Palestinian State Formation

Palestinian State Formation: Education and the Construction of National Identity

By

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Implosion of the Palestinian National Movement

The Palestinian National Movement (PNM) imploded in August 2007.[1] Clashes between the Islamic movement-Hamas, and the more secular oriented Fateh led to a Hamas takeover of Gaza. Both parties, as Rashid Khalidi notes, "have been fighting for control over a Palestinian Authority [PA] that has no real authority."[2] Under continued Israeli occupation, an antagonistic dual authority prevails in the PA controlled areas. Even before winning the January 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas has and continues to be ostracized by Israel, the US and much of the international community. In contrast, the much weakened authority of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas continues to garner increased international political support and financial aid. President Bush immediately relaunched the "peace process" to nowhere.

Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, experience economic deprivation, financial ruin, continued expansion of Israeli settlements, and an ever expanding Israeli Wall which is fragmenting the geographic landscape. In short, the Palestinian dream for independence is being supplanted with hopelessness.[3] They recognize that all international aid is meaningless if it is not accompanied with tangible pressure to bring an end to the more than 40-year Israeli occupation.

From the start of the Oslo agreements the international community supported this enterprise, hoping that the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians would lead to a negotiated political settlement of one of the most intractable international conflicts. International donors reasoned that for the peace process to yield the intended political outcome, the Palestinian Authority needed financial assistance to build the institutions of a state. Through the building of state institutions the PA would be empowered to improve the Palestinian economy which would produce rapid and visible benefits in the daily lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Increasing confidence in the PA's institutions was

expected to bolster the PA's legitimacy thus undermining domestic opposition to the peace process. In short, the intended outcome of this support was the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the *sine qua non* for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.

In 1994-95 Palestinians were hopeful that the Oslo Accords would lead to statehood and the normalization of life. The outbreak of the second uprising, the *Aqsa Intifada*, in late September 2000, is an important conjunctural moment. Far from being a rebellion launched by Arafat to wrest concessions from Israel, this uprising was in large measure a spontaneous explosion of rage and frustration at the years of continuing occupation and settlement expansion, and a protest against the PA leadership as well as Israel. Arafat and the PA leadership were accused by the increasingly intransigent Palestinian opposition (mostly Islamic) of betraying Palestinian aspirations by acquiescing to Israeli demands to end Palestinian resistance despite the continuation of Israeli control and occupation (Enderlin 2003; Kimmerling 2003; Malley and Agha 2001; Usher 2003; Shikaki 2002). Khalil Shikaki notes that the "young guard has turned to violence to get Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip unilaterally as it withdrew from South Lebanon in May 2000 and simultaneously to weaken the Palestinian old guard and eventually displace it" (Shikaki 2002, 1). Thus, in the span of a few years, hope for improved lives in an autonomous and democratic Palestinian state gave way to despair and rising violence.

In the resistance phase Palestinians viewed themselves as one united people. For Palestinians, national identity was shared irrespective of the location of their domicile. The PLO served as the symbol and agency which cemented the unity of the Palestinians, whether they were "inside" or "outside" of historic Palestine. Perhaps, we should consider the post-Oslo phase as a new *historic crisis* confronting the Palestinians as they attempt to reformulate or reconfigure their identity under rapidly changing circumstances. The PLO still exists, and officially it still claims to represent all of the Palestinians, the "inside" and the "outside". However, the Palestinian Authority has for all practical purposes superseded the PLO and has assumed most of its functions. And now, the PA itself is divided.

The optimism of 1993 has not produced peace, nor has it enabled the formation of a sovereign Palestinian state. Fifteen years after Oslo, Israeli occupation continues and violence and terror are on the rise. The optimism of 1993 has given way to pessimism and despair. The current condition can optimistically be characterized as one of no-peace and no-war. In this context, the survival of the PA and its institutions would not have been

possible without the support of the donor community.

State Building Undermines Resistance

This book examines the role of education in building a new Palestinian state, and especially on the role and function of the education system in the process of state formation. Since education frames a people's identity, the nature of the education system affects how Palestinians relate to their state. Education serves three primary functions. First, it gives the Palestinian Authority (PA), a state in formation, the opportunity to develop its institutional capacity to allocate resources and values to the people. Second, education contributes to economic development by upgrading the skill levels of the population. Third, and most important, through education the PA transforms the parameters of identity to serve the requirements of state-building and the peace process. International assistance to the PA affects all of these processes through the disbursal of political rent, whose primary function is to bolster the PA and to keep the peace process going.

Palestinian Arabs and Zionists have contested sovereignty over historic Palestine for more than a century. After a long conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, a tenuous peace agreement has been reached by which Palestinians are taking the first steps in constituting themselves into a nation-state. This agreement sanctioned the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a state-in-the-making. Immediately thereafter, in 1994 the PA assumed various administrative tasks of governance through newly created ministries. One of the key ingredients of a nation-state is the creation or maintenance in its people of a sense of national identity. Political scientists and other social scientists have noted that states undertake the practical function of political socialization, to create a consensus identification in people's minds between the individuals and their state. In addition, the state is centrally involved in a second function, that of creating the skills and conditions for economic development that will provide better material lives for people. Education and education systems are centrally involved in both of these functions.

The new Palestinian Authority has assumed two seemingly contradictory functions: state building and resistance, and the dynamic tensions between the two raise key questions for political and policy analysis. Are these functions mutually exclusive or complementary in the context of the ongoing peace negotiations, and state-building? Can the Palestinian leadership transform the Palestinian national movement from a revolutionary organization to a pragmatic state apparatus? Are the PLO

and the PA interchangeable? What type of power does the PA need to cultivate the support, or to secure the compliance, of the Palestinian people for the state-building project? Clearly, the answers to these questions have a direct bearing on the education system. Will this system promote a resistance identity or a state-building legitimizing identity?

This study analyzes Palestinian strategies to transform and reconstruct the education system during the present highly contested process of state formation. How does the Palestinian educational system, with its multiple external influences, respond to and shape the transitional post-1994 condition? Who are the principal actors and organizations that shaped the priorities which became state policy? In view of significant external influences, how does the Ministry of Education (MOE)[4] prioritize the objectives and goals of Palestinian education, and develop policies to implement these goals?

Prior to the formation of the PA and in the context of the *intifada* (uprising) that started in 1987, Palestinian activist educators and NGOs specializing in education, who were connected to wider social and political movements, played an important role in shaping ideas for building and reforming the Palestinian education sector. They drafted ideas and plans for the creation of a Palestinian curriculum. These activists wanted to put an end to a style of education that relied on rote learning, and that discouraged critical thinking. Once the PA was formally set up, however, international donors played a significant role in developing Palestinian education priorities. The PA adopted an educational paradigm that Paulo Freire (1973) critically describes as the banker's approach, which treats minds as containers for depositing knowledge and focuses only on the need to transmit knowledge and values through lectures and texts. The banker's approach denies the relationship between knowing and acting as well as the fundamentally collaborative nature of these processes. In this approach education is reduced to the acquisition of skills and the mastery of a mix of techniques. Pedagogues like Freire argue that although the acquisition of such skills is important (e.g., literacy and numeracy), by themselves these skills are quite insufficient. These pedagogues believe that the banker's approach perpetuates passive learning, and excludes or constricts societal debates about values, goals, desired visions, and actions to achieve them that education should promote. Why did the PA adopt this paradigm?

This study shows that international institutions such as the World Bank exercise enormous influence in the production and dissemination of information (knowledge, and paradigms), and that such influence, even if unintended, has a direct bearing on which options are adopted by host

governments when they set educational priorities and strategies.

What can curricula and textbooks tell us about how the PA tries to create and construct a consensus identity between individuals and the emerging state? Is the PA, through the new texts, trying to redefine the terms of reference of Palestinian national identity? Do the contents of these texts affirm a resistance identity or do they promote a reconfigured identity through a process I call institutionalized nationalism (state-building)? In Chapter 7 the contents of a select number of texts are analyzed/evaluated to show how the Palestinian Authority is redefining or re-representing the terms of reference for Palestinian national identity. Such a reading suggests the emergence of a new "affiliative order"[5] which is being promoted by the PA. Table 7.1 compares this new affiliative order to the pre-Oslo resistance identity.

My findings reveal that the texts define a Palestinian citizen as one who lives in a defined territory which is ruled by a single authority. By territorializing the definition of citizenship, refugees are thus excluded. In fact, the texts rarely mention refugees, and more importantly refugee camps and diaspora Palestinians are absent from the photographs and illustrations in the texts. The texts mute resistance. By doing so, what is not included is quite revealing. Yasser Arafat is introduced only in his capacity as the head of the Palestinian Authority. His resistance related affiliations, as head of Fateh and the PLO, are excluded. The texts thus de-emphasize the history of resistance, and instead state-building functions are amplified.

State Formation, Education, and Rentierism

The major concepts I use in this research are state formation and political rent or rentierism. State formation is defined as the historical process through which ruling elites seek to construct local identity, insure social cohesion, and gain support from the ruled. In this connection, this study identifies two aspects of state power, using the concepts of Michael Mann. "Despotic" or coercive power is used to curb opposition and to prevent it from foiling the state's political agenda, a function which does not require "institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups"(Mann 1993, 315). By developing the distributive capacity of the state (health, education, social services), what Mann calls "*infrastructural power*," the state through its ministries and agencies develops the capacity "to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its [the state's] own infrastructure" (Mann 1993, 316). Thus by administering educational systems, the state incorporates civil society into its national

development plan, and prepares it to accept the new and reconfigured basis of identity.

Scholars who write on the impact of rentierism on state formation focus mostly on wealthy or oil producing countries. In contrast, this study adapts the concept of rentierism to demonstrate that political rent, provided to the PA by international donors and institutions, has bolstered the Palestinian Authority. [6] The providers of political rent have always insisted that their support is intended to assist the PA in creating transparent and democratic institutions. But consistent with other experiences, political rent as a major source of state revenue has had opposite effects. Freed from the need to extract its revenue from direct taxation, the PA has in effect used donor resources to build a massive security apparatus not only to maintain internal political order, but to stifle political dissent. Through such mechanisms, the PA has curtailed political and civic engagement, thus reducing the impact of social forces (political parties and NGOs) on the policy-making environment. In addition, because of political expediency, rarely do the donors express public concern with the PA's violations of citizens' human rights.

Imagining Alternatives in Normal Times

By all accounts the Palestinian Ministry of Education is one of the best functioning ministries of the Palestinian Authority. Though it functions under severe constraints and adversity, it has managed to keep schools open. Matriculation exams, for the most part, have been administered in a timely fashion. However, the prevailing no-war-no-peace condition has not been conducive for the implementation of critical reform plans. Such reforms would require sustained debate about education and curricular issues. But the Palestinian public space is too pre-occupied with the wider issues pertaining to war and the increasingly remote prospects for peace.

On the 13th of April 2000, the Qattan Foundation for education hosted a workshop to discuss the MOE 6th grade textbook on the Arabic language. Several educators presented papers, but one in particular contained some bold observations. Wasim al-Kurdi, a teacher of Arabic who currently heads the Qattan center's research department, presented a paper titled: "On Selecting Texts: One or Multiple Voices."[7] He invited the workshop participants to think critically. His paper asserts that the actual textbook reads very much like a dogmatic religious text. He questioned the assertion that in the Jahiliyya period (pre-Islamic ignorance) that ignorance actually prevailed. He did agree that ignorance of religion and Islam might have existed, but one cannot conclude that

knowledge did not exist. He thus urges textbook writers to free themselves from dogmatic constraints. Students should be afforded the opportunity to hear multiple voices. Moreover, Arabic textbooks should present a narrative that is not limited to religious or literary references and allusions. He reasoned that language should enable multi-disciplinary inquiry, which requires critical reasoning. I could easily imagine that his intervention was influenced by Michael Apple's questions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge (Apple 1990). Though his ideas were deemed controversial by some workshop participants, they were not dismissed. But what happened to them? The outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada* a few months later put a stop to debates. For Palestinians the absence peace prevents or stultifies debates.[8]

Israeli critics, mostly of right wing persuasion, accuse the PA that Palestinian textbooks incite hatred and violence against Jews and Israel. After reading and deconstructing these texts, I find no evidence to substantiate these charges. But, I think another question needs to be raised. Do Palestinian school texts actively promote peace and reconciliation with Israel? The answer to this question is a partial or a qualified yes. The texts under review project a nuanced nationalist narrative that serves to advance the Oslo generated peace process, which the PA hopes will lead to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. But the texts fail to incorporate a clear and undistorted image of the Israeli other. But, can texts produced under conditions of no-war-no-peace actually promote peace education?

The historical evidence is not encouraging. The Japan Times of 27 March 2001 reported that several Korean women brought a lawsuit against the government of Japan. The women were asking for compensation for being forced to provide sex to Japanese servicemen during World War II. The women who were forced into this prostitution were euphemistically called "comfort women."[9] Norma Field notes that the "first references to the military comfort women in [Japanese] social studies textbooks appeared in 1996," but in only one or two sentences.[10] The appearance of this admission is one of the factors that prompted the formation of a right wing nationalist organization in Japan demanding textbook reform.[11] This organization still disputes those horrible facts. To this day the contents of Japanese textbooks represents an obstacle to good bilateral relations between Japan and Korea.

Wolfgang Hopken, an education specialist affiliated with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, presented a paper on the subject of textbooks and conflicts to a workshop organized by the World Bank in March 2003. His paper summarizes the

findings of his institute on how textbook reforms can contribute to reconciliation among former adversaries.[12] He notes that for textbooks to contribute to the process of reconciliation between adversaries, the violence has to have ended. Even after the violence ends, he notes that a precondition for textbook reforms is the presence of a relatively stable peace. In addition, for reconciliation to be advanced through textbook reform the countries involved must secure wide societal support, and support from the elites as well. Thus, cross-country textbook reform projects need a favorable political environment to be successful.[13] They also need trained textbook authors who can construct critical and dialogic narratives, but such training is both time consuming and costly.

Fouad Moughrabi defines a pedagogy of difference as, "one that values the intrinsic worth of each individual regardless of differences of religion, gender, class, ethnicity and social background." Moughrabi adds that the real challenge for Palestinian education is "how to organize schools, educate teachers, and structure curricula in ways that transform social diversity into a resource. In other words, how can spaces in society and in schools be created where social divisions are no longer viewed as a liability but rather as a heritage, and where each individual is granted a place within the broader narrative"(Moughrabi 2004, 427). For Moughrabi and other Palestinian pedagogues, educational reform must start at the local (national) level. But the reforms he calls for are animated by the universal principles contained in what he defines as a pedagogy of difference, which should serve as the basis for educating pupils for democratic citizenship.

Can the notion of a pedagogy of difference serve as the basis for articulating an educational vision? Throughout this study the word "vision" has been invoked. It appears in MOE documents and reports, and is used by education activists as well. The word is often loosely defined, but it is invoked to express a feeling that education must serve some higher social purpose. In other words, how and should the national educational system serve the shared interests of the national community? Palestinians are not alone in posing such questions. Islamic reformers in Egypt are posing the same questions. They believe that in addition to *talim* (formal schooling), education should also serve the function of *tarbeya* (proper upbringing) which involves the social, cultural, and moral formation of pupils.[14] The purpose of education then is to prepare learners to be productive citizens who are worldly. An educational vision then, is not only about some standardized benchmarks, but rather its primary concern is the transformation of individuals into democratic citizens through a pedagogy of difference.

Outline of the Book and Normative Concerns

The organization of this study is as follows. Chapter Two articulates the advantages of the state formation and education approach as a theoretical framework for this study. I sketch the core problems of Palestinian state formation and identify the impact of *political rent* on state formation in Chapter Three. Chapter Four examines the way international assistance shapes Palestinian development and education strategies. Chapter Five presents a synoptic assessment of the Palestinian educational system, and the corrosive impact of Israeli occupation policies, prior to the founding of the PA. Chapters Six and Seven focus on the institutionalization of the education system under the PA. Chapter Six analyzes the role of education in development, and Chapter Seven focuses on the role education plays in identity formation.

This study does not claim that Palestinian national identity is constructed or reconfigured solely through the agency of education. However, having analyzed the role of education in the process of state formation, this study contends that education and educational reforms do indeed play a significant role in the production of national identity. Prior to the state-building historical moment, Palestinian nationalism embodied many markers. These markers have evolved, through a process of inclusion/exclusion–as evidenced by the state-building narrative–which is contained in the new textbooks. This narrative represents the emergence of a new affiliative order.

The research for this study is animated by certain normative concerns. To paraphrase Paulo Freire, the educational system must enable students to become more human, rather than reinforcing their subordination (Freire 1973). In this context, education acquires a transformative role, in which communities can be actively involved in transforming the quality of each person's life, the environment, the community, and the whole society. Therefore education is not merely an individualistic academic exercise, but a dynamic process in which education and development are totally interwoven. Education animated by this spirit recognizes that each person has a contribution to make in building the new society, and it tries to help each person and community become more and more capable of, and committed to, the service of the people and national transformation.

I should note that my knowledge and interest in Palestinian affairs is not just academic. For the past 30 years, I have observed, studied and written about the Palestinian condition. This journey has taken me to the most important centers of Palestinian life: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and most importantly to all

corners of Israel and Palestine. I have worked as a development specialist for several private non-governmental agencies, including the Welfare Association based in Geneva and Jerusalem. Finally, I served as a Political Affairs Officer for the UN mandated "International Conference on the Question of Palestine," (1982-83) which enabled me to develop lasting contacts in the UN system. I point out in Chapter Three that I not only observed and monitored Palestinian debates, but that I actually participated in them during the difficult days of the civil war in Lebanon. It would be fair to say that therefore I am not only an observer, but a participant as well. This dual role has enabled me to cultivate many friendships among Palestinians. Some of these friends have played, and others are still playing an important role in shaping and/or contesting the institutions of modern Palestinian politics.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: STATE FORMATION AND EDUCATION

> Formal schooling by and large is organized and controlled by the government. This means that by its very nature the entire schooling process–how it is paid for, what goals it seeks to attain and how these goals will be measured, who has power over it, what textbooks are approved, who does well in schools and who does not, who has the right to ask and answer these questions, and so on–is by definition political. Thus, as inherently part of a set of political institutions, the educational system will constantly be in the middle of crucial struggles over the meaning of democracy, over definitions of legitimate authority and culture, and over who should benefit the most from government policies and practices" (Apple 2003, 1).

My objective in this study is to delineate Palestinian strategies used to transform and reconstruct the education system during the course of a highly contested process of state formation. How does education, with its multiple external influences, adopt and adapt to the transitional post-1994 national condition? This chapter summarizes how social scientists and international consultants study education. Social scientists have studied education and its role in political socialization. International organizations like the World Bank tend to study education through the prism of human development. Though these studies have produced some important insights and data, their approaches are not comprehensive. Alternatively, how then do we study education, educational systems, and education reform?[1]

Dominant social and political science approaches have studied these issues through limited lenses thus reducing education to a dependent variable that could shed light on processes of political socialization, and on the role of education in creating human and social capital. Critical and cultural theorists have focused on the relationship between education and differential power in society. However, none of these approaches conceptualize education as an integral component of the process of state

formation. In this connection, Andy Green notes that "specific state forms must be related to the form of educational development which issue from them" (Green 1990, 77). The next three sections identify the advantages of the state formation and education approach, as contrasted with the dominant social science and policy-oriented paradigms in the study of education.

Education and the Social Sciences

Following in the tradition of John Dewey, political theorists have investigated how education and schools can promote a democratic polity through democratic education (Gutman 1987). However, Political Science as a discipline, has produced limited scholarly research on education.[2] Writing in 1957, David Easton lamented that, "in Political Science as a whole, attention to problems of education has all but disappeared"(quoted in Coleman 1965, 8). And in 1965, observing that certain aspects of educational systems "facilitate inquiry in the ways in which they affect, and are in turn affected by, other structures and processes in society"(Coleman 1965, 14), James Coleman noted that few political scientists had so far investigated the "specific ways in which educational systems affect the functioning of political systems"(Coleman 1965, 8). With the acceleration of the process of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, however, modernization theorists identified a strong correlation between education and the status of political elites, with the result that education was thrust to the "top of the list of variables" commanding the attention of social scientists (Coleman 1965, 4).

Within political science literature, studies of education tend to be subsumed under the concept of "political socialization," defined as the "process by which democratic societies transmit political values, attitudes, and modes of behavior to citizens" (Gutman 1987, 15).[3] But the field of political socialization has dwindled and lost its focus, as evidenced by the decline of research devoted to it (Conover 1991; Cook 1985). Conover and Searing note that the "field as a whole provides disappointing theoretical and empirical bases for undertaking the educational reforms that might strengthen the role of schools in the making of citizens" (Conover and Searing 2000, 119). According to Amy Gutman, political socialization studies make sense if their aim is to uncover the processes by which societies perpetuate themselves. However if we want to understand "how members of a democratic society should participate in consciously shaping its future, then it is important not to assimilate education with political socialization.[4] When education is so assimilated, it is easy to lose sight of

the distinctive virtue of a democratic society, that it authorizes citizens to influence how their society reproduces itself"(Gutman1987, 15).[5] By confining their purview of education to political socialization, Political Science studies run the risk of taking a top-down, pro-establishment approach.

More recently Martin Carnoy and Joel Samoff, in an analysis of education in five post-revolutionary societies, argue that looking at education "is an important way to understand larger economic and political change, or the lack of it"(Carnoy and Samoff 1994, 3). Furthermore they maintain that conflicts over the direction that education should take are ostensibly political, and are reflected in the national development strategies that the state pursues. They posit several questions and concerns, which indeed the Palestinian Ministry of Education officials considered in their deliberations (Carnoy and Samoff 1990, 83-96): Should the state adopt the "human resource development" strategy favored by World Bank advocates because it increases economic output in the short run? (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985; Becker 1962). Would such a strategy place less emphasis on state expenditures on university or vocational training?[6] Does the adoption of a policy emphasizing the development of skills tend to assign education the primary role of preparing students for the occupations needed by the market?

Based on their five-country study, Carnoy and Samoff conclude that the centralization and growth of ministerial bureaucracy "promotes educational forms and processes that are inherently undemocratic and bureaucratic" (Carnoy and Samoff 1990, 93). However, technocratic definitions of knowledge can be challenged by political organizations or civic associations that remain unincorporated by the state. Thus, despite the tendency of the educational system to reproduce "a hierarchy of expertise,... other forces develop--in and through education--that challenge hierarchy"(Carnoy and Samoff 1990, 95-96). Some observers have noted that former communist regimes, by virtue of pursuing modernization through education, inadvertently produced educated citizens who contributed to the toppling of the very regimes that provided them with their education. (Nie et al 1996, 184) It is precisely because of this reason that Palestinian reformers favor the expansion of all forms of education. They believe or hope that such a process has the potential to instill youth with inquisitive minds which would serve to challenge the authoritarian tendencies of the Palestinian state.[7]

In recent years, the dominant paradigm in social science has viewed education as a source for the development of "social capital"(Nie et al 1996, 196), i.e., resources that benefit society as a whole.[8] In part this

reflects the increasing role of policy-oriented economists in studying education. For example, since the late 1970s both the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have increasingly analyzed investment in education through the prism of "human development" (Psacharopoulos et al 1985, 3-4), a model designed to spread the benefits of economic growth beyond a narrow elite.[9] Along with other international development organizations, including UNESCO and UNICEF, they have addressed ways to link education and development, providing technical assistance and advice to ministries of education throughout the developing world.[10] For the most part, these analyses are limited to technical advice and published mostly in agency papers.

International Organizations and Education

The ideas and policy recommendations, addressed to leaders and educators of the developing countries by agencies like the World Bank (WB), the United Nations system (e.g., UNESCO), and the Paris based International Education Institute (IEI) cannot be taken lightly. The importance and impact of these international agencies for developing countries is not limited to the provision of funds earmarked for specific developmental projects. Rather, the data in Chapters Three and Five demonstrate that their central importance lies in their role as the producers of knowledge–data and paradigms-- that shape and delimit the policy options of the leaders of the developing world.

With the publication of *Priorities and Strategies for Education* (1995), a World Bank policy document, educational leaders in the developing countries are offered a set of six strategies to improve their education provision.[11] These strategies call for reforms in education and finance management, requiring the redefinition of the role of government in six key areas: 1) higher priority for education, given the critical role education plays in sustainable, long-term development and the reduction of poverty; 2) greater concern for the needs of the labor market; 3) concentration on public funding at the primary and basic levels, coupled with more reliance on private financing of higher education (see also World Bank 1994); 4) greater concern with equity (for the poor and women), premised on the notion of basic education as a right; 5) family and community involvement in school governance; 6) more emphasis on institutional autonomy (World Bank 1995, 91-136). Nicholas Burnett, who managed the preparation of this Bank publication, acknowledges that inducing change in how countries operate their educational systems will be difficult. He writes:

"Education is intensely political: it affects the majority of citizens, involves all levels of government, almost always makes up the single largest component of public spending in developing countries, and involves public subsidies that are biased in favor of the elite" (Burnett 1996, 219).

Priorities has generated many criticisms, but it has been treated as a serious document precisely because of the WB's clout. Recipients of WB funding are expected to adopt the six strategies. In this connection, it should be noted that WB funding of education increased from 11 percent in 1975 to 25 percent in 1990 of all bilateral and multilateral assistance to education. This translates to about $2 billion annually (World Bank 1995, 145-6). The WB is quick to note that this amount is meager. They estimate that low and middle-income countries spend about 6 percent of their total GNP to finance education (public and private) yielding an annual expenditure of $270 billion. The Bank's share of this expenditure is only 0.6 percent. In view of these stark figures, the Bank concludes that its primary mission is to "concentrate on providing advice designed to help governments develop education policies suitable for the circumstances of their own countries" (World Bank 1995, 153). In the Palestinian case the Bank also serves as the primary coordinator for various funds which provide support for the PA.

The WB has fashioned for itself to play the role of a development advisory service, which also provides modest funding. In addition, it seeks to coordinate the activities of other agencies, in their funding decisions and their broad policy advice, as shown in Chapter Four. In this capacity, as a lead agency, the WB exercises enormous influence in the production of information.[12] By commanding vast professional expertise (staff and consultants), it conducts, commissions, and disseminates studies. In other words, it has disproportional influence in the setting of policy relevant agendas. Moreover, Lauglo points out that when the "Bank commissions studies from a weakly developed indigenous base, it also exerts influence on the way that this base develops—the issues addressed, the methodology, the framework for analysis." Therefore for host governments, the "Bank is frequently a source of policy-relevant knowledge—not only from international research and project experience, but also from information which the Bank collects or collates about the country itself"(Lauglo 1996, 222). In this context, the power of information production and dissemination by the WB has a direct bearing on the options which host governments consider in the development of their domestic educational priorities and strategies.

The Bank's recipe for reform can be criticized on many levels. I will

identify only a few points which are relevant to this case study. First, the Bank adopts an orientation towards outcomes which "means that priorities in education are determined through economic analysis, standard setting, and measurement of the attainment of standards" (World Bank 1995, 94).[13] This methodology excludes or constricts the need for societal debates about values, goals, and desired visions that education should serve. In turn, standards are set *apriori* rather than as a reflection of priorities, which is tantamount to using a "particular diagnostic tool ...[as the] starting point for setting priorities in public policy" (Samoff 1996, 252).

Second, education is viewed as a black box which produces outputs, thus eliminating the notion of process from the educational enterprise. But education is all about process: curriculum development, teacher training, learning environments. Children need nurturing that goes beyond the mastery of cognitive skills and knowledge. Instead of reducing their sights to serving the specific needs of the job market, they need to learn how to think critically, to engage in cooperative learning, and to discover their potentials, and ultimately to generate, master, develop, discover, and create knowledge.[14]

Third, by advocating the promotion of "basic education", while proposing the privatization of the tertiary sector, the WB despite its calls for "equity" is proposing the reproduction of inequality. Namely policies to increase tuition in this sector will most likely have a deleterious effect on the poorer segment of society. According to a report funded by the World Bank and prepared by the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, almost 67% of high school graduates (2000-2001) were admitted to Palestinian colleges and universities. With rising tuition fees and insufficient financial aid in the Palestinian tertiary sector, the adoption of such a policy would indeed cause hardship for a large segment of high school graduates.[15]

Finally, reducing education to the acquisition of basic skills[16] narrows the objectives of education. Thus learning is ignored as education is reduced to the mastery of a mix of techniques. As Lauglo notes, such an approach would "see art, crafts, physical education, social studies (certainly any integrated studies) as soft frills which could be cut with no real sense of loss. Those steeped in the mainstream of Western pedagogic philosophy will also suspect that an emphasis on basic cognitive skills runs the risk for support of complacency about a style of teaching in which pupils are passive recipients of subject-matter knowledge which teachers dole out"(Lauglo 1996, 224).

Simply put, the questions discussed above present a dichotomous view

of education, which Lauglo characterizes as a struggle between "bankers" and "pedagogues" (Lauglo 1996, 231-33). They view education through different epistemologies. Bankers are interested in cost-benefit analysis, and see people through a rational actor model. Pedagogues, on the other hand, see education as an interactive process, "replete with discontinuities, and always locally contingent" (Samoff 1996, 254). Indeed the education activists and reformers, discussed in Chapters Five and Six, are clearly animated and inspired by the dispositions of the pedagogues. Furthermore, Chapters Six and Seven, uncover the clash of these competing viewpoints in the policy formulation process of the PA's educational institutions. This undertaking has therefore led me to scrutinize the PA's "National Development Plan"; to examine the documents, texts and oral communications connected with the development of a Palestinian curriculum plan; and to investigate the debates and deliberations seeking to arrive at a Palestinian vision for education.

An Alternative Mode of Analysis: State Formation and Education

Research on the role of education in the process of development and identity formation, while limited in general, is virtually nonexistent for the Middle East; studies on education in the Middle East are mostly limited to development policy papers funded by international agencies or internal bureaucratic studies by education ministries. Recently, a publicly funded research center in Abu Dhabi convened a conference on Arab education and published its findings in 1999. The volume analyzes the challenges to be faced by Arab education in the 21st century through two basic prisms: "human capital," and the "total quality management" of education.[17]

The social science literature, discussed above, has yielded important insights into the role of education in fostering development through the creation of "social capital." But these approaches are limited because they fail to link education and education systems to the process of state formation. Nowhere is this more important than in Palestine, where the process of state formation, however contested and beleaguered, is the subject of intense national discussion. In focusing on the role of education in the transition process in Palestine, therefore, this study not only contributes to the study of education in the Middle East, but also develops a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the study of education in other transitional societies.

In recent years, a growing number of scholars have examined the role

of education and education systems in state formation (Curtis 1988, 1994; Green 1990). State formation can be seen as the historical process through which ruling elites seek to construct local identity, insure social cohesion, and gain support from the ruled. These studies have deepened our understanding of the connections between political and educational changes, and the cultural politics of education. These authors assume that the function of schools and the education system is to meet the demands of state formation (Boli 1989; Harp 1998; Melton 19880).

This approach neglects the relative autonomy of the education system and overlooks the possibility that the education system itself generates important effects that may modify or alter the course of state formation (Wong and Apple 2003, 91). The evidence presented in Chapter Five shows that under Ottoman, British, and Israeli rule, the Palestinian education system (institutions, administrators, teachers, and students) contributed to undermining the objectives of what we might call the colonial state. Moreover, the same chapter demonstrates that the struggles and contests over the shaping and writing of the new Palestinian curriculum do not automatically serve the process of Palestinian state formation. Thus one can conclude that education is not merely a dependent variable that responds to other forces such as those of state formation. Instead schooling and educational systems have a profound effect on many issues including identity and cultural cleavage. Therefore schooling and state formation can best be seen as reciprocal and interactive (Wong 2000, 9-10).

Agreeing with Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Wong and Apple thus view state formation as "the historical trajectory through which the ruling power struggles to build local identity, amend or preempt social fragmentation, and win support from the ruled. These tasks of state building necessitate the transformation of social relations and ideology of the dominated groups" (Wong and Apple 2003, 83). In this context, they note that rulers often view schools as essential instruments in shaping the identities of citizens in order to secure their allegiance. For example, this is achieved through the teaching of courses on civic and national education, a matter which is discussed at length in Chapter Seven. But they are quick to caution that though schools and curricula do advance knowledge that serves the interest of state formation, this is not done in a "mechanical and unmediated way" (Wong and Apple 2003, 84).

The production of curricula can be understood as an instance of the construction of what Michael Apple calls "legitimate knowledge." In particular Apple asks "whose knowledge is most worth?" He contends that curriculum studies is centrally concerned and engaged with the process

where mere knowledge is transformed into official or legitimate knowledge. "But the politics of curriculum doesn't end with the knowledge itself. It also involves who should select it, how it should be organized, taught, and evaluated, and once again who should be involved in asking" (Apple 2003, 7).[18] To understand and explain the knowledge that schools impart to students, Apple urges us to probe both internal and external influences that shape this knowledge. The internal influences are those of the official educational context, whereas the external embodies the process whereby "official knowledge" is reshaped through the struggles between the state and civil society.

To refine the theory of state formation and education Wong and Apple employ Basil Bernstein's (Bernstein and Solomon 1999) notion of "pedagogic device," which "regulates the production of the school curriculum and its transmission through three types of hierarchically related rules: *distributive rules*, *recontextualizing rules,* and *evaluation rules*" (Wong and Apple 2003, 84). Accordingly, various forms of knowledge, contested by multiple social forces, are distributed through schools and their curricula. It is further argued that "recontextualing rules" are the result of discourse contested by the producers of "official" and "nonofficial" pedagogic discourses. The official discourse is produced by state officials and their agencies, domestic and international consultants, and other relevant centers of cultural production. Nonofficial discourse results from the deliberations and interventions of experts from the universities and schools of education, teachers and others from the schools, private foundations (e.g. NGO's). The tension and contestation between these domains "strongly suggests that the state can never monopolize power in curriculum production" (Wong and Apple 2003, 84). Basil Bernstein insists that the "pedagogic device" is not deterministic. He adds that though "the device is there to control the unthinkable, in the process of controlling the unthinkable it makes the possibility of the unthinkable possible. Therefore internal to the device is its own paradox: it cannot control what it has been set up to control" (Bernstein 1996, 52).

In post-colonial societies, the writing of curricula and the introduction of pedagogic reforms is further affected or at times blocked by the external because the fields of knowledge are dominated by some externally oriented agencies of cultural production. For example the evidence presented in Chapters Four and Seven shows how the World Bank and other international agencies, by producing knowledge (data, paradigms, and the provision of technical advice), play an important role in shaping Palestinian educational priorities. Wong adds, that in such "circumstances, the pedagogic discourse is always under strong regulation from the

pedagogic agents in the (ex-) metropolis" (Wong 2002, 36). When this problem exists, "the ruling regime will not have an appropriate primary field to extract discursive materials for producing a common and locally centered curriculum" (Wong and Apple 2003, 85). The evidence presented in Chapter Seven, demonstrates that the production of the Palestinian curriculum is clearly affected by the requirements of the peace process. Thus the curriculum represents decisions made (locally and externally) to determine the organization and the selection of content and learning experiences. In addition educators point out what is taught in the classroom often diverges from the content and intended objective of the official curriculum.[19]

In the context of Palestine this study identifies what counts as official knowledge and who produces it. In this connection, how does the Abu-Lughod reform plan, discussed in Chapter Seven, get translated into state policy? Finally by identifying what is included in and excluded from the curriculum, and what is included in and excluded from the textbooks that are produced, this study highlights and illustrates the controversies that serve as proxies for wider questions of power struggles and relations in Palestinian society.

This study, therefore, examines whether the Palestinian education system, under PA rule, has assisted in the production of a revised conception of nation and political identity, and in particular chapter 7 probes the extent to which such an identity has contributed to the formation of a new Palestinian affiliative order. Does the institution of education, represented by the Ministry of Education (MOE),[20] through the writing of a new (indigenous) curriculum, contribute to resetting the points of reference of what constitutes the new Palestinian National identity?

The Palestinian National Authority and the Construction of Identity

The signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993 paved the way for the establishment of a "Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority."[21] The Palestinian Authority (PA) since 1994 has, by virtue of a partial transfer of power agreement [22] negotiated with Israel, assumed control over education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, and taxation in the areas ceded to it by Israel. In effect, the PA has established full-fledged ministries, and a vast security apparatus which is tantamount to a quasi-state. With the signing of the Hebron Accord in January 1997, in terms of civil affairs, almost 75 percent of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza live under PA jurisdiction. In

effect, a *defacto* Palestinian state has been created, but one that does not enjoy full sovereingty

Although the PA was created by the above mentioned DOP, it is in fact an outgrowth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Both were led by Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. Thus, like other post-colonial states, the PA derives its domestic or national legitimacy from the PLO's long history as the social and national agency–that led the struggle for liberation and independence. Its international legitimacy is derived from the specific provisions of the various agreements signed with Israel (hereafter Oslo Accords). The state building process was formalized through the holding of internationally supervised elections which institutionalized the Palestinian political system.[23] Palestinian voters elected the Palestinian Council (PLC), a legislative body, composed of 88 members, and Arafat was popularly elected as the President of the Palestinian National Authority.[24] Palestinian observers view these elections in one of two ways: the elections are indicative of a process of transition to democracy in Palestine, or they are a mechanism for the legitimation of a political process that could perpetuate Israeli control or hegemony, and foster authoritarian rule.[25]

The PA assumed control of the Israeli-run share of the West Bank/Gaza educational system on August 28, 1994. Prior to this date, in this century alone, the educational system has been successively run by the Ottoman Empire, the British, Egypt and Jordan, and lastly Israel. To this day, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) continues to run its own schools ranging from grades 1 through 9. Finally there are several private schools funded by local and international NGO's. Overall, the public school system now run by the PA is responsible for educating the majority of school age children.

From 1967 to 1994, the educational system of the West Bank and Gaza was administered by the Israeli Civil Administration, whose objectives were "maintenance and containment, not building a Palestinian identity or the human capital required by particular economic development policies" (World Bank 1997, 4). With the establishment of the PA in 1994, the MOE, with advice from UNESCO and the World Bank, has embarked on determining the priorities, objectives and philosophy of the Palestinian educational system. Reports produced by these international agencies concur that, given the limitations of natural resources, the success of the peace process with Israel and the future of an independent Palestine will depend primarily on the development of Palestinian human resources. In this connection, the main task in the near future is to build up, with international assistance, the Palestinian capacity, to "prepare a long term

strategy for developing the Palestinian educational system" (UNESCO 1995, p.I). In building the educational system (general and tertiary) the following priorities are highlighted: institution building; development of a unified Palestinian curriculum with performance expectations associated with the building of skills and knowledge key for economic, as well as democratic, development; improving the capacity of the educational system to expand; improving teaching quality and student performance (Abu-Lughod 1996; UNESCO 1994, 1995; World Bank 1997).

A common theme in the literature on decolonization and democratization concerns the problem of national identity or national unity. For decades, the legitimacy of the Palestinian claim for statehood and nationhood has been contested or opposed by successive Israeli governments. It was not until the 1980's that some Israeli writers and scholars, began to question the received wisdom of the official narrative on 1948. These revisionist writers ("new historians", and "critical sociologists") revised the past narratives and found room for a Palestinian counter-national narrative (Pappe 1997). This narrative had long before been developed by Palestinian scholars, as evidenced by the works of Edward W. Said, Muhammad Muslih, and most recently Rashid Khalidi.[26] The latter, in particular, notes that, despite much adversity, including colonial rule, by 1914, on the eve of World War I, "the idea of Palestine as a source of identity and as a community with shared interests had already taken root" (Khalidi 1997, 156).[27]

The claim of Palestinian nationhood or peoplehood has been fervently disputed by some Israeli leaders and political parties. Historians sympathetic with Israel often invoke Golda Meir's pronoucements: "There was no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state?...It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country from them. They did not exist."[28] One of the better known expressions of this viewpoint can be found in a book by Joan Peters (1984), who claims that the Arabs of Palestine were never indigenous. Kimmerling and Migdal dismiss the Peters thesis. They note that numerous historians have shown that "Peters' tendentiousness is not, in fact, supported by the historical record, being based on materials out of context, and on distorted evidence" (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, xxvii).[29]

Israeli social scientists Joel Migdal and Baruch Kimmerling note that a "Palestinian national identity, like those of other modern nations, has been created–invented and elaborated–over the course of the last two centuries" (2003, xxvii). This process started with the Arab-Palestinian revolt against

Ottoman rule in 1834. Historian Yehoshua Porath observes that "*Filastin"* the Arabic word for Palestine, was invoked by leaders of the Christian Orthodox community (e.g., Khalil Sakakini and Yusy al-Isa) in 1913. For these leaders, Palestine as a geographic entity was distinct from the notion of Greater Syria (Porath 1974, 7-8). Porath adds that the rise of Zionism "deeply affected the development of the consciousness of the distinctive identity of *Filastin* [Palestine] even before the First World War, but more especially after it" (Porath 1974, 8).[30]

The notion of nationhood survived the calamities sustained by the Palestinians, ranging from the loss of their home in 1948, life in the diaspora, to the current phase marked by the vicissitudes of an unfolding "peace process." However, the latter process is punctuated by daily violence which does not bode well for actual peace. Thus like Kurds, Armenians, and Jews, the Palestinians were able to forge and assert their identity even without the trappings of a modern state. For Palestinians, this national identity was shared by Palestinians irrespective of the location of their domicile. In turn, the PLO served as the symbol and agency which cemented the unity of the Palestinians, whether they were "inside" or "outside" of historic Palestine. The Oslo process has however caused the "recentering of Palestinian society," requiring a "redefinition of identity in new circumstances"(Khalidi 1997: 203).

The PLO still exists, and officially it still claims to represent all of the Palestinians, the "inside" and the "outside." However, the PA has for all practical purposes superseded the PLO and has assumed most of its functions. This poses some important challenges to the PA in the post-Oslo period: What does it mean to be a Palestinian today, and who has the right to live there? How will Palestinian citizenship be determined, and who will it include or exclude? How will these changes be reflected in the educational system, and most particularly in the new Palestinian curriculum?

These questions suggest that unlike other societies that experienced decolonization, the problem of identity and national unity for Palestinians is markedly different. In the former, the state of newly independent countries tried to weave national unity from a social fabric divided by religion, tribe, ethnicity, and multiple nationalities. As is clear today, this experiment has contributed to internal strife, civil war, secession, and an inordinate amount of violence associated with the state-building process.[31] In contrast, the PA instead of trying to create unity from a fragmented reality, is expected to forge unity by further fragmenting the Palestinians of the "inside" and "outside." This problematic is dealt with in connection with the efforts of the MOE to write new textbooks, and with the process

of building a new national Palestinian national curriculum.

The state tries to be all things to all people. Through the use of coercion and nationalist ideologies transitional states attempt the construction of grand narratives to shape national consciousness. In this connection Schudson observes that the "modern nation-state self-consciously uses language policy, formal education, collective rituals, and mass media to integrate citizens and ensure their loyalty" (Schudson 1994: 64). Through this legitimation process the state attempts to shape and fashion identities which serve the state-building process.

The scholarly literature on identity (national, religious etc.), and nationalism is vast.[32] Recent writings tend to view national identity as constructed. Accordingly, Anderson (1991) views nations as "imagined communities," while Hobsbawm (1990) and Gellner (1983) see identity and nationalism as "invented traditions." But the process of such constructions occurs within a multilayered and contested space (state-civil society) which involves continuous interpretation and reinterpretation. Edward Said (1995: 3) observes that,

> ...these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy...

In this study, identities–national and political–are defined as constructed and relatively changeable, rather than being fixed, immutable, or eternal. The central question is how, from what, by whom, and for what? (Castells 1997).

The construction of identity is therefore historically contingent and is shaped by actors (individuals, social groups, and societies) who, as Castells notes, are anchored in "social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure and in their space/time framework." Accordingly, Castells derives a hypothesis which states: The one "who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it." Furthermore, he notes that the process of identity construction occurs in a context engraved by power relationships. Accordingly, he proposes a typology distinguishing between "three forms and origins of identity building"[33] (Castells: 1997: 7): "legitimizing identity," which is engendered by dominant institutions, often associated with the process of state-building; "resistance identity," which is led by oppositional social actors (political opposition forces and

liberation movements); and "project identity," which is led by social actors seeking the "transformation of overall social structure," as exemplified by the transformation of feminism from a movement fighting for basic rights to one that wants to dismantle or challenge the basis of patriarchy.[34]

To study the role of state agencies (education) in the production of national identity, one needs to explain the particularities of the historical moment or conjuncture. Partha Chatterjee adapts Gramsci's notion of "historical moments" in his study of anti-colonial nationalism. He identifies three such moments: the moment of departure, the moment of mobilization, and the moment of arrival (Chatterjee 1993, 50-52). In this study, the moment of arrival is marked by the founding of the PA in 1994. It is a moment marked by the project of state-building and accompanied by mostly a "legitimizing identity." In this moment, the properties of the nation and who the national is are more specified by the terms of citizenship. This process could, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven, lead to the denationalization of significant sectors of the Palestinian population (diaspora).

There is evidence that all three forms of Castells' identity construction are competing with one another in Palestinian society today.[35] However, the first two are the most evident and relevant for our study. The PA's genealogy stems from the PLO which led the Palestinian resistance movement since its modern inception in the 1960s (Cobban 1984; Gresh 1983; Nassar 1991). The top leaders of the PLO, and in particular Yasser Arafat, not only negotiated the Oslo accords with Israel, but have come to occupy the key positions in the PA and its institutions. The structure of the PA was modified in 2003 with the creation of the post of Prime Minister. This post was ostensibly created to appease the United States and Israel and to jumpstart the "roadmap" to further peace negotiations. Though the PLO remains as the official body which formally represents all Palestinians, the PA has in fact supplanted the PLO as the new locus of Palestinian political power.[36]

The Palestinian leadership's dual role—state building and resistance—is reflected in its adoption of both legitimizing and resistance identities. (Robinson 1997; Sayigh 1997; Khalidi 1996) These roles and projects are both complementary and contradictory. As the PA builds the institutions of an incipient state, it also seeks to complete the tasks of liberation and resistance–to end occupation–through negotiations with Israel. This dual track has, in effect, subsumed the functions of resistance to that of state building. Thus though the PA/PLO remain animated by the ethos of resistance, the bulk of their effort is geared towards the fostering of

legitimizing identity formation. The PA is pursuing policies to shape, restructure, and indeed to form civil society itself, and through the latter's institutions it seeks to reproduce the "identity that rationalizes the sources of [its] structural domination" (Castells 1997: 8). These same institutions and social forces are also vying to affect this dual process of identity building.

Islamist political forces, e.g. *Hamas* (or the Islamic Resistance Movement) and *Islamic Jihad*, have opted to remain outside of the dominant legitimizing identity building process, thus placing them as the focal point of opposition to the PA and its overall policies.[37] Along with the remnants of the various social forces and political organizations who spearheaded the *intifada* (uprising)[38] which was launched in 1987 against Israeli occupation, they are mostly concerned with sustaining resistance identity which primarily seeks to end occupation. For example, through acts of violence against Israelis, the Islamic movement seeks to simultaneously pursue a course of resistance to continued Israeli occupation, and to challenge the authority, domination, and legitimacy of the PA. On another level, Palestinian oppositional forces—Islamic and secular (nationalist)--challenge the PA from the margins in several policy relevant domains: social, welfare, religious, and education policies. The role of these forces, conjoined with the persistence of conservative social and cultural attitudes in Palestinian society (Zureik and Nakhaie 1995), have a direct bearing on how disputes about the content and orientation of the curriculum are being resolved.

Through its influence on the educational system, what role does the state play in the contested process of identity formation? According to March and Olsen, national identity is "molded by the state's political influence on education and cultural life" (March and Olsen 1995, 64). This assertion is posited in the context of determining the various functions of governance. Briefly, the craft of governance involves the developing of: identities of citizens and groups; capabilities of citizens, groups and institutions; accounts of political events; and an adaptive political system (March and Olsen 1995, 45-46). How can such a system be implemented? Can citizens accept the legitimacy of institutions? March and Olsen also ask: "What sort of citizens and institutions does it take to constitute a democratic society? How can such institutions and citizens be fostered?" (March and Olsen 1995: 47). These concerns are clearly reflected in the process of Palestinian curriculum development (Chapter Seven).

In the March/Olsen schema, by accepting an identity, both citizens and public officials accept its implications and constraints. In turn, "governance involves how identities are formed and how they are

interpreted." This process unfolds through political institutions in which education, and in particular national and civic education, contribute to "molding beliefs about what obligations, rights, rules are relevant to a specific situation..." (March and Olsen 1995, 73; 77). At present we can only study what the PA wishes to include in the legitimizing identity, and offer only a preliminary assessment of the extent of the internalization of this identity by the various Palestinian social forces. After the passage of sufficient time, we can be more specific as to whether these identities have indeed been internalized by social actors leading them to construct "their meaning around this internalization" (Castells 1997: 7). Therefore, this study is concerned with beginnings, and origins of identity formation, in the context of a state formation project.

State Formation: Rentierism and The Limited State

Most theories—Rationalist, Culturalist or Structuralist--conceptualize the state as a "free-standing structure, as an entity that can be isolated in inquiry"(Migdal 1997, 220). For example, in her early work Theda Skocpol concedes that the state assumes a class-divided society. Hence, the state's key function is to contain the class struggle in support of the propertied classes (Skocpol 1979). However, she concludes that the state has interests of its own, which at times could be opposed to the interests of all societal forces. Eric Nordlinger goes further and proposes the state as the central unit of analysis. Accordingly, the state with its distinctive interests is the agent of change. Its decisions are a function of its internal variations and not subject to the prevailing societal constraints. He concludes: "As an independent variable, it is the state's boundedness, cohesiveness, and differentiation that minimizes its malleability" (Nordlinger 1988, 881). Hence the state is postulated as an independent actor as well as an independent variable (Nordlinger 1987). These approaches assume that the state can achieve conformity and obedience within its territorial domains. Thus the state is essentialized and its capabilities overstated.

Mitchell is critical of approaches that view the state as standing above or being apart from society. He adds, "The customary Weberian definition of the state, as an organization that claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, is only a residual characterization. It does not tell us how the actual contours of this amorphous organization are to be drawn" (Mitchell 1991, 82). Building on this observation, Migdal adds that the disintegration of many states and the birth of new ones in the late 1980s and 1990s should lead us to replace state-centric approaches with "theories

that start with the limitations of actual states" (Migdal 1997, 211). Thus, Migdal adopts a state-in-society approach which focuses on "state engagement with other social forces, [which] highlights the mutual transformation of the state and other social groups, as well as the limitations of the state" (Migdal 1997, 222; see also Migdal, Kholi, and Shue 1994). Therefore the state is not reduced to a single coherent actor, making it conceivable that different state institutions can actually operate not only differently but also in conflict with one another (Vitalis 1995; Katzenstein 1995). In this context, the coercive institutions of the state try to ensure and impose compliance, whereas the educational and cultural institutions (Ministries) could promote engagement and free-thinking through national and civic education.

Migdal's approach requires the study of the multiple levels and institutions of the state and their engagement with society. Through coercion or the threat of coercion, the state attempts to secure the compliance of the populace. But seldom do states attain compliance through coercion alone. Thus, each state "needs what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman called 'legitimating universes,' a constellation of symbols justifying state domination" (Migdal 1994, 15). For Weber "legitimations of domination" were presented in the form of three ideal types: traditional; charismatic; and legal. (Gerth and Mills 1970, 77-79) For Gramsci, the problematic of state domination is tempered by the concept of *hegemony*. Accordingly, the state or the "integral state" includes both the "political state" and "civil society" (Gramsci 1971, 263).[39] Carnoy points out that hegemony is "expressed in the civil society and the state [through which] the ruled could be persuaded to accept the system of beliefs of the ruling class and to share its social, cultural, and moral values"(Carnoy 1984, 87). With the addition of the cultural and ideological dimensions, Gramsci identifies the role of the state as "educator" (Gramsci 1987, 187-8). In this capacity, the state through formal education and mass media tries to integrate citizens into the nation-state. Laclau and Mouffe, building upon Gramsci's notion of hegemony, see this process as:

> movement from the 'political' to the 'intellectual and moral' plane, that the decisive transition takes place toward a concept of hegemony beyond 'class alliances'. For whereas political leadership can be grounded upon conjunctural coincidence of interests in which participating sectors retain their separate identity, moral and intellectual leadership requires that an ensemble of 'ideas' and 'values' be shared by a number of sectors (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 66-67).

The relationship and interaction between the state and society (social forces) can be interpreted as a contest in which both are vying to shape and affect the policies and conduct of the state. Michael Hudson notes that the growth of civic space can be seen in the case of the Arab World, "to curb the authoritarian *mukhabarat* (national security) state"(Brynen et al 1995, 72). Gramsci notes that "civil society" is a contested space, where the state tries to establish its hegemony over society, and where society through its independent institutions tries to limit the grip of the state over its affairs. Thus Gramsci defines civil society as "at once the political terrain on which the dominant class organizes its hegemony and the terrain on which opposition parties and movements organize, win allies and build their social power" (Forgacs 1988, 224). By positing our understanding of the state within this contested terrain, one can, in agreement with Migdal, define the state as an "organization divided and limited in the sorts of obedience it can demand"(Migdal 1997, 231). Moreover, the state is not static with unchanging goals and ideological orientations. As is shown in the course of this study, the Palestinian state with its multiple political orientations, embodies an ongoing dynamic as it engages Palestinian social groups, movements, political parties, and NGOs. Thus, instead of limiting this study to central decision-making, the analysis will also focus on the importance of fronts, coalitions, pacts, and charters in studying the Palestinian state's (state-in-society) role in the setting of educational priorities and strategies.

In presenting his state-in-society approach Migdal notes the impact of global forces without elaboration. This is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed. In studying developing countries in the post-colonial era, the global or external factor is crucial to the analysis. In the Palestinian case, the process of state formation is defined and limited to a great extent by the nature of the agreements signed with Israel. Moreover, given the PA's financial woes, the state's budget is derived to a great extent from international donors whose assistance is usually accompanied by "advice." Ayubi notes that the "increasing reliance on 'un-earned' income, invoking the description of many Arab countries as rentier (or semi-rentier) states, has rendered the state vulnerable to several (mainly external) forces over which it had little control"(Ayubi 1995, 35). The concept of "rentier state" has been mostly applied with reference to the oil producing countries. However, even poorer countries such as Egypt have been described to at least be partially rentier states. In such a state, the economy relies on substantial external rent. The rent could be derived from oil revenues, fees (Suez Canal), or direct foreign assistance. The reliance on external rent usually corresponds with a weak taxation system marked by indirect rather

direct taxation. Once the external rent dries up, the state will have to increase its revenues to support its activities (e.g. education) through direct taxation, which requires compliance. Ayubi concludes, that in "non-oil countries, democratization is more likely to correspond to the decline in exogenous revenue sources and the need to increase local taxation" (Ayubi 1995, 457).[40] The evidence presented, in Chapters Four and Six, on the impact of the external factor, e.g., on Agreements with Israel; and of World Bank and IMF paradigms that accompany aid packages,[41] shows that the external factor has a direct bearing on the PA's formulation of priorities and strategies for Palestinian education. More importantly, the external factor sheds light on the real limits of the power of the Palestinian state as it seeks to attain sovereignty.[42] In Chapter Four, international assistance and subsidies to the PA are characterized as the disbursal of "political rent," which is conditioned by and designed to secure the PA's commitment to the peace process.

The advantages of the state-in-society or limited state approach are threefold: *first*, by situating the state in a state-society dichotomy, it enables the identification of the multivariate interactions between the state and social forces, thus highlighting the role of social agency and the importance of competing ideas and ideologies in shaping or at least contributing to the formulation of policy (priorities and strategies); *second*, the external factor emerges as a central variable affecting the choices of both state and society (social forces); *third*, by disaggregating the state, it allows the researcher to focus not only on the role of the executive, but on the more immediate role and function of the Palestinian Ministry of Education.

