The Ransom of the Jews

The Ransom of the Jews

The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain Between Romania and Israel, Second Edition

RADU IOANID

Foreword by Elie Wiesel

Translated by Cristina Marine

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

This volume was written and published by the author exclusively in his private capacity. The content of the texts from this volume is not connected in any way with the institutions and organizations to which the author was or is affiliated being his sole responsibility in terms of their writing or selection.

Translation of a part of the historical study and of all the documents was done with the support of the Romanian Cultural Institute, Bucharest, Romania.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Ioanid, Radu, author. | Wiesel, Elie, 1928-2016, writer of foreword.

Title: The ransom of the Jews : the story of the extraordinary secret bargain between Romania and Israel / Radu Ioanid ; foreword by Elie Wiesel.

Description: Second edition. | Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021015929 (print) | LCCN 2021015930 (ebook) | ISBN 9781538140734 (cloth) | ISBN 9781538140741 (paperback) | ISBN 9781538140758 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Jews—Romania—History—20th century. | Romania—Emigration and immigration. | Israel—Emigration and immigration. | Romania—Emigration and immigration—Government policy. | Ransom—Romania—History—20th century. | Romania—History—1944-1989. | Romania. Securitatea—History—20th century.

Classification: LCC DS135.R7 I66 2021 (print) | LCC DS135.R7 (ebook) | DDC 325/.24980569409045—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015929

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015930

frn_fig_002 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

In memory of my father, Virgil, who used to tell me that the Communist regime of Romania succeeded where both the Iron Guards and Ion Antonescu had failed—in making Romania a country free of Jews.

I am God, your God who took you out of Egypt and out of slavery.

THE FIRST OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

Acknowledgments

the idea for this book published first in United States in 2005 belongs to David Singer, director of research at the American Jewish Committee (AJC). It was he who first proposed that I undertake this compelling and challenging research, and the AJC initially sponsored my efforts. Thanks to the dedicated support of this organization and of the United States Congress, I was able to gain access to highly classified Romanian official records in the archives of several intelligence agencies. The AJC also graciously agreed to permit me to transform my research report into a book. Thus I am grateful to the organization in general and specifically to David Singer, Andrew Baker, and David Harris.

Both in Romania and in Israel, my research on this sensitive piece of history raised eyebrows among certain bureaucrats with little understanding of history. They feared the skeletons in the closets of their governments. Despite this attitude, I was able to find in government circles of both countries wonderful friends who helped make this book possible.

In Romania, President Emil Constantinescu and some of his advisers supported my work wholeheartedly. I am grateful to Professor Zoe Petre, the president’s chief of staff, and to Marius Oprea, adviser to the president, for their warm assistance. Both understood immediately the ethical and moral implications of my work and backed it without hesitation. The successive leaderships (under Presidents Constantinescu and Iliescu) of the Romanian Information Service (SRI) declassified and made available to me a great many documents which were crucial to an understanding of the surveillance and repression of the Romanian Jewish community by the Communist secret police, the feared Securitate. I want to thank especially Costin Georgescu and Radu Timofte, directors of SRI, and General Marius Brăteanu, the SRI’s general secretary, for their efficient help.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through Mircea Geoană, Romanian ambassador to Washington, and Dumitru Preda, director of the ministry’s archives, who helped me find documents that contributed greatly to an understanding of the complex history that I relate in this book.

I am grateful to Dan Badea, a gifted journalist, and to Cornel Burtică, a former Communist leader who willingly left the party leadership. Both enabled me to understand the direct connection between Nicolae Ceaușescu and the trade in human beings.

In Romania, I was permitted access to highly classified documents that officially do not exist. I have had to refer to them in the following pages as “documents from a Romanian government archive that requested anonymity.” Those people who kindly and efficiently helped me see these records understand why I cannot mention their names here.

In Israel, the late Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, formerly with the Liaison Bureau, guided me through the complicated institutional history of the alyah of Romanian Jews to Israel. His humor, wisdom, and deep knowledge of both Israeli and Romanian history were essential in helping me compose this book. He helped me understand a key fact about the Romanian trade in human beings—that there was more to this trade than simply a matter of finances. The archivist of the state of Israel, Tuvia Friling, made available to me important declassified documents in English and Hebrew; with his newly published book, which I had the privilege to consult in manuscript, they shed new light on Ben-Gurion’s role during World War II and on the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. I am also grateful to Tuvia for putting me in touch with Ephraim Illin, one of the lesser-known heroes of Israel who helped me clarify the financial history of the Romanian Jewish emigration.

A group of distinguished Israeli diplomats offered advice and comment. I am grateful to the late Ambassador Meir Rosenne, former legal adviser to Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, specifically for his insights on the late Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen. My thanks to Ambassador Yosef Govrin for his comments and subtle analysis of Israeli-Romanian relations during the last years of the Ceausescu regime. Because of Ambassador Govrin, I was able to better understand the human rights dimension of Israeli foreign policy during those years. I also appreciate the wise comments of Ambassador Abba Gefen. The late Yitzhak Artzi, formerly deputy mayor of Tel Aviv and member of the Knesset, gave me interesting leads and documents.

In Great Britain, Phyllis Yadin helped me understand Henry Jakober’s role. In the United States, General Ion Mihai Pacepa, former deputy head of Romanian foreign intelligence and the highest-ranking defector in the history of the cold war, condemned twice to death by Ceaușescu for his defection, spent many hours guiding me through the organization and history of the Securitate and its trade in human beings. I am grateful to him for his unwavering support. Liviu Turcu, former head of the Western European and, later, the North American department of Romanian foreign intelligence, who defected to the United States early in 1989 and was also condemned to death in Romania, guided me through the Securitate’s complicated financial operations.

Nestor Rateș, for many years director of the Romanian department of Radio Free Europe, provided me with crucial details. The late Robert Levy graciously provided me with many useful documents originating from the Romanian Communist party archives. Mircea Răceanu, former head of the North American desk in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once imprisoned and condemned to death by Ceaușescu, patiently explained to me the almost total control of that ministry by the Securitate. Ambassador Alfred Moses shared with me his impressions about his meetings with Ceaușescu. I am grateful to them all for their patient support.

My friends and colleagues Paul Shapiro and Daniel Mariaschin helped me understand the dilemmas that confronted Washington in its foreign policy decisions regarding Romania during the Ceaușescu regime.

I owe special thanks to Elie Wiesel, who strongly encouraged me to write this book and, when I felt discouraged, insisted that the truth is ultimately more important than the adverse reactions of various bureaucracies. Finally, I am exceedingly grateful to my first American publisher and editor, Ivan Dee, who patiently persevered with the preparation of my manuscript. His help and understanding made this book possible.

During the spring of 2014, the Romanian Foreign Intelligence (SIE) and the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS) declassified the so-called Dunărea archive comprising 26 volumes of the OVS and AVS units (Special Currency Operations/Special Currency Unit) which handled the selling of Romanian citizens for almost 30 years. Part of these documents which are selectively included in this volume were crucially important for me to better understand and explain the topic of the Romanian Communist trade with human beings. I am very grateful to historian Andrei Muraru who helped me find new documents related to this complicated topic. At CNSAS, Germina Nagâț, Adrian Cioflancă, and Dragoș Petrescu were extraordinary helpful in facilitating my access to the OVS/Dunărea collection. I am also very grateful to Cristina Marine for the translation of into English of a part of my study on the ransom of the Romanian Jews and of all the documents included in this volume. I am totally in debt to Susan McEachern who patiently and during difficult times had the patience to put up with a complicated manuscript in terms of its editing. I am also grateful to the Romanian Cultural Institute in Bucharest, especially to Bela Krizbai and Mihaela Ghiță, for their guidance and support related to the translation of part of this book.

Tel Aviv

January 2021

Foreword

A Letter to the Author from Elie Wiesel

dear radu,

I have just finished reading your book. How to describe it? This story is sober and troubling—the historical analysis striking, the investigation documented with hidden and painful truths: it is all of this and even more. Anyone who is interested in the events that will forever mark the destiny of a people and their thirst for humanity—I speak of course about what is so poorly, in the absence of truer words, called the Holocaust—must read it. This is true also in terms of Jewish community life in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s. The atmosphere of fear and distrust, the role of American Jews, and Rabbi Rosen and his (too close?) relationship with the Romanian government, his courageous fight against anti-Semitism, his contribution to the massive emigration of so many Jews to Israel—you speak of these matters with eloquence and discretion. You do not judge, you only observe and record the story.

Born like you, but before you, in Romania, I thought I knew everything about the fate of the Jews during the war and later under the Communist regime. The violent and brutal anti-Semitism of the Iron Guard, the fascist policies of Ion Antonescu, the savage pogroms and deportations of thousands and thousands of Jewish families to Transnistria where they would suffer and perish—I knew about these things vaguely enough. But I did not know about the historical context of the official and “respectable” hatred that permeated all aspects of daily life—all vile, narrow-minded, and stupid. I did not know, for example, that at the beginning of the 1940s Romanian Jews were able to buy bread at a high price—but not pastry. And that laws as aberrant and humiliating as the numerus clausus—the quota system—affected the Jewish deaf and dumb too: they were excluded from their own association. As were doctors, journalists, teachers, and architects. Just as in the time of the Romans after the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem, an official decree of 1940 forbade the Jews the right to be students and teachers.

I learned much about the complex relations between Romania and Israel. Golda Meir escaped an Arab attempt on her life, at the entrance to the main synagogue in the Romanian capital, thanks to the Securitate.... Ceausescu served as the middleman between Menachem Begin and Anwar el Sadat in order to conclude the peace between Israel and Egypt.... All of this you relate based upon information from apparently trustworthy sources.

But your real revelations concern the transformation of the Romanian government into an extraordinary merchant of human beings during the postwar years. Here and there rumors circulated about this. If 380,000 Romanian Jews established themselves in the Jewish State, it is because Romania “sold” them as if they were slaves. In other words, certain Romanian Jews were able to obtain visas to go abroad, especially to Israel, in return for payments in dollars. You provide names and figures. Am I surprised? No. I do remember that in the little villages, as in the cities of Eastern and Western Europe, it was mentioned that a certain Romanian “official” was good because he was “taking,” that is, he allowed himself to be bought in order to be more understanding toward the Jewish minority and its specific concerns. But I ignored the fact that these were not anecdotes and isolated incidents but a true system, a well-conceived and calculated policy: the country became richer by allowing its Jews to leave. Through its government security services, the Romanian treasury received a certain amount of money—coldly calculated according to a precise schedule—for each of its Jewish citizens who wished to emigrate. Everything took place in great secrecy, far from the eyes of the media, especially under the rule of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who supervised the bargaining personally but at a distance. Special envoys came from Europe carrying hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Romanians.

Where was the money coming from? From American Jewish sources. Who were the liaisons of the Israeli government? Israeli agents, considered heroes in Jerusalem. But the Romanians also dealt with a British Jewish merchant who had his friends in official circles in Bucharest. Less idealistic than the Israelis, he requested a commission for his services: a troubling and at the same time fascinating episode. One reads it like a mystery. (In a quasi-comic incident, a high-ranking officer of the Romanian espionage services disguised as a Romanian “diplomat” carried a suitcase from Zurich to Bucharest; it and its contents of one million dollars were lost—and luckily found one week later.)

With honesty and evident pain, you raise profound ethical questions: in a desperate situation one could pay the Gestapo in Bratislava and Budapest extraordinary amounts of money in order to have them stop sending Slovak and Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz; but was money needed to negotiate with the Communist devil or his representatives, or in fact with a Jew who was concerned more with money than with his brothers and sisters in prison? After discussion at the highest level in Israel, Ben-Gurion ultimately decided that in order to save lives, one could deal with a scoundrel.

You had access to the witnesses and the actors in this drama and to the official archives in preparing this work: you used them with the same talent and lucidity that may also be found in your earlier book, The Holocaust in Romania, in which you related the sufferings of your fellow countrymen during the darkness of the Holocaust.

Nevertheless you and I must acknowledge the recent changes that have occurred in this country where political and intellectual leaders have decided finally to confront this chapter of their past: Romania is no longer the country of yesterday, even less the country of before yesterday.

Of course Ion Antonescu is still too popular in certain circles; his fanatical heritage has not completely disappeared. But in the higher levels of the government, one can see a desire to part with his legacy and conceive a nobler future, without erasing the somber traces left in history by our common enemies.

Elie Wiesel

Preface to the Second Edition

the first edition of this book was published in 2005 by Polirom Publishing House. Since then, access to the archives of the former Securitate has hugely improved, much to the benefit of researchers. The contributions of the civil society, CSAT, and the management at CNSAS, SIE, and SRI have been crucial for advances in historical research regarding the history of the communist regime in Romania. In the spring of 2014, SIE and CNSAS declassified the so-called Dunărea archive comprising twenty-six volumes of the OVS and AVS units (Special Currency Operations/Special Currency Contribution) that handled the selling of Romanian citizens for almost thirty years. This second edition of The Ransom of the Jews includes the text published in the first edition, with updates based on information in the recently declassified documents, a selection of documents from the previously mentioned twenty-six volumes, as well as other documents that were declassified after 2005.

The OVS/AVS documents contribute significant clarifications regarding the selling of the Romanian Jews in the 1959–1989 period and the sums obtained from selling people. It began with the thirst for hard currency of the communist regime in Romania that, in the late 1950s, was veering the country’s foreign trade toward the West, as well as with the need of the PMR (Romanian Workers’ Party or Romanian Communist Party between 1948–1964) leadership to improve the quality of Romania’s livestock. Some of the animals had to be brought in clandestinely because some breeds could not be imported legally. In addition, the leadership of communist Romania deemed it was financially advantageous for the Romanian state to charge a fee in hard currency for each Jewish emigrant without having the Romanian state directly involved in the process of obtaining the money. From this vantage point, it was just a small step to the idea of barter: Jews in exchange for pigs, cattle, and sheep. Obviously, it would have been quite risky to have a foreign trade enterprise arrange the trade of people for cattle. Hence the need for total secrecy for this operation, which was assigned to the General Directorate of Foreign Information (DGIE). This “combination” was done with the approval of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, at the initiative of Alexandru Moghioroș, a member of the Political Bureau and vice president of the Council of Ministers, who was in charge of agriculture, and with the written approval of Alexandru Drăghici, a member of the Political Bureau and minister of the interior. Initially, the currency flow included the buyers’ families, a British middleman who deposited the money in Swiss bank accounts, passports issued by the Ministry of the Interior, and the acquisition of cattle and other agricultural products by the same British middleman. Additional sums in hard currency would be deposited into the DGIE accounts or into the accounts of the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade. DGIE sold people who were “free” as well as people who were in jail. The invoices signed by the DGIE officers are shocking: this many pigs and that many cows for that many Jews. The human beings became a good, priced not only in hard currency but also in animals.

In the late 1960s, the British middleman (Henry Jakober) was gradually marginalized by the Israeli authorities, who continued paying for the Jews who wanted to emigrate from Romania. The barter, agricultural products in exchange for Jews, was replaced with a direct trade: cash and/or cashier’s checks for Jews. In addition to the price per Jewish head, the Romanian state received from Israel tens of millions of dollars in low-interest loans and achieved an annual trade balance that was clearly in Romania’s favor, thus generating significant revenue. Furthermore, certain Israeli companies were coerced by the Israeli government to import low-quality Romanian products with a view to “buying” the goodwill of the Romanian state. As a result, the real sum per head for each Jew emigrating to Israel was outrageous and well over “the education expenses” incurred by the Romanian state—a pretext that was frequently invoked by the Romanian negotiators and communist propaganda. It was not only the Jews who were sold to their families or to the Israeli state. Under Ceaușescu’s regime, a similar process was coordinated either directly by or under the control of the Romanian espionage services—DGIE, the Directorate of External Information (DIE), and the Center for External Information (CIE)—when the emigration of the ethnic Germans in Romania was paid for by the Federal Republic of Germany. In the early 1970s, DIE was also involved in a domestic operation during which the potential emigrants, be they Romanians, Jews, or Germans, were literally robbed. It is interesting to note that, in the 1950s, negotiations regarding emigration to Israel failed every time employees of the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the Foreign Trade Ministry were involved. The operations to sell human beings were a DGIE/DIE/CIE monopoly.

Researchers Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminița Banu, and Laura Stancu made a major contribution to our understanding of the history of the selling of ethnic Germans by the communist regime with their volume Acțiunea “Recuperarea.” Securitatea și emigrarea germanilor din România (1962–1989) [Operation “Recuperation.” The Securitate and the Germans’ Emigration from Romania (1962–1989)], which was published in 2011 by Editura Enciclopedică. This extremely valuable volume including 461 carefully selected and codified documents is an essential source for researchers as well as for those interested in studying and understanding an important part of the history of the ethnic minorities in Romania who were not only discriminated against by the communist regime but also sold as goods until 1989. Most of these documents refer to paid emigration of the ethnic Germans, but there are also important documents about the emigration of Jews to Israel. Florica Dobre and Florian Banu, in their introduction to Acțiunea “Recuperarea,” articulate important theses. Notably, they highlight the cynicism of some Western governments, whose policies long supported Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime, which had severe consequences for Romania’s population. The decision of the West German secret services to sell operational techniques to the Securitate, including the phone tapping techniques, is fairly symptomatic of the sometimes cynical approach of the Western countries to the communist world. Dobre and Banu rightly conclude, “It was somewhat of a paradox since Romania’s dissidents who were supported declaratively by the Western democracies were monitored by the Securitate using top-notch techniques supplied by the same democracies, and their personal files were processed with the latest technologies of Western origin.”¹ Even if the “buyers” and “sellers” of people will not be at the same level—in other words, it is one thing to sell a slave and quite another thing to buy the slave so that you may free the slave—Dobre and Banu are actually right when they write that “speaking about the so-called ‘trade in people,’ we think that if you blame the party providing this service for money, you should not exonerate of any moral responsibility the party that requests/accepts the service.”²

We agree with the conclusion drawn by Dobre and Banu, who define the selling of ethnic Germans (and, implicitly, of all the other categories of Romanians who were sold) “in the context of human rights and international legislation.” According to Dobre and Banu, “From this point of view, linking the issuing of immigrant visas to payment of large sums of money is reprehensible, in contradiction with the fundamental human rights. We shouldn’t overlook either the communist authorities’ abusive measures of harassing the persons who had submitted applications to emigrate, which could go as far as terminating their employment contracts.”³

However, we have reservations about another conclusion of the two authors that partially justifies the operations of selling the citizens of the Romanian state: “In other words, Romania’s leadership had the opportunity, through the Securitate, to put sums of money in hard currency into the state treasury. What should the then political leaders have done? [Should they have] rejected the deal by invoking the moral principles of the ‘socialist ethics and equity?’ Consequently, a pragmatic analysis will show that the idea of discouraging such emigrations by requesting the reimbursement of the education expenses, or by receiving compensation (albeit partial!) from the state that was to benefit from this workforce looked less cynical.”⁴

Their following conclusion is also debatable: “Consequently, beyond the aspects that are ethically censurable, the decision of Romania and of [the] F[ederal] R[epublic of] Germany to resolve in an amicable and discreet manner a delicate issue could be considered pragmatic, wise, [and] fully comprehensible in the political context of the Cold War. Each of the two parties got, in general, what it wanted: the German party responded to the reintegration pressure of reintegrated families ... the Romanian party improved its image abroad regarding the respect for the right to free emigration and, at the same time, received a financial compensation.”⁵

Concerning the hard currency accounts opened with the sums obtained from the selling of Germans and Jews, Dobre and Banu write, “To conclude, we would like to point out again the falsity of Ion Mihai Pacepa’s [deputy head of DIE who defected to the United States in 1978] statements regarding the ‘beneficiaries’ of this ‘trade in people’: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceaușescu. The sums of money the German party obtained from the negotiations were deposited to the accounts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, after 1966, were incorporated as revenue to the state budget and used, incredible as it might seem to some, to pay Romania’s foreign debt and to import technology.”⁶ The two authors are partially right in the sense that, during the Gheorghiu-Dej regime and during the Ceaușescu regime, most of the funds in these accounts (T 65, TN 73, and TN 75) were used to pay for technology imports. These accounts were managed during the Gheorghiu-Dej regime by Gheorghiu-Dej himself and by the Political Bureau and during the Ceaușescu regime exclusively by Ceaușescu through executive notes regarding how these funds should be spent. This does not mean that Pacepa is completely wrong in his statements: the documents related to the OVS/AVS accounts funded with the sums of money obtained from the selling of Romanian citizens prove that both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceaușescu “gifted” themselves and their colleagues in the Political Bureau/ Steering Committee with “presents” that were exceedingly expensive, such as luxury hunting rifles. In addition, using the same accounts, Ceaușescu purchased a Boeing 707 for his exclusive personal use.

In 2008 and 2010, Stelian Octavian Andronic, a former DGIE/ DIE/CIE officer who served with diplomatic cover in Israel and the Netherlands and later, after 1978, was the chief of UM 0107 AVS, under the alias Nicolae Arnăutu, published two memoirs. Both contain useful information for researchers interested in the trade in people practiced by the Romanian communist regime. It is worth focusing briefly on Andronic’s opinions on the relationships between Jews and Romanians, on anti-Semitism in Romania, on the Holocaust, and on the emigration of the Jews because they are samples of the way of thinking of a Securitate officer deeply indoctrinated with the ultranationalist thinking of the Ceaușescu regime.

Andronic thinks, despite historical evidence, that “we, Romanians, never touched the Jewry’s notable representatives, even when they behaved as anti-Romanians, quite to the contrary.”⁷ Andronic’s position regarding different moments in the history of the Jews in Romania is eloquent, albeit surprising for a person who lived in Israel for many years. While ignoring the participation of the 888 Jews who were officially recognized as veterans of the 1877 War of Independence, Andronic justifies the Romanian State’s anti-Semitic discrimination during the Congress of Berlin, writing, “The pressures of the ‘Israeli Alliance’ on the Congress of Berlin meetings in June–July 1878, with a view to denying Romania’s independence unless Art. 7 in our Constitution is eliminated, an article that included certain restrictions [in fact, denying Jews citizenship] related to granting the Jews Romanian citizenship led to the internationalization of the Jewish issue in Romania, a fact that was a serious interference in Romania’s internal affairs, all the more so since the Romanians sacrificed their blood in that Balkan war.”⁸ He also writes, “The Peace Treaty of Berlin imposed on Romania to amend its Constitution by eliminating Art. 7 that included some restrictions against granting citizenship to the Jews who had emigrated from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, where they were persecuted. In reality, it was just an economic restriction that forbade Jews from opening pubs in villages, so, it had no racial connotations, but merely economic ones.”⁹ Furthermore, Andronic fabulates when he writes about “close friendly relations between the leader of the Jewish community in Romania, Rabbi [if he was the leader of the community he also had to be the rabbi—in fact, he wasn’t] Filderman and Marshal Antonescu who is nowadays portrayed as one of the great anti-Semites who oppressed the Jews.”¹⁰

Even during the postcommunist period, forever indoctrinated by the communist regime, Andronic continued to deny that, during the Second World War, Romania had been “a country of genocide.”¹¹ One of his sources was Pamfil Ripoșanu (a prominent Romanian émigré who lived in the United States), who allegedly knew well the historical reality because he had “close relationships with the Jewish circles in America and Israel.” Moreover, Andronic had another argument against the existence of the Holocaust in Romania: “During 1962–1967, I talked several times with Rabbi Moses Rosen, both in [Romania] and in Tel Aviv, where I served as Romania’s Consul, and I never heard him say there had been a genocide in our country.”¹² Nevertheless, following the ideological guidelines of the Ceaușescu regime, Andronic’s writings include references to the Holocaust in Northern Ardeal. Andronic also believed that “it was the Jewish minority that, during the post-war period, enjoyed the most goodwill of the authorities in Bucharest and was, sometimes, favored over the Romanian population.”¹³

Regarding the selling of Jews and ethnic Germans, a trade acknowledged as such in SIE’s official documents in the early 1990s, Andronic opines, “The phrase ‘trade in people,’ borrowed from abroad and used in SIE’s note of 1991, was coined and used by the anti-Romanian foreign political circles in their propaganda against Romania’s interests abroad. To label as ‘trade in people’ the emigration process of the ethnic Germans and the Jews is the best evidence of a premeditated hateful action against our country. A secret service in Romania [CIE/SIE], that managed this problem for a long period of time, accepted to borrow a slogan from abroad, 100% hostile to our country.”¹⁴

In their introduction to the volume Acțiunea “Recuperarea,” Dobre and Banu contrast Andronic’s narrative, “somewhat idyllic” but “the only one that could facilitate an assessment,” with Ion Mihai Pacepa’s “outright ridiculous statements” and “aberrations.”¹⁵

In fact, both Pacepa and Andronic belonged to Securitate, the repressive apparatus of the Romanian communist state. They include in their memoirs both evidence-backed facts and approximations or improvised and baseless arguments. However, there is a fundamental difference between them: Pacepa broke off his relationship with the communist regime in 1978 and helped create, both abroad and at home, an image of the Romanian dictator that was closer to reality, while Andronic was faithful to Ceausescu’s dictatorial regime until the last moment. Although Pacepa is not free of errors and inaccuracies that, to the extent they were used by historians, must be corrected in the light of subsequent declassified documents, we must, nevertheless, point out that many of his assertions regarding the Securitate “trade in people,” especially the claims regarding the “combinations” of DGIE with Henry Jakober, as they are described in the book Orizonturi roșii, are supported by the recently declassified OVS documents.

The greed for hard currency of the PMR/PCR leadership was matched only by the cynicism and hypocrisy of the communist leaders and of their Securitate agents. The behavior and immorality of the latter rivaled some of the Mafia bosses. The Romanian historian Marius Oprea evaluated the selling of the Romanian citizens in the following terms: “The human flesh trade practiced by the authorities in Bucharest is another page in the history of communism.”¹⁶ It is also a page in Israel’s history that the Israeli authorities chose not to disclose. As Shlomo Leibovici-Laiș (an Israeli intelligence operative and historian) wrote, “Only the fall of the Ceaușescu regime put an end to this ‘business’ that did not honor Romania. Exposing this infamous chapter is an act of historic justice.”¹⁷

Introduction

Lost and Found

in 1974 a romanian passenger carrying a diplomatic passport boarded a plane at the Zurich airport bound for Bucharest. The flight went smoothly, but once in Bucharest the diplomat realized with horror that one of his suitcases—one that had been given to him by an old acquaintance shortly before his departure—was missing. The Romanian diplomat was General Gheorghe Marcu, one of the division heads of the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DGIE), the espionage branch of the feared Securitate, the Romanian Communist regime’s secret police.

The old acquaintance who had handed Marcu the suitcase was Shaike Dan, a senior adviser to several prime ministers of Israel and one of the most respected operatives of the Israeli intelligence community. The missing suitcase contained $1 million in cash, money given to Marcu in exchange for allowing a certain number of Romanian Jews to emigrate to Israel. To General Marcu’s great fortune, the suitcase was found intact a few days later in the Zurich airport.¹

For many years General Marcu was the third-ranking agent in Romanian foreign intelligence.² Stationed in London under diplomatic cover in the late fifties and early sixties, he also had extensive Middle East experience. The fact that his colleagues accused Marcu on more than one occasion of being a British or an Israeli spy did not seem to hinder his career.³ In 1975, a year after losing the suitcase containing the cash, he was made head of the DGIE currency department.⁴ In 1978 the forty-two-year-old Marcu supervised the DGIE division responsible for coordinating the entire Romanian espionage effort in the United States, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.⁵ Officially he was deputy director of the Institute for World Economy. In fact, according to Cornel Burtică, minister of foreign trade and a member of the Politburo of the Romanian Communist party (RCP), this institute employed “a few dozen genuine researchers and a few hundred undercover Securitate officers.”⁶

Born in 1910 in Lipcani, Bessarabia, Shaike Dan was one of the most efficient operatives in charge of alyah beth, the organized emigration of the Jews to Palestine and, after 1948, to Israel. In a letter addressed to Dan on the occasion of his retirement, Shimon Peres, then prime minister of Israel, wrote: “I am one of the very few people who know the truth that you did everything to hide: that without you, without your mighty devotion and your unmatched ingenuity and resourcefulness, the State of Israel would never have arrived at what it is today. Even if we distribute the credit in the fairest way possible—without your mighty undertaking that continued uninterrupted for forty years—the Jews of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, 600,000 olim, the cream of the Jewish people, would never have reached Israel.”⁷

The 1974 Zurich meeting between Shaike Dan and General Marcu had been preceded by many other meetings and was followed by still others. Although, according to Shlomo Șeobpvoco-Lais, as a result of thisincident, both Dan and Marcu were decalred personae non grata by the Swiss authorities, the episode of the missing cashfilled suitcase was only a comic footnote in the tale of one of the greatest barters of human beings in the twentieth century: the selling of Romanian Jews to Israel.

1

“The Jews Are Our Misfortune”: Anti-Semitism in Romania, from the Congress of Berlin to World War II

The history of Romanian anti-Semitism is long and sad, and to this day largely unrecognized even by most Romanians.

Following the war fought by Romania and tsarist Russia against Turkey in 1877, and after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the nations of Europe recognized the independence of Romania. But the Congress required that Romania treat all its citizens, including Jews, as equals under the law. Article 44 of the treaty stipulated that a person’s religion could not be used as a basis for denying him either his civil and political rights or his access to specific professions.

But the Congress of Berlin had little effect on the Romanian government’s continuing history of discrimination against its Jewish population. Romania agreed to Article 44, but not for long. It soon required the “naturalization” of Jews on an individual basis before the full rights of citizenship might be granted. On January 17, 1879, the Romanian Parliament revised the country’s 1866 constitution to require both an individual petition and a parliamentary vote in order to gain naturalization, a requirement that remained law until 1919. Thus between 1866 and 1904 only 2,000 Jews were naturalized in all of Romania. (Jewish veterans of the 1877 War of Independence received citizenship, but they numbered a mere 888.)¹ Romanian Jews remained stateless and highly susceptible to both economic and political discrimination.

From the Congress of Berlin well into the twentieth century, a large portion of the Romanian political and intellectual classes continued to express their hostility toward the Jews and toward Article 44, the treaty provision that was intended to protect them. Resentment of the Jews in the late nineteenth century came both from the boyars (the gentry) and the new bourgeoisie who had recently begun to assume a political role. As long as Jews worked as middlemen—tax collectors, distributors of manufactured goods, and salesmen for spirits whose production was controlled by the boyars—they were allowed some rights. But as soon as they showed a desire to take up other pursuits and to gain civil and political rights, they became a “social peril,” the “plague of the countryside.”

Jews had long been active in a wide range of trades in Romania. Competition from skilled Jewish craftsmen stimulated the new Christian bourgeoisie to brutal opposition of Jewish citizenship and the support of measures that would restrict them to “national labor.” Rural peasants, living in abject misery because of a severe land shortage, also found the Jews easy targets for their grievances. Unable to resolve their severe agrarian problems, and willing to pander to the nationalist feelings of Christian tradesmen and merchants, in the last decades of the nineteenth century Romanian governments were content to divert feelings of frustration and anger onto the Jews.

Carol Iancu has summarized the legal situation of the Jews at the outbreak of the 1877 War of Independence, before the Congress of Berlin: “They did not have the right to reside permanently in the countryside, and they could be expelled [from the countryside and even cities] on charges of vagrancy following an administrative order. They could own neither house, nor land, nor vineyards, nor hotels, nor taverns in the countryside; they could not possess land for cultivation; they could not sell tobacco; their right to own houses or buildings in the cities was always challenged; they could not take part in any public adjudication; they could not become professors, lawyers, pharmacists, state-certified doctors, or railroad employees; they were obliged to serve in the military, but were barred from becoming officers.”²

Discrimination had eventually barred Jews from jobs in the railroads, the customs service, the state-run salt and tobacco monopolies, and the stock market. The 1866 constitution had permitted only Romanians (including naturalized subjects) to purchase real estate in rural areas while an 1869 law had forbidden Jews to collect taxes there. In 1884 itinerant merchants were barred from the villages, a measure that adversely affected many Jews. Several regulations hindered Jews from obtaining licenses to sell alcoholic beverages in rural settings.

The most dramatic form of anti-Semitism in rural areas was the expulsion of thousands of Jewish families from the countryside during the last third of the century by both central and local authorities. Even if they were elderly or born in the locality, those expelled were permitted only a day to leave, as when twenty-five Jewish families were forced from their homes in the Bacāu district in 1885. If a Jew dared to protest Romanian anti-Semitism, he was deported.

In June 1868 military service had become compulsory for all males in Romania with the exception of foreigners. Since resident Jews were generally classed as “foreigners,” this directive meant that the army would lose a source of cannon fodder and manpower. A March 1876 law on recruitment therefore stipulated that all male residents were obligated to serve—in other words, that only citizens of other nations might avoid service. Jews had thus become subject to the draft even though they were not citizens but were merely “stateless foreigners” or “inhabitants of the country.” This 1876 law continued to be enforced even after the Congress of Berlin and the recognition of Romania by the European powers.

Two pieces of legislation in 1893, the Primary Education Law and the Secondary and Higher Education Law, made education free for the “sons of Romanians” only. “Foreigners” such as Jews might enroll, but only if space were available and they paid tuition.

In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth, this continuing anti-Semitism combined with poverty to create the conditions for the mass emigration of Jews from Romania. Between 1899 and 1914, 140,000 Romanian Jews left the country.³ Many of them traveled by foot and begged for money and food from the Jewish communities they found along their way.

Concerned about its image abroad and the risks this posed to its ability to secure foreign loans, in 1900 the Romanian government attempted to show that its treatment of Romanian Jews was not at all harsh and that the massive emigration was the work of Jewish “provocateurs.”⁴ Meanwhile, especially in Bucharest, emigrating Jews were rounded up en masse in order to declare in writing that they were leaving the country because of hunger and poverty, not persecution.

A fateful transformation in Romanian politics occurred at the close of World War I, when the demographic composition of Greater Romania changed dramatically. It acquired (actually reacquired) Bessarabia from Russia as well as Transylvania and Bukovina from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From an almost ethnically homogeneous nationstate, Romania suddenly became a country in which ethnic minorities comprised almost 30 percent of the population. In December 1918, under Western pressure, Romania abolished the humiliating requirement of parliamentary confirmation for Jewish citizenship; henceforth proof of birth in the country and evidence that the individual was not a citizen of another would suffice.

While the Romanian political classes were pleased to acquire these new territories, they were less sanguine about the minorities who inhabited them. Political leaders—especially those in the Liberal party—sought to postpone the granting of civil rights to all minorities in the new territory of Greater Romania. Again, under strong Western pressure that threatened to withhold recognition of the new Romanian borders, a new constitution was adopted. Enacted in March 1923, it granted full citizenship to Jews and other minorities. Article 56 of the Citizenship Law of 1924 extended Romanian citizenship to all inhabitants of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, and other areas.

In a sense, the ensuing period between 1923 and 1937 represented a golden age of human rights for Romanian Jews. But unease began to appear in the mid-1930s with the formation of such nationalistic movements as the League for National Christian Defense (LANC) and the Iron Guard. Anti-Semitism was a main feature of their programs: LANC used the swastika as a political symbol, and both LANC and the Iron Guard were involved in the devastation of synagogues, the burning of Jewish homes, and the beatings of Jews.

In December 1937 the radical anti-Semitic right took power in Romania. The National Christian Party (PNC), successor to LANC, was asked by King Carol II to form a new government, even though the party had won only 9 percent of the popular vote in that year’s elections. Almost immediately the civil liberties for which Jews had struggled for generations were seriously undermined by anti-Semitic legislation. As many as 200,000 Jews were immediately deprived of their civil rights. The PNC government, better known as the Goga-Cuza regime, had a short life of only forty-two days and was followed by the royal dictatorship of Carol II. But the PNC’s legislative legacy endured. In August 1940, Prime Minister Ion Gigurtu, Minister of Justice Ion V. Gruia, and King Carol II signed law number 2650, openly inspired by the Nuremberg racial laws. The law defined who was to be considered a Jew; a corollary law forbade marriages between Jews and Romanians “by blood.” These and other anti-Semitic measures formed legal precedents that would soon be useful to the fascist regimes that followed.

On September 6, 1940, Ion Antonescu, in an alliance with the Iron Guard, established a dictatorship which abolished the rights of the Jews still further. The war and the Nazi model of anti-Semitic public policy gave Antonescu the opportunity to radically “resolve” the “Jewish question” in Romania. From mid-1940 to early 1942 the Romanian government issued a broad range of laws and regulations with clear anti-Semitic intent.

Eighteen days after taking power, in an interview with the Italian newspaper La Stampa, Antonescu laid out the underlying concepts that would guide Romania’s anti-Jewish economic legislation. Jews formed the greatest obstacle to expansion of the Romanian economy, Antonescu declared, and he promised to solve the problem by replacing Jews with Romanians. He proposed that most Jewish property be expropriated in exchange for compensation.

In late 1940 and early 1941 the government enacted restrictions on Jewish business activities. It prohibited Jews from engaging in the sale of products included in state monopolies—salt, matches, and tobacco, for example—while the Ministry of Labor required Jewish-owned grocery stores to remain closed on Sundays so they might not take business away from Romanian shops on the other six days of the week.⁵

Jews were eliminated from most of the professions. In November 1940, Jewish doctors and other health-care providers were excluded from the National Association of Physicians. Jewish physicians were segregated in their own professional associations and permitted to care only for Jewish patients. Dozens of professional and social associations expelled Jewish members: bar associations, the journalists’ union, the writers’ union, the Society of Architects, the Romanian opera, even the deaf-mute association. Segregated Jewish schools were established. An October 1940 decree provided that Jews could no longer be teachers or students.

Professional and enforced social discrimination went hand in hand with ministerial orders that essentially outlawed the recognition of Jews as human beings. By mid-1941, for example, Jews were permitted to buy bread but forbidden to purchase pastries. Beginning in August 1942, Jews were charged a higher price for bread than non-Jews, and they might purchase bread only with specially marked ration cards.⁶

While expropriations of property could be carried out with some degree of efficiency, replacing Jews in the workforce was more difficult. Although officially most Jews were fired from their jobs in 1943, thousands continued to work for Romanian firms. These companies were forced to seek every possible sort of waiver and approval in order to retain their Jewish workers, because the Jews’ skills were irreplaceable; even a “Romanized” economy could not do without their services.⁷

Another key component of the fascists’ anti-Semitic legislation was Jewish forced labor. As early as December 1940 the government decreed that Jews were obligated to work “in the public interest” under the Ministry of National Defense or other state ministries.

The Holocaust in Romania brought not only plunder, “Romanization,” and forced labor to Romanian Jews; it culminated in a series of devastatingly cruel deportations, executed under murderous conditions. Ion Antonescu was chiefly responsible for designating the Jews as Romania’s primary enemy and in ordering these deportations. His obsession with the need to purge the country of Jews was constant. On July 4, 1941, he asserted that “the Jewish people had embezzled and impoverished, speculated on and impeded the development of the Romanian people for several centuries; the need to free us from this plague is selfevident.”⁸ On September 6, in a letter to his deputy, Mihai Antonescu, he advised that “everyone should understand that this is not a struggle with the Slavs but with the Jews. It is a fight to the death. Either we will win and the world will purify itself, or they will win and we will become their slaves.... The war in general and the fight for Odessa especially have proven that Satan is the Jew.”⁹ On November 14, in a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Ion Antonescu declared: “I have enough difficulties with those jidani [kikes] that I sent to the Bug. Only I know how many died on their way.”¹⁰ Observing that even Nazi Germany was acting slowly, Antonescu urged his lieutenants to hasten Romania’s solution to its “Jewish question”: “Put them in the catacombs, put them in the Black Sea. I don’t want to hear anything. It does not matter if 100 or 1,000 die, [for all I care] they can all die.”¹¹

Administrative and legal measures authorized the deportations, expulsions, and resettlements in ghettos. As a consequence, the entire Jewish population of Bessarabia and almost all of that of northern Bukovina were deported or “evacuated”; so was the entire rural Jewish population of Moldova. “Evacuations” were carried out primarily in northern Moldavia and southern Transylvania but also in Walachia. Transit camps and ghettos were established in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria.

In 1930 Romania had been home to 759,000 Jews. At the close of World War II about 375,000 of them had survived. As a result of 1944 deportations to concentration camps and extermination centers in the Greater Reich, 150,000 of the original Jewish population of Romania ended up under Hungarian sovereignty in northern Transylvania. Nearly all of these—130,000—perished before the war’s end. More than 45,000 Jews—probably closer to 60,000—were killed in 1941 in Bessarabia and Bukovina by Romanian and German troops. At least 75,000 of the deported Romanian Jews died as a result of expulsions to Transnistria. In all, at least 270,000 Jews under Romanian jurisdiction died, either on the explicit orders of Romanian officials or as a consequence of their criminal barbarity. Romanian officials sometimes worked with German help, but more often they acted on their own.

The general policy toward Jews during the war was one of terror, plunder, rape, deportation, and murder. Those Jews who survived owed their good fortune only to the inefficient and corrupt nature of the Romanian administrative system, to Ion Antonescu’s decision to postpone and then abandon plans to deport Jews from Old Romania, and sometimes to the kindness and courage of a few Romanians.

The idea of the forced emigration of Jews was not new to Europe; it had found widespread support among both fascist and non-fascist anti-Semites in many European countries during the period between the world wars. Even the Nazis had seriously promoted such a solution before 1939. In principle the Antonescu regimes permitted the voluntary emigration of the Jews. Even the viciously anti-Semitic Iron Guards supported it. But as Antonescu instituted his wartime policies of the physical destruction of the Jews, his government was already considering how it might use their suffering to extort money from American Jewish organizations.

Romanian authorities were not content to rob the Jews of their property; they sought to extract as much value as they could from the Jews through taxes and bribery. Their devices were well known abroad. According to the Israeli historian Tuvia Friling, in late 1942 Romanian authorities asked 200,000 to 500,000 lei for each of the 70,000 Jews to be released from Transnistria and allowed to emigrate to Palestine. Rumors of total ransoms varied from $14 million to $48 million. David Ben-Gurion was suspicious of Romania’s real intentions but willing to try to save the deportees; in British government circles the talk was of “blackmail, extortion, and slave trading.”¹² When news of the would-be trade was leaked to the press, the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews (CJA), a Zionist organization in New York, placed an ad in the New York Times of February 16, 1943, which stated bluntly: “For Sale to Humanity, 70,000 Jews, Guaranteed Human Beings at $50 Apiece.” The ad continued: “Romania is tired of killing Jews. It has killed 100,000 in two years. Romania will give Jews away practically for nothing. Seventy thousand Jews are waiting in Romanian concentration camps: Romania will give these 70,000 Jews to the Four Freedoms for 20,000 Lei ($50) apiece. This sum covers all transportation expenses.... Attention America, the Great Romanian Bargain is for this month only.”¹³

Just three days earlier, C. L. Sulzberger had written in the Times, quoting neutral sources in London, that the Romanian government was allegedly ready to release seventy thousand Jews from Transnistria and to permit them to depart for Palestine against “a tax of 20,000 lei on each refugee.”¹⁴ Both Sulzberger’s report and the ad clearly referred to the seventy thousand Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina who were dying in the camps and ghettos of Transnistria, to which they had been deported by Ion Antonescu during the fall of 1941. According to Romanian official figures, not many more than fifty thousand of these Jews were alive in September 1943.

Part of the reason for the Times ad was the hope that publicity would help accelerate emigration to Palestine—not a simple matter. In 1943 Romanians were caught between their ardent desire to rid the country of Jews (if possible at the greatest financial and political profit) and the pressure of their German ally to exterminate them. Combined with British reluctance to allow such large numbers of Jews to settle in Palestine, the Transnistria rescue plan fell through.¹⁵

As the Romanian Jewish writer Mihail Sebastian wrote as early as 1941, Romanian authorities knew that the U.S. government was keeping a close eye on the mass murder and mistreatment of Romanian Jews: “Gunther, the American envoy..., told someone yesterday that at the peace conference the Romanians would not be forgiven two things: that they crossed the Dniester, and that they behaved as they did toward the Jews.”¹⁶ Indeed, Franklin Gunther Mott, chief of the American consulate in Bucharest, had written in August 1940 to Secretary of State Cordell Hull: “I have even availed myself of every suitable occasion to General Antonescu and other Romanian officials how deeply my Government and the people of United States deplore and abhor the exercise of wanton license in dealing with human lives....”¹⁷ Later in the war, allowing Jewish emigration would be one more way by which Romanian authorities attempted to gain favor with Washington.

In early 1944 the U.S. government made a major shift in its policy toward the fate of European Jewry. As Ira Hirschmann, a member of the newly established War Refugee Board, wrote, President Roosevelt had instructed U.S. representatives abroad “to take all measures within the Government’s power to rescue the victims of the enemy persecution who are in imminent danger of death.”¹⁸ Roosevelt’s choice to direct the War Refugee Board was John W. Pehle. In his office at the Treasury Department, Pehle discussed the refugee situation with Hirschmann, a former senior executive with Saks Fifth Avenue and Bloomingdale’s in New York, now FDR’s special representative in Turkey. Hirschmann’s mission was to try to save as many Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Jews as possible. The first designated target was Transnistria.

“John Pehle was pointing at a large wall map,” Hirschmann recalled. “His finger was on an area between the Bug and the Dniester rivers.... ‘One hundred and seventy-five thousand Jews and other anti-fascists from major cities have been sent here by the Romanians,’ he continued. ‘It’s disease infested, and only fifty thousand remain alive. See what you can do about it.’”¹⁹

Hirschmann saw no other option than to attempt to negotiate with the enemy for the release of the Jews at a time when Allied planes were bombing Romanian oil fields and cities.²⁰ By special sanction from Washington, he was permitted to do so.²¹ He arranged a meeting with Alexandru Cretzianu, the Romanian minister in Ankara. Hirschmann knew that Cretzianu was sympathetic to the Allies and that his father had been a diplomat in the United States in the early 1920s.

For Cretzianu, the topic of the meeting with Hirschmann was no surprise. From remarks by the Jewish Agency representative in Turkey and by the U.S. minister Mott, Cretzianu was aware of the West’s “unfavorable” reaction to the treatment of Romanian Jews.²²

At their meeting in March 1944, Hirschmann told Cretzianu that Washington was “outraged by the reports we have received of the massacre of your own citizens.... There is a time when the conscience of free people will rise against barbarism and strike down the perpetrators of the crime.... A day of reckoning is approaching. You cannot avoid it.”²³

Cretzianu tried to defend his government by blaming the Nazis for most of the crimes (which was false) and by noting that the situation of the Romanian Jews had lately improved (which was correct). But, Hirschmann responded, “A great deal of improvement will be necessary before you will be accepted by the humane nature of the world as a self-respecting people.”²⁴

After further conversation, Hirschmann sensed Cretzianu’s point of vulnerability. “My clue came after a casual conversation about the Russians.... I could see a shadow pass over his face. Suddenly he said: ‘It’s the Russians we fear, not the Americans.’ This is what I had been looking for. Dropping all caution and with it all formality, I looked straight into Cretzianu’s eyes and coldly, almost brutally, said: ‘Mr. Minister, you, Antonescu, and your families are going to be killed.’

“He winced, but I continued in the same vein: ‘The Russians will do it.’

“After a pause during which neither of us said a word, I resumed: ‘I will offer you a visa for every member of your family in exchange for one simple act which will cost you nothing.’ ‘And what is that?’ he queried. ‘Open the door of the camp in Transnistria.’ He seemed genuinely shocked. ‘And why does the president of the United States send a personal representative to negotiate for some Jews?’ ‘That is why the United States is what it is,’ I continued, ‘and that is why Romania is where it is today.’”²⁵

At this point it became clear to Hirschmann that the Romanian government was ready to sell its Jews. Only the price remained to be discussed. Cretzianu asked, “Precisely what do you want and what do you offer?” Hirschmann replied that the U.S. government wanted the Transnistria camp disbanded, with its Jews allowed to return to their homes immediately; that five thousand children be transported to ships that would take them to Istanbul and then to Palestine; and that Antonescu end all persecution and repression of minorities in Romania.

“It is not impossible,” Cretzianu replied. “But what will you offer in return?” Hirschmann answered: “It should not be necessary to offer anything to a government to have it stop killing its citizens, but I promise you visas for entrance to the United States for you and three members of your family.”²⁶ Soon five ships were carrying about three thousand Jewish orphans and refugees from Transnistria to Palestine.

If the Antonescu regimes allowed the emigration of the Jews, not many of them were in fact able to leave Romania. A great many of those who left perished on their way to Palestine, their vessels sunk by Soviet or German warships. Others were arrested by the British and interned on Cyprus. During the fall of 1940 the Antonescu regime allowed the departure from Romanian ports toward Palestine of three ships carrying 3,351 German Jews originating from the Reich. From September 6, 1940, to August 23, 1944, the same regime permitted seventeen ships with 4,987 Jews (mostly Romanian) to sail toward Palestine from Romanian ports; of these, 1,136 drowned with the sinking of the Struma (762 dead in February 1942) and the Mefkura (374 dead in August 1944).²⁷ The Struma was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine; only 1 person survived. The Mefkura was shelled by a Soviet warship; only 5 survived its sinking.

During his stay in Turkey, Hirschmann was well aware of the work of the Jewish Agency and of the Alyah Beth Mossad in Istanbul. Headed by Ben-Gurion, the Jewish Agency had intelligence ties (through Moshe Sharett, Reuven Shiloah, Teddy Kollek, and Gideon Raphael) with British military intelligence (MI9), headed by Major Tony Symonds and headquartered in Cairo.²⁸ Alyah Beth Mossad was a Jewish underground organization designed to support “illegal” immigration. It worked to rescue Jews from German-occupied areas and bring them to Palestine.²⁹ The head of Alyah Beth Mossad was Shaul Avigur, who advocated the parachuting of Alyah Beth agents into occupied Europe. Like Hirschmann, in the spring of 1944 Avigur was also stationed in Istanbul.

Hirschmann referred to the Istanbul representatives of the Alyah Beth fondly as “the boys.” They had established a number of intelligence contacts in occupied Europe in order to gather information about the most efficient ways to smuggle out Jews targeted for destruction. Officially London and Washington did not cooperate with “the boys,” but highly placed British and American intelligence operatives placed great value on their resourcefulness. They exchanged services and favors. Allied intelligence gained information about conditions inside enemy territory and sometimes used Palestinians as couriers to the Axis countries. The British, in turn, did not interfere with the work of Alyah Beth in making deals with shipowners and captains. Moreover, British and American intelligence officers helped “the boys” find new contacts and trained the Palestinians who were to be dropped into Axis Europe in the techniques of parachute jumping and undercover work.³⁰

One of the Alyah Beth people, who parachuted into Romania in June 1944 from an RAF bomber, dressed in a British uniform, was Shaike Dan. Dan had left Romania in 1935 for Palestine. There he had joined the Nir-Am kibbutz, later returned once to Romania as a Zionist activist, and in 1941 had enlisted in an artillery unit of the British army. Dropped into Romania in 1944 together with Menu Ben-Ephraim, another Alyah Beth parachutist, Dan had two missions, one from MI9 and the other from Alyah Beth. The MI9 mission was to locate British and American pilots and crewmen who were being held as prisoners of war in Romania. The Romanian oil fields had been heavily bombed by the RAF and the U.S. Air Force, and hundreds of downed British and American crewmen had been captured and held by the Romanian army, first in Poiana Țapului and then in Bucharest. British and U.S. headquarters had no information of the whereabouts of the airmen and were eager to know about the conditions of their internment. The Alyah Beth portion of the mission was to establish contact with the Zionist leadership in Bucharest, to organize Jewish self-defense there (the danger of German and Romanian mass reprisals against the Jews was still great), and to speed the emigration of Jews to Palestine.

After parachuting into Romania with Ben-Ephraim, Dan worked his way to Bucharest where he contacted the emissaries of various underground Zionist organizations and tried to mediate among them.³¹ A representative of the Zionist underground, Yitzhak Artzi, become Dan’s contact and helped him and Menu Ben-Ephraim with false papers. Soon the two men located the camps where British and American prisoners were being held and procured their names. This information was transmitted immediately to MI9 in Cairo.

Dan then began his mission on behalf of Alyah Beth. He was facing German pressures against emigration, Romanian opportunism and greed, conflicts between underground Jewish leaders, and the shifting attitudes of the Turkish government. (Turkish waters were extremely important for the transit of departing ships.) Nevertheless Dan, together with the clandestine Jewish leadership from Romania, was able to arrange for three ships—the Morina, the Bulbul, and the Mefkura—altogether loaded with slightly more than a thousand Jewish emigrants, to leave for Palestine in August 1944, sailing from the Romanian port of Constanta. Only the Morina and the Bulbul reached their destination.

When Dan parachuted into Romania, the Romanian government was desperately looking for a way out of its alliance with Nazi Germany in order to avoid occupation by Soviet troops. Toward this end, Romanian authorities believed the Romanian Jewish leadership to be so powerful that it was capable of convincing the Allies to open a second front in the Balkans. Panic over the Soviets was so great that during the night of August 22–23, 1944, Ovidiu Vladescu, general secretary of the Romanian government, on Mihai Antonescu’s behalf, asked A. L. Zissu and Wilhelm Filderman, leaders of the clandestine Jewish leadership, to request that the U.S. and British Allies occupy Romania before the Russians.³² This was naive, wishful thinking. Less than twenty-four hours later, King Michael, with the support of the National Peasant, Liberal, Social Democratic, and Communist parties, arrested Ion Antonescu and declared Romania on the side of the Allies.

The political situation following this coup was, as Dan described it, “fluid.” The next day (Dov) Berl Schieber, an emissary of Menu Ben-Ephraim, went to see Emil Bodnaras, an NKVD agent and head of the Communist militia in charge of defending Bucharest, to suggest that the Zionist underground would cooperate with the new government.³³ Meanwhile, heavy German attacks against Bucharest were blunted by U.S. and British bombings. A week later the Red Army reached Bucharest. After further communication between Dan and British authorities in Cairo, Allied planes landed in Bucharest and transported the British and American prisoners out of Romania to safety. Dan then changed into a crisp British uniform and remained behind in Romania. A new phase of alyah was beginning.

2

Voting with Their Feet: Jewish Emigration before the Fall of the Iron Curtain

With the support of the Red Army and the Soviet secret services, the Romanian Communist party began immediately to consolidate power by taking over key ministries of government and gradually but gradually and ruthlessly eliminating from Romanian political life anyone who dared oppose its goals. For the foreseeable future, democracy in Romania was doomed.

In October 1944, in a meeting in the Kremlin, Churchill and Stalin settled the postwar spheres of influence between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The British proposal, approved by Stalin with a stroke of his blue pencil, gave the Western Allies a 90 percent influence in Greece, a 50 percent influence in Yugoslavia and Hungary, 25 percent in Bulgaria, and only 10 percent in Romania. In practical terms this meant that the influence of the Western Powers in governing Romania would be minimal, next to nothing, while the USSR would have an overwhelming dominance.¹ The National Peasant party and the Romanian Communist party, uncompromising adversaries in the immediate post–World War II struggle for political power in Romania (the first backed by the Western powers, the second by the USSR), found themselves competing for the favor of the Iron Guard’s “former untainted members” who were now perceived as potentially useful militants. This was yet another reason why Anti-Semitism was therefore very much alive.

Beginning in 1945, Romanian war criminals were tried at the request not only of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust but also of the U.S., British, and Soviet governments and by prominent members of the National Peasant and Communist parties. On January 21, 1945, the so-called Law 50, pertaining to the punishment of war criminals, was drafted by the Romanian minister of justice and signed by King Michael. Four of the accused were found guilty and executed in Romania: Ion Antonescu; his deputy, Mihai Antonescu; C. Z. Vasiliu, the former deputy head of the Romanian ministry of interior; and Gheorghe Alexianu, former governor of Transnistria. But in dozens of cases, the death sentences of civil servants and high-ranking officers were commuted by the courts of law or other legal bodies. On June 1, for example, the minister of justice asked the king to commute capital punishment for twenty-nine of the accused in the first trial of war criminals, and the king agreed.² Hundreds of officers and high-ranking officials were sentenced to life or lengthy prison terms. Hundreds of noncommissioned officers, gendarmes, and enlisted men were also sentenced to prison terms or hard labor. Those who did not die in prison were released between 1958 and 1962. The publicity surrounding the first trials was used by the RomanianCommunist party as propaganda against its political enemies; but as the party tightened its grip on power, this propaganda faded and eventually vanished altogether.

The close of World War II represented a miracle of sorts for the Jewish population of Romania: at least 350,000 Jews, most of them from Regat (Romania in its pre–World War I borders), survived the Holocaust. With the exception of the Soviet Union, Romania now had the greatest number of Jews in all of Europe.

In order to avoid direct Soviet rule, Holocaust survivors from Bessarabia and Bukovina were frantically attempting to make their way to Regat, even though the Jews there found themselves severely impoverished. The new governments were incapable or unwilling to initiate the restitution of properties that had been confiscated by the Antonescu regime. Although sympathetic to the survivors of the Holocaust, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, the Communist minister of justice, declared that he could not help them recover their property because he feared the reaction of those massive numbers who had profited from Aryanization. Iuliu Maniu, the democratic leader of the National Peasant party who was “committed to the idea that moral limits should restrain ethnic resentments,” told a group of Jewish leaders in 1946: “For now the state has more important problems than the Jewish question.... And anyway, how serious are your problems? You have been able to manage [so far] with your money and your brains.”³

Meanwhile Romanian Jews were hearing further warnings from fellow Jews and from Red Army soldiers, advising them to move as quickly and as far as possible from “big brother.” The mass emigration to Palestine was just over the horizon.

As the former chief rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen, recalled in his memoirs, for many of the survivors

the only way to make a new start in life was to take the road to the Land of Israel. They no longer trusted anyone—and with reason. If they were to go on living, they had to become masters of their own fate and that of their children, to live normal and independent lives. Ships were sailing for Palestine crammed with these desperate Jews. The Jewish masses eagerly awaited these ships and Jewish youth craved for the unique opportunity of being reborn to a life worth living: alyah to the Land of Israel.⁴

Adding to the pressures, the Red Army began rounding up Jewish refugees from Bessarabia and Bukovina, considered by the USSR to be Soviet citizens, in order to move them back to the regions from which they had fled. According to Liviu Rotman, “Ironically, the Soviet authorities conferred prisoner-of-war status on many Jews they found on the front lines who had been in forced labor in Transnistria and other deportation regions. Many ‘prisoners’ were not released despite appeals by their families and various Jewish communities against this outrageous situation, stressing their serious physical and moral condition.”⁵ Immediately after the successful coup against Antonescu, looking for information on the whereabouts of his family from Lipcani, Shaike Dan visited an orphanage in Bucharest where he witnessed “the orphans of Transnistria ... blank-faced ... children whose eyes screeched with the horrors of the Holocaust.... I knew I had to smuggle out these Transnistria orphans before they fell into the hands of the Red Army, which was getting closer, otherwise they would be sent back to Transnistria.”⁶ Taken back to the USSR in 1945 by Soviet authorities, one hundred of these children were sent to orphanages in Odessa, only to be rescued once more the next year by Rabbi Zissu Portugal of Agudath Israel, an ultra-orthodox Jewish organization. The children were successfully returned to Romania and then sent to Palestine and Israel.⁷ Like Dan’s sister Shifra, many Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina were able to cross clandestinely into Romania. When the border was sealed, other Jews from the same regions made the trip via Poland. Dan’s brother Nissan escaped in this manner from Bessarabia.

Just as Jews had been blamed for modernization and for the birth of capitalism in Romania in the nineteenth century, now the coming of communism was laid at their feet. Without question Jews were overrepresented among the rank and file and in the leadership structure of the Romanian Communist party, a tiny prewar organization now rapidly inflated by a massive infusion of new members (some of them true believers, most of them opportunists). But, as Andrei Roth notes, “Hand in hand with the overall increase in the total number of the party members, the proportion of the Jews had decreased.”⁸ Nonetheless a daily U.S. intelligence report noted in April 1945: “Anti-Semitism is reliably reported to be increasing among all political groups in Moldova, including the Communists.”⁹ Dan describes this trend in the story of a man participating in a huge pro-Communist rally who carried the portrait of Ana Pauker, a leading Jewish Communist. After having his heel repeatedly stepped on by the man next to him, he shouted, “Stop stepping on my foot, or I’ll smash your head with the jidanca [kike].”¹⁰

Under these circumstances it was only natural for Alyah Beth Mossad to concentrate on the emigration of Romanian Jews, trying to move as many as possible to Palestine. The task was extremely difficult: the British quota for Jewish emigration to Palestine was only 3,600 per year. One of the priorities of Alyah Beth Mossad was to win the goodwill of Romanian Communists toward the Jewish emigration.

The attitude of the Romanian Communist party toward Jewish emigration was ambivalent and fluctuated with Soviet policy shifts. “From 1945 to 1946,” Liviu Rotman writes, “Communist representatives joined the other Jewish fractions supporting the emigration struggle, but only reluctantly acknowledged the possibility of a viable Jewish State.... In October and November 1945 the Communists supported the Zionist press against anti-Jewish acts in Tripolitania and Egypt and the pro-Arab stand of British Foreign Minister A. Bevin, but at the same time they refrained from firm support for a Jewish state in Palestine. With respect to alyah the Communists advocated free emigration to all countries, without singling out Palestine. Their position became even more flexible for a short period in 1947 when they welcomed the imminent proclamation of the State of Israel. This shift in attitude was promoted by the position of the USSR that, for a short time, viewed Israel as a potential center of ideological and political expansion in the Middle East.”¹¹

Indeed, as early as 1946 the Soviet government advocated free emigration to Palestine. In September 1946, Soviet embassies in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary were instructed “not to interfere with nor to hinder the passage of Jewish refugees on their way to Palestine.”¹² In order to extend their control over Romania’s Jewish population, in June 1945 the Communists there established, with the help of Iosif Sraier, an influential fellow traveler, the Comitetul Democratic Evreiesc (CDE). The politics of the CDE mirrored faithfully those of the Romanian Communist party on the Jewish problem.¹³

In December 1944, as British commanders were recalling Shaike Dan to Cairo,¹⁴ Moshe Agami arrived in Bucharest in the company of Joseph Klarmann. Agami was a highly placed agent of the Alyah Beth Mossad; he came to Romania with prewar experience there and an arranged position as the Romanian correspondent for the labor daily Davar, published in Palestine. In his youth in Poland, Klarmann had actually been a journalist; now he had no difficulty in establishing himself as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency correspondent in Bucharest.¹⁵ Dan remembers Agami, who “carried a valid Palestinian passport,” being driven around Bucharest in a car with a “small British flag on it” and living in “a spacious, legal apartment [with] a wonderful Romanian cook, and bottles of vodka for the wee hours of the night.... Moshe Agami’s apartment doubled as an office for the emissaries, and as a place to get a whiff of the spirit of the Land of Israel.”¹⁶

In addition to the goodwill of the newly established Romanian authorities, Alyah Beth Mossad needed ships in order to effect the emigration of Jews to Palestine. Klarmann and Agami cultivated J. D. Pandelis, the Greek owner of the Struma, the Smyrna, the Aegia Anastasia, and other ships, as well as the leadership of the Romanian secret services. According to Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, a member of the Zionist underground in Romania in 1943–1948 and later an official in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Klarmann introduced Agami to Emil Bodnăraș, head of the Romanian secret services.¹⁷ Already the general secretary to the president of the Council of Ministers, since April 1945 Bodnăraș had been in charge of the feared Romanian intelligence agency, Serviciul Special de Informații (SSI).¹⁸ Born in 1904 of a Ukrainian father and a German mother in Bukovina, in the thirties Bodnăraș had been an officer in the Romanian army who had deserted in order to became a Soviet spy.¹⁹ Dan describes Bodnăraș as “an old Communist who escaped to Russia during the old regime ... who had a Jewish wife.” Both Klarmann and Agami became friendly with Bodnăraș, who was “very sympathetic” toward the Palestinian envoys, an attitude confirmed by Leibovici-Lais.²⁰

After his discharge from the British army in Cairo, Dan was sent by Alyah Beth Mossad clandestinely back to Romania. After a complicated journey via Italy, Austria, and Hungary with his fellow parachutist Menu Ben-Ephraim, sometime in the early spring of 1946 he reached Bucharest and reconnected with Agami. Under Agami’s leadership, and with other Alyah Beth Mossad agents, Dan continued to organize the emigration of Romanian Jews. A decision was made to send another boatload of immigrants to Palestine aboard the Smyrna. The operation was very complicated. In Romania, Dan and his colleagues struggled to obtain exit permits for the Jewish immigrants over the opposition of British authorities who raised continuing obstacles. The financial demands of the shipowners and their crews, the corruption of the Romanian authorities, and the unpredictable policy shifts of the Soviet occupation authorities added to the difficulty of the task. In Paris, meanwhile, Ehud Avriel of the Alyah Beth Mossad office there was procuring thousands of Ethiopian visas from Bucharest (the lie was transparent, but the Romanian authorities did not care). Finally, after the name of the ship was changed from the Smyrna to the Max Nordau (the name of a World War I Zionist), 1,754 passengers sailed on May 7, 1946, from Constanța to Palestine.

Following the sailing of the Max Nordau, British pressures proved insurmountable, ending the illegal Jewish emigration via sea from Romania. But the Romanians continued to allow Jews to travel to Yugoslavia, where the sailings continued.²¹ Alyah Beth Mossad emissaries were already on the ground in Yugoslavia working toward this goal. Together with Agami and Baruch Kamin, Dan made sure that the transit to Yugoslavia via Timisoara and Jimbolia ran smoothly: “Our friend Bodnăraș ... sent a special commissar to work with our people in the field and to prevent unforeseen problems. I myself ran back and forth between Bucharest and the Romanian-Yugoslav border, prodding Jews to assemble in Yugoslavia and get ready for alyah on a boat called Hagana.”²² With Bodnăraș’s blessing, and through Melania Iancu (a Zionist activist, leader OSE—Organisation Secours Enfants, and a CDE member), Agami and Dan contacted the Romanian minister of the interior, Teohari Georgescu, and his chief officers for assurance that emigrating Jews could leave Romania without difficulty. A man named Leha, the commissar assigned to the operation, was regularly provided with “small amounts of money” and other gifts from Alyah Beth Mossad via the CDE.²³ On July 24, 1946, the Hagana sailed from Yugoslavia to Palestine with 2,678 Romanian Jews aboard.

The Paris office of Alyah Beth Mossad now became the operations center of the illegal emigration to Palestine. The organization’s strategy was shifting toward the use of larger ships. It also provided funds for the transfer of Jews from Romania to Yugoslavia.²⁴ Ehud Avriel, who had good contacts with the Yugoslav security services, was one of the few people who understood early on the seriousness of the rift between the Yugoslavs and the Soviets.²⁵ Concerned about the situation in Romania, he advised Shaike Dan to go to Yugoslavia.

When Dan returned to Bucharest and found that emigration via sea from Romania had totally stopped, he went immediately to Yugoslavia to reassess the situation and further the emigration of the Romanian Jews in transit there. After the departure of the Max Nordau, a small Pandelis vessel called the Aegia Anastasia was prepared for sailing; but because of the new Romanian restrictions on emigration by sea, Alyah Beth Mossad arranged for the ship to be moved to the Yugoslav port of Bakar. Pandelis also supplied another, much larger ship, the Knesset Israel, which was soon loaded with some three thousand emigrants.²⁶ Both ships left Bakar on November 6, 1946. With a limited capacity of six hundred, the Aegia Anastasia, now renamed the Hakedosha, sank between Bakar and Split with no loss of human life.²⁷ Its passengers were transferred to the already overcrowded Knesset Israel, which successfully arrived in Haifa, only to have its passengers immediately deported to Cyprus by British authorities.

After these sailings, Dan established a direct contact with the head of the Yugoslav secret services (code named Stephen). Like other East European Communists, the Yugoslavs, who at that point did not allow the emigration of their own Jews to Palestine, saw the Zionists as their allies in the “anti-imperialist,” anti-British struggle. Furthermore they respected Dan for his wartime deeds as a parachutist (Randolph Churchill, Winston Churchill’s son, had also been parachuted into Yugoslavia during the war by the RAF to support Tito’s partisans). Dan discovered that the Yu-goslavs knew in detail about his alyah activities, and that they not only tolerated but encouraged them. In the spring of 1947 Dan established a similar relationship with the leadership of the Bulgarian secret services.

