From
EMPIRE
to
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Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule

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To Avner and Yehonatan

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Contents

Illustrations

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Note on Transliteration

IN ORDER TO MAKE the reading for the nonspecialists easier, I used a simplified version of the IJMES transliteration system to transliterate Arabic and Ottoman-Turkish words. Most diacritical marks that are not on an English keyboard are not used. The following marks are used to indicate *hamza* (') and *'ayn* ('). For example, the word "history" is transliterated as *Ta'rikh,* the word "Ottoman" is transliterated as *'Uthmani,* and the word "Arab" is transliterated as *'Arab.* I did not use *h* to signal *ta marbuta* (*'Uthmaniyya* and not *'Uthmaniyah, Filistiniyya* and not *Filistiniyah*).

For Hebrew words, I used the standard transliteration system. For example, "the First World War" is transliterated as *Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona.* I used (') as *'ayn* in Hebrew as well. The word "immigration," for example, is transliterated as *'Aliya.*

For personal names in Ottoman-Turkish, Arabic, and Hebrew, I used the format that is most common within the context of the person and his background. Thus, for example, I used Cemal Paşa and not Djemal Pasha, Husayni and not Hussaini, Ya'akov and not Yakov.

From EMPIRE *to* EMPIRE

Introduction

ON DECEMBER 9, 1917, after a long and bloody fight between British and Ottoman forces, Jerusalem was conquered by the British. The mayor of the city, Hussein Selim al-Husayni, handed the British officers the keys of Jerusalem on behalf of the city's residents. Two days later, on December 11, General Edmund Allenby, the high commander of the British military forces, entered Jerusalem and thus brought an end to four hundred years of Ottoman rule over Palestine. General Allenby entered the Holy City on foot through the Jaffa Gate and was greeted by the elders of all of the city's communities and faiths, as well as by representatives of France, Italy, and the United States. He read a statement that was translated into six languages, in which he promised to preserve all of Jerusalem's holy sites, and to maintain the status quo under British military rule. The residents of Jerusalem, Jews and Arabs alike, welcomed the British forces who entered the city. Having endured much suffering toward the end of Ottoman rule of their city, mainly during the war years, they hoped for a brighter future under British rule.[1]

Allenby's dramatic entrance into the city of Jerusalem may be considered a turning point in the history of Palestine. In Palestinian historiography this moment clearly signaled the end of one period, that of "Ottoman Palestine," and the beginning of a new era, that of "Mandatory Palestine." In this historiography, the Ottoman and post-Ottoman eras are treated as two separate periods. Little attempt has been made to bridge them. World War I is usually treated as a separate event in the history of the region, which only emphasizes the gap between the Ottoman and post-Ottoman periods. The shift from one imperial rule to another has never been discussed as one that included continuities, and not only ruptures.[2]

This temporal divide within Palestinian history was one of the initial inspirations for this book. I was intrigued by this clear rupture and absolute separation, as well as by several questions that have been neglected in the historical research,

as a result of this temporal divide: How did the shift between the two imperial regimes take place? What was the significance of World War I in this process of change? How did people, who had lived all their lives under Ottoman, Muslim rule, understand the transition to British, Christian rule? How did the shift from one empire to the other affect Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Jerusalem? Was there a difference in the ways these groups dealt with the transformation? How did indigenous Jews and Arabs, who perceived themselves as loyal Ottoman subjects before (and sometimes during) World War I, cope with the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire? How did changes in geographical boundaries and urban space affect local identities?

This study focuses on one locale, the city of Jerusalem, in order to challenge this temporal split and explore the shift between these two regimes and historical periods in Palestine. I treat Jerusalem as a mixed city in a process of change, and at the same time view Palestine as a mixed locale inhabited by both Jews and Arabs. This book offers a "histoire totale" (à la Braudel) of Jerusalem in a period of crisis and change. While integrating Jews and Arabs into one historical analysis, this study also recognizes and investigates the differences *between* and *within* these two groups and their experiences, and examines the forces and dynamics that influenced them and the dilemmas they faced at this time of transition.

The chronological focus of this book is the years 1912 to 1920, a "twilight zone" of the Ottoman rule in Palestine, during which communal and national identities were renegotiated and reconceptualized as people confronted changing political and social realities. The year 1912 serves as a starting point because of the effects that the Balkan wars and the loss of so much territory had on the Ottoman Empire as a whole, and in particular on intercommunal relations within the Arab provinces.[3] It was during this period, just before, during, and after World War I, that complex and fluid forms of alliances between communities became possible. Hence, the British mandatory administration, which was established in 1920, following the military administration's rule between the years 1917 and 1920, fixed the national and communal categories in Jerusalem. Moreover, it was in this period that the future of intercommunal relations in Palestine and future relations between Jews and Arabs were negotiated, sometimes with the assistance, and sometimes the meddling, of foreign intervention. The years between 1912 and 1920, then, were formative years in the history of the city and its residents, but have never been investigated and studied together.

JERUSALEM ON THE EVE OF WAR

In order to fully understand the special nature of Jerusalem, it is important to first consider its demographic composition as well as its administrative setup and urban fabric at the eve of war. Despite the importance of the city, it is difficult to estimate the exact population of Jerusalem, and of Palestine in general, just before the war. For the pre–World War I period, the population of Palestine is roughly estimated at between 689,000 and 800,000 people. The main reason for ambiguity is the different data used for population and demographic analysis. These data derive from Ottoman censuses of different years, as well as from Zionist records, foreign travelers, and consular accounts, and later (1922) the British census. The Ottoman censuses included only the Ottoman subjects, Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike, and not the foreign subjects who also resided in Palestine. Zionist and other sources, on the other hand, offered different estimations, and were accused at times of exaggerating the number of Jews living in the country. Another factor that adds to the confusion and the difference between the sources is the ambiguity regarding the number of Jews, both foreign and those who adopted Ottoman citizenship, mainly between the years 1914 and 1916.[4]

The demographic figures for pre–World War I Jerusalem also vary considerably according to the sources used; they range between a total of sixty thousand to seventy thousand. Basing his estimations on Western sources, historical geographer Yehoshua Ben Arieh claims that in 1910 Jerusalem numbered seventy thousand persons, among them twelve thousand Muslims, thirteen thousand Christians, and forty-five thousand Jews. In 1916, the census of the Zionist movement counted twenty-six thousand Jews.[5]

This ambiguity reflects not only the difficulty in estimating the demographic composition of Palestine and Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period, but also demonstrates the sensitivity of demography, and demographic debates, in areas of conflict and national tension. Moreover, it highlights some of the legal and political divisions in Jerusalem and Palestine between Ottoman subjects and foreign nationals during the last period of Ottoman rule. These divisions and distinctions will be crucial during the war period, for example, when foreign nationals were deported from Palestine.

Following the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the mid-nineteenth century signaled the beginning of a period of major changes and transformations

in Palestine in general, and in Jerusalem in particular. Those included legal, economic, social, and urban changes that affected the city and its inhabitants. Jerusalem emerged during this period as a major administrative center in the Arab lands. An indication of its importance to the imperial center is the change in the city's legal status: in 1874 Jerusalem became an independent *sancak* (district), and its governor was put under the direct control of Istanbul. It was also the first Ottoman town after Istanbul in which a municipal council was appointed. This newly acquired status represented the growing political and religious interests of the Ottoman center on the one hand, and those of European and foreign powers on the other. The interaction between Ottoman policies and interests, foreign penetration and involvement, and the role of the local population in this changing reality, shaped many of the developments of the last decade of Ottoman rule, as well as the nature of intercommunal relations.[6]

When the last Arab Ottoman mayor of Jerusalem, Hussein (Selim) al-Husayni, was reelected in 1914, just a few months before World War I broke out, the city was a vibrant urban locale. Jerusalem served as a junction for religious, social, cultural, economic, and governmental activities, in which Jews, Muslims, Christians, and foreigners took part. The Jewish community consisted of Sephardi and Oriental Jews, as well as Ashkenazi Jews. The Christian community was divided according to several denominations: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic, Armenian, Copt, Ethiopian, Syrian, Anglican, and Protestant. Jerusalem had become the biggest city of Palestine and the political and cultural center of the country on the eve of the war. It differed in orientation from the coastal towns, such as Jaffa and Haifa, which were dominated by working-class associations, commercial and business concerns, and social associations.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the city consisted of "the Old City," a walled area that was divided mainly according to ethno-religious lines. This special division was based on shared features of the residents, such as common religion, ethnicity, or place of origin. Construction outside the city walls was limited. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that Jewish entrepreneurs began building houses and neighborhoods outside the city walls and started developing "the New City" of Jerusalem. The inhabitants of these new neighborhoods reflected the ethnic diversity of the city; Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians began to move outside

the walls and build there as well, though not in organized building projects or neighborhoods like those that the Jews constructed in this first stage of expansion.[7]

As the provincial capital of the independent *sancak* of Jerusalem, the city had three councils active in it: the municipal council, *Majlis Baladiya;* the administrative council, *Majlis Idara;* and on the eve of World War I the general council of the *sancak, Majlis 'Umumi.* The municipal council had already been active in Jerusalem since 1863, but its functions were regulated by law only in 1875 and 1877. From 1863 until the British occupation of the city, Jerusalem's municipality was headed by twenty-three Muslim mayors and one Greek Ottoman mayor. By the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the activities and responsibilities of the municipality expanded, and it was responsible for sanitation and hygiene; preservation of security; law and order in and around the city; the maintenance and improvement of infrastructure; construction of buildings; and the water supply, among other things.[8]

From its establishment until 1896, the municipality of Jerusalem was located in the Old City near the *saraya,* the government building that served as the center of administration of the city and the *sancak.* This building hosted the offices of the *mutasarif* (governor), the administrative council, the office of the *Tabu* (the land registry bureau), the office of the *nüfus* (population registry), as well as the police headquarters. In 1896 the municipality moved to its new location in the building of Hotel Jamal, at the corners of Mamila (Mamun Allah) and Jaffa Roads.[9] The area around the municipality, Jaffa Road, and down to Jaffa Gate became very important in the urban space of late Ottoman Jerusalem, and served as a commercial, social, and political center (see map 1).

A few months before the declaration of war, it seemed that Jerusalem was about to go through major changes for the benefit of its residents. On February 6, 1914, Mayor Hussein al-Husayni reported in a newspaper interview on the planned construction of a four-track tramway from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, and on his plan to illuminate the city with electric lights.[10] It was also reported elsewhere that the number of American, Russian, and Armenian tourists was very high during 1914, and that 850 tourists visited Jerusalem recently.[11] These are indications of the relative prosperity of the city in the period just preceding the war. However, the declaration of war on August 1, 1914, put an end to this and caused much turmoil in the lives of Jerusalemites of all communities.

Map 1. Jerusalem and Environs, ca. 1925 (reproduced). The arrows point to the Jaffa Gate; Damascus Gate; the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Quarters (the Armenian Quarter is clearly indicated on the map); the Holy sites; the Jaffa street; the municipality; and the public garden. *Source:* Jerusalem: Edition Joseph Levy Chagise, ca. 1925. Eran Laor Cartographic Collection, Jer 36, NLI.

THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF JERUSALEM

Jerusalem was, and still is, an important city to each of the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Its religious centrality enhanced not only its political and historical significance, but also granted it symbolic importance and meaning in the eyes of the three religions. Although many studies have traditionally focused on the religious centrality of Jerusalem and its influences, this book rather steers away from focusing on the religious and ethno-national categories and dichotomies, which, I argue, may potentially limit the boundaries and frame of the analysis in many ways. Part of the aim of this book, then, is to move beyond the well-known and often oversimplified religious categories of Muslims-Christians-Jews, or the ethno-national "Jews versus Arabs" dichotomy, and offer another form of analysis for this important and fascinating city.

However, one obviously cannot undermine or ignore the religious centrality of the city. The symbolic and actual place of religion affected the way the city was perceived and imagined by its residents, the various foreigners who frequented it, as well as by the Ottoman and British authorities of Jerusalem. The religious sensitivity of the city, hence, affected the way the city was ruled, administered, and thought about. When viewed as a holy city, Jerusalem holds multifaceted meanings to the three religions, and, not surprisingly, their interpretations of its religious significance differ.

Jerusalem was under Muslim rule for thirteen centuries, from AD 638 until 1917, with the exception of the Crusaders' occupation of the city between the years 1099 and 1187. Historically, it served as a site for Muslim pilgrimage, prayer, study, and residence. Despite the fact that it never served as the capital of Islam, Jerusalem is considered the third-holiest city in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. Its religious prominence comes from it serving as the first Qibla, the initial direction toward which the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslim community faced while praying. The direction of prayer later changed to Mecca. Another reason for Jerusalem's religious significance for Muslims is derived from its association with Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey to the city *(al-isra'),* followed by his ascent to heaven *(al-mi'raj),* both mentioned in the Qur'an (17:1) and in various *hadith* (sayings) of the prophet. According to the Muslim tradition, Prophet Muhammad was transported at night on a winged horse from Mecca to Jerusalem, where he led Abraham, Moses, and Jesus in a prayer. He then ascended to

heaven from the site of the Dome of the Rock. As Islam broadly acknowledges and accepts Jewish and Christian traditions and legacies, the associations of Judaism and Christianity with Jerusalem also resonate in Islam's connection to the Holy City as well.[12]

Jerusalem holds a central role in Jewish history and law, and is hence spiritually significant in Judaism as well. It is mentioned in the Bible by name seven hundred times, and by the name *Zion* (indicating first the Temple Mount, then Jerusalem as the capital city, and later Palestine as a whole) some 150 times. It served as the capital of the country three times; it received its special political status from King David and King Solomon, the latter built the temple on the site that was purchased earlier by King David and was called the Temple Mount (Har ha-Bayit in Hebrew). This is also the site the Bible refers to as the site in which Abraham was willing to sacrifice his son Isaac. In Judaism, Jerusalem signifies the political union of the country as its national capital, as the place for true worship of God, and, following its destruction, as a spiritual center that symbolized Jewish yearning for national and religious restoration. In addition to its significance for national restoration of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, Jerusalem also signifies a universal era of peace and justice, which is associated with the days of the Messiah.[13]

Many centuries later, following the first Zionist Congress in 1897, where the connection between Eretz Israel and Zionism was clarified and defined, Theodor Herzl became very aware of the sensitivity of Jerusalem and its holy sites. He was finally convinced of its religious and symbolic centrality for the Jews after his visit to Palestine in 1898. In order to respond to the political needs and religious sensitivities of Jerusalem, Herzl distinguished between old and new Jerusalem. He envisioned the Old City with its holy sites as a universal and international center, and viewed the new Jerusalem as a political, social, and cultural center for the new Jewish society.[14] During the sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, just one year before he passed away, Herzl reaffirmed the connection between the Jews to Jerusalem while reciting Psalm 137, "If I forget thee O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning." The affirmation of the connection of Jews to the historic land of Israel was finally made in 1905.

In Christianity, the holiness of Jerusalem originates from the belief that Jerusalem is the site of Resurrection, where Jesus Christ died and then rose from the dead. The Resurrection forms the core of Christian belief, and hence Jerusalem

is considered a center for Christian faith and religion. Jesus Christ spent most of his public life in Jerusalem. The traditional route to the site of crucifixion passed through the Via Dolorosa, which turned into a central pilgrimage site, as did the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, where Jesus is believed to be buried. The ongoing fight between the Eastern and Western Churches over the control of the holy sites, and mainly of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, continues to overshadow every aspect of Christian life in Jerusalem, and had much influence over Ottoman and later British policies toward the holy sites (as will be discusses in chapter 4).[15]

As will be further discussed in this book, the religious and symbolic significance of Jerusalem to the three monotheistic religions turned it into a politically, culturally, and socially sensitive locale for both the Ottoman and British authorities, and had much effect on the ways they administered and imagined the city and its residents.

A MULTIETHNIC EMPIRE: INTERCOMMUNAL RELATIONS IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND PALESTINE

Ottoman Jerusalem was home to Jews, Christians, and Muslims from various ethnic and geographical backgrounds, both indigenous and recent immigrants, holding either Ottoman or foreign citizenship. It was not unique in its composition of different religions, as religious diversity was one of the characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. In the Arab provinces and elsewhere in the empire, during most of the Ottoman period, religion, and one's affiliation to a religious creed, lay at the basis of each individual's affiliation to a broader community and served as the primary signifier of a person's identity. Religious affiliation and the collective sense of identity originating from it were nonpolitical, and remained as such until the nineteenth century.[16] The *millet* system was an attempt of the Ottoman administration to take into account the organization and culture of the various religious-ethnic groups it ruled. The system provided a degree of religious, cultural, and ethnic continuity, but also allowed the incorporation of these communities into the Ottoman administrative, economic, and political system. It was based on religion and ethnicity, which also often reflected linguistic differences. In the nineteenth century, as a result of institutional reforms, as well as internal and external pressures facing the empire, the *millets* turned into hierarchically

organized religious bodies with political functions, headed by a cleric who was appointed by the sultan in Istanbul. The three *millets* were the Greek-Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish. In Palestine, the Jewish *millet* consisted of only the Ottoman subjects, mostly Sephardi Jews, who served as the representatives of the Jewish community toward the Ottoman authorities.[17]

The challenge of how to handle religious diversity and possible intercommunal tensions in Palestine was enhanced by the growing foreign involvement in the country. The foreigners who entered the country—immigrants, clergymen, missionaries, or official representatives of foreign countries—created much suspicion among the Muslim population, who viewed them as representatives of European interests. The special status of foreigners, under the conditions of the *capitulations,* created a clear legal, economic, and social division between the indigenous inhabitants, Muslims, Jews, and Christians, holding Ottoman citizenship and those holding European ones, who won the protection of European powers. The Tanzimat reforms and the granting of legal equality among Muslims and non-Muslims were perceived by some of the local Muslims living in Palestine as possibly threatening their own privileged position in the judicial and administrative system. The Muslims, hence, perceived the non-Muslim populations in the country, who won the protection of foreign powers and had close relations with the Europeans, as a possible threat.[18]

Tensions between Muslims and Christians within the empire and in Palestine grew following various wars between the empire and European powers, as well as revolts and sectarian struggles such as the 1860 to 1861 turmoil in Mount Lebanon. The Ottoman-Russia war in 1877, which was followed by the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878-1879, had a major impact on intercommunal relations in the empire. The war resulted in the killing of two thousand to three thousand Muslims in Bulgaria, Serbia, and other areas in the Balkans, and in the forced migration of more than a million Muslims from their homes to the Ottoman area. The empire lost territories south and southeast of the Danube, which were populated by large numbers of Muslim-Turkish people. More importantly, it affected the empire's Christian-Muslim balance, as the Muslims became the majority in the remaining areas of the empire.[19]

More relevant to the period discussed here, the Balkan wars of 1912 to 1913 served as another traumatic event that had a major influence on intercommunal relations in the empire and in Palestine. By the end of 1913, following a process of

death and forced migration, Muslims became a minority in the Balkans, including in regions where they used to form the majority group. In the course of the wars, the empire lost nearly all its European territories.[20]

The empire's swift and dramatic defeat in the wars affected its Arab provinces on two main levels. First, it demonstrated the empire's weakness and isolation, and strengthened the belief among the Ottoman Arabs that the empire was no longer powerful enough to control the non-Turkish regions, thus accelerating the development of nationalism in the Arab provinces. Second, it enhanced the tension between Muslims and Christians, as well as between Ottoman Jews and Christians within the empire. Christians were suspected of being European sympathizers, and the Muslims blamed Europe for the war.[21]

At the same time, the rise of nationalism, both Arabism and Zionism, as well as Ottoman policy following the Young Turk Revolution, affected relations between Jews and Arabs in the country as well. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution raised many hopes for freedom and change within the Ottoman Empire. Many of these hopes were soon followed by a great feeling of disappointment, although the revolution also signaled major transformations within the social and political spheres in Palestine.[22]

The first wave of Jewish immigration *('Aliya)* started in 1882. It was followed by a second wave of immigration between the years 1904 and 1914, which was composed mainly of immigrants from Eastern Europe, including many of the foremost Zionist leaders of the time. In 1908 and 1909, following the Ottomans' suspicion that the Zionist movement sought to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine, the number of Jewish immigrants and land purchase were restricted. Despite this, Jewish immigration to Palestine did not stop. These two waves of immigrants were driven by Zionist ideology and subscribed to the ideas of economic, political, and cultural Jewish revival in Palestine. They joined what is known in the literature as the *old yishuv,* the indigenous Jewish community composed of Sephardim and Ashkenazim alike who lived in Palestine before 1882, and who partly (mainly the Ashkenazi Jews) lived on donations and charity from the Jewish Diaspora (Halukah). The new immigrants, who are known as the *new yishuv,* settled in cities and the newly established agricultural settlements. The Zionist movement in Palestine developed relatively quickly. It opened an office in Jaffa, and developed a large variety of social, educational, economic, and administrative institutions in the country.[23] This rapid growth, and the

increasing number of Jewish immigrants, created a deep sense of threat among many of the Arabs in the country.

The Arab nationalist approach toward Zionism changed in the course of a few years. In 1913, following the Decentralization Party (Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya), many Arab nationalists favored a certain kind of cooperation with the Zionists. However, in 1914 opposition to Zionism grew again, as can be seen in the local press of the time. The Arabs' arguments against the Zionists originated from what they perceived as a Zionist attempt to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Their arguments were mainly related to the separatist tendencies of the Zionist movement and the failure of the Zionists to integrate into the local population, to learn its language, and to adopt Ottoman citizenship.[24] Many of these concerns were expressed in newly established newspapers, such as *Filastin* and *al-Karmil,* which served as the main medium of communication during the pre–World War I period. When the war broke out these newspapers were forced to cease their publication, following Ottoman censorship.

On the eve of the war, then, people of diverse national, ethnic, and religious affiliations, who identified themselves as being part of various collectives and groups, interacted in the social and urban space of Jerusalem. Religiously, Jerusalem was composed chiefly of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, who were divided according to ethnic backgrounds and schools of practice. Legally and administratively, some Jerusalemites were Ottoman citizens and some were under the protection of foreign powers, an affiliation that defined their set of loyalties (such as Ottomanism, which reflected their connection and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire) and legal status. Some Jerusalemites identified with the political ideologies of Arabism (and later Arab nationalism) or Zionism, which affected their political and national outlook. As was discussed elsewhere, these sets of identification could have lived simultaneously with each other. Hence, until 1914, being an Arabist did not necessarily conflict with being a loyal Ottoman subject.[25] Similarly, as this book demonstrates, some groups in Jerusalem were both Ottomanists and Zionists. All these sets of loyalties and affiliations were flexible, complex, and dynamic, not static, and at times they overlapped.

In addition to the native Jerusalemites, other people were present in the city, including representatives of the Ottoman administration (and later military personnel), as well as other foreigners, including consuls and official representatives of Western countries, businessmen, missionaries, tourists, and later soldiers. The

outbreak of World War I and the changing political and regional framework complicated this dynamic composition of the city. It forced its inhabitants to face new challenges, difficulties, and realities.

In order to capture the moment of transition between two empires, as the title of the book suggests, I use the term *interimperial city* to describe this time of change in Jerusalem's history. Considering the stimulating work on the effects of colonialism and postcolonialism on urban locales, and the rich scholarship on colonial cities, one may wonder whether the city of Jerusalem can actually be considered an intercolonial city—a demonstration of a city's shift between two *colonial* situations.[26] However, is the colonial framework relevant for Jerusalem between the Ottoman and British Empires? Can *both* empires be considered as colonial entities? Not quite. Whereas there were many colonial features to British rule in Jerusalem, Ottoman rule in Palestine (and Jerusalem) was very different from European colonialism, and cannot simply be considered within the same analytical framework.

The question of the nature of the Ottoman Empire's rule in its provinces is a subject for much debate. Some of the questions asked in this context are whether the Ottoman reformers were engaged in a "civilizing mission" of the provincial local population, what the meanings of Ottomanism and of Ottoman citizenship were, and what the nature of the empire's modernization project in the provinces was. Such questions and many others are discussed in relation to various locales and contexts within the Ottoman framework, and the answers to them differ accordingly.[27]

If Ottoman rule in its provinces was a form of colonialism, it differed from European forms of colonialism in many ways. One important thing to mention is that the Ottoman Empire encouraged its provincial subjects to adopt Ottoman citizenship and allowed them to participate in the Ottoman and local political scene. Hence, the local population was involved in Ottoman politics, was elected to the Ottoman parliament and to local institutions, and could negotiate, as local Ottoman elite, with the central government.[28] Such was the situation in Jerusalem, where representatives of the local Jewish and Arab communities served in municipal institutions as well as in the Ottoman parliament.

The nature of a colonial city under Ottoman rule would necessarily differ from that of the European model. In his classic study on colonial urban locales, Anthony King defines a colonial city as "the urban area in the colonial society most typically characterized by the physical segregation of its ethnic, social and cultural component groups, which resulted from the process of colonialism. It is to be distinguished from the *ex-* or *postcolonial city,* the same urban area which results from modifications following the withdrawal of the colonial power."[29] Using Singapore as her case study, Brenda Yeoh views three main features that distinguish the colonial city from other cities. The first is the racial, cultural, social, and religious pluralism of such a city, which hosts a variety of people, including colonialists, immigrants, and indigenous. The social matrix of relations between them is that of domination and dependence. Second, the colonial city is also characterized by a distinct social stratification system, where race is a key factor that distinguishes between the "native" and the colonizer. Third, social, economic, and political power in a colonial city is concentrated in the hands of the colonizers. In her work, Yeoh is mainly engaged with examining the colonial city as a contested terrain of power, discipline, and resistance, involving both the colonialists and the colonized people.[30] Are some of these features suggested by Yeoh and King applicable to Jerusalem during Ottoman or British times?

The elements of political, spatial, and social segregation, as well as the impact of race on the matrix of relations between the colonizer and the colonized, may be considered in some cases within the Ottoman framework. However, in the context of Jerusalem many of these elements are not entirely applicable. Some basic problems ought to be mentioned in this context. Most importantly, whereas Jerusalem was indeed very ethnically, politically, and religiously pluralistic, the clear distinction between the colonizers and colonized is difficult in this city, as well as in other Ottoman provincial towns. The city's "nonnative" population included both Ottoman officials, who carried the same legal status as some locals, and representatives of European countries who were legally foreigners. Moreover, the emphasis on race as a key category is problematic in the Ottoman provincial case of Jerusalem. The spatial factor in the city will be discussed specifically in chapter 2, but it is worth mentioning that spatial segregation in Jerusalem, wherever it existed, was not based on racial or colonial lines, but rather on religious and ethnic ones. In fact, there was no correlation between ethnic segregation and relations of control and domination. Following these and other problems, the

Ottoman case may actually be better described, for example, as an "ambivalent colonialism," or as a "borrowed colonialism," a term coined by Selim Deringil.[31]

Moving to the British rule, several scholars have argued that Jerusalem may be viewed as a colonial city during the British Mandate. Jeff Halper, for example, examined the transition of Jerusalem between Ottoman and British rule and suggested that the city moved from what he calls a ritual city, a city that possessed mainly ideological and religious functions, into a colonial city following World War I. Moreover, he argued that it was a "quasi-colonial city" between the years 1840 and 1917, and turned into a colonial city under British rule. Its "quasi-colonial" nature derived mainly from the shared political power and administration of the city between the Ottomans and various representatives of European powers, who represented their "clients" among the local population of the city.[32] Another work that discusses the relevance of the colonial situation to Jerusalem is that of Ruth Kark and Michal Oren-Nordheim. The city, they claim, changed profoundly under British rule and became the capital city of mandatory Palestine. Following the British occupation several characteristics of the colonial city may be located in Jerusalem, among them physical-spatial changes, economic and social changes, as well as major changes in the city's administrative functions.[33] When briefly discussing the Ottoman past of the city, Kark and Oren-Nordheim argue that late Ottoman Jerusalem may also be studied under the framework of colonial cities, as it was greatly influenced by European powers and Western elements of planning, physical, and social change.[34] Several other studies focus on the spatial changes that the city has gone through following the British occupation, and mainly on the work of various town planners and their vision of modernity and change.[35]

Indeed, Kark, Halper, and others make a very strong and convincing claim for the study of Jerusalem in a colonial context during the British Mandate, and demonstrate its different characteristics as a colonial city. This discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this work. However, for the reasons explained earlier, I challenge their argument regarding the late Ottoman period, and argue, in light of recent works, that the nature of a certain kind of "Ottoman Colonialism" was very different than the paradigmatic European colonial experience, and needs to be contextualized and problematized according to the case under study. Jerusalem, hence, is treated here as in inter*imperial* and not an inter*colonial* city, a city that "changes hands" between two empires (as the title of chapter 4 suggests).

In the introduction to his edited volume *War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East,* Steven Heydemann points to the lack of research on how states and societies in the Middle East have been shaped and reshaped by their exposure to, and participation in, war making and war preparation. The study of war in the Middle East has been shaped mainly by diplomatic and military historians, and not by social historians or anthropologists. Research on wars and conflicts in the Middle East has not paid enough attention to war as a social and political process, he claims.[36]

Indeed, research that considers wars as processes of social change and examines their effects on cities and their residents has been very developed in the European context, but much less so in research that focuses on the Middle East. The two seminal volumes of Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert *(Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919)* are especially inspiring when thinking about the centrality of cities for the study of societies in war; the impact of war on social groups and identities; the changing nature of citizenship; and the importance of relief networks for the study of the experience of war. Understanding cities as "nerve centers" during wartime, claim Winter and Robert, will contribute to the understanding of both the urban and national history of a collective.[37]

What makes cities a good research site for the historian? Cities serve as sites of historical investigation because they unite diverse national identities, modes of life, and cultures. This diversity plays out in the city's streets and urban life, and turns the city into a dynamic, challenging, and intriguing site for examining questions of identity, intercommunal dynamics, and spatial changes. Moreover, as Winter and Robert demonstrate, cities can also serve as metropolitan centers and imperial meeting grounds. They see a close connection between city, nation, and empire, and claim that the boundaries between them were "porous in wartime."[38]

The study of Jerusalem demonstrates many of these points, but it also adds an important dimension to the discussion on the experience of cities and societies in wartime: the relational dimension. The city served as a junction for the empire and the local society, as well as a meeting point for civilians, foreign representatives, soldiers, and governmental officials during and following the war. It hence constituted a borderline between ethnicities, nationalities, cultures, and

periods.[39] To this diverse nature of Jerusalem and its communal complexity one should add another dimension, which is the sensitivity of the city on the political, religious, and symbolic levels in the eyes of so many—the city's residents, governmental officials, and foreign representatives. The combination of all these aspects makes the city of Jerusalem a fascinating case and offers a new and fresh lens not only to the study of Palestine during the transition between two regimes, but also to the study of the urban environment in Palestine.

RELATIONAL HISTORY OF A MIXED CITY IN TRANSITION

The most useful framework to uncover the complex dynamic of Jerusalem, and to scrutinize the challenges and developments in the life of Jerusalemites, is the *relational history* approach to the study of Israeli/Palestinian history. The theoretical foundation of relational history was first coined and developed by Perry Anderson, as part of his discussion of the future agendas of radical history. *Relational* history, he wrote,

> studies the incidence—reciprocal or asymmetrical—of different national or territorial units and cultures on each other. The overwhelming bulk of our history writing, be it radical, liberal or conservative, remains national in focus. These national histories can be compared. What is less often either attempted or achieved, however, is a reconstruction of their dynamic inter-relationships over time.[40]

In the Israeli/Palestinian context, this approach has been developed and incorporated in recent years by a group of scholars such as Zachary Lockman, Deborah Bernstein, Salim Tamari, and Baruch Kimmerling, among others. The basic premise of the relational paradigm in this context is the belief that the histories of Jews and Arabs in modern Palestine can only be grasped by studying the ways these communities interacted within a complex web of economic, political, social, and cultural interactions and relations. It examines the ways by which *inter*communal and, just as important, *intra*communal identities and boundaries were constructed and shaped in the context of the joint geographical locale and the common political framework in which Jews and Arabs lived. Examining the interaction and relations *between* the national communities, as well as *within*

each national group, and analyzing how factors such as religion, ethnic identity, or country of origin created complex webs of identification, aim at complicating and questioning the nationally based binary of Arab–Jew.[41]

The relational history approach challenges and serves as a critique of what Lockman calls "the Dual Society Model," which characterized much of Israeli historiography until quite recently. This model considers Jews and Arabs as two separate entities, with distinct and disconnected histories or experiences, whose limited interaction is only in relation to the political and military conflict. Communal identities are regarded as natural and primordial, which makes us lose sight of a complex set of relations, interactions, and forces that influenced the construction and development of identities.[42]

The relational model does not argue against the centrality of a national conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, but it conceptualizes the conflict as a dynamic process that involves these two parties, and sometimes (such as in the case discussed here) others as well. As Baruch Kimmerling argues, a historical and social study of conflicts is best done when treating the conflict as one methodological unit that includes all parties involved. This leads to an integrative and interdisciplinary approach to the history of Jews and Arabs in Palestine.[43]

This book treats the city of Jerusalem as its main organizing and uniting framework of analysis. When considered as a mixed locale in a process of transition and change, Jerusalem serves as a perfect site for examining the relations, the interactions, and the ways various communities and other actors present in the city dealt with the war crisis and the changing reality. By investigating the relations between Jews, Arabs, Ottoman officials, and other foreign representatives in the city, this book argues that intercommunal relations in Palestine (and in Jerusalem specifically) may and should be examined not only through the lens of the national conflict, but through other lenses as well.

My analysis is both on the *inter*communal and *intra*communal levels. Intercommunally, the book follows the ways the residents of Jerusalem faced the war crisis and coped with it, and studies the support mechanisms that they used. It also examines the role that the Ottoman authorities in the city, as well as different foreign powers (mainly the Americans), played during this crucial period, and analyzes the effects of their involvement. On the intracommunal level, this study breaks the broad ethno-national categorization of Jews versus Arabs into smaller categories, and argues that the transitional period between the Ottoman

and British administrations enabled various communal identities to be negotiated and different alliances between communities to form. To demonstrate this point, chapter 3 closely examines parts of the Sephardi community in Jerusalem and analyzes their special location as both Ottomans and Zionists in their own self-image. Doing that, the actual category of "Zionism" is complicated as well. It also follows the attempts made by the Sephardim, the Ashkenazi Zionists, and the British to distinguish between Muslims and Christians, and analyzes the reasons for such attempts.

The British strategy of distinguishing between the communities and organizing them according to religious-based lines signals, I argue, the end of the period in which fluid forms of identity were still possible. This moment of transition, between Ottoman and British rule, is therefore a rare moment of alternative configurations, one that has been overshadowed by the sharp divisions that followed. This moment also offers a different perspective to the one lived and experienced in Jerusalem today. Unfolding and complicating the common general categories of Jews and Arabs, then, sheds light on surprising alliances and conflicts *within* these two broad groups, and not only *among* them, as is commonly done. It also highlights the critical role of foreign intervention, governmental and nongovernmental, in forming local political alliances and shaping the political reality of Palestine at this critical and sensitive time. The integration of all these actors—the local inhabitants of the city, as well as Ottomans, Europeans, and Americans—into one historical analysis allows me to examine the complex and delicate relations between ethnic and national groups and, eventually, the evolving national tension between Jews and Arabs.

THE CHAPTERS OF THE BOOK are organized chronologically and move from the final years of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem to the beginning of the British Mandate. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the war years in Jerusalem from an *inter*communal perspective. Chapter 3 presents a close analysis of one community on the *intra*communal level, and examines its special location and characteristics. Chapters 4 and 5 move to British military rule and analyze the first years of British rule in Jerusalem.

Chapter 1 focuses on the war crisis in Jerusalem and the challenges that the war posed to the city and its residents. It follows the ways in which the various

communities dealt with the war crisis and looks at how the city functioned and changed as an urban locale. This chapter uses relief and support networks in order to examine intercommunal and communal dynamics in the city and explores the special role of America in relief efforts. The analysis of these networks reveals the changing power dynamics and foreign involvement in the local context of Jerusalem.

Chapter 2 continues the discussion on Jerusalem during the war from a different perspective. Its first section focuses on the public domain and discusses the ways public space in the city at a time of war was contested and used. Its second section moves to a careful analysis of the very private domain, by closely analyzing and comparing two diaries written by two Arab Jerusalemites during the war. Through a microanalysis of these unique firsthand accounts, I follow the ways one's affiliation to the Ottoman Empire was negotiated and thought of during this time of crisis and change. The analysis of the diaries unfolds the process of frustration and anger toward the Ottoman Empire and its representatives, and discusses, among other issues, the effects of the war on women and the connection between the urban space and the very private domain.

Chapter 3 focuses on one community in Jerusalem, the Sephardi intelligentsia. By analyzing the unique web of identities and alliances held by the Jerusalemite Sephardim, who viewed themselves as both loyal Ottomans and Zionists, this chapter explores how their location and identity affected their attitude toward future life in the country and relations with the Arabs. The analysis of the Sephardim reveals the internal fractions and tensions within the Jewish community, and the various stances toward Zionism and toward the evolving national conflict in Palestine. It also unfolds and complicates the category of "Zionism," and argues that there were multiple faces to this ideological stance. The case of the Sephardim demonstrates how seemingly contradictory layers of identity and alliances existed side by side in the context of late Ottoman Jerusalem.

Moving to the very beginning of British rule in Jerusalem, chapter 4 focuses on the moment of transition from Ottoman rule to the British military administration. This chapter addresses the internal process of negotiation among various British administrators, officials, and clergymen regarding the occupation of the city and its meaning, and also explores the dynamics of the relationships between the British and the local population. It highlights and questions the British policy of maintaining a status quo in the city and examines the basic premises of

British administration in Jerusalem, as well as their imagination of the city and its residents.

The fifth and final chapter looks specifically at the beginning of intercommunal rivalry among the city's inhabitants, following the Balfour Declaration and what Arabs viewed as the pro-Zionist policy of the British. By focusing on two central national organizations, the Muslim-Christian Association and the Muslim National Association, this chapter investigates the development of intercommunal tension in Jerusalem during the period of military rule, between 1917 and 1920, and demonstrates the shifting alliances between the various religious and national groups in Jerusalem. The period of military administration, I argue, signaled the end of the transition period between Ottoman and British rules, during which future national relations in Palestine were seriously negotiated.

1

Jerusalem During World War I

A Multiethnic City in Time of an Acute Crisis

THE SURRENDER OF JERUSALEM to the British forces on December 9, 1917, ended a period of great despair in the history of Jerusalem and of Palestine in general. World War I will be remembered as a dark period in the history of Palestine, a period during which people starved to death, were forced to migrate from their homes, and lost control over their lives and destiny. However, the study of World War I in Palestine has traditionally focused on the political and military aspects of the war, while neglecting an important dimension—that of the experience of civilians in war.

Indeed, wars can affect civilians and local populations on different levels. While examining the relations between war and social change, Arthur Marwick describes several areas of change. These include changes in social geography (population, urbanization, distribution of industry); economic and technological changes; changes in social structure and social cohesion (particularly with regard to national and racial minorities); and changes in behavior, in popular culture, in family relations, and, lastly, in social and political values.[1] Other scholars have followed some of these criteria while looking into the effects of war on gender relations, the changes in class structures and in the labor force, and the effect of diseases and famine on the population in war areas, as well as on questions of migration and immigration of populations.[2]

This chapter, then, aims at shifting the focal point from the politicians and the military commanders to the experience of Jerusalem and its residents during the war period, at a time of an acute crisis. In the division made between "home front" and "war front," developed following World War I, Jerusalem falls into the category of "home front," as it served only as a rear base for the Ottoman army

22

during most of the war, until the British troops reached the city in 1917. However, as we know from the European experience of the First World War, this division between "home" and "war" fronts was often rather vague, as this war involved civilians in a way that was not previously found. In many cases, the war came directly home, even though it really took place elsewhere.[3] As will be demonstrated here, these boundaries are also flexible in the case of Jerusalem, as examined by the experience of its inhabitants.

In an attempt to capture the experience of the communities who lived in Jerusalem (Muslims, Jews, and Christians), this chapter will follow the ways by which these communities dealt with the crisis caused by the war, check how the city functioned and changed as an urban locale, and what the effects of the war were on people's feelings of belonging to the Ottoman Empire. It will also follow various relief and support networks that operated in the city, both community-led and governmental/municipal-led organizations, and will examine what these networks can tell us about intercommunal and communal dynamics at this time of crisis. Welfare and relief work is viewed here as a way of investigating the complexities of social and communal hierarchies in Jerusalem, and of highlighting power dynamics in the *intra-* and *inter*communal level. It is also used in order to scrutinize the changing role of the United States in the development of the "politics of welfare" in the region.[4]

A MIXED CITY IN AN ACUTE CRISIS:
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY

The Ottoman Empire joined the war officially on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary on October 30, 1914. On November 7, 1914, the Ottomans declared that they viewed the war as a Jihad, a holy war. However, despite its claim of neutrality between August 1 and October 30, on August 2 the empire signed a secret treaty of alliance with the Germans for reciprocal military support against Russia. That very same day general mobilization was announced, first in Turkey and later throughout the empire.[5] Nevertheless, even in the period of neutrality the war was already felt in Jerusalem, as well as in the rest of Palestine.

One of the immediate results of the outbreak of the war in Europe was the economic crisis and the effects of the uncertainty of the situation on the financial markets. The banks stopped providing credit and stopped selling gold. On

August 6, 1914, the foreign banks in Jerusalem, including the Ottoman Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Anglo-Palestine Company, the German Palestine Bank, and the Commercial Bank of Palestine, published advertisements in *ha-Herut* in which they tried to calm down the worried customers who were witnessing the rapid economic deterioration in Europe. The advertisements stated, "there is nothing to worry about, and we have to wait patiently for the gold that was already ordered and will soon arrive in our city."[6] Despite this attempt to calm down the customers, the foreign banks were closed in August and the only bank that continued to operate on an irregular basis was the Anglo-Palestine Company. Despite the fact that it was under British protection, and following some diplomatic activity of the American ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, this bank managed to continue operating during long periods of the war, and managed to partially support the Jewish community in Palestine by providing it with paper money and credit. The special role of the bank and American involvement in its continued operations will be discussed later.

Together with the foreign banks, other institutions closed down, among them schools, relief organizations, and trade houses. All the public works that were taking place in the city at the time stopped as well, and the workers became unemployed. In October the foreign postal services stopped working, including the Austrian, German, French, and British offices. The only postal service that continued operating was the Ottoman one. One of the results of this was the almost complete halt in the delivery of newspapers from abroad and any piece of news from outside of Palestine, as foreign newspapers came to the country via foreign post offices. It created a feeling of almost complete isolation from the outside world.[7] This feeling of isolation from the world was also amplified following the cessation of the arrival of foreign ships in Palestinian harbors.

What added to this sense of isolation was the closing down of most of the Palestinian newspapers, both in Hebrew and in Arabic. The newspapers were all closed between 1914 and 1915, at different times and on the basis of different reasons given by the government. The Arabic newspaper *al-Karmil,* for example, was shut down in December 1914, and its editor, Najib Nassar, was arrested. This, according to the Ottoman authorities, was because of the anti-Ottoman and Arab nationalistic views that the newspaper expressed. Hebrew newspapers, such as *ha-Ahdut* and *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir,* were accused of Zionist propaganda and of publishing anti-Ottoman articles, and were shut down as well, *ha-Ahdut*

in December 1914 and *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* in November 1915. The only Hebrew newspaper that continued to function until 1917 was *ha-Herut,* the newspaper affiliated with the Sephardi community in Jerusalem. The newspaper continued operating until 1917, when its editor, Haim Ben-'Attar, was arrested by the Ottomans and later passed away.[8] *Ha-Herut* was thus the only Hebrew newspaper that was published regularly during the war. It is described as the only source of information that the Jewish community had about the outside world. However, it is also important to remember that the newspaper was censored by the government. The censorship may be what led to the patriotic and loyal Ottoman tone that the newspaper took during the war, although before the war the manifestations of loyalty to the empire were very prominent as well.[9]

The sea blockade had yet another grave consequence. Palestine, which grew cotton, grain, and citrus, used to export its surplus overseas and relied on imports to meet its food needs. When the sea blockade started, all supply lines were cut. Soon after the Ottoman government entered the war, flour prices began to climb. The stocks of grain that were on hand supported people for only a short period of time, after which the famine started to be felt throughout Palestine and Greater Syria, mainly in the cities. The harvests during the war were poor. In 1915 Palestine started suffering from locusts, which caused great damage to what was left of the crops. The famine as a major consequence of the war, as well as the locusts, created a challenge for the relief efforts in Jerusalem and elsewhere, as will be discussed.[10]

On October 1, 1914, before officially joining the war, the Ottoman government announced the cancellation of the capitulations, the privileges that foreign subjects enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire. Soon thereafter, however, despite the announcement, the Ottoman authorities tried to reassure people holding foreign citizenship that they could remain in their places and should not leave, and that the empire, which would now become their sponsor, would try to protect their security and treat them well. The cancellation of the privileges was a positive thing, claimed representatives of the government, because finally there would be full equality between all subjects of the empire, and all people living in the empire would be living under the same legal system.[11]

Despite these attempts to create confidence in the empire, this order created much panic and tension among those who enjoyed these privileges, the Christians among them, because their links with their sources of funding were cut,

and also because of anti-European demonstrations that began to be held in the city. Anglicans, being citizens of an enemy country, were advised to leave the city in September 1914, while the Ottoman authorities began seizing Anglican-owned buildings and possessions. The British consul in Jerusalem left the city then as well. The Greek Orthodox Church went into financial difficulties following the cancellation of the capitulations and the stop in the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and was forced to borrow money.[12]

Official foreign representatives left Jerusalem as well. The American consul, Dr. Otis Glazebrook, who stayed in the city until 1917, became the representative of British interests in the country and kept the remaining belongings of some British subjects. Most of the other foreign consuls, apart from the Russian and Spanish consuls, were deported in November 1914, and there was much speculation about whether the government would indeed deport foreign citizens from Palestine.[13]

CONSCRIPTION AND MOBILIZATION

Another factor that created great distress and affected life in Jerusalem during the war years was military conscription. The process of conscription was gradual, and so was the treatment of the Ottoman authorities toward the people who were supposed to be drafted. Mobilization of people into the army was announced throughout the empire before its official entry into the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Jerusalem, the first stages of mobilization won the support of most communities living in the city, as service in the army was viewed as a sign of loyalty to the empire. According to the military regulations, every Ottoman subject between the ages seventeen and forty had to serve in the army for two years. Some people, mainly students and teachers in governmental, religious, and some foreign schools, were first allowed to serve for only one year or were allowed not to serve at all.[14]

In the first period of mobilization, before the Ottoman Empire officially entered the war, signs of support of the empire and calls for joining the army were published in various newspapers and in advertisements throughout the city. An example of the manifestation of patriotism toward the empire could be seen on the first day of mobilization of Jewish soldiers into the army in August 1914. A big parade of the drafted soldiers took place in the streets of Jerusalem, which was

accompanied by a military band and some speeches. Some of the soldiers were reported as addressing Zeki Bey, the military commander in Jerusalem, saying how proud they were to serve the Ottoman homeland. Zeki Bey, in turn, thanked them and ordered the military band to accompany them in the parade through the streets of Jerusalem. Jews and non-Jews alike were reported as walking behind the parade and cheering the soldiers and the empire. One of the drafted soldiers, Itzhak Shirizli, addressed the audience in a patriotic and enthusiastic speech, and said in Turkish:

> Oh Homeland [*Eretz Moledet,* in the Hebrew translation]! Open your arms and receive your sons who sacrifice themselves for you. From north and west they come with no difference between religion and nation *(umma).* All the sons of the country realize their duty and happily fulfill their duty.
>
> The duties of the homeland are sacred in every country and language. . . . They come before every person's special needs. Today we leave our families and sons, and come [to the service of] the dear Empire.
>
> . . . From this moment we are not separate people [individuals]. All the people of this country are as one man, and we all want to protect our country and respect our empire.[15]

Shirizli, a Sephardi Jew, addressed all communities in Palestine, from all religious faiths, saying that the love for the empire was more important than national feelings and sentiments. Were these feelings of patriotism common to all religious groups in the city at the time? Were these feelings indeed authentic, or did they demonstrate forced support of the empire?