In addition to conceptualizing the state as limited, this study identifies two aspects of state power. "Despotic" or coercive power is being used to curb opposition and to prevent it from foiling the PA's political agenda, a function which does not require "institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups"(Mann 1993, 315). By developing the distributive capacity of the state (health, education, social services), what Mann calls "*infrastructural power*," the PA through its ministries and agencies is developing the capacity "to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure" (Mann 1993, 316). Among the various techniques used by states to effectively penetrate social life, Mann identifies the spread of literacy and education. Thus, by administering educational systems, the PA is incorporating civil society into its national development plan, and is preparing it to accept the new and reconfigured basis of national identity which is constrained by the requirements of the peace process.[43]

CHAPTER THREE

THE PARADOXES OF PALESTINIAN STATE FORMATION: UNDERTAKING STATE-BUILDING WHILE STILL LEADING RESISTANCE

> I do not see here a conflict or contradiction between pursuing a strategy of resistance and pursuing a strategy of state building. It is not a case of 'either a national liberation movement or the Palestinian Authority.' As long as there are areas of government by the PA, there is a PA. How can this even be contested? There are civil responsibilities that must be taken care of–administrative, educational, infrastructural, the health sector. Our recognition of the existence of two separate needs, of resistance and state building, does not mean that the two issues are mutually exclusive. There must be a dialogue between them (Bishara 2003, 48).[1]

In August 1993, the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a liberation and resistance movement, announced that the two parties reached a historic agreement–the Declaration of Principles (DOP). This agreement was signed in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993. Shimon Peres signed for the government of Israel, and Mahmud Abbas for the PLO. This agreement also sanctioned the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a state-in-the-making. Immediately thereafter, the PA assumed various administrative tasks of governance.

The new Palestinian Authority thus assumed two seemingly contradictory functions: state building and resistance. Are these functions mutually exclusive or complementary in the context of ongoing peace negotiations? Can the PLO leadership transform the Palestinian national movement from a revolutionary organization to a pragmatic state apparatus? Are the PLO and the PA interchangeable? Can the emerging Palestinian state attain sovereignty, recognized by Israel and the International community? What type of power does the PA need in order to cultivate the support, or to secure the compliance, of the Palestinian people for this project? Lastly, to what extent does international assistance to the PA enable or restrict the sovereignty and self-determination which

Palestinians seek?

Many less-developed states have had to adapt and redesign their economies to the new dictates of a global order which embraces the neoliberal virtues of unregulated private markets and free-trade. In contrast, from the outset the Palestinian economy under the PA was designed and to a large extent funded by the policies and prescriptions of globalizing institutions like the World Bank and the IMF (Samara 2000). The evidence presented in this chapter and in Chapter Four shows that exogenous factors–Israeli occupation policies and the infusion of international aid–have, in the post-Oslo period, played a central role in the process of Palestinian state formation.

It would be most useful to conceptualize the influx of international assistance to the PA as *political rent*, thus giving the PA some of the attributes of a *rentier state*. Unlike taxes political rent is not derived from society. Giacomo Luciani elaborates:

> All states can be autonomous in the short run, but in the longer run their ability to act autonomously from society is linked to their revenue foundations. A state that economically supports society and is the main source of private revenues through government expenditures, while it in turn is supported by revenue accruing from abroad, does not need to respond to society. On the contrary, a state that is supported by society, through taxes levied in one form or another, will in the final analysis be obliged to respond to societal pressure (Luciani 1995, 211).[2]

To illustrate this point, it is estimated that almost 50 percent of expenditures in the 1996 PA budget were derived from external sources in the form of aid and loans (Beck 1999, 22). The *Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute* (MAS), a semi-official organ of the PA, notes that the development budget for fiscal year 2000 is $445.5 million, excluding recurrent expenditures. The Palestinian Treasury is expected to contribute only 5.3 percent of the total. The balance is secured through grants, 57.7 percent, and loans, 36.9 percent (MAS Economic Monitor #6, 41).

Funds for the development of education are almost nonexistent. More specifically, the wage bill of the Ministry of Education (MOE) absorbs 90 percent of its allocated budget (IMF 1999, 26). Thus aside from recurring costs, who will fund the PA's educational development plans? And what is the level of conditionality which accompanies the influx of political rent? The international donor community is not expecting handsome financial returns from these types of investments or expenditures. Instead the disbursal of political rent to the PA is conditioned by and designed to secure the PA's commitment to the peace process. According to

Palestinian economist Adel Samara, the influx of such rent requires the construction of "a new system reorienting the Palestinian people toward accommodation, thus limiting their goals of national liberation" (Samara 2000, 25).

Palestinian Identity and the Historical Quest for Statehood

Yezid Sayigh, in his exhaustive and authoritative study of the Palestinian national movement, concludes that state building or statist political institutionalization has been the central objective pursued by this movement since 1948, and more specifically since the mid-sixties (Sayigh 1997).[3] More recently, reflecting upon his work, Sayigh observed that the social and political transformations experienced by the Palestinians are comparable to those experienced in other parts of the Arab world and the third world in the post-colonial era. Thus despite physical dislocation from their patrimony, dispersal, the absence of a shared social space—territorial base through which contests, negotiations, and transformations would normally take place—the Palestinian elite who assumed the leadership of the nationalist movement (PLO), and who now lead and staff the PA, are ostensibly cut from the same social fabric as their counterparts in the post-independence, post-monarchic, or post-liberal Arab countries: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria.[4] These similarities prompt Sayigh to ask:

> Is this an indication of the impact of armed conflict and the accompanying militarization of society and politics throughout Middle East societies, or is it evidence of the power of the pervasiveness of wider social trends (such as the spread of modern education), the prevalence of statist models..., the spread of petty salaried employment, and the impact of (largely externally-induced) economic developments...Trends indeed that were so pervasive and powerful that they produced similar social, political, and institutional outcomes even among the scattered and stateless Palestinians?" (Sayigh 1998, 14).

The regional experience with state formation (republican or monarchist) has produced states characterized as statist political systems marked by command and control (Ayubi 1995).[5] They command the economy with the promise of the creation and equitable distribution of wealth, and they control politics through the aggregation of power to attain political order and stability, democratic or otherwise (Huntington 1987, 5). In the Arab world, this formula has led to the establishment of authoritarian central control where the military "happily obliged by

providing such a style of governing, wanted by the people or not" (Jreisat 1997, 17).To explain the evolving phenomenon of Palestinian state formation and its impact on development and identity formation, I adopt Mann's distinction between "despotic" (coercion) and "infrastructural" power of the state. Through the latter the state coordinates and influences most areas of social life, which include the shaping of educational systems.

Sayigh (1997) claims that the process of Palestinian state-building started immediately after 1948, and Robinson (1997) situates its beginnings with the outbreak of the *intifada* in 1987. In contrast, I will present a more nuanced periodization which identifies its relevant beginnings to the post-October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The periodization I adopt allows for a more systematic exploration of the local, regional and international conjunctures, which have a direct bearing on the nature of the evolving Palestinian state. Of particular importance then, is to also identify how these forces and conjunctures affect the two basic components of the emerging state's power: "despotic," and "infrastructural."

Finally, this study proposes that the interaction between these two types of power enables the Palestinian political system to define the character, shape, and staffing of the administrative structures, e.g., the MOE, and that it in turn shapes the behavior of individuals and organizations within them. This is "especially so in systems of command and control, such as those found in the Arab states. The role of the state is conspicuously visible and decisive in all efforts to build institutions or to form their processes" (Jreisat 1997, 5).

Historical Roots of Palestinian National Identity

Rashid Khalidi notes that the process of constructing Palestinian national identity occurs within a multilayered space and time that is shaped by real political and intellectual forces (social agency), but is not limited to the role of elites. Accordingly, Khalidi notes that these agents are influenced and grapple with competing loyalties including: "transnational" (religious and national); "local patriotism;" and "affiliations of family and clan" (Khalidi 1997, 10). These struggles are affected and their outcomes are, to varying degrees, shaped by powerful external (colonial) forces. These processes are undergirded by important social and material transformations which include the formation of new social classes; the expansion of modern communications, the spread of education, and the introduction of mass politics. For Khalidi, these developments are seen as the prerequisites for the emergence of

nationalism. Finally, the consolidation of identity takes hold at a conjunctural moment marked by a historic crisis which enables the swift and substantial change of attitudes in a society (Khalidi 1997, 256).

Khalidi's empirical concern is to document the multiple factors which explain the context for the emergence and consolidation of Palestinian national identity. His approach, however, is of great value to scholars interested in other post-colonial societies where national consciousness emerged "without the trappings of an independent state and against powerful countervailing currents" (Khalidi 1997, 194). Armenians and Kurds, like Palestinians, have managed to retain and cling to their notion of nationhood despite numerous calamities which has befallen them. All three of these Middle Eastern peoples have "been denied self-determination by the great powers in the settlements imposed on the Middle East after World War I, they live in disputed homelands that overlap with those of other peoples, and the territory they claim has ambiguous and indeterminate boundaries" (Khalidi 1977, 11). Indeed, these factors lie at the core of the crisis of the modern nation-state in many parts of the post-colonial world.

In the late Ottoman period, prompted by the reform process known as the *Tanzimat*, Palestine and Jerusalem in particular witnessed major cultural changes. Education was secularized, public education was established, mission schools proliferated, and the press was expanded. An expanding government bureaucracy required the services of many teachers and other professionals. Khalidi notes that the massive expansion of opportunities gave ample scope to individuals of both non-notable and non-Muslim background to achieve status. In this context of development and increasing prosperity, what were some of the political, intellectual, and ideological options that appeared to be open at the end of the Ottoman era in Palestine? (Khalidi 1997, 61-62).

Khalidi probes this question by identifying the overlapping and competing identities which shaped the lives of two Jerusalem notables: Yusuf Diya' al-Khalidi and Ruhi al-Khalidi.[6] In this transitional phase of the Ottoman era, these individuals and other people from different walks of life navigated their loyalties, identities, and affiliations among multiple forces, including: Ottomanism, Islamic solidarity, Arabism, Palestinian patriotism, opposition to Zionism, political party affiliations, and other primordial attachments. The eventual defeat of Ottomanism in World War I, coupled with the assertiveness of the Zionist movement, and the start of the British mandate in Palestine, combined to produce a sense of a historic crisis among " most politically conscious, literate, and urban Palestinians" (Khalidi 1997, 149). Khalidi concludes that these transformations were so

intense and profound that in a relatively short period of time (1917-1923), a distinct Palestinian national identity took hold. The new synthesis however, was to "remain strongly tinged, and to overlap with, elements of religious sentiment and Arabism...both of which had been among its precursors" (Khalidi 1997, 174-175).

Rebirth of the Palestinian National Movement: 1964-68

The establishment of Israel in 1948 deprived the Palestinians of a national base and a national leadership that could guide, direct, and sustain national life. Thus, unlike the Israelis for whom 1948 represents independence and statehood, for Palestinians 1948 is viewed as the *Nakba* (catastrophe or disaster), which effectively dashed their hopes for nationhood and statehood.[7] In turn, Palestinians were dispersed, and often subjected to competing Arab authorities in their refuge. They entered an Arab world that was gripped with the fever of decolonization, anti-colonialism and emerging third world nationalism. The Palestinian notable class was defeated prior to 1948, and their cousins and comperes in Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad were swept away in the decade that followed, marking the beginning of the changing of the guard in modern Arab politics. Unable to reverse the adverse effects of 1948 by themselves, Palestinians were swayed by the promise that the forces of Pan-Arabism, led by President Nasser of Egypt, could destroy Israel and liberate Palestine on their behalf.

Palestinian political activity thus submerged itself under the auspices of the competing nationalist Arab parties and the new political regimes. These forces were represented primarily by the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), the Ba'th party, the Parti Populaire Syrienne (PPS), the communist parties, and the Muslim Brotherhood. But the scattered Palestinian communities never ceased trying to rebuild their own political space[8] and to revive and sustain an independent national movement. Sayigh concludes, "it was no coincidence that the Palestinians should have reached this stage soon after the hopes pinned on pan-Arabism were dashed with the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961 and the resurgence of the Arab cold war" (Sayigh 1997, 19).

By the early 1960s dozens of Palestinian groups espousing armed struggle, had already surfaced. Some of these groups conducted raids against Israel, with the intention of triggering a conflict between Israel and the Arab states. The Arab states were being challenged by these groups at a time when they seemed unable to check Israeli moves. For example in 1963, Jordan and Egypt were in a dispute with Israel over the latter's

unilateral diversion of the Jordan River waters. In addition, Israel launched its nuclear program and started the settling of the Negev, which was viewed by Nasser as opening the door for the absorption of millions of new Jewish immigrants to Israel.

At Nasser's behest, the PLO was established in January 1964 at the first Arab Summit meeting which convened in Alexandria at the Palestine hotel especially built for the occasion. By creating the PLO, Nasser and the Arab states sought to highlight their central concern with Palestine, but more importantly they sought to contain, co-opt, control, and defuse the rising tide of Palestinian nationalism. Despite the intentions of the Arab states, the first head of the PLO, Ahmad Shukayri, "exceeded his mandate and presented the Arab leaders with a fait accompli by creating a state-like body, with a constitution, executive, legislative assembly, 'government' departments, army, audited budget, and internal statutes" (Sayigh 1997, 19). The Alexandria summit asked Shukayri to study the feasibility of setting up a Palestinian entity. The notion of entity (kayan) is the first reference expressing the Palestinian desire to establish some form of sovereignty or statehood on parts of historic Palestine.[9] Of equal importance, Fateh, which became the largest Palestinian organization by virtue of its early advocacy of independent armed struggle, in June of 1965 introduced a memorandum to the second session of the Palestine National Council (PNC)--the legislative assembly--affirming the central responsibility of the Palestinian people for the liberation of Palestine. But the Arab states tried to curtail this movement by denying it the right to organize the Palestinians in the diaspora.[10]

At the end of the 1967 war, extensive territories with their populations fell under Israeli occupation and a new exodus of Palestinian refugees poured into the neighboring countries. Now, all of historic Palestine was under Israeli jurisdiction. The defeat sent shock-waves throughout the Arab world. The following decade, wrought with political upheavals, was characterized by a period of unprecedented self-criticism and the call for radical change in the Arab world (Laroui 1976; Ajami 1981). Nizar Qabbani (1932-1998), one of the leading and most popular poets of his generation, articulated the national malaise of a defeated people in simple verses that people easily committed to memory. Overnight, his poem, which amplified the voice of ordinary people, was celebrated and chanted wherever Arabs gathered and felt free to speak their minds. In part, in "Annotations to the Notebook of Defeat," the poet says:[11]

To you my friends, I mourn
the ancient books and our mother tongue
like battered shoes

our speech is full of holes
smut and scorn and whorish words
To you, I mourn
the end of thought
that brings defeat...

If only someone were to grant me safety
and I were able to meet the Sultan
I would tell him:
Your Majesty, your wild dogs
have torn my clothes
your spies hound me...
Your Majesty
just for having been in the vicinity of your deaf walls
and for attempting to uncover my grief
your soldiers kicked me with their boots
forced me to eat
dirt, your Majesty
twice you lost in war
because half of our population lost its tongue.
What is a people's worth
without speech?...

We call for an angry generation
to uproot history
to plough horizons
to seed the bedrock of new thought.
We call for a generation rising
with new faces
forgiving no mistakes
forfeiting and stooping no more
not knowing a broken word.
A generation of staunch pioneers.
Children...
Do not read our chronicles
Do not trace our footsteps
nor even dwell upon a thought we cherished.
Ours is a generation of vomit
consumed by festering sores
a generation of crooks and evil clowns
and you children
you are spring's rains
hope's sheaths of wheat
fruitful seeds in our barren lives.
You are the generation
that shall vanquish defeat.

The new generation that would speak its mind to the Sultan, that would demand freedom to act, that would usher a new politics to "vanquish defeat" in the Arab world was represented by the rejuvenated and emboldened Palestinian resistance movement. Thus the humiliating Arab defeat in 1967 opened the door for the new Palestinian guerrilla organizations to wrest control of the PLO. In December 1967, the Executive Committee of the PLO secured the resignation of Shukayri, and his interim replacement invited the resistance organizations to coordinate their activities within the PLO. The fifth session of the PNC, held in February 1969, elected Yasser Arafat as Chairman of the PLO, a position he held until his death in 2004. The inclusion of the resistance organizations in the PLO also required the prior revision of the Palestinian National Charter in 1968. In effect, since then the PLO emerged as the accepted vehicle for Palestinian representation.

Weakened by the war, the leaders of the Arab states promoted the virtues of Palestinian resistance, as a measure to absorb and deflect the anger and frustration of their citizens over the defeat. Therefore the PLO was heralded as the phoenix risen from the ashes of defeat. This honeymoon period was brief in duration, for the dominant Arab political order bounced back quickly. Between 1967 and 1970 radical and conservative Arab states reconciled their differences, which enabled them to contain, constrict and if need be to subdue, the Palestinian movement's revolutionizing potential. The Palestinian movement secured the right to organize among Palestinians residing in various Arab states through agreements negotiated with host governments like Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. These agreements are akin to state-to-state agreements governing Palestinian activities.[12] From its inception, the PLO, to use international relations terminology, can be defined as a non-state actor. It lacks an autonomous territory from which to operate, which undermines its ability to control its destiny and curtails its maneuverability.[13] Indeed, as noted by Selim, "by virtue of the very nature of its creation, the PLO was highly vulnerable to the manipulation and intervention of Arab governments (Selim 1991, 263).

Dispossession, defeat, and exile occasioned the rebirth of Palestinian identity through the establishment of the modern national movement, the PLO. By 1969 the guerrilla organizations wrested control of the PLO from the old leadership, and in effect militarized and bureaucratized an otherwise political movement. The movement advocated the liberation of Palestine and called for the establishment of a secular state in all of its territory. The means to achieve these goals, as stipulated by the Palestinian National Charter, was to be armed struggle.[14] Finally, it should be noted

that the PLO was not deterred by the fact that its articulated goals were clearly well beyond its capabilities.

Critical Conjuncture: 1973-74 and Beyond

Yezid Sayigh is correct in pointing out that statist impulses have shaped modern Palestinian national politics. Indeed, as he and others have identified, the PLO since its inception has been saddled with quasi-state structures. However, the idea of pursuing a two-state solution did not emerge until the eve of the 1973 October war, and was not formally adopted by the PNC until 1974. Out of this critical historical conjuncture, PLO structures evolved and increasingly acted like a quasi-state. Politically the PLO embarked on a road of substituting its maximalist goal of "total liberation" of all of Palestine with the minimalist goal of establishing a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. In the rest of this section, I will briefly probe the relevance of these developments to the process of Palestinian state-building which began with international support in 1994 in Gaza/Jericho.

President Sadat's objectives in preparing and launching war in 1973 was ostensibly to render conditions more favorable for a negotiated agreement with Israel, and to induce superpower involvement in the settling of the conflict (Telhami 1990, 7). In the new atmosphere prevailing after the October War, Palestinians embarked on an intense debate on the value of adopting new transitional political objectives. Without abandoning their objective of "total liberation," the 12th session of the PNC, convening in June 1974, adopted the "ten point" program advocating the establishment of a Palestinian National Authority on any part of Palestinian land which is "liberated" or evacuated by Israel.[15] This decision was preceded by and followed by an intense debate among the various Palestinian factions. While living in Beirut I was both an observer and participant in this debate. I dutifully recorded my impressions in my daily diary, a habit I have kept to the present. The protagonists of the debate fell in two camps: Advocates of the "National Authority" idea included the largest Palestinian organization-Fateh- and the leftist Democratic Front (Hawatme), and the Syrian sponsored Saiqa; the opponents included the Popular Front (Habash), and the Iraqi sponsored Arab Liberation Front. Both camps were convinced that a political settlement was imminent. However, while the former saw an opportunity to advance the objectives of the Palestinian struggle, the latter was convinced that any political settlement resulting from the prevailing balance of power would be tantamount to surrender (Cobban 1984, 155-

157).

By 1970 the PLO had already secured recognition of the Palestinian people's inalienable rights from the Non-Aligned countries.[16] More importantly, in October 1974 an Arab summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, recognized "the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated" (Lukacs 1992, 464). Within a month, the PLO received international recognition as Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly. Two weeks later, the PLO was granted observer status by the UN General Assembly, and the rights of the Palestinian people–self-determination, national independence and sovereignty–were recognized as inalienable rights.[17] From 1974 to 1988 the PLO incrementally amended its political program. The PNC convening in Algiers almost one year after the start of the *intifada* (the uprising against Israeli occupation), issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on 15 November 1988.[18] Thus, from 1964 to 1988 Palestinian political thinking evolved dramatically. These changes are reflected in the resolutions adopted by the PNC. Walid Khalidi, one of the most noted Palestinian scholars encapsulates this metamorphosis in the following:

> We have total liberation [1964]. Then we see a secular, democratic state [1968]; i.e. interfaith coexistence. The emphasis shifts to the faiths. Then an entity, a Palestinian entity, on any part [of Palestine] that is liberated--to be sure as a transitional solution [1974]. Then, a state within the 1967 frontiers [confederated with Jordan] as part of a comprehensive settlement, without mention of a two-state solution [1984]]. And then, **explicitly**, the two-state solution expressed in Algiers [1988].[19]

The implications and ramifications of the PLO's international recognition, and its evolving minimalist political stance are numerous. I will identify those factors that have direct relevance in explaining the conditions and constraints placed on the PLO as it pursued its quest for statehood.

First, international and regional recognition was secured at a price. Indeed the PLO emerged as the embodiment of Palestinian aspirations, and served as its representative. As a full member of the Arab league, with voting rights, the PLO abandoned the universalism of the past, in favor of joining the particularist based regional system of Arab nation-states. Given its exile status, however, this meant that the PLO's options became more constricted and subsumed to the imperatives of the regional system which wanted a resolution to the conflict. Though the leadership continued to pay

lip service to resistance and armed struggle, its modus operandi shifted to mostly diplomatic and political efforts (Kirisci 1986; Selim 1991), which required or at least resulted in the curtailment of popular mobilization and grassroots work.

Like the other states of the region, the PLO leadership's primary function was to advance its objectives by devising a coherent foreign policy, [20] a key sovereign function of states. In effect, the PLO leadership and particularly Arafat understood that the international recognition they secured required the PLO to accept new rules and procedures of the international game which they had joined. Arafat also understood that UN and international support for Palestinian rights, as expressed at the ICQP, did not allow for "total liberation," but favored only Palestinian independence and statehood in the areas occupied by Israel in 1967 (The West Bank and Gaza).[21] From this point on, the PLO ceased to be a liberation movement, but also failed to reconfigure itself into a more narrowly defined independence movement. Instead, the PLO bureaucracy, which had more embassies than Israel, behaved, prematurely, like a quasi-state.

Second, the increasing tendency to favor diplomacy over grassroots work, led to the further bureaucratization of PLO structures. The various agencies and departments of the PLO acted like quasi-governmental ministries involved in the provision of services—medical care and social services—to the mass constituency. Given that much of the funding for these services came from Arab states and to a lesser extent from wealthy Palestinians, in this distributive capacity the PLO was funded in ways much like the other *rentier* states of the region, and it therefore could act like them. Like his counterparts in the Arab states, Arafat pursued a populist-nationalist policy that reinforced authoritarianism. Yezid Sayigh concludes that *rentier* politics increased the "proliferation of paramilitary agencies and payrolls [which] weakened voluntarism and bureaucratized the mass base. Palestinian trade unions and social associations became extensions of political factions, led by salaried apparatchiks, in typical corporatist fashion" (Sayigh 1997, 25). By limiting the political space for participation in national politics, the door was opened for the marginalized political forces to seek other venues. Consistent with the prevailing regional trends, the Islamists came to the fore to challenge the PLO's nationalist ethos and authoritarian hold over national politics.[22]

Third, despite giving primacy to diplomacy, especially since 1974, the PLO continued to glorify armed struggle because its legitimacy, in Palestinian eyes, was initially derived from its role in the armed struggle against Israel. However, the function of the military apparatus, especially

in Lebanon during the civil war, was to "protect the PLO's statist entity from attack, reinforce its political credibility, and enhance its diplomatic strategy" (Sayigh 1997, 27). But armed struggle only produced defeats and setbacks. Undeterred by this fact, the PLO leadership managed to incorporate new elements to the Palestinian narrative. Defeats, as in 1982, were translated as *Summud* (steadfastness). Thus failure was portrayed as triumph, which might explain the absence of any official critical evaluation of this and other triumphalist episodes. After 1982 most of the PLO's military forces were dispatched to live in various Arab countries under tight control by the various Arab security services. Their days in combat were over, but they remained loyal to Arafat through a system of patronage that kept them and their families on the payroll. In due time they emerged as the nucleus of the new police and security forces of the incipient Palestinian state.

The Intifada and State Building

After his forced departure from Beirut in 1982, Arafat and the PLO were quite weakened. The start of the *intifada* in December 1987 gave the PLO a new lease on life. By most accounts, the uprising was not caused or led by the PLO leadership from the outside. Rather, it was the culmination of years of grassroots organizing by Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, and led by the Unified National Leadership (UNL), the endogenous Palestinian leadership. The leadership consisted of the second-rank representatives of the various guerrilla organizations–Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine plus the Palestine Communist Party (Hilterman 1991; Robinson 1997, 94-131; Lockman and Beinin 1989). The images of youths throwing stones at Israeli soldiers captured the imagination of the Arabs. One again, the poet Nizar Qabbani wrote a poem praising this new hope and lambasting the Arab political order. In "Children Bearing Rocks"[23] the poet says:

With stones in their hands,
they defy the world
and come to us like good tidings.
They burst with anger and love, and they fall
while we remain a herd of polar bears:
a body armored against weather.
Like mussels we sit in cafes,
one hunts for a business venture
one for another billion

and a fourth wife
and breasts polished by civilization.
One stalks London for a lofty mansion
one traffics in arms
one seeks revenge in nightclubs
one plots for a throne, a private army,
and a princedom.

Ah, generation of betrayal,
of surrogate and indecent men,
generation of leftovers,
we'll be swept away-
never mind the slow pace of history-
by children bearing rocks.

But the *intifada* was primarily an act of resistance seeking the political objective of ending occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state. The children, and of course most sectors of Palestinian society, resisted and expressed defiance, but the UNL knew that the political objective can only be achieved through diplomacy.[24] In effect, the PLO helped contain the *intifada* as it pursued a political solution. Compromised by its support for Saddam Hussein in 1990 and after the Gulf war of 1991, the PLO participated in the Madrid peace conference. After Madrid, the bilateral negotiations moved to Washington. The negotiations had the effect of reducing most Palestinians to marginalized spectators. During a visit to the occupied territories in July 1993, it was evident to me that the *intifada* had run out of steam. Instead of leaving a people empowered to confront adversity, it had begun to create a feeling of anger and despair. This was partially due to the fact that since the negotiations in Madrid and Washington began, the PLO leadership ceased virtually all political organizing attempts to shape public opinion, as if talks served as a substitute for all politics (Hovsepian 1993).

Marginalized by an unfavorable balance of forces the PLO leadership, in secret meetings with their Israeli counterparts, negotiated the 1993 "Oslo Accords," after the end of the cold war and the Gulf War. These accords paved the way for the establishment of the PA, and Arafat's ultimate return to Gaza in 1994. He returned to a Palestinian political landscape that was turned upside down by the speed of the momentous events and transformations that had occurred. The secular political parties, like the previously mentioned Popular and Democratic Fronts, had crumbled, mostly due to their inability to comprehend the nature of the political transformations induced by the "Oslo" process. Their political programs and utterances sounded hollow, and they seemed unable to

present cogent alternatives.[25] However, the Palestinian political space was filled with a vast array of committees and NGOs that grew out of the *intifada*. With the possible exception of the women's movement, most of these groups are highly decentered, and thus pose no real challenge to the PA. Thus the only credible opposition to Arafat's legitimacy emanated from the reinvigorated, organized, and politicized Islamist movement.[26]

The rise of Islamist movements is a function of the crisis of authoritarianism, which in the Arab world has eliminated public space for the contestation of politics (Salame 1996; Hovsepian 1995). In Palestine, the Islamist group Hamas was able to enlarge its base among Palestinians at the beginning of the *intifada* thanks to Saudi funding and to initial Israeli support for it as a divide and rule tactic to weaken the PLO (Abu-Amr 1993, 7-8; Usher 1993, 19). Since then, the continuing improvement in Hamas' fortunes can be explained by the PLO/PA's failure to deliver on its promises. The PA promised its constituency that Oslo would be a harbinger of peace and prosperity. Instead the evidence is overwhelmingly negative: Economic, social and political conditions sharply deteriorated in the first five years after the signing of the Oslo agreements. Between 1992 and 1996, real per capita income in the Palestinian territories declined by almost 40 percent, from $2,400 to $1,500 per annum, and unemployment figures ranged from 18 percent for the West Bank to 29 percent in Gaza. During Israeli enforced closures, the figures jump to 50 percent and 70 percent respectively (Sara Roy 1997; UNCTAD 1996; Palestine--Human Resource Development, 1996).

The Islamist movement is best known for its violent tactics represented by suicide bombs against Israeli civilians. However, the Islamists, and in particular Hamas, are a broadly based movement with a vast network of social organizations throughout Palestine (Roy 1995; Mishal and Sela 2000). Jarbawi notes that it is "Fateh's chief rival and a major contender for political power. Appearances notwithstanding, it is ideologically flexible and politically pragmatic. Operating in an environment still highly receptive to its message, it cannot be discounted that the movement...will be able to grow in the future" (Jarbawi 1996, 33). Hamas differs with the PA on several important questions. First, its ideas are derived from an Islamic rather than a nationalist discourse. It seeks to establish an Islamic state in Palestine, based on the *Sharia* (Islamic law), and governed by the *ulama*[27] (Hamas Charter, Article 1). Second, the struggle against Israel is seen as part of wider Islamic *Jihad*[28] (Articles 15 and 16). Third, it seeks the liberation of all of Palestine, thus negotiations which "will give up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of its religion" (Article 13). Finally, as Ahmad notes, "Hamas opposes peace talks as a function of its intrinsic

competition with the PLO" (Ahmad 1994, 107). Thus, though Hamas has rejected the Oslo accords, in reality its response can be more usefully characterized as hedging its bets. "Hamas wanted it both ways: to reject Oslo, but not so completely as to be left out of the emerging political order the agreement established" (Robinson 1997, 172).

The Palestinian Authority's relationship with the Islamist movement is filled with many difficulties and contradictions. The PA's state-building function gives it a monopoly over the conduct of peace negotiations with Israel. To make progress on this front, the PA needs to control the activities of the Islamists that could derail peace negotiations. Thus as a state the PA needs to have a monopoly over the use of violence. But when negotiations falter, as they most often do, the PA finds itself in a difficult conundrum. Can it continue to function as a state even if its people are still under occupation? Or if it reverts to its resistance role, can the PA control the various forms of resistance? In this context, the Islamist movement exerts enormous influence. By conducting dramatic and bloody acts of violence (suicide bombings) against mostly Israeli civilians, this movement has the power to unhinge the PA's quest to reach a negotiated political settlement with Israel.

The Oslo process was greeted as a historic breakthrough, and many Palestinians welcomed it, as they pinned their hopes for a better future on it. But five years after the signing of the Oslo accords, the critics of Oslo seem vindicated, given the lack of progress in the US sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The most noted Palestinian critic, Edward W. Said of Columbia University, early on considered this process as deeply flawed because it is ultimately "peace" without *justice*.[29] He captures the meaning and implications of this historic denouement in the following words:

> For the first time in our history, our leadership has simply given up on self-determination, Jerusalem, and the refugees, allowing them to become part of an undetermined set of 'final status negotiations.' For the first time in our recent past, we accepted the division of our people—whose unity we had fought for as a national movement since 1948--into residents of the Occupied Territories and all the others, who happen today to constitute over 55 percent of the Palestinian population; they exist in another, lesser category not covered by the peace process. For the first time in the twentieth century, an anticolonial liberation movement had not only discarded its own considerable achievements but made an agreement to cooperate with a military occupation before the occupation had ended, and before the government of Israel had admitted that it was in effect a government of military occupation (Said 1996, xxix).

Arafat responded to Said's relentless critique by banning his books from the PA controlled areas.[30]

Though Edward Said's words are hard hitting, I do share the substance of their meaning. However, this should not allow us to obscure some of the important achievements that Oslo enabled. Palestinians and Israelis and their national movements are linked. Neither side can make the other disappear, nor can peace be achieved without fulfilling some of the deep aspirations of the other. Through the first paragraph of the DOP Israelis and Palestinians agreed to "recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights."[31] Kimmerling and Migdal summarize the significance of this denouement in the following words:

> Beyond the language of the accord, both [Chairman] Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin acknowledged in the months and years after the signing that the tactical basis of the conflict had changed once each recognized the mutual and legitimate political rights of the other. The transformation was from what social scientists call a zero-sum game to a non-zero-sum game. Zero-sum refers to a situation in which gains by one side are seen as coming only through a corresponding loss by the other side–you win, I lose, and vice versa. Rabin understood that the building of strong political institutions in the Palestine Authority would redound to Israel's benefit, as well. And Arafat knew that an increased sense of security among Israelis would make the public more disposed to move toward a final status agreement acceptable to Palestinians (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 339).

Today both sides are deeply fatigued by escalating violence. Instead of peace, Oslo seems to have led Israelis and Palestinians to the edge of the abyss. The ultimate failure of Oslo "showed that for the two sides to succeed they must incorporate their larger publics into the process." To move out of the abyss, "leaders and their societies alike must now begin to acknowledge that the writing of their own unfinished story depends, in great part, on the ability of the other society to continue writing its story" (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 417).

The Formation of the Palestinian Authority

Within a few months of the signing of Oslo I, Israeli authorities gave Arafat permission to set up the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza. After 27 years of exile, on July 1, 1994, Arafat arrived in Gaza. The parameters of the PA's powers were constrained by Israeli stipulations. Arafat's mandate was not to build a democratic order, but to

stem violence and "terrorism,"[32] and to insure security and stability thus enabling the "peace process" to go forward. Thus, upon assuming power, the PA was expected to subdue, if necessary by physical force, all of its Palestinian opponents. Similar to other instances in the history of decolonization, retreating powers—Israel in this case—turn power over to personalities and groups of proven "reliability." Arafat was keenly aware that were he to fail in his new functions and role, he would provide the Israelis with the pretext to repudiate the agreement.

Political Legitimacy and the Decentering of Politics

The PA clearly understood that it needed elections to legitimize its rule. They insisted on holding elections before the start of the final status negotiations. Though Israel preferred to postpone them to the end of the 5 year transition period, they did relent to the Palestinian request. In effect, the election law had to gain *apriori* Israeli approval. The electorate was to select a "President" by popular (national) vote, and an 88 member "Palestinian Legislative Council" (PLC) would be selected by regional representation.[33] A large number of candidates (676) contested the 88 seats. The outcome was predictable. Arafat won by about 88 percent of the vote, and Fateh, which is headed by Arafat, emerged as the undisputed ruling party in the PLC by securing 50 of the 88 seats. The functions and powers of the legislative council are largely undefined. But since 1999, PLC members have been intent on pursuing an agenda for reform. The PLC, as specified in the Oslo Accords, is not permitted to play a role in the final status negotiations (Robinson 1997, 195-197; Andoni 1996; and Shikaki 1996). Lamis Andoni, a veteran journalist, writing in *Middle East International* (2 February 1996), observes that the "election campaign has ended with a deepening feeling of an emerging ruling elite, whose economic interests are tied with Israel, and a widening social [and] economic gap in the West Bank and Gaza." About 50 percent of the new cabinet hailed from the landowning class.

Though the PA has yet to secure Israeli and American recognition as a state, it certainly looks and acts like a highly centralized state. Moreover, it is certainly as viable and perhaps more vibrant than "juridical" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982) or "quasi-states"(Jackson 1990).[34] It is headed by a President, and the Office of the Presidency. Arafat presides over a cabinet composed of 25 Ministers, who in turn preside over Ministries typical of other states. In addition, the PA has set up several authorities which *inter alia* include the: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics; Housing, Environmental, and Civil service Commissions; Palestinian Monetary Authority; and the

Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR). The PLC serves as the legislative branch. A Judicial branch exists, but so far has shown little independence in its actions.[35] In addition, Gaza and the West Bank have been subdivided into various governates with PA appointed governors. Finally each town and city has an elected mayor and council.

Fateh, which is headed by Arafat, is the dominant political party which in effect enhances Arafat's ability to preside over the emerging Palestinian polity. At the level of society, the left factions of the PLO and other political parties have declined and a new political party system has yet to emerge.[36] Even the previously mentioned Islamist movement (HAMAS) was weakened in the mid 1990s. Their military infrastructure was dealt a severe blow. Their leaders and supporters were jailed an executed by both Israel and the PA's repressive policies. In addition, the inability of the Islamic movement to achieve tangible political change has led to disillusionment among many of the younger cadres (Roy 2000, 25). In my various research trips to Palestine, and particularly in 1997, I was struck by the growing level of popular alienation and resignation from politics. In my daily diaries (September through October 1997) I repeatedly recorded two words (despair and paralysis) to describe the mood of a population which only a short time before was highly mobilized and politicized. In effect, under PA rule, Palestinian society has become increasingly depoliticized. In turn, the remaining political parties and many of their former cadres seem to have shifted their focus from the overtly political domain to the less contentious arena of the NGOs (Hammami 2000; Roy 2000).

Indeed more than a thousand NGOs provide services (social, health, education and relief), and lobby and contest PA policy making with the intention of affecting specific policy outcomes. However, these organizations have undergone a profound transformation since Oslo. From the 1970s through the years of the *intifada* (1987-93) the NGOs were created by the various political organizations and social movements. They worked in all arenas of civic life: social, education, culture, the media, human and women's rights. "The scope and size of this sector attests to the historical importance of NGOs as a response to occupation and statelessness" (Hammami 1995, 53). Rema Hammami, co-founder of one of the NGOs--the Women's Affairs Center in Gaza—notes, that in part the early successes of the *intifada* were "made possible due to the organizing and mobilizing skills and experiences of the grassroots organizations" (Hammami 2000, 16). However, from 1991, a large number of NGOs have been "transmogrified into professionally based, foreign funded and

development oriented centers (Hammami 2000, 16-17).

With the establishment of the PA in 1994, the depoliticization of the NGOs accelerated. The PA wanted all these organizations to obtain permits and to register with the ministry of the interior (security and intelligence services), so that it would be in a position to curb their criticisms of the PA's repressive practices.[37] With the weakening and/or demise of the social movements and political parties, the NGO community distanced itself from its mass-base, and was transformed into an elite and professional network, whose salary structure is much higher than the public sector's. Hammami captures the essence of this transformation in the following words:

> They [NGOs] have thus become desirable workplaces for a new generation of middle class professionals who view NGO employment as a career path to more lucrative salaries and prestigious jobs in international organizations. Speaking English, dressing well and maintaining a nice office are all part of this new culture. The entrance of waves of young professionals into the NGO sector has further de-politicized it, resulting in an even greater divorce from a popular base. The new professionals tend to treat the 'grassroots' in a patronizing and condescending manner, perceiving them as social groups in need of instruction, rather as constituencies from which they take direction and legitimacy (Hammami 2000, 27).

The taming of the NGOs was furthered by the conditionality of donor funding, which can also be understood as the distribution of political rent. Thus instead of pursuing a social transformation agenda, they adopted the vocabulary of the IMF/World Bank. Instead of mobilization, both Islamic and secular NGO's focus on "development" and "human resource development." These activities are essentially safe and for the most part do not provoke the ire of the PA. Collectively they provide important services to parts of the needy population. Were they not engaged in the delivery of such services, the PA would have to assume those functions and expenditures. Thus, ironically, because of the NGOs the PA can allocate its expenditures to other sectors of the government, e.g. security.[38]

The proliferation of the NGO community in Palestine is consistent with similar situations in other parts of the Third World. In an engaging cross-regional analysis on civil society and the prospects for democracy, Jeff Haynes focuses on the emergence of "action groups" who could potentially play a role in building a civil society capable of ushering in democracy. He identifies two types of such groups. Developmental groups seek to improve the living conditions of their members. They are not concerned with equity, thus they are "apolitical because they do not wish

to change the distribution of power in society" (Haynes 1997, 25).

In contrast, sociopolitical groups seek to heighten the consciousness of their members to induce apolitical citizens to fight for their interests. They offer "an opportunity for those lacking in power to take their life chances into their own hands, that is, to have a voice in the *arrangement* of society. From the vantage point of traditional power holders this will be unwelcome because, if successful, it will result in a reduction of their power" (Haynes 1997, 25). As shown above, the Palestinian NGO community is more "developmental" in orientation than "sociopolitical." Unlike the "sociopolitical" groups, Palestinian NGOs under the PA limit their focus to social work and community development, rather than the political domain which addresses the fundamental inequalities of wealth and power. They provide important services without taxing the PA politically.

During the *intifada* (1987-93) the NGOs were linked to broad based social movements and political parties, under the umbrella of the PLO. Thus in the resistance phase, the PLO organizational model, according to George Giacaman can be seen to embody two "antinomial and contradictory elements: a pluralistic civil society-in the making lodged within the confines of a proto-state, the PLO." Giacaman adds, that "in the absence of a state and in the conditions of the diaspora, the antinomy of state/civil society endured as temporary necessity and as a means of shouldering national responsibilities [resistance to occupation], in what was hoped would be a transitional stage."[39] In the 20 years prior to Oslo these groups were at the nexus of a budding civil society. But in the state-building phase, "the threat to civil society from such a unitary model and history became quickly apparent, especially in light of the disarray of the opposition within the PLO and the resultant weakness of political parties, as well as the requirements of the agreement with Israel."[40] This unitary model served the PLO and the Palestinian people to mobilize opposition to occupation. But once this model became transposed to govern the population in the West Bank and Gaza, its latent authoritarian qualities came to the fore.

The PA, like other post-colonial states in similar circumstances, commands a certain level of legitimacy and the support and consensus of the governed. Its populist rhetoric, reformist program, developmental ambitions, advocacy of social justice, and its role as the agency for independence arouse positive expectations from the public. However, in its pursuit of these goals, the PA is hampered by several obstacles. First, in any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement the issue of the right of return–a right of Palestinian refugees to return to their pre-1948 homes inside what

is now Israel–needs to be addressed. This right is important to the Palestinian diaspora which constitutes more than 50 percent of the total Palestinian population. Dr. Khalil Shikaki, the head of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a survey among Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon. His findings were issued on 14 July 2003. Appearing on National Public Radio (NPR), Shikaki reports that the "overwhelming majority [of Palestinians] wanted to live in a Palestinian state [West Bank and Gaza]; only a small minority [10 percent] wanted to live in the state of Israel....Ninety percent of those who wanted to have Israel as a permanent place of residence said that they would rather have a Palestinian citizenship and a Palestinian passport."[41] The same NPR report notes that upon releasing these findings, Shikaki's office was attacked by rioting Palestinians. Simply put, the PA needs to confront the implications of this right of return and how it can be satisfied within the contours of a clearly delineated two-state solution.

Second, the PA still rules over an undefined and contested territory. Third, with a weak resource base, its economy is highly dependent on external aid and Israeli policies. Fourth, though it is pursuing its stated aims of self-determination and full independence, the constraints of the Oslo accords portend much less,[42] thus requiring the reconfiguration of national goals.

For Palestinians, national identity, was shared irrespective of their respective domicile. In turn, the PLO served as the symbol and agency with cemented the unity of the Palestinians, whether they were "inside" or "outside" of historic Palestine. Perhaps, we should consider the post-Oslo phase as a new *historic crisis* confronting the Palestinians as they attempt to reformulate or reconfigure their identity under rapidly changing circumstances. The PLO still exists, and officially it still claims to represent all of the Palestinians, those "inside" and those "outside". However, the Palestinian Authority has for all practical purposes superseded the PLO and has assumed most of its functions. This poses some important challenges to the PA in the post-Oslo period: What does it mean to be a Palestinian today? What are Palestine's borders, and who has the right to live in Palestine? How will Palestinian citizenship de determined, and who will it include and exclude? How will these changes be reflected in the educational system, and in civics textbooks? These questions are addressed in Chapters Six and Seven.

Institution Building and the Expansion of the Public Sector

The first order of business was to bolster the power of the PA over a

population "with which it shared many emotional bonds but with whom it had no practical political experience" (Robinson 1997, 176). The exiled PLO leadership thus came in and marginalized the local elite which had led the *intifada,* through coercion and co-optation. Yasser Arafat weakened local political organizations, including Fateh which he founded, "in order to fragment politics" (Frisch 1997, 351), thus further personalizing his control over the political arena.[43] Within months after Arafat entered Gaza, up to seven Palestinian intelligence services were reporting to him; since that time the number has increased to nine. At least one, the Special Security Force (SSF), functions as the gatherer of information on the other services (Usher 1994, 25) to stem any challenge to his rule. These agencies are staffed by exiles who were formerly part of the PLO's military apparatus, and to a lesser extent by Palestinians released from Israeli jails. By virtue of expanding the institutions of the PA, Arafat established a system of political patronage in which corruption not only spread but was encouraged.[44]

In addition to the security services, a police force operates in PA controlled areas. Together they number about 40,000 (Usher 1996, Robinson 1997).[45] Raji Sourani, a leading attorney and human rights activist, estimates that police to population ratio works out to 1:50, one of the highest in the world.[46] In 1993 The World Bank estimated that a force of 9,000 would require a budget of $180 million annually. A force four times this size would then cost at least $500 million. The PA 1996 budget allotted $147 million for a police force of 27,000.[47] Clearly, the PA must have secured additional funds for the additional forces who are on the payroll. This might explain the creation of the slush funds mentioned above. The funds generated through corrupt practices are at least partially geared to beefing up the forces which insure the security and longevity of the regime. According to official PA figures, security (military) expenditures represent about 35 percent of the recurring budget.[48] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), from 1998 to 1999, the Palestinian defense budget increased by 67 percent amounting to $500 million in 1999. If this data is accurate, it would suggest that Palestinian security expenditures constitute around 11.5 percent of the Palestinian GDP, up from 7.2 percent in 1998, which is well above the world average of 2.4 percent of GDP.[49]

The PA has created a large civil bureaucracy, mostly as a result of what the IMF calls an "excessive" public employment program (IMF 2003, 91). Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Minister of Finance who worked with the IMF in various capacities until 2001, believes that his ministry needs to achieve a better balance among the various spending needs. In

presenting the PA's budget proposal for FY 2003 to the PLC he notes that "the share of the wage bill in total spending should be reduced over the medium term.[50] During the first 27 months of the *al-Aqsa intifada* the World Bank reports that public sector employment increased by 17 percent. This increase should be "understood as an emergency measure, and not one that would be advisable under more normal circumstances. Once the immediate crisis is in hand, careful thought will need to be given to sizing the civil service in a way that is fiscally sustainable" (World Bank May 2003, 88).

Public sector employment has important social and political functions. Many of the PA's appointees to the various ministries and parallel bodies in the PLO serve the purpose of absorbing and compensating the returnees and former militants, thus bolstering the PA's power base. Personnel recruitment and appointments are therefore based more on ascriptive rather than meritocratic standards.[51] The combination of these factors makes the PA the single largest employer.[52] In 2003 the PA employed 26 percent of those still working inside the West Bank and Gaza, and pays 40 percent of all domestic wages (World Bank, May 2003, xiii). Almost 60% of the 1998 and 1999 PA budgets were earmarked for public sector salaries (civilian and military/security). [53] Public sector employment growth in the fourth quarter of 1999 and in the first quarter of 2000 vastly exceeded the provisions of the budget. In the beginning of 2000 the PA estimated that by the end of 2000 more than 112,500 people will be employed by the public sector. The World Bank notes that due to donor budget support in 2003, "125,000 people receive a regular monthly salary [from the PA] and provide essential services to the population" (World Bank, May 2003, xiii). According to the PA,

> Roughly 6,000 people were added to the payroll in the fourth quarter of 1999—three times as many as the budget had assumed—and some 4,257 were added in the period January-April 2000, compared with the budget's 3,410 for the year as a whole. Due to the unplanned way with which hiring decisions are still made, very few of those recently recruited are in fact for positions envisaged in the budget, thus leaving genuine demands for employment in the judiciary, health, and education sectors still to be met....The rapid expansion of PA staff not only makes less resources available for other important recurrent and capital expenditure, it also makes it exceedingly difficult to ensure adequate renumeration of PA employees, as well as to implement the long-standing reform of the West Bank pension system.[54]

Furthermore, because the share of the PA budget has increased in favor of basic government functions–security and emergency allocations–the World Bank is concerned that,

> Resources for education and health services have declined in proportional terms at a time when demographic trends actually support greater spending on social services. With high population growth rates, reduced budgets will make it increasingly difficult to sustain current social indicators with respect to primary enrollment rates and access to health care.[55]

The PA has pursued economic policies influenced by neoliberal perspectives favoring: free trade, no protectionism, no economic regulation, and no conditions on foreign money transfers. They hoped to lure foreign, including diaspora Palestinian, investors. Such investments, they reasoned, could spur economic prosperity thus rendering the peace process more acceptable to the ordinary citizen. A visible role for the private sector would also increase the level of aid from the international donor community. Indeed some projects and investments have materialized, but they are mostly concentrated in real estate speculation and construction of hotels, offices, and new buildings. In reality this type of economic activity has not improved the lives of the majority of the people. Unemployment reached 30 percent in the years 1994-96, and 20 percent of all Palestinian households, by World Bank standards were below the poverty line.[56] From 1996 to 2000, the eve of the *al-Aqsa intifada*, unemployment decreased to 10 percent, mostly due to increases in job opportunities in Israel (70,000) and 50,000 in the PA. As a result of the increasing violence of the *al-Aqsa intifada* 92,000 Palestinians lost their jobs in Israel, thus unemployment peaked to 36 percent in the third quarter of 2002 (World Bank May 2003, 12). Poverty levels have reached crisis proportions. The World Bank uses a poverty line of $2.10 per day. Accordingly, 21 percent of the Palestinian population was considered poor in 2000. This number increased to 60 percent by December 2002. The World Bank concludes that "the poor are getting poorer. In 1998 the average daily consumption of the poor was equivalent to US$1.47 per day. This has now slipped to US$1.32. More than 75 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip are now poor. The high population growth rate (4.3 percent per annum) is fueling the growth in poverty" (World Bank, May 2003, xiv).

Upon the signing of the 1993 peace accords, more than two-thirds of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza was confident that their economic conditions would improve.[57] However, by 1995 and also 1997, fifty and almost sixty percent, respectively, noted that their

economic conditions had actually worsened (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 1995; 1997). Other PA practices compounded the problem. For example, by establishing import monopolies for at least 27 key commodities,[58] the PA has actually weakened the local private sector which is composed mostly of small producers. Samara argues that these monopolies were created to augment the PA's revenue base without having to rely on direct taxation, a practice consistent with rentierism (Samara 2000, 25). The PA's widespread corruption caused some delays in the actual disbursement of donor monies. However, despite corrupt practices by the PA, donor support did not wane. Until 2000 the donor community feigned commitment to transparency, but seldom challenged the PA's fiscal and financial mismanagement. For example, the World Bank reports that the Palestinian GDP in 1995 was valued at $3.1 billion. However, they estimate that an additional $170 million was unaccounted for, "due to revenue clearance leakage."[59] These forms of "leakage" end up in the PA's covert budget where transparency and accountability have no room.[60]

The PA's Public Control Commission conducted an independent investigation and found the PA guilty of corruption, abuse of power, and abuse of public funds.[61] The Commission's report and the PLC's investigation of the matter did not deter the PA from continuing the practice of maintaining two budgets, one public and the other covert. The latter contains significant amounts of money (political capital) which enables the PA to buy political loyalty from significant sectors of Palestinian society (Samara 2000, 24). In a report issued in September 2003 the IMF reports that from 1995 to 2000 large sums of money were diverted. "All in all, excise tax revenue and profits from commercial activities [monopolies] diverted away from the budget may have exceeded US$898 million."[62] The result of these practices is that the PA by 2000 had failed to construct a legal and regulatory environment conducive to foreign and expatriate investment.

In view of these realities, as shown in Table 3.1, it is not surprising that a large percentage of the public, in the years preceding the *al-Aqsa intifada*, believed that corruption in PA institutions was both endemic and on the rise. Public opinion surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) reveals that about 65 percent of the public feared criticizing the PA in public.[63] Finally, less than 25 percent of the respondents gave a positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy.

Table 3.1: Indicators of Public Discontent[64]

	Sept 1997	Oct 1998	Apr 1999	Feb 2000	Mar/Apr 2000
Fear Criticism of PA	58%	57%	56%	62%	65%
Corruption in PA Institutions	65%	66%	71%	60%	71%
Positive Evaluation of Democracy	34%	27%	26%	28%	22%

When the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) data is broken down further, we discern that negative evaluations of PA performance is higher among those holding university degrees, Gaza residents, and the refugee population which is scattered in various refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, almost 90 percent of public sector (PA) employees believe that corruption is high and endemic in the PA. Lastly, more than 60 percent of the public believes that *wasta* (connections) is indispensable for securing jobs.

al-Aqsa Intifada, the Weakening of the Palestinian Authority, and Economic Reforms

Matin Beck (1999) and Helga Baumgarten (1998) in separate studies have shown that political rents enable leaders like Arafat to become more autonomous from society. In such circumstances they note that the power of leaders increases substantially thus pushing them in the direction of more authoritarian rule. It is true that the PA has in a rather short span of time succeeded to create the institutional trappings of a functioning state. However, decision making is highly centralized in the hands of Arafat (until 2004), the president of the PA; the security apparatus is above the law; dissidents are harassed and jailed; unfavorable court rulings are ignored by the executive; and reforms are promised but rarely implemented. However, we can already see that political rent has been central, if not decisive, in enabling the development of the PA's "despotic" power while also funding the services of its "infrastructural" power. The *al-Aqsa intifada* has not changed this equation.

The *al-Aqsa intifada* broke out in late September 2000. On 15 September 2003, Terje Roed-Larsen, the United Nations special coordinator for the peace effort, informed the UN Security Council that 2,808 Palestinians and 830 Israelis had been killed in the fighting since September 2000. He further noted that neither the Palestinians nor the

Israelis have "seriously and actively addressed the core concerns of the other side."[65] As in the first *intifada* (1987-1993), " a dramatic event in the context of diplomatic stalemate sparked a reaction on the ground that was ripe for explosion" (Hammami and Tamari 2001, 5). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve in this matter in detail. Instead only a few features of this *intifada* are delineated which shed light on the obstacles facing the PA in advancing the dual functions of building a state and leading a resistance movement.[66]

The *al-Aqsa intifada* was not instigated by nor was it led by the PA/PLO leadership. However it differs from the first in a number of ways. First, it is not aimed solely at the Israelis. In fact it can be seen as a revolt against the PA leadership as well (Shikaki 2002; Tamari 2003). As the uprising entered its third year, the Palestinian national movement was split into three different wings–the PA leadership (Arafat), the young leadership of Fateh (*tanzim)*, and the armed resistance led by the Islamists (Hamas and Islamic Salvation) and some of the offshoots of Fateh. All of these groups seem to be following mutually incompatible strategies. Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari, an early supporter of Oslo and a member of the Palestinian negotiating team on the issue of refugees, contends that Palestinian nationalism is being redefined as a result of two key developments. Namely, the project for Palestinian independence (two-state solution) has failed due to intransigent Israeli settlement policies, and the rise of the Islamist movements. The latter, he contends, are positing themselves as an alternative paradigm [to Arafat and Fateh] of national deliverance. He captures the essence of this denouement in the following:

> The rise of the Islamic movements was predicated on this [PA/PLO] weakness. Hamas and their allies present themselves, paradoxically, as representing a system that can claim both worldly and otherworldly adherence. Worldly, through a seemingly accountable network of social services for the poor–something the patronage based institutions of the PA are unable to deliver. But the Islamists also hold out the promise of otherworldly salvation through the cult of martyrdom. It is a combination with built-in limits, certainly as regards its positioning as an alternative to the PLO. It feeds on the inability of secular nationalism to create a state rather on the Islamist's ability to create a workable system of governance.[67]

Clearly, the Arafat-led PA has lost domestic support. But ironically, when the governments of the United States and Israel insist on removing Arafat at some undetermined time, he manages to regain some of the support he lost.[68]

Second, the *al-Aqsa intifada* is a highly militarized and brutal

campaign with no clear political objective. Its primary mode of expression is through suicide operations that instill terror among Israeli civilians. Instead of weakening Israel's resolve, public opinion supports the Sharon government's policies of subduing the "terrorists." Palestinian reformers have tried to stem the cycle of violence. For example, on 17 June 2002 a number of Palestinian leaders announced the formation of the "Palestinian National Initiative" (NDI). The effort is led by Dr. Mustafa Barghuti, Dr. Haidar Abdul Shafi, and Mr. Ibrahim Dakkak.[69] The NDI called for the establishment of a national emergency leadership, to pave the way for the holding of democratic elections at all levels of the political (PA) system. Through such measures they hope to advance the cause of political, administrative and institutional reforms. Simply put, the NDI represents a domestic social and political coalition that seeks internal democratic reforms and political solutions of the conflict with Israel. In this context political means militant but non-violent forms of resistance. Graham Usher notes that Fateh and Hamas militants are convinced that neither the United States nor Israel would permit such sweeping elections. He sadly concludes that therefore the "intifada is likely to further degenerate from a national struggle against occupation to an attritional, competitive, and unaccountable contest for post-Arafat leadership." He adds, that the "divided leadership will fail the Palestinians, and not only because such an ungovernable battle of succession will sooner or later raise the specter of civil war. It will fail them for the same reasons Oslo failed them: because a people whose leaders are conflicted on aims and divided on means will never be free" (Usher 2003, 39).