Meanwhile in Bucharest, Moshe Agami and Josef Klarmann continued to cultivate their connection with Bodnăraș, who had now been elevated to minister of defense and who continued to be one of the most trusted high-ranking Soviet agents in Romania. Sometime in the fall of 1947, According to Dan, Agami and Klarmann “spoke to him about the possibility of fifteen thousand Jews emigrating at once from a port in Romania. Until then no one had talked about numbers like this, but I believed we’d be able to squeeze them onto two ships.²⁸

“Bodnăraș didn’t turn the idea down flat. He asked for a day or two to talk it over with his superiors. Despite his senior status, he had to consult with Moscow and with its representative in Romania, Ambassador Kaftaradze. Two days later he came back with a positive reply: the ships could put in at a Romanian port, and fifteen thousand Jews would be permitted to sail aboard them. But this positive response had two qualifications: all the work on the ships to ready them for sailing would be done in Romania—and, needless to say, paid in full; and the sailing itself would take place not from Romania but from a neighboring country....

“The Romanian authorities had good reason to permit such a large number of Jews to leave. First of all, they’d be rid of some Jews, and if it looked like a shipload of fighters to help in the struggle against British imperialism, what could be better? Another reason was much more practical. Most of the Jews were not from rural areas in Romania but from big cities. The apartments they would leave behind were as important to the Romanians as air to breathe. Finally, the preparation and stocking of the ships in Romania, the astronomical sums that were to be spent on building materials, fuel, water, and food, and the employment of several hundred workers in Constanța for several months, would improve Romania’s foreign currency reserves by no mere trifling sum.”²⁹

According to Leibovici-Lais, when Bodnăraș returned with a positive answer from Kaftaradze, he also added, “You asked me to let fifteen thousand people go. I advise you to take out fifty thousand. These will be the last to leave.”³⁰ Bodnăraș must have known that the Iron Curtain, anticipated by Churchill only four days after the surrender of the Third Reich, was about to fall.

But the circumstances under which the emigration of the Romanian Jews to Palestine was allowed to continue grew more complicated. Due to British pressure, the Romanians were willing to continue to allow the emigration but not through their ports, even though Alyah Beth Mossad was allowed to repair its ships there. At the same time Bulgaria was ready to open its ports to the Romanian emigrants for a fee per head. With the coordination of Shaul Avigur in Paris, Alyah Beth Mossad adapted quickly to the new situation that required larger ships, greater funding, and faster response. In this effort Dan shuttled between various East European capitals; in Bucharest, Agami busily arranged for exit permits and the bribing of various Romanian officials; in Geneva, Pinchas “Pino” Guinsburg, treasurer of Alyah Beth Mossad, paid certain fees per head to Bulgarian authorities while Ephraim Shiloh of the Tirat Zvi kibbutz coordinated transportation logistics in Bulgaria.

Meanwhile thousands of Romanian Jews were crossing the border into Bulgaria, over the Danube, through Negru Vodă and Giurgiu ports, each of them was allowed to take out of the country two to three dollars per person. Again Commissar Leha, together with Chief Commissar Chief Solomon from the Inspectoratul de Siguranță al Capitalei (ISG), supervised the departures at the two crossing points.³¹ Again Moshe Agami coordinated the operation with Bunaciu of the Ministry of the Interior and Feldman of the CDE, making sure that the formal requirements imposed on the emigrants by these agencies were eased. The result of this activity was the sailing from Bulgaria on September 26, 1947, of two ships: the Medinat Hayhudim (formerly the U.S. icebreaker Northland) with 2,664 emigrants, and the Geula with 1,688.³² A day earlier, two other Alyah Beth Mossad ships, the Pan Crescent and the Pan York, arrived in Constanța where work to prepare them for sea began at once.

David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv and Moshe Sharett in the United States now had concern that the illegal emigration to Palestine might jeopardize the creation of the state of Israel by triggering an Arab uprising and consequently a delay of the UN resolution establishing Israel. Already in Palestine and under pressure from his superiors to halt the sailing of the Pan Crescent and the Pan York, Shaul Avigur faced similar pressure from Alyah Beth Mossad to continue the sailings. He decided to approve their departure, though the preparation of the ships was heavily improvised. The ships were moved to the Bulgarian port of Burgas. After thousands of Romanian Jews crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, the Pan York and the Pan Crescent, carrying 15,239 souls, sailed on December 27, 1947, from Burgas to Palestine. As they had done with the earlier Exodus ship, British authorities in Cyprus interned the passengers of these two ships before they allowed them to proceed to Palestine.

During 1947 a transport of five hundred Jewish children was allowed to leave Romania legally for the Netherlands. Another two thousand Jews were allowed to leave Romania legally following individual requests. And in the same year some sixteen thousand Romanian Jews crossed the borders illegally, most of them into Hungary.³³ Three days after the sailing of the Pan York and the Pan Crescent, the Iron Curtain fell on Romania. On December 30, 1947, King Michael was forced by the Communists to abdicate.

3

The Zionist Enemy

From the close of 1947 to May 14, 1948, when David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel, no Romanian Jews emigrated to Palestine. The United States recognized the new nation that same day, the Soviet Union two days later, and Romania on June 11. In July, Romanian authorities agreed to receive an Israeli legation in Bucharest, and, roughly four months later, received Reuven Rubin as Israel’s plenipotentiary minister. In June 1949, at a time when there were only four consulates in Israel—the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain—Romanian diplomats arrived and opened their own.

Almost from the onset of their diplomatic relations, Israel and Romania wrangled over the subject of Jewish emigration. In March 1949, Moshe Sharett, Israel’s minister of foreign affairs, wrote his counterpart, Ana Pauker—a member of the Politburo of Romania’s Communist party—that the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel, though permitted, had almost ceased. Sharett emphasized that Jewish emigration to Israel was vital to the survival of the new state. In Romania, he protested, Zionism was presented as a “poisonous imperialist weapon” and a “reactionary and fascist force.” Sharett asked that seven Palestinian emissaries, all Israeli citizens imprisoned by Romanian authorities for spreading “Zionist propaganda,” be liberated, and he asked the Romanian government to reexamine its policy toward Jewish emigration to Israel.¹

These early diplomatic relations between Romania and Israel reflected the impact and contradictions of Soviet policy. On one hand the Kremlin enlisted Israel in its “anti-imperialist front”—Moscow had thought favorably of the militant anti-British policies of the Jews in Palestine. On the other hand, Soviet Jews continued to be persecuted as part of an anti-Zionist campaign.

In 1948, as the historian Joshua Rubenstein notes, Stalin provided the essential munitions for Israel to win the war against the Arab Legion.² With Soviet approval, the Czech government sold massive amounts of weaponry to Israel. Dan and a Russian-Romanian Jew, Robert Adam, who then lived in Paris, devised a plan with Shaul Avigur and a future top Israeli diplomat in Prague, Ehud Avriel. The scheme allowed Israel to buy firearms from the Czech government and transport them through Yugoslavia to Israel. With the help of Avriel and Ephraim Illin, a successful Jewish businessman, who lived in Paris, Adam arranged for private American donations to Israel to be transferred to a Swiss account in his name; Adam then transferred the money to Avriel, who paid the Czechs. Although the Czechoslovak government forbade the shipping of firearms direct to Israel, it willingly allowed their transfer via Yugoslavia. Illin, Avriel, and Dan even succeeded in buying and sending military planes, including fighters, from Prague through Yugoslavia to Israel.³ Well-informed historians and political leaders in Israel today credit Illin for saving Jerusalem and perhaps Israel itself upon its creation in 1948. As described in his book Al Hechatum (The Undersigned), Illin arranged the sailing of the famous SS Nora from Venice to the port of Sibenik in Yugoslavia, and from there to Tel Aviv. The Nora was loaded in Yugoslavia with Czechoslovak firearms, bought by Ehud Avriel in Czechoslovakia, which proved crucial in struggles at the creation of the newly independent state. Spitfire aircraft, also bought from Czechoslovakia for the Israeli air force, were fitted with additional fuel tanks shipped via Yugoslavia to Israel—and it was Illin again who obtained the fuel for these planes. This was a delicate operation, as Stalin’s relationship to Tito had grown tense around the same time.

In September 1948, Golda Meir arrived in Moscow as head of the first Israeli legation to the Soviet Union. According to Rubenstein, “Enormous crowds greeted her in front of Moscow’s main synagogue on Saturday September 11, where she attended Sabbath morning services with members of her staff.... Several weeks later, even larger crowds assembled on Rosh Hashana and again on Yom Kippur. They waited for hours in front of the synagogue, then escorted Golda through the streets, shouting ‘Next year in Jerusalem!’”⁴

Two months later the wife of foreign minister and Politburo member V. M. Molotov, Polina Zhemchuzhina, herself a Jew, encouraged Meir to continue to attend synagogue in Moscow, saying to her in Yiddish: “I am a daughter of the Jewish people.”⁵ Stalin, outraged by this display of “Jewish nationalism,” responded swiftly and brutally. On November 20 the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, created in March 1942 by the Soviet government in order to win sympathy and support from the West, was dissolved. In January 1949 the Soviet press began a vigorous “anti-cosmopolitan,” anti-Jewish campaign.

Between September 1948 and January 1949 the Soviet government began arresting prominent Jewish intellectuals and activists; dissolving societies for Jewish culture in Kiev; and closing Yiddish-language journals. Stalin forced Molotov to get a divorce and Polina Zhemchuzhina was arrested for her pro-Jewish sympathies. The Soviet secret police manufactured confessions to four crimes by those who had been arrested: bourgeois nationalism; creation of an anti-Soviet nationalistic underground; treason against the Soviet Union; and espionage on behalf of U.S. intelligence.⁶ In May 1952 fifteen Jewish members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were thus tried, and in August thirteen were executed.

In Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, the Communist party organized, under close Soviet supervision, the viciously anti-Semitic trial of Rudolf Slansky, a former party official.

In December 1952, at a meeting of the presidium of the Politburo, Stalin declared: “Every Jew is a nationalist and an agent of American intelligence.”⁷ He organized a second major anti-Semitic secret police investigation and trial in January 1953 under the rubric of the “doctors’ plot.” A month after Stalin’s death (on March 5, 1953), Soviet authorities revealed that the “doctors’ plot” had been fabricated by the Soviet secret police. But Jewish doctors had been already condemned for allegedly planning to poison the Soviet leadership, and some of them had been executed.

The Romanian Policy: The Jews between “Assimilation” and Alyah

As one of Eastern Europe’s most obedient Soviet satellites, Romania closely imitated the “Soviet model” in its policies toward Romanian Jews and Israel. Because the Soviets hoped that the new state of Israel would join the “anti-imperialist camp,” Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe were at first encouraged to allow Jews to emigrate to Israel. The Romanian Communist party even encouraged the emigration of Communist Jews to Israel, hoping thereby to reinforce the Israeli Communist party. Between December 1948 and January 1949, 3,600 “politically instructed” Jews left Romania for Israel in order to “support the fight against the domination of American imperialism in Israel.”⁸ Shlomo Leibovici-Lais mentioned that one of the ships that carried these emigrants also carried typography and typesetting equipment—everything the Israeli Communist party would need to print the Romanian-language newspaper Glasul Poporului.⁹

Emulating the other face of the Soviet model, the Romanian Communist party began its own anti-Zionist campaign. In The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist, Robert Levy writes, “In March 1948 the [Romanian] government issued for the first time secret, nev-er-published criteria restricting Jewish emigration from Romania ... that formally prohibited Jews who were skilled workers ... doctors, or engineers from emigrating.”¹⁰

In October that year the Politburo of the Romanian Communist party twice discussed the Jewish problem. First it decided to close Jewish schools and hospitals, and in March 1949 it outlawed the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (popularly known as the Joint).¹¹ As Vasile Luca, a member of the Romanian Communist party’s Politburo, recognized, the Joint had been extremely helpful in sending foodstuffs and supplies in the immediate post–World War II years, not only to Romanian Jews but to the general Romanian population, which was then confronted by severe drought and famine. Yet this made no difference to Romanian authorities, who thought the Joint, in the words of Miron Constantinescu, another party leader, was an espionage network.

The end of the war had brought no peace to Romania’s Jewish community. Desperate Jews crammed aboard “eagerly awaited” ships headed for Palestine, and, according to Moses Rosen, “Jewish youth craved the unique opportunity of being reborn to a life worth living: alyah to the Land of Israel.” Yet Jewish Communists opposed the emigration and did their utmost to obstruct the exodus.¹²

Zionists in Romania actively promoted and helped organize the move to Palestine. As early as 1945 the Romanian Zionist Organization headquartered in Israel wrote Ana Pauker to inform her of the efforts of the Jewish leadership in Palestine to create the state of Israel.¹³ Yet Jewish Communists would not budge, and they set out to destroy Romania’s Union of Jews from within. First they attacked Wilhelm Filderman, an emblem of the organization, and, in a display of power, arranged for him to be briefly arrested.¹⁴ In 1945 the Romanian Communist party established a new organization, the Jewish Democratic Committee (CDE). Although most of its founders were Communists, they included a few left-wing Zionists “to ensure the democratic unity of the Jewish population and to fight against reactionary Jewish elements, whose interests were tied to the reactionary policies of the historical parties.”¹⁵

From the outset, the CDE sought to undermine the autonomy of Romanian Jewish institutions and to control Filderman’s Union of Jews.¹⁶ According to Moses Rosen, the Zionists offered no resistance, for they saw no future for Jews in Romania. In 1947, as Rosen and the CDE stepped up their attacks on Filderman and Chief Rabbi Safran, both men left the country.¹⁷

In June 1948, Rosen was elected, or rather imposed, chief rabbi of a devastated Romanian Jewish community.

Rosen had been born in 1912 in Moinești, a small shtetl in Moldova, the son of an Orthodox rabbi of Fălticeni. His brother Elias had been the rabbi of Oswiecim, later known as Auschwitz. Together with his wife and two children, Elias perished in the Holocaust. Rosen had been affiliated with the Zionists and Social Democrats before the war. Accused of being a Communist, in 1939 he was interned into the Miercurea Ciuc camp by the regime of Carol II, along with, ironically, many members of the Iron Guard. Because of his past, Rosen was, from the Communist perspective, a natural “comrade-in-arms.”

As chief rabbi of the Romanian Jewish community, Rosen now found himself in an odd position. On one hand he opposed the Communist party’s atheistic policies, which, through the CDE, controlled and nearly destroyed the Romanian Jewish community. On the other hand he could scarcely support the Zionists, who aspired to emigrate to Israel and therefore invested little in maintaining the integrity of Romania’s Jewish community.

As Rosen was profoundly concerned with the survival of the Jewish community in Romania, he had to play a dangerous political game. He sought to accommodate the Communist leadership—which wavered on the subject of Jewish emigration but advocated total assimilation—without compromising the autonomy of the Jewish community; at the same time he attempted to maintain an alliance with the Zionists without advocating a general exodus to Israel. Negotiating this political terrain sometimes made Rosen’s life a nightmare. “My position at this time was rather paradoxical,” he later wrote. “The Jewish Communists wanted the Jews to remain in the country, but to become totally assimilated. Therefore, even if they agreed to maintain communities, their final purpose was completely opposed to mine. On the other hand, the Zionists, my natural allies in my struggle for strong communities, saw in this struggle a danger of ‘stabilization,’ a danger for alyah. Every improvement, every concession I obtained was for them an impediment to emigration.”¹⁸

But Rosen was not unsuccessful in achieving his aims, even during the years of the harsh Stalinist repression. On Hanukah, in December 1951, Rosen spoke to the leading Israeli diplomatic envoy in a meeting at which he was expected to criticize both the United States and the Israeli governments. Instead he directed his criticism entirely at Washington. Beginning in 1948, the Romanian secret police watched Rosen closely until communism fell in 1989.¹⁹

Zionist activities in Romania continued energetically. When an Israeli legation opened in Bucharest, rallies supporting Israel took place in front of the Israeli mission. The CDE tried to persuade Israeli diplomats to halt the rallies and began an anti-Zionist campaign in Romania. The Romanian Communist party, for its part, passed a resolution in November 1948 which condemned Zionism and accused Zionists of being traitors and spies.²⁰

Romania’s Zionists responded to these forms of persecution in two ways: they demanded the acceleration of emigration to Israel and praised the Soviet Union for helping to establish the new state. Fălticeni’s Zionist organization printed a poster that declared, “Jews, let us all go to the Great Synagogue today ... to attend the rally of the Jewish population, and celebrate the historical event of the creation of the Jewish state. Nobody should miss the opportunity to show, besides the joy of the moment, our thanks and gratitude to our defenders at the UN, led by the USSR.”²¹

Yet despite the large numbers of Jews that lined up each day outside the interior ministry to obtain permission to emigrate, and despite Rubin’s persistent pressure on Pauker to relax emigration policies, Zionist demands came to little effect. Tensions exploded in February 1949 after a week of massive Zionist protests against Romania’s emigration policies. Romanian authorities swiftly and brutally responded.

On February 18, one day after a protest by twenty thousand Jews, the regime arrested three Israeli emissaries suspected of espionage. Four other emissaries were already under arrest, detained since December 1948. Moshe Agami and other Israeli envoys avoided the CDE, which they knew carried little weight on issues related to Jewish emigration. The Zionist activist Mela Iancu recalls that “at the beginning of 1949, [Mordechai] Namir [a future Israeli diplomatic envoy to Moscow] visited Ana Pauker. Namir went with Agami, and from the [foreign] ministry came directly to me. They were very pleased. Of course we discussed the essential problem, emigration. They reported that Ana Pauker had come up with the numbers—5,000 people per month, with a total of 40,000 to 50,000 people. Namir was optimistic and hoped that this emigration would soon start. At a reception in which the minister of Israel, Rubin, participated, he asked Ana Pauker to set free the Palestinian instructors, who had already been in prison for four months.” Pauker immediately entreated Teohari Georgescu, another member of the party’s Politburo: “Teo, see what the story is with those Palestianian boys, and let them go.” The boys were shortly set free under condition that they leave Romania immediately.²²

On the same day the Israeli emissaries were arrested, the Romanian Communist party’s secretariat directly addressed the emigration issue. Pauker and Georgescu advised their colleagues to wait for things to calm down, then begin emigrating the “elderly and those with children in Israel.”²³ However, Vasile Luca and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the party leader, were unwavering. According to Dej, Zionist leaders “should be summoned and treated like leaders of fascist organizations,” and Luca claimed that “Zionist organizations must be disbanded as enemies of the republic and treated as such.”²⁴ Emil Bodnăraș was pragmatic: “We lack housing; they [the emigrants] leave behind houses. We lack jobs for our youth; they leave behind jobs.”²⁵

In 1933 the Romanian Communist party had claimed 1,655 members, of which 364 were Jews. A Romanian researcher, Florian Banu, having consulted statistics concerning the ethnic origins of Romanian Communist party members, reports that in 1933 there were in fact 1,459 party members—375 Romanians, 444 Hungarians, 330 Jews, 140 Bulgarians, 100 Russians, and 70 Ukrainians.²⁶ Of these, the Jews represented 22.6 percent. Although Jews and non-Jews joined the party in massive numbers after 1945—for opportunistic reasons or out of political conviction—the actual percentage of Jews in the party dramatically decreased. In February 1946, for example, Jews represented only 5.3 percent of party members.

After surviving the war among a population that was an object of total discrimination, some Jews now became members of the Communist elite, both in the party and in the military. While they by no means dominated the party leadership (the Politburo and the Secretariat), a good many Jews could be found in the Central Committee and in the regional party bureaucracies. In 1949, Jews comprised fewer than 10 percent of the members of the Securitate, the secret police organization, yet their presence was proportionally greater in its leadership. Anti-Semites exploited this influence to create the impression that Jews dominated the secret police.²⁷

More specifically, in 1948, when the Securitate was created, its employees had the following ethnic backgrounds:

Table 3.1. Ethnic Structure of Securitate in 1948

Romanians | 3,334 (83.9%)
Jews | 338 (8.5%) 
Hungarians | 247 (6.2%) 
Russians | 24 (0.6%) 
Yugoslavs | 13 (0.3%) 
Others | 17 (0.4%) 
Total | 3,973¹       

1. Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, p. 63.

Thus Jews were the most powerfully represented of the minority groups, yet in terms of sheer numbers they were no challenge to the Romanian contingent. Their numbers and consequent power were nonetheless magnified by political gossips for political ends.

In keeping with its long tradition of anti-Semitism, in Romania the Jews were blamed for the murders and excesses of Communist rule, and for the government’s harshly repressive tactics for dealing with dissidence. Yet Jews, not surprisingly, were appalled by the tactics of the regime. A 1946 CDE report identified six categories of “disgruntled” Jews: former deportees, former inmates at forced labor camps, orphans, the handicapped, war widows, and former tenants evacuated by Antonescu’s state agency in charge of the Aryanization of Jewish properties.²⁸ From this grim situation, the Jews emigrated. Even the CDE acknowledged that racial discrimination and Zionist activities fueled the general exodus.²⁹

The famine of 1946–1947 triggered a new wave of anti-Semitism, especially in Moldova. Jewish merchants were blamed for the increased cost of food, and their reserves were often raided and confiscated by the police. Florian Banu writes, “Naturally the question ‘Where is the grain?’ was raised, and the answer appeared: In Palestine, where it was sent by Ana Pauker.... The conviction that the Jews [were] responsible for the food situation of the country increased together with the shortages.... It is interesting to note that representatives of the democratic opposition, in their attempt to undermine the position of the Communists, did not hesitate to appeal to a sentiment which does not have anything to do with democracy: anti-Semitism.”³⁰

At the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, at which the Romanian delegation lied about the nation’s role in the Holocaust, former prime minister and member of the new Communist government Gheorghe Tătărescu had warned Rabbi Safran: “Do not forget that although we are now in Paris, we belong to Romania; do not forget that we shall leave Paris and return to Romania and meet there again.”³¹ Prime Minister Petru Groza, apparently respectful of Rabbis Safran and Rosen, supported anti-Semitic measures. Nevertheless, Groza and Rosen had remained in friendly contact through the most repressive years of the Stalinist era. Son of an Orthodox priest and a wealthy fellow traveler of the Romanian Communist party, Groza had even asked Rosen to conduct a service in Hebrew at his funeral. Safran said of Groza: “It is difficult to judge how serious he was ... although he was prime minister, he had no real power. I knew well enough that the ... matters I presented to him were not taken into his office but into the one opposite, occupied by Emil Bodnăraș, the general secretary of the Council of Ministers. If I left Groza’s office with promises that my requests regarding various matters (emigration, for instance) would be solved, I knew that those promises had to be confirmed by Bodnăraș; his voice would carry great weight, especially regarding the matter of the Jews leaving Romania for the Holy Land.”³²

Safran’s assessment was accurate. Groza, though apparently pro-Jewish, was politically weak and sometimes hypocritical in reporting to the Romanian Communist party on the emigration activities of the Jewish community. When it came to Bodnăraș, the real power behind the problem of Jewish emigration, as Safran writes, he “never took an official stand regarding matters of principle as for instance the Zionist doctrine. Being a very practical man he in fact played a major role in solving the concrete problems of Jewish emigration. Actually solving the matter depended on him directly, as he was all-powerful within the regime and the Russians trusted him.”³³

In June 1949, Groza told Bodnăraș, “Now the Americans are playing their Jewish card. And it’s not at all difficult to play that card in a country with 400,000 Jews, and with tens of thousands of them infiltrating into our state, economic, political, and cultural apparatus.... It’s full of Jews. Everywhere you look there are Jews. How can you expect the Jews working for instance in the State Planning Commission to carry out an honest and decent day’s work ... [when they’ve] been placed in posts planning [the daily functioning of] the very factories and commercial enterprises that were expropriated from them? The Zionists are the perfect candidates for being the fifth column [in this country].”³⁴ Political measures were soon advanced against the new enemy.

In 1949, Romanian Communists began a brutal campaign against the Zionists. Over the course of the next ten years, as Mihai Pelin, a Romanian historian, writes, some 250 Zionist leaders and low-ranking militants were arrested, interrogated under terrible conditions, and tried by military courts. “In the beginning it was obvious that a new public Zionist trial [was being] prepared. Stalin’s death complicated things, but the communists did not give up. Measures against the Zionists continued.”³⁵ Zionists were accused, Pelin writes, of “plotting against the regime; misleading the Jewish population, taking it to Israel in order to insure conscripts for the imperialists; collaboration with the reactionary forces against the working class; and espionage.”³⁶ In July, Rabbi Zissu Portugal, a leader of the Agudath Israel and savior of the orphans from Transnistria, was arrested. Two months later, having received no explanation, he was released. In September 1950 the Romanian legation in Tel Aviv reported that former Alyah Beth Mossad Jewish parachutists were involved in “the campaign against Romania.” According to diplomatic documents, the parachutists had in fact publicly protested the arrest of Zionists in Romania.³⁷

Public exchanges between Israel and Communist countries soon grew increasingly divisive. During the trial of Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia (on charges of traitorous activities), Radio Bucharest proclaimed, “We have criminals among us, Zionist agents and agents of international Jewish capitalism. We shall expose them, and it is our duty to exterminate them.”³⁸

On February 11, 1953, the Soviet Union ended diplomatic relations with Israel. Rabbi Portugal was again arrested and again released. In March 1954 a trial of Romanian Zionists began. With the support of government and public opinion, forty-eight people in Tel Aviv went on a hunger strike. In July a Romanian court condemned more than a hundred Jews for espionage. That same day in the Israeli parliament, Moshe Sharett protested: “The Israeli government finds unconvincing the declarations of the Romanian government on the basis of which over one hundred Jews have been condemned to long [prison] terms.”³⁹

As Jewish emigration grew into a highly political issue in both countries, the intelligence agencies of the respective governments became increasingly involved. In the late 1940s and early 1950s both Romanian and Israeli intelligence activities were reorganized. In August 1948 the Romanian Communist party established the Securitate. Two months earlier the Sherut Yediot (or, SHAI)—Hebrew for “Information Service”—had been created in Tel Aviv and placed under the supervision of Reuven Shiloah, special adviser to the prime minister. According to the historians Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, SHAI included three elements: a domestic secret service, Shin Beth, led by Isser Harel; a foreign intelligence service, the so-called Political Department, led by Boris Guriel; and the Institute for Alyah Beth, in charge of emigration, led by Shaul Avigur.⁴⁰

At a 1950 symposium in Israel, Shiloah declared: “We have not yet begun serious work in the states of Eastern Europe. We hope to do this in the future. There is a need to extend help to the [Israeli] missions dealing with the problems of the Jewish communities [in those countries] and the problems of immigration to Israel from those countries. We suffer from a lack of suitable people to do intelligence work abroad. Before the establishment of the state, we could rely on the help of loyal Jews and non-Jews in addition to special units of Haganah personnel from [Palestine]. This supportive and special attitude toward us has changed.... The minister must be a partner in intelligence matters. On the other hand, it is clear to the [Political] department that there is an urgent need for each mission to have one person whose job will be to deal only with intelligence matters.”⁴¹ Eliahu Epstein (Elath), Israel’s minister in London, emphasized that some intelligence work could be handled above ground, especially in Western European countries where contacts with military and scientific circles were legal.⁴²

Echoing Elath, Ehud Avriel, minister to Bucharest and former minister to Prague, clearly distinguished between the division’s work in Western and Eastern Europe. In the East, influential and knowledgeable people could not be accessed, and Israeli diplomats were under constant counterintelligence surveillance. He suggested, therefore, that operatives in Eastern Europe focus their efforts on studying and foiling Soviet-bloc counterintelligence: “Who are the people following us? What means are they using? What does the Kominform know about the Jews?” Avriel continued, “It is important to know at least several hours in advance about impending actions against the Jews; it is important to know which people are betraying us, who is trying to sabotage our activities, etcetera. In these countries the ministers themselves must serve as intelligence agents. They have contacts.... In addition to the minister, there is room in each mission for a Political Department man.... The best cover is the commercial [attaché’s] job, and it is best that whoever carries [the title] will be able to do the job properly.”⁴³ Immediately after this meeting, Israeli intelligence was accordingly reorganized.⁴⁴

Isser Harel, then head of Shin Beth, explained: “The Shin Beth’s debriefing on recent immigrants from behind the Iron Curtain and the orderly transmission of the information collected—on Soviet industrial and military and other strategic installations—for the CIA seems to have begun in June or early July 1951.”⁴⁵ The U.S. diplomatic mission in Israel was interested in this information as well as in news of the “persecution of religious dissidents, the denial of human rights behind the Iron Curtain, and forced labor camps.” The American consulate provided this information by interviewing Jewish emigrants from the Eastern bloc and by consulting Romanian newspapers and journals as well as Israeli government press releases and official reports.⁴⁶

Coordinated by the deputy head of the American consulate, Erwin P. Keeler, and by Steven Zakorski, a consular attaché, these information-gathering operations, known as Trevi and Peripheral Security, worried the Israelis. Shiloah and other Israeli leaders feared they might disrupt relations with Communist governments or jeopardize future arrangements for the emigration of Jews to Israel. Shiloah thus imposed strict limitations on cooperation with Trevi and Peripheral Security activities.⁴⁷

Shiloah had good reason to be cautious. From its opening, the Israeli consulate in Bucharest had been infiltrated by Romanian secret service agents. Consequently, as Pelin writes, the Israeli consulate was “under extraordinary pressure, being under careful surveillance from outside and inside. In the private homes of Ehud Avriel, commercial attaché, and Eliezer Halevy, secretary of the legation, microphones were installed.” Romanian agents, code named Lagu, LT9, and G, reported on all the Israeli diplomats, while code name X specifically reported on Zvi Locker and Halevy. Zoltan Hirsch, alias LT9, was a prime Securitate agent at the Israeli consulate. He reported mainly to Ehud Avriel, the minister in Bucharest, but also to Eliezer Halevy, deputy chief of the mission. Hirsch’s wife, Regina Fischler, a telephone operator for the Israeli legation, was also allegedly recruited by the Securitate.⁴⁸ Thus when it came to emigration matters, caution was a byword for the Israelis.

In August 1949 the Romanian Communist party secretariat reached a consensus on the emigration of the Jews. It would permit emigration and simultaneously intensify the propaganda against it by publishing letters from Palestine that described the “misery” there.⁴⁹ Levy and Pauker write, “A synthesis prepared ... at the end of 1949 revealed that while only 400–500 Jews had been allowed to emigrate between January and September–October 1949, the number had increased to some 3,000–4,000 by the end of the year.”⁵⁰

Behind the sudden rush of emigrants was Israeli pressure. On October 1, Ben-Gurion met in Tel Aviv with Nicolae Cioroiu, the leading Romanian diplomat in Israel. Ben-Gurion told him that “the development of relations between the two countries depends on the evolution of the economic relations and on the emigration of the Jews who want to leave Romania.”⁵¹ A month later Moshe Sharett, Israel’s foreign minister, protested in the presence of the same Cioroiu that the Romanian government was unfairly constraining Jewish emigration: Israeli ships were no longer permitted to call in Romania, collective departures were canceled, and severe restrictions made individual departures increasingly difficult. The meeting was tense. Sharett said to Cioroiu, “Immigration is the political axis of the government of Israel. The Jews from Romania are a determining factor in Israel. RPR [the Popular Republic of Romania], the enemy of Zionism and of [the Israeli] government, refuses [to meet for] discussions, did not answer our letter, attacks us, arrests Zionists, and does not respect the promises given to Namir and Agami. Eliasiv [director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry] is not received officially.... I cannot conceive [of] diplomatic relations between two states with [such] completely opposed views, especially concerning emigration.”⁵²

Sharett’s words were not empty threats. On November 21, 1949, Israel recalled Rubin and Agami from Romania. Israeli newspapers launched a massive press campaign against the Romanian authorities. Israeli officials were unhappy with Rubin’s results in promoting Jewish emigration; by withdrawing the veteran Agami, Israel demonstrated its skepticism about the future of emigration from Romania.

Yet Israel could not long ignore the importance of Romania’s Jewish population. Two months after Agami and Rubin’s departure, Israel nominated Avriel to head the Israeli consulate in Bucharest. The Israeli government continued to entreat Romania to let the Jews go. But as diplomatic efforts continued to fail, Israel turned to less conventional means.

In November 1949, Zalman Robinson, a Romanian Jew, arrived in the Romanian port of Constanta. A civilian there gave him money and directed him to the train station. When he reached Bucharest, a car took him directly to Ana Pauker’s house. Robinson was Pauker’s brother. Unlike Ana, who was a member of the Romanian Communist party’s Politburo as well as a foreign minister, Zalman Robinson had remained an Orthodox Jew.⁵³ He had emigrated to Palestine in 1944 and was returning in 1949 to visit his sister. He stayed with Pauker in the very house in which she met fellow members of the Politburo.

As Moses Rosen later recalled, “No two people could have held more different views than Zalman and Ana—he was deeply religious and a staunch Zionist; she was a convinced Communist and an atheist. Yet they had a profound love and respect for each other. They recognized that in their different ways they were idealists. When Zalman first came to her house, Ana embraced and kissed him and said to him in Yiddish, ‘Zalman, you have come home.’ To this he replied, ‘Home is Israel, not here.’”⁵⁴ In Bucharest, Robinson continued his pious life, kept in touch with his fellow Orthodox Jews and with the Israeli legation in Bucharest, and taught Jewish children Hebrew and Talmud at the synagogue.

Leibovici-Lais, a personal friend of Zalman Robinson, reported that a senior official in the Israeli government had approached Robinson shortly before he left for Romania and asked him to speak with his sister about Jewish emigration. Likewise Israel’s foreign ministry contacted Robinson’s wife, Dina, just before she left for Romania, and told her that her husband, as Pauker’s brother, “should personally work on emigration problems.”⁵⁵ The Israeli government and the Israeli legation in Bucharest, having exhausted their patience with traditional forms of diplomacy, came to rely increasingly on the personal influence of Zalman Robinson.

Although Robinson was sometimes a superfluous contact—by the spring of 1950, Jews in Romania could openly emigrate to Israel—the legation nevertheless persuaded him to stay in the country. When the emigration tide turned again that summer, and restrictions were renewed, the Israelis again relied on Robinson, dubbed by Ben-Gurion “the empress’ brother.”

From the outset, Robinson exploited every opportunity and occasion to intervene with his sister. He appealed to her “countless times ... to allow free emigration ... particularly for Zionist Jews.” Beginning in December 1949 he exhorted her to allow Zionists, especially religious Zionists, to emigrate, arguing that religious Jews and Zionists should be allowed to leave “since they were not well regarded in Romania.”⁵⁶ In addition to these constant appeals to his sister to ease Jewish emigration, Robinson actively sought the release of arrested Zionists. He also pressured his sister to allow medicine to be sent into prisons for those Jews who were sick.⁵⁷

Robinson was a man of courage. Rosen writes, “When the Romanian authorities arrested the Zionist leadership on July 10, 1950, Zalman was outraged. He heard that the Romanian leaders, whom he knew well, as he had met them at his sister’s house, were having a meeting with her. He burst uninvited into the room where they were assembled, holding a piece of paper. The startled leaders asked him what he wanted. ‘I have a written request,’ he replied. ‘You have arrested the heads of the Zionist organizations. I am a Zionist. Please arrest me, too.’ The Communist leaders burst out laughing. They found his intervention highly amusing and even tried to exchange jokes with him.”⁵⁸

When Ana Pauker fell from power in June 1952, emigration to Israel came to a standstill. During her tenure no fewer than 100,000 Jews had left Romania to settle in Israel. Yet, as Rosen writes, “she was a passionate, convinced Communist, who totally rejected the Zionists’ thesis on the existence of a Jewish nation whose country was Israel. She strenuously argued that Romanian Jews were Romanian nationals whose duty it was to build up their Romanian homeland together with the Romanian masses.... Was she influenced by her Zionist brother Zalman, to allow Jews to leave for Israel? ... Though unlikely, this notion cannot be ruled out. Was she influenced by the Holocaust, realizing the fate that might await those who remained in the Diaspora?”⁵⁹

Even today, with the power of hindsight, Rosen’s questions cannot be unequivocally answered. Robinson, regarded by the Rabbi of Buhuși as “our telephone to the Kominform” and by Rosen as a “saintly but naive man,” was arrested on April 30, 1953. He spent two and a half years in a Romanian prison. He returned to Israel devastated, according to Rosen, after one of his daughters attempted to commit suicide and believing that Ana had fallen from power because of him.⁶⁰

Israel’s attempts to ease the emigration of Romanian Jews did not prove fruitless. On November 29, 1949, the Romanian Ministry of the Interior cautiously relaxed its emigration criteria, allowing more Jews—with the exception of technicians—to emigrate. But departures were granted individually in order to avoid a disruption of Romania’s economy.⁶¹ According to archival records, “Departures jumped from 100 to between 500 and 600 a month in the last part of 1949, and increased to roughly 2,500 per month at the beginning of 1950—with a total of 15,500 people leaving for Israel between November 1949 and April 1950 when the gates suddenly opened completely. On March 31, 1950, the Interior Ministry [under the leadership of Politburo member Georgescu] met to discuss the party’s decision to issue 10,000 to 12,000 exit visas per month beginning in April 1950.... The numbers rapidly exceeded all expectations, as from January 1 to June 1, 1950, some 47,000 people received exit visas, 37,000 of them in April and May alone.”⁶² Between January 1 and May 15, 1950, 53,480 emigration requests were submitted.⁶³ By the following June, the Romanian Ministry of the Interior was determining how much each Jewish emigrant would be allowed to take with him.

Romania’s relaxed emigration policies prompted a Jewish exodus. From the eleventh district in Bucharest alone, 12,200 Jews registered to leave. By May 12, 1950, 6,146 Jews from Bacău had registered, and 6,500 of the 10,000 Jews in Arad (of which 600 were Communist party members). Sometimes the local police went door to door to distribute emigration forms, and in Săveni, Moldova, they beat drums to announce to the Jews that forms for departure were available to be picked up.

A CDE report on Jewish emigration for the year 1950 contains the following numbers:

Table 3.2. Jewish Emigration from Romania during 1950

January | 1,500
February | 2,000
March | 3,000
April | 3,000
May | 4,000
June | 5,000
July | 7,000
August | 7,000
September | 7,000
October | 4,000
November | 3,000
December | 3,000¹

1. Archive of CCRCP, codul I, 106, fond 37, Comitetul Democratic Evreiesc, Report of CDE on December 28, 1950.

The exodus continued in 1951, as 50,000 to 60,000 Jews received exit visas. By the time the Romanian Communist party ended this free flow, exit visas had been issued to 100,000 Jews.⁶⁴

The general Romanian population showed mixed feelings about this exodus. In Moldova, Romanian factory workers expressed sympathy for the emigrants, saying that the Jews had relatives in Israel who missed them, and that life would be better for them there. In Botosani, a non-Jewish female member of the Communist Youth (UTM) said of the emigration: “This is treason, they all must be hanged.” A young Jewish woman and member of the same organization replied: “This is exactly why we need to leave; you will have nobody to hang.” The employees of a Târnăveni textile store hung their sentiments on a poster in the window: Jewish customers were not welcome. Georgescu, president of the co-op union in Rădăuți, when entreated by a sick Jew for a car to go to the hospital, answered, “When you went to Transnistria, were you given a car?”⁶⁵

Those who hoped to emigrate found that economic and financial contributions to the Romanian Communist party were advisable. Agami’s recently declassified memoirs indicate that until 1947 “[our] relationship [to] the regime’s leaders was not based on bribery.”⁶⁶ But new considerations soon applied.

Despite the new emigration criteria adopted in 1948 and 1949, Romanian Communist authorities continued to see emigration as an important source of income. Andrew and Leslie Cockburn write that “Though the Kremlin had endorsed the principle of free emigration, local governments were given latitude in extracting whatever price they could either for the state treasury desperate for hard currency or for officials eager to replenish their personal incomes.”⁶⁷ In Israel, Ben-Gurion grumbled in his diary about Romania, “You can’t do anything without money. From top to bottom, even the Communist [party] wants money.”⁶⁸

In the fall of 1949, according to an agreement between the Israeli legation in Bucharest and Sovromtransport, a Romanian-Russian transport service largely under Russian control, the legation was obliged to pay $57 for every thirdclass ticket on a ship bound from Romania to Israel.⁶⁹ In December, when Rubin’s mission in Romania was brought to an end, Pauker told him that the legation’s contribution toward the emigration was inadequate. Once back in Israel, Rubin proposed raising the emigrant fee to $120, under the condition that Romania release 50,000 Jews.⁷⁰ A meeting in June 1950 between Sovromtransport, the Israeli consul, and Deputy Chief of Mission Halevy established that the Israeli consulate would pay $90 for each of the 1,300 tickets on the ship Transylvania, the sole vessel designated by Romanian authorities for emigration to Israel.⁷¹ But the established fee was not what was in fact paid. Israeli intelligence experts Melman and Raviv have confirmed that Romanian authorities were paid $100 for each passenger.⁷²

According to a 1951 government report, Romania had come to depend on this important source of hard currency: “It is difficult for the [Romanian] state, at this point, to renounce a yearly income in hard currency of about two million.”⁷³ However, in fact, it was paid much more than it had been established.

Israelis were willing to pay not just for travel expenses but also for the right of Jews to emigrate. In 1949, with the help of Ephraim Illin, the Israeli businessman earlier involved in the Czech-Israeli arms deal, Shaike Dan helped create an Israeli-Yugoslav company which, according to Amos Ettinger, gave Yugoslavia a $200,000 steel-making furnace manufactured by the Brassard Brothers, twelve oil-drilling installations, and eight American-manufactured luxury cars for Yugoslavian leaders, products they could not buy direct from the West. Dan was thus returning the favors extended to him during the transit of the Romanian Jews via Yugoslavia.⁷⁴

Yugoslavia was not the only Communist country interested in drilling equipment. Before the Arab oil boom, Romania had been one of the world’s major oil producers. From the turn of the century, American oil companies, chiefly New Jersey’s Standard Oil, had invested heavily there.⁷⁵ In 1938, Standard-owned Romano-Americana was the fourth-largest oil company in Romania. That year U.S. investment comprised 10 percent of the Romanian oil industry.

In 1938, Nazi Germany, preparing for its campaign on the Eastern Front, began seizing U.S. and British oil operations in Romania.⁷⁶ Antonescu’s empowerment ensured their success. During World War II the Allied forces naturally sought to disrupt Romanian oil production in order to harass Germany’s war effort. In 1945 the Soviets took possession of the Romanian oil fields and transported much of the oil-drilling equipment to the Soviet Union as war trophy. Washington and London protested, maintaining that the equipment belonged to British and American oil companies and had been taken illegally by the Germans.⁷⁷ By March 1945 the Romano-Americana oil company was complaining that the Soviets had carried away 65 percent of its equipment. Against these charges, the Soviets maintained that all the equipment they seized bore German markings, had not been paid for by Romano-Americana, and was destined for the Baku oil fields. The U.S. State Department’s reply was brief: Return our equipment or pay for it.⁷⁸ Between 1945 and 1947 a Soviet-American commission in Bucharest discussed the removal of oil equipment from Romania to little effect.⁷⁹

The Soviet seizure of their oil-drilling equipment left Romanian authorities in a state of despair. In 1947, with the support of the Lehman Brothers, Nicolae Malaxa, a Romanian industrialist, traveled to the United States, where, for $8 million, he contracted with the International Derrick and Equipment Company to supply oil-drilling equipment to Romania.⁸⁰ Soon after, Romania became a Communist dictatorship, and Washington annulled the deal.

Like the Yugoslavs, the Romanians sought to rehabilitate their oil industry from the ravages of the war. As Dan recalled, “This kind of equipment could only be had in the West, and it seems [the Romanians] knew who to turn to.... I took my expert Ephraim Illin, and we left for Bucharest as guests of the Romanian trade ministry.... The talks with the Romanians were all business and straight to the point. Three or four drilling instruments weren’t enough for them. They wanted a whole boatload and were ready to pay in full.... Unlike the Yugoslavs, they also intended to get paid for issuing exit permits to the Jews. Ever since the Pan York and the Pan Crescent, no Jews had left Romania. Now we were in a good bargaining position. Ephraim Illin took care of the business side and I of the Jewish side.”⁸¹

According to Leibovici-Lais, negotiations on the oildrilling equipment began in January 1949, with Namir and Pauker at the helm, and continued in 1950 with Illin and Dan. Pauker asked Namir to delegate the details of the negotiations to Agami and her deputy Ana Toma.⁸²

Informed of Pauker’s request, Moshe Sharett, the Israeli foreign minister, immediatelly sent Agami to Bucharest as an Israeli diplomat. But his negotiations with the Romanian authorities went nowhere. So, with the help of Avriel and Dan, Agami contacted Illin. They met in Paris, and Illin gladly provided the Romanians with oil-drilling equipment, pipe, and tractors in exchange for Jews.

Israel held mixed feelings about the deal, especially since it might break the U.S. embargo against Romania. As Illin recalled, “Bitter disputes broke out among us regarding the question of whether we had the right and the ability to risk acting in opposition to American policy. Reuven Shiloah, one of the key men in the Foreign Office, was firmly opposed to the deal. Ehud Avriel, Shaike Dan, Shaul Avigur, Yosef Bartel, and, of course, Moshe Agami were in favor. I declared that we had no choice but to act in accordance with our own best interests. It was not a matter of some small smuggling operation but of a political act that we owed to ourselves, to the Holocaust survivors, and to those who did not have the protection of the Jewish state and were massacred by the Nazis. After much discussion and wavering, the decision was made and I was given the go-ahead.”⁸³

Anticipating that the deal might not go through, or that it might be leaked, Shiloah prepared for possible failure. He sent a coded cable to the Israeli legation in Bucharest, stating, as Illin recalls: “Illin is going to Romania, thinking that he will solve the immigration problem. We have no basis to believe that he will succeed. Do not identify with him, do not cooperate with him, avoid all direct contact with him. If he does succeed, he will be congratulated. If he fails, do not give him any help.”⁸⁴

Illin thought at first that the Romanian deal was a “replay of the Yugoslavian script.” Yet he soon realized that this was an “entirely different opera.... The Yugoslavians—if one may make a generalization about national character—are frank and at times even naive.... The Romanians were absolutely different: suspicious, troublemaking, quarrelsome, and petty. Negotiations with them were as difficult as parting the Red Sea, particularly when they were represented by Jewish Communists—a curse not recorded in the Torah. Although the Yugoslavians were also dedicated Communists, they were patriots first and foremost, always bearing in mind what was best for Yugoslavia. [Romania] ... was an extremist Communist country.”⁸⁵

Negotiating with Gogu Rădulescu, the Romanian minister of foreign trade, his deputy Abramowitz, and a Russian security agent proved challenging. A deal was nevertheless reached and implemented: the Romanians paid for the oildrilling equipment partly in cash and partly in Jews. As Dan recalled, “The instruments and the drill pipes were at that time more important to the Romanians than a few more Jews.... The agreement signed between Ephraim Illin and the Romanians dealt with a whole shipload of drilling equipment. Even though no mention was made of a quid pro quo, the agreement between me and the Romanians spoke about exit permits for many thousands of Jews still in Romania. The figure was astronomical, about 20 percent of all the Jews still in Romania, but the Romanians gladly agreed.”⁸⁶

Both sides benefited from the arrangement. Israel received nearly 100,000 new citizens from Romania over the course of two years, and Romania’s economy was buoyed by the influx of fresh currency and oil-drilling equipment.

4

Barter

World War II and poor postwar management devastated Romania’s economy. The new Romanian Communist regime introduced ill-advised economic measures, including the nationalization of industries, land, and real estate, and tight control of hard currency; the Soviet Union imposed heavy war reparations on Romania for its role in the occupation of part of the Ukraine; and the cold war ruled out economic support from the West. Together, America’s export regulations and Romania’s socialization decrees dramatically reduced Romanian-American trade. In 1950 U.S. exports to Romania amounted to $1.5 million dollars; in the same year Romania’s exports to the United States were a mere $150,000.¹

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Romania reached their nadir in the late 1940s and early 1950s. U.S. diplomatic personnel were systematically harassed in Bucharest. In September 1948, four members of the American consulate, charged with taking photographs in a forbidden zone, were detained for sixteen hours. Romanian authorities asked Washington to recall two of its diplomats, and American officials acquiesced. Between 1949 and 1951, Romanian officials forced the United States to reduce from fifty-three to eleven the staff of its consulate in Bucharest, and enforced travel restrictions on those who remained: they had to stay within seventy miles of the city. The Romanian government closed U.S. and British libraries and arrested and tried their employees, and harassed journalists as well.

Romanian officials claimed that Washington treated their country with undeserved disfavor, and that diplomatic relations between the two countries had decayed due to unfair U.S. policies rather than injustices committed by the Romanian government.² As the historians Joseph Harrington and Bruce Courtney describe the situation, “During the last two months of 1951, harassment [by Romanian officials] increased.... While Romania’s behavior toward the American legation was in part due to Soviet pressure, the harassment was also a direct reaction to several aspects of America’s policy toward Eastern Europe. Bucharest was especially disturbed by Washington’s continued protests concerning Romania’s human rights violations.... Further, Romania objected to America’s unwillingness to export needed industrial products to Romania.”³

Despite Romania’s complaints, the State Department continued to protest its human rights violations. On August 1, 1951, President Truman suspended Romania’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status.⁴ By 1952 Romanian harassment and American trade restrictions had almost rendered defunct the U.S. consulate in Bucharest; there was even talk of closing it altogether.⁵

In March that year Romanian authorities nearly halted Jewish emigration from Romania to Israel. The Transylvania, which sailed from Constanța to the Israeli port of Haifa, had provided the principal mode of transportation. Romanian authorities docked the ship ostensibly for repairs, and provided no substitute vessel.⁶ In 1952, 3,712 Romanian Jews emigrated to Israel; between 1953 and 1954 this number dropped to several dozen; between 1953 and 1958, despite U.S. condemnation, a mere 1,657 Jews emigrated.

Stalin’s death in 1953 did nothing to diminish Romania’s anti-Semitic policies. Jewish emigration continued to be banned; more Zionists were arrested and tried, and in April 1954 two hundred were imprisoned, their sentences ranging from fifteen years to life.⁷

For Israel, Jewish emigration—and not only from Romania—remained a priority. In 1952, Shaul Avigur and Shaike Dan created the Liaison Bureau (known as the Lishka) in Israel to arrange Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁸ Run by Shaul Avigur, the bureau answered to Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Based in Tel Aviv, not in Jerusalem with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Liaison Bureau was parallel to the Mossad and Shin Beth in the structure of the Israeli intelligence community. Although it never had more than fifty people on staff, its role in coordinating the emigration of Jews to Israel was crucial. The fact that Shaul Avigur, “the grey eminence of Israel” and “an institution by himself,” was in charge of this office for many years is telling in terms of its importance in the Israeli bureaucracy.⁹

Despite constraints imposed by Romanian authorities on the U.S. consulate in Bucharest, Washington did not lose interest in Romania. By using economic sanctions, the United States believed it could generate dissent between Moscow and her satellites.¹⁰ The National Security Council (NSC) recommended that the U.S. government support nationalistic movements in the Soviet satellites, hoping that these movements might undermine Soviet control and return Romania, as Harrington and Courtney write, to “the family of free and democratic nations.”¹¹

Washington was well aware of the challenges this policy posed. As the New York Times aptly commented, “No people dislike Communism more than the Romanians, and none do less against it.”¹² In July 1956 the NSC reaffirmed America’s goal to free the satellite states from Soviet control. Despite its historically Western orientation and the people’s “Russophobia,” Romania was viewed by the NSC as the satellite least likely to obtain its independence from Russia because it lacked a popular movement for change that could seriously challenge the local authorities. Regardless, Romania continued to press the West in general and especially the United States for trade development as well as for greater cultural exchanges.¹³ Neither Washington nor London was receptive.¹⁴

Emil Bodnăraș, worried about the state of Romanian diplomatic and trade relations with the West, tried to use the Romanian Jewish community, and especially Rosen, to improve his country’s image in the eyes of the international community. In 1955, under heavy surveillance, Bodnăraș permitted Rosen to attend the World Peace Assembly in Helsinki and later to confer with Chief Rabbi Kurt Wilhelm of Sweden at conferences in Romania and in Sweden.

During 1955 and 1956, according to Rosen, Bodnăraș remained circumspectly supportive of Jewish emigration. “It was he who, with caution and able tactics, regularly backed my efforts to resume alyah. It was due to him that I was able to travel abroad and establish bridges with our Jewish brethren.”¹⁵ Before leaving for Stockholm, Rosen asked Bodnăraș for passports for A. L. Zissu and Misu Benevenisti, Zionist leaders whom the Communist authorities had recently freed from prison. Bodnăraș granted the passports, but when Rosen asked Bodnăraș for two hundred additional passports for other Zionist activists, Bodnăraș hesitated. “If your trip is a success,” he said—by which he meant the appropriate contacts and statements, and Rosen’s return home—“your requests will be granted.”¹⁶

Despite Rosen’s minor successes and Bodnăraș’s conditional generosity, Israeli diplomats continued to view the condemned Zionists in Romania and the emigration of the Jews as chief priorities. With emigration from Eastern Europe to Israel having come almost to a standstill, future prospects appeared bleak. Between January and April 1956, just eighty-two Jews emigrated from Eastern Europe to Israel: twenty-three from Hungary, fifteen from the Soviet Union, fourteen from Bulgaria, five from Czechoslovakia, and twenty-five from Romania. Golda Meir, the Israeli foreign minister, confronted Gheorghe Chitic, the Romanian chargé d’affaires in Tel Aviv, about emigration.¹⁷ And Israeli diplomatic envoys to Romania, visiting or stationed in Bucharest, continued to press Romanian authorities to increase the pace of Jewish emigration.¹⁸

Bilateral discussions on the issue of the “reunification of the families” (a Romanian euphemism for emigration) almost always led to trade or commercial negotiations. To promote these transactions, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Chitic to be amenable during negotiations with his Israeli counterparts.

In November 1956, Elkanah Margalit, an Israeli diplomat in Bucharest, asked the Romanian deputy minister of foreign affairs to try to persuade Egypt to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel. This was Romania’s first opportunity to mediate in the Middle East conflict. In the same year the Federation of the Romanian Jewish Communities was granted approval to publish a magazine in Romanian, Hebrew, and Yiddish (English was added later), a few hundred copies of which were also to be distributed in the Soviet Union. These timid overtures did not preclude the Romanian authorities from pressing Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen to condemn Israel as the aggressor in the 1956 Suez War. Meanwhile Romania played the Soviet game with servility as Bodnăraș and other Romanian Communist leaders supported the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

In August 1957 the Romanian consulate in Tel Aviv communicated to Israeli authorities that of the 180 Zionists arrested in Romania, 179 had been freed. Romania now wished to discuss the reunification of the families, but not alyah. On September 12, according to diplomatic documents, Israeli president Yitzhak Ben-Zvi lunched with Romania’s leading diplomat in Jerusalem; the president reiterated the problem of reunification.¹⁹ Roughly two months later the leading Israeli diplomat in Bucharest, Arie Harell, gave Prime Minister Chivu Stoica a letter from Ben-Gurion in which the Israeli prime minister emphasized the humanitarian aspects of Jewish emigration to Israel, criticized the slow rate at which it had recently proceeded, and appealed to the Romanian government to find an “administrative solution” to accelerate matters. Stoica replied—by letter to Ben-Gurion and verbally to Harell—that “the Romanian government is carefully following the problem of reunification of the families.... The Romanian government will not allow mass emigration [because] this issue is a strictly internal one.”²⁰

A report by the American embassy in Bucharest concluded that the years 1955 and 1956 represented a period of relative stability for Romanian Jews. “Those who remained wished to leave but were cautious to show it, because those who intended this were discredited through quasi-repressive measures. The emigration process ended almost totally.”²¹ The report noted that, while there were few official signs of anti-Semitism, it was nonetheless widespread in the Romanian population. Not only were Jews perceived as having taken advantage of the Communist regime, but Romanians generally believed that Jews were unfaithful to the regime. “All arguments [that] served to denigrate the Jews were useful even if they contradicted what actually was the case.” After the Hungarian revolution, Romanian authorities began to apply a policy of numerus clausus—a quota system—which systematically eliminated Jews from government positions. “Discreet and confidential” at the start, it became increasingly obvious.²²

Suddenly, however, Romanian emigration policy shifted. On May 31, 1958, at a meeting of the Romanian Communist party Politburo, members were presented with a report of roughly 37,000 unprocessed emigration requests: 26,302 Jews asked to go to Israel, 8,426 to the Federal Republic of Germany, and 2,088 to Austria, Canada, and the United States. Gheorghiu-Dej approved in principle the emigration of all these people, saying it should take place “gradually.”²³ Around the same time, Soviet troops withdrew from Romania.

Bodnăraș crucially influenced this change of policy. According to Harrington and Courtney, “[Roughly two years] after Stalin’s death in March 1953, Nikita Khrushchev visited Bucharest. While there he met an ‘old Bolshevik’ comrade, Emil Bodnăraș, the Romanian defense minister. During their conversation, according to Khrushchev, Bodnăraș raised the question, ‘What would you think about pulling your troops out of Romania?’ Khrushchev admitted to being taken aback by the question and made the rather elusive response that the Soviet Union had to keep troops stationed in Romania because of a possible Turkish offensive.”²⁴ Khrushchev, at any rate, lost his temper, and the Romanians withdrew the request.²⁵ In 1958 Bodnăraș again approached Khrushchev on the subject. By that time the Hungarian revolution had dramatically improved Khrushchev’s opinion of the Romanian Communist party and Bodnăraș’s credentials. The historian Sergiu Verona writes, “Romania’s behavior proved faultless during the Soviet intervention in Hungary,” and Bodnăraș was the “key person in the Romanian leadership’s support of the Soviets during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Bodnăraș was appointed minister of transport and communications when the transit of Soviet troops through Romania was essential to the USSR; he also played a key role in the arrangements for [Prime Minister] Imre Nagy’s lodging [read arrest] in Romania after the Soviets abducted Nagy from Hungary.”²⁶ Because Romania helped crush the Hungarian revolt, or because Romania was surrounded by Communist countries and was therefore of little strategic interest to the Red Army, or perhaps as a goodwill gesture by the USSR to the West, the Soviet army withdrew from Romania.

Shortly after this withdrawal, the Romanian Communist party began to shift the trajectory of Romania’s trade away from the Soviet bloc.²⁷ In an interview with the Washington Post, Prime Minister Chivu Stoica indicated that Romania was willing to trade with the West. Washington remained unenthusiastic.²⁸

The new relaxation of emigration restrictions for the Jews was undoubtedly linked by Romanian authorities to their hopes for trade with the West. Romanian Jews leaped at the chance to emigrate to Israel.²⁹ As Rosen observes, “When Romanian Jews heard on Yom Kippur 1958 that they could register for emigration to Israel, the effect on them was electrifying. So overwhelming was the feeling of joy, excitement, and relief that even ultra-orthodox Jews in Szatmar took off their tallitoth, put down their prayer books, left the synagogues, and began to queue up at police stations for exit permits. These dramatic scenes were repeated all over the country. Every day thousands of Jews gathered in Bucharest outside the central police station. The queues stretched for miles. It was an awesome sight.... The scenes were reminiscent of Messianic times.”³⁰

The American consulate in Bucharest reported on the Romanian Communist party’s response: “During the months of October–December 1958, the police prefectures were literally under assault from 100,000 Jews who decided to leave the country. This action was perceived by the regime as a slap in the face (although it encouraged it under the slogan of ‘family reunification’), and official anti-Semitism ceased to be discreet and became a drastic repression against the ‘traitors.’ All those who asked to emigrate were fired or severely demoted; students were expelled from universities. Gradually these measures were extended to those who did not ask to emigrate and whole areas such as the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, [and] foreign trade became Judenrein [free of Jews].”³¹

Israeli authorities were naturally pleased by this new alyah. Yet for Romanian authorities the new emigration policies created unexpected problems. In September 1958, O-Farid El Chahlaoui, the United Arab Republic’s ambassador to Bucharest, met with Vasile Dumitrescu, deputy minister of foreign affairs, to protest the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. In April 1959 the Egyptian newspapers Al-Ahram and Le Progrès Egyptien launched a press campaign against the same emigration. And the Lebanese government chimed in.³² According to Leibovici-Lais, Arab ambassadors threatened to leave Bucharest. And when an office of the Keren-Hayesod (the equivalent of America’s United Jewish Appeal) campaign was opened in Israel, Ben-Gurion denounced Romania for bowing to Arab pressures.³³

Ben-Gurion’s denunciation generated a fierce response from the newspaper of the Romanian Communist party. On February 25, 1959, Scinteia devoted its front page to an attack on Zionism. According to Rosen, it was an attack unseen in a major Romanian newspaper since the days of Lavrenty Beria. Worse was yet to come. The following day the government announced that the emigration of Jews to Israel was suspended. Thousands of exit permits, already issued, were canceled. Hundreds of Zionists were taken into custody. Young Jews were expelled from schools and universities.³⁴ The onslaught continued for several months. In the spring, Rabbi Portugal, the leader of the shattered Agudath Israel, was again arrested along with several hundred Jews suspected of being Zionist activists.³⁵ The West was outraged. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote to Romanian authorities to demand the release of three Jewish families.

Five days after the Scinteia article, an insulted and fearful Rosen met again with President Ion Gheorghe Maurer (they had met some five months earlier) to discuss Jewish emigration. Maurer told Rosen, “We know perfectly well who Rabbi Portugal is.... We the leadership, and not some police officer, decided that he should be arrested. We have thought the whole thing through. The fact that we took the decision to arrest him also means that we have considered the risks.”³⁶ Maurer was furious: “Yes, Chief Rabbi, we wished to end our Jewish problem. I personally did not wish to feel like a prison administrator who cannot travel abroad for fear of being attacked and accused of holding innocent people in prison. My colleagues and I therefore hit on the idea of starting the registration of Jews to find out how many of them really wanted to leave. We expected 10,000 to 20,000 applications, but we received 130,000. Yes, 130,000. Who could have imagined such a figure? What terrible harm have we done to the Jewish people that they wish to leave in such huge numbers? We saved your lives, we granted you equal rights. Why should there be such a flight, worse than when the Jews were under the Fascists?”³⁷

Maurer then explained further: “Nasser’s ambassador comes to us and protests against the departure of the Romanian Jews, claiming that we are sending soldiers to Israel. We reply that this is not true, that only the old and handicapped are leaving. The ambassador then says to us, ‘Whom should I believe, you or Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir?’ Every evening they broadcast precise details of how many Romanian Jewish engineers, doctors, and young professionals have arrived in Israel.... We opened the gates of our country, so we should no longer be described in the world press as bandits. But our gesture has made no difference. Nothing has changed. We are still attacked and described as bandits. Well, if we are bandits when we keep the gates closed and bandits when we open them, we would rather keep them closed and avoid the problems we have with the Arabs.”³⁸

In response to the humiliation that Romanian authorities had suffered, and in exchange for its willingness to permit alyah, Maurer wanted the Israeli press to treat Romania more favorably. Israeli authorities agreed. According to Leibovici-Lais, Golda Meir met with representatives of the Israeli press and asked them to be discreet about the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. With the exception of Haaretz, the media complied, censoring themselves in order to avoid another scandal that would interrupt the emigration.³⁹ A few months later the emigration of Jews to Israel was resumed. Although it was not an exodus, the gates had opened once again. “But no one wrote about the alyah or spoke about it on radio or television,” Rosen writes. “The Knesset made it an offense to refer to the arrival of the Romanian Jews by passing a special law. This emigration law acquired a special name, the sha-sha alyah (hush-hush alyah).”⁴⁰, ⁴¹

As their political and economic relations with the USSR proved fruitless, Romanian authorities desperately sought favorable trade relations with the West. In mid-April 1959, Romania notified Washington that it was willing to discuss war damage and the nationalization of U.S. interests.⁴² Within two months Romania had secured $60 million in contracts with various Western companies.⁴³

But Khrushchev had other plans for Romania, as part of an economic association for Communist Eastern Europe called Comecon. He wanted Romania to supply agricultural products and raw materials to the more industrially advanced countries of the Soviet bloc. Romania’s leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej vehemently opposed Khrushchev’s plan; he saw Romania as a future industrial center. Consequently “Romanian-Soviet trade soon slowed to a trickle.”⁴⁴ The Sino-Soviet split, which Khrushchev announced at the 1960 party congress, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, provided Gheorghiu-Dej with sufficient room to pursue his own plans without risking a complete break with Moscow. At a Comecon meeting in February 1963, Romania declared that it would not modify its industrialization program. Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito now established a rapprochement, and in 1964 the Romanian Communist party issued the so-called April Declaration, which rejected the Soviet Union’s rule of the Communist bloc and affirmed Romania’s autonomy. At home, Gheorghiu-Dej ordered “de-Russification” and nationalistic “Romanization” measures to encourage general support for his defiance of Moscow and to deflect criticism from his own severe domestic economic policies. As cultural exchanges with the West multiplied and the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts ceased, Romania began opposing the Soviet Union in United Nations votes.⁴⁵

Meanwhile Romanian authorities were using every possible means to improve their image in the West. In November 1961 they allowed Rabbi Rosen to travel to the United States. Rosen again sought to make himself indispensable to Romanian and Israeli authorities so that he could maintain a semblance of control over Jewish emigration to Israel.⁴⁶ In an interview with the New York Times during his stay in the United States, he praised Romania for permitting freedom of religion. Israeli authorities were not pleased. Golda Meir met Rosen in New York and told him, “The Romanian government should award you a special decoration for the services you have rendered them and for the speeches you are making on their behalf in the United States.... You are disrupting everything. I have come here to save the hungry and persecuted Jews, but I find that you are proclaiming that life is good in Romania. Is this not sabotaging our work?”⁴⁷ As a result of this conversation, the Israeli consul in New York, Meir Rosenne, strongly discouraged Rosen from visiting Israel by rejecting his visa application. Rosen pushed back and threatened to hold a press conference on the tarmac of the Tel Aviv Airport unless he received the entry visa for Israel.

The vexation of Israeli officials was not confined to Rosen. They were generally irritated by Romanian authorities who continued to harass Israeli diplomats stationed in Bucharest. According to a September 1960 report by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli minister Bendor participated “without being invited” in a commemoration of the Iasi pogrom. The report also mentions that between 1958 and 1960, Romanian authorities declared four Israeli diplomats persona non grata. They also attempted to confine Israeli diplomats in Bucharest to one synagogue in order to make surveillance easier and limit their contact with Jewish parishioners. And though Romania professed an “anti-fascist” ideology, it refused to cooperate with Israel in the investigation of the case against Adolf Eichmann.⁴⁸

Romania’s struggle for independence from the Soviet Union did not go unnoticed in Washington. In a speech on June 26, 1963, at the Free University of Berlin, President Kennedy observed with favor Romania’s “economic and political variation and dissent” vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.⁴⁹ Taking advantage of Romania’s increasing independence and its consequent need for economic support, Washington promised better relations with Romania if its authorities could speed the emigration of Jews. On August 7, William Crawford, head of the U.S. legation in Bucharest, told Mircea Malita, the Romanian deputy minister of foreign affairs, that “Romanian-American relations could best be improved were Bucharest to let more people emigrate, especially those seeking family reunification.”⁵⁰

Romanian authorities found themselves caught between the urgings of the United States and Israel to increase emigration and the Arab desire to shut it down. Objections were strongly put forward by the United Arab Republic’s ambassador in Bucharest, and Romanian diplomats met with pressure at the ministries of foreign affairs in Baghdad and Damascus.⁵¹

U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union’s East European satellites remained consistent into the 1960s. In early 1964, Dean Rusk told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America’s policy toward the Communist world had three objectives: “to prevent communism from expanding; to reduce the dangers of war; and to encourage independence movements.”⁵² With respect to the United States, Romania had its own objectives. In 1964 the Romanian government expressed its interest in again obtaining Most Favored Nation trade status. Romania also wanted American loans and industrial construction, including an atomic power plant.⁵³ In 1964 diplomatic missions between the United States and Romania were raised from the consular level to embassy status—a significant nod from Washington.