It seems that in this first period, these patriotic manifestations were shared by at least all Jews who held Ottoman citizenship. However, when the Ottoman Empire joined the war, and especially after Cemal Paşa, the minister of the navy and the commander of the Fourth Army, arrived in Jerusalem in January 1915 to command the attack on the Egyptian front, the pressure that came from the government increased. In this period we find more and more evidence for people's attempts to escape military service. One way of doing that was by paying the *Badel Askari,* a high exemption fee that could be paid by non-Muslims. The high fee created socioeconomic differentiation between those who could afford to pay it and those who could not. It is reported that some people had to use all their family's savings in order to pay the fee.[16]

Despite the initial call for all Ottoman subjects to serve in the army, regardless of religious faith, the government started differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims, putting its faith in the Muslims. Thus, the latter were called to serve in the front lines, while non-Muslims, Jews and Christians alike, were sent to work in the labor brigades. The soldiers were sent to work in the desert with no food and water, under very difficult conditions, and their work was described as inhuman.[17]

Attempts to escape from military service are described as extremely difficult. In January 1915 the government called up Jews, Christians, and Muslims, even those who studied or taught in schools, for service in the army. In his diary, Khalil al-Sakakini describes in detail his attempt to spend his military service in Jerusalem. He got as far as Rüşhen Bey, the military governor of the city, but when he realized that people would do anything possible to get away from their service, he decided not to lose his pride and gave up this attempt. When he went to the recruiting center, thinking that he would be drafted, he was told that the government did not want to recruit those who serve their country, and that he should stay close to his school and spend his military service in one of the hospitals. Despite this, after two months Sakakini was called again to the army, this time to serve in one of the labor units. Mayor Hussein al-Husayni, a close friend of his, tried to discuss this matter with Rüşhen Bey again, but was unable to convince him to allow Sakakini to pay the *Badel Askari,* and hence Sakakini feared that he was about to be deported from Jerusalem. In his diary, Sakakini claimed that he was suspected by the government both because he was a Christian and because he was the director of the al-Dusturiyya school, which preached Arab nationalism. Hence, he was punished by the government for being Christian and an Arab nationalist.[18] One has to remember that Sakakini was relatively lucky because of his connections in the city's local and governmental administration. Still, his case demonstrates the pressure that people in the city were put under in this period. It also touches upon the issue of identity politics, and how one's affiliation to a collective, be it a religious, national, or ideological affiliation, played a role regarding the question of military service as well.

The Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem did whatever they could to find those who avoided military service. Military policemen walked around the city and searched for draft dodgers and deserters *(Ferars).* People hid in attics and basements, in synagogues, mosques, and churches, hoping that the police would fail

to find them. Some managed to escape the city and hide elsewhere, out of the fear of being caught and drafted. The *mukhtars* and official representatives of the different neighborhoods in Jerusalem played an important role in this process, as they were sometimes bribed by the deserters, and, in return, managed to keep the policemen away from the hiding place of the draft dodger. Some people managed to stay in their hiding places throughout the war and came out only when the war was over. Those who were caught were brought to the military court and were usually convicted without a trial. The punishment was normally flogging.[19] The fear of the authorities, then, was common to most residents of Jerusalem.

The role of the *mukhtars* is interesting and demonstrates the limits of community solidarity at this time of crisis. The *mukhtars* were members of the local communities, yet their commitment to their communities was apparently questionable, as they were open to bribery in order to escape from army service, as described earlier. Part of their duty was to call people for military service. A note in Arabic from April 25, 1914, before the beginning of the war, signed by the drafting office in Jaffa, provided the following instructions to the *mukhtars* of the villages on how to draft soldiers: "You must open (the envelope with the names of the soldiers) and stick it to the wall of the mosque, and show joy and happiness and not despair and neglect. The soldiers should not wait, and you (the *mukhtars*) should tell them to bring food with them that would last for five days."[20] The *mukhtars,* then, represented the authorities to the local population, both in the cities and in the villages.

People who did not hold Ottoman citizenship were either called to renounce their foreign citizenship and adopt Ottoman nationality or were threatened with being expelled from Palestine. Among the Jewish community, Ottomanization committees were set up in order to convince foreign subjects to adopt Ottoman citizenship and avoid expulsion. Despite this effort, several waves of expulsion and forced migration took place during the war, mainly to Alexandria, Syria, and Anatolia. According to estimations of the Zionist office in Jaffa, around seven thousand to eight thousand Jews were expelled from Jerusalem alone, mainly to Alexandria.[21] The forced expulsions were mainly of people who held foreign citizenship, Jews and European Christians alike. Among the Jews, the majority of those expelled were Russian citizens. However, there were political expulsions, and deportations as well, of political leaders and prominent members of the different communities, including those who held Ottoman citizenship. The reasons

for such actions varied, but mainly it was because they were suspected of being disloyal to the Ottoman Empire and planning to act against it. Such was the case, for example, with David Ben Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, who were deported to Istanbul in 1915, as well as with Khalil al-Sakakini and the brothers 'Isa and Yusuf al-'Isa, the editors of *Filastin*.[22] Indeed, as Donna Robinson Divine argues, political status was among the major factors that conditioned the consequences of war on people in Palestine. The war affected Ottoman citizens in different ways than it affected non-Ottomans, and also distinguished between different religious groups. The factor of citizenship and political status played a major role and created different challenges for the various communities living in Palestine, as the cases discussed earlier demonstrate.[23]

Mobilization to the army seems like one of the most traumatic experiences of individuals during this time of crisis in Jerusalem. The centrality of it in people's consciousness is demonstrated by Najwa al-Qattan's analysis of the various meanings and implications of the term *Sefarberlik,* the Ottoman term for mobilization to the army (in Arabic: *Safarbarlik*). By using a linguistic historical analysis, she discusses the term and the ways it was used in Syria during and after the war. However, it can also be applied to the experience of the war in Palestine.

According to al-Qattan, the term was used in the official state discourse with reference to either the Second Balkan War or to World War I. In addition to its original meaning, this term received many more connotations following the war experience in Greater Syria. Such included bounty hunters who roamed city streets to catch young men evading the draft, the notion of forced civilian migration, wartime dislocation, and political exile. Used as a reference to the Great War, this term symbolized a local civilian catastrophe, a war at home, and is associated with hunger and misery. In the words of al-Qattan, "*Safarbarlik,* collectively remembered, has become a site of competing and contesting communal identities, claimed by many as a watershed if not a crucible in the history of the collective."[24]

How, then, did the Jerusalem's *safarbarlik,* the experience of Jerusalemites during the war, affect their communal identities? How did support and relief networks operate in the city? What was the influence of communal support networks versus intercommunal, city-led relief efforts on Jerusalemites and on the way they dealt with the war crisis? What were the forces that gained power and influence following the socioeconomic crisis?

DEALING WITH THE CRISIS: INTERCOMMUNAL AND COMMUNAL-LED RELIEF EFFORTS

The ways in which support networks and relief organizations operated in Jerusalem can shed light on several issues, among them the nature of intercommunal relations in the city and the growing involvement of the United States and its various representatives in internal affairs in the country. For this purpose, it is interesting to compare and analyze three forms of relief efforts that operated in Jerusalem during the war: intercommunal relief, which was led by the local municipal and Ottoman administrators in Jerusalem; communal-led relief, mainly among the Jewish and Armenian communities; and, lastly, American-led support.

Municipal and Governmental-Led Relief Efforts

On August 18, 1914, before the official entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war, the Jerusalem municipality held a special meeting to which all representatives of the various communities in the city were invited. The purpose of the special session was to discuss the crisis that the city faced following the outbreak of the war, and to discuss ways to assist the city residents. Zeki Bey, the military commander of Jerusalem, was the main speaker. He called for all the residents of the city to unite, regardless of nationality and religious beliefs, in order to cope with the crisis that the city was facing. At the end of the meeting the participants decided to address all communities and ask for lists of poor people, so that the municipality could help them as much as possible. On November 10, 1914, Zeki Bey is reported as addressing the Arab notables in Jaffa with a similar message. Internal peace and cooperation among the communities is one of the main conditions for victory over the external enemy, he said.[25]

Zeki Bey was the military commander of Jerusalem, and also, when the war broke out, the civil ruler de facto. He served in his position until mid-1915, when he was removed by Cemal Paşa and replaced by Midhat Bey. Zeki Bey was one of the people active in the municipal and governmental-led relief efforts for the residents of Jerusalem. He is described as being highly appreciated by Oriental Christians and Jews who felt secure under his protection. He did not make any attempt to incline the population on one side or the other, and was very popular among the inhabitants of the city, as well as among the consuls serving in

Jerusalem. He helped Jews who escaped from Jaffa and took refuge in Jerusalem, and also facilitated the departure of the expelled religious orders when those were compelled to leave by the Ottoman authorities.[26]

Another person active in the municipal relief efforts was Mayor Hussein al-Husayni, who was also involved in various organizations and efforts to ease the crisis on the city's inhabitants. Those efforts were organized by both the municipality and private initiatives of local residents, as well as by Ottoman officials, such as Zeki Bey and later Rüşhen Bey. The main challenges that these initiatives addressed were how to cope with the famine that was spreading in the city, how to fight the locust plague that attacked Jerusalem in 1915, and how to organize wheat deliveries from Jordan, issues that will be discussed later.

The emphasis that Zeki Bey placed on intercommunal cooperation in Jerusalem during this time of crisis is seen again in a joint meeting of Jewish and Muslim residents of Jerusalem that took place on November 24, 1914, in the Hebrew Teachers' College in Jerusalem. The meeting was organized as a result of cooperation between the Ottomanization Committee among the Jews and Zeki Bey, who sought to promote closer relations and cooperation between Jews and Muslims in Palestine. The meeting was devoted in part to the issue of Ottomanization, the adoption of Ottoman citizenship among those holding foreign citizenship. The importance of the meeting, as it was reported, was that it was the first time in which Jews and Muslims officially met in order to discuss the relations between them and the Ottoman government. Jews from all factions in Jerusalem, some Jewish representatives from Jaffa and some settlements, and Muslim notables all attended the meeting. Among the speakers were Eliezer Ben Yehuda, David Yellin, Saleh abd al-Latif al-Husayni, and Sheikh Abd al-Kadir al-Muthafer. Hussein al-Husayni, who could not attend the meeting, sent a note that apologized for his absence, greeted the participants, and wished the initiative good luck.

The chair, Eliezer Ben Yehuda, opened the meeting saying that this gathering, taking place in the midst of the horrors of war, was extremely important for the country and its residents. The meeting symbolized the realization of the Muslims regarding the importance of cooperation and of building closer relations between Jews and Muslims in Palestine. The Jews, claimed Ben Yehuda, have always realized the importance of such cooperation, and viewed themselves as united with the Muslims as Ottoman citizens. Now, he continued, the notables among the Muslims approached us (the Jews) saying that they have

objected to Jews who held foreign citizenship, and that the only way of getting closer is if all Jews adopt Ottoman citizenship. Building closer ties and cooperation between Jews and Muslims is necessary for our common good, as well as for the country and the empire, concluded Ben Yehuda.[27]

The next speaker was Sheikh Abd al-Kadir al-Muthafer, who declared that he was speaking on behalf of many of his Muslim brethren. He spoke in favor of Ottomanization of Jews, and for the study of Arabic and Turkish in all Jewish schools:

> Through these languages Jews and Muslims would be able to come together and unite. Muslims would benefit from the Jews, and Jews would find good neighbors in the Muslims. There is no extremism in Islam as there is in Christianity. Islam respects all other religions. This meeting should create unity. . . . The person behind this idea [of organizing such meeting] is commander Zeki Bey . . .
>
> We have a common destiny. If the enemy would claim our [Muslims'] property, he would claim yours [Jewish] as well. The same way we would protect our [property] and yours, you would protect yours and ours.[28]

The two next speakers were Muhammad Saleh Abd al-Latif al-Husayni and David Yellin. The latter addressed the audience in Arabic. Summarizing the importance of the meeting, Avraham Elmaliach wrote:

> It was the first time that the two peoples gathered to discuss their relationship. . . . Not less important was the educational value of the meeting for the Jews. Tens of years they have been living in Eretz Israel without realizing that there is another people living with them. . . . The Jews did not feel it and avoided the outside environment, not only because they [the Jews] focused on their self-development, but because the people of the book disregarded the people of the field and the desert.[29]

The meeting was supposed to be the first in a series of meetings among Jews and Muslims, to look into all the issues that needed to be addressed. However, shortly after this meeting, Cemal Paşa arrived in Palestine and, among other things, removed Zeki Bey from his post as the commander of Jerusalem. Following his removal, he was unable to continue with his initiatives. Zeki Bey was removed probably because of his popularity and good reputation among the local population in the city, and because of the general antinational policy that Cemal

Paşa began to implement in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. As part of this policy Cemal Paşa intensified Ottoman activities against Arab nationalists, as well as against Zionists, and the idea of creating cooperation between Jews and Muslims was discarded.

The meeting and the statements made in it are meaningful despite the fact that it had no continuation. Clearly, a major part of it was dedicated to the issue of Ottomanization, to the importance of loyalty to the empire, and to the benefits that Ottoman citizenship carried. It took place in a period during which Jews holding Ottoman citizenship, led by the Sephardi elite in Jerusalem, called on foreign citizens to waive their foreign citizenship for an Ottoman one. Shortly after this meeting took place, the Ottoman government began expelling citizens of foreign countries from Palestine. Moreover, the composition of the meeting of Jews and Muslims only, and the clear statement that its objective was to reach an understanding between Jews and Muslims, is significant as well, and reflects the tension between Jews (and possibly also Muslims) and Christians at this time. During this period, before World War I and during the war years, the Sephardi community in Jerusalem kept accusing the Christians in Palestine of inciting the Muslims against the Jews. This claim was based mainly on the articles that objected to Zionism that were published in the Christian-owned newspapers in Palestine. The Sephardi community in Jerusalem saw the Muslims as possible partners for the Jews in their efforts to cooperate and reach an understanding between them for the benefit of Palestine and of the Ottoman Empire. The speeches in this meeting serve as an example of this attempt at creating a Muslim–Jewish front against the Christians. Interestingly, as is seen in the preceding, at least one Muslim speaker cooperated with this attempt while highlighting the advantages of Islam in contrast to Christianity. These tensions will be further discussed in chapter 3.

Some intercommunal cooperation did take place in the city during the war, despite the failed initiative described earlier. An example for such cooperation is the Red Crescent Society (Cemiyet Hilal-i Ahmer), a Jewish–Arab relief organization. The Jerusalem branch of the Red Crescent Society was established at the beginning of 1915. Founded in 1877, the center of the organization was in Istanbul, with branches all around the empire. Its aim was to treat the sick and wounded and to relieve the suffering of people in times of war. The Red Crescent Society was composed of Ottoman physicians and nurses who treated

both soldiers and civilians.[30] It was established on the initiation of Zeki Bey; the honorary president of the society was the mayor, Hussein al-Husayni, and his deputy was Albert 'Antebi.[31] The members of the organizing committee were, among others, Yizhak Eliachar, a Sephardi Jew from the famous and influential Eliachar family, and Salim al-Khouri. In his memoir, Jawhariyyeh pays much attention to the fund-raising parties held by the Red Crescent Society. He describes the Jewish women employed by the Red Crescent Society who collected contributions for the society in these celebrations. Jawhariyyeh described these ladies as beautiful and tempting, and adds that they wore uniforms that they received from the army.[32]

There are numerous descriptions of parties and fund-raising events organized by the Red Crescent Society during the war. In one of the parties, held in the Notre Dame church compound, around fifteen hundred people participated. There were chairs and couches in the garden, and the stage was decorated with Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German flags. Among the guests were governmental and military officials; sheikhs; the consuls of America, Austro-Hungary, Spain, and Greece; the directors of banks; and Jamil Bey, the deputy mayor. Students from the Jewish and governmental schools greeted the guests and also performed on the stage. The contributions from this evening were all for the Red Crescent Society, it was reported.[33]

The municipality was actively involved in easing the suffering of people, but also tried to address certain challenges that the war brought about. One of those challenges was the locust plague that attacked the city in the spring of 1915. The locusts were not a direct result of the war, but they created more hardship for the city's residents, and also destroyed trees that survived the dry summer of 1914 and had not been used by the Ottoman army for fuel and heating. The locusts destroyed the vines, olive groves, and trees to such an extent that for two years after the plague there was no fruit available and sugar and honey were sold at very high prices. The lack of oil was felt mainly among the poor, for whom it was a major staple article. The prices of local soap increased as well because of the lack of olive oil.[34] The locust plague began in Egypt in the summer of 1914 and spread to Palestine. Wasif Jawhariyyeh recalls sitting on the stairs of the municipality, raising his head up and not seeing the sky or the sun because they were covered with locusts. The locusts also flew into houses and destroyed whatever they could find there, he remembers.[35]

Bazaar in aid of the Red Crescent at Notre Dame.

1. Bazaar in aid of the Red Crescent at Notre Dame. *Source:* Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Matson Photograph Collection, LC-DIG-matpc-08170 (LOC-P&P).

When the locusts arrived in Jerusalem, the municipality organized a special committee whose role was to coordinate the city's struggle against them. The government issued an edict ordering residents of Jerusalem between the ages nineteen and sixty to collect locust eggs for ten days and to bring them to police stations, where the eggs would be set on fire. Those who failed to collect the eggs were required to pay a fee of half a Turkish lira. It is reported, that between seven hundred to eight hundred people had to pay the fee. Many of the residents of Jerusalem took part in this collective effort to fight the locusts. Schools were closed and their students were called to join the effort as well. Each school was assigned an area where its students had to collect the locusts.[36] Avraham Elmaliach claims that more than fifteen hundred people joined in the fight against the locusts, and that within three days ninety thousand kilo of locusts were collected in Jerusalem alone.[37] The municipality managed to get organized and to engage as many people as possible in the battle against the locusts. This was a collective effort of all the residents of Jerusalem, and seemed to have united the people against one clear target.

However, it appears that the most acute hardship the residents of Jerusalem and of Palestine faced during the war years was the famine, and especially the shortage of wheat. As mentioned earlier, shortly after the war broke out, famine started hitting the people of Greater Syria and Palestine, and especially the residents of the cities. When flour and wheat became hard to find, merchants took advantage of the situation and raised their prices.

Linda Schatkowski Schilcher reports on two important steps taken by Cemal Paşa when he arrived in Damascus in 1915 and faced the famine. The first was to ban grain exports from the inland provinces of Aleppo and Damascus to the coast, because of his fear that grain moving to the coastal regions would not be marketed there but exported to enemy fleets that would offer good prices for the grain. The second step, which was also relevant to Palestine, was ordering the collection of the annual agricultural tithes not in money but in kind. Policemen were sent to "purchase" the grain at government-fixed prices, which were much lower than the prices in the free market. Producers started hiding their harvests, and even those who were still able to plant lost any incentive to do so because of the expected confiscation of the harvest by the government. The market was open to grain speculators on the one hand, and to private grain entrepreneurs on the other hand, the

latter serving as the sole authorized purchasing agents. In Jerusalem, the ʿAntebi family is mentioned as such an agent.[38]

In Jerusalem, as well as in other provinces in Greater Syria, the Ottoman authorities formed a grain syndicate, which was in charge of selling grain at fixed prices. The grain syndicate was supposed to purchase grain in Karak, East Jordan, and deliver it to Jerusalem. Various public figures in Jerusalem served as members in the grain syndicate, among them the mayor, Ertuğroul (ʿAref) Şaker Bey (who replaced Hussein al-Husayni after the latter was fired from the mayorship by Cemal Paşa), the Jewish Sephardi banker Haim Valero and his deputy, Hussein al-Husayni, and Ali Jarallah, who was a member of Majlis Idara.[39] The centrality of the districts of Karak and al-Salt as the main grain providers of Jerusalem represents the regional geographical changes that took place following the war breakout. If, before the war, Jerusalem was dependent upon both an internal supply from Eastern Jordan and an external supply from the sea, when the war broke out and the sea was cut off, only the land remained open as a venue of imports.[40]

In his memoir, Wasif Jawhariyyeh provides some more details about the government's initiatives of importing grain from Karak and al-Salt. Jawhariyyeh reports that Rüşhen Bey, the military commander of Jerusalem who was very influential among the Ottoman administration and was greatly appreciated by the people of Jerusalem, realized the suffering of people in the city and approached Hussein al-Husayni with an offer to import wheat from Eastern Jordan to Palestine. He offered this to al-Husayni because of the latter's high popularity among the city's inhabitants. Jawhariyyeh describes at length several trips to Karak in which he joined al-Husayni in order to arrange the import of wheat to Palestine. Because there was no bridge across the Jordan River, the wheat had to be transported via the Dead Sea. To facilitate this, al-Husayni became the contractor of a port that was built on the west bank of the Dead Sea. Jawhariyyeh does not refer to this project as being part of the activities of the grain syndicate in Jerusalem. However, it seems that it was part of this initiative, at least to judge from the involvement of Hussein al-Husayni.[41]

However, these government- and municipal-led initiatives did not seem to ease the suffering of people in Jerusalem, if one can judge from personal testimonies. In April 24, 1915, Ihsan Tourjman, a local Muslim resident of Jerusalem, reported in his diary that he walked with Khalil al-Sakakini to a bakery and

2. Department of Turkish military works transports a boat to the Dead Sea. On the sign above the boat, it is written *Quds Manzil Mufettişlik:* Jerusalem's inspector's residence. *Source:* TMA 4185, no. 33, Picture Collection, National Library of Israel (NLI).

spoke with the baker, who said that no dough or bread was available anymore.[42] At the end of May he wrote that there were hardly any vegetables in the market. He only saw some tomatoes and cucumbers.[43] More than a year later, in December 1916, he discussed the food shortage at length:

> I have never seen such a day in my life. . . . All [supply] of flour and bread had stopped. When I walked to the *manzil* [the Ottoman army's headquarters in the Notre Dame Compound] this morning I saw many men, women and children in *Bab al-'Amoud* [looking] for some flour. . . . I see that the enemy gets stronger than the *fellahin.* . . . How poor these people are . . . but all of us are miserable these days. . . . Two days ago the flour finished. My father gave my brother 'Aref one dirham to buy us bread. He left the house and looked for bread but could not find any. At the end he received some bread from our relatives. . . . The flour has finished in our country, and it is its main source [of food]. . . . Isn't our government committed to [maintaining] the quiet life [well-being] of its inhabitants?[44]

The writer keeps discussing the issue of inequality and the difference between rich and poor in relation to the shortage of supply. Most rich families have stocks of supply in their houses, he claims, which can last for a year or more. Even if those families do not have flour, they still have other products that can help them survive. "What will happen to this poor miserable nation," he asks. He continues criticizing the government: "Wasn't it the duty of the government to store flour so that it would be able to sell it during these days to the poor? . . . The government should wake up before the people revolt [against it]."[45]

Indeed, these signs of dissatisfaction, anger, and frustration at the government's negligence of its people during this time of crisis are very prominent in Tourjman's diary. The stronger his frustration toward the government becomes, the greater his ambivalence toward the government and the Ottoman Empire gets. The hardships and suffering, and what seemed to him the limited support that people received from the government, increased his animosity toward it. This important process will be discussed and analyzed in the next chapter.

3. Soup kitchen in Jerusalem during World War I. *Source:* World War I Jerusalem photographs, the Jacob Wahrman Collection.

Communal-Led Relief and Support Efforts

The Jewish and Armenian communities in Jerusalem offer two interesting cases for the investigation of relief and support efforts on the communal level. Unlike the vast literature that is available about the Jewish community, the story of the Armenian community during the war remains to a large extent uninvestigated. However, despite the imbalance in sources available, and despite the different challenges the two communities faced, in both cases the ways they handled the war crisis shed some light on internal tensions within the communities, as will be discussed.

The Armenian community in Jerusalem was, until the end of the nineteenth century, the third largest Christian community in the city (after the Greek Orthodox and the Latin communities). In 1910 it is reported that the community included around thirteen hundred members. Following World War I and the wave of refugees from Anatolia, the community almost doubled itself and was estimated to include 2,367 members (a number that is based on the British census and that contradicts much higher estimations that include the refugees as well). The core of the Armenian community was the Armenian patriarchate, the monastery, and the St. James Church, all located in the Armenian Quarter in the southwestern side of the Old City. The monastery was one of the largest (if not the largest) in the city, and was used to host thousands of pilgrims and visitors who arrived to Jerusalem. The patriarchate enjoyed fairly wide jurisdiction under the Ottoman *millet* system, and filled both religious and administrative functions. Other than being an important religious center, the St. James monastery also served as an educational and cultural center. During the nineteenth century the community established two schools, for boys and girls, as well as a seminary for priests, who also resided within the church's compound. The first printing press in Jerusalem was established in the monastery in 1833, and in 1866 a monthly publication, *Sion,* began to appear. Famous as merchants, many Armenians held top economic positions in Jerusalem, and also served as representatives of foreign companies and even consuls of Western powers such as Austria-Hungary.[46]

Following the 1915 atrocities in Anatolia, one of the main challenges that the Armenian community in Jerusalem faced was the arrival of thousands of Armenian refugees to Jerusalem, who settled around the Armenian Patriarchate in the Old City. It is reported that almost ten thousand refugees arrived to the

city, mainly women and children, as well as the teachers and caretakers of the children. The refugees who arrived to the city were destitute, sick, and homeless, and needed shelter and moral and financial support.[47]

The arrival of the refugees to the city divided the Armenian community in Jerusalem into two distinct groups, the native Armenian community, known as the *kaghakatsi* (of the town), and the newly arrived refugees, the *zowaar* (visitors). The refugees, who obviously did not come to the city driven by religious motivations but out of a desperate attempt to save their lives, differed from the native population in many ways. They did not speak Arabic, only Armenian and Turkish, had different customs and traditions from the Armenians who had lived in Jerusalem for centuries, and hence had few ties with their new environment.[48]

The relations between the *kaghakatsi* and *zowaar* are described as very loaded and complex. The refugees seem to have found the local Armenians to be more Arab than Armenian owing to their time in close proximity with the Arabs in Jerusalem (and Palestine). They also accused the *kaghakatsi* of being passive during the massacres of the Armenians by the Ottoman army, as the small Armenian communities in Palestine and Lebanon were not subject to the Ottoman policies of deportations and massacres during the war.[49]

Despite the tension, different accounts describe the ways by which the local Armenian community supported the refugees. Around four thousand refugees found refuge in the Armenian Convent of St. James, which opened its pilgrims' hostel and monks' quarters to provide the refugees with accommodation. The existence of the large population of laymen in the monastery transformed it, and changed the boundaries and distance between clergymen and laymen. The functions of the monastery changed and its communal and administrative work expanded to fit the needs of the refugees. Boys were placed in the seminary building within the Armenian convent compound, and an orphanage for girls was opened in the Greek Convent of the Holy Cross. Teachers took charge of the children and a kindergarten was organized for the very young. The refugees had to be clothed, barbers were called to cut their hair, and cooks worked at huge cauldrons to provide meals. Following the war, the refugees were assisted by the Near East Relief organization (NER) and the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU). By 1923, it is reported that the NER sheltered eleven thousand orphans in Beirut, Jerusalem, and Nazareth. Very few were adopted by local Armenian families in Jerusalem and many left the city.[50]

An interesting question that remains open has to do with the attitude of the local Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem toward the indigenous Armenians and the newly arrived refugees. It seems that in contrast to the extreme policies toward the Armenians in Anatolia, in Jerusalem Cemal Paşa's policies were actually tolerant toward the Armenians, both the locals and the *zowaar*. This tolerance is especially interesting when contrasting it to the harsh treatment of other communities in the city during the war.

Similarly to the situation among the Armenian community, the war revealed internal tensions within the Jewish community as well, which are reflected by the relief and support efforts. The Jewish community in Jerusalem was composed of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews from the *old yishuv,* as well as of a relatively small community of the *new yishuv,* which was affiliated with the Zionist office in Jaffa and with Zionist organizations abroad. The Sephardi elite tended to support the Zionist establishment, who managed to control most of the economic support to the city and to organize the main relief efforts. The Ashkenazi Jews from the *old yishuv* tried to continue supporting their community in the traditional ways of donations, basing the support on a religious basis.[51]

In the first stage of the war the Jewish community in Jerusalem organized independently and supported itself without outside help. The second stage lasted for about two years, from 1915 to 1917, when the American Jewish community started sending money and food supplies to Palestine. During this period the support efforts were organized mainly by the *new yishuv* and were focused on distributing and handling the American support. In the last stages of the war, following the entrance of the United States into the war, and when Otis Glazebrook, the American consul in Jerusalem, left the city, the support efforts became less organized.[52]

Avraham Elmaliach differentiates between the ways by which Jaffa and Jerusalem, the two main cities in Palestine, dealt with the crisis, and criticizes the *old yishuv* in Jerusalem for not being organized enough. According to him, in Jaffa the Jewish community was organized and responsible, and realized that in a time of crisis the community should unite and put all conflicts aside. The Jewish population in Jerusalem, he argues, and especially its religious communities, was at first indifferent to the deteriorating situation in the city and kept relying on contributions. There was no feeling of solidarity, claims Elmaliach, and the only community that tried to organize support institutions for the

population was the small community of the *new yishuv.* He also describes various cases of corruption, when merchants in Jerusalem raised prices of flour and cheated their customers.[53]

The institutions that were established in Jerusalem at the very beginning of the war, following the growing famine, were the tea and bread houses. These institutions, in which people could receive tea and bread free of charge on a daily basis, grew rapidly, and eventually started serving hot meals. It was reported that between three hundred and four hundred people used the services of these houses each day. Following these institutions a "Sustenance Committee" was established in Jerusalem, which was responsible for collecting food and money contributions for the tea and bread houses. This committee was established by members of the *new yishuv* and young members of the Sephardi community.[54]

The first institution that was supposed to unite all Jews living in Jerusalem was the Jerusalem Merchants Association, established in August 1914. The main founders were David Yellin, Albert 'Antebi, Yosef Eliachar, and Yehezkel Blum. It was supposed to cooperate with the Anglo-Palestine Company in an attempt to receive credit and checks from it, to help support the Jewish community, to buy cheap food products, to give loans to merchants and workers, and to help people search for working places. The idea behind the association was to create as many jobs as possible and try to develop a more productive atmosphere among the Jews. The association was composed of the elite members among the Sephardi community and the Zionist circles in Jerusalem. However, the Merchants Association was dissolved after a short time and was reestablished under new management, this time with the blessing of the *Majlis 'Umumi* in Jerusalem and with a mixed management of representatives of the city's institutions. The association's goal was to provide food and support for *all* residents of Jerusalem, regardless of religious faith, with the support of the government.[55]

One of the important institutions that continued operating in Jerusalem despite the war, and that played a major role in supporting the Jewish community, was the Anglo-Palestine Company. The work of this institution also reflected the growing involvement and interests of the United States in Palestine. In a period of economic crisis and high inflation, when all other banks were closed, the credit that the Jewish community received from the Anglo-Palestine Company gave it a significant advantage over other communities in Palestine.

The Anglo-Palestine Company was established under British protection in 1903 by a group of Zionist activists, headed by David Levontin, and opened its first branch in Jaffa. By 1915 the company had eight branches, including one branch in Beirut (which was closed only in the 1930s) and forty-five cooperatives. The bank provided credit and financial assistance to the Jewish colonies and to various associations and businesses, in an effort to economically support the Jewish *community* in Palestine and enhance Zionist work. It became the main financial institution for the Jewish colonization work in the country.[56]

Shortly after the beginning of the war, the bank started issuing banknotes as a consequence of the shortage of gold in the country. This paper money was circulated similarly to the Ottoman banknotes, and enabled some trade and exchange of goods to continue despite the economic hardships. In an interview with the bank's director, David Levontin, he recalls that in order to provide currency and help the Jewish community the bank issued registered checks, which would be paid back after their due date.[57]

The Anglo-Palestine Company was one of the foreign institutions that were shut down by the Ottoman authorities at the beginning of the war. In January 1915 the military authorities in Jerusalem ordered all people who held in their possession registered checks to present them to the local authorities. According to the instructions, the government's treasury would confiscate money from the bank's branches, and the company would be liquidated within ten days under the control of governmental officials. Branches would be closed and offices would be evacuated. However, the bank's directors got ready ahead of time and made sure that most of the cash and checks would not be found in the bank's offices.[58]

What also assisted the Anglo-Palestine Company was the pressure that the American consuls in Palestine and Istanbul put on the Ottoman authorities, owing to large deposits of American money in the bank, made mainly to Jewish-led relief organizations in Palestine. This interest is reflected in the numerous correspondences between the American consulates in Jerusalem and Istanbul and the State Department in Washington, which also discuss the future of American citizens' investments in the bank. The American embassy in Istanbul was requested to take all appropriate steps to postpone the bank's liquidation and preserve books and archives of the Anglo-Palestine Company in the interest of American depositors.[59]

The American support and pressure, together with the acts taken by the bank's administrators, contributed to the continuation of the bank's operations undercover throughout most of the war, and to the financial support and assistance it provided to the Jewish community. It reflects the deeper involvement that the United States had in Palestine. However, this was not the only support that was offered by the United States at this time of crisis. Another venue of support was offered by the American Jewish community, led by the Joint Distribution Committee for Jews Suffering from the War, which sent both food products and money to the country.[60]

The most important food delivery arrived in April 1915 with the ship *Voulcan*. The ship carried on it nine hundred tons of food. Fifty-five percent of its products were handed to the Jewish community, which distributed most of them to Jerusalem (60 percent), and the rest to different cities and settlements. The Muslims in Palestine received 26 percent of the products, and the Christians 19 percent. The Muslims and Christians used the products to support their communities in Jerusalem and Jaffa.[61]

The American consul Dr. Glazebrook was personally involved in the distribution of the food among the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian communities in Palestine. Each community had its own distribution committee, and Dr. Glazebrook received reports on their decisions and the people appointed to serve in them.[62] The distribution of food among the Jewish community in Jerusalem was organized by a committee that was composed of Dr. Glazebrook, David Yellin, and Dr. Yizhak Levi. This committee, *Va'ad ha-Makolet* (the Food Committee), which was elected after many disputes, organized lists of people and organizations that were in need of support, regardless of their affiliation to religious institutions. Among the Jewish community in Jerusalem, twenty-three thousand people and thirty-five institutions enjoyed the American support from this ship. However, the Food Committee was also criticized for not distributing the food fairly, and for selling wheat and sugar at higher prices than their prices before the war. The American Jewish community also delivered fifty thousand dollars, most of which was distributed in Jerusalem.[63]

The decision regarding the distribution of support is interesting, and brings to light the divisions within the Jewish community and the power struggles among mainly the *old yishuv* and the *new yishuv*. The idea behind the relief from the *Voulcan* is clear from the following lines, included in a letter that Consul Glazebrook sent to David Yellin regarding the distribution of the aid:

It is not like *Halukah*. . . . It is an emergency fund and would be administered independent of creed, race or nationality. Neither precedence nor prejudices will interfere with carrying out the wishes of the donors.[64]

The *Voulcan* shipment demonstrates the deep American involvement and investment in Palestine, and mainly the influence of the Jewish American community, which collected and organized the aid. Focusing on American involvement in the Middle East, Rashid Khalidi claims that at this point the United States was not a power with significant interests in the Middle East in general, and in Palestine specifically, beyond modest cultural, educational, and missionary concerns.[65] However, as the preceding cases of support demonstrate, it seems that at least during the war period the United States played a major role in aiding the local population, and mainly the Jewish community. This also demonstrates the influence that the Jewish Zionist organizations, mainly the Joint Distribution Committee, had on the American government. Personal connections between high-ranking American Jews and the US government helped in promoting the Zionist case as well. Judge Louis Brandeis, for example, used his personal friendship with President Wilson to encourage him to support the Jewish community during the war.[66]

The case of the distribution of relief had another long-term effect. Throughout this period, the Zionist activists in Palestine managed to gather the support and cooperation of other groups, such as the representatives of the Sephardi community, in the relief distribution efforts to the Jewish community. By doing this, the Zionist organization gathered more power and influence within the Jewish community, as well as in the eyes of the local and foreign authorities, and was able, at times, to play the role of a quasi state. This contributed to its growing strength in Palestine and abroad, which would be clearly demonstrated with the issuance of the 1917 Balfour Declaration.

AMERICA IN PALESTINE I: THE AMERICAN COLONY'S RELIEF EFFORTS

The American involvement in support and relief efforts in Jerusalem (and Palestine) did not end with the support offered by the American Jewish community, which was analyzed earlier. The American Colony in Jerusalem, established as

a cooperative Christian community in the city in 1881, was engaged in various philanthropic and charitable activities during the war years, and aided the local population of all communities. Before and after the war, its members were also very involved in the urban development of Jerusalem and took part in various projects that were organized by the municipality and the Ottoman (and later British) authorities.[67] During the war, the American Colony enjoyed a special status vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem, especially before the United States joined the war. Its members were able in many cases to use their connections with the local authorities, and within the leadership of the various communities, to support their charity work.

A central relief project that was organized and operated by members of the American Colony was the feeding project. The American Colony operated a large soup kitchen, which fed up to 2,450 women, men, and children of all communities in Jerusalem, who received a dish of soup daily. This soup kitchen was operated thanks to donations coming from supporters of the American Colony in the United States. In December 1916, for example, it is reported that the Colony received donations of one thousand dollars for the operation of the soup kitchen. The money was sent to the Colony through the State Department. Because of the good connections of the Colony with the Ottoman authorities, it was able to secure its property from the German military authorities, who wanted to confiscate it and threatened to exile all the members of the Colony.[68] The Khaskie Sultan (al-Takiyya) soup kitchen was operated during the war by the American Colony as well, and fed, according to reports, four thousand to six thousand people daily. This feeding institution was active also after the British forces arrived in the city.[69]

The American Colony also helped by operating two hospitals and a clinic, in cooperation with the Red Crescent Society, which treated 1,020 severely injured patients. In the hospitals, the American Colony had only one Armenian physician, it is reported. The Red Crescent Society is described as providing very good treatment to the sick and wounded.[70]

It seems that one of the main areas of involvement of the American Colony, under the direction of Bertha Vester, was in aiding women and girls. The effects of war on them were extremely harsh because of the mobilization of men to the war effort and the steep deterioration of the economic situation. Women had to sell their babies in order to support their families, or left their babies in front of

the American Colony because they could not support them anymore. Prostitution in the city is described as a growing problem, too: girls and women "went to the wrong with German and Turkish troops because they had not enough to live from," it is reported. In order to support women, the Colony operated a sewing room where four hundred women were employed in making garments. The American Colony Aid Association also conducted a school of handicrafts and dressmaking, whose aim was to help young girls support their families' income through handicrafts.[71]

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This chapter examined the effects of World War I in Jerusalem and the ways the city and its diverse population confronted this acute crisis. The war affected people in different ways. Socioeconomic status, citizenship (whether one was an Ottoman or foreign citizen), gender, and affiliation to different groups and organizations were only a few of the factors that influenced the way individuals and groups experienced the war. Following Steven Heydemann, this chapter showed the process by which the city's residents were shaped and reshaped by the war.[72] It explored the challenges that the city and its residents were facing, as well as three kinds of relief networks that operated throughout the war: Municipal- and government-led relief, communal-led relief, and the relief efforts of the American Colony.

The investigation of the relief organizations, the ways they operated and functioned, and the internal struggles that were part of their operations shed light on the ways in which Jerusalem, as a city, functioned during the war, the internal struggles within its communities, and the relations between the residents of the city and the Ottoman authorities. The significance of support organizations, I claim, is indicative of future political developments, both within Jerusalem itself and also in the larger Palestinian context.

It is worth emphasizing several issues while examining the government- and municipal-led support. First is the important role that several figures within the Ottoman administration in the city played in assisting the communities and the city to deal with the war difficulties. Such figures were Zeki Bey and Mayor Hussein al-Husayni. Interestingly, they were both removed by Cemal Paşa. Hussein al-Husayni was removed around June 1915 and was replaced by a Turk called

Ertuğroul ('Aref) Şaker Bey. The reason for his firing was possibly his affiliation with the Husayni family, an important family within the Arab political and social elite of the city. It is interesting to note that in 1914 Hussein al-Husayni received a promotion from *Rutban* to *Nişan* (military ranks), as a sign of appreciation for fulfilling both his civil duty as the mayor of Jerusalem and his military duties at times of war.[73] This suggests that al-Husayni was not removed from his post as mayor because of poor functioning as a civil servant but for other reasons. Hussein Al-Husayni continued to be involved in various projects and eventually, when the British entered the city, he was the one who presented the city's surrender pact while symbolically representing the city.[74]

Zeki Bey, who served as the military (and later civil) commander of Jerusalem, was removed from his post as well, probably following the popularity he gained among the city's inhabitants, and maybe also following German pressure on Cemal Paşa. According to one version, Zeki Bey later returned to Jerusalem as a civilian. When the British entered Jerusalem they arrested Zeki Bey and sent him to a prison in Cairo. The Jews staying in Alexandria as refugees helped to have him released from prison.[75] Zeki Bey was interested in creating better understanding and cooperation between the various communities living in Jerusalem, and was respected by the residents of the city.

By replacing them, Cemal Paşa opened a new era in the way the residents of the city felt toward the Ottoman authorities. His entry into Jerusalem, and the enhanced pressure he put on the city's residents, had a major influence on the way people started viewing their location within the Ottoman collective and their allegiances to it. The way the Ottoman authorities dealt with the crisis seems to have been dependent on individual officials and the trust that they won among the city's residents. Indeed, the popularity they gained among local Jerusalemites of all creeds, which may have posed a threat to Cemal Paşa, may have been one of the main reasons for their removal from their positions. The replacement of these figures, coupled with the harsh treatment by Cemal Paşa, created much ambivalence toward the Ottoman government and its representatives among local Jerusalemites.

Considering the communal support networks, it is clear that the war and the support operations on the communal level reveal internal tensions within the two communities that were examined, the Armenian and Jewish ones. Among the Armenians, the arrival of the refugees created tension between the local,

indigenous community and the newly arrived refugees who needed much support and assistance. The community helped the refugees, but it seems that they did not fully integrate within it, until this very day. Regarding the Jewish community, it was well organized and managed to arrange various means of support relatively quickly. However, when closely examining this process of communal support, the picture becomes more complicated. The process of relief and support networks involved many negotiations and internal struggles, and revealed tensions that had existed before but only surfaced at this time of crisis. These tensions found expression both among the *old yishuv* and the *new yishuv*, each of which represented different perceptions and visions toward future life in Palestine, and also in personal struggles among people within the same subcommunity. Dealing with the crisis also created alliances between the Zionist circles in Jerusalem, a relatively small group of people (especially in comparison to Jaffa), and the Sephardi elite in the city. The Zionist-Sephardi alliance was more successful than the *old yishuv*'s initiatives. However, it is interesting to see how the Zionist-Sephardi circles, who preached self-reliance, were heavily assisted by external help, mainly from the American Jewish community. This is important especially in light of the *new yishuv*'s criticism toward the *old yishuv* regarding its reliance on donations from abroad, the *Halukah* money. At this time of crisis, the Zionists did the same thing.

Indeed, it seems that this Zionist-Sephardi alliance created an alternative support network that replaced, or was in addition to, the Ottoman one, under the lead of the Zionist movement. However, in terms of affiliation to the Ottoman Empire as a uniting framework, it appears that, despite the crisis, the Sephardi elite in Jerusalem still viewed itself as loyal Ottoman subjects until a relatively late stage of the war. They maintained their unique identity in which Ottomanism and Zionism were intertwined, a process that will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.

Regardless of these internal tensions and fractions, the ability of the Jewish community to organize itself, whether by its own independent initiatives or with external support and resources (such as the one provided by the United States), is indicative of processes that took place in Palestine not too many years later. The ways the Jewish community confronted the crisis contributed to the Zionist movement's future success in the national struggle. The challenge of the war years was a difficult one, and the Zionists managed to do as much as possible to

organize themselves and reduce the misery and distress among the Jewish community. Part of their success in doing so was because of the financial support they received from the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which continued to operate throughout long periods in the war when other banks had long closed. The ability of the Jews to receive credit and monetary support for their activities played a major role in the community's ability to deal with the crisis in the most efficient way possible owing to the circumstances. A large part of the success was because of foreign aid, mainly from the United States. It is thus suggested that the Zionist movement's activities during the war paved the way for the role it would play in future political developments in the country. The first such dramatic development was, of course, the Balfour Declaration.