The first uprising, in contrast, can be characterized more as a militant but mostly unarmed insurrection, which led both the PLO and Israel to start negotiations on the modalities of a two-state solution. The first *intifada* took place in a context where there was no formal contact between the Palestinian national movement and the Israeli government. But, the *al-Aqsa intifada*, because of its militarized nature does not involve mass mobilization nor direct participation of the Palestinian street. In addition, it has also pitted armed PA forces against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which have led to the reoccupation of some of the territories previously ceded by Israel to the PA. Consequently, The PA's quest to build state-like institutions has been severely hampered, and its ability to negotiate with Israel almost halted.

In the context of *al-Aqsa intifada*, the Palestinian Authority was induced to undertake two specific types of reforms. The initial call for reforms was domestically generated. However, the government of the United States insisted that it would not release the "roadmap" for peace

negotiations unless the PA produced a leader that would be acceptable as a negotiating partner to Israel. Speaking at the Rose Garden on 24 June 2002, President Bush urged the Palestinian people to "elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty," which is how a "Palestinian state can be born."[70] Thus, a combination of internal and external influences converged to bring about the post of Prime Minister (PM). Mr. Mahmud Abbas who a decade earlier signed the Oslo Accords on behalf of the PLO , served as the first Palestinian PM. Several months before his confirmation to this newly created position, he called for a halt to the militarization of the *intifada*.[71] However, unable to control the violence of the *intifada*, and having failed to put together a working coalition, Mr. Abbas resigned. His successor, Mr. Ahmad Qurei, who a decade ago was the principal negotiator of the Oslo agreements on behalf of the PLO, has been appointed by Mr. Arafat as the new PM.[72]

A second reform concerns the revamping of the finance ministry and the introduction of transparency in the formal PA budget. Towards this end, and as mentioned above, Mr. Salam Fayyad an IMF trained economist, assumed the Finance Ministry portfolio in 2002. The new minister has been hailed as a great reformer by American and European officials.[73] He is credited with instituting internationally acceptable fiscal processes at the Ministry of Finance (MOF). For example he created a single PA treasury account in which all foreign aid and Israeli collected PA taxes are deposited. This move consolidates all PA revenues into one account, and is designed to stop the "leakages" mentioned above. These reforms are part of a comprehensive package, the"100 Days Plan," which was adopted by the PLC on 22 June 2002.[74]

The IMF considers the reforms carried out in public finance since June 2002 to be "highly significant in improving accountability and transparency" (IMF September 2003, 107). However, they do note that the 2003 budget allocates $74 million to the President's office (PA), or 8 percent of the budget total. Of this total, "US$34 million is dedicated to 'transfers'." Thus the president uses this fund to allocate resources to various organizations and individuals. "Some have legitimate claims but have fallen through the safety net and have no recourse other than appealing to the President....**However other claimants and organizations are part of politically favored networks who should not be getting such grants under any criterion** [my emphasis]" (IMF September 2003, 107). One should note that these formal accounts exclude the PLO and Fateh budgets which are and had always been controlled by Mr. Arafat.

The poor performance of the Palestinian economy under *al-Aqsa*

intifada, coupled with the increasing possibility of public dissatisfaction with the peace process, was a source of alarm for both the PA and the international donor community. The international donor community decided to bolster the PA by providing it with more political rent. Donor monies paid for: PA salaries, emergency job creation programs, food aid, infrastructure repairs, and support for UNRWA. The purpose of these subsidies was to avert "economic collapse" of the PA (World Bank May 2003, xiii). Towards this end and over the course of the first 27 months of the *intifada*, the donors provided an average of $315 per person per year. When compared to levels of aid for other high-profile "post-conflict"societies (Bosnia, $215 per person per year; East Timor, $235 per person per year), the WB is justified in claiming that assistance to the Palestinians represents "an unprecedented level of international financial commitment" (World Bank May 2003, xv).

Donor assistance has staved off the collapse of the PA and its institutions. However, the PA still faces major internal and external difficulties. Domestically, the political landscape is quite fractured, thus the PA is unable to forge a national consensus on matters pertaining to peace and negotiations with Israel. The public still supports the roadmap, if it is to lead to full independence. On domestic issues public opinion surveys indicate that vast majorities are quite skeptical about the PA's commitment to tangible reform. The data in Table 3.2 needs to be understood in the context of the *al-Aqsa intifada*. Between 1997 and 2000 a majority of the public (65 to 71 percent) believed that corruption is endemic in the PA. But on the eve of the new *intifada* and through 2003, that number has jumped to about 83 percent. Positive evaluation of democracy, which was a low 22 percent in 2000, dipped further down to 17 percent by 2003. Fear of public expression however has declined from a high of 65 percent in March/April 2000 to well under 50 percent in 2002. This change is partly explained by the weakening of the PA and its security services as a result of the losses they sustained in fighting with the IDF.

Table 3.2: Indicators of Public Discontent[75] 2001-2003

	2001	**2002**	**2003**
Fear Criticism of PA	50%	43%	N/A
Corruption in PA Institutions	83%	80%	84%
Positive Evaluation of Democracy	22%	17%	N/A
Positive Evaluation of PA Performance	39%	40%	27%

The polling data also reveals that most people are worried about maintaining their present level of economic subsistence (60 percent or more). More than 63 percent of the public is pessimistic about the future. The public is also quite fractured in terms of their political affiliations and preferences. For example, Arafat and Fateh are supported by about 35 percent of the public, HAMAS secures 25 percent and the unaffiliated represent 43 percent of the respondents. Simply put, the public seems to be tired, and does not believe that the PA or the splintered opposition are capable of leading them forward to a better future. Discontent and resignation prevail.[76]

Political rent has clearly staved off the collapse of the PA. At the same time it has prevented the development of state-society linkages that would enable the people to hold their government accountable. Despite the destruction of some of the PA's infrastructure (buildings and assets), the PA's infrastructural power has in fact been enhanced due to the largesse of the donor community. The infusion of emergency assistance helped create public sector jobs, thus increasing the reliance of more people on the PA's patronage system. The coercive power of the PA towards the people has not diminished. However, given the multiple political fractures in Palestinian society, the PA is unable to deliver on the political expectations that come with political rent. To attack and subdue the oppositional forces, who are not all "terrorists," could very well lead to internal civil war.

In the last two years of his life, Arafat was a virtual prisoner in his Ramallah compound. Shortly after Arafat's death, Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the PA in January 2005 with 60% of the vote. But he inherited an impossible situation. Under his watch, Fateh's hegemony over national politics ended with the HAMAS victory in the 25 January 2006 elections. The latter won 78 of the 132 seats of the PLC. Abbas pursued the "peace process" but both Israel and the Bush administration called him a "disappointment." In the summer of 2007 HAMAS routed the Fateh organization in Gaza. In response, Abbas dismissed the national unity government and appointed one led by former PA Finance Minister Salam Fayyad. In the past Gaza was separated from the West Bank by geography, now they are ruled by competing governments claiming to represent the Palestinian national interest. In this context, US diplomacy is pushing for a new round of negotiations between Israel and the PA which has imploded. To bolster the PA, and to secure its role in the renewed peace process, the international community convened in Paris on 17 December 2007 to pledge funds to shore up Abbas' hold on the diminished PA, and to insure its subservient role in the never-ending "peace process." Prior to the conference the PA sought assistance to the

tune of $5.6 billion, but the international donors exceeded PA expectations by pledging $7.4 billion. The bulk of these funds are earmarked for budget support. For now, Abbas is no longer considered a disappointment by Israel and the US.

In effect, political rent has contributed significantly to the formation of the PA and its survival, but at what cost? In the next chapter we analyze the impact of political rent on Palestinian development strategy.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL RENT AND PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT

The analysis and data in this chapter will show that the policies of the donor community, through the disbursement of political rent, are intended to shore up the Palestinian Authority and to keep the peace process going. In Chapters One and Two, political rent is defined as state revenue that is accrued from external sources without direct taxation of citizens, so that the state is not obliged to respond to societal pressure. Prior to 1996 the PA submitted annual investment programs to the donor community to secure funding. However, since 1999, the PA adopted the World Bank's new development paradigm–Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). This approach purports to be more holistic than the previous paradigms including the structural adjustment program. The CDF is intended to foster development by creating a partnership between the state, the donors, civil society, and the private sector. Despite this seemingly inclusive approach, the evidence shows that the CDF approach to development simply invokes new rhetoric intended to produce universal acceptance of the virtues of the neoliberal agenda. Finally, the evidence also shows that the development policies adopted by the PA are not broadly shared in Palestinian society. This in the long run will have very negative consequences for Palestinian democratic institutionalization.

The international donor community believes that tangible improvements in the performance of the Palestinian economy are crucial if the PA is to secure Palestinian public support for the peace process with Israel. To insure the success of the peace process, a vast array of international donors, ranging from the United States, individual European countries, and various organs of the international community--the United Nations System, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union--are working together to assist the PA to improve the economy, and the efficiency and credibility of the Palestinian self-governing institutions.[1]

The improvement of the Palestinian economy hinges on the adoption

and implementation of a comprehensive national development plan producing rapid and visible benefits in the daily lives of Palestinians. More importantly, to improve the performance of the economy the donor community and prominent advisors are urging the Palestinian Authority to adopt wide-ranging measures of institutional reforms to enable good governance. In this connection, the New York based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) convened an international task force (TF) to conduct a "comprehensive and systematic assessment of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority, its structure and procedures, its ability to set priorities and to allocate resources, and its transparency and accountability" (Council on Foreign Relations 1999, v). This project was conducted by the US/Middle East Project of the CFR and directed by Mr. Henry Siegman. The TF was chaired by Mr. Michel Rocard, former French Prime Minister and current president of the Development and Cooperation Committee of the European Parliament. The principal finding of the TF report, issued in 1999, is that the PA must make extensive changes to develop sound institutions of good governance, which must embody several principles: a participatory political system, the adoption of a constitution, pluralist civil society, sustainable development, and a free market economy.[2] In the preface to the report, Leslie H. Gelb, President of the CFR captures the central concerns and preoccupations not only of the Task Force, but of the PA's principal backers from the international community. He notes:

> Confidence in the Palestinian Authority's institutions affects its contest for legitimacy with elements that reject the Oslo Accords and claim to do a better job than the Palestinian Authority at delivering certain services to the Palestinian people.[3] This confidence bears on the Palestinian Authority's ability to negotiate with Israel and affects Israel's confidence in the Palestinian Authority's ability to implement agreements. Good governance is therefore a necessary condition for the success of the peace process.[4]

These recommendations are based on many findings presented in the report, namely, that too much power is concentrated in Arafat's hands; second, that the PLC is relatively impotent; third, that the public sector is highly bloated. In this connection, the TF warns that the "use of public sector hiring as a means of easing unemployment, the overall result is serious job inflation, institutional flabinness, lower–quality public services, and reduced cost-effectiveness" (CFR 1999, 66). Though Arafat considered that he was being judged too harshly, the PA has welcomed the report and expressed its willingness to work with the TF as an advisory group to assist in implementing its recommendations in a timely manner.[5]

The PA is trying to bolster the Palestinian economy in the context of preparing for Final Status negotiations with Israel. In this connection the PA secured the services of the Adam Smith Institute, a leading British consulting firm, to assist it in its preparations for the negotiations. The British Foreign Ministry's Department of International Development is footing the bill of 1.6 million pounds. At the same time, the PA has retained the services of the US based consulting firm, Arthur Andersen, to advertise its investment attractions to foreign and particularly American investors.[6]

A careful reading of the report shows that the TF fails to examine the problem of PA corruption, nor does it address the issue of human rights violations.[7] Such omissions are not unique to the TF report. For example most peace plans intended to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fail to address basic human rights and international humanitarian law protections. In a report titled: "The 'Roadmap': Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes," Human Rights Watch (HRW) expresses its concerns. According to HRW, the "failure to incorporate such standards is not new." They do note that some human rights standards are at times incorporated, "not as binding obligations but as political benchmarks subject to negotiation, political expediency, and performance by other parties." Indeed, political expediency could very well explain why the TF fails to address these issues. The HRW report concludes:

> It is crucial not to repeat these mistakes. Recent experience in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Guatemala and elsewhere has shown that the legitimacy and sustainability of political processes are strengthened, not weakened, by including IHL [international humanitarian law] standards. All conflict-related agreements should include and uphold these standards.[8]

Renewed efforts for Palestinian reforms were reinvigorated in the darkest days of the *al-Aqsa intifada,* during the Spring of 2002. The *Quartet*, composed of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, issued the "Madrid Declaration" on 10 April endorsing the principle of a the two-state solution. In May, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) met with Arafat and the PA's cabinet and proposed sweeping institutional reforms. On 23 June 2002 the PLC adopted its "100 Days Plan of the Palestinian Government,"which includes the holding of presidential and legislative elections; the reorganization of the security services; and the creation of a single Treasury account at the Finance Ministry.[9] President Bush in a speech on 24 June 2002 urged Palestinians to adopt major reforms as well. In support

of the "100 Days Plan" the Quartet established the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform (ITF), to develop the PA plan and to assist in its implementation. The ITF is composed of representatives of the Quartet, Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The role of the ITF is "to monitor and support the implementation of civil reforms, and to guide the international donor community in support of the Palestinian reform agenda" (IMF 15 September 2003, 110).

The International Task Force (ITF), held its first meeting on 10 July 2002 and put forward a "Reform Action Plan," partially adopted from the earlier plan of the PA. The plan calls for reforms in seven specific areas: financial accountability, the market economy, local government, ministerial and civil service reform, the judiciary, elections, and civil society. The PA with PLC prodding moved rapidly to reduce the size of the cabinet, and key reformers such as the new finance minister (Salam Fayyad) were appointed in June 2002. In February 2003, under intense domestic and international pressure, Arafat agreed to appoint a Prime Minister and the PLC approved Mahmud Abbas and his cabinet on 20 April 2003. On 30 April, the day after the appointment of the first Palestinian prime minister, the Quartet formally issued the "roadmap" (IMF 15 September 2003, 111-112).

From this sequence of events we can delineate two central observations. First, the donor community continues to support the PA, provided that the PA implement some basic reforms. As with the previous Task Force and for the same reasons cited above, the issue of human rights safeguards for Palestinians is obscured or omitted.[10] Second, as the IMF explains, "[we] will continue to remain engaged, along with the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral donors, in the reform process, and will seek to help the Palestinians build upon an economic recovery and ultimately work toward their goal as an independent state in the community of nations in peaceful and prosperous coexistence with Israel" (IMF 15 September 2003, 10).

The PA's quest to devise and launch development plans and strategies is almost totally dependent on Israel and other external forces (Naqib 2000; Roy 1995, 1998, 1999; Shaban 1998; World Bank and MAS 1997; UNSCO 1998, 1999).[11] These efforts are aptly dubbed as "development under adversity" (World Bank 1997). In the next sections of this chapter, the donor community is identified as the most important shaper of Palestinian development strategy.

The Politics of International Assistance

In an era of rapid economic globalization, no state, including the most powerful such as the United States, remains unaffected by exogenous influences. The international arena or the global context, has a direct impact on a state's domestic political institutions and its potential for success or failure in competing economically and politically with other states. General and specialized international organizations and treaties, including regional organizations and trade blocs like the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the World Bank, challenge the sovereignty of national governments within their boundaries. However, globalization is experienced very differently in advanced capitalist countries than in less-developed ones. The authors of an innovative introduction to comparative politics note: "It is likely that the more advantaged a state is, as measured by such factors as level of economic development, military power, and resource base, the more it will shape global influences. Conversely, the policies of the less advantaged countries are extensively molded by other states, by international organizations, and by broader international constraints" (Kesselman, et al. 2003, 8).

Many less-developed states have had to adapt their economies to the new dictates of a global order that embraces the neoliberal virtues of unregulated private markets and free-trade. From the outset the Palestinian economy under the PA was designed and to a large extent funded by the policies and prescriptions of globalizing institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.

On 1 October 1993, only two weeks after the signing of the Declaration of principles (DOP), the US government hastily and swiftly convened the Conference to Support Middle East Peace. The political goal of the conference was to marshal tangible international support for a "comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and for the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles."[12] Most importantly, forty donor countries and international organizations pledged almost $2.4 billion, over five years, to "promote reconstruction and development in the West Bank and Gaza."[13] Table 4.1 shows that by 2000 the international donor community committed nearly $4.5 billion and disbursed approximately $2.9 billion (grants and loans) for Palestinian development.[14] From the outset the donors faced a conundrum: Should the pledged funds be used to insure the short-term goal of promoting the peace process, or to lay the foundation for long-term economic growth and development of the Palestinian economy?

Between 1993 and 1996, the PA, Israel, and the donors made a series of choices that favored a policy of short-term political relief instead of a policy of long-term investments. The Palestinian economy was in shambles, and this was further exacerbated by Israeli border closures resulting in large scale unemployment and increasing poverty rates, particularly in Gaza. In addition, as Table 4.2 shows, the Palestinian areas were found lagging in infrastructural development, as compared to other countries with similar levels of income. This is mostly due to the legacy of two and a half decades of Israeli occupation during which investments in public infrastructure were negligible.[15] Thus, funds earmarked for short-term support were spent on immediate job creation and poverty alleviation projects. Funds for Technical Assistance were spent on institution building projects, namely the strengthening of PA ministries, and particularly its coercive apparatus (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 6-7; 143-154).

Table 4.1: Total Donor loans and Grants: 1994-2000 (Amounts=1000 US dollars)

	Total Commitments	**Total Disbursements**
Loans	$759,682.00	$386,918.00
	16.8% of commitment	13.2% of disbursement
Grants	$3,753,664.00	$2,549,541.00
	83.2%	86.8%
Total	**$4,513,346.00**	**$2,936,459.00**

Source: Adapted from: PA, "Preamble for the 2000 First Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor's Assistance (June 2000).

Despite the structural weaknesses of the Palestinian economy, the World Bank and other donor agencies are confident that the WBGS is endowed with special assets that could propel rapid growth. The most important asset is the high quality of human resources, as indicated by the relatively high level of educational attainment of the adult population. In addition, there is a strong expatriate community whose business elites have accumulated vast wealth, and who under the appropriate circumstances could invest their capital in the WBGS to bolster the economy. In addition, Palestinian society through its active civic associations, has played an important role in the delivery of public services and the establishment of most of the centers of higher education. Accordingly, the authors of the World Bank's "Development Under Adversity," express optimism that in "the right environment and with the right mix of strategies and policies, the WBGS economy could thrive and

become a leader in the region" (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 8).

Table 4.2: Comparing Infrastructure Services in the WBGS (Data for 1992-94)

Country	**Population** (million)	**Per capita Income** (US$)	**Electric Supply** (kw per 100 people)	**Electric power system losses** (%)	**Households with sanitation** (%)	**Number of phones** (per 100 people)	Meters of paved roads **(per 100 people)**
Egypt	55.0	650	21.0	14.0	50	4.3	**59**
Jordan	3.9	1,120	25.0	19.0	100	7.0	**170**
WBGS	**2.4**	**1,450**	**13.0**	**30.0**	**25**	**3.1**	80
Lebanon	4.0	2,500	32.0	N.A.	N.A.	9.3	**N.A.**
Syria	13.0	2,800	30.0	N.A	63	4.1	**180**
Israel	5.1	13,500	82.0	4.0	100	37.1	**266**
Mauritius	1.1	2,700	33.0	14.0	100	9.6	**190**
LMICs*	1,152.6	1,620	21.5	12.4	N.A.	7.9	**N.A.**
OECD**	**N.A.**	**19,710**	**82.6**	**7.3**	**N.A.**	**45.1**	**N.A.**

Source: Diwan and Shaban (1997, 7)
* Lower middle income countries
**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Institutional Structures for Donor Assistance and Coordination

Since 1993 the donor community gave the World Bank the responsibility to plan, finance, and execute the assistance plans for the Palestinians. Though the United Nations is part of this development network, its role has been reduced to implementation rather than agenda setting. This function is carried out by the UN's Office of the Special Coordinator (UNSCO). In coordination with the PA, the donor community has established a set of multilayered and complex structures to mobilize, coordinate, deliver and allocate aid to the PA and the Palestinian people. Ultimately these efforts are intended to enable the PA to articulate long-term development plans. The donor aid coordination structures include:[16]

1. Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC). The AHLC is the main international donor body overseeing the assistance effort of the donor countries. It is chaired by Norway, and meets several times per year. The AHLC serves as the primary coordination mechanism "on policy matters related to the WBGS development program" (Diwan and Shaban 1999,

144). Briefly, it is responsible for setting the policy framework and priorities for all donors and aid institutions. Formally, the AHLC was created by the Multilateral Steering Group of the 1993 conference. The AHLC has seven full members: Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway, Russia, and the United States. Associate members include the PA, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia and the United Nations. The World Bank is both a full member and serves as secretariat for the AHLC.

2. Consultative Group on the West Bank and Gaza (CG). The CG is chaired by the World Bank and brings together more than 40 active donors. Its meetings are used to discuss investment priorities, proposed projects, and to explore co-financing arrangements of projects. At its Fall 1997 meeting the CG "reviewed implementation of the 1997 Palestinian Public Investment Program and public investment funding needs" (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 145).

3. Holst[17] Fund, is administered by the World Bank. Its primary function is to channel donor funds in support of the PA's recurrent budget and start-up expenses. It also serves as a funding instrument for employment-generation initiatives.

4. Ministerial Meetings. The meetings are essentially pledging sessions. Two key meetings have been held, the first in October 1993 in Washington DC, and the second in Paris in January 1996.

5. Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC). At the suggestion of the United Nations, the AHLC established the LACC, thereby effectively devolving certain aspects of donor coordination to the local level–West Bank and Gaza donor representatives and the PA. The LACC is jointly chaired by Norway, UNSCO and the World Bank (UNSCO 1995, 35). At its December 1994 meeting the LACC decided to set up 12 Sector Working Groups (SWGs). "These groups focus on improving coordination and speeding up implementation of donor assistance consistent with priorities set in consultation with the Palestinian Authority and supported by the United Nations and the World Bank" (UNSCO 1995, 35). For each SWG, one or more PA ministries act as "gavel holder," a donor country representative as "shepard," and a UN agency or the World Bank serving as the "secretariat."

6. Joint Liaison Committee (JLC). The AHLC established the JLC in 1994, whose members include the PA, Israel, and the major donors. "The JLC addresses issues related to economic and other policy matters affecting the development effort" (UNSCO 1995, 35). The World Bank and the United Nations serve as co-secretariat.

Donor financial assistance is channeled through a multilateral bridging mechanism operated by the World Bank and to a lesser extent the United

Nations. In particular the World Bank plays a central role in this domain. It serves as the secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), chairs the Consultative Group (CG), and serves as co-secretariat for the Local Aid Coordinating Committee (LACC), the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) and four of the Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs). From 1994 to 1998, the Holst Fund, supported start-up and recurrent costs of the PA. More importantly, the Bank has played an important role in designing the various development plans of the PA, a matter whose relevance is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Through these structures, the donors have considerable influence in the way their money is spent. Adel Samara, a leading Palestinian economist concludes that "Palestine" is "thus constructed according to their wishes" (Samara 2000, 30). Finally, not all donor funds are outright grants. The loans, in principle, must be repaid. However, since the PA's expenditures are higher than its tax revenues, the reality is that the PA will continue to expand its foreign debt which in the future will inevitably create a repayment crisis. Who will pay this debt? Since there are no public sector assets to be sold, it seems reasonable that the price for receiving "political rent" will require more political concessions by the PA towards Israel and the United States. Furthermore, despite donor claims of favoring a two-pronged development strategy, consumption and investment, the reality is that the investment track has been neglected for political expediency. In the World Bank sponsored study, *Development Under Adversity*, Ali Khadr notes:

> The opportunity and challenge for donors now is to step in and guide the peace process more firmly. A related issue is whether donors will renew funding commitments as the initial five-year pledge period draws to a close. For its part, the PA needs to assess carefully the financial burden imposed on future generations if new funding is provided on less generous conditions than during the first round of pledges (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 153).

Political Rent and the Security Imperative

The influx of international aid is not unique to Palestine. In the end of the cold war, the international community has marshaled a multilateral effort of aid coordination and post-conflict reconstruction in several places including, Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Africa, El Salvador, Haiti and Mozambique. The success of post-conflict rebuilding hinges on "...three interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars—political, economic, and military—to support and consolidate the peace. The absence of any one of

these three pillars is inevitably detrimental to the health and survival of the entire peace process."[18] If we accept this formulation, then we should pose two interconnected questions. First, what comes first—the centralization of power or economic development? Second, if centralization of power (regime consolidation) is given primacy at the start of the reconstruction process, to what extent would that constrict the possibility of developing an inclusive polity characterized by respect for the rule of law?

Rex Brynen (2000), a Canadian political scientist and an expert on Palestinian affairs, published the most comprehensive and systematic analysis of what he calls the "very political" peace building effort in Palestine. Despite its many faults, he maintains that international aid has been instrumental in putting together important "elements of the development mosaic in Palestine" (Brynen 2000, 222). Though critical of the PA's corrupt practices, Brynen softens the critique by attributing such practices to the "institutional growing pains of the PA" (132).

The PA has expressed frustration with the slow pace of money transfers from the international community. Despite this, the level of aid represents almost 12 percent of Palestinian GDP (Brynen 2000, 117). As shown in Table 4.1, the ratio of disbursements to commitments stands at about 65 percent. This represents a significantly higher ratio than the 50 percent for Bosnia and almost 59 percent for Cambodia (Brynen 2000, 116). The level of aid provided to the Palestinians by the donor community compares quite favorably with similar war to peace transitions. The higher levels of aid receipts per capita in Palestine and Bosnia can, in part, be explained by their geostrategic and economic importance to the donor community.

Though the United States serves as the key broker or sponsor of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the level of US donations to the Palestinians pales compared to those of the European Union and even the Arab states. The EU has been the single largest donor and the US the second. However, aggregate figures do not capture the full picture. Brynen notes that a "far better indicator of donor burden (or generosity) is the measure of annual pledges as a percentage of Donor GNP..." (Brynen 2000, 83). Brynen adds that by this measure, "Norway stands as the most generous among Western donors, devoting around 0.0359 percent of GNP annually to the Palestinian territories. The United States, by contrast, fares poorly by this indicator (0.0014 percent), despite its preeminent position in the peace process" (83). Also by this measure, the generosity of Jordan and Saudi Arabia exceeds that of Norway.

According to the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, peace and its much touted dividends have yet to be realized in the West

Bank and Gaza (WBGS). This is so primarily because there is no peace yet. In other words, most experts maintain that sustainable development can come only with full peace (Diwan and Shaban 1999, Brynen 2000, Naqib 1999). In this connection the World Bank notes:

> In this sense, it [WBGS] is not a true post-conflict entity because no peace treaty has been reached. The situation may best be characterized as one of no peace-no war. Thus, the weakness in the political security pillars, and the attendant reorientation of donor funding to support recurrent budgetary costs and emergency job creation, meant that peace dividends were elusive. By contrast, with all three pillars more or less on track in Bosnia, the country has achieved some peace dividends, although much remains to be done (World Bank, "Precis" 1999, 8).

Given the state of no-peace-no-war, donor community assistance to the PA has succeeded in two primary areas. First, in dire times (e.g., *al-Aqsa intifada*) emergency assistance has prevented the PA from imploding. Second, donor assistance has enabled the PA to centralize and consolidate power. Clearly, the requisites for power consolidation are not necessarily complementary to the imperatives of socioeconomic development. As shown in the discussion on the expansion of the Palestinian public sector, it might have immediate negative consequences. This also means that though sustainable development is desired, it actually remains a more distant and long-term objective. Given these priorities, Palestinian development objectives are further skewed by the influx of international assistance. Brynen argues that such donor policies "also created a strong incentive to engage in administrative rent-seeking behavior, with Palestinian agencies pursuing project initiatives because they seemed likely to attract external support, rather than because they were needed (Brynen 2000, 224-25).

The consolidation and actual survival of the PA emerges then as the primary purpose for the provision of political rent. Indeed, without political rent, the PA and the peace process would not have survived. If the survival of the PA required the silencing of domestic opposition, then the donor community displayed little concern with the PA's slow progress in laying a solid foundation for the protection of human rights. The donors provided support to develop Palestinian democracy by sponsoring initiatives to strengthen the legal and justice system. The United Nations details those efforts in a report issued on "Rule of Law Development," in 1999.[19] Many of the proposed reforms have been incorporated in the PA's development plan for 1999-2003. However, the donors were inconsistent in their approach. They were too willing to overlook the PA's abuses of

human rights as a necessary condition to maximize the requirements of security for the PA and Israel. The adopted calculus was simple: democracy is a virtue, but security is an immediate necessity. On this score Brynen adds: "The inconsistent signals from the donors were exacerbated by fragmentation among donor institutions involved: aid agencies tended to press for human rights issues, and foreign ministries and security agencies tended to be more concerned with political stability. Substantial differences also existed among donors, with the United States pushing hardest for the security-oriented agenda." Furthermore Brynen notes that donor ambiguity on the trade-offs between democracy and security "...served some useful purpose: support for human rights organizations helped raise the cost to the PA of the most egregious abuses, while support for the security sector addressed a real (if unpleasant) need for the peace process (Brynen 2000, 178).

International human rights organizations have issued numerous reports detailing the PA's abuses of human rights, and the absence of an effective rule of law in Palestine. In a study issued in 2001 Human Rights Watch reports that 450 Palestinians were held in prison. The majority of the detainees were members of Islamist militant groups, as well as other Palestinian critics of the Palestinian Authority. They were arrested arbitrarily and without a warrant and were not told the reason for their arrest. While in detention the suspects are denied access to lawyers and to independent doctors. Most were held for months without being charged or tried. Many were subjected to torture. The methods employed include suspending prisoners from the ceiling by the wrists, beating them on the soles of their feet, and forcing them to sit or stand in painful positions for long periods. At least three prisoners died in the first six months of *al-Aqsa intifada* as a result of these torture techniques, which brings the number to 28 since the PA was established in 1994.[20]

Both Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), insist that by virtue of bankrolling the peace process, donors have a legal responsibility for the human rights violations committed with these funds. In a report issued in 1997 HRW notes: "As the PA has indiscriminately rounded up hundreds of suspected militants in response to acts of violence against the Israelis, both Israel and the US have signaled to Arafat that they are little concerned with abuses when they are committed in the name of Israeli security and saving the Israeli-PLO peace process."[21] In May 2003 HRW published another report which confirms and updates their previous findings. They conclude:

> Human Rights Watch and Palestinian human rights organizations have documented extensive and severe human rights violations by the PA

> security forces, which operated above the law. These violations include torture, ill-treatment, deaths in custody of alleged collaborators, flouting of high court orders for the release of prisoners, and incommunicado detention of persons for long periods without charge or trial. U.S. and Israeli pressure on the PA also led to the creation of the State Security Courts in 1995, which expanded to handle basic civilian and criminal cases. **Trials in these courts were often secret, over in minutes, and virtually guaranteed to be unfair** [emphasis in the text].[22]

In effect, the PA and the donor community, have been preoccupied with the requirements of the centralization of power that would guarantee regime consolidation and survival. Even a cautious analyst such as Brynen concedes that such priorities "may" encourage authoritarian rule and patronage-based politics (Brynen 2000, 4). The lofty ideals of democracy and the rule of law are thus invoked by the PA and the donors as a discursive device where language is used not as an instrument of clear expression, but as a device for concealing truth.[23] Thus, the function of political rent is primarily to serve the security imperative rather than the creation of a political space for the flourishing of democracy.

Palestinian Development Priorities in the Context of New International Paradigms

Prior to 1996, the PA with assistance from the World Bank and the IMF submitted annual investment programs to the donor community. As of 1996, the PA's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) assumed primary responsibility for devising the Palestinian Public Investment Program (PPIP), which was presented at the World Bank Consultative Group (CG) meeting in Paris in November 1996. The PPIP was seen as a one year (1996-97) development and investment strategy. Since then, MOPIC has produced two multi-year rolling development plans: The Palestinian Development Plan: 1998-2000 (PDP1); and the Palestinian Development Plan: 1999-2003 (PDP2).[24] The PPIP and PDP1 can be characterized as a project specific plan accompanied by shopping lists presented to the donor community to insure continued financial support. In contrast, the PDP2 has moved towards a more programmatic and integrated sector based approach to economic planning, developed in conjunction with and under the supervision of the IMF staff. To complement this new approach, Arafat issued a presidential decree on 10 January 2000 announcing the formation of a "Higher Council for Development" (HCD). The HCD is chaired by Arafat, and its membership includes the ministers of: finance, MOPIC, Economy and

Trade, and Mohammad Rashid, Arafat's economic advisor. The HCD is "charged with promoting investment in Palestine and ensuring good revenue performance and sound revenue administration, as well as strengthening the public finance system."[25]

Since the Spring of 1999 the PA and its various ministries, with extensive assistance from the staffs of the IMF and the World Bank, have been developing the basis for a forward looking *Palestinian Strategic Development Plan (PSDP)*.[26] The PSDP is adapted from the World Bank's new development paradigm, the *Comprehensive Development Framework* (CDF).[27] Palestine is one of thirteen self-selected countries to pilot the CDF.

Before detailing the importance of the CDF, it is important to reiterate that the World Bank has been intricately involved in all phases of shoring up the Palestinian economy. Even before the adoption of the DOP in 1993, the Bank had prepared a six volume report titled, *Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace* (World Bank 1993), which laid the basis for future donor assistance. In 1994, the bank laid out the technical and analytical framework for investment and planning--the Emergency Assistance Program of 1994. In addition, the bank in partnership with the PA, Norway, and the UN, has played a central role in providing planning support and economic analysis, in the process of developing the PDP, and in developing the database used by MOPIC to report and monitor donor assistance. The central role played by the bank is acknowledged by PA officials in most of the reports submitted to the various donor structures. The World Bank describes its multilayered role in the following:

> From the outset, whether working directly through Bank-financed projects or as an instrument for donor coordination, planning and implementation, the Bank has tried to get a comprehensive view of Palestinian development needs. From the earliest days, the Bank has been asked to take a leadership position in analyzing and planning for long-term Palestinian development. The Bank has also administered the *Technical Assistance Trust Fund* (TATF)...Over 25 TATF-financed studies have become the baseline for much critical work for institutional reforms at the municipal and national levels, and for many sector strategies, including: water, power, transport, finance, and legal reform. The Bank has also played a leadership role in designing and then administering instruments for delivering donor funds, including the multilateral vehicle for emergency budgetary and employment support, the *Johan Jurgen Holst Peace Fund*. Finally, the Bank has had a leadership role in intensive partnership and coordination activities at the local and international level in its capacity as Chair of the Consultative Group (CG), Secretariat of the...AHLC, and Secretariat of several local aid coordination structures.[28]

It is in the context described above that it would be instructive to explain the importance and relevance of the CDF to Palestinian development strategies. In this connection, several questions need to be addressed: What is the CDF, and how does it differ from the Bank's previous development paradigms? Does the CDF propose specific development strategies for developing countries, including Palestine? Whose interests are served by CDF? And what does the PA's adoption of the CDF approach tell us about the nature of its relationship to the donor community?

The Comprehensive Development Framework: The New Development Paradigm

In January 1999, World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn circulated a proposal for a "Comprehensive Development Framework" (hereinafter CDF Proposal) to the Bank's board, management, and personnel.[29] The proposal emanates from Wolfensohn's previous policy statements,[30] whose primary aim is to effectively alleviate poverty and promote sustainable development.[31] The Bank emphasizes that the CDF is not a blueprint. Instead, it is based on four basic principles. First, each participating country, rather than assistance agencies, must decide on and own its development policies and priorities (CDF Proposal, 31). Second, the proposed partnership, among government (all levels), multilateral and bilateral institutions, civil society, and the private sector, will insure the most effective use of human and financial resources. Thus all development actors should be involved in defining development needs and implementing programs. Third, development should be conceptualized as holistic. In this connection Wolfensohn notes that " the notion that development involves a totality of effort—a balanced economic and social program—is not revolutionary, but the fact remains that it is not the approach that we in the international community have been taking" (The Other Crisis, 6). Fourth, development is seen as a participatory process, requiring continuous and broad national consultations to engender sustained national support. Accordingly, development policies must articulate a long-term vision of needs and solutions (CDF Proposal, 30) .

CDF is presented as a two-sided matrix. The vertical columns of the matrix cluster the prerequisites for sustainable development in four broad categories: structural, human, physical, and specific strategies (CDF Proposal, 32).[32] The second includes four horizontal rows specifying the partners involved in development: Government (national, provincial, local); Multilateral and Bilateral Institutions; Civil Society; and the Private

Sector.

Briefly, the CDF is to serve as a "summary management tool" to be used by all players, and in particular national governments and parliaments, in crafting holistic and integrated development plans (CDF Proposal, 23). The introduction of the CDF signals the Bank's dissatisfaction with the paradigms it fostered and advocated in the past half century. Joseph Stigliz, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, notes that most of the previous paradigms, including the structural adjustment program[33] and the 'Washington Consensus" which emphasized privatization, stabilization, and liberalization, failed because they "focused narrowly on economics."[34] The previous strategies, adds Stiglitz, "saw development as a *technical* problem requiring technical solutions--better planning algorithms, better trade and pricing policies, better macroeconomic frameworks. They did not reach deep down into society, nor did they believe such a participatory approach was necessary. The laws of economics were universal...These scientific laws were not bound by time or space" (Stiglitz 1998, 4). The market failures in East Asia and Russia, according to Stiglitz, are ample evidence of the limitations of the market as panacea.

For Stiglitz, the new and comprehensive development paradigm sees development as a "transformative movement" (Stiglitz 1999, 2). Stiglitz elaborates:

> Development represents a *transformation* of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more 'modern' ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, extend lifespans, and increase productivity (Stiglitz 1998, 2).

In this context, change which is engendered by such development can be seen as a vehicle that enables individuals and societies to control the forces that shape their destinies. In this process, the individual, as John Dewey points out, becomes an active learner who learns by doing, and by participating (Dewey 1939).

The new paradigm (CDF) has several shortcomings. If the development paradigm of the past forty or fifty years was so flawed, why should we expect the new paradigm to be significantly better? Are the new concerns with accountability, transparency, and participation (democracy) genuine? Or alternatively, can they be viewed as new rhetoric intended to

produce universal acceptance of the virtues of the neoliberal agenda?

The answers to the questions posed above require some nuance. Indeed as an institution the World Bank has been engaged in an internal debate to revise their previously "economistic" views. In a 1997 interview Steven P. Hyneman, chief of the Human Resources and Social Policy Division of the World Bank, told me "we are undergoing a major revolution," which is forcing the bank to factor in the importance of nurturing "human capital" as a necessary ingredient for insuring sustainable development. He added, "in the past the way development was conceived placed us in an intellectual prison." He predicted that under the leadership of Wolfensohn, the Bank president, "we will be spending a lot more time on these issues in the next four to five years." Heyneman also suggested that this development can, in part, be explained by the end of the "Cold War" prism, which in the past had constrained imaginative thinking about development.[35] Thus, on this score, the bank's comprehensive approach can indeed be viewed as salutary.

The CDF however has some serious shortcomings.[36] First, it is conceived entirely by the deliberations of the bank's leadership about development and poverty alleviation. The poor are the subject of discussion, but they were not part of the deliberations purporting to address their needs. In short it is a debate about the poor without the poor been invited to the table. This leads Richard Cameron Blake to the conclusion that instead of the CDF being a "true cooperative effort with other development actors from the start," in fact it appears to be "merely another 'Washington Consensus' camouflaged in clever rhetoric. How can true country ownership and participation come from a program created entirely by outsiders" (Blake 2000, 6).

Second, in the CDF schema, country ownership means that development plans will be produced locally but in cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors. However, these locally produced plans are to be conceived within the framework of the new paradigm. The question is, what is more important, the paradigm, or the details of development plans? Clearly dominant paradigms set a context for the accepted or permissible lines of inquiry that can be pursued. By their very definition paradigms represent not only the state of knowledge of the scientific community, but it is coupled with their normative and ideological concerns as well. Thus methodologically paradigms set the context for raising questions which in turn limit the parameters of the answers.[37]

Third, the CDF opens the door for the poor and civil society to articulate, advance, and protect their interests before government officials

and policy makers, a fact that would make the development process intrinsically participatory. However, in some countries the "establishment of goals will continue to be set more centrally" (CDF Proposal, 10). Thus, ownership can often mean government (bureaucracy) rather than citizen ownership. In such circumstances how can the government and state bureaucracies be held accountable? The answer according to the CDF is through the active participation of "civil society." But one should caution that civil society in reality refers to NGOs, which as discussed in the previous chapter have become increasingly professionalized, depoliticized, and cut off from the previously vibrant social movements from which they emanated.

Fourth, the proposed partnership between government, donors, civil society, and the private sector is to produce a "shared understanding" of development priorities. The reality is that the involved players are not equal, and do they really share a common objective. Do all parties share the same interests, and if not whose interests will be favored? In principle, the government seeks to promote the "common good" for all individuals in society. The private sector is in the business of making profits, whereas the NGOs are vehicles for the provision of services to the poor and powerless. Finally the donors, despite their insistence on wide participation, actually deal with and in turn provide assistance (political rent) to governments, and this contributes to the government's consolidation of power. Perhaps instead of focusing on "shared understandings," the World Bank should at least acknowledge the possibility that understandings can also be very conflicting and contentious. In addition, privatization of state-owned enterprises and the very capitalist system go unproblematized, which leaves no room to consider that capitalism as experienced in many developing countries (and the former socialist countries) can more aptly be viewed as "wild" (Barber 1995) or "cruel" (Markovitz 1999). Writing with reference to Africa Markovitz poses the question sharply:

> The World Bank's programs and the East Asian crisis illustrate that unrestricted capitalism does not necessarily benefit African development, either in the short or long run, a contention that today runs against the conventional wisdom. The Africa trade bill sets forth the supporting policies and mechanism for the strengthened civil society that would bolster unfettered capitalist development. *Most people in the less developed countries do not, have not, and will not benefit in their lifetimes or in the lifetimes of their children from capitalist expansion.* A small portion of the population, the organizational bourgeoisie, have accrued the advantages. Trickle-down benefits to middle class elements have been ephemeral and easily diminished. Rampant capitalism has pushed people

> into cities where they are unable to earn their daily bread; it has eventuated in episodic famines as well as less visible but more invidious daily privations (Markovitz 1999, 44).

The CDF does not address the question of power and powerlessness within and among societies. Instead the evidence so far suggests that despite its claims the CDF contributes to the perpetuation of existing power imbalances within developing countries. In this connection in an article titled, "The World Bank's Draft Comprehensive Development Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development," Richard Cameron Blake observes:

> On its face, the CDF appears to give the poorest of the poor more of a voice in formulating their countries' development policies. Examination of the implementation of the CDF in several pilot countries, however, reveals that it is most often being used as a tool to improve relationships between those countries' governments and international development donors; the voices of the of those countries' citizens in poverty, as well as other elements of civil society, are largely being ignored (Blake 2000, 1).

As an antidote to the CDF's limited inclusion of civil society, Blake suggests the need for much wider civic participation if the goal of comprehensive development and poverty alleviation is to be accomplished. He offers a participatory model derived from the "widespread public participation that surrounded the drafting of South Africa's post-apartheid constitution" (Blake 2000, 7). Before adopting the draft constitution, the Constitutional Assembly sought input from all segments of society. It established a web page and listed e-mail addresses and phone numbers seeking input from people; it organized meetings in areas where such technologies are unavailable; it published a regular newsletter (print and Internet versions). The Constitutional Assembly gave an active voice to the disempowered to insure that the adopted constitution would reflect the "general will."

The section below demonstrates how the PA was influenced by the World Bank's new development paradigm. In particular this is shown by dissecting and analyzing the various multi-year development plans produced by the PA with the assistance of World Bank and IMF personnel.

Palestinian Development Strategies

To meet or tackle the challenges of Palestinian development, the PA has developed plans which articulate the following broad objectives:

> To develop a society that provides for the well being of the Palestinian people through sustainable growth within the context of a democratic society built on foundations of equitable social and economic opportunities in the context of an independent, free, sovereign and modern entity in peace with its neighbors.[38]

Such lofty claims have been made before by both developed and developing countries. To assess the PA's ability to achieve this goal we need to address several questions. First, how does the PA intend to operationalize its goal for comprehensive development? Second, to what extent is Palestinian development contingent upon widespread civic participation? And third, does the infusion of political rent advance or skew the PA's stated development objectives?

All Palestinian development plans, from the PPIP to PDP1 and PDP2, are constructed under the guidance of MOPIC and with much assistance and input from the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations. These documents are prepared primarily as proposals to be presented to the donors at the Consultative Group (CG) meetings. The PPIP, presented to the donors in 1997 included a listing of 390 projects at a cost of almost $1.3 billion. The PDP1, presented to the CG in December 1997, highlighted the program areas and projects which the PA designated as having the highest priority for Palestinian development. More than 600 projects are listed in the plan with a budget of $3.5 billion, or about $1.2 billion per year for the three cycle of 1998-2000.[39] Of this amount, the donors had already committed $0.7 billion, the PA was to allocate $0.2 billion, and the remainder of $2.5 billion awaited further donor commitments.

The launching of the PDP2, a five year development plan, is considered by the PA and its primary international advisors, as more rational, coherent, and comprehensive approach to development. The PA identifies its priorities within its overall priorities (wish list). Palestinian priorities are clustered under four sectors which are derived from the CDF framework. This plan was presented to the donors in February 1999 and called for about $4.6 billion in investment funds, 93 percent of which is expected from donor contributions. Allocations to the four sectors over the 5 year period are as follows: Infrastructure Development and Natural Resources, 49 percent; Institutional Capacity Building, 8.99 percent; Human Resources and Social Development, 24.99 percent, with education as its largest single component, accounting for 38.6 percent of the sub-sector, and 9.51 percent of the entire PDP2; and Productive Sector Development, 17.02 percent.[40]

The PDP priorities are to serve the pursuit of four central national

goals. These goals focus on economic growth and employment generation; rural development; improving social conditions and human resource development; and the development of financial institutions and policies (PDP2, 58-60). Through such a multi-pronged approach, the PA and the donor community hope to erect a solid architecture capable of promoting sustainable development. But the PA seems to assume that the influx of donor largesse will continue unabated. The reality, however, is that since 1997 aid levels have either markedly declined or are now earmarked for emergency assistance. Thus, according to the AHLC, there are fewer funds for peace building and economic development. This constraint, "hampers PA economic planning and erodes donor credibility" (AHLC 2000, xii-xiii).[41] Since the *al-Aqsa intifada* the PA has been hampered by a severe fiscal crisis. To offset the impact of the crisis, in 2002 at least two-thirds of donor disbursements ($828 million) were earmarked for PA budget support and emergency measures. The IMF expects that this ratio will be maintained in 2003 as well, with expected allocations of $673 million to these categories, and $245 for institution building and development. Simply put, this leaves fewer resources for long-term development projects (IMF 15 September 2003, 67).

An analysis of stated Palestinian needs as contrasted with the pattern of actual donor disbursements highlights some crucial differences. The PA has sought an increase of investments for the infrastructure and productive sectors of its development plan. Donor funds, as shown in Table 4.3, have however been skewed in favor of the other two sectors, institution-building and human resource building, which are more short-term oriented. Institution building has enabled the PA to consolidate its power, and human resource development has required the funneling of resources to secure the basic needs of the population such as health, education, and emergency job creation. In assessing the impact of the influx of donor financial support Brynen concludes:

> External assistance has not established a viable economic system for Palestine, which remains geographically fragmented and heavily dependent on Israel for trade, labor export, and many other things. The Palestinian economy has yet to develop clear areas of comparative advantage and remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. There have been serious problems of institutional development. The PA's large public-sector payroll, irregularities in its fiscal regime, and problems of corruption and off-the-books financing (through monopolies) have all risen, in part, for political reasons. But whatever their short-term political utility to the regime, they all represent legacies that will weaken future economic developments (Brynen 2000, 201).

Table 4.3: Comparison of Palestinian Investment Priorities with Actual Donor Disbursements (1994-2000)

	Infrastructure	**Human and Social Resources**	**Productive Sectors**	**Institution Building**
Core Investment Program (1996)	56.0%	27.3%	6.8%	7.2%
PPIP (1997)	42.0%	34.0%	16.0%	8.0%
PDP (1998)	51.0%	24.2%	16.6%	6.7%
PDP (1999)	47.0%	23.4%	19.6%	8.6%
PDP (2000)	46.3%	25.7%	15.4%	11.8%
Average of PDP's (1996-2000)	48.5%	26.9%	14.9%	8.5%
Donor Disbursements (1994-98)	**27.5%**	**41.6%**	**8.7%**	**22.4%**

Source: Palestinian Authority, *Palestinian Development Plan 1999-2003* (January 1999), 48.

Since 2000, Palestinian development Plan(s) have been renamed as the *Palestinian Strategic Development Plan* (PSDP). The PSDP has adopted the CDF paradigm. However, it is evident that the ability of the PA to formulate and forge national development plans is almost totally reliant on donor largesse rather than on domestically developed priorities and strategies. The articulated priorities mimic the new language of the CDF paradigm, and espouse the virtue of free markets, the sanctity of the private sector, the need for free and international trade, and the desirability of proper governance and transparency. But the realities on the ground are something else.

The adoption of the new paradigm has enabled the PA to institute a financial and banking sector. An elaborate taxation system has been

operationalized. The PA's capacity on the macroeconomic level has been enhanced. The adoption of the new paradigm has enabled the PA to think of development through a more holistic and integrated (sector wide) approach. Yet it fails on many counts.

First, though the CDF anchors development to the notion of "country ownership," which allows a country to articulate its development priorities, the reality is quite different. The extent and allocation of funds (Table 4.3) does not necessarily correspond to the PA's stated priorities. The reality is that the PA has adopted the new international paradigm, which was not developed domestically, to maximize the influx of donor funds. It is difficult to see how that translates into real "country ownership." Needless to say, the PA like other developing countries, has no choice as it presides over a small economy with limited resources.

Second, as noted above, the success of the new development paradigm hinges on the forging of a partnership between the PA, the private sector, civil society, and the donor community. Indeed, the donors have funded projects on the rule of law and democracy. But funding policies have actually strengthened the centralization of power to the detriment of the rule of law and the welfare of civil society. Those representing civil society are mostly NGOs that are no longer connected to social movements or grassroots politics. For example, the World Bank commends the Ministry of Environmental Affairs for including civil society in its efforts to develop a national environmental strategy. The Ministry held a participatory workshop in June 1999 to share its ideas and to seek input on priorities and proposed actions. According to the World Bank, "Civil society in particular (represented by ARIJ) were very pleased to be invited and given the opportunity to participate in the formulation of policy and to argue their views about priorities of action."[42] ARIJ is the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem. It is a small professional research organization which is actually based in Bethlehem, and whose members hold advanced degrees in engineering and agriculture. Part of ARIJ's work is to promote environmental awareness among the population.[43] Like other NGOs its members participate in the development process in their capacity as "experts" and not as the proponents of some inclusive notion of a civil society.

The much heralded private sector has been undermined by the patronage system and the monopolies controlled by the PA or its business allies (Samara 2000, Naqib 2000). However, a segment of the private sector—mostly expatriate Palestinian businessmen—has thrived due to its vast capital holdings, and close connections with the PA and Arafat. Many of this sector's investments in Palestine are channeled through the

Palestinian Development and Investment Company (Padico), a private holding company. Padico is chaired by Munib Masri, an American educated billionaire, who also held a ministerial portfolio within the PA. Munib Masri and his co-investors do not expect to make fortunes from their investments in Palestine. Their fortunes were already made in the global market and particularly in the oil producing Gulf states. Prior to becoming investors in Palestine, these individuals and many others contributed funds through the largest private Palestinian development agency—the Welfare Association,[44] to assist their compatriots. They see themselves as nationalists committed to the revival and building of the Palestinian economy. The investments of these wealthy expatriates has been welcomed by the PA as an example of the employment of Palestinian capital in the service of the state-building process.

Not all Palestinians value the altruistic motives of the wealthy expatriates like Munib Masri and his co-investors. William Orme of the *New York Times* notes that local critics, including other businessmen with less capital "contend that it [infusion of expatriate capital] rests on a foundation of cronyism, nepotism and protectionism, with troubling implications for a Palestine of the future." He adds, that some people see "Padico's close ties to Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority as a framework for further concentration of wealth in a society already riven with deep inequalities."[45] Thus, the only active components of the proposed partnership are the PA which has accepted the vocabulary of the new paradigm, and the rich segment of the expatriate community whose vast capital holdings have had a negative impact on the local private sector (Samara 2000, 25).

According to the CDF approach the participating country, and not assistance agencies, must formulate its development priorities and strategies. But as noted earlier, it is the assistance agencies that have designed the operative development paradigm. Therefore, the donor community's international institutions seem to serve not as a co-equal but as a senior partner in this process. The fact that the PA's investment and development program is almost entirely dependent on donor aid, functionally reduces the PA to the presentation of shopping lists to secure funding. Khalil Mahshi, the Director General of International and Public relations for the MOE puts it succinctly, "the development budget is dependent on donor aid. If the latter does not materialize, then almost all development activities will not be implemented."[46] At the behest of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), Japan and the World Bank have jointly produced a report which assesses the effectiveness of international aid to the West Bank and Gaza. Their conclusions reinforce the arguments

presented here. In a muted but revealing conclusion the report notes that "at the level of line ministries, the selection of investment priorities continues to be heavily shaped by perceptions of donor-interest, and donors thus continue to have an indirect, often unintended, but still powerful influence in shaping Palestinian development priorities" (AHLC 2000, 16).

Third, the AHLC correctly notes that the "decisions taken today will have lasting consequences for generations of future Palestinians. They will also determine the viability of any future Palestinian entity" (AHLC 2000, 117). The decisions that have been taken so far emanate from specific constraints. First, these decisions are derived from studies conducted by foreign agencies, and mostly reflecting and serving the prerequisites of sustaining the peace process in the short run. Consequently, the long-term interests of the Palestinian people, are not central to the decision-making process. Second, the development plans, according to Naqib, are produced by technicians and professionals, without subjecting their plans to an open public debate (Naqib 2000, 35).