Romania satisfied U.S. expectations. On April 22, 1964, in the midst of the ideological conflict then raging between Moscow and Beijing, the Romanian Communist party plenum adopted a declaration that emphasized Romania’s sovereignty and national independence. As Harrington and Courtney write, “On October 31, 1964, Romania unilaterally cut its armed forces from 240,000 men to 200,000 and reduced the length of conscription from 24 months to 18 months.... To further reduce Soviet influence in Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej refused to permit further Warsaw Pact military maneuvers on Romanian soil.”⁵⁴ Between October and December of that year, Romanian authorities arranged for Soviet advisers of the Securitate to be removed from Romania.⁵⁵

As Romania improved its relations with the United States, its ties with the USSR deteriorated. In seeking to develop its foreign trade with the West, Romanian Communist authorities needed above all bank loans, credits, and commercial contracts. Thus their banking and commercial ventures with the West became increasingly daring for a Communist country. Almost any means were justified in moving toward the ultimate goal: hard currency. Whatever the West valued was exported and sold, including, as we shall see, human beings. But when it came to human sales, Romanian authorities acted with false restraint. Appearances had to be maintained. Cash would not be exchanged directly.

On July 11, 1956, the Securitate had been reorganized into eleven directorates and seven departments. The most important directorates were Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Intelligence, and Counterespionage.⁵⁶ The Foreign Intelligence directorate, which heavily infiltrated the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade and directly controlled Romania’s trade in human beings.

According to General Ion Mihai Pacepa, First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej alone did not have the courage to approve such a delicate matter. Khrushchev, on vacation in Romania in October 1958, persuaded him to do so. Khrushchev insisted that the Foreign Intelligence directorate of the DGIE accept merchandise rather than money from the Israelis in return for Jewish emigrants, so that if news of the operation were leaked, the revelations would not damage Romania.⁵⁷

Initially the DGIE pursued the trade in human beings through an intermediary. Henry Jakober, a Jewish businessman living in London, in the late fifties paid Romanian intelligence in cash given to him by private individuals in the West for exit visas for their relatives—free or imprisoned, Jewish or non-Jewish, according to Ion Mihai Pacepa.⁵⁸ In fact, the operation was more complicated. Born in 1900 in Munkacevo, and an escapee in 1938 to Great Britain from anti-Semitic Hungary, Jakober was described by Phyllis Yadin, his assistant from 1962, as a kind and compassionate businessman, one whose commercial dealings with Romania and Eastern Europe were prompted by philanthropic motives. Jewish families allowed to leave Romania under arrangements made by Jakober sometimes confirm this description. On the other hand, Gheorghe Gaston Marin, former vice-president of the Concil of Ministers during Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej regime, describes Jakober as “Securitate’s broker in London, an agricultural produce merchant....”⁵⁹ Jakober received more than a hundred letters a week from families living in the West and in Israel who were willing to pay for the release of their relatives. Jakober handled transactions through two or three major Swiss banks.

This operation was launched to address the urgent need to improve the quality of the livestock in Romania. “Alexandru Moghioroș, a member of the Political Bureau and vice-president of the Council of Ministers, and the spirited and competent Bucur Șchiopu, for many years the Minister of the Food Industry and Administrator of the State Agricultural Enterprises had a special and unforgettable merit in the renewal and modernization of plant and animal production.”⁶⁰

The names of these two high-ranking officials of the Romanian communist state are also found in the DGIE documents on the “Jakober affair.” Obviously, neither Alexandru Moghioroș nor Bucur Șchiopu would participate in such a delicate field without the approval Gheorghiu-Dej who, at the same time, denied any involvement of the Romanian state in the selling of its own citizens. On February 29, 1960, after having denied, together with Emil Bodnăraș, the existence of the Holocaust in Romania (Jews were allegedly protected during World War II by the working class) and after having rejected a proposal to establish a fund subsidized by the World Jewish Congress that was to cover the “taxes” to be paid by the emigrants, at a meeting with the former British labor MP Maurice Orbach, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej told the former MP: “We believe such a thing is not appropriate, lest somebody should think we will accept such solutions because we do not want to turn the Jews’ emigration into a business affair. We do not have people to sell.”⁶¹

The ransom, according to Dennis Deletant, varied between $4,000 and $6,000 for each. “The procedure was as follows: Jakober was approached at his address at 55 Park Lane in London and given the name of the person to be ransomed. He then gave the name a reference number, which was quoted in all correspondence, and took the details to Bucharest. There the ransom fee was fixed by the Romanian intelligence directorate acting on Dej’s orders and communicated to Jakober, who on his return to Britain gave instructions to those paying the ransom to deposit the sum into Jakober’s account at the Credit Suisse bank in Lucerne, Switzerland. The monies were only paid over to the Romanian authorities after the ransomed person had arrived in the West. In one such case a ransom of $4,200 was paid in August 1962 by relatives and friends for the release from prison of Maria Golescu, the librarian of the British Information Office in Bucharest.”⁶²

Another cash transaction involved pastor Richard Wurmbrand, a converted Jew and Lutheran minister imprisoned for many years in the Romanian gulag. In December 1964, according to the Guardian, the “Reverend Stuart Harris, head of the European Christian Mission, held a clandestine meeting with a tall, gaunt figure in a Bucharest park ... who accepted a ransom of $10,000 ... [a] financial temptation to which the Communist regime succumbed.”⁶³

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, both the Romanian authorities and Jakober preferred to handle emigration payments not in cash but in agricultural products. Jakober owned two companies in Great Britain: Jakober & Co. and Lineage Livestock Ltd. According to Yadin, after Jakober negotiated a fee with the Romanians—mostly with the head of the DGIE office in Great Britain, Captain (later General) Gheorghe Marcu, who was stationed at the Romanian embassy in London undercover as commercial attaché—the funds were sent to an account in Switzerland and were used to purchase agricultural products. Jakober bought cattle from the Netherlands and sent the livestock to Romania in exchange for Jews and, though fewer in number, non-Jews.⁶⁴

General Pacepa confirms Yadin’s testimony: “Year after year DGIE became more deeply involved in Jewish emigration. It had not only to manage the ‘the Jakober-Marcu gentleman’s agreement’ but also to obtain the best breeds of animals and transport them to Romania on chartered airplanes also paid for by Jakober. The diplomatic pouch was carrying more bull sperm obtained with Jakober’s help than it was secret information.”⁶⁵

The document that seems to be the first of a series providing evidence about the direct role of the Securitate in the selling of the Jews was identified by researcher Mădălin Hodor. “In April 1960, Securitate colonel Nicolae Doicaru submitted to Alexandru Drăghici, for approval, a Report that included a bizarre proposal. The new chief of Directorate 1 (External Intelligence) was advising the Minister of the Interior that “by means of Securitate work” a “combination” could be run whereby the Romanian state could “save” hard currency. Undercover Securitate officers had negotiated, as far back as 1958, with an English businessman to import elite-breed cattle and, upon delivery, $18,000 had to be paid. Since he knew about the regime’s obsession with accumulation of hard currency, Doicaru was proposing that, instead of paying the owed sum of money, they should deliver goods they could do without: Romanian citizens who wanted to leave the “communist heaven.” The State was going to double its profit. Pleased with the commercial skills of his employee, Alexandru Drăghici approves on April 6, 1960, the document that was to affect the fate of hundreds of thousands of people and was give rise to an organized mafia.”⁶⁶

An unsigned DGIE report dated August 22, 1967, outlines the progress of this large scale secret affair as follows:

1.In April 1959, H. Jakober, an English businessman, bank director and owner or stakeholder of several English companies, with whom the Ministry of Foreign Trade and GOSTAT had commercial relations, during a discussion with Cde. Al. Moghioroș, proposed to deliver our country breeding cattle in exchange for exit visas for some Jewish families.

2.After Cde. Al. Moghioroș discussed these issues with the top leadership, Cde. Al. Drăghici summoned us and ordered us to contact H. Jakober and proceed to bring [to Romania] breeding cattle in exchange for exist visas for some Jews.

3.The transactions with H. Jakober were taking place as follows: he would give us lists with Jews he was proposing to be allowed to leave the country, they were verified at the archive and by the internal affairs bodies, and then Cde. Al. Drăghici decided who could leave and who could not.

At the same time, we received from the MAI [Ministry of Internal Affairs] farms lists—that had been approved by the MAI leadership—with the breeding cattle and their characteristics so that H. Jakober could identify them.

This procedure continued until 1961 when we received an order from Cde. Al. Drăghici whereby, in parallel with cattle acquisition, different equipment had to be brought in and certain sums had to be paid in hard currency.

Actually, in April 1961, Cde. Al. Drăghici, on behalf of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of PCR [PMR] gave us the order to acquire through H. Jakober a number of 8 high-precision machine tools needed for the machine building industry. The order was executed, the machine tools were acquired and delivered to the industry on the basis of [deliv-ery-receipt] minutes. Payment was made in Jews’ departures. The machine-tools made by the SHW producer in FRG were acquired in July 1961. In exchange for their value of $290,278, 29 Germans and 50 Jews of a religious sect were allowed to leave the country.”⁶⁷

In 1963, based on Cde. Al. Drăghici’s approval, a new arrangement was made with Jakober whereby the latter undertook the obligation to pay a fixed amount of money for each Jewish family leaving the country. At first, the sum was $250, but it was gradually increased to $410 for each family leaving the country.

We further mention that these departures were approved by the Visa and Passport Commission, as those who were approved had to meet a number of criteria (aged over 50, retired, unskilled, etc.)

Initially, the hard currency sums were collected directly by the National Bank of the S[ocialist] R[epublic] of Romania [People’s Republic of Romania] by cashing H. Jakober’s checks with the bank’s address that we deposited. Later, as of 1964, MAI leadership ordered that we receive directly the amounts in hard currency from H. Jakober. We deposited these sums based on an address into a special account, named T65, opened with the National Bank of SR Romania. With H. Jakober, for every sum we received, we drew minutes he signed (in a single copy) and saved them in the operation file.

The combinations with H. Jakober continued along these lines until June 1967 when, in the wake of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the departures for Israel were suspended.

As of 1966, no acquisitions of animals or goods were done anymore through H. Jakober, since the combinations were done only in hard currency.

4.We report that, in 1966, pursuant to a Decision of the Council of Ministers, the hard currency amounts in account T65 were transferred to the Ministry of Finance. This Decision also provided for the MAI to receive, without ransom [?!], 20% of the hard currency it brought in through this channel.

5.To date, through the combinations done through H. Jakober, in exchange for the 23,566 Jewish families which left the country, we gained:

•9,020,738 US dollars in hard currency

•3,414,739 US dollars in equipment, animals, etc.

Total: 12,435,508 US dollars

The quantitative and value list of the goods obtained is attached.

We report that on August 24, 1965, a detailed report about these issues was compiled for Cde. Minister C. Onescu–a report that was returned to us on 15.08.1965.⁶⁸

This report seems to have been written as a result of a high-level investigation. It ignored DGIE’s selling of the Jews aged under 50, as well as the selling of the ethnic Germans or of the Romanians. At the same time, the report also ignores the sums paid by the emigrants’ families for the “debts to the state” of those who were in jails.

The contacts of Henry Jakober with DGIE can be documented as far back as 1958. In May 1958, the Securitate Office in London informed the Central that, in exchange for 1,080 British pounds, it had bought 11 pigs, 5 boars and 6 sows. Securitate Directorate I (espionage) approved the transport of the pigs by a special Dakota plane, with a 880 British pounds transportation fee. The pigs were Landrace Danish breed that Denmark had prohibited from live animal exports and had been purchased from Henry Jakober. The plane landed in Bucharest on June 11, 1958, after an overnight stopover in Münich.⁶⁹ Initially, Securitate would contact Jakober in Bucharest through captains Gheorghe Răcuțeanu and Constantin Dumitrache who introduced themselves as representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. In the winter of 1959, Mihail Gavriliuc, the chief of Directorate I, approved to continue the commercial transactions with Jakober, while making sure to ask that Alexandru Moghioroș, First Vice-president of the Council of Ministers in charge of agriculture, be briefed about this operation.⁷⁰

On October 25, 1958, informer ”Veronica” reported that Jakober had with him “. . . a letter of recommendation from Cde. Marcu of our agency in London addressed to a comrade Ionescu, a director in the Ministry of Agriculture, to whom he had sold breeding swine.”⁷¹ It is also obvious that, even before Drăghici gave his approval in April 1960, Jakober was already playing a middleman role between the families of those who wanted to emigrate and DGIE. Suspected by the domestic Securitate of “spying for England,” Jakober would travel on business several times to Romania every year. He was quite bored in Bucharest and, apparently, his only pleasure was his meetings and meals with Maria Tănase, a famous Romanian folk singer, whom he had known for a long time. His phone calls were always taped, as he was constantly under surveillance.

Since 1959, Jakober had been in contact with “Minister Bucur” [Bucur Șchiopu] and with the foreign trade enterprise Prodexport. On August 10, 1959, informer “Tereza” reported: “At Prodexport, he negotiates business to bring into the country purebreds, namely: cows, bulls, from Texas and from England, the best sheep breeds, pigs, and poultry. He also negotiates and delivers special fodder making equipment. Since the “Gostat” Council by the Ministry of Agriculture deals directly with cattle import to improve breeds, Jakober went directly to Minister Bucur Șchiopu who sees him every time he travels here and treats him with special attention. . .Although an export is severely punished, Jakober promised he would find time to go for a week to Denmark and bring a bottle with sperm for insemination, but this is very confidential because, in fact, it’s a theft. It is about the Landras [Landrace] swine.”⁷² In August 1959, the first documented information surfaces according to which Jakober attempted to offer breeding cattle in exchange for the emigration of a Jew. In this context, informer “Tereza” reported: “On Sunday, when I went with him to Valea Călugărească, he told me he wanted to make a proposition to Bucur Șchiopu, namely to address one of his personal wishes: a very rich family in France has a relative in R.P.R. [People’s Republic of Romania], a certain Doctor Frigher of Rădăuți (Bukovina), an elderly ailing Jew who got the entry visa for France but didn’t get the exit visa from R.P.R. He wants somebody to intervene and expedite the departure and would offer in exchange–in the form of a sample without value—any [number] of cattle he would be asked worth up to $10,000. He was going to discuss about this on August 11, c.y., either with Bucur [Șchiopu] or with Petri.”⁷³

Jakober’s contacts with Gheorghe Marcu, stationed in London as an undercover DGIE officer in June 1959, show clearly his concern to share with the Romanian authorities information on how to preserve “a sample of the chemical substance used to dilute the sperm for artificial inseminations, both for bulls and for rams, as well as information on how to store the semen so that it would be active for a while.” Jakober’s letter to Bucur Șchiopu, from the same period, includes the technical details on how to treat bull semen, be it frozen or not, in order to use it for artificial inseminations.”⁷⁴

Mădălin Hodor provides the following information regarding the contacts between DGIE and Jakober, before 1960, concerning the selling of Jews: “On November 12, 1959, the Resident Agency in London asks “Central” about the arrangements made with Jakober on payment for the latest delivery of animals. Confusion is greater as a result of the handwritten note on the telegram that belonged to Alexandru Drăghici, Minister of the Interior. [Drăghici] asks Nicolae Doicaru to report “to him today with a response to the issues raised by the Resident Agency.” We may never be able to find out what Colonel Doicaru told Minister Drăghici in their face-to-face meeting, but we know what the result of the meeting was. On March 17, 1960, the Resident Agency in London dispatched a new telegram reporting that, following up on note No. 1282/TS received from Bucharest, “in a discussion with Jakober in the context of BERY MARCU combination, [Jakober] agreed to deliver 15 Jersey cows and two Jersey bulls and 15 Australian Merino sheep.” Doicaru, strong on his position, feels he could ask for more and increases the proposed number of animals in the exchange transaction. In exchange for the Jewish family, the Romanian party was going to get 100 Australian Merino sheep, 25 Jersey cattle, and 30 Landrace pigs. According to the colonel’s calculations, the total sum of the transaction was $35,100 that also included $18,000 for Jakober. On April 29, 1960, London advises that Jakober accepted the new terms of the combination. The officers of the Resident Agency propose that the Jews “be released” only after the delivery of the animals. Alexandru Drăghici agrees.”⁷⁵

In a phone conversation recorded by Securitate, a conversation that took place on January 22, 1960, at 12:38 a.m., between Jakober, who was in room 216 at the Athénée Palace Hotel and a certain gentleman Herman who was in London, they discussed the problem of issuing a passport for Herman’s brother who lived in Bucharest, for a sum of 5,000 (unspecified currency), with an advance of 2,000.⁷⁶ In another phone conversation between Jakober and a person in Paris, a conversation that was also taped at Athénée Palace on October 25, 1965, the former mentioned cases A54 (Vollant) and A306 (Abramovici) promising he would inquire why these persons were denied issuance of passports.⁷⁷

For the people who were in jail and for whom their families were willing to pay, the bureaucratic circuit of the paperwork was as follows: the family of the jailed person paid at a bank in Switzerland, to an account indicated by Jakober, an advance of the final amount that had been agreed on. An officer of UM (military unit) 0123/I (DGIE) went to a court of law or to the MI archive to review the investigation file of the respective person, and, then, another officer of the same [military] unit went to the jail to discuss with the respective prisoner. Quite often, to ease the formalities, the prisoners were transferred from the provincial jails where they were serving their sentence to a jail in Bucharest. The personal file of the respective prisoner was attached to a pardon petition signed by Alexandru Drăghici, interior minister, addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers, Chivu Stoica, or to the President of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, or to the head of state, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who would sign the decree of pardon. There followed payment of difference between the advance and the total sum agreed on, and the issuance of the passport.⁷⁸ After the decree of pardon was signed, UM 0123/I would send to the Directorate of Foreign Control and Passports a report mentioning the express approval of Alexandru Drăghici, along with a list with the names of those who were to receive passports, a list that often included hundreds of names. At the subsequent request of UM 0123/I or of other units or departments in the Ministry of the Interior, some of the persons on those lists were, nevertheless, denied the passport.⁷⁹ In most cases, passports were denied to doctors or engineers who could have had access to classified information. For example, a military doctor who had information about the Black Sea fortifications and about the warplanes of military units, or an engineer at Electromagnetica manufacturing plant that was producing equipment for the Romanian army, or an engineer who had contributed to the construction of Sadu V Hydroelectric Power Plant would be denied their emigration requests.⁸⁰

After the approval issued by Alexandru Drăghici in April 1960, the negotiations between Jakober and the DGIE officers pointed directly to the barter of Jews in exchange for agricultural products. On April 3, 1961, Securitate Directorate II (Counterintelligence) taped in room 242 of the Athénée Palace Hotel a conversation between Henry Jakober, a translator, and a certain “Mister Marcu” (most probably Gheorghe Marcu). The conversation focused on the emigration of Jews, some of whom were in jail, who were identified nominally and whose names were on certain lists both Jakober and Marcu could access. Their specific situations and their place on these lists are discussed; the price per head is negotiated, with a proposed price of $8,000 per person. The conversation reveals that, in exchange for the respective sums received from the emigrants’ families, Jakober undertakes the obligation to deliver different agricultural and industrial products. Jakober also promises to purchase American equipment for the oil industry from Venezuela to bypass the American embargo on such products.⁸¹

The Jakober-DGIE barter did not run without problems since the Romanian side would be often late to meet the obligations under the arrangement with the British businessman. For instance, in a letter addressed to Gheorghe Marcu, dated October 25, 1961, Jakober pointed out that delays on the Romanian side to issue exit visas for the persons the two sides had already agreed on had become intolerable, since he would accept delays only in the cases that involved persons who were in jail.⁸²

In the context of Jews-in-exchange-for-breading-animals barter, Jakober would give DGIE “bonuses.” So, in December 1961, Securitate received “at no cost” and “as a result of the combination with Jakober” a Jaguar car, a Humber car, and “three complex air conditioning units.”⁸³ PCR’s top leadership would profit directly from the trade in people transactions carried out by DGIE, DIE, and CIE, and they were gifting themselves with most expensive hunting rifles. A DGIE report noted that “on September 8, 1965, purchasing documents were received from the Resident Agency Frankfurt/Main for ... a Magnum Royal 375 hunting rifle, [that was] ordered in England from the company Holland and Holland for comrade I. Gh. Maurer, as well as another hunting rifle [that was] ordered on December 10 from the same company for comrade Al. Moghioroș.”⁸⁴ A report countersigned by General Doicaru, dated August 25, 1965, included a list of eight hunting rifles with prices ranging from $314 to $2,734, along with a large number of cartridges. One of these rifles, with a price tag of $1,168, and 400 cartridges were delivered to Cabinet 1, i.e. to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, on May 22, 1962. Hundreds of cartridges worth $623.50 were bought for Gheorghe Apostol.⁸⁵

On December 23, 1973, General Gheorghe Marcu informed his superiors that “Edward” (or “Eduard”—was DIE/CIE’s cover name for Heintz Gunther Husch), his official contact in the Federal Republic of Germany for the negotiations concerning the selling of the ethnic Germans from Romania, was willing to offer the Romanian authorities as gifts four hunting rifles “for big game, and with scopes.” On June 28, four hunting rifles were taken from the inventory of UM0920 and distributed as follows: a Mauser hunting rifle, caliber 9.3x64, series 17809, to Cabinet No. 1, i.e. to Nicolae Ceaușescu; at the order of Nicolae Ceaușescu, two of these rifles were gifted to comrades “Dragoș” and “Stejarul” (possibly Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Emil Bodnăraș). The gift rifle for comrade “Dragoș” was a Holland and Holland, caliber 375. Finally, the Ministry of the Interior will keep the fourth hunting rifle “for protocol actions.” All these rifles came with scopes, spare barrels, expensive cartridges, and other accessories.⁸⁶ Soon after Pacepa’s defection, in the summer of 1978, “...another document was found indicating that, three-four years prior, the head of the state was presented with five different hunting rifles, brought to Bucharest by Rolf Spitra [V.W.F. Fokker representative]. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Emil Bobu, and Nicolae Doicaru chose one each, and the other two were kept by Ion Mihai Pacepa.”⁸⁷ To understand the value of these rifles, we note that a new Holland and Holland caliber 375 costs today $105,900, and a used rifle could go as high as $70,000. “Together with the spare barrels and scopes, the rifle series 17809, identified on the list of 93 rifles that were seized from Nicolae Ceaușescu’s residence in Primăverii Boulevard after his execution in 1989, was valued at 123.00 lei. Among the seized rifles, there were also two Purdey rifles and a Holland and Holland rifle, the Rolls-Royces of firearms.”⁸⁸ In fact, DIE and CIE had developed a habit of literally begging for hunting rifles for Nicolae Ceaușescu from foreign partners. Stelian Octavian Andronic, the chief of AVS/UM 0107, recounts how “both the DSS chief Tudor Postelnicu and the Minister of the Interior George Homoștean pushed him to get an expensive hunting rifle from his West-German partners so that the Ministry of the Interior would offer it as a gift on Nicolae Ceaușescu’s birthday. Andronic identified this rifle among those that had been seized from the dictator’s residence after his execution in December 1989.”⁸⁹

In the first half of 1960, Gheorghe Marcu reported to Doicaru that DGIE owed Jakober $6,720 for the additional 20 sheep that had been delivered. “To avoid paying this amount, we could do a new Jakober combination [sic] by allowing the emigration of an old man, aged around 60, and of a couple, aged around 40. Both the old man and the younger couple are at large. If such a combination is done, we could further get from Jakober around 40 LANDRACE pigs, worth $5,600....”⁹⁰ Hence, according to DGIE evaluation, three persons were worth 20 sheep and 40 pigs. In a similar transaction, in December 1960, Jakober exchanged 5 pigs and one Landrace boar, two Zebu bulls, and Landrace swine semen for six Jews.⁹¹ At the end of the same month, the respective list with the Jews’ names approved by Alexandru Drăghici would expand from 6 to 23 persons, the number of pigs also increased to 101, and the number of cows and bulls increased to 30.⁹² Later, Jakober added to the price for the Jews, whose number decreased from 23 to 17, a number of 10 pigs, 5 sheep, 2 cows, one bull, and a ton of fodder.⁹³ The Jews were allowed to leave the country only to the extent the lots of animals arrived in the country.⁹⁴ With the written approval from Drăghici and Doicaru, on February 5, 1961, Jakober arranged with Marcu and Frangulea to deliver two pieces of fodder processing equipment, 16 cows and bulls, 15 ewes and rams, 5 pigs, and 4 Coolie dogs in exchange for issuing passports for 20 Jews.⁹⁵ On April 16, 1961, Jakober committed to deliver “a fully automated slaughterhouse from the company Gordon Johnson in England, with a capacity of 100/200 poultry, in exchange for the emigration of 23 persons, Jews and non-Jews.⁹⁶ This slaughterhouse and another slaughterhouse for “bacon” located in Periș remained under MAI umbrella and used the workforce of the Directorate General of Prisons and Labor Colonies.⁹⁷

On July 26, 1961, using again the written approval of Alexandru Drăghici, Gheorghe Marcu requested that in exchange for 18 sheep worth $5,000 the exit visas be given, “at our discretion,” to one of two Jewish families of four persons each.⁹⁸

Until March 2, 1962—1962 was apparently the last barter year—a report of Securitate‘s Directorate I (DGIE) indicated that, in exchange for 474 families, Securitate had obtained $1,579,594, 500 cattle, 257 sheep, 584 swine, 11 cars, and different agricultural and industrial equipment. By the date of the report, as a result of “the Jakober-DGIE combinations,” 409 Jewish families, 21 German families, 35 Romanian families had left the country, and 80 more families were going to leave the country in exchange for the last cattle transport.⁹⁹ Some of the cars mentioned in this report were used by the MAI leadership. In early 1960s, Alexandru Drăghici could be seen in Bucharest riding a huge gray Jaguar. Most probably, it was the Jaguar 3.4-Liter Saloon Mark II, with automatic transmission, that had cost Jakober 1,294 British pounds. During the same period, the deputy Minister of the Interior Vasile Negrea received from DGIE, with Drăghici’s approval, a 6-cylinder Humber. This car was also a “gift” from Jakober.¹⁰⁰

It was difficult to safeguard the secrecy of the DGIE-Jakober “combinations” both domestically and abroad. Securitate’s Directorate I kept the strict evidence of the officers who knew the combinations done with Jakober during 1958-1961. They were: colonels Nicolae Doicaru, Adalbert Iszac, Lt. Colonel Stefan Deutch, majors Ilie Sinceleanu, Vlad Frangulea, Dumitru Diaconescu, Gheorghe Ichim and Ilie, captains Gheorghe Marcu, Stelian Maier, Duma, sergeant Ștefan Burcă, and operators “H” from Central.¹⁰¹ The domestic Securitate, namely Directorate IV (Countersabotage) had been notified as early as July 1960 that the foreign trade enterprise Prodexport was receiving telegrams from London addressed to Gheorghe Marcu, “commercial counselor at the P.R.R. Legation in London,” who was in Bucharest at that time, and the telegrams were about the emigration of some Jews. Source “Brateș” informed Captain Iosif Banu that nobody at Prodexport knew anything about these operations.¹⁰² In 1964—the exact publication date of this material couldn’t be established—an article in the Sunday Telegraph included quite precise details about communist Romania selling its citizens. One year later, a similar article was published in the American press.¹⁰³ On April 18, 1967, as a reaction to a message received from the PRR Embassy in Rio de Janeiro that suggested financial settlement against payment, under the auspices of ONT Carpați (Romanian Travel Agency), of the emigration from Romania, UM 0123/I sent an official response indicating that “the reported issues are not within the purview of our unit.”¹⁰⁴ During the same period of time, Major Gheorghe Marcu was invoicing snacks offered to Jakober at the secret location “Roma” of the same UM 0123/I.¹⁰⁵

On October 10, 1965, another Securitate informer who worked at Prodexport noted again that the company’s telex machine was being used for the correspondence with Jakober and Marcu. The informer complained he had to stay in contact with two Securitate “lines,” but the same officer Banu told him it was about “a connection with a ‘Top Special Directorate’”¹⁰⁶ Responding to the memorandum from Securitate’s Internal Security (Directorate II Counterintelligence), signed by A[ristotel] Stamatoiu sent to Colonel Neagu Cosma, General Doicaru asked that Jakober be kept under surveillance but mentioned that the relationships of his directorate “...with this element are under no circumstances likely to allow him to bring any damages to the economy of our state or to get access to information.”¹⁰⁷ Doicaru’s encouragement urging counterintelligence to tail Jakober was a figure of speech: “Jakober was constantly under surveillance while he was in Romania. So were his contacts.”¹⁰⁸ Sometimes, tailing pointed to DGIE officers who met with Jakober, without mentioning their names, though, but rather using codenames, such as: “translator,” “gentleman,” or “known person.”

In a hand-written note Securitate considered to be “Jakober’s initial commitment,” on May 18, 1961, he committed “to take the necessary steps so that nobody emigrating as a result of my intervention would ever talk or act against the interests or the prestige of the Romanian State.” Another similar note was signed by Jakober in mid-1963.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile, Jakober was running larger operations and he became a sought after middleman in the Western world. A MAI report dated September 25, 1961, that was countersigned by Alexandru Drăghici, showed that Jakober allegedly negotiated with the American Joint Distribution Committee a $300,000 payment to take some Jews out of Romania.¹¹⁰ On October 4, 1961, Jakober sent the following telegram from the Imperial Hotel in London: “I signed with Münich regarding 500 persons. As I promised in Bucharest STOP I must have all passport numbers and the majority should leave by October 15, at the latest, otherwise I cannot make payment as agreed STOP I leave for London, send telegram. Jakober.”¹¹¹ Indeed, in September 1962, Doicaru called forth Lt. Colonel Frangulea and Captain Marcu to discuss the contacts between Henry Jakober and “the emigration leadership in FRG” that seemed to have used millions of marks to take out of Romania ethnic German families for whom the German state was willing to pay between 1,000 and 4,000 marks per person. Jakober allegedly was in contact with a certain Garlepp (emigration representative of the FRG government) and allegedly refused to get involved in the emigration of former legionnaires from Romania.”¹¹²

It was impossible to keep Jakober’s operation secret. Service “F” of Securitate that intercepted correspondence was seizing dozens of letters between Romanian citizens living in Romania and their relatives living abroad that dealt with payment to get a passport.¹¹³

Intelligence agencies in the ”fraternal countries” also notified the Ministry of the Interior in Romania about Henry Jakober. On March 23, 1961, in a letter addressed to Lt. General Gheorghe Pintilie, deputy interior minister, Lt. Colonel Carel Comarec, chief of the Domestic Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia [SRC] complained that “his [Jakober’s] position is so strong that the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia cannot purchase goods from Romania unless it uses Jakober [Jakober] as a middleman although the Czechoslovak authorities would have been willing to pay for these goods. The Deputy Minister of the Interior of the P[eople’s] R[epublic] of Hungary, Iozef Galambos, on July 30, 1962, was also requesting information about Jakober from Alexandru Drăghici.¹¹⁴ More precisely, on September 7, 1962, Erich Mileke, first deputy of the minister of the interior of the German Democratic Republic, sent Alexandru Drăghici “for your information only” and without requesting any information in exchange, a letter pointing out that the intelligence agencies in the German Democratic Republic (i.e., implicitly those in the USSR as well) were aware of the operations of selling Jews through Jakober.¹¹⁵ Finally, on September 24, 1962, a note of “the Soviet agencies” requested information about Jakober from their Romanian counterparts whom they accused of foreign currency smuggling through Soviet sailors. In his response, Alexandru Drăghici stated curtly that Jakober “often comes to Romania for different commercial affairs.”¹¹⁶

Not all the attempts to take Jews out of Romania for hard currency were successful, since Securitate was wary of opening multiple channels for this sensitive issue. A proposal of a certain Gabriel Reiner, an American citizen living in New York who represented the company Cosmos Travel Bureau and who, in 1962, allegedly offered $5,000 per family for the emigration of some Jews from Romania, was rejected. In this context, there is a report dated October 9, 1962, signed by Lt. Colonel Vlad Frangulea and by Major General Nicolae Doicaru and countersigned by Alexandru Drăghici, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior.¹¹⁷

Securitate and DGIE were on edge because the Romanian immigrant circles in Western Europe were talking about the trade in people affairs Jakober was doing with the Romanian authorities. For example, DGIE was reporting that “. . .in Paris, the Romanian defectors’ circles expected the arrival of Noica Constantin for whom a sum of $500 was paid. This action was organized by the defector Iancu Rațiu.”¹¹⁸ DGIE drew the obviously wrong conclusion that “...all the comments made abroad about our state regarding emigration concern only the persons of Romanian and German nationality. We do not have any information indicating that the emigration of Jews in exchange for money would generate abroad negative comments regarding our state.” Consequently, DGIE was proposing, under Doicaru’s signature, “a. ... that no person of Romanian nationality be approved to leave the country in exchange for money. b. Emigration of persons of German nationality be approved only under exceptional circumstances.”¹¹⁹

Israeli authorities quickly discovered Jakober’s arrangements with the Romanians, and the Israeli Liaison Bureau was irritated. Emigration was no place for private enterprise; it was and ought to remain a state matter. The bureau asked Shaike Dan to solve the matter. Dan, in an interview with Amos Ettinger, described Jakober: “That Jew had a reputation of being willing to dip his hand into anything that would fatten his bank account. I in the meantime had learned other things about him. I knew that he was wealthy and that as part of his business he helped a certain Eastern European country [Romania] market its grain and corn in Europe.... Coming and going between that country, wheeling and dealing with the authorities there, he was asked by wealthy people in West Europe to discuss the possibility of getting their relatives in the East out in return for a fat payment. This involved only ‘important’ people, professors, physicians, whose relatives paid between five and twenty thousand dollars per head. This Jew worked out these deals in return for a handsome fee for the satisfaction of all parties involved. Of course, this didn’t involve hundreds of people, but dozens of Jews did get out this way.”¹²⁰ But Yadin says that Jakober did not receive a commission for every person whose emigration he enabled, and that it was not only “important people” but usually relatives in the West who willingly paid the ransom.

In any event, in 1961 Dan asked a staff member of the Israeli embassy in London to arrange a meeting with “that Jewish emigré.” “My objective,” Dan recalls, “was to stop his private business on the Jewish issue, which I saw as an opening for extortion on a grand scale. The meeting was scheduled for an early morning hour at the restaurant in the Dorchester Hotel in London. I didn’t beat around the bush, and I hope that in my life I won’t have to speak again to anyone in the language I used with him. I told him point-blank that he better withdraw from all business that involves payment for getting Jews out. If he did not stop it, I threatened [him with] the band that got Eichmann.”¹²¹ According to a high-ranking Israeli diplomat who chose to remain anonymous, Dan also warned Jakober, “The Thames is deep.”

Dan continues, “The Jew, who at the beginning of the conversation still tried to keep up appearances, was now frightened and offered to continue to work only through me and only on missions I assigned him. Even though I didn’t answer him on the spot, I knew I could now use his connections and services. In my head I already spun out plans for the emigration of thousands of more Jews. Before I put this man into operation, I went to talk to Shaul Avigur, who was then in London. It was with no light heart that I told Shaul about [Jakober], but I said to him that I see this man as another channel that may make large-scale immigration possible. No one could suspect Shaul of being less interested in alyah than Shaike Dan, but since the days of Alyah Beth Mossad, I knew that Shaul couldn’t easily swallow the fact that we worked hand in hand with pirates and lowlifes. At those times I would always say to him: ‘This work can’t be done with chief rabbis, only with shady types like these.’”

Dan was persistent. “Shaul didn’t let up, and asked that I arrange a meeting between him and [Jakober] so he could take his measure. Knowing Shaul as I did, I had reason to fear such a meeting, but I did what he wanted. We met in that Jew’s home in one of the swankiest sections of London. Lots of art objects and Judaica were evidence of the fact that the man was from a religious background. In the conversation between us, the subject of the commission the man would receive for his services came up again. Shaul, who couldn’t grasp that there was a word in the human vocabulary such as ‘commission,’ could see us making deals with goyim, with Turks or Greeks, but was shocked to hear that we’d have to pay a commission to a Jew as a fee for rescuing Jews. Shaul left the meeting more despairing than when he arrived. The next day he asked me to drop by his room at the Cumberland Hotel before he left London.

“I came about an hour before his flight. Without saying anything else he pronounced his decision: ‘That won’t work; that won’t come out!’ Plans to get more Jews out were already racing through my head, and I said to Shaul—I quote myself word for word: ‘Every country has just one prime minister. This is going to be decided not by me and not by you but by Ben-Gurion.’ And I added: ‘The prime minister may decide as you see it, but on this I will accept judgment only after Ben-Gurion decides.’ You have to know Shaul to realize how rare it was for someone to challenge his authority. It wasn’t the first time I had argued with him, and not the first time a dispute between us was brought to a higher authority to be settled.

“To review the issue with Ben-Gurion, I also invited Golda Meir. I wanted her to be present, to hear her view too. To this day it’s not clear to me why at that meeting she didn’t open her mouth. Ben-Gurion listened patiently to Shaul, who spoke about extortion and heard me speak about another opening leading to the immigration of Jews to Israel. In the end he said: ‘What Shaike is proposing is very grave.... But in Shaike’s words I hear fervor, vision, and belief that it will succeed, and I authorize him to act to the best of his understanding.’ Shaul was astounded by Ben-Gurion’s reaction and simply did not believe his ears. Without telling me, he asked Ben-Gurion for written authorization. Only much later, Ben-Gurion’s secretary, Hayim Yisraeli, told me that written authorization had been done. I had a lot of trouble with [Jakober], but the fact is that between 1961 and 1966 many Jews emigrated to Israel with his help.”¹²²

In February 1975, three months before his death, Jakober was still in business, albeit under Israeli supervision, and was receiving letters of gratitude from the families of released Romanian Jews. He was also instrumental in the release of about a thousand Jews from the Romanian penitentiary system.

After his meeting with Dan, an intimidated Jakober asked for an “emergency meeting” with Gheorghe Marcu. Jakober explained that he had made Israeli foreign intelligence aware of his contact with Romanian intelligence, and that Israel wished to use him for a top-secret operation. Israel was ready to pay the Romanian government an unstated sum for each Jew allowed to emigrate, based on a gentleman’s agreement between Jakober and Marcu. Although Bucharest at first rejected the proposal, considering it a provocation, Jakober persisted. Several months later he proposed to build an automated chicken farm in Romania, free of charge, if five hundred Jewish families were allowed to leave. President Gheorghiu-Dej approved the proposal as a one-time experiment, and before the end of the year a modern chicken farm was installed in Periș. When Gheorghiu-Dej visited, he liked it so much that he approved five hundred exit visas and ordered five more chicken farms.¹²³

What began as an experiment with Jakober soon became a major operation. The cash-starved Romanian economy found these trade-generated farms a great boost to its exports. General Pacepa, the highest-ranking defector in Communist history, describes this remarkable story: “By the end of 1964, the Ministry of the Interior had become the largest meat producer in Romania. It owned chicken farms, turkey farms, and pig farms producing tens of thousands of animals a year, several cattle farms, and other farms with some 100,000 head of sheep—all with automated slaughterhouses, refrigerated storehouses, and packing plants. To transport the packaged meat it also had a TIR [European International Road] fleet of refrigerated Mercedes trucks. In early 1965 a Kellogg’s Corn Flakes factory was added to the ministry’s food line.”¹²⁴

Pacepa describes how these farms and food processing plants—built in Periș and operated by political prisoners—were paid for by Henry Jakober in exchange for exit visas for Romanian Jews. When the labor force was lean, Pacepa writes, Gheorghiu-Dej would simply say to Alexandru Draghici, the minister of the interior, “If you cannot find the people you need in the jails, just arrest the ones you need and then use them.” Deputy Minister of the Interior Alexandru Danescu was placed in charge of the farms, and output was exported only to the West. Henry Jakober helped these exports both directly and indirectly. By the mid-1960s the annual authorization of emigration visas for Romanian Jews was, according to Pacepa, “entirely dependent upon eggs, chicken, turkey, pork, beef, and corn flakes exported to the West.”¹²⁵

Pacepa reports that live Danish Landrace pigs, “anesthetized and transported first in diplomatic automobiles, then in special diplomatic pouches, and finally in large TIR trucks protected in special diplomatic seals,” were smuggled out of Denmark with Jakober’s help. By 1965, Romania annually produced fifty thousand Landrace pigs, “all exported to the West as bacon and ham with Jakober’s help.”¹²⁶

The money obtained from these agricultural exports (between $8 million and $10 million a year) was kept in a secret account to which only Gheorghiu-Dej had access. Prime Minister Maurer was kept in the dark about the exchange, and only six officers in the DGIE knew of Israel’s role in the creation of Romania’s new farms.

5

An Uneasy Relationship

As Romania sought independence from the Soviet bloc, relations with Moscow grew increasingly acrimonious. Romania’s refusal to side with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet conflict was a major point of contention. And when Bucharest suggested that it no longer wished to have Soviet secret police advisers in the country, the head of the Soviet KGB, Vladimir Semichastny, and its director of foreign intelligence, Alexander Sakharovsky, were furious. They visited Bucharest in an effort to persuade the Romanians to change their minds, but their visits were to no avail.¹

Nicolae Ceaușescu, who came to power in 1965, had become suspicious of the KGB owing to its alleged involvement in Gheorghiu-Dej’s death (Dej had died of lung cancer—the rumor in Bucharest was that he had been irradiated by the KGB).² Consequently Ceaușescu closely supervised cooperation between the Securitate and Soviet and East European intelligence agencies, prohibited the East German Stasi from establishing a liaison office in Bucharest, and thwarted Soviet efforts to involve the Romanian secret police in a smear campaign against the Vatican and its supporters.³

As Romania shifted its diplomatic and trade relations from the Soviet Union to the West, its policy toward Israel also changed. Yosef Govrin, Israeli ambassador to Romania between 1985 and 1989, recalled that Ceaușescu played his “Jewish and Israel card in order to advance Romania’s interests in the West.”⁴ Dennis Deletant writes that “Ceaușescu’s policies toward the Jews can be summed up in a few words: to let those who so wished emigrate in order to facilitate the process of creating a homogeneous Romania based on the majority Romanian element.”⁵ Ambassador Govrin elaborates: “At least two motives prompted Romania to permit alyah to Israel: first, to solve in this manner the Jewish question in Romania, gradually ridding itself of the Jews, thus vacating their jobs for Romanian workers, besides receiving payment from Israel for each emigrant depending on their age and education; second, demonstrating consideration of demands by Israel and the West to let the Jews leave Romania as a humanitarian act....”⁶ Liviu Turcu, former chief of the North American and Western European departments of the CIE (successor to the DGIE and DIE) and one of the most important CIE defectors, later observed that Ceaușescu looked upon the rapidly diminishing Jewish community in Romania as hostages; their general exodus would deprive him of a crucial bargaining chip with Israel and the United States.⁷ He would dole them out gradually.

From 1958, when Romania again opened its doors, until 1965, when Dej died, 107,540 Romanian Jews emigrated to Israel. On average, 13,487 Jews emigrated annually; the numbers peaked in 1961 when 21,269 Jews emigrated, and in 1964 when 25,926 left. In 1965, with the advent of Ceaușescu, 10,949 Jews emigrated to Israel; by 1966, the numbers had dropped to 3,647. The years 1967 and 1968 were disastrous, with 779 and 226 Jews respectively allowed to emigrate. Between 1969 and Ceaușescu’s fall from power in 1989, Jewish emigration to Israel stabilized at an annual average rate of 1,997.

The 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab nations was partly to blame, to a certain extent, for the dramatic decline in emigration in 1966 and 1968. Romanian authorities had no wish to attract the hostility of the Arab states, which condemned Jewish emigration to Israel. Yet, as Pacepa notes, there were also personal reasons. The “Jakober-Marcu gentleman’s agreement was kept in deepest secrecy. Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who was also Gheorghiu-Dej’s best personal friend, did not know a thing about it. Ceaușescu himself learned of this operation only in 1965, when he came to power. He denounced the setup as ‘outrageous,’ transferred the farms to the Ministry of Agriculture, fired Marcu from DGIE, and drastically reduced Jewish emigration.”⁸

Pacepa reveals that Ceaușescu was informed of the DGIE’s sale of Jews during a private encounter with the head of the directorate, General Nicolae Doicaru. Immediately after Ceaușescu met with DGIE management, Pacepa recalls, “I was waiting in the anteroom of Ceaușescu’s office, and I could hear him screaming hysterically. From Doicaru I later learned that his revelation about the ‘Jakober affair’ generated a kind of ‘nuclear explosion.’ Ceaușescu’s first reaction was to accuse the former minister of the interior, Alexandru Draghici (who had coordinated the ‘Jakober affair’ during Gheorghiu-Dej’s reign), of being an ‘enemy of the Communist party’ for wanting to destroy Romania’s international prestige.⁹

“Two years later,” Pacepa continues, “Ceaușescu had second thoughts ... and asked if Jakober was still alive. Soon after, Marcu was reinstated in the DGIE, promoted in rank and position, and ordered secretly to resume contact with Jakober.... This operation now became more secret than ever.”¹⁰

Under Shaike Dan’s supervision, Jakober resumed his role in the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. But Jakober’s importance waned under the close supervision of Dan, whose role in negotiations increased. Ceaușescu was now pleased to have a direct connection with the Israeli government, but he ordered that it be maintained simply as a personal relationship between Dan and Marcu and kept secret.¹¹ According to a former Israeli diplomat, Golda Meir literally told the Romanian authorities, “Let [the Jews] go, and we will help you.”¹²

Ceaușescu’s “principles” regarding the negotiations were described by the DIE/CIE officer Octavian Andronic, the successor after 1978 of Gheorghe Marcu, as follows: “Among the tasks I got as the chief of unit AVS I also had “Recuperarea” [Recovery]. ... From the archive documents, I learned it was actually the initiative of a businessman from London, named Henry Jakober, who was rumored to be an agent of the Israeli intelligence. ... At that time, Eastern Europe and the USSR were the main reservoirs of Jewish population which could be transferred to the new state. Consequently, the respective states were contacted via diverse channels to achieve a permanently organized Aliyah [emigration] to be directed exclusively towards the recently established state of Israel. This operation materialized in confidential protocols, concluded at head of state and government level, for different terms that would be extended periodically by continuing the same high-level negotiations. ... The arrangements with Israel and the FRG were based on the principle that the emigrants’ states of origin had to receive compensations for their efforts and future losses incurred as a result of organized permanent emigration. It was taken into account that, in their countries of origin, the emigrants benefited from free-of-charge professional, high-school, and university education. During the various stages of these governmental arrangements, the compensations were obtained both through the delivery of goods and equipment and through cash payments.”¹³

Now that he was directly involved in the sale of Jews to Israel, Ceaușescu ordered the DGIE to shift gears from the “ancient age of barter” to “modern foreign trade.” He wanted “cold dollars.” He also ordered the DGIE to contact the Mossad directly in order to eliminate the commission that Tel Aviv paid Jakober for his role as mediator.¹⁴ Ceaușescu directed that the new gentleman’s agreement provide that “Bucharest would be paid in cash a certain amount per head, depending on age, education, profession, employment, and family status, for each Jew allowed to emigrate.”¹⁵ Marcu and Dan met monthly at Romanian embassies in West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Marcu brought lists containing the names of Jews approved for emigration; Dan brought suitcases of American dollars.¹⁶ Colonel Bucur Adalbert described these meetings in a report dated November 10, 1978, that mentioned Gheorghe Marcu and Shaike Dan met in Vienna, Geneva, and Bucharest. In his report, Adalbert Bucur also wrote “I know that, through Ieshaiahu Dan, 15 weapons of a special design, with the respective ammunition, were taken from the Jews. The weaponry was delivered to the unit depot.”¹⁷ One of Dan’s associates, Yanai Motke, would also travel to Romania with a diplomatic suitcase that usually contained half a million dollars. On the occasion of one delivery to a DGIE officer, the man looked at the suitcase and complained, “Next time bring a Samsonite.”¹⁸

Eventually Ceaușescu himself met with Dan. Cornel Burtică, former minister of foreign trade and later member of the Politburo of the Romanian Communist party, recalls: “During the summer of 1969 ... Ceaușescu, who was hunting somewhere in Lăpușna, called me on the phone and told me: ‘There is an envoy of the Israeli government, one Dan, who is due to arrive. Receive him, talk to him, but don’t start any negotiations until I get back.’”¹⁹ Burtică continues, “This is how I met Dan.... We discussed the numbers [of would-be Jewish emigrants], and he asked me if the numbers of emigrants could be augmented. Ceaușescu told me that he had discussed this with [Dan] and that they had agreed on numbers and means of payment, the technical part being left to discussion by the Securitate and the Finance [Ministry].... All major decisions, including this one, were made by Ceaușescu.”²⁰

In 1991, Octavian Andronic described the position and the approach of the Romanian party involved in the negotiations regarding the emigration from Romania:

“The Romanian party invoked the following reasons:

•Emigration from Romania is a situation artificially created abroad for propaganda purposes.

•Emigration creates huge difficulties for the Romanian economy as some of the best specialists and rural population which are quite useful are leaving.

•The compensations offered or agreed upon cannot cover the moral and material damages to Romania created as a result of the final, organized, and permanent departure of a large number of citizens of the two ethnic groups.

“Given this approach, although the arrangements had been agreed upon at the highest level, the Romanian party would stubbornly sabotage them through different measures aimed at reining in the emigration impulse of the two ethnic groups by:

•placing strict restrictions to the categories of people who would qualify for the so-called issue of family reunification.

•discouraging emigration by complicating the formalities the applicants had to meet.

•capping the value and the quantities of the assets that could be taken out of the country upon permanent departure.

•taking administrative measures against the specialists who applied for permanent departure from the country (job demotions, job reassignments, job terminations.”²¹

Regarding the positions of the German and Israeli parties to these negotiations, Andronic writes that they “... never argued against granting these compensations to the Romanian party, maybe worrying they could have been exposed as the initiators and the facilitators of these payments included in the confidential arrangements agreed upon at the highest level.”²²

Ceaușescu maintained strict secrecy about the negotiations and exchange. He removed the DGIE’s name from the new agreement and spread a disinformation story that Marcu had been withdrawn from the DGIE and appointed deputy director general of the Institute of World Economy, a cover-up institution staffed by DGIE officers.²³ Burtică confirms that the Institute had a few dozen genuine researchers and a few hundred foreign intelligence officers.²⁴ It was a military unit within the DGIE; hundreds of DGIE officers received Institute identification without ever entering its doors. Only Marcu kept an office there.²⁵

On November 10, 1969, the Dan-Marcu gentleman’s agreement became an unsigned but written protocol that would be valid for three years. It stated that Romania agreed to allow 40,000 Jews to emigrate to Israel: 2,000 in 1969, 12,800 in 1970, 16,000 in 1971, and 9,200 between January and October 1972. The protocol also noted that of the 40,000 emigrants, Romanian authorities would permit 10 percent to have university degrees, another 10 percent to be qualified workers and technicians allowed to take their diplomas with them, and 2 percent to be students. The protocol mentioned no price tags, only that Tarom, the Romanian national airline, would provide transportation.²⁶ According to a former Israeli diplomat, transport negotiations were particularly thorny. When the Romanians demanded full-fare prices, the Israelis were outraged. Ultimately the negotiators settled for charter-priced airline tickets paid for by the Israelis.

The Romanian government did not entirely honor its side of the protocol. Although it specified that 2,000 Jews could emigrate to Israel between November 10 and December 31, 1969, only 1,754 Jews were actually released; and though the protocol stated that between 1970 and 1972 an additional 38,000 Jews would be released, in fact a mere 10,480 were allowed to emigrate.

When Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Valeriu Georgescu, the first Romanian ambassador to Israel, to explain the reduced figures, he replied that “certain paragraphs of the previous agreement, especially those concerning the prohibiting of publicity on this subject, were not respected by the Israeli side.”²⁷ Despite this conflict, the protocol substantially increased the number of Jews allowed to emigrate to Israel.

After 1972, agreements of this type were signed by the Romanian and Israeli representatives every five years. Probably sometime in late 1972 or early 1973, and certainly again in 1978, similar secret protocols were signed.

When Dan traveled to Bucharest for this business, he normally met with his counterpart, General Marcu. A 1964 photograph shows him in front of Ateneul Roman, the city’s main concert hall, smiling and smoking a cigar. On one visit he met with Marcu and Pacepa’s boss, General Doicaru, head of the DGIE. Difficult to impress, Dan confessed to one of his Liaison Bureau colleagues in Tel Aviv: “I met a hangman.”

In his efforts to negotiate the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel, Dan was also forced to ask Israeli authorities to release Romanian spies held in Israeli prisons. In January 1965 the former Securitate Colonel Francisc (Efraim) Samuel, who had emigrated to Israel in 1958, was arrested for espionage on behalf of the Romanians. He had used a radio and drop boxes to report to Bucharest. His handler was a Romanian diplomat, and Samuel was condemned by a court in Haifa to six years in prison.

Romania pressured Israel to free the colonel. President Ceaușescu became personally involved in the case and even threatened to stop the emigration of Jews to Israel if Samuel were not immediately released and returned to Romania.²⁸ According to an Israeli journalist, Dan, fearing that Ceaușescu would make good on his threat, spoke directly to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol; Samuel was immediately released.²⁹ Most probably, Francisc Samuel could have been one of the agents of the DIE captain: “. . .Stelian Octavian Andronic. . .[who], between 1965-1969, worked for CI [counterintelligence]” in Tel Aviv.³⁰

DIE attempts to recruit Romanian Jews as spies in Israel did not end with this episode. According to a 1978 Securitate internal investigation, during 1969–1970 about 250 Romanian Jews who had made alyah reported to Israeli authorities that they had been recruited in Romania for espionage activities in Israel.³¹

Dan’s involvement in the emigration of Romanian Jews apparently made him a prime political target of Soviet and Arab agents. According to the historians Raviv and Melman, Charles Jordan—an American citizen and senior official for the Joint—disappeared after arriving in Prague on August 14, 1967. “It can now be stated with near certainty that Charles Jordan was murdered—in a case of mistaken identity—by Communist agents. They believed that their victim was Shaike Dan.”³²

Before visiting Prague, Jordan had gone to Bucharest. In his memoirs, Rosen describes an attempt by a couple in a car with Belgian license plates to kidnap and poison him. If these events did in fact occur, it is unlikely that the DGIE was behind them, for its members had no interest in eliminating Dan or Jordan. That said, according to Rosen, Jordan was kidnapped in Prague by the Egyptian secret service, taken to the United Arab Republic embassy, killed in a struggle during his interrogation, and his body dumped in the Vltava River. Rosen claims that members of Czechoslovakia’s secret service witnessed Jordan’s kidnapping and the disposal of his body, and had orders not to interfere.³³ In an interview with Amos Ettinger, Dan acknowledged that it was possible his identity was mistaken, but added: “If I really was targeted for murder, in this instance it is not really clear [that they intended to kill me].”³⁴

When Ceaușescu came to power in 1965, he reorganized the Securitate and its Foreign Intelligence branch several times, first in 1967, and again in 1972 and 1973. He aimed to modernize the Romanian secret service and increase its power without diminishing its repressive role or interfering with its reporting directly to him. In 1972 he changed the service’s name from the DGIE (UM 0123/I) to DIE.³⁵ (In 1978, after Pacepa’s defection, it would become the CIE.) The DIE became an important espionage as well as economic force for Romania, as Ceaușescu dramatically increased its power to obtain hard currency by any means.³⁶

As Ceaușescu was reorganizing the Securitate, Tel Aviv’s Liaison Bureau was undergoing a major leadership change. In March 1970, Nehemiah Levanon replaced Shaul Avigur at the Liaison Bureau, thus filling the “oversized shoes,” as Raviv and Melman write, “of one of the founding grandfathers of Israeli intelligence.” Avigur had retired in his seventies in poor health after seventeen years of commanding the bureau’s secret fight for Soviet Jewry. Levanon had worked for Avigur at the bureau and earlier in the institute for Alyah Beth. “Posted to Moscow as a diplomat in the 1950s,” Raviv and Melman write, “Levanon was expelled by the Soviets for [having] clandestine contacts with the Jews.... Levanon returned to Israel and worked at the Liaison Bureau headquarters in Tel Aviv and was then posted at the Israeli embassy in Washington to take charge of Jewish affairs—mainly lobbying among American politicians and officials on behalf of emigration from the Soviet Union.”³⁷

Dan, maintaining his pivotal role as a contact between Israel and the Romanian leadership, was briefly the chief of Vienna’s Liaison Bureau. In this capacity he ensured that Romanian Jewish emigrés flew directly from Bucharest to Tel Aviv rather than stopping over in Austria, Italy, or France. He thereby increased the number of Jews who made it to Israel, and circumvented the Securitate, which used the CIE debriefing of Romanian emigrés in Austria and Italy as a pretext to slow and even cancel the issuance of visas.³⁸

By the early 1970s, Ceaușescu had completed what his predecessor had only begun: he had quietly, systematically, efficiently, and almost entirely purged almost every Jew from positions of importance in Romania. To deflect international suspicion, Ceaușescu kept a handful of Jews—especially those he liked—in visible positions. Ambassador Govrin observes that those remaining were “born Jewish but attempted with all their might to assimilate into Romanian society and culture. And the more they tried, the less inclined were Romanian nationalists in the local hierarchy to absorb them. Therefore we find that not a single Jew at this time served in the higher echelons of the ministries of defense or foreign affairs; nor, if I am not mistaken, in any other ministries.”³⁹ According to Deletant, however, the remaining Jews possessed newfound freedoms. Under Ceaușescu, “the status enjoyed by the Jewish community was unique in the whole Communist bloc. The Jews enjoyed what one scholar described as ‘possibly the greatest measure of autonomy among all denominations.’ This he attributed to their contracting numbers leaving a predominantly elderly community, which posed no threat to the regime or to Ceaușescu’s desire to promote a favorable image in the West....”⁴⁰ Rabbi Rosen serves Ambassador Govrin as a useful example of Jewish freedom in Ceaușescu’s Romania: He “was the only rabbi in the whole Communist sphere who gave ... sermons publicly, and he used to recite a prayer every Saturday and on Jewish festivals for the well-be-ing of the state of Israel, its ministers, its advisers. This was a courageous act that was not even performed by all rabbis in the West.”⁴¹

A controversial figure both within and beyond Romania’s borders, Rosen, according to Govrin, aroused resentment in certain Jewish circles in Romania as well as among some of Israel’s envoys in Bucharest: “Perhaps [it was] due to the forceful way he ruled the community, even to the manifestation of totalitarian trappings in his immediate surroundings, or maybe owing to suspicions of his collaborating with the Communist regime, since on his visits to the West he customarily praised the authorities’ attitude to the Jewish minority during the Ceaușescu period....”⁴² Rosen was also suspected of collaboration with the Communist authorities for his help in trying to obtain Most Favored Nation trade status for Romania.

Although human rights were neglected in Romania as in other Communist countries, Rosen played a seminal role in the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. But he could not have done so without the help he received from Israel, the United States, and Jewish organizations in the West. He was also a force of change within Romania: he fought for the national rights of the Jewish minority promised by the constitution—such as the right for religious education—and publicly demanded the eradication of anti-Semitism.

In lockstep with the Stalinist tradition of the 1950s, the Securitate agents of Dej and Ceaușescu kept the Jewish community’s activities under tight surveillance. Indeed, from 1948 to the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, all of Rosen’s movements and those of the Jewish community were monitored and recorded by dozens of secret police officers. Hundreds of community informants assisted; neighbors reported on each other; and U.S. and Israeli contacts were followed, their conversations secretly transcribed or taped.

In April 1967, for example, Nahum Goldman, chairman of the World Jewish Congress, visited Bucharest with Gerhard Riegner. For reasons unknown, the Jewish community’s technician could not record Goldman’s speech at the Athénée Palace Hotel. Both Rosen and Goldman wished to have the speech recorded in order to have Goldman on tape saying, “It is possible for Jews to live a full life under Communist rule.” Two or three months later, Rosen related the story to Bodnăraș. Smiling, Bodnăraș responded to Rosen: “Tell Goldman not to worry; we have a tape of the entire speech.”⁴³

Microphones were installed in Rosen’s office (as well as in synagogues, Jewish schools, and hospitals). In order to control his activities, Securitate officers often tried to intimidate him. While officers of the internal Securitate bugged Rosen’s private residence and organized a network of informants around him, DIE agents discreetly visited him at his office at the Federation of Jewish Communities, especially when Rosen returned from his frequent travels abroad.⁴⁴ DIE (later CIE) leaders maintained a close relationship with Rosen, whose code name as a CIE informant in the late 1980s was GX 21.⁴⁵ Before 1977, Rosen’s main DIE contacts were General Romeo Popescu and Colonels Dumitru Popescu, Ion Pașca, and Nicolae Spataru; after 1978 his main CIE contact became the future General Alexandru “Bebe” Tănăsescu (alias Florin Mărgărit).⁴⁶

The years 1967 and 1968 were outstanding in the history of Romanian diplomacy. In January 1967, Romania was, to the chagrin of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR), the first Eastern European Communist country to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. A U.S. report noted: “Despite Ceaușescu’s opposition to emigration, [Romania’s] ethnic German population declined sharply. In 1967, when diplomatic relations with West Germany were established, roughly 60,000 ethnic Germans requested permission to emigrate. By 1978, some 80,000 had departed for West Germany.”⁴⁷

Romania sold not only its Jews. Encouraged by results in the Jewish trade, Ceaușescu ordered the DIE to initiate a similar operation for ethnic Germans, which he considered potentially even more lucrative. Pacepa writes, “There were at that time more ethnic Germans than Jews left in Romania. The sale of ethnic Germans was arranged along the same lines, based on a personal agreement between the same Marcu and ‘Eduard,’ who represented himself as an undercover intelligence officer and personal representative of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German minister of the interior, who was directly involved with facilitating the emigration of Germans from Eastern Europe.... Suitcases full of U.S. dollars were transported monthly to Bucharest via the Romanian airline Tarom, and special credits with part of the interest paid by ‘Eduard’ were periodically issued to maintain or stimulate Ceaușescu’s enthusiasm for the emigration of Volksdeutsche to the fatherland.”⁴⁸

Eduard, according to Pacepa, was in fact Edgar Hirt, a negotiator for West Germany in the relationship with Romania and, especially, with the German Democratic Republic, a country equally involved in the general trade of dissidents, family reunification, and East-West spy swapping.⁴⁹ Pacepa confused Hirt, who had participated in the negotiations with the Romanians with his successor after 1967, the German negotiator Heintz Gunther Hush (code name Eduard or Edward). Hirt had one order from Egon Franke, the minister of inter-German relations: “Keep it quiet.” Hirt, who knew very well the negotiations with Romania, had negotiated deals with Wolfgang Vogel, an East German lawyer with strong Stasi connections.⁵⁰

When in June 1967 Israeli forces swiftly and mercilessly crushed the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armies, the socalled Six-Day War was a major defeat not only for the Arab world but also for the Soviet Union and its satellites, which for years had economically and ideologically supported Egypt and Syria. As the Israeli historian Howard Sachar writes, “On June 9, the Communist bloc leaders gathered in Moscow, where seven of them issued a long declaration of solidarity with the Arab cause, promising help to the Arab nations should Israel continue its ‘aggression.’ Within the next few days all Communist governments except Romania severed diplomatic relations with Israel.”⁵¹ Romania refused to sign the Moscow Declaration. By June 1967, through a declaration issued as Document 7972 of the UN Security Council, Romania had positioned itself as a potential mediator between Israel and its adversaries.⁵²

From December 1966, Israel had supported the election of Romania’s foreign minister, Corneliu Mănescu, as chairman of the UN General Assembly.⁵³ Bucharest was not unmindful. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Romania’s position was that Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories and have its security provided by an international guarantee and honored by its neighbors. In an interview with the Dutch paper Haagse Post on July 29, 1967, Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer declared: “Like the Dutch leaders, we feel that no state should be threatened with destruction just because it was created in a somewhat exceptional manner.... That state has been founded and the people have installed themselves in the country, and it won’t do to say: Let us cut the throats of three million people. That does not provide any solution to the problem.... We are of the opinion that there is a certain amount of logic in the viewpoint that the Israeli troops cannot be withdrawn without guarantees. Ten years ago the Israelis faced the same situation. They were told to withdraw, and they did so. Ten years afterward the same condition is being raised, and at the present time I feel that the Israelis should at least receive some kind of guarantee to ensure that the same thing does not happen again in ten years’ time.”⁵⁴

In August 1968, Ceaușescu strongly opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, fearful of the threat to his own regime. He accelerated Romania’s pro-Western foreign policy, which both the Romanian citizens and Western chancelleries admired. Yet the Romanian Communist party’s domestic policies remained Stalinist and nationalistic. Diplomatic relations with Israel thus served a useful purpose: they enabled Romania to emphasize its difference from the Soviet Union and the rest of the East European Communist bloc. In September 1968, during a discussion in Bucharest, Ceaușescu declared that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories “must be coupled with the recognition by the Arabs of Israel’s right to exist.” When a British official at the meeting replied that the Israelis should be asked to withdraw only under conditions that guaranteed their security, Bodnăraș agreed.⁵⁵

Israeli-Romanian economic relations continued to develop and were now broadened to include armaments. The Romanians were most interested in tanks. In January 1969, Romanian authorities denied rumors that Israel had proposed to sell Romania Soviet tanks captured during the Six-Day War at a reduced price.⁵⁶

Yet this was not a baseless rumor. According to Raviv and Melman, the Israeli military and Romania had a history of working together: “Israeli experts serviced Romanian tanks and other military equipment” in return for “Ceaușescu’s agreement to permit the departure of Romania’s Jewish citizens.”⁵⁷ In the 1970s, Pacepa recalls, Shaike Dan delivered a Centurion tank to the DIE “at Marcu’s request, and in return Marcu promised him that such a gesture would be followed by an increase in Jewish emigration from Romania.” Ceaușescu was ecstatic and asked Marcu to obtain the blueprint for the tank as well.⁵⁸ A former member of the Liaison Bureau confirmed to the author of this study the delivery of the Centurion tank.⁵⁹ According to a former Israeli diplomat, Romania also asked Dan for up-to-date computers. When the equipment offered by Israel did not satisfy the Romanians, the deal fell through. Dan, commenting on his complicated relationship with the Romanian authorities, says: “My relations with the Romanians became so close, they even allowed themselves to ask unpopular things from me. If I was able to help them, I did so willingly. I’ll say no more than that many of their requests had to do with weighty matters.”⁶⁰ In June 1982, the Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon made a secret visit to Romania—arranged by Mossad—and offered, according to Melman and Raviv, “technological cooperation.” He was joined by experts from the Israeli military and aircraft industries.⁶¹

Armaments were not the only topic of conversation between the two countries. Romania and Israel also negotiated problems related to raising their diplomatic representation to embassy level. Fearing an Arab reaction, Romania postponed an official agreement for months and preferred to negotiate it behind closed doors. Romania’s delay made the Israelis anxious. Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister, told Bucharest that the Arab world should not be allowed to dictate Israeli-Romanian relations.⁶²

On August 17, 1969, Romania agreed to elevate relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level. Meanwhile Romania continued to support “the struggle of the Arab people to defend their national independence and sovereignty” and called for a negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict.⁶³

Earlier that month, in a major diplomatic victory for Bucharest and to the delight of Ceaușescu, President Nixon visited Romania. As Harrington and Courtney write, “Ceaușescu welcomed Nixon ... complete with honor guard and a twenty-one-gun salute.” Nixon wanted Ceaușescu to act as a mediator between Washington and Beijing, and to help in the resolution of the Vietnam conflict. Ceaușescu agreed. In return, he wanted Most Favored Nation trade status for Romania.⁶⁴

Romania’s entreaties to the West annoyed the Kremlin. Although the two countries maintained economic relations, Romania and the USSR mistrusted each other. After Nixon’s visit to Romania, the KGB began sending its “illegals,” disguised as Western journalists, to Bucharest. As the Russian defector Vasili Mitrokhin writes, “The KGB reports on Romania were written in a tone that combined indignation with deep suspicion.... The illegals sent to Romania under Western disguise in 1971 were ordered to collect intelligence on Romanian relations with the United States and China; Romanian claims on Soviet territory in Bessarabia and north Bukovina; the political and economic basis of opposition to the Soviet Union.... The priority given to Romania reflected growing Soviet displeasure at the foreign policy of its leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu.”⁶⁵

Ceaușescu needed the United States in his struggle for independence from the Soviet Union; he viewed Israel as the key that would unlock the American vault of support. When Israel’s foreign minister Moshe Dayan visited Bucharest in April 1978, Ceaușescu asked him to put in a good word with Washington for Most Favored Nation status for Romania. Dayan replied, “I will talk to our ambassador in Washington, and I promise you, Mr. President, that we will do everything we can.”⁶⁶

Dayan’s visit to Bucharest involved continuing negotiations on Jewish emigration to Israel. Dan arranged for the foreign minister’s political adviser, Eli Rubinstein, to brief Dayan thoroughly, and insisted that “under no circumstances should [Dayan] mention the word immigration. The expression ‘family reunification’ was and still is the formula accepted by us and by them in Romania.”⁶⁷

The rise to embassy-level diplomatic relations between Israel and Romania coincided with increased Arab sponsored terrorism against Israeli targets in Europe and the persecution of Jews in Arab countries. On January 27, 1969, as Howard M. Sachar notes, “Nine Jews among fourteen prisoners [were] hanged as ‘spies’ in Baghdad’s Liberation Square; crowds estimated at 200,000 marched past the dangling corpses as the onlookers were treated to a running loudspeaker commentary on Jewish ‘treason.’ Libyan Jewry shared in this intensified persecution. Following the June War, hundreds of Jewish shops were burned again, as in 1945 ... two-thirds of the remaining 4,000 Jews fled to Europe, the rest to Israel.”⁶⁸

Israel was irritated by Romania’s political ambiguity: either it spoke indifferently about Arab terrorist acts against Israel or ignored them altogether. A month after the incident in Iraq, Eliezer Doron, head of the Israeli legation in Bucharest, confronted Corneliu Mănescu, the Romanian foreign minister, on this issue. Doron brought up the recent terrorist attack against an Israeli plane at the Zurich airport, and expressed his frustration that Romania’s governmentcontrolled newspapers had ignored it—yet had condemned Israeli action in Beirut.⁶⁹ Mănescu lamely equivocated.

