jeremy and Daphne Chen. 2013. "ASUC Senate Passes Israeli Divestment Bill SB 160, 11–9." *The Daily Californian*, April 18. Accessed May 15. http://www.dailycal.org/2013/04/18/asuc-senate-passes-divestment-bill-11–9/.

Gordon, Nahida. 2012. Divestment MRTI Recommendation: Nahida Gordon. Pittsburgh, PA, July 2–3, 2012. Speech circulated via email.

GushShalom. n.d. "National Boycott Over Settlements Products." Gush Shalom (Israeli Peace Bloc). Accessed January 19, 2009. http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/campaigns/boycott_settlements_products/.

Guterman, Deborah. 2009. "Village Sues Canada Companies Cashing in on Occupation." *The Electronic Intifada*, June 11. Accessed July 7, 2012.

http://electronicintifada.net/content/village-sues-canada-companies-cashing-occupation/8287.

Guttman, Nathan. 2004. "Presbyterians Divest Themselves from Israel." July 22. *Haaretz*. Accessed August 24 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/presbyterians-divest-themselves-from-israel-1.129171.

———. 2011a. "Congress Moves to Punish Palestinians, But Even Israel Objects." *The Jewish Daily Forward*, September 30. Accessed July 4, 2012. http://forward.com/articles/143299/congress-moves-to-punish-palestinians-but-even-isr/.

———. 2011b. "StandWithUs Draws Line on Israel: Growing Advocacy Group Pushes Pro-Government Agenda." *Forward*, December 2. Accessed February 9, 2012. http://www.forward.com/articles/146821/?p=all.

Haber, Jon. 2011. "Israel's Anti-Boycott Law." *Divest This!*, July 14. Accessed February 9, 2012. http://divestthis.com/2011/07/israels-anti-boycott-law.html.

———. 2012a. "BDS at Penn: Is It a Mortal Threat or Just an Epic Failure?" *Jewish Exponent*, Feburary 2. Accessed May 25, 2013. http://www.jewishexponent.com/bds-penn-it-mortal-threat-or-just-epic-failure.

———. 2012b. "BDS Loses by Losing." *The Daily Beast*, July 10. Accessed July 25. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/10/bds-loses-by-losing.html.

———. 2012c. Email correspondence with author, May 8.

———. 2012d. "PCUSA – Motivations." *Divest This!*, June 24. Accessed July 9. http://www.divestthis.com/2010/06/pcusa-motivations.html.

———. 2012e. "PCUSA Divestment – This Just in." *Divest This!*, July 6. Accessed July 24. http://www.divestthis.com/2012/07/pcusa-divestment-this-just-in.html.

———. 2012f. "PCUSA Divestment – Who Pays?" *Divest This!*, June 28. Accessed July 16. http://www.divestthis.com/2012/06/pcusa-divestment-who-pays.html.

———. 2012g. "Presbyterians Reject Divestment–Take Four." *The Daily Beast*, July 6. Accessed July 25. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/06/presbyterians-reject-divestment-take-four.html.

Hajjar, Lisa. 2005. *Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Halevi, Leor. 2012. "The Consumer Jihad: Boycott Fatwas and Nonviolent Resistance on the World Wide Web." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (1):45–70.

Halily, Yaniv. 2011. "AHAVA Closes London Store over Threats." *Ynetnews.com*, September 22. Accessed January 23, 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4125530,00.html.

Hallward, Maia Carter. 2011a. "International Law and the Case of Operation Cast Lead: 'Lawfare' and the Struggle for Justice." In *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy*, Maia C. Hallward and Julie M. Norman (Eds), 111–132. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2011b. *Struggling for a Just Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second Intifada*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Hallward, Maia and Patrick Shaver. 2012. "'War by Other Means' or Nonviolent Resistance? Examining the Discourses Surrounding Berkeley's Divestment Bill." *Peace and Change* 37 (3):389–412.

Halper, Jeff. 2013. "ICAHD's Evolving Agenda: Resistance, Advocacy, Strategizing." *Resisting Occupation, Constructing Peace: ICAHD Monthly Newsletter*, January. http://www.altro.co.il/newsletters/show/2762?key=e0f0b63d2ec479e75f19c54f8ca56341.

Hamilton, Josh. 2010. "UC Berkeley Student Senate Fails to Override Veto of Israel Divestment Measure." *Democracy Now!*, April 30. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/30/uc_berkeley_student_senate_fails_to.

HBS. 2000. "The Burma Pipeline." *Harvard Business School*. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://hbr.org/product/burma-pipeline/an/798078-PDF-ENG.

Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Cathryn Johnson. 2000. "Justice beyond the Individual: A Future with Legitimation." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63 (4):298–311.

Heilman, Uriel. 2004. "Presbyterians Stand by Divestment Despite Dialogue with Incensed Jews." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, September 28. Accessed August 24, 2013. http://www.jta.org/2004/09/28/life-religion/features/presbyterians-stand-by-divestment-vote.

Helvey, Robert L. 2004. *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*. East Boston: Albert Einstein Foundation.

Hill, Toya Richards. 2006a. "Committee on Peacemaking and International Issues: 2004 GA's Israel/Palestine Language Replaced." *So Great a Cloud of Witness News*, June 18. Accessed September 21, 2010. http://oga.pcusa.org/ga217/news-andphotos/ga06072.htm.

———. 2006b. "GA overwhelmingly approves Israel/Palestine recommendation," June 21. Accessed May 29, 2013. www.jewishbroward.com/getfile.asp?id=14567.

Hirschfield, Yair and Sharon Roling. 2000. "The Oslo Process and the People-to-People Strategy." *Development* 43 (3):23–28.

Hoffman, Jonathan. 2010. "The Judge Who Thought He Was Defence Counsel." *CiF Watch*, July 14. Accessed May 17, 2013. http://cifwatch.com/2010/07/14/the-judge-who-thought-he-was-defence-counsel/.

———. 2011. "Anti-Ahava Activists Accuse Israeli Owned Store of 'Playing the Jew Card.'" *CiF Watch*, June 16. Accessed May 27, 2013. http://cifwatch.com/2011/06/16/anti-ahava-activists-accuse-israeli-owned-store-of-playing-the-jew-card/.