The PA and the donors have agreed on the need to set up nine industrial estates (Samara 2000, 28). Through these industrial estates, the PA hopes to attract foreign and domestic capital to promote employment generation and industrial development (PDP2, 58). The most heralded of these estates is the Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE), which is run by the Palestine Industrial Estate Development and Management Company (PIEDCO). The industrial estates are located along the border between Israel and the Palestinian controlled areas. They are similar to "free trade zones," which abound in various parts of the third world. The GIE is expected to facilitate joint ventures (Israeli, Palestinian, and International), and at full capacity it is expected to create upwards of 20,000 permanent jobs, "with a further 30,000 jobs created indirectly for services and associated manufacturing operations" (AHLC 2000, 48).

At face value the industrial estates, and the GIE in particular, seem like a good idea. However, upon closer examination, the idea has many shortcomings. First, given the diminutive nature of Palestinian capital, the likes of the GIE can only further the path-dependence of the Palestinian economy.[47] Table 4.4 illustrates the extent of Palestinian dependency on Israel in terms of both imports and exports. Samara insists that "these border industrial zones will obstruct the development of the industrial sector inside the WBG, which was already obstructed by the occupation." He also notes that the Palestinian economy under the PA will now "be connected not only to the Israeli economy but to the border industrial zones as well" (Samara 2000, 29). These zones according to the World

Bank are "established in a legal and regulatory environment attractive to foreign investors" (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 71). This conducive environment, not unlike other trade zones, offers a cheap and non-unionized supply of labor. In addition, foreign and Israeli capital will not have to worry about costly environmental controls and regulations.[48]

Table 4.4: Palestine's Principal Trading Partners Exports and Imports, 1998 (value in USD '000s)

Country	**Total Value of Trade Transactions**	**Percent of Total**
Israel	2,214,638	79.98%
Jordan	66,124	2.39%
Italy	57,812	2.09%
Turkey	48,399	1.75%
Spain	36,422	1.32%
Germany	34,126	1.23%
China	33,789	1.22%
United States	33,430	1.21%
Egypt	27,728	1.00%
United Kingdom	25,357	0.92%
Principal Partners	**2,577,825**	**93.10%**
Total Trade	**2,768,948**	**100.00%**

Source: UNSCO Report on the Palestinian Economy, Spring 2000,

GIE's can also be viewed as Free Trade Agreements, which Naqib argues are not timely. They overlook, under the guise of free trade, the fact that Palestinian industries were undermined during the Israeli occupation. Thus, Palestinian industry needs "protection over a limited period of time so as to overcome the economies of scale advantages of foreign competition" (Naqib 1999, 36). In this connection, will the decision to set up GIE's deepen the adverse path dependence in Palestine? And will it preclude the institution of a "*new positive path dependence"* (Naqib 2000, 32)? Do such policies advance the long-term Palestinian interest, and were

the Palestinian people consulted?

In addition to reversing *path dependence*, development plans according to Naqib need to invest in human resources. Naqib adds that growth "can be sustained only by accumulation of human capital that allows continuous technological progress" (Naqib 2000, 32). For this to occur, a country needs to adapt existing technologies and to simultaneously develop a capacity to create local technology. To tackle this problem, the private sector and the PA need to augment the resources allocated for "science and engineering departments at the universities" (Naqib 2000, 37-8). Indeed the PA and the donors give primacy to human resource development, and as pointed out in this chapter, expenditures on education represents 9.51 percent of the development budget. However, the existing budget for the Ministry of Education is burdened by increasing demands on the system. To continue with current levels of funding, the education sector will be forced to maintain the status quo rather than develop the system further. Here the PA faces a conundrum. To reallocate more funds in favor of education, which requires an open atmosphere for inquiry and the exchange of ideas, will require the reordering of priorities. Will the PA, for example, reduce its military/security expenditures in favor of education? To borrow Peter Evans' terms, will the PA function as a "developmental" or a "predatory" state? (Evans 1995).[49]

The donor community readily admits that its assistance to the PA has yet to lay the foundation for sustainable development. Both the PA and the donors have been preoccupied with more immediate concerns, namely shoring up the PA and supporting the peace process. "In both of these pressing tasks, issues of sustainability, while not irrelevant, were typically secondary to other considerations" (AHLC 2000, 87). The development of a comprehensive framework for development is further retarded by the uncertainties of the negotiations with Israel. Furthermore, with an annual rate of population growth of more than about 4 percent, a high rate even by third world standards, the PA and its institutions are confronting mounting demands on health, education, and other social services. These demands further exacerbate the PA's ability to devise comprehensive development plans.

Donor led development and political rent have failed to create a comprehensive development plan. In fact, as noted on numerous occasions throughout this chapter, Palestinian development today is contingent on donor funding largesse. Political rent has succeeded in enabling the PA to consolidate its power. This process of consolidation brings with it a centralized and hierarchic *modus operandi* reflected in the practices of the various ministries. This is coupled with a declining level of participation

of Palestinian civic institutions and social movements in both political and development issues.

The data in this chapter demonstrates that Palestinian development strategies are, to a great extent, determined by the infusion of political rent and shaped by the priorities inherent in the accompanying donor paradigms–the Comprehensive Development Framework. "Development under adversity," in the Palestinian case, has enabled the PA to consolidate its institutional power over society that is devoid of democratic impulses. Despite adversity the PA has survived, but given its limited economic resources, it remains unable to chart a comprehensive development strategy, thus increasing its dependence on external assistance. As long as the no-war-no-peace scenario continues, it would be difficult to expect more.

The donors have set up an intricate and complicated structure to assist and monitor the PA's performance in institution-building. This edifice not only assists the PA, but also constrains its choices. Chapters Three and Four have demonstrated that the process of Palestinian state formation is deeply affected by the requirements of the donors and the imperatives of the peace process. In the next three chapters we turn our attention to Palestinian education. The data in Chapter Five demonstrates the impact of the colonial state in shaping an education system that was anything but Palestinian. The colonial legacy produced an educational system marked by inadequate funding, weak instruction, and inappropriate curricula. In turn, chapters Six and Seven show how Palestinian national development plans have a direct impact on the formulation of Palestinian education policies and reforms.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COLONIAL LEGACY: INADEQUATE FUNDING, DEFICIENT MATERIALS, WEAK INSTRUCTION, INAPPROPRIATE CURRICULUM

> The powers and responsibilities of the military government and its Civil Administration in the sphere of education will be transferred to and will be assumed by the Palestinian Authority. The sphere of education will include all matters dealt with in the laws, regulations and military orders listed [in the transfer agreement], as well as the responsibility over higher education, special education, educational training activities, educational institutions and programs, and private, public, and non-governmental or other educational activities or institutions (*Agreement on the Transfer of Power and Responsibilities*, 1994). [1]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) assumed control over the educational system in the West Bank and Gaza on 28 August 1994. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), established at the handover, negotiated the transition from the Israeli Civil Authority to the PA only days before the start of the 1994-95 academic year. On the first day of school (1994) Palestinian students started the day with the singing of their national anthem and the raising of the Palestinian flag, without fear of reprisal from the Israeli occupation forces. From 1967 to 1994 any public display of Palestinian nationalism had been simply prohibited by the Israeli authorities. The unfurling of the Palestinian flag, or the simple display of its colors (black, green, red, and white) by any Palestinian would have resulted in automatic arrest. This transfer of authority was greeted with jubilation by ordinary Palestinians. For the first time in their modern history Palestinians assumed central responsibility in the administering of their educational institutions. They are "in charge of teaching and learning in their society, which means, in effect, that they are now able to shape their future and consolidate their identity through education."[2]

The MEHE inherited an educational system beset with enormous

problems, and many conflicting influences. According to the PA, the principal impediment to Palestinian education was the absence of "an indigenous national government which could develop a vision of a system to serve Palestinians. The lack of national sovereignty and of the machinery of national government led to severe problems in education, leaving the PA with an exceptionally difficult task of restoring the system's quality."[3] During British rule and control of Palestine (1917-1948) Palestinian educators had registered similar protestations. In a testimony before the British Royal Commission in 1937 Dr. Khalil Totah, appearing on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, noted in his opening remarks: "The major grievance of the Arabs as regards education is that they have no control over it."[4] In the same testimony he noted that Arab education in Mandatory Palestine "is either designed to reconcile the Arabs to this policy (of establishing a Jewish national home) or to make education so colourless as to make it harmless and not endanger the carrying out of that policy."[5]

Thus, in the pre-state formation phase, Palestinian education served as a site of political, cultural, religious, and national resistance to foreign occupation, be it Ottoman, British or Israeli rule. The non-compliance of Palestinian educators with British and later Israeli education policies helped to undermine the objectives of the colonial state in administering the education system. Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate how Palestinian education is integrally linked to the process of Palestinian state formation. This chapter demonstrates that education serves as a site of resistance and reform both under occupation and in the state-building phase, as exemplified by the role of the education activists during the first intifada and their precursors under British Mandatory rule.

The analysis and data in this chapter show several things. First, the delivery of education to Palestinians under foreign rule failed to nurture and address particular local needs of the population. Second, under Ottoman, British, and Israeli rule, the education system actually helped undermine the objectives of the colonial state. Those educated under foreign control played a role in pushing for independence. For more than a century Palestinian educators have been fighting to replace curricula that have ignored their particular identities and history. Third, with the outbreak of the 1987 intifada activist educators played an important role in developing ideas for the building of an independent Palestinian education system. Even before the Palestinian Authority was formally established, the activist educators formed teams to develop curricula for various subjects. These activist educators flourished in the context of resisting Israeli occupation. But, how difficult is it to translate radical ideas in the

context of state-building?

The Colonial Legacy of the Palestinian Education System

The task of rebuilding and transforming the Palestinian educational system is hampered by the hybrid nature of that system. The current structure of this system is the by-product of more than two centuries of rule by colonial or occupation powers, namely, by Ottoman, British, Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian authorities. Each of these powers devised and administered the educational system to advance its own particular interests, which precluded the building of Palestinian identity or the human resources needed to shape national development policies.

Under Ottoman rule (1517-1917), the modern system of Palestinian education was established by the Ottoman state. From Istanbul, the Ministry of Education set up a public education system, composed of elementary and secondary education. Borrowing from previous Islamic institutions, the Ottomans instituted the Kuttab schools in villages and towns whose educational mission concentrated on advancing basic literacy and religious instruction through the study of the Qur'an. The statutory basis of the founding of the public education sector was the Basic Law of 1869 and its subsequent revisions. Accordingly Turkish was mandated as the sole medium of instruction. Thus Arabic was taught to Arab children as a second language, and French as the second compulsory language. Elementary schools were free but the rural population was expected to pay the costs of school construction.

The basic education law of 1913 provided for universal and free elementary education. This law also permitted the various confessions (Christian, Muslim, and Jewish) to set up their independent private schools (Al-Amir 1997, 46-47). To offset these limitations and to challenge Turkish political and cultural domination, a number of private schools were established (Christian and Muslim) in Palestine. The Christian schools were founded mostly by missionaries. However, some of these foreign schools were set up as early as the 16th century because the Ottomans, confident of their power, granted concessions, known as capitulations, to several European powers. These powers set up schools for their respective communities which were almost completely independent of Ottoman state control. Under the capitulations German, French, Russian and English schools were set up (Tibawi 1956, 22-23).

In the last quarter of the 19th century, prompted by the *Tanzimat*[6] (reform and modernization), public education, to a large degree, was secularized. The *Tanzimat* grew out of efforts by Ottoman officials to

centralize state institutions and to create a modern army to cope with the challenges of modernization and the challenges from rival European powers. The reforms resulted in many social changes, including the introduction of universal education and an increase in higher education as well. More specifically, these reforms led to the establishment of public schools throughout Palestine (Khalidi 1997, 39-50). Under Ottoman rule, Khalidi concludes that a "fissiparious and divided educational system—in fact, several systems" (Khalidi 1997, 51), grew in Palestine. Each system used a different curriculum, taught a different foreign language, and was under the control of a different authority. It is only since 1994, that a Palestinian Authority has embarked on the difficult task of unifying the educational system, but only for the fraction of the Palestinian population which lives in areas under PA jurisdiction, since the majority of Palestinians live outside historic Palestine.

Under the British Mandate in Palestine (1917-1948)[7], the Yishuv (Jewish community) enjoyed wide autonomy in structuring and devising its educational system. Funds for Jewish schools came from three primary sources: The Jewish Agency, the local community, and the mandatory government. The government's contribution was in the form of direct block grants. Jewish and Zionist organizations administered what became known as the "Hebrew Public System" (Tibawi 1956, 37). In contrast, the Palestinians had no visible control over their educational system (Landau,1993). Under British rule, spending on Palestinian education rarely exceeded 5 percent of public expenditures (Tibawi 1956). Tibawi's data show that more money was spent on the education of Jewish children whose community represented one-third of the population, than on Arab children, whose community represented two-thirds of the population. He adds, "one-third of the population had more pupils at school than the other two-thirds"(Tibawi 1956, 177). Tibawi compares the level of expenditures on education in Palestine to the levels of expenditures to four countries. Egypt and Iraq, both under British rule, and two countries that were previously under French mandate, Syria and Lebanon. He extracts two basic conclusions from the data. "Firstly, in voting money for expenditure on education, national governments in the Near East during the two wars were more generous than occupying or mandatory powers. Secondly, the governments of four neighboring Arab countries assigned relatively larger proportions of their budgets for education than the Government of Palestine" (Tibawi 1956, 179). Despite the neglect and the obstacles placed by the British, the educational system in Palestine grew not only in the urban but the rural areas as well. In the rural areas, the spread of education was, to a great extent, organized and funded by the local

population as they raised funds to build schools (Miller 1985: 90-118). By 1947, 44.5 percent of the Palestinian school-age population was enrolled in schools, both government and private, as compared to only 20 percent in 1922-23. (Tibawi 1956, 270-271). When these figures are disaggregated, in the rural areas the rates of school enrollment were significantly less, because only 432 of about 800 villages had schools (Miller 1985: 98).

Khalidi notes that the "attendant spread of nationalist concepts through this system [education] greatly facilitated the politicization of the countryside" (Khalidi, 1997, 173). Indeed, it was this outcome which the British authorities sought to prevent. Upon assuming control of education in Palestine, the British rendered Arabic as the operative language of the formerly Ottoman public education system, and in turn introduced English as the second language of instruction. These developments were welcomed by the nationalists. On the other hand, British educational policies sought the denationalization of the Palestinians, by devaluing Palestinian and Arab culture and history (Badran 1969, 142; Tibawi 1956, 205). For example, curricula in the public school system under British rule excluded the teaching of contemporary history which is marked by the rise of Palestinian national consciousness. Teachers, the purveyors of knowledge in the classroom, were forbidden from joining nationalist clubs and associations, and were not allowed to introduce non-sanctioned teaching materials in their classrooms (Tibawi 1956, 196-97).

The public system was supplanted with a growing private education sector. For example, the al-kulliya al-Arabiyya (Arab College), founded by Palestinian educators in Jerusalem, provided education through the end of the secondary cycle, and served as a teacher training college as well. Many of its leading graduates pursued higher education in Britain or at the American University of Beirut. In addition, many of its graduates played and continue to play important roles as professionals, writers, poets, and leading Palestinian nationalist figures (Nashabe 1988).[8] For example, Haidar Abdel-Shafi', the head of the Palestinian negotiating team at the 1991 Madrid peace talks, is one of its prominent graduates.[9]

For the British, the spread of education was to increase the number of Palestinians who could be incorporated in the civil service. The British used education to "maintain social order and to transmit what seemed to them universal values" (Miller 1985: 97). Palestinians perceived formal education "as a means for securing a white-collar job with steady income, and to enhance social status, in a predominantly peasant society" (Mahshi and Bush 1989, 471). However, the major grievance of the Palestinians was that they had no control over the educational system. Despite British intentions and the official content of the curriculum, the educational

system fostered Palestinian national consciousness. Teachers and students were centrally involved with the growing nationalist movement of the time. They participated in political strikes in opposition to British rule and the rising Zionist movement. The Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine told the Mandate Commission in 1937 that as in Egypt and Syria, pupils in Palestine are "very politically minded."[10] In effect, schools served as sites to cultivate national identity and as the loci for nationalist resistance.

With the end of the Mandate, and the establishment of Israel in 1948, Palestinian education was subjected to new influences. The Palestinian population that found itself under Israeli jurisdiction was incorporated in an educational system that advanced Jewish values while ignoring Arab and Palestinian culture (Ma'ri 1978; Graham-Brown 1984). In Gaza, ruled by Egypt until 1967, Palestinian education was informed and guided by the Egyptian curriculum, a fact that continued after Israel occupied it. However, as shown in Chapter Seven, beginning with the academic year 1999-2000 newly authored Palestinian texts have replaced some of the Egyptian ones. Jordan, which annexed the West Bank in 1950, guided education of Palestinians under its curriculum.[11] The education of the Palestinian refugees, dispersed to several Arab countries, was administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was created by the General Assembly in 1949. UNRWA established schools for Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. As is customary with United Nations protocols, UNRWA adopted the curriculum of each host country in which it operated.

The 1967 war brought all of Mandatory Palestine under Israeli jurisdiction. Israeli occupation authorities inherited an educational system composed of an amalgam of local, Turkish, British, Egyptian, and Jordanian systems of education. This hybrid system, however, was administered by the Israeli Civil Authority, which was established by the military occupation. In effect, the school system was under complete Israeli control and supervision. The Israeli military government had intended to appoint Palestinians to run the affairs of the education department in both the West Bank and Gaza, but these intentions never materialized. This failure according to Mahshi and Bush (1989) can partly be explained by the fact that Palestinians resisted the devolution of such administrative functions, primarily because they were seen as part of an Israeli attempt to promote Palestinian self-administration while consolidating colonial governance.

Indeed, most Palestinians were uninterested in perpetuating the colonial state, instead they were seeking self-determination and independence.

Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari notes that the Israeli occupation regime, despite many attempts, failed to recruit a significant number of Palestinians to serve as collaborators or as instruments to mediate Israeli rule (Tamari 1989). With reference to education, in 1987 the Israeli Civil Authority appointed a Palestinian to head the education department of the military government. The appointee had little chance to assume his responsibilities, due to the outbreak of the Intifada on 8 December 1987. Not only did he resign his official post, but by March 1988, in the first months of the uprising, Palestinian tax collectors and policeman resigned en masse. These resignations were part of a process whereby Palestinians tried to disengage from the military occupation in order to delegitimize the governance process of the Israeli military government.

Under Israeli occupation, the educational system lacked dynamism and innovation. During more than 27 years of occupation, infrastructural development was given short shrift. Minimum funding was provided for the running of the existing institutions. Palestinian educator Ibtisam Abu Duhou notes that the Israeli authorities did not build any schools during the first decade of the occupation (Abu Duhou 1996, 15-16). Some funding for the construction of new schools or the expansion of existing ones was raised by the Palestinian municipal councils, village councils, or local and international councils. But these efforts were quite inadequate for the rising needs of a growing population. "Consequently, the existing educational institutions deteriorated and became insufficient to accommodate the increase in school population and to meet the Palestinian human resource demands" (UNESCO 1995, 9).[12]

The Israelis' policy of neglect can be explained, in part, by their view that universities and high schools are a threat to security. Echoing earlier British conclusions, Israel's deputy attorney general in testimony presented to the Israeli High Court of Justice on 14 July 1980 stated, "where there are schools, there will be demonstrations, raising of flags, and therefore a threat to security."[13] In effect, the expression of Palestinian feelings, identity, history, and affinity with Arab history were excised out of school texts, under the pretext that such references were "anti-Semitic" in nature. Thus books and curricula were either banned or routinely revised, through the force of military orders issued in the first two months of the occupation in 1967. By 1992, more than 100 texts had been banned from use in Palestinian schools in the West Bank and Gaza (Rigby 1995, 12). Palestinian educator, Munir Fasheh, notes: "anything that referred to Palestine or the Palestinians as well as any reference to 1948 or before 1948 was omitted." He concludes, "apparently the Israelis hoped that by erasing such events from the history books, they could also erase them

from human memory" (Fasheh 1989, 517).

It is telling that the Israelis did not learn the lessons which the British also failed to learn during the Mandate. Munir Fasheh recounts a conversation, in 1976, with one of the assistants to the Israeli officer of education. The officer believed that the hostility of Palestinian students to the Israelis was the result of textbooks laden with propaganda. Fasheh adds, "It was amazing how completely he failed...to see that, since the Israelis had taken control of the curriculum, opposition among Palestinians to Israeli policies and practices had increased. For example, the number of students who were killed, wounded, arrested, or tortured in the spring of 1982 exceeded the corresponding number for the preceding years" (Fasheh 1989, 517). A central lesson is that education contributes to self-awareness, but it is occupation or colonialism that breeds resistance.

As discussed in Chapter two, education can either retard or advance the process of state formation. Under British and Israeli rule the objectives and goals of the colonial state were not advanced by the education system. Instead the school system, despite the intentions of the colonial state, produced elites who resisted the entire enterprise of foreign rule. Indeed, the politics of resistance during the first intidafa, as shown in the last part of this chapter, produced a new generation of activists intent on reforming education as part of the struggle to end occupation and to engage in Palestinian state-building.

The Educational Environment: Before the PA

This section is divided into three parts. The first highlights basic educational demographic data by presenting aggregate data on rates of educational attainment. Part 2, investigates the problems associated with the quality of education, and how the intifada contributed to their exacerbation. At times the data is estimated, precisely because the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) had not developed the mechanisms for producing sound databases. In other words, the estimated data enables us to understand the mind-set of the policymakers as they embarked on finding solutions for the problems and challenges confronting the Palestinian education sector. As it turns out, the initial data underestimated the numbers and therefore the scale of the challenge facing the MOE. Thus, revised data is presented to demonstrate the extent of the gap between the early estimates and the more precise figures ascertained by the PCBS. Finally, part 3, identifies the various debates and initiatives which sought to induce reform in the educational system on the eve of the Transfer Agreement which took place

in August 1994.

Basic Educational Demographic Indicators

About 40 percent of the more than eight million Palestinians world wide reside within the parameters of what used to be Mandatory Palestine--Israel[14], Israeli occupied East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Table 5.1 presents a breakdown of these figures.

Table 5.1: Global Distribution of Palestinian Population (1986, 1990/91, 1995 and 2002)

Country	1986	1990/91	1995	2002
Jordan	1,398,050	1,824,179	2,170,101	2,596,986
W. Bank/ E. Jerusalem	951,520	1,075,531	1,227,545	2,152,415
Gaza	545,100	622,016	726,832	1,229,250
Israel	608,200	730,000	800,755	919,453
Lebanon	271,434	331,757	392,315	463,067
Syria	242,474	301,744	357,881	410,599
Arab Countries	582,894	445,195	516,724	599,389
Rest of World	280,846	450,000	500,000	550,000
Total	4,880,518	5,780,422	6,692,153	8,921,159

Source: Compiled from: PCBS 1996; MAS Social Monitor, Issue No.6, 2003; and World Bank "Country Profile Table," located at: devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?CCODE=WBG&PTY.

The population in the West Bank and Gaza has increased due to the number of returnees after the Oslo Agreements, and to the increasing rate of population growth rates, and particularly in Gaza. The IMF estimates that the population growth rate for 2002-03 is above 4 percent per year, making it one of the highest worldwide (IMF 15 September 2003, 11). The large increase of the population in the West Bank and Gaza between 1998 and 2002 is documented in the population census undertaken by the

PA in 1998. The census shows that in 1998 the population of the West Bank had grown to 1,873,476 and in Gaza the population increased to 1,022,207.[15] By 2002, the total population of the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem Palestinians) reached more than 3.2 million. This study focuses mostly on the Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and Gaza, and who in turn constitute about 40 percent of the total Palestinian population.

Like many developing countries, the majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza is aged 18 years or younger (UNESCO 1995, xii). Data from 1997 to 2003 shows that a large proportion of the total population of the West Bank and Gaza is 14 years or younger. These figures range from 46.8 percent in 1997, 46.8 percent in 2000, and 46.1 percent in 2003.[16] The rate of infant mortality is decreasing because of improvements in health care. Rapid population growth increases the burden on the educational system to absorb more pupils. In addition, the market will need to create jobs at a higher rate to accommodate graduating students seeking employment. However, the prospects for employment are less than encouraging. Between 1995 and 1997, the average rate of unemployment increased from 18.2 percent in September 1995 to 28.4 percent in May 1996. During this time period, real per capita GNP, which is a measure of income generated per person and a clear indicator of living standards, fell a dramatic 37 percent. The level of poverty between 1995 and 1997 doubled from 20 percent to 40 percent of the total population. Thus, one million people out a population of 2.5 million were impoverished.[17] As noted in Chapter Three, unemployment decreased from 30 percent to 10 percent from 1996 to 2000. But since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 unemployment peaked at 36 percent in 2002 (World Bank May 2003, 12). Poverty levels have increased dramatically as well. In 2003, more than 75 percent of the population in Gaza are poor (World Bank May 2003, xiv).

The figures in Table 5.2 show high gross enrollment rates for school-age children for both primary and secondary education In both the West Bank and Gaza, about 90 percent and 65 percent respectively. They compare favorably with the gross average for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In the latter, the average enrollment rate for primary school (ages 6-11) is 97 percent, but is only 56 percent for prepatory and secondary levels (ages 12-17).[18]

Table 5.2: School Enrollment Rates by Age, Sex, and Region (1994-95)

	Gaza			West Bank			Total		
Age	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
6-11	90.9	90.2	90.6	91.9	91	91.5	91.6	90.7	91.2
12-14	89.4	87.2	88.3	91.6	90.2	90.9	90.9	89.2	90.1
15-17	63.8	71.9	67.9	63.6	65.2	64.4	63.7	67.4	65.6
18+	4.7	9.0	6.9	5.1	7.1	6.1	5.0	7.7	6.4
Total	38.3	42.1	40.2	35.7	38.3	37	36.5	39.5	38.0

Source: Data extracted from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS] (1996, 4).

The difference between the aggregate school enrollment figures for Gaza and the West Bank are minimal. Secondary enrollment rates are significantly lower than the primary level, partially due to poverty and as a reflection of the fact that compulsory education stops at grade 10. In Gaza, the figures above also reveal that as females reach the age of 15, their enrollment rates when compared to males drop significantly. In Gaza, for example, the ratio of women to men in the tertiary sector is almost 1:2. This drop can, in part, be explained by the persistence of the patriarchal family structure, and the conservative social mores prevalent in Gaza.

In 1995, Palestinian education officials worked under the assumption that school enrollment will increase at a high rate from 1995 to 2020. Those assumptions were based on estimates developed by the World Bank and the PCBS, and they are reflected in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Projected School Enrollments for West Bank and Gaza 1995-2020 (in thousands)

Level (age)	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Primary (6-11)	334	430	507	542	624	656
Prepatory (12-14)	144	173	223	257	274	310
Secondary (15-17)	100	116	142	182	188	223
Subtotal (Pre-Tertiary)	578	719	872	981	1086	1189
Post-Secondary (18+)	63	81	101	124	154	184

Source: World Bank Population Statistics; PCBS, The Demographic Survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Preliminary Report, March 1996, Table 3.1, 3.2.

For policy-makers such projected increases have significant implications for the system's absorptive capacity, and will require major budgetary increases, but as noted earlier, the available resources are limited and the PA's ability to generate more funds is quite constrained. Before the year 2000, education officials expected enrollment in the pre-tertiary sector to increase by about 100,000 students, which would thus require the construction of 250 new schools. The existing overcrowding today can only compound the problems which confront the PA. Enrollment increases require more teachers, supplies and textbooks. Thus, in addition to increasing the investment budget for physical plant, the costs associated with expanding enrollment will increase the recurring costs "in a budget that already constitutes a major share of the total public budget" (World Bank 1997, 5).

In retrospect the demographic burden was even greater than MOE officials contemplated. More accurate PCBS data shows that the total number of students enrolled in the pre-tertiary sector was actually higher in the base academic year 1994-95. The early projections expected that the number of the students in the education system would go above one million in 2015. Instead in 2000-2001 the total number of students went beyond the one million threshold. The early estimates for 2000 were underestimated by more than 200,000. The main education indicators for 2002-2003 show that the number of students has risen to 1,045,982. As a result of the young age structure of the Palestinian population, the school system had to cope with over 65,000 new entrants during the first two years of the al-Aqsa intifada (World Bank May 2003, 43). The total number of pupils are distributed in 2764 schools and kindergartens. More than 90 percent of the kindergartens are privately run. Furthermore, instead of needing to construct only 250 schools, the educational system (including UNRWA) increased the number of schools from 1474 in 1994-

95 to 1918 in 2001-2002.[19]

Table 5.4 presents the most accurate data for the actual number of students enrolled in the pre-tertiary sector.[20] The World Bank concludes that even "under normal circumstances, then, it is a considerable challenge to provide quality education to a rapidly expanding system (World Bank May 2003, 43).

Table 5.4: Number of Students in Schools and Kindergartens in the Palestinian Territory 1994 to 2003

94/95	95/96	96/97	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03
654,697	707,554	781,954	838,499	889,895	942,942	976,375	1,013,805	1,045,982
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2003)								

The PCBS data[21] also measures levels of educational attainment. For example, 6.1 percent of males have earned university degrees (BA/BS and beyond), while 6.1 percent have obtained some type of post-secondary intermediate diploma, e.g. teaching certificates and vocational training. For females the numbers are 2.4 percent and 4.8 percent respectively (PCBS 1996, 25, 69-88). The data also reveals that students whose parents have completed 13 or more years of education, are predisposed to follow their footsteps (PCBS 1996, 25, 89-194). Households with fewer children, and families with higher socio-economic standing are also shown to increase the chances of educational attainment for their children.[22] These patterns confirm Bourdieu's theorizing about the reproduction of cultural capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1994), which is inherently unequal and gives the offspring of the upper classes of [Palestinian] society major advantages in securing upward mobility.

Palestinians, like other dispersed peoples, have placed high value on educational attainment. This sentiment is aptly captured in the words of Don Peretz:

> Palestinians of all social and economic origins and political persuasions agree on the necessity of high-quality education for their youth. This is perhaps the highest priority of every Palestinian family; it is seen as the key to the future, the path out of refugee camps and the lowly status of a permanent underclass throughout the Arab east. Even among the poorest refugee camp families with six, eight, or ten children, it is not unusual to find several individuals who are high school or university graduates or

have technical school certificates (Peretz 1993, 22-23).

The point however is not whether an individual values education or not. Rather it is a problem of the availability of and access to resources. Thus it would be fair to conclude that even if one values and places high priority on education, failure to attain dreams for social mobility are the result of the inherent inequality of objective conditions (Peretz 1993, 28). Despite the high value placed on education by Palestinians, the deficiencies of the curriculum, combined with the Israeli closure of Palestinian schools during the intifada, caused a sharp decline in the performance of Palestinian students.

Education Without Quality: The Impact of the Intifada

Even before the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987, the quality of education was in decline. Textbooks were dated because the occupation authorities did not provide funds for new editions. Teachers were poorly trained and underpaid, thus prompting many to secure second jobs. Between 1967 and 1992 public school teachers were not afforded the opportunity for teacher training and professional development (Fasheh 1989, 521). In the first ten years of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (1967-1977) no new schools were built, leading to overcrowding and high teacher-student ratios. Existing schools lacked basic facilities such as science laboratories, libraries, playgrounds. The imposition of restrictive orders and measures by the Israeli authorities led to an effective ban on extracurricular activities (Abu-Duhou 1997; Aruri 1989; Fasheh 1989). The arbitrary closure of schools reduced the actual time students spent in the classroom. For example, over a two-year period,1981-1982, Bir Zeit University was closed three times for a total of seven months.

The educational system had many deficiencies before 1967, but the subsequent Israeli occupation compounded these problems. In this connection, two issues should be raised. The first pertains to the tawjihi or the high school matriculation exam. The second to the encouragement of the academic track at the expense of technical or vocational education.

After 1948 Egyptian and Jordanian education authorities introduced the tawjihi matriculation exam in Gaza and the West Bank respectively. To graduate from high school, West Bank students were required to take the Jordanian tawjihi, while the Gaza students took the Egyptian equivalent. Aside from the fact that these exams are based on non-Palestinian curricula, they are designed and structured in a manner which requires the recitation and regurgitation of facts. Four months before the exam, education authorities distribute a pool of questions to all the

students. When administered, the actual exam is composed of questions selected from the distributed questions, with little or no alteration. These exams are taken very seriously by both students and parents, precisely because the results determine one's future in the pursuit of higher education.

The structure of the tawjihi, encourages a pedagogy which fosters rote and almost meaningless learning.[23] This type of learning is not only thought-less, but creates a learning environment that is quite uninteresting and stifling. Such an approach emphasizes the passive acquisition of knowledge as facts, which in turn excludes problem solving and critical thinking. As passive recipients of facts, students do not learn how to learn. As Frank Smith put it, "students can be trusted to learn, and to think, provided that students are immersed in an environment that promotes and encourages thought. Facilitating thinking is more a matter of attitude than of lesson plans" (Smith 1990, 126). In contrast, a learning environment would challenge teachers and students alike to recognize that knowledge can and should be challenged. Indeed, thinking flourishes by asking questions rather than simply finding answers (Greene 1998).

By placing emphasis on the acquisition of authoritative knowledge of facts, rather than on reflection, reasoning, and critical thinking, the tawjihi system thus encourages complacency. Students, as passive recipients of knowledge (as discreet information), in turn see this process as satisfying their individual goals for higher pursuits. Gone from the equation is the transformative role of education, which prepares both the individual and the community to become agents of social change for society as whole. The emphasis on increased academic efficiency, as measured by traditional criteria, such as test scores (tawjihi), translates into traditional pedagogy which emphasizes the technicalization of knowledge. Munir Fasheh, a leading Palestinian educator, examines the relationship and relevance of education to society, and to the lives of people. He notes that major events such as the 1967 war, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the intifada, "shook the foundations of the world created by formal education and Western hegemony; they revealed the gap between what we—the formally educated—had learned and taught in schools and universities (in terms of conceptions, convictions, explanations, analyses, skills,...), and the events and needs of the real world. They revealed how little we knew, and how irrelevant and rigid that little knowledge was—and still is" (Fasheh 1989, 547-48). He thus calls for education as praxis, a notion which he borrows from Freire.[24]

In the quote from Peretz, earlier in this chapter, it is noted that Palestinians like other dispersed peoples valued education as a vehicle to

attain individual security, and thus formal education was seen as the passport for success, in the absence of a shared patrimony that could advance the collective interests of the community. But this pursuit of formal education took an academic bias, without consideration for societal needs.[25] Table 5.5 reveals this bias clearly. A study conducted jointly by the European Commission and the Palestinian National Authority notes that 60 to 80 percent of high school graduates pursue university studies, while less than 4 percent enter Vocational Education Training (VET). The study concludes that the streaming of students into universities results in high unemployment among college graduates. This bias also produces a shortage of skilled workers thus affecting the local economy adversely.[26] The education system, under Israeli rule, did not provide opportunities for the development and expansion of vocational training opportunities.

Table 5.5: Matriculating Students Divided by Discipline 1969 and 1977

Disciplinary Track	1969	1977
Literary (Liberal Arts)	60.4%	65%
Scientific	35.6%	32%
Vocational	2.7%	2.1%
Commercial	0.7%	0.7%
Agricultural	0.5%	0.2%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Extracted from Rihan and Mahshi, in Nakhleh (1980).

In contrast, a comparison with Jordan is instructive. In 1967 the vocational stream in Jordan lured only 3 percent of the students, but by 1980 this number reacher upwards of 15 percent (Fasheh 1989, 520). In 1995, one year after the PA assumed control of Palestinian education, the percent of secondary students enrolled in the vocational/technical track remained at 3 percent in Palestine. In comparison, the enrollment rates in this track in Egypt was 31 percent, and in Jordan 19 percent.[27] If we assume that families in both Jordan and the West Bank favored the purely academic track, then what explains the differential in those pursuing

vocational tracks? The key difference between the two circumstances is the nature and exercise of authority and the incentives and institutions created by the authorities. The Jordanian monarchy designed its own development plans which included the building of much needed educational institutions (e.g. vocational training). In the Palestinian case, authority was exercised by the Israeli military, which placed obstacles before indigenous attempts to build new educational institutions. More importantly, as Sara Roy notes, Israeli occupation policies resulted in the "de-development" of Palestinian society (Roy 1995), including its educational institutions.

Before the intifada, illiteracy prevailed mostly among older women and men. But the levels of illiteracy among youth increased during the intifada. Disciplinary problems have increased, and respect for authority figures such as parents and teachers has declined. Psychological problems, usually found in oppressed and powerless societies, have multiplied. These include: dissimulation, excessive individualism, and the collapse of group solidarity and sense of community.[28] By early 1993 the Israeli government was eager to pull its forces from some parts of Gaza. Sara Roy, a close observer and expert on economic development in Gaza, notes that Israel's inclination for withdrawal was also in part prompted by the ominously "increasing disablement and approaching breakdown of civil society in Gaza, a product of widening societal divisions and internal fragmentation never before seen inside the territory" (Roy 1993, 21).

Despite the high value placed on education by Palestinians, the deficiencies of the curriculum, combined with the closure of Palestinian schools for many months during the intifada, caused Palestinian performance on standardized tests to decline sharply. In 1990-91, the Tamer Institute for Community Education, conducted a study to assess the achievement levels in math and Arabic, of about 3000 fourth and sixth grade students in the central region of the West Bank (Tamer Institute 1991). The students were found lacking in basic literacy and numeracy skills. A number of randomly selected results of the tested population showed: only 24 percent of the fourth graders could accurately measure (with a ruler) a given line segment of 5 centimeters in length; 73 percent of fourth graders could not add ½+ ¼; only 2.3 percent of fourth graders, and 22.8 percent of sixth graders were able to construct the required number of sentences. Their sentences displayed weak grammatical structure, the inability to express ideas clearly, and limited vocabulary; finally, the results of the reading comprehension component of the test revealed major flaws. On average, sixth graders provided fully correct answers at a rate of only 30 percent.

Between 1991 and 1993, under the auspices of the International Assessment of Educational Progress, the achievement rates in science and mathematics of eight graders from twenty countries were assessed. In 1991, Jordanian students scored the lowest in terms of the average of correct answers in both mathematics and science. One year later, West Bank students ranked below Jordan. Students in private schools performed better than those in the public sector (under Israeli Civil Authority). The latter performed better than the students enrolled in UNRWA schools. Writing in the Harvard Educational Review, Munir Fasheh, a Palestinian educator and the founder of the Tamer Institute, notes that these studies were conducted after almost two years of school closures had been imposed by the Israelis. He notes, that despite these prolonged closures, "all students were promoted to the next grades, as if they had attended school" (Fasheh 1995, 67).[29]

The available data on the decline of the quality of Palestinian education shows that this decline is the result of multiple factors. All the sources cited in this study concur that Israeli occupation policies, have had a drastic and deleterious effect on the educational delivery system. But to stop there would be inadequate. The performance of Jordanian students on the standardized tests mentioned above were almost as poor as that of their Palestinian counterparts, even though they did not experience the closure of schools during the intifada. As noted above, Jordan and other Arab countries have developed a vocational track to train skilled labor which is needed by the local market. But, Jordan's curriculum and pedagogy, as noted earlier, fosters rote learning and relies on obsolete teaching methods. Thus, though Palestinian students earn diplomas, they fail to learn how to learn. Students are not encouraged to construct their own explanations of experiences and phenomena, so their knowledge is reduced to the learning of theories from outdated textbooks. Higher order cognitive skills that require discovery and experimentation are de-emphasized. The author of a World Bank report on Palestinian education concludes that this type of traditional pedagogy prepares uncritical minds who lack basic problem solving skills (World Bank 1997, 10).

Early on, in the 1970s, attempts to reform the Palestinian educational system were met with resistance both from the Israelis and from traditionally-oriented Palestinian educators. Munir Fasheh, who in 1976 served as the acting director of the Technical Education Office of the West Bank, discovered the near futility of introducing reforms. A proposal to hold a conference to study the problems of education in the West Bank drew the ire of the Israeli officer in charge, and derision from the Palestinian head of a local teacher training college. The combined

responses aborted the idea. The attempt to introduce school counselors for several school districts was welcomed by the Israeli officer, but fiercely opposed by most Palestinian administrators. The failure of these attempted reforms convinced educators like Munir Fasheh that the institution of change through the existing educational structures was almost impossible (Fasheh 1989, 520-522).

Reformers like Fasheh tried to infuse reforms through the introduction of co-curricular activities. In this connection, science and mathematics clubs were set up in some schools. Through these clubs, students were encouraged to "perform experiments and gather information about topics" which interested them (Fasheh 1989, 522). This experiment lasted a few months in the boys' schools, but to the astonishment of most educators, it continued to thrive for almost two years in some of the girls' schools. With a bit of irony, this co-curricular activity was quelled by two conflicting forces. First, the Israelis banned these activities because they viewed these clubs as potential sources for the fomenting of subversive activity. Thus, the logic of "security reasons," was invoked. Secondly, and of equal importance, conservative Palestinian forces attacked these clubs on the grounds that they served as vehicles for the importation of alien and radical ideas. These failed attempts, led Fasheh[30] to the conclude that:

> Encouraging youngsters to think freely and critically and to question things honestly is very dangerous to any authority. For the first time, I faced in action the fact that teaching is basically a political activity: it either helps 'unveil reality,' as Freire puts it, and creates attitudes, values, and intellectual models that will help students understand and be critical about what is going around them and confident that they can go beyond existing structures; or it produces students who are passive, rigid, timid, alienated, and lacking in self-esteem (Fasheh 1989, 522-23).

The harshness of life during the intifada has yielded other negative consequences. Many students dropped out of school, as they were swept into resistance activities. Others graduated, but now feel that their education is both incomplete and defective. In both instances, there is a feeling among youths that their personal sacrifices were in vain.[31] The following vignettes shed light on the resentment and disappointment of two individuals.

Vignette #1: "Samya" [32]

On a windy but pleasant winter afternoon, I spent several hours at Bir Zeit University (BZU). I met with the President of the university and other

top officials and educators. Those meetings provided me with valuable data, but their importance pales when compared with my chance encounter with 23 year old "Samya." It was late afternoon, and she had just come out of a political science class. I was waiting for her professor who had offered to give me a ride back to my hotel in Jerusalem. She and a friend joined us the car. With a slight giggle, "Samya" addressed the Professor, "Dr., you did not introduce us to your guest."He introduced me as a friend from New York, and informed them that I am studying the problems associated with Palestinian education. "Samya," in turn, took permission to pose a question to me. She said, "we [students] feel that we are not as smart as European or American students! Why is that?" My answer was simple. I told her that they have no cognitive deficiencies, but lack opportunities, and access to good libraries, museums, concert halls and extra curricular activities—all of which are central to a good education. She was pleased with my answer, but not comforted. Given that the semester was almost over, she added, "we hardly go to the library at the university, because most of our professors base their exams on their lecture notes, so we don't read any of the readings placed on reserve." I pointed out that when I taught at Hunter College in New York, I warned my students that all the assignments and exams require reflection and analysis of the readings, and not just repeating in rote fashion the material from my class lectures. With laughter, she said, "I am glad you don't teach at BZU!"

Her giddy laughter could not be mistaken for immaturity. As we talked, I discovered that she had been an active opponent of the occupation. Her first arrest took place when she was only 16. During the intifada she was arrested twice more. What stands out about this fact resides in its ordinariness. We interrupted our conversation for a few minutes, because we had to drop her off on the side of the road before we reached the Israeli military checkpoint at Beit Hanina, which the Israelis contend is part of greater Jerusalem. As we inched towards the checkpoint, she walked through back roads and made her way to a point beyond the checkpoint, which is where we picked her up. The conversation resumed. She informed us that though she officially graduated from high school, she in fact knows that she never learned all the Math needed for entrance to the university. The tawjihi exam for her graduating class only covered half of the material which should have been covered during the academic year, mostly due to the long periods of school closures. She also added that now, only months away from earning a BA from BZU, she was well aware that the quality of her education was highly compromised.

Before dropping her off on the outskirts of Jerusalem, she expressed

with great sadness, that her sacrifices during the intifada were all for naught. Instead of yielding liberation, it had reduced her and Palestinians to life in a new ghetto. So, "why," she asked, "did we sacrifice?" She added, "we feel like we sacrificed our youth and education for the struggle, but we ended up less free, and without a quality education... we feel cheated." She uttered these words with a smile on her face, but even that youthful smile could not hide her frustration and anger. As we dropped her off I discovered that she would have to elude yet another checkpoint, as she was headed to her home in Bethlehem. She had to use side roads, because the Israeli authorities had not renewed her travel permit. "Samya" had to elude four checkpoints each day to pursue her education. She slid through these security traps with the full knowledge that, if caught, she would be arrested, but she put herself in harm's way each day just to reach the university. This young woman rendered me speechless, but I knew right there and then, that I would not forget her. As we parted, I wished her well.

Vignette # 2: "Mohammad"

Unlike the West Bank with its sprawling green hills punctuated by terrestrial farming, Gaza is more like a large slum. Gaza is more vulnerable and economically depressed than the West Bank. Its population density of 9,300 per square mile, is one of the highest in the world. To the visitor, the squalid conditions overwhelm the senses and the sensibilities. Gazing out onto the vast expanse of the Mediterranean sea is perhaps the only emotional and visual relief one gets from the human misery that abounds. Even the wealthy, whose homes are ostentatious, cannot escape the stench of garbage and open sewers. On the 7th of October, 1997, I crossed Erez–the border with Israel–late in the afternoon. Herds of journalists were rushing back to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv to file their stories. They had spent the day covering the return of Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of the Islamic movement Hamas, who was released from an Israeli prison. As they departed, I slipped into Gaza. I was to spend two days interviewing educators affiliated with local universities, or with officials of the MOE.

One of the Palestinian development agencies provided me with a car and a driver, which facilitated my work greatly. Not to slight the educators I met, but the chance encounter with the "driver" proved most fruitful. All the publications, statistics and interviews which I secured fall flat in comparison with what I learned through the driver.[33]

"Mohammad" is 23 years of age. He lives with his parents in Jabalyya

camp, which is one of the most crowded in Gaza. With his expecting wife, and ten siblings, they live with their parents—a total of 13 people, with another on the way. The eleventh sibling, his sister, lives with her husband's family. Both Mohammad and his father are employed, thus unlike many families they have two modest salaries to support the family.

When the intifada broke out in Gaza, Mohammad was enrolled in one of the United Nations (UNRWA) run schools. The intensity of the moment, and his active participation in the resistance to occupation diminished the importance of staying in school. The numerous school closures, and the irrelevance of the classroom led him to leave school before completing the 9th grade. As the intifada waned, he secured seasonal employment in Israel. With the unfolding of the peace process, and the arrival of the PLO leadership and Arafat to Gaza in 1994, he was led to believe that better times were surely coming. The local Fateh leaders convinced him that soon Gaza would become the Singapore of the Middle East, and peace would permit them to visit the green hills of the West Bank, or the beautiful mountains of Lebanon. The promise of abundance and jobs would soon replace misery and poverty. But, they were told that some patience would be required.

By 1997, the abundance of jobs had never materialized; in fact unemployment increased exponentially and the quality of life decreased with a vengeance. Frustration and despondency replaced optimism. When Mohammad gathers with his friends, they daydream about two concerns. As he listed them, a full smile never left his face. He said, "we are always obsessed with jobs." Most of his friends are unemployed, and thanks to God, for the last few months he has been employed. He added, "we also dream, that before we die, we hope to see the beauty of the West Bank, and the mountains of Lebanon." Such an opportunity would fill their eyes and souls with enough beauty to endure their misery and poverty. For now, this voyage is only an elusive dream.

On the second day of our conversations, Mohammad expressed regret for not completing his studies. He envied the students he saw, as we visited the universities in Gaza. He heard that he could take a two week training course in photography, but was unsure if he could afford the tuition. He concluded by noting that he and his friends had sacrificed their education for freedom. Now, they have freedom, but their lives have not improved. They have no skills, and they are confined to Gaza, which more and more resembles a large prison. He said, "we are unable to dream of a better future." Instead of being empowered by the intifada, their feeling of powerlessness has grown.

In the Moment of Enthusiasm: New Pedagogies

The Israeli response to the intifada was the intensification of its prior occupation practices. These included repeated closure of schools and universities for extended periods, arrests and deportation of teachers, dismantling of public institutions, curfews, and the harrassment and torture of youths. During the first 18 months of the intifada, students below the 11th grade missed a total of 15 months of schooling due to school closures. Students in grades 11 and 12, missed 17 months of schooling in the first 19 months of the uprising. When schools were officially reopened, the Israeli military authorities prevented teachers from any remedial teaching (Graff (1991, 150-51). In addition, Swedish Save the Children estimates that school attendance during the first year of the intifada dropped precipitously. Thus, Gaza attendance rates in UNRWA elementary schools dropped to about 21 percent, and 18 percent in the public school sector. In addition to military closures of schools, other factors such as commercial strikes, curfews, and general strikes explain this decline.[34] The basic difference with past occupation policies was the scale and intensity of the Israeli response. The intended purpose was not only to humiliate Palestinians, but to quell the uprising. The targeting of educational facilities was intended to pressure Palestinian families to curb and ultimately end their protest activities, or risk the loss of their children's education. Israeli authorities "are well aware of Palestinian reliance on education as a solution to their many problems...[thus] they have exploited this vulnerability by closing schools frequently and without warning as a collective punishment" (Nixon 1990, 258)..[35] But in this moment of enthusiasm, Palestinians were unafraid to disengage from the occupation itself. Psychologist M. Scott Peck, writing on spiritual and personal growth notes that, "courage is not the absence of fear: it is the making of action in spite of fear" (Peck 1979, 131).

Prolonged school closures, and concern that young children might lose their newly-acquired literacy and numeracy skills, prompted parents and teachers to search for alternative forms of education. This quest led to the formation of the popular education movement, as part of the growing network of popular committees. Popular committees, which were established in the early 1970s to assist the Palestinians in resisting Israeli, were revived. The earlier formations were intended to counter Israel's efforts of destructuring Palestinian institutions. Thus, grassroots organizations were formed by Palestinians to assist them in addressing the basic social and infrastructural needs and problems of Palestinian society (Hilterman 1991). The popular committees that arose during the intifada, according to Farsoun, produced "an authentic organizational structure,

knitting the people together in a web of reciprocal relations, mutual cooperation, and solid, politically conscious bonds, creating a 'woven fabric' of hegemony that could unite many threads of Palestinian society which traditionally were separated by conflicting objective interests" (Farsoun and Landis 1990, 27).

These committees were set up in almost all major Palestinian population centers, as substitutes for the government, private, and UNRWA schools closed down by the Israelis. The alternative schools operated in private homes, community centers, and places of worship. Intent on quelling alternative forms of education, in April 1988 Civil Administration authorities issued a warning to public school teachers that participation in such teaching activities could result in prosecution and incarceration. Indeed, by the following month, all popular committees were declared illegal. Accordingly, any person convicted of membership in any of these committees would face a sentence of up to ten years. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) expressed its revulsion at the criminalization of alternative education. In a statement issued by ACRI, they note: "We cannot accept that the State of Israel forces people to go underground in order to study and teach." They added, the arrest of students and teachers involved in such activities, "creates the impression that the punishment is not aimed at violence and incitement, but at education itself."[36]

At the end of July 1988, popular education spread more as the Jordanian government formally abdicated any responsibility towards the West Bank.[37] Public school teachers, who were on the Jordanian payroll[38], quickly recognized that their future lay with the fortunes of the intifada. Palestinian educators and activists, while trying to cope with the destructive consequences of closures and other prohibitions, concluded that this adversity presented them with an opportunity. They were challenged to think creatively about the kind of education they would need as they embark upon the process of nation-building. Khalil Mahshi, a leading Palestinian educator, aptly describes the challenge of this adversity in the following:

> The [intifada] has brought about a fundamental change...people from all sectors of Palestinian society have come to realize the strength that comes from collective action....They have come to realize that an educational system stemming from their own culture and responding to their particular needs is essential in the foundation of a future state. The [intifada] has challenged Palestinians to change their attitudes about the process of learning and the existing system of education....One the one hand, they want to return to school and pick up where they left off before the uprising

> started. On the other, they are experimenting with many new forms of learning....If people are unwilling to settle for the old ways of learning and schooling, will they put the effort into making the substantial changes required? (Mahshi and Bush 1989, 482-83).

During the intifada education was provided to Palestinian children in a semi-clandestine manner. Existing school curricula were used, but in some areas teachers experimented with the introduction of study guides and self-help packets which they wrote for the students. In such a context, the content of education was made more relevant to the conditions of life. Students were able to interact with one another more freely given that classes were smaller, averaging about ten. Teachers improvised as they sought new ways to teach children. One public school teacher from the Ramallah area recounts his experience with the need to improvise in the following words:

> I have been teaching electricity to students for years. One day in our alternative school, I prepared a lesson on electricity. I thought to myself, what will get these children interested in learning about electricity. When they arrived I asked them if they had seen any Palestinian flags that day. When they said yes, I asked them where they saw them hanging. The children answered, 'on the electricity wires.' I asked them what would happen if they tried to take the flag down, and they said, 'we would be killed.' I asked them how they would be killed, and they replied, 'by electricity.' I asked them why electricity can kill, and they sat quietly, eager to learn. In all my years of teaching, I have never had a group of children so interested in learning about electricity.[39]

The non-school-centered learning approaches had greater success with the private school sector than with the public and UNRWA sectors. Private schools like the two Quaker[40] schools in Ramallah, were predisposed to dabble with experimentation, thus they were more successful with this form of decentered learning (Mahshi and Bush 1989, 475-76). But as a movement, popular education could not be sustained for long. Eventually students and teachers went back to the formal classroom, but this experiment yielded two noteworthy results.

First, a cross section of Palestinian educators launched a debate on the need to revamp the existing formal education system, to make it more relevant to the needs of Palestinian society. Though these debates started before the intifada, the intifada rendered them more urgent and poignant. From 1980 to 1997 hundreds of Palestinian educators, activists and members of the community, convened more than 120 workshops, conferences, symposia, and public lectures to discuss the problems and

challenges of education.[41] The various conferences and symposia, organized by the NGO sector, covered a wide array of topics: Vocational training, early childhood education, illiteracy, aims of higher education, methods of teaching Arabic and English, critical assessment of the tawjihi exam, the role of education in development, and alternative pedagogies. Since 1988, the data reveals the preoccupation of Palestinian educators with the need to develop a unique Palestinian philosophy for education. In addition, the desire for the development of a Palestinian curriculum is expressed as early as 1982. They advocated the adoption of new pedagogies to facilitate the nurturing of Palestinian children. All of the ideas and programs adopted by Palestinian educators advocate "comprehensive curriculum change, as well as a major transformation in teaching methodology on all levels. More important, they stress the need for the integration of school and community, and insist on education that is relevant to the current needs of the community" (Mahshi and Bush 1989, 480). Interviews conducted by the author in 1995-6, and 1997 with more than 20 leading Palestinian educators identified similar concerns. All of the interviewees were asked the same questions. The first question asked them to provide their top three priorities for reforming the educational system. With no exception, all of the respondents included the following concerns as their top three priorities and goals: teacher training and retraining; Palestinianization of education as a means to making education more relevant; development of a national curriculum.[42]

The available data shows that between 1980 and 1988 Palestinian educators organized fewer than two events per year to discuss the state of education. However, in 1987 five events were held and they mostly dealt with technical dimensions of education. With the start of the intifada in December 1987, educators began to focus on the future needs of Palestinian education. In May 1998, the General Federation of Employees in the Education Sectors of the Occupied Territories, with the assistance of prominent educators, organized a national conference to consider the state of education, and to consider alternatives for the future.[43] In 1990, under the auspices of the PLO's education department, Palestinian educators convening in Amman, Jordan, formed a team of educators from the West Bank and Gaza to develop a Palestinian educational philosophy.[44] Though the PLO and its institutions tried to guide and harness the activities of Palestinian educators, the fact remains that the absence of a central Palestinian authority in the Occupied Territories enabled Palestinian educators in the West Bank and Gaza to initiate and plant the seeds for the establishment of a Palestinian educational system.