Romania steered a treacherous course in attempting to balance its political allegiances between the Arab states and Israel. High-ranking Romanian officials, including Ceaușescu, continued to meet with their Arab counterparts, stressing their “brotherly” relations. Hafez al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, and Yasser Arafat were “comrades” to Ceaușescu. At the same time Romania ordered its diplomats in Arab countries to keep their distance whenever the host government took actions that Israel might see as aggressive.

Egypt recalled its ambassador from Bucharest when Romania and Israel raised their diplomatic representation to embassy level. His replacement, the chargé d’affaires, blamed the recall on the “Jewish blood” of Prime Minister Maurer (whose origins in fact were German) and other Romanian Communist leaders.⁷⁰ In a diplomatic cable from Egypt, the Algerian ambassador to Baghdad, Ahmed Tanefile al-Madani, was reported to have declared in Baghdad that “the Arab countries that met to discuss the boycott against Israel decided to not boycott Romania because it was a ‘socialist country,’ but recommended reducing relations with Romania as long as this country continues to develop relations with Israel.”⁷¹ Egyptian foreign trade enterprises sought to impose specific anti-Israeli provisions on their Romanian counterparts in an effort to force Romania to boycott the Jewish state.⁷²

Ceaușescu, too, appeared sometimes irritated with Israel. In a meeting with Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress held in May 1970 in Bucharest, Ceaușescu spoke bitterly about Israel’s current policies, calling its leaders “arrogant and silly.” Romania had refused to end its relations with Israel “despite very great pressures.” For Israel to insist on direct talks with the Arab countries, Ceaușescu claimed, was “nonsense and is an excuse for covering Israel’s purpose not to withdraw from the occupied territories.”⁷³

In February 1970, owing to Israel’s “military actions against the Arab countries and its repression of Palestine’s liberation movement,” the Politburo of the Romanian Communist party decided to “reduce and restrain cultural and diplomatic relations with Israel, [and] to condemn more firmly Israeli repression against the Arab countries.” Yet simultaneously it would “develop economic relations with Israel, ensuring not to export strategic goods.”⁷⁴ The party obviously did not regard Jews as a strategic good.

Arab leaders thought otherwise. In April 1971, Ceaușescu met in Moscow with Abdel Moshen Aboul Nour, general secretary of Egypt’s Arab Socialist Union. The historians Ionel Calafeteanu and Alexandru Cornescu-Coren write, “Nour stated that ‘because the Jewish immigrants increase Israel’s combat capacity,’ [Egypt] wishes that ‘this emigration be suspended until the end of the conflict.’ Ceaușescu tried to diminish the importance of the emigration, and stated that in 1970 ‘only 300 people’ of Jewish origin left the country, but even those had ‘other destinations, although it is possible that they changed their direction.’ Furthermore, Ceaușescu said that ‘Romania took into account Nasser’s opinion to restrain and maintain restrained Jewish emigration’ but emphasized that ‘total restrictions cannot be accepted.’”⁷⁵ Ceaușescu lied to Nour: in 1970, 5,614 Romanian Jews had emigrated to Israel, a peak year under his rule.

Over the next several years a number of episodes indicated Romania’s growing ties to Israel:

In the early 1970s, Romania cautiously attempted to mediate between the Arab countries at war with Israel. In January 1971, on Israel’s behalf, Romania asked Egypt about the fate of four wounded Israeli prisoners of war. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed its ambassador in Cairo to leave no paper trail concerning this démarche.⁷⁶

Between 1972 and 1973, the 1969 Jewish emigration protocol having expired, Dan and Marcu prepared a new one. Although he was not an official member of the Israeli delegation to Bucharest, Dan organized visits to Romania by Israeli prime ministers. These visits, he recalls, “became a feature of the political process. They were part of a way to get our word to the other countries of Eastern Europe and to the Arab states.... Ceaușescu earned himself a reputation as a mediator. His attempts to be a peacemaker for the Middle East boosted his stock in the West, too....”⁷⁷

Dan continues, “Before Golda Meir left to visit Romania, I acted as intermediary in preparing the meeting between her and Ceaușescu.... I said: ‘When you discuss political matters, do that alone.’”⁷⁸ Jewish emigration and the peace process in the Middle East held Meir and Ceaușescu in a fourteen-hour discussion; together they tried to arrange a meeting between Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Golda Meir, but these efforts failed.

Dan was in Bucharest on Friday, May 5, 1972, when Pacepa, then deputy head of the DIE, received information from Beirut that four Arabs had left Cairo for Bucharest to assassinate Meir as she walked to the Chorale Temple. “At approximately five-thirty,” Pacepa writes, “four Arabs, surprised and overwhelmed, were arrested on a street close to the synagogue without being able to use their submachine guns and grenades. All of them were carrying Egyptian passports.”⁷⁹

Ceaușescu was furious and ordered the assassins killed. He soon changed his mind. The terrorists—photographed, fingerprinted, and lavishly fed—were expelled the following day. A few months later, with photographic evidence in hand, the DIE identified the leader of the terrorist team in the Meir operation as Abu Daud, the same person who planned the 1972 terrorist attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich.⁸⁰

Her life spared by the DIE, Meir entered the Chorale Temple. Thousands of Jews crowded the temple, the courtyard, and neighboring streets. As Rosen writes, “More than one hundred boys and girls welcomed her, singing ‘Shalom aleichem.’ Golda was astonished ... she began to cry. Her picture with the caption ‘Golda Wipes Her Tears in Bucharest’ appeared in all the Jewish newspapers.”⁸¹ But the Israeli-Romanian talks did not go well. At one point Meir even walked out of her discussions with Nicolae Ceaușescu. The atmosphere improved only during the state dinner.

On November 10, 1975—the thirty-seventh anniversary of Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany—the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution equating Zionism with racism. In view of the entire assembly, Israel’s UN ambassador, Chaim Herzog, tore up the UN resolution, and said, “Hitler would have felt himself at home were he present here today.”⁸² Unlike the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist bloc as well as the Arab countries, Romania maintained an ambiguous political voice and refused to vote on the resolution.

In 1977, Bucharest asked Shaike Dan if Menachem Begin, who had just been elected prime minister, would accept an invitation from Ceaușescu to visit Romania. Dan recalls, “I had to tell Begin that behind this invitation was the president’s sincere desire to serve as a mediator between us and Egypt.”⁸³ Dan’s appeal prevailed, and Ceaușescu became the first head of state to meet with Prime Minister Begin.

Thoroughly briefed by Dan, Begin arrived in Bucharest on August 25, 1977. Ceaușescu made known his desire to help broker a Middle East settlement. According to Sachar, “It was accordingly Ceaușescu who arranged a secret parallel meeting in Bucharest between Begin and Said Merei, a representative of the Egyptian national assembly. To Merei as to Ceaușescu, Begin emphasized his willingness to offer ‘extensive satisfaction’ on the Sinai, even to negotiate some form of self-governing Arab entity for Gaza and the West Bank. Merei in turn promised to convey Begin’s message to Sadat.”⁸⁴

The Romanian authorities took extraordinary security measures during Begin’s visit. Rosen describes one of them: “My wife and I ... saw [Begin] disappear in the direction of the temple. Suddenly from another direction we saw another Begin coming toward us. This ‘Begin’ wore the same kind of clothes as the first one. His appearance was very similar, too. His entourage consisted of the same number of people, and he was accompanied by the same number of security men. Later I understood that two Begins had left the hotel, each taking a different route. The Romanian police feared an assassination attempt and wanted to confuse the plotters. I don’t know whether they succeeded in confusing them; they certainly confused me.”⁸⁵

Abba Gefen, the Israeli ambassador to Bucharest, described the dramatic consequences of Begin’s visit: “Ceaușescu became convinced that the new prime minister of Israel sincerely wanted peace, and he invited President Sadat to come to Bucharest. Sadat arrived in October and asked ... Ceaușescu whether he was really convinced that Begin wanted peace and was able to sign it. Ceaușescu answered both questions affirmatively.”⁸⁶ In September 1977, Israeli foreign minister Dayan instructed Meir Rosenne, the foreign ministry’s legal adviser, to draft an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.⁸⁷

Twelve months later Begin and Sadat signed the Camp David agreements. Ceaușescu was shocked that he did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in these negotiations. Indeed, for years to come one of his chief interests was to have the CIE recruit influential insiders who could help him bring home the prize.⁸⁸

Begin’s government brought sweeping change to Israel. Soon after he became prime minister, he changed the Liaison Bureau’s leadership. His government transformed Israel’s perception of the Jewish diaspora. Raviv and Melman write, “The new prime minister summoned Mossad chief Yitzhak Hofi and Nehemiah Levanon, who was the new head of the Liaison Bureau.... Begin told them that he regarded immigration to Israel as no less important than peace with Egypt [or] combating terrorism.”⁸⁹ After the Soviets severed relations with Israel in 1967, it became more difficult to press for the release of Soviet Jews. Levanon believed in quiet activity, but in Israel and in the diaspora, various militant organizations were making vociferous demands for the freeing of Soviet Jewry.

Meanwhile Washington and Moscow had begun the pre-Gor-bachev era of détente. Responding to American pressures, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev permitted approximately 250,000 Jews to leave his country; two-thirds moved to Israel. “This increased emigration forced the Liaison Bureau to expand,” Raviv and Melman write. “It began to appoint consuls to various Israeli embassies in Europe, and it sent personnel to maintain ties with Jewish organizations around the world.... Levanon and Mossad chief Hofi worked in close coordination on the great consensus project of immigration.... They knew that Prime Minister Begin wanted more.”⁹⁰ Although Begin supported the Liaison Bureau’s mission, he would have preferred an open and visible campaign to Levanon’s secret tactics.⁹¹

After more than a decade as head of the Liaison Bureau, Levanon was replaced by Yehuda Lapidot, a Likud party loyalist, former hardline Irgun militant, and talented biochemist allegedly involved with Begin in the April 1948 killing of some two hundred Arab civilians in the village of Deir Yassin near Jerusalem.⁹² Israelis questioned this leadership change. Many in the diplomatic and intelligence communities, according to Raviv and Melman, “did not understand why the inexperienced Lapidot got the liaison bureau job. The new chief and Prime Minister Begin, however, understood each other perfectly. The bureau’s work went much more smoothly with Lapidot happily carrying out Begin’s wishes by waging a public campaign for Soviet Jewry.”⁹³

Despite Begin’s interest in emigration and Lapidot’s alacrity in managing its public dimension, Israel’s policies toward Romania did not change. Jerusalem noisily demanded freedom of emigration for Soviet Jews, but it made no such demands on Romania. “Different circumstances,” write Raviv and Melman, called for “different methods.”⁹⁴

General Marcu’s work with Israel was not without its challenges. On June 23, 1973, his subordinate, Constantin Dumitrachescu, a former contact of Jakober’s, head of the Romanian espionage arm in Tel Aviv, vanished from the tarmac of the Lod Airport. He had defected.

Dumitrachescu was Romania’s number two man in the Tel Aviv embassy, occasionally participating in meetings with, among others, Abba Eban. After he defected, he wrote Marcu to assure him that he had no intention of damaging Romania’s political regime.

DIE sent Colonel Victor Dorobanțu, operating under the name of Virgil Dragomir, and General Gheorghe Bolînu to Tel Aviv to investigate Dumitrachescu’s disappearance jointly with Mossad. Dorobantu and Bolinu returned to Bucharest quite empty-handed; they had uncovered only a receipt showing that Dumitrachescu had left Israel for Copenhagen.⁹⁵ Dumitrachescu’s defection, though significant, was of negligible importance compared to what would follow.

In 1978 Marcu agreed with Dan on what would be his last involvement in a protocol for the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel.⁹⁶ On July 27, 1978, a U.S. Air Force Hercules cargo plane left West Germany for Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington with General Pacepa, deputy head of Romania’s DIE, on board. Pacepa’s defection shook the Romanian secret service. According to several eyewitnesses, Ceaușescu became hysterical, tore off his shirt, and shouted, “I cannot even trust this shirt I am wearing!” Most of the operatives who were engaged in Romanian espionage abroad were hastily recalled. DIE agents, undercover as diplomats or as “illegals” in the West, panicked and fled.

Under the harsh and incompetent supervision of Elena Ceaușescu, the president’s wife, a major investigation was begun. After Pacepa’s defection, the party leadership was, according to Burtică, fearful, hysterical, and suspicious.⁹⁷ The DIE collapsed.⁹⁸ In the chaotic attempt to rebuild, Pacepa determined that “twenty two ambassadors were replaced, and more than a dozen high-ranking officers were grounded while several dozen more simply vanished from sight in the turmoil.”⁹⁹

In his memoirs, Burtică writes that with the exception of several young officers, everyone in the DIE was either fired or grounded and closely investigated. For years a furious Ceaușescu refused to promote ex-DIE officers to the rank of general.¹⁰⁰ Yet they were scapegoats; if anyone was to blame for Pacepa’s defection, it was Ceaușescu and his brother, General Nicolae A. Ceaușescu (code named General Călin), who commanded personnel at DIE. But no one in Romania dared to blame the two brothers for their shortcomings.

As head of the U.S., Latin America, Africa, and Middle East division of DIE, General Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) led the largest of the DIE’s three services. His generals commanded several brigades.¹⁰¹ Sometimes he undertook curious missions: in 1973, for example, he had to buy a rabbit leather hat for the minister of the interior, Emil Bobu, to be worn when Bobu went hunting with Ceaușescu. Marcu failed on his first attempt (Bobu did not like the hat) but succeeded on the second.¹⁰² After 1975 he controlled the Operațiuni Valutare (foreign currency operations), which, among other things, managed the sale of Jews to Israel and ethnic Germans to West Germany. Following Pacepa’s defection, Marcu was accused by his colleagues of being a British, Soviet, and even an Israeli agent.¹⁰³

Documents related to the investigation of Pacepa’s defection indicate that Marcu adopted a reserved demeanor during the investigation. He was transferred from the DIE to another military unit, where he was marginalized as head of one of the schools for noncommissioned police officers. According to Burtică, however, in 1981 Marcu coordinated teams of Securitate officers—sent abroad on Elena Ceaușescu’s orders—to investigate Burtică’s alleged involvement with the CIA, KGB, and Mossad.¹⁰⁴ When Ceaușescu’s reign came to an end, a retired Marcu resurfaced as a private businessman with alleged connections in London and Tehran.

After Pacepa’s defection, the DIE (UM 0920) was thoroughly reorganized. Renamed the Centrul de Informatii Externe [CIE]¹⁰⁵ and with a force of 2,426 officers, the CIE—directly or through its militarized foreign trade companies, Dunarea and Delta—retained its essential mission: to obtain hard currency for the Ceaușescu regime. The selling of Jews and ethnic Germans remained a priority.

After Pacepa’s defection, in the summer of 1978, a special unit was created, AVS (Aport Valutar Străin [Foreign Currency Input]) that later became UM 0107 AVS. Until 1985, the chief of this unit was Stelian Octavian Andronic (alias, as of 1978, Nicolae Arnăutu) whose sole superiors were the chief of CIE (former DIE) and the minister of the interior. As Marcu’s successor, Andronic was the key person in the negotiations with Israel and Germany on the issue of selling the Jews and the ethnic Germans from Romania.

A Securitate officer, starting as a captain and then lieutenant-col-onel in DGIE/DIE, Stelian Octavian Andronic was “sent to Israel [between 1962 and 1966, he served under diplomatic cover as Third Secretary at the Consular Section] where he used to go to the meetings with his agents while being tailed. One of these agents was arrested. Despite his missteps, during 1972–1977, he was assigned to the Netherlands where, again, he lost two important informers.”¹⁰⁶

At his diplomatic post in Tel Aviv, Andronic was an important link in the operation of robbing the Romanian citizens who lived in Romania and were inheriting properties in Israel. “My role, as a consul, was to legalize the powers of attorney received from the petitioners in Romania and to oversee the process; whereby the Israeli lawyer we hired carried out his mandate to capitalize on the goods and to transfer the amounts received into in the country. Most of the assets identified were empty lots located in different areas of Israel, the most valuable ones were located on Mount Carmel, near Haifa; the prices for these plots were relatively small and the amounts of money (in dollars) obtained from these sales were transferred directly to Romania, at the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade (BRCE) in the owners’ names. In accordance with the applicable law, the transferred sums were delivered 15% in [US] dollars and 85% in lei, at the official rate of the National Bank of Romania.”¹⁰⁷

A document of the General Prosecutor’s Office dated March 3, 1990, noted the following regarding the former chief of AVS: “Colonel Andronic Stelian served as the head of the Foreign Currency Input unit (AVS), within UM 0544, in the period 1978—after I.M. Pacepa’s treason—to 1986, when, at the order of Tudor Postelnicu, or even of Ceaușescu Nicolae, he was transferred as deputy chief of a production unit within the former DSS, where he is today. Andronic Stelian was extremely shocked by this decision he did not expect since he had been a loyal dog of the nomenclature for whom he had done invaluable services. ... As the chief of the AVS unit, he went on frequent short missions overseas, for 2-5 days, especially to Switzerland, Austria, Israel. He did not talk to anybody about the objective of the missions he was assigned to and, despite the terms of employment, he was under the direct supervision of Tudor Postelnicu, at that time the head of the former DSS, bypassing Pleșiță Nicolae, the former chief of the Foreign Intelligence Center.”¹⁰⁸

At the beginning, Andronic negotiated with Shaike Dan whom he describes “the type of well indoctrinated Zionist, committed, who would pursue his goal with determination.”¹⁰⁹ “In our meetings,“ recounts Andronic, “... organized at Dan’s insistent requests exclusively in Bucharest. ... extremely serious problems were being discussed, quite often under unfriendly threats from Dan who never failed to spook me so that we wouldn’t slow down the pace of the emigration to Israel ... His persistent threat was the Vanich [sic Vanik]-Jackson Amendment the Jewish Lobby introduced in the American legislation that made the Most Favored Nation Clause for our country contingent on the issue of the Jews’ emigration from Romania.”¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, Ceaușescu plotted his own revenge against Pacepa. Under the direction of General Moț, Ceaușescu commanded his newly created counterespionage unit to capture or kill the defector.¹¹¹ With Ceaușescu’s approval and Yasser Arafat’s support, Moț enlisted the help of Carlos the Jackal, the engineer of several terrorist attacks in Europe, including the bombing of the Radio Free Europe building in Munich. Carlos received unlimited support from the Securitate, but he finally confessed to General Nicolae Pleșiță, head of CIE, that he could not deal with Pacepa.¹¹²

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ceaușescu’s political behavior became increasingly unpredictable. On the one hand he insisted that the Soviet Union participate in Middle East peace talks, and promised Israel renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet powers.¹¹³ On the other hand he threatened Soviet president Yuri Andropov that Romania might abandon the Warsaw Pact.¹¹⁴ Ceaușescu’s government endorsed a peace plan with four critical points: “Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied after June 1967, including East Jerusalem and southern Lebanon; the establishment of an independent state governed by the PLO; guarantees for the security of all states in the region; and convocation of an international peace conference, with representatives from the PLO, the Soviet Union, and the United States.”¹¹⁵

Although Israel rejected the plan, it continued to cultivate improved relations with Romania.¹¹⁶ And it continued to buy Romanian Jews from Ceaușescu. On December 31, 1982, the protocol concerning this highly confidential matter once again expired. Six months later a new, “strictly confidential” agreement was signed, valid until December 31, 1988, in which Romania promised to permit the annual “departure” to Israel of at least fifteen hundred Jews. Israel, for its part, promised to pay $3,300 for each emigré. Payments were to be made every three months.¹¹⁷

In an addendum to the agreement, however, Israel insisted that emigrés over retirement age be excluded from these arrangements. Israel did not wish to pay the ransom for them.¹¹⁸ Yehuda Lapidot, head of Israel’s Liaison Bureau, and Stelian Octavian Andronic, head of AVS (Aport Valutar Străin), the hard-currency unit of the CIE, signed the agreement.¹¹⁹ Here is how Andronic describes Yehuda Lapidot, Shaike Dan’s successor: “Dan was replaced by another representative, “the Professor,” and, as a result, my relationship with the representative of the Israeli prime minister became more tense and the meetings were now being organized alternatively in Bucharest, Tel Aviv, and, sometimes, even in Vienna. The “Professor,” with a completely different background, wouldn’t use Dan’s favorite method to spook us with the American amendment. ... The meetings with the “Professor,” Dan’s replacement, who, every time, was accompanied by the Second Secretary the Embassy of Israel in Bucharest, took place in a relaxed, correct atmosphere, even amicable....”¹²⁰

On February 21, 1985, Shimon Peres arrived in Bucharest as prime minister of Israel. Ceaușescu again pressed for a post–Camp David mediation, which this time was to include the Soviet Union.¹²¹ Shaike Dan briefed Peres and his adviser on the situation in Romania. Although Dan was weary of cautioning Peres about Ceaușescu’s greed and his repressive regime, he noted that as long as emigration continued, it was worthwhile to maintain Ceaușescu’s support.¹²²

Dan was not the only one angry with Ceaușescu and his regime; the Israeli political establishment was also losing patience. According to Ambassador Govrin, after 1985 Romania’s “relations with Israel gradually deteriorated. Although the countries continued to exchange high-level visits, they failed to make major breakthroughs. Romania continued to insist on Israeli concessions, including direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In August 1987, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, after nine hours of talks with Ceaușescu in Bucharest, reported no progress on the issue of Middle East negotiations. A few months later, Ceaușescu invited representatives of the PLO and the Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue Committee to a meeting in Romania, but that discussion too bore no fruit.”¹²³

Govrin notes that Israel was increasingly irritated by the catastrophic human rights situation in Romania. Anti-Semitism, quietly encouraged by the Romanian Communist party and openly promoted by Ceaușescu’s ideological henchmen, including Eugen Barbu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor, was on the rise. Articles and books denying the Holocaust were being published in an otherwise heavily censored environment. Buildings of historical significance to the Jews and old synagogues were being demolished in the “program of urban planning” personally coordinated by Ceaușescu.

And while Israel’s diplomatic relations with Romania tottered, Ceaușescu’s relations with Arafat improved. A U.S. report revealed that “Arafat and other high-ranking PLO officials frequently traveled to Bucharest. The Romanian media described Arafat as a personal friend and comrade of Ceaușescu. Between November 1987 and December 1988, Arafat met with Ceaușescu five times. The PLO opened one of its first diplomatic offices in Bucharest, and several bilateral agreements were concluded, some of which reportedly offered the PLO educational and even military training facilities in Romania.”¹²⁴ Arafat enjoyed Bucharest. In August 1987 the Romanian Communist party received him as a head of state. He usually stayed in a CIE villa code named T16, located on Turgheniev Street very close to Ceaușescu’s residence.¹²⁵

Although Ceaușescu consistently supported Arafat and hired a known terrorist to do his dirty work, he did not support all Palestinian terrorist factions. Abu Nidal was welcome in Warsaw, Budapest, East Berlin, Sofia, and Belgrade, yet after killing a Jordanian diplomat, Azmial-Mufti, and wounding another in Bucharest in December 1984, Romania closed its doors to him. Nidal tried to blackmail Romania, going so far as to place bombs in its Beirut embassy. Yet Ceaușescu refused to be pushed around, and Romania arrested Nidal’s followers whenever possible.¹²⁶

After the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, Ceaușescu had grown worried about his own safety and left nothing to chance. He therefore improved his relationship with Arafat and condemned counterterrorist efforts by Israel and the United States. In October 1985, Romania officially condemned the Israeli raid against the PLO headquarters in Tunis, and in April 1986, Ceaușescu wrote to President Reagan, condemning the U.S. attack against Libya.¹²⁷

That same year Ceaușescu’s role as a mediator between Eastern bloc countries and Israel began to decline. In August, after almost twenty years of hostile silence, the Soviet Union renewed contact with Israel and generally sought to improve relations as part of its “new diplomacy.”¹²⁸ Soviet satellites followed suit. Israel and Poland reestablished diplomatic relations in September 1986. Hungary improved its trade and tourism relations with Israel. And in January 1987, Israeli delegates met with Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian representatives to discuss agricultural cooperation.¹²⁹

In October 1986, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir instructed Mossad’s liaison department (not to be confused with the Liaison Bureau) to open talks with the KGB. Shamir intended to shift his attention to the release of Soviet Jews, since he felt that contacts with the Romanians were proving fruitless.¹³⁰

Shamir’s outlook was not entirely accurate. One year later, Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel via Romania, by rail and plane. Govrin recalls: “When I applied to Ceaușescu in May, 1987, on behalf of Prime Minister Shamir for his permission to allow this, he gave it to me on the spot, on condition that the USSR agree to it. Indeed, the USSR accepted the idea that month. Thus the immigrants could arrive in Bucharest by a direct flight from Moscow or by train from [anywhere in] the USSR, and after a short stay there could continue by air to Israel.”¹³¹

A Securitate report dated August 20, 1988, contains the details of this arrangement. It was agreed to verbally, but two hundred Soviet Jews had already transited through Romania. The Israeli government would pay Romania for security, for two nights’ hotel accommodations in Bucharest for the emigrants, and for their airline tickets from Bucharest to Tel Aviv. According to the same document, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, and the Arab League pressured Bucharest to prohibit this arrangement.¹³² The Romanian secret police, fearing further Arab terrorist acts on its soil, requested Ceaușescu’s personal advice.

When the emigration agreement expired in December 1988, a new five-year protocol was drafted the following month under Ceaușescu’s personal supervision. The handwritten mandate was filled with empty rhetoric and continued to use the old euphemism of the “reunification of families.”¹³³ But Ceaușescu’s negotiators reached an understanding with their Israeli counterparts, and Israeli-sponsored emigration continued during 1989 together with Israeli payments to Romania.

Eleven months later, on Christmas Day, at the height of a bloody revolt, Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu were executed in Târgoviște. According to Romanian media, Arab terrorists fought in defense of Ceaușescu’s regime; the few captured mercenaries were evacuated on a special flight to Libya. The Romanian Communist party was overthrown, and the market in Romanian Jews was closed.

6

The Money Trail

Jews, Germans, and oil are our best export commodities.”¹ This was Ceaușescu’s estimate of Romania’s foreign trade in the mid1970s. But Romania’s oil was virtually gone. It had been used by the Third Reich on the Eastern Front during World War II; its facilities had been bombed by the U.S. Air Force and the RAF; it had been taken by the Soviet Union as war reparations; and it had been consumed by the Romanian chemical industry in the manufacture of various plastics by order of Elena Ceaușescu, who fancied herself a chemist. Only Jews and Germans remained. Thus did Ceaușescu instruct his trusted aide, General Pacepa, to increase Romania’s price tag for each Jewish or German emigrant.²

Before World War II more than 80 percent of Romania’s foreign trade went to the West. Between 1948 and 1959, however, trade with the West dramatically declined; almost 90 percent of Romania’s foreign trade shifted to Comecon nations. By far the most important trading partner during this period was the Soviet Union. Yet this was not to last.

When the Romanian Communist party began to insist on autonomous development, it brought Romania into direct conflict with the rest of the Soviet bloc. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Khrushchev had envisioned Romania as a supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials for the more industrially developed members of Comecon. But in 1964 First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej threatened to take Romania out of Comecon unless the organization recognized that each member had the right to pursue its own course of economic development.³ Perceiving that his approach could reinforce Romania’s status vis-à-vis the Soviets, Gheorghiu-Dej began to pursue alternative economic relations as early as the late 1950s. By 1964, foreign trade with Western countries was again a major source of Romanian commerce. Almost 40 percent of Romania’s imports and almost a third of its exports involved the West.

When Ceaușescu came to power in 1965 he adhered to the Gheorghiu-Dej program. His political vision for Romania was “independence.” He needed independence from the East because he did not wish to cede political and economic control to Moscow. He needed independence too from the West in order to avoid the general inconvenience of human rights inquiries and condemnations, and of having to account for Romania’s political and economic situation. He needed independence in order to build a Communist dynasty.

The West supplied Ceaușescu with almost half the machinery and technology he needed to build a modern industrial base. In 1971, Romania joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the following year gained admission to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By 1973 roughly 47 percent of Romania’s trade involved Western industrialized countries. In the process of this growth, Romania incurred an enormous trade deficit which forced it to borrow heavily from Western banks. Having temporarily quieted concerns about its human rights record, in 1975 Romania managed to secure Most Favored Nation trading status from the United States. But international disappointment with Romania returned, and by the 1980s trade relations with the West had soured.

According to a 1989 U.S. analysis, “Ceaușescu blamed the IMF and ‘unjustifiably high’ interest rates charged by Western banks for his country’s economic plight. For its part, the West charged Romania with unfair trade practices, resistance to needed economic reform, and human rights abuses.”⁴ Ceaușescu looked elsewhere, but attempts to increase Romania’s trade with less-developed countries failed. The manufacturing capacity of his potential trading partners was being swiftly diminished by oil shortages stemming from the Iran-Iraq War. Frustrated by this narrowed horizon of opportunity, Ceaușescu begrudgingly resumed trade with the Soviet bloc. By 1986, socialist countries were involved in 53 percent of Romania’s foreign trade. Still, Ceaușescu remained defiant. He ordered his foreign trade enterprises to avoid direct relationships with business firms in other Communist countries, and he refused to take part in Comecon efforts to establish mutual convertibility of the currencies of the member states. Yet despite these attempts to follow an independent path, Romania lost its Most Favored Nation status in 1988, and shortly thereafter it failed to negotiate a new trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC).

A Stalinist economically and politically, Ceaușescu’s appetite for independence was as great as his thirst for hard currency—the ticket, he believed, to economic stability. He supported major industrial failures in a botched attempt to become an international economic force; stationed Romanian diplomats and spies abroad to keep a watchful eye on the Western world, hoping to steal its military and technological secrets; and tried, albeit backwardly, to modernize his own country.

For Ceaușescu, the thought of independence was sweeter even than national strength and prosperity; his political strategy for realizing it proved to be catastrophic. Beginning in 1984, Romania sought no further loans from the IMF or the World Bank, curtailed imports from hardcurrency nations, and maximized exports. Although the Romanian standard of living plummeted, the country generated trade surpluses as large as $2 billion a year through the rest of the decade. In April 1989, with great fanfare, Ceaușescu announced the retirement of the foreign debt, declaring that Romania had at last achieved full economic and political independence.⁵

In fact he had run the country into the ground. In 1989 Romania was second only to Albania as the poorest Communist nation in Europe. The general population was daily confronted with shortages of food and energy. In a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, basic foodstuffs such as cooking oil, sugar, and salami could be purchased only with government coupons, which allocated a quota to each Romanian citizen.

In the 1960s, small co-ops had commonly sprung up here and there in East European Communist countries, especially in Poland and Hungary but also in Romania. They contained shoe shops and tailors, family restaurants and coffeehouses. Yet the most important co-op in Romania’s economy was not in the business of hemming a trouser leg or baking warm pretzels. ... A very promising Romanian co-op initiative of the foreign intelligence branch of the Securitate was in the business of selling Jews and Germans.

The DGIE wanted hard currency, and this was not simply a matter of following orders. Incentives were also involved. The decisions of Romania’s Council of Ministers allowed the Romanian Ministry of the Interior and especially the DGIE to retain part of the hard currency they earned from exports. According to a February 23, 1966, directive, the DGIE was to give 80 percent of its export earnings to the Romanian treasury; it could keep the remainder.⁶

The DGIE’s role in obtaining hard currency was not Ceaușescu’s invention but that of his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej. As we have seen, because of the Jacober operation, and with the help of the Liaison Bureau, the DGIE came to manage the most modern agricultural system in Romania. By the mid-1960s that operation netted between $8 million and $10 million annually. It was deposited by the DGIE in a secret bank account accessible only by Gheorghiu-Dej.⁷

Reflecting on the changes in Romanian government that were instituted by Ceaușescu, General Pacepa writes: “he reorganized the DGIE, increasing its size from 700 to 2,800 officers and raising its foreign currency budget eightfold. After that the DGIE’s main task was to lay hands on as much Western money as it could, to support Romania’s bankrupt economy. How was not important, only how much.... One of the ways to do that was in smuggling operations. Drugs confiscated at the Romanian borders and unmarked arms were turned over to the DGIE’s new, supersecret ‘OV’ [Operațiuni Valutare] section. Trading prospective emigrés for hard currency became another of the DIE’s main jobs.... The cruel truth is that virtually 90 percent of the Romanian citizens who emigrated to the West in the 1970s were secretly ransomed in foreign currency by either Israel or West Germany, or by their own relatives in the West.”⁸

Ceaușescu viewed the DGIE (and its successors, the DIE and the CIE) as one of Romania’s major foreign currency providers. According to Liviu Turcu, the Securitate’s tasks related to foreign trade were so important to its leadership that when its head, Tudor Postelnicu, was promoted to minister of the interior, he retained oversight of this revenue-producing responsibility and reported directly to Ceaușescu. His successor, General Iulian Vlad, declared in March 1990 that the entire Securitate and Ministry of the Interior worked for a military foreign-trade enterprise, ICE Dunărea.

On July 18, 1967, a DGIE protocol indicated that Henry Jakober had paid for “309 numbers” the amount of $700,000 and, for “the remaining 80 numbers,” he was going to pay $149,500. The lists with the names were attached to the respective protocol.⁹ Each of these numbers represented a human being for whom a family living in the West was paying top dollars to the Romanian state. A file with fifty-eight” documents, most of them representing the correspondence between the Saxone family and Henry Jakober, that also includes several statements representing the value of the sums deposited by Aurel Saxone, resident of Paris, to the account of the British businessman, was generously shared with this author by Mrs. Mioara Iancovici-Saxone. The correspondence over the period 1963–1964 referred to the family of lawyer Valentin Saxone, a former member of the National Liberal Party (PNL), arrested on August 19, 1959, convicted with Sentence No. 1709 of November 22 by the Bucharest Military Tribunal to 16 years of forced labor for the crime of “conspiracy against the social order” and pardoned on January 16, 1963. More precisely, the correspondence referred to Valentin Saxone’s wife, Lia Saxone, and to their two daughters, Mioara and Liana. The correspondence started on March 27, 1962, with a letter Valentin Saxone sent to Henry Jakober who logged this case with the reference number 0240. In November 1962, Aurel Saxone wire-transferred the sum of $5,000 to an account of the Credit Swiss Bank in Zurich. Jokober did not manage to have Valentin Saxone released from prison, but one year later, in November 1963, he asked Aurel Saxone to transfer the $5,000 to Credit Swiss Bank in Lucerne, to account 2925, with the reference 0240. Following this transfer, Mioara and Liana Saxone got the exit visa to leave Romania. On September 1, 1964, the Saxone sisters arrived in Israel.¹⁰

Although Dej claimed his regime prohibited a direct trade in human beings, cash receipts from such sales remained lively and profits continued to accumulate. Alexandru Drăghici, a former Politburo member and minister of internal affairs, declared during a 1969 investigation into his office: “When I left the Ministry of the Interior [in July 1965], I deposited into an account of the Bank of Romania $6,250,000 from the people who were leaving the country.... I reported to the party leadership about it then and later.”¹¹ When asked why some people left Romania without paying, Drăghici responded, “Most of them were old Jews. In fact, Israel was paying, but it was not only an Israeli problem. There were some self-appointed intermediaries abroad who were offering amounts of money for x or y. I reported to the leadership about this and I had approval in this direction.”¹²

Bartering Jews or selling them directly was not the only way in which Romania obtained money from Israel. Commercial trade between the two countries was also used by Romanian Communist authorities to extort cash from Israel against the emigration of the Jews.

During the barter period, yearly cash deposits in favor of the Romanian government were made by Israel in exchange for the emigration of the Jews. During the early 1960s, when Romania’s exports to Israel were weaker than Israeli exports to Romania, cash paid by Israel was used to balance the trade between the two countries. A document stamped “strictly secret” and dated November 23, 1961 (the original document was destroyed roughly ten months later), describes one of these yearly cash payments: “In 1960 lumber exports [from Romania] to Israel stopped, though Israel insisted on this product. Consequently the trade balance in favor of the People’s Republic of Romania suffered. Romania’s commercial account nonetheless remained rather considerable because of the sum of 4.7 million rubles (about $1.2 million) originating from noncommercial revenues.”¹³

More or less the same situation prevailed in the following year. The same report notes that on September 30, 1961, a Romanian account in the Bank of Israel contained $900,000, a sum originating again from “noncommercial revenues” [italics in original].¹⁴

Another secret report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarifies the meaning of “noncommercial revenues.” The report notes that in 1961, 12,150 people were allowed to emigrate to Israel. The report also states that in 1960 Romania exported goods valued at $1 million to Israel, and imported goods valued at $2.2 million. “The exchange can be considered balanced, taking into account the sum of over one million dollars which rests at the Bank of Israel in a Romanian account. The sum originates from noncommercial income related to the expenses of those who leave for Israel.”¹⁵ Similar accountings for 1962 and 1967 show continuing trade deficits that are “corrected” in Romania’s favor by the same “noncommercial income.” More precisely, the selling of the Romanian Jews became part of the trade balance between the two countries.

Over a year’s time, Romania often exported goods to Israel that were not always needed by the Jewish state, in sum producing roughly twice the value of Israeli exports to Romania. At the end of each year Israel would pay Romania the difference in cash. It can be safely assumed that these arrangements continued until 1989, as Ambassador Govrin notes in his memoirs: “Israel’s trade with Romania [continued between] 1985 and 1989 on a principle agreed to [in 1984] by Israel’s minister of industry and trade, Gideon Pat, and his Romanian counterpart in Bucharest—according to which Israel would import goods from Romania at a volume twice that of goods exported by Israel to Romania. This was an Israeli gesture.”¹⁶ According to Raviv and Melman, “The Jewish State imported far more Romanian goods than it truly needed—as there is a limit to how much prune jam a country can use.”¹⁷

In fact, a jar of Romanian prune jam could sell in Israel for the price of an empty glass jar. The Israeli government would sometimes instruct state-owned agencies to do business with Romania even if the deal was unprofitable. Take, for example, negotiations between the Romanian foreign trade company Industrial Export and the Israeli transportation company ZIM. ZIM needed four maritime freighters. According to the Romanian ambassador, V. Georgescu, ZIM’s director confessed to him that he had instructions from the Israeli government not to acquire these ships from Yugoslavian or Norwegian companies that were offering them at lower prices. They should be bought from Romania because of “special interests” that superseded commercial ones.¹⁸

Ceaușescu’s Romania had other incentives for developing economic relations with Israel. They enabled Romania to obtain credits in hard currency under highly advantageous conditions. According to records from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1970 Israel granted a $7 million loan to Romania without interest. Since these kinds of “loans” can rarely be found, it is likely that either Israel or a major American Jewish fund-raising organization paid the interest, partially at least. This was not the only occurrence of such a loan. A former high-ranking official at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the author that Israel obtained loans for the Romanian government from West German banks, then paid the interest. More precisely, according to Pacepa, Romania received “several additional large credits issued by various Western banks, with part of the interest payments defrayed by Yeshahanu [Shaike Dan].”¹⁹

Indeed, in January 1970, DIE reported that the state of “Israel granted a $20,000,000 credit. Interest of 9 [and] ¼ 0/0, payable in eight installments, will be defrayed by Israel to the extent we respect the Jews’ emigration schedule. Otherwise, we would have to pay part of the interest.”²⁰

Romanian authorities also obtained hard currency through preferential exchange rates offered by major Jewish organizations in the United States that wished to support a Romanian welfare program—organized by the Federation of Romanian Jewish Communities—for needy and old Jews.

In 1964, Romanian authorities admitted the Joint back into Romania. As Rabbi Rosen recalls: “I warned the government that the Joint was using excuses not to begin work in Romania, and that the Romanians had to take the initiative in breaking the impasse. They responded by agreeing to an exchange rate for the dollar which was 25 percent higher than normal, but they insisted that an agreement could be signed only if I brought in $200,000 a year. I traveled to the United States and managed to obtain $600,000. As a result, the Romanian authorities agreed to a rate of 15 lei to the dollar. This was 25 percent more than the official rate for gifts, which was 12 lei. The general official rate was 6 lei per dollar. The American Distribution Committee wanted a rate of 18 lei, so the haggling continued. It took three long years before we could come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Joint.”²¹ The rate eventually obtained by Rosen was at least three times higher than the official market exchange rate. Even the so-called advantageous rate obtained by the Joint allowed the DGIE to cash a good deal of hard currency: under the Communist regime the worthless leu was always heavily overrated compared to the dollar.

When Ceaușescu took power, he virtually halted the barter system of Jews for agricultural products. He wanted cash, and the Israeli government provided it for every Romanian Jew that reached Lod Airport to begin the absorption program. The Dan-Marcu agreements, periodically reviewed by both sides, regularly filled Romania’s treasury. General Pacepa writes: “In July 1978 this payment amounted to between $2,000 and $50,000 per person. Sometimes Yeshahanu [Dan] was asked to pay up to $250,000.”²² Marcu brought Dan lists of Jews approved for emigration, and Dan and Yanai brought suitcases of cash. It was in 1974 that one of these suitcases, containing $1 million, was lost in Zurich’s airport, only to be found intact two days later.

A table with the rates in operation “Inheritance II” for the Jews who emigrated during 1967-1970, compiled on March 14, 1970, showed the following prices in US dollars per head:

Table 6.1. Prices Paid by Israel to Romania between 1967 and 1970 for One Jewish Person

A graduate | 2,500
A student | 1,500
A skilled worker | 510
An unskilled element, child, etc. | 410¹

1. ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. I, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al., 2011, p. 141.

For the same period, DIE reported the following number of Jewish emigrants:

Table 6.2. Number of Jews Who Emigrated to Israel between 1967 and 1970

1967 | 783
1968 | 170
1970 (the first three months) | 837"¹

1. Ibid.

It is interesting to note that, for 1969, there was a significant discrepancy in this report compared with the Israeli logs regarding the Jews’ emigration from Romania (see the Appendix Emigration from Romaniato Israel, 1948-1989/table Shlomo Leibovici-Lais/Yosif Govrin).

The Sales Accounts

On January 18, 1973, according to the instructions of the Minister of the Interior Ion Stănescu, the Chairman of the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade (BRCE) Vasile Voloseniuc opened account TN 73 that replaced account T 65, and on June 18, 1975, the same Vasile Voloșeniuc informed Ion Stănescu that account TN 75 was opened. TN 73 and TN 75 are the two accounts where most of the amounts obtained from the selling of the Jews to Israel were deposited.²³ Sometimes, part of the sums obtained from these trades in people were deposited into an account of the Ministry of the Interior at BRCE. For example, this is what happened on May 31, 1975, when $870,540 that Gheorghe Marcu obtained from Shaike Dan were deposited into the M.I. account No. 47.21.427.300-1.²⁴

In the 1970s, the meetings between Shaike Dan and Gheorghe Marcu took place in Vienna, Geneva, or Bucharest. Another officer of the Romanian side and another representative of the Liaison Bureau in Israel also participated in these meetings. Gheorghe Marcu received from Shaike Dan cash amounts between $400,000 and $1.5 million. These meetings took place several times every year. Sometimes, the Israeli side would come to the meetings with cash but also with checks of hundreds of thousands of dollars issued by Bank Leumi—New York, the Geneva branch. In one case, on March 20, 1976, documents show Shaike Dan paid with 155 gold coins, with a weight of 1.7 kg.²⁵ DIE used the following procedure for the amounts of money received from Shaike Dan. Under the alias Major General Dorin Pavelescu, Gheorghe Marcu submitted a written request of approval for his meeting with Shaike Dan and for a possible trip to Vienna or Geneva. At the respective meeting, Shaike Dan signed a receipt for the delivery of the respective sums; this receipt often indicated four categories of emigrants: A, B, C, and D. These categories represented: A. graduates; B. students/technicians; C. workers/office workers; D. school students/housewives/retired. In 1976, the state of Israel paid for category A. $3,000 per head and $500 for category D. In his turn, Gheorghe Marcu signed a report for the minister of the interior indicating the amount received from Shaike Dan. The minister of the interior would submit a request to the BRCE chairman asking that the sum received from Shaike Dan be deposited to account TN73.²⁶ Sometimes, Shaike Dan’s receipts included details regarding the loans granted by the state of Israel in exchange for the Jews’ emigration. For example, at the meeting on May 26, 1975, the minutes indicated, in addition to the cash amounts and the checks given to the Romanian side, three loans (two worth $15 million and one worth $25 million) for which the Israeli side committed to defray part of the interest, up to 4.75% or 6%, depending on whether the Romanian side observed the promised emigration pace.²⁷

TN 73 and TN 75 were indeed controlled by Nicolae Ceaușescu who decided how to use the funds in these accounts for different investments that were considered strategic. A report of the Minister of the Interior Teodor Coman, dated January 31, 1978, showed that, on that date, there were $31,552,618 in those accounts and that over $46 million had already been spent on Boeing aircraft, more precisely, the presidential plane Boeing 707, acquisitions of copper, protein flour, soya varieties, as well as for the building and the development of factory of “Stars” (synthetic diamonds).²⁸

A report of unit AVS within UM 0544, dated December 20, 1982, mentioned that, during that year, 1,750 emigration requests for Israel had been approved and that 1,356 persons had already emigrated to that country, for a charge of $2,000,000.²⁹

The accounting figures of CIE and of the Liaison Bureau were very detailed. They took into account the number of emigrants in the categories A, B, C, and D and they would subtract or add, depending on the situation, the persons emigrating to other directions, not to Israel. For example, in 1982, for the emigrants in category A, CIE cashed $1,326,800, and $744,800 for category B. They also cashed $103,580 for those who emigrated to other directions, a bonus of $300,000 for 1,500 persons according to the agreement of December 12, 1982, as well as a difference of $19,627 for 13 persons who left in December 1982. For the emigrants who left for Israel in 1982, CIE collected directly $2,421,307. This amount did not include, obviously, the benefits resulting for the lower interest rate, the difference in the balance of trade between the two countries, and other special arrangements.³⁰

Although Israeli authorities generally paid $2,000 for each Jew who emigrated from Romania to Israel, Romanian authorities asked for as much as $250,000 in “special cases.” Lazar Derera, a Romanian foreign trade employee of Jewish origin, was arrested by Romanian authorities for allegedly sabotaging the economy in a deal with the Tel Aviv–based company Chemical Phosphate. According to Phyllis Yadin, Jacober tried unsuccessfully in 1972 to obtain Derera’s release for a quarter of a million dollars.³¹

A former high-ranking functionary of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that the 1983 negotiations for renewal of the emigration agreement were particularly nettlesome. Ceaușescu had decreed that all would-be emigrants must repay the expense of the free education they had received in Romania’s schools. And CIE negotiators demanded $600,000 in return for Romania’s agreeing to exceed the annual emigration limit of two thousand Jews. To Romania’s annoyance, the Israelis consistently refused to pay for small children and retirees. Israel, for its part, pointed to Romania’s deception with respect to the education of its emigrants: often a low-ranking technician was sold as an engineer with an advanced degree. The CIE demanded $9,500 for each Jew and $15,500 for those between the ages of sixteen and sixty who had educational credentials, from a high school diploma to a Ph.D.

On June 7, 1983, following the arrangement between Israel and Romania regarding the emigration of the Jews that had expired on December 31, 1982, and “based on the approvals received from the higherups,” that is from Nicolae Ceausescu, a new arrangement was agreed upon for the period January 1, 1984—December 31, 1988. The Romanian party committed “to support...an annual emigration at least to the average level [of emigration] during 1981-1982, that was around 1,500 persons, irrespective of their education and professional background..., the Israeli party committed to compensate the Romanian party for each person emigrating to Israel with the sum of $3,300,” with advance payment at the beginning of every quarter.³² The parties agreed to keep the arrangement confidential and to further discuss the issue of the persons who were past the retirement age, for whom the Israeli party was not willing to pay.

On January 19, 1989, CIE received again the approval from Nicolae Ceaușescu to negotiate with the Israeli party a new arrangement regarding the selling of the Jews. The Romanian party wanted “not to set an annual number of persons to emigrate to Israel. . .[and]. . .to increase the hard currency compensatory payments. . .” made by Israel for the emigrants. [Document from a government of Romania archive that requested to remain anonymous]. The mandate of the Romanian party specified that the new confidential arrangement should not “. . .exceed, however, the number stipulated in the arrangement for the period 1983-1988” and that “. . .the Israeli party should be persuaded to accept the satisfactory increase of the compensatory sums in hard currency that are to be paid for each person....”³³ Indeed, during the negotiations, in 1989, the Romanian officials reiterated that the price for each Jewish emigrant must be raised in compensation for the cost of that person’s education and health care. Romanian representatives also requested that Israel be willing to accept fewer than its annual minimum quota of emigrants, and they demanded that Israel pay in advance for the emigrants’ transportation to Israel. According to a high-ranking former Israeli diplomat, the Romanians were paid by the Jewish Agency with funds that originated usually from the United Jewish Appeal, sometimes from the American Joint Distribution Committee (the Joint) in the United States.

Ceaușescu personally supervised the DIE’s financial operations. As we noticed at the close of 1973, he had ordered the opening of a secret account that he controlled personally, code named TA, which contained every penny obtained by the DIE from its foreign currency operations. According to Pacepa, “The money the DIE obtained from the West in the form of checks or bank transfers that could be legally controlled was immediately deposited in the Romanian bank of foreign trade known as BRCE and credited to the national budget. But the money obtained by the DIE in hard cash—most of it from the export of Jews and Germans—was recorded only in Ceaușescu’s TA accounts. Cash received in other currencies was exchanged in dollars, usually in Zurich. The dollar bills received from Bonn and Tel Aviv were first ‘laundered’ into new ones in case the numbers were recorded, and then were kept [temporarily] in a DIE underground vault. This was Ceaușescu’s secret slush fund.”³⁴

Propelled by a thirst for hard currency, in 1970 Ceaușescu and Ion Stănescu (head of Securitate) ordered the DIE to begin Peregrinii (Pilgrims), another extortion operation related to emigration. It was coordinated by General Gheorghe Bolînu, head of the DIE’s third division (which controlled emigration and counterespionage), and General Eugen Luchian, who served in the Office for Security and Military Matters of the Council of Ministers. The coordination among the Commission for Passports and Visas by the Council of Ministers whose secretary was Eugen Luchian, the UM 0920, and the Directorate for passports, foreigners’ records, and border control in the Ministry of the Interior was far from perfect, as evidenced in the 1971-1972 correspondence among these three entities regarding the emigration of the Jews.³⁵ According to the declarations General Eugen Luchian made in 1978, the connection between the Commission for Passports and Visas by the Council of Ministers and UM 0920 was made by General Gheorghe Marcu or by some of the officers under his supervision.³⁶

Colonel Sandu Florea’s report dated October 2, 1978, pointed out: ”In this operation [Peregrinii] officers of sector “LC” were engaged—Col. Sandu Florea, Col. Gudina Tudor, Col. Gaman Pompiliu, Lt. Col. Florea George, Lt. Col. Brescan Ion, and Lt. Col. Stancu Dumitru (deceased); from the Governmental Commission for Passports and Visas by the Council of Ministers, [were engaged] officers Major Cartis Gheorghe and, for a very short time, Col. Mazilu [Constantin] and Col. Dumitru [Virgil]. This operation was carried out within Division V3. ... To identify the persons who wanted to emigrate and their relatives who were willing to pay amounts in hard currency in the form of donations to the state covering education expenses, permanent and incidental sources were used. The internal sources used [by the officers] in the team led by Major General Luchian Eugen included: lawyer Micșa Remus, lawyer Pora Ion, Ganea (Goldemberg Bebe), Călugărașu Nicolae, Mrs. Nicolescu, etc.³⁷

Romanian citizens with relatives who wished to leave the country, or potential candidates themselves—whether ethnic Romanians, Germans, or Jews—were approached and asked for cash, apartments in Romania, cars, and other valuables in exchange for permission to emigrate. The going rate was $826 to $10,000 per person. This operation was so secret that it was “strictly” forbidden “. . . for any other officer of UM 0920 or of any other central or territorial units of the Ministry of the Interior to learn anything about it. The operation will be carried out as a fully clandestine operation, and only the cadre mentioned under Chapter I, Art. 3, will know about it, “. . . that is, officers at the Commission for Passports and Visas by the Council of Ministers and those from Sector LC—Currency Department of UM 0920. In March 1973, the Interior Minister Emil Bobu re-approved operation Peregrinii requesting “. . . to secure a non-disclosure agreement from each of the officers involved in this operation.”³⁸

Mihai Pelin emphasizes that the precedent of the Peregrinii operation was “. . . the Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 261/1957 that was aimed at regulating the hard currency that could be used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs when it resulted from the ministry’s operations. Decree 210/1960 consolidated the provisions of the DCM [Decision of the Council of Ministers] No. 261/1957, and on February 23, 1966, through DCM No. 270, the previous regulations were reviewed also to the benefit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially [to the benefit] of the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence. 80% of the currency we are referring to was deposited to the State Bank of Romania, and 20% was deposited into a special account of MAI [Ministry of Internal Affairs].”³⁹

A Securitate document cited by Mihai Pelin offers further details regarding operation Peregrinii: “In order to identify the persons who could pay, in addition to other means, internal sources with relations among the citizens applying for emigration were also used. The respective persons were contacted undercover. Usually, the officers introduced themselves as civil servants or Bar representatives. After establishing the amount of money agreed upon that was to be donated by the person applying for permanent emigration, a report was drawn up indicating the hard currency amount agreed on and requesting that emigration be approved. The report was approved by the chairman of the State Security Council, Ion Stănescu, or by one of this deputies, Grigore Răduică and Constantin Stoica. ... Within this operation, amounts in millions of hard currency were brought into the country, along with a significant number of cars. Some of the emigrants also donated to the state personal real estate that later became safe houses of UM920.”⁴⁰ This was the situation of the safe house Minerva, located at 53-55, Sc. 3, Ap. 93 Mihai Bravu Blvd., a one bedroom apartment used mostly by officer Gheorghe Cartis, who operated under the alias Virgil Marian, with ID Series L, No. 808117, who met at this address with different emigration candidates to sign the invoices for the sums they were being robbed in exchange for the passports.”⁴¹

Another DIE officer involved in the Pegregrinii operation, under the alias Silviu Șerbănoiu, was Colonel Tudor Gudină. “In the 1950s, he had worked at the Directorate for Criminal Investigations where he had beaten to the pulp hundreds of people who had been abusively arrested, especially Zionist Jews, many of whom managed to emigrate later. This is what his superior experience regarding Israeli intelligence consisted of.”⁴² In 1972, in exchange for some passports, Tudor Gudina robbed doctor Jean Eskenasy of an apartment located at 5-7 Șoseaua Cotroceni, that later became the Securitate safe house, and of $10,000 with an invoice that was also seized by the Securitate officer.⁴³

Furthermore, the Peregrinii operation identified persons who “had damaged the national economy or who were sentenced for such actions and who have [monetary] possibilities and are willing to pay for the damages incurred and for the jail sentences with hard currency transfers home from the relatives or friends in the Western countries.”⁴⁴ Along with Major Cartis Gheorghe, colonels Constantin Mazilu and Virgil Dumitru of the Commission for Passports and Visas by the Council of Ministers also participated in the Peregrinii operation. Together with Tudor Gudină, colonels Florea Sandu, Pompiliu Găman, and Ion Brescan of UM0920 were also involved in the Peregrinii operation.⁴⁵

In December 1973, Ceaușescu terminated Peregrinii under the pretext of “unfavorable echoes in the international media.”⁴⁶ But in fact the reason was that too many DIE officers and informants—dealing privately with emigrants—were diverting funds from Ceaușescu’s pockets.⁴⁷ In its first seven months, Peregrinii netted slightly more than $1.3 million in deutschemarks, French francs, and Swiss francs.⁴⁸ Investigated after Pacepa’s 1978 defection, General Luchian stated that Peregrinii generated a total of about $6 million for Romania’s treasury. On November 28, 1978, the investigation on Pacepa’s defection motioned to have colonels Constantin Mazilu and Florea Sandu demoted to the rank of soldier and transferred to the reserves. Major Gheorghe Cartiș had the same fate, and former Major-General Eugen Luchian was sentenced to eight years in jail. These officers were accused of having stolen sums of money and goods from the would-be emigrants.⁴⁹

According to Pacepa, the unit charged with securing cash from the West and administering the funds obtained from the sale of Jews also constructed and managed a factory that produced synthetic diamonds based on technologies stolen from the De Beers company of South Africa, and using equipment illegally imported from Sweden. The DIE unit also managed two Romanian foreign trade companies, one specializing in contraband arms and industrial diamonds, the other in civil and industrial construction in the Third World.⁵⁰ Pacepa recalls, “Obtaining cash dollars from the West had taken priority over all the DIE’s other intelligence jobs. [In 1978] Ceaușescu increased the DIE’s annual quota to $1 billion. Of course the DIE was far from being in a position to meet such a ridiculous quota.”⁵¹

In the spring of 1978, Ceaușescu widened his command of the DIE’s hard-currency operations. He took control of the DIE’s bank accounts by creating a “collecting account” code named OV-78. Signed by Teodor Coman, minister of the interior, the order creating account OV-78—which contained $64,761,473—stated that it was created by Ceaușescu’s order. It also stated that money kept in accounts TN-73 and TN-75, which held funds obtained from the sale of Jews and ethnic Germans, should be transferred to OV-78. Lastly, it ordered the DIE to double OV-78’s balance. This order was to be handled by Generals Pacepa, Alexandru Danescu, Gheorghe Marcu, and Teodor Sîrbu.⁵²

How was the DIE to achieve these goals? An appendix to the same order specified traditional export operations in addition to the “confidential export of neutralized goods,” the “selling of products prohibited for export or import,” and the “selling of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment.”⁵³ The “confidential export of neutralized goods” meant that a country’s import quotas would be circumvented by using a third party with access to that market. The “selling of products prohibited for export or import” meant, according to Pacepa, that the DIE should obtain hard currency from the sale of counterfeited Kent cigarettes, Teacher’s Scotch whiskey, and Campari aperitif, all manufactured illegally in Romania under the DIE’s supervision.

Ceaușescu also authorized the DIE to sell drugs to the West. He used his own border patrol and counterfeited documents in order to profit from the drug trade. In one episode related by Pacepa, Ceaușescu “had just been informed that three hundred pounds of cocaine from the Middle East had been confiscated at the Romanian border on its way to the West, and he had ordered his minister of the interior to draw up false documents showing that the cocaine had been burned in accordance with international agreements Romania had signed. ‘The West needs oxygen, doesn’t it?’ Ceaușescu quipped, looking at Doicaru and me. The money the DIE obtained from smuggling that cocaine into Western Europe added a healthy padding to Ceaușescu’s special ‘TA’ bank account.”⁵⁴

When it came to the sale of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment, Ceaușescu had no scruples. Using the Romanian Defense Ministry’s foreign trade company, Romtehnica, he sold weapons to whoever was interested. In 1985, according to the Washington Post, Romania was the world’s fifth-largest exporter of munitions.⁵⁵ It sold any kind of weapon its DIE officers could steal or its industry could reproduce. It sold uniforms to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and jointly entered into military manufacturing ventures with Muammar Gadhafi. It even sold Soviet military technology to the U.S. government. In July 1979, Washington purchased four personnel carriers from Ceaușescu via his brothers Marin and Ilie. The former was stationed as a commercial attaché in Vienna while the latter served as Romania’s deputy minister of defense. Designed to be used for training purposes, with a “low level of sophistication,” according to correspondent Benjamin Weiser, the vehicles arrived in the United States “on a Yugoslav freighter, the Klek.”⁵⁶

The four personnel carriers had no special value for Washington, but this was the beginning of an astonishing relationship. Weiser writes, “For ten years before deposed Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu’s execution, the U.S. government secretly bought advanced military technology from Romania.... As a part of the clandestine intelligence program coordinated by the CIA, the U.S. government paid more than $40 million through foreign middlemen, with about 20 percent ending up in Swiss accounts controlled by the Ceaușescu family.... The U.S. military were able to obtain important components of tactical, non-nuclear weaponry—including air defense systems—that the Soviet Union has in place to protect itself and other Warsaw Pact countries. From Romania alone the acquisitions included the latest version of the Shilka, one of the most effective anti-aircraft systems in the Soviet inventory; mobile rocket launchers that had been modified and improved by the Romanian military; and radar systems used in identifying and directing.... Of all the East Bloc deals, the Romanian transactions may have been the most stunning because of Ceaușescu’s involvement.”⁵⁷

As in all Communist countries, Romania’s economic and social bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient and corrupt. Yet when it came to the hard-currency operations, business was streamlined. According to Liviu Turcu, head of the North America department of the CIE, who defected to the United States in January 1989, “In order to organize the special hard currency operations, at the beginning of the 1980s, on Nicolae Ceaușescu’s secret order no. 000320, a special structure was created in CIE, its existence a secret even inside the [Romanian foreign intelligence]. Named U.M. 0107/AVS, this structure had discretionary authority inside the Securitate over foreign trade operations.”⁵⁸

This special unit of the CIE was headed until 1985 by Colonel Stelian Octavian Andronic (alias Nicolae Arnăutu) and later by Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Anghelache (alias Gelu Eftimie). Andronic and Anghelache replaced Marcu and handled the sale of Romanian Jews to the Israeli Liaison Bureau.

A former DIE officer stationed in Israel and the Netherlands, Andronic was trusted by the Securitate’s leaders and by Ceaușescu personally since he had also been involved in the ultra-sensitive sale of weapons to the United States. According to Weiser, beginning in 1979 Andronic “flew to Switzerland on a regular basis and coordinated the diversion of funds to the family’s secret bank accounts... and ... sometimes opened the accounts himself.”⁵⁹

Andronic later explained that his mission involved “the following main tasks: to bring to Romania hard currency resulting from the estates of Romanians who lived abroad; to transfer to special accounts from the BRCE ... the amounts that resulted from the agreements with West Germany and Israel concerning emigration; to handle the operations for obtaining hard currency apart from the export of goods; and to obtain commissions from various foreign trade operations.”⁶⁰

According to Leibovici-Lais, in the late 1960s the West German government probably discovered that Romania was selling its Jews to Israel. In fact, West Germany had started to buy ethnic Germans from Romania through Jakober. Gradually, as had been the case with the state of Israel, the middlemen were excluded. One way or another, irrespective of the chronological order, the Romanians suggested to the Germans that the two countries begin to discuss the emigration of ethnic Germans from Romania. “But, from habit, they imposed one condition: keep this a secret, and don’t tell the Israelis anything.”⁶¹

The West German government defied Romania’s caution and queried the Israeli government directly. According to Shaike Dan, “On more than one occasion our ambassador in Bonn, Arthur Ben-Nathan, was asked by ministers in the German government how Israel manages to get the Jews out of Romania. Golda Meir was even asked to come and explain it.”⁶²

In 1967, when diplomatic relations between Romania and West Germany were first established, “roughly 60,000 ethnic Germans requested permission to emigrate.” According to the same U.S. report, by 1978 “some 80,000 had departed for West Germany.”⁶³ Ceaușescu’s sale of ethnic Germans to West Germany was no different from his sale of Jews to Israel: “In 1978 the two countries negotiated an agreement concerning the remaining German population, which had decreased from 2 percent of the total population in 1966 to 1.6 percent in 1977. Romania agreed to allow 11,000 to 13,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate each year in return for hard currency and a payment of 5,000 deutschemarks [$2,414] per person [under the pretext] of reimbursing the state for educational expenses. In 1982 that figure rose to $3,122–$3,568 [7,000–8,000 deutschemarks] per person. In the decade between 1978 and 1988, approximately 120,000 Germans emigrated, leaving behind a population of only about 200,000, between 80 and 90 percent of whom wanted to emigrate.... In 1987 an entire village of some 200 ethnic Germans applied en masse for emigration permits.”⁶⁴

As with the sale of Jews to Israel, Romania obtained interest-free or low-interest loans from West Germany in exchange for its ethnic Germans. The negotiations, however, were fraught with challenges. In 1979, West Germany’s chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Bucharest and “extended credit guarantees of approximately $368 million in return for Romanian pledges to facilitate the reunification of ethnic German families.”⁶⁵ In 1983 the question of emigration was again discussed as Ceaușescu sought to increase the “education tax” per ethnic German emigrant from the equivalent of $2,632 to $42,105. Both Bavarian premier Franz Joseph Strauss and West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visited Romania and agreed to pay approximately $5,263 per emigrant. According to press reports, the agreement remained in effect through June 1988 and provided for the annual emigration of 11,000 to 13,000 Transylvanian Saxons. In January 1989, Romania agreed to maintain this rate of emigration.

Romania’s relations with West Germany—at their most cordial during Willi Brandt’s chancellorship—deteriorated in the 1980s. In a 1984 visit to Bonn, Ceaușescu sought to exploit a setback in West German relations with Bulgaria, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Observers believed the Romanian president was determined to rebuild his reputation in the West. But disagreements over arms control, trade, and the treatment of ethnic Germans darkened the talks and prevented Ceaușescu from gaining ground.

In the late 1980s, as West Germany lost patience with Romanian policies, restrained criticism gave way to outright protest. In April 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that the situation of Romania’s ethnic Germans had become intolerable. The West German Foreign Ministry officially condemned Romania’s human rights policies.⁶⁶

Edgar Hirt, West Germany’s chief “reunification of families” negotiator with East Germany, declared that Romania’s primary negotiation tactic was blackmail. “The Romanians had proved quite cash-thirsty indeed. Entire families of ethnic Germans seeking to emigrate and claim German citizenship had sometimes been arrested by the Securitate, the secret police arm of the most ruthless dictatorship the Communist world had known since Stalin’s death.”