Hoffman, Roald, et al. 2010. "Six Nobel Laureates, Connected with Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, and Elie Wiesel Counter Desmond Tutu and Noam Chomsky's Statements on Israel Divestment Issue at UC Berkeley." *PR Newswire*, April 17. Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/six-nobel-laureates-connected-with-scholars-for-peace-in-the-middle-east-and-elie-wiesel-counter-desmond-tutu-and-noam-chomskys-statements-on-israel-divestment-issue-at-uc-berkeley-91203369.html.

Horn, Denise. 2008. "Global and Transnational Activism Bridging Multiple Worlds." *International Studies Association Annual Convention*, March 26. San Francisco. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p252637_index.html.

Horowitz, Adam. 2009. "AIPAC ED Fears the Growing Movement to Sanction Israel Could Fundamentally Change US Policy Towards Israel. He's right."

(May 7). *Mondoweiss*, May 7. Accessed March 12, 2013. http://mondoweiss.net/2009/05/howard-kohr-bds.html.

———. 2010. "TIAA-CREF Divestment Campaign Finds Strong Support Among Shareholders." *Mondoweiss*, July 21. Accessed June 28, 2012. http://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/jvp-tiaa-cref-divestment-campaign-finds-strong-support-among-shareholders.html.

Horowitz, Adam and Philip Weiss. 2010. "The Boycott Divestment Sanctions Movement." *The Nation*, June 28. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement#.

Huddy, Leonie. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Politcal Psychology* 22 (1):127–156.

ICJ. 2004. "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion." *The Hague: International Court of Justice*, July 9. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4.

ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross). 2004. "Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers." Last modified August 4. Accessed April 27, 2012. http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.

IJVC (Independent Jewish Voices Canada). n.d. "What is the Jewish National Fund?" Accessed March 14, 2012. http://ijvcanada.org/2011/what-is-the-jewish-national-fund/.

Israel Law Center. 2013. "Israel-Based Civil Rights Group Informs Fortune 100 Pension Giant Against Divestment Proposal." *Financial Content,* April 10. Accessed April 29. http://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/news/read/23896547/Israel.

Interview with Advocacy leader. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with PCUSA Member. Kennesaw, GA, June 13.

Interview with Interfaith Activist. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with Methodist BDS Activist. Kennesaw, GA, March 2.

Interview with Interfaith Dialogue Advocate. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with Presbyterian BDS Opponent. Kennesaw, GA, May 26.

Interview with IPMN member. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with IPMN Member. Kennesaw, GA, February 26.

Interview with Jewish scholar-activist. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with Jewish activist involved in PCUSA Debates. Kennesaw, GA, February 15.

Interview with MESC Member. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with PCUSA Middle East Study Committee Member. Kennesaw, GA, February 24.

Interview with MESC Member 2. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with PCUSA Middle East Study Committee Member. Kennesaw, GA, March 23.

Interview with MRTI Member. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview with PCUSA Mission Responsibility Through Investment Committee Member. Kennesaw, GA, June 9.

Interview with Presbyterian Pastor. 2011. Katie Sizemore Interview. Kennesaw, GA, February 28.

IPMN-PCUSA (Israel/Palestine Mission Network of the Presbyterian Church). 2012. "Final IPMN Report from the 220th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA)." Modified July 9. Accessed July 26, 2012. http://www.israel-palestinemissionnetwork.org/main/component/content/article/18/229-final-ga-220-report.

———. n.d.a. "Who We Are." Accessed October 10, 2011. http://israelpalestine-missionnetwork.org/main/home/who-we-are.

———. n.d.b "How IPMN Works: An Overview of Our Structure." Accessed March 27, 2013. http://www.israelpalestinemissionnetwork.org/main/ipmn-documents/IPMN_Structure.pdf.

"Israel Law Center Threatens Suit Against TIAA-CREF if it Doesn't Deny Vote to Shareholders." 2013. *We Divest*, April 12. Jewish Voice for Peace – WeDivest.org 2013. Accessed April 29, 2013. http://wedivest.org/2013/04/israel-law-center-threatens-suit-against-tiaa-cref/.

"The Israel Divestment Debate." 2006. *Nation* 282 (18):22–30. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/israel-divestment-debate.

J Street U. n.d. "Home Page." Accessed May 9, 2013. http://www.jstreetu.org/.

J Street. 2012. "The Boycott, Divestment, & Sanctions Movement." Modified May 1. Accessed October 15. http://jstreet.org/policy/issues/the-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement/.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Jamjoum, Hazem. 2011. "The Global Campaign for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions against Israel." In *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy*, Maia C. Hallward and Julie M. Norman (Eds), 133–152. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Janzen, Ed. 2006. "In Defense of Divestment." *Canadian Dimension* 40 (5):17–18.

JCPA. 2012. "JCPA Calls on the Presbyterian Church to Confront Anti-Semitic Rhetoric." *JCPA*, February 6. Accessed July 9. http://engage.jewishpublicaffairs.org/p/salsa/web/blog/public/entries?blog_entry_KEY=6129.

JCRC (Jewish Community Relations Council). n.d. "Take Action for Israel: How YOU Can Help ISRAEL." Accessed March 17, 2012. http://www.jcrc.org/israel_takeaction_yourhelp.htm.

Jenkins, Rhys. 2005. "Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and poverty." *International Affairs* 81 (3):525–540.

"Jewish Agencies Express Profound Hurt by Presbyterian Church Actions." 2013. *7th Space Interactive* 2008. Accessed April 23, 2013. http://7thspace.com/headlines/284556/jewish_agencies_express_profound_hurt_by_presbyterian_church_actions.html.

John, Andrew and Jill Klein. 2003. "The Boycott Puzzle: Consumer Motivations for Purchase Sacrifice." *Management Science* 49 (9):1196–1209.

JTA Wire Service. 2010. "Senate Committee Advances Kagan Nomination." *Baltimore Jewish Times*, July 21. Accessed February 3, 2012. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/national_news/senate_committee_advances_kagan_nomination/19756.

JTA 2012. "Anti-Israel aid billboards are taken down." *Jewish Telegraph Agency,* June 26. Accessed July 4, 2012. http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/06/26/3099211/anti-israel-aid-billboards-coming-down.