The intifada played an important role in propelling the peace process

between Israel and the PLO. In 1991, both parties attended the Madrid Peace conference,[45] in search of a political solution. In this period of diplomatic activity and until the eve of the 1994 Transfer of Power Agreement, the activities of Palestinian educators multiplied. For example, five educational events were organized in 1991, eleven in 1992, eighteen in 1993, and twenty in 1994. The dominant themes preoccupying Palestinian educators focused on the role of education in sustaining the rebuilding and social integration of Palestinian society. Thus, the purpose of education would not be limited to and constrained by the "diploma disease", but instead it should prepare students to serve as the makers of history for their society.[46]

The development of a distinctive and unified Palestinian curriculum were deemed crucial. In 1993, two workshops convened to study the requirements of a Palestinian curriculum. On 15 October, the Palestinian Council for Higher Education (PCHE) and the Center for Curriculum Development brought together about 136 educators at Bir Zeit University. They started the process of drafting plans for the construction of a Palestinian curriculum. In November of the same year, under the auspices of the PCHE and UNESCO, about 153 educators and activists discussed new ideas about the curriculum for the secondary level. They agreed on the need to eliminate the tracking system that required students to choose the arts or the sciences. In addition, they advocated the institution of vocational education at the secondary level.[47] The role of education in this process is not simply to spread literacy and numeracy, but according to Palestinian educators, it must be linked to the creation of a citizen animated by a set of shared social values which include civic responsibility, and respect and understanding for democracy. Imbued with these values, Palestinian educators played an important role in the process of nation-building and state formation.[48]

In the context of the intifada, a number of NGOs specializing in education were formed.[49] They assumed the responsibility of implementing many of the ideas which were discussed in the various events mentioned above. They initiated innovative programs in various domains: Early Childhood Training; Vocational Training; Community Education for Youths; and Teacher Training. In the absence of a Palestinian state, Palestinian NGOs served as the prime repository for the development of ideas and programs for the development of a Palestinian educational system. As mentioned earlier, between 1991 and 1993 teams of educators were formed to develop the beginnings of a Palestinian national curriculum. Most of the members of these teams are educators affiliated with one or more of these NGOs.

The Educational Network, in October 1993, held a series of discussions among several Palestinian NGOs involved in various aspects of Palestinian education.[50] At the conclusion of these discussions the outlines of a vision for Palestinian education, animated by the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence,[51] were issued in a joint statement. Accordingly, education is to serve the individual, but also the community. By emphasizing learning as a function of experience and praxis, the individual can "make decisions and formulate ideas [which are] in harmony with himself and his environment." The statement adds that the construction of a new future requires the student to "choose and question within the framework of a democratic society which safeguards...freedom of thought and expression". Together, students, teachers, and society, must interact and play an active role in educational planning. The statement adds, "current curricula and educational programs require fundamental changes," and should be based on the principles of participation and equality. Finally, the statement addresses the connection between the desired national curriculum and national identity. They write:

> Concern for national identity increases whenever [a people] is exposed to suppression and distortion. Realizing the vulnerability of their identity, Palestinians [in] this century have shown great concern to develop their identity in order to preserve it and [to] safeguard [their] future. An educational curriculum that reflects, comprehends and is related to symbols and elements of national identity requires full understanding and consciousness of national history....Historical awareness forms the foundation for a meaningful, interrelated present and an undistorted future.[52]

On the eve of the Transfer Agreement in 1994, debates on the role and future of Palestinian education were animated by the circumstances of the intifada. Educators connected with many NGOs, which for the most part grew out of the uprising, shaped the parameters of discourse. In Chapters Six and Seven, we will probe the extent to which the ideas and efforts of these educators and activists were incorporated in the institutionalization of the Palestinian educational system under the PA.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION UNDER THE PA

To consolidate its rule in the state building phase, the PA wields two kinds of power as described by Mann (1993). "Despotic" or coercive power is being used to curb opposition and to prevent it from foiling the PA's political agenda, a function which does not require "institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups" (Mann 1993, 315). By developing the distributive capacity of the state (health, education, social services), what Mann calls "infrastructural power," the PA through its ministries and agencies is developing the capacity "to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure" (Mann 1993, 316). Among the various techniques used by states to effectively penetrate social life, Mann identifies the spread of literacy and education. Thus, by administering educational systems, the PA is incorporating civil society into its national development plan.

The institutionalizing of the education system involves a series of negotiations between various actors-donors, innovative educators, and education NGOs. The data in this chapter shows that the organizational structure of the MOE is hierarchic. Such a structure is more conducive for the inputs of the experts of the donor community. In determining which priorities to pursue, the MOE relies more heavily on the donors thus reducing the input and deliberations of the innovative educators in this process. In this connection, the ministry has yet to develop a formal participatory mechanism for dealing with independent educators and education-oriented research centers and NGOs. Consequently the MOE is more prone to accept advice, given by donor experts and consultants, which favor the upgrading of the much needed technical and skills-oriented aspects of education. Pragmatic considerations, emanating from an understanding of what is fundable, have led the MOE to adopt such a policy.

As noted in previous chapters, the signing of the DOP on 13 September 1993 in Washington, led to the formal establishment of the

Palestinian Authority (PA) on 4 May 1994. However, even before the actual formation of the PA and its institutions, the PLO sought the assistance and cooperation of UNESCO in developing Palestinian educational capabilities. Specifically, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO, signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in Granada on 9 December 1993, and a Plan of Action in Tunis on 30 April 1994 (UNESCO 1995a, 1). In anticipation of the formal establishment of the PA, the PLO needed international assistance to assume full responsibility over Palestinian education. On 28 August 1994 Israel transferred authority for education in the West Bank and Gaza to the PA and its newly formed Ministry of Education. Soon thereafter, UNESCO undertook a mission between 23 October and 13 November to assess the state of Palestinian education (discussed in Chapters Two and Five), in order to propose a series of projects designed to assist the developing and strengthening of the newly formed Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE).[1] In 2002 these two ministries were merged again to become the MOEHE.

In this study, as indicated in Chapter Two, the Palestinian educational system is analyzed in terms of its role in development and national identity formation. This chapter focuses on the role of education in development, whereas the question of identity formation will be the focus of Chapter Seven. As noted in Chapter Two, development can be conceptualized as economic growth, as modernization, as redistributive justice, and as socioeconomic transformation (Mabogunje 1989). Though education plays a role, significant at times, in each of these domains, it should not be conceptualized solely as an independent variable. The role of education is contingent upon and derived from the broader development strategies adopted by the state. In this context, education is conceptualized as a form of development planning. Accordingly, this chapter situates the process of setting national educational priorities and strategies (1994-2000) as a function of the PA's larger process of devising a Palestinian development strategy.

Chapter Five has demonstrated that prior to the Transfer Agreement of 1994, the role and future of Palestinian education were animated by the circumstances of the intifada, where discourse was mostly shaped by educators and NGOs. This chapter examines the extent to which the ideas of these educators and activists are incorporated in the institutionalization of the Palestinian educational system under the PA. The chapter is divided in four sections. Part one profiles the objectives and structures of the MOE and the MOHE; Part two situates educational reforms (1994-2000) in the context of the Palestinian Development Plan; Part three assesses the

impact of "political rent" on the construction of Palestinian educational priorities; and Part four provides some conclusions which are derived from the deliberations and evidence presented in the chapter.

Education in Palestinian Hands: Objectives and Structures

The education system under Israeli occupation suffered from years of neglect, a matter that has been documented in chapters one and four. The system was in need of extensive reforms and repairs to curb the ongoing deterioration. The MEHE inherited the school system only days before the official opening of the 1994-95 academic year, and indeed the schools opened on time. There was a total of 1474 schools. Of these 1074 were administered by the MEHE, 253 by UNRWA, and 147 private schools. Total enrollment was 661,610, of which 446,777 (67.5 percent) were enrolled in the government run schools. The number of teachers in the education system reached 24,342. Of these, 14,681 (60 percent) were in government schools. To administer a system in disrepair is quite a daunting challenge. Sue Berryman, a World Bank expert on education, concludes that during the first year of operation the primary objective of the MEHE was to simply keep the system running, and to avoid chaos (Berryman 1999).

Pre-University Education and Training: Profile, Objectives and Priorities

To insure continuity and to prevent disruption in the education delivery system, the MEHE decided to just administer the system as inherited from the Israeli authorities. Upon the transfer of authority from Israel the Palestinian education sector was in shambles. Schools and classrooms were overcrowded. Many school buildings were in a state of disrepair. Most schools lacked science laboratories, computers, libraries and library books, playgrounds, physical education equipment, art supplies, and adequate sanitary facilities. Schools in rural areas lacked adequate buildings, and did not have enough classroom space for girls. The number of schools were not sufficient for the existing population, much less to accommodate the children of returning families. Thus, many schools operated on a double-shift basis, while others even ran three shifts per day.

Palestinian education relied on dated textbooks, and their contents lacked any relevance to Palestinian needs. Two curricula were used: the Jordanian in the West Bank, and the Egyptian in Gaza. These curricula,

according to the Ministry of Higher Education, are inflexible and "not sufficiently attuned to Palestinian national identity, or to the specific socio-economic needs of Palestinian society and economy" (PNA/MOHE 1997, 4). Vocational and technical education was mostly neglected. School administrators lacked training and experience in education and administrative skills.[2] The majority of the teaching staff, in both the academic and technical institutions, lacked training, and did not have the opportunity to undergo in-service training.

Upon transfer of authority from the Israeli Central Administration, the PA assumed responsibility over all public school facilities in the WBGS except for those based in Jerusalem. Jurisdiction in Jerusalem-based schools is divided between Israel, UNRWA, and the private (NGO) sector.[3] The PA assumed control over the majority of basic and elementary schools. Preschool and university education are mostly run by the private/NGO sector and UNRWA.[4]

Both the UNESCO report (1995a) and subsequent documents of the MOE have highlighted the need to develop, expand, and professionalize Vocational Technical Education and Training (VTET). This sector is hybrid. Most of the existing institutions cater to students who forego the secondary level of education (grades 11 and 12). Others operate more like junior colleges. In 1994 vocational training was provided by 18 secondary schools. The students enrolled in these facilities do not represent more than 4 percent of all those enrolled in secondary schools. By contrast, 47 percent of Israeli students and 30 percent of the students in Arab schools in Israel are enrolled in vocational training programs (PNA/MOHE 1997, 5). In 1995, 31 Vocational Training Centers (VTCs) were transferred by the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinian Ministry of Labor, 25 of which are public and are under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs.

The VTCs offer a range of specializations including: electrician skills, radio and television maintenance, refrigeration, carpentry, computer maintenance hairdressing, sewing (for women), tile laying, bookkeeping and word-processing. Women make up about 37 percent of total number of students at these centers. Overall, in 1994-95 about 60 percent of all students enrolled in four primary skills: sewing for women, tile laying, bookkeeping and word-processing, and hair dressing (PNA/MOHE 1997, 5-7).

The Vocational Technical Education and Training (VTET) sector was neglected by the Israeli occupation. The Israeli labor market required mostly unskilled Palestinian labor. However, after the transfer of authority in 1994, both UNESCO and the several Palestinian ministries (education,

labor, social affairs) emphasized the need for building this sector's capabilities. It was reasoned that to build a state, the education system must become more relevant by expanding a VTET program capable of producing "highly skilled labour, managers or a labour base, which is able to quickly acquire the new skills required for the latest changes in technology" (UNESCO 1995a, 42).

Despite the prevailing problems the MEHE inherited an education sector with some positive indicators. First, enrollment rates for the compulsory cycle (through 10th grade) were estimated at 91 percent, and 47 percent for the non-compulsory (grades 11 and 12) secondary cycle (PNA/MOHE 1997, 4). Second, literacy rates among Palestinians is competitive by any standard and is quite high when compared to other developing countries. For example, the literacy rate for the population 15 years or older (1996) was about 84 percent. In contrast, the rate for the Middle East and North Africa region as a whole is 57 percent (Berryman 1999, 160). Quantitatively the education system performs adequately. However, the quality of education leaves much to be desired. Sue Berryman of the World Bank concludes that "the education system is not well organized to develop the foundation skills and higher-order cognitive thinking abilities that students need to succeed" (Berryman 1999, 161).

Given the gravity and extent of the problems in the education sector, the time to introduce educational and administrative changes would have to come at a later stage. Delaying the introduction of reforms gave the MEHE much needed time to conduct a series of diagnostics intended to identify the inherent structural problems of the existing educational system. The first year served as a transition period to develop the necessary plans to not only curb deterioration but to also craft a reform agenda for the transformation of the Palestinian education system to best serve its beneficiaries.

After conducting a series of diagnostic tests, the UNESCO team in cooperation with personnel of the nascent Palestinian Ministry of Education issued a report detailing a set of remedies for the short and long-term. Mr. Khalil Mahshi, Director General of External Relations of the Ministry and one of its early and leading cadres, informed me that by the end of 1994 a draft report was in circulation and it served as a yardstick by which to measure the progress of the Ministry.[5] The UNESCO report (1995a) and the MEHE identified ten priorities to advance four goals. The educational priorities include the need for: curriculum development and unification; textbook printing and distribution; consolidation and expansion of existing schools; upgrading the skills of teachers, supervisors, and administrators; improving school

maintenance; obtaining proper equipment for the Ministry; development of the Directorate of Technical Education and Community Colleges; initiating the process of developing a long-term educational vision; establishing effective mechanisms for coordination among the various institutions involved in human resource development; establishing effective mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with international donors (UNESCO, 1995a, 34-35).

These priorities are set to reach four basic goals. First, if Palestinians are to become competitive regionally and globally, they need to develop various skills and expertise. Thus the quality of education needs to be improved with an emphasis on the development of the field of technical and vocational education (UNESCO 1995a, 36). In addition, the report strongly recommended the need for a unified Palestinian curriculum, a matter which will be fully discussed in Chapter Seven. The improvement of the quality of education would also require the training and retraining of teachers, and the upgrading of the physical learning environments, to create an "effective interaction of learners, teachers, and learning materials" (UNESCO 1995a, 36).

Second, the education system needs to insure equity and access in educational opportunities for all sectors of society. Disadvantaged youths, former prisoners, and former dropouts need to be educated. In addition, the provision of education to females and children in the rural areas is to be given high priority. Third, educational reforms need to render the system relevant to Palestinian socio-economic needs.

Fourth, the MEHE is one of the first functioning institutions of the PA, and one of the most visible. It delivers services to all sectors of society, and of the civilian sectors it absorbs the largest portion of the PA's budget. It employs 21,600 teachers which represents 4.3 percent of the labor force. The education sector absorbs a high portion of public and recurrent budget expenditures. Also as noted by Sue Berryman, "education serves as an important instrument for economic growth and poverty alleviation" (Berryman 1999, 157). Consequently, the MEHE is poised to play a central role in the nation building process, which requires the expansion of its capacity building functions. These include expanding the Ministry's abilities in the areas of policy-formulation and implementation, planning and management (UNESCO 1995a, 43-48).

The UNESCO report (1995) identified the key problem areas facing Palestinian education and proposed short term goals for two years (1995-97). The international community (mostly the EU) allocated funds for specific projects. The Italian government funded the establishment of the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center (to be discussed in chapter

7); Saudi Arabia financed the rebuilding of schools; The government of Italy in conjunction with UNESCO, and the International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP), funded the "Capacity Building In Educational Policy Formulation and Management for The Palestinian Educational Authority" project; The EU and the Italian government funded the establishment of an "Educational Management Information System" (EMIS), to develop an expansive database to assist the work of the Ministry in the planning process (UNESCO 1995a, x-xi; 125-160).

Given the magnitude of the tasks, all of the early initiatives to plan and develop the education sector were dependent on donor assistance or "political rent", as noted in Chapters Three and Four. The UNESCO report (1995) concludes that the "international community has the unique opportunity to assist the Palestinian people in developing a genuine education system while at the same time contributing to laying the foundation for a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East" (UNESCO 1995a, I). In later years, the MOE prepared several multi-year development plans all of which acknowledged the indispensable role and level of donor investment financing in education. Accordingly, the MOE notes that donors will have to assume the bulk of the financing of the proposed development plans, "since the PA education budget will barely suffice to finance salary expenditure."[6] The significance and impact of donor financing will be discussed below.

The Tertiary Sector: Colleges and Universities

Similar to its 1995 report on pre-university Palestinian education, UNESCO (1994a,b) had sponsored an earlier report on the state of Palestinian higher education. Long before the start of the current peace process, the Palestine National Fund (PNF) in 1975 asked UNESCO to assess the feasibility of establishing an open learning system for the Palestinians. Existing institutions of higher learning in Palestine and the Arab countries did not offer a relevant course of study to facilitate the development of Palestinian society. The requested feasibility study for the establishment of the "Palestine Open University", was mostly funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD). The final report (UNESCO 1980 a&b) was produced by a team of consultants headed by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, professor of political science at Northwestern university.[7] The "Open University" was to be established in either Beirut (Lebanon) or Cyprus, but the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon prevented its implementation.

Two lessons emerge from the aborted plan of the Open University. First, institutions of higher education for Palestinians would have to develop in Palestinian territories under Israeli occupation. Second, these institutions would be highly dependent on external funding and constrained by Israeli occupation restrictions. The sources of funding were initially mostly from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) and funneled through the PLO. In addition, Palestinian philanthropists who accumulated their wealth in the Arab Gulf states made major contributions in this effort. Lastly, after 1993, contributions from various international NGOs and members of the EU have sustained the development of the Palestinian higher education sector.

From 1978 to 1994 this sector was managed by the Council of Higher Education. In 1994 the MEHE took responsibility for the community colleges. With the establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education in 1996, the entire sector of higher education was placed under its guidance. This sector is comprised of 8 universities and 16 community colleges (MOHE 1977, Appendix 1A, B).

All Palestinian universities were founded after the 1967 war and under Israeli occupation. None of these institutions received funds from the Israeli authorities.[8] Instead, they were founded and funded by private, not-for-profit institutions controlled and guided by boards of trustees. The first Palestinian university was established in 1972 in Birzeit, a small town ten miles to the north of Jerusalem. Hanna Nasser[9], the founding president, established the university on land donated by the Nasser family. Until the founding of Birzeit, Palestinian students flocked to various universities in the Arab world in pursuit of higher education. From the outset, Palestinian universities were motivated and animated by nationalist goals and aspirations. Abu-Lughod articulates this point in the following words:

> [The] need for skilled individuals to confront Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and for the cadres to run civil society gave impetus to the development of universities in those areas. The popular sentiment, then and now, was that national institutions of higher learning can contribute immeasurably to the articulation and development of a national consciousness. They can provide training in the development of Palestinian society itself and can strengthen the social and cultural foundations of a society torn asunder by a unique military occupation imposed by a colonial settler state (Abu-Lughod 2000, 83).

At first glance one might be impressed by the number of Palestinian colleges and universities, but numbers alone can be deceiving. Does Palestine need so many institutions of higher learning? Abu-Lughod maintains that the "answer," to these questions, "is neither simple nor

clear" (Abu-Lughod 2000, 87). Israeli imposed blockades contributed to the geographic separation and isolation of the Palestinians. Gaza residents were often forbidden to travel to the West Bank, thus the Israeli blockade required that the two parts of Palestine cater to their local populations separately. Residents of the West Bank, due to roadblocks and closures, were most often prevented from traveling to other Palestinian locations, thus effectively creating four university zones: the south (Hebron and Bethlehem); Jerusalem (Al-Quds University); the center (Birzeit); and the north (Al-Najah University). The consolidation and rationalization of these institutions is under discussion (PNA/MOHE 1997). It is conceivable that some universities can merge or form consortiums in order to achieve greater consolidation and efficiency, but such plans must await the final outcome of the current and seemingly endless "peace process".

West Bank universities are better endowed and funded than their counterparts in Gaza. However even those based in the West Bank are in need of upgrading their curriculum, library holdings, and research facilities. In some cases attempts for reform have been resisted by university administrators.[10] In its 1994 report UNESCO (1994, 6) recommended the need for urgent action to improve the tertiary sector, and particularly in Gaza. This sector needs financial assistance to upgrade its facilities (teaching equipment, updated libraries, science and computer laboratories), and to modernize its academic programs and curricula.

Most importantly, the Council for Higher Education in 1995 issued a report in Arabic titled: "A Vision for the Future of Higher Education: Education for National Integration and Development," by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. He argues that given the divided and fragmented social fabric of Palestinian society, higher education needs to serve an integrative function to unify the Palestinians. In addition, if development is to occur, universities must expand their research capabilities which are almost non-existent today. Towards this end, he calls for a cooperative effort between the state (PA) and the private sector to finance research, develop solid graduate programs in selected fields, and to establish scientific institutes.[11]

To implement any proposals to improve and develop the tertiary sector of education requires the setting up of a national body endowed with authority to develop policy and strategy. UNESCO recommended that such an authority ought to restructure the current institutions "with a view to integrating them into a coherent national system thus maximizing complementarity of [programs] and minimizing current duplications and imbalances" (UNESCO 1994a, 4).

Up to the Gulf War (1991) about 75 percent of the financing of the Universities and Colleges came from external sources, namely from the

Arab Gulf States. After the war, these subsidies dropped precipitously leaving these institutions in dire financial straits. Tuition fees covered less than 10 percent of the overall costs. Thus the higher education sector depended on heavy subsidies from the PLO (PNA/MOHE 1997, 8-9). Today all the institutions of the tertiary sector face a severe financial crisis. Abu-Lughod suggests that the existing needs of the universities can be met if the PA were to allocate an annual subsidy of $50 million to this sector as a whole. Abu-Lughod concludes; "Now that the Palestinian Authority is empowered to address the needs of Palestinian society, surely it must assign a value to higher education that is equal to that of law and order. Without its minimal support for higher education, the system is likely to remain on the 'critical list' of society" (Abu-Lughod 2000, 95). Thus, as with the pre-university sector, the question of finances and scarce resources is of crucial importance.

Structure and Leadership of the MOE

The founding of the MOE and the MOHE, 1994 and 1996 respectively, signaled the creation of institutional frameworks whereby authority of education was put in Palestinian hands. Given the size of the constituency served by the MOE, much of the discussion in the rest of this chapter will focus on the pre-university education sector. The discussion of tertiary education is mostly limited to the problems associated with the scarcity of resources and finances. Thus for the first time in their history Palestinians are in a position to develop and articulate a unified vision to set national educational goals and strategies. The primary questions to be addressed in this section include: How is the MOE structured and organized? How does the absence of geographic contiguity of the Palestinian controlled territories affect these structures? Creating a coherent and unified Palestinian identity can be facilitated by the centralizing of educational authority. However, is a centralized mode conducive to local and non-governmental participation? Are the Intifada educators and NGO activists (discussed in chapter 5) included in the formulation of educational plans, and if so in what capacity?

The MOE was created by the PA and is endowed with executive functions over the education sector, including: general administration, planning and policy making, budgeting, monitoring, evaluation, and the issuing of certificates. It presides over a system which is organized along three tiers: central and regional and district levels. The central level is the actual Ministry. Its basic organizational structure has remained constant since its inception. The Minister is appointed by the President of the PA

and confirmed by the PLC, and is a member of the Council of Ministers, and a Deputy Minister.

Yasser H. Amro, the first Minister of education is a political appointee. He has no expertise in education, though he did also head the PLO's education department. He hails from Hebron, an important geographic constituency for Arafat, and has been a member of the Palestine National Council of the PLO since its founding in 1964. In addition, he has been a member of the Palestinian Central Council since 1970. In effect, he represents the old guard leadership which helped Arafat consolidate his leadership over the PLO. He obtained a law degree from Damascus University (Syria) in 1960. He retired in 1999, but was not formally replaced until 2002. Instead, Dr. Naim Abu Hommos, the deputy minister, served as acting minister, until he was formally appointed as the Minister in 2002. He holds a Ed.D. in Curriculum and Instruction from the University of San Francisco, 1980. From 1989 to 1994 he served as Secretary-General of the Council for Higher Education.[12]

The Deputy Minister is served by two Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM), one for the West Bank and the other for Gaza. The ADM for Gaza also presides over the MOE headquarters in Gaza, referred to as the Technical Office. The political state of flux, namely the absence of a final settlement to the conflict with Israel, has impinged and continues to do so on the structure and method of work of the MOE. Namely, given the geographic separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, the MOE though centrally located in the city of Ramallah in the West Bank, is required to have parallel structures in both regions. The Gaza Technical Office houses part of each Directorate. Thus, the absence of geographic contiguity complicates the administration of the education sector, and forces much duplication of effort. The Minister and Deputy Minister of Education, under normal circumstances, spend two days per week in Gaza. However, when the West Bank and Gaza are sealed off due to Israeli imposed closures, it is easier for the Minister of Education to travel to New York than to reach Gaza. For example, since the start of al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, MOE officials from the West Bank have been unable to reach Gaza due to the closures.

In 1994 the professional and administrative affairs of the Ministry were run by 12 Directorates, and since 1998 it has expanded to 16. Each Directorate is presided by a Director General.[13] The 16 Directorates are divided into 46 Departments, and the latter were subdivided into 135 Divisions. In addition, the education system is divided into 17 districts, 12 in the West Bank, one for Jerusalem, and four in Gaza. The district offices provide direct supervision over the schools in such matters as: student

admissions; appointment, transfer, training and promotion of teachers; and the monitoring and auditing of school finances. In 1995 the central Ministry employed approximately 160 staff members, and by 1999 the number has more than doubled to about 350.[14]

The structure of the central education administration is the result of grafting a new structure (central) onto the preexisting district structure inherited from the period of Israeli rule and before. The central apparatus has recruited personnel from the PLO's education department, the universities, and from the Council of Higher Education. In contrast, the district education directorates are headed by a Director of Education, who is served by two assistants. School principals and teachers are the most important assets of this sector. In particular, the principals have much experience but little training in modern administration. The teachers in the schools have learned how to teach on the job, but many are in need of professional development. They are less than happy with their current incomes. Despite the rapid rise in the cost of living, wages are quite low. This condition has sparked numerous strikes by the teachers demanding higher pay.

The MOE's official organization chart provides for the creation of an independent Council of Education, to serve as an advisory body to the Minister, and to provide oversight on behalf of civil society. According to a World Bank report, there is no "elected body of governors to make or advise on sectoral policy—the Educational Council that has appeared on the Ministry of Education's table of organization for years has never convened and will probably be eliminated in the next revision of the Ministry's organization chart" (World Bank 1999, 47).[15]

In addition to the formal staff, the Ministry relies on the advice of a number of Palestinian and international expert consultants. The latter represent the various international donor agencies. Some of the Palestinian consultants were affiliated with the various NGOs who shaped the parameters of education discourse during the intifada (see chapter 5). The consulting services of these individuals is offered in their capacity as "experts" rather than as educators affiliated with social movements as discussed in chapter 3. The Ministry seeks the input of NGOs specializing in education, but on an ad hoc basis. This point needs some elaboration.

Khalil Mahshi until 2002 served as the Director General of International Relations of the Ministry. During the intifada he played a pivotal role in the articulation of a critical and liberating vision for Palestinian education.[16] He served as Principal of the Friends school in Ramallah and was integrally involved with the Palestinian NGOs. He was one of the first educators to be recruited by the nascent MOE. His

educational philosophy was formed under occupation and in the context of resistance. Abla Nasser, who was the director of Tamer Institute until early 2000, identified him as the one person in the MOE who has tried to open the Ministry to critical input from the community of education activists. However she maintains that no formal structure for coordination and cooperation exists between the Ministry and the NGO sector. She told me, "we are asked for our individual input on a select number of discrete projects. They use us to benefit from our expertise, but we [NGO sector] want to create a partnership with the Ministry."[17] Two days prior to my interview with Abla Nasser, Khalil Mahshi confirmed the absence of a structured partnership with the NGOs.[18]

I probed this matter with Dr. Fouad Moughrabi. He is on leave from the University of Tennessee (political science), and heads the Qattan Center for Educational Research and Development.[19] The Qattan Center had planned to convene, in November 2000, an international forum on: "How To Make Palestinian Schools More Effective." The conference has been postponed due to the deterioration of the situation and the rising toll of Palestinian lives in connection with the Aqsa Intifada. In this connection, I asked Fouad Moughrabi (2 December 2000) to respond to a few questions submitted to him via Email correspondence. The questions posed to him included: Does your work [Qattan Foundation] occasion systematic and cooperative work with the Ministry? Does your work affect the Ministry's thinking, or is your work essentially independent? Do you see evidence that the Ministry has established a formal framework to seek systematic input from independent organizations like yours? His response is quite revealing:

> We have told the Ministry that our work [research] should help them accomplish quite a few things and that we want to work with them. But they are unresponsive. Worse still they are at times hostile. Just last night I was [informed by one of our staff] that a key Ministry official who was visited by some of our researchers...said he has orders not to cooperate with us. Yet at other times they tell us that they are willing to cooperate and will distribute our newsletter to all their schools. The Ministry does not have a formal system of dealing with independent centers here. Often the [MOE] does not know what the MOHE is doing...The hostility is intense when it comes to the curriculum unit. Salah Yassin [Director of the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center],...feels very threatened by us despite my efforts to reassure him that we do not intend to debunk their work...What they have produced so far is garbage and it is widely criticized by teachers in every area.[20]

The organizational structure and mode of operation of the MOE is not conducive for the creation of a partnership with the innovative educators who occupied center stage during the intifada. As shown above, both the World Bank and independent Palestinian educators conclude that the centralization of the Ministry leaves no room for oversight, let alone programmatic cooperation between the Ministry and Palestinian civil society. Thus, the Ministry formulates policies, without substantial input from the activist NGO sector. To be fair to the Ministry, many of the NGOs lack professional expertise. In this connection, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod notes, "the Ministry [viewpoint], with some justification, is that NGOs are really dakakin [shops or small enterprises] supported by foreign money."[21] The claim is not completely inaccurate.[22] However, it should be noted that some of the NGOs (e.g., Tamer Institute) were established well before the formation of the PA. To stay economically viable some of these NGOs had to compete for funds, made available by the World Bank and other international agencies. The prevailing realities thus make the Ministry open and responsive to the donors, by virtue of the latter's provision of "political rent," a matter discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Education and Palestinian Development Priorities

Chapter Four has demonstrated that donor-led development and political rent failed to create a comprehensive Palestinian development plan. Instead, it has been shown that Palestinian development is to a great extent contingent on donor largesse, which has enabled the PA to expand its control and centralization of power, and that this is also reflected in the practices of various ministries, including the MOE. These practices by the central authority (PA) have narrowed the public space for civic participation in both political and development issues. In fact the situation of the PA, despite the historical and ideological differences, resembles the postcolonial predicament in a number of societies that aimed for autonomous egalitarian development, as Samoff captures in the Tanzanian case:

> In sum, influenced by theories of modernization and still heavily reliant on external sources of capital, skills, and technology, independent Tanzania's leaders initially sought and largely followed foreign development advice. By the mid-1960s, however, their initial optimism had been tempered by frustration. Rapid modernization, social harmony, and international cooperation all seemed in jeopardy....Tanzania's marginal situation in global terms both imposed constraints. Its leaders gained some maneuvering

> room from the former British administration's and international capital's relative disinterest. At the same time, the process of development left little foundation--neither a dynamic economic sector with a self-sustaining increase in productivity nor an organized and increasingly self-conscious subordinate class--on which socialism could be built (Samoff 1990, 219).

The absence of a national social and development plan compounds the problem of articulating a vision and plan for the education sector. The failure or inability to produce a vision that would enjoy national consensus forces the MOE to base its plans on creative speculation. Khalil Mahshi, in his capacity as the Director General of International Relations of the MOE, has played a central role in the preparation of multi-year education development plans: A Three Year Plan (1998-2000) was first issued in 1997, and by 1998 it was subjected to at least three revisions. The Three Year Plan (TYP) was produced as the education sector plan for inclusion in the PDP (1998-2000). By 1998 the MOE started the process of formulating a more ambitious Five Year Plan (FYP), and it has undergone at least two major revisions.[23] Despite the fact that Arabic is the language of the country, these plans are first written in English because their intended audience is the donor community. The adoption of English also facilitates the input and advisory role of the consultants who work and represent the international agencies of the donors. For example, the Arabic version of the FYP was issued months later, towards the end of 2000.[24] The English version is punctuated with the vocabulary of the internationally accepted development paradigms. Once these formulations are in place, they are then reflected in the Arabic version as a given. Thus, the process of national discussion and deliberation is anchored to and limited by the language (meanings) of internationally sanctioned vocabularies and paradigms.

In the absence of clearly articulated national visions and development plans, Khalil Mahshi speculates as to what they could or should be:

> For education to serve the process of national development it has to fit within a *long-term vision* for Palestine on which consensus has been built. The PA has not so far formulated such a vision. Without it, the MOE feels handicapped in formulating its policies and drawing its development plans. It [MOE] has, however, made the best informed guesses about where Palestine will be heading economically, politically, socially, culturally and in its relationship with neighboring countries and the international community at large. Palestine is oriented towards a free market economy. It will encourage the private sector and will try to attract foreign investment. It will increase free trade with other countries once Israeli border restrictions are lifted. It seems inevitable that Palestine will be

> affected by globalization, whether by its positive or negative aspects and consequences. In such a context, education has to be modern and forward looking. The curriculum has to focus on foreign languages, science, technology, information technology and telecommunications. These areas will help graduates to find jobs in fields such as tourism, services, business and trade, information technology and telecommunications. Palestinians can find a place for themselves in such fields and compete with others countries in the region. The Palestinian leadership has to shape up to this challenge and embark, as soon as possible, on the process of creating the badly needed long-term vision which has the blessing and support of society at large.[25]

A close reading of the plans shows the abundant use of the accepted neoliberal vocabulary, which embraces values including: free trade, free market, foreign investment, and the private sector. Indeed these objectives are also featured in the TYP and the FYP. To be fair to Khalil Mahshi, both he and the MOE as a whole have also articulated the need for a vision which emanates from the values cherished by Palestinian society.[26] But can these values be advanced if the primary goal of education is to favor the teaching of science and technology? Is such an approach akin to the technicalization of knowledge, and if so how does this affect educational priorities? What does the adoption of the "Education For All" paradigm, discussed in Chapter Two, include, and what does it leave out of its purview? Is there room for critical thinking in such a context? What is meant by "vision"? These questions are broached in the section below.

The Formulation of Educational Plans: The Process

A vision is not simply a statement which articulates a series of abstract principles. Rather it is a societal commitment to a common and shared purpose. Thus, the formation and the articulation of a vision results from a thorough, deliberative, and participatory process, based on extensive consultations and public debates. The construction of a national vision requires the participation of society through an open yet structured debate. The adoption of a vision does not preclude the presence of other visions, but in fact assumes the existence and persistence of competing visions. For an educational system a vision can be built around various goals: quality, meeting basic needs, and/or universal access. Giving primacy to one of these objectives can preclude other objectives. Thus, the outcome of the debate cannot be agreed to a priori, but should emanate from the public debate, so that the public can understand the difficult choices that will be made, and their consequences.[27]

The MOE tried to organize a public meeting to debate the issues surrounding the formulation of a vision. However, the plans for convening such a forum have yet to be carried out.[28] As noted in chapter 5, in 1993-94, prior to the establishment of the PA, various NGOs organized public fora to discuss the requisites of a desired vision for Palestinian education.[29] UNESCO in conjunction with the Council for Higher Education sponsored a conference in Jerusalem to probe the requisites for an innovative vision for Palestinian education (Leonard 1994, 9-10). In 1994 representatives of the Educational Coordinating Committee (ECC) met with both the Minister and deputy Minister of Education to discuss the relations between the MOE and the NGOs. The NGO representatives were invited to provide feedback on the MOE's comprehensive strategy paper for the education sector. The ECC expressed the hope that such meetings would lead to the creation of a participatory mechanism to insure their input in the articulation of a national vision for education. [30] In addition, a number of MOE officials and education experts (Education Working Group) met in 1995 to identify the elements needed to formulate a "comprehensive vision" for Palestinian education. Such a vision would require the creation of a "specialized agency for co-ordination among the government and non-government bodies involved in the development of educational plans and their implementation" (UNESCO 1995a, 124).

All of the activities described above indicate a desire among various sectors of Palestinian society to play a role in the shaping of educational visions and plans. No matter how useful these public meetings were, they have not led to the formation of formal structures to regulate relations between government and society. These meetings provided a forum for MOE officials to report on the progress of their work and thinking. The officials and experts who spoke can be likened to a teacher imbued with the "banking approach" (Freire 1973) to education, which is based on the transmission of information from teacher to pupil. The official (teacher) possesses all essential information, whereas the student is like an empty vessel needing to be filled with knowledge. Thus the official (teacher) talks and the pupil (conference participant) absorbs passively. Such a process (model) does not invite critical participation, thus the results tend to confirm and affirm the contents of the reports prepared by the staff of the ministry and their international consultant collaborators.

From 1997 and onwards the policy formulation process has become increasingly technicalized to conform with donor expectations. It is in such a context and framework that the TYP and FYP have been developed and presented to the donors. In the 1994-96 period, MOE plans sought donor financing for projects on an individual basis. Since then (see chapter

4), donor aid has moved away from project-focused to sector wide program support. The Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) was initially articulated by the World Bank in 1995 with reference to its Africa sector lending and investment program (Harrold 1995). The SWAp is a method of working. One of its distinctive features is the condition whereby governments take responsibility for setting policies, priorities and standards which apply to all public sector activity. Mick Foster defines it as a condition where all "significant funding supports a single sector policy and expenditure [program] under Government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, with progress towards using Government procedures to disburse and account for funds" (Foster 2000). In effect, the SWAp requires aid recipients to develop new ways of managing aid, to meet donor satisfaction.

The development of national education plans and programs need to go through a series of steps. First, the MOE established a management structure for the development of the FYP. A planning committee, composed of senior staff, is chaired by the deputy Minister of Education. This committee was served by consultants from UNESCO and IIEP. Second, upon the completion of the 1999 draft, the FYP was presented to an International Workshop (October 1999) organized by the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) and the MOE.[31] Participants in this conference included representatives of the Ministries of Education, Higher Education, Labor, Planning and International Cooperation. In addition, representatives of the donors and international and Palestinian NGOs were included. In presenting the FYP to Workshop participants, Khalil Mahshi dubbed it as a "tool" for discussion, and invited feedback.[32] However, upon examining the new draft (28 June 2000), it becomes evident that the plan has been enhanced not by popular input but by experts: statisticians, economists and econometricians, who are well versed with the requirements and vocabulary of donor development paradigms. The input of these experts is quite valuable. I do not question their expertise or their important contributions. But such a process prevents or filters out input from locally based groups and citizens. The narrowing of public participation and deliberation undermines the principle and goal of education that the MOE has articulated, namely, to develop the value of democratic citizenship.

Third, and most importantly the finished product (FYP) was presented to the meetings of the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG). France is the ESWG Shepard, the Gavel Holder is the Director General of International Relations of the Ministry of Education, and UNICEF serves as the Secretariat. According to the Finnish consultants, this ESWG is

recognized by the donors as the "most effective of all SWGs, going beyond the exchange of information to joint problem analysis and policy discussions with the sector's donors." Lister adds that the success of this SWG is in part due to "an energetic and effective Shepard (France) and the pro-active stance of the Gavel Holder [Khalil Mahshi]. [The] MOE has been unusually self-critical and open to advice from its partners..." (Lister 2000, 8). In addition, based on my experience, several MOE officials are more than willing to share information and to provide unpublished documents to researchers. Indeed, when compared with the PA's development plans, the Ministry of Education's FYP is technically more proficient than other sector reports. Though public fora are held to share information and seek public input from experts and members of professionalized and depoliticized NGOs (chapter 3, B.1), the reality is that critical decisions about plans and priorities for Palestinian education are made in these (ESWG) meetings.[33] The reason for this is simple. If the FYP stands a chance to be implemented, the development expenditure of the Education Plan will have to be funded by the donors (PNA/MOE 1999, 34; PNA/MOE 2000, 15-16).

As noted in Chapter Four, the PA has adopted the World Bank's CDF approach. In the education sector, the planning of the FYP is further along than the draft CDF which the Bank introduced to the ESWG in March 2000. The Finnish consultants consider that the FYP has clear "local ownership," whereas the "Palestinian participation in the draft education CDF has been much more superficial." But, Lister notes that both the FYP and the CDF have a shared focus, namely basic education (Lister 2000, Vol I, 19). Simply put, the most important national priority is to upgrade and develop the quality of basic education. Thus though different teams of experts produced the two plans, they have never the less reached the same conclusions with regards to public policy. The close correspondence of the two approaches is due to the fact that the respective teams have used the same assumptions, and the same sources of data.

Not unlike other experiences in developing countries like Tanzania (Samoff 1990), the MOE policy vacillates between reliance on mass support and distrust of mass participation. Thus notwithstanding the rhetoric of mass participation as suggested by the CDF approach (chapter 4), educational policy making is highly centralized. The discourse which the MOE conducts is disproportionally influenced by the assumptions and requirements of the donors. However, both the donors and the MOE are keen to ascertain the extent of their customers' (public) level of satisfaction with the delivery of services. The level of public satisfaction with the educational delivery system is gauged through polling data and

public opinion surveys, rather than through an active engagement with the public. In this connection, the MOE cooperated with a World Bank sponsored "client survey to assess consumer satisfaction with education, as well as with other public services."[34] But almost in the next sentence the World Bank's study on public expenditure review, is quick to point out that "the customers' (or their parents) can properly evaluate only the visible dimensions of the school system. Do teachers show up for work? Is the school building in reasonable physical condition? Do the children have textbooks? Is the physical equipment in the play yard in safe condition?" (World Bank 1999,7).

The World Bank sponsored consumer satisfaction survey was conducted in conjunction with the preparation of its study on aid effectiveness, and how it impacts people on the ground (World Bank 2000). In this connection, the World Bank commissioned the Palestine Research Center in Nablus to conduct a national public opinion survey. A total of 1,253 persons were polled from 120 locales in the West Bank and Gaza. The random sample asked Palestinians "what they thought of the aid effort" (World Bank 2000, xvi). Sixty percent of the respondents hold a positive view of donor performance (xvii). The performance of the PA in the education sector in 1996 was positively appraised by 78 percent of the public[35] The aid effectiveness survey produced equally positive results. About 79 percent expressed satisfaction with improvements in school facilities, while 71 percent "reported improvements in education quality over the past five years" (World Bank 2000, 67).

The advocates of the "free market" maintain that consumer satisfaction—freedom of choice—is tantamount to public participation (Friedman 1999). In other words markets are viewed as surrogates of democracy because they allow the consumer to vote on a daily basis.[36] But the choices a consumer makes "are about individual needs and desires; whereas political choices are public, about the nature of public goods" (Barber 2001, 296). In this context the citizen is reduced to a mere consumer whose needs are shaped by public policy. But a democratic order requires citizens to be autonomous enough to be able to decide not just what they should consume but whether they should consume at all. Given the imperatives of the policy process discussed above, the Palestinian public has been reduced to play the role of a consumer and not that of an active citizen.

Educational Priorities and Reforms: 1994-2000

> Palestine faces the exciting historical challenge...to create a unified, national education system. The Palestinians... [envision] an educational

> system which will anchor education as a human right for each citizen, [and]... will provide a strong foundation for durable peace and just and equitable economic and social development[.]...[It] will [instill]...in the youth the qualities and values...[required] to build and maintain a civil and democratic society, as well as to manage the institutions of a modern state. The vision includes the realistic premise that Palestine will gear up to compete regionally and globally in an open economy....Education is expected to impart the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values to achieve this [vision] (FYP 28 June 2000, chapter III, 1).

The MOE's articulated vision includes the Palestinian quest for the pursuit of peace, justice, equity, and democracy. Education is expected to transmit the skills and values which are needed to attain these ideals. As laudable as these ideals might be, they do not constitute a clear and coherent vision for education. The goals they list are so general that they are not self-implementing, they lack a clear roadmap for implementation. Furthermore, to be truly effective, these goals need to be the result of a serious and intense dialogue among Palestinians that would make such goals, principles, objectives, and methods part of a shared vision for the future. If such a shared vision existed, it would provide a basis on which Palestinian society could hold accountable the administrators, thereby enhancing both democratic practices and the efficacy of policy-making.

Instead, the MOE has arrived at five principles to guide its efforts at reforming the basic and secondary education cycles. The five articulated principles are: 1) Education is a human right; 2) Education is for citizenship; 3) Education is an instrument for socio-economic development; 4) Education is an instrument for values and democracy; 5) Education is a continuous lifelong process (PNA/MOE 2000, chapter II, 2-3). The second and fourth principles will be discussed in connection with the development of the Palestinian curriculum in Chapter Seven.

As shown in Table 6.1, the five principles are translated into five general goals, and each goal has additional detailed objectives. In discussing the MOE's educational reforms, this chapter will focus on only two challenges facing the educational system: access and equity, and quality. In this connection, the Palestinian Authority's national development plans and accompanying budgets have adopted the "Education For All" model, giving primacy to basic education, as the centerpiece of its public policy. The MOE, the key institution of the Executive branch of the PA, is entrusted with the implementation of this model.

The "Education For All" model emerged from the 1990 international conference on international education held in Thailand. The conference was sponsored by the UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank

(UNESCO 1991, volumes I, II, III). Inspired by the International Declaration of Human Rights, conference participants concluded that education for all is a basic human right. Building on this approach, the World Bank issued its report on educational priorities, and the Education Sector policy report (World Bank 1995, 1999).[37]

Table 6.1: Goals and Objectives of the MOE Five Year Plan: 2000/01 to 2004/05

I.	Access to education for all children
	1. Full access to all children of school entrance age to grade one.
	2. Incorporation of all Returnee children to grades 1-12.
	3. Increase enrollment rates of the seventh grade to close to 100%.
	5. Increase access to Basic Education (grades 1-10) for all children in under-served areas (e.g., rural).
II.	Improvement of the quality of education
	1. Full adoption of the unified Palestinian curriculum by 2004/5 in all grades (1-12).
	2. Provide students with new textbooks and teaching materials.
	3. Upgrade the quality of school facilities and buildings.
	4. Improve quality of teaching.
	5. Develop and expand extra-curricular activities.
	6. Strengthen the assessment and evaluation system.
III.	Develop formal and non-formal education
	1. Enact and apply the Education Law.
	2. Expand vocational and technical training at the secondary level.
	3. Expand pre-school education.
	4. Encourage the development of more private schools.
	5. Expand adult literacy programs.
	6. Coordinate with UNRWA.
IV.	Develop management capacity in planning, administration, and finance
	1. Improve management capacity at all levels (school, district, central).
	2. Develop monitoring capabilities.
	3. Prepare and implement a plan for the decentralization of educational and managerial activities and decisions.
V.	Develop the human resources of the education sector
	1. Develop in-service training.

2. Improve pre-service training. 3. Develop staff administration skills. 4. Develop and strengthen the supervision system. 5. Coordinate and benefit from education and training provided by universities and other institutions. 6. Develop the school as a unit for development. 7. Strengthen the cooperation between the education sector and the international community.
Source: Data is extrapolated from, FYP (18 June 2000, 4-6).

In many ways all of these texts are complementary. They view education from the prism of human resource development, which posits education as a key asset for the promotion of modernization. This approach gives primacy to the development of skills, which has been characterized in Chapter Two as the technicalization of knowledge, but leaves little room for the development of critical thinking skills. In addition, this model calls on the state to be the principal source for the financing of basic education. The model also emphasizes the value and importance of vocational and technical training as well as higher education. However, given resource limitations, the state's function in the latter domain is to be limited to the provision of supervision and coordination of the tertiary sector. The financing of this sector should come from the private sector and from the consumers.

The MOE's stated policy of favoring the science and technology components of education in conjunction with its adoption of the "Education for All" model reflect the PA's development objectives and priorities. As shown in chapter four the PA defines development in terms of modernization as opposed to social transformation. This conception gives education a functional value—students need to acquire skills, and schools need to serve as recruitment filters for most of the wage labor force. Furthermore, on behalf of the donors, international experts are urging the MOE to develop the capability for setting standards and the measurement and attainment of standards, to better monitor and assess student and teacher performance (World Bank 2000, 40). These are very important but insufficient functions of education. As noted in Chapter Two, when education is viewed as a black box which produces outputs, it eliminates the notion of process from the educational enterprise. But education is all about process: curriculum development, teacher training, learning environments. Children need nurturing that goes beyond the mastery of cognitive skills and knowledge. Instead of reducing their sights

to serving the amorphous market, they need to learn how to think critically, to engage in cooperative learning, and to discover their potentials, and ultimately to generate, master, develop, discover, and create knowledge. (Lauglo 1996; Samoff 1996; Greene 1988; Smith 1990; Ayers 1993; and Freire 1973, 1994). Clearly, it is too early to assess the appropriateness of these claims. The data on outcomes, if available, is too scant. Instead, a useful critique of this paradigm does not depend on evidence from the real world to question the claims and representations of these models. Rather, one needs to examine the flawed nature of the method and its assumptions.[38] The essence of the argument, presented more fully in Chapter Two, is reproduced here. First, if education is to emphasize the mastery only of basic cognitive skills, what happens to learning? If standards are set a priori, then education is reduced to a black box that produces outputs. Finally, as Lauglo points out, the emphasis on basic skills runs the risk for support of complacency about a style of teaching in which pupils are passive recipients of subject-matter knowledge which teachers dole out (Lauglo 1996, 224). Seen from this prism, education is guided by the banker's cost-benefit analysis rather than the critical educator's need for contingency and interaction.

Access and Equity

Of the five goals listed in Table 6.1, registering tangible progress in the first two is the most important priority for the MOE (PNA/MOE 18 June 2000, Chapter III, 2). Access to schooling, in tangible terms, requires the availability of enough school buildings, classrooms, teachers, school books, and other school supplies. This need is exacerbated by the rapid growth of the population. In 1999 the population of the WBG was estimated at over 3 million, with an annual population growth of about 4 percent—one of the highest growth rates in the world (PCBS 1999). Part of the increase is due to the number of Palestinian returnees. The WBG population is not only growing but is very young as well. The median age (1999) hovers around 16.4 years. Rapid rates of population growth increase the demands on the social delivery system—education, health, and other social services.

One source estimates that annual outlays in the education sector will have to increase by about 64 percent between 1996 and 2010, if the MOE is to maintain existing ratios student/teacher and student/classroom ratios (Pederson and Hooper 1998, 57). Sue Berryman of the World Bank projects that the PA will have to construct 50 new schools annually over the next ten years, to accommodate rising enrollment rates. By 2020

school enrollment is expected to double requiring an increase in the number of schools from 1,357 (1993-94) to about 2,700 schools by the year 2020 (Berryman 1999, 163).

In its first four years at the helm, between the academic years 1994/95 and 1998/99, the MOE had to accommodate a 36 percent increase in student enrollment. The sharp rise in student population, as discussed in Chapter Five, is due to high rates of population growth, and a large number of returnees. In this period the number of students rose from 645,697 to 889,895. Enrollment rates, in the peak year (1996/7), rose by 10 percent. The rates of growth however are uneven, for example, in the same period, enrollment rates in Gaza increased by 49 percent, adding a heavy burden on the MOE to insure access to all. Despite these increases, as shown in Table 6.2, the MOE managed to increase the enrollment rates for basic education (grades 1-10) from 93.6 percent (1997/98) to 96.8 percent (1999/2000). The MOE projects enrollment rates to reach 98 percent by the academic year 2004/5. Rates of enrollment for secondary education (grades 11-12) have increased from 51.6 percent (1997/98) to 56.9 percent (1999/2000). The objective of the FYP is to increase this rate to 68.1 percent by 2004/05.

Table 6.2: Gross Enrollment Rates and Gender Breakdown 1997/98 to 1999/2000, Projections for 2000/01 to 2004/5

Gross Enrollment Rate*	97/98	98/99	99/00	01	01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05
Basic (Grades 1-10)	93.6%	95.3%	96.8%	97.9%	98.2%	98.2%	98.4%	98%
Secondary (Grades 11-12)	51.6%	53.6%	56.9%	59.9%	62.7%	64.2%	64.6%	68.1%
Enrollment of Girls per 100 Boys								

Basic (Grades 1-10)	98	98	98	98	99	100	100	101
Secondary (Grades 11-12)	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103

Source: Ministry of Education, FYP (18 June 2000, chapter III, 8).
* Gross enrollment represents the percentage of the school age cohort which is in school

To accommodate rising enrollment rates, the MOE with donor funding, supervised 429 construction projects between 1994-98.[39] These projects included the construction of 152 new schools, the rehabilitation of 374 schools, and the addition of a total of 3,764 classrooms, at a cost of about $108 million.[40] As a result of the expansion of physical capacity, the student/classroom ratio has improved slightly. In 1998/99 it stood at 35.4, as compared to 35.9 in 1994/5. Without timely donor support, these ratios would have reached 43.1 in the West Bank and 66.7 in Gaza (World Bank 2000, 39). Despite the great and rising need for the construction of more schools, Khalil Mahshi notes that during its first four years of existence, the "PA has not been able to include school construction in the national budget."[41] However, this inability has not prevented the PA from gaining political capital from the construction activity. In this connection, the launching and completion of each project is accompanied with a formal announcement followed by a public celebration attended and presided by MOE and other PA officials. They imparted a simple public message: the Palestinian Authority is working hard for you. News of these developments are reported in the print media, and broadcast on the PA's radio and television station, to maximize the political capital of the achievement.

By expanding physical plant capacity, the MOE sought to eliminate double-shift schools. This policy objective was considered as unrealistic and not cost-effective. One World Bank study advocates the virtues of the double-shifting of schools as a "more efficient use of the physical plant." This study also claims that running schools on a double shift basis would not "compromise annual instructional time." Such constraints, the study adds, "are forcing even countries such as the United States to move to double shift schools to accommodate enrollment pressures" (World Bank

1997, 13). Another study concurs with the need to optimize the utilization of space, but warns that this remedy "has some disadvantages" (World Bank 2000, 39). Though the MOE has not formally abandoned its policy objective, in practice it has succumbed to these economic constraints, but it hopes either to maintain current levels or to reduce them gradually (Ministry of Education, FYP, 18 June 2000, chapter III, 8). The MOE believed that getting rid of double-shift schools would improve the quality of education. But now, as Khalil Mahshi explains, "it is debating whether double-shift schooling can be utilized to improve quality instead of being one of the causes of poor quality schooling" (Mahshi 1999, 11). He points to the possibility that double-shifting could free up scarce funds which can be invested in quality improvement projects. However, the evidence to support such a claim is not readily available, which leads one to conclude that the MOE and Khalil Mahshi are making a virtue out of necessity.

To accommodate rising student enrollments the MOE, between 1994 and 1999, increased the teaching staff of the public sector by 42 percent. In the same span of time teachers holding a university degree increased from 36 percent to more than 47 percent (World Bank 2000, 38). The rise of the size of the teaching staff is one important factor in improving the overall student-teacher ratio from 31.5 in 1994 to about 28.7 in 2000 in the PA administered school system in West Bank and Gaza.[42] The West Bank ratio is 27.9 as contrasted with 31.4 for Gaza. In the same year the ratio in UNRWA run schools in both the West Bank and Gaza is substantially higher (39.5).[43]

Teachers are quite unsatisfied with the prevailing rates of remuneration. The MOE is quite aware of this fact, and believes that the salary structure should be improved substantially. The Minister of Education, Yasser Amro, expressed his support for the teachers' demand for salary increases. He said that finances are very tight and donors cannot be approached to augment their assistance to increase salaries (Al-Quds, 13 February 1996). In addition, this matter is beyond the Ministry's jurisdiction. Teachers, as civil servants, receive their salaries from the Finance Ministry, which simply has no more resources to allocate to the education sector. The diminutive salary scale has an adverse effect on the teachers' motivation and performance. For example, many male teachers seek second jobs. The patriarchal structure of Palestinian society requires females to shoulder most of the responsibilities of the household. Thus female teachers are saddled with additional full-time work of unpaid labor (Taraki 1997; Hammami 1997).