Hirt’s protests against the Romanian government’s practices had little effect. According to Romanian officials, Bonn willingly sponsored the liberation of East German political prisoners. Interested in liberating Germans from Romania, Hirt made direct payments to the Romanian diplomats and DIE undercover officers stationed in Bonn. According to Craig Whitney, an expert in the history of the East German secret services, “Hirt began inviting the [Romanian] ambassador or his deputy chief of mission for a chat and a cup of coffee, sometimes, he claimed, wordlessly slipping an envelope with 50,000 or 60,000 deutschemarks [$18,000–$21,000] across the table. Freed with money thus drawn from [the Catholic church’s] Caritas, the arrested ethnic Germans began to turn up at Frankfurt airport.”⁶⁷

Ceaușescu also attempted to extort money from West Germany by using the tens of thousands of Holocaust victims who still lived in Romania. He wanted the war reparations owed to the Jewish and Romanian victims to be placed in his own bank accounts, whereupon he would pay the victims in lei at an exchange rate he established. According to the West German ambassador Erwin Wickert, who served in Romania between 1971 and 1976, “The German side refused systematically to take into account these requests under the pretext that Romania under Antonescu was an ally of Nazi Germany. At Ceaușescu’s order, faked lists [sic] of victims were given to Germany. During his visit in Bonn, the Romanian dictator tried once more—without success—to play the restitution card.”⁶⁸ According to a former Israeli diplomat, the Romanian authorities enlisted Moses Rosen in an effort to obtain these reparations from Germany, but Israel opposed this deal and it fell through.

More precisely, this official robbery attempt unfolded as follows. Less than five months after diplomatic relations had been established between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany (January 31, 1967), on June 14, 1967, the Department of Cults, in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the National Bank, taking into account that “... the Federal Republic of Germany awards compensations to the victims of Nazism, and, in our country, there are Romanian citizens who could raise such claims,” proposed that the Federation of the Jewish Communities “suggest ... to submit requests, as private individuals requesting compensations ... [because] ... it would not be appropriate for our country to raise officially compensation claims.”⁶⁹

In 1971, thirty-one containers with 155,125 compensation files were delivered by Romania’s ambassador to the FRG to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The largest number of files originated from counties in Northern Transylvania, Maramureș, and Bucharest, with over 11,000 files per county, as well as from the counties of Iași, Mureș, and Cluj, with over 6,000 files per county. The majority of the petitioners were Jews, but there were also Roma and Romanians. All the documents were in Romanian and German, having been notarized in Romania and in FRG.⁷⁰

Mihai Pelin describes this operation as follows: “After having obtained new approvals from the party authorities, the entity headed by Nicolae Doicaru launched the operation with the code name Recolta. Later, 155,126 files were speedily compiled regarding persons who had been affected by the Wehrmacht or by the Nazi regime; about 22,000 files for persons whose assets had been seized by the German army; about 3,500 files for persons who had been politically persecuted by the Germans in the same period, as well as 451 files for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments done in the concentration camps during the Second World War. Persons of Jewish origin fell almost exclusively in this final category.”⁷¹ Obviously, Nicolae Ceaușescu would not accept the idea that the Romanian state could not profit from such an operation and devised a plan whereby the compensations awarded to the petitioners were to be deposited to the National Bank at an exchange rate he would establish. Some of the files sent to Germany were fake, but most of them were valid. That is the reason why the negotiations with the FRG failed and tens of thousands of people were denied the compensations they deserved. From this point of view, Kadar’s Hungary was more clever and the RFG compensated individually the Hungarian citizens, survivors of the Holocaust.

Ambassador Wickert notes in his memoirs the amounts paid for various German immigrants: 1,800 deutschemarks ($650) for a person with no education; 5,500 deutschemarks ($1,964) for a university student; 7,000 deutschemarks ($2,500) for a student in the final year of school; 11,000 deutschemarks ($3,298) for a person with an M.A. or M.B. degree; and 2,900 deutschemarks ($1,035) for a skilled worker. He also describes how the money changed hands: Securitate officers traveling to Germany picked up the cash and carried it in suitcases direct to Switzerland, where they deposited it in secret accounts.⁷²

According to a 1991 memo addressed by the Romanian minister of foreign affairs to his colleague in the Ministry of Justice, these German funds were “deposited in a Swiss bank in Basel in [one of] two accounts. One of the accounts was open to Romanian companies, but the other was known only by those who made the payments and by the people trusted by the Ceaușescu family.”⁷³

Germany not only paid for the emigrants but, in December 1983 or January 1984, deposited an additional one million deutschemarks ($421,230) in a CIE account. “The Germans’ condition was that Romania use this money to buy only German products. Ceaușescu obliged ... and bought ‘special equipment’ for the Romanian ministry of the interior.” In 1982 the West German government also offered Romania a low-interest credit of 800 million deutschemarks ($330 million).⁷⁴

For 22 years, Dr. Heinz Guenther Huesch mediated on behalf of West Germany with the DIE and CIE. According to the Canadian Broadcasting Company, over the course of 200 meetings Huesch negotiated about 200,000 departures of ethnic Germans from Romania at a price of 10,000 to 15,000 deutschemarks ($4,000 to $6000) per person.⁷⁵ Luminița Dobre and Florian Banu noted that, between 1950 and 1999, a number of 428,666 ethnic Germans left Romania. Of these, 5,384 left between 1950 and 1960, and 186,400 between 1990 and 1999. Therefore, it means that 186,400 ethnic Germans were sold by DGIE/DIE/CIE between 1961 and 1989.⁷⁶ For years, according to Pacepa, Huesch was Marcu’s main contact, which Ceaușescu “considered potentially even more advantageous,” given that there was now a far greater population of ethnic Germans in Romania than Jews.⁷⁷ According to the study authored by Luminița Dobre and Florian Banu, on March 15, 1970, the direct price cashed by Romania per head of ethnic German was as follows:

Table 6.3. Prices Paid in 1970 by the Federal Republic of Germany to Romania for One Ethnic German Person

a) a higher education graduate | 11,000 DMW (app.$3,000
b) an undergraduate student | 5,500 DMW (app. $1,506
c) a technician | 2,800 DMW (app. $792)
d) no professional training | 1,800 DMW (app. 490)¹

1. Dobre and Banu, 2011, p. XLIII.

Obviously, at each round of negotiations the price was increased.

West German emigration payments to Romania were largely made by Commerzbank AG-Neuss. A Romanian investigation into Ceaușescu’s foreign bank accounts—begun after his execution—revealed that AG-Neuss made payments to the BRCE accounts OV-78, Feroviarul, AA, and AC—all of which were accounts replenished by CIE and byother civil or military entities involved in the Romanian foreign trade and controlled by Ceaușescu. AG-Neuss made a total of thirteen payments with a combined value of more than 134 million deutschemarks (about $54 million).⁷⁸ As recently as August 24, 1989, four months before Ceaușescu’s execution, Huesch had AGNeuss pay Lieutenant Colonel Anghelache, Colonel Andronic’s successor in the handling of these accounts, 9,308,000 deutschemarks (about $5 million).⁷⁹

Israel also fattened Ceaușescu’s accounts. Indeed, according to a Canadian investigative journalist, the Israeli government and Jewish organizations had paid Ceaușescu no less than $60 million in cash in return for Jewish exit visas in the 1970s and 1980s.⁸⁰ At one point in the mid-1980s Shaike Dan obtained from the Joint an extra $250,000 (beyond the moneys regularly paid to the Israeli authorities by the Jewish Agency for the emigration of Romanian Jews), which he paid to his Romanian contacts in order to obtain exit visas for an additional eight hundred Jews.⁸¹ A high-ranking former Israeli diplomat estimated that $50 million was paid by the Israeli government to DIE/ CIE for exit visas. A rough calculation would indicate that, between 1968 and 1989, Ceaușescu sold 40,577 Jews to Israel for $112,498,800, at a price of $2,500 and later at $3,300 per head.

Israel actually paid less per head for emigration than the amounts noted above, since it paid for neither children nor retirees. An accurate accounting must nonetheless include the money given to Romania during the barter periods (these amounts are difficult to estimate) as well as the funds conveyed each year by Israel to cover the importexport difference between the two countries, as well as the profits generated by the interest-free or low-interest loans. Pacepa’s generalization is probably the most accurate: “Over the years the Yeshahanu [Dan]-Marcu agreement netted Bucharest hundreds of millions of dollars.”

The Jewish minority in Romania declined dramatically because of emigration. By 1988 the Jewish population there had dwindled to roughly 23,000, of which half were sixtyfive or older.⁸² Consequently Romanian authorities had to scramble to find enough Romanian Jews to fill their promised quota. In 1989, Ceaușescu directed the CIE to allow people in mixed marriages to leave for Israel, and to obtain more money per head.⁸³ It is unknown whether a final emigration agreement was signed in the second half of 1989. In that year, 941 Romanian Jews left for Israel, and Bank Leumi deposited $3.2 million in four installments into the TN-75 account controlled by Ceaușescu and the AA account controlled by Securitate. That same year the New York Bank Hapoalim deposited another $2 million to the same AA account of BRCE.⁸⁴

In December 1989, during the trial of Ceaușescu and his wife, Elena, the prosecutor asked, “Let us now talk about the accounts in Switzerland, Mr. Ceaușescu. What about the accounts?” Elena Ceaușescu replied, “Accounts in Switzerland? Furnish proof!” Ceaușescu said, “We had no account in Switzerland. Nobody has opened an account. This shows again how false the charges are. What defamation, what provocation!”⁸⁵ Three hours later a firing squad executed the Ceaușescus.

In 1990 the former minister of the interior, Tudor Postelnicu, was imprisoned along with the members of the Romanian Communist party Politburo. But Lieutenant Colonel Anghelache, allegedly his nephew, whom Dan Badea, a gifted Romanian journalist, called “a doctor in the slave trade,” was still at large, slipping over borders under false names and various passports, hastily closing accounts and transferring Ceaușescu’s fortune to new ones. His role as Romania’s delegate to the FIFA (the International Federation of Football Associations—the most important world soccer association) was, according to Liviu Turcu, the perfect cover for his travels to Switzerland’s banks.⁸⁶

7

The Washington Equation

When Ceaușescu came to power, Romania’s relations with the United States were cool and peripheral. Although Romania’s condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the opening of the Vietnam War–related Paris peace talks improved the atmosphere, U.S. trade restrictions with Eastern European countries held economic relations to a minimum. Then, in August 1969, President Nixon visited Romania—the first visit to a Communist country by an American head of state since the 1945 Yalta Conference. Nixon was warmly received. He and Ceaușescu discussed a wide variety of international problems and agreed, as a U.S. embassy report noted, “upon the mutual establishment of libraries, the opening of negotiations for the conclusion of a consular convention, and the development and diversification of economic ties.”¹ Nixon sought to improve economic relations with Romania, and in 1972 Congress debated granting the country Most Favored Nation status.

David Funderburk, a former ambassador to Romania, observed that Ceaușescu and Nixon were “admiring friends” because they had “such a fixation on power—its acquisition and retention,” and because “Nixon and Kissinger apparently became convinced that Ceaușescu could be trusted and was a bona fide maverick. Thus they could use him. In reality he has used them.”² Nixon’s spectacular overture to Romania set a precedent that many succeeding administrations in Washington would follow.

One of the main goals of Ceaușescu’s foreign policy, for reasons of trade and prestige, was to obtain Most Favored Nation status. But the goodwill of U.S. administrations, Ceaușescu’s diplomatic gimmicks, and the efforts of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs (dominated by DIE officers) fell short of their target.

To obtain Most Favored Nation status, the U.S. Congress had to be persuaded to grant it. Toward this end Ceaușescu enlisted the help of Rabbi Rosen and the Israeli government. Rosen described his lobbying efforts: “Beginning in 1975 ... I ceaselessly strove to obtain this U.S. status for Romania. It would provide the country with many hundreds of millions of dollars, on the one hand; it would also facilitate alyah, i.e., the possibility for every Jew to leave for Israel if he wished to do so.”³

Govrin confirms Rosen and Israel’s efforts to help Romania. Rosen, he writes, “served as an advocate for Romania’s leadership among the American administration and [in] public opinion by praising the freedom of religious observances and the national rights that the Jews enjoyed in Romania. Israel’s prime ministers and ambassadors in Washington and Bucharest joined Chief Rabbi Rosen’s activity as intercessor, as did Jewish organizations in the U.S.A., which were impressed by the relative liberty exercised by Romania’s Jewish minority.... They also took into consideration Romania’s policy of permitting Jews to emigrate to Israel (though not at the desired rate); that it had not broken off diplomatic relations with Israel; the fact that Romania did not vote for the anti-Zionist resolution in the United Nations; and its enabling free access (although always monitored by the security service) of official Israeli representatives in Bucharest to maintain contact with Romania’s Jewish communities.”⁴

Israel was initially reluctant to support Romania’s bid for Most Favored Nation status, but Ceaușescu threatened to halt the emigration of Romanian Jews without Israeli support. The Israeli agencies in charge of emigration and the Israeli cabinet met to discuss this situation. They hesitated. Ceaușescu sent Rosen to Israel with the message, “Help us obtain the MFN, otherwise Romanian Jews will starve”—an implicit threat to the Joint’s operation in Romania.

Despite reservations about Rosen, Israel eventually decided to support Romania’s bid for Most Favored Nation status. Yet its support made a negligible impact on the emigration of Jews from Romania.⁵ Rosen knew that Israel held him in low esteem: “Certain interests in Israel were unhappy with some of my initiatives. This occurred in particular during my prolonged efforts to help the Romanian economy by using the goodwill that I had obtained in the United States.”⁶

Ambassador Roger Kirk, who represented the United States in Romania between 1984 and 1989, and Mircea Răceanu, deputy head of the U.S. desk in Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assessed Rosen’s lobbying efforts: “Rosen’s consummate skill [was] at operating within the Romanian system and [in] his willingness to be useful to Ceaușescu by lobbying for Romania in the United States and by issuing public statements of gratitude to Ceaușescu’s Jewish policy even while pushing Ceaușescu for additional concessions. Rosen’s maneuverings and self-importance ... earned him the enmity, even contempt, of some observers inside and outside Romania. Others considered his service to Ceaușescu as a betrayal of his honor and even of his faith.”⁷ Kirk and Raceanu believe that Rosen sincerely tried to help his people, and that he was effective precisely because he was uncompromising.

With Rosen and Israel’s assistance, Ceaușescu finally prevailed. In July 1975 the U.S. Congress approved the entire Romanian trade package and renewed Most Favored Nation status beginning in January 1976.⁸ Ceaușescu was jubilant and believed, according to Kirk, that Washington “needed Romania so badly that it would grant him MFN status without the conditions mandated by U.S. law.”⁹

This miscalculation would later cost Ceaușescu dearly. As Govrin writes, “Romania enjoyed this status in conjunction with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment passed by the American Congress as an integral part of the Trade Law, stipulating that the granting of MFN status to Communist countries should be conditional upon granting of permission to emigrate to its citizens.”¹⁰ Furthermore, Congress was to reassess the status annually. Ceaușescu had opened Romania to periodic scrutiny from abroad; his unwillingness to improve local human rights conditions would lead to conflict.

In 1975, as Kirk writes, Romania became the first East European country to receive Most Favored Nation status; by 1981 bilateral trade had reached $1 billion. Yet because of “persistent reports of human rights violations in Romania and the regime’s decision to impose an education tax on applicants for exit visas, the United States Congress hesitated to renew most-favored-nation status.”¹¹ Major Jewish organizations in the United States became suspicious of Ceaușescu’s actions. The Romanian dictator allowed 2,393 Jews to leave for Israel in 1975 and 2,223 in 1976, far below 1973 and 1974 numbers when 4,123 and 3,729 respectively were allowed to leave. In 1977, in an effort to boost emigration numbers, Dr. William Korey from B’nai B’rith International and Jacob Birnbaum of the Center for Russian and East European Jewry “urged Congress to implement a monitoring procedure to facilitate Jewish emigration.”¹²

On April 12, 1978, President Jimmy Carter cordially greeted Ceaușescu in Washington but emphasized the importance of human rights in bilateral relations. The next day Ceaușescu met with Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson at the Romanian embassy. According to Pacepa, in his discussion with Ceaușescu “Jackson was polite but very firm, his main concern being over human rights and freedom of emigration. He stated flatly that, based on his experience, Bucharest repeatedly tried to cheat on emigration; that the current situation, according to verifiable figures he had, was far from satisfactory; that emigration policies and human rights were systematically violated by Bucharest; and that substantial corrections would have to be made if Romania wanted to preserve its most-favored-nation status.”¹³ Nestor Rateș, the Washington correspondent for Radio Free Europe, who was present at the meeting, recalled that, having listened to Ceaușescu, Jackson closed the meeting by saying: “Mr. President, [what you have said] is propaganda. No emigration, no MFN.”¹⁴

Israel, not wishing to jeopardize the influx of Jews from Romania, had worried that if Romania were granted Most Favored Nation status, Washington would eventually discover its special emigration arrangements. According to Rosen, “Certain circles in Israel were actually conducting an organized campaign against granting MFN status to Romania.”¹⁵ No one in the United States knew what was happening, according to Pacepa, until he defected. Even President Carter was unaware of the deal between Israel and Romania; he noted on Pacepa’s report of the arrangement, “Absolute novelty.”¹⁶

Jewish organizations in the United States were also divided over the renewal of Romania’s Most Favored Nation status. In 1979, Jacob Birnbaum, a crusader for Soviet Jewry, “wanted Congress to suspend ... the MFN until Romania increased the number of Jews permitted to emigrate to Israel.”¹⁷ The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, on the other hand, endorsed the extension. In Rosen’s view, “The leaders of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington were involved in a sophisticated campaign. They did not ask that the MFN status be withheld from Romania, but that the possibility should always be there so that the Romanians should be frightened into agreeing to increase the number of Jews leaving for Israel.”¹⁸ American Jewish organizations and Congress were justifiably suspicious of Ceaușescu’s true intentions. In June 1978, Senator Jackson wrote President Carter about Romania’s “erratic emigration process,” complaining that “Bucharest quickly processed emigration applications during congressional hearings but showed little interest in assisting emigrants during the remainder of the year.”¹⁹

This indeed was Ceaușescu’s pattern. Whenever a high-ranking U.S. official from the State Department or Congress visited Romania, Ceaușescu released a few dozen Jews and non-Jews who had waited years to emigrate. Whenever Romania’s Most Favored Nation status was due to be renewed, or when Romania came under the scrutiny of Congress, he accelerated emigration, later reducing it to its “normal” pace. While Congress repeatedly endorsed the MFN extension, it continued to express increasingly strong concerns about Romania’s human rights situation.

In May 1983, Senator Jesse Helms met with the Romanian foreign minister, Stefan Andrei, and told him that “you have not lived up to the assurances and promises of last year.”²⁰ Romania had not only failed to fulfill its emigration promises; in 1983 the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee called Romania’s human rights situation a disaster. Applicants for emigration became targets of discrimination; dissidents were routinely harassed and confined to psychiatric hospitals; typewriters had to be registered with the police; trade unions were prohibited or severely repressed; foreign contacts were heavily restricted; publications were severely censored; and foreign journalists were constantly badgered.²¹

In October 1983 the Ceaușescu regime claimed that the emigration purposefully encouraged by the West was becoming a “brain drain” for the nation. To compensate Romania, Ceaușescu proposed a heavy tax “requiring would-be emigrants to reimburse the state for the cost of their education.”²² Although it was against the law in Romania to hold foreign currency, emigration candidates were asked to pay as much as $20,000 in hard cash in order to leave. Under West German, Israeli, and American pressure—including the threatened revocation of Romania’s Most Favored Nation status—Ceaușescu yielded, and the tax was not officially imposed.

Washington, outraged by Ceaușescu’s proposal, viewed it as further evidence of “Romania’s inhumane practices.”²³ Bonn was equally upset by the treatment of ethnic Germans in Romania and made this clear to the Romanian government.

Yet Washington, Bonn, and Jerusalem also worried about Romania’s anti-Semitic attitudes. A 1984 Library of Congress study reported, “There were repeated anti-Semitic outbursts in the official press and elsewhere that were condoned by the regime.”²⁴ To forestall international reactions, in the 1960s the Romanian government had begun carefully camouflaging its anti-Semitism. Although it largely purged its administration of Jews, it maintained a few in high-ranking positions for decorative purposes, in order to demonstrate the quality of political power that Romanian Jews enjoyed.

After the Six-Day War, Romania did not, like the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe, launch a national anti-Zionist campaign. At least to international observers, for the next twenty years Romania seemed to support its small Jewish community. According to a Library of Congress report, “Romania’s Jewish community in the late 1980s numbered between 20,000 and 25,000, of whom half were more than sixty-five years old. Jews enjoyed considerably more autonomy than any other religious denomination.... For twenty-five years the Jewish Federation in Romania had been allowed to publish a biweekly magazine in four languages. There were three ordained rabbis, and religious education was widely available to Jewish children. In addition, the government permitted the Jewish Federation to operate old-age homes and kosher restaurants.”²⁵ As Ambassador Funderburk recalled, all this was possible because “Ceaușescu made a deal with Israel to allow the Jews to emigrate to Israel in return for payments per head.”²⁶

Despite an official policy of apparent tolerance, however, anti-Semitism was on the rise in the early 1980s. Anti-Semitic articles began to appear in heavily censored Romanian media. Between 1980 and 1985, according to Rabbi Rosen, “No one but Ceaușescu was behind the savage campaign of hatred, of pogrom, incitement. Who would dare write in the journal of the Bucharest organization of the Communist Party Saptamina the article ‘Ideals,’ in which the court poet [Corneliu] Vadim [Tudor] used a language borrowed from Nazi literature, if he were not ‘covered’ by Ceaușescu’s Securitate.”²⁷ In one of his many anti-Semitic articles, Tudor called the Jews “thieves and corrupters, people with no conscience and no sense of loyalty, who have no patriotic links whatsoever to their country and only think [of] how to exploit it.”²⁸ Elena Ceaușescu, who “had a definitive anti-Semitic streak and only a minimal understanding of the outside world,” may also have been involved in this campaign.²⁹

In May 1984, 190 members of the U.S. House of Representatives formed a congressional Human Rights Caucus and addressed a letter to Ceaușescu indicating its “distress” over Romania’s continued defiance of the Helsinki human rights provisions. The letter, according to Harrington and Courtney, “noted a number of anti-Semitic articles that had appeared in Romanian literature and the popular press, especially poems written by Corneliu Vadim Tudor.... The caucus also noted its concern about the ‘direct and calculated persecution of fundamentalist Christians’ and Bucharest’s efforts to destroy the remnants of Hungarian culture in Romania.”³⁰

Ceaușescu further damaged his relationship with Washington when he allowed his bureaucracy to recycle American Bibles into toilet paper. In June 1984 the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reported that “Rolls of toilet paper contained fragments of biblical verses. The Romanian government permitted the World Reformed Alliance to ship 20,000 Bibles to the Reformed Church in Transylvania. The Alliance shipped the Bibles during the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, no one knows the number of Bibles that actually reached church congregations. The undistributed Bibles arrived at the paper and pulp [plants] at Braila and Bistrita, where they were recycled into toilet paper and first reappeared in state retail stores in February 1985.”³¹

As Romania’s reputation deteriorated, Ceaușescu clung to a shred of credibility in the United States. Funderburk writes, “Romania was repeatedly thanked for attending the 1984 Summer Olympic games at Los Angeles.... On the other hand, America’s position as the symbol of freedom, democracy, and human rights was eroded by its visits with Ceaușescu, which appeared to most Romanians as support for his regime and policies.”³²

Another heavy blow was to follow. In May 1985 after resigning his diplomatic post in Romania, Ambassador Funderburk, in a long interview with the Washington Post, vehemently criticized Ceaușescu and what he saw as Washington’s “unduly friendly policy toward him.”³³

In December that year, Secretary of State George Shultz visited Bucharest and “warned [Ceaușescu] that Romania could lose most-favored-nation status unless it changed its human rights policies. Both sides agreed to establish a system of consultation on human rights issues.”³⁴ Ceaușescu told Shultz that “no more Bibles are needed, and that freedom of religion was greater in Romania than in most other countries.”³⁵ In a subsequent report to Washington, the American embassy characterized Romania as a “flashing yellow” situation.³⁶

In February 1986, at Senate hearings on Romania’s Most Favored Nation status, Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgeway’s statement articulated the U.S. dilemma: “Our relations with Romania confront us with tough choices. On one side we have national security interests and our ability to positively affect the lives of individuals who need our support. On the other side we have a sense that our engagement brings us into association with a repressive regime that neither shares nor responds to the high principles of human rights that are so important to us.”³⁷

Again Washington warned Romania that its Most Favored Nation status would be repealed unless it improved its human rights record. Rosen was sent back to Washington to lobby, and on June 3 President Reagan granted a twelve-month extension. That same day he wrote Ceaușescu to express strong concern over Romania’s human rights issues, and closed, “Your government’s unwillingness to accommodate these concerns has placed at risk our policy, which benefits Romania substantially.”³⁸

Ceaușescu and his colleagues dismissed U.S. appeals. On August 29 and September 1, 1987, Representatives Steny Hoyer and Bill Richardson, Senator Frank Lautenberg, Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter, and the staff director of the Helsinki Human Rights Commission, Ambassador Samuel Wise, traveled to Romania to meet with Ceaușescu and Ioan Totu, his minister of foreign affairs. When the Americans raised the issue of human rights, Totu retorted that Romania was not obliged to respond to U.S. inquiries about human rights. After all, Totu said, he had not chosen to mention such internal U.S. problems as the Iran-Contra affair.³⁹

In 1987, against Senate opposition, Reagan once again extended Romania’s Most Favored Nation status through July 1988.⁴⁰ In January that year, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead met in Bucharest with Ceaușescu and presented him with another letter from Reagan, which again warned the Romanian president about his nation’s human rights issues: “Without substantial improvements in the next three months, it will be very difficult for me to decide on renewed extension of MFN for Romania this spring, much less for the Congress to accept a positive recommendation.”⁴¹

Ceaușescu would not concede, and in a February 1988 letter told Reagan that Romania had decided to reject the requirements of Most Favored Nation status. “As regards democracy, we have created in Romania a unique broad-based democratic system ... a system incomparably superior to many other democratic systems including that of the United States.... The laws of the country ensure equal rights and obligations: there is no discrimination or restriction of any kind.... We have decided to reject the extension of this clause under the conditions set forth by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.”⁴²

According to Govrin, Romania hoped that after the November 1988 presidential election of George Bush, Washington’s attitude toward Romania would improve. But America “showed no willingness to separate the human rights issue from granting MFN status to Romania, especially in light of the repressive acts undertaken by Romanian authorities toward Romanian dissidents.”⁴³ Against all odds, Ceaușescu hoped that his regime could somehow retain the role of maverick in American eyes.

Romanian relations with the United States now continued to deteriorate. In October 1988, Romanian authorities protested the American embassy’s contact with Romanian dissidents.⁴⁴ Ceaușescu nervously anticipated the Malta Summit, as he was convinced that Washington and Moscow were plotting against him.

In July 1989, Ambassador Kirk’s posting in Romania came to an end. The United States would not send another ambassador to Romania until after Ceaușescu’s deposition. Govrin writes that in that month of Kirk’s departure, when President Bush visited Hungary and Poland but not Romania, Romania’s leadership was angered, venting its irritation in articles and commentaries “accusing President Bush of ... striving to return to the Cold War and ... intending to undercut the stable socialist regimes of Eastern Europe by pushing them into antisocialist reforms of a capitalist nature.”⁴⁵ According to Kirk and Raceanu, Ceaușescu “carefully noted U.S. White House spokesman Marlon Fitzwater’s statement shortly after the Bush-Gorbachev summit in early December, 1989, that Bush had expressed concern to Gorbachev about the situation in Romania.”⁴⁶

Romania’s relations with its Western European partners also worsened. France was outraged by the CIE’s attempts to kill Romanian dissidents living in Paris. In the mid-1980s, West Germany’s official criticism gave way to direct acts of protest against Romanian policies. In April 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that the “situation for Romania’s ethnic Germans had become intolerable.”⁴⁷ And the West German Foreign Ministry officially condemned Romania’s human rights policies. Israel, according to Govrin, also grew increasingly concerned about Romania’s human rights situation, aggravated by the rise in anti-Semitism and the demolition of synagogues.

Ultimately Ceaușescu lost his prestige in the West because he could not (and would not) adapt to the spectacular changes occurring in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. The two men were arch enemies. Ceaușescu hated Gorbachev for initiating perestroika and glasnost; Gorbachev despised Ceaușescu for his Stalinism. On May 25, 1987, during a visit to Romania, Gorbachev had a heated session with Ceaușescu. In his memoirs, Gorbachev recalls that the discussion became so loud that “one of the aides gave an order to close the windows, flung open on a warm night, and to move the guard further back into the park—no point in [having] witnesses.”⁴⁸ Based on information from a Western colleague stationed in Bucharest, Govrin explains that Gorbachev’s animus toward Ceaușescu stemmed from three major sources: “Ceaușescu’s cult of personality that Gorbachev could not stand, with all of its implications for the way in which the state is led; Romania’s inferior economic status, which connotes a negative model of the socialist-Communist regime in action; and Romania’s blunt behavior at the Cultural Forum of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] held in Bucharest several months earlier, which resulted in the failure to reach a unanimous, joint East-West resolution.”⁴⁹

Although Romania had erratically and only partially fulfilled Western desires for emigration, when it came to the question of human rights Ceaușescu would not be moved. His regime’s conduct at the CSCE conference reinforced Romania’s sad reputation on the issue. A U.S. report summed up: “After a twenty-six-month review, an East-West consensus emerged, but Romania announced it was not bound by the agreement. From the start of negotiations, Romania had attempted to dilute the draft text prepared by the nonaligned states. During the final negotiations, it submitted seventeen amendments to remove human rights provisions from the final document.... Other delegations, including some from Warsaw Pact states, rejected these efforts. Romania’s refusal to abide by the agreement drew universal condemnation from the other delegations and represented another step toward the international isolation of Ceaușescu’s Romania.”⁵⁰

U.S. support of the Ceaușescu regime, and the granting of Most Favored Nation status, was, according to Kirk and Raceanu, “America’s worst political and economic investment in the countries of Eastern Europe.”⁵¹ For support and trade failed to foster reform, and improved neither emigration to Israel nor Romania’s human rights situation.

8

“Why Did You Drain My Soul?”

Sometimes I felt like saying to President Ceaușescu: ‘Why did you make it so hard for me over so many years? Why did you drain my soul?’”¹ Shaike Dan explained further: “True, it is just a drop, but it’s from a faucet that drips all the time.... It must be emphasized that today more than 380,000 Romanian Jews live in Israel.”² Prime Minister Shimon Peres held the same opinion. “I think that in terms of alyah, immigration to Israel, this is the largest, most exciting, least-known undertaking in the history of Israel, and [Dan] was the driving force behind this chapter.”³

Schlomo Leibovici-Lais, reflecting on Israeli-Romanian relations, has noted that because Romania, comparatively, was partially spared the human toll of the Holocaust, Romanian Jewry represented the most important source of emigrants for the new state of Israel.⁴ Especially after the 1967 war, Israel considered Romania, in Israeli ambassador Abba Gefen’s words, its “window on the Iron Curtain” and a potential “bridgehead for the renewal of relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.”⁵ Romania offered Israel “diplomatic respectability”⁶ but also practical advantages—the unique opportunity to contact isolated Jewish communities in Communist Eastern Europe. In Govrin’s words, “The communities were visited by members of the embassy staff and envoys of Nativ, who were an internal part of the embassy staff dealing with alyah matters and met local Jews daily who visited the embassy to receive information and guidance relating to their approach to Israel.... They also dealt with all matters involved in the immigration of the Jews from the USSR to Israel as they traveled through Romania.”⁷

Israel in fact purchased Jews from countries other than Romania. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Hungary was paid $1,000 per emigrant, and Bulgaria between $50 and $350.⁸ Between 1956 and 1961, Israel bribed Moroccan authorities in order to smuggle its Jews to Israel through Spain on forged passports.⁹ In 1971, Israel paid Saddam Hussein $1 million for the release of 1,246 Jews from Iraq.¹⁰

Between 1980 and 1985, Mossad, as a coordinator of Operation Moses, bribed Sudanese authorities in order to smuggle Falashas (Ethiopian Jews) out of Ethiopia, which reeled under famine and civil war.¹¹ In 1990 a crumbling Mengistu regime in Ethiopia received money from the Joint for the remaining twenty thousand Falashas to emigrate to Israel. Tens of millions of dollars were paid. According to Tad Szulc, Israel paid $2,427 per Falasha, “roughly what Ceaușescu charged in Romania for an exit permit for a Jew.”¹² There were others too, but no country sold Jews to Israel as avariciously and for such an extended period of time as Romania.

A high-ranking Israeli official recently remarked that the agreements with Romania “worked to the satisfaction of both sides.”¹³ This is only partly true. Israeli officials were always ill at ease over their deals with Romania. It boiled down, according to Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, to “buying slaves.” But in so doing Israel was rescuing a community threatened by discrimination and economic and cultural extinction, at the same time strengthening Israel by infusing it with new immigrants. In short, “Israel secretly engaged in the longest and most expensive ransom arrangement in recent history.”¹⁴

Israeli officials worried that the price paid by West Germany for ethnic Germans in Romania would be discovered by American authorities, who would then be curious about the emigration arrangements of Romanian Jews. Some Israeli leaders therefore lobbied for Romania’s Most Favored Nation status, which temporarily buoyed Ceaușescu’s prestige and his treasury.¹⁵

But Israel was dealing with a regime and a dictator that were deeply involved with Arab terrorist organizations and with governments committed to Israel’s destruction, and that cruelly oppressed their own population. As Raviv and Melman observe, in order to maintain the influx of Jewish immigrants, “Israel even appears to have neglected its own security concerns. Ceaușescu had strong links with such enemies of Zionism as Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad, and Yasser Arafat. Ceaușescu trained their cadets [and] provided passports to Arab guerrillas.”¹⁶

Israel accepted the risk. As Dan writes, “[I] warned Shimon Peres pending his expected meeting with the president of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu. I described the character of the man, his rapacity, the repressive regime he’d imposed upon his countrymen, and his attempts to curry international recognition. I added that as long as such a meeting could get Jews out of there, it was worthwhile.”¹⁷ Leibovici-Lais recalls the Israeli government’s resignation: “They referred with disgust to the slave trade. They were horrified, but they always reached the same conclusion: There is no other way out!”¹⁸

The granting of Most Favored Nation status, as Anderson and Van Atta wrote in a 1991 issue of the Washington Post, “was no small decision by the United States. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu was a brutal, almost psychopathic tyrant—qualities that the United States chose to ignore for decades. His people starved and froze to death because of his greedy ineptitude.... The truth about the ransoms and the effect they had on U.S. policy is a sensitive matter today. If Washington was pressured into a pro-Romanian policy to save the lives of some, what about the millions of others who died while the United States said nothing? If their pro-Romanian policy was based more on the fact that Ceaușescu was seen as a maverick Communist, then the ransoms are only a fascinating footnote in history. But our information suggests that pro-Romanian Jewish advocates were influential in keeping Ceaușescu on America’s good side.”¹⁹

The full story is more complex. Richard Nixon, seduced by Ceaușescu, and in defiance of the State Department’s opposition, endorsed the granting of Most Favored Nation status to Romania. Subsequent presidents, despite reservations, followed suit. Rosen and some American Jewish organizations endorsed the U.S. decision; other American Jewish organizations and circles in the Israeli government opposed it.

Officials in Washington probably had no hard evidence—until General Pacepa’s defection—that Romania was selling Jews to Israel. And even if they had such evidence they were not interested to investigate this issue. Once they knew, they did nothing to upset the arrangement that allowed Jews and Germans to continue to emigrate. Ceaușescu’s maverick status also enabled him to maintain his slave trade. As Harrington and Courtney note, “During the first half of the 1980s, advocates of continuing Romanian MFN emphasized Romanian denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, criticism of Moscow’s Afghanistan policy, obstructionism within the Warsaw Pact, and participation in the Los Angeles Summer Olympics, defying Moscow’s boycott.”²⁰

Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik probably did not anticipate the extraordinary impact their amendment would have on American foreign policy. As Michael McFaul wrote, it was “a moral act ... [and] one of the most successful foreign policy ideas initiated by Congress during the Cold War.”²¹ Gradually the Jackson-Vanik Amendment changed its focus from emigration to human rights. As Harrington and Courtney note, “Emigration remained a concern, but only one of many.... In 1974, the Jackson-Vanik criterion was emigration. In 1987, Jackson-Vanik meant human rights, religious freedom, and minority equality.”²² Ceaușescu could not or would not keep pace.

Mikhail Gorbachev also contributed to Ceaușescu’s loss of support in Washington. “The new Soviet leader embraced many of Ceaușescu’s peace initiatives and in doing so ended Romania’s ‘maverick’ identity. The argument that MFN rewarded Bucharest for its independence from Moscow was no longer valid. Stripped of this protection, Ceaușescu’s regime was laid bare for inspection, and its record of human rights violations forced even Romania’s supporters to think twice about extending MFN, a privilege normally thought of as a reward for good behavior.... What remained was an ugly reality of human abuse and deprivation that even Moscow found distasteful. As Gorbachev moved toward détente, toward the twenty-firstcentury Europe, Washington’s continued tolerance of Romania’s behavior became a hindrance to future Soviet-American relations.”²³

Finally, Ceaușescu’s sale of sophisticated Soviet weaponry to the United States also proved to be a mistake. If Andropov or Gorbachev had found out about this trade, it would have placed Ceaușescu in an extremely precarious position. Neither the Soviet leadership nor the KGB would have forgiven such an act by a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Ceaușescu pretended to be evenhanded in his relations with Israel and the Arab states. Although in 1967 Romania maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, Ceaușescu was decidedly pro-Arab. Quick to condemn “Israeli aggressions,” he reluctantly condemned Arab terrorist acts. He never visited Israel, nor did he allow his prime ministers to do so, though he himself was officially invited. The leaders of Syria, Iraq, and Libya were “comrades,” in ideology if not in arms. Commerce with Arab states was important to Ceaușescu, but, as Melman and Raviv write, “like a bazaar trader, Ceaușescu sold the Israelis secrets and information involving his Arab friends. He also had a role in the sensitive deal-making, including the groundwork, that led to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and efforts to free Israeli prisoners and hostages held in Lebanon.”²⁴

Ceaușescu mistrusted non-Romanians. Although his propaganda proclaimed equality between Romanians and ethnic minorities, his regime heavily discriminated against them, especially Hungarians and Jews. The ruler kept his anti-Semitism under wraps until the early 1980s. However, his regime prohibited anti-Zionist propaganda. He believed that the Jews had powerful international influence, and used to say to his aide, Pacepa, “Romania has a proletariat dictatorship ... America a Jewish dictatorship.”²⁵

When it came to the emigration of Jews, Germans, and the few thousand Romanians who were allowed to leave the country, Ceaușescu was a hypocrite. On one hand he negotiated emigration directly with Dan and Huesch; on the other hand he repeatedly condemned those who sought to emigrate. Beginning in the late 1970s, according to a Library of Congress study, Ceaușescu launched a duplicitous media campaign. “Spokespersons for ethnic minorities in the workers’ councils praised the regime’s treatment of minorities and declared their devotion to socialist Romania. By contrast, those who desired to emigrate were depicted as weaklings with underdeveloped ‘patriotic and political consciousness,’ would-be traitors abandoning their fatherland and the struggle to build socialism. Stories abounded [in the Romanian media] of Romanians emigrating only to find life more difficult in their new environment and happily returning to their homeland.... Obtaining permission to leave the country was a lengthy, expensive, and exhausting process. Prospective emigrants were likely to be fired from their jobs or demoted to positions of lower prestige and pay. They were often evicted from their homes and publicly castigated. At the same time, they were denied medical care and other social benefits, and their children were not permitted to enroll in schools.”²⁶ By comparison, Ceaușescu’s code of honor made that of a second-rate mobster sparkle.

Pacepa vividly describes the Romanian dictator. He was “constantly in a state of agitation, contorting his face in an effort to overcome his stutter and spattering saliva all around when he spoke.... [He] had belonged to what Marx called the Lumpenproletariat—a shoemaker’s apprentice who never practiced his humble craft but instead earned his living by craftiness.... [He] could hardly read or write, [he] was a sick megalomaniac, who paid lip service to Marxism only to achieve his own ends. Ceaușescu’s reign covered twenty-four years and turned Gheorghiu-Dej’s Romania upside-down and inside-out.... In 1966 he replaced Romania’s military high command with his own men, allegedly to move out aging Stalinist holdovers. Once in the saddle, Ceaușescu also moved to create his own brand of Marxism, called Ceausism—a ludicrous mixture of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, nationalism, Roman arrogance, and Byzantine fawning that was so slippery, undefined, and ever-changing that he filled thirty-four volumes of his collected works without being able to describe it.”²⁷

The head of Ceaușescu’s chancellery, Silviu Curticeanu, who knew him perhaps better than any of his colleagues, thought the dictator’s dominant characteristic was “shrewdness.... A diabolical one ... quick and cunning in all circumstances, he was often perfidious, two-faced, and hypocritical.... Another feature of his character was toughness. Severe and austere, totally lacking humor, Ceaușescu used toughness as a tool to impose his points of view every time his shrewdness and arguments were not sufficient.”²⁸

Curticeanu calls Elena Ceaușescu, who beginning in the early 1970s was second in command in the Romanian Communist hierarchy, Ceaușescu’s “major weakness.... She does not deserve to be characterized. In order to do it, an inventory of all the negative human features known to history is sufficient; dominant were meanness and avarice, stupidity, and crass lack of culture.”²⁹

Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Emil Bodnăraș, both members of the Politburo, bear the heavy historical burden of having empowered Ceaușescu in 1965. In 1972, Bodnăraș multiplied his guilt: he proposed that Elena Ceaușescu be made a member of the Romanian Communist party’s Politburo.³⁰

Gradually Romania’s government began to function according to the whims of the Ceaușescus. Govrin describes an April 1986 parliamentary session: “Aside from the Ceaușescu couple, mentioned at least six times by each of the speakers, no other name was mentioned, not the government members nor those of the Politburo members. The listener was supposed to reach only one conclusion: before Ceaușescu’s rise to power, Romania had never known economic or democratic progress (this is why Ceaușescu’s twenty-year rule was called the ‘golden era’), and until Elena Ceaușescu’s nomination as head of the National Council for Scientific Research (with status equivalent to a minister), Romania had never known scientific progress....”³¹ An aide to Rabbi Rosen, professor Alexandru Vianu, described Ceaușescu to Govrin in 1987 as being “unbalanced [and] close to madness.”³²

Although Romania was more independent of Moscow than other Soviet-bloc nations, Western intelligence officials never assumed that the Ceaușescu regime betrayed its Soviet allies out of a secret affection for U.S. policy or Western ideology. As Benjamin Weiser noted in the Washington Post, “It was just greed—pure and simple personal greed.”³³ Alexandru Barladeanu, a former Politburo member who opposed Ceaușescu, declared that “Ceaușescu sold Germans and Jews as slaves through Securitate, and the funds obtained were morally tainted.”³⁴ When it came to profiting from emigration, morality was Ceaușescu’s least concern. The Romanian Communist government succeeded where its fascist predecessors had failed: it not only eliminated Romanian Jews, it profited from them.³⁵

A young Romanian historian, Marius Oprea, recently reflected, “The trade with human beings practiced by the Bucharest authorities is a page of the history of communism closely guarded from curious eyes.”³⁶ It is also a page that Israeli authorities are reluctant to reveal. Yet sooner or later historical truth comes to light. In May 1987 the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Adrian Severin, officially apologized on behalf of the Romanian government for “deporting tens of thousands of ethnic Germans to labor camps during Communist rule or selling them by demanding cash from the Bonn government for emigration permits.” He referred to “dishonorable bargains claiming substantial financial compensation for reunifying ethnic German families from Romania who wanted to settle in Germany.”³⁷ Severin declared at a news conference with his German counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, “We express deep regret and apologize for what happened.... This is a gesture of moral reparation for Romanian citizens and German citizens of Romania—whose destinies remain definitely marked by such lamentable actions.”³⁸

The Romanian government has not similarly apologized officially to the government of Israel nor to the Romanian Jews it oppressed and sold.

Primary Documents

GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ AND THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS AGAINST PAYMENT*

1

[Journal article]

February 29, 1960. Minutes of the meeting between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, first secretary of the Romanian Workers’ (Communist) Party [PCR] and the former British labor MP, Maurice Orbach. In response to the labor MP’s proposal to establish a fund under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress for those who want to emigrate, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej kept stating “we do not have people for sale.” In fact, the barter of Jews in exchange of agricultural products was under way and had been approved at the highest levels of the communist nomenclature in Romania. In the interview, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej denied the existence of the Holocaust in Romania.

On February 29, 1960, Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej received the former labor MP Maurice Orbach. Cde. Emil Bodnăraș, a member of the Political Bureau of the C[entral] C[ommittee] of PCR., was also present.

Orbach. I want to express my gratitude for the opportunity to meet with two comrades in the top leadership of the Romanian state who have done a lot for the Romanian people. During our discussions, I should use the word “excellency” for comrade first-secretary; however, if I may, I would like to use the word “comrade.” For 43 years, I have been personally involved in the socialist movement [and] have followed with keen interest the Romanian people’s struggle. In general I have followed the struggle of the peoples in other countries too. I am a member of the left wing of the Labor Party. During my visit to Romania, I have focused mainly on two issues that have interested me, namely the issue of the hospital administration and some commercial issues. I have discussed these issues with the respective ministers and I am very pleased with the results. I am directly interested in the Great Britain’s good relationships with the socialist states. I have known in more detail some problems about Romania since mid-last year, when the secretary of the People’s Republic of Romania’s [RPR] Legation in London briefed me about slanders published in the London press regarding the emigration of Jews from Romania. At that time, he invited me to visit Romania so that I could see by myself how things really are in Romania. I could not respond to that invitation immediately because, in autumn, there were parliamentary elections in England, and that’s why I am visiting Romania now. During my visit in Romania, I’ve had indeed the opportunity to study the life of the Jews in P.R.R. On this occasion, I took detailed notes regarding different aspects of the way of life of the Jewish population in RPR. I believe I am now fully informed on this issue and, returning to England, I will be able to provide competent answers to all the questions I will be asked in the West about this issue. I have visited many countries worldwide so far and I can say that, with the exception of the state of Israel, in no other country the Jewish population has such a rich cultural life as it has in Romania. I would just refer to the fact that there are three good Jewish theaters in Romania. In England, there is only one Jewish theater that is quite bad. In the USA, there is also one bad Jewish theater. In fact, both theaters in England and the US are just a joke. In Romania, I visited several schools where they teach Yiddish, and I could see the excellent conditions created by the people’s democratic regime for the Jewish population. Personally, I am not an observant Jew, I am an old Marxist. I identified myself with the Jewish community during Hitler’s rise to power. I must say that, personally, I think there are very many reactionaries among the Jews as well. Lately, I’ve assumed the personal task of fighting the slander against the socialist countries. After my visits to other countries, I published in the press articles with information about what I observed in the respective countries. The English public, which quoted my information, was favorably impressed with the information I provided. Upon my return, I will certainly publish again in the press my impressions of the countries I visited, Romania among them, and I am certain the readers will continue to believe me. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to discuss two issues, namely the first issue refers to a number of Jews from Romania who would like to leave Romania to reunite with their families or maybe for other reasons. In my opinion, until February last year, this problem was handled quite well in Romania. A large number of Jews left and were given the possibility to reunite with their families. I learned that some of those who left for Israel returned to Romania because they were disappointed with the situation they found in Israel. However, I think that those who want to leave Romania should be allowed to leave, since this is also good for RPR After February 1959, there was a stagnation in the Jews’ departure from RPR, and in December 1959 departures have resumed.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. I have not understood too well, maybe Mr. Orbach didn’t make himself clear–why would he think it is also good for RPR for some Jews to leave Romania; after all, we think everybody, Romanians, Jews, Germans, Magyars are citizens with equal rights and all enjoy the same rights. If it’s possible, I would like Mr. Orbach to be more explicit.

Orbach. I don’t want to be misunderstood. I do not agree that all Jews must leave Romania, but I think those who have relatives and want to reunite their families should be allowed to leave. For example, personally, I would not leave England unless there was racial discriminations there. According to the information I have, in Romania, many Jews were killed during the Nazi period; maybe this is a reason generating a certain state of mind.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. I must point out that, in Romania, there were fewer victims of Nazism than in any other country under Nazism. The Romanian people has lived and continues to live together with the Jewish population in good conditions. In this respect, the Romanian fascists couldn’t just do what they wanted. In this country, the workers’ movement created a certain situation, a certain respect. Although there were some organizations that engaged in discrimination, the Romanian administrative bodies couldn’t just have their way, as it happened in other countries.

Cde. Bodnăraș Emil. During the Horthist occupation, all the Jews were deported to the Northern Ardeal and it can be said that, in fact, on Romania’s current territory, those were most of the victims during Nazism. As for the rest, there were some isolated cases in Northern Bukovina, and there was the pogrom in Iași during the war, that was also, in fact, a provocation of the German authorities.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. Actually, this is the explanation of the fact that Romania is the only country among those that had been under Hitler’s control where the Jews remained in place. To this day, Romania is the country where most of the Jews live.

Orbach. That’s exactly right. I visited the German Democratic Republic [GDR]. There, I learned that a total of 3,000 Jews live in GDR. I visited Czechoslovakia and noticed there are also very few Jews in that country. However, during my visit to Romania, I’ve noticed that you allow some Jews to leave the country permanently.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. You probably know the principled position of the Romanian state that was not informed either by the politics of the State of Israel or by the politics of other countries. We rejected both the attempts of Israel’s government and of the United Arab Republic to discuss the Jews issue. We considered it an interference in internal affairs. We had a similar conflict with the F.R. of Germany regarding the Germans. I don’t know if you are aware of the fact that we have a German ... population. During the war, some Germans joined the Hitlerite troops and, consequently, this population also experienced the challenge of family reunification. We do not have diplomatic relations with F.R. of Germany. They tried to interfere in our internal affairs, made an attempt to link some commercial relations issues on the position of our state regarding the issue of reunification of the German families. Obviously, we rejected such attempts and considered them an interference in our country’s internal affairs. After all, we do not have people for sale, we do not consider the matter of family reunification as a commercial transaction issue. We have a principled and firm position on the issue of family reunification based on our humanitarian views. Last year, certain persons in the leadership of the United Arab Republic, even Naser himself, used declarations made by different personalities with leadership positions in Israel, in the leadership of the World Jewish Congress, who tried to stir a lot of fuss around the issue of the Jews’ emigration. They frame this problem in such a way as if we wanted to get rid of this population. In reality, it was nothing else but a provocation that generated fluster, especially in the Arab world and, in certain circumstances, could generate a complicated situation. Certain voices, especially in the United Arab Republic, claimed that through the emigration of the Jewish population Israel gets stronger, will have a strong army, and this army could threaten the security of the Arab states, and so on. We were not impressed with all these provocations but rather continued to approve the departures according to the requests of people in the Jewish population who wanted to reunite with their families that had been separated during the war. Therefore, these measures taken in Israel and in the United Arab Republic did not result in pressures or certain arrangements regarding the emigration of the Jewish population.

For humanitarian principles, we deemed it was appropriate to support the reunification of families separated during the war. We consider that this reunification can take place in Israel, in Romania, or in any other country those persons want.

Orbach. I must point out that the British government would never allow that.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. At a certain moment, we found ourselves caught between two fires: on one hand, Ben Gurion’s actions in Israel aimed at raising funds, and, on the other hand, the actions of the United Arab Republic that reacted fast. In fact, the Arabs seemed to have enjoyed this situation. Just between the two of us, the United Arab Republic allowed the emigration to Israel of several tens of thousands of Jews, in other words, they are not consistent with themselves either.

Orbach. That’s right. I personally traveled to Egypt and to the Syrian region and realized that’s the situation indeed. Everybody who left for Israel from the United Arab Republic were, in fact, merchants, and by leaving they left behind very large assets. However, in Romania, the situation is different. I personally criticized Ben Gurion when he asked for financial help from the USA.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. In our country, there are Jews holding top positions in the state administration, they are members in the government, party members, and they enjoy the same rights as any citizen.

Orbach. During this visit in Romania, I’ve had the opportunity to meet with many Jews and what comrade first-secretary has just said is indeed correct. Personally, I am certain that 90% of the Jews in Romania want to remain and will remain in the country. However, I wouldn’t like to see a repeat of last year’s stagnation. Actually, I don’t know how many are leaving the country daily; however, if they are allowed to leave, I think in a few months there will be no more people who want to leave. In this context, I do not want P.R.R. to be the target of obstacles raised by Israel. The Jewish World Organization took measures to impose silence on the issue of Jewish emigration, so that neither the Arabs nor Ben Gurion could make a fuss.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We responded to everybody who raised such problems stating that the emigration of some Jews from Romania to other countries is Romania’s internal problem. I told the same thing both to Naser and to Ben Gurion, that is why we keep allowing family reunification in Israel, or wherever they want, in keeping with the previously mentioned principles.

Orbach. I want to be clear, I have no intension to exercise pressure, in fact, I wouldn’t be able to do it as a private person. Although I’ve been a socialist for a long time, I’m not in a position to put anybody under pressure. Personally, I accept and agree with the principles you have mentioned before. I hope, however, that the whole issue of the Jews’ emigration from Romania will be resolved in a few months. Certainly, those who have a good situation and are happy here will not leave. Nevertheless, I am concerned especially about those who have already completed the application forms and who must now meet certain financial conditions, and, in order to do that, they are waiting to receive financial help from aboard. That is why I thought about creating a fund made available by the World Jewish Organization [and] deposited to the P.R.R. Bank that could cover such expenses. I’m not thinking of entering an agreement on this issue, but a sum of about $500,000 could be deposited to a P.R.R Bank account to be used by certain persons when they need to. I’m not going to insist on this matter, since it’s just my idea. I’d like to know to what extent I could talk to the press about this issue, if I could mention there are Jews who are leaving Romania.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. In principle, we have nothing against it. However, we need to discuss to what extent this measure could be to the advantage of those who are leaving and even of those who are waiting for them.

Orbach. That’s why I’d like to know your opinion, whether to talk to the press or not.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. As I said, in principle, I have nothing against it; however, some Western circles could interpret your visit to Romania as if you have come especially to discuss the issue of the Jews’ emigration while all the other issues you have actually dealt with were just side matters. Obviously, if you are asked, I think it is appropriate to say that the Romanian government demonstrated goodwill regarding those who want to reunite with their families, so you could offer a principled response. However, it is a must to reject [missing text] any political springboard, even when these attempts come from Israel or from other countries.

Orbach. I’m very pleased with the clarifications you’ve just made. In fact, I asked this question because I wanted to know if I have to keep quiet about this matter or not.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. The conditions of the country’s economic development, the beautiful perspectives for the development of the national economy, create good living conditions for all the citizens of our country, and, certainly, the Jews are among them. We are not saying we will not meet with certain difficulties, inherent challenges during the development period, since we cannot address overnight the country’s backward economy that we have inherited from the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, our country’s economy is in full swing, and this is a guarantee of its future upward development.

Orbach. I have been very impressed with everything I’ve seen during my visit in Romania.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We have sufficient natural resources to develop a complex economy. In a few years, we will be closer, regarding the level of development, to some countries that are currently way ahead of us.

Orbach. I have no doubt regarding your assessment of Romania’s development perspectives. Two years ago, I visited the D.R. of Germany. Last year, I visited that country again and I must say that the progress D.R. of Germany made in two years is equivalent, let’s say, to the progress a capitalist country will make in 20 years.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We are now working on a draft plan for the development of P.R.R.’s economy through 1975 and on a six-year development plan of the national economy. In fact, I have spoken publicly about these issues several times.

Orbach. I read the speech you delivered in December last year. I got it from your minister in London. I’d like to raise an issue, but before doing that, I’d like to underscore again that I don’t want to put any pressure. It is about some Jews who were arrested. I understand you have principles, and you respect these principles, and that you consider all those who spread chauvinism, irrespective of their nationality, enemies of [your] regime and, consequently, measures are being taken against them. Last year, The Times also published letters regarding the Jews who were arrested in this country. Maybe that’s normal if somebody is an enemy to be treated as such; however, I think a different approach could be also taken, for example, these elements should be expelled from the country.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș. We had several cases that were more difficult and have not been solved yet.

Orbach. Certainly, you could also take the following approach and tell them: if you want to be Zionists, go to Israel and be Zionists and unemployed there. So, in conclusion, expel them from the country.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We know some cases, [and] we must analyze the situation of these citizens. However, we must point out that Israel’s Diplomatic Office in Bucharest does not have principled relations with the Jewish population. It asks them to provide information and to do certain things that contravene the country’s laws and, this way, the respective citizens are breaking the law.

Orbach. Obviously.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. Certainly, these elements are damaging the cause and create an unfavorable atmosphere. We have drawn attention to the Legation several times, but it seems it has instructions from the home country to continue this action.

Orbach. Obviously.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We have a strong position regarding the adversarial, nationalistic, fascist elements. We take measures against them irrespective of their nationality. That’s how we take measures against the anti-Semitic elements and teach them a tough lesson. That’s also why we take a stand against the Zionist activity some are carrying out in this country. We showed the Zionists a great deal of understanding, we criticized Zionist politics, we tried to persuade them, but when they broke the law we had to take administrative measures. There were also cases when, after they had been sentenced, we expelled them from the country.

Orbach. I think there are still some Zionists in this country and if you send them across the border too it will be [missing text]

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. We will analyze this problem and see how it weighs in when we analyze the situation as a whole. Certainly, since we know that Mr. Orbach is a progressive democrat, we will try to sort this out.

Orbach. Let me tell you that I went to Spain to take Lopez Reimondo out of jail and I was successful. He is now in Latin America and sent me a letter thanking me for what I did for him.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. In our opinion, the issue of family reunification is a humanitarian matter not a political objective.

Orbach. I think I’ve gathered sufficient information on this issue and I’ll be able to answer the questions I may be asked.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. Some Western circles are promoting an alarmist policy claiming the Jewish population in our country lives in poverty, in miserable conditions, and so on. The problem is viewed simplistically, and, obviously, it’s not good for anyone.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș. Ben Gurion alerts Nasser and Nasser [alerts] Ben Gurion and that’s how they get upset.

Orbach. I don’t think I have received a response to the financial issue I have raised.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. Such a thing does not seem appropriate, lest people should think we accept such solutions so that we could turn the emigration of the Jews into a business. We do not have people for sale.

Orbach. I wouldn’t want anybody to be unable to leave the country for lack of funds to pay certain fees.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. Maybe it would be better for us to look into the issue of fees. It’s not quite clear for me.

Orbach. May I ask if, in addition to this issue of the Jews, I could bring other services to Romania, as a politician, as a journalist.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. The best service you can bring to Romania is to present objectively what you saw in P.R.R. I think that Mr. Orbach will not be for the first time in Romania, maybe he will have again the opportunity to visit [our] country.

Orbach. I hope you would be willing to meet again and have other discussions. I have to say that during my visit I observed how the medical services are organized here, in fact, I must say I represent England at the International Hospital Federation. I was deeply impressed with what I saw in Romania in connection with the medical services and I plan to publish in England a number of articles on this topic. We are extremely interested in this problem because, in England, healthcare is state-funded. I will also write about the situation of the Jews and publish wherever I can. I don’t think it would be interesting to write about the industry. In fact, I haven’t seen too much either. England is an industrial country, so I will write that you are a country rich in raw materials that will help stimulate growth. You certainly heard that the railway workers’ strike in England ended successfully. Until recently, the railway workers’ organizations were leaning to the right. Lately, we’ve tried to veer them to the left. Over the next months, we plan to organize many strikes and workers’ actions because the bourgeoisie in England is very fierce. The workers in the nationalized industry have worse wages than those in the private industry just because they want to discredit nationalization. Unfortunately, the truth is the leader of the Labor Party is right wing and since the leader of the left wing of the Labor Party has been sick lately he couldn’t focus on the party’s issues. I am extremely grateful that, although you are very busy, you could spare me such a long time. I promise I’ll continue to think of the problems you clarified for me. I will not talk publicly about some of the issues, but, as I’ve said before, I will publish a number of articles about the other issues. May I thank you again that two of the best leaders of Romania took their time to talk with me. Personally, I am very pleased with the results of my visit to Romania. Finally, I have a personal request. My son collects autographs and, of course, if you agree, I’d like to have your signatures.

March 2, 1960

►ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secţia Cancelarie, dosar nr.13/1960, ff. 2-12, in Mihai E. Ionescu, România şi Războiul Rece, Studia hebraica, nr. V, Editura Universităţii Bucureşti, 2006, pp. 212-218.

______________

*Translator’s disclaimer: The English version of the Romanian documents mirrors some of the grammar and sentence structure errors in the original files. This translator corrects neither the officials’ convoluted writing style nor the awkward capitalization; every effort is made to find better English synonyms for Romanian words that are used incorrectly.

SECURITATE, HENRY JAKOBER, AND THE TRADE IN JEWS

2

[Typed document in general use]

May 30, 1958. Telegram from the London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding the transport of Landrace pigs by booking cargo flight.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIRECTORATE I-A 162

TOP SECRET

Copy No. __

Excerpt

from Telegram No.357/TS of 30.V.1958 received from London.

The Field Office advises that, for 1,080 [British] pounds, it bought 11 pigs (5 boars and 6 sows) ready to be shipped to the country [Romania] and all shipping documentation [are] completed. Since there is no direct air cargo flight London-Bucharest, the agency suggests three possibilities to transport the pigs:

1.Charter a cargo flight London-Bucharest, price 800 pounds [£].

2.Ship by regular flight London-Budapest, to be taken over by us, price 750 pounds [£], or a) ship to Brussels, price 200 pounds [£]; b) ship to Copenhagen, price 300 pounds [£], wherefrom we are to take them over.

3.Send from home [Romania] a special aircraft. Central’s decision is requested and, if the third option is accepted, we need the necessary information so that we may obtain the landing authorization in London s.s.

Victor

In conformity, Lt. Maj. Drăguț Ioan

►ACNSAS, fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 6.

3

[Typed document in general use]

May 31, 1958, Telegram from the London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding the transport of Landrace pigs by cargo flight.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIRECTORATE I-A

162

TOP SECRET Copy No. __

Excerpt

from Telegram No.357/TS of 30.V.1958 received from London.

The Field Office advises that, for 1,080 [British] pounds, it bought 11 pigs (5 boars and 6 sows) ready to be shipped to the country and all shipping documentation [are] completed.

Since there is no direct air cargo flight London-Bucharest, the agency suggests three possibilities to ship the pigs:

1.Charter a special flight London-Bucharest, price 800 pounds [£].

2.Ship by regular flight London-Budapest, to be taken over by us, price 750 pounds [£], or

a.ship to Brussels, price 200 pounds [£];

b.ship to Copenhagen, price 300 pounds [£], wherefrom we are to take them over.

3.Send a special aircraft from home [Romania].

Central’s decision is requested and, if the third option is accepted, we need the necessary information, so that we may obtain the landing authorization in London.

Victor

In conformity,

Lt. Maj. Drăguț Ioan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 6.

4

[Typed document in general use]

May 31, 1958. Telegram from the London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding the transport of Landrace pigs by cargo flight.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

DIRECTORATE I-A

162 TOP SECRET

Single Original

EXCERPT

from the telegram sent to London on 31.V.1958.

The Field Office was advised that for the shipment of the 11 Landrace pigs it should charter a special flight London-Bucharest, for 800 [British] pounds.

Measures should be taken to ensure pigs reach destination in good condition and advise the date of the plane arrival.

In conformity,

Lt. Maj. Drăguț Ioan

Ss

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 7.

5

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

June 10, 1958, Telegram from the London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding the transport of Landrace pigs by cargo flight.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIRECTORATE I-A—161

TOP SECRET

SINGLE Original

EXCERPT

from telegram No. 408/c dated 10.06.1958 received from London.

Field Office reports that on 10.06, CY, at 14:45 the aircraft carrying the Landrace pigs left for Bucharest. Pigs were loaded in good condition, with feed for two days, and Cde. BREBU is on the plane.

Arrangements were made with the crew to help Cde. BREBU carry out his task. BREBU brings full documentation to be submitted to the comrade who comes on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture. BREBU will also bring two parcels addressed to M.A.E. with the material ordered by Cde. REMIȘHOVSKY; parcels will be delivered to the comrade who comes on behalf of M.A.E.

The plane will land at Băneasa [Airport] on 11.06, CY, at 13:00, English time.

It is requested that measures be taken to give Cde. BREBU the exit visa from R.P.R. on the airport so that he can return by the same plane. Noted that Sebastian and Cornel were closely watched during the drive.

s.s. Victor

In conformity,

Lt. Maj. Drăguț Ioan

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 13.

6

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

October 18, 1958. Report of Directorate I-A requesting that Henry Jakober be contacted directly in order to procure Landrace boar sperm and to continue acquiring pigs of this breed.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIRECTORATE I-A

161

TOP SECRET

Copy No. ___

APPROVED

DIRECTORATE I-A CHIEF

Major General Gavriliuc Mihai

Signature

October 18, 1958

REPORT

on contacting the English citizen IAKOBERT [sic] HENRY.

Said IAKOBERT HENRY is the English farmer from whom the Field Office in London purchased the 11 Landrace pigs that were brought into the country.

Later, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry requested the acquisition of several Landrace pigs of Danish origin, a variety of this breed that is superior to the English breed. Consequently, Central tasked the Field Office in London to take measures and procure the pigs as requested.

London Field Office analyzed the procurement options and concluded this problem could also be resolved through farmer IAKOBERT HENRY whom it contacted to discuss procurement options.

During these discussions, farmer IAKOBERT HENRY stated this problem can be addressed through his relations in Denmark and also stressed the difficulties he is likely to face in resolving this problem because the Danes will not sell live Landrace pigs. At the same time, IAKOBERT HENRY mentioned that, as a last resort, he could certainly procure Landrace pig sperm (semen) that we could use for artificial insemination of the English Landrace sows that were purchased.

We mentioned that it is important for us to obtain sperm for artificial insemination, but, nevertheless, it is highly necessary to procure several Landrace Danish pigs (male and female) because this breed is superior to all the other varieties of Landrace breed, and, consequently, we will have the possibility to raise and multiply this pure breed in the country and to use it on a larger scale to improve other domestic pig breeds.

Given that the Field Office in London informed us that farmer IAKOBERT HENRY arrives [in Romania] on October 19, 1958, to discuss business with Metalimport, we suggest to contact the above-mentioned person with a view to establishing the concrete options available to resolve this problem.

We suggest that contact be made through Cde. Cpt. RĂCUȚEANU GHOERGHE and Cpt. DUMITRACHESCU as a translator.

Because farmer IAKOBERT HENRY knows the pigs are acquired for M.A.S., Cde. Cpt. RĂCUȚEANU GH. will introduce himself as a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

When the above-mentioned person is contacted, we will determine clearly what possibilities he has to resolve the problem of procuring Danish Landrace pigs and well as the procurement terms.

Department Chief

Major Sînceleanu Ilie

Signature

Bureau Chief

Lt. Major

Drob Eugen

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, pp. 15-16.

7

[Typed letter with letterhead]

Letter from Henry Iacober to Gheorghe Marcu. [English original]

TELEPHONE

SAWBRIDGEWORTH 2347

THREE MILE POND FARM.

SAWBRIDGEWORTH

HERTS

HJ/AVM.

C. Marcu Esq.,

The Commercial Section,

Legation of the People’s Republic of Roumania,

26 Cadogan Square,

London S.W.I.

27th May, 1959.

Dear Mr. Marcu,

With reference to the complaint about two of the gilts from the first consignment to Prodexport, I would advise that I have been in touch with the British Landrace Society, and a Member of their Council and of the British Landrace Pig Society Progeny Testing Station, Mr. S. Horvat, has explained the occurrence in his letter, which we attach hereto.

His letter confirms that there are two causes for birth troubles with pigs, one of which is hysteria, the other cause is a lack of animal protein.