JVP (Jewish Voice for Peace). 2013. "Jewish Letters of Support for Divestment from the Occupation." Jewish Voices for Peace 2010 [cited May 24, 2013]. http://www.scribd.com/doc/30663779/Growing-Jewish-Support-for-UC-Berkeley-Divestment-from-Israeli-Occupation-4–28–10.

———. 2012. "JVP Petition Thanking 60 Minutes for Report on Palestinian Christians Hits 35,000." *Jewish Voice for Peace*, http://thankyou60minutes.org/.

Kaleem, Jaweed. 2012. "Presbyterians Reject Divestment Related to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *The Huffington Post*, July 6. Accessed July 31. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/06/presbyterians-vote-against-divestment_n_1652999.html.

Kane, Alex. 2010. "How Much Money is Needed to Stop the BDS Movement?" *Mondoweiss*, October 26. Accessed March 18, 2012. http://mondoweiss.net/2010/10/how-much-money-is-needed-to-stop-the-bds-movement.html.

———. 2013a. "California BDS Debate Heats Up: Riverside Campus Passes Divestment Measure as Stanford Rejects the Same." *Mondoweiss*, March 7. Accessed May 10. http://mondoweiss.net/2013/03/california-riverside-divestment.html.

———. 2013b. "Israel Lobby Group Gears Up Early to Counter Church Divestment Initiatives in 2014." (March 1). *Mondoweiss*, March 1. Accessed March 26. http://mondoweiss.net/2013/03/counter-divestment-initiatives.html.

———. 2013c. "San Diego Students Pass Divestment Measure Targeting Companies That Do Business with Israeli Military." *Mondoweiss*, March 16. Accessed May 10. http://mondoweiss.net/2013/03/divestment-targeting-companies.html.

Kantz, Carola. 2007. "The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process." *Business & Politics* 9 (3):1–20.

Karsh, Efraim (Ed.) 1996. *Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security*. London: Frank Cass.

Kaufman-Lacusta, Maxine. 2010. *Refusing to be Enemies*. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press.

Kaufman, Edy. 1992. "Limited Violence and the Palestinian Struggle." In *Unarmed Forces: Nonviolent action in Central America and the Middle East*, Graeme MacQueen (Ed.), 95–103. Toronto: Science for Peace.

Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keller, Adam. 2010. "Is Israel Singled Out – And Why?" *The Other Israel*, August 1. Accessed August 1. http://toibillboard.info/Is_Israel_singled_out.htm.

Kepler, Tania. 2010. "Israel's Anti-Boycott Legislation." *Alternative News*, July 4. Accessed July 7. http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/topics/economy-of-the-occupation/2706-israels-anti-boycott-legislation.

Kershner, Isabel. 2009. "Netanyahu Backs Palestinian State, with Caveats." *The New York Times*, June 14. Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/world/middleeast/15mideast.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press.

King, Martin Luther. 2012. "Letter from Birmingham Jail." Martin Luther King Jr. Online 1963. Accessed July 7, 2012. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.

King, Mary. 2007. *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*. New York: Nation Books.

Klein, Jill Gabrielle, et al. 2004. "Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation." *The Journal of Marketing* 68 (3):92–109.

Klein, Naomi. 2010. "Open Letter to Berkeley Students on Their Historic Israeli Divestment Bill." *Common Dreams*, March 31. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/31–9.

Kriesberg, Louis. 2007. "The Conflict Resolution Field: Origins, Growth and Differentiation." In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, I. William Zartman (Ed.), 25–60. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Kriesberg, Louis and Bruce W. Dayton. 2012. *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution,* 4th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kuumba, M. Bahati. 2002. "'You've Struck a Rock': Comparing Gender, Social Movements, and Transformation in the United States and South Africa." *Gender and Society* 16 (4):504–523.

Landes, Richard and Benjamin Weinthal. 2012. "The Post-Self-Destructivism of Judith Butler." *The Wall Street Journal*, September 9. Accessed May 27, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443921504577641351255227554.html.

Laor, Yitzhak. 2012. "Israeli Racism is Embedded in Daily Politics of Every State Body." *Haaretz*, June 16. Accessed March 16, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/israeli-racism-is-embedded-in-daily-politics-of-every-state-body.premium-1.437020.

Lederach, John Paul. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Lein, Yehezkel. 2002. "Land grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank." *B'Tselem*, May. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/200205_land_grab.

Lerner, Michael. 2012. *Embracing Israel/Palestine: A Strategy to Heal and Transform the Middle East*. Berkeley: Tikkun Books.

Leonard, Gary S.D.,ed. 2010. *The Kairos Documents*. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal Ujamaa Centre for Biblical and Theological Community Development and Research.

Lesch, David W. 2008. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press.

LeVine, Mark. 2012. "Can the BDS Movement Go Global?" *Al Jazeera*, September 3. Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/2012929235952942.html.

Levy, Gideon. 2012. "Survey: Most Israeli Jews Wouldn't Give Palestinians Vote If West Bank Was Annexed." *Haaretz*, October 23. Accessed December 11.

http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/survey-most-israeli-jews-wouldn-t-give-palestinians-vote-if-west-bank-was-annexed.premium-1.471644.

Lim, Audrea (Ed.) 2012. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. London: Verso.

Lim, Suk-Jun and Joe Phillips. 2008. "Embedding CSR Values: The Global Footwear Industry's Evolving Governance Structure." *Journal of Business Ethics* 81 (1):143–156.

Lis, Jonathan. 2013. "Israel Extends Law Restricting Unification of Citizens with Spouses from 'Enemy States.'" *Haaretz*, April 14. Accessed May 9. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-extends-law-restricting-unification-of-citizens-with-spouses-from-enemy-states-1.515423.

Losman, Donald L. 1972. "The Arab Boycott of Israel." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (02):99–122.

———. 1979. *International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Lundahl, Mats. 1984. "Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott against South Africa." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 86 (1):68–83.

Lyons, Andrew Ford. 2007. "Bringing the Discussion Home: the Olympia-Rafah Sister City Project." *The Electronic Intifada*, May 1. Accessed February 3, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/content/bringing-discussion-home-olympia-rafah-sister-city-project/6891.

Maller, Tara. 2010. "Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions." *Washington Quarterly* 33 (3):61–79.