Teachers played an important role during the intifada, by organizing strikes to resist Israeli occupation, and by providing informal schooling to

students during Israeli imposed closures. Now, as civil servants of the PA they have reorganized their trade unions and are lobbying the PA to reform the Civil Service and Labor Law.[44] To improve their working conditions, the teachers have organized workshops, teach-ins, local and general strikes, but the PA has been unable to respond and act on their demands.[45] The unhappiness and low motivation of the teachers can have a deleterious effect on the quality of teaching.

The policy aim of the MOE is to expand schools rapidly and to simultaneously reduce inequalities in access to schooling. This goal has been partially achieved by securing donor assistance, by reducing expenditures per pupil, and by maximizing the use of physical plant. The evidence presented above shows that the education sector has absorbed the increasing number of students, but serious inequalities remain between Gaza and the West Bank, between the cities and the rural areas, and between public schools and UNRWA schools which serve refugees. Thus in the tension between expansion of access and equity, the balance seems to have shifted toward the former.

Quality of Education

Most educators would agree that improvements in the quality of education take time and resources. This challenge is articulated by Sue Berryman of the World Bank:

> Quantitative reforms have a particular and difficult political economy, especially when compared with reforms that increase access to education. Increasing access requires adding inputs--building new schools, hiring more teachers, and purchasing more textbooks and equipment. This kind of reform usually enjoys broad political support, as the benefits are visible, broadly distributed, rapid, and fairly certain. However, as quality reforms take much longer, their results are less visible and much less certain. Implementing quality reforms places greater demands on the systems' management capacity for a longer period of time. It requires changes in the classroom behaviors of thousands of teachers, which implies adjustments to teacher training and incentives (Berryman 1999, 166).

Schools need to be equipped with resources (science and computer labs, art and music labs), schools need to be refurbished, textbooks and teaching materials need to be produced and updated. Schools need libraries with updated and current holdings. Curricula need to be rewritten and modernized, a matter which is analyzed in Chapter Seven. Methods of assessment, measurement, and evaluation need to be developed. They must institute or expand co-curricular activities including, competitive

athletics, student clubs (debate, drama, chess, music), student run school newspapers, and the publishing of school yearbooks.

The school unit needs to be transformed into a center of meaningful learning that gives primacy to critical thinking rather than rote learning. In this connection, Frank Smith notes:

> The thinking and learning power of children is enormous. We have in our classrooms both the individuals and the imaginative possibilities required for the creation of better realities tomorrow. Our best hope is to provide environments where everyone is given the opportunity, support, and freedom—to think (Smith 1990, 132-33).

Such a learning environment would challenge teachers and students alike to recognize that knowledge can and should be challenged. Thus education can be conceptualized as a way of encouraging people to think for themselves, to think against authority and orthodoxy, to think in terms not of acquiescence and agreement but in terms of skepticism and creative dissent.[46] This form of emancipatory education enables students to explore alternative possibilities.

One of the most creative Palestinian educators, Munir Fasheh—the founder of the Tamer Institute—(see chapter 5), has repeatedly told me that quality education does not rely on modern curricula as much as on creative and resourceful teachers. He told me, "give me a great curriculum and a bad teacher and you will have no education. Conversely, give me an adequate curriculum but a great teacher and you will have quality education."[47] Educators are asked to nurture students, but to succeed they also need nurturing. From this perspective, the professional development of teachers is not only to improve their knowledge base of the subject and new pedagogies. Instead it can be viewed as a "personal journey to find appreciation and meaning in one's work" (Guskey and Huberman 1995, 2). Teacher training programs cannot be reduced to attending the occasional seminar or the participation in a workshop, instead teachers need to be involved in constant education.

To improve the quality of education involves a long-term commitment and poses an inordinate challenge to students, teachers, schools, and education systems as a whole. Clearly the MOE has not had the time nor the resources to tackle all of these challenges in their quest to improve the quality of education. Nevertheless, the MOE has begun to tackle some of these challenges, as articulated in the goals and objectives of the FYP (Table 6.4, II and V). In addition to curricular reform (chapter 7), the MOE has embarked on the improvement of physical plant, and the expansion and institution of in-service training for teachers.

In 1997 the MOE, in conjunction with the Department of International Development (UK), launched the "School Review Project."[48] The primary goal of the project is to empower and enable public schools, in various Directorates, to assume local responsibility for their development. In other words, the participating school is conceptualized as a development unit (Table 6.4, V, 6). In this capacity, the school appoints a development group, composed of a head teacher (e.g. a language or social studies supervisor) and three additional experienced teachers. They are mandated to diagnose the needs (strengths and weaknesses) of the school as a prelude to the articulation of a development and implementation plan for the improvement of their school. Prior to commencing their work, each development group receives training from the central Ministry in a variety of areas including: management of meetings, staff supervision, construction of plans, time management, and communications. During the first year, the development plans focused on: teaching and learning; and the cultivation of links to the community (e.g. parent-teacher associations).

In the first year (1997-98), 69 schools from various localities participated in the school review project. The development groups adumbrated modest plans, and recruited teachers from their schools to undergo training. To reduce the burden of time on the participating teachers, their teaching loads were reduced. In its second year (1998-99), 263 additional schools were incorporated in the project. The UK based Department of International Development is committed to fund the first three years of the project. Should the MOE secure continuous funding, it hopes to incorporate all schools in school-based development planning.

Not enough time has passed to yield sufficient data to assess the impact of the various teacher training programs. One needs to be reminded that this aspect of the education system was seriously neglected for more than 30 years. Thus the institution of any type of professional development for teachers can only be salutary. The Palestinian Authority has articulated, through the PDP, the desire to construct a democratic political order based on a just and more equitable social system. In turn the MOE, through the FYP, has proposed the construction of a critical education system that fosters the building a mature democratic society. It stands to reason, then, to expect that teacher training programs should be predicated on an approach that negates the process of the passive transfer of knowledge that is inherent in the banking approach to education. The members of the Palestinian Educational NGO Collective practice and favor training practices "which are participatory, empowering, experimental, continuous, and which encourage participants in training

courses to assume the responsibility for acting as agents of change in their own institutions and communities."[49]

Key players within the MOE have expressed similar sentiments to those articulated by the NGOs. Khalil Mahshi is indeed one of the Palestinian educators who has articulated such a vision in his writings and through his work during the intifada and in the institution building process. Said Assaf, who is directly responsible for the construction and implementation of teacher training programs, shares this vision as well. He believes that the education system should prepare students and teachers to "understand themselves, to comprehend the world around them, and through their actions to have an impact [transformative] on that world."[50] The promotion of such a democratic ethos stands at variance with the PA's increasingly authoritarian practices (as opposed to declarations). This poses a paradox: How can an institution (Ministry), or at least some of its key actors, promote a democratic and transformative vision, when the central authority (PA) practices the opposite?

Political Rent and the Financial Challenge: "It's the Money Stupid!"

The evidence presented in Chapter Four shows the vital impact of political rent in the consolidation of the PA's power base, which serves as the sin qua non for the perpetuation of the peace process. In addition, political rent has enabled the PA to build an elaborate structure for governance, including Ministries responsible for the administering of important social and economic services. One of the characteristics of the Palestinian educational policy process is its structural susceptibility to external influences. Like their counterparts in other developing countries in Africa and the Arab World, Palestinian educational policy makers look to Europe and North America for models, analyses, and diagnoses, and for approval. This is a subtle process which conditions policies—from identifying problems to postulating intervention strategies. Even more important, most new projects in education, and a significant portion of the recurring budget, rely on donor financing.

One is not suggesting a conspiracy among donors nor between donors and Palestinian leaders, or that donors set educational policy and priorities in Palestine, or that educators do only what donors are willing to fund. Despite constrained circumstances, Palestinian educators and administrators display an independent spirit. However, expectations of what can be funded do influence what is proposed or attempted—for example, "Education for All" is driven by World Bank assumptions which favor the

development of cognitive skills, the limitation of public financing of vocational schools and the tertiary sector, and the acceptance of double-shift schooling as a cost-benefit virtue.

As noted in Chapter Four, overall donor assistance to the PA is declining. Due to funding shortfalls, the PA is in competition with the NGOs over the dwindling level of international assistance. The PA views donor assistance as a zero-sum game, so that assistance to the NGOs, is assistance denied to the PA. This competition makes the PA suspicious of some of the NGOs. According to Hammami, some of the left political parties conflated "support for NGO independence with opposition to" the Palestinian Authority (Hammami 1995, 61). Thus the PA accuses them of being foreign agents who are unaccountable to anyone. The credibility of this depiction is partially derived from a careful reading and deciphering of donor documents. For example, the World Bank notes that the NGOs which have survived the funding shortfall did so "because of their historical links with Western donors." In addition these NGOs, according to the same report, "have evolved into professionally based, foreign-funded development centers with targeted clients, rather than popular constituencies. While their increased professionalism is a positive development, the lack of broad-based support means less accountability for their clients" (World Bank 1999, 37). By this standard, both NGOs and the PA are highly dependent on foreign assistance.

The point of this discussion is to identify another indirect impact of foreign funding. Here it is instructive to quote Samoff's study on Tanzania at length, with minor revisions so that the word Palestine is substituted for Tanzania. Samoff writes:

> Success in securing foreign assistance becomes itself a source of power and influence within [Palestine]. The tendencies toward self-protection and self-aggrandizement that characterize administrative structures everywhere are [Palestine] in part played out within a web of international of connections. Increasing the resources within one educational subsector, for example, may depend as much on building an alliance with, say, Swedish educational advisers as on constructing a supportive political coalition within [Palestine] (Samoff 1990, 225).

Funding for Palestinian education emanates from various sources: the PA, donors, UNRWA (funded by the donors), NGOs, and families. The bulk of the limited resources of the PA are allocated for the pre-tertiary sector, excluding pre-school. Funds for the latter are derived from local and international NGOs and Palestinian families. The tertiary sector is covered by student fees and emergency assistance from EU members. The

financial fragility of the education system is soberly depicted by the World Bank in the following:

> At this time, all levels of education except for the universities seem fiscally sustainable, although funding for public vocational centers is insufficient to provide for even minimal acceptable quality. However, this fiscal equilibrium is fragile (World Bank 1999, 44).

In 2002 capital funding constraints have meant that the MOE was able to build only 438 new classrooms, less than half of the 1,000 needed to accommodate the new school entrants. The MOE had requested $73 million in emergency financing for education from the donors, but they were only able to secure $31 million. This shortfall restricted the MOE from managing the expansion of the school system. One of the outcomes is that "many schools have become over-crowded, forcing the re-introduction of two and even three shifts as a regular feature" (World Bank May 2003, 44). The point is very simple. The MOE is operating on an extremely tight budget, and the MOHE is in need of funds from the PA if it is to succeed in assisting universities, which are running on deficit spending. Where will the funds come from? Will donor pledges be translated into commitments that are disbursed in a timely manner? Equally important, how will the MOE educational development plan be funded?

The PA is heavily dependent on donor assistance for capital expenditures, a condition that also obtains for the MOE. For example, donors have covered the bulk of the costs for the production of textbooks, school maintenance, and construction. Until 1999, the donors also covered some of the recurrent costs. Starting with 1999 the PA assumed responsibility for the MOE's recurrent costs, most of which (95 percent) goes to salaries. In effect, about 17-18 percent of the PA budget is allocated to the MOE. Donors like the World Bank worry that the growth in total salaries might be the result of bureaucratic bloating (World Bank 1999, 45). The World Bank's Sue Berryman warns the PA not to use the education sector as a jobs program to alleviate high unemployment rates (Berryman 1999, 163).

Between 1994 and mid-1999, the donors committed about $406 million, and disbursed almost $314 million, to the education sector. However, the level of assistance for education declined precipitously, from $92 million in 1996 to $15 million in 1998 (World Bank 2000, 38).[51] The figures for 1998 might be an anomaly, but no one expects the level of assistance to go back to the level recorded in 1996. More than 30 donors have contributed to the education sector, but four-fifth of the total comes

from the EU (63 percent) and Japan 19 percent (World Bank and UNSCO 1999, 25).

Before addressing the financial implications of the FYP, some broad conclusions can be deduced from the data presented to this point. First, due to a variety of reasons, including donor fatigue and the uncertainty of the political and security climate, donor assistance is expected to level off at lower rates than in the pre-1998 period. Second, periodic political crises can and will, as in the past, slow down the implementation of projects, thus causing a delay in donor disbursements. Third, some pilot projects could be canceled due to the failure of raising sufficient funds to make them sustainable. Fourth, most donor funds are earmarked for projects that can yield visible and tangible results. In other words, raising funds for the improvement of the quality of education is more difficult than raising funds for capital investments. The PA also benefits from capital investments, because they produce jobs (construction), and new schools improve access to a larger segment of the population, thus maximizing the PA's political capital.

Fourth, by virtue of targeting most of the public appropriations for basic education, the PA has accepted World Bank recommendations to relegate the financing of tertiary education to the private sector. The World Bank argues that state support for higher education can be a source of disproportional benefit for the privileged sectors of society. However, it does caution that rising university tuition costs coupled with the absence of adequate levels of assistance for less endowed Palestinians, could reduce their access to higher education opportunities (World Bank 2000, 42; 1999b, 44-45).

This poses a conundrum for the PA. The "Education for All" model calls for the upgrading of the populations' basic skills. However, comprehensive and integrated development requires the upgrading of research capabilities in the natural sciences, as well as social science and the humanities. Giving primacy (public funding) to the sciences results in postponing the development of the humanities. To insure long-term development, however, would require more budgetary allocations to the tertiary sector, which includes vocational education. It seems that the World Bank is unaware of the fact that in the West, particularly the United States, many of the major research institutions are publicly supported, and in turn these institutions produce important research that is indispensable for the development of the national and regional economies. In his exhaustive study on the rise of the "Network Society," Manuel Castells concludes that the "state, not the innovative entrepreneur in his garage, both in America and throughout the world, was the initiator of the

Information Technology Revolution" (Castells 1996, 60).[52] If the higher education sector in the US, supported by the state, plays such a crucial developmental role, why should the state in developing countries abstain from this formula?

The proposed budget for the FYP (2001-2005) is $280 million, or $56 million per year. The MOE hopes to raise $11 million per year from local communities. The donors are expected to contribute the lion's share, $225 million over five years, or averaging $45 million per year.[53] It is not unreasonable to expect and to actually secure these funds. However, what happens if the donors provide a lesser amount? Also what happens if the donors earmark their funds to the MOE's lower priorities? After all, this has happened in the past. The simple answer is that the MOE would have to alter its priorities to suit donor preferences.[54] In other words, setting educational priorities and securing funding for these priorities can be, and often are, contradictory processes. If the priorities are altered due to the funding imperatives, then this adds yet another dimension to donor influence in the articulation of Palestinian national educational objectives.

Finally, on 15 August 2000, I posed a multi-pronged question to Khalil Mahshi regarding the problems associated with financing. I specifically asked: The MOE's recurrent budget leaves very little room for strategic development, at least this is how I read the data, as presented in the FYP. This seems to suggest that the development budget is almost entirely dependent on securing additional sources from the donors. 1) Is this a correct reading?; 2) If so, then is the development strategy "hostage" to donor largesse? Khalil Mahshi responded succinctly: "Yes the development budget is dependent on donor aid. If the latter does not materialize, then almost all development activities will not be implemented."[55] It would be fair to point out that the PA's dependence on outside donors is not a matter of choice. The PA has to secure assistance if it is to meet the demands of its rising population. Thus, like other post-colonial societies, the PA exercises authority but does not enjoy the full attributes of sovereignty.

Persisting Problems and Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that the education sector has embarked on a fairly successful process of institutionalization. The MOE, by all accounts, receives praise for its performance and its ability to tackle some hard issues and pressing needs. The structure and operation of the Ministry is to a large extent conditioned by the geographic separation of the PA areas, which requires the Ministry to sustain dual, identical, administrative

structures in the West Bank and Gaza. Imposed on the PA by Israeli occupation, these duplicative institutions are rendered even more inefficient by Israeli travel shutdowns. Decision making over policy matters, however is quite centralized, and the donors, by virtue of their funds and technical resources (production of knowledge), exercise more influence in the setting of priorities than Palestinian civic organizations. In effect, donors through "political rent" play a crucial role in the articulation of national development plans and in setting priorities for the education sector. Nevertheless, some of the senior staff of the MOE remain committed to the creation of mechanisms that insure civic input in the setting of national education priorities. This seeming paradox will receive greater attention in the next chapter.

The MOE's goal of expanding access to education has been partially achieved. However, inequities persist and remain widespread, particularly between the West Bank and Gaza, and between refugees and non-refugees. The education system faces too much demand in the face of dwindling resources. New schools have been built, but many more are needed. The adoption of the "Education for All" paradigm has come at the expense of devising a more active role for the state in support of the tertiary sector, which in turn stultifies overall development efforts.

In all of its documents the MOE cautions that the successful implementation of reforms is ultimately contingent on progress in the "peace process" and the resolution of the conflict with Israel. Failure on this front results in undue hardships for people due to Israeli closures and economic sanctions. Such difficulties surfaced again in connection with what has been dubbed as the al-Aqsa intifada. In a letter addressed to donors and journalists, Khalil Mahshi poignantly captures the difficulties of the moment, and its impact on quotidian life. He writes:

> Those of you who have visited my office...will...remember Abu-Jad. Yes, he is the janitor...who is charge of cleaning our department and making coffee. Many of you have said to him, and to me, that he [makes] the best coffee in Palestine...As soon as I enter my office, he would follow me, greeting me with his pleasant smile and a fresh cup of his delicious strong coffee. He arrives to work at 7:00 a.m...He takes pride in his work and is very pleased to get compliments about his good work, especially from our visitors...When he takes a leave from work, even for a day, I feel handicapped without his coffee and without the quick service he provides to my numerous daily visitors.
>
> Today [16 November 2000], I got to work as usual, before 8 a.m. My office was still closed. There was no smell of Abu-Jad's coffee. I was not surprised. Today seems to be one of the worst days since the beginning of

> Al Aqsa Intifada in terms of [the] Israeli-imposed closure on Ramallah and on other cities, towns, refugee [camps], and villages. Normally, the Israeli army has roadblocks on the roads leading to Ramallah. Palestinians use alternative dirt roads [backroads] to get in. We always feel that the Israeli army knows about the dirt roads, but does not close them. Today, the army has put heaps of dirt and rocks on dirt roads.
>
> Abu-Jad got to work at 9:10 a.m., more than two hours late. He left home at the same time he does every morning but had to get out of the shared taxi from his village (Beit Anan) at each heap of dirt and walk to catch another taxi to the next heap. He spent more than two hours getting here (normally it takes him 20 minutes), and much more money. He was already exhausted, psychologically and physically.
>
> He came to greet me, with the delicious cup of coffee, but without the daily pleasant smile. He was worried about the way back home and about his daughter who also commutes to Ramallah to study at [the] women's technical college [located] next to our Ministry. Later on, he told me that he was pleased to hear from home that his daughter was safe at home. She did not succeed to leave the village, as he did, to go to Ramallah. She did not study, yet he was pleased that she was safe.
>
> Three out of eight of my colleagues in our department did not make it to work today. Two came very late, like Abu-Jad. When I asked about about other colleagues at the Ministry, I was told that more than 60% were absent. Most government schools whose students come from surrounding areas had similar rates of absence today.
>
> Abu-Jad left work early today hoping to find transportation back to his village. I wonder if I will see him on Saturday.[56]

The efforts of the MOE and the PA are thus quite vulnerable to the viccissitudes of endless negotiations that lead to breakdowns and violence. Despite the critical discussion contained in this chapter, one must express amazement at the Ministry's ability to keep schools open more often than not. Some officials have left the Ministry to go back to their jobs elsewhere. Others, like my friend and interlocutor, Khalil Mahshi, left in 2002 to live and work in a safer and saner environment, Paris.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PALESTINIAN CURRICULUM: THE STRUGGLE OVER/FOR IDENTITY

> To recognize the role of perspective and vantage point, to recognize at the same time that there are always multiple perspectives and multiple vantage points, is to recognize that no accounting, disciplinary or otherwise, can ever be complete. There is always more. There is always possibility. And this is always where the space opens for the pursuit of freedom. Much the same can be said about experiences with art objects-not only literary texts, but music, painting, dance. They have the capacity, when authentically attended to, to enable persons to hear and see what they would not ordinarily hear and see, to offer visions of consonance and dissonance that are unfamiliar and indeed abnormal, to disclose the incomplete profiles of the world. As importantly, in this context, they have the capacity to defamiliarize experience: to begin with the overtly familiar and transfigure it into something different enough to make those who are awakened hear and see.[1]

The philosopher Maxine Greene asserts that the world presents itself to the learning and inquiring mind in incomplete profiles. The incompleteness of such learning, as she claims, opens the space for the pursuit of freedom and democracy. Palestinians have endured the ravages of military occupation that has and continues to dehumanize them. In resisting this dehumanization, will Palestinians construct and forge a national identity that is more tolerant and open than the system of Israeli occupation?

One important way to elaborate on this question is to focus on the domestic political contests that are vying to shape the scope, content and objectives of Palestinian education. Palestinian educators and their respective education ministries have been trying to articulate a unified national vision or plan for education. Whether such a unified plan has been created is less important than understanding the controversies and struggles that are involved in attaining such a vision. Thus to understand the process of instituting educational and curricular reforms, it is

imperative to identify the competition among the contending political forces and the struggles which are involved in the remolding of the Palestinian educational system.

The research and case materials presented in this chapter show how the quasi-state institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) are addressing the multiple—but not always mutually reinforcing--demands of the complex task of identity creation, nation-building, and resistance to Israeli occupation. In this context, the effort to reformulate and modernize the Palestinian education system can be understood as a contest between two competing forces: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and his team of radical reformers, and the bureaucracy of the ministry of education (MOE). The Abu-Lughod team developed their ideas through a participatory approach, which ultimately produced a radical plan for the construction of the first Palestinian curriculum. This plan called for pedagogic reform that emphasizes how learning takes place and not just what is learned. Explicitly, their approach invites students to generate their own knowledge by questioning authority and knowledge previously transmitted as authoritative. However, as the MOE ventured to incorporate the curriculum plan into state policy, it excluded many of the radical ideas. The MOE plan focused on practical matters rather than questions of pedagogy. The ministry was understandably consumed with the quotidian needs of the school system: more schools and classrooms, the printing of textbooks, and the timely administration of the *tawjihi* matriculation exam. Furthermore, the MOE discouraged wide public input in their deliberations.

The radical reformers wanted to transform society by transforming its members through education. In contrast, the MOE saw its primary task as one of state-building, a process constrained by the influence of political rent[2] and the requirements of the peace process. To verify this hypothesis, this chapter analyzes the textbooks published by the MOE to uncover the embedded meanings of Palestinian identity. Is the PA, through the new texts, trying to redefine the terms of reference of Palestinian national identity? To answer this question, the texts are read dichotomously. The evidence shows that the Palestinian Authority (PA) as nation-builder is trying to change or re-center the basis of Palestinian national identity. The promotion of institutionalized nationalism by the PA at the expense of resistance identity is seen as the beginning of a new but contested affiliative order. This order is contested by oppositional social and political forces who believe that resistance identity should not be compromised as long as Israeli occupation continues.

Redefining Palestinian Identity: The New Affiliative Order

It is important to note that the political forces involved in these struggles are many, both internal and external. Within the Palestinian sphere they include the PA and its ministries, and educational reformers who act independently of, though not in opposition to the PA. An important question is whether these struggles expand the space for the pursuit of freedom and democracy. In addition, given the PA's dependency on international financing, the contents of Palestinian textbooks are scrutinized by Israeli or pro-Israeli groups, which produce periodic reports accusing the PA of instilling hatred of Jews and Israelis in Palestinian youths. These reports have prompted threats from the US Congress and President to cut off international assistance to the PA.[3]

Raphael Israeli[4] contends that if the MOE texts remain unaltered they will have a pernicious impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Akiva Eldar, writing in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz[5] reports that according to Dr. Ruth Firer of the Hebrew University, the new Palestinian texts are "freer of negative stereotypes of Jews and Israelis, compared to the Jordanian and Egyptian books," that they are replacing. He adds, "the [Israeli] defense establishment has investigated and confirmed this finding." Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan[6] expanded the parameters of the question by examining the contents of Israeli and Palestinian textbooks. They conclude that the "books used in each society reflect the conflict in which they are both engaged." However, they conclude that the Palestinian texts do not incite hatred or violence against Jews or Israel. The PA took these charges seriously and submitted a report refuting the charges to one of the bilateral negotiating sessions with Israel.[7] Finally, the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, located in Jerusalem, submitted a report on the Palestinian curriculum to the offices of the US Consulate General in Jerusalem. The report, written by Israeli and Palestinian education specialists notes that the "overall orientation of the curriculum is peaceful despite the harsh realities on the ground. It does not openly incite against Israel and the Jews. It does not incite hatred or violence."[8] To dwell on politically and ideologically charged claims and counter-claims is not fruitful. However, this dispute does call to our attention the important problem of Peace Education within societies and among conflicting national parties.[9]

The PA has indeed issued a series of schoolbooks starting with six texts on civic education in 1995-6. History, religion, geography, Arabic language, civic and national education texts were issued in September

2000. In this chapter, the contents of a select number of texts[10] are analyzed/evaluated to show how the Palestinian Authority is redefining or re-representing the terms of reference for Palestinian national identity. Such a reading, it will be maintained, suggests the emergence of an "affiliative order"[11] which is being promoted by the PA. Table 7.1 shows how the new affiliative order is supplanting the pre-Oslo terms of reference for Palestinian identity. The old is animated by the ethos of resistance (e.g. freedom fighters) and claims an unambiguous unity of the Palestinian people. Both articulate a nationalist ideology, but institutionalized nationalism emphasizes state-building which ostensibly downplays resistance. The past was symbolized by the PLO as the umbrella organization that represented all Palestinians, whereas the present is represented by the PA whose immediate authority is confined to control over Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Legitimacy in the first instance is bestowed by the history of struggle and the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) including the "Declaration of Independence" of 1988. Institutionalized nationalism is derived from the Oslo Accords, which have transformed the Palestinian national leadership into a body that is heavily constrained by the impact of "political rent."

Table 7.1: Selected Attributes of the Palestinian Affiliative Order

Resistance	**Institutionalized Nationalism**
1. Resistance/Liberation	1. State-Building (Resistance Muted)
2. Leadership–PLO (Arafat as Chairman)	2. Leadership–PA (Arafat as President of PA)
3. Legitimacy Derived from PNC (internal)	3. Legitimacy Derived from Oslo (external)
4. Palestinians (one unified people)	4. Palestinians--Ambiguous Category (inside-outside)
5. Symbols: Jerusalem, Right of Return, Guerillas	5. Symbols: Jerusalem, Right of Return, PA Officials

The analysis of the textbooks will be used to demonstrate and probe several questions: What does the nascent "affiliative order" (institutionalized nationalism) include and exclude from its purview? How do these texts, particularly *National Education* textbooks, define and delimit the parameters of Palestinian identity? How does the emerging definition alter the displaced "affiliative order" which was codified in the documents of the pre-Oslo resistance phase? How do the various social agents respond to the redefinition of identity as contained in the documents of the new "affiliative order?" Finally, what kind of citizenship and values are promoted by these texts?

The Foundations of the New Palestinian Curriculum

In the late 1980s, in the context of the first *intifada*, Palestinian educators/activists initiated a sustained debate on the need to reform and revolutionize the structure and content of education. They dabbled and experimented with avant-garde pedagogies that would foster critical thinking by both students and teachers. In their articulated vision, education could not be reduced to the acquisition of information. For these reformers, education could serve the central purpose of educating youth to become new and renewed citizens, entrusted with a mission to build a free and democratic society. Palestinian educators/activists agreed that the reform process must start with the construction of a new comprehensive Palestinian curriculum.

Discussions and deliberations on the value and importance of developing a Palestinian curriculum can be traced back to the early 1970s. However, the first concrete step that launched the process of curriculum development took place in 1990 when, at the behest of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), UNESCO and its Assistant Director-General for Education, Dr. Colin Power, convened a symposium in Paris entitled the "Palestinian Curriculum for Fundamental Education." Conference participants—Palestinian and international educators—recommended that the establishment of "A Palestinian Center for Curriculum Development" was vital if future Palestinian educational needs were to be met. The Paris meeting was replicated in Jerusalem in 1993, jointly convened by UNESCO and the Palestinian Council for Higher Education, and it reached the same conclusions. Finally, in 1994 the newly formed Palestinian Ministry of Education signed an Agreement of Cooperation with UNESCO that called for the formal establishment of the *Palestinian Curriculum Development Center*.[12] UNESCO and the Palestinian Ministry of Education jointly appointed Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

as the founding Director of the Center. The Center was mandated to develop, in one year, a plan for a Palestinian curriculum, to be implemented gradually over a five year period.

The choice of Abu-Lughod requires some explanation.[13] In an immediate sense, he was not part of the group of educator/activists who flourished during the *intifada*. In fact Abu-Lughod had spent most of his life in exile and returned to resettle in Palestine in 1992, after an absence of forty-four years. In 1948 his family was dispersed from Jaffa, which occasioned his long American exile. He earned a doctorate from Princeton University, and for almost thirty years he lived in Chicago, where he worked as a professor of political science at Northwestern University, and also served as director of the African Studies program.

Abu-Lughod was not just an academic or intellectual. He was an organizer of institutions, and an articulate defender of the Palestine cause. After the 1967 war, he co-founded the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, the Institute for Arab Studies, and the Arab Studies Quarterly. During his American exile he was nominated and elected to the Palestine National Council.[14] His opinions were sought by many Palestinian leaders, including Arafat. In 1980 Abu-Lughod was appointed by the PLO to lead a UNESCO sponsored team to conduct a feasibility study for the creation of the "Open Palestinian University." He assembled a team of Palestinian experts from various fields– anthropology, education, sociology, politics and administration. The study was issued in 1980[15]. In 1980, working out of UNESCO headquarters in Paris, Abu-Lughod embarked on laying the groundwork to implement the study's findings. In June 1982 he moved to Beirut to start the Open University, but the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon brought an abrupt end of this project. He spent the summer of 1982 besieged in Beirut. Edward Said, a lifelong friend of Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, observes:

> Beirut was perhaps a more important experience for Ibrahim than any before or after. It taught him first of all that even the best of institutions could be undermined by mediocrity and the brutish instability of politics and society in the Middle East. Second, it taught him the real dynamics of power, both as they affect those who have it, and those who do not. Third, and perhaps most important, it taught him that one can always press on, even though failure looms.[16]

Abu-Lughod's 1982 experience started the mental process of his migration out of the United States. In 1992 he decided to relocate to Ramallah, Palestine and became vice-president of Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. He participated in many political and intellectual debates,

and was welcomed back to Palestine as a favorite native son. Ibrahim died on 23 May 2001.

The selection of Abu-Lughod as the director of the Center (PCDC) brought to the job an educator and an engaged intellectual. He had international and political experience. He knew how to conduct and manage internationally mandated feasibility studies. He had solid political connections to the PLO and vast connections with the Palestinian intellectuals in the diaspora. With his return from exile he became a leading member of the Palestinian Council of Higher Education, and helped promote educational reform through private and non-profit institutions such as the Palestinian Welfare Association. However, he had not participated directly with the educational reform movement that flourished during the *intifada*. Despite this, he shared the reformers' articulated vision that education, both through revised pedagogies and a new curriculum, should prepare youth for engaged citizenship and democratic practice.

Despite his political engagements, Abu-Lughod was not formally affiliated with any political party or member organization of the PLO. Though he served in the PNC, he did so as an independent. From the outset of his tenure with the PCDC he insisted on guarding its independence from the bureaucracy of the MOE. The PCDC did not become fully incorporated within the structures of the MOE until after Abu-Lughod's departure from its helm. He assembled a team of experts and consultants to produce the mandated plan. The team included Ali Jarbawi, a political scientist from Bir Zeit university, and a mix of educators, academics, intellectuals, and activists with an interest in educational issues and reform. The committee included people from both the West Bank and Gaza, but given the difficulties of travel between these regions due to Israeli imposed closures, the bulk of the committee came from the West Bank. Some of the educator/activists of the *intifada* who had previously worked on developing alternative curricula were not recruited, causing some consternation or bewilderment among them.[17] However it should be noted that at least two members of the Abu-Lughod team (Walid Deeb and Rana Barakat) had previously worked with the Tamer Institute, one of the leading Palestinian grassroots education organizations.

The PCDC became fully functional by October 1, 1995, and was headquartered in the vicinity of Ramallah, which serves as the administrative center for PA offices and its affiliates. Within less than a year the Abu-Lughod team issued its final report, the "First

Comprehensive Plan." The full report, including the executive summary was formally submitted to the Ministry of Education and UNESCO on September 15, 1996.

The report adopts a vocabulary that contests the "banker's"approach[18] to education, and to the dominant traditional pedagogies, which emphasize rote learning and memorization. Instead, and consistent with the views of the education activists, the report invokes the vocabulary associated with Freire, Dewey, and Maxine Greene. It wants students to become critical thinkers and learners. Literacy and numeracy are vital skills if the quality of education is to improve. However, the report notes that education and the curriculum must simultaneously emphasize the importance of creativity and experimentation. Thus the report rejects the input-output model of education, which reduces the student to a mere sponge whose function is to absorb "facts". In addition Abu-Lughod firmly believed that education can best be seen as "the agency [vehicle] for the promotion of development–of the child and the nation–and one which can contribute to the cultivation of a civic culture" that promotes not only democracy and free thinking but a democratic and deliberative method of achieving these goals.[19]

Proposal for Radical Reform: The Abu-Lughod Plan

The *First Comprehensive Plan* is composed of two parts. The first is a general report of the basic findings and the proposed plan of action. The second includes twelve "technical studies," produced by the PCDC education specialists, that dissect the curricula used in Palestinian schools, Jordanian and Egyptian, covering various subjects: social studies, languages, science (physics, biology), mathematics, and religious studies.[20] Each team assessed the substantive and methodological weaknesses of each subject-matter. In addition to crafting new or revised content, each team developed guidelines for innovative teaching methods and identified the needed or desired technical tools (laboratories, computers, etc.) needed to enhance the teaching and learning experience. These plans benefited from and extracted ideas from other national experiences (e.g. British, Canadian, Dutch, Israeli, Norwegian, Swedish and American) and was motivated by a desire to construct domestic educational standards that are consistent with existing international standards.[21]

The work of the PCDC was animated by Abu-Lughod's understanding that Palestinian education and the proposed curriculum should serve the process of nation-building. However, because Palestine and Palestinians

are so fragmented, Abu-Lughod understood that development in this context must serve to cement or construct national integration.[22] In effect the work of the PCDC should be seen as part of the development and consolidation of Palestinian national aspirations and nationalism. This point is underscored in the report in the following passage:

> "This is a plan formulated for the Palestinian national authority that seeks to design, supervise and implement a national curriculum for Palestine. The formulation of the plan is premised upon the notion that the Palestinian Authority wished to implement a curriculum that is based on Palestinian national principles, premises, vision and consciousness. It is premised on a Palestinian philosophy of education. The curriculum should enable Palestinian students to fulfill themselves; the curriculum is viewed as a means and an instrument to provide the requisite skills to meet manpower needs of Palestinian society – scientifically, socio-economically and technically. The aim of the curriculum is to enable every Palestinian who successfully completes twelve years of schooling to have adequate broad knowledge, **positive values of participation, modernity, equal coexistence of societies, democracy** and technical skills either to join the labor force or to pursue his/her higher education or both."[23]

Briefly, existing curricula were deemed deficient and incompatible with Palestinian national objectives. Thus the new curriculum is conceived as a vehicle that could promote not only development but could reinforce Palestinian national culture and identity as well.[24]

The Abu-Lughod committee embarked on its work with a willingness to rethink all aspects of Palestinian education. Its method of work is distinguished by three key features. First, the committee adopted a participatory and consultative approach in its work. The PCDC organized "town meetings" in the West Bank and Gaza to discuss the plans for the production of a Palestinian authored curriculum.[25] The town meetings, held in various parts of the Palestinian territories, invited the participants to discuss philosophy, approaches, and desired outcomes of the curriculum plan under review. These meetings generated considerable public interest and excitement. The PCDC designed and conducted comprehensive surveys of teachers whose results were carefully reviewed and appended to the final report. Focus group meetings were held with teachers to assist in developing ideas for the curriculum plan in the making. Various committee members, including Abu-Lughod, insisted that most of their ideas were the result of these encounters. Fouad Moughrabi affirms that for the "first time in the history of educational planning in the Arab World, the [*First Comprehensive Plan*] emerged from the bottom up following

extensive consultations with teachers, students, parents, academics and members of the business community."[26]

Second, the committee insisted on retaining its independence and resisted undue interference from the MOE in its deliberations.[27] Instead of seeking the permission of Ministry officials or local school principals, the PCDC researchers consulted with teachers directly. Abu-Lughod insisted on running a semi-independent operation. He wanted to avoid direct interference from the Minister and his top aides. He did not hold them in high esteem and often questioned their qualifications as educational planners. For him, they were simply political appointees who lacked vision and the necessary credentials and intellectual grounding to come up with ambitious educational reforms. Hence, though Abu-Lughod was under contract to the Ministry, he preferred to emphasize that his mandate was actually conferred upon him by UNESCO.[28] Abu-Lughod's independence was tolerated because of his public standing. He gave up a prestigious post at Northwestern University to join the Palestinian effort in the reconstruction of Palestinian society. However, his successor has become fully integrated within the Ministry and holds the title of Director-General of the Directorate of General Administration of Curricula.[29]

Third, and perhaps most significant, the Abu-Lughod team emphasized pedagogical reform instead of merely focusing on curricular content. Consistent with Abu-Lughod's understanding of education as a vehicle for the transformation of society and the individual, his committee did not dwell only on what students should know (e.g. literacy and numeracy). Instead the team anchored its deliberations on the desired type and quality of citizen that the educational system should nurture and cultivate. Thus, for Abu-Lughod, a democratic education would enable free thinking and would inspire the imagination by enabling the citizen to deliberate, and hence to participate. For Gutman this is precisely what a theory of democratic education is made of. It focuses on "what might be called 'conscious social reproduction'–the ways in which citizens are or should be empowered to influence the education that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes, and modes of behavior of future citizens."[30]

The Abu-Lughod Recommendations

As previously noted, the entire enterprise of constructing a new curriculum is animated by a nationalist and state-building agenda. This mission is emphasized throughout the Abu-Lughod report. It notes that with the assumption of the functions of self-government, Palestinians need a new curriculum that cements, protects, and reinforces their people's

national identity and culture. "The curriculum must also take into account the Palestinian aspiration to reconstitute its societal fabric and prepare the skilled personnel for the process of state-building."[31] The Abu-Lughod plan is more than a nationalist tract. After evaluating existing curricula and texts that were not authored for or by Palestinians, the Abu-Lughod team proposed a radical reform–oriented plan for Palestinian education whose purpose is to reformulate and modernize the Palestinian educational system. The recommendations cover a wide array of issues including: the length of the school day and schooling, the elimination of the tracking system in the secondary level, and the introduction of new subjects and languages, pedagogical reforms, and the promotion of a Palestinian identity that is not simply Arab and Muslim but open to universal influences as well.

First, the Abu-Lughod plan kept the number of years of schooling to twelve. But the child is to start school at age five rather than six. Schooling is divided into three stages: Preparatory (four years), Empowerment (five years), and Take-off (three years). Though compulsory education remains ten years, those students that complete the entire cycle would do so by age seventeen.[32] The school day for the Preparatory stage is to begin earlier in the day, and, given the shorter attention span of this student cohort, the periods are to be shorter. The length of the school day is five hours and forty-five minutes, and the school year is to commence in early September and end by mid-June. For the upper grades the school day is lengthened.[33]

Second, the proposed plan suggested the elimination of the existing tracking of secondary school students into literary and scientific tracks, which are based on test scores. The first nine years of education are anchored in a core curriculum with some optional electives. Additionally, in with the last three years of schooling the plan does away with the tracking system and instead offers a mix of overlapping academic and technical tracks. In this connection, the proposed curriculum offers new courses in statistics and other quantitative measures, civics, ethics, fine arts, physical education, and economics.[34] The plan calls for the introduction of foreign language instruction, particularly English, beginning with the first grade and for foreign language instruction through the entire twelve year schooling cycle. The learning of foreign languages is seen as a tool to enable Palestinians to deal with and expand their interactions with the modern world. In addition "the proposed curriculum seeks to provide Palestinians with a third language competence and suggests one of the other world languages such as French, or the teaching of Hebrew as a functional language of the region.[35]

Third, and perhaps most importantly the Abu-Lughod plan gave greater emphasis to issues of pedagogy than to particular curricular content. The new emphasis is on how students learn and not on what they learn. In this sense the new plan emphasizes critical learning as opposed to education based on rote learning. In addition, the proposed approach advanced the notion of an integrated curriculum. For example, at the primary level:

> "Teaching these subjects will be organized in an integrated way so that the teacher will connect the subjects during the instructional process. For instance, the teacher of the class should connect mathematics during instruction with other subjects, like science, history, etc. This will help students achieve an integrated, unified, and coordinated view toward the curriculum and toward the experiences of life as whole. Arithmetic skills, for example, will develop as if they are skills connected with the comprehensive ability of the student to use them in all subjects and real-life situations..."[36]

The adoption of a critical pedagogy also lends itself to constructing a curriculum whose content is relevant to the existential realities of Palestinian students. The plan debunks existing curricula as arid, boring, and irrelevant. Teachers are urged to lecture less and to adopt interactive techniques that foster problem-solving and critical thinking.[37] By focusing on the value of critical and independent thinking in the teaching process the student becomes transformed into a lifelong learner. This desired objective is central to the new curriculum, which aims to show that:

> **"truth is not absolute or final and that definitive canons do not exist.** Learning cannot take place by giving students **information** as if it is a collection of **facts** that must be memorized. The curriculum must develop the critical, analytical sense among the students by concentrating on the scientific method, which focuses fundamentally on **the importance of verification of the accuracy of information and the credibility of sources**....What is important is not obtaining information but how to use it.[38]

The approach being advanced by the new plan in effect understands education as a journey filled with experimentation and questioning. The most conducive environment for open inquiry is in and through the "democratic classroom," based on a model of social interaction and decision-making that enables discussion in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect.[39] Accordingly, such an approach promotes independent thinking among students, which would contribute to the transformation of the individual from a passive subject to an engaged and free citizen.

In this context it stands to reason that the Abu-Lughod plan recommended the elimination of the final matriculation exam known as the *tawjihi*. This exam reinforces rote learning and memorization, which stultifies the education process. Furthermore the plan maintains that the *tawjihi* serves the primary function of determining which student gains admission to institutions of higher learning. In contrast, the "proposed curriculum is intended to enable students to learn to acquire skills that are essential. It is not geared to prepare students for the sole purpose of applying to a university."[40]

Fourth, in addition to facilitating the development of independent thinkers and a democratic civic culture, the Abu-Lughod plan seeks to instill or cultivate in Palestinian children a multi-dimensional identity, one that is not just Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic, but universal as well. Since Palestine is intricately enmeshed in the regional and international system, and also because Palestinians are a diasporic people, it is imperative that Palestinian children learn that their identity encompasses numerous dimensions. As such, Palestinian children need to learn multiple languages (e.g. English and French) and acquire multiple skills (computer and connectivity) to negotiate the global environment they inhabit. But the construction of such an identity is filled with important and seemingly insurmountable obstacles. In some ways the insistence on freedom could very well run at odds with certain components of the proposed curriculum. The questions of religion and religious instruction, and the writing of Palestinian history and geography might explain this conundrum.

The Abu-Lughod plan is quite secular in its orientation, and thus it skirted the issue of religion. In fact, religion is discussed only fleetingly on page fifty-two in a footnote. The report recommends the reduction of the teaching of religion and instead advocates the teaching of ethics and comparative religion. If it were to advance its standard of integrated and critical learning to this matter, then religion could be studied not just as divine truth, but could be subjected to more critical inquiry. To avoid controversy and confrontation the Abu-Lughod plan recommended the separation of religious teaching (Islam and Christianity) from history and civics. On this score, the plan reneged on its avowed goal of constructing an integrated curriculum in order to avoid public consternation.[41]

The Abu-Lughod report also confronted difficulties in drafting a plan concerning how to construct and teach both Palestinian history and geography, subjects that are constitutive of Palestinian identity and pose as a serious source of conflict with Israel and Israeli narratives. After all, much of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a contest over history, conflicting historical claims, and disputes over imagined and real

geographies. Professor Ali Jarbawi[42], a member of the Abu-Lughod team poses several poignant questions in this regard:

> "What Palestine do we teach? Is it the historical Palestine with its total geography or the Palestine that is the product of the signed agreements with Israel? Is it merely a neighbor or a state founded on the destruction of most of Palestine? This might be the most difficult question but the answer need not be so difficult. The new curriculum must be a Palestinian creation. It must acknowledge the realities of the situation without falsifying historical truths and their repercussions in various dimensions in the context of social science instruction."[43]

The Abu-Lughod plan thus produced hybrid recommendations. First it emphasized a positivist bent, namely the need to identify historical and geographic "realities" or facts. These building blocks could then be used to produce more complete narratives without skirting controversial issues. Abu-Lughod and other Palestinian historians have maintained that Palestinian history has yet to be written mostly because existing institutions of higher learning have yet to develop the capacity for advanced research in the social sciences as well as the physical sciences and technology.[44] Thus the writing of Palestinian history is to be undertaken by Palestinians who are willing to engage in open and critical inquiry. Abu-Lughod did not want to produce a blueprint for the writing of a linear historical national narrative,[45] but real curricula are part of the state's domain and what ultimately goes in them represents not only facts but myths (official histories) that are constructed as seamless, continuous, and unproblematized renditions of history.

Finally, the Abu-Lughod team recommended that the PCDC serve as the primary agency to implement the proposed plan with oversight from a high level Ministerial committee appointed by the Minister of Education. "Oversight" is defined as cooperation and assistance and not control.[46] This would enable the PCDC to function semi-autonomously as it had in the past. But the report does acknowledge that the state must play an important role. Thus they proposed the formation of a State Board of Education, composed of experts from various ministries, to supervise the "articulation and development of the Palestinian curriculum".[47]

The next section of this chapter analyzes the process of institutionalizing this plan. What happened to the radical recommendations? Does the participatory method employed by the Abu-Lughod team continue, or is it supplanted with an alternative approach?

Institutionalization of the Abu-Lughod Plan

Palestinian state formation is seen to be disproportionately affected by "political rent." In addition, though this nascent state is not endowed with oil wealth it still enjoys some of the attributes of the rentier state. The Palestinian state is seen to exercise two types of power, which Mann calls "despotic" and "infrastructural." To discuss the institutionalization of the curriculum by the PA, we need to develop some further linkages between education and state formation.

The First Palestinian Curriculum

After submitting his report to the Ministry and UNESCO, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod stepped aside from the PCDC. He wanted to teach, to write, and to engage in debates on national political matters.[48] After the publication of the Abu-Lughod report all matters pertaining to curriculum development came under the direct supervision of the Palestinian Authority (MOE). Instead of remaining a quasi-autonomous body, the PCDC became fully incorporated into the MOE under the Directorate of General Administration of Curricula headed by a Director-General. The new team headed by Dr. Salah Yassin was less than happy with the radical contents of the Abu-Lughod plan. Dr. Yassin told me that the plan is "too ambitious and cannot be implemented." He had serious reservations about some of the proposed curricular and pedagogic reforms. He was adamant that the *tawjihi* matriculation exam would not be eliminated, "instead it should be improved and reformed."[49] He expressed serious objections to the tenor of the report and was dumbfounded as to how the issue of religion and religious instruction were almost dismissed. In view of these criticisms, the Abu-Lughod plan was revised and in 1997 distributed as a "draft plan."[50]

The *First Palestinian Curriculum Proposal* adopted many of the Abu-Lughod recommendations.[51] The scientific/literary tracks are eliminated. English as a second language is taught from the first grade. Civic education has been added as a new subject, and national education is subsumed under social studies. Arts and crafts is added to the twelve year school cycle. For grades five through twelve, technology and applied sciences have been added so as to inculcate an understanding of computers and other scientific tools and techniques. This component of the new curriculum is influenced by those who envisage schooling as central to the development of "human" and "social" capital. Elective subjects are offered in grades five through ten, including a third language (French,

German, or Hebrew), environmental studies, or home economics. Finally, time has been allocated for teachers to organize independent activities intended to allow for innovative teaching/learning as contrasted with the rigidities of the past.

The new plan was circulated mostly to ministry functionaries, the Palestinian cabinet or Council of Ministers, and members of the PLC. The MOE wanted to secure wide political legitimacy for its proposal, so it submitted the plan to the cabinet, which approved it on 12 December 1997. In addition, the PLC considered the draft plan without much deliberation, and formally approved it on 31 March 1998. The approved plan was subsequently published as the "First Palestinian Curriculum Plan."[52] Nathan Brown observes that once the plan was formally approved, "public discussion concerning the curriculum all but disappeared.[53]

The *First Palestinian Curriculum Plan* focused on practical matters rather than questions of pedagogy. According to Fouad Moughrabi, the reform vision articulated by Abu-Lughod is "practically absent."[54] In contrast, Moughrabi points out that despite trying and difficult circumstances associated with the closures and Israeli re-occupation of parts of the Palestinian controlled territories, the Ministry has continued to function and has kept schools open. The ability to keep the system functioning is a great achievement. But clearly such difficult circumstances do not allow for such luxuries as pedagogic and curricular reforms that enable students and teachers to think freely and critically, to experiment, and to transform education itself into a process predicated on discovery.

To implement the sum of these ideas into a new curriculum the PCDC formed a curriculum development team composed of education specialists and administrators, and in effect excluded the intellectuals whom Abu-Lughod had recruited. Several teams were composed to write the proposed textbooks. Each team was assigned a specific subject, thus leaving little room for the production of integrated curricula as Abu-Lughod had intended. The textbook writers were selected for their expertise, and in turn they worked individually, as opposed to the participatory, and collegial method employed by the Abu-Lughod team. Reliance on public meetings and workshops which could secure direct input from teachers and civic-minded individuals was phased out. Teachers were involved only after the completion of the textbooks, when they were invited to participate in workshops designed to train them on how to use the new texts.[55] One such meeting was organized by the Teacher Creativity Center, a professionalized NGO formed during the first *intifada*. Professionalized

NGOs, like the TCC, lack a broad base of support,[56] thus they are unable to insure broad societal input in the development of public policies.

In effect, the teams formed by the PCDC viewed knowledge as the outcome of their private deliberations, rather than the result of interactions with the wider community. They produced texts which impart "official" or "legitimate" knowledge to the student by excluding the sources of non-official knowledge. By removing the participatory and deliberative dimensions from the writing/production process, the new curriculum has in effect adopted the "bankers" approach to pedagogy, which treats students as the passive recipients of knowledge. Michael Apple notes that "cultural production" is composed of three moments: "production, circulation, and reception or use." If the production phase has been exclusionary in style, this does not guarantee that reception by the reader will be automatic. Here we have the possibility that texts can in fact be subjected to "oppositional readings" by teachers and students.[57] This observation will be used in the comparative analysis of the National Education textbooks produced in 1994-5 and 2000 respectively.

One should recall that since the 1950s Palestinians used Jordanian and Egyptian curricula and textbooks in the West Bank and Gaza. These texts were subjected to thorough review and censorship by the Israeli military governor in charge of Palestinian education from 1967 to 1993. The Israeli military governor banned several books and excised certain words and sections of other texts.[58] In 1996 the education ministries of Jordan and the PA reached an agreement to allow the PA to use Jordanian textbooks until the Palestinian authored texts are produced. According to the new plan, textbooks for all of the school cycles would be written and published in stages between 2001 and 2005. According to plan, in 2001 the Ministry of Education issued twenty-nine textbooks covering the following subjects: Arabic, geography, national education, civic education, Christian religious education, Islamic education, Arabic handwriting, mathematics, and general technology.

The *First Curriculum* and the subsequent production of textbooks are grounded in a Palestinian nationalist state-building and developmental agenda. The entire statist enterprise is legitimized by invoking, on numerous occasions, the PNC "Declaration of Independence" of 1988.[59] As shown in Table 7.1, this source of legitimacy predates the Oslo Accords. Paradoxically, the latter are never mentioned in the new plan. The official document, approved by the PLC, identifies the following aims to justify curriculum reform: to realize national unity, in particular by replacing the Jordanian and Egyptian curricula with a unified Palestinian curriculum; to adapt the curriculum to present realities; to promote

national, religious and human values as well as the acquisition of skills and knowledge as a means of national development; to cope with demographic growth, which implies a comprehensive curriculum with sufficient diversity to suit all learners; to support economic development by preparing learners to become employable and productive human resources; to provide good education, by improving the school environment, teaching methods and teacher competencies, and management of the educational system; to promote comprehensive development by giving due attention to science and technology.[60]

Instead of articulating the Abu-Lughod reform vision that aims to promote thinking and creativity, the new curriculum plan can best be seen as a mechanism for the transmission of knowledge, authority, and values. Here the emphasis is on the preservation of values, which leaves little room for subjecting these values to critical evaluation that might lead to change. In this context the new plan restored the centrality of religion in the curriculum. Thus the primary intellectual foundation of the new curriculum is belief in and obedience to God, to parents and the family, and to the homeland (Palestine), which is indivisible from the Arab nation and its Islamic heritage. Finally, it is asserted that Palestine is a democratic peace-loving state. That it is not yet a state, nor democratic, is simply ignored. In contrast, Palestinian identity in The Abu-Lughod report consisted of three over-lapping elements: international, Arab-Islamic, and Palestinian. The new plan privileges the Islamic dimension, so that moral lessons are mostly based on Qur'anic verses which intrude in the teaching of not only religion (Islam) but the Arabic language, arithmetic, science, and civics. In turn, less emphasis is given to the international.

The adopted texts are clearly less secular in content and perspective than the Abu-Lughod vision. Whereas both the old and the new can be characterized as representing national identities, the new plan is more pronounced and excessive in articulating a religious identity as well.[61] Ramzi Rihan, vice-president for development and planning at Bir Zeit University and consultant to the MOE, observes that the emphasis on national identity, to a great extent, "reflects concern among Palestinians that their identity is seriously threatened and therefore requires active affirmation."[62] The word "Palestine" is used in two senses. The first refers to geography and history, and the second refers to the emerging state of Palestine. The four foundations do not make a single reference to Israel, which can be seen as evidence that the entire enterprise is imbued with an irredentist hidden agenda. Deflecting the claim of "hidden agendas", Ramzi Rihan emphasizes that "Palestinians are in the process of arriving at a self-definition of identity to replace the 'definition through others' that

has been imposed on them for many generations." He adds that "national independence and state-building have to be accompanied by psychological, social, and cultural liberation from external domination."[63] The new curriculum plan, though less ambitious than the Abu-Lughod plan, is still quite ambitious. All curricula are to be written from scratch. This requires large financial resources to not only write the texts, but to train teachers in new and challenging pedagogies. To usher in reform, the reformers must confront tradition and the forces of tradition, which can obstruct innovations.

The New and Contested Affiliative Order as Reflected in National Education Texts

Within a year of assuming authority over the education system, the MOE in 1995 published a new series of textbooks, *Al-Tarbiyya al-wataniyya* or National Education.[64] These textbooks are the first Palestinian authored texts produced for Palestinian students. Nathan Brown suggests that these texts can thus be seen as the authoritative voice of the Palestinian state. This claim might be too strong, since the title page underscores that these texts are "experimental" editions. Furthermore, Dr. Said Assaf, the then Director-General of educational training and supervision, is listed as the supervisor of the project. He coordinated the efforts of a committee of educators that produced the texts. He regards these texts as a quick and short-term remedy. In my interview with him in 1997, he cautioned that the new texts "are not only experimental, but they have not been subjected to critical scrutiny by him or others" in the MOE.