I know that in Roumania farms are inclined to feed their animals with more Maize, Barley and Grains, and no Fish Meal, Meat Meal or Bone Meal and not much in the way of high grade Oilcakes like Groundnut or Soya Meal.

Many high class cows will get hysterical at giving birth and will eat some of the litter if lacking in animal protein. This is something which in my opinion cannot be avoided occasionally and has definitely nothing to do with the quality of the animals.

Please pass Mr. Horvat’s letter on to your Ministry of Agriculture, Bucharest.

Thanking you in advance, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Tov. H JAKOBER

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 149.

8

Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names.

March 9, 1960. Memorandum sent by Directorate I, UM 0123, to Văcărești Prison stating that majors Vlad Frângulea and Ichim Gheorghe are assigned to contact prisoner Bery Marcu, one of the first jailed Jewish Romanian citizens and exchanged for agricultural products.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

-U.M. [Unitatea Militară, i.e. Military Unit] No. 0123/i

- No. 171/___________

Date: 9.03.1960

TOP SECRET Copy No. 2

To:

VĂCĂREȘTI PRISON

We request that you allow Cdes. Major Frangulea Vlad and Ichim Gheorghe to contact prisoner Bery Marcy, born on 17.XI., in Bârlad, son of Boris and Estera, transferred temporarily for work reasons, from the Satu Mare prison to the Văcărești prison.

Head of U.M. Nr. 0123/i

MG/MR

2 copies

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. II, p. 14.

9

[Handwritten document]

March 17, 1960. Report sent by London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding the Marcy Bery “combination” indicating that Henry Jakober “agrees to deliver 15 Jersey cows and 2 Jersey bulls, and 15 Australian Merino ewes and 2 Australian Merino rams.”

M.A.I.

-171-

Top Secret

Single Original

EXCERPT

from note 142/C, dated March 17, 1960.

The Field Office informs that, following note No. 1882/T.S., the combination BERY MARCU was discussed with JAKOBER and the latter agreed to deliver 15 cows and two Jersey bulls and 15 Australian Merino ewes and two Australian Merino rams.

If we agree, the Australian Merino ewes and rams could be delivered on the same aircraft used to deliver 50 Carriedale sheep. The 17 Jersey cattle and the three Friesian cows could be also delivered by direct cargo flight London-Bucharest.

Field Office indicates the [cargo] flight Australia-Buch[arest] costs around 6,500 British pounds, and for the 20 cattle [cargo] flight London-Bucharest, around 1,500 British pounds. Field Office requests Central’s approval and transfer of the needed funds.

Field Office also reports that from Australia to [Romania], maritime transport takes two months and it costs approximately 5,000 British pounds, in addition to food and companions’ pay.

In conformity, Lt. Maj.

Illegible

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, file nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 257.

10

[Handwritten document]

May 4, 1965 [April 6, 1960]. Note written by Captain Stancu of UM 0123 according to which, in exchange for persons who left the country, a number of breed cattle, sheep, and pigs were imported. The note refers to the results of the combinations with Henry Jakober until April 6, 1960.

M40

May 1065

Top Secret

Single Original

NOTE

All the persons who were approved to leave the country permanently, according to Report No. 00527, dated 6.IV.1960, left the country, and the following [items] were brought in exchange:

10 Jersey cows (February 1960)

30 Landrace pigs (February 1060)

100 Corriedale sheep (June 1960)

17 Jersey cows (May 1960) 2 Zebu bulls (April 1962)

3 Friza cows (May 1960)

Cpt. Stancu

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, p. 5.

11

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

April 6, 1960. Proposal made by the chief of Directorate I-A (UM 0123), General Nicolae Doicaru, approved by the Minister of the Interior Alexandru Drăghici, to initiate a “combination” with Henry Jakober authorizing the import of prime cattle breeds in exchange of exit visas for some Jewish families.

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

TOP SECRET—Directorate I-A-

Copy No. N b. 00527 Dated 6.04.1960

APPROVED

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Colonel General

Signature

Alexandru Drăghici

Memorandum

As approved by the M.A.I. top leadership, as a result of the latest combination made by Iakober, ten Jersey cattle, 30 Landrace pigs, 50 Australian Merino fine wool sheep, and two Bebo bulls were brought into the country.

Per the approved combination, Iakober will procure the livestock and we will pay for transport.

So far, based on this combination, ten Jersey cows and 30 Landrace pigs were brought into the country.

There have been left abroad, at our disposal, the 50 Australian Merino sheep and the two Zebo [sic!: Zebu] bulls.

After having discussed with several transport companies both in England and in [Romania], it seems our state would have to pay $10,000.

We point out that the respective livestock have been at our disposal for about one month, waiting for us to provide means of transportation. Unless we bring them urgently into the country, we have the alternative to give them up or the alternative to pay the cost, in hard currency, for keeping them abroad until they are transported.

Since we consider it is not appropriate to use such a large sum of money to cover the transport expenses for the above-mentioned cattle, we submit for approval this follow-up combination:

“Iakober” suggested to his contact officer that exit visas be given to the Bery Marcu family comprised of six persons. We propose that, in exchange for these persons, we should request the following from “Iakober”:

•To increase the lot of 50 fine wool Australian Merino sheep to 100 heads.

•To provide an additional 15 Jersey cows and 2 Jersey bulls.

•To pay for the transportation expenses of the 100 sheep from Australia to our country.

•To pay for the transportation of the two Zebo bulls from Australia to London.

In conclusion, if this combination is approved, our state could obtain an increase in the number of prime breed animals, as mentioned above, and we would avoid paying the transportation expenses in hard currency, that is the equivalent of around $35,100.

The persons for whom permanent exit visa is requested are:

1.Dr. Preninger O, 55, currently a patient at the Colentina Hospi-tal-Bucharest, with his wife Roză, 60, and their daughter Hanna, 19, unemployed.

2.Marcu Eugenia, 50, sister in law, retired, and

3.Bery Marcu, jailed at the Văcărești prison, with his wife Sofia, 60, unemployed, free.

Chief of Directorate I A

Signature N. Doicaru

DOICARU N.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 3-4.

12

[Typed document in general use with spaces for handwritten proper names.]

June 5, 1960. Proposal made by the chief of Directorate I-A (UM 0123), General Nicolae Doicaru, approved by the Minister of the Interior Alexandru Drăghici, a member of the Political Bureau of the PMR, to initiate a “combination” with Henry Jakober proposing the granting of permanent exit visa to three persons in exchange for 65 ewes and five rams worth $13,500.

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

– Directorate I-A-

171 of 5.06.1960

TOP SECRET

Copy No.1

N = 001013

APPROVED

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Colonel General Alexandru Drăghici

Signature

Memorandum

In the context of the combinations done with JAKOBER HENRY, as approved by the M.A.I. top leadership, our state obtained the following livestock:

•42 LANDRACE pigs

•12 FRIESIAN cattle

•22 JERSEY cattle

•20 ROHNEY MARCH sheep

•10 SOUTHDOWN sheep

•2 ZEBU bulls

•100 CORRIEDALE sheep

In the context of these combinations, JAKOBER HENRY will also pay half of the transportation costs for the Zebu bulls, on the Africa—Constanța route, and for the 100 CORRIEDALE sheep recently brought into the country, on the Australia—Bucharest route.

The price of the livestock obtained through JAKOBER HENRY and the transportation costs he paid so far total $78,788.

We further mention in the context of the arrangement with JAKOBER HENRY that he was expected to deliver only 80 CORRIEDALE sheep; however, since the space on the aircraft used for the transportation of the sheep allowed for the transportation of 100 sheep, with no increase in the transportation costs, JAKOBER HENRY delivered an additional 20 sheep, worth $3,000, a sum representing only the real cost of the sheep, with no transportation expenses, whereby the transportation cost for these 20 sheep was saved.

To avoid paying the amount due for these 20 CORRIEDALE sheep, JAKOBER H. requested that exist visas be granted to JOSEPHSON IOSEF, 65, domiciled at 90 Jules Michelet Str., Bucharest, and GIROIU RADU and his wife ANGELA, domiciled at 38 Dionisie Lupu Str., Bucharest. All of them are living in liberty.

If this combination is approved, we think it is possible to obtain from IAKBOER HENRY an additional delivery of 45 Australian Merino ewes and 5 Australian Merino rams for a price of around $10,500. The selection of these animals was done based on the specifications of the M.A.I. Administrative Directorate.

Our investigations indicate that IOSEPHSON IOSEF applied for [permanent] departure together with his wife EVELYN and their daughter ROSALIA; indeed this issue has not been discussed yet with IAKOBER HENRY. We hereby submit the proposal that in exchange for granting the exit visas for IOSEPHSON EVELYN and IOSEPHSON ROSALIA, JAKOBER HENRY should pay for the transportation of the 50 sheep from Australia to Bucharest.

Taking into account the [information] above, we propose that this combination be also approved that will result in an additional $30,000 saving for the state, to reach the total amount of savings as a result of the combinations with JAKOBER HENRY to about $105,000.

DEPARTMENT CHIEF

Major, Sînceleanu Ilie

Signature

Frangulea

BUREAU CHIEF

Lt. Col. Deutsch Ștefan

Signature

APPRPOVED

DIRECTORATE I-A Chief

Colonel,

Doicaru N.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 6-7.

13

[Handwritten document]

No date [July 1960?]. Proposal made by Captain Gheorghe Marcu of UM 0123 to initiate a “combination” with Henry Jakober to grant the permanent exit visa to three persons, in exchange for 65 ewes and five rams worth $12,320.

[Illegible]

NOTE

Regarding the tally of the livestock obtained through IAKOBER and their value.

Cdes. Sînceleanu and Marcu -

We were ordered to create a table with these new elements proposed by Iakober, along with a report forecasting the animals we might need. You should also discuss with our experts and with the Ministry [experts], Carnatiu etc.

Signature

Doicaru

a.From the combinations made [so far], we obtained the following:

•42 LANDRACE pigs

•13 FRIESIAN cattle

•32 JERSEY cattle

•120 ROMNEY MARSH sheep

•13 SOUTHDOWN sheep

•2 ZEBU bulls

•100 CORREIDALE sheep

b.In the context of the same combinations, JAKOBER also paid the air freight transportation costs for some of the livestock on the London—Bucharest route, for the 100 sheep on the Australia—Bucharest route, and will pay for half of the transportation cost for the two ZEBU bulls from Africa to Bucharest.

The price of the livestock obtained through Jakober and the transportation costs he paid comes up to 74,788 US dollars.

c.According to the arrangement [we] made with JACOBER, he was supposed to deliver only 80 CORRIEDALE sheep; however, since the aircraft space allowed it, he delivered 100 sheep. The price of the additional 20 sheep is 6,720 US dollars.

To pay this amount, there is the option to do a new JACOBER combination in exchange, whereby we allow the [permanent] departure of an old man aged about 60 and of a couple aged about 40.

Both the old man and the younger couple live in liberty.

If we do this combination, we think we could get from Jacober an additional 40 LANDRACE pigs worth 5,600 US dollars or other animals according to the top leadership’s instructions. This way, total savings of 12,320 US dollars could be achieved.

Cpt. Marcu Gheorghe

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 8-8bis.

14

[Handwritten Document]

July 28, 1960. Report from the Field Office in London to Central (UM 0123) requesting approval to exchange Romanian citizens for 25 pigs.

MAI

-171- Dated 28.07.960

Top Secret

Single Original

EXCERPT

Doc. No. 562/TS of 26.07.960

This is to report that Jakober was informed about Central’s decision and he agreed to deliver the 5 Danish Landrace pigs and 20 English Landrace pigs and also to cover the transportation costs. At the same time, our debt to him (the sheep and the Zebu bulls) is considered to have been paid. The [situation of the] persons [previously] mentioned, that is Giroiu, Iosefson, Birkenfeld, and Menger has to be solved, and, regarding Constantinescu Elena, before the contact [officer] could say anything, Jakober asked that she be taken out of the combination since her relatives did not comply with the agreed arrangements. Iakober will suggest another person. He was told the conditions set up by the Central regarding the persons.

Jakober committed to deliver the above mentioned animals by the agreed date or earlier. He requested that the families Giroiu and Iosefson, together with the other persons, be allowed to leave immediately after livestock delivery.

Regarding the Zebu bulls, it is noted they were transported to Frankfurt/Main where they got stuck as a result of the difficulties we have already reported. The bulls were removed from Frankfurt/Main and are now with the African company that initiated the transport. In the next few days, Jakober will ensure the delivery of the bulls to the destination [Romania]. He will provide precise dates.

In conformity

Cpt.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, pp. 283-283bis.

15

[Handwritten Document]

July 28, 1960. Report from the Field Office in London to Central (UM 0123) with information about the status of the transport of the Zebu livestock and pigs to Romania through Henry Jakober.

MAI

-171-

28.07.960

Top Secret

Single original

EXCERPT

from Note No. 673/B dated 27.97.960

The Landrace pigs are to arrive in Bucharest by 3.08.960, according to Iakober.

Iakober will send to Prodexport information on the [arrival] date, the attendant, and the flyover license and requests to keep close contact with Prodexport to respond to the arrangement of the reported issue.

Regarding Zebu bulls, they were found in West Germany and because the Czechoslovak transit does not accept transfer through Frankfurt/Main due to the disease, the bulls are to be sent to Münich from where they will be transported to the country [Romania].

He requests information on whether families Giroiu and Iosefson were allowed to leave.

In conformity

Cpt.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 284.

16

[Handwritten Document]

August 19, 1960. Report from the London Field Office of Directorate I-A regarding a “combination” with Jakober who requests the replacement of one of the candidates for emigration with another one.

Top Secret

NOTE

1.=With No. 636 [illegible] of 19.08.60, the London Field Office reports in connection with IACOBER because [illegible] declines [to allow] transit visa for the two ZEBU bulls. He suggests direct transport Africa-Bucharest.This operation costs an additional $2,700. To replace ELENA CONSTANTINESCU, IAKOBER requested SAMUEL GROPPER, age 65, residing at 4 INTRAREA VÎNĂTORI, BUCHAREST, District LENIN, and his wife LESETTA (born STEINBETER), aged 60. Since he is now requesting two persons, IACOBER accepted to contribute to the sum of $2,700. Central’s decision is requested on this [illegible].

2.Field Office requests to expedite departure for MUNTZER’s wife.

Ss Vlad

Signature

Illegible

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 287.

17

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

August 20, 1960. Report of Directorate I-A (UM 0123) requesting a “combination” with Henry Jakober to grant the permanent exit visa for a Jewish couple in exchange for the transport to Romania of Zebu bulls.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

-DIRECTORATE I-A-

171

Dated 20.08.1960

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

APPROVED

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Colonel General

Alexandru Drăghici

MEMORANDUM

As a result of the latest combination with the English citizen IAKOBER HENRY the following were brought into the country:

•17 Jersey cattle (15 cows, 2 bulls)

•100 Corriedale sheep

•20 English Landrace pigs

•5 Danish Landrace pigs

and 2 Zebu bulls are to be brought into the country.

*All these breed animals were brought in at the request of the Administrative Directorate approved by the M.A.I. top leadership.

In the context of this combination, 18 persons received the exit visa, but the exit visa was rejected for CONSTANTINESCU ELENA who was included in the group of persons for whom IAKOBER HENRY requested visa and IAKOBER HENRY was to suggest another person yet are to be transported from Africa to FRANKFURST-AM-MAIN, F.R.G, wherefrom they will be transported to the country by railway.

For the transportation of these bulls by railway a transit permit issued by the authorities of the S.R. of Czechoslovakia is needed and because this permit has not been issued yet by the Czech comrades, IAKOBER HENRY proposed that the bulls be transported by air directly to Bucharest.

If the Zebu bulls are transported by air, the transportation cost increases by $2,700.

With a view to closing this combination, IAKOBER HENRY proposed to replace CONSTANTINESCU ELENA with GROPPER SAMOIL, son of HAXAL and ESTERA, born on 7.10.1906, in IVEȘ-TI-TECUCI, domiciled in Bucharest, 4 Intr. Vânători, District Lenin, and, for the transport price balance of the $2,700, requests the visa for the wife of the above mentioned, GROPPER LIZETA, daughter of SMIL and AMALIA, born on 26.08.1906, in Comănești.

Taking into account the above information, we propose that exit visas be approved for GROPPER SAMOIL and GROPPER LIZETA who would leave after the Zebu bulls had been delivered.

We attach the personal files of the persons for whom exit visas are requested.

DEPARTMENT CHIEF

Major,

Sînceleanu Ilie

Signature

BUREAU CHIEF

Lt. Col.,

Deutsch Ștefan

Signature

APPROVED

DIRECTORATE I-A CHIEF

Colonel

Doicaru N.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 13-14.

18

[Handwritten document]

October 24, 1960. Note from UM 0123 regarding the barter with Jakober who, in exchange for the delivery and transport of bulls and pigs, requests emigration visas for some Romanian citizens. Jakober is concerned about the exposure of the smuggling of Landrace pigs.

M.A.I.

171

Top Secret

Single original

EXCERPT

from doc. No. 13324 dated 24.11.960

It is noted that on 23.11.960 LIVIU talked with Iakober about the tasks [mentioned] in the mission order.

As a result:

1.By 15.12., c.y., he will deliver the two Zebu bulls from Africa and will also cover the transportation expenses to Bucharest. In exchange, he requests that Lupescu Iosif and his wife Margareta, domiciled at 1 Poteraș Str., Bucharest, be allowed to leave. Both are elderly Jews. Shall leave the country by 30.11., otherwise wouldn’t be able to get the money.

2.Iakober will deliver, by the end of December, 5 Danish Landrace pigs (3 sows and 2 boars) of a different family from that [illegible] before. He will pay for the transportation costs by air to Bucharest.

He commits to get the Danish Landrace sperm. He needs to have a contact in Copenhagen so that he can deliver the sperm to be urgently transported to Bucharest.

Jakober claims there are more difficult conditions regarding the procurement of Landrace pigs because:

On the occasion of the visit of a businessman [illegible] from London, somebody at the Ministry of Agriculture told the Canadian that our country managed to get, via England, Landrace pigs from Denmark. Back to his country, the Canadian informed the Canadian authorities and, this way, Denmark learned about it too.

The Danish authorities investigated and asked the English to help. Iakober was also asked if he knew anything about this affair, but he denied.

Iakober asked that measures be taken to avoid any such discussion in the future because his situation is at stake as well as the situation of other people who could be arrested.

For the 5 pigs and for the sperm, Iakober requests the following [persons] be allowed to leave: SIGMUND SWARTZ and his wife, Silvia, 15 Pictor Romano Str., Bucharest; Șaraga Ștefania and her son ALIN ION, 8 Maria Rosetti Str., Bucharest.

He requests that Sigmund Swartz be allowed to leave by 30.11, otherwise he will lose the money.

He asks that instructions for this combination be delivered in advance.

In conformity,

Cpt.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, pp. 291-291bis.

19

[Handwritten document]

November 26, 1960. Note regarding permission to emigrate granted to some persons in exchange for cattle in the context of the “combinations” of Directorate I-A with Henry Jakober.

MAI

171

26.11.960

Top Secret

Single original

EXCERPT

from doc. sent to London on 26.11.960

It is noted that exit visas were granted to Șaraga Ștefania and her son.

It is requested that Iakober take measures for the immediate delivery of the cattle included in this combination.

To make a decision on the other proposals, LIVIU will get in contact with Iakober to set up a meeting in Bucharest. We will be advised of Iakober’s arrival date in Bucharest.

For conformity,

Cpt.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. IV, p. 293.

20

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

December 8, 1960. The report of Captain Gheorghe Marcu of Directorate I-A (UM 0123) on his discussion with Henry Jakober in Bucharest. Proposal to grant the permanent exit visa to 26 persons in exchange of breed animals needed for the zootechnical field.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

-182-

TOP SECRET

December 8, 1960

REPORT

Regarding the discussion with IACOBER, on December 7, 1960

As agreed in London, Iacober came to Bucharest to discuss the finetuning of the arrangements initiated in London.

The outcome of the discussion with him was as follows:

a.İACOBER committed to bring to Bucharest in December 1960, covering all incurred costs, the following:

•5 Danish Landrace piglets (3 sows and 2 boars) of a different family from those delivered previously.

•1 ten month old Danish Landrace boar, ready to breed.

•The two Zebu bulls, previously promised.

•If we want, he can procure Danish Landrace semen for artificial insemination.

In exchange, IACOBER proposes the following persons be allowed to leave:

1.—SIGMUND SCHWARTZ SILVIA SCHWARTZ

2.—ŞTEFANIA ŞARAGA ALIN ION NEFIAN (age 6)

3.—LEOPOLD FILDERMAN ANGELA FILDERMAN

b.For possible future combinations–as previously discussed—IAC-OBER lined up the following persons for whom he requests exit visas and asks that we let him know if we agree with his proposals and would like to know what consideration would be agreeable for us. These persons are:

1.—SILVIU KLARSFELD GABRIELA KLARSFELD ANDREI KLARSFELD

2.—SILVIU GEORGE RENE GEORGE LIMIOARA GEORGE IOANA GEORGE

3.—LUCIA FILDERMAN

4.—CLARA STERN

5.—SAMUEL GROPER LIZETA GROPER

6.—IOSEF LUPESCU MARGARETA LUPESCU

7.—MAIER MILSTOC GOLDA MILSTOC

8.—FLORICA NICOLESCU VICTORIA MARINESCU MIHAI MARINESCU

9.—FELIX BELIGRADEANU LOLA BELIGRADEANU

The next meeting with Iacober is set for Friday, December 9, 1960.

Cpt. Marcu Gheorghe

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 16-17.

21

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

December 10, 1960. Report from Directorate I-A (UM 0123) signed by Colonel Nicolae Doicaru, the directorate chief, by Major Vlad Frangulea and by Captain Gheorghe Marcu and approved by the Minister of the Interior Alexandru Drăghici about the discussion with Henry Jakober [that took place] in Bucharest. Permanent exit visa is suggested for 23 persons in exchange for 101 pigs, 28 cows and bulls worth $140,000. Exit visa is declined for two persons because of their political orientation (social-democrats).

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

- DIRECTORATE I-A

-171-

Dated 10.12.1960

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

APPROVED

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Colonel General Alex. Drăghici

Signature

Without the other two who are under review

Signature

10.12.60

To procure the Wanganela sheep, Cde. Minister requested that Jakober make other proposals.

REPORT

Regarding a new combination with IAKOBER HENRY with a view to obtaining high-productivity breed animals

During previous discussions with IAKOBER, we understood he is interested to obtain exit visa for 23 persons and offers in exchange to procure for us a number of high-productivity breed animals which are of interest to our national economy.

On the occasion of his visit to this country, IAKOBER HENRY was contacted by Major FRANGULEA VLAD and Cpt. MARCU GHEORGHE and from their discussions resulted the following:

1.Given our needs, IAKOBER HENRY was told we are interested in the procurement of the following animals:

•10 DANISH LANDRACE piglets

•1 ten month old DANISH LANDRACE boar, ready to breed.

•2 ZEBU bulls from Africa

•4 ZEBU cows

•2 JERSEY bulls

•10 JERSEY cows

•2 FRIESIAN bulls

•10 FRIESIAN cows

•80 ENGLISH LANDRACE sows

•10 ENGLISH LANDRACE boars

IAKOBER HENRY was also told we are also interested in WANGANELA sheep from Australia.

All these animals are to be brought into the country at IAKOBER HENRY’s expense and delivered in good condition.

2.In exchange for the above mentioned animals, IAKOBER HENRY requested that exit visa be granted to the following persons:

•ȘARAGA ŞTEFANIA—age 42.

•NEFIANU ALIN ION—child, age 6.

•KLARSFELD SILVIU—age 29.

•KLARSFELD GABRIELA—wife

•KLARSFELD DAN ANDREI—child, age 3.

•FILDERMAN LUCIA DENISE—age 57.

•STERN CLARA—age 73.

•GROPPER SAMOIL—age 54.

•GROPPER LIZETA—wife

•LUPESCU IOSIF—age 55.

•LUPESCU MARGARETA—wife.

•MÜLSTOC MAYER—age 41.

•MÜLSTOC GOLDA—wife.

•BELIGRADEANU FELIX—age 61.

•BELIGRADEANU LOLA—wife.

•SCHWARTZ SIGMUND—age 71.

•SCHWARTZ SILVIA—wife.

•FILDERMAN LEOPOLD—age 61.

•FILDERMAN ANGELICA—wife.

•GEORGE SILVIU age 59

•GEORGE RENÉE—wife.

•GEORGE LUMIOARA—child, age 20.

•GEORGE IOANA—child, age 14.

For these persons, the respective files on each person’s situation are attached.

Regarding FILDERMAN LEOPOLD and GEORGE SILVIU, investigations revealed that the above-mentioned persons participated actively in the social Democrat Party’s activities—TITEL PETRESCU—and GEORGE SILVIU was secretary general of M.A.I., during 1945-1947. On the other hand, taking into account IAKOBER HENRY’s keen interest, he was told these two persons shall not be included in the current combination and their situation will be later discussed, maybe in the context of other combinations.

We took this approach because, if top leadership deems possible to grant exit visa to the above-mentioned persons, taking into account IAKOBER HENRY’s keen interest, we could interest him in the procurement of WANGANELA sheep and maybe of other [animals].

3.When IAKOBER HENRY learned about our needs, he indicated it is possible to procure the above-mentioned animals, except the WANGANELA sheep, since the procurement process, as it is the case of the DANISH-LADRACE pigs, is very challenging.

Regarding the other animals we requested in exchange for the above-mentioned persons, IAKOBER HENRY said he would share his position during the next meeting.

4.Based on the issues discussed with IAKOBER HENRY, there are real possibilities to finetune the combination under the conditions we indicated.

Given the above-mentioned situation, we suggest:

1.To approve ongoing discussions with IAKOBER HENRY.

2.In exchange for the above-mentioned animals, except the WANGANELA sheep, to approve the exit visa for the persons mentioned under point 2, except the families FILDERMAN LEOPOLD and GEORGE SILVIU.

3.Regarding FILDERMAN LEOPOLD and GEORGE SILVIU, if top leadership deems it is possible to grant the exit visa, to continue discussions with IAKOBER HENRY in order to procure the WANGANELA sheep.

4.A written arrangement will be drawn with IAKOBER HENRY (with a single original to be kept only by us) outlining the animal deliveries, with precise deadlines that will determine the departure of the requested.

We note that by granting the exit visa to all the persons requested by IAKOBER HENRY, including FILDERMAN LEOPOLD and GEORGE SILVIU, and the delivery of all the animals we requested, including the WANGANELA sheep, our state will ensure hard currency savings in the amount of $140,000, with no investment.

Major

Frangulea Vlad

Signature

Cpt. Marcu Gheorghe

Signature

APPROVED

CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Colonel Doicaru N.

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 18-21.

22

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

February 6, 1961. Report from Directorate I-A (UM 0123) approved by Alexandru Drăghici, minister of the interior, signed by Colonel Nicolae Doicaru, chief of Directorate I-A, by Major Vlad Frangulea and by Captain Gheorghe Marcu, regarding the list of animals and zootechnical products that are to be procured by IAKOBER HENRY. The report includes a list of 20 Jews who are to receive permission to emigrate in exchange for the respective animals and products.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

-181-

No. 647/10.II.961

TOP SECRET

February 8, 1961

APPROVED

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Colonel General Alex. Drăghici

Signature

REPORT

regarding a new combination with IAKOBER

As previously agreed on 6-02-1961, Maj. FRANGULEA and Cpt. MARCU GHE. continued the discussions with IAKOBER with a view to establishing the framework for the Combination we are interested in. Discussion results are as follows:

a/. IAKOBER agrees to deliver the following equipment and breed animals:

•4 large pieces of “GIANT” brand equipment to produce concentrated forage, each with 12 tons daily capacity.

•2 small pieces of “GIANT” brand equipment to produce concentrated forage, each with 6 tons daily capacity.

•Both types [of equipment] are completely automated, and their cost, including transportation and assembly, is about $21,000. The two installations will be delivered in two months.

•8 AYRSHIRE mounted cows;

•3 AYRSHIRE bulls;

•2 ABARDEEN ANGUS cows;

•1 ABARDEEN ANGUS bull;

•3 LINCOLN LONGWOOL pregnant ewes, with an annual productivity of about 12 kg. of good quality wool;

•2 LINCOLN LONGWOOL rams;

•3 SUFFOLK pregnant ewes with good quality wool;

•2 SUFFOLK rams;

•5 DANISH LANDRACE piglets;

•3 mounted PEPIN-WANGANELA ewes with very fine wool (Australian Merino) that are not allowed for export, with the same regime as the DANISH LANDRACE pigs;

•2 PEPIN-WANGANELA rams;

•4 COLI [sic: COOLIE] dogs that are used to watch cattle and completely eliminate the need for gatekeepers. These dogs are renowned for these qualities.

The cost of the above-mentioned animals, including their transportation to Bucharest, is over $25,000.

In addition, IAKOBER commits to deliver to Bucharest some high-technology medical instruments (for artificial insemination, tuberculin syringes, tools for tattooing and marking the animals, etc.), as well as some quantities of medicine used to prevent and control diseases (INPASIL, NEVAGIN, etc.).

b/. In exchange for the above-mentioned installations and animals, IAKOBER requests exit visa for the following persons:

1.—OTTON DANIEL

MARIA DANIEL

2.—MORITZ MATASANU

RASELA MATASANU

ELY STRULOVICI

3.—ERWIN WEXLER

BELA WEXLER

NADIA WEXLER

REBECA DAVIDSHON

4.—BERNARD KATZ

OLGA KATZ

5.—EMANUEL SHAPIRO

6.—HENRI STORFER

ELSA STORFER

7.—ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN

SONIA GOLDSTEIN

ANDRE GOLDSTEIN

IRENE GOLDSTEIN

8.—STEFAN KERTESZ

IUDITH KERTESZ

We mention that our investigations showed no problems that could raise obstacles to their departure, except STEFAN KERTESZ. In connection with KERTESZ, according to our information, during the period when he was Chimimport’s representative to F.R.G., he allegedly took bribes from West-German businessmen in order to facilitate some deals. Regarding family WEXLER, on January 15, c.y., they received an exit visa without our intervention.

c/. Taking into account the fact that this combination with IAKOBER would generate over $46,000 savings, with our State receiving the installations and the breed animals without spending hard currency or lei, WE SUGGEST:

1.In exchange for the installations and livestock we requested to grant exit visa from P.R.R. to the persons IAKOBER requested.

2.To enter a written agreement with IAKOBER that we shall keep and that will include his commitments with the precise deadlines when the installations and the animals will be delivered, as well as the departure dates for the persons he requested.

3.Since IAKOBER does not have contact with the LONDON Field Office and certain issues may come up in the process, it is necessary to indicate a fictitious name and an address so that IAKOBER could write to us when he needs to make urgent communications.

4.Since in 1960, on our request, IAKOBER delivered 3 FRIESIAN cows to replace the 3 cows that were supposedly ill, although, as it was later proven, they were healthy—a fact IAKOBER knows—he requests to be reimbursed for the sum of 8,000 lei. We propose to approve this amount to close this situation.

CPT.

MARCU GHEORGHE

Signature

MAJOR

FRANGULEA VLAD

Signature

APPROVED:

CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Colonel

Doicaru Nicolae

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 35-38.

23

[Handwritten document]

May 10, 1961. Protocol with UM 0123 officers signed by Henry Jakober regarding his delivery of agro-industrial and veterinarian installations in exchange for 23 persons, mostly Jews.

PROTOCOL

concluded today, April 10, 1961

1.I, the undersigned Jacober Henry, hereby pledge that, together with the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, will procure and will cover the costs for the following:

a.A complete automated slaughterhouse from the company GORDON JOHNSON in England, with a capacity of 1,000/1,200 poultry (chicken) / hour. The slaughterhouse will be delivered according to the specifications provided by the technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture, per the initial offer.

b.I will cover the transportation and insurance costs for the poultry slaughterhouse mentioned under point a) (Delivered to Bucharest or Constanța).

c.The cost of the technical assistance needed to assemble and start the slaughterhouse will be covered, according to the offer.

2.The departure of the citizens who are included in this combination is established as follows:

1.George Silviu with family

2.Katy Bernard with wife

3.Krieger Theo with family in April 1961

4.Conescu Jean with wife

5.Blumen David with family

6.Sudit David with family

7.Tansig Pavel with family

8.Tisebler Dora

9.Daniel Constantin in May 1961

10.Feldman David with family

11.Banuş Arthur with family

12.Deruner Herman with family

13.Wollman Rebeca

14.Goldstein Iosif with wife

15.Crisbăşenu Alexandru May 1961

16.Jianu Ionel with family

17.Samueli (Ana, Isabela, Valeria)

18.Torosian Herant

19.Meţianu Ion June 1961

20.Filderman Leopold with wife

21.Groper Samuel with wife July 1961

22.Berindei Ion (by July 1961, he will be released from jail)

23.Sterian Simion will leave the country on 10.V.1961.

3.Mr. Jakober will be sent a coded telegram to inform him when the above-mentioned have the travel documents in their hands. They will be also told to leave the country by TAROM flights. Dl. Jakober already knows about this [arrangement].

Bucharest 10/5/1961

Signature H Jakober

This agreement also assumes that, if some of the persons on the list cannot leave for different reasons, they will be replaced with other persons acceptable to the Romanian authorities.

Bucharest 10/5/1961

Signature

H Jakober

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 42-43.

24

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

September 25, 1961. Report of Directorate I-A (UM 0123) approved by Alexandru Drăghici, minister of the interior, signed by Major Vlad Frangulea and by Captain Gheorghe Marcu regarding a “combination” with Henry Jakober concerning the emigration of the Germans and the Jews for whom the American Joint Distribution Committee (Joint) intervened and that should have generated a benefit of $800,000 for Securitate. It is mentioned that in the future a Securitate account in Switzerland will be used to transfer the sums received from Jakober.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

- SERVICE VIII -

TOP SECRET

Sept. 25, 1961

APPROVED

MINISTER OF INTERIOR

Colonel General Alex. Drăghici

Signature

REPORT

regarding the results of the discussions with IAKOBER HENRY

According to the instructions received from the M.A.I. top leadership, the following [matters] were addressed in the discussions with IAKOBER:

a/. Regarding the contracted machine-tools worth $290,000, IAKOBER said he would contact again the suppliers to shorten the delivery times, so that all the machine-tools will be delivered by the end of 1962.

Regarding the machine-tools that are to be delivered after April 1962, he agrees, if we want, to deposit the price balance (since 1/3 of their value was transferred to the suppliers upon placing the order, per the attached official documents) into an account we will indicate.

Regarding future combinations, he agrees they will be made in exchange of [US] dollar cash deposits to our account in Switzerland.

b/. IAKOBER submitted a list of 35 persons. We agreed that, in exchange for granting the exit visa to these persons within 3 weeks, he will deposit the amount of $120,000 (twelve hundred thousand) within 10 days into the Swiss bank account we are going to indicate.

We attach the list of the persons he requested and further mention that 5 of these persons are serving different jail terms.

c/. IAKOBER gave us a telegram he received on 23 this month from MÜNICH showing that his partner is very interested in the combination with the Germans and he will go on Tuesday 25 of this month to Vienna to finalize the combination (see attached telegram).

IAKOBER said that from Vienna he will come to Bucharest and bring the list of the Germans he will request in exchange for $500,000 (the amount we indicated).

He emphasized we need to understand him since he cannot make a firm commitment until he has arranged all the guarantees with his partner in F.R.G. However, he pledged solemnly the amount of $500,000 will materialize shortly.

d/. IAKOBER gave us a list of Jews for whom—as he claims—the Zionist organization JOINT intervenes and will pay him to take these Jews out of P.R.R. To grant the exit visa, IAKOBER was asked for an amount of $300,000. Currently, he is discussing with the JOINT representative in New York to obtain the money we have asked. He claims he firmly believes this combination will be achieved; however, he needs several more days to finetune it.

e/. We persuaded IAKOBER to postpone the settlement of our payment for the 200 LANDRACE pigs and 30 FRIZE cattle he delivered until we have completed the above-mentioned combinations for the balance of the respective sums.

He was also persuaded to deliver within one month the 100 FRIZE cows ordered by the M.A.I. top leadership, with no payment now, but rather later, after the combinations under c/. and d/. (Germans and Jews) have been completed.

We took this approach to persuade IAKOBER to accelerate the process of finalizing the two combinations so he can be paid for the animals he already delivered (around $100,000).

On the other hand, the amount he will receive from us for the animals he delivered will also provide a guarantee that IAKOBER will meet his obligations within the established timeframe.

f/. Upon our request, IAKOBER contacted by phone the French company ROUCHAUD that had to deliver in September the universal milling machine with automatic cycle. He received a telegram from this company (telegram is attached) advising the above-mentioned machine-tool will be delivered from the factory on November 15, this year, at the latest.

IAKOBER mentioned he will go to Paris to try to shorten the delivery time as much as possible.

g/. From a broad re-analysis of the situation, in the context of the order received from the M.A.I. top leadership, we find the following:

1.Value of the contracted machine-tools: $290,000.

2.Value of the new proposed combination $120,000

3.Value of the delivered animals that are not paid yet (plus the 100 FRIZE) including transport __________$110,000 ____________- TOTAL = $520,000

4.Value of the combinations (Germans and Jews) that IAKOBER pledged to resolve as reported

•German combination ___________ $500,000

•Jews combination ______________$300,000

The total amount to be achieved is $1,320,000, which also includes the value of the 200 LANDRACE pigs and 130 FRIZE cattle IAKOBER delivered.

Given the above:

WE SUGGEST:

1.To approve the combination under point “B” by granting the exit visa from P.R.R. to the persons on the attached list in exchange for $120,000.

2.To indicate to IAKOBER the account [number] and the bank so that he may deposit the above-mentioned amount.

Major FRANGULEA VLAD

Signature

Cpt. MARCU GHEORGHE

Signature

APPROVED CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Major General Doicaru Nicolae

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 69-72.

25

[Document written in ink calligraphy for UM 0123 top leadership]

November 6, 1961. Report-note of Directorate I-A regarding operation IH (Jakober Henry). Analysis of the results and weaknesses of the “combinations” with Henry Jakober, with suggestions for improvement approved by Colonel Nicolae Doicaru, chief of UM 0123.

Top Secret

Single original

Nov. 6, 1961

13.11.1961

Cpt. Marcu and Major Frangulea,

Take note and implement measures to address the identified weaknesses. Doicaru

NOTE. REPORT.

Regarding operation “IH”

Operation “IH” was initially carried out by Dept. VII, and, as of 1960, it has been carried out by Major Vlad Frangulea, Dept. XI Chief and Cpt. Marcu Gheorghe, Dept. VIII, who are in charge with the timely implementation of the tasks connected with this operation and closely follow the instructions and orders given by the Ministry top leadership and by the Directorate management.

Since 1959, within this operation, several combinations have been undertaken that resulted in granting exit visa to 156 persons. Of these, 13 were serving different jail terms,–7 for counter-revolutionary activity and 6 for common law offences- and were pardoned for the sentences they had to serve.

As a result of these combinations, our state earned a revenue of about $635,550 (six hundred thirty five thousand five hundred fifty) in goods and hard currency as follows:

1.Animals worth about $216,170 two hundred sixteen thousand one hundred seventy US dollars

a. | Cattle | 163 head
| English FRIZE | 57 heads
| Jersey | 40
| “Santa Gertruda | 34—“
| Ayrshire | 14 heads
| Red-Poll | 15–“
| Aberden Argus | 3- “
b. | Sheep |
| Oxford | 45 heads
| Romney-Marsth | 55 “ S
| Southdowne | 18—“
| Corriedale | 100 –“
| Suffolk | 10 –
| Lencester | 5 –
| Shropshire | 10
c. | Swine | 388
| English Landrace |
| “-Danish 2-“ Petroine 3-“ |
d. | Canines Collie (dogs) | 4

2.Automated feed concentrates equipment—6 pieces worth $9,110—nine thousand one hundred ten—US dollars

3.Machine-tools worth $290,270—two hundred ninety thousand two hundred seventy US dollars From different capitalist countries a number of 8—eight—machine-tools were contracted:

3—three- universal milling machine-tools together with the necessary accessories from the company S.H.W.—F.R.G.

1—one—machine-tool for milling concrete and grooving of concrete surfaces with automatic roller cycles together with the necessary accessories from the company “Rouchaud”–France

2—two—machine-tools for fillet grinding with the necessary accessories from the company “Lindner”—F.R.G.

1—one—fillet grinding machine with the necessary accessories from the company “Reisbauer”–Switzerland

1—one—coordinate drilling machine with the necessary accessories. Of the total value of these machine-tools, suppliers were paid $136,424—one hundred thirty six thousand four hundred twenty four US dollars–and the rest of $153,846—one hundred fifty three thousand eight hundred and forty six US dollars—is to be paid when the orders are delivered.

4.Available at the Bank–$120,000—one hundred twenty thousand US dollars. For the above-mentioned amount, we received 2—two–checks in the amount of $70,000–seventy thousand US dollars–and a $50,000—fifty thousand US dollars -cashier’s check to Schweizerische Kreditanstalt Bank in Zürich. In addition to the above-mentioned results, in November this year, an additional 100 English Frize heads are to be delivered for M.A.I. On November 1 this year, “IH” owed M.A.I. $153,846—one hundred fifty three thousand eight hundred forty six US dollars—a sum that represents the price difference for the machine-tools he will have to pay different suppliers by the end of this year and during 1962.

At the same time, M.A.I. owes “IH” $110,000—one hundred ten thousand US dollars, representing the value of 200—two hundred—English Landrace pigs and 30 English Frize cattle that are in the M.A.I. inventory as well as the cost of the 100 Frize cattle that are to be delivered.

If we also add the sum that will be used to grant exit visa to a new group of persons, the total revenue until November 1 this year is about $745,550—seven hundred forty five thousand five hundred fifty US dollars.

The average of the sums we got is about $4,000—four thousand US dollars—for each person.

In the near future, there is a possibility to finalize two more combinations of large proportions that will produce about $800,000—eight hundred thousand US dollars. However, it seems that, compared with the average achieved so far in the above mentioned combinations, our demands decreased substantially—by about 70-75%.

The audit of this operation revealed some weaknesses:

Since there has been no precise record of the results per [each] combination and no invoices were issued at the beginning of the operation, as necessary, there is a discrepancy among the invoices, the records of the M.A.I. Administrative Department, and the periodic reports submitted by Directorate I-A to the Ministry’s top leadership.

For example, comparing the situation of the inventory compiled by the M.A.I. Administrative Department on 1.XI, this year, and the invoices in the operation file, there is a difference of:

34 Santa Gertruda cattle

15—Red-Poll

18 Southdown sheep

10 Shrapshire sheep

3 Petroine pigs

These are logged in the M.A.I. inventory but there are no corresponding invoices in the operation file.

On the other hand, there are invoices for additional 2 Jersey cattle, 22 English Landrace pigs, and 2 Danish Landrace pigs that are not recorded in the M.A.I inventory.

It was also a mistake that the delivery of the animals to the M.A.I. Administrative Department was made with no accounting forms; a record would normally have been made for each lot of animals, since this would be the only document necessary to inventory records.

It is a must to have a precise evidence and to set up forms regulating the receipt and delivery of the goods in this combination, all the more so since, shortly, the machine-tools will arrive and they have to be delivered to organizations outside M.A.I.- that will certainly pay in lei.

V[ery] correct.

In this case, it is advisable to analyze the possibility of covering the import operations—vis-à-vis beneficiaries—under the umbrella of the Ministry of Trade (foreign trade units) the Committee for New Technology, C.S.P. or the Ministry of Heavy Industry and the value (in lei) of the imported goods be deposited to a special account of the respective organization that should belong to M.A.I.- or to be transferred to the state revenue.

Another drawback is the fact that there is no precise record of the persons who were approved to leave, who received departure authorizations, the number and serial number of the certificates, the departure date, etc. so that we could trace along the line the closing of the combinations achieved throughout different periods.

Yes. V[ery] correct.

Signature

Doicaru

As a result, sometimes, “IH” was mistakenly sent numbers and serial numbers of the issued certificates or even [information about] the departure of some persons who, in fact, had not even received the exit visa from the Passport Commission.

This was the case of Deleanu Hary; information was sent that he received the departure certificate although, in fact, he hadn’t received it, and “IH” was aware of this situation and shared with us his confusion.

Obviously, repeating this mistake could create obstacles to the implementation of the operation since mutual confidence plays an important part.

In the above-mentioned situation, the blame lies mainly with the Passport Directorate that procrastinates unreasonably the certification requests of the persons approved by the Ministry’s top leadership and are included in the combination, although Directorate I-A keeps sending memos requesting urgent action.

Upon checking the situation, it resulted that on Oct. 30, this year, of the 41 persons agreed upon in the protocol concluded on Sept 25., this year, and approved by the Ministry’s top leadership to leave the country by Oct. 15., this year, only 13 left, the others had not received the departure certificates.

Furthermore, there are 4 persons who have not left yet because they do not have departure certificates although they are included and approved in the protocol concluded in May this year. Certainly, to a great extent, the comrades who are handling the operation are to blame too because they took for granted the verbal information from the Passport Directorate without checking their veracity and they kept doing it although there had been previous situations when there were misinformed by some comrades from the Passport Dir. I also consider as a negative aspect the fact that the operation file is missing from all the operational records of our directorate, although it includes elements of operational interest about which we hold verification materials. In the future, some of these elements could come up within the range of activity of one of our field offices or of an operative service with foreign operations; as they are not included in our records, these [elements] feature as unknown with our directorate.

The file will not be stored with [illegible] but rather with Cpt. Marcu or Major Frangulea.

Signature Doicaru

I opine they wouldn’t have exposed [the operation] if an individual file had been created and logged as operation “IH”; such an action would have been featured in the hard files of several elements, without knowing what it is about.

Correct

Another negative aspect is the fact that the operation was approached only from the point of view of the revenues and of the commercial activities and the operational aspect has been neglected.

In fact, through this operation, a semi-official channel has been created that could be used very well by our directorate to take out [of the country] sincere and well verified agents and other more complex intelligence-operational measures could also be implemented or within the objectives of Serv. VI.

I think we must also take into account another aspect, namely:

In the context of the combinations, different elements left and are going to leave after having been arrested for counter-revolutionary activities or after having participated or are going to participate in intelligence activities, and these [cases] have been handled by different agents.

It’s not out of the question that one of the respective agents had been sent abroad with tasks and, in such a situation, a thorough background check must be done to avoid the possibility of sending abroad an element that could endanger the agents sent with duties and who are committed to us.

You are right.

In conclusion, operation “I.H.” is being carried out competently and promptly and, as a result, in a relatively short period of time, important combinations for our state have been achieved.

I note that the sums quoted within this report are based on the present invoices, but, according to Cdes. Major Frangulea and Cpt. Marcu, evaluating the goods based on Prodexport calculations (the current market prices), the achievements of the operation to the present moment raise to approximately $792,550.

There has not been given sufficient attention to the operational records and the accounting-statistical records of this operation. At the same time, the intelligence-operational channel that was created through this operation has been neglected.

Given these findings, I suggest:

1.To mandate strict records for each combination indicating: date of the protocol, “I.H.” obligations (goods, currency), what has been achieved, date and documents, M.A.I. obligations (persons’ names, date of the departure certificate, its serial number and number, the respective person’s departure date).

Correct.

2.Goods obtained should be delivered to the beneficiaries with minutes that will also reflect potential differences or deficiencies regarding the [goods] condition. Delivery should be made under the umbrella of an organization that deals with import of goods. Yes. For the equivalent in lei obtained from beneficiaries apart from M.A.I. a special account will be set up in the name of the respective organization that will belong to M.A.I.

3.This action shall be recorded under the operational records of our directorate under the name operation “I.H.” and the elements shall be recorded within Service XI.

Yes.

4.If [among] the persons who are going to leave, there are persons who are in jail, were arrested or are working in intelligence missions, it must be established whether they were tracked with agents on a mission abroad and are devoted to us. If the answer is affirmative, an analysis should be made on whether the respective persons suspect in any way the respective agents.

Yes.

5.To analyze and take intelligence-operational measures through the existing channel (agents’ extractions, compromising agents [operating] abroad who proved to be insincere or traitors, bringing to the country elements presenting operational interest, etc.)

6.To avoid incorrect data from the Passport Dir., to request that they [Passport Directorate] send written responses to the memoranda from our directorate whereby they are provided the names of the persons approved by the Ministry top leadership and accelerate the issuance of the departure certificates. The response should also include the serial number and date of the certificate and the date when the certificate was sent.

V[ery] correct.

7.The present report should be filed at the operation.

Securitate Cpt.

Signature

Panțiru Virgil

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 84-91.

26

[Handwritten document]

February 14, 1962. Protocol concluded today with Henry Jakober regarding instalment payments of $238,000 in exchange for passports for 87 persons.

PROTOCOL

Concluded today, February 14, 1962.

a.I, the undersigned IAKOBER HENRY, hereby pledge to pay the amount of $238,000 (two hundred thirty eight thousand) that I owe the Romanian state.

b.In exchange for this amount, 87 persons will be allowed to leave the country by April 15, 1962. The list of the persons is attached to this Protocol and the attachment is an integral part of the Protocol.

c.At the same time, I commit to pay the sum of $24,000 (twenty four thousand) for the rest of 16 persons in the table with 116 persons (group 080). This sum will be deducted from the debt of $54,800 (fifty four thousand eight hundred).

Signature HJakober

February 14, 1962

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, p. 117.

27

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

February 15, 1962. Report of Directorate I-A (UM 0123) approved by Alexandru Drăghici, Minister of the Interior, signed by Major Vlad Frangulea and Captain Gheorghe Marcu regarding a “combination” with Henry Jakober concerning the emigration of 116 Jews for whom the American Joint Distribution Committee (Joint) intervened. The report includes the explanations of the two UM 0123 officers regarding the reasons for the delay in the departure of this lot of Jews.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

- DIRECTORATE I-A

-1100-

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

February 15, 1962

STAMP (Directorate Chief Office)

No. 0102 of 21.02.1962

APPROVED

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Colonel General Alex. Drăghici

Signature

REPORT

During the discussions with JAKOBER HENRY following the instructions of the M.A.I. top leadership, the following was established:

1/ Regarding the combination for 100 persons for whom the Organization JOINT intervened, he was told what the cause of the delay in their departure was (debts, documentation, etc.) and Jakober accepted the explanations.

Jakober was told that the first groups of persons will leave on February 17 this year and within about 3 weeks the whole lot of 100 persons [will leave].

Jakober H. agreed to pay the first $50,000 instalment on February 17, c.y., and the rest of $100,000 to be transferred by the end of February c.y.

2/ JAKOBER submitted a new list of 88 persons and offered in exchange $130,000, requesting the exit visas for these persons. As a result of our discussions, he was persuaded to increase the amount to $238,000, a sum that will be confirmed by us.

The list of the persons attached herewith was forwarded to Department “C” M.A.I. for verification, and the results will be sent to the M.A.I. top leadership.

3/ We agreed with JAKOBER to add 16 persons from Rabbi Rosen’s list to the group of 100 persons for whom he committed to pay the sum of $24,000.

4/ We mention that we owe JAKOBER $55,000 for the cattle and pigs [already] delivered. Given the above,

WE SUGGEST:

a.To approve the exit visa for the persons in the attached table in exchange for the amount of $238,000.

b.The amount of $24,000 for the 16 persons (of the ROSEN group) to be deducted from our debt to JAKOBER that amounts to $55,000 so that we will have to pay the remaining amount of $31,000 in the context of one of the future combinations.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DIRECTORATE

Captain

Marcu Gheorghe

Signature

CHIEF DEPARTMENT XI

Major

Vlad Frangulea

Signature

APPROVED

CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Major General

Doicaru Nicolae

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 115-116.

28

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

►May 18, 1962. Report of Directorate I-a countersigned by Major-General Nicolae Doicaru, chief of the Directorate, and signed by Captain Gheorghe Marcu and Major Vlad Frangulea, regarding a “combination” with Henry Jakober concerning the emigration of 116 Jews for whom the American Joint Distribution Committee (Joint) intervened. The report includes the explanations provided by the two officers regarding the status of the departure of this group of Jews.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

- DIRECTORATE I-A

TOP SECRET

May 18, 1962

REPORT

regarding the situation of the latest two combinations made with IAKOBER.

I.– On December 9, 1961, a combination was made with IAKOBER for 116 persons, and the sum of $1,500 for each person was agreed upon.

Currently, the situation is as follows:

a. | Persons who left the country | 68
b. | Persons who are to receive the passport. | 29
c. | Persons in detention under legal proceedings | 7
d. | Persons rejected by the M.A.I. top leadership because they are in the Suceava group that caused 50 million lei damages to the state. | 6

Yes.

•FISCHER CAROL

•ZEILIG BUIUM;

•FRIEDEL NABER IACOB

•BAUXMAN ARNOLD;

•REICHER NATHAN

•SCHAPIRA HERMAN

e.Persons who have passports but cannot leave the country because they have debts: 3

Yes.

1.—SINIGALIA RUDOLF (1,329,930 lei);

2.—SLINKA HERSCH (723,167 lei);

3.—FURST SAMOIL (510,252 lei).

f.Unidentified persons because of lack of sufficient information.

_____________________TOTAL 116_____________________

We conclude from the above that for the 68 persons who left the country we have the right to charge $102,000 and for the 29 persons who are to receive passports an additional $43,500.

We have received from IAKOBER $100,000 so far and he owes us another $45,500.

When the persons delayed for different debts leave, this amount will be increased with $1,500 per person.

II.Regarding the combination made with IAKOBER on February 15 c.y. and for whom IAKOBER must pay $238,000, the situation is as follows:

a. | Persons who left the country | 58
b. | Persons who are about to get the passport | 14

c.Persons under litigation 3

•FIEDERER BERNARD ($2,000)

•BUNGER ALFRED ($5,000)

•GROZEA ADOLF ($4,000)

d.
Persons with debts
2

To consult DA

1.—BLANC MORITZ (101,761 lei) ($3,000)

2.—LASCAROV MIHAIL (510,162 lei) ($8,000)

e.
Persons rejected by the M.A.I. top leadership
6

1.—VRALA ALEXANDRU ($3,000);

2.—BABEANU STEFAN ($2,000);

3.—MANOLESCU ANTON ($ 2.000);

4.—AUSLENDER IOSEF ($3,500);

5.—COANDA CONSTANTIN ($3,000);

6.—VASILIU CHEORGHE ($6,000);

f.Persons who refuse to leave PRR 5

1.—MAYERSOHN SAMSON ($1,500);

2.—GRUNFELD HERMAN ($1,500);

3.—SIBILA SILVIU ($2,500);

4.—SARARU SERGIU ($1,500);

5.—GRUNBERG ANGELA ($1,000);

From the amount of this combination, we have cashed so far $38,000 and we will further receive $200,000.

If the persons with debts, the jailed persons, as well as the persons rejected by the M.A.I. top leadership, will not leave the country, the above mentioned sum will decrease by $46,500, representing their value according to our arrangement with IAKOBER.

III.Pursuant to the approval of the M.A.I. top leadership, IAKOBER must remit $2,500, representing the debt of about 50,000 lei VEREA B. still owes.

IV.At the same time, we will pay IAKOBER from the value of a future combination the amount of $94,000 representing the value of the following livestock he delivered to P.R.R. without reimbursement:

•290 LANDRACE pigs;

•26 FRIZE cows;

•9 FRIZE bulls;

•20 HEREFORD cattle.

V.Recapitulation

1.For the two combinations, the amount of $158,000 was received.

2.To be further collected $201,500.

3.If departure is approved for the persons with different debts as well as for the SUCEAVA group, another $24,000 will be cashed.

4.Our debt to IAKOBER is $94,000.

DEPUTY CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Captain

Marcu Gheorghe

Signature

CHIEF DEPARTMENT XI

Major Frangulea Vlad

Signature

APPROVED

CHIEF DIRECTORATE I-A

Major General,

Doicaru Nicolae

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 142-145.

29

[Handwritten document]

October 21, 1962. Report of Directorate I-A (UM 0123) by Lt. Col. Vlad Frangulea regarding a meeting with Henry Jakober and a “combination” regarding the emigration of 310 Jews in exchange for $700,000.

M.A.I.

25-10-1962

Cde. Vice-president Alex. Drăghici approved this combination.

TOP SECRET

REPORT

On October 21, 1962, at the meeting with IACOBER, it was agreed that, in exchange for $700,000 (seven hundred thousand), 310 (three hundred ten) families of Jewish nationality be allowed to leave the country, according to the attached list.

Lt. Col. Frangulea Vlad

Oct 22, 1962

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. XIII, p. 176.

30

[Typed document in general use]

No date (1964?) “London Market in Rumanians,” article published by the Sunday Telegraph, London. “London Market in Rumanians.”

“A secret organization with headquarters in London is handling an increasing traffic in emigrants from Rumania to the West. It charges between £500 and £3,000 to arrange an “emigration.” The key figure in the organization is a Central European businessman with extensive trade relations behind the Iron Curtain. He lives in an apartment in Park Lane. He makes no secret that the whole traffic is “strictly business.” The purchase price is usually paid into a Swiss bank but it may be swallowed up in trade deals between Rumania and Britain. Only “hard” currency is accepted in payment. This traffic in human lives across the Iron Curtain was revealed last week by Rumanian emigres living in Paris. Romania is the only country to have a fixed price list for the release of the persons not wanted by the regime.

An elderly peasant may secure permission to leave for £500. On the other end of the scale, a young qualified engineer might pay more than £3,000 in addition to expenses incurred in Bucharest in lei. Approximately the same sum will secure release of anyone serving a sentence for a “political” offence. The cost of the air or rail ticket to the West must also be paid for in “hard” currency. Only in the case of the more important political prisoners, the Romanian authorities categorically refuse to release them. Few failures. The traffic has been going on for several years and brought the Romanian government millions of British pounds. But hundreds of people are still queuing regularly at the permit offices in Bucharest and every plane leaving Romania for Western Europe carries its quota of “bought” emigres. Working from London, the emigration organization seldom fails to produce the desired result. There are agents working in most capitals where there is a large Russian (probably Romanian, t.n.) colony. Although the Securitate authorities are believed to know all about this traffic, they choose to turn a blind eye on it. No laws are broken and all the parties involved in the deal seem to be satisfied.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VIII, p. 363.

1968-1989

TRADE IN JEWS CARRIED OUT BY ROMANIA AND ISRAEL THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

31

[Typed document in general use]

May 20, 1968. Transcript of the discussion at the Steering Committee of the CC of RCP with Alexandru Drăghici. He states that from the emigration of the “elderly Jews” through “some middlemen” he obtained $6,250,000. He also states he had approval for this operation.

Copy No. 2

TRANSCRIPT of the discussion with Alexandru Drăghici

-May 20, 1968 –

Cde. Gh. Stoica: Comrade Drăghici, you may remember that, last time, we asked you to reflect about a work place. We would like to hear now what your opinion is about this.

Al. Drăghici: I told you then, even at this moment, I have huge headaches and it’s difficult for me to deal with anything. I’d appreciate it if you considered my retirement [request] so that I may close this chapter of my life.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: We could say we are not anticipating [your] retirement, because you are still young, with physical and mental ability to continue working and being useful. Consequently, we would like you to keep reflecting along this line and to think even of a work place.

Al. Drăghici: One thing has to be understood: for me it is an awful nightmare and it was not easy to live through those miserable moments. I joined the party as a young man not because I was interested in a career, to become a minister or a great leader, I never thought of that, I thought only about the fight, I spent years in Doftana, I lived through the tragedy of Doftana, I have been fighting for 15 years to defend the working class accomplishments. It’s wrong when they say it’s not Securitate that fought this battle, it’s not Drăghici who did this. It’s not true! It was a life and death fight with the enemy! It’s not easy for me to live the nightmare I’m living now. I have headaches, I made an effort to come here, but, for the time being, if you are not considering my retirement, I don’t know what I’m going to do.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: I have another question. You met with [Moscony] Stârcea. At the plenary, you stated you had recruited him as an informer and that was the reason why you released him.

Al. Drăghici: The truth is that he paid, his wife paid. [Vasile] Negrea or somebody else talked with him and eventually he acknowledged.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: The reason why he was released was because he was recruited to be of service to the state.

Al. Drăghici: At the Permanent Presidium I shared the reason, but at the plenary I did not want to say we use money for this issue. When I left the Ministry of the Interior, I deposited into the National Bank account $6,250,000 [received] from those who left the country and paid in hard currency. I reported this situation to the party leadership then and later as well.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: Those who left without paying, why did they leave?

Al. Drăghici: Most of them were elderly Jews. But, in fact, it was Israel’s issue that was being paid, but it was not only Israel’s issue. There were some middlemen abroad who took over this activity and were offering sums of money for [different] persons. I reported about this issue to the top leadership and had their approval....

►Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond CC al PCR, Comitetul Executiv, nr. 264/17/18.2/1972.

32

[Typed document in general use]

January 18, 1973. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Ion Stanescu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $800,000 into a new account TN73. The account TN73 will be under the personal control of Nicolae Ceaușescu

Record stamp

No. 0104 Pages 1

January 18, 1973

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

—[Minister’s] Office

No. 03522 Dated 18.01.1973

SECRET Copy No. 2

RECEIVED

18.II.973

Signature

To:

The ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. Voloșeniuc –

With this letter, we deposit the sum of $800,000 (eight hundred thousand) to be recorded into a separate account according to the instructions you received. We suggest that this account should start with the symbol 73.

We hereby request that you accept the above-mentioned sum and confirm receipt with legal documents.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Ss/ION STĂNESCU

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 1.

33

[Letterhead. Typed document in general use]

January 19, 1973. Memo of the chairman of the Bank for Foreign Trade to the Minister of the Interior Ion Stănescu confirming the $800,000 deposit and the opening of account TN73.

ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE CHAIRMAN

OFFICE

BUCHAREST, January 19, 1973

Secret

Copy No. 1

Record stamp

B.D.S.

No. 0208 Pages 1

January 19, 1973

TO: MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Cde. Minister Ion Stănescu

We follow up on your letter No. 03522 of January 18, 1973, and bring to your attention that we opened account No. 47.21.406.8/T.N.73 and deposited the amount of $800,000 (eight hundred thousand).

We hereby request that for any operation connected with this issue the above-mentioned symbol be indicated.

Chairman

Romulus Petrescu

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, Vol. VA, p. 3.

34

[Typed document in general use]

February 5, 1973. Deposit receipt for the amount of $1,210,236.70 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level, namely: A = people with higher education diplomas; B = university students; C = workers, clerks; D = housewives, people with no qualifications, high school students. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D

We handed over to you, at our meeting in Vienna, on Monday 5/2/73—in cash—the amount of US $1,210,236.70 (ONEMILLIONTWOHUNDREDTENTHOUSTWO HUNDREDTHIRTYSIX AND70/100)—as follows:

1.Your final account as of 31/12/72:

“A”—46 × 2,691.50 = 123,809

“B”—3 × 1,614.-- = 004,842

“C”—92 × 0,549.-- = 050,508

“D”—87 × 0,441.-- = 038,367 − $ 217,526.

2.Corrections for the period 15/11/69 until 31/12/72 as per our detailed account: $448,945.50

3.Interest on old loan as per your account: 554,000.-1,220,471.50

4.Less advance as per our letter of 22/11/72: 010,234.80

TOTAL: $1,210,236.70

Vienna, 5/12/73.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 9.

35

[Handwritten document]

February 10, 1973. Report of DIE General Gheorghe MARCU (alias Dorin Pavelescu) acknowledging receipt of $1,210,256.70 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the sum be deposited at BRCE to account TN73.

U.M. 0920

No. 005082 of 10.II.1973

Single original

Top Secret Signature

I.Stănescu

APPROVED

Signature

NOTE—REPORT

On 5.II.1973, in Vienna, I received from DAN, the sum of $1,210,256.70 (one million two hundred ten thousand two hundred thirty six and 70 cents). With this amount, DAN has paid all his arrears up to 31.XII.1972.

Will you please approve that the above-mentioned sum be deposited to B.R.C.E. to account TN 73.

Respectfully,

Major General Pavelescu Dorin

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 8.

36

[Typed document in general use]

February 14, 1973. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Ion Stănescu to the chairman of the Bank for Foreign Trade to deposit $1,210,236.70 into account TN73.

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

THE MINISTER’S OFFICE

No. 0090161 of 14.2.1973

TO:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

CDE. CHAIRMAN V. VOLOȘENIUC

We hereby deposit the sum of $1,210,236.70 (one million two hundred ten thousand two hundred thirty six and 70 %) asking that you accept and deposit it tino account No. 47.21.406.300.8/T.N. 73.

We also ask that you confirm receipt of the above-mentioned hard currency.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Ss/Ion Stănescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 11.

37

[Typed document in general use]

May 5, 1973. Receipt for handing over the amount of $741,700 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest on 14/5/73 you presented the account for the period Jan. 1st—May 15th according to lists Nos. 1-20 as follows:

A—143 × 3000 = 429,000

B—019 × 1700 = 032,300

C—259 × 0600 = 155,400

D—250 × 0500 = 125,000

TOTAL: 741,700 We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna on 17/5/73—in cash—the amount of US Dollars: SEVENHUNDREDFORTYONETHOUSANDSEVENHUNDRED.

A list of corrections will be presented separately.

Vienna, 17/5/73.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol VA, p. 24.

38

[Handwritten document]

May 21, 1973. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $741,700 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the amount be deposited to BRCE account TN73.

U.M. 0920

AS No. 25,100

21.05.1973

Top Secret

23

Approved

Signature illegible

NOTE–REPORT

On May 17 this year, the sum of $741,700 (seven hundred forty one thousand seven hundred) was collected in Vienna from DAN. Please approve that the above-mentioned sum be deposited to BRCE into account 4721406300/TN73.

Please advise.

Major General Pavelescu Dorin

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol VA, p. 23.

39

[Typed document in general use]

May 25, 1973. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $741.700 into account TN73 No. 0106852 dated 25.05.1973.

Received

31.V.1973

Signature

Secret

Copy No. 2

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of $741,700 (seven hundred forty one thousand seven hundred) in hard currency and request that it be deposited into the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade account No. 47.21.406.300.8/TN 73.

Please confirm receipt of this hard currency deposit.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Ss/Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. V, p. 26.

40

[Handwritten document]

July 25, 1973. Request to approve travel to Vienna of General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $1,583,700 for “the emigration of Jews.”

U.M. 0920

No. 0027895 of 25.VII.973

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature

NOTE-REPORT

As agreed with DAN on August 7, 1973, he is to hand over the sum of $1,583,700 (one million five hundred eighty three thousand seven hundred US dollars) for the emigration of Jews during 12.V- July 20, 1973.

We hereby request approval for Maj. Gen. Pavelescu Dorin and Lt. Col. Barbu to travel to Vienna or Geneva to receive this sum.

Please advise.

Mj. Gen. Pavelescu Dorin

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 34.

41

[Typed document in general use]

August 13, 1973. Receipt for the amount of $1,583,700 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A,B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level.[English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

We handed over to you today, on Monday August 13th, in Vienna—in cash—the amount of US $1,583,700.—as follows:

In $ bills of | 100 = 903,700
|  50 = 90,000
|  20 = 590,000
|   1,583,700

(ONEMILLIONFIVEHUNDREDEIGHTYTHREETHOUSANDAND
SEVENHUNDRED US DOLLARS). The above is accordance with your note for the period 12/5–20/7/73, for:

“A”—334 × 3,000 = 1,002,000

“B”—19 × 1,700 = 0,032,300

“C”—454 × 0,600 = 0,272,400

“D”—554 × 0,500 = 0,277,000

TOTAL: 1,361 1,583,700

Vienna, 13/8/73

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 35.

42

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten proper names.]

August 20, 1973. Letter of the Interior Minister Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $1,583,700 into account TN73.

Copies 3

No. 00107314 of 20.08.1973

Received 20.08.73

Ss/illegible

To,

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of $1,583,700 (one million five hundred eighty three thousand seven hundred US dollars) and request that it be deposited into account No. 47.21.406.300.8/T.N. 73.