American support was not limited to the Jewish community only. As we saw, the American Colony was very active in providing aid of different kinds to the city residents, regardless of communal affiliation. This is the first instance in which we witness a deep and influential American intervention in the affairs of Palestine, which came to light in the form of aid and charity work. Involvement of a similar nature, as well as political intervention, continued after the war, with the work of the NER, as well as with attempts for political intervention such as the King-Crane Commission. This may be an instance in which we witness two kinds of welfare politics: global (American) and local welfare politics.[76] American involvement, especially that offered by the American Colony, may suggest a new kind of American Orientalism, a way of studying and investigating the Orient through the lens of nurses and charity work.[77]

2

Identities in Transition

Contested Space and Identities in Jerusalem

THIS CHAPTER WILL EXPLORE the process by which Ottoman identity and affiliation to the Ottoman collective were negotiated and thought of in Jerusalem during World War I, by examining changes in both the public and private spheres. Focusing first on the public domain, I will investigate the ways the urban public space was utilized, changed, and negotiated during the war years. Moving to the private sphere, I will then closely examine the ways by which the war affected people's identities and senses of affiliation to the empire. The public and private domains are related, as will be demonstrated in the following. Changes in public space and its uses also affected the ways people thought of the city, its authorities, their own position in it, and their own affiliation to various collectives. Space and place are considered here to be intimately bound with the constitution of social identities, and are deeply embedded in historical conflicts and processes, such as the war. Urban space is viewed not as a passive, fixed, or abstract arena where things simply "happen," but rather as a site of political action that involves conflicts over the meanings and interpretations of public space. History of people, then, is integrated here with history of place.[1]

Treating Jerusalem as a mixed urban locale, the first section of this chapter focuses on the uses of public spaces in the city, and on how the war affected these spaces and their usage. Places receive new meanings in wartime than they do in times of peace, writes Jay Winter; he gives as an example the way railway stations become a site in which identities are exchanged during wartime, when civilians wear uniform and turn into soldiers as they are sent to war.[2] In the case investigated here, some of the questions that will be addressed have to do with the use of public space in Jerusalem. Who used different circles, gardens, and public

buildings in Jerusalem before the war and for what purpose? How did the function and use of these places change following the outbreak of war? How did the presence of soldiers in the city change the urban environment? These questions will be explored by focusing on three such spaces: Jaffa Road, Jaffa Gate, and the public municipal garden.

The second section of this chapter will discuss the ways the war affected people's views of themselves in the context of the Ottoman collective. By a close reading and comparison of two diaries, those of Ihsan Tourjman and Khalil al-Sakakini, I will analyze in a micro level how the war, as well as local and regional developments, influenced these two individuals. Mainly I will focus on the ways Tourjman and Sakakini articulated and struggled over their location within the city and the empire. The diaries reveal the negotiation over multiple levels of identification, such as Arabism, Ottomanism, and local identities, and the ways they played out at this time of crisis. They also emphasize the connection between the very private feelings and contemplations and the external developments taking place at the time in Jerusalem and Palestine.

CONTESTED SPACE: PUBLIC SPACE AND ITS USES

As with other cities around the world, the city of Jerusalem had certain areas within it that can be described as political public spaces. What is public space and how can it be defined? The origins of the concept of public space can be first located in relation to Greek democracy and to the notion of the place where citizenship was practiced and debated, a meeting place that enabled citizens to interact and exchange ideas. In recent years, a growing theoretical debate has focused on the fundamental related questions of what are the meanings of "public," what makes a space "public," and what formulates "the public." Two of the questions that are being asked in this context are what a public realm is and what the relations between the public and government are.[3]

Henry Lefebvre's works on everyday practices of life and the social production of space are essential for any discussion on urban public space, the spaces in cities in which day-to-day activities are performed. Although the discussion on public space takes different directions and forms, Lefebvre emphasizes the dialectical relationship between identity and urban space, and provides a conceptual framework for understanding spatial practices of everyday life as being

central to the production and maintenance of physical space. Lefebvre's distinction between *representational space* (lived space, space in use, but also symbolic and imagined spaces) and *representations of space* (planned, ordered, and controlled space) is especially useful. Public space, according to Don Mitchell, often falls into the category of representation of space, but as people use these spaces they also become representational spaces. However, public spaces are also "spaces for representation," spaces in which a political movement can use the space that allows it to be seen and to represent itself to larger publics and audiences. Different social groups can also become public and represent and expose themselves through their use of public space.[4]

Public spaces gain symbolic, as well as practical, meaning throughout the years through a process of negotiation between different groups that try to utilize the space for their own purposes. Central to this process is the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion of different groups from the urban space. On the one hand, these groups can be those who challenge the state's authorities, including marginalized groups that use public space in order to represent themselves. On the other hand, it can be the state itself that uses the space for its own manifestation of power and authority. The practical and symbolic usage of a space, then, can be negotiated and changed.[5]

In an attempt to create a typology of public space, Fran Tonkiss suggests three ideal types of such spaces in the city. The first is the square, pubic parks, or green areas as sites of collective belonging, places that are provided or protected by the state and that offer equal and free access to all users. The second public space is represented by the café as a place representing social exchange and encounter, mainly among the bourgeois. The third locale is the street, which represents the basic unit of public life in the city, a shared public space that allows individuals to interact, on different levels, with others. The streets represent spaces that, theoretically at least, are equally accessible to everyone.[6]

Following this suggested typology, I would like to focus the analysis on several secular sites in Jerusalem (as opposed to religious spaces) within the city center just outside the walls, which stretch between the municipality, Jaffa Gate, and Damascus Gate and include the Russian Compound and the city park (see map 2). How were these spaces, Jaffa Road, Jaffa Gate, and the garden, utilized in the process of war? What were their different functions? Who were the people seen in the streets of Jerusalem at this period? What were the activities taking place in

the streets and the gardens? Who were the people participating in them, and how did these activities affect life in the city at this time of crisis? To use Lefebvre's terminology, these three sites can be viewed as both *representational spaces* and *representations of space,* as they were both controlled by the Ottoman authorities, but at the same time were also contested spaces that were claimed and used by different groups for different purposes.

The area of Jaffa Gate and Jaffa Road that connected the Old City with some of the new neighborhoods served as one of the major centers of the city during the last years of Ottoman rule. Jaffa Road is still central in today's Jerusalem as well. In 1914, before the war broke out, the area served as a lively commercial and social center, in which one could find many stores, banks, coffee shops, and a large public garden. In 1896, the municipality moved to its new building at the corners of Mamila *(Ma'mun Allah)* and Jaffa Road, and turned this area into an administrative center as well. In his memoir, Ya'akov Yehoshua described this area, between the municipality and Jaffa Gate, as *the City* of Jerusalem. The big merchant houses; the foreign banks and post offices, including the Anglo-Palestine Company Bank; the hotels; the consulates; and the coffeehouses were all located in this area, near the municipality. The shops, which belonged to Arab, Armenian, Greek, German, and some Jewish merchants, sold imported textile products and appliances and offered to exchange different mercantile products. The customers of these shops were both the local population and tourists. This is also where the first three photography stores in Jerusalem were opened. These stores, the hotels (Du-Park, which was later known as Hotel Fast, Lloyd or Jerusalem-Kaminitz Hotel, and Hughes Hotel), as well as the travel agencies, which had offices in the streets, all served the tourists who frequented this street.[7] This area was a mixed urban locale that served social, economic, and administrative functions for all of the city's inhabitants, as well as for its visitors. It was where people interacted and communicated.

The city park *(al-muntaza al-baladi)*, Al-Manshiya, was located nearby as well. Established near the Russian Compound in 1892, it served as an important site in the city's life during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and during the war, as will be examined later. First and foremost, it was a social space, a place of leisure, in which Jerusalemites as well as governmental officials and military personnel walked around while enjoying the music that was played there every afternoon on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. In the café, which was located in one of

Map 2. Jerusalem: Old City, City Center, and Jaffa Road, ca. 1917. Jerusalem, 1:5,000 (reproduced), Survey of Egypt, ca. 1917. *Source:* Eran Laor Cartographic Collection, Jer 334, NLI.

the garden's corners, people could drink coffee or cold beverages and smoke the *Nargilah*. But the garden also served as a political site. During the late Ottoman period, it served as a gathering place for government celebrations or announcements, as well as for demonstrations of all kinds. During special celebrations for the empire, a military band played in the garden as well.[8]

Jerusalem turned into a "front line" in the war and as an area of actual fighting only in December 1917, during the British occupation of the city. During most of the war Jerusalem served as a rear base for Ottoman, German, and Austrian forces that were sent to fight mainly on the southern front. The number of soldiers that were present in Jerusalem varied, according to the developments in the front lines. However, the presence of military forces was felt in the city throughout the

war and affected the dynamic within its public spaces. In the first stages of the war the Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem confiscated many buildings and properties that belonged to enemy countries, such as hospitals, convents, and various buildings that belonged to different missions. Most of the confiscated property was located in the area around the Russian Compound, close to the municipality and the Jaffa Road. The Notre Dame compound, for example, located across the street from the New Gate, became the main headquarters of the Ottoman forces. Many of the Ottoman forces were also located nearby in the Russian Compound, which included the military police and a military hospital (located in the building of the Russian hospital). The Ratisbon convent was confiscated and served as a military hospital as well. By focusing their forces around the Russian Compound, Jaffa Road, and the western gates of the city, the Ottoman forces created a kind of "territorial continuity" of their military headquarters and hospitals.[9] The condensed military presence in these areas, coupled with the centrality of this district in the administrative, mercantile, and social life of the city just before the war broke out, contributed to its importance as a political space during the war years as well.

Another important political public space in Jerusalem was Bab al-Khalil, Jaffa Gate, and the area just in front of it. Jaffa Gate serves as a good example of a contested space and demonstrates the flexibility of a political public space. It was a site for demonstrations and public hangings and became a symbolic gate for the city of Jerusalem, as seen in Allenby's well-documented ceremony in December 1917, which took place near the gate. Again, this area served different functions during the war years. Before the war broke out, this compound was crowded with people who were entering the Old City or going out of it toward Jaffa Road and the municipality. The area in front of the gate served as the "central station" of Jerusalem; this is where carriages and wagons collected passengers from. In the building outside the gate were workshops, shops that sold different merchandise, a bakery, restaurants, and cafés. Some of them were owned and managed by Germans.[10]

The most apparent building in Jaffa Gate was the clock tower. The Ottomans built the tower in 1906 as a present for Sultan Abdülhamid II, and, as other clock towers that were built in different locations around the empire, this tower too was conceived as a symbol of Ottoman loyalty, as well as of the spirit of change in the empire. The clock on top of it was considered the most reliable clock in town, and the Jerusalemites used to set their clocks according to it. Another symbol for Ottoman presence in the area was the *sabeel,* the public water fountain, which

was built near the Jaffa Gate in 1900 to celebrate twenty-five years of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II and that served the passersby. Both the *sabeel* and the clock tower were removed by the British governor of Jerusalem, Sir Ronald Storrs, in 1921 and 1922, respectively.[11]

The area around Jaffa Gate was used for different purposes altogether during the war. In Cemal Paşa's time, this area became a site for demonstrations, parades, as well as public executions. When Cemal Paşa ordered the hanging of people suspected as Arab nationalists, such as the mufti of Gaza, Ahmed 'Aref al-Husayni, the hangings took place at the entrance to Bab al-Khalil. Defectors from the Ottoman army were also hanged in Jaffa Gate. On June 30, 1916, for example, two Jews, two Christians, and one Muslim, all accused of defecting from the army, were hanged there.[12] The hangings were indeed public: in the photos that document them, one can see the hanged men dressed in white clothes, surrounded by Ottoman officers and soldiers. Behind them there are spectators who observe the scene. These hangings of political activists in the city gate served as a demonstration of Ottoman authority in the city, but also turned into very powerful symbols for Cemal Paşa's cruelty and abuse of the residents of Jerusalem, as well as other areas in Palestine and Greater Syria.

Jaffa Gate served as a place for other forms of political manifestations as well. During the war, several pro-Ottoman parades ended up or passed through the gate on the way from the Old City to the municipality area. Khalil al-Sakakini mentions several of them in his diary. He also describes a parade of soldiers who were recently drafted into the army that passed near the Jaffa Gate. The area before the gate was crowded with people who were waiting for the soldiers. He too was looking for some of his friends, to whom he wanted to say good-bye just before they left the city. For Sakakini and others, this area became a site for a collective farewell from the drafted soldiers.[13]

Another big event took place near the Jaffa Gate on December 1914. When the news came that Ottoman troops would pass through Jerusalem on their way to the Egyptian front, the Jewish Ottomanization Committee decided to organize a reception for those troops at the entrance of the Jaffa Gate. The committee decided that a special "gate of honor" would be built at Jaffa Gate, by Jewish carpenters and under the supervision of Professor Boris Shatz, the director of the Bezalel art school. The leaders of the Jewish communities and the heads of the schools in Jerusalem stood under two tents near the gate and greeted the soldiers

with special gifts. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian school students stood along the way that led to Jaffa Gate, waving Ottoman flags. Once the Ottoman troops, headed by the commander of the army, arrived at the gate, they were introduced to the representatives of the municipality and the different communities of Jerusalem, who greeted them warmly. The gate served here as a place of celebration and political support of the Ottoman forces.[14]

Utilized for both social and political functions, one of the intriguing and interesting ways in which public space, and mainly the public garden, in Jerusalem was used during the war years was for parties and celebrations. Some of these celebrations were to mark Ottoman victories (or claimed victories) on the battlefield, some to collect money for charity, and some to promote the government authority. These celebrations are mentioned and discussed quite frequently in Jawhariyyeh's memoir and Tourjman's diary, though from different perspectives. Jawhariyyeh, as a musician who played at many of these events, mentioned them mainly as part of his lively and vivid account of music and art life in late Ottoman Jerusalem.[15] Tourjman, on the other hand, described these celebrations much more critically, as decadent and immoral, and points to them to demonstrate the extent of Ottoman corruption and immorality. They raise Tourjman's ire and reinforce his growing frustration and antagonism toward the government, as will be discussed in detail in the following.

The analysis of public sites in Jerusalem serves to demonstrate how public space was contested and negotiated during this time of crisis. In the words of Henry Lefebvre, "Space is permeated by social relations; it is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations."[16] In Jerusalem, streets, gardens, and squares served multiple purposes, sometimes simultaneously, during this period of wartime and conflict. Hence, the city garden served as a place for leisure and celebration, as well as a site for political protest, and is described and remembered differently by people who used it. Jaffa Gate was used as both a political site for demonstrations (and hangings) and as a vibrant urban space for commerce and daily interaction between the city's residents. Indeed, spaces manifest in the broad social and political processes and serve to influence and shape social identities.[17] A close examination of Ihsan Tourjman and Khalil Sakakini's diaries, analyzed here, further demonstrates this connection between public space and the processes of negotiating one's identity and, in this case, detachment from the Ottoman Empire.

4. Scene inside the Jaffa Gate looking east. A postcard from the begin-ning of the century. Note the mixed style of clothes and the means of transportation. The hotel in the distance is Central Hotel. *Source:* World War I Jerusalem photographs, the Jacob Wahrman Collection.

CONTESTED IDENTITIES AND AFFILIATIONS:
IHSAN TOURJMAN AND KHALIL AL-SAKAKINI COMPARED

Considering his service in the Ottoman army and the meaning of his being a soldier and fighting for the Ottoman cause, Ihsan Tourjman wrote in his diary:

> Will I go to protect my country (*watani*)? I am not an Ottoman, only in name, but a citizen of the world (*muwatani al-'alam*) . . . Had the state (*dawla*) treated me as part of it, it would have been worthwhile for me to give my life to it. However, since the country does not treat me in such way, it is not worthwhile for me to give my blood to the Turkish state (*al-dawla al-turkiyya*). I will happily go [to fight in Egypt?] but not as an Ottoman soldier.[18]

Tourjman expresses here his profound frustration and anger at the way the Ottoman Empire, which he perceived to be *his* state, treated him. This entry reflects a deep sense of dislocation and alienation, and even betrayal from the collective to which he belongs, the Ottoman Empire.

Through the reading of Ihsan Tourjman's diary and its comparison to Khalil al-Sakakini's diary, and mainly by exploring Tourjman's depiction of local and regional developments, this section examines how Ottoman identity and affiliation to the Ottoman collective were negotiated and conceptualized in Jerusalem during World War I. The case of Jerusalem demonstrates what Jay Winter argues in the context of other cities: that identities on all levels—individual, local, national—overlap in times of war and become more significant than in peace times. The division between "us" and "them" is necessarily being made, but, as we will see in the case here, this division may also create much confusion and ambivalence.[19] The analysis of autobiographical sources illuminates and demonstrates the multilayered levels of people's identities and the ways they played out during the time of war.

The question of multiplicity of identities and the processes surrounding the negotiation among Ottomanism, Arabism, and local national identities at the end of the empire have been widely discussed in the literature.[20] As demonstrated by Rashid Khalidi, Ottomanism and Arabism lived side by side and allowed a wide and flexible range of identifications in the Ottoman context. Before 1914, Arabism in general did not imply Arab separatism and did not conflict with loyalty to the Ottoman state. Arabs saw themselves as belonging to the empire, and the differences between Ottomanists and Arabists were issue specific rather than ideological. Arabism at that time did not stand for Arab nationalism, and both Arabists and Ottomanists perceived themselves as Ottoman patriots.[21]

How did the war affect this complex identity? Several studies have discussed the effects of World War I on the consciousness of local inhabitants in Syria,

Lebanon, and Palestine, and on their sense of belonging to the empire. Tarif Khalidi, for example, suggests that the public hangings of Arab nationalists in Beirut and Damascus caused people to start questioning their affiliation to, and identification with, the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman wartime policies provoked sentiments of anger, resentment, and horror directed at Cemal Paşa. In this, Khalidi echoes George Antonius who, in *The Arab Awakening,* points to Cemal Paşa's acts against the Arabs—in particular the trials and executions of Arab nationalists—and considers them as the immediate reason for Sherif Hussein's declaration of the Arab revolt. Khalidi also identifies widespread feelings of apathy among the populations of Syria and Lebanon, which he attributes to the physical vulnerability of people subjected to famine and disease, as well as to a decline in religious belief.[22]

In his discussion on the formation of Palestinian identity, Rashid Khalidi credits the war as well. He attributes the collapse of Ottomanism as transnational ideology (and as a focus of identity) both to the defeat of the Ottoman army and to the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from the Arab-speaking lands in 1918. Regarding the war years, Khalidi further argues that the attitudes and identities of the local population in Palestine were transformed rapidly, but he does not develop this argument further.[23]

The case of Jerusalem during the war, as discussed on a micro level here, integrates as well as demonstrates the arguments of all of these scholars; but it also complicates them. The process described in the diaries is one of negotiation between possible conceptions and foci of identity and affiliation, just before the demise of the Ottoman Empire. It portrays the confusion, disorientation, and loss that some people experienced at this time of change and crisis. Part of this disorientation, I argue, derived from the replacement of local Ottoman administrators in Jerusalem, who were familiar with the city's sensitivities and its inhabitants, with "external" administrators in the first stages of the war. The external Ottoman officials were represented first and foremost by Cemal Paşa, who arrived in Jerusalem as the commander of the Fourth Army in January 1915. Despite Cemal Paşa's investment in the reshaping of the civil and military infrastructure of Greater Syria through the construction of roads, buildings, and the creation of educational and cultural institutions, he was known as a cruel leader who was behind the hangings of suspected national activists—Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem—as well as the deportations of foreign subjects or those believed to be a risk to the Ottoman cause. His arrival

and activities signaled for some Jerusalemites the beginning of this process of alienation from the Ottoman collective.[24]

The process of confusion and alienation analyzed here had several dimensions. Wartime economic and social crises, which were exacerbated by atrocities against the local population and changes in the Ottoman administrators of the city, intensified resentment toward the Ottoman government and its representatives. In some cases this increasing criticism of the government led to a growing feeling of detachment from the Ottoman collective, as seen here. This feeling signaled what Rashid Khalidi refers to as the decline of Ottomanism as a uniting transnational ideology.

Before the close analysis of the two diaries, it is necessary to discuss the value of a diary as a historical source, and especially the special nature of Ihsan Tourjman's diary, which is used extensively here. The 192-page handwritten diary was written in Jerusalem over a period of two years, from 1915 to 1916, when Tourjman was in his early twenties. Records indicate that Tourjman died in 1917, before he reached the age of twenty-five. Upon the discovery of the diary, the identity of its writer was somewhat mysterious, as the cover of the diary identified "Muhammad 'Adil al-Salih, from Jerusalem" as the writer, a man who appears to have left no other record of his life in that city under this name. However, repeated attempts to locate any trace of the writer leads to the belief that the writer was actually Ihsan Tourjman, the son of a clerical family who served in the Ottoman civil service and as translator in the Islamic court of Jerusalem. Tourjman served as a soldier in the Ottoman army under the command of Rüşhen Bey, and was based in the Jerusalem headquarters in the Notre Dame compound.[25]

Defining Tourjman's social group, I borrow Ehud Toledano's idea of "Arab-Ottoman elite," suggested in relation to Egypt. This concept highlights the links between the local (Arab) and the larger (Ottoman) context of the period under discussion. In the case of Egypt, Toledano describes a process of transition from an Ottoman-Egyptian elite (with strong connection to the empire but also a sense of local Egyptian solidarity), to an Egyptian-Ottoman elite toward the beginning of the twentieth century (when the Egyptian factor became stronger than the Ottoman one, although the links to the empire still existed). The demise of the empire turned this group into an Egyptian one, which underplayed and eventually erased Egypt's Ottoman past. The process described here may be placed in

the "junction" of the transition between what Toledano calls the "local-Ottoman" to the "local elite," as Tourjman's strong links and sense of belonging to the empire began to be shaken during the war, as will be demonstrated.[26]

Several leads in the diary identify Tourjman as a member of the Arab-Ottoman elite of late Ottoman Jerusalem. His social circles included such well-known Palestinian figures as 'Isaf Nashashibi and Mussa 'Alami, as well as various members of the Husayni and Khalidi families. He was related to the Khalidi family on his maternal side.[27] Khalil al-Sakakini, the well-known educator and intellectual, is frequently mentioned in the diary. Tourjman studied in al-Sakakini's school al-Dusturiyyah in 1909, and al-Sakakini became his mentor and close friend. The writer seems to have spent much time with him—in his house, school, and elsewhere in Jerusalem. Sakakini's diary writing may have been Tourjman's inspiration in writing his own diary.[28]

Although this diary represents a testimony of a single individual at a specific interval, I do not view it as merely a personal account, but rather as a source that can shed light on the larger social group to which the writer belonged. Because he acted in a specific social and political context, his personal views and dilemmas may reflect his larger environment as well. Such treatment of the diary is methodologically consistent with the prevalent academic practice that regards personal narratives and autobiographies as sources for social history.[29] For the analysis of the diary discussed here, I adopt Edmund Burke III's use of the term *social biography,* which views biography as reflecting the social process and cultural interaction that an individual is experiencing. Burke views social biographies as alternative ways to analyze historical processes, while putting the lives of ordinary people in the center of attention.[30]

Although Tourjman does not fully fit into Burke's category of "ordinary people"—nonelite who are not part of the official, military, or intellectual circles—his testimony still represents a very unique and valuable autobiographic source, given the lack of documentation on the Arab experience of wartime Jerusalem. It provides a very rich and vivid description of Jerusalem and the events that took place not only in the writer's life, but also in the urban environment of the city. In what follows I will focus on the writer's process of identity contemplation as it unfolds throughout the diary, by examining three central themes: wartime conditions in Jerusalem as experienced by residents; the condition of

women and their treatment by Ottoman officials in the city; and, finally, the political changes that took place in the region and the ways they influenced the writer and his sense of affiliation to the empire. In order to connect the diary to its broader context, I will briefly compare Tourjman's diary and the picture that it paints to al-Sakakini's diary. Such a comparison shows that the issues that consumed and upset Tourjman occupied the minds of other members of his community as well and were not unique to him.

WARTIME JERUSALEM THROUGH THE EYES OF TOURJMAN

Tourjman described at length the impact of the war and the hardships it brought to the city, and often referred to food shortages and harsh treatment at the hands of some government officials. In his April 24, 1915, entry Tourjman reported that he and Khalil al-Sakakini had learned from a baker that bread was no longer available. At the end of May he wrote that there were hardly any vegetables in the market—only a few tomatoes and cucumbers.[31] His diary reflects a direct connection between the shortage of food and the hardships of the war. It also protests the Ottoman government's neglect of its subjects. This connection is very clear in a December 1916 entry:

> I have never seen such a day in my life.... All [supply] of flour and bread stopped. When I walked to the *manzil* [the Ottoman army's headquarters in the Notre Dame compound] this morning I saw many men, women and children in *Bab al-'Amoud* [looking] for some flour.... I see that the enemy gets stronger than the *fellahin*.... How poor these people are . . . but all of us are miserable these days.... Two days ago we ran out of flour. My father gave my brother 'Aref one dirham to buy us bread. He left the house and looked for bread but could not find any. At the end he received some bread for our relatives.... The flour has finished in our country, and it is its main source [of food].... Isn't our government committed to [maintaining] the quiet life [well-being] of inhabitants?[32]

Tourjman was very aware that the burden of hunger and misery fell most heavily on the poor. He claimed that the rich families had stocks large enough to last them a year or longer and asked about the fate of the poor and miserable. Yet he addressed his most vehement blame to the government: "Wasn't it the duty of the government to store flour so that it would be able to sell it during these

difficult days to the poor? The government should wake up before the people revolt [against it]," he wrote.[33]

These indications of dissatisfaction, anger, and frustration at the government's neglect during this time of crisis are very prominent throughout the diary, as well as in other sources. Bahjat and Tamimi, for example, expressed similar criticism toward the Ottoman government and its local representatives in the province of Beirut in their report. They criticized the neglect of the population, the victims of the war, and the corruption of the local Ottoman bureaucrats. However, unlike Tourjman, they continued to express their unconditional loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and to the Ottoman framework, even after viewing the effects of the war on the local population. Among the multiple identities that they held, the Ottoman component was probably still the most dominant one.[34] Unlike them, Tourjman's frustration with the government's policies will translate later into a growing animosity, not only toward the government and its representatives, but toward Ottoman rule as a whole. This frustration led him to question his own affiliation and sense of solidarity with the empire.

The celebrations that took place in Jerusalem, which were mentioned earlier, serve for Tourjman as a reinforcement of the immoral behavior and corruption of some Ottoman officials in the city. On April 26, 1915, for example, Tourjman described a celebration that took place in Jerusalem in honor of an unspecified holiday *('id)*:[35]

> The city today is decorated in the most beautiful way. All the shops *(mahalat)* are lighted up in celebration of this holiday. Wouldn't it be better if the government didn't celebrate and [instead] mourned together with its subjects? Wouldn't it be better to spend this money on the poor and the miserable? This evening, many beautiful women *(jami'a al-saidat al-jamilat)* from Jerusalem participated in the celebration. There were beverages *(mashrubat)* [probably alcoholic] for everyone and music . . . but that wasn't enough, because they invited prostitutes from Jerusalem *(mumisat al-Quds)* to attend this celebration. And I was told that there were more than fifty known prostitutes [present] that night. Every officer or amir or pasha took either one or two or more women and walked in the garden. . . . The men are telling secrets of the state to these women without noticing, because they are drunk. . . . The days of happiness change to sadness, and the days of sadness change to happiness . . . when we are happy we think about our brothers the Turks in the Dardanelles front.[36]

The writer's attitude toward the government in light of such celebrations is noteworthy. The celebration of April 1915 happened to coincide with the locust attack on Jerusalem, which may explain his bitterness, anger, and frustration. These complaints regarding the government's disinterest in the poor are repeated in other places in the diary and grow harsher as the war continues. Yet despite his alienation from the government, he sympathized with the Ottoman soldiers fighting on the front, and referred to them as *his brothers* the Turks; after all, he was a soldier, too. Later in the diary, as his resentment toward the empire grew, he no longer referred to his fellow soldiers in such a sympathetic way.

Another example of Tourjman's criticism of the government appears in an entry on July 27, 1915. While referring to German victories in the war and the Ottoman government's celebration of them, he wrote:

> Whenever Germany wins we are happy, but we [the Ottoman forces] never win. It is always our allies, the Germans [that win], and whenever they win we are happy. When the Germans win, the government decorates the streets and celebrates. This time the streets are even more decorated than [they were] the day we entered Egypt. Instead of being happy we should cry and we should be aware of what is good for the nation *(umma)* and the country. Instead of celebrating we should think about something that will bring success back to us, and improve our situation in the world. We should think about the social situation these days and the situation of the poor. That night [of the celebration] we have spent all this money while the poor need help and support. Instead of wasting our money on candles and fireworks, we should have spent the money on charity. But who should we complain to, we should cry and weep about our problems and hardships.[37]

The anger at the way the government spent money on celebrations at the expense of its obligations toward the poor is very clear here. The first priority of the government was not the well-being of its subjects, Tourjman lamented. His frustration is aggravated by the fact that government officials celebrated German rather than Ottoman victories. Again, there is some ambivalence in his approach. On the one hand, he harshly criticized the government, but on the other, he still referred to himself as part of the Ottoman collective. He used the first plural form in his writing ("we," "us"), which suggests that he still viewed himself as a loyal subject, part of the Ottoman collective.

WOMEN, WAR, AND THE CITY

As the description of the party indicates, the situation of women was an issue that bothered Tourjman, and contributed to his ongoing criticism and frustration with the Ottoman authorities. Women are yet another undocumented group in the history of wartime Jerusalem, and wartime Palestine in general, and hence Tourjman's contribution on women's condition, and his special focus on the phenomenon of prostitution, is important.

Literature on the European experience of World War I, and the effects of the war on the civil population, discusses the role that women played throughout the war extensively. In particular, the connection between gender, national identity, and war's effects on women is a prominent subject in research. In recent years there has been an attempt to complicate the debate and go beyond the discussion of whether the war changed gender relations and systems. Hence, parts of this discussion are devoted to the place of women's bodies in the war, to questions of rape, prostitution, and their meaning and influences in the context of war, and to the ways they have been utilized to discuss questions of national identity and national pride.[38]

Rape of French women, for example, was viewed as a recruiting tool for French propaganda against the Germans. It served as a stimulus for French men to act for the defense of the "women," who embodied the nation, its pride, and future, and hence for the defense of the nation. The connection between the woman and the national cause turned the woman's body into a site of conflict. As Billie Melman argues, from many studies on war iconography, popular culture, and propaganda during the war, the picture that emerges is of World War I as a "sexual war," a war during which women's bodies and sexuality were utilized in different forms.[39]

In research on World War I in Palestine, or elsewhere in the Arab lands, these dimensions of the war are mostly neglected. One important exception is Elizabeth Thompson, who indicates in her research on Lebanon and Syria in the interwar period that gender, as an analytical category, helps tie aspects of social and economic change directly to political developments. Gender-related issues connect tensions at home, in the private sphere, to those in the society as a whole, and could easily mobilize mass sentiments, as was the case in postwar Syria and Lebanon. When analyzing the effects of World War I on future developments of what she calls "the colonial civic order," Thompson demonstrates how the war

had shaken paternal authority and challenged the definitions of family and community as people knew them.[40] Indeed, some of the same effects were evident in Jerusalem as well, as can be seen in Tourjman's diary. In fact, the condition of women and their suffering during the war add to Tourjman's frustration and discontent with the Ottoman government.

In his general writing and contemplations about women's condition, Tourjman seemed to have been influenced by the public debates about feminism, women's rights, and the liberation of women taking place around the same time, mainly in Cairo and Istanbul, led by feminists such as Huda Shaarawi and Saiza Nabarawi in Cairo and Halide Edib Adivar in Istanbul.[41] Khalil al-Sakakini's views regarding women's liberation influenced him as well. He also discussed the writings of Qasim Amin with al-Sakakini on several occasions.[42] In his own writings, he expressed concern about the situation of women and their low status, and combined it with criticism on his own society and the government. He criticized men for their ill-treatment of women and wrote about the importance of women's education, a prominent theme among intellectual circles at the time. For example, on April 1, 1915, after describing the Nabi Mussa celebrations in Jerusalem, he mentions women who cannot buy food and clothes, as is customary at this time of year, because of the economic crisis. Women do not rebel against the situation, he complained, and said that women believe that men are smarter and hence agree to men's control over them. He continued:

> I feel sorry for the Muslim women. I feel that all women on earth are humiliated, especially Muslim women, but even European and American women. Thank God for not being born a woman! I don't know what would have happened if I was born a woman.[43]

At the end of the month, he again talked about the importance of women's education to the society in general. He started by talking about the veil *(hijab)*, saying that the veil is a barrier *(mani')* to women's progress and has to be taken off gradually, not suddenly. This again hints of his awareness of the public discussions taking place in Cairo at the time about the meaning of the veil in relation to women's liberation and Islam. Regarding the issue of women's education, he then wrote:

How can we [the Arab society] progress while our second half, the women, is *jahil* [ignorant, uneducated]? How can we live when part of our body is paralyzed? We have to teach her, teach her, teach her and then we will be able to reach modernization. It won't do us any good if only men are educated and women are uneducated. Before teaching our children we have to teach our women.[44]

Tourjman's concerns focused on the condition of women owing to the war crisis they experienced, but extended also to the general position of women in society. Regarding the latter, he expressed an ambivalent position. He openly criticized his own male-dominant society for its treatment of women. His criticism continues when he blamed his society (Muslim-Arab) for being indifferent to women's conditions, and especially to women's lack of education. He viewed women's education as a key to the progress of the entire society. However, his general tone when writing about women is somewhat patronizing. When it comes to his own life, while expressing his wish to marry his beloved girlfriend, Tourjman also admitted that he is looking for a Muslim woman who will be educated but will also be able to handle housework. In his words, "I don't want someone who can play the piano but doesn't know how to handle housework."[45]

One of the issues that appears in the diary is the phenomenon of prostitution as an indication of women's hardships in wartime Jerusalem. The presence of prostitutes in Jerusalem during the war is not surprising considering that there were so many military forces in the city at a time of poor economic conditions. It seems that their presence created discontent among some of the city's residents. As Jens Hanssen argues regarding the location of prostitutes in late nineteenth-century Beirut, in Jerusalem too prostitutes were considered social outcasts, but their presence was very obvious in the city. As in the case of Beirut, Jerusalem's prostitutes exercised "social marginality on the center," to borrow Hanssen's terminology.[46] Tourjman discussed the issue of prostitution on several occasions, in the context of celebrations and also in relation to war's effects on women and on gender roles in the family and the community. On April 1915 he described the way in which war and economic hardship brought dishonor, rape, and prostitution to poor women and young girls.[47] A few days later he described how he felt when he saw a prostitute in al-Manshiyeh garden:

> I saw a prostitute . . . she is miserable, and the man she is with treats her with animal-like passion *(maladha haywaniyyah)*. I think that the prostitutes ended up as prostitutes because they fell in love with men who promised to marry them, but later threw them away. This poor woman doesn't know what else she can do apart from being a prostitute. God help these prostitutes *(mumisat)*. I feel sorry for these miserable women and I pity them.[48]

In another entry in his diary, Tourjman made the connection between the harsh economic conditions and the way they affected women:

> I see women begging for money while carrying their children with them. My heart breaks. Some respectable women gave their honor in order to help their children. Our condition now is the worst in terms of hunger. The men are at war, and this is one of the hardest times.[49]

Tourjman viewed prostitution as a direct result of the hardships of war. The draft only worsened the economic situation of women, who were left alone to support their families. Prostitution was the only means of survival for some of them.[50] As Tourjman mentioned several times in his diary, some prostitutes were Jewish, but there were Muslim and Christian prostitutes as well. At one instance Tourjman mentioned rumors that Cemal Paşa was about to marry a Jewish woman, from the "private prostitutes," possibly a woman named Leah Tenenbaum from Jerusalem. He criticized Cemal Paşa for this and said he is not worthy of leadership.[51] In the earlier description of the party, Tourjman mentioned drunk officers who revealed secrets to the prostitutes who accompanied them. Perhaps some prostitutes were employed by the British to spy on their clients, many of whom were military officials.[52]

Another indication of such a way of utilizing women is mentioned in relation to quite a mysterious figure, Alther Levine. Levine, a Jew who held an American passport, was presented as the most important spy in the service of British forces that operated in the Middle East during the war, who used a large network of agents in different cities in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. According to ʿAziz Bey, Levine won the trust of Cemal Paşa and managed to provide information and secret documents to the British headquarters. As part of his network, Levine made use of mainly Jewish prostitutes, most of them were working in a brothel and casino that was operating near the Russian Compound and directed by a

Jewish woman called Esther Haim. Levine paid the prostitutes; in return, they provided him with information that they gathered from the Turkish, German, and Austrian clients.[53]

There were some venues that supported women and girls who became prostitutes. Some were mentioned in the previous chapter, in relation to the work of the American Colony during the war. Donna Robinson Divine discusses some self-help organizations for girls, founded in the city of Gaza, where the number of prostitutes seems to have been the highest because of their proximity to the front lines where the troops were based. These self-help organizations raised money to train girls orphaned by the war. The existence of such organizations, founded by the wives and daughters of notables and Muslim clergymen, indicated the failure of traditional institutions in the city following the war.[54] Regarding the postwar period and in relation to Jewish prostitutes, Margalit Shilo mentions many organizations, mainly women-led ones, both Jewish and missionary, whose aim was to provide working places for girls and help them deal with their economic condition.[55]

The diary allows us a glimpse into the challenges that women faced during the war. The fate of women is usually associated with the nation's future, and atrocities against them in times of war are viewed as a means to hurt the enemy.[56] In the case discussed here, Tourjman uses the poor condition of many women in Jerusalem in general, and the existence of prostitution in particular, not so much to discuss the *nation's* future as such, but rather to castigate the government for its failure to protect women and other vulnerable members of society. The woman's abused body represents a grave insult not only for the woman herself, but also for society at large. For Tourjman, the condition of women and their treatment by the government were yet other reasons to castigate the Ottoman state.

"BY GOD, THE NATION DIED . . ."

The writer's criticism toward the government became even more pronounced as the war progressed and as Cemal Paşa's treatment of the local population became increasingly severe. After hearing that the Ottoman government had arrested "our Christian brothers" on the pretext that they were discussing politics and endangering the state, Tourjman wrote that he did not understand what the

government was trying to achieve by this, and whether it was just looking for revenge.[57] While discussing the effects of war on the residents of Jerusalem, and the inefficient ways in which the government handled the acute crisis, he went as far as criticizing "the despotic, cruel and stupid government which does not know how to handle and manage the life of its citizens."[58] Relating to his own position as a soldier, he mentioned that some of his relatives were killed in the war, and criticized the ways Jews and Christians were humiliated in their service in the labor battalions of the Ottoman army. He was strongly against the morality of war and against military commanders who take advantage of the soldiers and citizens to fulfill their own ambitions.[59]

Moving to the collective level, Tourjman distinguished between the Arab and Ottoman nations, and gradually distanced himself from the Ottoman one. He talked about the tribulations that "my race the patriotic (or nationalist) Arab" *(jinsi al-Arab al-wataniin)* is going through, and wondered why people were so tolerant of the Turkish government. People are slaves, and allow the government to "play" with them, he claimed.[60] People continue to be silent even when the government does everything it can to harm them, such as threatening to expel those who try to escape from military service or those involved in local politics. He went on to criticize his fellow citizens for not revolting against the government, although, to be sure, he himself did not publicly defy the government either. On the contrary, he continued to serve as a soldier, albeit not as a combatant. But at the same time he registered in his diary his private moments of defiance. Returning to the subject of the government, he again distinguished between the Ottoman and Arab nations:

> Aren't the disasters *(wailat)* that this government caused the Arab and Ottoman nations *(lil-umma al-Arabiyya walil-umma al-Uthmaniyya)* enough? They [the Ottomans] claim that the homeland *(watan)* is in danger, but [in fact] it is in danger because of them [the Ottomans] and their actions [toward us].[61]

Here his criticism becomes more charged as he accuses the government of putting the nation and the citizenry in danger. The writer's language indicates that he distanced himself from the Ottoman government, but also continued to distinguish between the government and Ottoman subjects, while saying that the latter were victims of the acts of their own government.

Following the hangings of Arab nationalists in Beirut in 1915, Tourjman disengages himself completely from the empire:

> The government killed eleven people, but they were worth more than eleven thousand people. They were killed because they demanded reforms, they were killed in Beirut, which is "the mother of the Arab country" *(um al-bilad al-'Arabi)*, but no one said a word—people were afraid for their lives. The government killed the best of our men *(shababina)*. I swear that the nation died *(wallahi al-umma matat)*. You [the dead] should know that the Arab nation will not forget you. . . . The death of these people will be repaid. The government claimed that you are traitors, but you are not. You are loyal to your nation, country, and family.[62]

By now his orientation is clear: he strongly supported the Arab national cause, and referred to the men who were hanged as "*our* young men." He expressed deep despair at the impact of their death on the Arab nation ("the nation died"), promised to remember those who died, and swore to revenge their death. None of this, however, prevented him from criticizing the "people," his fellow citizens, for their failure to rise against the empire.

On September 15, 1915, the writer addressed Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa directly out of what seems to be great anger and frustration:

> Enver and Cemal . . . the homeland is in danger *(al-watan fi al-khatar)*, and you are dreaming! . . . What do you want from this war? Do you want to rule the world and occupy it *(tumliku al-'alam wa-taftahuha)*, or do you want to return to your old glory *(amjadkum al-kadim)*? You have brought disaster to your homeland *(wail li-al-watanikum),* which you claim that you want to free. . . . Germany cheated you. . . . Greetings to you and your country *(fa-salam alaykum wa-'ala biladkum)*.[63]

It is important to notice the words that Tourjman uses: homeland *(watan)* and later simply country *(bilad)*. He is very cynical when asking if the Ottoman rulers want to rule and occupy the world. Here, his distance is not only from the government, but from the country, the homeland.

Toward the very end of his diary, on July 10, 1916, Tourjman voiced his harshest criticism toward the government in support of Arab nationalism, specifically toward the "men of the Hijaz." In a very angry and impulsive tone, he wrote:

> The Ottomans killed our sons, offended our honor—why would we like to remain under it [the empire]? . . . Every Arab is zealous for his race. It is enough for us! The silence of this state while facing what is happening to us shows its weakness. It [the government] hanged people in the streets. When they did that they believed that they would weaken the hope of the Arab nation, but they didn't know that there are men behind them [those who died] who will protect the Arab nation. It was their best opportunity for revenge. Yes, they died, and the Palestinians and Syrians didn't say a word *(lam yanbat bint shifaa)*. . . . The Arabs will harass the Ottoman government until it gets out of the Arab countries humiliated as it got out of any other place. . . . God bless you Sherif Hussein, and hurt those who try to hurt you. You Arabs proved to the world that you are men who refuse to be humiliated and proved to God that you are the sons of Arab ancestors. You proved that you protect your Arab nation in your life for ending up *(nukhlis)* the barbaric Ottoman nation *(al-umma al-barbariyya al-ʿuthmaniyya)*.[64]

Tourjman does not mince words here in expressing his feelings toward the empire and his admiration toward Sherif Hussein, who led the Arab revolt. Despite the criticism that he voices again against his fellow citizens (here he mentions specifically the Syrians and Palestinians), he expresses great respect for "the Arabs" who would harass the Ottoman Empire, or, as he calls it, "the barbaric Ottoman nation." Particularly interesting are the national distinctions Tourjman makes here. Not only does he distinguish between Ottomans and Arabs, but he also treats Syrians and Palestinians as a separate category. His mention of Palestine is not surprising, considering that a separate Palestinian national identity had already begun to take shape in the years preceding the war.[65] Throughout the diary he refers to Palestine as an entity separated from Syria, and does not view it as part of Greater Syria. Already at the beginning of the diary he stated that Palestine would either become independent or part of Egypt.[66] Hence, he seems to be developing a local Palestinian identity but criticizes Palestinians for not rising against the Ottomans. Simultaneously, he also refers to himself as part of "the Arabs."

The trajectory of Tourjman's perceptions outlined here—distancing himself from the Ottoman state and moving toward overlapping identifications with Arab and local (Palestinian) foci of identity—goes hand in hand with Rashid Khalidi's analysis of the different stages in which the notion of Palestinian identity has

evolved. According to Khalidi, the first stage, before World War I, was when the sense of a unique Palestinian identity competed and overlapped with other foci of identity, such as Arabism and Ottomanism. After the war, a sense of a common Palestinian identity became a primary category of identity for many.[67] This transition and transformation, analyzed here, highlights the war years as a critical moment during which those foci of identity began to conflict and crystallize.

TOURJMAN AND AL-SAKAKINI COMPARED

In order to contextualize the views and feelings expressed in Tourjman's diary, it is important to expand the analysis by mentioning other sources and look at the ways other writers dealt with the issues that were bothering Tourjman. One example was mentioned briefly earlier—Bahjat and Tamimi's report on their journey in the province of Beirut, in 1916-1917. However, a comparison with Bahjat and Tamimi is problematic because their report focused on a different geographical locale (the province of Beirut), was made for a special purpose (official report to the Ottoman governor), and was different in nature from that of a diary. The most obvious source for comparison is Khalil al-Sakakini's diary, both because of the similar nature of the source (diary, autobiographic writing), and the geographical and social position of the writer (Jerusalem, Arab elite). As mentioned earlier, Khalil al-Sakakini is mentioned extensively in Tourjman's diary. Al-Sakakini was both Tourjman's mentor and personal friend, and served as a source of inspiration to Tourjman. Al-Sakakini kept a diary for many years, but during the war years the diary is not full, and there are actually no entries between April 4, 1915, and November 1, 1917.[68]

Al-Sakakini's humanist writing expresses his great concern about religious tensions in the empire, following the declaration of Jihad. Al-Sakakini questions his own identity and position within the Ottoman collective, as well as national affiliation in general, but his writings on these issues did not express the same level of anger and frustration as that of Tourjman.