Manby, Bronwen. 1992. "South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions." *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (1):193.

Maoz, Moshe. 2013. "The Zionist/Jewish and Palestinian/Arab National Movements: The Question of Legitimacy – a Comparative Observation." *Israel Studies* 18 (2):30–40.

Marans, Noam E. 2012. "Op-Ed: Christians' Letter Is an Unworthy Tactic." *JTA*, October 21. Accessed November 5. http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/10/21/3109851/op-ed-christians-letter-is-an-unworthy-tactic.

Marihugh, Cheryl. 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility: An Insider's View: Should Compliance with the Law Fall Under the Rubric of CSR?" *Dollars & Sense*, May/June. Accessed July 3, 2012. http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0506marihugh.html.

Martin, Bradford. 2007. "'Unsightly Huts': Shanties and the Divestment Movement of the 1980s." *Peace & Change* 32 (3):329–360.

Massad, Joseph. 2013. "Israel and the Politics of Boycott." *Al Jazeera*, March 19. Accessed May 26. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331884943284526.html.

McAdam, Doug, et al. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. 2012. "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan Genocide." *International Security* 37 (2):119–155.

McGreal, Chris. 2004. "Israel Shocked by Image of Soldiers Forcing Violinist to Play at Roadblock." *The Guardian*, November 28. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/29/israel?INTCMP=SRCH.

Mead, Donald. 2012. Divestment MRTI Recommendation: Donald Mead. Pittsburgh, PA, July 2–3, 2012. Speech circulated via email.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen Walt. 2006. "The Israel Lobby." *London Review of Books* 28 (6):3–12.

Meital, Yoram. 2006. *Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Metta Center for Nonviolence. n.d. "Nagler's Law." Accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.mettacenter.org/definitions/naglers-law.

Middle East Study Committee Recommendations-Final. 2013. PCUSA 2010. Accessed April 23, 2013. http://www.pc-biz.org/Explorer.aspx?id=3179&promoID=126.

Miller, Aaron David. 2008. *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*: Bantam Books.

Milton-Edwards. 2009. *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A People's War*. London: Routledge.

Mingst, Karen A. 2008. *Essentials of International Relations*, 4th ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Minutes of the 217th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA). 2006. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://apps.pcusa.org/ga217/.

Montreal_Activist_1. 2011. Interview with Author. M. Hallward. Montreal, Quebec: Interview with long time Montreal-based activist in Tadamon and other groups. March 19.

Montreal_Activist_2. 2011. Interview with Author. M. Hallward. Montreal, Quebec: Interview with Tadamon activist. March 18.

Montreal_Activist_3. 2011. Interview with Author. M. Hallward. Montreal, Quebec: Interview with Tadamon Student Activist. March 18.

Morris, Benny. 1999. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–1999*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Mozgovaya, Natasha. 2010. "Food co-op in Rachel Corrie's Hometown Boycotts Israeli Goods: The Olympia Food Co-op Announced Last Week That No More Israeli Products Will Be Sold at its Two Grocery Stores." *Haaretz*, July 20. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/focus-u-s-a/food-co-op-in-rachel-corrie-s-hometown-boycotts-israeli-goods-1.302980.

———. 2012a. "Presbyterian Church in U.S. Rejects Divestment of Global Companies in Israel." *Haaretz*, July 6. Accessed August 2. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/presbyterian-church-in-u-s-rejects-divestment-of-global-companies-in-israel-1.449218.

———. 2012b. "Presbyterian Church in U.S. Votes to Boycott Israeli Settlement Goods." *Haaretz*, July 6. Accessed August 31. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/presbyterian-church-in-u-s-votes-to-boycott-israeli-settle-ment-goods.premium-1.449329.

MRTI. 2011. "MRTI Report to 2012 General Assembly: Engagement with Corporations on Israel-Palestine Issues from 2004–2011." Committee on

Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI) of the Presbyterian Church (USA). Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.pcusa.org/resource/mrti-report-2012l-assembly/.

Mueller, Charles W. and Miriam J. Landsman. 2004. "Legitimacy and Justice Perceptions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 67 (2):189–202.

Murphy, Maureen Clare. 2011. "AHAVA Promotional Campaign on Twitter Jammed with BDS Messaging." *The Electronic Intifada*, May 11. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/maureen-clare-murphy/ahava-promotional-campaign-twitter-jammed-bds-messaging.

———. 2012. "Milestone Victory: Pension Fund Giant TIAA-CREF Divests $72 Million from Caterpillar." *The Electronic Intifada*, June 21. Accessed July 9. http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/maureen-clare-murphy/milestone-victory-pension-fund-giant-tiaa-cref-divests-72-million.

Nagler, Michael. 2010. "Nagler's Law." Metta Center for Nonviolence. Accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.mettacenter.org/definitions/naglers-law.

Näsström, Sofia. 2007. "The Legitimacy of the People." *Political Theory* 35 (5):624–658.

Nathan-Kazis, Josh. 2010. "How to Beat Back Israel Divestment Bill: Get Organized." *The Jewish Daily Forward*, April 21. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://forward.com/articles/127439/how-to-beat-back-israel-divestment-bill-get-organ/.

National BDS Activist. 2011. Interview with Author. Kennesaw, GA, May 13.

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nguyen, Phan. 2012. "Who's Who Behind the Olympia Food Co-op Lawsuit." *Mondoweiss*, February 22. Accessed March 13. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/02/whos-who-behind-the-olympia-food-co-op-lawsuit-2.html.

Niva, Steve. 2010. "Why the Critics Are Wrong: Olympia Food Co-op Boycotts Israeli Goods." *Counterpunch*, July 26. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/07/26/olympia-food-co-op-boycotts-israeli-goods/.

Noguchi, Annie Kim. 2010. "The World is Watching: a Breakdown of the ASUC Divestment Bill." *Harboiled: the asian pacific american issues newsmagazine at uc berkeley.* Accessed May 29, 2013. http://hardboiled.berkeley.edu/archived-issues/year-13/issue-13–4/the-world-is-watching/.

Nye, Joseph S. 2001. "Soft Power and Conflict Management in the Information Age." In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Chester Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Eds), 353–364. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

OFC (Olympia Food Co-Op). 1993. "Boycott policy." Accessed January 20, 2012. http://olympiafood.coop/boycott.