Before looking at the contents of the texts (both the 1994-95 and the 2000 editions) to delineate the properties of a new Palestinian narrative, we should note a few important points. The first texts were indeed published at a time when the peace process seemed to yield a promise for a better future. In 1994-95 Palestinians were hopeful that the Oslo Accords would lead to statehood and the normalization of life. This hope and enthusiasm was almost dashed by the time the 2000 textbooks were issued. The outbreak of the second uprising, the *Aqsa Intifada*, in 2000 is an important pivotal moment.

Far from being a rebellion launched by Arafat to wrest concessions from Israel, this uprising, in large measure, was more of a spontaneous explosion of rage and frustration at the years of continuing occupation and settlement expansion, and a protest against the PA leadership as well as Israel. Arafat and the PA leadership were accused by the increasingly intransigent Palestinian opposition (mostly Islamic) of negating Palestinian

aspirations by acquiescing to Israeli demands to end Palestinian resistance despite the continuation of Israeli control and occupation.[65] Khalil Shikaki notes that the "young guard has turned to violence to get Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip unilaterally as it withdrew from South Lebanon in May 2000 and simultaneously to weaken the Palestinian old guard and eventually displace it."[66] Thus, in the span of a few years, hope gave way to despair and rising violence.

As noted above, the new curriculum plan and the National Education textbooks (1994-5) promote a system of values based on the transmission of authority from God, family, nation, state, school, and other social institutions. The 1994-5 first grade text dwells on the importance of the family and the home (pp 13-26), on the community (pp 41-52), on God and his prophet (pp 53-60), and on the homeland (pp 61-68). The 2000 text is more organized. The introduction is written in the form of a letter addressed to colleagues (male and female), and signed "the authors.". The letter states: "The importance of national education for the first grade lies in its direct and effective contribution in building the personality of the student and in guiding it towards: belief in God, religion, and Islamic values; Awareness of self, family, school, and society;Love, loyalty and belonging to the homeland and the umma [community of believers, or Muslim nation]."[67]

In addition, the teachers are urged to develop and inculcate students with positive social values including: respect for the elderly and neighbors; cooperation, and respect for work and time. Students are to be taught the value of health, hygiene, and the importance of maintaining cleanliness in both public and private domains. Emphasis is placed on the need for affiliation, which includes social harmony and getting along with others. These values are ultimately validated by the Qur'an. For example, sixth grade students after reading the section on values which should be cherished, are asked to engage in an exercise. "Let us return to the holy Qur'an to identify the holy verses which uphold these values...".[68] The introduction asks teachers to emphasize "integrated learning" and to use creative teaching methods, such as drama, as ways of improving their teaching. The text is accompanied by various illustrations, pictures, and exercises. The students are asked to provide answers based on the contents of the pictures. For example, students are asked to identify and distinguish between "proper and improper" behavior (p.17). Elsewhere, the student is provided with a verse from the Qu'ran recited by a male figure holding prayer beads. The teacher is instructed to explain the verse to the students and to in turn ask the students to recite it (p.26).

Indeed, all the textbooks examined in this chapter consider authority (literally of God, Family, and State) as something that is to be transmitted, from one generation to the next, rather than being cultivated through critical thinking and learning.[69] Thus, knowledge itself is seen as a set of givens to be transmitted. Paradoxically, though the contents of these texts privilege such a notion of knowledge, the authors urge teachers to adopt creative pedagogies in the process of imparting this knowledge. Students are invited to participate in practical exercises and activities requiring not only the learning of facts, but of offering responses and opinions to certain situations. For example, the sixth grade student is asked to address the following question: "Do I agree with the system of hereditary rule which was established by Muslim rulers after the era of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs? I explain my reasoning."[70] Indeed this exercise, among many others, does invite students to think and learn. Thus we are left with a conundrum: the knowledge to be transmitted is imparted authoritatively, leaving little room for critical thinking or interactive deliberation. But teachers are urged to employ more engaging and creative pedagogies.[71] Despite the authoritative contents of the texts, the curriculum adopts student-centered pedagogies. The exercises at the end of each chapter are designed to promote creative thinking, decision-making and problem-solving skills. The instructional activities – role-playing, simulation, and case studies – are designed to transform students into active learners. We are thus left with an interesting paradox. The authoritative structuring of the contents promotes submission, whereas the new pedagogic devices are intended to emancipate the individual to become an active learner.

The Nation in History

The 1994-5 texts were intended to fill a void and are, as stated on each title page, "experimental." This might explain their eclectic nature. They cover a wide variety of issues with the intention of teaching the students something about who they are, the importance of their family, the school and its multiple activities, and their society. Illustrations depict the types of houses people live in. The first grade text provides three illustrations of three types of houses: bedouin, urban and rural (p.23). Refugees and refugee camps that dot the entire landscape of both the West Bank and Gaza are downplayed. The second grade texts provide the students with eighteen illustrations of different types of occupations that engage Palestinians; however, only three depict women: one is a teacher, the second a doctor, and the third a shepherd (pp. 20-22).[72] Though two of the illustrations depict women as skilled professionals, the texts overall fail to

promote gender equality. Tafida Jarbawi, Dean of the UNRWA Women's Teacher Training College in Ramallah, conducted a content analysis of the new texts. She concludes that women, despite some exceptions, are portrayed in dependent roles whose primary responsibility is child rearing.[73]

Included in the eclectic mix is a unit on the human species and its racial sub-divisions. The sixth grade text tells the student that humanity is composed of three major racial groupings: Caucasian, Negroid, and Mongol. Each has distinct physical features, as well as different customs, languages and religions (p.53). Accordingly, the Palestinian is Caucasian whose color is predominantly white. Aside from such physical features, the "white" person is distinguished from the others by being endowed with "intelligence and a mastery of scientific and practical knowledge" (p. 54). Part of the problem of such racialized (and racist) thinking stems from the attempt to define, uncritically, the Palestinians of today as the product of a homogeneous people with a linear and continuous history, all of which is attached and located in a Palestine defined in terms of the modern discourse of nation and nation-state. In contrast, some Palestinian poets writing in the diaspora, portray themselves as people of color thus emphasizing a multicultural and universal sensitivity and sensibility, which is best reflected in Suheir Hammad's first book of poetry titled, *Born Palestinian, Born Black*.[74]

The self-conceptualization as "undifferentiated people" forms the bedrock of presenting Palestinians as a unified and not a fragmented nation.[75] Both editions of the *National Education* texts can be read as a nationalist narrative, and indeed, as Calhoun reminds us, nationalism has a complex relationship to history. Nationalism, through nationalist historians, produces accounts of the nation that provide the public with a shared sense of collective identity. Thus, by its very nature, "nationalist historiography – that which tells a story of the nation, however accurate the facts it cites, and whether or not it is overtly bellicose or ethnocentric – embeds actors and events in the history of the nation whether or not they had any conception of that nation."[76]

History texts or textbooks conceive the nation as age-old, thus concluding that the modern nation-state, is rooted in a unified and uncritical ancient past, that in the case of Palestine actually predates the birth of Islam. Theoreticians of Arab nationalism, most notably Sati' Al-Husri but also Edmond Rabat, Michel Aflaq and Constantine Zuraik, defined the Arab nation as objectively based on the unity of language (Arabic) and the coherence (seamlessness) of its history. Therefore, it is predetermined and eternal.[77] The writing of linear historical narratives of a

nation's origins and development is often coupled with the claim to primordial national identity. Such writing presumes that national identity is pre-existing. Calhoun adds: "Invoking history and primordial ethnicity are both ways of responding to problems in contemporary claims to nationhood."[78] The Palestinian texts under review invoke the tools of nationalist historiography to demonstrate the existence of an essentialized, continuous, unified and undifferentiated identity, developed from ancient times to the present, and in Palestine. Such a view excludes from its purview the notion of nation and culture as ostensibly hybrid creations and constructions.[79] Moreover this approach tends to exclude from its purview the "other" (Jewish history) in the constructed national narrative. Similarly, as Yael Zerubavel[80] shows, the construction of modern Israeli national identity employs discursive techniques and narrative forms that exclude the "other" (Palestinian Arab history).

Unit Two of the *National Education* (1995) textbook for the fifth grade is titled "The Palestinian People" and it starts with a question. "Dear Student, do you know who are the Palestinians?" In bold and colorful print a simple answer is provided. "The Palestinian people are the descendants of the Canaanites." Thus, this land has "been called the land of Canaan" (p.19). The student is then informed that these people–Palestinians–inhabited the land [Palestine], and founded a society with specific customs and values. These Palestinians as a people are part of Arab [Muslim and Christian] and Muslim society. Unit four of the same text identifies how, despite adversity and historic setbacks, Palestinian society has remained intact. This history is periodized in the textbook by delineating ten distinct eras.[81]

The significance of the founding of the PLO becomes more pronounced in the last stage of the periodization of Palestinian history, triggered by the 1967 war and dubbed as "Palestinian Society Under Occupation." Now, the rest of historic Palestine was occupied by Israel, and though a new wave of refugees was created, most of the people remained in the West Bank and Gaza. This phase is punctuated by war (1973), the recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."[82] Other highlights include the battle of Karameh of 1968, remembered by Palestinians as the symbol of modern resistance. The remainder of the narrative includes the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the launching of the Palestinian *intifada* in December 1987 to resist Israeli occupation. The narrative is capped by the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and the PLO (i.e. the Oslo Accords of 1993) which gave birth to the Palestinian National Authority, and the return of Palestinian leaders and

forces to the areas ceded by Israel to the PA.[83] This national narrative hinges on the founding of the Palestinian "state," an act that enables Palestinians to end the modern rupture in their history and to resume a normal national existence like other nations.

Treatment of modern and contemporary history is quite truncated. But the text underscores that the modern misery of the Palestinians and their displacement is the result of the 1948 war.[84] After 1967 Israel is depicted as the usurper of land and an occupation force. Students are presented with a map dotted with Israeli settlements. Students are then asked to name a nearby settlement, and to explain Israel's goal for "establishing settlements on Palestinian lands."[85] But the texts do not provide further content nor context. Ambiguity on such matters reflects the PA's desire to project itself more as a state-builder, rather than a resistance movement. Thus, resistance to occupation is mentioned but in a rather muted manner. But rarely, if ever, do the texts identify the conditions that Palestinians encounter daily–checkpoints, identification cards, curfews, detention, land confiscation, home demolitions, uprooted trees, and closures. These contexts are left for the student and teacher to bring out in classroom discussions. Some of these issues are clearly incorporated in the poetry selections incorporated in the texts. For example, Mahmoud Darwish, the Palestinian poet laureate, early in his writing career wrote a poem titled "Identity Card--Record I am an Arab," which is still memorized by Palestinians and Arabs everywhere. This poem is received by the reader as an example of both pride (national), and an invitation to resist if attacked. However, aside from a brief sketch of the founding of the PLO, themes of revolution, armed struggle, and return (right of return) are mostly retired, to open the door for statehood.

At the end of this unit, teachers are asked to engage students in an exercise. This exercise consists of conducting a discussion among students on the history of the Palestinian struggle for freedom and independence. The text provides a long excerpt from the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, adopted by the Palestine National Council in its 1988 session held in Algiers. In fact, in every textbook reviewed in this chapter, this declaration is invoked as the principal legitimizing tool for the Palestinian state. But one should not forget one important detail, namely that this state does not exist in fact yet. Here, at last, the simple and undifferentiated historical narrative can only lead to a pre-determined outcome–independence and the founding of the modern state of Palestine. That such a process is considered normal is exemplified further by the next and last page of the text–The Palestinian flag in full color. The

message is simple: Palestine is like other countries, and it too takes pride in its independence and freedom that is represented by the flag.

Despite the historical denouement, all the textbooks from 1994 to 2000 derive legitimacy of the contemporary Palestinian national claim from two specific accommodationist points of reference: the 1988 Declaration of Independence and the 1993 Oslo Accords, which the fifth grade text characterizes as a "peace treaty."[86] The flag to which Palestinians pledge their allegiance, represents and justifies Palestinian sovereignty over only the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, all territories occupied in 1967. This is significant, because the textbooks under consideration actually do not dwell on the Palestinian refugees. In fact, the examined texts have an insignificant number of pictures or illustrations of refugees residing in Palestine or in the diaspora. The Palestinian diaspora, who constitute at least fifty percent of the population, is mentioned only once, but their history is excluded from the depictions of Palestinian life. The lack of sustained focus on the refugees (both in Palestine or in the diaspora) could be explained by the PA's desire to downplay the contentious issue of the "right of return." However, this analysis concurs with that of Yael Zerubavel, who suggests that playing down the exiles serves the imperatives of the national narrative that is being constructed. Here the emphasis is on returning to a normal and natural existence, which the presence of exiles undermines.

Let us go back to the question of "Who are the Palestinians?" The answer to this question is presented via a 3000–year historical narrative as undisputed proof of Palestinian peoplehood and nationhood [in Palestine] which legitimizes modern state formation and the declaration of independence. But this question does not really depend on the presentation of a unified unbroken claim and presence in Palestine. This question is actually a very modern and contemporary question punctuated by the persistence of the 1967 Israeli occupation, which is a contest over who has more legitimacy in their claim to sovereignty over all or part of historic Palestine. Ironically, or not so ironically, modern Israeli and Palestinian historical narratives are both constructed to serve a national claim by drawing on pre-existing primordial claims of a natural and continuous presence on the contested geography of historic Palestine.

The Geography of the Nation

The cartographies of the Middle East have been re-imagined and refashioned in the course of the twentieth century. "From a political perspective, the appearance, disappearance, and tentative reappearance of

Palestine demonstrate that borders are in flux."[87] According to Massey, the present is not just present materially in the present-day landscape, but the past is also present in the memories of the people and in the conscious and unconscious constructions of the histories of places.[88] The complexity of the question of geography, boundaries and borders is evident in the *National Education* 1994-5 and 2000 textbooks. The introduction of the fifth grade text notes that the second unit deals with the location of "Palestine, its borders and its size."[89] However, in fact the book fails to identify specific borders. Instead, Palestine is placed into the southwest corner of Asia at the crossroads of three continents. Or it is identified as part of the map of the Arab World. The Arab world is colored in green, and Palestine is identified as a small region colored in brown. The map has no borders.[90] Israel is not identified, but neither are Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In other instances, historical or topographical maps of the Arab world are produced that identify only cities, including Jerusalem, Cairo.[91] The fifth grade text reproduces a map in which the Arab world is marked off in yellow. The students are then asked to consult an atlas to assist them in clustering countries and their names under two categories. They are to first identify the countries that have "natural borders," then to distinguish them from those that have "political borders."[92]

The sixth grade textbook broaches the question of maps in a unit titled "Administrative and Legal Institutions." The student learns that countries are administratively divided into the equivalent of states, counties, or provinces. However, the students are not provided with a map of Palestine. Instead they are provided with a blank rectangle where a map should be. The pupil is asked to draw a map of Palestine that identifies some of the major administrative divisions or governorates.[93] The empty rectangle speaks volumes. Maps and the delineation of borders are controversial. These texts want to teach civics to students without a state, whose national territory has yet to be formally determined. Indeed the issue of officially declared and recognized borders is part of what the unresolved conflict is all about. Even Israel, which was founded in 1948, has no formally recognized international boundaries.

Under these constraints, Palestinian students are taught certain aspects of geography by focusing on cities, towns, and the location of religious sites with historic significance. The 1995-96 texts introduce students only to cities that fall within the West Bank and Gaza. They feature places like Jericho, Gaza and its cities, Bethlehem, and Nablus.[94] Several cities and sites, inhabited by Palestinian citizens of Israel, are mentioned with reference to pre-1948 Palestine in the context of lessons on geography and topography in historical Palestine.[95] Religious sites introduced in the texts

include Muslim and Christian places of worship in Jerusalem, Gaza, and Bethlehem.[96] Jewish sites, as established earlier, fall outside of the embattled Palestinian national narrative and are mostly not referenced. However, sites or shrines that are simultaneously valued as holy by Judaism and Islam are indeed identified, such as the al-Buraq Wall/wailing Wall, the Sanctuary of Abraham/al-Haram al-Ibrahim, Jacob's Well, and Joseph's Tomb. Though these places are mentioned, the texts do not identify their significance to Judaism.[97] Historical and archeological sites located in Jerusalem are identified, but only Greek, Roman, European (Christian/Crusader) and Islamic ones are referenced.[98] Mr. Yassin, the MOE director of publications, explains that these selective accounts were meant to avoid antagonizing Palestinians whose sensitivities might be inflamed by references to Jewish historical and religious links to Palestine. "What's more, Mr. Yassin added, he did not want the books to stir up the passions of Muslim opponents of the [Oslo] accords with Israel. 'I am concerned about the opposition,' he conceded. 'Religion is full of dangers."[99]

As noted above, Palestinian textbooks refer to "Palestine" in two senses. The first refers to the historic (pre-Partition plan) Palestine. The second refers to the emerging Palestinian state. To complicate matters further, the texts under review refer to Palestine the "homeland" in two distinct senses as well. In the present, homeland refers to only the West Bank and Gaza. This point is reinforced by the preface to all textbooks published in 2002, which in part states that since its inception, the MOE "has placed the subject of curriculum development as one of the strategic goals of its operation....[It] actually has started the unification of the curriculum in the two wings of the homeland, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."[100] But the same term (homeland) is invoked to refer to the pre-Partition (1947) period as well. The Palestinian homeland of the present is thus mapped into the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem – the declared capital of the emerging state of Palestine.[101] In this connection, the cities, holy sites, and illustrations cited in these texts are located within these specified boundaries.[102] However, in the context of teaching students about pre-1948 Palestine, cities and locations that are located in Israel are referenced (e.g., Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Caesarea, the Negev, and Safad).[103] The MOE explains that the "curriculum traces the development of the Palestinian people throughout its history; therefore mentioning the names of certain cities that are related to particular historical events is natural and bears no political ramifications."[104]

Needless to say, geography, borders, and boundaries are not simple matters. In the context of an unresolved conflict they are politically and historically charged questions. The delineation of borders is therefore not a decision that can be made by educators and the MOE. The political context of the new curriculum and the process of authoring the textbooks is, according the MOE, an exercise that can best be explained as a "tentative and transitional attempt to account for political complexities in this political juncture."[105]

The State: Sovereignty, Citizenship, and Symbols

The Palestine National Council declared the creation of a Palestinian state in 1988, but no formal state yet exists. The Palestinian state in this and subsequent documents has specified its future boundaries, and has declared East Jerusalem as its capital. The declared state is for all Palestinians irrespective of their domicile. They are to be guaranteed the rights of citizenship without invoking the term citizen and citizenship. In contrast, the *National Education* texts define the state as "a group of individuals who live on a specific geographic area and who submit to a particular political authority."[106] The citizen is thus a person who is protected by the state and in turn enjoys certain inalienable rights. Most importantly, the citizen in these texts is more specified than the broad definition that encompasses all Palestinians, as presented in the Declaration of Independence. The textbooks limit those eligible for citizenship to those who live in a specific and delimited geography (i.e. the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem) ruled by the state (PA). This might be an unintended oversight, but the fact remains that the citizen of the texts is actually a sub-set of "all Palestinians." This leads one to suggest that, instead of being an oversight, such a redefinition can be explained by the political constraints and limited parameters of the seemingly perpetual "peace process," undergirded by an understanding that the Palestinian state is, if established, to be limited to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. As shown above, the texts have downplayed their representation of the refugees in the diaspora, which leaves one uncertain as to whether they are or will be included in the category of citizen.

The legitimacy of the state is thus derived from two historic points of reference: The Declaration of Independence, and the Oslo Accords. The former was promulgated by the Palestinian National Council, which insisted on the right of resistance until the end of the occupation is realized. The latter document, with the US serving as the guarantor, excludes two basic words. First, nowhere in the text is Israel defined as an

"occupier," and the word "resistance" or the right of resistance is completely eschewed. Clearly, invoking these documents as the principal points of reference from which the emerging Palestinian state derives its legitimacy is an exercise in political ambiguity. In this connection, all the textbooks reviewed in this chapter have clearly muted or minimized the right of resistance. In fact, resistance is depicted as being relevant only to the past, and even in that context is also quite muted. The words which characterized the Palestinian national movement (struggle and liberation) have been replaced or substituted with those reflecting the nation and state-building agenda (state, citizen). The texts do not identify Palestinian leaders in their capacity as the founders of a resistance movement, but only in their capacity as officials (ministers and deputies) of the Palestinian state. Thus Arafat and his comrades have no history, they are introduced to the students only as leaders of the state. The texts' silences on these matters speak volumes, and these silences lend credence to our claim that indeed the properties of the new affiliative order can be gleaned from what the texts say and don't say.

The image of the Palestinian state given in the textbooks is clear: it is democratic and peace loving. It has a flag, an elected president, a parliament. In 2003, to jumpstart the stalled peace process, the PLC authorized the creation of a new post: Prime Minister. The national political system is the PA, and the Parliament (PLC) is an elected body. But the texts do not mention that a new round of elections is overdue by three years. Separation of powers is insured through the presence of an Executive, and an independent Judiciary. The rights of citizens are enshrined in a Constitution, which does not exist yet.[107] The early textbooks (1995-6) did not include a unit on "National Institutions," while in contrast, the texts published in 2000 talk about the PLO and the PNC. Under the rubric of "National Institutions" and divided in two parts, the student is introduced to a total of eleven lessons. The first two focus on the PLO and the PNC. The remaining nine lessons introduce students to an understanding of the state, the constitution, the three branches of government and the concept of the separation of powers, and the legal system. The texts also introduce economic institutions (banks), the private sector, and social and health institutions (welfare societies for the families of martyrs, hospitals, and sports teams).[108] Out of a total of forty-three pages, only four pages are used to discuss the PLO. The word "resistance" does not appear anywhere. The words "liberation" and "revolution" appear only once, in the same sentence that introduces a PNC resolution to form the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). The PNC, in turn, is covered in three descriptive pages starting with a photograph of Arafat from the PNC

session that declared statehood in 1988. There is no caption under the photo, and Arafat's name does not appear anywhere in this text. His affiliations as the head of Fateh, the largest Palestinian guerilla organization, and his position as the Chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee are nowhere to be found in both editions of the textbooks.

The point being made is simple. Symbols of the past (resistance, liberation, and guerrilla fighters) are fading and giving way to the symbols of the new era. Palestine in the pages cited above is depicted as a typical state, which has ministries and ministers, judges, and is governed by the rule of law. This democratic state guarantees the freedom of the individual, and beckons the individual to be a good citizen. This ideal depiction goes against the fact that the "national security" apparatus of the state comprises the largest part of the public sector. Large majorities of the Palestinian population believe that the PA and its officials are corrupt. In addition, about sixty percent of the public fears to criticize the PA in public. Democracy is defined in mechanistic procedural terms, as opposed to a dynamic deliberative one.

The *National Education* and other textbooks list a number of values and attributes that every citizen should embrace, including love and obedience to God, homeland, and family. The texts try to inculcate students with principles that shape a democratic ethos and a vibrant civil society. Other values to be embraced include: tolerance, peace (coexistence), pluralism, civic virtue, respect for human rights, freedom of speech and association, social justice, equality, loyalty, honesty, respect, courage, sacrifice, patience, self-restraint, volunteerism, teamwork, fair resolution of conflicts, a sense of right and wrong, respect for law, and acceptance of responsibility for one's actions.[109] These virtues are to guide the individual's behavior and serve as the basis of relations among citizens. But, because the curriculum concentrates on the Palestinian, Arab, Islamic dimensions in social studies, the "other"(Israeli or the universal) is not clearly specified. "Whether a healthy attitude of openness to other societies is maintained cannot be determined until the textbooks for the higher grades with their broader worldwide scope are published."[110] The texts do not include references to ethics and moral judgment, and independence of thought.

The *National Education* and the new *Civics* textbooks emphasize that a vibrant civil society is essential if democracy and all forms of rights are to be safeguarded. The citizen enjoys basic rights and freedoms enshrined in the law and the Constitution, including the right to life, the pursuit of happiness, freedom of expression, and those civil and political rights that enable citizens to choose their leaders in open and contested elections.[111]

The state bestows citizenship on members of society, thus citizens have the obligation to uphold the law. A vibrant civil society is filled with multiple associations and organizations organized independently of the state. These associations promote and enhance social cooperation within society, and serve the common good. A good civil society promotes social harmony.[112] The virtues of civil society are celebrated, when in real life the PA has tried to curtail the proliferation of independent associations. By dwelling on cooperation and social harmony these texts can then be understood as favoring unity (national and social), which often precludes dissent, opposition, and difference. Indeed the PA has tried to subordinate, with mixed success, the institutions of civil society both through coercion (security) and legal measures. What results in practice is that obligations and duties of the citizen are given greater primacy than the rights listed above.

It would be fair to conclude that overall the new curriculum can best be characterized as a vehicle that promotes the students' personal and national identities. This is done through the celebration of and promotion of Palestinians as a unified and subjugated people engaged in a long revolt to attain independence. Their national identity is a function of this historic quest. But having entered the nation and state-building phase, the referents for national identity in the present are shifting the meaning of struggle, unity, and citizenship. Who is a citizen of the future Palestine? The answer at this time is either ambiguous or couched in the language of simple definitions of what is a state and who is a citizen of this state. The state and the requirements for its formation thus become transformed as the new symbol of Palestinian national identity, accompanied with all the trappings: flag, citizens, declaration of independence, a capital, and national holidays. Indeed the PA celebrates the fifteenth of November as its "day of independence," despite the existing realities of occupation, and a state that has yet to secure formal recognition and autonomy.

The data in this chapter shows that the ideas of the radical reformers were not totally rejected by the PA and the Ministry of Education. The textbooks the MOE produced do in fact adopt some of the reformers' pedagogy that aims to promote thinking and creativity. Some of the exercises provided by the new texts invite the students to think critically. However, the invitation to think critically is limited because the entire curriculum is conceived as a mechanism for the transmission of knowledge, authority and values.

The national and political identity that the texts of the new curriculum promote fits and serves the state-building agenda. The predicates of the old affiliative order are slowly giving way to the construction of the new

affiliative order. The new, however, is far from becoming the equivalent of a dominant and unchallenged paradigm. The indicators extracted from the textbooks suggest that this new path is being facilitated and promoted by the MOE and the PA as part of the post-resistance and state-building phase.

NOTES

Chapter One

[1] A critical analysis of the obstacles facing the Palestinian national movement, both historically and contemporaneously is beyond the scope of this study. Chapter 3 offers a synoptic discussion of this vital topic. For more sustained analysis of the Palestinian national movement consult: Rashid Khalidi (2006) and Doumani (2007).

[2] Quoted from Rashid Khalidi, "Shared Responsibility," *London Review of Books,* 16 August 2007.

[3] On the dire social, political and economic consequences see: World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Update* (March 2007; November 2007), and World Bank (17 December 2007; and 24 September 2007).

[4] In 2002 the MOE was merged into the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE).

[5] I borrow the notion "affiliation" or "affiliative order" from Edward W. Said's discussion of how in humanistic studies a "canon" is established over time through a process of inclusions and exclusions. The inclusion-exclusion process is socially legitimized which leads to the reproduction of the filiative discipline. (Said 1983, pp.15-24)

[6] A friend who worked with the Palestinian Planning Ministry in Gaza as a consultant told me that among his colleagues they jokingly characterized the Palestinian state as not having "Founding Fathers, but Funding Fathers."

[7] His paper is available in Arabic. I present just a brief summary of some of the points he raises. The paper is posted at:
www.qattanfoundation.org/arabic/research/arabiclan.pdf

[8] In a telephone conversation (1 November 2003) with Fouad Moughrabi (Director of the Qattan Foundation), he described the response to Al-Kurdi's presentation. I base my depiction on the information he provided me.

[9] Keith Howard, editor. 1995. *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women*. London: Cassell; David Andrew Schmidt, 1999. *Ianfu–The Comfort Women of the Japanese Imperial Army of the Pacific War*. Lampter, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press.

[10] Norma Field, 1997. "War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After." *Positions*, Spring 1997: 27.

[11] The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform published a monograph titled, "The Restoration of National History." A photocopy was provided to me by Ms. Rika Saito, a Japanese graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania.

[12] The meetings were held on March 24-26, at the offices of the World Bank in Washington, D.C. The workshop is titled, "Textbooks, Curricula, Teacher training,

and the Promotion of Peace and Respect for Diversity. In particular see Wolfgang Hopken's paper titled: "Textbooks and Conflicts. Experiences from the Work of the Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research." This paper can be found at the following website:
www1.worldbank.org/education/social_cohesion/doc?World%20Bank.pdf

[13] The Georg Eckert Institute holds one of the largest collections of school textbooks from all over the world in its library. See:
http://www.gei.de/english/index1.shtml

[14] Raymond William Baker. 2003. *Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Baker reviews the debates of Egyptian Islamic reformers on education (see pages 17-52).

Chapter Two

[1] In this study, education is defined as formal schooling which is by and large controlled and administered by the state. Education systems refer to the actual government ministries that supervise and set educational priorities. Lastly, educational reform is defined as a process involving many actors including the state, education activists, and external actors.

[2] In conducting my research I have found that the most useful sources on the education problematic are not found in the major social science journals. For example, I conducted a search in the ABC Pol. Sci. Database, which covers listings from 300 journals. I queried the database for listings on: Education and democracy, citizenship, development, social change, and the third world. I found a combined total of 67 listings dating from 1984. About one third of the entries were on developing countries, and no more than 10 percent were written by political scientists. Most of the articles were published in development or area studies journals.

[3] Coleman (1965) noted that political socialization is only one aspect of the way in which the political system relates to education; the others are political recruitment and political integration.

[4] Gutman (1987, 16) suggests that instead of focusing only on the various aspects of the schooling process, the analysis of education "should focus on the central political question of how authority over educational institutions should be allocated in a democratic society."

[5] Bourdieu and Passeron (1994). Coleman addresses this problem under the rubric of the "elite-mass gap" (1965, 25); Nie, et al (1996) acknowledge that inequality exists in society, however he notes that education can not be expected to resolve this problem.

[6] The World Bank believes that vocational education is best left to private providers and to training on the job. As for higher education, total privatization is the solution (World Bank 1995, 154). These opinions will de difficult to dismiss given that as of 1990 the World Bank's share of total multilateral aid for education was 62 percent. (Lauglo 1997, 222). In this connection the World Bank is

advocating a policy of decentralized and community financing of education (Bray 1996).

[7] Ibrahim Abu-Lughod who headed the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center until early 1997, expressed this sentiment in a discussion with me in New York on 17 July 1997. It is difficult to prove this point; however it sheds light on the motivations of individual reformers.

[8] The World Bank refers to it as "human capital", which is essentially an economic concept. Burnett and Patrinos (1996, 275), of the World Bank's Human Development Department, define it as a form of capital which is the "source of future earnings, or of future satisfactions, but cannot be bought or sold."

[9] The early pioneering studies of this approach include *inter alia*: Becker(1975); Bowman (1966); and Schultz (1963).

[10] For example, UNESCO publishes an annual report titled, *World Education Report*, and its regional offices assist various ministries of education in the development of their curricula; These organizations hold international summits to propose agendas for educational development. In 1991, the above mentioned UN agencies along with The World Bank sponsored the "World Conference on Education for All". These proceedings were published by UNESCO.

[11] The importance of education for the World Bank is captured in the opening lines of this policy report: "Education produces knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes. It is essential for civic order and citizenship and for sustained economic growth and the reduction of poverty. Education is about culture; it is the main instrument for disseminating the accomplishments of human civilization" (World Bank 1995, xi).

[12] Several authors have noted that the production of wealth and power among nations has shifted from material production to information processing activities. This means that the source of economic power today resides in the ability to create new knowledge and apply it to every realm of human activity. In particular see (Carnoy et al, 1993); in addition the three volume work by Manuel Castells, under the general title of: *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, is indispensable (Castells 1996; 1997; 1998).

[13] For a critique of the Bank's reliance on a rates of return analysis see (Bennell 1996).

[14] Lauglo 1996; Samoff 1996; Greene 1988; Smith 1990; Ayers 1993; and Freire 1973, 1994.

[15] See, *Palestinian Higher Education Financing Strategy*. Prepared by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Palestinian National Authority. With Financial and Technical Assistance provided by the World Bank (2002, 8-9, 17-18). The report was posted in January 2003 by the World Bank at: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/MOHE+Strategy/$File/MOHESR.pdf

[16] My critique does not preclude the need for setting certain standards and guidelines for the attainment of desired levels of literacy and numeracy, provided that these standards do not reduce education to the equivalent of the acquisition of

goods and services from the market. I maintain that education and learning can be more usefully conceptualized as a dynamic process.

[17] For the volume on Arab education see, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies (1999); and for the new paradigm see, World Bank (2002).

[18] In addition see Apple and Christian-Smith (1991), Apple (1990) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1994).

[19] Teaching can be viewed as not only the transmission of the assigned texts, but as a process which involves interpretation. It is beyond the scope of this study to look at how teaching affects the students's reception of the curriculum and the specific textbooks.

[20] In addition to the MOE, the Ministry of Higher Education (MHE) was established after the election for the Palestinian Council in January 1996. The latter is responsible for all post-secondary education, including 8 universities, and 20 technical (vocational) and junior colleges. Prior to the 1994 transfer agreement, The Council for Higher Education, was the central Palestinian body overseeing Palestinian higher education.

[21] See Article I, *Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles*, September 13, 1993; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agreement, initialed in Oslo on 20 August, was signed in Washington, D.C., at a White House ceremony full of pomp and fanfare.

[22] *Agreement on the Prepatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Israel-PLO)*, August 29, 1994; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[23] The elections were held on 20 January 1996. I witnessed the election campaign from close range during two research trips in December 1995, and January 1996. First, I stayed at the Ambassador hotel in East Jerusalem which served as headquarters for the election observers from the European Union, and the US based National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. The timing of my visits, and the location of my lodging gave me the opportunity to talk with candidates, and to witness rallies, collect promotional materials, and compare notes with international observers.

[24] The term "Palestinian National Authority," is used by the Palestinians, whereas the agreements signed with Israel refer to only "Palestinian Authority". Clearly the insertion of the word "national" by the Palestinian side is indicative of their claim to statehood which the Israelis have yet to concede. See, *Palestinian Elections Law* (Gaza: Palestinian Election Commission, 7 December 1995). In this book I will use PA to refer to the incipient Palestinian state.

[25] For the first view see, Shikaki (1996); Ahmad Khalidi (1996); for the critical view see, Andoni (1996).

[26] See Said (1992); Muslih (1988); Rashid Khalidi (1997).

[27] Kimmerling and Migdal (2003, 277) conclude that Palestinian national identity must be seen as a historical process which started with the Arab-Palestinian revolt against Ottoman rule in 1834.

[28] Cited in the *Sunday Times*, London, June 15, 1969.

[29] See, Yehoshua Porath, "Mrs. Peters Palestine," *The New York Review of Books*, January 16, 1986; Justin McCarthy. 1990. *The Population of Palestine: Population*

History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate. New York: Columbia University Press.

[30] The work cited by Porath is the first volume on the history of Palestinian nationalism, see (Porath, 1977; 1986).

[31] The literature on this subject is vast. On Africa see, Davidson (1992); Mamdani (1996); With reference to the Middle East see, Salibi (1988).

[32] The literature on identity, nationalism and culture is vast, in particular see: Anderson (1991); Breuilly (1994); Chatterjee (1993); Hall (1989); Hobsbawm (1990); Said (1993).

[33] Castells adumbrates these forms of identity building with reference to the emergence of what he calls the Network Society (Castells 1996), however they remain useful for this study.

[34] For further discussion of patriarchy, and women's movements in the Arab world see: Sharabi (1988); Ahmed (1992). For works on gender and the Palestinian women's movement see: Peteet (1991); Hammami (1995); Rosemary Sayigh (1998); and Taraki (1995).

[35] This study does not broach the identity processes affecting Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship. For an illuminating study of their collective identity in the crosscurrents of Israelization and Palestinianization see, Rouhana (1997).

[36] Yassir Arafat served as both the President of the PA, and as the Chairman of the PLO's executive committee. On a weekly basis, Mr. Arafat convened and presided over the meetings of the PA cabinet and the PLO executive committee. He then convened a joint meeting of the PA/PLO, which is viewed as the broad cabinet. Thus Arafat simultaneously assumed two roles and functions: the head of state, and the leader of a liberation or resistance movement.

[37] For background on these forces see: Abu-Amr (1994); Mishal and Sela (2000); and Legrain (1986).

[38] The *intifada* which was unleashed in December 1987 was led by the nationalist forces aligned with the externally based PLO. The role played by the Islamic forces in the *intifada*, and in the ensuing period enabled it to widen its social base of support. The uprising is viewed as an important watershed in the development of the Palestinian resistance movement. For an incisive analysis of the causes leading to the uprising see: Hilterman (1991); other worthy studies include: Lockman and Beinin (1989); Nassar and Heacock (1990); Ruether and Ellis (1990), Emerson (1991), Peretz (1990); Schiff and Ya'ari (1990); and Hunter (1991).

[39] Just as the state is not viewed as a simple rational actor, my usage of civil society does not connote a single unified rational actor. Civil society or the social forces of a society are not viewed as an aggregate of diverse interests which speak or act with a single harmonious voice. In fact, they represent diverse views and interests. Some support the dominant political coalition, and others seek pacts and coalitions with other oppositional forces and groups in their quest to affect and influence the formulation of state policies.

[40] In addition see, Beblawi and Luciani (1987), and Luciani in (Brynen 1995, 211-228).

[41] A friend who worked with the Palestinian Planning Ministry in Gaza as a consultant told me that among his colleagues they jokingly characterized the Palestinian state as not having "Founding Fathers, but Funding Fathers."
[42] The inside-outside dichotomy has been broached by a variety of theorists. In addition to Skocpol, I refer you to Walker (1993).
[43] The construction of new identities presupposes a crisis of identity (Greenfiled 1992, 14).

Chapter Three

[1] Azmi Bishara is a difficult person to introduce. He is an Israeli citizen. He is an Arab nationalist and until March 2006 was a member of the Israeli Knesset. He heads the Israeli Arab National Democratic Alliance (*Tajamu'/Balad*). In Israel he is an "Israeli-Arab." To Palestinians he is a "Palestinian from the 1948 area." He is also a former professor of philosophy at Bir Zeit university, which is located in the West Bank.
[2] For further elaboration on the importance and relevance of rent and political rent to the study of Arab states and the PA see: Beblawi and Luciani (1987); Luciani (1996); Richards and Waterbury (1996, 55-61), and Beck (1999).
[3] Sayigh's analysis of Palestinian state formation adopts a periodization that predates the launching of the *intifada* in 1987 (uprising) and the 1993 Oslo Accords which led to the establishment of the PA. In contrast, Robinson's (1997) approach is anchored in the dynamics of the *intifada,* which paved the process of Palestinian state building.
[4] For a discussion of the post-colonial Arab state see, Nazih Ayubi (1995) and Naqeeb (1991).
[5] See al-Naqeeb (1991: 42). Al-Naqeeb has developed his thesis into a book published in Arabic, *Al-Dawla al-Tassalutiya fi al-Mashreq al-Arabi al-Mu'aser* [The Authoritarian State in the Modern Arab East] (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1991). In addition consult: Richards and Waterbury (1990, 300-373); Moore (1974); Batatu (1985); Hinnebusch (1990); and Zubaida (1989); Salame (1994).
[6] Yusuf and Ruhi are from the Jerusalem based Khalidi family. Rashid Khalidi identifies them as his relatives.
[7] The term *nakba* was coined by the Syrian scholar Constantine Zurayk, immediately after the Arab defeat in 1948. See Constantine Zurayk (1956, 2). *The Meaning of the Disaster*. Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative. The Arabic title is *Ma'na al-Nakbah.*
[8] Arab governments were often fearful of the potential of Palestinian political activism, so they isolated the refugees from their domestic populations, by herding them into refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon. For example, though Nasser championed the Palestine cause, his policies were geared to prevent the emergence of social and political organizations with an explicit Palestinian character and agenda (Khalidi 1989, 59).

[9] Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and some Palestinian organizations expressed serious reservations, while Egypt, Algeria and Iraq fully endorsed the idea. See *Compendium of Palestine Documents* (Cairo: State Information Service, 1970), Part 2, p.1273.

[10] Egypt discouraged any independent Palestinian political organizing. Whereas Lebanon prevented such activity by placing Palestinians under strict control of the then dreaded Deuxieme Bureau, the internal security forces. On these matters, consult: (Petran 1987; Rosemary Sayigh 1994; and Yezid Sayigh 1997).

[11] *Hawamish 'Ala Daftar al-Naksa* ("Annotations to the Notebook of Defeat") by Nizar Qabbani first appeared in an independent chapbook following the 1967 war. It was later included in Qabbani's collection, *Al- 'Amal al-Siyasiyya* ("The Political Works") published by Manshurat Nizar Qabbani, Beirut 1973. Translated from the Arabic by Kamal Boulatta.

[12] On PLO relations with Lebanon see; (Walid Khalidi 1979). By way of influencing the PLO, several Arab governments created their own resistance organizations. "As these organizations entered the PLO, they injected into its politics the policies of their respective patrons [Syria, Iraq]. In a sense, the PLO became a microcosm of inter-Arab politics" (Selim 1991, 263).

[13] See Haas (1964, 469-475). This point is also elaborated by Eqbal Ahmad, a noted scholar on revolutionary movements in an interview I conducted with him in New York on 16 November 1981, and published in Arabic in *Palestine Affairs*, April 1982. See also Ahmad's essay on revolutionary warfare (1971).

[14] See Article 9, *The Palestinian National Charter*, 1968.

[15] The text of the resolution can be found in Lukacs (1992, 308-309). For a critical discussion of all PNC resolutions from 1964 to 1988, see Muslih (1990).

[16] The support garnered from the Non-Aligned movement was instrumental in securing UN recognition of the PLO in 1974. For an astute account of this movement see, Singham (1976; 1977), and Jankowitsch (1978).

[17] These rights are elaborated in UN General Assembly resolution 3236 of 22 November 1974. The text is available in Tomeh (1975, 111).

[18] For the full text see Lukacs (1992, 411-415).

[19] Quoted from an unpublished speech given by Walid Khalidi (December 1988) at a forum sponsored by the Brookings Institution in Washington. For a further development of his argument see (Walid Khalidi 1992, 141-149). A decade earlier, Khalidi promoted the idea of Palestinian statehood on the pages of *Foreign Affairs*, in an article partially titled: 'Thinking the Unthinkable," see Walid Khalidi (1978). See also Muslih (1990).

[20] To pursue its diplomatic objectives, the PLO pushed its agenda through the UN, the European Union, the Arab League and the Non-Aligned movement. It floated various ideas through secret channels with the US, and with some Israelis. In the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon which resulted in the evacuation of PLO forces from Lebanon, the PLO pushed for the convening of an international conference, under UN auspices, on the Question of Palestine. The conference (ICQP) convened in Geneva (29 August to 4 September 1983). In my capacity as a Political Affairs Officer of the ICQP (UN Secretariat), I served the working and

drafting groups of the conference. I worked closely with key delegations, including the PLO and its highest officials. The PLO, especially Arafat pushed for the adoption of an unambiguous declaration favoring a two-state solution, to result from international negotiations with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as its key points of reference. The ensuing "Geneva Declaration" adopted these measures. The full text of this Declaration can be found in: *Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine*, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983 (United Nations Publications, No. E.83.I.21), chap.I, sect.B.

[21] The 1984 meeting of the PNC, which convened in Amman, endorsed the ICQP resolutions. I attended the session as a working journalist. I observed that in the deliberations of the Political Committee, only the diplomatic team of the PLO understood the limits and constraints of international support. The marginalization of the grassroots explains this lacuna.

[22] The rise of the Islamic forces gained importance during the *intifada*, and today they remain as the primary organized opposition to the PA.

[23] The English translation is printed in Lockman and Beinin (1989, 100).

[24] Faisal Husseini (1940-2001) was one of the recognized leaders of the *intifada*, and a loyalist of the Arafat-led Fateh movement. He and the rest of the UNL insisted that only the PLO can negotiate a political settlement on behalf of the Palestinian collectivity. He expressed these views to me on numerous occasions, and especially when I accompanied him during his meetings on Capitol Hill in 1989.

[25] See Muwatin (1995), and Hilal (1998). Palestinians are involved in a heated debate on the collapse of the old political party system. In 1997 (15 and 17 September), a leading newspaper published in Ramallah, the provisional capital of the PA in the West Bank, ran a two-part series titled, "Hal Intaha 'Asr al-Fasa'el?" (Has the era of the resistance organizations ended?). Various leaders, and intellectuals argued that these organizations must reconfigure themselves into political parties with a broader appeal. I broached this issue with Dr. Asa'd Abdul-Rahman, member of the PLO Executive committee, and Malouh Abdul-Rahim, member of the political bureau of the PFLP who recently returned from exile. The latter in particular said, "we are finished," and added that they need to reconfigure themselves by forging new political coalitions capable of articulating political programs that resonate with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Author's interview, Ramallah, 14 September 1997). For a scathing critique of the Palestinian left, see the proceedings of the Fourth Annual *Muwatin* conference in 1998 (Muwatin 1999), entitled, "Structural Transformations in Palestinian Political Life and Prospects for Change."

[26] Similar to other Arab countries, the Palestinian Islamic movement is not monolithic, but is in fact highly variegated. The most influential and effective organizations are Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Jarbawi 1996; Robinson 1997, 132-173; Abu-Amr 1994; and Ahmad 1994).

[27] This summary is based on a critical reading of the "Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine." I specifically use the version

translated by Muhammad Maqdsi for the Islamic Association for Palestine, Dallas, Texas, in 1990. Hereafter, I will refer to this document as the "Hamas Charter."

[28] The common definition for *Jihad*, is "holy war." However, this definition misses a crucial element of the meaning of the term, which also refers to a process of internal renewal and affirmation of the community's beliefs. But as Esposito points out, "despite the fact that jihad is not supposed to include aggressive warfare, this has occurred, as exemplified by early extremists like the Kharjites and contemporary groups like Egypt's Jamaat al-Jihad.., as well as Jihad organizations in Lebanon, the Gulf states, and Indonesia" (Esposito 1988, 95).

[29] Let me be candid, I too was less than enthusiastic about the prospects of the Oslo peace process. Even before the White House ceremony in 1993, I expressed my doubts in an article which I titled: "Will Arafat Become the Israeli's Enforcer?" (Newsday, 5 September 1993) The question mark in the title represented my only concession to optimism.

[30] See, *Asharq Al-Awsat* of 22 August 1996, and *The Guardian International*, 23 August 1996.

[31] The full text of the accord can be found in UN documents: General Assembly and Security Council; A/48/486, S/26560 of 11 October 1993.

[32] I avoid using the word terrorism in this study. Instead I use words like violence and murder to describe horrific acts. To paraphrase George Orwell, the word terrorism, given its ideological meanings, tends to obscure and hide meaning.

[33] Prior to the elections, the Palestinian Independent Electoral Commission, advocated a Proportional Representation system of elections. Such a system would have produced a more democratic and less predictable outcome. Commission members (Dr. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Dr. Ali Jarbawi), told me that Arafat rejected the proposal without discussion.

[34] With reference to some African states, Jackson and Rosberg, deemed some of the states as ineffective on the domestic front, but by virtue of international recognition they were often maintained artificially by the international community. Jackson notes that "quasi-states are creatures and their elites beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms," he adds that the international community which "fostered the independence of such states...caters for their survival and development (Jackson 1990, 24, 25).

[35] For example, in 1998 the Attorney General, Mr. Fayez Abu-Rahmeh, submitted his resignation because the security services usurped his rights. He accused them of arresting dissidents (Islamic) without the issuance of an order to show cause from his office. Furthermore, the security services prevent attorneys from visiting the arrested dissidents, and hold people in custody without filing formal charges. For details on his resignation see, *Al-Hayat* 6 May 1998. Furthermore, these violations have been documented by the Gaza based Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR). Raji Sourani, the director of PCHR, who in the past was imprisoned without charges (order to show cause) by Israel, in an ironic twist of fate was also arrested by the PA. These practices are further documented in a report issued by Human Rights Watch (1997).

[36] According to Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, only three political parties have been able to maintain a modicum of organizational viability. They include Fateh the party in power, the Islamic movement in particular Hamas, and the former communist party renamed the People's Party of Palestine (Interview in New York, 20 June 2000).

[37] In January 2000 the PLC approved legislation governing the rights and freedoms of NGOs, "The Charitable Associations and Community Organization Law." The draft law, modeled on a repressive Egyptian law, was introduced by the Justice Ministry in 1995. However, the NGO network delayed its passage. They secured the support of many PLC members which enabled them to purge its most regressive components.

[38] In a more recent study (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005) the authors demonstrate that the flow of international aid into the PA-controlled territories is a central causal factor in explaining the emergence of a depoliticized and denationalized NGO elite.

[39] Quoted from George Giacaman's introduction to a book published by Birzeit university. The essay is titled, "In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future." The specific text is found at: www.birzeit.edu/ourvoice/politics/apr99/giaca.html. Giacaman is professor of Philosophy and the Dean of Graduate Studies at Birzeit university. In addition, along with MK Azmi Bishara, is co-founder of *Muwatin* (citizen), a Palestinian NGO which promotes democracy.

[40] See source in previous footnote. In addition see Giacaman (1994), and Tamari (2003).

[41] Quoted from an interview with Robert Siegel, National Public Radio, "All Things Considered," on 14 July 2003. The full transcript is located at: http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/transcripts/2003/jul/030714.shikaki.html. The full results of the poll is located at: http//www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html.

[42] Border restrictions and the strange shape of the "embryonic quasi state bequeathed to the Palestinians--it now looks like Swiss cheese, with the Palestinians getting the holes and Israeli troops and settlers getting the cheese--don't exactly inspire investor confidence." Quoted from *Newsweek*, 11 December 1995.

[43] In the first PA cabinet, prior to the Palestinian elections of 1996, about 50 percent of the posts were given to Arafat's exile cohorts. However, amongst them they controlled the most important ministerial portfolios: Planning and International Cooperation; Finance and Economy. Security and police remained under Arafat's direct supervision (Frisch 1997). In contrast, Brynen (1995a, and 1995b) concurs that PA patronage can be conceptualized as a form of neopatriarchy, which can corrode the legitimacy of political leadership. But he notes, that Arafat retains "considerable strength within many of the constituencies (key social elites, the PA bureaucracy and security services, Fateh) that count (1995b, 33).

[44] According to the PA Ministry of Finance, by the end of 1997 the PA employed about 86,800 people--48,400 civilian and 38,400 police and security (Ministry of

Finance 1998, 5). Robinson (1997, 178) estimates that about 25 percent of all Gazans depend on the PA for their livelihood. Corruption is used to perpetuate the patronage system, thus Arafat is always in need of unrestricted funds without the scrutiny of auditors. On this score, Arafat's key brokers have made sweet deals with Israeli businessmen, giving the latter a monopoly over the supply of fuel and building materials. (e.g. Construction accounts for 40 percent of Gaza's GNP) Part of the commissions paid by the Israelis is "often channeled into an unaudited fund controlled by Yasser Arafat himself" (Peter Hirschberg, "Playing Monopoly", *The Jerusalem Report*, February 22, 1996.)

[45] The figure of 40,000 is also mentioned by Greg Myre of the *New York Times*, 21 September 2003, in a dispatch titled, "Israel's case Against Arafat."

[46] Usher notes, that by "way of comparison, the police to population ratio in London is 1:3,200; in Los Angeles, it is 1:2,800" (Usher 1996, 34).

[47] The PA's draft budget for 1996 was estimated at about $902 million. Of this figure, $273 million were allotted for capital expenditures, to be fully financed by the donor community. Recurrent expenditures equal $629 million, which includes wages (civil service, $250 million, and police/security forces $147 million). Projected revenues were set at $554 million, leaving a deficit of $75 million to be covered by external funding as well. This data is based on the PA's draft budget of 1996, a copy of which I have obtained.

[48] PA practices resemble the prevailing trends in the region. According to Ayubi, the military in the Middle East is the single largest employer. One out of every fifty people is a soldier. In addition, he notes that military spending has increased by 1600 percent since the 1967 war. The military in the Middle East, has the highest expenditures in the world, relative to GDP. Put differently, for every dollar spent on education, the Middle East spends $166 on defense (Ayubi 1995, 256-67).

[49] See *Jordan Times*, 10 March 2000. The level of Palestinian expenditures on security is consistent with the pattern of expenditures of most other Arab countries. The IISS report indicates that Arab countries increased their military expenditures by 9.1 percent in 1998 to $44 billion from $40.7 billion in 1997. Thus total defense expenditures constituted 7.4 percent of GDP, well above the world average of 2 percent of GDP. In contrast, Arab state expenditures on basic services such as health care and education is minimal, with Jordan on top spending 3.7 percent in these sectors in 1998.

[50] See, "Budget Proposal for FY 2003: Excerpts from the Statement of the Minsiter of Finance to the Palestinian Legislative Council," 31 December 2002.

[51] Senior staff of *Orient House* in Jerusalem, which serves as the base for the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs, told me that 35- 40% of their staff have no official function. They added, that *Orient House* serves as the vehicle for the disbursement of salaries that are tantamount to social welfare policies (Interview with Director of the office in Jerusalem, 13 September 1997). The same pattern is evident in the PLO's Department of Refugee Affairs, headed by Dr. Asad Abdul-Rahman who is a member of the PLO Executive Committee. He and his senior staff confirmed this point in an interview I conducted in their office in Ramallah (14 September 1997).

[52] According to World Bank calculations, PA expenditures on wages equals about 14 percent of GDP, which are particularly high by developing country standards. See, "New Visions for the Economic and Social Development of the West Bank and Gaza: A Summary of an International Conference" (December 1996). The conference was jointly sponsored by the World Bank and the French Institute for International Relations. I secured the text from an Internet site funded by the World Bank: www.palecon.org.
[53] See "MAS Economic Monitor," No.6, 1999, p.15.
[54] Quoted from, The Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, "West Bank and Gaza Economic Policy Framework Progress Report," Prepared by the Palestinian Authority in collaboration with the staff of the International Monetary Fund, Lisbon, June 7-8, 2000, 7-8. The report can be found at: www.pna.net/events/economic_ahlc.htm.
[55] World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza: Public Expenditure Review," Confidential Report #18712-G7, 11 January 1999, p.8.
[56] The World Bank defines poverty as a condition where a household lives on the equivalent of less than $2 per day. See World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza Update," April 2000, p.1.
[57] The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), Public Opinion Poll, September 1993, Nablus. Since 2000 the Center has been renamed to the: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).
[58] Muhammad Rashid, Arafat's principal economic advisor, is credited with having created the PA's economic monopolies. Rashid heads the economic committee of the interim status negotiating team, and is advised by the Adam Smith Institute mentioned above (Hass 2000). In 1998 the Palestinian Public Control Commission issued a report which detailed widespread corruption practices, abuse of power and abuse of funds in several ministries.
[59] World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Update,* Fourth Quarter 1998, 9.
[60] The PA, after mounting pressure from the IMF and the donor community, has divulged details of its secret investment portfolio. Mohammad Rashid, who ran the fund on behalf PA president Yasser Arafat, announced that the fund will either be divested or transferred to a publicly accountable Palestinian Investment Fund by the end of 2000. See, William A. Orme, Jr., "Palestinian Investment Fund, No Longer Secret, Will Close," *The New York Times*, July 7, 2000.
[61]The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) appointed a committee to investigate the report's claims. The PLC's findings were almost identical to the Commission's report. It recommended the dissolution of the Council of Ministers, and the exclusion of the primary culprits from the future cabinet. Arafat did not act on any of the recommendations, instead he kept the indicted ministers in the new cabinet. Ironically, the PLC gave its vote of confidence to the new cabinet (Naqib 2000, 45). For further details on these practices see (Roy 1998; Abed 1999) and Dov Alfon, "Europe May Suspend Funding to PA: Arafat Associates Suspected of Misappropriating EU Financial Aid," *Ha'Aretz*, 31 January 1999. See also, Daniel Klaidman and Matt Rees, "Something Rotten in Palestine," *Newsweek*, 29 May 2000; Ronen Bergman and David Ratner, "The Man who Swallowed Gaza,"

Ha'Aretz Weekly Supplement, 4 April 1997; and David Hirst, "Shameless in Gaza," *The Guardian Weekly, 27 April 1997*.