An interesting example of al-Sakakini's perception of nationalism appeared on March 26, 1915, when he was convinced that he was about to be deported from Jerusalem after his failed attempt to pay the redemption fee. This statement resembled Tourjman's (being a citizen of the world), but al-Sakakini's is more influenced by his humanist approach. Al-Sakakini wrote:

> What is my crime? I think that I am guilty of two things: First, being a Christian, and as far as they [the Ottoman authorities] know, Christians are supportive of England, France and Russia; and secondly, because I am the director of a school in which I preach according to the national spirit. . . . It is very possible that they want to deport me so that I will stop [being the director of] my school and by this will be punished for being a Christian and an Arab. . . . The only things I can say here are as follows: I am not Christian and not Buddhist, not Muslim and not Jewish. Just as I am not Arab, or British, not German and not Turkish. I am just one among humankind *(Ana fard min afrad hadihi al-insaniyya)*. . . . I was derived to live in this society, and I strive to awake it. . . . If nationalism means to love life—then I am a nationalist. But if it means to prefer one religion over the other, one language over the other, one city over the other and one interest over the other—then I am not a nationalist, and that's all.[69]

On November 20, 1917, after three years of war, al-Sakakini reflected on the meaning of national affiliation during wartime, as well as on his location and position in the war. He criticized himself for being too concerned with his own well-being. More importantly, he wrote that he did not like the war, and that he would like to be on the side of justice—not to support the Ottomans because he is Ottoman or to support the British because he admires them. He expressed anger about the role that national affiliation plays in wartime, especially in relation to the treatment of injured and captive soldiers. Those need to be treated well regardless of their nationality, he wrote, and despite his hatred of war, he needed to help them as well, as a human being.[70] This is another example of al-Sakakini's humanist approach as he attempted to differentiate between belonging to a certain collective and higher obligations of humanism.

One issue that greatly upsets al-Sakakini is religious tensions that resulted from the empire's declaration of Jihad. His concern is clear, considering his own belonging to the Christian religious minority group. However, al-Sakakini expressed this concern even before the call for Jihad, on September 17, 1914, remarking that one of the biggest problems of war in Palestine is the weakening of the relationship between Muslims and Christians.[71] When the Ottoman government declared Jihad, al-Sakakini wrote that this call aroused old sentiments and feelings.[72] A few days later, on November 9, he added that the war created animosity between Muslims and Christians, and that this animosity would remain for generations to come.[73]

His strongest statement about the impact of Jihad on religious tensions in the country appeared on November 18, 1914. The call for Jihad would have been justified had the Ottoman Empire been *forced* to enter the war, he wrote. However, it entered the war voluntarily, just to help Germany and Austria-Hungary. It fought together with Christian states, and its Muslim soldiers fought side by side with Jewish and Christian soldiers. The call for Jihad was only meant to help the Turkish race *('unsur)* and to strengthen its rule, not to defend Islam. This Jihad would harm the Muslim world more than it would help it, because Christian nations would call for a similar war and give the neutral countries a reason to enter the conflict.[74]

The Ottoman Empire's policies are clearly criticized here. However, in general, al-Sakakini's views toward the empire and its policies seem to change over time. At the beginning of the war, al-Sakakini reflected on his own affiliation to the empire. He praised the Turks (not Ottomans) and the support they receive from the people, while criticizing the Arabs who had no hopes. However, as the war progressed, and especially after realizing that the government falsely claimed victories, he started doubting all the news that reached him, calling it rumors and false information. He wrote: "There is no doubt that a nation that allows itself to do that [spread false news] is a despised nation and has lost its mind and is limited in vision *(umma munhata mukhtalat al-shu'ur qasirat al-nazar)*."[75]

In his diary al-Sakakini expressed frustration toward the government, the war, and its effects on the empire and especially on intercommunal feelings. However, his criticism is different from Tourjman's and is less explicit and less firm. This probably stemmed from several differences between the two: al-Sakakini, a Christian intellectual, belonged to a religious minority group, and Tourjman, a young Muslim, belonged to the majority. In addition, Tourjman served as a soldier and al-Sakakini did not. Despite these differences, the comparison between Tourjman and al-Sakakini demonstrates the sort of contemplations about identity taking place at this critical time among Arab-Ottoman elite circles in Jerusalem.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Through an analysis of the public space and the very private domains, this chapter illuminated and demonstrated the effects of World War I on Jerusalem's urban environment and on people's lives and experiences in it. It first followed the ways

by which central public sites within the city gained political significance throughout the war, and demonstrated how their meaning and use was negotiated and contested by local residents, soldiers, and the city's authorities. Regarding the private sphere, through a microanalysis of Tourjman's diary, this chapter highlighted and analyzed how parts of the Jerusalem Arab-Ottoman elite experienced and viewed the war, and how they perceived their own position within the Ottoman Empire. It focused mainly on the ways multilayered levels of identity were negotiated and debated following internal and external changes at the time.

The diary serves as a unique and valuable testimony that sheds light on life in Jerusalem at a critical period of the city's (and region's) history. It connects the private and public spheres by revealing how the economic and social crisis, reflected also in the urban environment, affected people living in the city, and delves into the condition of women and the phenomenon of prostitution. It scrutinizes how political changes, as well as Ottoman policies and treatment of the local population, affected how people viewed their own positions within the context of the empire. It also alludes to the ways socioeconomic and religious differences in the context of war affected people's experiences of the crisis. Moreover, it may serve as a case study for examining a larger process of transformation that took place at the time, both in people's affiliation to a larger collective and with regard to the future dramatic political developments.

The war, I suggest, was a central event in the history of Palestine and Greater Syria. As Elizabeth Thompson suggested regarding Syria and Lebanon, in Palestine the war was crucial not only politically, but also socially, changing dynamics among Jews, Muslims, and Christians. The discussion of the diary may hence serve as a starting point for a broader discussion on the various impacts of World War I on Palestinian society.

The comparison of Tourjman's diary with that of al-Sakakini suggests that al-Sakakini experienced and contemplated similar issues, although his emphasis was slightly different. Unlike Tourjman, al-Sakakini was troubled by interreligious tensions in the empire caused by the war, probably because of his own position as a Christian Arab intellectual. However, he, too, dedicated much of his writing to questions of identity and affiliation to the empire, as well as to the meanings of national affiliation.

The analysis of this diary, as well as of similar sources, demonstrates the ways identities were negotiated and debated at the demise of empire. People's

affiliation to the Ottoman collective allowed for multilayered, blurry, and flexible foci of identity to exist side by side. For some people, however, wartime trauma and the empire's treatment of its subjects created a deep, personal "identity crisis," during which they began questioning their affiliation and loyalty to the empire. In the case discussed here, affiliation with and connection to the Ottoman Empire were challenged and negotiated in light of other possible foci of identity, such as feeling Palestinian or part of Greater Syria. Tourjman's diary may demonstrate, in the Palestinian context, the same transition from identification with a "local Ottoman" elite to a "local elite" that Toledano analyzed in relation to Egypt. This brings back the question of continuity and change in the context of World War I, and the impact of the demise of the Ottoman Empire on people's sense of citizenship and connection to a larger unit of identification. Using an autobiographical source such as a diary allows us an intimate glance into the lives and most personal contemplations of people over such crucial and intimate questions, in a dramatic and difficult period in their lives, as well as in the history of the Ottoman Empire.

3

Between Ottomanism and Zionism

The Case of the Sephardi Community

ON APRIL 1, 1914, Haim Ben-'Attar, the editor of *ha-Herut,* a Sephardi newspaper in Jerusalem, wrote:

> We have to show all the Nashashibis, Husaynis and Khalidis that we do not wish to exploit the people of the country *['Am ha-Aretz]. . . .* We wish to work and live side by side with our neighbors for the promotion of the economic condition of our empty country, and for the development of its culture and education.[1]

This short paragraph reflects, in part, the approach of *ha-Herut* toward the Arab population in Palestine. The ideas presented here—the hope to live in coexistence with the Arabs and develop Palestine together, the attempt to convince the Muslim elite families of the good intentions of the Jews living in Palestine—present the attitude of the young Sephardi intelligentsia in Jerusalem, the readers of *ha-Herut,* toward the national question in Palestine.

By focusing on the young Sephardi intelligentsia in Jerusalem in the last few years of the Ottoman Empire, this chapter will address questions related to identity formation and the Sephardim's vision of future life and intercommunal relations in Palestine. It will analyze the unique web of identities and alliances held by the Jerusalemite Sephardim, who viewed themselves as both loyal Ottomans and enthusiastic Zionists, and will examine the manifestations of these notions of Ottomanism and Zionism as they appeared mainly in the Sephardi newspaper *ha-Herut,* as well as in other sources.

One of the main arguments presented here is that the Jerusalemite Sephardim's perception of Ottomanism changed during this period and moved

from an "Ideal Ottomanism" to a more "Instrumental Ottomanism." This shift reflected their understanding of the changing reality in the region, namely, the political changes taking place in the empire following the Young Turk Revolution, the external challenges that the empire faced, and the rising notions of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces. This realization enabled them to analyze the local conditions and forces, and affected the way they viewed relations with the Muslims and Christians in Palestine. As this chapter will demonstrate, the Sephardim's special position among the Jewish community in Jerusalem, as both Ottoman subjects and Zionists, and their cultural and linguistic proximity with the local Arabs, provided them with a unique lens through which they viewed intercommunal relations in the country, which was different than that used by the Ashkenazi Zionists. Their perspective toward the national issue was twofold. On the one hand, the Sephardim were aware of the possible threat that the Arab national movement posed to the Jewish nationalist project. On the other hand, they were also more open and willing to see the Arabs, especially the Muslims, as possible partners for future life in the country. These two poles, that seem opposite and contradictory, actually existed side by side among the Sephardim, and created their unique perspective. Indeed, as this chapter demonstrates, Zionism was not a monolithic ideology, but played out in different ways by various actors.

When considering the identity of the Jerusalemite Sephardim, it is of course important to remember that identity is a fluid, flexible, historically constructed, and negotiable category, which is in a constant process of change. Stuart Hall analyzes cultural identities as "those aspects of our identities that arise from our 'belonging' to distinctive ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and, above all, national cultures," and claims that these identities are formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways people are represented or addressed in the cultural systems that surround them. Those identities are historically defined. The subject may assume different identities at different times, and these identities can be contradictory, pulling in different directions.[2] The idea that identities are historically constructed is presented by John Comaroff as well, who looks at identities as not "things" but relations, whose content is wrought in the particularities of their ongoing historical construction.[3] Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the Sephardi identity was negotiated as well, and consisted of poles that seem to be pushing in contradictory directions. However, it is this seemingly contradiction and negotiation that formed a multilayered and complex set of identities. This

negotiation could have taken place at this moment, during the transition between two regimes, in which fluid categories could still exist and be negotiated, before they were taken over by foreign powers and interests who did all they could to fixate them.

In the late Ottoman period, the Jewish community in Palestine was segmented according to ethnic and geographical background, and consisted of both Ottoman and foreign citizens. The latter enjoyed European consular protection and were not included in the *millet* framework. Only Ottoman subjects, mostly Sephardi Jews, were incorporated into the *millet* unit, and were granted fairly wide judicial powers. The Jewish community was roughly divided into three major ethnic groups: the Sephardim (Jews who came from Spain, Portugal, the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey, who spoke Ladino), Oriental Jews (Maghrebim, who came from North Africa, as well as Jews who immigrated from Middle Eastern countries), and Ashkenazim (who came mainly from Eastern Europe).[4] However, as will be examined here, these categories were somewhat fluid and flexible.

The Jewish community had experienced many changes since the end of the nineteenth century, generally following the waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Around twenty-five thousand Ashkenazi Jews arrived in Palestine as part of the first wave of immigration *('Aliya)*, starting in 1882, and symbolized the beginning of the "new Jewish community" *(ha-Yishuv ha-Hadash)* in Palestine. This community differed from what came to be known as "the old community" *(ha-Yishuv ha-Yashan)*, the Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities that settled in Palestine before 1882. The majority of those immigrants of the first *'aliya,* who were driven by Zionist ideals and settled in the first Jewish colonies *(Moshavot)*, were encouraged by the Ottoman authorities and their sponsoring philanthropists to adopt Ottoman citizenship upon their arrival in Palestine.[5]

The second wave of Jewish immigration took place between the years 1904 and 1914, and was different in nature from the first *'aliya*. Around forty thousand Jewish immigrants arrived mainly from Eastern Europe, driven by a more radical form of Zionism combined with some elements of socialism. They consisted of mainly Ashkenazi Jews, many of whom refused to give up their former foreign

citizenship and adopt the Ottoman one. The ideals of economic, political, and cultural Jewish revival in Palestine were the driving forces behind the first two waves of immigration to Palestine.[6]

Who are the "Sephardim"? There are different definitions of the Sephardi community in Palestine. The narrow definition defines "Sephardim" as only the ancestors of those Jews who had a Hispano-Levantine cultural background, and who fled, or were expelled from, Spain in 1492. The more inclusive definition of "Sephardim" includes all Jews who were not Ashkenazi, including the descendants of the Spanish expulsion as well as "Oriental Jews," originally from Arabic-speaking countries, North Africa, and Palestine (the latter are called Mistaʿarvim, Jews who had never left Palestine and spoke Arabic as their native language).[7] Here I will follow the more inclusive definition, referring to the Sephardim as they typically have viewed themselves.[8]

For many generations the Sephardim were the dominant community in Palestine. They started losing their numerical domination following the waves of immigration of Ashkenazi Jews. The community was concentrated in the four "holy cities," Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed, with Jerusalem as its center, although Sephardim resided in other settlements as well.[9] Most of the Sephardi community held Ottoman citizenship, in contrast to the Ashkenazi immigrants (both from the old and new *yishuv*), who mainly held foreign citizenship. The latter were dependent on the protection of European consulates in Palestine under the privileges of capitulations. In 1842 the Ottoman authorities recognized the Sephardi rabbi as the *Hacham Başı,* or chief rabbi, and granted him fairly wide jurisdictions as the representative of the Jewish community in Palestine vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities. As a consequence, the Sephardi community as such became the sole representative of the Jews in Palestine for the authorities. However, when the famous *hacham başı* Yaʿakov Shaul Eliachar passed away in 1906, a bitter struggle over the leadership of the Sephardi community began. The struggle for the post of the chief rabbi continued until the beginning of British rule in Palestine, and weakened the position of the Sephardim among the Jewish community.[10]

Unlike the Ashkenazi community of the *old yishuv,* the Sephardi Jews combined religious practices with work, and were economically independent. Most of the Sephardim supported modern education and did not think that in the Land of Israel the only work done should be religious work. The Ashkenazi Jews from the *old yishuv,* on the other hand, dedicated most of their life to the study

of religion, and were economically dependent on donations and charity from the Diaspora *(Halukah)*.[11]

The Sephardi population was mainly an urban community. Most of the readers and writers of *ha-Herut* were centered in Jerusalem and lived in close proximity to Muslims. This proximity was both geographical and cultural, because some of the Sephardi Jews had lived with Arabs in their countries of origin. In his memoir, *Yerushalayim Tmol Shilshom,* Ya'akov Yehoshua describes his life in the Sephardi community in Jerusalem in the pre–World War I period. He distinguishes between the relations of Jews with Muslims and Christians and claims that the Sephardi community was much closer to the Muslim community in Jerusalem than to the Christians. As we will see, this distinction between Muslims and Christians will be made elsewhere as well. One of the reasons for the close relations was that Jewish and Muslim families lived in the same compounds in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Muslims owned most of the houses in the Old City, and Jews rented apartments or houses from them. Every Jewish family was related to a Muslim family, either in friendship or trading contacts.[12]

Through Yehoshua's vivid descriptions of daily life in Jerusalem one learns of the close relations between the Sephardim and the Muslims. They visited one another, participated in each other's holiday celebrations, and sat together in the coffee shops in the Jewish Street. The children played together, and Jewish physicians took care of Muslims when they were sick. Yehoshua also describes in length the "*hamam* (public baths) culture" in Jerusalem, and says that Sephardi and Oriental Jews visited and used the Arab public baths. According to Yehoshua, a Jewish woman was present in every *hamam.* Her role was to guide the Jewish visitors and to teach the young Jewish brides on how to purify themselves before their wedding. The conversations between Jews and their Arab neighbors that took place in the *hamams* were about daily issues, as well as about business and trade.[13]

A great majority of the Sephardi Jews were fluent in spoken and written Arabic, even though for many Ladino was the mother tongue. Ya'akov Yehoshua mentions that many of the Sephardi Jews followed the Arabic press closely, and even read the newspapers that were published in Syria or Lebanon. According to Eliyahu Eliachar, many Sephardi Jews also had Arab partners in their businesses.[14] The ability of the Sephardim to communicate in Arabic was frequently mentioned in *ha-Herut* and is an important factor in their perception of Zionism and of intercommunal relations in Palestine, as will be discussed.

The Ashkenazi immigrants of the second wave of immigration had a completely different life experience than did the Sephardim. Most of them immigrated to Palestine from Russia, and were greatly influenced by socialist ideology and by what is known as "Activist Zionism," the Zionist ideology that preached Jewish immigration to Palestine and the "conquest of labor." Most of the immigrants were young and came to Palestine alone, looking for new challenges. Many of them grew up in religious or traditional families, but had gone through a process of secularization.[15] Their ideological influences were European. Moreover, many of the immigrants, especially those who came from Russia, carried with them fresh memories of the pogroms and riots against the Jews that took place in Russia following the 1905 revolution and before. They were thus extremely sensitive to, and aware of, the issue of "self-defense," as well as suspicious of Arab intentions.[16] They were not familiar with local life in Palestine and did not know Arabic. It was because of this unfamiliarity with the local population that *ha-Herut* was critical toward the Ashkenazi Zionists immigrants, as will be discussed.

The various differences between the Sephardim and the second *'aliya* immigrants, in terms of life experience and urban location, are important to notice, as they influence the approach of the Sephardim toward the major issues discussed here. As the analysis that follows shows, these differences also play out when examining the different approaches of the Sephardi and the second *'aliya* Ashkenazi Zionists toward the national question in Palestine.

HA-HERUT AS A SEPHARDI NATIONAL NEWSPAPER: AGENDA, WRITERS, AND READING COMMUNITY

One of the main sources used for the analysis here is the Sephardi newspaper *ha-Herut* ('Liberty', in Hebrew). The newspaper was published in Jerusalem from 1909 until April 1917, when the Ottoman authorities shut it down following the military conscription of its editor, Haim Ben-'Attar. *Ha-Herut* was first a weekly, then a biweekly, paper, until it became a daily in 1912. As a weekly paper, it first sold twelve hundred copies.[17] It was the only Hebrew newspaper published in Palestine during World War I. The early version of *ha-Herut* was a Ladino newspaper, *al-Liberal,* which was published after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The main power behind the paper was its publisher, Moshe 'Azriel, who, since 1900, owned one of the largest Hebrew publishing houses in Palestine. 'Azriel, a

young Sephardi Jew, wanted to introduce some secular education into the mostly religious curriculum of the Sephardi community. For a short period the editor of *ha-Herut* was Avraham Elmaliach, but he was soon replaced by Haim Ben-'Attar. Ben-'Attar began his professional career as an assistant in 'Azriel's publishing house. He then started translating literature to Ladino, and later became a journalist and columnist.[18]

In its first issue, *ha-Herut* declared that it was a nationally oriented paper, whose main aim was to revive the Hebrew language:

> As a Hebrew language newspaper, *ha-Herut* will reflect the hopes and feelings of our people. It will dedicate much attention to Jerusalem, to the Jewish communities, and to the development of trade, industry, and agriculture in the land of our ancestors. As a general newspaper, *ha-Herut* will attempt to report from around the world . . . all its information will be derived from the original sources, telegrams, newspapers and from special reports of writers who have promised to assist us.[19]

In the same statement, *ha-Herut* stressed that it was not affiliated with any political party, and that it aimed to create a platform for free speech and discussion. *Ha-Herut* did not view itself as targeting exclusively the Sephardi community, but as a paper for the general Jewish and Hebrew-speaking audience in Palestine. However, from its content it was clear that the Sephardi community was its main target population, and that it served as an opposition to the traditional Sephardi leadership. The editors and writers of *ha-Herut* represented the young intelligentsia in the Sephardi community of Jerusalem, although among the writers who contributed to the newspaper there were also some Ashkenazi Jews.[20]

While looking at the profile of the writers in *ha-Herut*, it is interesting to see that some of the main contributors to the newspaper were Maghrebi, Sephardim from North African backgrounds, who did not belong to the established Jerusalemite Sephardi families. Among those were the editor, Haim Ben-'Attar, who was born in Morocco; Dr. Shimon Moyal, who was born in Jaffa to a Moroccan family; and Dr. Nissim Malul, whose family came from Tunisia. Two other important writers in the newspaper were Avraham Elmaliach, who was born in Jerusalem to a Maghrebi family, and Albert 'Antebi, born in Damascus. Most of these writers were fluent in Ladino, Turkish, French, Arabic, and, of course, Hebrew; they

signaled a new generation of young intellectuals in the city. They studied in various schools in Jerusalem and elsewhere. Some, such as Haim Ben-'Attar, studied in the Sephardi schools in Jerusalem. Others, such as Dr. Moyal and Dr. Malul, studied in Cairo and Beirut. And some, such as Elmaliach and 'Antebi, studied and later taught at the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) School in Jerusalem, and were very much under French influence. Albert 'Antebi also served as the director of the AIU institutions following the resignation of Nissim Bachar in 1883. Most of them did not belong to the Sephardi elite families, such as Meyuhas, Ginio, Eliachar, Valero, and Navon. Those families were deeply rooted and established in the local community, the Ottoman administration, and the Sephardi leadership, and were under strong French influence following their education at the AIU institutions.

One of the main issues that was raised and debated in *ha-Herut* was the language struggle and the attempt to encourage the use of Hebrew in schools in Palestine. *Ha-Herut* devoted much attention to this issue and dedicated many articles and essays to it. This issue was strongly related to *ha-Herut*'s commitment to Zionism, its concern for the unity of the Jewish community, the ethnic relations within it, and various social issues.[21] However, this was not the only concern that *ha-Herut* addressed regarding the language question in Palestine. Other issues that engaged the newspaper were the debate regarding the status of Arabic among the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, as well as the question of how to influence the Arab press and expose it to the Zionist agenda. This issue was central to the discussions that took place in the newspaper and will be discussed at length in the following.[22]

FROM "IDEAL OTTOMANISM" TO "INSTRUMENTAL OTTOMANISM": PHASES OF OTTOMANISM AMONG THE SEPHARDI COMMUNITY

While describing the anniversary of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, an article published in *ha-Herut* in January 1916 stated:

> The patriotic feeling among the Ottomans should be strong, especially during this time of emergency. We are all the children of large Ottomania [the Ottoman Empire], we should cheer up and recover and believe in the strength and the power and greatness of the Ottoman homeland, for which all its loyal sons must sacrifice anything it demands of them, every time and every hour. We like

the historical memories. We revive in them our patriotic ideal—to witness the glory and the well-being of Ottomania, which is dear to all the children of the common homeland.[23]

This article, published in the midst of World War I, joins many other expressions of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, the "dear homeland" as it was often called. These manifestations of patriotism to the Ottoman Empire, coming at a period of great distress in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine and throughout the empire, are somewhat surprising. It is striking to find that in such a difficult period, when the military commander Cemal Paşa ordered the hanging of Arab political activists in the streets of Jerusalem, Beirut, and Damascus, and while people were suffering from hunger and diseases, such patriotic statements were still being expressed.

One could argue that these signs of loyalty to the empire enabled *ha-Herut* to be the only newspaper in Palestine that was published on a regular basis throughout the war, whereas all others were shut down by the Ottoman censorship.[24] However, I argue that such expressions of Ottoman loyalty were not simply a tactical means of keeping the newspaper afloat, and hence this phenomenon needs to be explained and analyzed. After all, the writers of the newspaper were not forced to express loyalty to the empire, and the fact that they did is meaningful and should be addressed.

While discussing the period following the Young Turk Revolution, Michelle Campos distinguishes between two general orientations regarding the way Ottomanism was viewed among the Jewish community. The first is that of the European Zionists, who viewed Ottomanism and Jewish participation in the Ottoman collective in a strategic way. Within this group Campos distinguishes between the *new yishuv* Zionists and the *old yishuv* Zionists, such as Eliezer Ben Yehuda. The former viewed Jewish participation in the empire's political life as tactical and utilitarian, whereas Ben Yehuda viewed the empire as a source of stability and as one that deserves loyalty and civic participation, but without cultural or emotional layers of belonging. The second group is that of the young Sephardi intelligentsia, who fully embraced Ottomanism and did not see any contradiction between Ottomanism and Zionism.[25]

Indeed, as Campos argues, Ottomanism served several functions at different times to different audiences. Looking specifically at the young Sephardi

intelligentsia, I claim that their perception of Ottomanism, and of loyalty to the empire, also changed in the course of this period. Specifically, prewar Ottomanism differed from the way in which Ottomanism played out during the war. In the prewar period, Ottomanism served the Sephardi intelligentsia as a way of proving genuine loyalty toward the empire, and was seen as a tool of gaining legitimacy for the Jewish community in Palestine and as a way of advancing Palestine for the benefit of all its inhabitants. I call this the "Ideal Ottomanism" phase. Following the outbreak of the war, the discussion about Ottomanism became more urgent, both following the Ottoman government's threat of expelling foreign citizens, but also following the undermining of the empire and the growth of Arab nationalism. This urgency reflects a different stage of Ottomanism, that of "Instrumental Ottomanism." Ottomanism was still seen as a proof of loyalty to the empire, but also as a way for handling the war crisis and the various threats it posed. In each phase the call for Ottomanization—becoming an Ottoman citizen—and for loyalty to the empire served different goals and purposes. It is hence important to investigate these phases and the goals fulfilled in each of them, and, finally, to scrutinize the Ottoman pillar within the Sephardi identity and its implications, especially vis-à-vis the Arabs and the national issue in Palestine.

The fact that the Sephardim held Ottoman citizenship was central to the way they viewed themselves and their role in the country. Already in October 1912, in the midst of the Balkan wars, a large advertisement appeared on the first page of *ha-Herut* that encouraged the "People of Israel" to support and donate money for the success of the empire. It stated:

> Can you, the Man of Israel *(Ish Israel)* stand aside when you see that your country is attacked? The historian who will come and say that you were always loyal to your country in which you lived, that you sacrificed everything for the homeland and paid your part in money and blood—this historian will come and see the price that you are paying in the Balkan wars. . . . Jews volunteer for the army, they donate money to it . . . all the people of Israel should help great Ottomania![26]

Indeed, throughout the Balkan wars, *ha-Herut* expressed its concern for the strength of the empire, and for the future of the reforms that the CUP promised to carry out. In an article from September 9, 1912, the writer objected to

the internal divisions within the empire (referring to the rivalry between the Committee of Union and Progress—CUP—and the Decentralization Party), claiming that these rivalries weaken the empire even further and strengthen its external enemies. Those enemies were viewed as the Christians, who betrayed the empire during the Balkan wars. The writer then declared that the Jews were loyal Ottoman citizens, and that they were willing to sacrifice everything for the unity and success of the empire.[27] The same spirit of loyalty is reflected in another article, which described the attitude of the Christian-owned Arabic newspapers in Palestine toward the Jews:

> We hate the homeland? Are there any other people who were more loyal, caring and devoted to the empire than the people of Israel? Do we, who have sacrificed so much for the country, hate the homeland?[28]

In the prewar period, the main demonstration of Ottoman loyalty was the call to those Jews who held foreign citizenship and enjoyed the rights granted by the capitulations to become Ottomans. This reflects the first stage of Ottomanism, namely, that of an "Ideal Ottomanism" that viewed the empire as the central focus of identity. Following the CUP's alleviation of Jewish immigration regulations to Palestine, the newspaper enthusiastically encouraged the Jews in Palestine to adopt Ottoman citizenship. According to Ben-ʿAttar, in an article from April 1914,

> It is not enough that the majority of the inhabitants in Palestine became Jewish. The important factor is that the number of Jews who live in Palestine would be Ottoman. This is the main basis for our settlement in the country, and the essence of our success.[29]

This paragraph demonstrates another phase in the process of Ottomanism. Ben-ʿAttar highlights the advantages of adopting Ottoman citizenship, and views this step as the key for the Jewish settlement in Palestine and as a basis for its legitimacy, not only in the eyes of the Ottoman authorities, but also in the eyes of the other inhabitants of the country, the Arabs. Hence, Ottomanization was perceived as another means of approaching the Arab population and of removing their objection to Jewish immigration to Palestine.[30] As Haim Ben-ʿAttar

commented, addressing his readership at the end of an interview he held with a Muslim sheikh regarding the question of Ottomanization:

> Become Ottomans! This is the argument of the Arabs, even the good among them, towards us.[31] And we argue the same to our brothers who hold foreign citizenship, to come and take refuge under the shadow of our glorified government. Only by fulfilling this duty will we be able to enjoy the rights that our Ottoman citizenship grants us. . . . If we would stand here under the protection of our government, our neighbors would certainly greet us hospitably, because with our talents, money and culture we would bring much gain to our country.[32]

This paragraph clearly demonstrates the advantages that the adoption of Ottoman citizenship holds for the Jews in Palestine. Becoming an Ottoman citizen was seen as one of the ways to approach the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, mainly the Muslims among them, and to reach a better understanding between the two peoples. By holding Ottoman citizenship, the Sephardim hoped to prove to the Arabs that the Jews living in Palestine were loyal citizens of the country and were determined to act for its benefit. Here then, the discussion about Ottomanism is connected to relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, a discussion that *ha-Herut* and its writers were deeply engaged in. From what seems to be a pure and ideal approach toward loyalty to the empire, this phase highlights the benefits that the Jews could gain from such expressions of loyalty.

The last part of Ben-'Attar's argument is patronizing toward the Arab population of Palestine, as he presents the Jews as more advanced and sophisticated than the Arabs. This approach is related to *ha-Herut*'s claim that the Jewish community in Palestine could develop and promote life in the country both culturally and economically. This argument was demonstrated in the newspaper already a year earlier, in a series of articles from September 1913 that claim that the cultural and economic levels of life in Palestine had vastly changed since the Jews started settling in the country in the late nineteenth century. According to these articles, the Jewish farmers had developed agricultural, mechanical, and working techniques that helped the Arab farmers as well. Moreover, following the immigration of prominent physicians from Europe, the level of medicine was raised, too, for the benefit of both Jews and Arabs. The education system had progressed and now included the first technological university in the empire (the Technikum),

as well as a teacher's seminar, art institutions, and music schools.[33] The article argued that not only did the inhabitants of Palestine, Jews as well as Arabs, benefit from these developments, but also the Ottoman government, thanks to the taxes paid to it directly or indirectly (by the various products imported to Palestine). The Ottoman bureaucracy also benefited, as Jews enrolled in Ottoman institutions, such as military schools, and became loyal officials in the empire's administration and bureaucracy.[34] The advancement of the Jewish community in Palestine was thus presented as for the benefit of the Arab community of the country, as well as of the Ottoman Empire. The Jews, then, are presented here as agents of modernization in Palestine.

The next phase in the discussion about Ottomanism took place after the war began, and reflected more urgency than those preceding it. It focused on the connection between Ottomanism and service in the Ottoman army. Following the cancellation of the capitulations in Palestine in September 1914, the Ottoman government began threatening to expel from Palestine citizens of enemy countries, mainly Russians. Several Ottomanization committees were established around Palestine that tried to encourage foreign citizens to renounce their citizenship and adopt an Ottoman one. There was a great fear among the Jewish community that non-Ottoman citizens would leave the country independently, or would be expelled by the authorities. The concern for the future and the continuity of the Jewish community in Palestine was hence one of the incentives for encouraging foreign citizens to naturalize. There was a sense of urgency in this Ottomanization process, because those who were not Ottomans were indeed expelled, mainly to Egypt.[35] A long article entitled "To Our Jewish Brothers," published in *ha-Herut* in May 1915 and written by Albert 'Antebi and David Yellin, both members of the Ottomanization committee, is a good example for this phase of Ottomanism:

> 12 days are left for you to adopt Ottoman citizenship, or to get ready to leave the country. . . . This expulsion is not temporary, but a permanent one! . . . As Jews and Ottomans, we call upon you today and say: don't destroy in one minute what we have built for many years! Give up the disgraceful Russian citizenship to take the good certificate of our dear Turkey. . . . Remember the past, how much we have suffered, how many sacrifices have we made to keep our religion, race and language! . . . Only free and tolerant Turkey allows us to live according

to our own spirit, as Jews. In other places you can be French, English or Austrian, but here you are being offered to be Ottoman Jews. Can you decline this offer and remain foreigners? Naturalize, brothers, become Ottomans! This is the duty of the *yishuv,* of your religion, and also the duty of humanity. We live in one country, under one flag, one sky, one set of laws and in one homeland.[36]

Indeed, the signs of urgency are very clear here, as is also the attempt to employ the past Jewish experience as a catalyst for adopting Ottoman citizenship. Giving up Russian citizenship was seen by the Sephardim as the right thing to do, and a sign of loyalty and patriotism, as well as a service to the Jewish community in Palestine.

Service in the army was also seen as a sign of Ottoman loyalty. The Ottomanization committees published advertisements in the newspaper, in which they called upon Jews to volunteer for the army in order to defend the homeland. Serving in the army was seen as guaranteeing the future of the homeland and as an act that would define the future of the Jewish community in Palestine.[37] On the first day of conscription of Jewish soldiers to the army, the newspaper reported on the enthusiastic and patriotic feelings among the volunteers and the thousands of people greeting them in the streets of Jerusalem. As Yitzhak Shirizli, one of the conscripts, said in Turkish:

Oh homeland, open your arms and receive your sons who sacrifice their souls for you. . . . From east and west, from north and south, they come, regardless of religions and nations. All the people of the country realize their duty and are happily running to fulfill their duty. . . . The duty of the homeland is sacred in every country and language, and it precedes even the special needs of each people [*'Am* in Hebrew]. Oh brothers! The sons of one country! Poor and rich, we are all one now. We are all the sons of the country. We all have one thought in our hearts: to raise the honor of our kingdom [*mamlakha* in Hebrew, meaning here the empire].[38]

Apart from serving in the army, the Ottomanization committees also tried to encourage people to serve in the local "Popular Defense" units, which were established in various cities. The call to join these units, composed of local inhabitants, targeted all, but, as the advertisement in *ha-Herut* stressed, the call was

important mainly for the Jews. Joining these units would enable the Jews to prove their loyalty to the nation and homeland.[39]

Military service, then, in different forms, was used as proof of the loyalty of Jews to the empire, as well as their duty as equal citizens in Palestine. However, these calls were somewhat naïve, given the local reality, especially judging from the number of people, Jews and Arabs alike, who tried to avoid their service, either by paying the *Badel Askari* to postpone their service, or by finding other ways of avoiding it. However, the tax was high and only few could actually pay it. Moreover, each naturalized citizen had to pay a high naturalization tax, which was again beyond the reach of many people. The Zionist office in Jaffa and the main activists in the Ottomanization committees tried to assist as much as possible, both financially and by negotiating with the Ottoman authorities on ways to reduce or postpone military service. Despite all these efforts, only eight thousand Jews naturalized. Many chose to leave Palestine independently, or were expelled by the Ottoman authorities.[40]

The process described here, that of moving between "Ideal Ottomanism" to "Instrumental Ottomanism," reflects an understanding of the Sephardim regarding the changing realities in the region. Even though they still viewed the Ottoman Empire as their organizing and defining framework, they realized that the empire was facing both external and internal threats. Thanks to their special location in the Jewish community in Palestine, and their understanding of the developments taking place among the Arabs in the country and elsewhere, they were more aware than the Ashkenazi Zionists, for example, of the possible threat that the Arab national movement might pose. Hence, they were striving to maintain and strengthen the connection to the Ottoman Empire, which they perceived as the collective that they were most familiar with, and that had proven its ability to protect and assist them in the past as well.

Some Ashkenazi Zionists from the *new yishuv,* such as David Ben Gurion, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, and Moshe Sharett, were also preaching in favor of Ottomanism and were active in the Ottomanization committees during the first period of the war. Their assumption was that the Ottoman Empire would survive the war and that the only way the Jewish community would survive would be within the Ottoman context.[41] Ben Gurion, for example, viewed the Ottoman Empire as the framework for the national project of the Jewish community in Palestine, and saw the Turks as only the rulers of the country. He viewed Ottomanism as a sign

of loyalty to the empire, but what really motivated him were the national interests of the Jewish community in the country. Ottomanism, then, was for him a tool for Jewish national survival in Palestine.[42]

The difference here between the Sephardi and Ashkenazi attitudes toward Ottomanism reflects their different sets of priorities toward the national question in general and toward intercommunal relations in Palestine. This difference is more apparent when analyzing the ways these two groups viewed Zionism. What was Zionism for the Sephardi young intelligentsia, represented by *ha-Herut*? What was it for the Ashkenazi second *'aliya* Zionists?

zionism and the "arab question" in palestine: "inclusive" versus "exclusive" zionism

In her discussion of the Sephardi elite in Jerusalem and their perceptions of Zionism, Pnina Morag-Talmon claims that Sephardi Zionism was mainly cultural and less practical. Unlike the Ashkenazi immigrants to Palestine, who were affected by the processes of enlightenment, emancipation, and nationalism in Europe, the Sephardi elite in Jerusalem had to cope with those cultural and political processes in a different setting and context. This elite adopted the idea that stood at the basis of Zionist ideology, of the national unity of the Jews in Eretz Israel, but emphasized cultural components, such as the revival of the Hebrew language as a tool for national unity.[43]

Following Morag-Talmon's inference, that a difference existed between "Sephardi Zionism" and "Ashkenazi Zionism,"[44] I also claim that Zionism indeed played out differently among the Sephardi elite and the European Jewish immigrants to Palestine, especially those of the second *'aliya*. However, I differ from her claim that "Sephardi Zionism" lacked practical components. In order to demonstrate this, I will discuss the different ways Zionism played out in Sephardi and Ashkenazi discourse, by comparing the Sephardi newspaper *ha-Herut* with two workers' newspapers in pre–World War I Palestine, *ha-Po'el ha-Tz'air*[45] and *ha-Ahdut*.[46] By examining the questions that these newspapers focused on, I will show the difference in perception of Zionism and the national question in Palestine between the Sephardi elite, represented by *ha-Herut*, and the Ashkenazi immigrants of the second *'aliya,* represented by the workers' papers. I will argue that the Sephardim were aware of the Arabs living in the country,

and that many warned that not reaching an understanding with them might undermine the Jewish national project in Palestine. They realized the possible threat that the Arabs posed, but also viewed them as possible partners for a future life in the country. Hence, their version of Zionism was an "inclusive" one. The Second *'aliya* Ashkenazi version of Zionism, on the other hand, was an "exclusive" one—they prioritized the national project over anything else (class struggle specifically), and excluded the Arabs from the discussion about future life in Palestine.

Class and National Struggles According to the Workers' Newspapers

Two of the main issues that occupied the workers' papers in the period before the war were the tension between class struggle and national struggle and the promotion of Hebrew labor, the "conquest of labor." The "conquest of labor" *(Kibush ha-'Avoda)* was one of the basic foundations of Zionist ideology during this period. Hence, the Jewish workers were viewed as having a role in the national project, namely, to "conquer" the Jewish labor market and to replace the Arabs working in the different Jewish settlements. Jewish labor and Jewish self-reliance were perceived as essential to the national endeavor of the Zionist movement. A Jewish independent society in Palestine could not be based on Arab or foreign labor, it was claimed, and hence the concept of "Hebrew labor" became a national issue and an essential tool for the realization of Zionist ideals and Jewish life in Palestine. The idea of the "conquest of labor" also connoted a class conflict. The conflict was between the workers and the Jewish planters and landlords regarding working conditions and wages.[47]

"An essential condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all the labor professions in Palestine by the Jews."[48] This statement, published in *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir,* reflected the workers' agenda toward the labor issue in Palestine, and their intention to work in all professions, regardless of their status (in contrast to the professions that were perceived as "Jewish professions" in Europe). Jewish labor was perceived as the moral and material basis for Jewish settlement in Palestine and the only way by which Jews could become productive again. This issue was perceived as critical for the future of the Jewish community in Palestine. Thus, according to Ya'akov Zerubavel, the editor of *ha-Ahdut,* "Hebrew labor is the essence (of Zionism), the ability of the (Zionist) movement to turn

the (Jewish) people into an independent one."[49] In another editorial, Zerubavel claimed that the condition of Jewish society in general was dependent on the condition of Hebrew labor. The Jews in Palestine had to decide whether they wanted to establish a new society, which would be based on new foundations of labor and productivity.[50] What is implied in these statements is the contrast between the life of the Jews in Europe, which was perceived as unproductive, not self-sufficient, and even stagnant, and the new life in Palestine, which was supposed to create a new Jewish society. The new society would be based on self-reliance and would be economically independent.

National and class tensions were interwoven in the discussion regarding the labor issue. The struggle was against the competing Arab worker, but it was also against the Jewish landlord or employer who preferred the latter over the Jewish worker (because of the lower wages of the Arab worker).[51] The workers' papers did not hide their criticism of the Jewish employers who did not employ Jews. This issue was very clearly addressed in an article by Ya'akov Rabinovich in *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* entitled "Protection of the National Labor." The article reflects the connection between the class and national struggles: the class struggle is an internal Jewish struggle between the employers and the workers, whereas the national struggle is between the Jews and the Arabs. Although the Arabs are not mentioned directly in the article, it is clear whom the national struggle is aimed against.[52]

An article that mentioned the Arabs was published in *ha-Ahdut* in May 1912. The writer criticized Jewish farmers for not employing Jewish workers and mentioned that the objection should not be against Arab labor. "The Arab is our brother . . . but there is not enough Hebrew labor, and our aim should be that at least 80% of the labor would be ours, so that we would not feel that we exploit other peoples' work."[53] Here again, socialist rhetoric is used to discuss national issues, and the tension between socialist ideals and a nationalist agenda is clear.[54]

These articles reflect the conflicting interests among Jewish employers and workers toward the question of labor. These interests were related directly to the national question in Palestine. Viewing them as representations of a class conflict only would not be accurate.

An important essay, which deals directly with the debate regarding national versus class struggle, was written by Yitzhak Ben-Zvi for *ha-Ahdut* in January 1913. In this two-part essay, "National Protection and a Proletarian Perspective,"

Ben-Zvi tried to analyze the ways by which proletarian solidarity could be bound with the national rivalry with the Arabs. The dilemma is obvious: as "real" internationalist socialists, Jewish workers must not compete with other workers. The rivalry with Arab workers means that Jewish workers do not truly support the ideology of international class solidarity.[55] Ben-Zvi claimed that the national interests of the proletariat are strongly related to other interests, including class ones. The protection of national interests might sometimes cause rivalries between different national groups of workers. However, these rivalries are partial and temporary, and are related to specific historical periods. They do not mean that the international solidarity of the working class is invalid.[56] In the second part of his essay, Ben-Zvi dealt specifically with the situation in Palestine. The historical role of the Jewish workers in Palestine, he claimed, was to increase their number in the country. Hence, they had to cope with various difficulties, presented to them by both Jewish employers and Arab workers. There was still no Arab proletariat in Palestine, argued Ben-Zvi. The Jewish communities and workers ought to assist the Arab workers to turn into a working class. The role of the Jewish workers was thus to advance the industry and agriculture of Palestine, not by taking over the position of the Arabs but by helping their development as a class, as well as by advancing the country. The objective of the Jewish worker was not to inherit the role of the Arab worker, but to become more advanced and to create a more progressive life in Palestine. Class solidarity would thus be carried out after the Jewish consolidation in Palestine.[57]

The notions expressed here demonstrate the complexity of the debate regarding the "conquest of labor" within the workers' movement. This debate was both internal and external, and potentially contained both class and national struggles. The internal debate within the Jewish community was between the workers and the employers, whereas the external debate was between the Jewish and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. The national debate on the reactions toward the Arab national movement was a real and sincere one, which caused many debates and disagreements within the workers circles (in both parties, although *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* had realized already in 1914 that there were two national groups in Palestine).[58] The national struggle undermined the class struggle, and thus the main competitors were perceived as the Arabs, and not as the Jewish employers (although great feelings of resentment were expressed toward the latter). In relation to the "Arab question" the intention was first to separate the two labor

markets, and only after the establishment of an independent Jewish community to develop future relations with the Arab community in Palestine.[59]

The labor movement, then, viewed the national and class struggles as two contradictory processes. Class solidarity was viewed as important and essential, but only when the specific historical reality permitted the execution of such an agenda. Clearly, in the case of Palestine, the national struggle was more crucial than the class one. It was thus essential first to finalize the national issue, to promote Jewish national interests in Palestine, and only then to move to the class struggle and to the examination of future relations with the Arabs in Palestine. This version of Zionism, then, excludes the Arabs from the debate about future life in Palestine.

Relations with Muslims, Christians, the Ottoman Empire, and Ashkenazi Jews According to ha-Herut

The writers of *ha-Herut* devoted much time to discussing various aspects of the national question. In relation to this issue, I argue that the Sephardim present a complex view that at first seems contradictory. Their view is influenced by their awareness of the growing frustration and anger among the Arabs in Palestine, and of the growing power of the Arab national movement. On the one hand, they discussed ways of dealing with the Arabs and influencing them, and, on the other, they welcomed and encouraged possible partnership between Jews and Arabs in future life in the country, and viewed such partnership as the key to the success of Jewish life in Palestine.

Among the themes that were debated in *ha-Herut* were the ways by which the Jewish community should influence the Arabs in Palestine, and especially the Muslims among them, in order to convince them of the good intentions of the Jews in Palestine. Other issues discussed were Jewish loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, as described at length earlier, and the hopes of cooperating with the Arabs and coexisting with them. Another theme was the newspaper's criticism of the "political activists" (*ha-'askanim* in Hebrew) who failed to achieve any progress regarding Jewish life in Palestine. It was implied that the "activists" were the Ashkenazi Jews, who had failed to integrate the Jews in Palestine into one unit, as well as to truly understand developments among the Arabs in Palestine. These themes exemplify the approach of *ha-Herut* in contrast to the two workers' papers. The

newspaper expressed a desire to cooperate and coexist with the Arabs, declared loyalty to the empire, and expressed its concern regarding the future of the Jewish community in Palestine, and hence presented what I call an "Inclusive Zionism" approach.