———. 2010a. "Latest update from Board of Directors Re: Boycott." *Olymipa Food Co-op*, August 6. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://olympiafoodcoop.blog-spot.com/2010/08/latest-update-from-board-of-directors.html.

———. 2010b. "Press Release about Israeli Products Boycott." *Olympia Food Co-op*, July 24. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://olympiafoodcoop.blogspot.com/2010/07/press-release-about-israeli-products.html?spref=tw.

Olympia Activist 1. 2011. Interview with Author. Olympia, WA, April 10.

Olympia Activist 2. 2011. Interview with Author, Kennesaw, GA, May 11.

Olympia Activist 3. 2011. Interview with Author, Kennesaw, GA, May 12.

Olympia Activist 4. 2011. Interview with Author. Olympia, WA, April 10.

Olympia Boycott Opponent. 2011. Interview with Author, Kennesaw, GA, May 18.

Olympia BDS. n.d.a "FAQ." Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/resources/faq.html.

Olympia BDS. n.d.b "International Jewish Statement of Support for the Olympia Food Co-op's Boycott of Israeli Products." Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/supporters/international-jewish-statement-of-support.html.

Olympia BDS. n.d.c "Jewish Letter of Support (Local)." Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/supporters/jewish-letter-of-support.html.

Olympia BDS. n.d.d "Muslim Statement of Support for the Olympia Food Co-op's Boycott of Israeli Products." Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/supporters/muslim-statement-of-support-for-the-olympia-food-co-ops-boycott-of-israeli-products.html.

Olympia BDS. n.d.e "Why BDS?" Accessed May 18, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/why-bds.html.

Olympia BDS. n.d.f "Who Are We?" Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.olympiabds.org/who-are-we.html.

Olympia BDS. 2010. "The Olympia Food Co-op Has Risen To The Occasion!". Flier.

Olympia BDS. 2011. "Olympia Food Co-op files Motion to Strike Lawsuit Seeking to Penalize Exercise of Free Speech." 2011. *Olympia BDS*, November 2. Accessed January 18, 2012. http://www.olympiabds.org/2011/olympia-food-co-op-files-motion-to-strike-lawsuit-seeking-to-penalize-exercise-of-free-speech.html.

Olzak, Susan and Suzanne Shanahan. 2004. "Racial Policy and Racial Conflict in the Urban United States, 1869–1924." *Social Forces* 82 (2):481–517.

Omar, Dina. 2010. "At Berkeley, Moral Victory Despite Divestment Vote Loss." *The Electronic Intifada*, May 3. Accessed May 25, 2013. http://electronicintifada.net/content/berkeley-moral-victory-despite-divestment-vote-loss/8809.

OP&L (Olympia Power & Light). 2010. "Editorial: What Went Wrong with the Co-op Boycott of Israel." Accessed March 14, 2012. http://itsourcoop.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Olympia_Power_Light_editorial_Oct6_full.pdf.

PACBI. 2009. "Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel." Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) 2005 [cited January 19, 2009]. http://www.pacbi.org/campaign_statement.htm.

———. 2012. *Palestinian BDS Call*, July 9, 2005 [cited February 16, 2012]. http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1801.

"Palestinian Civil Society Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Against Israel Until It Complies With International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights." 2005. *BDS Movement*, July 9. Accessed February 13, 2011. http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/52.

Palestinian grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign. 2007. *Towards a Global Movement for Palestine: A framework for today's anti-apartheid activism*. Ramallah.

Pappé, Ilan. 2004. *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Park-Poaps, Haesun and Kathleen Rees. 2010. "Stakeholder Forces of Socially Responsible Supply Chain Management Orientation." *Journal of Business Ethics* 92 (2):305–322.

Parry, William. 2010. "Israel Responds to Palestinian Nonviolence With Violence and Repression." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 29 (2):12–33.

PCUSA. 1984. "The Divestment Strategy: Principles and Criteria." 196th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.pcusa.org/resource/divestment-strategy-principles-and-criteria/.

———. 2010. 14-08 "Breaking Down Walls"--*From the Middle East Study Committee*. PC-BIZ 2010 Accessed April 23 2013. Available from http://www.pc-biz.org/Explorer.aspx?id=3179&promoID=126.

———. 2012a. "2012 General Assembly Divestment List (Long Version)." pcusa.org 2012. Accessed December 18, 2012. http://www.pcusa.org/resource/2012-general-assembly-divestment-list-long-version/.

———. 2012b. *Program Book for the 220th General Assembly*. Lousville, KY: G.A. Meeting Service Office of the General Assembly.

———. 2012c. The Report of the Middle East Study Committee ss Approved by the 219th General Assembly (2010) Including The Report of the Middle East Monitoring Group as Approved by the 220th General Assembly (2012). Office of the General Assembly Presbyterian Church, USA.

———. 2013a. "15–01 On Recognizing That Israel's Law and Practices Constitute Apartheid Against Palestinian People – from the Presbytery of Muskingum Valley." PC-Biz 2012. Accessed May 9, 2013. http://pc-biz.org/Explorer.aspx?id=3769.

———. 2013b. "General Assembly of the PC(U.S.A.)." Office of the General Assembly 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://oga.pcusa.org/section/ga/ga/.

PeaceWorks. 2011. Peace Works Solidarity Conference: Solidarity in Action. April 8–9, 2011, at Olympia, WA (Evergreen State College).

Pearlman, Wendy. 2011. *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peled, Yoav. 2006. "Dual War: The Legacy of Ariel Sharon." Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project, March 22. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032206.

Pessah, Tom and Emiliano Huet-Vaughn. 2010. "A bill in support of ASUC divestment from war crimes." *Associated Students of The University of California, Berkeley*. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://mondoweiss.net/2010/03/berkeley-student-senate-divestment-resolution.html.

PFMEP. 2012a. Letter from Presbyterians for Middle East Peace to Commissioners to 220th Presbyterian General Assembly, June 11. Informational Package for General Assembly Commissioners.

———. 2012b. Middle East Peacemaking Questions to Consider. Informational Package for General Assembly Commissioners.

Pinkston, Tammie S. and Archie B. Carroll. 1996. "A Retrospective Examination of CSR Orientations: Have They Changed?" *Journal of Business Ethics* 15 (2):199–206.