[62] Quoted from, International Monetary Fund–West Bank and Gaza, "Economic Performance and Reform under Conflict Conditions." Prepared by a staff team comprising: Messrs. A. Bennett, K. Nashashibi, S. Beidas, S. Reichold, and J. Toujas-Bernate. Approved by the Middle Eastern Department, September 15, 2003.

[63] On 27 November 1999, twenty prominent Palestinian activists, academics and members of the PLC signed a petition accusing the PA and President Arafat of corruption, deceit and despotism. At least seven of the signatories were immediately arrested by the Palestinian security services. Clearly such actions by the PA do not generate confidence in the public, instead they increase the level of fear. This and other types of human rights violations are documented in the various reports issued by the *Palestinian Center for Human Rights* (Gaza), which can be found at: www.pchrgaza.com. See also, Human Rights Watch (September 1997), "Palestinian Self-Rule Areas--Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority."

[64] The data for Table 2.1 is extracted from the results of several public opinion polls conducted between May 1995 and April 2000. These surveys are carried out by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus, the West Bank. CPRS has been conducting public opinion polls on the political and socio-economic conditions in Palestine since September 1993. Full texts of the polls are available at: www.cprs-palestine.org/polls. The Center was renamed in 2002 as the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Reasearch (PSR).

[65] As reported by Felicity Barringer in "U.N. Envoy Urges Israel to Leave Settlements," *The New York Times*, 16 September 2003.

[66] The discussion on the *al-Aqsa intifada* is indebted to the following sources: Hammami and Tamari (2001); Tamari (2003); Usher 2003; and Shikaki (2002).

[67] Quoted from Salim Tamari, "No Obvious Destination." *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*: 18-24 September 2003 (Issue No. 656), which can be found at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/656/op8.html.

[68] The Israeli cabinet's decision to "remove" Arafat has paradoxically galvanized support for the leader who has been beseiged in his Ramallah compound. See, Khaled Amareyeh, "Arafat's Comeback." *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, 18-24 September 2003: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2003/656/rel.html; and Graham Usher, "Waiting on America." in the same issue: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2003/656/fr2.html; and Graham Usher, "Arafat Beaming on the Gallows," *Middle East International*, 26 September 2003, pp.4-6.

[69] Dr. Barghuti is the founder of the Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, and was affiliated with the People's Party (formerly Communist Party). Dr. Abdul Shafi led the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference in 1991. Mr. Dakkak, an engineer, played an important role in the Palestinian national movement before the outbreak of the first intifada. Edward W. Said served on their founding advisory board. The text of the initiative can be found at: http://palestinemonitor.org/Other%20Updates/palestinian_national.

[70] Quoted from President Bush's speech of 24 June 2004. The text is available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/text/0624bshspe.htm. In addition see the statement on the same subject by Secretary Colin Powell, issued on 25 June 2002 (http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/text/0626pwl.htm).
[71] The speech was given in mid-November 2002 in Gaza. The full text is published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*. See, Abbas (2003).
[72] See, Greg Myre, "Arafat Swears In New Palestinian Cabinet," *New York Times*, 8 October 2003.
[73] See, the statement of Rt. Hon. Christopher Patton, External Relations Commissioner of the European Parliament:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp03_312.h..; Profile of Mr. Fayyad in the Jewish Virtual Library
(htp://www.us-israel.org/jsource/biography/Fayyad.html); James Bennett, "The Radical Bean Counter," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 May 2003; James Bennett, "Palestinian Seeks Reform by Following the Money." *The New York Times*, 1 Janaury 2003.
[74] For a full discussion of the "100 Days Plan," see IMF (September 2003, 84-131).
[75] The data in this table is extrapolated from various polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). More than one poll was conducted per year, thus the percentage given is an average for the entire year. In particular, I have drawn this data from poll numbers 2 to 8 which were conducted between July 2001 and June 2003. The full results are located at: http://www.pcpsr.org/new/html. Other public opinion surveys consulted include: one conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 21-25 September 2002, and is found at:
http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no.46.htm; Birzeit Opinion Poll #12, found at: http://miftah.org./doc/pol_12.pdf; and a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion on 3 February 2003, and is found at: www.miftah.org/docs/polls/poll_108.pdf.
[76] See Lori A. Allen, "Uncertainty and Disquiet Mark Intifada's Third Anniversary." *Middle East Report Online,* 8 October 2003. It can be found at: http://www.merip.org

Chapter Four

[1] The introductions or prefaces of most of the reports produced by or on behalf of the international donor community include a variant of the following formulation: "Since 1994, the Palestinian Authority, the United Nations, the World Bank and other partners in the international donor community have been cooperating in a development initiative aimed at translating the Middle East peace process into visible achievements on the ground. Coordinated aid distribution and programme implementation mechanisms have been established in order to maximize the efficiency of funding and its benefits." United Nations, Office of the Special

Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, *Programme of Cooperation for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1998-1999*, 1999, page 3.

[2] The report also urges the Palestinian Authority to establish clear separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches to secure accountability of the former to the latter, insure the independence of the judiciary, and centralize all public revenues and expenditures in the Ministry of Finance.

[3] The "elements" which Gelb refers to are mostly represented by the Islamist grassroots movement in Palestine, e.g. HAMAS.

[4] Quoted from, Council of Foreign Relations (1999, vi). Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki, two Palestinian scholars, served as principal authors. TF members include several former European Foreign and Economics Ministers, International Bankers, and former members of the US Congress. The TF was mostly financed by the EU, and was hosted by Norway.

[5] The PA response is available at: http://www.pna. It should be noted that the entire report has been translated to Arabic by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, which is headed by Khalil Shikaki, one of the principal authors of the report.

[6] See Amira Hass, "Too Much Advice?," *Ha'Aretz* 15 March 2000. For a critique of the PA's choice of interlocutors, see Edward W. Said, "The Right of Return at Last," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 10-16 February 2000.

[7] For a similar conclusion see, Deborah Sontag, "Panel Criticizes Extent of Arafat's Power," *The New York Times*, 29 June 1999.

[8] Quoted from, Human Rights Watch (2003). *The "Roadmap": Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes*. The report is located at: http://www.hrw.org/mideast/is-ot-pa.php.

[9] For details see, World Bank (August 2002), *West Bank and Gaza Update*, pages 1-6:
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/PA+Reforms/$File/Reform+update+Aug+2002.pdf.

[10] It should be noted that under the section on judicial reforms and the rule of law, the ITF calls upon the PA to abolish the "security courts." These courts are extra judicial institutions that do not respect due process. For a fuller treatment of this matter, see the Human Rights report cited in footnote 8 above.

[11] Israel's impact on the Palestinian economy before and after the Oslo peace process have been likened to a policy of "de-development". This policy is predicated on expropriation (land), integration (in the Israeli economy), and deinstitutionalization. In addition, the closure of borders by Israel for security reasons, affect the movement of labor of goods. Briefly, the Palestinian economy remains extremely dependent on Israel (Roy 1995, 1998, 1999; Naqib 2000, Shaban 1998). These observations are also confirmed by the quarterly reports of the United Nations Special Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, which can be found at: http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/unsco.

[12] "Conference to Support Middle East Peace, Co-Sponsor's Summary, Washington, DC, 1 October 1993," reproduced in, *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record.* Washington DC: Institute for Palestine

Studies, 1994: 156. The Conference brought together members of the Multilateral Steering Group, the gavel-holders of the working groups, namely the European Union, Japan, Canada, and the US; The G-7 countries, Norway, and major donors from around the world; Israel and Arab representatives, including the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the World Bank and the United Nations.

[13] *ibid. 156-7.*

[14] Given the importance of this undertaking, the World Bank initiated a new quarterly publication, supervised by the Bank's resident mission in the WBGS. See, "West Bank and Gaza Update: The World Bank Group," Third Quarter 1999, 1.

[15] For example, transportation networks were mostly constructed before 1967. The supply of electricity is lower than other countries of the region. All of the PA's neighboring countries have significantly higher rates of telephones per capita. Water resources are limited, and mostly under the control of Mekoroth, the Israeli water company. Sanitation facilities are quite deficient, evidenced by the fact that only 25 percent of households are connected to sewage networks (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 6-8).

[16] The information below is available in numerous documents published by the World Bank, the Palestinian Authority, and the United Nations. The information in this section relies mostly on the following sources: (Diwan and Shaban 1999, 143-46).

[17] In 1994 the Johan Jorgen Holst Peace Fund, named in honor of the late Norwegian Foreign Minister instrumental in brokering the Oslo peace negotiations, was established as the funding mechanism for donor support to the PA. See, World Bank (2002). *Holst Fund: Supporting Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, p.1.

[18] World Bank, "Aid Coordination and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The West Bank and Gaza Experience," *Precis*, Spring 1999, p.2.

[19] United Nations, *Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Survey and State of the Development Effort, May 1999. The full text of this document can be found at: www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/unsco/unfront.html.* According to this report, the donor community has supported more than 322 activities including projects designed to improve: the performance of the Ministry of Justice and the judicial system; law enforcement; forensic science capacity; penal institutions; independent human rights monitoring; the electoral system; human rights and public information development.

[20] The data is derived from, Human Rights Watch (November 2001). *Israel, The Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories*. The findings are consistent with reports issued earlier and later than this one. See, Human Rights Watch (September 1997), *Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority*; Amnesty International (December 1996), *Palestinian Authority: Prolonged Political Detention, Torture and Unfair Trials*; and Human Rights Watch (May 2003), *The "Roadmap": Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes*.

[21] Quoted from, Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Palestinian Self-Rule Areas--Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority," New York: September 1997, p.6. See also, CESR, "Human Rights Violations Resulting From the Oslo Process," (18 January 2000), which can be found at: www.cesr.org.

[22] Human Rights Watch (May 2003, 8).

[23] This idea is borrowed from George Orwell's formulation in an essay titled: "Politics and the English Language" (Orwell, 1946, 170).

[24] The Palestinian Development Plan (PDP) was produced under the guidance of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, for presentation at the fifth Consultative Group meeting for the West Bank and Gaza in December 1997. See, *Khitat al-Tanmiya al-Falastiniya* (Palestinian Development Plan: 1998-2000); and, *Palestinian Development Plan* 1999-2003. The full texts are available at: www.palestine-pdp.org.

[25] Quoted from the "Decree"of 10 January 2000, p.1. The entire document can be found at: www.pna.net/events/decree.htm.

[26] See, Palestinian Authority, "Pathway Toward A Palestinian Vision for 2005 and Beyond: A Progress Report on the Palestinian Strategic Development Plan," June 2000, p.6. This report can be found at: www.pna.net/events/pathway_lisbon.htm.

[27] The CDF was first outlined in a speech by World Bank President James Wolfensohn in a speech given at the October 1998 Annual meetings of the Bank. See, *West Bank and Gaza Update*, Third Quarter 1999, p.6. The idea was further developed into a memorandum circulated to World Bank personnel. See "Memorandum from James D. Wolfensohn to the Board, and Staff of the World bank Group (21 January 1999), available at: www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf.pdf (hereinafter CDF Proposal).

[28] Quoted from the World Bank's, *West Bank and Gaza Update*, Third Quarter 1999, p.2.

[29] Memorandum from James D. Wolfensohn to the Board, Management, and Staff of the World bank Group, January 21 1999, available at: www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf.pdf.

[30] In particular I refer to three policy speeches delivered by, James D. Wolfensohn, "The Challenge of Inclusion," Address to World bank Annual Meeting, 23 September 1997, available at: ww.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am97/jdw_sp/jwsp97e.htm (hereinafter The Challenge of Inclusion); "The Other Crisis," Address to the World bank Board of Governors, 6 October 1998, available at: www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am98/jdw-sp/a (hereinafter The Other Crisis); and "Coalitions for Change," Address to the Bank's Board of Governors, 28 September 1999, available at: www.worldbank.org./html/extdr/am99/jdw-sp/jdwsp-en.htm (hereinafter Coalitions for Change).

[31] In all three speeches referred to above, Wolfensohn notes that despite many multilateral efforts, poverty persists. He adds, "Next month our global population will reach 6 billion. On current trends we will not meet the International Development Goal of halving poverty..., nor the goal of universal primary education... by 2015...In 25 years time that 6 billion people on our planet will grow

to 8 billion. Of the 6 billion today, 3 million live under $2 a day and 1.3 billion live under $1 a day. These extraordinary statistics may rise to 4 billion and 1.8 billion respectively. This is not the legacy to leave to our children (Coalitions for Change, 7).

[32] Structural includes: good and clean governance, the Justice and financial systems, and social safety net and social programs. Human includes: education and knowledge institutions, and health. Physical includes water and sewage, energy, roads, transportation, and telecommunications. Specific strategies refers to rural, urban, private sector, and country specific strategies.

[33] For an insightful critique of structural adjustment programs and their deleterious effects on the poor and powerless segments of third world societies see Haynes (1997, 63-74).

[34] Quoted from Joseph Stiglitz (who until recently was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank), "Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Processes," The Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, 19 October 1998, available at: www.worldbank.org

[35] Interview with Stephen P. Heyneman at the World Bank, 24 February 1997.

[36] Through its Website, the World Bank hosted an electronic dialogue on the Comprehensive Development Framework. Several of the participants recorded critical observations and some misgivings. In particular see the contributions of Dr. Khandakar Qudrat-I Elahi at: vx.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?visit_cdf&id on the following dates: 15, 21, 25, 30 June 2000, and 4 July 2000. See also Richard Blake at: vx.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?visit+cdf&id (6 July 2000).

[37] These methodological concerns have been raised by Kuhn (1970). Similarly Foucault and Said use the term "discourse" to denote both the parameters and limits of inquiry; in this connection see Said (1978, 3).

[38] Quoted from: Palestine National Authority, "Pathway Toward a Palestinian Vision for 2005 and Beyond," June 2000, p.1. It can be found at: www.pna.net/events/pathway_lisbon.htm.

[39] For a complete listing of the projects see PDP1, "Projects List," 98-145.

[40] This data is extracted from the PDP2, chapter 8, sections 8.1 and 8.2.

[41] The PDP2 development budget assumes 1997 levels of donor financing. The AHLC considers such assumptions as unrealistic. See AHLC (2000, 25).

[42] World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Update*, Third Quarter 1999, 8.

[43] Information on ARIJ can be found at: www.arij.org.

[44] The Welfare Association (WA)was founded in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Its mandate has been to assist the enable Palestinians to cope with the adverse effects of Israeli occupation. In my capacity as the director (1994-96) of the New York based Welfare Development Fund (WDF), an offshoot of the WA, I worked closely with Munib Masri and many of the wealthiest Palestinians. They served on the board of Trustees of both the WA and WDF. Their philanthropy was motivated not only by providing charitable contributions, but as a function of their nationalist obligations.

[45] See William A. Orme Jr., "The Young Palestinian Giant: Holding Company Close to Arafat Casts Widest of Nets," *The New York Times*, 6 May 1999. Masri

and his Padico cohorts have established: the Palestinian stock exchange, a modern television assembly plant, Paltel, the first privately owned telephone company in the Middle East. This group has also ventured in the development and management of industrial estates, tourism, real estate, and has established a securities exchange.

[46] Email communication with Khalil Mahshi, 9 August 2000.

[47] According to Douglas J. Puffert, path-dependent economic allocations have lasting effects on subsequent allocations. See his November 1999 "Path Dependence in Economic History," located at: www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_komlos/pathe.pdf.

[48] Deregulation has produced wealth for some, but misery for many. For hard hitting details on various parts of the world see the Website of the New York based National Labor Committee: www.nlcnet.org.

[49] Naqib summarizes the difference: "Developmental states extract relatively few resources from the economy and in return provide much in the way of public goods that constitute an enabling environment, reducing risks, encouraging investment, and fostering development. Predatory states in contrast, provide few public goods in return for extracting large quantities of resources, that distort and impede development" (Naqib 2000, 38).

Chapter Five

[1] Quoted from, *Agreement on the Transfer of Power and Responsibilities (Israel-PLO),* August 29, 1994. This Agreement was signed on August 24, 1994, and implemented on August 28, 1994.

[2] Quoted from, "Palestinian Education In Palestinian Hands" (1994). *Educational Network*, 16-17: 1. This quarterly newsletter is published by the Educational Network, an independent Palestinian NGO established in 1989. The Network functions as an umbrella body for 18 NGOs involved in local educational efforts.

[3] Quoted from, *Background to the Establishment of the Ministry of Education* (1998). Website of the Palestinian National Authority: www.pna.org.

[4] Quoted by Tibawi (1956, 205).

[5] Quoted in Tibawi (1956, 205).

[6] See, Gettleman and Schaar (2003, 80-84).

[7] The Mandate over Palestine was formally confirmed upon the British by the League of Nations in July 1922.

[8] See also, Mohammed and Abu-Ghazaleh (1973); Matthews and Arkawi (1949).

[9] I first met Dr. Abel-Shafi' in 1993 in Gaza. When he discovered that my father-in-law is Chukri al-Sharif, he remembered him fondly as a classmate. Though they have not seen each other since graduating from the college, they remained connected to each other through that shared experience.

[10] Quoted in Tibawi (1956, 201). It should be noted that the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was in full swing at this time. The revolt was organized against British policy

and the spread of the Zionist movement in Palestine. On this revolt see, Sweedenberg (2003).

[11] After 1967, when Israel gained control over all of Jerusalem, curricula for Arab schools were approved by the Israeli government. Initially, Israel shifted the curriculum of east Jerusalem public schools to follow that of its Arab schools. This attempt was abandoned in 1974, thus the Jordanian curricula, prevailing in the rest of the West Bank, were brought back (Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed 1999, chapter 6).

[12] For example in 1991, three years before the Transfer Agreement, expenditure on all levels of education was estimated at $170 million. The share of the Israeli Civil administration was about $58 million, and UNRWA spent $52 million. The remaining amount was generated from external international aid programs, the NGOs, and the Palestinian diaspora. Israeli supervised public expenditures were derived from tax revenues: income tax, VAT, customs and excises (50%). The remainder was raised from school fees, and education taxes levied by the municipalities (UNESCO 1995, iii-iv).

[13] Quoted from the *Washington Post*, 19 November 1980. At the time, the raising of the Palestinian flag was considered a threat to security, thus prohibited by law.

[14] Palestinians residing in Israel constitute about 12.6 percent of the overall Palestinian population. They are Israeli citizens. This study does not probe their educational environment.

[15] See summary of PCBS census results which can be found at: www.pcbs.org/inside/select/htm. The population figures and estimates for Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have also changed due to the displacement of a large number of Palestinians from Kuwait due to the Gulf conflict of 1990-91.

[16] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) "Demographic Indicators in the Palestinian Territory, (1997-2003):
www.pcbs.org/english/populati/dem97_03/table_01.htm.

[17] Nigel Roberts, "The Prospects for the Palestinian Economy," The World Bank, Paper presented at a conference entitled, "Resolving the Palestinian Refugee Problem--What Role for the International Community?", University of Warwick, March 22-24, 1998, London England; MAS *Economic Monitor* (August 19, 1997); and The World Bank, *Human Resources*, Palestine Economic Forum Home Page, September 4, 1997.

[18] The data for the MENA area is extracted from (World Bank 1997, 3).

[19] This data is extracted from, PCBS, "Number of Schools and Kindergartens by Region and Stage, 1994/1995-2001/2002:
www.pcbs.org/english/educatio/edu_ser/educ1.htm.

[20] At least two-thirds of all students in the pre-tertiary sector are enrolled in government run schools. UNRWA runs the second largest school system, and private schools absorb about 7 percent of the total.

[21] Even before the PA was officially formed, with backing from the PLO, the gathering of demographic data commenced in 1993. The PCBS came into official existence after the signing of the Transfer Agreement in 1994. In April-July 1995 the PCBS conducted an ambitious national demographic survey. The results of this

survey have been published in numerous volumes and furnish researchers with basic data on population structure, fertility, migration, marriage, education, and housing conditions. The data is presented on both national and district levels. The bulk of the funding for this project came from the European Union. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics updates data on a quarterly basis: www.pcbs.org.

[22] Zureik and Nakhaie (1997), also conclude that educational attainment is higher when it is correlated to key socio-economic indicators. Their study, whose data is derived from a 1991 stratified, multistage survey, confirms the basic findings of the PCBS. For example, they note that "parents with the highest possible schooling (22 years) ensure about 4.6 years of extra schooling for their children compared with parents with the least possible years of schooling (0)" (Zureik and Nakhaie 1997, 20). For example, most graduates from Bir Zeit University came from the urban middle class, and the majority was educated in private schools (Davies 1979).

[23] In 1995-96, I prepared a feasibility study for the setting up of a model school for advanced and high achieving Palestinian students. As part of the study, a questionnaire was sent to the principals of 10 private high schools. The principals of six schools, located in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Beit Hanina responded. All of them had serious misgivings about the value of the *tawjihi*. Instead they adopted what they call an "enhanced Tawjihi format" with a curriculum that covers topics that go beyond the requirements of the matriculation exam. All of these schools offer or require their students to take the GCE exams. Two schools offer the option of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and/or the French proficiency exam (Delse).

[24] For a fuller investigation of this notion see, Munir Fasheh's dissertation, *Education as Praxis for Liberation: Bir Zeit University and the Community Work Program*. Harvard University, Graduate School of Education, March 1978.

[25] The quest for education among Palestinians reached its apex in the 1970s, when Palestinian university graduates accounted for about 10 percent of the total number of Arab university graduates. At the time, Palestinians accounted for only 3 percent of the total Arab population. See (Zahlan 1977, 104).

[26] See, Palestinian National Authority and European Commission "Establishment of a Multi-Purpose Vocational Education and training facilities in the West Bank." The study is undated, but can be found at:
www.pna.org/mol/voctrain/prot9605.htm.

[27] See World Bank, 1998. *Education in the Middle East and North Africa: A Strategy Towards Learning for Development*. Published by the Human Development Sector (page 44).

[28] These matters have been documented in various studies produced by Dr. Iyyad Sarraj, the head of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program (GCMPH). His findings can be found at: www.gcmph.net/eyad/.

[29] The Palestinian and Jordanian data for the twenty country comparative study was collected jointly by the Tamer Institute and UNICEF, and published by the Jordanian based, *National Center for Educational Research and development* (1993). Comparative data for the MENA region can be found in a World Bank

study (Valverde et.al. 1996); and in a study by UNESCO, (Ahlawat et.al. 1995). See also, (World Bank 1997).

[30] Fasheh is not the only Palestinian promoting educational reform among Palestinians. Others will be introduced in later sections of this study. He has his detractors among Palestinians, but others view him as the most innovative and creative Palestinian educator. For example, Hanna Nasser, the founder and President of Bir Zeit university, where Fasheh served as Dean of students, regards him as the source of creative ideas. This point is seconded by Ramzi Rihan, Vice President for Development at Beir Zeit university. Personal interviews with the author at the office of the President, Beir Zeit university, 9 January 1996.

[31] These issues have been documented by various psychologists in the West Bank and Gaza. Most notably, Dr. Iyad Sarraj, the only trained psychiatrist in Gaza, has through the center he established sponsored numerous studies on the resentments harbored by youth. See Gaza Community Mental Health Clinic publications: www.gcmhp.net.

[32] The information is based on two discussions with a young woman, who at the time was a student at Bir Zeit University. She is given the assumed name of "Samya".The vignette is reconstructed from my diary entries, 9-10 January 1996.

[33] The information is based on discussions that took place over two days, 7-8 October 1997. My driver (Mohammad) accompanied me to various meetings with educators affiliated with the Islamic University, the al-Azhar University, representatives of NGOs, and with officials of the MOE. The vignette is reconstructed from my diary entries of 7-9 October 1997.

[34] See the report of Save the Children, authored by Nixon (1990, 255-57).

[35] On Israeli punitive practices against Palestinian education during the *intifada* see, Al Haq (1990).

[36] Quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*, 9 September 1988.

[37] The full text of the Jordanian declaration of disengagement from the West Bank can be found in (Lukacs 1992, 520-25). Through this statement, Jordan ceded to the Palestinians and the PLO full responsibility to devise plans for the future of the West Bank.

[38] Public employees in the West Bank, including teachers, remained on the Jordanian payroll until Oslo. Though the territories were occupied by Israel, Jordan did not relinquish its responsibilities. Jordan expected to resume rule over the West Bank once UN Security Council was implemented and the territories were returned. Jordan did not give up its responsibility over the West Bank until after the convening of the 1988 PNC. The funding of the school system continued to operate from Jordan until Oslo. The funds came from West Bank municipal taxes, and from a special Arab fund created to assist the Palestinian people.

[39] The statement from this teacher was obtained by one of the field investigators for Save the Children. See Nixon (1990, 277).

[40] Quaker and other Christian schools provide education to students whose parents have the means to pay high tuition. However, the bulk of the students enrolled in these schools are not Christian. A bit less than 10 percent of Palestinians are Christian. Despite this, and as shown in Chapter two, Palestinian Christians and

their institutions "played a very important part in the creation of the Arab concept of *Filastin"* (Porath 1974, 7).

[41] Between 1995 and 1999, two Palestinian educational NGOs--The Educational Network, and the Tamer Institute-- have collaborated to document all Palestinian educational initiatives since 1967. They have entered all of their findings in a database which includes information on: type of activity, sponsor, subject, date, goals, list of documents presented, number of participants, recommendations of the participants, follow-up activities, publications produced by each event, and press coverage. The Tamer Institute provided the author with a copy of the database.

[42] All those interviewed are listed in the bibliography.

[43] The conference was held at the Ambassador hotel in Jerusalem. About 300 educators, academics, and activists participated. A summary of the conference proceedings was published in Arabic, by the Teachers Federation. Though held during the early days of the *intifada*, the conferees were not only concerned with the immediate challenge of delivering education to Palestinian children. Indeed, one can clearly discern that Palestinian educators were planning for the post-uprising educational needs of Palestinians.

[44] The conference was held at the Jordan branch of the Jerusalem Open University. Under PLO and Arab League sponsorship, between 8-11 August 1990, a number of educators tried to bolster the role of the Palestinian Council of Higher Education in the West Bank and Gaza. Details extracted from the EdNet and Tamer Institute database.

[45] The invitations to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, were issued jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 October 1991. For details see (Quandt 1993, 396-408; 497-505).

[46] This view of education is clearly espoused in the recommendations of the March 1989 symposium on "Education and the Intifada."Education is thus seen as an integral part of the socialization process, where the student is prepared to not only secure a degree, but to also be part of the process of development and social integration. This information is based on the EdNet and Tamer Institute database.

[47] Based on data from (EdNet and Tamer Institute 1997).

[48] The Center for Applied Research in Education, a West Bank NGO, convened two workshops on education and democracy. The first was held in Ramallah on 19 February 1993, and the second was held in Jerusalem between 18-20 July 1994. Two additional conferences, held in 1993, addressed the questions of civic education and the role of values in education. They were held respectively in June and October. The first was sponsored by the Educational Network, and the latter by the federation of Teachers (EdNet and Tamer 1997).

[49] Under the umbrella of the Educational Network project, founded in 1989, twenty NGOs engaged in educational activities and projects in both the West Bank and Gaza, coordinate their activities.

[50] The participating groups included: Al-Mawrid, Al-Ufuq, Center for Applied research in Education, the Early Childhood Resource Center, Education for Awareness and Involvement, the Tuffah Educational Development Center (Gaza),

the Tamer Institute for Community Education, Bir Zeit University Continuing Education Department, and Ibda'.

[51] The "Declaration of Independence" was issued by the Palestine National Council, which convened in Algiers, on 15 November 1988. For a full text, see (Lukacs 1992, 411-15).

[52] All the quotations from the "Educational Vision" statement were obtained from: Educational Network Website--www.birzeit.edu.ednet.

Chapter Six

[1] In June 1996 the PA split The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) into two separate Ministries. The Ministry of Education (MOE) retained jurisdiction over all educational levels except for the post-secondary cycle. The mandate of the Council for Higher Education was thereby transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE.

[2] This information is repeated like a refrain in all of the reports issued by the United Nations, other international organizations (e.g. the World Bank), and in the various publications of the Ministry of Education. In particular see, Mahshi (1999, 6-8); UNESCO (1995a, iv-vi).

[3] Private schools include religious schools run by the Islamic Waqf.

[4] With the start of the 1994-95 school year the PA assumed administrative control over the following: Basic Level (grades 1-10--ages 6-15) 739 schools; Secondary (grades 11-12—ages 16-17) 253 schools; The PA run approximately 10-15 Vocational schools, and three two-year colleges. UNRWA ran 254 (basic); Three vocational centers, four two-year colleges and two four-year universities. The private sector (NGOS) run the bulk of pre-schools (453); basic (70); Secondary (41); one vocational center; 13 two-year colleges, and 8 universities (PCBS 1995).

[5] Khalil Mahshi, Director General of International Relations, Ministry of Education, personal interview, Ramallah, July 1995.

[6] See, Ministry of Education, Five-Year Education Development Plan: 2000/2001--2004/20005 (28 June 2000, 13). A copy of the plan was provided to me by Mr. Khalil Mahshi from the Ministry via Email attachment.

[7] In addition to supervising the feasibility study, Abu-Lughod authored "The Curriculum Report" (Part II, Annex 8). Years later, Professor Abu-Lughod relocated to Palestine and assumed the position of Vive President of Bir Zeit University. In 1996 with UNESCO and Italian government funding, he led the effort to set up the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center.

[8] The Israeli military authorities subjected Palestinian universities and schools in general to repeated closures, expulsion of students, faculty, and administrators. See, Gerner (1989); Sullivan (1988).

[9] Hanna Nasser was deported to Jordan, without warning, on 21 November 1974 by the Israeli military authorities. From Amman (Jordan) and Beirut (Lebanon) he continued to serve as a roving university president. He was permitted to return in the early 1990s. I met him in Beirut in the 1970s, and on several occasions in his

office (and social gatherings) between 1993 and 1996. From our discussions, and other published sources, I learned of his family history and their motivations for donating land for the creation of educational institutions.

[10] In 1995, as Executive Director of the Welfare development Fund, we funded an independent review of the academic programs of Hebron University. The review panel consisted of five education specialists based in England and Jordan. The panel concluded: "[The] University was found to be in poor shape. The principal recommendation is that the University should undergo a period of retrenchment, rationalization and consolidation extending over several years." From, Welfare Development Fund, Academic Development of Hebron University: A Special Study Prepared for the Board of Trustees of Hebron University (January 1995, iii). The report was received by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees (Dr. Nabil Ja'bari), but there is no evidence that any of the recommendations were ever implemented.

[11] See, Council of Higher Education, A Vision for the Future of Palestinian Higher Education: Education for National Integration and Development (Ramallah, Palestine 1995). The report is only in Arabic.

[12] Brief biographical notes on the Minister and the Deputy Minister are available in, Ministry of Education, "Background on the Establishment of the Ministry of Education," and is found at: www.pna.org.

[13] The 16 Directorates are: Planning, General Education, Training and Educational Counseling, Examination, Educational Technology, General Curricula, Textbooks and Publications, Vocational and Technical Training, Activities and Student Affairs, School Supervision, International and Public Relations, Administrative Affairs, Finance, School Supplies, Buildings and Projects, Auditing and Internal Supervision.

[14] All of these figures are collected and extrapolated from the following sources: UNESCO (1995, 44-46); Ministry of Education, Special Report: Education in Palestine (1998), which can be found at: www.pna.org; Ministry of Education, The Organogram of the Ministry of Education (1998) in Arabic; Ministry of Education, The Five-Year Education Development Plan: 2000/2001--2004/2005 (October 1999 Draft, 11-12), obtained via Email attachment from Mr. Khalil Mahshi.

[15] The Palestinian Legislative Council, an elected body, does have a committee on education. However, it has not developed the capacity to provide proper legislative oversight over the functioning of the MOE.

[16] See his article cited in chapter 3 (Mahshi 1989). I first met him in 1994 when I started to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of the "Palestine Academy." The aim was to establish a model secondary school for a student body selected for its high performance, innovative capabilities, and potential for leadership. The process of conducting the feasibility study involved not only the collection of data, but also required intensive discussions and interviews with leading Palestinian educators. I asked all the educators I met to produce a list of the most innovative educators with whom I should meet. Khalil Mahshi was one of three names who made it on everyone's list. The others include: Dr. Jacqueline Sfeir (Bethlehem University), and Dr. Munir Fasheh, former professor at Birzeit

University and founder of the Tamer Institute (discussed in chapter 5). For a list of all those interviewed see Welfare Development Fund (1997, Appendix 6).
[17] Abla Nasser (Tamer Institute), personal interview, Ramallah 6 October 1997.
[18] Khalil Mahshi, personal interview, Ramallah 4 October 1997.
[19] The Qattan Foundation was founded in 1998 with financial support from Abdul Mohsen Qattan, one of the wealthiest Palestinian expatriates residing in London.
[20] Fouad Moughrabi, communication via electronic mail, 2 December 2000, with his permission.
[21] Quoted from an Email communication from Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, 11 December 2000.
[22] For example, as reported in the Educational Network (No. 29, Summer 1998, 10), the UNDP funded the "Promoting a Gender Sensitive Educational System." The beneficiaries include, the Educational Network, the Tamer Institute for Community Education, the Teacher's Creativity Center, and the Women's Affairs Technical Committee. In addition, the World Bank has provided a $10 million grant to be spent through the NGO project, which is administered by the Welfare Association, a private development agency organized by Palestinian philanthropists.
[23] Copies of these plans were provided to me by Mr. Khalil Mahshi. In particular, I have secured: Ministry of Education, Education Development Plan 1998-2000 (1997 draft, and a 1998 version); Ministry of Education, The Five Year Education Development Plan: 2000/2001-2004/2005 (October 1999 draft, and 28 June 2000 version). Henceforth these plans will be referred to as the TYP and FYP respectively. These plans were obtained as electronic file attachments.
[24] This information is based on an Email communication with Khalil Mahshi (10 August 2000), by permission.
[25] Quoted from the English language version of an article written for publication in Spain. See, Khalil Mahshi, "School Education in Palestine: From Collapse to Empowerment," (1999, 12). The unpublished English version was sent to me by Khalil Mahshi as an electronic file attachment.
[26] In particular see, PNA/MOE(1998, 3) ; PNA/MOE (2000, 20; 24).
[27] The term vision is used often in MOE documents. The word is used in many ways to connote a sense of national purpose. It is also used loosely to indicate the need for a unifying philosophical and cultural purpose. The word itself is never given a specific definition. One can deduce then, that the word vision, as used in the documents, actually means guiding principles. But such principles are clearly historically bound. Thus John Dewey was pre-occupied with education for democracy (Dewey 1919); Paulo Freire sees education as the source of emancipation for the poor (Freire 1973); and Maxine Greene argues that education should serve the liberation of the mind, spirit, and imagination (Greene 1988). In many ways then, these authors present us with a "vision" for the role of education in society.
[28] In March 1998, Tony Zahlan, a Palestinian development specialist suggested the holding of such a conference. He proposed an agenda for "An Exploratory Discussion of a Palestinian Vision for Education." The preliminary proposal was

submitted to Khalil Mahshi, a copy of which was forwarded to me via electronic mail by him.

[29] See Educational Network, No. 14, February 1994. See also, Nasru (1993.

[30] See Educational Network, Nos. 16 and 17, (Autumn-Winter 1994, 20).

[31] Information on the policy process is based on several sources: Written exchanges with Khalil Mahshi, who is at the center of the process (email exchanges, 10 August 2000); Consultants' report produced on behalf of the government of Finland: Stephen Lister and Raisa Venalainen, Harmonizing Aid For Education in Palestine (18 July 2000, Volume 2: Annexes, 16-21), hereafter as (Lister 2000 Vol.I and II).

[32] For a report on the Workshop see, Educational Network. No. 34 (February 2000, 1-3).

[33] It should be noted that the NGOs who specialize in early childhood (pre-school) training did provide the most input and to a great extent MOE officials did listen to them. This is the case because the MOE's role in this sector is quite minimal, thus they rely on the private sector to provide these services.

[34] The World Bank notes that this is the first time that a study of consumer satisfaction has been conducted in the context of multilateral peace-building efforts.

[35] These results are reported by the Palestine Research Center's poll, conducted in September 1996.

[36] For example see, Fareed Zakaria, "Paris is Burning," The New Republic, 22 January 1996, 27-31.

[37] The Bank's recommendations for higher education see, World Bank (1994).

[38] An exemplar of this methodological approach is found in Edward W. Said=s critique of "Orientalism" (Said 1978).

[39] In its public expenditure review, the World Bank notes that construction standards are deficient or undeveloped. This prevents the realization of lower prices "that result from longer production runs that require standardized specifications to achieve economies of scale." The report adds that the Ministry is aware of this problem and has launched a project to set such standards (World Bank 1999, 46).

[40] This data is extracted and extrapolated from information compiled by PECDAR, MOE, UNDP, and MOPIC. The complete listing of the projects are reproduced in: World Bank (June 2000, Annex 2a).

[41] Quoted from Khalil Mahshi, "School Education in Palestine: From Collapse to Empowerment" (1999, 12).

[42] The data on this matter varies. For example, Table 5.6 reports a ratio of 28.5 for 1998/99. In contrast, the World Bank puts the figure at 29.5 for the same period (World Bank 2000, 38).

[43] PCBS, Education Indicators (1994/95-1999-2000), the data is available from: www.pcbs.org.english/child/time_ser/educ.htm.

[44] There are several Teachers' Unions, partially because various political parties established competing unions to advance their political agendas. See, Educational

Network (No. 15, July 1994, 1-3; and Nos. 16 and 17, Autumn-Winter 1994, 13, 20; No. 18, Spring 1995, 15-16; Hilterman 1991, 103, 114-15).
[45] On the various protest activities see, Educational Network (No. 22, Spring 1996, 1-3; Nos. 24/25, Summer 1997, 3-4; and No. 35/36, July 2000, 1-2).
[46] I have arrived at this view of education through experience and the process of appropriation. My mentors are many and they include (Ayers 1993; Dewey 1916, 1964; Freire, 1973, 1994; Giroux 1992, 1998; Giroux and McLaren 1989, 1994; Greene 1988; Kohl 1986; McLaren and Leonard 1993). As shown in chapter 5, many of the ideas contained in these works, particularly Freire, were appropriated by the educators of the intifada.
[47] Munir Fasheh, personal interview, Ramallah, 14 January 1996.
[48] The information on this project was provided by Dr. Said Assaf, Director General for Training and Educational Counseling of the MOE. In addition see, Educational Network (No. 30, Autumn 1998, 1-2).
[49] Quoted from the statement of the Educational NGO collective, titled: "Training for Transformation," Educational Network (No. 34, February 2000, 4). The members of the group include the following NGOs: Early Childhood Resource Center, Educational Network, Tamer Institute, Teacher's Creativity Center, and the Young Scientists Forum.
[50] Said Assaf, personal interview, Ramallah, 4 October 1997.
[51] Another source estimates donor assistance for the education sector (1994-98) at $413 million (World Bank and UNSCO 1999, 25).
[52] For the full argument see, Castells (1997; 1998).
[53] The data is extracted from Tables 11 and 12 of the FYP.
[54] I raised these questions with Khalil Nakhleh, advisor to the MOHE and an education consultant to the EU mission in Palestine. He coordinated the effort of producing the MOHE development plan (MOHE 1997). He appeared not happy with my question, but admitted that PA dependency on donor financing does indeed constrain the MOHE in constructing its national priorities for the tertiary sector. Our discussion took place in Jerusalem on 30 September 1997.
[55] Khalil Mahshi's response to my queries was transmitted via electronic mail on 19 August 2000, by permission.
[56] Khalil Mahshi provided me a copy of this text, via Email, on 16 November 2000, quoted by permission.

Chapter Seven

[1] Greene 1998, 128-9
[2] International assistance and subsidies to the PA are seen as forms of political rent, designed to secure the peace process and conditioned upon the Palestinian Authority's commitment to it.
[3] The bulk of the charges that Palestinian schoolbooks promote incitement against Israel and peace are produced by a the "Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace" (CMIP). This Center is headed by a right-wing Jewish settler who lives in

the settlement of Efrat. All of its publications are available at their website: www.edume.org. For a critical discussion of CMIP's findings see (Brown 2003, pp. 235-243; and Moughrabi 2001), and Elisa Morena (pseudonym for Sophie Claudet), "Israel or Palestine: Who Teaches What History: A Textbook Case." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 2001.

[4] Israeli 2003

[5] January 2, 2001

[6] Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan, "Comparing Palestinian and Israeli Textbooks," March 28, 2002. The short article (found at www.mideastjournal.com/israelitextbooks5.html) is a summary of a multi-year study conducted by Firer who is the director of peace education projects at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Her co-author, Adwan, is a professor of education at Bethlehem University. The full study was published by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. See Firer and Adwan (2004).

[7] See "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee,' April 3, 2001, and the full text can be found at: www.nad-plo.org/textbooks/third_sub.pdf

[8] Cited from page 38 of: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (March 2003), Report I: Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum–Reviewing Palestinian Textbooks and Tolerance Education Program. Submitted to: The Public Affairs Office, US Consulate General, Jerusalem. The full report can be found at: www.icpri.org/index1.html.

[9] For example see, Wolfgang Hopken, "Textbooks and Conflicts. Experiences From the work of the Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research," Paper presented to a World Bank Conference, held in Washington D.C., 24-26 March 2003. The full paper is located at: http://www1.worldbank.org/education/social_cohesion/doc/World%20Bank.pdf

[10] The texts under review in this chapter include: *National Education* (1995-6) for grades 1-6; Civic Education (2000) for grades 1 and 2; National Education (2000) for grades 1, 2, 6 and 7; Arabic Education (2000) for grades 1 and 2; Arabic Education (2001) for grades 2 and 7; and Islamic Education (2000) for grades 1 and 6. On occasion other texts are referenced, including geography, and language arts texts. The full citations are in the bibliography.

[11] I borrow the notion "affiliation" or "affiliative order" from Edward W. Said's discussion of how in humanistic studies a "canon" is established over time through a process of inclusions and exclusions. The inclusion-exclusion process is socially legitimized which leads to the reproduction of the filiative discipline. (Said 1983, pp.15-24)

[12] The details of this agreement and the accompanying "Terms of Reference", produced by UNESCO, are noted in (CDC 1996, 4-5).

[13] I have known Ibrahim Abu-Lughod since 1975. I always viewed him as a friend, mentor, colleague, and comrade. The brief biographical sketch provided within the text is thus drawn from our conversations over the years. For more background see: (Ahmed-Fararjeh 2003).

[14] The Palestine National Council (PNC) served as the Palestinian people's parliament in exile. Though the PNC still exists, its functions have been *defacto* taken over by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), created after the Oslo process.
[15] UNESCO, 1980a and b.
[16] Quoted from Edward W. Said, "Elegy for Ibrahim Abu-Lughod," *London Review of Books*, 13 December 2001, the internet edition is found at: www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n24/said2324.htm.
[17] In an interview (14 January 1996, Ramallah) Marwan Awartani, a mathematician from BirZeit university, and Munir Fasheh, the founder of the Tamer Institute, expressed their concerns that they and many others were excluded from the work of the Abu-Lughod team.
[18] Paulo Friere (1973) defines the banker's approach as an educational paradigm which treats minds as containers for depositing knowledge and focuses only on the need to transmit knowledge and values through lectures and texts.
[19] Personal interview with Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Ramallah, 26 September 1997.
[20] Abu-Lughod 1996, 2.
[21] Abu-Lughod 1996, 13. See also the bibliography of the plan (157-68).
[22] This understanding permeates the report. Abu-Lughod uses the same terminology in an earlier report which he wrote on the needed vision for the future of higher education in Palestine (Council of Higher Education, 1995).
[23] Abu-Lughod 1996, 7. Quoted from the English version of the Executive Summary. Emphasis added.
[24] Abu-Lughod 1996, 6
[25] I attended one of the first "town meetings" held in Gaza on 8 December 1995. The meeting was held at the Gaza Municipal building and co-chaired by Abu-Lughod and the Gaza Deputy Director of the MOE, Mr. Abdullah Abded Al-Munem. Local notables, religious leaders, educators, writers, members of the PLC, and academics were in attendance.
[26] Moughrabi 2001, 8
[27] Khalil Mahshi, Director-General for International and Public Relations, on various occasions, both in formal interviews and social occasions, chided Abu-Lughod for running the PCDC as private enterprise completely unaffiliated with the Ministry. He reiterated this point in a personal interview on 4 October 1997.
[28] Abu-Lughod expressed these attitudes to me and to others on numerous occasions. I should note that I met Abu-Lughod in 1975. Thus our discussions were not reduced to formal interviews only. We were engaged in a continuous dialogue which took place in the US, Ramallah, and elsewhere. These judgements are also corroborated by Brown (2003), and Moughrabi (2004).
[29] Under Abu-Lughod the PCDC served the Ministry of Education without being subsumed under its organizational structure and hierarchy. Now, the PCDC has been incorporated as one of the many divisions within the MOE. Each division is headed by a Director-General.
[30] Gutman 1987, 14
[31] Abu-Lughod 1996, 6-7. These ideas are emphasized throughout the report.

[32] Abu-Lughod 1996, 72-74
[33] Abu-Lughod 1996, 88-89
[34] Abu-Lughod 1996, 10
[35] Abu-Lughod 1996, 8
[36] Abu-Lughod 1996, *90*
[37] Abu-Lughod 1996, 447-450
[38] Abu-Lughod, 1996, 455. Emphasis added.
[39] Abu-Lughod 1996, 35
[40] Abu-Lughod 1996, 1996, 9. For more details on the *tawjihi* matriculation exam see: 82-89.
[41] On numerous occasions I discussed this question with Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. He was quick to admit that instead of delving critically into the question of religion, he steered the team away from such deliberations. He was quite aware that despite his secular bent that ultimately the implemented plan would incorporate religion as central to the curriculum.
[42] Prof Jarbawi was a member of the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod team. In this capacity he authored the survey of existing social science curricula and proposed new guidelines for future curricula. In particular see Abu-Lughod 1996, "Technical Studies Reports," Chapter 6, 403-481.
[43] Abu-Lughod 1996, 454
[44] Abu-Lughod 2000, 85
[45] Which, as Craig Calhoun indicates, is ideologically embedded in the discourse of nationalism (Calhoun 1997, 53).
[46] Abu-Lughod 1996, 11
[47] Abu-Lughod 1996, 11
[48] Abu-Lughod also traveled a lot to the US to receive medical treatment in New York and Chicago. On his last visit to New York in 2000 I accompanied him to the Columbia University hospital to obtain the results of his lung x-rays.
[49] Salah Yassin, personal inteview, Ramallah, 21 September 1997. Said Assaf , personal interview, Ramallah, 4 October 1997, expressed similar concerns.
[50] *Al-Manhaj al-falistini al-awal al-muqtarah* [First Palestinian Curriculum Proposal]. It was issued by the Ministry of Education, Curriculum Development Center (1997).
[51] *Al-Manhaj* 1997, 53-56
[52] The approved plan was published as: Ministry of Education, General Administration of Curricula (Palestinian Curriculum Development Center), *First Palestinian Curriculum Plan* (Jerusalem: Al- Ma'aref, 1998).
[53] Brown 2003, 215
[54] Moughrabi 2002, 8
[55] Brown 2003, 216
[56] World Bank 1999, 37
[57] Apple 2003, 14
[58] Fasheh 1989
[59] *First Palestinian Curriculum Plan* 1998, 5, 7, 9
[60] *First Palestinian Curriculum Plan* 1998, 5-6

[61] The vast majority of Palestinians are Muslim. Christians represent less than 10 percent of the population. Religious identity is not limited to Islam. The discussion of the textbooks in this chapter shows that Christianity is valued as an integral part of Palestinian identity. The new curriculum offers two sets of courses on religion. One for the Muslim students, and another for the Christians.
[62] Rihan, 2001, 26
[63] Rihan 2001, 26
[64] Some of these textbooks were reprinted in 1996. In this section the following editions are cited: *National Education* (grades 1,5, and 6), Second Experimental Printing 1996; For grades 2,3, and 4, the first experimental edition of 1995 is cited.
[65] Enderlin 2003; Kimmerling 2003; Malley and Agha 2001; Usher 2003; Shikaki 2002
[66] Shikaki 2002, 1
[67] See the "Introduction," *National Education* (First Grade 2000, page is unnumbered).
[68] *National Education* (2000), page 69.
[69] The issue of obedience and duty to God and parents, coupled with loyalty to the homeland is repeated in various additional textbooks including: *Our Beautiful Language*, grade 6, Part 1, 19; *Civic Education*, Grade 6, Unit VI.
[70] *Arab and Islamic History*, Grade 6, page 86.
[71] Teachers were and are highly demoralized. They are poorly paid, and their attempts to unionize has met with harsh treatment from the PA. Though it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be important to probe how teachers respond to the proposed pedagogic exercises. The Qattan Center for Educational Research and Development (Ramallah) has conducted numerous focus-group discussions with teachers. The Center has published some of its findings of teacher attitudes. They report that teachers see the school system as too centralized and hierarchical, which produces and reproduces existing patriarchal roles in society. They see the purpose of the school system as serving the function of domesticating and controlling rather than creating critical citizens. See: Qattan Center, "Teacher Education in Palestine: Understanding Teachers' Realities and Development Through Action Research," which can be found at:
http://www.qattanfoundation.org/research/research1.html.
[72] The third grade text includes six similar illustrations representing various forms of economic activity. Only one women is depicted, and as a customer at a grocery store (p.27).
[73] Jarbawi, T. 2002
[74] Suheir Hammad. 1996. *Born Palestinian, Born Black* (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing).
[75] I am extracting the notion of "fragmemts" from Partha Chattergee (1994).
[76] Calhoun, 1999: 51.
[77] William L. Cleveland (1971) considers Husri as the founder of the idea of Pan-Arabism. For a more recent analysis of Arab nationalism see Added Dawisha (2003).
[78] Calhoun 1999, 53

[79] Said 1993
[80] Zerubavel, 1995.
[81] This periodization is developed in *National Education* (5th grade textbook), 1995, on pages 19-40. The page numbers inserted in the text above refer to this textbook.
[82] This recognition was conferred by the League of Arab States at its summit meeting in 1974 in Rabat, Morocco.
[83] The Oslo Accords use the term "Palestinian Authority," a term that has been used throughout this study. However, the Palestinian leadership insists on inserting the word "National," which is seen as a legitimating device.
[84] *National Education*, grade 6 (p. 60) and grade 7 (pages 54-57, 78-81).
[85] *National Education*, grade 6, p.16.
[86] *National Education*, grade 5, p.37.
[87] Manners and Parmenter 2000, 13
[88] Massey 1995, 187
[89] *National Education* (1996, second experimental edition, 2).
[90] *National Education* (1996, second experimental edition, 7)
[91] *National Education*, 6th grade (2000, 4).
[92] *National Education*, fifth grade (1996, 20). The texts do not explain what is meant by "political" versus "natural" borders. But the purpose of the exercise is clear: borders in Palestine/Israel are political.
[93] *National Education*, 6th grade (1996, 20).
[94] The 6th grade text (1996) covers all four cities, whereas the 3rd grade text does not cover Bethlehem.
[95] In particular consult the following textbooks: *National Education*, grade 6 (pp.9,11,14); *Geography of Palestine*, grade 7 (pp.8-10, 19, 23, 28-29, 46, 55, 56, 65, 76-77, 80); *Our Beautiful Language*, grade 6, part 1 (pp.44, 64, 120); *National Education*, grade 7 (pp.19, 47, 55, 75); *General Science*, grade 1, part 2 (pp. 5, 7), *National Education*, grade 2, part 1 (p.22).
[96] *National Education,* 4th grade (1995, 23-31).
[97] *National Education*, grade 7 (pp.67-69, 83).
[98] *National Education*, grade 7 (pp.72-73).
[99] Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian Maps for a Nation That Doesn't Exist Yet," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1997.
[100] For example see the Preface for the 3rd grade textbook: *Our Beautiful Language* (2002). The page is not numbered.
[101] All photographs and illustrations of Jerusalem are represented by sites that are uniquely located in East Jerusalem, and mostly in the old city. However, when Jerusalem is presented historically, the designation East is not invoked.
[102] *National Education*, grade 2, part 1 (pp.8, 9, 11, 18, 19, 32); *National Education*, grade 2, part 1 (pp.51-52)
[103] *National Education*, grade 2, part 1 (p.19); *Arts and Crafts*, grade 7, part 2, (p.23); *National Education*, grade 7 (p.47); *Our Beautiful Language*, grade 2, part 1 (p.60); *Our Beautiful Language*, grade 6, part 1 (p.121); *Our Beautiful Language*, grade 1, part 1 (pp.10, 12).

[104] Ministry of Education. 2002. *Clarification 2: Highlights on the Palestinian Experience in Curriculum Development*. Ministry of Education, Ramallah, Palestinian Authority.
[105] See previous footnote. The copy of this report which I received as an email attachment has no pagination.
[106] This definition is presented in various texts: *National Education* (2000), grade 6, p. 29; *National Education* (1996) grade 6, p.9.
[107] Brown 2003
[108] *National Education* (2000), pp. 20-63.
[109] *National Education* (2000), grade 6, pp.64-83.
[110] Rihan 2001, 29
[111] *National Education* (1996) grade 6, pp.15-17.
[112] *Civic Education*, grade 6, pp.27-48.

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART-PALESTINIAN CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT CENTER


General Director
Secretary
Ass. Gen. Director
Humanities Department
Head of Department, Assist., (5) employees
Language Department
Head of Department, Assist., (5) employees
Director of School Curriculum
Deputy Director
Technology Department
Head of Department, Assist., (6) employees
Science and Math Department
Head of Department, Assist., (6) employees
Secretary (2)
Vocational Science Department
Head of Department, Assist., (6) employees
Environmental, Arts, Physical Education Department
Head of Department, Assist., (3) employees
Computer Department
Head of Department, Assist., (2) employees
Director of Technical Department
Deputy Director
Language Editing Department
Head of Department, Assist., (2) technical employees, (2) editing employees
Design and Sketch Department
Head of Department, Assist., (10) employees
Secretary (2)
Production Department
Head of Department, Assist., (2) employees
Follow-up Department
Head of Department, Assist., (2) employees

APPENDIX B

MAPS AS A PROBLEM

الوحدة الثانية

مفاهيم ومؤسسات إدارية وقانونية

أولاً: التنظيمات الإدارية في فلسطين:

تقوم إدارة البلاد من خلال تقسيمها إدارياً إلى وحدات صغيرة يطلق عليها اسم المحافظات، يرأس كل محافظة محافظٌ بالإضافة إلى مجلس تنفيذي للمحافظة ومجلس استشاري.

المجلس التنفيذي يُشَكَّلُ من المحافظ رئيساً ومساعد المحافظ ومدراء الدوائر في المحافظة.

والمجلس الاستشاري يتشكل من الاعيان ورؤساء المجالس البلدية والقروية ورؤساء الغرف التجارية والجمعيات، ويتفرع عن هذه المحافظات وحدات إدارية اصغر منها مثل: الالوية، وكل لواء يتكون من عدد من الاقضية، وكل قضاء يتألف من عدد من النواحي وكل ناحية تتكون من عدد من القرى والتجمعات السكانية.

في المستطيل المجاور ارسم خارطة فلسطين وبين عليها المحافظات والألوية وأهم الأقضية.

٢٠

Students are asked to draw a map of Palestine in the empty rectangle. They are also asked to identify the various regions of Palestine. The page is from the 6th grade textbook, *National Education* (1996, 20).

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