According to the writers of *ha-Herut,* the decision to influence the Arab press was spurred by constant attacks by the Arab newspapers, especially those owned by Christian Arabs, on the Jewish community and the Zionist movement. Some of those essays are presented in *ha-Herut.*[60] The Christians were named "the troublemakers," "the enemy" (*ha-Zorerim* in Hebrew), and were perceived as the worst enemies of the Jews in Palestine. In this context, two Arabic newspapers were frequently mentioned: *al-Karmil* and *Filastin.* These newspapers, as well as the Syrian *al-Muqtabas,* were viewed as spreading anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist propaganda among the Palestinian Arabs. The two former papers were Christian-owned newspapers, but the latter was a Muslim-owned one.[61] Their criticism toward the Jews focused on several issues, according to *ha-Herut:* Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, disloyalty of the Jews to the Ottoman Empire, as well as criticism of the Arab land sales to the Jews.[62] The newspaper thus distinguished between the Muslim and the Christian Arabs, a distinction that will be further discussed.

Following the consistent and growing criticism toward the Jewish community in Palestine, the motivation of the Jews became to try and change the Arab perception toward them. In this context, the Palestinian office in Jaffa, headed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, established a press bureau in 1911 whose aim was to follow the Arabic press and translate articles from Arabic to Hebrew and German. By publishing the translations in *ha-Herut* and elsewhere, the writers aimed to expose the Jewish readers to the Arab press, so that they would know what was written on the Jews in the various newspapers. As part of this bureau, Jewish writers fluent in Arabic, such as Dr. Nissim Malul and Dr. Shimon Moyal, published articles in the Arabic press, in which they explained the agenda and ideology of the Zionist movement.

The discussion that took place in *ha-Herut* was related to this effort but involved a more profound debate regarding future relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, as well as regarding the identity of the Jewish community. The analysis of this debate and the ideas expressed by some of the writers show that the motivation of *ha-Herut* was more than just to follow the Arabic press, but to

try and encourage more understanding between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and create more integration and cooperation between the two national communities. In short, *ha-Herut*'s writers, even though expressing at times different views regarding the national tension in Palestine, nevertheless realized the importance of Jewish–Arab relations in the country. They understood the threat that the national conflict posed to the Zionist movement and to the future of the Jewish community in Palestine, and constantly warned about the urgency in finding a solution to the problem. As the analysis here shows, this debate had several levels, which intermingled with each other.[63]

The first debated issue focused on the best means to influence Arab readers and the best ways to approach the Arab community in Palestine. The first option raised in *ha-Herut* was the establishment of an Arabic-Hebrew paper, which would be written in Arabic and would expose the Arab readers to the real intentions of the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine. The second idea was to publish articles in the existing Arabic newspapers that would clarify Zionist attitudes.

The views regarding this issue varied. In an essay from July 1, 1912, the prominent writer Shmuel Ben-Shabat supported the "penetration" of the existing Arabic press. Ben-Shabat claimed that the initial idea to publish a new newspaper was occasioned by the constant attacks against Jews in the Arabic press, but the Zionist leadership in Palestine did not carry out this initiative. However, claimed Ben-Shabat, following the triumph of the CUP in Istanbul, the attacks against the Jews in the Arabic press had significantly decreased. This change occurred following the publication of various articles in the Arabic press, which were written by Nissim Malul. These articles, praising the Jewish community and explaining its necessity for the promotion of life in Palestine, convinced Ben-Shabat that the best way to influence the press was by publishing in the existing Arabic newspapers.[64]

A different view was expressed in the December 17, 1912, issue of *ha-Herut,* by Haim Ben-'Attar.[65] He mentioned the renewed attacks in the Arabic press, and claimed that the only way to influence the press would be to publish an Arabic newspaper. He blamed the "political activists from Jaffa" for not issuing such a newspaper earlier. Such a paper could have been distributed among the Palestinian Muslims, claimed Ben-'Attar, and used for moderating the attacks toward the Jews. Moreover, an Arabic newspaper could have proved to the Muslims that

the Jews were loyal to the Ottoman Empire, contrary to the accusations of the Arabic press.

Another contribution to the ongoing debate regarding relations with the Arabs and the status of the Arabic language in Palestine was offered in a three-part essay written by Dr. Nissim Malul.[66] Malul responded to Ya'akov Rabinovich's attack against him in *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir,* and to the Ashkenazi Zionists critics who feared that, by learning Arabic and assimilating with the "natives" *(Anshei ha-Aretz),* the Jews would lose their nationalism. He argued that if the Jews wanted to settle in Palestine they must learn Arabic, the language spoken in the country. Interestingly, he also claimed that language is not a major component of national identity:

> There is no necessary condition for the nationalist to know his language (Sic! The editor). The nationalist is a nationalist in his national feeling, but not his language (! The editor), the nationalist is nationalist in his national acts.[67]

Hence, national consciousness is demonstrated by activities, not by the language spoken by the people, according to Malul. Malul ends his third essay by claiming, "We should know Arabic well and assimilate with the Arabs (Sic!? The editor) . . . as a Semitic nation we should base our Semitic nationalism and not blur it with European culture; with Arabic we will be able to create a real Hebrew culture."[68]

This is a very unique view, which stands in complete contrast to the workers views, as demonstrated earlier, and also to most nationalist thinking of the time, which connected language to national identity. However, it also contradicts the spirit of *ha-Herut,* which perceived the spread of the Hebrew language among the Jews in Palestine as one of its main objectives. At the end of Malul's essays, the editor of *ha-Herut* briefly commented on the idea of assimilation. He agreed that Arabic should be taught and used among the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as the *second* language, and not as the first and main one. The national language, claimed the editor, must be Hebrew. Assimilation with the Arabs would risk the status of the Jews in Palestine and would undermine their culture and traditions.[69]

Another issue raised in Malul's essays was the different reaction of Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews to the idea of issuing a joint Arabic-Hebrew newspaper. He

claimed that most of the Ashkenazi Jews opposed the idea, whereas the Sephardi Jews supported it. He added another aspect to this debate by mentioning the Sephardi Jews in countries such as Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, who were not involved in any Zionist activity. These Jews were familiar only with Arabic and establishing a newspaper that they could read and that would expose them to Zionist ideas was thus essential.[70]

The connection that Malul made between the language question and the Sephardi–Ashkenazi distinction was not exceptional in *ha-Herut*. Other articles in the newspaper accused Ashkenazi Jews of not knowing the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, not reading their newspapers, and not realizing that the Arabs too were developing a national consciousness. This is an important point because it reflects the way the Sephardim perceived themselves as more aware of internal developments within the Arab community than the Ashkenazi Jews.[71] This accusation was linked again to *ha-Herut*'s critique of the "political activists," the second *'aliya* Zionists, who had not promoted the idea of a joint Arabic-Hebrew newspaper. Moreover, these activists were accused of not creating a united Jewish community in Palestine. Hence, according to some articles, Jewish society was still disintegrated and divided, a division that weakened Jewish claims over Palestine and halted the further development of the Jewish community in the country.[72]

The lively debate that took place in *ha-Herut* regarding relations with the Arabs, the status of Arabic, the establishment of an Arabic–Hebrew newspaper and the response to the attacks on Zionism in the Arabic press had some practical implications. The first was the establishment of a Jewish daily newspaper written in Arabic, *Sawt al-'Uthmaniyya* (the Voice of Ottomanism), edited by Dr. Shimon Moyal and his wife, the writer Esther Azhari Moyal. The newspaper was established in Jaffa in 1913 and ceased publication following the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The Moyals viewed this newspaper as an organ for replying to the attacks published against Zionism in the Arabic press and invested much money and energy in it—it is argued that they invested around four thousand francs in its publication. It also reflected their stand vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, reflecting their loyalty to it. *Sawt al-'Uthmaniyya* was distributed in Haifa and Jaffa, and Moyal also sent copies to Beirut and Syria.[73] It was a short-lived attempt to realize the vision of some of *ha-Herut*'s writers regarding the establishment of an Arabic–Hebrew newspaper.[74]

The second practical manifestation of the discussions that took place in *ha-Herut* was the establishment in April 1914 of a new association called *ha-Magen* (The Shield). The association was established in Jaffa by representatives of prominent Sephardi and Maghrebi families who belonged to the same milieu as that of the writers and readers of *ha-Herut.* Among the members of the group were Nissim Malul, Shimon and Esther Moyal, Avraham Elmaliach, David Moyal, Yosef Amzalek, Yosef Eliyahu Chelouche, Ya'akov Chelouche, Moshe Matalon, David Hivan, and Yehoshua Elkayam.[75]

Avraham Elmaliach, the secretary of *ha-Magen,* described the background of the organization in its founding manifesto. The organization was established following the attacks against the Jewish community in the Arab press, which came despite the attempts and hopes of the Jews to work side by side with the Arabs for the advancement and development of Palestine, "their country our country . . . the shared homeland" (in Hebrew: *artzam artzenu . . . ha-moledet ha-meshutefet*).[76] Realizing that something needed to be done against these attacks, Elmaliach continued:

> We, the Sephardim, who know the language of the country and who read this poisonous press daily, we who know the Arab people with whom we are living, who start feeling the change [in it] for the worst . . . we realized that we cannot sit silently while such great danger threatens the entire *yishuv.*[77]

The overarching objective of *ha-Magen* was to "defend by all *kosher* and legal means our status in the land." More specifically, it had both internal and external concerns. Internally, the association would endeavor to strengthen the ties between the Jews and the rest of the inhabitants of the country and the government. It intended to target the Hebrew, Arabic, and Turkish press by doing two things. The first was to translate articles that focused on Jews into Hebrew, and the second was to encourage people to respond to the articles that appeared in the Arabic and Turkish press and send articles that could improve the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. *Ha-Magen* would also try to influence the Arabic and Turkish press by increasing their subscribers and readers and improving their style and content.

Externally, the association would strive to secure all the civic and political rights of the Jews, including voting rights to the municipality and parliament. To

reach this goal, *ha-Magen* would translate all the governmental laws into Hebrew, so that everyone would know their rights and duties. The association would try to bring Jews and Arabs together by establishing a joint literary club, and would encourage publishing essays on Judaism and Islam with the hope of contributing to good relations between the two peoples.[78]

Ha-Magen serves as an example of an attempt to carry out the vision of the young Sephardi intelligentsia toward the Arabs in Palestine. Its basic premises were joint ownership of Palestine by both Jews and Arabs, and shared responsibility between them.[79] The special role of the Sephardim is demonstrated here as well. They are viewed as the "contacts" with the Arab population in Palestine, as those who could serve as the link between the Jews and the Arabs, thanks to their language skills and their knowledge of Arabic. The members of *ha-Magen* felt that they could serve as mediators between Jews and Arabs in Palestine by introducing the Jews to what was written about them in the Arabic press, and likewise the Arabs to the real intentions of the Zionist movement and the Jewish community. It seems that they truly felt they belonged to both worlds and could serve as a bridge between them.[80] The association, however, had limited power and influence. It had a branch only in Jaffa, and ceased its activity at the beginning of World War I. On the other hand, the writers who published articles in the Arabic press, such as Dr. Nissim Malul and Dr. Shimon Moyal, were indeed prominent figures in both the Hebrew and Arabic press at the time.

The analysis thus far demonstrated the different agendas held by the Sephardi newspaper *ha-Herut* and the workers' newspapers, *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* and *ha-Ahdut*. The two workers' newspapers clearly preferred the national struggle to the class struggle, and marked one of their main objectives as "the conquest of labor" and the independent development of the Jewish community in Palestine. Class solidarity and class struggle would be carried out only following the success of the national struggle. Only then would relations with the Arab population in the country be examined. Their agenda was exclusionist of the Arabs, as they created a clear distinction between Jews and Arabs in the country in order to create an independent Jewish community in Palestine. Only after the establishment of such a community would cooperation and a settlement with the Arabs be possible.

Ha-Herut, on the other hand, being aware of the national tension that was developing in the country, realized the urgency in dealing with it. It presented

a view that believed in cooperation with the Arabs (mainly Muslims) in Palestine, and perceived them as possible partners for future life in the country. The newspaper was constantly struggling with the question of how to affect and influence the Arabs in Palestine and convince them of the good intentions of the Jews living in the country. While reflecting national views as well, and expressing at times patronizing attitudes toward the Arabs, the writers of *ha-Herut* nevertheless realized that Jewish life in Palestine was tightly linked with that of the Arabs. The newspaper made a clear distinction between Christians and Muslims, claiming that the Christians provoked the Muslims against the Jews. There was hope to cooperate with the Muslims for the promotion and success of Palestine, as well as of the Ottoman Empire. It also attacked the "political activists" (probably the Ashkenazi Zionist activists) for not doing enough for the promotion of a united and integrated Jewish community in Palestine, and for not realizing the urgency of the "Arab question" and promoting cooperation with the Arabs in Palestine.

In her article, while discussing specifically the Turkish Jewish community, Esther Benbassa claims that "it would be more accurate to speak of Zionisms, in the plural, and to make a particular distinction between currents brought in from outside and local nationalist variants."[81] In the preceding discussion I distinguished between two forms of Zionism, one presented by the workers' newspapers and the other presented by *ha-Herut.* However, the question is, how do we characterize these two forms of Zionism? Can the distinction be between "Ashkenazi—second *'aliya* Zionism" versus "Sephardi/Maghrebi Zionism"? Or can *ha-Herut*'s Zionism be characterized as "Ottoman Zionism," as analyzed by Michelle Campos, while emphasizing the Sephardim's commitment to the Ottoman body politic?[82] The first distinction, between "Ashkenazi" and "Sephardi" Zionism, is only partially accurate, because, as was demonstrated earlier, some of the advocates of the latter were Ashkenazi and not necessarily Sephardi Jews. A distinction between an "*old yishuv*'s Zionism," represented by the Sephardim, and a "*new yishuv*'s Zionism," represented by the Ashkenazim, is also only partially correct, as it assumes a clear distinction between the *old* and *new yishuv* and the clear-cut affiliation of the Sephardi Jews to the *old yishuv.*[83] Another definition is offered by Itzhak Bezalel, who claims that the "Sephardi-Mizrahi Zionism" varied from European forms of Zionism. This form of Zionism is directly connected to Judaism and to the belief in redemption, he argues. The Sephardim, according to Bezalel, were supportive of the Jewish immigration and colonization of

Palestine, but less supportive of the political and ideological dimensions of political Zionism.[84]

In the Palestinian context the distinction that I offer here is between "Inclusive Zionism" and "Exclusive Zionism." "Inclusive Zionism" refers to the orientation of the Sephardi intelligentsia, whereas "Exclusive Zionism" refers to the Ashkenazi, second *'aliya* Zionists. The "Inclusive Zionism" approach was more attuned to local conditions in Palestine, to the existence of two peoples in the country, and to the need for living together in one locale. It was a more pacified and realistic approach, which considered the situation in Palestine while thinking about future relations between the different inhabitants of the country. As examined at length earlier, the notion of Ottomanism, loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, played a major role in the "Inclusive Zionism" approach and enabled the young Sephardi intelligentsia to examine the reality in Palestine through a lens different from that of the European Zionist. Their loyalty to the empire affected the Sephardi perspective both toward the local Ottoman authorities and also toward the Arabs living in the country. However, I claim that it was not only the complex web of identity of the Sephardi elite that enabled them to view Zionism differently. It was also their special location in the urban setting and their life experience that affected their unique perspective.

SHIFTING ALLIANCES I: MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS, "LOCAL JEWS," AND ZIONISTS

The Distinction Between Christians and Muslims

As mentioned earlier, the Sephardi writers made a clear distinction between Muslim and Christian Arabs. The latter were perceived as "the worst enemies" and as inciters of the Muslims against the Jews and the Zionist movement. These views raise the question of whether this distinction between Muslims and Christians was justified. Were the Christian newspapers really more aggressive toward the Jews than the Muslim ones? Why did the Sephardi Jews in particular make this distinction?

This distinction was debated among several scholars, including Neville Mandel, Rashid Khalidi, as well as, much earlier, Malul himself. One of their concerns was whether the religious affiliation of the editor of the newspaper had

any influence on the views expressed in the newspaper. Another issue that was debated was the nature of the newspaper's opposition toward Zionism and the CUP.[85] It seems that the newspapers and their attitudes did not provide any real justification for the distinction between Christians and Muslims. However, the distinction still existed in the eyes of the Sephardim. How can this be explained?

One explanation to this distinction concerns the life experience of the Sephardi Jews, as was discussed earlier. Although Jews and Muslims were closely linked to each other in daily life, Christians were always more remote. Another explanation is related to the Sephardim's loyalty to the empire, and the external threats that the Ottoman Empire had faced during the Balkan wars. The two Balkan wars shook the stability of the empire, as most of its Christian territories were lost. The wars were extremely harsh for the Muslim inhabitants of the empire, as most of the Balkan Muslims lost their homes and became refugees. The wars signaled a growing tension between Muslims and Christians within the empire, as the Christians were perceived as sympathizers of Europe, and sometimes as European collaborators. The Sephardim may have been influenced by the anti-Christian feelings throughout the empire and developed hostile feelings toward the Christians as well. As loyal Ottoman citizens, the Sephardim viewed the Christians as part of the general betrayal process in the empire, which took place during the Balkan wars.[86]

Moreover, the Sephardi resentment toward the Christian Arabs can also be explained by the collective experience of Ottoman Jews in the empire. Over the years, the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire had persecuted Jews, because of economic, religious, and ethnic reasons. The Jews perceived Ottoman rule as the best protector against Christian anti-Semitism, and sought its protection when the empire lost its European territories.[87] The Christians also enjoyed the protection and assistance of the Western powers, which were perceived as imperialists by the Ottoman Empire. On the local level, the activities of the Christian missions may have also contributed to the feeling of resentment of the Sephardim toward the Christians. Initially, those missions targeted Jews, especially Sephardi Jews, and the missions were hence perceived as a great danger to Jewish children and their upbringing. To all this may be added the historical memory of life side by side with the Muslims before and after the Spanish expulsion of 1492, and their shared persecution by Spanish Christians. Thus,

the Sephardim's reaction toward the Christians was influenced by this historical experience. Moreover, it is suggested that the link between the Christians and the Western powers stimulated the criticism of the Sephardim against the Ashkenazim, as was discussed earlier.

"Local Jews," Zionists, and "Arab Jews"

The distinction between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, both regarding their location within the country and their ability to understand and deal with the relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, can be found in several contexts. For example, in a series of interviews with Avraham Elmaliach, conducted in 1964, in which he discussed the relations between the Sephardim and the Arabs in Palestine in retrospect. Highlighting the notion of the Sephardim as intermediaries between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, as well as his criticism toward the Zionist leadership, he said:

> If we [the Sephardim] had started to deal with the "Arab Problem" not after the Balfour declaration but before it—even before World War I, when we established the *ha-Magen* association and dealt with the Arabic press. . . . If we had dealt with this seriously, things would have looked different. Because of various reasons—because some of the Zionist leaders did not deeply understand the "Arab problem," or because they may have thought that they would be able to solve the problem of Eretz Israel without the Arabs—it all went in vain. In the meantime the Arab national movement began to gain power, and then it was very difficult to talk with the Arabs.[88]

Indeed, this implied distinction between "local Jews," when referring to the Sephardim, and "Zionists," with reference to Ashkenazi Zionists, appears in several contexts. One example is in the reports submitted by the King-Crane Commission in 1919. In describing whom the committee members were to meet while in Palestine, and how long was to be spent with each group, it was written that: "The said Commission granted the Muslims and the Christians seven hours to express their opinions before it. The Jews were accorded but two hours; one for the *Zionists* and one for the *local Jews, Ashkenazim and Sephardim*."[89]

When the representatives of the Sephardi community in Jerusalem met with the commission and were asked about the relations between them and the other communities in the country, Yosef Meyuhas, one of the representatives, answered:

> I am a Palestinian, born here and the son of a family who have lived here for 250 years. I know all the categories of inhabitants in the land, the villagers as well as the townsmen. Many of the Arab townsmen learned Arabic with me; I have been through my long teaching of the Arabic language in close relations with the Arabs, and I can bear witness with a full knowledge of the situation . . . there are many points of junction between Arabs and Jews. . . . The Sephardim, the old local element, will serve as a link between the Arabs and the newcomers. And is there a better instrument of entente than the knowledge of the reciprocal languages? We are now walking on this path of entente.[90]

A similar distinction between the Zionists and the local, Ottoman Jews was made by some Muslim notables from Jerusalem who were candidates for the parliament, in an interview to the Egyptian newspaper *al-Iqdam* in March 1914 (quoted in *ha-Herut*). While discussing Zionism and the Jewish community in Palestine, Raghib Nashashibi distinguished between the Ottoman Jews and the foreign subjects, and said:

> I do not object to the Ottoman Jews, but to the foreign subjects among them. The Ottoman Jew enjoys the same rights as we do, and if the foreign Jew indeed wishes to get closer to us [the Muslims] he would have adopted Ottoman citizenship and learned the language of the country, so that he would understand us and we would understand him, so that we would all work for the benefit of the homeland. . . . If I get elected as a representative to the parliament I will do whatever is in my power to fight Zionism and Zionists without harming the feeling of our Ottoman brothers.[91]

Nashashibi used the same argumentation the writers of *ha-Herut* did while advocating the idea of Ottomanization among foreign subjects. He viewed the adoption of Ottoman citizenship as the main condition of living in the country, and considered Ottoman Jews as full and equal citizens.

An even sharper distinction was made in a much later editorial published in *al-Quds al-Sharif* newspaper on July 8, 1920. The editorial was entitled "To the

Jewish Arabs and the Zionists" (also referred to in the article as "foreign Zionists"). The Jewish-Arabs are presented as "living in our country from time immemorial [*mundhu ta'rikhuna al-hijri*]," with their rights protected and preserved by the Arabs. The Zionists, on the other hand, claimed that Palestine is their country. However, the writer continues:

> This claim is a clear lie and history is the biggest witness. Our ancestors the Canaanites lived in this country before your [the Zionists'] ancestors, will you deny it? Then your ancestors came and began to spread corruption until they were able to enter [the country] slowly slowly. . . . Our language is not your language, our customs are not your customs, and our nature is not your nature [character, *khulq*].[92]

The interesting part about this editorial is the way the local Jews in Palestine were referred to as "Arab Jews," and the distinction that was made between them and the Zionists who had only recently immigrated to the country. The use of the term "Canaanites" in reference to the local Arabs is interesting as well. This terminology was obviously used to undermine the place of Zionism in Palestine, and to highlight the "local Jews" who had been living in the country before the Zionists arrived. The Sephardim may not have fully supported this clear-cut distinction made between them and the Zionists, as two broad distinct categories, as many of them considered themselves Zionists as well, as was discussed earlier.

Indeed, an intriguing category that is relevant to this discussion is that of "Arab Jew," which challenges the seemingly fixed and unchangeable categories of "Arab" and "Jew." As was demonstrated earlier, these categories can be complicated and broken based on ethnic and religious criteria, and hence can be more fluid and negotiable. The term "Arab Jew" is an example of an attempt to challenge the ethno-national divisions, and to suggest a hybrid category that has the potential of calling into question these distinctions, so embedded into the national-based narratives.

Who are "Arab Jews"? How can this group be characterized? Can it imply to some of the Sephardim discussed here? While discussing the life of the Hebronite writer Ishaq Shami, Salim Tamari refers to him as an Arab Jew, or a Jewish Arab, which he considers as one of the most contested Levantine identities. It

is designated for the forgotten group of Mashriqi (Eastern) Jews who identified themselves with the rising Arab national movement and its emancipatory program, and who shared language and culture with their Muslim and Christian compatriots in the Ottoman Empire. Using the category of "Arab Jew" serves to undermine the apposition of Arab and Jew as two distinctive categories, whose existence was not always self-evident, and allows other voices to be heard. Hence, Ishaq Shami, rooted in Arab culture, language, and customs, as well as in Jewish secular life, lived in a constant duality, between two worlds.[93]

Yehuda Shenhav and Ella Shohat also use the term "Arab Jew" for their critical analysis, though in a very specific historical context. Shenhav uses it in order to discuss the tension between nationalism, religion, and ethnicity, as demonstrated in the case of the Jewish Iraqi immigrants to Palestine in the 1940s. This category existed at a certain moment in history, and was cut off following the development of the Zionist discourse on the one hand, and Arab nationalism on the other. The model of "Arab Jew," claims Shenhav, "shatters the binary polarity between Jewishness and Arabness and posits continuity instead. In other words, it proposes a historical model that is not in conflict with Arabness and that contested the de-Arabization of Jewish nationalism."[94]

Ella Shohat refers to "Arab Jews" as mediating entities, and similarly to Shenhav, uses this category to extend the critical discourse regarding Zionism beyond the dichotomies of East versus West, Arab versus Jew, and Palestinian versus Israeli. Focusing on the Sephardi Jews from Arabic-speaking countries, she claims that the Zionist project brought a painful binarism into the formerly relatively peaceful relationship between diverse Palestinian religious communities, while forcing the Sephardi Jews to choose between anti-Zionist "Arabness" and a pro-Zionist "Jewishness." Arabness and Jewishness were posed as opposing each other, as two dichotomies that could not be bridged.[95]

In both Shenhav's and Shohat's writings, the term of reference is *Iraqi Jews,* some of whom referred to themselves as "Arab Jews" even following their (forced or voluntary) immigration to Palestine and later Israel. However, is this category applicable to some of the Sephardi Jerusalemites? Two figures mentioned earlier, Dr. Nissim Malul and Dr. Shimon Moyal, may demonstrate in their biography and unique perspective this interesting hybrid identity, although they have not referred to themselves as "Arab Jews." Born in Palestine to Maghrebi families (Malul in Safed in 1892, Moyal in Jaffa in 1866), they completed their higher

education in Egypt (Malul) and Lebanon (Moyal), and lived for a significant time in Cairo. Fluent in Arabic, they both published in the Arabic press *(al-Muqattam, Filastin,* and *al-Karmil).* Malul worked as a translator for the Zionist office, and later established two Arabic newspapers, *al-Akhbar* and *al-Salam,* both of them funded by the Zionist movement, and preached in favor of Jewish–Arab understanding. Their joint publication *Sawt al-ʻUthmaniyya* and their activity in *ha-Magen* association were discussed earlier.[96]

Moyal and Malul present a very unique perspective on the evolving national conflict during the years before World War I (and in the case of Malul, also during the Mandate), as well as toward the unfolding nature of Arab–Jewish relations in Palestine. In the close connection they had with the Arab world, and in their dual location—as being both in Palestine and active in the Jewish community, but also very involved in Arab cultural, intellectual, and political life—they demonstrate the duality that characterizes the "Arab Jews." What stands out in much of their political and intellectual activity in Palestine was a belief that close ties must be developed between Jews and Arabs (especially Muslims) in the country, that Jews who did not know Arabic must be exposed to Arabs and their culture, and, finally, that it was important to act as loyal Ottomans in advancing the development of Palestine. The identification with the Ottoman Empire played an important role in the perceptions of these individuals, and made their voice complex, combining in them both Zionism and Ottomanism, both Jewishness and Arabness.[97]

Moyal and Malul emphasized the commonalities between Jews and Muslims, while viewing the Christian Arabs as inciting national tension and hatred toward Jews and Zionists. Moyal, through *ha-Magen* association, engaged in political activity that was oppositional to the two Christian-owned newspapers published in Palestine at the time, all the while actively trying to expose these newspaper's readers to the "real intentions" of the Jews and the possibility of working together for the advancement of Palestine. They viewed Sephardi Jews as a possible bridge between Jews and Arabs, and as promoters of mutual understanding. They both worked in cooperation with the Zionist office in Jaffa, but criticized some of the Zionists' policies toward relations with the Arabs. It seems that their ability to view both perspectives, the Zionist and the Arab nationalist, enabled them to operate between these two worlds, even though it is quite clear that their loyalty was always to the Jewish-Zionist cause.

Malul and Moyal encapsulate, in many ways, some of the issues that were discussed earlier regarding the Sephardi community in Jerusalem: the centrality of Ottomanism and the way it played out, and their approach toward Zionism and the "Arab question." Focusing on the Sephardi intelligentsia as a case study and examining their multiple and complex set of identities and loyalties demonstrate the ways in which existing categories, which seem to be inherent to Palestinian history and historiography, may be challenged. Such categories include, for example, that of "Arabs" versus "Jews." These binary categories can be broken into smaller and more complicated ones, some of which, such as the "Arab Jew" category, are also very challenging. Moreover, by distinguishing between "inclusive" and "exclusive" forms of Zionism, this chapter demonstrated the complex and heterogeneous nature of Zionism and highlighted the varied ethnic composition of the Zionist movement. Zionism was not a homogeneous, monolithic ideology, and there was more than one way of imagining future life in Palestine. The ethnic factor was indeed an important part in the process of national formation.

This complex web of identities and manifestations of nationalism was possible, I argue, especially at this moment in history, during the transition between two empires and two historic periods. This seems to be almost the last chance for such fluid categories to exist and be negotiated before they were fixated by foreign powers and interests, such as the British mandatory regime.

4

When a City Changes Hands

Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule

> Field Marshall Lord Allenby, the man who has freed Palestine, Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia, thereby breaking the barbarous yoke of the Turk, after five hundred years of oppression. Allenby's capture of the Holy City of Jerusalem is most gratifying to all Christians. The Turkish Empire has crumbled and fallen, and a new Arab nation is in the making. The Holy Land is once more free! Field Marshal Lord Allenby's tribute to his armies: "I had such an army as man has never commanded."[1]

This quote appeared at the beginning of an official British film that documented the entrance of General Allenby to Jerusalem on December 11, 1917. The words that are used to describe this event capture the way British officials viewed this moment in history, in which the British army entered Jerusalem and freed it "from the yoke of the Turk." It demonstrates the strong symbolic value of this event, especially for Christians, and shows how British propaganda wanted this event to be remembered by the world.

This chapter focuses on what is being described in this quote—the moment at which Jerusalem "changed hands" and "moved" from the Ottoman Empire to British administration. This is when Jerusalem can be described as an "interimperial city," a city that shifts between two empires. Two days before the event described here, on December 9, British forces first entered the city, and the mayor, Hussein al-Husayni, approached their soldiers with a white flag and gave them the keys to Jerusalem on behalf of the city's residents. This moment of "delivery" of the city symbolizes the transition from one ruler to the other, from four hundred years of Muslim rule over Palestine to Christian, British rule over it. It

also marks the end of a very difficult period of war and crisis in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine. The process of transition from one empire to the other was long and complicated, and this particular moment of transition symbolically represents this process, its ambivalence, and the sensitivities that it entailed.

What stood at the core of the transition process was the British intention to rule the city (and eventually the country), without being perceived merely as colonizers. This was reflected in the way they wished the occupation to be carried out and be perceived by the local population, in the ways they viewed the religious divisions among the city's communities. It was also manifested in the British setup of the military administration in the first few years of their rule.

This chapter moves deliberately back and forth between the British perception and imagination of this event and that of the local population. The first section discusses how British officials—generals, statesmen, and clergymen—imagined the occupation of Jerusalem. The symbolism used in the discussions and debates that preceded the occupation is important and reflects the British aspiration of ruling the country with minimum opposition coming from the local population or from other great powers. The second section analyzes the actual process of surrender of Jerusalem and Allenby's entrance into the city, and emphasizes the symbolic aspects of these events and their implications on the residents of Jerusalem. Lastly, this chapter will analyze the first impressions of British soldiers of the city and its inhabitants, and examine the initial reactions of the local population toward the new rulers of their city, following the end of Ottoman rule.

IN PREPARATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE HOLY CITY

The preparations for the campaign in Palestine and for the entry of British forces into Jerusalem were discussed at length well before the actual occupation of the city. In addition to their military preparations, the British were very concerned about the reaction of the local population in the city toward a British occupation, or rather toward the occupation by a Christian force that ended four hundred years of Muslim rule over the country.

As early as September 1914, an intelligence report was sent to the War Office in Cairo, which included an estimation of the state of affairs in Palestine. The letter was signed by "a native of Jerusalem." According to the writer:

There is a growing feeling among all classes of men in Palestine in favor of a foreign occupation of the country, especially of an occupation by Great Britain. . . . This desire was first limited to the Christian elements, but in these latter days of oppression and plunder it has rapidly spread among Muslims, a large number of whom are more eager for it than Christians. . . . It should, however, be noted that there is a large number of Mohammedans who are bitterly opposed to any foreign occupation of their country, and who would join forces with the Turkish troops in resisting any such intrusion.

The writer continues to describe the Turkish oppression, the difficulties that were posed by conscription into the Ottoman army, the confiscation of houses, agricultural products and animals, and the fleeing of young people to Egypt and America. He repeats his assessment that the Christians and Jews of Palestine "eagerly await emancipation," and claims that in Jerusalem even notable families such as the Husaynis and Khalidis eagerly wish an occupation.[2]

This report should be treated with suspicion. At the early date when it was written, September 1914, the cruelty and oppression of the Ottoman occupation of Palestine was not yet so heavily felt. The local population of the big cities and of the rural areas started feeling the oppression and distress only later in the war, following the arrival of Cemal Paşa in the region and his harsh treatment of the various communities. In addition, the families of note were not supportive of a foreign occupation at this early stage of the war. Most probably, at this early stage, no one could have imagined that three years later Britain would occupy Jerusalem and put an end to Ottoman rule. However, this report, despite these shortcomings, is significant because it was one of the first documents to recognize how important it was for the British, already at this early stage of the war, to characterize the attitudes of the local population toward them and the Ottoman Empire. It also helps in understanding the division between Muslims and Christians in the country.

A report that seems to be more reliable was published two years later by the Arab Bureau in Cairo on December 29, 1916. This report is based on testimonies of residents of Jerusalem who fled to Cairo, and focuses on the political situation in Jerusalem and the distinctions between the local communities. Discussing the administration of the city, the report claims that most public offices, apart from those held by Turkish officials, were in the hands of members of the

three prominent Muslim families, the Husaynis, Khalidis, and Nashashibis. Even though these families are "compelled to keep in with the Turks, none of them can be described as being out-and-out pro-Turk. Many of them come into contact with Western schools and have become enlightened as to the frauds and corruption of the Turkish government." The writer also argues that Britain holds the most prestigious position among the native Muslims, who, with very few exceptions, would resent any interference by other foreign countries such as Russia, France, or Italy.[3] Again, the Muslims are viewed as the community that might potentially resist a British occupation of the city, and hence the various reports pay special attention to this particular community.

Another report regarding the situation in Palestine and the attitudes of the local population appeared in April 1917. Here the assessment is that the majority of the population would support a British occupation. The writer estimated that "with the exception of the Circassian colonies planted by the Turks east of the Jordan, I don't think there is a single section of the population of Syria or Palestine or even of the desert that cannot be regarded as friendly to us. All the Arab population, Muslims and Christians alike, are longing for the day of their deliverance from the Turks. The Jews can be relied on to give us active co-operation, and so of course can our traditional friends the Druses [sic]." The writer continued to describe the situation in the country, and argued that "the condition of the population is absolutely wretched. There is no town in Syria and Palestine where the leading families have not either been executed or deported. Towns such as Nablus which were formerly strongly anti-Christian are now fanatically anti-Turkish. The food question is really serious on account of the Turkish requisitions, the locusts, and the shortage of agricultural population due to so many having been called to the army."[4] The part that religion played here, according to the report, is important: the British were aware of the sensitivity of being a Christian power attempting to replace a Muslim regime. This sensitivity becomes very clear in the internal debates among the British regarding the actual entrance into Jerusalem and its symbolism, as will be discussed. Moreover, as the largest religious community in the country, the Muslims were definitely a force that needed to be taken seriously.

However, the religious sensitivity of "Christianity versus Islam" was not the only reason why the Muslims caused such concern among the British, as is clearly seen in the preceding reports and estimations. The possibility of a Muslim

response to a British occupation, not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in India, was indeed a concern for the British in their consideration of an occupation of Jerusalem. For Britain, Muslims were not only potential enemies, but also potential subjects and allies, which added more complexity to the delicate situation. Another reason for the special sensitivity toward the Muslims' reaction was the Balfour Declaration, published only a few weeks before the occupation of Jerusalem. Realizing that the occupation of Palestine might be interpreted by non-Jews as the first step in carrying out the British policy toward Zionism (as was indeed the case), the British may have consciously tried to pay special attention to the Muslims in order to counterbalance the effects of the Balfour Declaration.[5]

Why was the occupation of Jerusalem such a charged and sensitive issue for the British? What was the special significance of this particular city? Was Jerusalem's occupation important for the British for military or political purposes, or did it carry with it mainly symbolic value? Indeed, much attention was paid to the occupation's symbolic aspects. Morally, the occupation of the city came at a critical moment for Britain in the war. The trench war in France had reached a deadlock. The Americans, who had only recently entered the war, had not made any significant contribution to the war effort yet, and the situation with the Russian allies was unclear following the March and November 1917 revolutions. The occupation of Jerusalem was a heavy blow to Ottoman prestige, and its symbolic importance served to uplift spirits in Britain.[6] From a military-strategic dimension, Damascus and Baghdad, for example, were viewed as more important to the war effort, because of their centrality and significance for the Arabs. Capturing them would mean the real end of Ottoman rule over the Arab lands. As the writer of the April 1917 report clearly stated:

> The fact that I really wish to emphasize is that Damascus is the true capital of Arabia. . . . Damascus is the place to go for. With Baghdad and Damascus in our hands it is really the end of the Turkish Empire outside Turkey proper, and only by getting Damascus into our hands can we place the Arab State upon anything like an economic foundation. . . . The delivery of Jerusalem from the Turks would be hailed by every Christian, Jew and Arab, to whom it is equally a holy if not the holiest city, [and] would have world wide moral and political effect. Still, for the foundation of the Arab state, Damascus is the essential objective, and until Damascus is in Entente hands the work of the Palestinian Expedition will not be politically assured.[7]

However, the strategic significance of the occupation of Jerusalem cannot be overlooked. Palestine was central for Britain as a shield for Egypt and the beginning of a land bridge to India, and hence controlling it was important in order to secure Britain's interests in this part of the world. Moreover, as a result of the Palestine campaign, the Ottoman forces were forced to split into two parts, with some units located in the north and other units located east of Jerusalem. In addition, the British advance into Palestine forced the Ottomans to deploy forces from other areas, making the British occupation of Baghdad, for example, much easier.[8] Hence, the importance of Jerusalem lay not only on the symbolic level, although the symbolic component was undoubtedly a key. In what follows I will examine how symbolism played a major role in the process that preceded the occupation and the takeover of the city. This symbolism served the aim of the British forces to carry out the occupation and the transition process between regimes in the smoothest way possible.

"THIS IS A MILITARY OCCUPATION ONLY": BRITISH DEBATES ON THE MEANING OF OCCUPATION

The British were indeed aware of the symbolic importance and value of Jerusalem, mainly from the religious perspective. They realized the delicacy of the situation: that a Christian force would occupy the Holy City, taking it from a Muslim power that had ruled over it for four hundred years. Hence, they were especially aware of the Muslims' potential reaction toward the occupation. However, they were also aware of another dimension of the occupation that had the potential to cause tension, namely, the reactions of the great powers, mainly France, Italy, and to a lesser extent Russia to the British takeover of the city. One can learn about this complex web of tensions and interests, and of the way the British chose to deal with them, from a lengthy exchange of letters between various British officials and the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, Rennie MacInnes.[9]

The Protestant/Anglican Bishopric in Jerusalem was established in 1841 in cooperation with the king of Prussia, who had a vision of a worldwide Protestant union with Jerusalem as its center. In 1850, the Protestants were recognized as an official religious community in the Ottoman Empire. The Anglo-Prussian union was annulled in 1882, because of dissatisfaction among the Germans, and in 1887 the bishopric was reconstituted as an Anglican Bishopric. One of the aims of the

church was to bring Christianity to the Jews of Palestine, following the concept of the "restoration of the Jews."[10] The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem was connected to British state officials, and the correspondence with him can shed light on British intentions toward the occupation and their rule in the city. It also reveals the difference among the "people on ground"—the British administrators who served in the Middle East, mainly in Egypt—and the policy makers in London.

Originally, the correspondence was born out of an exchange of letters regarding religious affairs, as part of the preparations for the occupation of Jerusalem. However, it soon turned into a discussion regarding the meaning of the occupation, its symbolic value, and the possible reaction of the local population and the foreign powers in the city to such an occupation. This episode, hence, serves as an example of how the internal tensions and dynamics played out among the British.

On May 2, 1917, more than seven months before the actual British occupation of Jerusalem, Bishop MacInnes, then based in Cairo, sent a letter to Major General Clayton, the first chief political officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces, in which he wrote:

> In view of the possible conquest of Palestine by a British army and the occupation of the country by some Christian power or powers, I desire to bring before you a matter of very considerable importance: the desirability of taking official possession of every building erected originally as a Christian church, which is now used as a Mohammadan mosque. . . . It is solely from the political point of view that the subject presents itself to my mind. . . . I regard it as one of deep political importance.
>
> It is my strong conviction that the British government, in its desire to placate the Mohammedan races, is sometimes advised to adopt measures which have the very opposite effect. The measure designed by the Western mind to show magnanimity and tolerance is regarded by the Eastern as a sign of weakness and fear. Where it was intended to allay feeling, the deepest suspicion is aroused instead.
>
> In the present instance it would create the worst effect throughout the East if a Christian conqueror were deliberately to leave in Muslim hands Christian churches which the Muslims, with equal deliberation, have desecrated, and then taken into use as mosques. . . . It has rightly been the British policy never to interfere with the religion of the subject races. It should equally be our policy not readily to acquiesce in interference with our own. It may be alleged that such step would annoy the Mohammedans and create some bad feelings. I have

no such fear. . . . I would therefore respectfully urge that in all lands of which we become possessed, every building originally erected as a Christian church which is now used as a mosque or held by Muslim hands, be officially taken back into Christian possession.[11]

Other than the actual matter discussed in the letter, the conversion of churches into mosques and the need to return them to their original purpose, the letter contains many more important insights. First, the patronizing tone used here toward the local Muslims is significant, and reflects the belief that the Muslims could be easily manipulated, and needed to be treated with a firm hand by the British. Any other treatment by the occupiers would be interpreted as weakness by the "natives." MacInnes's patronizing wording and tone leave no doubt as to who he believes is the ruler and the master of the people occupied. Secondly, the way religion plays out in the letter is very telling. Clearly, MacInnes views the occupation of Palestine as a Christian conquest against the Muslim race, and from reading his letter it seems that the occupation would signal the triumph of the West over the East, almost a clash between civilizations, á la Samuel Huntington. Thirdly, MacInnes's mention of the British policy of not interfering with religious matters of their "subject races" is somewhat strange. After all, MacInnes's suggestion here is a clear interference with one of the most sensitive religious matters. Despite his own position as the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem, and his awareness of religious sensitivities, the sensitivity of this matter did not seem to occur to him at all. Maybe his ignorance was because of his location in Cairo at this time; he arrived in Jerusalem only following the war.

MacInnes's letter received various responses from both clergymen and military personnel that provide some insights into the preconceptions, intentions, and beliefs of the British administrators and politicians. The first comment on the letter appeared on July 5, 1917, in a letter presumably from Colonel Deedes to the High Commissioner in Egypt, General Reginland Wingate.[12] Deedes suggests to look into the subject more carefully, to check the current legal status of the mosques, and to find out what their status among the native population is. Politically, however, the writer states:

At the outset it must be regarded as doubtful whether the measure advocated by the Bishop . . . is capable of being reconciled with certain desiderata of British

policy towards Islam. Such action would inevitably be attacked by every pan-Islamist or anti-British tendency and would almost certainly involve protests from the heads of Muslim states. The Bishop's arguments seem to be based on inadequate premises. . . . It is surely impossible that this measure could be effected without causing resentment and creating discord that might well prejudice the good relations between Muslims and Christians of a locality for a generation.[13]

Deedes's concern is twofold. He is worried about the effects of MacInnes's suggestion on intercommunal relations between Muslims and Christians in Palestine, but this concern is also intermingled with a concern about how it would affect the attitude toward the British in Palestine. It is implied that the resentment that Deedes is most worried about is not that between Muslims and Christians, but toward the British.

From a religious point of view, in a cautious response from July 18, 1917, Archbishop Davidson from Lambeth Palace, the Archbishop of Canterbury's residence in London, wrote that "the question is one requiring the utmost caution in its handling, and the plan that such buildings, if no longer really required for Mohammedan use, should be placed under trust with a future allocation of them to the Christian purposes for which they were built sounds in every way the sensible and equitable plan."[14]

The most significant reaction to MacInnes's letter appeared in a letter written by Captain Graves to Colonel Deedes, regarding the bishop's suggestion. In a harsh letter, Graves wrote:

Bishop MacInnes appears to regard our invasion of Palestine somewhat in the light of a *crusade,* the success of which should place Christianity in a predominant position over Islam and other confessions. As least, the carrying out of his proposals would undoubtedly have that effect upon the native mind. This is a natural enough attitude on the part of a Christian Bishop, but it does not take into account the questions of military and political expediency by which we must be guided. . . . Our reputation for justice and religious toleration demands the strictest impartiality in dealing with all such questions. The Muslim majority in Palestine are now well disposed towards us, but in spite of Bishop MacInnes' belief that there would be no opposition on their part to the restoration of mosques to Christian purposes, there can be no possible doubt that they would be alienated thereby. Conflicting claims by the Catholic and Orthodox

churches would certainly arise, in addition to the claims by the *Waqf* adminis-
tration in which all these properties are vested. On all these grounds, it would
be highly impolitic to allow this question to be raised, at any rate until after the
new status of Palestine has been determined by a peace conference and it would
then require the most careful and searching inquiry for the protection of the
different interests involved.[15]

Like Colonel Deedes, Graves expresses here a major concern about Britain's
reputation as being tolerant and sensitive toward the local communities. He too
is worried about creating resentment toward the British and wants to keep the
delicate balance of power in the relationship between the "natives" and the colo-
nial power. His use of the word *crusade* and his rejection of viewing British occu-
pation as a victory for Christianity over the Muslim world demonstrate how the
British wished the occupation to be perceived, not only by the local population
but also by the other great powers.