Plitnick, Mitchell. 2012a. "Americans for Peace Now: Right So Often, But Wrong on Presbyterian Divestment." *The Third Way: Finding Balance In Mideast Analysis*, July 5. Accessed July 9. http://mitchellplitnick.com/2012/07/05/americans-for-peace-now-right-so-often-but-wrong-on-presbyterian-divestment/.

———. 2012b. "Israel Divestment Campaigns Gain Momentum in U.S." *Inter Press Service*, July 6. Accessed July 30. http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/israel-divestment-campaigns-gain-momentum-in-u-s/.

Plitt, Bill. 2012. Boycott Overture Advocate to Committee 15. 220th PCUSA General Assembly, Pittsburgh, PA, July 2–3. Speech circulated via email.

Prager, Dennis. 2004. "Presbyterian Church Defames Christianity" July 20. Townhall.com. Accessed August 24 2013. http://townhall.com/columnists/dennisprager/2004/07/20/presbyterian_church_defames_christianity/page/full.

Presbyterian Mission Agency n.d.a. "Middle East Background." Accessed August 24, 2013. http://www.presbyterianmission.org/ministries/global/middle-east/.

Presbyterian Mission Agency. n.d.b "What is MRTI?" Accessed February 18, 2011. http://gamc.pcusa.org/ministries/mrti/what-mrti/.Qumsiyeh, Mazen. 2011. *Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment*. London: Pluto Press.

Ramos-Horta, Jose. 2005. "The Dignity of the Ballot." *The Guardian*, October 30. Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/31/hearafrica05.development1.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, et al. 2011. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ratner, Michael and Paul Jay. 2013. "Shutting Down Critiques of Israel on Campus." *ZNet*, April 8. Accessed April 24. http://www.zcommunications.org/shutting-down-critique-of-israel-on-campus-by-michael-ratner.

Ravid, Barak. 2012. "EU Foreign Ministers Pushing to Label All Settlement Products." *Haaretz*, October 3. Accessed October 13. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/eu-foreign-ministers-pushing-to-label-all-settlement-products.premium-1.467916.

RCF (Rachel Corrie Foundation for Peace & Justice). n.d.a "About the Rachel Corrie Foundation." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://rachelcorriefoundation.org/about.

———. n.d.b. "Supporting the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement." Accessed February 3, 2012. http://rachelcorriefoundation.org/about/bds.

Resource Center: Iran Sanctions. 2012. U.S. Department of the Treasury 2012. Accessed June 15, 2012. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran.aspx.

Reut, 2010. *Building a Political Firewall Against Israel's Delegitimization: Conceptual Framework*. Jerusalem: Reut Institute. Accessed May 29, 2013. *www.reut-institute.org/data/.../20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf.*

Rigby, Andrew. 1991. *Living the Intifada*. London: Zed Books.

Ringmar, Erik. 1996. *Identity, Interest and Action: A cultural explanation of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman (Eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robbins, Annie. 2012. "Billboard Campaign to End US Aid to Israel Hits LA – Thanks to CBS." *Mondoweiss*, June 13. Accessed July 4. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/06/stop-30-billion-campaign-plasters-los-angeles-with-billboards.html.

Robbins, Annie and Adam Horowitz. 2013. "UC Berkeley Student President Announces He Will Not Veto Divestment Bill." *Mondoweiss*, April 24. Accessed May 15. http://mondoweiss.net/2013/04/president-announces-divestment.html.

Robbins, Annie and Mattew Taylor. 2012. "California State Assembly Passess Resolution Equating Criticism of Israel with Anti-Semitism." *Mondoweiss*, August 29. Accessed May 11, 2013. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/08/california-state-assembly-passes-resolution-equating-criticism-of-israel-with-hate-speech.html.

Rosen, Robyn. 2011. "Protests Drive Ahava out of Covent Garden." (March 31). *The Jewish Chronicle*, March 31. Accessed January 20, 2012. http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/47284/protests-drive-ahava-out-covent-garden.

Rosner, Scott and Deborah Low. 2009. "The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on Effectuating International Political and Economic Change." *Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law* 11 (1):27–79.

Rothman, Jay. 1998. "Dialogue in Conflict: Past and Future." In *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, Eugene Weiner (Ed.), 217–235. New York: Continuum.

Rothschild, Nathalie. 2011. "Criticism of Boycott Bill by BDS Supporters in Israel and Abroad Rings Hollow." *Nathalie Rothschild*, July 14. Accessed March 15, 2012. http://www.nathalierothschild.com/2011/07/14/criticism-of-boycott-bill-by-bds-supporters-in-israel-and-abroad-rings-hollow/.

Rousseau, David L. and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. 2007. "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (5):744–771.

Roy, Beth. 1994. *Some Trouble with Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roy, Sara. 1999. "De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28 (3):64–82.

Said, Edward. 1995. *Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*. New York: Vintage Books.

Santos, Filipe M. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. 2005. "Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization." *Organization Science* 15 (5):491–508.

Schell, Jonathan, et al. 2009. "The power of nonviolence." *The Nation*, January 14. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/power-nonviolence

Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schouten, Esther M. J. 2007. "Defining the Corporate Social Responsibility of Business from

International Law." *Managerial Law* 49(1/2):16–36.

Seidman, Gay W. 2007. *Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational Activism*, *American Sociological Association's Rose Series in Sociology*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Semple, Kirk and Gersh Kuntzman. 2012. "Food Co-op Rejects Effort to Boycott Israeli-Made Products." *The New York Times*, March 27. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/nyregion/park-slope-food-co-op-to-de-cide-on-boycott-vote.html?_r=1.

Sen, Sankar, et al. 2001. "Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts." *Journal of Consumer Research* 28 (3):399–417.

Senator Opposing 1. 2010. Author Interview with UC Berkeley Student Opposing Divestment. Kennesaw, October 11, 2010.

Senator Recording. 2010. *Recording of Closed Door Session with Akiva Tor*. Berkeley. Transcription of Digital Recording.

Senator Supporter 1. 2010. Author Interview with UC Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, September 20, 2010.

Senator Supporter 2. 2010. Author and Patrick Shaver Interview with UC Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, September 13, 2010.