Please confirm receipt of the cash amount and the account balance.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Ss/EMIL BOBU

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 37.

43

[Typed document in general use]

November 15, 1973. Receipt for the amount of $1,422,900 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A,B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At meetings held in Bucharest, you presented your accounts for the period: 20 July—30 October 1973 as follows:

“A”—331 × 3,000 = 993,000

“B”—013 × 1,700 = 022,100

“C”—347 × 0,600 = 208,200

“D”—426 × 0,500 = 213,000

| 1,436,300 |
less corrections: | 13,400 |
TOTAL: | 1,422,900 |

We handed over to you at our meeting in Geneva, on November 15th 1973—in cash—the amount of US DOLLARS ONEMILLIONFOURHUNDREDTWENTYTWOTHOUSANDNINE
HUNDRED.

Geneva, 15/11/73

Signature Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 48.

44

[Handwritten document]

November 19, 1973. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $1,422,900 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the amount be deposited into BRCE account TN73.

U.M. 0920

No. 0027939 of 19.XI,.1973

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE–REPORT

According to the approval of 15.XI.1973, I received from Dan, in Geneva, the sum of 1,422,900 (one million four hundred twenty two thousand nine hundred) US dollars per the attached receipt.

Please approve that the sum be deposited into BRCE account TN 73.

Maj. Gen.

Dorin Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol VA, p. 45.

45

[Typed document in general use]

November 20, 1973. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $1,422,900 into account TN73.

No. 27,942 of 20.XI.1973

Received 20.08.73

Ss/illegible

To,

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of $1,422,900 (one million four hundred twenty-two thousand nine hundred) and request that it be deposited into account No. 47.21.406.300.8/T.N.73.

Please confirm receipt of the cash amount.

MINISTER

EMIL BOBU

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 46.

46

(Check Xerox)

February 14, 1974. Check of the Israeli Bank Leumi to BRCE for the amount of $356,350 received by DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) from Shaike Dan (alias Dan).

BANQUE CIFICO-LEUMI GENÈVE

Geneva, February 14, 1974

BANK LEUMI TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK

US $ 356.250.

-RUMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE———————

BANQUE CIFICO

LEUMI GENEVE US $ 356250

No 17171 BANQUE CIFICO-LEUMI

Signature

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 65.

47

[Typed document in general use]

February 14, 1974. Receipt for handing over the sum of $1,356,250 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A,B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

You presented your account for the period 5/10/73—15/2/74, according to your lists Nos. 49—70, as follows:

“A”—287 × 3,000 = 0,861,000

“B”—19 × 1.700 = 0,032,300

“C”—410 × 600 = 0,246,000

“D”—456 × 500 = 0,228,000

TOTAL: $ 1,367,300 handed over to you at our meeting in Geneva on 14/2/74, the amount of: $1,356,250 leaving a balance in your favour of: $11,050

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 66.

48

[Handwritten document]

February 18, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $1,365,250 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that $1,000,000 be deposited into BRCE account TN73. The amount of $365,250 represents the difference in the interest paid by the Israeli side for a $15,000,000 loan granted to Romania.

U.M. 0920

AS No. 0075118 of 18.02.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE–REPORT

According to the approval of 14.02.1974, we received from Dan

•1,000,000 (one million) US dollars in cash;

•356,250 (three hundred fifty six thousand two hundred fifty) US dollars by check No. 17171.

Please approve that the sum of $1,000,000 be deposited into BRCE account TN73 and check 17171 be cashed at BRCE, the amount will cover the difference in the interest for the $15,000,000 loan.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 62.

49

[Typed document in current use]

February 18, 1974. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank requesting to deposit $1,000,000 into account TN73. The sum of $356,250 represents the difference in the interest paid by the Israeli side for a $15,000,000 loan granted to Romania.

SECRET

Copy No. 3

No. 00107372 of 18.02.74

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of 1,000,000 US dollars (one million) in cash and request that it be deposited into account T.N.-73.

We also submit check No. 17171 in the amount of 356,250 US dollars (three hundred fifty six thousand two hundred fifty) to be cashed.

MINISTER

3

EMIL BOBU

Ss/.

1)The original was submitted to BRCE together with the respective check.

2) Copy No. 2 at FO

19.02.74

Signature

Negru

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 64.

50

[Letterhead. Typed document in general use.]

February 21, 1974. Letter of the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu confirming the deposit of different sums in West-German marks and US dollars sourced from DIE operations. It is also confirmed the existence of a credit line at the Swiss Credit Bank, Lucerne, on the order of Henry Jakober.

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

THE CHAIRMAN’S OFFICE Bucharest

February 21, 1974

Secret

Copy No. 1

BDS Stamp

No. 0381 Pages 1

1974 Month II Day 21

Cde. Negru

Photo at AS (Cde. Barbu)

Signature illegible

Ministry of the Interior

Cde. Minister Emil Bobu

Following up on your letters Nos. 0107368 and 010772/1974, we hereby inform you that:

•We deposited into your accounts the sum of $1,000,000 in hard currency, as well as the equivalent of check No. 1767930- in the amount of DMW 705,700;

•We confirm receipt of check No. 17171 in the amount of $356,250.

At the same time, the sum of DMW 5,500,000 was deposited into our accounts at Commerzbank, Frankfurt/Main, on January 22, 1974, for the interest on the Credit Agreement of DMW 200 million with Kreditanstalt für Wieberaufbau, F.R.G.

We are also sending you a copy of the $360,000 guarantee [letter] from the Swiss Credit Bank, Lucerne, on the order of Mr. Henry Jakober, Montreux, Switzerland, in favor of Electronum, Bucharest, and we request to approve that the rights of the above-mentioned guarantee be redeemed if needed.

We attach the bank statements in DMW and US $ of the account opened with our bank on February 20, 1974.

Chairman,

V.Voloșeniuc

Attachments: 3 non-secret pages.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 72.

51

[Typed document in general use]

May 9, 1974. Receipt showing the transfer of the amount of $850,000 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

To: M[arcu].

From: D[an].

We handed over to you today, at our meeting in Geneva o/a of exits as from February 15th 1974, in cash the amount of: US $ 850,000.- (EIGHTHUNDREDFIFTYTHOUSAND)

GENEVA, May 9th 1974.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol VA p. 77.

52

[Handwritten document]

May 13, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $850,000 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the funds be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

D.I.E.

AS No. 0069019 of 13.05.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE—REPORT

On 9.05.1974, I collected from DAN the sum of 850,000 (eight hundred fifty thousand) US dollars per the attached note. Please approve deposit of the above-mentioned sum into B.R.C.E. account T.N. 73.

Please advise.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 73.

53

[Typed document in general use]

May 17, 1974. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank requesting to deposit $805,000 to account TN73.

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Minister’s Office

No. 00107374 of 17.05.74

Copy No. 3

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of 850,000 US dollars (eight hundred fifty thousand) and request that it be deposited into account No. 4721.406.300.8/TN 73.

Please confirm receipt of the above-mentioned sum.

MINISTER

Ss/. EMIL BOBU

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 74.

54

[Typed document in general use]

May 31, 1974. Accounting calculations regarding the purchase of Jews signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. Dan points out that payments for “interest” must be included in a separate account. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

31/5/74.

We received your account for the period 15/2/—26/4/74 as follows:

The total of lists 71—80 for the above period is:

A: 160

B:13

C: 257

D: 276

The amount should therefore be changed to:

“A”—160 × 3,000 = 480,000

“B”—13 × 1,700 = 22,100

C”—253 × 600 = 151,800

“D”—275 × 500 = 137,500

You omitted the balance in your favor as per our letter dated 27/2/74: 11,050/802,450

less corrections as per your account: 14,700

Total due to you: 787,750

We paid you on 8/5/74 in Geneva 850,000

Total due 787,750

Balance in our favour at 26/4/74: 62,250

The “interest” is a separate account, and should not be included in this account—as explained to you at our meeting in Geneva on 8/5/74.

Thank you for the detailed lists attached to your account.

We shall discuss these problems at our next meeting.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 76.

55

[Handwritten document]

August 28, 1974. Request to approve travel to Vienna of General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $1,456,000.

U.M. 0920

AS/No. 0069031 of 28.08.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

28.VIII.74

NOTE-REPORT

As agreed with DAN on 29.08.1974, he will hand over in Geneva the sum of 1,456,000 (one million four hundred fifty six thousand) US dollars. To carry out this operation, we request that you approve travel to Geneva for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Bucur A.

Mj. Gen. Pavelescu Dorin.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 95.

56

[Typed document in general use]

August 29, 1974. Receipt for the amount of $1,456,250 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

We handed over to you at our meeting in Geneva, on 29/6?/74, in cash the amount of US Dollars: 1,456,000.- (ONEMILLIONFOURHUNDREDFIFTYSIXTHOUSAND), on account of exits during the period 26/4/74-16/8/74.

As explained to you at above meeting we request to prepare soonest the final account up to 16/8/74.

Geneva, 29/8/74

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 97.

57

[Handwritten Document]

September 3, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $1,456,000 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

U.M.0920

No. ... of 3.09.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE—REPORT

According to approval received on 29.08.1974, I collected in Geneva, from DAN the sum of 1,456,000 US dollars (one million four hundred fifty six thousand). Please approve deposit of the above-mentioned sum into account T.N. 73 at the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 96.

58

[Typed document in general use]

September 9, 1974. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $1,456,000 into account TN73.

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Minister’s Office

No. 69034 of 29.09.74

Copy No. 3

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of 1,456,000 US dollars (one million four hundred fifty six thousand) in cash. We request that it be deposited to account No. 47.21.406.300.8/T.N.73 and confirm deposit by sending an account statement.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

EMIL BOBU

Signature

B.R.C.E. Receipt No. 18234/9.9.1974

Signature

Negru

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 98.

59

[Handwritten document]

October 11, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $1,622.600 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73. The amount of $356,250 represents the difference in the interest paid by the Israeli side for a loan granted to Romania.

U.M.0920

AS/No. 358 of 11.XI.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE—REPORT

On 5.XI.1974, in Vienna, it was collected from DAN the sum of 1,622,600 (one million six hundred twenty two thousand six hundred) US dollars as follows:

•$1,226,350 cash;

•$356,250 representing contribution to the interest on the granted loan.

Please approve deposit of the above-mentioned sum into the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade account TN 63 [?]

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 105.

60

[Handwritten document]

November 3, 1974. Request for approval of travel to Vienna for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $1,456,000. The amount of $356,250 represents the difference in the interest paid by the Israeli side for a loan granted to Romania.

U.M. 0920

AS/No. ... of 3.XI.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE–REPORT

As agreed with DAN on 5.XI.1974, in Vienna, he will hand over the sum of $1,582,600 (one million five hundred eighty two thousand six hundred) as follows:

•1,226,350 US dollars for departures;

•356,250 US dollars for the interest on the loan.

Please approve travel to Vienna for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Barbu, to carry out this mission.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 96.

61

[Typed document in general use]

November 5, 1974. Receipt for handing over the sum of $1,266,350 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. The $356,250 check represents the difference in interest paid by the Israeli side for the loan granted to Romania. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on 4/11/74, you presented your account up to 18/10/74—totaling US $ 1,266,350.

We handed over to you today, in Vienna—in cash—the amount of: one million two hundred sixty six thousand three hundred and fifty US Dollars.

We handed over to you as well, a check for the amount of US $ 356,250 three hundred fifty six thousand two hundred and fifty US Dollars for “DOB.”

Vienna, 5/11/74.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 106.

62

[Typed document in general use]

November 12, 1974. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $1,266,350 in cash and a check in the amount of $356,250 into account TN73.

Received check No. 18115 in the amount of $356,250 (to be cashed) and the sum of 1,266,350 US dollars.

12.XI.974

No. 03584 of 12.11.1974

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of 1,266,350 US dollars (one million two hundred sixty six thousand three hundred fifty) in cash and check No. 18115 of 05.11.1974, in the amount of $356,250 (three hundred fifty six thousand two hundred fifty) issued by BANK LEUMI to be cashed.

We request that both sums be deposited into account No. 47.21.406.300.8/T.N. 73 and ask that you confirm deposit by sending an account statement.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

EMIL BOBU

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 108.

63

[Handwritten document]

January 14, 1975. Request for approval of travel to Vienna for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $617,500.

CF/RC

2 copies

Rd. 392

U.M. 0920

AS/No. 0059713 of 14.01.1975

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature

NOTE-REPORT

As agreed with DAN on 16.01.1975, he will hand over the sum of 617,500 (six hundred seventeen thousand five hundred) US dollars.

Please approve travel to Geneva for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Barbu, to carry out this mission.

Please advise. They will travel by SR flight.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 112.

64

[Typed document in general use]

January 20, 1975. Receipt for handing over the sum of $617,500 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

We handed over to you today, 20/1/75, in Vienna—in cash—the amount of US Dollars 617,500. (six hundred seventeen thousand five hundred) as per your account up to 10/1/75.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 114.

65

[Handwritten document]

January 25, 1975. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $617,500 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) and requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

U.M.0920

As. No. 059713 of 25.01.1975

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE—REPORT

On 20.07.1975, in Vienna, it was collected from DAN the sum of 617,500 (six hundred seventeen hundred thousand five hundred) US dollars.

Please approve deposit of the above-mentioned sum into the B.R.C.E. account TN 73.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 113.

66

[Typed document in general use]

January 25, 1975. Letter of the Minister of the Interior Emil Bobu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit $617,500 into account TN73.

Copy 2

Received the sum of 617,500 US dollars on 29.01.1975.

Signature

No. 039706 of 25.1.1975

To:

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the sum of 617,500 US dollars (six hundred seventeen hundred thousand five hundred) and request that this hard currency amount be deposited into account No. 47214063008 T.N. 73.

Please confirm the deposit with legal forms.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

EMIL BOBU

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 116.

67

[Handwritten document]

May 23, 1975. Request for approval of travel to Vienna for for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $399,400 and the amount of $1,266,790 representing part of the interest on the $30,000,000 loan granted in 1973.

U.M. 0920

AS/No.–of 23.05.1975

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature illegible

NOTE-REPORT

On 26.05.1975, there will be a meeting with DAN in Vienna to collect the sum of 399,400 (three hundred ninety nine thousand four hundred) US dollars. An attempt will be made to collect the sum of 1,226,790 US dollars representing part of the interest on the 30,000,000 US dollars loan granted in 1973.

Please approve travel to Geneva for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Barbu, to carry out this mission.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 124.

68

[Typed document in general use]

May 26, 1975. Receipt for the sum of $399,400 signed by Shaike Dan. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

We paid you at our meeting in Vienna, on Monday May 26th—in cash—the amount of US $ 399.400 (THREEHUNDREDNINETYNINETHOUSANDFOURHUNDRED) as per your account for the period: 17/1/75—16/5/75.

Vienna, 26/5/75.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 128.

69

[Xerox check]

May 26, 1975. Check issued by the Israeli Bank Leumi, Geneva branch, to the order of BRCE in the amount of $356,250.

BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL (SUISSE)

GENÈVE

Genève, le 26.5.1975

BANK LEUMI TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK

US $356,250.

-RUMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE, BUCHAREST

BANQUE LEUMI

LE-ISRAEL GVE US $ 356,250.00

No 19130

BANK LEUMI LE ISRAEL (SUISSE)

Signature

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 130.

70

[Typed document in general use]

May 26, 1975. Minutes to hand over the sum of $1,266,790 signed by Shaike Dan who presents the following balance sheet:

•The Israeli side owed the Romanian side $3,847,500 representing the 4.75% interest on the first loan of $15,000,000, plus $4,791,250 representing the 6% interest on the second $15,000,000 loan, for a total of $8,638,750. This sum was divided by 34,000 representing the number of persons that had been agreed upon to leave the country between1973 and 1976, for $254 per capita. Taking into account that between January 1, 1973, and January 1, 1975, 7,635 persons had left the country, the sum of $1,266,790 is reached.

•The minutes indicating the [additional] sum of $254 per emigrant will remain in force if the emigration rates will continue to be at the level of [emigration in] 1973 and 1974.

•The Israeli side pledged to grant the Romanian side an additional loan of $25,000,000 providing the Romanian side met its commitments made at the Vienna meeting on January 15-17, 1975. [English original]

To: M[arcu].

From: D[an].

At our meeting in Bucharest, on May 20th & 21st 1975, concerning our payment of interest-differences for the loans which we provided for you with the BfG Frankfurt/Main in respect of the “SPECIAL PROJECT”—as per our letters dated 5/2/73 and 8/4/74—we agreed on the following:

1.Our share of 4,75% interest on the first loan of US$ 15,000,000 amounting to: US$ 3,847,500 and our share of 6% interest on the second loan of $ 15,000,000 amounting to: 4,791,250/8,638.750 are to be divided by 34,000—the number of persons agreed to leave during 1973-1976, thus arriving at the amount of $ 254.–per capita.

2.According to the detailed lists, the number of persons who left during 1/1/73—10/1/75 is: 7,635, therefore due to you for a/m period:

7,635 x 254.- = $ 1,939,290

less our payments on 31/7/73 and 5/11/74: 712,500

Total in your favour: 1,226,790

3.We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna, on Monday May 26th 1975:

Check No. 19130 in favour of RBfFT for | US$ 356,250
Check No. 19131 in favour of RBfFT for | US$ 870,540
|  $ 1,226,790

4.We shall continue to pay the a/m amount of $ 254.- per capita up to the completion of exits of 34,000 persons only under the condition that future annual emigration will be not less than emigration in 1973 and 1974.

5.We shall keep our obligation to grant you the additional loans of US$ 25,000,000 and pay the interest-differences or shall pay the equivalent of the interest-differences without providing the loans—in case that future emigration will be as agreed at our meeting in Vienna on January 15th—17th 1973 „PLAN A”. Details to be agreed.

Vienna, May 26th 1975.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol VA, p. 127.

71

[Handwritten document]

May 31, 1975. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt from Shaike Dan (alias Dan) of the following sums:

•$399,400—to be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

•$356,250 interest difference–to be deposited into the BRCE account for the interest difference.

•$870,540—to be deposited into the account of the Ministry of the Interior.

U.M.0920

AS/No. ... of 31.05.1975

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature illegible

Request approval,

Signature N. Doicaru

NOTE—REPORT

On 26.05.1975, as approved, I collected from DAN the sum of $1,626,190 as follows:

•the sum of $399,400 (three hundred ninety nine thousand four hundred), per the attached receipt, for emigration during 17.01.—16.05.1975.

We suggest: To deposit the cash amount into our B,R.C.E. account TN73.

•the sum of $356,250 (three hundred fifty six thousand two hundred fifty) by check No. 19130.

We suggest: Check No. 19130 in the amount of $356,250 to be deposited at BRCE into the account for difference the interest on our 30 million US dollar loan.

•the sum of $870,540 (eight hundred seventy thousand five hundred forty) by check No.19131.

We suggest: Check No. 19131 in the amount of $870,540 to be deposited at BRCE into the Ministry of the Interior account No. 47.21.427.300-2.

On this mission, I was accompanied by Lt. Col. BARBU.

Please advise on the above.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, pp. 125-126.

72

[Typed document in general use]

No date (June 1975?). Receipt for handing over the sums of:

•- $414,700. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level.

•$1,226,790 representing the additional sum of $234 per capita for the 7,635 persons who had left the country between January 1, 1973, and January 1, 1975.

17 January—16 May 1975

A 090 × 3,000 = |  270,000 |
B 003 × 1,700 = |   5,100 |
C 0111 × 600 = |   66,600 |
D 146 × 500 = |   73,000 |
|  414,700 |
CORRECTION |   15,300 |
TOTAL |  399,400 |
Check. | − 356,250 |
Check. | − 870,540 |
| 1,226,790 |

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 134.

73

[Typed document in general use]

June 18, 1975. Letter of the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to the Minister of the Interior Teodor Coman advising him that, upon DIE request, account TN7 has been opened, an account that, just like TN73, will be under the exclusive control of Nicolae Ceaușescu. In the same letter, the minister of the interior is informed that from account TN73 $1,702,719.42 were withdrawn for the “Boeing 707 operation,” that is the aircraft that will be purchased for the exclusive use of Nicolae Ceaușescu.

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

CHAIRMAN’S OFFICE

No. 46/9511/R

Bucharest, June 18, 1975

Cde. Barbu

File

Signature

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Cde. Minister T. Coman

Following up on your letter No. 151965 of June 3, 1975, we hereby inform you that we registered and opened account No. 47.21.427.300-2—T.N.-75 in US dollars.

You will find attached the bank statements regarding some transactions in account T.N.-75.

We also inform you that, based on letter No.12/VII/C of 28.03.1973, received from the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers on 5.6.1975, we debited account 47.21.406.300-8 T.N. 73 with the sum of $1,702,719.42 representing the maturity plus interest for 1975, regarding Boeing 707 operation, and we are also attaching the account statement with all the transactions of account T.N.-73.

Chairman, Vasile Voloșeniuc

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 136.

74

[Handwritten document]

September 30, 1975. Request for approval of travel to Vienna for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $1,800,000.

U.M. 0920

AS/No. 0059743 of 30.09.1975

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

NOTE-REPORT

As it was agreed with DAN on 02.10.1975, in Geneva, he will hand over the sum of $1,800,000 (one million eight hundred thousand).

Please approve travel to Geneva for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Barbu, to carry out this mission.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 147.

75

[Typed document in general use]

October 10, 1975. Receipt for handing over the sum of $1,500,000 signed by Shaike Dan. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on 30/9/75, you presented your account for the period:

23/5–26/9/75 totaling: $ 1,807,800.–

We handed over to you at our meeting in Geneva on 2/10/75—in cash—the amount of: ONEMILLIONFIVEHUNDREDTHOUSAND US DOLLARS. 1,500,000.

•leaving a balance in your favour of $ 307,600.

•Geneva, 2/10/75.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 149.

76

[Typed document in general use]

December 16, 1975. Receipt for handing over the sum of $1,017.500 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on 8/12/75, you presented your account for the period: 26/9—28/11/75 as follows:

“A”—165 × 3,000 = | 495,000
“B”—10 × 1,700 = |  17,000
“C”—186 × 600 = | 111,600
“D”—235 × 500 = | 117,500
| 741,100

Balance as per our letter of 2/10/75:

| 1,048,900
|   307,800

less corrections as per your letter of 4/12/1975:

|  31,400
| 1,017,500

We handed over to you, at our meeting in Vienna on 16/12/75—in cash—the amount of 1,017,500. ONEMILLIONSEVENTEENTHOUSANDFIVEHUNDRED US DOLLARS.

Vienna, 16/12/1975.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 160.

77

[Handwritten document]

December 29, 1975. DIE’s comparative analysis of the financial arrangements (including the cashed sums) made with FRG and Israel regarding the emigration of the Romanian citizens to these two countries. It is noted the similarity between the two arrangements, FRG’s and Israel’s refusal to pay in full the interest on the granted loans as a result of the fact that the Romanian side did not meet the annual rates of emigrants. References are made to the sums spent on Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Boeing 707 aircraft, as well as for building the synthetic diamond facility.

29.12.1975

T.gl. Marcu

Cde. Barbu

File.

The Supreme Commander [Nicolae Ceaușescu] was informed.

Signature

NOTE

I.GERMANS

1.In may 1973, the following arrangement was made with the Germans:

a.They granted a 200,000,000 DMW loan

•with an 8 year term, 4 year grace period

•our share of interest: 4% annually

•the Germans cover 5.25% of the interest in staggered payments

b.As of July 1973, we had to allow emigration, within 5 years, of 40,000 Germans, in groups of 8,000 yearly.

2.The current situation

a.the Germans paid towards interest the sum of 29,000,000 DMW (17,400,000 DMW deposited to BRCE, and 11,600,000 DMW deposited into account TN73).

b.during the period July 1973-Decemebr 1975, 20,000 had to emigrate. 14,908 [people] emigrated. The Germans decline to pay difference in the interest unless measures are taken to ensure the emigration of the number agreed upon.

II.JEWS

1.In February 1973, the following arrangement was made with the Jews.

a.the Jews [Israel] granted a $30,000,000 loan ($15,000.000 on 1.II.973 and $15,000,000 on 10.IV.1974);

•term: 7 years, 4 year grace period

•our share of interest: 4% annually

•the Jews cover $8,638,750 difference in the interest up to the market level;

b.we had to allow emigration of 24,000 persons within 3 years (1973-1975).

2.The current situation

a.the Jews paid towards the interest the sum of $2,295,540 ($1,425,500 deposited to BRCE and $870,540 into account TN75).

b.As agreed, during 1973-1975, 24,000 persons had to emigrate. 10,077 [persons] emigrated.

The Jews decline to pay difference in the interest unless measures are taken to ensure the emigration of the number agreed upon.

III.The situation of hard currency sums received for emigration over the period 1970-1975.

•1970 | $4,912,123 |
•1971 | $2,375,520 |
•1972 | $4,318,000 |
•1973 | $15,446,663 |
•1974 | $12,164,230 |
•1975 | $15,253,770 |
TOTAL: | $ 54,470,306 |

IV. | Standard rates | Jews | Germans
| •graduates | $3,000 | 11,000 DMW
| •students | $1,700 |  7,000 DMW
| •workers |  $600 |  2,900 DMW
| •no profession |  $500 |  1,800 DMW

V.The situation of the BRCE accounts

•$18,125,720 in account TN 73

•$1,627,908 in account TN 75

VI.From account TN 73 the following [sums] were withdrawn:

•$13,500,000 BRCE loan

•$9,913,517 BOEING installments

•$1,227,000 for the “STAR” facility

TOTAL $24,640,517

•During 1970-1972, until account TN 73 was set up, the sum of $11,605,643 that was deposited to BRCE entered the economic circuit.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, pp. 184-186; in Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, and Laura Stancu, Acţiunea “Recuperarea.” Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 194-195; sursaACNSAS, Fond SIE, dosar 52873, vol. I, pp. 1-3.

78

[Typed document in general use]

March 16, 1976. Receipt for handing over the sum of $774,600 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on February 17th 1976, you presented your account for the period: 5/12/75—6/2/1976 as follows:

A—192 × 3,000 = | 576,000 |
B—16 × 1,700 = | 27,200 |
C—161 × 600 = | 96,600 |
D—170 × 500 = | 85,000 |
539      = | 784,800 |
less corrections | 10,200 |
TOTAL: | 774,600 |

We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna, today March 16th 1976—in cash—the amount of $774,600.- (SEVENHUNDREDSEVENTYFOURTHOUSANDSIXHUNDRED).

Vienna, 16/3/76.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 162.

79

[Typed document in general use]

March 16, 1976. Receipt for handing over the sum of $598,932 signed by Shaike Dan. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

We handed over to you, at our meeting in Vienna, on March 16th 1976 cheque No. 20300 in favour of your Bank for Foreign Trade, for the amount of $598,932.

(FIVEHUNDREDNINETYEIGHTTHOUSANDNINEHUNDRED
ANDTHIRTYTWO) US DOLLARS.

Above amount is to cover our share of interest for the year 1975, calculated at 2,358 x $ 254.- as per our letter dated 23/2/76. Vienna, 16/3/1976.

Signature

Dan

The sum of $598,932, equivalent of check No. 20.300/16.IX. 76, was cashed and deposited to account T.N.-75, bank statement B.R.C.E. No. 10/17.4.1976—N.C. 15/21.04.76

vH/TN 75.

Signature

Negru

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, pp. 163-163bis.

80

[Xerox check]

August 30, 1976. Check issued by the Israeli Bank Leumi to the order of BRCE in the amount of $541,700. [French original]

BANQUE CIFICO-LEUMI

GENÈVE 30 août 1976

Genève,

BANK LEUMI TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK

US$. 541.700—******

Payez ce chéque à l’ordre de RUMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN

TRADE la somme DE BANQUE CITICO-LEUMI GENEVE

US $ 541.700—**

No 21001

BANQUE CIFICO-LEUMI

DÉBIT

Signature

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 201.

81

[Typed document in general use]

August 31, 1976. Receipt for the handing over of the sum of $1,791,700 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

To: M.

From: D.

We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna, on Tuesday August 31st 1976:

In cash | US $ 1,000,000 |
Cheque No. 21011 | 541,700 |
Cheque No. 21012 | 250,000 |
TOTAL | US $ 1,791,700 |

Above amount is in accordance with your account for the period: 13/2—13/8/76 as follows:

A = 364 × 3,000 = | 1,092,000 |
B = 017 × 1,700 = | 28,900 |
C = 373 × 600 = | 223,800 |
D = 394 × 500 = | 197,000 |
| 1,541,700 |
Advance | 250,000 |
| 1,791,700 |

Vienna, 31/8/76.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 195.

82

[Handwritten document]

June 15, 1977. Request for approval of travel to Vienna for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $686,900.

U.M. 0920

AS/No. 0037844 of 15.06.1977

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature N. Doicaru

NOTE-REPORT

On 16.06.1977, DAN will hand over the sum of 686,900 (six hundred eighty six thousand nine hundred) US dollars.

Please approve travel to Vienna for Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu, accompanied by Lt. Col. Barbu, by AuA flight.

Please advise.

Signature

D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 260.

83

[Typed document in general use]

June 16, 1977. Receipt for handing over the sum of $686,900 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on June 14th 1977, you presented your account for the period 1/1—31/5/77 after deducting corrections—as follows:

A—160 × 3,000 = | 480,000 |
B—7 × 1,700 = | 11,900 |
C—180 × 600 = | 108,000 |
D—174 × 500 = | 87,000 |
   521 | 686,500 |

We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna on June 16th 1977, in cash, the amount of $ 686.900.(SIXHUNDREDEIGHTYSIXTHOUSANDNINEHUNDRED US Dollars).

Vienna, 16/6/1977.

Signature

D[an]

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 263.

84

[Handwritten document]

June 29, 1977. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $686,900 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan)–requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

U.M.0920

AS/No. 0037844 of 29.06.1977

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

NOTE—REPORT

Pursuant to the approval on 18.06.1977, I collected from DAN the sum of 686,900 (six hundred eighty six thousand nine hundred) US dollars. Please approve that the above-mentioned sum be deposited into B.R.C.E. account TN73.

Please advise.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 261.

85

[Handwritten document]

November 8, 1977. Request for travel approval to Vienna signed by Nicolae Doicaru, DIE chief, for General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) and Lt. Col. Bucur Adalbert (alias Dan Barbu) for a meeting with Shaike Dan (alias Dan) to collect the amount of $911,600.

U.M. 0920

AS/No. 0037871 of 8.11.1977

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature

Coman

NOTE-REPORT

As it was agreed with DAN, on 14.11.1977, he will hand over the sum of 911,600 (nine hundred eleven thousand six hundred) US dollars.

To collect this amount, we propose that Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu and Col. Barbu Dan travel to Vienna.

Please advise.

Signature

N. Doicaru

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 269.

86

[Typed document in general use]

November 14, 1977. Receipt for handing over the sum of $384,000 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

03.11—30.12.1977

A = 45 × 3,000 = | 135,000
B = 2 × 1,700 = |  3,400
C = 90 × 600 = |  54,000
D = 89 × 500 = |  44,500
226 = | 236,900 $
+ 1,471 × 100 = | 147,100
TOTAL = | 384,000 $
Minus all |
corrections 1977 = | 24,300 $
To be paid = | 359,700 $

Signature D[an]

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 305.

87

[Typed document in general use]

November 14, 1977. Receipt for handing over the sum of $911,600 signed by Shaike Dan. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on 7/11/77, you presented your account for the period: 9/?—27/10/1977 as follows:

A—200 × 3,000 = | 600,000
B—14 × 1,700 = | 23,000
C—216 × 600 = | 129,600
D—322 × 500 = | 161,000
  752 | 914,400
Minus corrections | 2,800
  747 | 911,600

We handed over to you at our meeting in Vienna, on 14/11/1977: In cash $ 500,000; by cheque No. 22948 drawn on your Bank for Foreign Trade: 411,600.

TOTAL $ 911,600

Vienna, 14/11/1977.

Signature

D[an]

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 274.

88

[Handwritten document]

November 21, 1977. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $911,600 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan)–requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

U.M.0920

AS/No. 37871 of 21.11.1977

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

Signature

T. Coman

NOTE—REPORT

As approved by Note-Report No. 37871, the sum of $911,600 was collected from DAN as follows:

•$500,000 (five hundred thousand) in cash;

•$411,600 (four hundred eleven thousand six hundred) by check No. 22.948.

Please approve that the above-mentioned sum be deposited into B.R.C.E. account TN73.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 270.

89

[Highly confidential document written in ink addressed to Cabinet 1]

No date (January 1978?) Report of the Minister of the Interior Teodor Coman to Nicolae Ceaușescu proposing to open account OV78 that will combine the sums in accounts TN73 and TN75 and suggesting means to fund this account in the future.

Report

In order to execute Your [sic] order regarding the use of the existing hard currency funds in B.R.C.E. accounts TN73 and TN 75, we propose the following:

1.Opening at the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade a new account with the symbol “O.V.-78” at Your disposal to which the existing hard currency balances in accounts TN 73 and TN 75 as of 31.01.1978 are to be transferred.

2.The sum that, in keeping with Your instructions, will be doubled in 1978 is $64,761,473. This sum is comprised of $31,552,618 currently in the BRCE account and $33,208,855 that BRCE is to recover from the beneficiary ministries that imported copper, soybean meal, and protein flour. We propose that BRCE recover this sum by March 30, 1978.

3.From account TN 73, ICE Technoimport withdrew $20,131,413 to pay installments to BOEING aircrafts. According to Your decision, this sum will not be recovered from the beneficiary. Since a previous decision stipulated that, by 1983, other sums be withdrawn from account TN 73, we request approval that future installments for the Boeing aircrafts be fully covered by the import plan.

4.In order to double the amount of $64,761,473, a group of DGIE cadre with foreign trade experience will assume the task. These cadre will carry out their activities only from inside the country, in keeping with the foreign trade methodology. The types of actions that are envisioned are included in Appendix II.

5.To carry out special operations implies making quick decisions; therefore, we propose that you approve that the existing funds in account “OV-78” be used under the signature of the minister of the interior, and quarterly, or as often as it is necessary, you will receive reports about the transactions, the sums spent, and the achieved benefits. All measures shall be taken so that the sums withdrawn or transferred from accounts “OV-78” be used with maximum efficiency and without any risks on our side.

We assure you, Comrade Supreme Commander, that Your instructions shall be carried out in an exemplary manner.

Teodor Coman.

Appendix I.1

1.Most special operations shall be carried out upon mutual agreement with the specialized foreign trade enterprises, in keeping with the methodology stipulated by the legal provisions in force. For this purpose, we will use all possibilities currently at our disposal and those that will be created at the foreign trade enterprises Agroexport, Romtechnica, Terra, Prodexport, Metalimport, and Mercur.

2.The entire operation shall be coordinated by

•Lt. General Alexandru Dănescu

•Lt. General Mihai Pacepa

•Major General Gheorghe Marcu

•Major General Teodor Sârbu

Appendix I.2

In order to use the hard currency funds, the following special operations shall be carried out:

•Hard currency investments to purchase and resale, through our sources, products that are prohibited from import or export, including armament, munitions, and military technology.

•Confidential export of neutral goods.

•Purchases and resale of commodities—grains, oil, sugar, non-fer-rous metals, etc.—in order to resale them in favorable circumstances.

•Trade operations with foreign [alcoholic] drinks and cigarettes, fine art, and other similar goods.

•Confidential operations to re-export precious metals and [precious] stones, coffee, cocoa, and other products, in favorable circumstances.

•Confidential intermediation between foreign buyers and sellers.

•Other special operations similar to those mentioned above that will ensure a rapid capitalization of the hard currency funds, using the possibilities and procedures that are specific to our work, in order to achieve maximum efficiency.

►Dan Badea, Averea preşedintelui. Conturile Ceauşescu, Editura Nemira, Bucuresti, 1998, pp. 204-205, Anexa nr. I.

90

[Handwritten document]

February 20, 1978. Note of General Nicolae Doicaru, DIE chief, reporting about the negotiations with Shaike Dan on raising the per capita [payment] for Jews who emigrated in 1977 with $100 because of the “devaluation of the dollar.” It is also requested that General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) go to Athens in order to raise this price.

UM 0920

AS/No. 0028517 of 20.02.1978

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

Coman

NOTE- REPORT

During November 3–December 31, 1978, a number of 226 Jews emigrated. The compensation value is $212,600.

During the discussions with DAN, I asked him to pay, on top of the prices agreed upon, an additional $100 per person, pointing out the dollar devaluation. At the end of our discussions, he agreed to pay $100 per person for the 1,471 persons who emigrated in 1977, for a total sum of $147,000.

It was agreed that he will pay the total sum of $359,700 on February 28, 1978, in Athens.

To carry out this mission, we propose that Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu travel on duty.

Please advise.

Signature

N. Doicaru

► CNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 303.

91

[Handwritten document]

March 6, 1978. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of $359,700 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan)–requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account TN73.

U.M.0920

AS/No. 0028517 of 6.03.78

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

Signature

Coman

NOTE—REPORT

As approved, the sum of 359,700 (three hundred fifty-nine thousand seven hundred) US dollars was collected from DAN by check No. 23267.

Please approve that the above-mentioned sum be deposited into B.R.C.E. account TN73 and the letter to B.R.C.E. be signed to this end.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 304.

92

[Typed document in general use]

March 16, 1978. The letter of the Minister of the Interior Teodor Coman to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit the Bank Leumi check in the amount of $359,700 to account TN73

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

COAT OF ARMS

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

MINISTER’S OFFICE

No. 28517/6.03.1978

To

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith the check No. 23262/1978, issued by LEUMI BANK—ISRAEL—(Swiss) in the amount of 359,700.00 (three hundred fifty nine thousand seven hundred) US dollars. Please proceed to cash this check, deposit the money to account TN 73 No. 4721406300.8, and confirm with account statement.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Teodor Coman

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 307.

93

[Typed document in general use]

May 23, 1978. Receipt for handing over the sum of $450,000 signed by Shaike Dan. [English original]

TO: M.

FROM: D.

We handed over to you, May 23rd 1978, at our meeting in Bucharest, our cheque No. 23779 for the amount of 450,000.- (FOURHUNDREDFIFTYTHOUSAND US DOLLARS) to the order of your Bank for Foreign Trade.

The above amount to be considered as an advance for exits as from January 1st 1978.

BUCHAREST, 23/05/1978.

Signature

Dan

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 343.

94

[Handwritten document]

June 9, 1978. Handwritten receipt confirming BRCE received $850,000, of which $450,000 by a Bank Leumi check for 1978 and $359,000 in cash.

1.9.VI.78 303 bis $450,000 Bank Leumi check

2.5.IX.78 $400,000 check cashed through BRCE

TOTAL: $850,000

6.III.78 =$359,700 for 1977.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 303bis.

95

[Typed document in general use]

June 23, 1978. Accounting summary of the emigration to Israel and of the sums owed to the Romanian side over the period January 1—May 23, 1978. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level. [English original]

ISRAEL

APPROVALS (1.1.—16.V.1978) = 985

DEPARTURES

(1.1.—16.V.1978)

A = 90 × 3,000 = 270,000

B = 1 × 1,700 = 1,700

C = 153 × 600 = 91,800

D = 147 × 500 = 73,500

——————————————

TOTAL 391 = 437,000

TO: M.

FROM: D.

At our meeting in Bucharest, on May 23rd, you presented your account for the period: 1/1—16/5/78 as follows:

A = 90 × 3,000 = 270,000

B = 1 × 1,700 = 1,700

C = 153 × 600 = 91,800

D = 147 × 500 = 73,500 437,000.

From the above following corrections should be deducted, as per attached letters:

A. Non Jews | C | D
| 2 | 8
B. Duplication | 4 | 1
C. Repeats | 2 | 1
| 8 | 10
C = 8 × 600 = 4,800 |  |
D = 10 × 500 = 5,000 | 9,800 |
427,200. |

We handed over to you at above meeting cheque No. 23779, for the amount of: 450,000.

Leaving a balance in our favour of: 22,800.

23/06/1978.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 385.

96

[Xerox check]

August 21, 1978. Bank Leumi check to the order of BRCE for the amount of $400,000.

BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL (SUISSE)

GENÈVE

Genève, le 21.8.1978

BANK LEUMI TRUST CO. OF N.Y.

NEW YORK US $ 400’000.

ROUMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

BANQUE LEUMI L.-ISRAEL GVE US $ 400000,00**

No 24252

BANK LEUMI LE ISRAEL (SUISSE)

Signature

Signature

DEBIT:

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 347.

97

[Handwritten document]

August 26, 1978. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu confirming receipt of $400,000 from Shaike Dan (alias Dan)—requesting that the amount be deposited into the BRCE account OV78.

U.M.0920

No. 0028567 V. 2/AS/26/8/1078

26.08.1978

Single original

Approved,

Please approve

Lt. Gen. Dănescu

REPORT

As approved, the sum of 400,000 (four hundred thousand) US dollars was collected from DAN by check No. 24252, along with receipt.

Please approve that the above-mentioned sum be submitted to B.R.C.E. to be cashed and the sum be deposited into account O.V.78.

Maj. Gen. Marcu Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 349.

98

[Typed document in general use]

►August 29, 1978. The letter of the Minister State Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior Tudor Postelnicu to the chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank to deposit the Bank Leumi check in the amount of $400,000 into account OV78.

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

COAT OF ARMS

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER SECRETARY OF STATE

AND CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY

No. 28567 of 29/8/1978

To

THE ROMANIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE

Cde. Chairman V. VOLOȘENIUC

We deposit herewith check No. 24252/August 21, 1978, in the amount of $400,000 asking that you please deposit the sum into account “O.V.-78”. Please confirm transaction by sending the account statement.

MINISTER SECRETARY OF STATE

Tudor Postelnicu

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 347.

99

[Typed document in general use]

No date (September 1978?). Accounting summary of the emigration to Israel and of the sums owed to the Romanian side over the period May 17—August 15, 1978. Categories A, B, C, and D represent the types of Jewish emigrants based on their education level.

ISRAEL

APPROVALS (17/5—15/8/1978) = 645

DEPARTURES (17/5—1/8/1978)

A = 123 × 3,000 = | 369,000
B = 6 × 1,700 = | 10,200
C = 160 × 600 = | 96,000
D = 130 × 500 = | 65,000
TOTAL 419 = | 540,200
illegible | 116
illegible | 19
illegible | 2
illegible 419 | 137

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 384.

100

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and for Cabinet 1, with blank spaces for handwritten proper names]

April 24, 1983. Note regarding the number of persons who emigrated to FRG and Israel between 1981 and 1982. The sums collected by Securitate in exchange for exit visas.

Top Secret

Single original

NOTE

regarding the persons who left permanently for FRG and Israel during 1981-1982

1.TOTAL DEPARTURES during 1981-1982 to FRG—23,622 of which

a. | university graduates | 1,033
b. | high school graduates | 4,629
c. | total number of persons under Decree 402/82: | 5,662
d. | no education | 18,000

Over the two years, the weight of those falling under Decree 402/1982 is 23.9% of total departures.

The average per person under Decree 402/1982 for 5,662 persons is $10,886.

The average per total number of emigrants (23,622) is $2,545, compared with approx. $1,700 paid according to the 1978 arrangement or with $2,300 paid by the end of 1982, as a result of unofficial negotiations that were carried out based on received instructions and guidance.

Currently, the West Germans claim the issue will be addressed during the general discussion, taking into account the loan [that was] granted, the due interest, and the fact they do not know whether they would continue with [the sum of] $2,300 they paid in addition to the 1978 arrangement.

2.TOTAL DEPARTURES to Israel 1981-1982–2,926 of which

a. | university graduates | 839
b. | high school graduates | 617
c. | total number of persons under Decree 402/82: | 1,456
d. | no education | 1,470

For the two years, the weight of those falling under Decree 402/1982 is 49.76% of total departures.

The average per person under Decree 402/1982 for 1,456 persons is $11,971.

The average per the total number of emigrants (2,926) is $5,960, compared with about $1,500 paid according to the 1978 arrangement or with $2,028 paid gradually later as a result of negotiations, after the official arrangement.

After release of Decree 402/1982, during negotiations with the Israeli side, the following was proposed:

In the first stage: an average of $10,000 per person was proposed. The Israeli side accepted $2,500.

In the second stage: an average of $9,000 was proposed. The Israeli side accepted $2,800.

In the third stage: an average of $9,000 was proposed. The Israeli side kept the average of $2,800.

In the fourth stage: an average of $8,000 was proposed. The Israeli side hinted it would accept the average of $3,000.

Currently, discussions have been resumed. The Israeli side is likely to propose an average of $3,000 for each emigrant.

We focus on proposing at the discussion on April 25, 1983, an average of $7,000-$7,500.

We report that the average [amount] per Decree 402/82 provisions is $5,960.

For this round of negotiations, we propose to offer the average of $7,000, that would be around $1,000 over the average as a result of the decree. According to our information, the Israeli side will propose an average of $3,200, claiming that for the citizens of German nationality in our country it is not required an average but, apparently, there would be overrides so that not even the $3,000 average per person is likely to be paid.

No. 00298/24 April 24,1983

►ACNSAS, dosar nr. 52873, vol. II, pp. 103-104 and in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea “Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds. Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 413-414.

LUXURY HUNTING RIFLES AND AUTOMOBILES FOR THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (RCP) NOMENCLATURE

101

[Handwritten document]

Jaguar car delivered free by Henry Jakober

M 40

May 24, 1965

Top Secret

Single Original

NOTE

Per the attached documents, in early 1962, an automatic automobile JAGUAR 3.4 l has also been brought into the country. The automobile was delivered free of charge in the context of the arrangements with JAKOBER.

Cpt. [signature]

102

[Typed document in general use with blank spaces for handwritten information]

British cars received free of charge from Henry Jakober.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

-D.G.I.-

STOP SECRET

Copy No. ____

Stamp (MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

SECRETARY GENERAL’S OFFICE

No. 00404

Day 03 Month 06 1965)

APPROVED

Signature

REPORT

In the context of the combinations with JAKOBER HENRY, to date, 6 (six) vehicles have been received from him free of charge. Of these, 3 automobiles have arrived in the country, namely:

1.A HUMBER vehicle, black, automatic, 6 cylinders, VIN No. B-S4000121 P.O.S.—B.W.-MLSO;

2.HUMBER vehicle, color green-light-green, 4 cylinders, VIN No. B-31204450 ODLS.;

3.VANDEN PLAS PRINCESS vehicle, sedan, black, 6 cylinders, VIN No. 40 FBAH 3259.

Given the above, we propose:

To approve delivery to the M.A.I. Garage of the two HUMBER vehicles and to keep the VANDEN PLAS PRINCESS for our unit.

Lt. Col. Marcu Gheorghe

[signature]

APPROVED [signature]*

103

[Handwritten document]

September 22, 1965. Report from the Ministry of the Interior regarding the import of hunting rifles and ammunition between 1961 and 1965 for Cabinet 1 (Nicolae Ceaușescu) and Alexandru Drăghici, as well as ammunition cartridges for Gheorghe Apostol, worth $18,083.

(Stamp) THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

[illegible]

No. 000642

DAY 26 MONTH Aug. 1965

Top Secret

Single Original

25.VIII.1965

15.09.1965

The report herewith that was done by the C.I.S.S. chief [illegible] at the order of Cde. Minister Onescu has been returned today. The report is to be filed. Signature

M. Doicaru

REPORT

regarding the hunting rifles and the cartridges purchased during 1961-1965

1.Upon the verbal order of the Minister of the Interior Gen. Alex. Drăghici, it was purchased in England a hunting rifle, series 31423, caliber 7 mm, double barrel, scope, leather carrying case, per invoice No. 76/30 II 1961, worth $1,558. Invoice was sent to the M.A.I. Financial Department, with our report No. 1432/June 8, 1961, approved by the deputy minister, Cde. Pintilie Gh. (Expense file August 1961, p. 411). The hunting rifle was delivered to the office of Cde. Minister Alex. Drăghici.

2.Upon approval given by Cde. Deputy Minister Negrea Vasile, sent to the Council of Ministers–the First Vice-President Office, No. 109 of 19.II.1962, 600 hunting rifle cartridges were purchased from England for the sum of $623.50. The sum of $623.50 was invoiced and recuperated from the Financial Department of M.A.I., according to report No. 0383/22.05.1962, approved by Cde. Deputy Minister Negrea Vasile (expense file June 1962, p. 27, journal entry 5/23.06.1962). The cartridges were delivered to the Office of the First Vice-president of the Council of Ministers, with report No. 109 or 19.II.1962 that was signed against delivery.

3.Upon verbal order of Cde. Vice-President of the Council of Ministers Alex. Drăghici, a hunting rifle, model 303, series 17712 and 400 cartridges were ordered and purchased from England and delivered to Cabinet 1, with letter No. C.5237/22.05.1962. The sum of $1,168.80 spent for the rifle and cartridges was recuperated from the Financial Department of M.A.I., with report No. 0768/3. XI.1962, approved by Cde. Vice-President Alex. Drăghici (file p. 75 -November 1962).

4.Upon approval by Cde. Vice-President of the Council of Ministers Alex. Drăghici sent to the First Vice-President Cde. Gh. Apostol No. 1057 of 19.X.1962, 1,600 hunting rifle cartridges were purchased from F.R. of Germany for the sum of $378.75. The cartridges were delivered to the Office of Cde. Gh. Apostol at the Council of Ministers, with receipts dated 4.XII.1962 and 13.XII.1962. The Financial Department of M.A.I. was invoiced for the sum with report No. 0178/27.II.1963, approved by Cde. Vice-President of the Council of Ministers Alexandru. Drăghici (File March 1963, folder 32).

5.Upon verbal approval from M.A.I. top leadership, a hunting rifle with scope, two barrels, case, and 200 pieces of cartridges were procured from England for the sum of $2,734.

The rifle and the cartridges were delivered to the M.A.I. top leadership and payment was made by the Financial Department with report No. 00196/18.XII.1963, approved by Cde. Vice-President of the Council of Ministers Alex. Drăghici (Accounting note No. 6/26.XII.1963, pp. 177-213, Vol. 1).

6.Upon verbal order received from M.A.I. top leadership, a hunting rifle series 35397, model Royal 375 of the best quality with ejector and two barrels was procured from England, for which the sum of $2,678.90 was paid. The rifle was delivered to the M.A.I. leadership. Invoicing and reimbursement of the sum of $2,678.90 were done upon approval by Cde. Vice-President Alex. Drăghici, with report No. 00362/15.VI,1964 (file June 1964, journal entry No. 2/20.06.64, pp. 13-28).

7.Upon approval by Cde. Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior Alex. Drăghici, written on the letter of the company Holland-Holland, England, dated 8.IX, 1962, 3 hunting rifles with series 35408, 35409, and 35410 were procured, for which the sum of $8,941.05 was paid.

The hunting rifles were delivered to the Office of Cde. Vice-President Alex. Drăghici (I.Gh.M., C.I. and memo No. 91695 of 6.08.1964).

Invoicing and reimbursement were done through the Financial Department of MAI, with report No. 0052/21.01.1965 (at Journal Entry No. 7/25.I.1965, p. 138) approved by Vice-President Alex. Drăghici.

A total of $18,083 spent on hunting rifles and cartridges was paid and recuperated from the MAI funds—[its] own sources—through the Financial Department.

►ACNSAS, Dosar 52813, Vol. 19, p. 4.

104

[Handwritten document]

December 23, 1973. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) about the offer made by Heinz Günther Hüsch (alias Edward) to gift DIE four rifles with scope for big game hunting.

UM 0920

AS/No. 28503 of 23.XII.1973

Top Secret

Single Original

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Office [illegible]

No. 001578 of 23.02.74

NOTE—REPORT

At the meeting with “EDWARD” on 21st [December], he sent New Year’s greetings on behalf of Minister GENSCHER and offered me a hunting rifle, as a token of their esteem.

I thanked him for the greetings but, regarding the hunting rifle, I told him I could not accept it until I have received approval from my superiors. EEDWARD immediately told me he was also authorized to offer my superiors three similar hunting rifles (for big game, with scope), and the West German side will be pleased if we accept these symbolic tokens of their esteem.

I told him I would respond to his offer at our meeting in January 1974 when he will hand over the sum of 5,800,000 DWM.

Please advise.

Maj. Gen. Marcu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, pp. 81-82.

105

[Handwritten document]

January 29, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu (alias Dorin Pavelescu) confirming receipt of 7,225.700 West-German marks and four Mauser rifles from Heinz Günther Hüsch (alias Edward).

U.M.0920

AS/No. 006904 of 29.01.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved,

[Signature]

NOTE—REPORT

On 21.01.1974, I collected from EDWARD the following:

1.A check for 5,500,000 DMW (five million five hundred thousand West German marks). I deposited the check at the BRCE branch in FRG, the amount was cashed and transferred to B.R.C.E.

2.The sum of 1,000,000 (one million) DMW, in cash, that we propose to be deposited to BRCE account TN 73.

3.Check No. 305.400.29 issued by COMMERZBANK, for 705,700 DMW (seven hundred five thousand seven hundred) that we propose to be deposited and cashed at BRCE and [the amount] transferred to account TN73.

We also received 4 (four) MAUSER scoped rifles, a gold plate, and 400 9 mm cartridges that were delivered per your instructions.

Please advise.

Maj. Gen. D. Pavelescu

The scoped rifles (four pieces) were brought into the country by a special courier and delivered at the Office of Cde. First Deputy N. Doicaru. Per telegram No...., today, 29.01.1974, I handed over the gold plate to Cde. First Deputy N. Doicaru.

Signature Pavelescu

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 49.

106

[Handwritten document]

June 28, 1974. Report of DIE General Gheorghe Marcu requesting that three of the four hunting rifles received from Heinz Günther Hüsch (alias Edward) be removed from records since DIE “donated” them to Nicolae Ceaușescu and two other members of the RCP top leadership.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

UM0920

No. 003194 of 28.06.1974

Top Secret

Single original

Approved

[Signature illegible]

NOTE–REPORT

Please approve that the items listed below be removed from our records and distributed as follows:

1.To the Cabinet 1 [Nicolae Ceaușescu]

•One special hunting rifle MAUSER, caliber 9.3x64, series: 1809;

•One rifle leather case;

•One rifle scope No. 1005998;

•One special rifle maintenance kit;

•One leather rifle strap;

•Three spare barrels, caliber 270 WIN; 243 WIN, and 30-06;

•160 (one hundred sixty) cartridges, caliber 9.3x64;

•One gold plate for rifle monogram

(all items were delivered by Lt. Col. Atanase Șt.)

2.By order of comrade president Nicolae Ceausescu, on 29.06.1974, witnessed by comrades “Dragoș” and “Stejarul,” it was approved that the following rifles be donated as follows:

a.To comrade “Dragoș”

•one KRIEGHOFF hunting rifle, series 73740, caliber 375 Magnum H&H;

•one spare barrel 16 pci/6 mm

•one scope Carl Zeiss-Diavari D. 1.5-6x;

b.To comrade “Stejarul”

•one Mauser hunting rifle, caliber 9.3X64, series G-21305;

•two spare barrels, caliber: 270WIN; 243 WIN

•one scope Carl Zeiss-Diavari;

•one synthetic rifle case;

•one rifle maintenance kit;

•one leather rifle strap;

•cartridges caliber 9.3x64 = 80 (eighty) pieces; 30-06 = 70 (seventy) pieces; 270 WIN = 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces; 243 WIN = 130 (one hundred thirty) pieces;

3.On the same occasion, it was decided the following items will be at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior for protocol activities:

a.one MAUSER hunting rifle, caliber 9.3x64, series G-2084;

•spare barrels, caliber 270 WIN; 30-06 and 243 WIN;

•one rifle case, synthetic material;

•one leather rifle strap;

•one rifle maintenance kit;

•cartridges caliber: 9.3x64 = 20 (twenty) pieces; 30-06 = 70 (seventy) pieces; 270 WIN = 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces; 243 WIN = 130 (one hundred thirty) pieces;

•one Carl-Zeiss Diavari scope;

b.

•one Mauser hunting rifle, caliber 9.3x64; series G-24575;

•spare barrels, caliber: 270 WIN, 243 WIN; 30-06;

•one Carl-Zeiss Diavari scope No. 1123347;

•one leather rifle strap;

•one rifle maintenance kit;

•cartridges caliber 9.3x64 = 100 (one hundred) pieces; 270 WIN=120 (one hundred twenty) pieces; 243 WIN=120 (one hundred twenty) pieces; 30-06=60 (sixty) pieces;

•one pair “Scherbach” glasses to read the targets;

c.Deleting from records the cartridges shot upon verifying and calibrating the scopes, as follows:

•– cartridge caliber 270 WIN = 40 (forty) pieces;

•– cartridge caliber 243 WIN = 20 (twenty) pieces;

•– cartridge caliber 9.3x64 = 40 (forty) pieces.

Major Gen. Dorin Pavelescu

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, pp. 83-84bis.

OPERATION PEREGRINII

107

[Book excerpt]

December 14, 1973. Minutes drawn by the control commission responsible for reviewing operation “Peregrinii” in 1973.

No. P.K. 001600

December 14, 1973

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

MINUTES

Drawn up today, December 14, 1973, in Bucharest

We, the undersigned, Nistoreanu Valentin, Teodorescu Gheorghe, and Negru Dumitru, pursuant to the order [we received], proceeded to review the special operations “Peregrinii” carried out in 1973, by a task force of economists comprised of: [colonel] Pascal Oliviu [Sandu Florea], [colonel] Șerbănoiu Silviu [Gudina Tudor] and [captain] Marian Virgil [Cartiș Gheorghe], under the command and control of comrade Luchian Eugen, and [general major] Bărbulescu Adrian [Bolanu Gheorghe] who carried out their activity based on instructions No. P.K. 00402 of February 19,1973, and concluded the following:

During this period, based on the reviewed materials in file No. 15 (volume I, with 300 documents, volume II—304 documents, volume III—308 documents, and volume IV—171 documents), 273 cases were resolved, and the following sums were obtained:

•$555,499.50 (five hundred fifty five thousand four hundred ninety nine and 50%);

•3,316,101 DMW (three million three hundred sixteen thousand one hundred one West German marks);

•112,100 fr.fr. one hundred twelve thousand one hundred French francs);

•475 Swedish krona (four hundred seventy five Swedish krona);

•2,120 British pounds (two thousand one hundred twenty British pounds);

•50,000 sch.a. (fifty thousand Austrian schillings);

•28,868 Swiss francs (twenty eight thousand eight hundred eight Swiss francs);

•990,827 lei (nine hundred ninety thousand eight hundred twenty seven lei);

•Gold jewelry weighing 474.70 (four hundred seventy four grams and 70%);

•One studio apartment recorded cadaster register of U.M. 0763 under entry 26;

•Auto spare parts and goods recorded in U.M. 0920 books with receipt documents No. 89903 and 563723/1973, worth 1,714.40 West German marks.

The audit of the file documents shows that the receipt of the above-mentioned sums and objects by the economists was certified in writing with receipts signed by the delivery sources or by the receiving economists.

The audit also shows that all the above-mentioned sums and objects were delivered to U.M. 0920 against official documents (receipts, receiving slips, numbered notes).

Whereby we have drawn up these minutes.

/ss/V. Nistoreanu

Teodorescu Gh.

Negru D.

►ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, dosar nr. 3447, vol. 74, ff. 7-8, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea „Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds. Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 189-190.

108

[Book excerpt]

September 6, 1978. Testimony of Major General Eugen Luchian regarding the operation “Peregrinii.” Automobiles acquired as a result of this operation. The testimony was made after General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s defection.

No. C/577 of 06.09.1978

TESTIMONY

Regarding the operation “PEREGRINII,” I want to make the following points:

•The operation was launched in June 1970 upon the order of the then chairman of the Council of State Security, Ion Stănescu.

•The operation was closed on December 1973 with the note-report No. P.K. 001598 approved by the Minister of the Interior, comrade Emil Bobu.

From the documents I kept when the operation files were submitted to U.M.0920, with minutes No. P.K. 001 599 of December 14, 1973, the following can be reconstructed:

•the total hard currency sum obtained and the receipt numbers used to submit this sum to U.M. 0920 (photocopies of the submitted files);

•taking over 3 apartments to be used as safe houses. As far as I know, the operation was based on a sales act between the person leaving the country permanently and an undercover UM 0920 officer, and then, the apartment was registered as state-owned, under the administration of this unit. In other cases, donation documents was used;

•getting a number of cars, as follows:

1 Mercedes car—350 S.E.

3 Alfa Romeo cars—2000

11 cars Renault 16 TS and 16 TL

1 car Renault 17 TL

4 cars V.W.-1303

1 car V.W.-1200

1 car V.W. K-70

2 cars Opel Olimpia Record-1900

1 car Opel Ascona

2 cars Audi

2 cars Ford

1 car Fiat-124

3 vans V.W.-1600

2 vans V.W.-1200

1 Hanomag utility van

4 cars Dacia-1300

Documents for the above-mentioned vehicles are kept in file No. 16/1973–acquisition of goods-receipts issued by U.M. 0920.

In addition to cars and utility vans, other materials were also acquired, such as: carwash equipment, spare parts, etc., for which there are receipts issued by this unit; they are kept in the above-mentioned file.

Approval for the procurement of these [vehicles] was given through note-reports approved by the former chairman of the Council of State Security, Ion Stănescu.

In total, the following [vehicles] were procured in the context of the operation “PEREGRINII”

•34 automobiles, 5 vans, and one utility van

It is not known what the final destination of these vehicles was after they were entered the U.M. 0920 inventory.

06.09.1978

/ss/ Maj. Gen. Eugen Luchian

►ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, dosar No. 3447, Vol. 16, ff. 144-145, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea „Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds. Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 230-231.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY PROCURED WITH THE SUPPORT OF ISRAEL

109

[Highly confidential document handwritten in ink, for Cabinet 1]

January 18, 1977. Special note regarding bringing into the country military technology used by Western countries.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

NO. 00025

TOP SECRET OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE

SINGLE ORIGINAL

314

January 18, 1977

SPECIAL NOTE

RE: PROCUREMENT AND BRINGING TO THE COUNTRY SOME ITEMS—AS SAMPLES—OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY USED BY SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES

To be filed appropriately until we decide how we proceed.

Signature N. Doicaru.

Pursuant to the order given by comrade NICOLAE CEAUȘES-CU—secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, supreme commander of the Armed Forces–to procure modern military technology, we are reporting hereby that the following have been procured and brought into the country:

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. V, p. 314.

110

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and for Cabinet 1]

March 14, 1977. Note addressed to Ion Coman, minister of national defense, regarding the inventory of military technology acquired with the help of Israel, transferred by the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of National Defense. The note was also sent to General Gheorghe Marcu.

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

TOP SECRET

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

No. 001712 of 14.03.77

Cde. Gen. Marcu

TO COMRADE COLONEL GENERAL ION COMAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

In accordance with the instructions [given by] comrade Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the S.R. of Romania, you will find attached the inventory of the military technology obtained by our ministry.

In accordance with the known instructions, the Ministry of National Defense will take over this military technology together with the interested ministries to take measures so that this technology be introduced in the country.

We hereby request that your representative get in contact with Colonel Simula Mihai to carry out the delivery-transfer operation.

MINISTER,

Teodor Coman

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. V, p. 313.

111

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and for Cabinet 1]

March 29, 1977. Inventory of the military technology procured with the help of Israel, including the Centurion tank, transferred by the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of National Defense.

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

COAT OF ARMS

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

MINUTES

Drawn in Bucharest, on March 29, 1977, between Colonel SIMULA MIHAI, representative of the Ministry of the Interior, U.M. 0920—as delivery source and comrades Col. Eng. TRICA ISPAS, M.M. cl III STOIAN COSTICA and M.M. cl. III COTOMAN D. GHEORGHE, on behalf of the Ministry of National Defense, as acquirers, (per letter M.I.C.M.-C.I.E.S No. 2203 of 29.03.77), according to the letter from the Ministry of the Interior No. 001712 of 14.03.1977—point 1, point 4, and point 6—we completed the delivery-transfer of materials as follows:

1.“CENTURION” tank MK-13 endowed with:

•Automatic antiatomic purifier;

•Complete radio equipment for connections with two exterior antennas;

•Electrical system to activate the turret and the cannon;

•Optical system to finetune targeting (with one spare)

•Infrared system for night operations (series 172493-1000-7041)—with case;

•Automatic electrical system to put off fires inside the tank;

•One machine gun, caliber 7.62 mm, with 626 cartridges;

•12 missiles caliber 105 mm (with 6 boxes);

•Tank scope equipment, series 7108965 (Soviet)—spare;

•Two technical manuals for the CENTURION tank.

2.Laser-telemeter with a general dispatch to set in motion (5pieces) and a three-piece device to be installed on the tank;

•Connection cables;

•One metal lab desk

3.Different weapons:

•STERLING automatic pistol, cal. 9 mm, series KR 130455, with charger without cartridges;

•UZI automatic pistol, cal. 9 mm, series SMG 073245 with 2 chargers and complete kit;

•FAL-HERSTAL automatic folding stock rifle, cal. 5.56 mm, series FN 8573, with scope type CIP 36 x C 69, bench stand for ground shooting, and 3 chargers with 60 cartridges;

•COLT rifle, type AR-15, cal. 5.56 mm, model SP 1, series 08225 with two charges and 13 cartridges;

•COLT rifle, cal. 5.56, series AL 303548 with missile thrower 40 mm, type M 203, series 41467, with three chargers, and 60 cartridges;

•FAL-HERSTAL automatic rifle, cal. 7.62 series 910707-AL-202012, with bayonet, and 2 chargers with 34 cartridges;

4.Plastic cartridges, 3 types (cal. 7.62—10 pieces, cal. 5.56–10 pieces, cal. 9 mm—10 pieces).

DELIVERED

Col. M. SIMULA

Signature

RECEIVED

Col. Eng. Trică Ispas

Signature

M.M. Cotoman Gheorghe

Signature

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. V, pp. 312-312bis.

112

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and for Cabinet 1]

No date (1978?) Description of the technical features of the UZI automatic pistol. Shaike Dan procured for DIE 15 UZI and 15,000 cartridges.

T. Marcu

Cde. Barbu (A.S.)

Signature

[Dorin] Pavelescu

PISTOL—AUTOMATIC

SMG—UZI Made in: Izreal [sic!]

Caliber: 9 mm

Rate of fire: 600 per minute

Charger: 32 cartridges

Scope: NATO Type, adjustable device for distances of 100 and 200 m.

Effective fire: 200 m

Stack: Metallic, foldable

Bolt: recuperating arc and counter-weight to amortize recoil

Safety levers:

•Lever for: automatic fire, staggered fire, safety;

•Additional lever to unblock firing mechanism.

Assigned to:

Escort, guard, police, guerrilla fight.

Note:

1.US Secret Service equipped all its units ensuring the security of the US president only with this type of pistol that is considered to be the most efficient for this purpose.

2.15 pistols and 15,000 cartridges were procured.

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871,vol. VA, p. 319.

AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL REGARDING THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS AGAINST PAYMENT

113

[Typed document in general use]

November 10, 1969. Protocol between the Israeli party and the Romanian party on the number of Romanian citizens who will be authorized to emigrate to Israel during November—December 1969 and January—October 1972.

PROTOCOL

Art. 1.—Taking into account the humanitarian considerations associated with the problem of the reunification of families of Jewish nationality residents of the State of Israel and who have close relatives in Romania, the Romanian party, at the request of the Israeli party, agrees to allow the emigration, over a three-year period, of a number of 40,000 Romanian citizens of Jewish nationality.

Art. 2.—The meet the above-mentioned objective, the Romanian party will take measures to allow the emigration of the 40,000 Jews as follows:

•2,000 persons during November—December 1969;

•12,800 persons in 1970;

•16,000 persons in 1971;

•9,200 persons during January—October 1972.

Art. 3.—As emigration applications will be submitted, the Romanian party will allow staggered emigration of the following professional categories: minimum 10% [higher education] graduates; minimum 2% students, minimum 10% skilled workers and technicians, and the rest other persons.

The persons falling in the above mentioned categories will be allowed to take with them the education diplomas.