One can further learn about the way the Foreign Office wanted the occupa-
tion of Jerusalem to be looked at from a series of letters written by Archbishop
Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury, between November and December
1917. Referring to the plans for the occupation of Jerusalem and stressing its
importance to the British Foreign Office, Davidson recognizes local (namely,
Muslim) sensitivities toward a Christian occupying force, as well as possible
tensions with other Western powers, particularly France. He stresses that the
occupation would be solely of a military nature and not a transfer of permanent
authority in the national sense. As Davidson wrote on November 26, 1917:

> The occupation of Jerusalem, if it does take place (which is still uncertain) [*sic*],
> would be a military occupation only and may conceivably be a mere temporary
> occupation and not a transfer of authority in any other sense, and the guardian-
> ship would be partly in Christian and partly in non-Christian hands.[16]

The discussion regarding the nature of British occupation and the sensitivi-
ties involved in it, from both local and regional perspectives, comes out in a very
specific context. Bishop MacInnes wished to be one of the clergymen who would
represent the city's religious communities in the event of Allenby's entrance to Jeru-
salem. Being based in Cairo during the war, he was asked by the Anglican Church

to be its representative in the event, and to convey the church's greetings to the Greek Patriarch and the heads of the Latin, Armenian, and Maronite churches.[17]

However, it seems that the British officials held a different opinion on this matter altogether. In a letter from General Clayton to General Wingate, Clayton writes that "it would be inadvisable for Bishop MacInnes to come in any capacity, as it would surely lead to trouble with our allies. . . . All kinds of political and ecclesiastical questions would thus arise, which would be inconvenient."[18] Thus, the issue at stake here was how to keep the delicate balance between Britain and its allies, mainly France, over the control and influence on the city and its religious affairs. Bishop MacInnes's attitude toward the occupation and its religious significance, as was discussed earlier, probably created hesitations among British officials on whether to allow his entry to the city. The concern was that MacInnes would violate the delicate religious balance in the city by highlighting and emphasizing the occupation as a Christian occupation or a crusade. This episode also demonstrates the special role that Christians in Jerusalem, from different religious communities, played regarding the connection to the great powers. Since the end of the Crimean War, there had been an extension in all religious interests in the Holy Land, and an increase in the links between certain states and churches in Palestine. Such were, for example, the connections between Russia and the Orthodox Church, and the increased influence of France among the Latin and Eastern Catholic communities.[19] The British officials did not want the presence of the Anglican Bishop to be interpreted as preference of one European power over the other.

Archbishop Davidson seemed to have partially understood the delicacy of the situation. In a letter to MacInnes on the matter he wrote that anything official, such as greeting the ecclesiastical authorities in Jerusalem, would be inopportune. He also repeated the point regarding the nature of the occupation as a military occupation only and not a transfer of power in the national sense. However, in order to respond to MacInnes's concerns regarding his presence, he also added that if Bishop MacInnes would be with the troops when they enter the city he might approach the religious figures on very general terms. In Davidson's words:

> You might in a semi-official manner call on the Greek Patriarch and perhaps on the other ecclesiastics, with greetings and with the assurance which I hereby give you of my own deep interest and fervent prayers, but the words had better be of a rather general kind.[20]

Bishop MacInnes was not present at General Allenby's entrance to the city. He expressed his feelings, and what was for him one of the greatest disappointments he had ever experienced, in a private letter from January 1918, which he wrote from his house in Cairo. In the letter, he argued that the authorities were concerned about political difficulties and of a possible embarrassment caused by him. According to the British strategy, nothing British should appear, and the city should be administered under martial law and not under British administration. According to MacInnes:

> They want to avoid giving any pretext for misunderstanding, or for the charge that we are using our military power to capture the country and lay claims to possess it. . . . General Allenby told me that he really did not think the time has yet come when he could properly allow anybody to go there [to Jerusalem] who was not required in a military capacity.[21]

This letter expresses much more than MacInnes's personal feelings of disappointment. It also reflects very clearly what the British administration's policy toward the occupation of the city was. In order to reduce tensions between them and the local communities, as well as between them and the other foreign powers that had interests in the city, they tried to reduce their presence to a minimum. As was clear from the letters of Clayton and Davidson, the occupation should be discerned as purely a military, temporary one, so that it would not pose any threat to the local communities or to other foreign powers. The ceremony on December 11 indeed tried to deliver this message.

Among other reasons, Bishop MacInnes was not allowed to enter the city because of the British fear that other religious figures would demand to be present in the city as well. Indeed, following the British occupation, the Roman Catholic Church began requesting to allow its religious representatives to enter Jerusalem. Its various requests were denied by Colonel Deedes, who said that Allenby regretted that he could not modify his policy regarding the entry of people who were not formerly residents of the city. He continued, "the Commander in Chief is satisfied that the interests of the different religious bodies in Palestine are amply safeguarded by the existing administration, the character of which ensures complete impartiality of treatment to all and a strict adherence to present and local

requirements only, thus obviating the premature raising of questions foreign to the present regime."[22]

As was argued earlier, the question of representation in the city was not only religious, but was also about colonial influence, as Britain attempted to reduce the tension with France and Italy over colonial influence and control over Christian affairs. Shortly after the occupation, on December 25, 1917, after returning from Paris, Sir Mark Sykes referred to this tension exactly. According to him, "France feels that it was underrepresented in the historic occasion of the liberation of Jerusalem." Jerusalem was taken by the British, and France felt humiliated by the event. Sykes claimed that Britain should meet these feelings by a wise concession of employing one or two French officials in the administration of Palestine.[23] The same tension between Britain and France over France's underrepresentation in the liberation of the city and its deliverance was reported by Colonel Ronald Storrs, the military governor of Jerusalem, who reported that "public opinion in France was growing sensitive."[24] Both France and Italy demanded from the British administrators a part in the administration in Palestine, but their request was only partially fulfilled. Allenby wanted the administration to be mainly British. In order to facilitate France and Italy's demands and reduce some of the tensions, it was finally decided to nominate a French officer as the governor of Ramleh and an Italian officer as the governor of Lydda.[25]

Indeed, Allenby's entrance to Jerusalem and the British occupation of the city were extremely sensitive matters. They involved local and foreign interests, and mainly reflect the British wish that the occupation would not be interpreted as a political, religious, or colonial occupation, but rather as a purely military one. From a British standpoint, a military occupation would cause less resentment and opposition among the local population, and would keep the balance of power within the city. The religious significance of the city was of course very much in the minds of most British officials. From a religious perspective, too, they were trying to reduce concerns and tensions, by limiting the presence of clergymen who did not reside in the city. Bishop MacInnes's case demonstrates the British concerns over what can be perceived as a "religious occupation," and of looking at it as a crusade of the Christians against the Muslims.

The notion of the occupation as a "new" or "last" crusade was not unique to MacInnes, and, according to Eitan Bar-Yosef, was often used during and after

the war. This notion came out often in films and books that were written on the Palestine campaign. Viewing the occupation as a crusade positioned the conflict of Britain against the Ottoman Empire within the context of a religious, Christian-Muslim struggle. The "crusading image" was used for the propaganda of the Palestine campaign, and especially in the occupation of Jerusalem. This image played a complicated role, as it called into doubt the idea that imperial affiliation transcended religious denomination and the notion that religious toleration stood at the basis of Britain's colonial rule. It hence reflected an ambiguity concerning Britain's imperial interests in Palestine and highlighted the tension between the empire and its subjects.[26] The way British propaganda made use of this image while the official administration tried to downplay it is very telling of how the British imagined the occupation, and the way they wished it to be interpreted by both the local populations and the other foreign powers involved. How, then, did all these considerations and sensitivities play out in the actual occupation of the Holy City?

WHEN A CITY CHANGES HANDS: AN INTERIMPERIAL CITY

The British advance to Jerusalem began on the night of December 7, 1917, after forty days of heavy fighting over Beer-Sheva, Gaza, and Jaffa.[27] The main attack on the city took place on the morning of December 8 under difficult weather conditions. The Turkish defense was weaker than expected, and the Ottoman military forces and civilians began their withdrawal from the city during the evening of December 8. The last official to leave the city was 'Izat Bey, the Ottoman governor. By the early hours of December 9 Jerusalem was in British hands.[28]

Hussein al-Husayni, the mayor of Jerusalem, announced the surrender of Jerusalem to the British forces at 11:00 A.M. on December 9, 1917. Major General Shea received the keys to the city on behalf of Allenby. The symbolic act of surrender was a process that lasted for a few hours, as the other British officers Husayni met that morning refused to accept the keys to the city. None of them wanted to take responsibility for this dramatic moment and to be the one who formally accepted the surrender of Jerusalem.[29]

Most of the accounts that describe this moment of symbolic surrender of Jerusalem mention that Husayni handed over both the city keys and the actual letter of surrender. However, there is another version of this event. According to

5. The surrender of Jerusalem, December 9, 1917. Hussein al-Husayni is the man standing in the front line, holding a walking stick. *Source:* World War I Jerusalem photographs, the Jacob Wahrman Collection.

it, just before Husayni approached the British forces, an urgent meeting took place in Ismail Husayni's house, in the presence of Mufti Kamal Husayni and Mayor Hussein al-Husayni. At this meeting, it was decided that the letter of surrender, written by the Ottoman governor of the city just before he left Jerusalem would be kept in the possession of the Mufti of Jerusalem and would not be handed to

the British forces, and that Husayni would hand Jerusalem to the British verbally. The reason for this was the fear that, if the Ottoman forces recaptured the city in a counterattack, the three notables would be accused by the new Ottoman commander of collaboration, by turning the writ of surrender over to the enemy.[30] It is interesting to see that, even at this dramatic moment, these local leaders could still imagine the return of the Ottomans to the city and did not fully grasp the full implications of this event.

Two days after the formal surrender General Allenby entered Jerusalem, in a modest ceremony that represented the end of four hundred years of Ottoman rule over the city. Allenby entered the city by foot through Jaffa Gate, leaving his horses and cars behind, outside the city walls. The reason for this mode of entry is twofold. When Kaiser Wilhelm visited Jerusalem in 1898 he entered with his carriage through the Jaffa Gate. Part of the wall next to the gate was knocked down to enable his carriage to go through. Allenby wanted his historical entrance to be remembered differently, with more respect toward the city's monuments, and to be contrasted with that of the German emperor. Secondly, his entrance by foot was intended to symbolize and emphasize his respect for Jerusalem as a religious center.[31]

At the Jaffa Gate, Allenby was greeted by the military governor and headed a procession that was arranged carefully to include all the Allied forces in Palestine. It included the staff officers, the commanders of the French and Italian detachments, the heads of the Picot Mission, and the military attaches of France, Italy, and the United States. The procession made its way to the citadel, where a proclamation, drafted by Mark Sykes, addressing "the inhabitants of Jerusalem the blessed and the people dwelling in its vicinity" was read in English, Arabic, Hebrew, French, Italian, Greek, and Russian. The proclamation announced that Jerusalem was under martial law and stated: "I make it known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the three religions will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of whose faiths they are sacred."[32]

This proclamation is important. It alludes to the need to keep the status quo, one of the basic foundations that guided the British administration of Palestine under martial law, and reflects the wish of the British to keep the occupation and transitional process as smooth as possible, without shaking up life in Jerusalem

too much. The British military administration, better known as the Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory (South) (OETA-S),[33] was managed according to international law, which prohibited changes in religious as well as secular matters in Palestine until the country's faith and final legal condition would be defined. However, some changes did take place, and the status quo was not completely kept during the years of martial law.

The ceremony had no Anglican or Christian features in it. It did not highlight the fact that Jerusalem was won by the British and Allied forces. Hence, no Allied flags were flown throughout the ceremony. Because of the tension between France and Britain over their colonial interests following the occupation of the city, the French consul of Jerusalem was not permitted to join Allenby's procession. It was explained to him that the ceremony was military, not civilian.[34] The French consul was not the only one absent from the ceremony. Religious figures, such as Bishop MacInnes, were also absent.

As was clear from the preparations for the ceremony, as well as from the ceremony itself, this event was full of symbolism. The importance of depicting

6. General Allenby prepares to enter the Jaffa Gate, accompanied by Hussein al-Husayni. The picture was taken just before the entrance through the gate. *Source:* TMA 4185, no. 119, Picture Collection, NLI.

7. The ceremony inside the Jaffa Gate, December 11, 1917. *Source:* World War I Jerusalem photographs, the Jacob Wahrman Collection.

the occupation of Jerusalem as a military one, and not as a civilian or religious one, was stated clearly by numerous British officials before the occupation of the city. It was also clear from the presence of certain people in the ceremony, and the absence of others. Moreover, Allenby's entrance to the city on foot was also

a highly charged symbolic act, which was engraved in the collective memory of the event. His entrance combined humility (entering by foot, and not on a horse) with authority, respect for others (the inhabitants of the city and its religious importance) with undoubted victory and conquest.[35] Although the proclamation itself addressed the people of Jerusalem, the fact that it was read in several languages shows that the audience to which Allenby wished to address his message was much wider. It included the British audience, as well as those of the United States, France, Russia, and Italy. The ceremony was also filmed by the War Office. The film was released in February 1918 and helped, of course, to expose wider audiences to the event, with its heavy symbolism.

The occupation of the city was undoubtedly British, and underneath the layers of symbolism, it was clear that the British were the new rulers of the city. Indeed, as Eitan Bar-Yosef claims, Allenby's entry to Jerusalem was underscored by a series of absences: the absence of any explicit reference to a British victory, as well as the absence of any clear Anglican, or even Christian, symbols and features. However, argues Bar-Yosef, it was exactly these seeming absences that pointed to the real presence of the British and Christian ethos. Religious tolerance became a Christian quality, which represents righteousness and justice, and, most importantly, not losing one's ethics and values even in times of v ictory.[36]

A HOLY CITY UNDER MILITARY RULE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

The proclamation that General Allenby read when he entered Jerusalem announced both the martial law under which Jerusalem was ruled, and the keeping of the status quo of the Ottoman rule. The logic behind the need to keep the status quo was, according to Ronald Storrs, "to impress upon those desiring immediate reforms that we were here merely as a Military Government and not as civil reorganizers. Our logical procedure would therefore have been to administer the territory as if it had been Egypt or any other country with important minorities; making English the official language, providing Arabic translations and interpreters, and treating the resident Jews, Europeans, Armenians and others as they would have been treated in Egypt."[37] Egypt, then, was the model for Storrs, and the British administrators, for ruling the city (and later the country). However, Storrs himself admitted that, in the matter of Zionism, by issuing the

Balfour Declaration, the Military Administration contravened the status quo, as the vast majority of the inhabitants of Palestine in 1918 were Arabs. There was inherent tension between the British declarations regarding the status quo and the political developments. This tension is another reflection of the differences between the British administrators and officials who were located in Palestine and the policy makers in London. This tension can be seen by examining the very first measures of the military administration in the city.

On March 2, 1918, General Allenby sent a detailed report to the War Office in London, in which he specified the arrangements of the administration of OETA. This report shows how strong the Ottoman influence was on the way the military administration in Palestine operated. It discussed various issues, among them the organization of the administration and the ways it would operate, and issues related to revenue and currency. According to Allenby, the Ottoman administrative system, based on provincial administrative decentralization under strong central control, appeared to be the best way of organizing the administration under local conditions in Palestine. The British forces initially occupied most of the area that formed the *sancak* of Jerusalem during the Ottoman times. Allenby suggested keeping the Ottoman administrative division of the *sancak* in order to disturb as little as possible the methods of government to which the population was accustomed, and to enable the British administration to make use of the Ottoman governmental machinery. Hence, influenced by the Ottoman administrative division, the military administration divided the territory under its control into four districts: Jerusalem, Jaffa, Mejdal (*kaza* of Gaza), and Beer-Sheva (*kazas* of Beer-Sheva and Hebron). Each of these districts was governed by a military governor. Jerusalem remained as a separate administrative unit and was governed first by Colonel Burton, who was soon replaced by Colonel Storrs. Storrs received his directions directly from General Allenby.[38]

As for the administrative work carried out by OETA, here too the Ottoman influence was very much felt. Under Ottoman rule, the government was organized under the following administrative units: public worship, administration of justice, police, gendarmerie, prisons, public health, hospitals, public education, public works, land registration, agriculture, forests, trade, postal services, and financial services. Allenby expressed his desire to put all these units back to work in order to enable them to provide their services to the population as soon as possible. Some public services were more urgent than others, he claimed,

and would have to be increased. These services included, for example, sanitation services, the repatriation of the inhabitants, aid for refugees, and the reestablishment of agricultural operations.[39]

The collection of public revenue was central in the Ottoman administration, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration being the most important unit of collecting taxes. The Foreign Office allowed this institution, together with the La-Régie Imperiale Company, which was in charge of the tobacco revenue, to continue functioning under British military rule. Moreover, Allenby also suggested that the Ottoman financial personnel, still available for duty, be employed by the British administration as well. As Allenby stated, "their knowledge of the country, of the people, and of the laws and regulations governing Turkish finance will be invaluable."[40] On a related issue, the official currency that would be used as the medium of exchange was suggested to be Egyptian currency.

Although the British officials criticized the Ottomans on their neglect of Jerusalem and its inhabitants, and scorned Ottoman rule over Palestine, they eventually clearly respected Ottoman administration and bureaucratic organization and acknowledged the benefits of keeping it as long as martial law was in force. By doing this, they also tried to show the foreign Allies that Britain had no political or colonial aspirations over Palestine. At least in the first stage of military rule over Jerusalem and Palestine, the status quo was kept in the sense that the Ottoman administrative frameworks continued to guide the British military authorities. The administrative guidelines changed after the final defeat of the Ottoman army, in 1919.[41]

Who were the people who staffed the British military administration? The general tendency of the British administration was to try and employ as many local bureaucrats as possible, and to avoid employing too many Europeans. However, the high-rank bureaucrats were British officers, the majority of whom had little administrative experience in the Middle East or any knowledge of Hebrew or Arabic. The local bureaucrats consisted of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, who were employed in various posts. The first people employed were Arab Christians, who studied in missionary schools before the war and knew English. Few Jews were employed in the local administration, an issue that created tension between the local British administrators and the Zionist commission. However, some officials remained in the positions that they held before the occupation. Such was, for example, the mayor of Jerusalem, Hussein al-Husayni, who remained in his post

until his death early in 1918, when he was replaced by his brother, Musa Kazim al-Husayni. Ronald Storrs also nominated Mufti Kamal al-Husayni as the acting president of the Muslim Court of Appeals, in order to continue religious activities without interruption.[42]

THE STATUS QUO AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOLY PLACES

One of the urgent and sensitive challenges that faced the OETA administration was the administration of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The British policy toward these sites was based on the Ottoman framework, which was introduced to Jerusalem by the Ottoman authorities in 1852 (based on an even earlier position from 1757), referring mainly to the Holy Sepulchre and its legal status, and giving paramount position to the Orthodox Church. The Ottomans originally introduced the concept of "The Status Quo in the Holy Places" as an attempt to regulate the right of control and access to the Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and Palestine. The status quo was settled by a series of documents and decrees that were set by the Ottoman Sultan Abdül Mecid in 1852, following the old dispute between the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic Church, which resulted with the subsequent intervention of European powers in the Crimean War. The decree, which was later confirmed in the Congress of Berlin in 1878, established the rights of several churches in relation to the Holy Places, including the ways of public worship, decorations used in the shrines, and the ways of usage and exercising ceremonies and rites.[43]

The codification of these early agreements into a body of official regulations was proposed during the drafting of the Charter of the British Mandate in 1920. It was eventually included in Article 13, which made the mandatory government responsible for "preserving existing rights and securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites, and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum." Article 14 discussed the appointment of a special committee that would define the rights and claims over the Holy Places.[44]

The British applied the status quo to other Holy Places in Jerusalem, including the Jewish and Muslim ones, and tried to satisfy all the parties and communities who held interests in those sites. Those included France and Italy, who

suspected the intentions of Britain (and of the Anglican Church), the Muslims, who suspected the Christian occupiers, and the Jews. This was part of the British attempt to present themselves as the respectful guardians of the "traditional" culture of the peoples they colonized. At first, the British placed military representatives from different countries to secure the holy sites, but they soon realized that this arrangement created confrontations over these sensitive places. Their solution was to cooperate directly with the different religious officials, and to replace the British military personnel present in the area with policemen. Other specific arrangements were suggested regarding the administration of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Regarding the Holy Sepulchre, it was suggested to have a British police guard on-site and to establish a committee composed of young Christian Jerusalemite intellectuals from the different denominations who would secure this site. Regarding the al-Aqsa Mosque, it was suggested that the Muslims would be the custodians of the Mosque, and that the place would possibly receive an extraterritorial status. Moreover, any conflicts or strife over the Holy Places were to be negotiated directly with the leaders of the different religions.[45]

"THIS IS NOT A 'HOLY' OR 'GOLDEN' CITY": FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF JERUSALEM

The first British soldiers entered Jerusalem two days before the official and well-documented entry of General Allenby. The diaries they wrote provide a firsthand account of their first impressions of the city, its residents, and also of their own expectations and prejudices from the Holy City and its inhabitants.[46]

In general, the British soldiers' first impression of the city was of a dirty and poor place. As Private C. T. Shaw wrote in his diary, "The first glimpse of the city doesn't give an impression of a 'Holy' or 'Golden' city, but of a filthy and muddy place."[47] He described the city as the most miserable place he had ever been, with no sanitation, with roads in a deplorable condition, and with numerous buildings in a state of ruin. Private Shaw seemed to be shocked by the people he saw on the streets. "The people are the dirtiest I have ever seen. I am sure some of them have never had a wash in all their lives. Their clothes are hanging in rags, and no one wears boots or shoes. None of the ordinary natives had indulged in a shave. These people do not carry a very nice odour with them either."[48] The inhabitants are of

all nationalities, he said, including Jews, Greeks, Italians, Spanish, Americans, and Germans. He considered the German and American colonies to be the best part of the city, as they were relatively clean.

From the soldiers' descriptions, it seems that, immediately following the entrance of the British forces to the city, commercial life—which had stopped in the last period of Ottoman rule—was renewed. Private Herbert Empson wrote in his diary that "there are many wandering vendors on the streets, selling cakes of various descriptions, bread, matches and other things. On the whole I am rather disappointed by the place. . . . The shops I have seen are all native, mostly dirty and untidy. There are no European shops, except the Anglo-American store which is situated just inside the Jaffa Gate."[49] The market in the Old City seemed to have been active as well. "Here you can see all kinds of natives [and of] all nationalities doing their trade," wrote Private Shaw, and he advises bargaining because "you can easily knock these people down in their price with a bit of arguing."[50]

The soldiers claimed that the local population ("natives") realized that the "British Tommy has plenty of money to dispose of and are making every effort to capture his wealth." Private Empson provided a detailed report on the prices of some products, and describes the food that was offered in the restaurants located in numerous places throughout the city. In the streets vendors sold oranges, figs, almonds, and souvenirs.[51]

Interestingly, the soldiers also described active nightlife in Jerusalem. One of the most popular places to visit at night was "The Empire Theatre," where "huge crowds visit nightly." Private Empson also described concerts that were played for his division and said that "there is no lack of evening amusement for those able to attend. Jerusalem is truly looking up under British rule."[52]

The picture that emerges from these descriptions in soldiers' diaries is of a city trying to recover from a difficult and traumatic period, which combines in it misery and poverty, but also attempts to "get back to normal" in terms of merchant activity and even nightlife. Some of the descriptions regarding the availability of food are surprising, considering the misery and famine that the city experienced during the war. Regarding nightlife, the local population most probably was not allowed to enjoy the concerts that the British attended. The presence of soldiers in a city created special spaces and opportunities for them, which were open only to the soldiers and some functionaries within the local population, but not to the majority of the local inhabitants.

Another very lively description of the city shortly after the occupation is that of Mr. Theodore Waters, who arrived in Jerusalem as part of the American Red Cross delegation.[53] The people on the streets were of mixed nationalities and religions, and included both adults and children, he wrote. He also described the priests and clergymen that were seen in the streets. The languages that he could hear on the streets were English, French, Arabic, Hebrew, Yiddish, Greek, Latin, and Armenian, among others, and at first glance the scene was of a very colorful place. However, Waters was convinced that this was a mere surface picture, and that there was much more hiding behind this seemingly lively city. He found part of this hidden scene in the soup kitchens spread around the city, mainly in the Old City, which served the people, mostly inhabitants of Jerusalem, but also refugees from al-Salt in Jordan who found refuge in Jerusalem.[54] Waters's testimony is very different in nature from that of the soldiers. Because of his affiliation with the American Red Cross, he was much more sensitive and insightful to the local population and the situation, and attempted to delve deeper into the real "Jerusalem scene" of the time, and not just get a superficial impression of the city and its inhabitants. His description is not free of religious terminology though. He praised the British efforts to renovate and improve the city's infrastructure and its inhabitants' lives, and said that Jerusalem really needed the help of the Christian world. "I can see the vision of a new Jerusalem, I mean it in a civic sense, and I can see it also as the most wonderful shrine of the world," he wrote toward the end of his description.[55]

Ronald Storrs, who was appointed military governor of Jerusalem on December 27, 1917, had observations of the city similar to those of Waters. When he entered the city in mid-December 1917, the population consisted of approximately fifty thousand to fifty-five thousand people, among them about twenty-seven thousand Jews. Storrs's first observation was that the most urgent problem in Jerusalem was lack of food. The city had been cut off from its main sources of grain supply from al-Salt and Karak in Trans-Jordan, which were still in Ottoman hands. It was still isolated from its overseas supply because the ports were not yet active. Famine was felt everywhere in the city, and Storrs realized that an immediate supply of food should be the first priority of his administration in Jerusalem. Jerusalem could not support itself, he argued in a report he sent to Cairo, and demanded the supply of at least two hundred tons of grain a month to help feed the population. His request was approved, and wheat started to be

delivered from Egypt to Jerusalem on a regular basis.[56] He began to organize the distribution of flour, sugar, and kerosene shortly after he arrived in the city, and was assisted by the newly funded Syria and Palestine Relief Fund in the treatment of the refugees.[57] Other organizations that assisted OETA were the American Zionist Organization and the American Red Cross.[58]

Another important matter was the thousands of refugees that flooded Jerusalem. According to Storrs, around seven thousand refugees, including Armenians, Syrians, Latins, Orthodox, Protestants, and Muslims, were in Jerusalem when he took up his post as governor, and he had to meet their food and housing needs. In addition, there were thousands of Jewish and Arab orphans in Jerusalem when the war ended. Young children sold alcoholic drinks to British soldiers, and young girls became prostitutes in order to support themselves and their families.[59]

What were the first concerns and impressions of other British officials following their entrance to the city? Their concerns lay mainly on the political level, as they again tried to evaluate the support that they might receive from the local population. In a memo written by Colonel Deedes on December 16, 1917, he reported that rumors about the Balfour Declaration had reached Jerusalem and had created joy among Jews and apprehension among non-Jews. However, it was Colonel Deedes's belief that he could pacify the latter with the assistance and support of the mayor, Hussein al-Husayni, who is described as very helpful to the British administration.[60]

Three days following this memo, another report from Colonel Deedes contained some very important and interesting observations. It referred both to the Muslim population and to the religious tensions between the British, being a Christian power, and the Muslims, but also to the internal divisions among the Jews. First referring to the Muslim population, Deedes wrote:

> No one would maintain that they [the Muslims] show signs of welcoming us. . . . Nevertheless, there have been, of course, no open manifestations of hostility, and the above remarks should be confined to the uneducated classes. The Muslim intelligentsia and the part attached to the Sherif's movement, people like the mayor and municipality of Jerusalem, have welcomed us as much as anyone. . . . I would like to add one thing, which has struck me again up here and that is the extraordinary sectional jealousy between these Jews, or rather, as

they all are, Zionists. I really believe their inter-party animosity is more acute than it is with the Arabs. . . . It is a little difficult to see how this "Zionism" they talk so much of is ever to become a living force when those who claim to represent it are divided into so many cliques.[61]

The British attempt to divide the local population into subgroups, and to distinguish between those who support the British administration and those who oppose it, is noteworthy. The absence of the Christians from this report strengthens the feeling that the Muslims were viewed as the main opposition group for the British, an opposition that was also based on religious tensions. This assumption will be proven wrong with the establishment of the "Muslim-Christian Associations" shortly after the occupation. As for the Jews, Deedes's observation that all the Jews are Zionists is not accurate, as at no point were all of the Jews living in Palestine supportive of Zionism. The divisions within the Jewish community were well known to the British. A report of the Arab Bureau from December 1916 referred to the division between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, mentioning that the "Ashkenazi are more strongly Zionist and are well supported by their rich co-religionists in Europe."[62]

"WE MISS THE OTTOMANS": CHANGING ATTITUDES AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION

The first indications of discontent with the British were already being felt in the early stages of British rule in the city. American and British reports, by military personnel and religious figures, all discussed the growing intercommunal tension among the city's inhabitants, as well as the growing resentment toward the British administration. These tensions are not surprising. They can be explained partly by the publication of the Balfour Declaration, just a few weeks before Allenby entered the city. It was seen by many Arabs, including by some of the British officers in the administration, as a clear violation of the status quo. Some of those officials declared openly that they opposed the Balfour Declaration.[63]

In addition to the Balfour Declaration, in April 1918 the Zionist Commission (Va'ad ha-Tzirim), arrived in Palestine, under the leadership of Dr. Chaim Weizmann. The arrival of the commission was approved by the British Cabinet, but was criticized by some of the British officials in Palestine. It was supposed

to start implementing the policy of the Balfour Declaration, and to assist the Jewish population in Palestine; in practice, it became the intermediary between the Jewish population and the military authorities. Because the exact status and mission of the Zionist Commission were somewhat obscure, and because of the objection of some of the military administrators to the Balfour Declaration, there were constant struggles and tensions between the commission and the military administration in the country. Despite these tensions, the commission operated legally as a semiofficial organization, and its members, many of whom were influential in the British government in London, were able to put some pressure on the military administration, influencing some of its decisions.[64] The Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Commission, and the general feeling that the Jews in Palestine were becoming much more influential than they were during the Ottoman era, all reinforced the tension between Jews and Arabs in the country and increased the Arabs' criticism of the military administration.

In January 1918 Bishop MacInnes sent a letter to Archbishop Davidson regarding the state of affairs in Palestine. He had not yet been able to get to Jerusalem and was still based in Cairo. Referring to the Balfour Declaration, he said that it created much alarm in Egypt and Palestine among Christians and Muslims and had the effect of bringing Muslims and Christians more closely together, in view of what they regarded as a common and very serious danger.[65]

In a letter from General Clayton to Mark Sykes from February 1918, Clayton shares his observations about the situation in Palestine. He mentions a possible tension between Jews and Arabs but does not seem to pay much attention to it. He writes:

> In Jerusalem itself feeling among the Muslims is strongest against the Jews whom they dread as possible controllers of the Holy City and of all Palestine. It is perhaps not surprising that the Jerusalem Jew of today is certainly not an attractive personality. . . . The pro-British feeling among Jews and Muslims throughout the country, especially in Jerusalem, is most marked and steadily increasing. We maintain strictly the formula that our administration is merely that of an occupying army, and as such purely provisional, but they seem convinced that we have come to stay, and they appear to welcome it. . . . I see particularly no evidence among the local population, of whatever community, of aspirations towards independence. Arab national feeling is very weak. . . . As regards the Jews, there are no doubt aspirations towards a restoration of the old

independent Jewish Kingdom, but the majority seems to think that the shadow of a great power over them is essential, and look to England as that power.[66]

Clayton expressed his growing concern and reservations regarding the British policy of the Jewish National Home in June 1918, when he noted that "any real development of the ideas which Zionists hold to be at the root of the declaration made by His Majesty's Government entails a measure of preferential treatment to Jews in Palestine. This is bound to lead to some feeling on the part of other interested communities, especially the local Arabs."[67] Here again the difference in perception between the local British officers and the politicians and decision makers in London is very clear.

From an American perspective, on April 1918 Captain William Yale reported on great unrest in Palestine over the Zionist question and a strong undercurrent of discontent and dissatisfaction with present conditions. According to Yale:

> It is rather significant that in Palestine, where there has been so much suffering and privation, and where the dissatisfaction with the Turkish regime was so great in 1916 and 1917, that nearly every Arab talked open treason against the Ottoman government and longed for the deliverance of their country from the Turks, there should be in the spring of 1918, soon after the British occupation, a party, which, according to British political agents, wished to live in the future under the suzerainty of Turkey. The sentiments of this party cannot be altogether explained by an inherent dislike of Europeans and the very natural Muslim desire of wishing to be under a Muslim ruler. There undoubtedly enters into these sentiments of this party the belief that under Turkish rule the Zionists would not be allowed to gain a stronger foothold in Palestine than they now have.[68]

Yale's mention of a longing for life under the Turks and his reference to the difference between the British and Ottoman approaches to the national question in Palestine are important, especially if we keep in mind the great discontent with the Ottomans in the last days of their rule over Jerusalem. Similar references to people's feelings appeared two years later, in 1920. Following the first clashes between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, Bishop MacInnes expressed his concerns regarding the popularity of the British in Palestine, and said that "British prestige, which was so high after the liberation of Jerusalem, has suffered grievously,

and there are numbers of people who now say that they wish the British had never come near their country at all if we were only going to hand it over to the Jews, for they [the people] would prefer to have the Turks back again."[69] Several months later, MacInnes expressed the same concerns. According to him, he was told by people from every class and creed, including Muslims, Christians, Orthodox Jews, and Patriarchs, that the vast majority of people in Palestine were bitterly disillusioned with regard to the advantage of British rule. The vast majority, according to him, would vote almost unanimously that the British should go and the Turks should return. This feeling originated mainly from the concern over the way Zionism and Zionist policies had been carried out since the occupation took place:

> The people seeing the intolerance, the bigotry, the narrow mindedness, the selfishness, the arrogant demand of Zionists, who treat the country as though it were already handed over to them by Great Britain, say "what about us?"[70]

All reports mentioned in the preceding indicate certain deterioration in the triangle of power between the Palestinian Jews, the Arabs, and the British administration. This started relatively soon after the British occupation, and it seemed that the British administrators enjoyed a very short "grace period" in Palestine, before they had to face the growing intercommunal tension in the country.

Indeed, these reports, as well as other issues discussed earlier, all point to the important role that religion and religious divisions in Palestine played before, during, and after the occupation of Jerusalem. British officials did whatever they could to downplay the religious aspect of the occupation and to present their occupation as merely military in nature, and not as a civil or religious occupation. By doing this, Britain tried to assuage both the local tensions and the potential imperial tensions with France and Italy. In the period before the occupation they treated the Muslim population in Palestine with great suspicion, and viewed them as a potential opposition to British rule over the country. Following the occupation British officials clearly divided the population of Palestine according to the three religions, Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and separated between these three groups. Clearly, the British involvement as a Christian, foreign power created instability among the city's communities and changed the dynamic of religious affiliations.

The changing nature of intercommunal relations is connected to the question of the preservation of the status quo in the city. On the one hand, Britain kept criticizing Ottoman rule over Jerusalem, presenting the Ottomans as imposing a "barbarous yoke" and viewing their occupation of Jerusalem as ending four hundred years of Turkish oppression. On the other hand, the British seemed to have appreciated the Ottoman administration, and immediately incorporated parts of it into their own administration. But most importantly, it seems that the basic premises of the status quo were violated following the publication of the Balfour Declaration and the arrival and activity of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. The transition of the Jews from the status of a religious community, a *millet,* in Ottoman times, into the status of a potential national community in Palestine, was for the Arab population an inconceivable transition, and had long-lasting effects.

5

Between the Muslim-Christian Associations and the Muslim National Associations

The Rise of Intercommunal Tension

ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918, a large gathering of Jews was held in Jerusalem, celebrating the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. This gathering was organized by the Zionist Commission and was approved by the military governor of the city, Sir Ronald Storrs, who also addressed the audience. The assembly passed relatively peacefully, but, after it ended, some fighting broke out near the Jaffa Gate, and some Muslims and Christians were arrested by the British police. The following day, a delegation of Muslims and Christians arrived at Storrs's office to protest against the events of the previous day and to hand him a petition that expressed the anger of local Jerusalemites. The petition read as follows:

> The undersigned inhabitants of Jerusalem and villages attached thereto, speaking for themselves and on behalf of all Arabs, Muslims and Christians, living in Palestine, beg to state:
>
> We have noticed yesterday a large crowd of Jews carrying banners and over-running the streets shouting words which hurt the feelings and wounded the soul. They pretend with open voice that Palestine, which is the Holy Land of our fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors, which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages, who loved it and died in defending it, is now a national home for them. . . . We Arabs, Muslim and Christian, have always sympathized profoundly with the persecuted Jews in their misfortunes in other countries. . . . But there is a wide difference between this sympathy and the acceptance of such

a nation in our country, to be made by them a national home, ruling over us and disposing of our affairs.[1]

Bernard Wasserstein and Ann Mosely Lesch view this event, the demonstration of the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration and its aftermath, as the first sign of the violent conflict that was about to develop in Palestine. The petition clearly expressed the frustration and anger of the Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem with the Balfour Declaration. In addition, it signaled the establishment of a new organization, the Muslim-Christian Association, which would play a central role in the Arab local opposition to the British policy and to the Zionists' activities in Palestine. The petition was signed by the leaders of various associations in Jerusalem and by a hundred Jerusalem and village sheikhs around the city.[2]

The Muslim-Christian Association, and mainly its Jerusalem branch, will be one of the focal points of this chapter. By discussing this organization, its ideology, and its activities, as well as another organization, the Muslim National Association, which was supported by the Zionist movement, this chapter will demonstrate the development of the intercommunal tension in Jerusalem on a local level and the changes in the dynamic of intercommunal relations among Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Jerusalem following the beginning of British rule. I will focus on the years of the military administration in the city, which, I argue, marked the end of the transition period between the Ottoman and British rules. These years were fundamental for future political developments in Palestine under the British Mandate, because it was in these years that future national relations in Palestine were first seriously negotiated. These negotiations involved three parties: the local organizations, Jewish and Arab alike; the great powers, and especially Britain, France, and the United States; and, lastly, King Faysal, who tried to promote the idea of Greater Syria. I will examine the ways by which all three parts of this equation approached the evolving national conflict and viewed the future of intercommunal relations in Palestine, and will analyze how this transition period, which began during the years of World War I, ended.

This chapter demonstrates how preexisting alliances and group affiliations that were perceived as natural during the Ottoman Empire changed following the British occupation, because of the shift in the balance of power and interests in Palestine. An example of such an alliance, which was forged mainly following the

wars and national revolts in the Balkans, was the one between Jews and Muslims. These two communities maintained good relations between them in opposing the Christians who, in turn, were perceived as European sympathizers, who caused Muslim emigration. In Palestine, this natural alliance between Jews and Muslims changed following the British support of Zionism and what was perceived by the Arabs as the growing power and influence of the Zionist movement in the country. These political circumstances, and the influence of the foreign involvement, generated the cooperation between Muslims and Christians and the development of the Muslim-Christian alliance.

SHAKING THE STATUS QUO: THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, THE ZIONIST COMMISSION, AND THE ARABS

The Balfour Declaration and the arrival of the Zionist Commission to Palestine intensified national tensions in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration was issued partly because of strategic interests and partly because of Britain's desire to strengthen its position vis-à-vis France in Palestine. These strategic interests played out during the war as well, and were also central before the occupation of Palestine. Other considerations included the possible effect of such a declaration on the attitude of Russian and American Jews toward the war and Britain's need to gain the support of world Jewry to win the war over the Central Powers.[3] Be that as it may, the declaration created much fear and anger among the Arabs in Palestine. If, until the publication of the declaration, Zionism was connected with the Jews only, after its publication Britain became publicly committed to the Zionist movement and to Jewish aspirations in Palestine. The Arabs interpreted the declaration as the intention of the British government to establish a Jewish state at the end of the war, while depriving the Arabs of their land and of their country. Their feeling was enhanced following the only general mention of "the non-Jewish communities" in the declaration, without any clear indication as to the make-up of these communities. The words "Arab" or "Palestinian" did not appear in the declaration.[4]

The Zionist Commission (Va'ad ha-Tzirim) arrived in Palestine in April 1918. Dr. Chaim Weizmann headed the commission, which was composed of leading Zionists from the Allied countries. Local leaders from the Jewish community in Palestine were not allowed to join the Zionist Commission or to take part in its

decision-making process.[5] The Zionist Commission had semiofficial status and won the support of the British government. It was also recognized by the military authorities in Palestine and won their cooperation, although it seems that the military administration was not as enthusiastic as the British officials in London were to assist the commission. As Ronald Storrs described in his memoirs, when his staff was informed by Clayton of the arrival of the Zionist Commission, "we could not believe our eyes, and even wondered whether it might not be possible for the mission to be postponed until the status of the Administration should be more clearly defined."[6] The commission's objectives were officially defined by the British government as "to carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government's declaration in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." The commission was supposed to serve as the liaison between the British authorities and the Jewish population in Palestine, as well as to help establish friendly relations with the Arab and other non-Jewish communities in the country.[7]

As Yehoshua Porath points out, the contrast between the influential and powerful position of the Jews within this newly established administration versus their position during the Ottoman period was striking for the Arabs. They claimed that the Zionist Commission was a government within a government and were bitter about the new status of the Jews, and about what they viewed as a clear British preference of the Jews over the Arabs. The change in the status of the Jews following the Balfour Declaration and the arrival of the Zionist Commission in April 1918 enhanced Arab bitterness and the formation of anti-Zionist sentiments.[8]

How did the Zionists in Palestine view their relations with the Arabs? In general, the Zionist leaders tended to regard Arab opposition to Zionism as "artificial agitation," fomented by a corrupt and self-interested class of landowning *effendis,* who forced the *fellahin* into an anti-Zionist struggle that actually conflicted with the *fellahin*'s own interests. According to most Zionist leaders, the real interests of the majority of Palestine's Arabs lay not in conflict but in cooperation with the Zionists, who were the only ones capable of developing the country for the benefit of its inhabitants. The British, according to this view, were obliged to reaffirm their support for Zionism and not give in to the *effendis*' anti-Zionist activities.[9] Obviously, there were other voices among the Zionist leaders who saw the situation as a more complicated one and offered some solutions to

the developing tension. One such figure was Haim Margaliyot Kalvaryski, whose works and views will be discussed in the following.

SHIFTING ALLIANCES II: THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE MUSLIM NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

The Muslim-Christian Associations

On November 8, 1919, a group of Jerusalem notables, Christians and Muslims, all representatives of various associations in the city, sent a petition to the US Senate, in which they protested what they viewed as the injustice against the Palestinian Arabs. A copy of the petition was also handed to the American consul in Jerusalem, Dr. Otis Glazebrook. The petition read:

> The Syrian Arab nation, which took part in this great war side by side with the Allies, would consider it a great injustice that its share of the booty of victory is to be her complete destruction and annihilation by being divided in portions to satisfy the ambition of the Powers contrary to the noble principle for which America went to war. Moreover, the proposition that the Southern part of this country, "Palestine," which has been inhabited by Arabs for the last thirteen centuries, should be made a "Home for Jews" whose number does not exceed 7% of its population, and who own 1% of its land, should be allowed to immigrate to it from all parts of the world against the will of its owners, is one of the most unjust ever heard of in the history of the world. The Arab, Muslim and Christian population of this country will not submit to it and is determined to maintain its country and its national life to the last breath, even if it shall make this country a scene of continual turmoil. Therefore we, the inhabitants of the country, who have already tried all possible means to carry our complaints to the ears of all the nations, come to submit our protest to you, asking for your kind assistance in the interest of justice and equality and in the name of humanity.[10]

This petition joins many other petitions sent to various British officials in the military administration in Palestine and in London. This particular one is interesting because it addressed the American Senate and begged for American assistance and intervention. It may have been written under the influence

of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918, which announced that Britain and France would help the oppressed people of the East to liberate themselves and to establish governments of their choice. The declaration stated that Britain and France agreed to support the establishment of national governments and administrations in Syria and Iraq, but Palestine is not mentioned. The leaders of the Palestinian Arabs protested this omission, which probably was not accidental.[11] They may have also referred to the contradictory agreements that were negotiated already during the war: the Sykes-Picot accord and the Hussein-McMahon correspondence.