Senator Supporter 3. 2010. Author Interview with UC Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, September 15, 2010.

Shain, Yossi. 2002. "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution." *SAIS Review* 22 (2):115–144.

Sharp, Gene. 1959. "The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revised)." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3 (1):41–66.

———. 1973. *Methods of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent.

———. 2005. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*. Boston, MA: Extending Horizons Books.

———. 2010. *Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 4th ed. East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution. Accessed March 2, 2013. www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/FDTD.pdf.

Sherwood, Harriet. 2013. "Israeli Journalist is Accused of Inciting Violence After Backing Palestinian Stone Throwers." *The Observer*, April 6. Accessed May 9. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/06/israeli-journalist-amira-hass/print.

Shlaim, Avi. 2009. *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*. London: Verso.

Shotter, John. 1993. *Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language*. Inquiries in Social Construction. K. J. Gergen and J. Shotter (Eds). London: Sage Publications.

Shrum, Glenn and Irene Rivera-Calderon. 2012. "Alan Dershowitz Advocates Support for Israel." *The Daily Pennsylvanian*, February 3. Accessed May 24, 2013. http://www.thedp.com/article/2012/02/alan_dershowitz_advocates_support_for_israel.

Silberman, Zach. 2012. "Anti-Israel Aid Billboards Are Taken Down." *Jewish Telegraph Agency*, June 26. Accessed July 4, 2012. http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/06/26/3099211/anti-israel-aid-billboards-coming-down.

Silverstein, Richard. 2011. "Israeli consul, StandWithUs Engage in Lawfare Against Olympia Food Co-op." *Tikun Olam*, September 10. Accessed March 2, 2012. http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2011/09/10/israeli-consul-standwithus-engage-in-lawfare-against-olympia-food-coop/.

———. 2012. "Olympia Food Co-op Wins Anti-SLAPP Motion, Court Dismisses StandWithUs lawsuit – OpEd." *Eurasia Review*, February 28. Accessed March 1. http://www.eurasiareview.com/28022012-olympia-food-coop-wins-anti-slapp-motion-court-dismisses-standwithus-lawsuit-oped/.

Simon, Bob. 2009. "Time Running out for a Two-State Solution?" *60 Minutes*. United States, CBS: 13 minutes. January 23. Accessed April 12, 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/60minutes/main4749723.shtml.

Skinner, Rob. 2009. "The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946–1960." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35 (2):399–416.

Smelko, Will. 2010. ASUC Presidential Veto II. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://asuc.org/elected-officials/asuc-president/executive-vetoes-orders/.

Smith, David. 2012. "Israel Condemns South Africa for Re-Labelling of West Bank Products." *The Guardian*, August 23. Accessed October 13. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/23/israel-south-africa-west-bank-label.

Soederberg, Susanne. 2009. "The Marketisation of Social Justice: The Case of the Sudan Divestment Campaign." *New Political Economy* 14 (2).

Somplatsky-Jarman, Bill. 2013. Email Correspondence on PCUSA divestment from South Africa, May 6.

Soule, Sarah Anne. 2009. *Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility*, *Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SPSC (Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign). 2010. "Israel Lobby Watch: E-Book on Jewish National Fund's Role in Colonization of Palestine Released." *The Electronic Intifada*, February 15. Accessed March 14, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/content/e-book-jewish-national-funds-role-colonization-palestine-released/1029.

Staff. 2011. "Ahava's Theft of Occupied Natural Resources Finally Exposed." May 18. Accesed November 8, 2011. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/article.php?id=5831.

Steinberg, Gerald M. 2011. "The Politics of NGOs, Human Rights and the Arab-Israel Conflict." *Israel Studies* 16 (2):24–54.

Stephan, Maria J. and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33 (1): 7–44.

Stockton, Ronald R. 2005. "The Presbyterian Divestiture Vote and the Jewish Response." *Middle East Policy* 12 (4):98–117.

———. 2006. "Presbyterians, Jews and Divestment: The Church Steps Back." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4):102–124.

Stolen Beauty. 2011. "CAUGHT: Ahava's Theft of Occupied Natural Resources Finally Exposed." Accessed May 29, 2013. http://www.stolenbeauty.org/article.php?id=5831.

Student Opposing 1. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Opposed to Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, October 11, 2010.

Student Opposing 2. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Opposed to Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, October 7, 2010.

Student Supporter 1. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, September 23, 2010.

Student Supporter 2. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, September 27, 2010.

Student Supporter 3. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, September 22, 2010.

Student Supporter 4. 2010. Author Interview with Berkeley Student Supporting Divestment. Kennesaw, GA, September 14, 2010.

Sucharov, Mira. 2011. "Values, Identity and Israel Advocacy." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7 (4):361–380.

Surasky, Cecilie. 2012. "Why Judith Butler Had to be Shut Down." *MuzzleWatch.* September 25. Accessed September 30, 2012. http://www.muzzlewatch. com/2012/09/25/why-judith-butler-had-to-be-shut-down/.

Surasky, Cecilie. 2013. "The Changing Face of Muzzling (Spring)." *Jewish Voice for Peace.* Accessed March 18. http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/301/p/salsa/ web/common/public/content?content_item_KEY=12291#ChangingMuzzling.

StandWithUs. n.d. "About BDS (Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions)." Accessed February 3, 2012. http://www.standwithus.com/bds/.

Tabachnick, Toby. 2011. "IAN Plans Grassroots Efforts to Fight Israel Delegitimization." *The Jewish Chronicle*, April 7. Accessed July 9, 2012. http:// thejewishchronicle.net/view/full_story/12683503/matchbin.

Taraki, Lisa and Mark LeVine. 2012. "Why Boycott Israel?" In *The Case for Sanctions Against Isarel*, Audrea Lim (Ed.), 165–174. London: Verso.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Mass Politics in the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Kate. 2013. "Mayor Backs College's Plan to Welcome Critics of Israel. February 6. Accessed March 18, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/ nyregion/bloomberg-defends-brooklyn-colleges-right-to-bds-talk.html?_r=0.

Teoh, Siew Hong, et al. 1999. "The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott." *The Journal of Business* 72 (1):35–89.

TESC Divest. 2010. "TESC Divest: Ending Evergreen's Complicity in Occupation." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://tescdivest.blogspot.com/p/resolutions.html.