Art. 4.—To give the Israeli party the possibility to ensure timely living conditions for those [people] who emigrate from Romania, the Romanian party will provide periodic lists of the persons who will emigrate to Israel.

The Romanian Party
The Israeli Party

►The document was shared by an archive in Romania that requested to remain anonymous. Cota 2000.

114

[Typed document in general use]

November 10, 1969. Minutes memorandum between the Israeli party and the Romanian party covering the number and the categories of Romanian citizens who will be authorized to emigrate to Israel during November—December 1969 and January–October 1972.

MEMORANDUM

Taking into account the humanitarian considerations associated with the problem of the reunification of families of Jewish nationality residents of Israel and who have close relatives in Romania, the Romanian party, at the request of the Israeli party, agrees to take measures in order to allow the emigration over a period of three years of 40,000 Romanian citizens of Jewish nationality, as follows:

•2,000 persons during November—December 1969;

•12,800 persons in 1970;

•16,000 persons in 1971;

•9,200 persons during the period January—October 1972, [for categories with] the following professional background:

•minim 10% higher education graduates;

•minim 2% students;

•minim 10% skilled workers and technicians and the rest other persons.

Skilled workers and technicians are: workers with a minimum of five years [experience] in production; graduates of [vocational] schools or of professional courses; graduates of professional technical schools and of other specialized schools.

The persons falling in the above-mentioned categories will be allowed to take with them their education diplomas.

Transportation will be done by direct TAROM flights to Israel, and the cost of the air fare will be paid in hard currency by the Israeli party according to the going rates.

To ensure smooth operation, each party will assign a representative who will become the permanent point of contact.

This arrangement will enter into force on November 10, 1969.

►The document was shared by an archive in Romania that requested to remain anonymous. Cota 2000.

115

[Handwritten document]

January 1970. The sums collected by Securitate in exchange for the emigration of Jews and Germans from Romania.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

EQUIVALENT VALUE | DOLLARS | JEWS | GERMANS
Proposals Dec. 1960 | Final [numbers] Jan. 1970
One University GRADUATE | - “ - | 2,500 | 3,000 | 3,000
One STUDENT (regardless of study year) | - “ - | 1,250 | 1,500 | -
One STUDENT (the first three study years) | - “ - | - | - | 1,500
One STUDENT (final two study years) | - “ - | - | - | 1,900
One TECHNICIAN | - “ - | 510 | 790 | 790
No studies | - “ - | 410 | 491 | 49
II. Total persons | - “ - | 40,000 | 40,000 | 40,000
III. Total dollars | - “ - | 26,232,000 | 32,875,200 | 33,000,000

ISRAEL granted a $20,000,000 loan. The 9% interest payable in eight installments will be covered by Israel to the extent we abide by the emigration schedule. Otherwise, we will have to pay part of the interest.

Payment of the first loan installment and interest is due by the end of March 1970.

THE WEST GERMAN PARTNER proposes:

1.They will continue to support us towards obtaining a state loan of 450,000,000 West German marks. It was mentioned that a decision in principle has been made by the West German government.

2.If we want, they can support us to get a private loan of 50,000,000 or 100,000,000 DM, at 8% interest.

They agree to cover part of the interest and, to this end, they will give us 4,000,000 DM.

If we decide to forego the loan, the sum of 4,000,000 DM is at our disposal

We did not accept this sum because we asked for 5,000,000 marks.

We are to receive the confirmation of the West German acceptance by February 5, 1970.

►ACNSAS, dosar nr. 3673, vol. I, ff. 337-338, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea „Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds. Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 136-137.

116

[Handwritten document]

March 14, 1970. Prices per capita cashed by Securitate in exchange for the emigration of Jews and Germans from Romania and the number of emigrants between 1967 and March 1970.

March 14, 1970

Table with the rates in operation “Moştenirea II” [“Inheritance II]

| Dollars
Jews | Germans
One university graduate | 2,500 | 3,000
One student | 1,500 | 1,910
One skilled worker |   510 | 790
No education, Chargerild, etc. |  410 | 497

*Compared with previous rates, a 30% increase was charged for Germans

March 14, 1970

Table with the emigration of Jews and Germans

Years | Persons
Jews | Germans
1967 | 783 | -  
1968 | 170 | 300
1969 | 800 | 1,800
1970 (the first three months) | 837 | 700

►ACNSAS, dosar nr. 3673, vol. I, p. 332, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea “Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds. Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 141.

117

[Handwritten document]

December 29, 1975. Prices per capita and sums collected by Securitate in exchange for the emigration of Jews and Germans from Romania and the number of emigrants between 1970 and 1975.

0052873/2

29.12.1975

Cde. Barbu

On file.

He was informed.

Cde. Supreme Commander [illegible] [i.e. Nicolae Ceaușescu]

NOTE

I.GERMANS

In May 1973, the following arrangement was made with the Germans:

a.

•they granted a 200,000,000 DMW loan, 8 years term, 4 year grace period

•our share of interest: 4% annually

•the Germans pay in installments 5.25% of the interest

b.

•as of July 1973, we had to allow emigration of 40,000 Germans, over 5 years, equally staggered 8,000 yearly.

Current situation:

•the Germans paid towards interest the sum of 29,000,000 DMW (17,400,000 DMW deposited at BRCE, and 11,600,000 DMW deposited into account TN 73)

Over the period July 1973–December 1975, 20,000 Germans had to emigrate. Only 14,908 emigrated.

The Germans decline to pay difference in the interest unless measures are taken to ensure emigration of the number [of persons] agreed upon.

II.JEWS

In February 1973, the following arrangement was made with the Jews:

a.

•the Jews granted a $30,000,000 loan ($15,000,000 on 1.II.1973 and $15,000,000 on 10.IV.1974)—term: 7 years, with 4 year grace period;

•our share of the interest: 4% annually;–the Jews pay $8,638,750 interest difference in the interest at market rate.

•

b.

•we had to allow emigration of 24,000 persons over three years (1973-1975)

Current situation:

•the Jews paid towards interest the sum of $2,295,540 ($1,425,500 deposited at BRCE and $870,540 into account TN 75.

•as agreed upon, during 1973-1975, 24,000 persons had to emigrate. 10,077 emigrated.

The Jews decline to pay difference in the interest unless measures are taken for the emigration of the number [of persons] agreed upon.

III.Situation of the hard currency sums cashed for emigration during the period 1970-1975.

•1970 | $4,912.123
•1971 | $2,375,520
•1972 | $4.318.000
•1973 | $15.446,663
•1974 | $12,164,230
•1975 | $15,253,770
Total: | $54,470,306

IV.APPLIED RATES

| Jews | Germans
[University] Graduates | $3,000 | 11,000 D.M.W.
Students | $1,700 | 7,000 D.M.W.
Workers |   $600 | 2,900 D.M.W.
No profession |   $500 | 1,800 D.M.W.

V.Situation of the BRCE accounts.

•in account TN 73 the sum of $18,125,720

•in account TN 75 the sum of $1,627,908

VI.From account TN 73 the following [sums] were withdrawn:

•$13,500,000 B.R.C.E. loan—$9,913,517 installment Boeing aircrafts

•$1,227,000 for the factory “Stele” [Stars]

Total: $24,640,517

•During 1970-1972, before account TN 73 was open, the sum of 11,605,643 US dollars was deposited at BRCE and introduced in the economic circuit.

►ACNSAS, dosar nr. 52873, pp.7-7bis, 8, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea „Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds., Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 194-195.

118

[Typed document in general use]

January 23, 1978. Summary in Romanian of the arrangement between General Gheorghe Marcu (M) and Shaike Dan (D) regarding the payments that are to be made to the Romanian party by the Israeli party in 1978. A “bonus” of $2,500,000 will be paid if the number of 3,000 emigrants is exceeded in the respective year. In addition to the price per capita agreed upon, a $125 benefit per capita will also be paid.

TO: M

FROM: D

At our meeting in Bucharest, on January 23, 1978, we agreed on the following emigration plan for 1978.

1.For the emigration of 3,000 persons we will pay a bonus of $2,500,000, in addition to the compensation.

2.For each number that is over or under the 3,000 we will pay $125 per person for the dollar devaluation and in addition to the compensation.

3.Final calculation and payment will be made at the end of 1978.

Bucharest, Jan. 23, 1978

►ACNSAS, Fond OVS, dosar nr. 2871, vol. VA, p. 354.

119

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and for Cabinet 1]

No date (January 1983?)

52873/3

NOTE

In the wake of the promulgation of Decree 402/82, it is necessary to renegotiate the conditions of the confidential arrangements with F.R.G and Israel regarding the permanent departure of Romanian citizens of German nationality and of the Jews to these two countries.

For the above purpose, a round of negotiations has been held both with the West German party and with the Israeli party.

On this occasion, final payments related to the situation of the permanent departures to Israel were made and provisional payments regarding the situation of the permanent departures to FRG over the period January 1—December 31, 1982, cases that do not fall under the provisions of Decree 402/82.

During the discussions with the representatives of the two parties regarding the renegotiation of the conditions included in the confidential Arrangement, in the context of the Decree 402/82 provisions, the following aspects resulted:

1.Both parties expressed their firm decision not to change anything in the conditions included in the confidential Arrangements before the expiration date, respectively December 31, 1982, for Israel, and June 30, 1983, for FRG.

2.The two parties rejected the idea of calculating the sums that are to be paid based on the categories included in the Appendix to Decree 402/82, requesting that the criteria of the current arrangements be applied, namely:

•a single category—number of emigrating persons—irrespective of their education for FRG;

•three categories (university graduates, up to age 60; high school graduates and students; the other persons that do not fit in the first two categories) for Israel.

The main argument raised by the two parties is the fact they do not have the necessary mechanism that would allow them to accept the calculations made for the different categories of education stipulated in Decree 402/82.

3.Both the FRG and Israel accept the idea of an increase of the current prices in the context of rising cost of living and inflation.

Given the reported facts and in order to ensure the implementation of Decree 402/82 provisions and the full recovery of the sums owed for the reimbursement of the education expenses for the persons emigrating permanently to the two countries, we hereby propose for approval the following:

1.To continue the confidential negotiations with the FRG and Israel with a view to making new arrangements that will comply with the provisions of Decree 402/82.

2.To accept at the negotiations with the FRG an average annual emigration number of 13,000 and 2,000 persons at the negotiations with Israel.

3.To apply for the arrangement with the FRG a unique sum per emigrant representing the weighted average of the sums that would have been obtained by applying Decree 402/82 for the persons who left permanently during 1981-1982.

4.To include in the confidential Arrangement with Israel 3 categories of fees to be levied based on the education level of the persons who are leaving.

By applying this payment system, we ensure both proceeds to the level of the Decree 402/82 provisions and the possibility of progress in the negotiations with the two parties to conclude the confidential Arrangements.

Given the above, please agree to use the following figures at the separate confidential negotiations with the two parties:

•For the FRG–$4,500 per person and a number of 13,000 emigrants yearly.

•For Israel—2,000 emigrants yearly and the following categories of payment:

CATEGORY A—university graduates, up to age 60 | =$19,000
CATEGORY B—high-school graduates and students | =$4,000
CATEGORY C—the other persons who do not fall |
       within 402/82 Decree | = $1,000

►ACNSAS, dosar nr. 52873, vol. II, pp. 5-7.

120

[Book excerpt]

January 25, 1983. Note from the Secretariat of the CC of RCP to the Minister of the Interior George Homoștean regarding the renegotiations of the arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel regarding the emigration of the ethnic Germans and of the Jews. It is requested to increase the sums paid per capita.

THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. H. 257 January 25, 1983

To: GEORGE HOMOȘTEAN

We hereby advise that we approve the attached note regarding the fees in hard currency that are to be reimbursed by the Romanian citizens who received permanent emigration approval.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC OF THE RCP

/ss/ Silviu Curticeanu.

NOTE

In the wake of the promulgation of Decree 402/82, it is necessary to renegotiate the conditions of the confidential arrangements with F.R.G and Israel regarding the permanent departure of Romanian citizens of German nationality and of the Jews to these two countries.

For the above purpose, a round of negotiations has been held both with the West German party and with the Israeli party.

On this occasion, the final reimbursements related to the situation of the permanent departures to Israel were made and provisional reimbursements were made regarding the situation of the permanent departure to FRG over the period January 1—December 31, 1982, [related to] cases that do not fall under the provisions of Decree 402/82. During the discussions with the representatives of the two parties regarding the renegotiation of the conditions included in the confidential Arrangements, in the context of the Decree 402/82 provisions, the following aspects resulted:

1.Both parties expressed their firm decision not to change anything in the conditions included in the confidential Arrangements before the expiration date, respectively December 31, 1982, for Israel and June 30, 1983, for FRG.

2.The two parties rejected the idea of calculating the sums that are to be paid based on the categories included in the Appendix to Decree 402/82 requesting that the criteria of the current arrangements be applied, namely:

•a single category—number of emigrating persons– irrespective of their education for FRG;

•three categories (university graduates, up to age 60; high school graduates and students; the other persons that do not fit in the first two categories) for Israel.

The main argument raised by the two parties is the fact they do not have the necessary mechanism that would allow them to accept the calculations made for the different categories of education stipulated by Decree 402/82.

3.Both the FRG and Israel accept the idea of an increase of the current prices in the context of rising cost of living and inflation. Given the reported facts and in order to ensure the implementation of the Decree 402/82 provisions and the full recovery of the sums owed for the reimbursement of the education expenses for the persons emigrating permanently to the two countries, we hereby submit for approval the following:

1.To continue the confidential negotiations with the FRG and Israel with a view to finetuning new arrangements that will abide by the provisions of Decree 402/82.

2.To accept at the negotiations with the FRG an average annual emigration number of 13,000 and 2,000 persons at the negotiations with Israel.

3.To apply to the Arrangement with the FRG a unique sum per emigrant representing the weighted average of the sums that would have been obtained under Decree 402/82 for the persons who left permanently during 1981-1982.

4.To include in the confidential Arrangement with Israel 3 categories of fees to be levied based on the education level of the persons who are leaving.

By applying this payment system, we ensure both proceeds to the level of the Decree 402/82 provisions and the possibility of progress in the negotiations with the two parties to conclude the confidential Arrangements.

Given the above, please approve to use the following figures at the separate confidential negotiations with the two parties:

•For the FRG–$4,500 per person and a number of 13,000 emigrants yearly.

•For Israel—2,000 emigrants yearly and the following categories of payment:

Category A—university graduates, up to age 60 | $19,000
Category B—high-school graduates and students | $4,000
Category C—the other persons who do not fall |
      under Decree 402/82 | $1,000

►ACNSAS, fond SIE, dosar nr. 52873,vol. 2, ff. 4-7, in Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Acţiunea „Recuperarea”. Securitatea şi emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989), eds., Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminiţa Banu, Laura Stancu, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 382-384.

121

[Highly confidential document handwritten in ink for Cabinet 1]

June 7, 1983. The Romanian version of the arrangement concluded between Yehuda Lapidot, representative of the Liaison Bureau, Israel, and Octavian Androniuc, representative of UM AVS 0107—CIE, Romania, regarding payments the Israeli party is going to make to the Romanian party for the emigration of Jews to Israel.

CONVENTION

Upon approvals from top decision makers on June 7, 1983, in Bucharest, discussions continued on the extension of the arrangement that expired on December 31, 1982, between the Romanian party and the Israeli party, represented by authorized specialists who came to an agreement on the following regarding the emigration of the Romanian citizens of Jewish nationality:

1.To conclude an arrangement valid for the period January 1, 1983—December 31, 1988, with the possibility to extend or renew it according to the will and agreement of both parties.

2.The Romanian party commits to support, based on actual requests, the annual departure of [a number of persons] at least to the average level of the period 1981-1982, that was about 1,500 persons, regardless of education and professional background.

3.The Israeli party commits to reimburse the Romanian party for every person leaving for Israel with the sum of $3,300.

4.Payment shall be made in advance, at the beginning of each quarter, and final invoicing shall be made at the end of the year based on a comparative analysis of the situation presented by the two parties.

5.The two parties commit to keep the strict confidentiality of the present arrangement, thus avoiding any type of publicity.

For the Israeli party | For the Romanian party
Signature | Signature
YEHUDA LAPIDOT | OCTAVIAN ANDRONIC

ADENDUM

to the Arrangement concluded on June 7, 1983, in Bucharest.

1.The Israeli party expresses its wish to discuss at the next meetings the issue of the persons who are beyond retirement age, with a view to excluding them form the provisions of Article 3 of the Arrangement.

2.The Romanian party took note of the Israeli party’s wish.

For the Israeli party | For the Romanian party
Signature | Signature
Yehuda Lapidot | Octavian Andronic

►Arhive Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, ACMEOR, Israel, cota May 2001.

122

[Document typed in capital letters (IBM typewriter) for the DSS chief, his deputies, and Cabinet 1]

August 20, 1988. Report on the transit through Romania of the Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel. The report mentions that payment for the Bucharest-Tel Aviv segment is made in hard currency by the Israeli authorities.

Single original

NOTE

Lately, some Arab states (Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia), as well as Arab-Palestinian organizations (O.E.P., the Cultural Boycott Bureau in Damascus, the Arab Ligue, the group Al Fatah—the Revolutionary Council) were informed that an increasing number of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality are transiting through Romania either for tourism or to emigrate to the state of Israel.

Arab-Palestinian representatives consider that massive emigration of Jews from the USSR will lead to the consolidation of the state of Israel that will affect the security of the neighboring Arab countries and endanger the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Seeking clarifications, the ambassadors of Jordan, Tunisia, and Sudan requested an official response from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MAE] regarding the transit through Bucharest of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who are traveling to Israel.

At the same time, the Romanian ambassadors to Jordan and Tunisia were summoned to the foreign ministries in these countries where they were asked to provide an official point of view on this issue.

Although the MAE representatives and the Romanian ambassadors denied the existence of an arrangement with Israel on this matter, for the Arab and Palestinian circles this continues to be an issue of interest, and one cannot rule out further official demarches or even actions that could affect the S.R. of Romania’s interests in its relations with some of the Arab states.

Investigating this situation, we concluded the following:

1.Currently, there is no official decision or approval showing there has been an understanding with the Israeli authorities regarding the transit through the S.R. of Romania of groups of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality emigrating to Israel.

2.On November 24, 1987, TAROM held discussions with a representative of the Israeli embassy in Bucharest, at his request, on ensuring transit conditions for some Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who have the legal approvals to emigrate from the USSR to establish permanent residence in the State of Israel.

At this meeting, without signing a document, they agreed, verbally, on an arrangement in principle as follows:

•the transportation of this category of persons on the route Moscow–Bucharest will be done via AEROFLOT, and on the segment Bucharest—Tel Aviv by TAROM, with payment of the airfare in US dollars;

•the Israeli embassy will pay in hard currency for the accommodation, meals, and domestic transport during the transit through Bucharest, for up to 24 hours;

•the TAROM representative in Moscow will receive the number and names of the respective passages.

The management of the Department for Civil Aviation and of TAROM deem the arrangement is legal and it is efficient economically, since so far, a sum $19,169 was paid for these services.

Upon finalizing the arrangement, TAROM representative considered that, according the O.A.C.I. and I.A.T.A. regulations, the transit of the Jewish emigrants originally from USSR through the Otopeni Airport could not be declined.

At the same time, TAROM management, within its competencies, took into account only the technical and economic aspects and did not pay attention to the potential negative political and propagandistic implications that could result in the context of actions initiated by states, organizations, and elements [that are] hostile to Israel.

From the coming into force of this arrangement to date, 232 Jewish emigrants transited through the Otopeni Airport, on a monthly average of 27 persons, up to 7 passengers per flight. Other 15 emigrants arrived in Bucharest by train and, as agreed, left for Israel via TAROM.

3.On July 7, 1988, discussions took place in Bucharest between the representative of the Soviet company AEROFLOT and a representative of the company TAROM that led to a draft [memorandum of] understanding, in keeping with the O.A.C.I. and I.A.T.A. regulations; this understanding stipulates that the contracting parties are responsible for providing and paying for the ground services (hotel accommodation, meals, domestic transport) to the first connecting flight and for up to 24 hours from the moment the passengers arrive at the transit points.

During these discussions, they also analyzed the measures that have to be taken by the two airlines in order to ensure the transportation of the Soviet passengers of Jewish nationality traveling on return flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv, via Bucharest, on AEROFLOT and TAROM flights. At the same time, they discussed future measures to improve cooperation in this field, so that the Soviet party be notified in advance about the number and structure of the passengers arriving from Israel, via Bucharest, as tourists, on their way to Moscow.

The understanding negotiated on July 7, this year, has not been signed yet by the two parties.

*

Since TAROM activity related to the organization of the transit of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality could create problems that are likely to affect Romania’s normal relations with some Arab states and Arab-Palestinian organizations, capable of committing terrorist acts, we bring to your attention these aspects asking you to make a decision.

August 20, 1988.

►This document was sourced from an Archive in Romania that requested to remain anonymous. Cota 2000.

123

[Highly confidential document handwritten in ink, for Cabinet 1]

January 19, 1989. Memorandum addressed to Nicolae Ceaușescu with proposals for the approval of the negotiations with the State of Israel regarding “The confidential Convention on recovering the compensation expenses, in hard currency, for family reunification as a result of the emigration to Israel of persons from the S.R. of Romania.”

NOTE

We are respectfully reporting the following:

In January this year, the CONFIDENTIAL CONVENTION on recovering in hard currency the compensatory expenses related to reunification of families through the emigration to Israel of persons from the S.R. of Romania expires. The Convention was concluded in 1983, for a period of 6 years.

Through the assigned counselor and the special channel, the Israeli party presses for the renewal of the convention for a period of 5 years, using the same channel.

We mention that the Israeli representative emphasized that the wish of the Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR is to discuss and resolve the problems connected with the permanent departures and the mixed marriages, as it has been done so far, through the assigned councilors and through the special channel that has been used so far.

At the same time, the Israeli party requested that the discussions regarding the renewal of the convention take place in Bucharest, in February 1989.

If continued cooperation is approved as proposed by the Israeli party, during the negotiations to conclude a new convention, focus should be placed on:

•complying in the future with the provisions of the Romanian legislation regarding resolving the application for permanent departure from the country;

•not to establish an annual number of persons to emigrate to Israel. The Convention should indicate that, in the spirit of the humanitarian policy of the Romanian state, based on requests, justified family reunification cases as well as cases regarding mixed marriages will continue to be resolved and the total number should not exceed the number indicated in the expiring convention;

•discuss with the Israeli party the possibilities to accept an increase of the compensatory expenses, in hard currency, according to the financial efforts of our country to ensure the education, health benefits, and professional skills of those [persons] leaving for Israel.

•obtain the firm commitment of the Israeli party to keep complete confidentiality on the Convention and on the collaboration means to resolve the problems that are the objectives of this convention.

Given the above, we respectfully request that You [sic] provide Your [sic] guidance and instructions regarding the possibility of discussing with the Israeli party these issues and regarding the mandate of the representative of the Romanian party whose project we attach herewith.

January 19, 1989

►This document was sourced from an Archive in Romania that requested to remain anonymous. Cota 2000.

124

[Highly confidential document handwritten in ink, for Cabinet 1]

January 19, 1989. The mandate of the Romanian party regarding “The Confidential Convention on recovering the compensation expenses, in hard currency, for family reunification as a result of the emigration to Israel of persons from the S.R. of Romania.”

MANDATE

of the representative of the Romanian party at the negotiations with the Israeli party for the renewal of the confidential convention.

In the context of the negotiations on the renewal of the CONFIDENTIAL CONVENTION regarding the recovery of the compensation expenses, in hard currency, for family reunification as a result of the emigration to Israel of persons from the S.R. of Romania, emphasis shall be placed on the position of the Romanian state regarding emigration and mixed marriages, pointing out that our country does not encourage permanent departures, as it considers that the place of each Romanian citizen, irrespective of nationality, is in the country where he was born and educated to be useful to society.

The Romanian representative shall point out that, in the spirit of the humanitarian policy of the top leadership of our party and of our state, justified family reunification cases, as well as cases regarding mixed marriages, will continue to be resolved and the total number [of cases] should not exceed the number indicated in the 1983-1988 convention.

Taking into account the fact that since concluding the previous confidential convention until now, the expenses made by the Romanian state for the education, health benefits, and professional qualification, etc. of the persons leaving for Israel have increased, the Israeli party should be persuaded to accept accordingly the increase of the compensatory sums in hard currency that are to be reimbursed for each person, from the date of entry into force of the new convention.

The Romanian representative shall negotiate with the Israeli party the technical conditions of continued cooperation on the permanent departure of the persons of Israeli origin meeting the family reunification and mixed marriages criteria and continue using in the future, if mutually agreed, the confidential channel that has been used so far.

The convention shall also stipulate expressly the firm commitment of the parties to maintain absolute confidentiality on the issues discussed, as well as on the existence of this Convention. At the same time, the Convention shall stipulate it is mandatory to keep secret the working system used to resolve the issues that are the objectives of his convention.

In the negotiations, the Romanian representative, depending on the issue that are raised and according to the guidelines he received, will press firmly to persuade the Israeli representative to accept the requests of the Romanian party regarding the recovery of increased sums, taking into account the qualification level of the persons subject to this convention.

If the parties agree on the above-mentioned conditions to review this convention, the Romanian representative shall sign the new confidential convention for a five-year term.

January 19, 1989.

►This document was sourced from an Archive in Romania that requested to remain anonymous. Cota 2000.

A proposal to arrest a former CIE officer in charge with the trade in people after the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu.

125

[Book excerpt]

March 3, 1990. Characterization of Colonel Octavian Stelian Andronic, former chief of AVS UM 0107 of CIE (UM 0544) and of his activity, with the proposal that he be arrested.

The General Prosecutor’s Office

124/C of March 3, 1990

March 4, 1990.

General Diaconescu is asked to verify and make proposals.

Ss [illegible]

General Prosecutor Robu himself

I think it must be investigated.

SS [illegible]

(Stamp MApN) [Ministry of National Defense]

NOTE

Colonel ANDRONIC STELIAN was the chief of the unit for Foreign Currency Intake (AVS) at UM 0544 during 1978—after the treason of I.M. Pacepa, to 1986, when, by the order of Tudor Postelnicu or even of Ceaușescu Nicolae, was reassigned as deputy of UM 0647, a production unit of the former DSS, where he currently works.

Andronic Stelian was extremely surprised by this unexpected decision because he had been a faithful dog of the nomenclature for whom he had made priceless services. That is why, when he left the unit he took with him all the top secret documents he had, some of them are extremely important, maybe to use them as a blackmail “weapon.”

Learning about this development, the intelligence services stepped in, recuperated the documents, and brought them to the AVS Unit. The respective documents included data about the foreign intelligence network, about the funding sources, through channels that were often illegal and beyond public oversight, mission orders, and other confidential information, such as proof of foreign accounts.

Such an action should have been punished, but the perpetrator went scot free and kept his work place.

When he was the AVS chief, he went on frequent missions abroad, for short periods of time, 2-5 days, especially to Switzerland, Austria, and Israel. He would not discuss with anybody about his missions and, despite work regulations, he would report directly to Tudor Postelnicu, the former chief of DSS, bypassing Pleșiță Nicolae, the chief of the former Foreign Intelligence Center.

He is a taciturn person, scrupulous, very stingy, who has been suspected by the counterintelligence bodies of having been recruited by the Israeli intelligence service. He had served for one term in Israel and a great part of his foreign network was Jewish.

He had no friends at home, he wouldn’t go to restaurants, was very subdued, would wear extremely modest clothes for his means, to demonstrate he was a poor person. He behaves like a well-trained agent.

On the other hand, he could travel aboard, anywhere, under no supervision, manipulating sums of money his immediate supervisors knew nothing about.

Undoubtedly, he is fully aware of different aspects of depositing sums abroad, both for the Ceaușescus and for other persons, and certainly for personal use. In fact, his removal from Unit AVS was made shortly after T. Postelnicu was assigned as the Minister of the Interior, especially for the purpose of ensuring the secrecy of these special operations.

He has a daughter, of about 28, with whom he is very close, an ASE graduate [Economic Studies], (. . .) It is possible he may request approval for treatment aboard; that will give him the possibility to stay abroad and to use the sums deposited into different accounts.

We propose that he be detained and investigated by the Military Prosecutor and, at the same time, make all the AVS document inaccessible although there are huge obstacles since this Unit destroys documents every six months.

08.03.1990

The file was forwarded by General Diaconescu Gheorghe to the Military Prosecutor Lt. Col. Zaharia. After talking with Postelnicu, Stamatoiu, and Vlad, he gave me the minister’s (. . .) and advised he talked with (. . .) (mentioned above) but, since nothing has been confirmed, he has not taken any declarations.

Col. SS [illegible]

►Dan Badea, Averea preşedintelui. Conturile Ceauşescu, EdituraNemira, 1998, Bucureşti, pp. 114-115, Anexa nr.2; also available in facsimile.

Appendix

Emigration from Romania to Israel, 1948–1989*

Year | Number of Emigrants
May 15, 1948–1949 | 31,274
1950 | 47,071
1951 | 40,625
1952 | 3,712
1953 | 61
1954 | 53
1955 | 235
1956 | 714
1957 | 594
1958 | 8,954
1959 | 8,360
1960 | 9,321
1961 | 21,269
1962 | 9,878
1963 | 13,243
1964 | 25,926
1965 | 10,949
1966 | 3,467
1967 | 779
1968 | 226
1969 | 1,754
1970 | 5,614
1971 | 1,861
1972 | 3,005
1973 | 4,123
1974 | 3,729
1975 | 2,393
1976 | 2,223
1977 | 1,501
1978 | 1,223
1979 | 1,113
1980 | 1,241
1981 | 1,179
1982 | 1,720
1983 | 1,340
1984 | 2,010
1985 | 1,374
1986 | 1,348
1987 | 1,673
1988 | 1,473
1989 | 1,499

*Sources: Shlomo Leibovici-Lais / ACMEOR Archives, and Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of the Ceaușescu Era, p. 261.

Notes

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

  1.Florica Dobre and Florian Banu, Introduction to Acțiunea “Recuperarea.” Securitatea și emigrarea germanilor din România (1962–1989), by Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, Luminița Banu, and Laura Stancu (Bucharest, 2011), p. lxxx.

  2.Ibid., p. lxxvii.

  3.Ibid., p. lxxix.

  4.Ibid., pp. xxix, lxxx.

  5.Ibid., p. lxxvii.

  6.Ibid., p. lxxxiii.

  7.Stelian Octavian Andronic, 36 de ani in serviciile secrete ale României: Din respect pentru adevăr. Memorii (Bucharest, 2008), p. 113.

  8.Ibid., p. 231.

  9.Ibid., p. 112.

 10.Ibid., pp. 113–14.

 11.Ibid., p. 202.

 12.Ibid., p. 204.

 13.Ibid., p. 44.

 14.Ibid., p. 236.

 15.Dobre and Banu, Introduction to Acțiunea “Recuperarea,” pp. xiii, xi.

 16.Marius Oprea, Alya reflectat în arhivele Securității (Tel Aviv, 2001), p. 8.

 17.Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Introduction to Răscumpărarea evreilor. Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România și Israel, by Radu Ioanid (Iași, 2015), p. 30.

INTRODUCTION: LOST AND FOUND

  1.Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 76.

  2.Mihai Pelin, Din culisele spionajului românesc, DIE 1955–1980 (Bucharest, 1997), p. 250.

  3.Ibid., pp. 306, 398.

  4.Ibid., p. 399.

  5.Ibid., p. 387.

  6.Interview with Cornel Burtică, Bucharest, March 23, 2002.

  7.Amos Ettinger, Blind Jump: The Story of Shaike Dan (New York, 1992), p. 14.

1. “THE JEWS ARE OUR MISFORTUNE”

  1.Carol Iancu, Les Juifs de Roumanie, 1866–1919: De L’Exclusion a l’Emancipation (Aix en Provence, 1978), pp. 186–187.

  2.Carol Iancu, Bleichröder et Crémiaux, Le combat pour l’émancipation des Juifs de Roumanie devant le Congres de Berlin, Correspondence inédite (1878–1880) (Montpellier, 1987), p. 29.

  3.Carol Iancu, L’émancipation des Juifs de la Roumanie (Montpellier, 1992), p. 32.

  4.Israel Bar-Avi, O istorie a Evreilor Români, Emigrăarile anului 1900 (Jerusalem, 1961), p. 150; quote from Die Welt, June 15, 1900.

  5.Gheorghe Dumitras-Bitoaica, Statutul juridic al evreilor și legislația romanizării (Bucharest, 1942), p. 121.

  6.Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry During the Holocaust [hereafter DCFJRJDH] (New York, 1988), vol. 3, p. 310.

  7.Aurica Simion, Preliminarii politico-diplomatice ale insurecției române din august 1944 (Cluj, 1979), p. 125.

  8.United States Holocaust Memorial Museum/Romanian Information Service [hereafter USHMM/SRI], RG 25.004M, roll 32, fond 40010, vol. l1.

  9.United States Holocaust Memorial Museum/Romanian State Archives [hereafter USHMM/RSA], RG 25.002M, roll 18, fond Președenția Consiliului de Miniștri, cabinet, Dosar 167/1941.

 10.USHMM/SRI, RG 25.004M, fond 40010, vol. 78.

 11.USHMM/SRI, RG 25.004M, roll 31, fond 40010, vol. 1.

 12.Tuvia Friling, Arrow in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust (Madison, Wisc., 2004).

 13.New York Times, February 16, 1943. The ad and its implications and consequences are analyzed at length by David Wyman in The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1946 (New York, 1984), pp. 85–87.

 14.New York Times, February 13, 1943, C.L. Sulzberger, “Romania Proposes Transfer of Jews.”

 15.Tuvia Friling, Arrow in the Dark, chapter 5.

 16.Mihail Sebastian, Journal, 1935–1944 (Chicago, 2000), p. 408.

 17.NARA, RG 84, US Embassy Ankara, General records, 1941, file 840.1, Situation of the Jews in Romania.

 18.Ira Hirschmann, Life Line to a Promised Land (New York, 1946), p. 26.

 19.Ibid., p. 46.

 20.Ibid., p. 49.

 21.Ibid.

 22.NARA, RG 84, US Embassy Ankara, General records, 1941, file 840.1, Situation of the Jews in Romania.

 23.Hirschmann, Life Line, p. 52.

 24.Ibid., p. 54.

 25.Ira Hirschmann, Caution to the Winds (New York, 1962), p. 156.

 26.Ibid., p. 157.

 27.Dalia Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939–1944 (New York, 1990), appendixes.

 28.Amos Ettinger, Blind Jump: The Story of Shaike Dan (New York, 1992), p. 47.

 29.Ibid., p. 43.

 30.Hirschmann, Life Line, pp. 78–79.

 31.Yitzhak (Menu) Ben-Efraim, From Land Under Siege to People Besieged: The Israeli Parachutists in Romania in World War II. A Personal Testimony, in Studia Judaica X (Cluj-Napoca 2001), p. 100.

 32.Cartea albă a securității (Bucharest, 1996), vol. II, p. 406.

 33.Itzhak Artzi, Biografia unui sionist (Bucharest, 1999), p. 115; Yitzhak (Menu) Ben-Efraim, From Land Under Siege, p. 104.

2. VOTING WITH THEIR FEET

  1.Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy, vol. VI (Boston, 1985), pp. 198–199.

  2.American Jewish Archives/World Jewish Congress Report [hereafter AJA/ WJCR], OSS/Romania, June 9, 1945, p. 2.

  3.DCFRJDH, vol. 6, p. 606.

  4.Moses Rosen, Dangers, Tests and Miracles: The Remarkable Life Story of Chief Rabbi Rosen of Romania as told by Joseph Finklestone (London, 1990), p. 49.

  5.Liviu Rotman, “Romanian Jewry, The First Decade After the Holocaust,” in Randolph Braham, The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry (New York, 1994), p. 291.

  6.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 115–116.

  7.USHMM/SRI, RG 25.004M, file 4720, concerning Rabbi Zissu Portugal.

  8.Andrei Roth, Who ‘Brought’ Communism to Romania and Who ‘Destroyed’ It, Radio Free Europe, EEP Report, December 7, 2000, Volume 2, number 22.

  9.Daily Intelligence Summary, April 27, 1945, A 17/8A, UJA, American Jewish Archives.

 10.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 158.

 11.Rotman, “Romanian Jewry,” p. 300.

 12.Abba Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads (Jerusalem, 2001), p. 186.

 13.Rotman, “Romanian Jewry,” p. 302.

 14.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 124, 157.

 15.Ehud Avriel, Open the Gates! A Personal Story of “Illegal” Immigration to Israel (New York, 1975), pp. 192–193.

 16.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 120, 157–158.

 17.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2001.

 18.Dennis Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989 (London, 1995), pp. 4, 15.

 19.Vladimir Tismăneanu, Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej (Bucharest, 1995), p. 204.

 20.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 121–122, 158.

 21.Ibid., p. 161.

 22.Ibid., pp. 161–162.

 23.USHMM/SRI, RG 25.004M, folder 4005, vol. 160, pp. 121–140, Interrogation of Melania Iancu.

 24.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 166.

 25.Ibid., pp. 171, 185–186.

 26.Itzhak Artzi, Biografia unui sionist (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 146, 148.

 27.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 161, 176–177.

 28.Ibid., p. 208.

 29.Ibid., pp. 208–209.

 30.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2001.

 31.USHMM/SRI, RG 25.004M, folder 40009, vol. 14, pp. 259–260, Interrogation of Alexandru Jurim.

 32.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 206.

 33.Romanian State Archives /Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român (hereafter RSA/CCRCP), code I–106, CDE report, December 28, 1950, p. 319.

3. THE ZIONIST ENEMY

  1.Romania-Israel, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, documente diplomatice, vol. I, 1948–1969 (Bucharest, 2000), pp. 6–10.

  2.Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimire P. Naumov, eds., Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven, 2001), p. 40.

  3.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 263–276, 290–296.

  4.Rubenstein and Naumov, Stalin’s Secret Pogrom, p. 41.

  5.Ibid., p. 46.

  6.Ibid., p. 50.

  7.Ibid., p. 60.

  8.RSA/CCRCP, code I–106, CDE report, December 28, 1950, p. 319; Rotman, “Romanian Jewry,” p. 315.

  9.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 11, 2001.

 10.Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist (Berkeley, 2001), p. 167.

 11.Rotman, “Romanian Jewry,” p. 312.

 12.Rosen, Dangers, p. 50.

 13.RSA/CCRCP, Department of Foreign Affairs, folder 14, 1945.

 14.Alexandre Safran, Resisting the Storm: Romania, 1940–1947: Memoirs (Jerusalem, 1987), p. 191.

 15.Ibid., pp. 194, 202.

 16.Ibid.

 17.Ibid., p. 289.

 18.Rosen, Dangers, p. 60.

 19.USHMM/SRI, folder 28827, vol. 1.

 20.Rosen, Dangers, p. 63.

 21.USHMM/SRI, RG 25. 004M, roll 148, file 7623, vol. 3.

 22.Interrogation of Melania Iancu, SRI Archives, fond Y, folder 40005, vol. 160, pp. 121–140. See also Levy, Ana Pauker, pp. 213–220.

 23.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 171.

 24.Ibid.

 25.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 5, 2001.

 26.Florian Banu, “Foametea din ’46 și creșterea antisemitismului în Moldova,” in Romania: A Crossroads of Europe (Iași, 2002), p. 246.

 27.Levy, Ana Pauker, pp. 165–166.

 28.Archive of CCRCP, codul I, 106, fond 37, Comitetul Democratic Evreiesc, CDE Report, March 3, 1946.

 29.Ibid., CDE Report, December 28, 1950.

 30.Banu, “Foametea din ’46 și cresterea antisemitismului în Moldova,” pp. 254–255, 257.

 31.Safran, Resisting the Storm, p. 242.

 32.Ibid., p. 228.

 33.Ibid., pp. 232, 274.

 34.Levy, Ana Pauker, pp. 166, 332.

 35.Mihai Pelin, Sioniști sub ancheta, A.L. Zissu, declarații, confruntări, interogatorii, 10 mai 1951–1 martie 1952 (Bucharest, 1993), p. 256.

 36.Ibid., p. 263.

 37.Romania-Israel, documente diplomatice, vol. 1, p. 73.

 38.Rubenstein and Naumov, Stalin’s Secret Pogrom, p. 61.

 39.Romania-Israel, documente diplomatice, vol. 1, p. 103.

 40.Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community (Boston, 1989), p. 18.

 41.Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (New York, 1991), pp. 79–80.

 42.Ibid., p. 80.

 43.Ibid., pp. 81, 82.

 44.Ibid., p. 83; Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 29–30.

 45.Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, p. 551.

 46.Ibid.

 47.Ibid., p. 552.

 48.Mihai Pelin, Sioniști sub anchetă, p. 46.

 49.Archives of CCRCP, Chancellery, folder 24, 1949.

 50.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 173.

 51.Romania-Israel, documente diplomatice, vol. 1, p. 26.

 52.Ibid., p. 32.

 53.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 183.

 54.Rosen, Dangers, p. 82.

 55.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 188.

 56.Ibid., pp. 188–189.

 57.Ibid., pp. 189, 192.

 58.Rosen, Dangers, p. 83.

 59.Ibid., p. 91.

 60.Ibid., pp. 84, 87.

 61.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 172.

 62.Ibid., p. 173.

 63.SRI Archives, Folder 10090, p. 324.

 64.Levy, Ana Pauker, p. 176.

 65.Archive of CCRCP, codul I, 106, fond 37, Comitetul Democratic Evreiesc, Report of CDE, December 28, 1950.

 66.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May, 11, 2001.

 67.Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, The Inside Story of U.S.-Israeli Covert Relations (Toronto, 1991), p. 22.

 68.Ibid., p. 23.

 69.Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond Israel, 1945–1949, pp. 211–224.

 70.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May, 11, 2001.

 71.SRI Archives, folder 10090, pp. 403–404.

 72.Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, “Buying Romania’s Jews: How Israel Ransomed 120,000 People from Ceaușescu,” Washington Post, January 14, 1990.

 73.Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond Israel, 1945–1949, pp. 211–224.

 74.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 305–306.

 75.Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians (New York, 1991), p. 18.

 76.Philippe Marguerat, Le IIIeme Reich et le petrole roumain (Geneva, 1977), p. 206.

 77.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 19.

 78.Ibid., pp. 20–21.

 79.Ibid., p. 28.

 80.Ibid., pp. 105–106.

 81.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 322–323.

 82.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 5, 2001; letter to the author from Shlomo Leibovici-Lais; phone conversation with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, October 5, 2002.

 83.Ephraim Illin, Al Hechatum, pp. 198–199.

 84.Ibid.

 85.Ibid., pp. 191–192.

 86.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 323.

4. BARTER

  1.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 107.

  2.Ibid., p. 114.

  3.Ibid., pp. 116–117.

  4.Ibid., pp. 118–119.

  5.Ibid., p. 146.

  6.Ibid., p. 144.

  7.Rosen, Dangers, p. 115.

  8.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 38, 40; Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 11, 2001.

  9.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 11, 2001.

 10.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 141.

 11.Ibid., pp. 142–143.

 12.Ibid., p. 149.

 13.Ibid., p. 166.

 14.Ibid., p. 169.

 15.Rosen, Dangers, p. 152.

 16.Ibid., p. 153.

 17.Romania-Israel, Documente diplomatice, 1948–1969, pp. 117–118.

 18.Ibid., pp. 114–117.

 19.Ibid., pp. 127, 139.

 20.Ibid., p. 146.

 21.Cartea alba a securității, vol. III, 1994, Report of the U.S. embassy in Bucharest dated February 26, 1964, titled “Evreii din Romania: o minoritate descrescinda” (the report was stolen by the Securitate informant code named Eugen Stănescu on February 26, 1964), DSS report dated July 1968, p. 515.

 22.Ibid., p. 516.

 23.Archives of CCRCP, Chancellery, File 15/1958.

 24.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 147.

 25.Khrushchev made two visits to Romania in June and August 1955. It is not clear during which visit Bodnăraș approached him on this subject. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (New York, 1970), pp. 513–514, and Sergiu Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944–1958 (Durham, N.C., 1992), p. 83.

 26.Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy, pp. 130, 132.

 27.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 195.

 28.Ibid., pp. 196–197.

 29.Cartea alba a securitatii, vol. III, 1994, Report of the U.S. embassy in Bucharest dated February 26, 1964, p. 516.

 30.Rosen, Dangers, p. 184.

 31.Cartea alba a securitatii, vol. III, 1994, Report of the U.S. embassy in Bucharest dated February 26, 1964, p. 516.

 32.Romania-Israel, Documente diplomatice, 1948–1969, p. 159

 33.Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, letter to the author, April 13, 2003.

 34.Rosen, Dangers, p. 188.

 35.Ibid., p. 173; in July 1956, Rabbi Portugal met with American rabbis visiting Bucharest. This was held against him by the Securitate (see SRI archives, file 47240, vol. 1–3, RG 25.004M, reel 158). The father of the Transnistrian orphans was set free in August 1959 and a few months later allowed to emigrate to the United States.

 36.Rosen, Dangers, p. 174.

 37.Ibid., p. 188.

 38.Ibid., p. 189.

 39.Phone conversation with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2003.

 40.Rosen, Dangers, p. 189.

 41.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 197.

 42.Ibid.

 43.Library of Congress, Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej’s Defiance of Khrushchev, data as of July 1989.

 44.Ibid.

 45.Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, letter to the author, April 13, 2003.

 46.Rosen, Dangers, p. 201.

 47.Romania-Israel, Documente diplomatice, 1948–1969, pp. 163–166. The Israeli government wanted to send police inspector Abraham Sellinger to Romania and to other East European countries in order to find documents related to this investigation. The Romanian archives did indeed contain much material relating to the activities of Gustav Richter, Eichmann’s envoy to Bucharest during World War II.

 48.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 222.

 49.Ibid., p. 224.

 50.Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Note 215/1964.

 51.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 232.

 52.Ibid., pp. 235–236; see also Gheorghe Gaston Marin, In serviciul României lui Gheorghiu-Dej (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 152–153.

 53.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 258.

 54.Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, pp. 53–54.

 55.Ibid., p. 66.

 56.Ion Mihai Pacepa, Moștenirea Kremlinului (Bucharest, 1993), p. 405.

 57.Ibid.

 58.Ibid., pp. 208-209

 59.Marin, 2000, p. 112.

 60.Ibid., p.182.

 61.Ionescu, 2006, p. 217.

 62.Dennis Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989, London, 1995.

 63.Stephen Bates, Pastor Richard Wurmbrand, “Cleric Driven by Missionary Zeal Despite Years of Persecution in Communist Romania,” The Guardian, March 16, 2001.

 64.Interview with Phyllis Yadin, London, March 16, 2002.

 65.Ettinger, Blind Jump, interview with Shaike Dan, p. 345.

 66.Hodor, 2014, p. 3.

 67.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871, vol. XIII, pp. 53-54.

 68.Ibid., pp. 263-265.

 69.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 1-37.

 70.Ibid., pp. 401-58.

 71.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. I, p. 380.

 72.Ibid., p. 283.

 73.Ibid., pp. 282-85.

 74.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 171, 185-87.

 75.Hodor, 2014, p. 1.

 76.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. I, p. 141.

 77.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VIII, pp. 180-181.

 78.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. I, pp. 25-23, 91-92.

 79.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VIII, pp. 75, 263.

 80.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XI, pp. 47-60, 62-64

 81.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. I, pp. 595-603.

 82.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XIII, pp. 79-80.

 83.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XIII, pp. 110, 114.

 84.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 52873. Justificare utilizare valută, vol. 19, pp. 2-3.

 85.Ibid., pp. 4-7.

 86.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VA, pp. 81-84bis.

 87.Pelin, 1997, p. 246.

 88.Badea, 1997, p. 246.

 89.Andronic, 2010, pp. 181-85.

 90.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XIII, pp. 8-9.

 91.Ibid., pp. 16-17.

 92.Ibid., pp. 18-21.

 93.Ibid., pp. 22-25.

 94.Ibid., pp. 26-27.

 95.Ibid., pp. 35-38.

 96.Ibid., pp. 48-49.

 97.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XVI, p. 59.

 98.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XIII, pp. 62-63.

 99.Ibid., p. 189.

100.Ibid., pp. 22, 150.

101.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, p. 49.

102.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 319-23.

103.London Market in “Romanians,” The Sunday Telegraph, ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VIII, pp. 363-364; 467-469 [?] unclear page numbers.

104.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VIII, pp. 345-348.

105.Ibid., pp. 306-307, 387.

106.Ibid., pp. 449-52.

107.Ibid., p. 453.

108.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XII, pp. 32-35.

109.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 335-336; vol. VIII p. 75.

110.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 335-336; vol. XIII p. 70.

111.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, p. 349.

112.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XII, pp. 105-108.

113.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VIII, pp. 16-19.

114.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. IV, pp. 369-370.

115.Ibid., pp. 372-373.

116.Ibid., pp. 378-379.

117.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 3673. Eduard, Vol. III, pp. 8-9.

118.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XIII, p. 182.

119.Ibid., p. 186.

120.Ettinger, Blind Jump, Interview with Shaike Dan, p. 345.

121.Ibid.

122.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 73.

123.Ibid., pp. 73–74.

124.Ibid., p. 74.

125.Ibid., pp. 74–75.

126.Pacepa, Moștenirea Kremlinului, p. 406.

5. AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP

  1.Pacepa, Moștenirea Kremlinului, pp. 253–254.

  2.Ibid., pp. 255–256.

  3.Craig R. Whitney, Spy Trader: Germany’s Devil Advocate and the Darkest Secrets of the Cold War (New York, 1993); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London, 1999), p. 651.

  4.Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of the Ceaușescu Era (London, 2002), p. 262.

  5.Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, p. 210.

  6.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 262.

  7.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

  8.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75.

  9.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

 10.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75.

 11.Ibid., p. 75.

 12.Interview with an Israeli diplomat who requested anonymity.

 13.Andronic, 2008, pp. 231-232.

 14.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

 15.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75.

 16.Ibid., pp. 75–76.

 17.ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. I, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al. (2011). p. 240.

 18.Tom Shachtman, I Seek My Brethren: Ralph Goldman and “The Joint” (New York, 2001), p. 184.

 19.Interview with Cornel Burtică, Bucharest, March 23, 2002; see also Rodica Chelaru, Culpe care nu se uita, Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtică (Bucharest, 2001), p. 163.

 20.Interview with Cornel Burtică, Bucharest, March 23, 2002.

 21.Andronic, 2008, p. 234.

 22.Ibid.

 23.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75.

 24.Interview with Cornel Burtică, Bucharest, March 23, 2002.

 25.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

 26.Document from a Romanian government archive that requested anonymity.

 27.Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, notă de convorbire 05/03503 from April 14, 1970.

 28.Tesu Solomovici, “Dosarul Sanmuel Francisc: povestea unui securist evreu trimis să spioneze în Israel,” Ziua, January 18, 2003.

 29.Tesu Solomovici quotes as sources in his article two Israeli journalists, Yosi Melman and Eytan Haber, from the daily Yediot Ahronot.

 30.Mihai Pelin, DIE 1955–1980, Culisele spionajului românesc, (Bucharest, 1997). p. 70.

 31.Ibid., p. 299.

 32.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 235.

 33.Rosen, Dangers, pp. 128, 221–222.

 34.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 365.

 35.Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, pp. 103–105.

 36.Pelin, DIE 1955–1980, Culisele spionajului românesc, pp. 386–391.

 37.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 225.

 38.Cartea alba a Securității, vol. II, p. 562.

 39.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 253.

 40.Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, pp. 206–207.

 41.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 251.

 42.Ibid., pp. 249–250.

 43.Rosen, Dangers, p. 223.

 44.Pelin, DIE 1955–1980, p. 368.

 45.Information from a CNSAS/SIE file of a person who requested anonymity.

 46.Radu Tudor, “Generalul Alexandru Tănăsescu a murit în condiții suspecte,” Ziua, January 21, 2003.

 47.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, “Emigration: Problem or Solution?” Data as of July 1989.

 48.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 76.

 49.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 13, 2001.

 50.Whitney, Spy Trader, p. 180.

 51.Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York, 1976–1987), p. 661.

 52.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, p. 51.

 53.Preda, Romania-Israel, Documente Diplomatice, p. 259.

 54.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, pp. 106–107.

 55.Ibid., p. 124.

 56.Ibid., p. 144.

 57.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 235.

 58.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 371.

 59.Phone conversation with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, March 25, 2014.

 60.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 353.

 61.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 268.

 62.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, p. 93.

 63.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Middle East, Data as of July 1989.

 64.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 292; Ceaușescu’s efforts to mediate between Washington and Beijing failed because China was suspicious of all East European Communist countries (see ibid., p. 296).

 65.Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York, 1999), p. 352.

 66.Abba Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads (Jerusalem, 2001), p. 175.

 67.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 355.

 68.Sachar, A History of Israel, p. 732.

 69.Preda, Romania-Israel, Documente diplomatice, p. 404.

 70.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, pp. 94, 148–149.

 71.Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cable from Bagdada, nr. 14.071 of April 27, 1970.

 72.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, pp. 180–181, 185.

 73.Ibid., p. 151.

 74.Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fond 220–20, 1970.

 75.Călăfeteanu and Cornescu-Coren, România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu, pp. 99–100, 177.

 76.Ibid., p. 162.

 77.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 353–354.

 78.Ibid., p. 354.

 79.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 95.

 80.Ibid., p. 96.

 81.Rosen, Dangers, p. 206.

 82.Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads, pp. 162–163.

 83.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 354.

 84.Sachar, A History of Israel, p. 845.

 85.Rosen, Dangers, p. 281.

 86.Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads, p. 164.

 87.Sachar, A History of Israel, p. 845.

 88.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

 89.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 226.

 90.Ibid.

 91.Ibid., p. 227.

 92.Ibid., p. 228.

 93.Ibid.

 94.Ibid., pp. 235–236.

 95.Mihai Pelin, Din culisele spionajului românesc, DIE 1955–1980, pp. 145–146.

 96.According to the June 7, 1993, agreement originating from a private Israeli archival source that requested anonymity.

 97.Chelaru, Culpe care nu se uită, pp. 165–167.

 98.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 425.

 99.Ibid.

100.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

101.Ibid.

102.Pelin, Din culisele spionajului românesc, p. 157.

103.Ibid., pp. 306, 387, 399.

104.Chelaru, Culpe care nu se uită, p. 208.

105.Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, pp. 377, 381.

106.Pelin, 1997, p. 70.

107.Andronic, 2008, p. 45.

108.Badea, 1998, pp. 114-115.

109.Andronic, 2010, p. 234.

110.Ibid.

111.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

112.Nicolae Pleșiță, Interview, Lumea Magazin, nr. 11 (91), 2000. According to Pleșiță, who allegedly used information provided him by Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen, the Mossad was closing on Carlos when Ceaușescu got cold feet and ordered CIE to severe all connections with the assassin. According to the author John Follain, the Securitate paid $400,000 to Carlos and “refused him nothing. A safe house in downtown Bucharest, sixty passports bearing false names (several of the passports were diplomatic), [and] three rocket launchers with eighteen projectiles and Romanian-made remote controls. He was even given a bank account in Bucharest, number 471 1210 3502, opened by Anna Luisa Kramer (alias Magdalena Kopp), Carlos’s companion, at the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade” (John Follain, Jackal: The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist Carlos the Jackal [New York, 1998, pp. 131–132]. According to Mircea Răceanu, head of the U.S. desk at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, early in October 1980, during a visit to Bucharest, the deputy secretary of state, Robert Berry, warned Ștefan Andrei, the Romanian foreign minister, that the United States knew that the Romanian government had hired an Arab commando to liquidate Pacepa and that any attempts to implement this plan would have “serious consequences.” Berry asked Andrei to convey this message to Ceaușescu. (Mircea Răceanu, Infern 89 [Bucharest, 2000], p. 324.)

113.Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads, p. 177.

114.Dimitri Volgokanov, Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime (New York, 1988), p. 373.

115.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Middle East, Data as of July 1989.

116.Ibid.

117.According to the June 7, 1993, agreement originating from an Israeli private archival source which requested anonymity.

118.Ibid.

119.Ibid.

120.Andronic, 2010, p. 235.

121.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 137.

122.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 376–377.

123.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, pp. 190–204; see also Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Middle East, Data as of July 1989.

124.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Middle East, Data as of July 1989.

125.Lumea Magazin, Convorbire cu col. (r) Dumitru Burlan, “Eu am fost sosia lui Ceusescu.”

126.Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (New York, 1992), p. 279.

127.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, pp. 140–142, 148, 151–153.

128.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Israel, Relations with Soviet Union. Data as of December 1988.

129.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Israel, Relations with Eastern Europe. Data as of December 1988.

130.Victor Ostrovsky, The Other Side of Deception (New York, 1994), p. 215.

131.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 262.

132.Document from a Romanian government archive that requested anonymity dated August 20, 1988.

133.Document from a Romanian government archive that requested anonymity dated January 19, 1998.

6. THE MONEY TRAIL

  1.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 72.

  2.Ibid.

  3.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Trading Partners, Data as of July 1989.

  4.Ibid.

  5.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Retirement of the Foreign Debt, Data as of July 1989.

  6.Dennis Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, p. 67.

  7.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

  8.Ion Mihai Pacepa in Sorin Roșca-Stănescu, Autopsia: Demontarea unei înscenări securiste împotriva generalului Pacepa (Bucharest, 1998), pp. 335–336.

  9.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XVIII, p. 200.

 10.Radu Ioanid, File correspondence, Mioara Iancovici.

 11.Marius Oprea, Alya reflectat în arhivele securității, p. 8, Symposium, Diaspora Research Institute, Tel Aviv, December 2001. The document originates from the Archives of CCPCR/Comitetul Executiv nr. 264/7/18/2/1972/Stenogram of the discussion with Alexandru Drăghici, May 20, 1968.

 12.Ibid.

 13.Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fond Israel, file 221/1961.

 14.Ibid., file 220/1962; see also Romania-Israel, Documente diplomatice, 1948–1969, pp. 196–197.

 15.Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fond Israel, note 3770/3 IV, 1964.

 16.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 312.

 17.Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 235.

 18.MAE Archives, cable from Tel Aviv, no. 71.314 from 24/IV/1969.

 19.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 76.

 20.ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. 1, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al., 2011, p. 137.

 21.Rosen, Dangers, p. 217.

 22.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75.

 23.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VA, pp. 3, 136.

 24.Ibid., pp. 3, 125.

 25.Ibid., pp. 3, 168.

 26.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. VA.

 27.Ibid., p. 127.

 28.Ibid., pp. 296-295.

 29.ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. 1, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al., 2011, p. 374.

 30.ACNSAS, OVS, Dosar 2871. vol. XI A, Partea I-a], pp. 1-2, pp. 4-5, pp. 296-295.

 31.Interview with Phyllis Yadin, March 16, 2002; see also Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 75; Mihai Pelin, DIE, 1955–1980: Culisele spionajului românesc (Bucharest, 1997), p. 193.

 32.Archival document from ACMEOR/Shlomo Leibovici-Lais released to Radu Ioanid in May 2001.

 33.Document from a government of Romania archive that requested to remain anonymous.

 34.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 73.

 35.ACNSAS, Dosar 52873, Justificare utilizare valută. vol. 19, pp. 111-121.

 36.ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. I, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al., 2011, pp. 231-233.

 37.ACNSAS, Fond SIE, Dosar 3673. vol. 1, pp. 332-333, in Dobre et al., 2011, p. 235.

 38.Dobre et al., 2011, pp. 181, 185.

 39.Pelin, 1997, p. 84.

 40.Pelin, 1997, p. 89; CNSAS, Dosar D3447. vol. 39, p. 214.

 41.Pelin, 1997, p. 91.

 42.Ibid., p. 360.

 43.Hodor, 2014.

 44.Pelin, 1997, p. 112.

 45.CNSAS, Dosar D3447. vol. 39, p. 213.

 46.Mihai Pelin, DIE, 1955–1980, pp. 112–114.

 47.Ibid., pp. 113–114.

 48.Ibid., pp. 90, 114.

 49.CNSAS, Dosar D3447. vol. 39, pp. 213-15.

 50.Pacepa, Red Horizons, pp. 71–73.

 51.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

 52.Dan Badea, Averea președintelui, Conturile Ceaușescu (Bucharest, 1998), pp. 204–205.

 53.Ibid.; the photocopy of the original document is reproduced in the appendix of Badea’s book.

 54.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

 55.Washington Post, May 15, 1985, p. A1; see also Pacepa, Red Horizons, pp. 368–372.

 56.Benjamin Weiser, “Ceaușescu Family Sold Soviet Military Secrets to U.S.; Romanian Officials, Others in the East Bloc Arranged Arms Transfers,” Washington Post, May 6, 1990.

 57.Ibid.

 58.Interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003.

 59.Weiser, “Ceaușescu Family Sold Soviet Military Secrets to U.S.,” Washington Post, May 6, 1990.

 60.Badea, Averea Președintelui, p. 87.

 61.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 5, 2001.

 62.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 353.

 63.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Emigration: Problem or Solution? Data as of July 1989.

 64.Ibid.

 65.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Relations with Non-Communist States—West Germany. Data as of July 1989.

 66.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Emigration: Problem or Solution? Data as of July 1989.

 67.Whitney, Spy Trader, p. 182.

 68.William Totok, “România anilor 70: o imagine nefardată, Memoriile unui fost ambasador la București,” Observator Cultural, Erwin Wickert, Die glucklichen Augen. Geschichten aus meinem Leben, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt (Stuttgart-Munchen, 2001).

 69.Berindei et al., 2012, p.281.

 70.Archive ITS/Auswartiges AMT, Romania, Restitution, 2008.

 71.Pelin, 1997, pp. 84-85.

 72.William Totok, “România anilor 70: o imagine nefardată, Memoriile unui fost ambasador la București,” Observator Cultural, Erwin Wickert, Die glucklichen Augen. Geschichten aus meinem Leben, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt (Stuttgart-Munchen, 2001).

 73.Badea, Averea Președintelui, p. 99.

 74.Ibid., p. 88.

 75.TV Documentary: “Evil’s Fortune: The Fifth Estate,” Linden McIntyre, Robert McAskill, Canadian Broadcasting Company, 1991; see also Badea, Averea Președintelui, p. 96.

 76.Dobre and Banu, 2011, p. LXXIX.

 77.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa; see also Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 76.

 78.Badea, Averea Președintelui, pp. 96, 97.

 79.Ibid., p. 97.

 80.“Evil’s Fortune: The Fifth Estate.”

 81.Tom Shachtman, I Seek My Brethren: Ralph Goldman and “The Joint” (New York, 2001), p. 185.

 82.Library of Congress Country Studies, Romania, Emigration: Problem or Solution? Data as of July 1989.

 83.Document originating from a Romanian archive that requested anonymity.

 84.Badea, Averea Președintelui, p. 102, appendix.

 85.Pacepa, Red Horizons (1990 edition), pp. 432–433.

 86.Badea, Averea Președintelui, p. 97; interview with Liviu Turcu, August 19, 2003; Jurnalul National, May 11, 2004.

7. THE WASHINGTON EQUATION

  1.Library of Congress, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania–United States. Data as of July 1989.

  2.David B. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981–1985 (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 95–96.

  3.Moses Rosen, “The Antisemitic Tyrant,” Revista Cultului Mozaic, no. 685, February 1, 1990, p. 8.

  4.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 88.

  5.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, Tel Aviv, May 11, 2001.

  6.Rosen, Dangers, p. 245.

  7.Roger Kirk and Mircea Răceanu, Romania versus the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985–1989 (New York, 1994), p. 67.

  8.Ibid., p. 5.

  9.Ibid., prologue.

 10.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 88.

 11.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania–United States. Data as of July 1989.

 12.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 424.

 13.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 275.

 14.Nestor Rateș to Radu Ioanid, April 15, 2002.

 15.Rosen, Dangers, p. 246.

 16.Roșca-Stănescu, Autopsia, pp. 107–108.

 17.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 437.

 18.Rosen, Dangers, p. 253.

 19.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 425.

 20.Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds, p. 144.

 21.Romania: Human Rights in a “Most Favored Nation,” June 1983, a report by the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee.

 22.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Emigration: Problem or Solution? Data as of July 1989.

 23.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 502.

 24.Library of Congress Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Other Religions. Data as of July 1989.

 25.Ibid.

 26.Funderburk, Reds and Pinstripes, p. 90.

 27.Rosen, “Antisemitic Tyrant,” p. 8.

 28.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 555.

 29.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 68.

 30.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 626.

 31.Ibid., p. 536.

 32.Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds, p. 34.

 33.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 14.

 34.Library of Congress, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania–United States. Data as of July 1989.

 35.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 53.

 36.Ibid., p. 57.

 37.Ibid., p. 71.

 38.Ibid., p. 275.

 39.Ibid., p. 149.

 40.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 574.

 41.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 173.

 42.Ibid., p. 283.

 43.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 100.

 44.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 229.

 45.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 101.

 46.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, p. 251.

 47.Library of Congress, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, Relations with West Germany. Data as of July 1989.

 48.Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York, 1996), p. 476.

 49.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 104.

 50.Library of Congress, Country Studies, Area Handbook Series, Romania, The CSCE Meeting in Vienna. Data as of December 1988.

 51.Kirk and Răceanu, Romania versus the United States, prologue.

8. “WHY DID YOU DRAIN MY SOUL?”

  1.Ettinger, Blind Jump, p. 361.

  2.Ibid., pp. 361–362.

  3.Ibid., p. 379.

  4.Interview, Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2001.

  5.Gefen, Israel at a Crossroads, p. 166.

  6.Sachar, A History of Israel, pp. 982–983.

  7.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, p. 257.

  8.Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, “Buying Romania’s Jews, How Israel Ransomed 120,000 People from Ceaușescu,” Washington Post, January 14, 1990, p. B5.

  9.Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 178–179.

 10.Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance, The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the Jews Since World War II (New York, 1991), pp. 286–287.

 11.Ibid., p. 298; Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 448–450.

 12.Szulc, Secret Alliance, p. 305.

 13.Document from an Israeli archival source that requested anonymity.

 14.Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Ransom for Romania’s Jews,” Washington Post, October 20, 1991, p. C7.

 15.Ibid.

 16.Melman and Raviv, “Buying Romania’s Jews.”

 17.Ettinger, Blind Jump, pp. 376–377.

 18.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2001.

 19.Anderson and Van Atta, “Ransom for Romania’s Jews.”

 20.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, p. 606.

 21.Michael McFaul, “The Russian Graduate,” Washington Post, May 10, 2002, p. A37.

 22.Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians, pp. 610, 614.

 23.Ibid., pp. 607, 615.

 24.Melman and Raviv, “Buying Romania’s Jews.”

 25.Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 334.

 26.Library of Congress Country Studies, Romania, Emigration: Problem or Solution? Data as of July 1989.

 27.Interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, August 11, 2003.

 28.Silviu Curticeanu, Mărturia unei istorii trăite (Bucharest, 2000), pp. 96–97.

 29.Ibid., p. 102.

 30.Burtica in Rodica Chelaru, Culpe care nu se uită, pp. 89, 90, 215.

 31.Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations, pp. 34–36.

 32.Ibid., p. 67.

 33.Weiser, “Ceaușescu Family Sold Soviet Military Secrets to U.S.”

 34.Alexandru Bârlădeanu, Despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu, Convorbiri (Bucharest, 1997), p. 233.

 35.Interview with Shlomo Leibovici-Lais, May 11, 2001.

 36.Marius Oprea, Alya reflectat în arhivele securității, Symposium, Diaspora Research Institute, Tel Aviv, December 2001, p.8.

 37.Reuters, May 1, 1997.

 38.Ibid.

About the Author

Radu Ioanid worked between 1989 and 2021 as a historian and archivist for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. He is presently the ambassador of Romania to the State of Israel and lives now in Tel Aviv. Born in Bucharest, he was educated in Romania and in France. He has also written The Holocaust in Romania, The Iași Pogrom, June-July 1941, A Photo Documentary from The Holocaust in Romania, as well as the Introduction to Mihail Sebastian’s acclaimed Journal 1935–1944.