This petition had a certain threatening tone to it in that the writers stated that they would not hesitate to turn the country into a scene of continual turmoil. Indeed, the OETA administration in Jerusalem seemed to have been prepared for possible disturbances in the city, as a result of unrest among its Arab population. This is evident from a secret plan published in 1919 that was distributed among various officers in OETA, and especially in the Jerusalem area. It presented a strategy for defending certain locations in Jerusalem that might be at risk in case of one of the two following scenarios: (a) an attempted massacre of the Jews in Jerusalem by the Muslims, and possibly by the Armenians, (b) a general Arab rising.[12]

The situation in Jerusalem, then, was clearly very fragile and tense. The petition mentioned earlier is only one indication of the frustration felt by some segments of the Arab population in the city, and elsewhere in Palestine, toward the Balfour Declaration and the other international agreements and understandings. One of the immediate reactions of the Arab population in Palestine to the Balfour Declaration, and to what they viewed as a pro-Zionist British policy, was to establish the Muslim-Christian Associations. The first association was established in Jaffa in early November 1918, and the second in Jerusalem, two weeks later. One of its main goals was to achieve cooperation between Muslims and Christians and to counter the British contention that there was a religious-based division among the Arabs in Palestine.[13] The Muslim-Christian Association was headed by members of the leading notable families and the religious communities, with an overrepresentation of Christians in comparison to their proportional strength in the population. The purpose of the associations was to express and organize popular opposition to Zionism, as well as to express their expectations of the British to uphold their promises to Sherif Hussein, as promised in the Hussein-McMahon exchange.[14]

The Muslim-Christian Associations joined other Arab national associations and clubs that were established, mainly in Jerusalem, in 1918. These were, chiefly, al-Muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club) and al-Nadi al-'Arabi (the Arab Club). Their members consisted largely of people from the young Arab intelligentsia. Al-Muntada al-Adabi was financed by the French and called for the unification of Palestine with Syria. Its members adopted a violent anti-British and anti-Zionist line and, indeed, the organization was considered by both the British and the Zionists as their biggest opponent. Al-Nadi al-'Arabi's main leaders and activists were members of the young generation of the Husayni family—Haj Amin al-Husayni acted as its president—and people related to them by marriage. The organization was engaged in cultural and social activities, and its political goals were identical to those of al-Muntada al-Adabi: the unification of Palestine with Syria and resistance to Zionism. Its propaganda, however, was more restrained and demonstrated some pro-British tendencies. These two organizations, al-Nadi and al-Muntada, worked in close cooperation with each other, both internally and externally.[15]

The British were, of course, extremely interested in these various associations. An intelligence report from August 1919, entitled "Arab Movement and Zionism," addressed these associations, as well as some others, and provided information on their members, activities, and agendas. While describing the Muslim-Christian Association, the report paid special attention to its religious composition, emphasizing the unity among its members in their opposition to Zionism and their religious-based division regarding the preferred mandatory power. The writer described the associations as:

> Composed of older and more representative Muslims and Christians of Jerusalem and the surrounding villages. The Latins in it are pro-French; the Greek Orthodox are nearly all pro-British; the Muslims are out for independence, though if they cannot have it some prefer Britain and others America as mandatory power. The Muslims want nothing to do with France, but Latin, Greek-Orthodox and Muslims are equally opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration. The Muslim Christian society is not so secret nor so violent in its attitude and activities as the five [societies] previously mentioned [in the report].[16]

The report paid particular attention to the various organizations (and its leading members). Other than the three discussed earlier, it mentioned two

others: al-Akha wa al-ʻAfaf (Brotherhood and Purity) and al-Fidaʼiya (the Sacrificers). The former is described by the British as "composed of the more violent propagandists . . . [its] members are expected to do the dirty work for the *Muntada* and the *Nadi* if and when any needs to be done." The members of al-Fidaʼiya are described in the report as ready to sacrifice themselves to start a revolt or assassinate anybody.[17]

According to the statute of the Muslim-Christian Association, the organization embodied two groups, both of which are located in Jerusalem. The first, the "Muslim-Christian Association in Jerusalem," focused its activities on Jerusalem, and the second, the "Palestine Muslim-Christian Society," devoted its activities to Palestine in general. The statute does not emphasize the political aspects of the activities of the Association. Rather, it presents the purpose of the Muslim-Christian Society in Jerusalem as "to elevate the interests of the country (Palestine) connected with agriculture, techniques, economics and commerce, the revival of science, and the education of the national youth and the protection of national rights, morally and materially." Every Muslim or Christian in Jerusalem and its districts could become a member of the society.[18] According to Porath, the Muslim-Christian Associations formed a countrywide network, with its headquarters in Jerusalem. In reality, because of the lack of a central system of organization, each association acted independently.[19]

During the Muslim-Christian Association's first period in Jerusalem, the two main figures who served as the leaders of the organization were the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, and the general administrator of the Awqaf, ʻArif Hikmat al-Nashashibi. However, because they both held important public positions in the administration of the city, they were forced to choose between their administrative and political positions, and ultimately chose the administrative ones. ʻArif al-Dajani took the leadership, and served as the president of the Muslim-Christian Association from January 1919.[20]

Rejection and opposition to Zionism were the main uniting themes in the ideology of the Muslim-Christian Associations and the other Arab societies in Palestine. They based their arguments on the historical continuity of Arab settlement in Palestine and on the numerical advantage of Arabs over Jews in the country.[21] The property of Jews in the country, according to the Arab sources, was less than 1 percent. According to them, neither the Balfour Declaration nor the attempt to allow a small minority to dominate the majority thus made

sense.[22] A religious argument was added as well. All religious beliefs in Palestine were to be treated equally, it was claimed. However, the religious rights of the Jews in Palestine were not equal to those of the Muslims and Christians. The arguments were all supported politically by President's Wilson's promises regarding self-determination, and by Article 22 in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which recognized the wishes of the people in the selection of mandatory power.[23]

The First Congress of the Muslim-Christian Associations was convened in Jerusalem between January 27 and February 10, 1919. The Muslim-Christian Associations were behind its convention, and its main goals were to formulate a program to present at the Peace Conference in Paris, and to choose representatives of the Palestinian Arab cause to attend the conference. Another reason for convening the congress was to debate the various international (mainly British and French) statements regarding self-determination and liberty of the nations that were under Ottoman rule. The need to address the question of Zionism and the status of non-Jews in Palestine was, of course, another central reason for organizing the conference. Even though the official members of the congress were activists in the Muslim-Christian Associations, some of the people present were also active in other associations, mainly in the Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi. The delegation chosen to represent the Palestinian cause consisted of members of the Muslim-Christian Association.[24]

The decisions passed in the congress followed many discussions and arguments among the different delegates. In the end, the congress passed a resolution that Palestine is part of southern Syria, and demanded its unity with Syria under an independent Arab government. The congress also rejected political Zionism, criticized France for its attempts to rule Palestine, and approved British assistance on the condition that such aid would not restrict Palestine's independence. These decisions were not reached unanimously, and two coalitions formed during the congress: a pan-Arab pro-French coalition voted for uniting Palestine with Syria, and a pan-Arab pro-British coalition rejected French claims over Palestine. The idea of unification of Palestine with Syria was at first rejected by some members of the prominent Jerusalemite elite families, such as 'Arif al-Dajani and Ismail al-Husayni, who tried to convince the congress of their idea of "Palestine for the Palestinians." Their fear was to lose their leading role if Palestine were to become part of Syria, under Faysal's rule. They too, however, ultimately accepted the idea of unity of Palestine with Syria.[25]

The British were very interested in the debates that took place in the congress, and in the decisions that were passed there. A detailed report on the congress concludes that:

> One thing is clear, and that is the unalterable opposition of all non-Jewish elements in Palestine towards Zionism. The fear of Zionism leads a few, mostly Latins, to favor the union of Palestine with a French Syria. It is also the main reason that leads the young pan-Arab element to favor its union with an independent Arab Syria, for with Palestine joined to an Arab Syria the people of Palestine, with the help of other Arabs, would be able successfully to resist Jewish immigration and Zionist plans. I am convinced that if it were not for Zionism ninety percent of the people of this country would come out without qualification in favor of a British administration and protectorate.[26]

The writer of the report also distinguished between the various religious communities in Palestine according to their inclinations toward a desired mandatory power or political solution. For example, according to him, the Jews, Zionists or not, desired British protection. Many of the Latins, on the other hand, had sympathies with France, even though it was pretty obvious that France would support the Maronites in Mount Lebanon. Most Greek Orthodox sought British protection. The Muslims were divided according to their affiliation to any national society and according to their social location (villagers or townsmen). Members of the Arab societies wished for an independent Palestine that would be part of a united Arab state, whereas villagers or people who owned a considerable amount of property held pro-British feelings. All non-Jews were affected by the various declarations and were worried about the future of Palestine. It was this last concern that led, according to the report, to the strong anti-Zionist resolution that was passed in the conference, and that created various alliances between religious groups and foreign powers.[27]

Defining the target of their struggle as the Zionist movement, it is important to note that on many occasions the Muslim-Christian Associations, as well as other national organizations in Palestine, made a distinction between the indigenous Jewish residents in Palestine and the Zionist immigrants. A report of Major General Money, the chief administrator of OETA, from March 31, 1919, mentioned a visit of representatives of the Muslim-Christian Associations. He noted

that "they assured me that Muslims and Christians generally had no feeling of animosity against the local Jews, with whom they lived for many years on amicable terms, but that their quarrel was with the Zionist idea of filling up the country with foreign Jews."[28] The same distinction was made in the anti-Zionist manifesto of the Palestinian Congress of February 1919. The distinction was made between Zionist immigrants and "those among them [the Jews] who have been Arabized, who have been living in our province since before the war; they are as we are, and their loyalties are as our own."[29] However, as Yehoshua Porath argues, this distinction was conditional upon the identification of the indigenous Jews with Arab nationalism, and with their being culturally Arab. The two possible communities among the Jews in Palestine that may have accepted this position were the extreme orthodox and some elements within the Sephardi community.[30] Regarding the latter, as was discussed in chapter 3 and will be discussed here, this distinction between indigenous Jews and Zionists appeared occasionally, both in the writings of the Sephardim themselves and in the writings of some Arabs.

As their name indicates, part of the agenda behind the Muslim-Christian Associations was to encourage political cooperation between Muslims and Christians in Palestine in the struggle against Zionism. This agenda may have been a response to the attempts of the British administrators to create a clear division among Christians and Muslims in Palestine, and came as a result of the British support for Zionism and what was seen by the local Arab population as the growing power and influence of Zionism in the country. The historical divisions between Muslims and Christians as they played out in the Ottoman period were downplayed in Palestine, following the changing political reality. The British, however, were not the only ones trying to create those divisions between Muslims and Christians. The Zionists likewise attempted to highlight the religious differences among the Arabs in Palestine and to encourage a religious-based division. One example of such an attempt can be found in an undated report, possibly written by Haim Margaliyot Kalvaryski, entitled "The Muslim-Christian Associations." In this report, when discussing these associations, Kalvaryski wrote:

> The newspapers that hate Zionism, such as *Filastin* and others, keep discussing the activities of the Muslim Christian Society. The impression is that there is in the country a big and strong society, which is composed of Muslims and Christians, that Muslims and Christians live in friendship and brotherhood

[and] that the only subject for hatred is the Zionist, [and] that, but for the Zionists, peace, quiet and friendship would have prevailed in *Eretz Israel* (Palestine). Unfortunately, this is not the case. The relationship between the Christians and the Muslims is very tense. More than the Muslim hates the Jew, he hates the Christian, and more than the Christian hates the Jew he hates the Muslim. . . . In Jerusalem there are some Christians who are members of the Muslim Christian Society, but in general the Christians are tired of this association and its activities. The only city in which the society still exists is Jaffa, but this too will not last for long. . . . This is the real condition of the Muslim Christian Associations. . . . There is no Muslim Christian Association. The Muslims are alone, and the Christians are alone.[31]

It seems that the Muslim-Christian Associations challenged the attempt to distinguish between the Arabs on the basis of religion, made by both the Zionists and the British, whose aim was to weaken the Arab national movement and to highlight the differences and disagreements among the Arabs. The British may have encouraged such a distinction because of a "divide and rule" policy, whereas the Zionists may have done it in an attempt to weaken the Arab national movement and its ambitions in Palestine. As was discussed earlier, the Sephardim also distinguished between Muslims and Christians. They viewed the Christians as the "worst enemies," and viewed the Muslims as potential allies with whom possible cooperation for the benefit of the country could be carried out. However, these distinctions and alliances changed and transformed during this first period of British rule, as explained earlier.

The Muslim National Associations

The Muslim National Associations were among several organizations established by the Zionist movement with the hope of balancing the effect of the Muslim-Christian Associations and of offering an alternative to the Arab national organizations in Palestine. The two other organizations were the Palestine Arab National Party and the regional farmer parties.[32] The rationale behind the establishment of these organizations was the belief that the Zionist movement and its various institutions should support the "moderates" among the Arabs. This was based on the Zionists' premise that the vast unrecognized majority of the Arab

population in Palestine did not support the activities and agenda of the Muslim-Christian Associations and the other national organizations discussed earlier. These organizations, it was argued, created a negative influence among the Arabs in Palestine, the majority of whom were neutral and subject to propaganda. The Zionists, then, saw the need to win the hearts and minds of this part of the population and realized the necessity of creating organizations that would counterbalance what they saw as the negative effect of the Muslim-Christian Associations.[33]

The Muslim National Association was established in Jerusalem in 1921, mainly with the support of Haim Margaliyot Kalvaryski. Kalvaryski hoped that the organization would lead to a Jewish–Arab entente and the creation of more positive Jewish–Arab relations in Palestine.[34] According to its founding manifesto published in July 1921, there were two kinds of members in the association: regular members, paying a membership fee of twenty Egyptian Piasters (*Kirsh*) per month, and honorary members, who were invited to join the organization. The central committee of the organization consisted of seven to thirteen members who were elected democratically at the general meeting. The central committee was also in charge of establishing more branches of the association in any village or town in the country, and of maintaining contacts with other organizations in Palestine that would benefit religion, the nation *(watan),* and all the people. According to the manifesto, the association welcomed any person as a member. The only condition was that the candidate did not have a criminal record. Interestingly, the manifesto also mentioned that the papers and documents of the organization would always be transparent to governmental security or examination.[35]

According to the manifesto, the association acknowledged the British Mandate over Palestine and supported the status quo while taking into account the Muslim majority in the country. It would strive to achieve peace between all people of different races and creeds, and act toward the removal and solution of the divisions and disagreements among all people. It would strive for the promotion of education, sciences, agriculture, and commerce in the country, and legally protect the rights and security of the people (residents—*ahaliin*). The association would keep the right to negotiate and debate with the government regarding all daily matters, as well as political issues. It also attempted to establish a national fund for the assistance of the farmers *(fellahin)* and landowners and to help the needy. The members of the association were described as brothers who help

each other in all matters, according to the law.[36] The main figures in the Muslim National Association, and those who established the organization in Jerusalem, were the following: Shukri al-Dajani, Musa Hadeeb, Haj Khalil al-Rasas, Haj Farik al-Dajani, 'Arif al-Khatib, 'Arif al-Muwakat, and Namadi al-'Afifi.[37]

Like other "pro-Zionist" organizations, the Muslim National Associations suffered from some inherent problems that weakened them among the Palestinian Arab community. The first and central one was their reliance on Zionist funds, which were channeled to them mainly by Kalvaryski. The second problem was that, among Palestinian Arabs, it was well known that these organizations were established largely thanks to Jewish influence. The British government, realizing their weakness among the Arab community, neither favored them nor showed them any support.[38] In the public sphere, the main activity of the Muslim National Association was to publish petitions in support of the Zionist movement and the ways it could potentially benefit Palestine, and publish others against the Arab national movement. Those petitions, signed by people in towns and villages for small amounts of money, were used by the Zionists as proof that the Arab community in Palestine was not unanimously hostile to the Zionist presence in the country.[39]

Haim Margaliyot Kalvaryski was not only the main figure behind the establishment of the Muslim National Association, but also the one behind many of the other connections between the Zionist movement and some Arabs in Palestine and Syria. In 1919, Kalvaryski became the main contact person for the Zionist movement with the Arabs, negotiating with various Arab leaders, attempting to promote cooperation between Jews and Arabs in the country, and emphasizing the advantages that the Arabs could expect from the Zionist presence.[40] Kalvaryski was a fascinating figure, a person with many faces, who strove to achieve that in which he believed, despite opposition from the Zionist Executive, as will be discussed in the following. In many instances he seemed to serve as a Zionist agent among the Arabs, and was constantly trying to bribe them and win their support with money. However, I would like to suggest that Kalvaryski's figure is more complicated, and that in his activities and approach to the Arabs he presented a nuanced, maybe ambivalent, view regarding the escalation of national tension in Palestine. A closer look at Kalvaryski and his position within the Zionist movement may also offer a different angle from which to examine the approach of the Zionist movement toward Jewish–Arab relations at this period.

Born in Poland in 1867, Haim Margaliyot Kalvaryski arrived in Palestine in 1895 as an agronomist and served for many years as the administrator of the agricultural settlements in the lower and upper Galilee. One of his major roles was to purchase lands from the Arabs and develop the Jewish settlements in the region. During World War I Kalvaryski managed to use his good connections with the Ottoman authorities in Palestine to help the Jewish community in the settlements and ease their difficult situation as much as possible. He managed to stay in Palestine throughout the war and, unlike other Jews and Zionist activists, was not expelled by the Ottomans to Damascus or Egypt. After the war, he served as a member of the general council (Va'ad Leumi) of the Jewish community and of the Zionist Executive, and served as the head of the Arab Bureau until 1928. In later years he was one of the leaders of the Leftist Brit Shalom movement that sought to reach "Jewish–Arab understanding" in Palestine.[41]

Kalvaryski has been portrayed in the literature as a Zionist agent who encouraged Arabs to cooperate with the Zionist movement by paying them money and bribing them. Hillel Cohen, for example, describes him as one of the major activists in the Zionist movement who developed ties with possible Palestinian collaborators and convinced them to cooperate with the Zionist movement.[42] I would like to revisit the way Kalvaryski is portrayed and offer a more nuanced way to analyze his role.

Kalvaryski's awareness of the Arab question and the national tension between Jews and Arabs began early in his life. In 1910, following the development of the Arab national movement in the Ottoman Empire, Kalvaryski began to see the connection between the Jewish movement in Palestine and national awareness among the Arabs. In 1913, according to his own words, he "came to the realization that we should reach some kind of a *modus vivendi* with the Arabs." He began developing close connections with Arab leaders, and discussed with them ways of creating a "Jewish–Arab understanding." He tried to stimulate such a discussion with some Zionist leaders, among them Nahum Sokolov, and in 1914 he managed to arrange a meeting with Jewish and Arab leaders in Lebanon, to discuss possible ways of reaching such understanding and possibly an agreement. This meeting was canceled at the very last minute. According to Kalvaryski, "the

meeting was canceled for many reasons, but mainly because the Jews did not understand its importance, and treated the Arab national movement flippantly, or ignored it altogether."[43]

Another attempt of Kalvaryski to reach an agreement between Arab and Jewish leaders came in 1919, when he discussed the national issue with King Faysal and presented his proposal to the Syrian Congress. Faysal's advisors asked Kalvaryski "to explain how the Jews thought of administering the State of Palestine," and to prepare a draft of an agreement between Jews and Arabs. Kalvaryski prepared such a draft and reported that "the king and his advisors were very much pleased with it," and that Faysal congratulated him for his accomplishment. He then discussed his program with the Palestinian delegates to the congress, among them Haj Amin al-Husayni, and his program was accepted as a basis for a constitution for Palestine.[44]

Kalvaryski's program was both an interesting and a somewhat confusing one in its language and ideas. Its first article stated that "Palestine is the motherland of all its inhabitants: Muslims, Jews and Christians are all citizens with equal rights." The second article, though, continued with the following long statement: "Whereas the Jewish people, of oriental Semitic origin, is in need of territory for the development of its national culture, Palestine, the land of its birth, constituting a small island in the vast sea of lands and peoples of Oriental-Semitic origins, extending from the Taurus Mountains across the breadth of Northern Africa and to the Straits of Gibraltar, constitutes the Jewish national home." Despite this clause, that basically accepted the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, the next statement in Kalvaryski's draft was "No religion shall be the dominant religion of Palestine." Later he also promised equality among all religious communities and suggested to avoid prejudice and bias on a basis of religion. Another contradictory article regarded the issue of immigration, where he stated, "Since the Jewish capital and labor streaming into a poor, sparsely inhabited country like Palestine can be of benefit to all its inhabitants, absolute freedom shall be granted to Jewish immigration."[45]

This proposal reflects much of the ambivalence that is typical of Kalvaryski. On the one hand, he followed the principles of the Balfour Declaration and declared Palestine the national home of the Jewish people, and that Jews should be allowed to freely immigrate to the country. On the other hand, he fully respected the rights of the Muslims and Christians, and promised them equal rights. How can this contradiction be resolved?

Kalvaryski did not seem to think that there was a contradiction in his suggestion at all. In the meeting of the Provincial Council of Palestinian Jews (Va'ad Zmani) in June 1919, Kalvaryski tried to explain his suggestion for a Jewish–Arab agreement:

> For this agreement, we should not give up anything of our basic program. *Eretz Israel* should be our national home: foyer national du peuple Juif [*sic*]. The Hebrew language should be recognized as the language of the country together with the Arabic language, and it should be used in all governmental schools and public institutions. Jewish immigration and colonization would be allowed freely . . . As for other questions, we should behave as a progressed and cultivated people, and we should not differentiate between one religion and the other. But at the same time, we must not ignore the needs of our neighbors. We must not build our national home on the ruins of others. We do not want to do to the Arabs here what we do not want the gentiles to do to us in the Diaspora. I am sure that the agreement with the Arabs could be carried out, and that it would be a blessing for us all.[46]

What I interpret as Kalvaryski's ambivalence, maybe even dissonance, is seen even more clearly in his opening statement at the same discussion in June 1919. In the introduction to his talk, he explained what in his personal history had made him realize that an agreement and understanding between Palestinian Jews and Arabs should be reached, and what had made him aware of "the Arab question." On a very personal note, he said:

> I realized how serious the issue of our relations with the Arabs is when I first purchased lands from the Arabs. . . . I realized how close the Bedouin is to his land. During my 25 years of colonial work I have dispossessed many Arabs from their lands, and you understand that this job—of dispossessing people from the land in which they and maybe their fathers were born—is not at all an easy thing, especially when one looks at these people not as a flock of sheep but as human beings. . . . I agreed to dispossess, because this is what the *yishuv* demanded, but I always tried to do it in the best way possible. I also tried to make sure that the *effendis* will not loot them. . . . I got familiar with the Arabs and the Arab question very early on.[47]

Reading this, what first comes to mind is the Hebrew phrase *Yorim ve-Bochim* (shooting and crying), in the case here, "dispossessing and crying." Kalvaryski confesses to dispossessing Arabs from their lands, but says that he was doing it in "the nicest way possible." Does the realization of the injustice of dispossessing people from their lands make him act differently? He does not quit his job in the Zionist movement and continues to be active in it for several more years. Still, I would suggest that it is important to note the special tone in Kalvaryski's speech, which alludes to a kind of dissonance toward his work and duties. Perhaps this dissonance was what made him active in various attempts to reach an agreement between Jews and Arabs. His special approach to the Arab question is also evident upon close examination of the debate that took place following Kalvaryski's presentation.

The debate, which focused on the relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and on possible ways of dealing with the national tension, revealed the feelings of major Zionist leaders toward "the Arab question." The main point that all participants agreed upon was that relations with the Arabs were not good. On the question of how to approach the problem, and whether it was possible to improve Jewish–Arab relations, the divisions among the speakers were deep. Only a minority, consisting of some local indigenous Jews (Meyuhas and Yellin) agreed with Kalvaryski that Arab hostility toward Zionism should be treated as a serious obstacle. David Yellin, for example, reminded the participants that "our 'matching' with the British government is temporary, whereas our 'matching' with the Arabs is eternal." He claimed that 90 percent of the Palestinian Arabs do not hate the Zionist movement, and that it is essential to reach both the urban and the rural population, explain the Zionist aims to them, and create good relations among Jews and Arabs that would promote trust and understanding. Yosef Meyuhas, a prominent Sephardi from Jerusalem, emphasized the importance of knowing Arabic as a means of approaching and improving the relations with the Arab population in Palestine.[48]

The majority of speakers, though, claimed that good relations with the Arabs could not be a prior condition of Zionist work, but rather would follow as a natural result of the real work of Zionism, consisting of colonization and economic development. At this point they considered it wasteful to divert valuable energy into the work of improving relations with the Arabs.[49] Such was, for example, the

attitude of David Ben Gurion, who claimed that there was a deep chasm between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and that nothing could fill it up. There was a clash of interests between Jews and Arabs in the country, he said, and added that "the question is a national question: we want the land to be ours, and the Arabs want the land to be theirs, as a *nation*."[50]

What is Zionism? This question was raised in the debate as well. The chairperson argued that friendship with the Arabs was one of the foundations of Zionism, as Zionism means not only the revival of Jewish people, but also the revival of the East. The revival of the East could be carried out only if Jews and Arabs would cooperate. Kalvaryski himself said that he did not see a contradiction between Zionism and peaceful coexistence with the Arabs. He did not see a problem in establishing a state, if the state provides equal rights to all its citizens. Jews and Arabs, he claimed, can live together.[51]

The discussion was supposed to focus on Kalvaryski's work among the Arabs, but it turned into a more general discussion about the perceptions of the Zionist movement toward the Arab question and the evolving national tension in Palestine. The participants who took part in this discussion found it hard to reach concrete decisions or a consensus, and hence it was decided to merely acknowledge the importance of discussing relations between Jews and Arabs, and to refer the matter to a special committee that would explore it thoroughly.[52] The debate reveals several points. First, as mentioned earlier, it demonstrates some of the attitudes of leading Zionist figures toward the Arabs and the relations between Jews and Arabs. Second, it shows how difficult it was for them to reach a concrete decision on the issue. Reading the debate, it seems that many speakers simply tried to avoid dealing with the difficult problem, the evolving national tension in Palestine. Third, this debate is very telling when examining the attitude of parts of the Zionist leadership toward Kalvaryski himself. The work that he had done with the Arabs and his suggestion for an understanding between Jews and Arabs were neither condemned nor endorsed. Some speakers even referred to Kalvaryski's suggested program as "a ridiculous and dangerous program" or as a "negative program."[53] Kalvaryski thus did not win the full support of the Provincial Council of Palestine Jews or of the Zionist Commission, although, until his resignation in 1928, he was very active in the Arab Bureau of the Zionist movement. It should be pointed out that he did not win full support among the Arabs with whom he negotiated either.[54]

Despite all this, I think that among the Zionist figures of the time, Kalvaryski presented a voice that is worth examining carefully. Like Nissim Malul and Shimon Moyal, who worked for the Zionist movement but were also very critical of some of its policies and attitudes, Kalvaryski too was very critical of the Zionist movement, even though he was part of it. He was committed to the Zionist movement, did the work of "dispossession" (as he himself described it), but at the same time criticized the Zionist leadership. His accusation toward this leadership, which failed to reach an agreement or understanding between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and ignored the Arabs and the evolving national conflict altogether, is worth considering more carefully. Among the generally nationalistic voices of the leading Zionists at the time, Kalvaryski's voice was more attuned to the reality of the national tension in the country. Kalvaryski, I suggest, "suffered" from inherent ambivalence in his political work, but was essentially motivated by sincere intention to improve national relations in Palestine.

AMERICA IN PALESTINE II: THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION

In the shadow of the escalating national tension in Palestine, the Peace Conference in Paris decided to send a Commission of Inquiry to Palestine and Syria in order to determine the wishes of the local populations concerning their political destiny. The idea of the commission was proposed by President Wilson as a way of solving the tension between Britain and France regarding the future mandates over the former Ottoman territories. The commission was supposed to include representatives from France, Britain, Italy, and the United States. Eventually, because of disagreements between Britain and France, their representatives, as well as the Italian representatives, did not take part in the commission. The commission was led by two Americans, Dr. Henry King and Charles Crane.[55]

In addition to the attempt of the Peace Conference to ascertain the wishes of people in the Middle East regarding their future, two other issues created the need to send an investigatory committee. The first was the conflicting interests of the great powers, mainly Britain and France, regarding the future of the Middle East. The second was the opposition of the Americans to the secret agreements during World War I. The instructions that were given to the commission were to visit Palestine, Syria, and Turkey, and to acquaint themselves as fully as possible with the social, racial, and economic conditions there. It was asked to form as

definite an opinion as possible regarding the divisions of territory and the assign-ment of mandates that would most likely promote order, peace, and development for the people and countries in question.[56]

The military authorities announced the arrival of the commission at the beginning of April 1919. Realizing the potential importance of the commission and its recommendations, all relevant parties and groups in Palestine began preparing themselves for its arrival. The leading Arab notables in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine began to prepare a list of demands for the commis-sion. Those included the unity of Palestine with Syria, the independence of Syria under an Arab national government, and a rejection of the Balfour Declara-tion and of Jewish immigration.[57] The Zionist Commission and the Provisional Council of Palestinian Jews began to discuss the stand it should take when its representatives testified before the King-Crane Commission. Realizing that it would look specifically into the political question and the relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, the leaders of the *yishuv* began to pay more attention to this issue.[58]

The commission arrived in Jaffa on June 10, 1919, and stated that its mis-sion was:

> To get as accurate and definite information as possible concerning the condi-tions, the relations and the desires of all peoples and classes concerned; in order that President Wilson and the American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they may be called upon hereafter to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East—whether in the Peace Conference or in the later League of Nations.[59]

The commission began to receive oral and written testimonies from people from Jaffa on June 11. Those included the head of the Protestant Syrian com-munity, a delegation of the Muslim-Christian Association, a delegation of the Zionist movement, the Grand Mufti of Jaffa, Tawfic Dajani, and the leader of the Greek community in Jaffa, which was the largest sect in the city. It then headed to Jerusalem on June 13, 1919.

It is interesting to examine which groups and organizations the King-Crane Commission interviewed while in Jerusalem. The commission's members indeed

tried to meet as many representatives of the local population as possible. Hence, the commission met separately with members of the Zionist Commission, as well as representatives of the Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities. Among the Arabs, the King-Crane Commission met representatives of the Muslim-Christian Association, a delegation of the three national organizations (al-Nadi al-'Arabi, al-Muntada al-Adabi, and al-Akha wa al-'Afaf), a delegation of the Protestant Arabs of Jerusalem, and representatives of some villages around Jerusalem.[60]

The Arab delegates tried to present a unified line to the commission, which consisted of the three demands that were agreed upon in the earlier discussions of the Muslim-Christian Associations. Those included independence for Syria, unity between Palestine and Syria, and rejection to the Zionist immigration and the Balfour Declaration. These demands were presented clearly by the Muslim-Christian Association's delegation, as well as by the delegation of the three Arab national associations. The Muslim-Christian Association's delegation included forty members, representatives of the Muslim, Greek Orthodox, and Latin communities in Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Protestant delegation, even though it appeared separately before the commission, presented the same demands, including the rejection of the Balfour Declaration. As the Protestants were natural allies of the British, their objection to British policy is worth noticing and probably reflects their resentment toward what they viewed as pro-Zionist policy. Again, as in the case of the Muslim-Christian alliance, here too there is a case of a natural affiliation (between the Protestants and the British) that changed following British intervention and local reality.

Indeed, the religious division between Christians and Muslims was one of the issues that seem to have interested the commission the most. Some of the questions asked specifically addressed the relations between Muslims and Christians in Palestine, in addition to the relations between Jews and non-Jews in the country. For example, in the concluding comments of the commission's interview with the Muslim-Christian Association, it was stated that: "those who spoke so strongly against the Jews were especially the Christians. The Muslims only said a few words in this sense and approved sometimes the Christians while they looked at them. The Christians even boasted of having spoken so strongly against the Jews." Like the Zionists and the British, it seems that the Americans too were interested in relations between the various religious sects among the Arabs in

Palestine. Each of them, however, had its own motivation in looking into these interreligious relations.

Another interesting point to note while reading the reports of the commission is the distinction made between "local Jews" and "Zionists," or between "local Jews" and "foreign Jews." This distinction was especially clear in the statement handed to the commission by the representatives of the three Arab national associations. In their statement, while explaining their objection to Zionism, they seem at first to generalize and talk about all Jews in Palestine, but later they distinguish between local Jews and foreign Jews:

> We protest against the Zionist idea and against the founding in Palestine of a National Home for the Jews, for Palestine is merely a small tract of Syria. Should Jews flow to it in any form there will be no room for them there. . . . The manners of the Jewish life and their famous national customs do not cope with the methods of our life and our customs. . . . The traditions of the Jews are different from ours, their manners are not like ours, their desires are not like ours, their hopes are not like ours. Should they come to us a quarrel must break out and peace will be threatened. . . . We are still in the first age of national existence. . . . The native Jews who live with us for many centuries, ours is theirs and theirs is ours. We therefore protest against (the) asking of the opinion of foreign Jews with regard to the future of this country. They have no right to do that.[61]

The Jerusalem Sephardim, who were the "native Jews" that the Arabs referred to, presented their views to the commission as well. They started out by stating that Eretz Israel belonged to the Jews, but also added that "there were always friendly relations between the Jews and their Arab neighbors." Yosef Meyuhas, one of the speakers, presented himself to the commission as a Palestinian who has lived among Arabs all his life. He said that the Arab feelings of antagonism against the Jews appeared recently, as a result of misunderstandings caused by the uncertainty of the political situation. There are many points of junction between Arabs and Jews, he claimed, and added that "the Sephardim, the old and local element, will serve as a link between the Arabs and the new-comers." He also emphasized the importance of language as a bridge between Jews and Arabs in the country.[62] The presentation of the Sephardi Jerusalemites followed the same fine line that was discussed in chapter 3, that of being both nationalists

and localists, of supporting parts of the Zionist agenda but also trying to serve as a link between the Zionists and the local population, the Arabs.

The Zionist Commission, when appearing before the King-Crane Commission, demanded that the League of Nations recognize the connection of the Jews to Palestine, and their right to reconstitute their national home in Palestine. They demanded that the sovereign possession of Palestine be vested in the League of Nations, and that Great Britain should act as the mandatory power in the country. Jewish immigration, they claimed, would materially benefit the local inhabitants, as Zionism would bring Western culture to the country.[63]

Following the interviews it carried out with the different organizations and groups, the members of the King-Crane Commission felt that the majority of the population was highly supportive of unification with Syria and objected to Zionism. Regarding the desired mandatory power, the Syrian congress, which convened in Damascus shortly after the visit of the commission, approved the idea of an American Mandate over Palestine. The Christian groups interviewed were not unanimous in this view, as some of the Christians, such as the Maronites, Greek Catholics, and the Latin Catholics, preferred a French mandate. The Jews, on the other hand, supported the idea of a British Mandate.[64]

The King-Crane Commission submitted its report to the League of Nations in August 1919. The report recommended the unity of Syria, including Palestine, under an American Mandate. If the Americans would not accept the mandate, it should be granted to Great Britain. The report advised "serious modification of the extreme Zionist program." It emphasized the hostility of the Arabs in Palestine toward Zionism, and claimed that anti-Zionist sentiments were the most unifying element in all the testimonies, reports, and interviews that the commission collected. It added that a national home for the Jewish people was not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish state. The report stated:

> In view of these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish Commonwealth should be given up. There would be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State.[65]

The King-Crane report was never adopted by the Peace Conference in Paris, or by the American government. It remained a secret document until 1922, when parts of it were published.[66] It reflected a pro-Syrian and anti-Zionist line, which contradicted the policy promoted by the British government. The fact that it was ignored and neglected may reflect the power and influence that the British and the Zionist delegations to the Peace Conference had. The King-Crane Commission can be looked at as a last international attempt to reexamine the situation in Palestine in the twilight period following the British occupation but before the mandate over Palestine was officially granted to Britain by the Peace Conference in 1920.

APRIL 1920: THE END OF THE BEGINNING?

Nabi Musa was a weeklong Islamic religious festival, commemorating Prophet Moses, which included a long pilgrimage walk along the Jericho Road to Jerusalem to the traditional burial place of Moses. It was described by Ronald Storrs as "the apex of the Muslim year,"[67] and was scheduled to be celebrated in Jerusalem on April 4, 1920. In his memoirs Storrs described the festival as a delicate matter, especially in the period of transition between Ottoman Muslim rule and British rule. It marked, according to Storrs, the passing of Islamic theocratic rule and, hence, the British military authorities tried to treat it with much sensitivity. However, the April 1920 festival, which ended with four days of bloodshed and violent riots in Jerusalem, may have marked the high point of the escalating national tension in the country during the period of the military administration. In other words, it may be considered as "the end of the beginning" of the British administration in Palestine.[68]

The Nabi Musa Festival disturbances came at the end of a few months during which Arab nationalist activity in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine switched into a different stage than previously. In the first months of their activity, the Muslim-Christian Associations were mainly engaged in distributing pamphlets and petitions and organizing small-scale protests against Zionist activity in Palestine and against British policy. In February 1920, the Muslim-Christian Association organized the first large-scale Arab nationalist demonstration, thus opening a new phase in its activities. The demonstration took place in Jerusalem on February 27, 1920, and attracted a crowd of more than a thousand people.

As the organizers promised the British administrators, the demonstration was peaceful and there was no violence or injuries. The demonstrators carried banners that called for the end of Zionist immigration.[69] In a report on the demonstration that appeared in the *Jerusalem News* newspaper, it was mentioned that this first demonstration marked a historic moment, because it demonstrated the transition between Turkish and British rule and showed the difference between these two regimes. Under Turkish rule such open political procession would have never been possible, claimed the reporter.[70] The Zionist reports on the first demonstration portrayed a different picture. Some of the cries heard there, according to one report, were "Death to the Jews," "The land is ours, and the Jews are our dogs." This demonstration, claimed the report, served to inflame the spirit of the people, including those who used to have very good and friendly relations with the Jews, and to create strong anti-Jewish feelings.[71]

Another demonstration took place in Jerusalem on March 8, following the proclamation of Faysal as king of Syria by the Syrian Congress. This demonstration too was generally peaceful, much larger than the first one, and also organized by the Muslim-Christian Association.[72] Following this demonstration, representatives of the Jerusalem Jewish community sent a letter to General Storrs, in which they claimed that the demonstration was not so peaceful and that the military authorities should be cautious about any other demonstrations. They also protested against the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, who participated in and spoke at the two demonstrations, acting contrary to his official role as mayor.[73]

Tension was felt in preparation for the Nabi Musa festival, as the rumors were that it would be the occasion for an anti-Zionist, pro-Sherifian demonstration in Jerusalem. British officials, including Storrs, tried to get assurance from Arab leaders that the pilgrimage would pass peacefully. The Zionist leaders, on the other hand, kept claiming that they felt insecure and that the military authorities were not doing enough to restrain the Arab nationalists. The Zionists also approached the British authorities and requested to be allowed to carry arms for self-protection, but their request was denied.[74]

Tension was at its peak, then, when the Nabi Musa procession took place on April 4. The pilgrims arrived from all over Palestine, but instead of marching to the Old City, the crowd gathered in front of the Arab Club and the municipality and listened to various speakers. Among them were Musa Kazim al-Husayni, Haj

Amin al-Husayni, and ʿArif al-ʿArif. They all called for the union of Palestine with Syria and turned the traditionally religious occasion into a heated political event.[75]

According to the Zionist report, the riots started when groups of demonstrators began raiding Jewish stores with sticks, stones, and knives. The crowd then moved down to the Jaffa Gate and into the Old City and continued to raid Jewish shops, loot them, and beat the Jews who were present. During the next three days the attacks continued, especially in the Old City, and targeted Jews living both in the Jewish Quarter and those living among the Arabs in other quarters.[76] The riots lasted for four days; nine people died (five of them Jews), and 244 were wounded (211 of them Jews).

One of the issues raised following the Nabi Musa events was the performance of the police and military forces, and their ability to protect the Jews who were attacked. The Jews claimed that the Arab policemen joined the rioters and failed to perform their duty. Likewise, they reported that those policemen who did arrive in the Old City gathered around the Jaffa Gate and did not enter the city itself. The Jews also claimed that the police did not arrest any of the attackers.[77] A different account appears in the *Jerusalem News* report. According to this report, at first the policemen were unable to control the situation, but once they gathered more forces at the scene of events, they arrested most of the leaders of the attacks. The report praised the performance of the British and Indian troops, as well as the medical teams that assisted the injured.[78]

Following the riots, a special committee of inquiry was set up to investigate the events. The Palin Committee of Inquiry endorsed the Zionists' claims that the riots were an attack of Arabs against Jews, but placed most of the blame on the Zionists and on their impatience to achieve their ultimate goal. The Zionists, the commission claimed, were the ones responsible for the deterioration of affairs in Palestine. The report was very critical of the Zionist Commission, claiming that it was turning almost into an independent administration. It also presented various examples of the irritation felt by the military administration toward the Zionist Commission. Despite its criticism, the Palin Report did not advocate the reversal of the policy of the Balfour Declaration, but suggested the establishment of a firm government that would be able to balance between Zionist aspirations and the Arabs' suspicions of the British administration.[79]

Following the riots and the complaints against the performance of the mayor in the course of different demonstrations, Ronald Storrs removed Musa Kazim

al-Husayni from his position, and replaced him with Ragib al-Nashashibi.[80] This appointment brought the rivalry between these two prominent families, the Husaynis and the Nashashibis, to the fore, and highlighted the dispute that would dominate internal Arab politics in Palestine for many years to come.

The Nabi Musa riots mark the first instance in which the escalating national tension translated into violence. They represent the peak of intercommunal conflict near the end of the military administration in Palestine. They were also important because many of the victims of the riots were Jews who lived among the Arabs in the Old City, Ashkenazi and Sephardi alike, people who were not considered by the Arab nationalists as their target population, as was discussed earlier. The track of violence, which started with these four days of riots, would continue for many years to come.

<p style="text-align:center">⁕</p>

THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION in Palestine ended shortly after the Nabi Musa riots, when on April 25, 1920, during the San Remo Conference, the Mandate for Palestine was assigned to Great Britain. The military administration was replaced with a civil one, headed by Sir Herbert Samuel. Samuel himself arrived in Palestine on June 30, 1920. His arrival signaled the end of the military rule over Palestine, which had lasted just over thirty months, and the beginning of a new period in the history of Palestine, that of the British Mandate.

These years of the military administration ended the transition period between Ottoman and British rule in Palestine, a period that started during World War I. Even though the British were the rulers de facto of Jerusalem (and later of Palestine) from 1917 until 1920, the period of the military administration was, in many ways, an interim period. It was during these years that the political status of Palestine was negotiated by the local inhabitants, the great powers, and also Syria and King Faysal. Britain, France, and the United States all had stakes in Palestine and tried to protect their interests by various reports they submitted, by supporting local groups, and by their participation in the Peace Conference in Paris. The local groups, the various Arab nationalist associations, the different Zionist bodies, and the organizations the Zionist movement tried to support were struggling both on the local scene and abroad to achieve their objectives. The third part of the equation was King Faysal, who, even though he supported the establishment of Greater Syria, which would include Palestine,

also negotiated with various representatives of the Zionist movement in order to reach a Jewish–Arab agreement.

It was also during this period that intercommunal relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine were negotiated, both internally and externally, before the national conflict and tension became a dominant factor in the lives of the inhabitants. Traditional affiliations and alliances between groups changed and switched following the British involvement, and because of what the non-Jewish inhabitants saw as a pro-Zionist British policy. Muslims and Christians, traditionally alien to each other because of a history of wars and conflicts in the Ottoman era, became allies against Zionism and the Balfour policy. Jews and Muslims, who historically maintained good relations, became alienated because of the changing political reality in Palestine. Christian affiliations changed as well, when, for example, the Protestants—natural allies of the British—protested against British policy. Despite the British attempt to "divide and rule," and their attempt to distinguish between the Muslims and the Christians, the latter cooperated and began creating a united Arab front. Hence, the two blocks, of "Jews" against "Arabs," began to develop.

As was discussed earlier, various solutions for the evolving national conflict were considered at this period, which at times involved figures and initiatives that seemed to have internal tensions and contradictions. Those contradictions were possible because of the fluid nature of this specific moment in history. Despite the Balfour Declaration and the message it contained regarding the British vision of the future, attempts to solve the evolving conflict and to advance understanding and cooperation between the various sides still took place at this time. The King-Crane report, for example, was such an attempt. The fact that the report was completely ignored by the Paris Peace Conference is very telling and seems to reflect the choice that the great powers made of ignoring, or underestimating, the conflict developing in the country. Similarly, some of the recommendations and observations of the British administrators who served in Palestine during the military administration were ignored by the British government in London as well. This reflects the tension between the British representatives in Palestine versus the politicians in London regarding the political situation in the country, as was discussed in chapter 4.

It seems that, following the declaration of the British Mandate over Palestine in April 1920, this interim period of negotiation was over. Negotiations between

Jews and Arabs continued in the following years, and included the involvement of foreign powers as well, but those took place under different international and local circumstances, and under a much more fixed political reality. The military administration marked the end of the transition period between Ottoman and British rule, and the beginning of a new period in the history of Palestine and its peoples, the period of the British Mandate.

Concluding Remarks

SHORTLY BEFORE THESE LINES WERE WRITTEN Israel marked the ninetieth anniversary of the end of World War I in Palestine, and of Allenby's well-documented entry to Jerusalem and the British occupation of the city. The way these occasions were commemorated was not at all surprising: they were remembered as the time in which Jerusalem, and later Palestine, was liberated from the Ottoman yoke and rescued by its saviors, the British, and as the beginning of an entirely new chapter in the history of Palestine and its inhabitants. Among other things, this book has sought to shed more light on the complexity of this moment in Palestine's history and suggested other perspectives and interpretations for examining this historical episode.

Indeed, one of the most important shifts I suggest in this book is the problem of periodization. Historians tend to be somewhat "obsessed" with the question of periodization; of clearly differentiating between historical periods and processes. This, of course, is only natural. However, part of the problem with this need to set "periodical boundaries" is that while doing this, we tend to forget the important issue of *transition* between these historical periods. These transitions, which may describe processes as well, may be extremely interesting and telling, and can shed light on another important element in history, the question of continuity and change.

Having this in mind, this book aimed to contribute to a better understanding of two gaps in the research about Jerusalem in particular and Palestine in general. The first is a temporal gap between the historiographies of two periods in Palestinian history, the Ottoman and the British. The book closely examined the transition between two historical periods, two ways of life, in a specific locale, the city of Jerusalem. This transition has been traditionally described and portrayed as a rupture rather than a gradual, multidimensional process of continuities and changes.

The second gap that this book attempted to bridge is the one between the historiographies of two ethno-national communities living in the country, Jews and Arabs. Leaning on the relational approach and challenging the binary division between Jews and Arabs, as well as the religious-based dichotomies of Jews-Muslims-Christians, does not necessarily mean blurring the different experiences and the distinctions among these groups. However, the actual integration of Jews and Arabs, as two complex categories, into one historical narrative, aimed at contributing to a better understanding of the history of Jerusalem and Palestine during a period of change and major transformations. This is not an attempt to "read history backwards" and examine this period and the possibilities it entailed nostalgically. On the contrary; such treatment may contribute to a richer, denser, and more dynamic study of the history of Palestine and its various communities, and to its analysis in the future through other perspectives, categories, and lenses, and not just through that of the national conflict. By doing so, this book aimed at contributing not only to the study of Jerusalem as a mixed city in a process of change, but also to the ongoing project of rewriting and rereading Palestinian history, while viewing Palestine as a mixed locale inhabited by both Jews and Arabs.

Using the framework of Jerusalem as a mixed urban locale, which comprises in it mixed social, economic, spatial, political, and cultural configurations, enabled me to look at the interaction between several communities, while also recognizing and highlighting the differences between them and their experiences during this time of change. Emphasizing the mixed nature of the city, I was able to analyze the dynamic nature of *inter*communal and *intra*communal relations at this period of transformation. While doing so, this book moved between three levels of analysis: the investigation of intercommunal relations among the city's residents during World War I and the first few years of British military rule; the interaction between the local residents and the imperial power, the Ottoman Empire at first and later the British military administration; and, lastly, the internal dynamics between the local British administrators and the decision makers in London, as well as between Britain and other great powers.