Thörn, Håkan. 2006. "Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations* 17 (4):285–301.

———. 2009. "The Meaning(s) of Solidarity: Narratives of Anti-Apartheid Activism." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35 (2):417–436.

Thornburgh, Blair. 2012. "Presbyterians Split on Israel Boycott: Church Opposes Divestment But Backs Settlement Boycott." *The Jewish Daily Forward*, July 6. Accessed July 27. http://forward.com/articles/159001/presbyterians-split-on-israel-boycott/.

Tidwell, Alan. 1998. *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. New York: Pinter.

Tikkun. n.d. "Israel/Palestine." Accessed May 9, 2013. http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/israelpalestine.

Tilly, Charles. 1984. "Social Movements and National Politics." In *Statemaking and Social Movements*, C. Bright and S. Harding (Eds), 297–317. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

———. 1998a. *Durable Inequality, Irene Flecknoe Ross Lecture Series*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1998b. "Social Movements and (All Sorts of) Other Political Interactions – Local, National, and International – Including Identities." *Theory and Society* 27 (4):453–480.

———. 2002. *Stories, Identities and Political Change*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Tutu, Desmond. 2010. "Archbishop Desmond Tutu to UC Berkeley: Divesting Is the Right Thing to Do." *Salem-News*, April 11. Accessed August 29. http://www.salem-news.com/articles/april112010/desmond-tutu-dt.php.

United Methodist Kairos Response. n.d. "Why Divest?" Accessed March 23, 2013. https://www.kairosresponse.org/About_UMKR.html.

United Press International. 1985. "Presbyterians Divest Mobil Stock as S. Africa Protest." *Los Angeles Times*, December 11. Accessed May 9, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/1985–12–11/news/mn-916_1_south-africa.

Vilkomerson, Rebecca. 2013. "AIPAC Does Not Speak for Me." March 4. Accessed March 7, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-vilkomerson/aipac-does-not-speak-for-_b_2797132.html.

Volkan, Vamik. 1985. "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach." *Political Psychology* 6 (2):219–247.

WAFA. 2011. Lawsuit Aims to Punish Olympia Food Co-op for Boycott of Israeli Goods. *WAFA, Palestine News & Information Agency*, September 1. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail&id=17293.

———. 2012. US Judge Rules Boycott Israel Campaign Legal. *WAFA, Palestine News & Information Agency*, February 27. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail&id=19140.

Wall, James M. 2012. "Pro-Divestment Presbyterians Win By Losing." *Wallwritings*, July 7. Accessed July 27. http://wallwritings.me/2012/07/07/pro-divestment-presbyterians-win-by-losing/.

Weber, Max. (1947)1964. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: The Free Press.

Weiner, J. 1986. "Students, Stocks and Shanties." *The Nation* 243 (11):337–340.

Weiss, Philip. 2013. "Jewish Federations Mount Campaign Against Berkeley Divestment Measure as 'Alienating and Hateful.'" *Mondoweiss*, April 23. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://mondoweiss.net/2013/04/federations-divestment-alienating.html.

Weizman, Eyal. 2007. *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. London: Verso.

West, Ben. 2012. "Protest Movements as Political Strategy." *Stratfor*, July 5. Accessed July 6. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/protest-movements-political-strategy?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120705&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=title&elq=1e9095160b5e4b999d3b84b33b8dc91f.

Wettstein, Jason. 2012. "Clarifying Statement, Re: The Flaming Eggplant Cafe and Boycott of Israeli Goods." Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.evergreen.edu/news/archive/2011/06/flamingeggplant.htm.

Whisler, Shane. 2008. "Assembly Calls for Peacemaking in Israel/Palestine." Accessed May 29, 2013. www.pres-outlook.com/component/content/article/45/7654.pdf.

White, Ben. 2010. "Behind Brand Israel: Israel's Recent Propaganda Efforts." *The Electronic Intifada*, February 23. Accessed March 17, 2012. http://electronicintifada.net/content/behind-brand-israel-israels-recent-propaganda-efforts/8694.

WhoProfits. 2012. "Ahava: Tracking the Trade Trail of Settlement Products." Accessed June 8. http://whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/ahava_report_final.pdf.

Wiesel, Elie. 2010. *Letter to Berkeley Students*, April 13, 2010. Accessed May 15, 2013. http://israelcc.org/docs/resources-for-professionals/combating-anti-divestment-resolutions.pdf.

Wise, Alissa. 2012. Speech advocating divestment to Committee 15. 220th PCUSA General Assembly Pittsburgh, PA, July 2–3, 2012.Circulated via email.

Wolpe, Rabbi David. 2011. "In Israel Debate, These Jews Should Be Ignored." *The Huffington Post*, February 2. Accessed May 2, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-david-wolpe/jews-who-should-not-be-he_b_817981.html.

The World Bank. 2008. "The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank." Accessed May 29, 2013. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21946232~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:294365,00.html.

Ya'ar, Chana. 2012. "Irish Band Caves to PA Arab Cultural Terrorism." *Arutz Sheva*, June 5. Accessed July 7. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/155500.

Zaimov, Stoyan. 2012. "PCUSA Votes 333–331 Against Divestment from Israeli-Tied Companies." *Christian Post*, July 6. Accessed May 25, 2013. http://www.christianpost.com/news/pcusa-votes-333–331-against-divestment-from-israeli-tied-companies-77766/.

Zertal, Idith and Akiva Eldar. 2007. *Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel, 1967–2007*. New York: NationBooks.

Ziadeh, Rafeef. 2013. "Stephen Hawking Is Right, It's Time to End International Support for Israeli Impunity." *New Statesman*, May 11. Accessed May 25, 2013. http://www.newstatesman.com/voices/2013/05/stephen-hawking-right-its-time-end-international-support-israeli-impunity.

Zunes, Stephen. 2010. "Will the Flotilla Attack Be Our "Kent State" Moment?" *Institute for Policy Studies*, June 7. Accessed June 30. http://www.fpif.org/blog/will_the_flotilla_attack_be_our_kent_state_moment.

———. 2012. "Divesting from All Occupations." *Foreign Policy in Focus*, July 25. Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.fpif.org/articles/divesting_from_all_occupations.

Index