This book, then, explored several main themes that stand in the junction between different theoretical and analytical approaches, and was engaged in reframing several historical and historiographical questions. One such question was the reexamination and relocation of World War I within the historical and

historiographical context of Palestine, an event that needs to be studied and connected to processes that were taking place before and after it. Such a shift touches upon the issue of continuity and change within the historical process, as mentioned earlier. Analyzing the war as a process of multidimensional social change, both within the mixed urban environment as well as in the lives and perceptions of individuals, offered a dynamic, more complex analysis of a city whose residents struggled with an acute social and economic crisis. Here this study moves beyond the confines of Palestinian/Israeli/Jerusalem history, and offers a contribution to the broader field of comparative social and urban histories of the Great War.

Another main argument of this book is that it was during this time of transition between empires that communal identities were negotiated, and that alliances between different communities and groups were in a constant process of change. This negotiation was possible until the end of British military rule in the country, when a clear division was made between "Jews" and "Arabs," and the religious, ethnic, and national categories in the country became fixed. Placing this work within the context of late Ottoman history is of course central. It is this context, and especially the analysis of Jerusalem and its inhabitants through the prism of Ottoman identities and realities, that generates insights on the developments studied here.

The complexity and flexibility of these categories were demonstrated through several case studies in the book, such as the analysis of Tourjman and Sakakini's writings, as well as through the scrutiny of the young Jerusalemite Sephardi intelligentsia circles. In their unique identification as both Ottoman subjects and Zionists, these Sephardi circles demonstrate the complexity of Zionism in this period, and show how fluid categories of identity, being both Ottomans and Zionists, could exist contemporaneously. They also illustrate the breaking of the fixed ethno-national categories of Jews versus Arabs, so common in the discussions about Palestine. Jews and Arabs, I claim here, were not two homogenous communities, but were rather two diversified communities with various agendas and perceptions.

This book was also engaged with various aspects of the first stages of British rule in Palestine. Mainly it discussed questions concerning the British imagination of Jerusalem and its residents, the place of religious symbolism as played out in the occupation and the military rule of the city, the fragile nature of the status quo, as well as the complex relations between the British administrators in

Jerusalem, British policy makers in London, the local communities, and foreign powers with interests in the city. Indeed, the years of the British military administration over Palestine marked the end of the transition between Ottoman and British rule in the country and served as an "interim period" between regimes. It was during this time that the political status of the country, as well as future relations between Jews and Arabs were debated, both externally and internally, and traditional affiliations and alliances between groups that existed during the Ottoman period changed and switched following the British intervention.

The focus on Jerusalem enabled an in-depth analysis of the various phenomena and processes described in the preceding, and presented a case study of one city that can be applied and examined in other cases and contexts as well. However, it also left many questions unanswered: How did other regions in Palestine experience the war and the transition? How did the same processes play out in other areas throughout the Ottoman Empire, in other mixed locales? These are just two of the questions that can be explored further.

This study also offers broader implications beyond the confines of the studied period; it even has clear contemporary relevance. In presenting a new perspective on the intricacies of intercommunal relations and dynamics from the very outset, the book primarily offers a far more nuanced analysis of an important chapter in the Jewish–Arab ongoing saga. Jerusalem still stands as one of the core issues to be negotiated in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The question of how to examine the different possibilities to its past, present, and, just as important, future is still very relevant to today's political dilemmas. Needless to say, the current reality in Jerusalem is fragmented, polarized, and conflicted in different ways than it was in the period this book focused on. The intensity, challenges, and fragmentation of today's Jerusalem, not only from a national perspective but also from religious, socioeconomic, and urban perspectives, also pose the question of the relevance of the relational approach to today's dilemmas. Is a relational approach, as the one utilized in this book, applicable to today's reality of separation and identity clashes as playing out in this city? Or alternatively, can such an approach open new opportunities and perspectives into looking at today's complicated and highly charged life in a more nuanced and careful way? Maybe it can offer some insights into thinking not only about ruptures, but also about potential links, relations, and bridges. These are among the topics that remain open for further consideration.

Notes

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Index

Notes

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3. On the memory and interpretations of the Balkan Wars in Arabic writing, see Eyal Ginio, "Between the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the 'Third Balkan War' of the '90s: The Elusive Memory of the Balkans in Arabic Writings," paper presented in Absent Spheres, Silent Voices: Recovering Untold Histories, The Third Istanbul Workshop on New Directions in Middle Eastern History, Istanbul, May 2007.

4. According to Ottoman population registration, drawn from the *nüfus* books (the Ottoman population registries), the total population of Palestine in 1913–1914 was 712,043, among them 602,377 Muslims, 81,012 Christians, and 38,754 Jews. In 1914, according to this data, 83 percent of the Palestinian population was Muslim (and even if noncitizen Jews were included, 77 percent were Muslims). According to the British census of 1922, also based on Ottoman data, the total population in Palestine in 1914 was approximately 689,000 people. For the most comprehensive demographic analysis and comparison between various sources, see Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990), 10–11. A different estimation of the total population is offered by 'Uziel Schmelz, who claims that the total population in 1914 was approximately eight hundred thousand. See 'Uziel O. Schmelz, "Ha-Yerida be-Uchlusiyat Eretz Israel be-Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona," in *Ba-Matzor uba-Matzok: Eretz Israel Bemilhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona,* ed. Mordechai Eliav, 17–26 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1991). For a detailed demographic study, see David Grossman, *Ha-Uchlusiya ha-'Aravit veha-Ma'ahaz ha-Yehudi: Tifroset*

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6. Ottoman Palestine was traditionally divided into three administrative districts *(Sancaks),* which were affiliated to the province *(Vilaya)* of Beirut: the *sancaks* of Acre, Nablus, and Jerusalem. When Jerusalem was granted a special status and became the provincial capital of Southern Palestine, the Acre and Nablus *sancaks* remained affiliated to Beirut. See Schölch, "Jerusalem in the 19th Century," 228–39; Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the *Tanzimat*: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation,* ed. David Kushner, 31–45 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1986).

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8. The *Majlis Idara,* the administrative council, was mainly responsible for the general administration of the *sancak,* including matters concerning public works, agriculture, land registration, finance, tax collection, and police. The general council, *Majlis ʿUmumi,* was established in Jerusalem in 1913. It was formed by representatives of the various *qadas* and its main function was to meet once a year in order to decide on a budget for the *sancak* of Jerusalem. See Schölch, "Jerusalem in the 19th Century," 241; Gerber, "A New Look," 31; Ruth Kark, "The Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1840–1917," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation,* ed. David Kushner, 46–58 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1986); Ruth Kark, "Peʿilut ʿIriyat Yerushalayim be-Sof ha-Tkufa ha-Othmanit," *Kathedra* 6 (1978): 74–108; Yehoshua Ben Arieh, *ʿIr be-Reʾi Tekufa: Yerushalayim ba-Meah ha-Tsha ʿEsre, Ha-ʾIr ha-ʾAtika* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1977), 151–54.

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27. See, for example, Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830–1914* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2008); Selim Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (Apr. 2003): 311–42; Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, "Introduction: Towards a New Urban Paradigm," in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Period,* ed. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, 1–25 (Beirut: Orient Institute, 2002); Ussama Makdisi, "Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform," in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Period,* ed. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, 29–48 (Beirut: Orient Institute, 2002); Thomas Kühn, "An Imperial Borderland as Colony: Knowledge Production and the Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1918," *MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (Spring 2003): 5–17.

28. Kühn, "Imperial Borderland," 12; Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism," 337–40.

29. Anthony King, *Colonial Urban Development: Cultural, Social Power and Environment* (London: Routledge 1976), 17.

30. Brenda S. A. Yeoh, *Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), 1–2, 9–11.

31. Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism," 312–13; Çelik, *Empire,* 246–74.

32. Jeff Halper, "On the Way: The Transition of Jerusalem from a Ritual City to Colonial City (1800–1917)," *Urban Anthropology* 13, no. 1 (1984): 1–32. It is worth mentioning that the ritual and colonial cities are not mutually exclusive, as many colonial cities were considered more important because of their religious significance. Such was the case, for example, with cities in India.

33. Ruth Kark and Michal Oren-Nordheim, "Colonial Cities in Palestine? Jerusalem under the British Mandate," *Israel Affairs* 3, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 55–94.

34. Ibid., 86–89.

35. See, among other works, Maura Abrahamson, "British Town Planning in Jerusalem" (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 1993); Gideon Biger, *An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine 1917–1929* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994); Noa Heisler-Rubin, "Mahshavto ha-'Ironit shel Charles Robert Ashbee u-Bituya be-Yerushalayim, 1918–1922" (MA thesis, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 2000).

36. Steven Heydemann, "Introduction: War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East," in *War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East,* ed. Steven Heydemann, 1 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000).

37. Jay Winter and Jean Louis Robert, eds., *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), 3–24, 527–54; Jay Winter and Jean Louis Robert, eds., *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919: A Cultural History,* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). On war and social change, see Arthur Marwick, ed., *Total War and Social Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Ian F. W. Beckett, *The Great War 1914–1918* (Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2001); Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, eds., *Facing Armageddon, The First World War Experienced* (London: Pen and Sword Books, 1996).

38. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai, "Cities and Citizenship," in *Cities and Citizenship,* ed. James Holston, 1–18 (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1999); Winter and Robert, *Capital Cities at War,* 549.

39. I borrow this from Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, eds., *The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 14.

40. Perry Anderson, "Agendas for Radical History," *Radical History Review* 36 (Sept. 1986): 36.

41. A good example of a recent study on late Ottoman Palestine that relies on this model is offered by Campos, "Ottoman Brothers." Zachary Lockman's study on Jewish and Arab railway workers set the basic framework for this new methodological approach in the study of Israel/Palestine. See mainly Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1996), and his article "Railway Workers and

Relational History: Arabs and Jews in British-Ruled Palestine," *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 35, no. 3 (July 1993): 601–27; Rebecca Stein and Ted Swedenburg, "Popular Culture, Relational History and the Question of Power in Palestine and Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 10.

42. Lockman, "Railway Workers," 601–3.

43. Baruch Kimmerling, "Be'ayot Conseptualiyot be-Historiographia shel Erez Israel uba Shney 'Amim," in *Eretz Ahat u-Shney 'Amim Ba,* ed. Danny Jacoby, 11–22 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1989); Joel Beinin, "Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 6–23.

1. JERUSALEM DURING WORLD WAR I:
A MULTIETHNIC CITY IN TIME OF AN ACUTE CRISIS

1. Arthur Marwick, "Introduction," in *Total War and Social Change,* ed. Arthur Marwick, xiv (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

2. For some recent examples of such analysis in relation to World War I and its effects in Europe, see Beckett, *The Great War*; Neil M. Heyman, *Daily Life During World War I* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002); Cecil and Liddle, *Facing Armageddon*; Peter Liddle, John Bourne, and Ian Whitehead, eds., *The Great War 1914–1917: The People's Experience* (London: Harper-Collins, 2001).

3. See, for example, Susan Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood and Politics in Britain and France During the First World War* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), 11–49, 245. On works that focus on the home front and the questions they are engaged with, see Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 152–72. Parts of this section are based on Abigail Jacobson, "A City Living Through Crisis: Jerusalem during World War I," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (April 2009): 73–92

4. Linda Schatkowski Schilcher uses the famine as a micro case to discuss similar issues: Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, "The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria," in *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani,* ed. John P. Spagnolo, 229–58 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1992); Nefissa Naguib and Inger Marie Okkenhaug, *Interpreting Welfare and Relief in the Middle East* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 4.

5. Yigal Sheffy, *British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914–1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 34–36.

6. *Ha-Herut,* Aug. 6, 1914, 1. All translations from the original Hebrew in *ha-Herut* are mine.

7. Avraham Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel Ve-Suriyah be-Yemey Milhemet Ha-Olam,* vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Ha-Solel, 1928), 118–19, 131; Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949* (Jerusalem: Ariel, 1992), 193–94.

8. Zvi Shiloni, "The Crisis of World War I and Its Effects on the Urban Environment in Jerusalem and Its Jewish Community" (MA thesis, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 1981), 119–21. On

Ben-'Attar and *ha-Herut,* see Yitzhak Bezalel, "'Al Yihudo shel 'ha-Herut' ve-'al Haim Ben-'Attar ke-'Orcho," *Pe'amim* 40 (1989): 121–47. In his diary entry of Sept. 30, 1914, Khalil al-Sakakini mentions the lack of newspapers in the city and says that people read only telegraphs because most newspapers were closed and the Egyptian newspapers were confiscated by the authorities. Khalil al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotai: Mi Yomano shel Khalil Sakakini,* trans. Gideon Shilo (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), 58–59. See also Akram Musallam, ed., *Yawmiyat Khalil al-Sakakini, al-Kitab al-Thani: Al-Nahda al-Orthodoksiya, al-Harb al-'Uthma, al-Nafi fi Dimashq* (Jerusalem: Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2004), 97 (Sept. 15, 1914).

9. Moredechai Ben Hillel Hacohen, *Milhemet ha-'Amim: Yoman* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981), 243. Some short-term Hebrew publications replaced the major newspapers in different periods, such as *Ben Hametzarim.* However, these publications appeared very irregularly and did not serve as a full replacement for a daily newspaper. Ben Hillel Hacohen reports in his diary on a meeting he had with Haim Ben-'Attar, the editor of *ha-Herut,* during which Ben 'Attar complained about the strict censorship of the newspaper. See Ben Hillel Hacohen, *Milhemet ha-'Amim,* 399.

10. One can learn about the steep increase in prices from a report published by Otis Glazebrook, the American consul in Jerusalem, on November 3, 1915. This report sums up the economic situation in the district of Jerusalem following the sea blockade, the famine, and the locusts. Dr. Glazebrook provided a list of articles and demonstrated the increase in their prices. For example, the price of rice increased 598 percent from 1914 to 1915, the price of sugar increased 858 percent, and the price of potatoes 427 percent. See Otis Glazebrook to the State Department, "Increase in Cost of Living Caused by War," Nov. 3, 1915; consular correspondence, American consulate in Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 72, National Archives at College Park, College Park, Md. (NACP). On the effects and consequences of the famine, see Schatkowski Schilcher, "Famine of 1915–1918," and R. Khalidi, "The Arab Experience of the War," in Cecil and Liddle, *Facing Armageddon,* 642–55.

11. An interview with the director of the security department in the Ottoman administration to a Turkish newspaper, appeared in *ha-Herut,* Sept. 28, 1914, 1.

12. Mazza, "Jerusalem During the First World War," 162–69.

13. Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem,* 194–95; Ben Hillel Hacohen, *Milhemet ha-'Amim,* 32–37.

14. The number of soldiers conscripted from the Jerusalem district to the Ottoman army is estimated to be almost sixteen thousand. See Otis Glazebrook to the American consul in Beirut, Aug. 18, 1914; consular correspondence, American Consulate in Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 69A, NACP.

15. *Ha-Herut*, Aug. 7, 1914.

16. The *Badel Askari* was fifty gold coins, which was worth more than one thousand French francs. Ya'akov Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim Tmol Shilshom,* vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1977), 42; Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet,* 180. See also a report in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Aharam* from Sept. 18, 1914, regarding the *Badel Askari.* According to the report, the government made a profit of around one hundred thousand Turkish lira just from the *Badel Askari.* Rich people seem to have taken advantage of the situation and provided loans with very high interest rates to people who could not afford to pay the expensive *Badel Askari.* Otis Glazebrook reported on the *Badel Askari* to the American ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, saying that the amount required by the

authorities is burdensome on the local population in ordinary times, but that under the present conditions it is next to impossible. See Otis Glazebrook to Henry Morgenthau, Aug. 10, 1914; consular correspondence, American Consulate in Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 69A, NACP.

17. Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet,* 179; "Memoirs of Abraham Gudovitz," Jerusalem Municipal Archives (JMA) Box 2163.

18. Al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotai,* 61–66.

19. Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim,* 3:42–43; Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet,* 180–82. Frumkin represented in the military court some of those who were caught.

20. See the instructions from Apr. 25, 1914, in consular correspondence, American Consulate in Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 69A, NACP.

21. Around 11,280 Jews were expelled to Alexandria, Egypt, in sixteen rounds of expulsion, which began in December 1914. The community of Jewish immigrants in Alexandria was a very active and vibrant one, and became well organized as a community. For more on this, see Nurit Guvrin, "Pgishatam shel Goley Eretz-Israel 'im Mizrayim ve-ha-Kehila ha-Yehudit Ba be-Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona," *Pe'amim* 25 (1985): 73–101; Zvi Shiloni, "Ha-Dildul ba-Uchlusiya ha-Yehudit be-Yerushalayim bi-Tkufat Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona," in *Mehkarim Be-Geografiyah Historit-Yishuvit shel Eretz-Israel,* ed. Yehoshua Ben Arieh, Yossi Ben Arzi, and Haim Goren, 132–34 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1987).

22. Shiloni, 139–40. Other political figures from the Jewish community who were expelled are Arthur Ruppin, the director of the Zionist Office in Jaffa, who was exiled in September 1916 to Istanbul; Albert 'Antebi, the director of the Alliance Israélite Universelle School and a prominent public figure, who was also exiled in the same month to Istanbul; and David Yellin, a prominent educator who was very active in the support organizations in Jerusalem. 'Antebi's exile is especially interesting, because he was in very close touch with Cemal Paşa, and his expulsion came as a great surprise in Jerusalem and in the Zionist movement. Sakakini was deported in 1917 to Damascus, following an accusation that he supported a Jewish friend of his, Alther Levine, who held American citizenship and hid from the authorities. Sakakini hid Levine in his home, and they were both caught and sent to Damascus (see more on this below). 'Isa and Yusuf al-'Isa were deported from Palestine to Anatolia and were freed only in 1918. Al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotay,* 69–80; Rashid Khalidi, "Anti Zionism, Arabism and Palestinian Identity: 'Isa al-'Isa and *Filastin,*" in *Configuring Identity in the Modern Arab East,* ed. Samir Seikaly, 83–96 (Beirut: American Univ. of Beirut Press, 2009).

23. Donna Robinson Divine, "Palestine in World War I," in *The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J. C. Hurewitz,* ed. Reeva S. Simon, 71–94 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990).

24. Najwa al-Qattan, "Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War," in *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon,* ed. Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, 163–73 (Beirut: Beiruter Texte und Studien 96, 2004).

25. *Ha-Herut,* Aug. 19, 1914; Ben Hillel Hacohen, *Milhemet ha-'Amim,* 29.

26. Shiloni, "Crisis of World War I," 14–17; Hemda Ben Yehuda, Kemper Fullerton, and Edgar J. Banks, eds., *Jerusalem: Its Redemption and Future. The Great Drama of Deliverance Described by Eyewitnesses* (New York: The Christian Herald, 1918), 18–19, 23, 28, 72–73. According to Ben

Yehuda's description, the only ones who did not favor Zeki Bey were the Germans, who criticized his way of life. It seems that Zeki Bey was quite a colorful figure.

27. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 2:64–65.

28. *Ha-Herut*, Nov. 27, 1914. Abd al-Kadir al-Muthafer is also mentioned in Khalil al-Saka-kini's diaries as one of the speakers in a pro-Ottoman demonstration against the entente powers. He is also reported to be the *mufti* of the Fourth Army brigade, commanded by Cemal Paşa. Khalil al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotay,* 60 (Nov. 18, 1914). In the 1920s al-Muthafer is mentioned as one of the leaders of al-Jami'yah al-Fidai'yah, a Palestinian organization that operated against the British Mandate in Jerusalem and Jaffa. See Hillel Cohen, *Tzva ha-Tzlalim: Mashtapim Falestinim be-Sherut ha-Ziyonut 1917–1948* (Jerusalem: 'Ivrit Publishing, 2004), 38.

29. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 2:66.

30. "Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti: Nizamnameh Asasısı," Osmanli Arşivi Daire Başbak-anliği (BBA), DH.ID 132/11 (40–25).There may have been a suborganization of the Red Crescent Society that was called the Hebrew Ottoman Red Crescent Society, in which Jewish physicians served in various positions to assist people. See *ha-Herut*, Dec. 21, 1914, 1. On the history of the Red Crescent Society, see John Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 138–47; Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Poor Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire 1876–1914," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21 (Fall 1991): 1–33.

31. Albert 'Antebi was born in Damascus. He was one of the most important activists among the Jewish community in the late Ottoman period and served, among other jobs, as the director of the Alliance Israélite Universelle School in Jerusalem until 1914. His main influence resulted from his position as the representative of the Jewish Colonization Association in Jerusalem. He was very well connected among the Ottoman authorities, foreign consuls, and the Zionist administration in the country, and was involved also in land purchases from Arabs for the Jewish community. Despite also being a mediator between the local authorities and the Jewish community in Palestine, he was critical of political Zionism and managed to create some strong enemies in certain Zionist circles. Before the war he declared that he was not a Zionist and that political Zionism was a destructive force for the Jewish community in the country. He believed in enhancing Jewish settlement in Palestine under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire. He also called for cooperation with the moderate forces among the Arab community in the country. See more on 'Antebi in Michael Laskier, "Avraham Albert 'Antebi: Prakim be-Po'alo Bishnot 1897–1914," *Pe'amim* 21 (1984): 50–81.

32. Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 200–201.

33. *Ha-Herut,* Sept. 15, 1915.

34. "The Locust in Jerusalem," 201, in container 16:6, John D. Whiting Papers, Manuscript Department, Library of Congress (MD-LOC); Letter from John D. Whiting to William Coffin, US State Department, July 17, 1919, in container II:46, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC.

35. Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 190.

36. On the collective effort to fight the locust plague, see Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 190; Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim,* 3:44–45; Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 2:139–44; "The Locus in Jerusalem," 201, MD-LOC.

37. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 2:142.

38. Schatkowski Schilcher, "Famine of 1915–1918," 236–39.

39. *Ha-Herut,* Dec. 3, 1916. In an article published in *ha-Herut* on Oct. 26, 1916, it is mentioned that twenty-five thousand kilos of grain were brought to Jerusalem every day from Karak and al-Salt in Jordan. The grain was distributed to the residents of Jerusalem by the municipality. *Ha-Herut,* Oct. 26, 1916, 4. Indeed, Jordan was the main source of grain supply to Palestine. Shortly after the British captured Jerusalem, they reported that there was a serious shortage of supply in Jerusalem because Jordan was in Ottoman (enemy) hands and grain could not be delivered. See a British report regarding the supplies for Jerusalem, Dec. 15, 1917, National Archives, Public Records Office (TNA: PRO), FO 141/746/4.

40. "Economic Conditions: Causes and Results," Report by the American Consulate in Jerusalem, Mar. 1915, in container 16:6, John D. Whiting Papers, MD-LOC; Ronald Storrs, *Orientations* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937), 297.

41. Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 201–3, 214–16, 227–30.

42. *Yawmiyat Muhammad ʿAdil al-Salah min Ahl al-Quds, 1915–1916,* AP.Ar.46, National Library of Israel—Manuscript Department (NLI-Ms.), 36 (Apr. 24, 1915) (Arabic). This 192-page handwritten diary was written for two years by Ihsan Tourjman, a young Muslim who resided in Jerusalem and served as a soldier in the Ottoman headquarters in the city. See a discussion on the diary, the writer, and its nature as an autobiographical source in the next chapter. In what follows I refer to the diary as *Yawmiyat.* All translations from the diary are mine.

43. Ibid., 97 (May 31, 1915).

44. Ibid., 154 (Dec. 27, 1916).

45. Ibid., 155.

46. Ben Arieh, *ʿIr be-Reʾi Tekufa,* 228–31, 278–85; Victor Azarya, *The Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem: Urban Life Behind Monastery Walls* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984), 64–73.

47. Assadour Antreassian, *Jerusalem and the Armenians* (Jerusalem: St. James Press, 1968), 52; John H. Melkon Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem: Memories of Life in Palestine* (London: Radcliffe Press, 1993), 2–3; Azarya, *Armenian Quarter,* 73–74.

48. Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem;* Azarya, *Armenian Quarter.*

49. Ibid.; Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), 285; Nefissa Naguib, "A Nation of Widows and Orphans: Armenian Memories of Relief in Jerusalem," in *Interpreting Welfare and Relief in the Middle East,* ed. Nefissa Naguib and Inger Marie Okkenhaug, 43 (Leiden: Brill, 2008). According to Naguib, the distinction between the "indigenous" and the "visitors" is still apparent in today's Armenian community in Jerusalem.

50. Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem,* 2–3; Naguib, "Nation of Widows," 41; Azarya, *Armenian Quarter,* 75–76.

51. This division between "old" and "new" *yishuv* is somewhat problematic and is being contested. See note 5 in chapter 3 below. Zvi Shiloni, "Tmurot ba-Hanhaga ha-Yehudit Be-Yerushalayim bi-Tkufat Milhemet ha-ʿOlam ha-Rishona," *Kathedra* 35 (Apr. 1985): 59–91.

52. Ibid., 88–89.

53. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 110–13. See also *ha-Herut,* Sept. 6, 1914.

54. *Ha-Herut,* Sept. 6, 1914; Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 123–24; Shiloni, "Tmurot," 64–66.

55. Nathan Efrati, *Mi-Mashber le-Tikva: Ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz Israel be-Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1991), 54; On the Merchants Association, see also CZA A153/144/2; *Ha-Herut,* Jan. 18, 1916.

56. Robert Lansing to Nathan Straus, Jan. 25, 1915; 867.4016/27 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M353, roll 43); Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs in Turkey 1910–1929, record group 59, NACP. See more on the history of the Anglo-Palestine Company in *Sipuro shel Bank: Yovel 75 le Bank Leumi le-Israel, 1902–1977* (Tel Aviv: Ahdut Publishing, 1977);*, Truma la-Cohen: Kovetz Likhvod Rabbi Zalman David haCohen Levontin le-Siyum 'Avodato Betor Menahel Rashi Shel Chevrat Anglia-Palestina be Eretz Israel* (Tel Aviv: *Anglo-Palestine Company,* 1926).

57. An interview with David Levontin, CZA A34/112.

58. Telegram sent by the American ambassador in London to the Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1915; 867.4016/35 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M353, roll 43); Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs in Turkey 1910–1929, record group 59, NACP**;** *Sipuro shel Bank,* 18–19.

59. Telegram sent by the American ambassador in London to the Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1915; 867.4016/35 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M353, roll 43); Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs in Turkey 1910–1929, record group 59, NACP.

60. The Joint Distribution Committee was an umbrella organization that united various Jewish American independent support groups, such as the American Jewish Relief Committee for the Sufferers of the War and the Provisional Committee for General Zionist Affairs. These organizations united into one umbrella organization at the end of 1915 and led the support effort of the American Jewish community to Palestine. See Shiloni, "Crisis of World War I," 45–50.

61. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 192–96; See also Otis Glazebrook to American consular agent in Jaffa, June 21, 1915; consular correspondence, American Consulate, Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 72, NACP. Attached to this letter is a list of products and their distribution among Muslims, Jews, and Christians in Jaffa and Jerusalem. Among the products distributed were flour, rice, sugar, barley, onions, potatoes, beans, coffee, and salt.

62. See, for example, letters from the consular agent in Jaffa, in which he reports to Dr. Glazebrook on the meeting of the Muslim and Christian local distribution committee. Consular agent in Jaffa to Dr. Glazebrook, May 17, 1915, and May 20, 1915; consular correspondence, American Consulate, Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 72, NACP.

63. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 192–96; CZA A153/144/2. Food and medical supplies were sent to Palestine by American ships until early 1917. It is estimated that, from December 1914, a total of $1,746,486 was sent to Palestine. See Charles D. Smith, "Historiographies of World War I and the Emergence of the Contemporary Middle East," paper presented at the workshop "Twentieth Century Historians and Historiography of the Middle East," Boğaziçi Univ., Istanbul, May 23–26, 2002, 22 n. 37.

64. The term *Halukah* stands for donations and charity money coming from the Jewish Diaspora, which supported Ashkenazi Jews from the *old yishuv.* Dr. Otis Glazebrook to David Yellin, May 19, 1915; consular correspondence, American Consulate, Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 72, NACP.

65. Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 118–19.

66. Samir Seikaly, "Unequal Fortunes: The Arabs of Palestine and the Jews During World War I," in *Studia Arabica et Islamica,* ed. Wadad al-Qadi, 399–406 (Beirut: American Univ. of Beirut, 1981).

67. In a report from 1913 about the involvement of the American Colony in life in Jerusalem it is written that the colony began to install a telephone system in Jerusalem, and also may have been involved in the installation of a new water system in Jerusalem. See William T. Ellis, "Americans Lead in Jerusalem Progress," Aug. 17, 1913, container I:2, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC.

68. "War Time Aid," container I:3, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC; Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem,* 201–2.

69. "War Time Aid," container I:3, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC; Vester Spafford, *Our Jerusalem,* 207–8. On the history of this institution, see Amy Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002).

70. John Whiting to William Coffin (Department of State, Washington), July 17, 1919, container II:46, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC.

71. "War Time Aid," container I:3, American Colony in Jerusalem Collection, MD-LOC.

72. See Heydemann, "Introduction," 1.

73. See, for example, BBA DH.KMS 25/45 #2; DH.KMS 27/48.

74. Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 198; *Yawmiyat,* 104 (June 11, 1915).

75. Ben Yehuda, Fullerton, and Banks, *Jerusalem,* 32, 54. On December 24, 1914, Khalil al-Sakakini wrote in his diary that Zeki Bey was removed from his post, and that it was not clear whether he was fired or had retired. According to Sakakini, some people thought that the reason for his removal was his shameless behavior with women, or that he did not like the Germans. See Musallam, *Yawmiyat Khalil al-Sakakini,* 2:142. The date mentioned by Sakakini differs from all other sources, which claim that Zeki Bey was removed from his post in 1915.

76. Naguib and Okkenhaug, *Interpreting Welfare,* 2–3.

77. See more on this in Abigail Jacobson, "American 'Welfare Politics': Americans in Jerusalem During World War I," forthcoming.

2. IDENTITIES IN TRANSITION: CONTESTED SPACE AND IDENTITIES IN JERUSALEM

1. Simon Gunn, "The Spatial Turn: Changing Histories of Space and Place," in *Identities in Space: Contested Terrains in the Western City since 1850,* ed. Simon Gunn and Robert Morris, 9–11 (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2001); Fran Tonkiss, *Space, the City and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban Forms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 1, 59–60; Michael Keith and Steve Pile,

"Introduction: the Politics of Space," in *Place and the Politics of Identity,* ed. Michael Keith and Steve Pile (London: Routledge, 1993), 1–2.

2. Jay Winter, "The Practices of Metropolitan Life in Wartime," in *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919,* vol. 2, ed. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, 1–21 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).

3. Don Mitchell, "The End of Public Space? People's Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 85, no. 1 (Mar. 1995): 116; Don Mitchell, "Introduction: Public Space and the City," *Urban Geography* 17, no. 2 (1996): 127–31; Lynn A. Staeheli and Don Mitchell, "Locating the Public in Research and Practice," *Progress in Human Geography* 31, no. 6 (2007): 792–93.

4. D. Mitchell, "End of Public Space," 115; Tonkiss, *Space,* 3; Eugene J. McCann, "Race, Protest and Public Space: Contextualizing Lefebvre in the U.S. City," *Antipode* 31, no. 2 (1999): 167–68.

5. John Lawrence, "Public Space, Political Space," in *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919,* vol. 2, ed. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, 280 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).

6. Tonkiss, *Space,* 66–69. On the symbolic and practical meaning of streets, and the significance of streets in relation to social identities and practices, see Nicholas R. Fyfe, *Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space* (London: Routledge, 1998); Zeynep Çelik, Diane Favro, and Richard Ingersoll, eds., *Streets: Critical Perspectives on Public Space* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1994).

7. Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim Tmol Shilshom,* 1:16; David Kroyanker, *Yerushalayim Rehov Yafo: Biographya shel Rehov-Sipura shel ʻIr* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2005), 30–35.

8. Kroyanker, *Yerushalayim,* 27–28; Tamari and Nassar, *Al-Quds,* 27. While discussing the garden in his memoir, Wasif Jawhariyyeh mentions that his father subcontracted the running of the café from the Ottomans, and that he did not have to pay any rent thanks to his good connections with the mayor at the time**.** Yehoshua writes that the owner of the café was responsible for the gardening, and that the municipality was responsible for keeping the garden clean.

9. Zvi Shiloni, "Prisat Yehidot ha-Memshal ve-Kohot ha-Tzava be-Yerushalayim bi-Tkufat Milhemet ha-ʻOlam ha-Rishona, ve-Hashpaʻatam ʻal Maʻarach ha-Sherutim ha-Tziburiʼm ba-ʻIr," *Mehkarim ba-Geographya shel Israel* 12 (1986): 65–72.

10. Kroyanker, *Yerushalayim,* 26–27.

11. The clock tower over the Jaffa Gate, which was a reminder of Ottoman rule over the city, was dismantled in 1922, and was replaced by a new tower that was designed to fit the British imagination of the city. This new clock tower, built at the end of Jaffa Road, was demolished in 1934 to clear the way for traffic. On this and the significance of British town planning in Jerusalem, see Ron Fuchs and Gilbert Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem: British Architecture in Mandate-Era Palestine," in *Hybrid Urbanism: On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment,* ed. Nezar AlSayyad, 89–91 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001); Kroyanker, *Yerushalayim,* 28–30.

12. I deeply thank Prof. Dror Wahrman for generously allowing me to use his late father's rich collection on World War I in Palestine. Jacob Wahrman's Collection, Jerusalem: Files on World

War I, Jaffa Gate and Executions. Jawhariyyeh also mentions a person who was hanged before Bab al-'Amoud, Damascus Gate, because of his activities as an Arab nationalist. See Tamari and Nassar, *Al Quds,* 163.

13. Al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotay,* 60 (Nov. 18, 1914), 58 (Sept. 30, 1914).

14. Elmaliach, *Eretz Israel,* 2:70–73.

15. See more on this in Salim Tamari, "Ha-Moderniyut ha-'Othmanit shel Yerushalayim 'Erev ha-Mandat ha-Briti," in *Yerushalayim bi-Tkufat ha-Mandat: ha-'Asiya veha-Moreshet,* ed. Yehoshua Ben Arieh, 51–57 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 2003).

16. Henry Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 286.

17. Nicholas R. Fyfe, "Introduction: Reading the Street," in *Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space,* ed. Nicholas R. Fyfe, 1–10 (London: Routledge, 1998).

18. *Yawmiyat,* 132–33 (Aug. 10, 1915). Parts of this section are based on Abigail Jacobson, "Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War: Jerusalem During World War I Through the Eyes of a Local Muslim Resident," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 1 (Feb. 2008): 69–88.

19. Winter, "Practices of Metropolitan Life," 1–7.

20. See R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity;* R. Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism," 50–69; Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks.* A critical review of the state of research on the subject can be found in Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," *American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (Dec. 1991): 1363–73. The debate over the Ottoman heritage in the history and historiography of the Arab Middle East is an ongoing discussion, and reflects an attempt to uncover the history of the region using local, both Ottoman and Arabic, sources, while emphasizing the Ottoman background of the Arab provinces. See Albert Hourani, *The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East* (London: Longman Group, 1970). For an interesting demonstration of the complexity of identity in the writings of two Arab-Ottoman bureaucrats who reported from the province of Beirut in 1916 and 1917, see Avi Rubin, "Bahjat ve Tamimi be-Vilayet Beirut: Masa el Toda'atam shel Shney Nos'im 'Osmanim be-Reshit ha-Mea ha-'Esrim," (MA thesis, Ben Gurion Univ. of the Negev, 2000).

21. R. Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism," 61–63.

22. Tarif Khalidi, "The Arab World," in *The Great War 1914–1917: The People's Experience,* ed. Peter Liddle, John Bourne, and Ian Whitehead, 293–98 (London: HarperCollins, 2001); George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1939), 185–91.

23. R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity,* 157–61.

24. See more on the evaluation of Cemal Paşa's years in Greater Syria and Ottoman policy during World War I in Hasan Kayali, "Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria During World War I," in *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation,* ed. Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler, 295–306 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998). There are some brief mentions of Jerusalem in Cemal Paşa's memoir. See Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 204.

25. *Yawmiyat Muhammad ʿAdil al-Salah min Ahl al-Quds, 1915–1916,* AP.Ar.46, NLI-Ms. Salim Tamari, from the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, uncovered the identity of the diarist after our failed attempts to locate al-Salah. The process that led Tamari to this discovery, as well as further analysis of several dimensions in the writings of Tourjman, are described in the introduction to the transcribed and edited version of the diary. See Salim Tamari, *ʿAm al-Jarrad* (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2008). See also Salim Tamari, "The Short Life of Private Ihsan," *Jerusalem Quarterly File* 30 (2007): 26–58.

26. Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700–1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within,* ed. Ilan Pappe and Moshe Maoz, 145–62 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997); Ehud R. Toledano, "Forgetting Egypt's Ottoman Past," in *Cultural Horizons: A Festschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman,* vol. 1, ed. Jayne L. Warner, 150–67 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2001).

27. Saʿad al-Din al-Khalidi, Ghalib al-Khalidi, and Muhammad Tawfiq al Khalidi are all mentioned throughout the text as his uncles from his maternal side, *khal.* However, neither al-Salah's nor Tourjman's names appear in the Khalidi's family tree.

28. Tamari, *ʿAm al-Jarrad,* 15–16.

29. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, *Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2001). For an excellent example of such a use of a social-cultural biography, see Mira Tzoreff, "May Ziadeh- Biographia Hevratit-Tarbutit: Masa min ha-Ishi el ha-Kolektivi" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv Univ., 2006).

30. Edmund Burke III, "Middle Eastern Societies and Ordinary People's Lives," in *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East,* ed. Edmund Burke III and David Yaghoubian, 1–9 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).

31. *Yawmiyat,* 36 (Apr. 24, 1915); 97 (May 31, 1915).

32. Ibid., 154 (Dec. 27, 1916).

33. Ibid., 155. The issue of hoarding food is also mentioned by Schatkowski Schilcher in relation to Beirut.

34. For an analysis of this aspect in Bahjat and Tamimi's writing, see Rubin, *Bahjat ve Tamimi,* 35–41.

35. April 1915 is when the Ottomans entered Egypt, so maybe this is the *ʿid* Tourjman refers to here.

36. *Yawmiyat,* 47 (Apr. 26, 1915).

37. Ibid., 124–25 (July 27, 1915).

38. Susan Grayzel's *Women's Identity at War* is an example for such research; it focuses on the relations between gender and war while comparing the experience of women in Britain and France. On gender and war, see also Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993); Billie Melman, ed., *Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870–1930* (New York: Routledge, 1998). For a good historiographical introduction to the state of research on gender and war, see Billie Melman's "Introduction," to *Borderlines.*

39. Melman, *Borderlines,* 9–11, 50–51, 66, 84–85.

40. Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000), 1–38.

41. Margot Badran, "Independent Women: More than a Century of Feminism in Egypt," in *Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers,* ed. Judith Tucker, 129–48 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993).

42. *Yawmiyat,* 11 (Apr. 10, 1915). See also Tamari, *'Am al-Jarrad,* 28.

43. *Yawmiyat,* 7 (Apr. 1, 1915).

44. Ibid., 48 (Apr. 28, 1915).

45. Ibid., 44 (Apr. 25, 1915).

46. Hanssen, "Public Morality," 195–99. On the phenomenon of Jewish prostitutes in late nineteenth-century Damascus, see Yaron Harel, "'Al ha-'Meshorerot' ha-'Menagnot' veha-'Meranenot' ha-Yehudiyot be-Damesek," In *Isha ba-Mizrah, Isha mi-Mizrah: Sipurah shel ha-Yehudiyah bat ha-Mizrah,* ed. Tova Cohen and Shaul Regev, 109–27 (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan Univ., 2005).

47. *Yawmiyat,* 37 (Apr. 24, 1915).

48. Ibid., 50 (Apr. 29, 1915).

49. Ibid., 147 (Sept. 15, 1915).

50. Prostitution plays out differently in times of crisis and conflict than in times of peace. For a discussion on prostitution in Victorian England, and the ways class, family, and economic factors played a role in women's work as prostitutes, see Judith Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980).

51. *Yawmiyat,* 93 (May 27, 1915). See more on Leah Tenenbaum in Tamari, *'Am al-Jarrad,* 33. From the way Tourjman refers to the prostitute as a "private prostitute" one can assume that there were different groups and statuses of prostitutes. The "private prostitute" most probably served the more important clients. The writer's criticism here has probably to do more with the fact that his supposed wife was dishonored than that she was Jewish. It is reported that in late 1919 there were five hundred prostitutes in Jerusalem, most of them Jewish, and that many brothels were under Jewish management. The brothels mentioned are located mainly near Jaffa Road, in the Jewish Nahlat Shiva'a neighborhood. See Ya'akov Gross, ed., *Yerushalayim 1917/1918: Hurban, Nes ve-Geula* (Jerusalem: Koresh, 1993), 417–20; *ha-Herut,* Oct. 16, 1915. To read more on Jewish prostitutes in Jerusalem following World War I, see Margalit Shilo, "Znutan shel Bnot Yerushalayim be-Motzae'i Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona- Mabat Gavri ve-Mabat Nashi," *Yerushalayim ve-Eretz Israel* 1 (2003): 173–96.

52. *Yawmiyat,* 47 (Apr. 26, 1915).

53. Eliezer Tauber, trans., *'Aziz Bey: Modi'in ve-Rigul be-Levanon, Suriya ve-Eretz Israel be-Milhemet ha-'Olam: 1913–1918* (Tel Aviv, 1991), 129–52. On Alther Levine see JMA Box 7006. It is not at all clear whether this information about Levine is indeed true, mainly because 'Aziz Bey's memoir is not considered a reliable source. Another episode about Levine, which is not mentioned at all in 'Aziz Bey's memoir, is his relationship with Khalil al-Sakakini. In November 1917, Sakakini provided Levine shelter in his house while the latter was hiding from the Ottoman authorities who wanted to arrest him (because of his American citizenship, according to Sakakini). The Ottomans managed to find Levine and arrest him, as well as his host, Sakakini. They were both deported

to Damascus. Sakakini describes this incident in length in his diary. On the relationship between Sakakini and Levine, see al-Sakakini, *Kazeh Ani, Rabotay,* 73–80; 'Adel Manna', "Between Jerusalem and Damascus: The End of Ottoman Rule as Seen by a Palestinian Modernist," *Jerusalem Quarterly File* 22–23 (Fall/Winter 2005): 120–23; Tom Segev, *Yemey ha-Kalaniyot: Eretz Israel Bi-Tkufat ha-Mandat* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1999), 19–34.

54. Robinson Divine, "Palestine," 91.

55. Shilo, "Znutan." Some Jewish organizations that Shilo mentions are the Association of Hebrew Women and the Women's Help Organization. The Pro-Jerusalem Society also led some women's organizations. Other organizations include the American Red Cross and some missionary organizations, such as the Social Service Association and Palestinian Women's Council. These associations tried to provide "proper jobs" for women.

56. Grayzel, *Women's Identities,* 50–51, 84–85.

57. *Yawmiyat,* 32 (Apr. 22, 1915).

58. Ibid., 48 (Apr. 28, 1915).

59. Tamari, *'Am al-Jarrad,* 33, 38.

60. *Yawmiyat,* 64 (May 7, 1915).

61. Ibid., 67 (May 8, 1915).

62. Ibid., 126–28 (Aug. 1, 1915). The secondary sources on this subject provide different dates and locations of the hanging. See, for example, Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks,* 193, where he writes that on August 21, 1915, eleven Beiruti leaders were executed in the town square. According to Michael Assaf, on the other hand, the first hanging took place in Damascus on August 21, 1915. See Michael Assaf, *Toldot Hit'orerut ha-'Aravim be-Eretz Israel ve-Brichtam* (Tel Aviv: Tarbut ve-Hinuch, 1967), 69.

63. *Yawmiyat,* 148 (Sept. 15, 1915).

64. Ibid., 182–86 (July 10, 1916).

65. See R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity,* 145–75.

66. *Yawmiyat,* 1 (Mar. 28, 1915). On this issue in reference to this diary, see Yehoshua Porath, *Zmichat ha-Tnu'a ha-Leumit ha-'Aravit ha-Falestinit 1918–1929* (Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., 1971), 7.

67. R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity,* 193.

68. The following section is based mainly on the new and more complete edition of Sakakini's diaries, edited by Akram Musallam. This is a fuller version of the diaries that had already been published in *Kada ana Ya Dunyah,* edited by Sakakini's daughter Hala Sakakini in 1955. See Musallam, *Yawmiyat Khalil al-Sakakini,* 2:95–160.

69. *Yawmiyat,* 157–58 (Mar. 26, 1915).

70. Ibid., 172–73 (Nov. 20, 1917).

71. Ibid., 98 (Sept. 17, 1914).

72. Ibid., 118 (Nov. 4, 1914).

73. Ibid., 123 (Nov. 9, 1914).

74. Ibid., 132–33 (Nov. 18, 1914).

75. Ibid., 142 (Dec. 25, 1914); 154–55 (Feb. 7-Mar. 8, 1915).

3. BETWEEN OTTOMANISM AND ZIONISM:

THE CASE OF THE SEPHARDI COMMUNITY

1. *Ha-Herut,* Apr. 1, 1914. The article is signed by the pseudonym CBR, used by the editor of *ha-Herut,* Haim Ben-ʻAttar.

2. Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies,* ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, 596–98 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

3. John Comaroff and Paul Stern, "Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution," in *Perspectives on Nationalism and War,* ed. John Comaroff and Paul Stern, 249 (UK: Taylor & Francis, 1995).

4. Kolatt, "Organization," 211–13; Ruth Kark and Joseph Glass, "The Jews in Eretz-Israel/Palestine: From Traditional Peripheriality to Modern Centrality," *Israel Affairs* 4–5 (1999): 80–82.

5. The distinction made between the *old yishuv* and the *new yishuv* may be contested. Members of the *new yishuv* viewed the *old yishuv* as a nonproductive community that relied mainly on charity from abroad. However, in reality, large segments of the *old yishuv* supported themselves by productive labor. On the other hand, some members of the *new yishuv* were observant Jews who were against some of the ideas promoted by the immigrants of the second *ʻaliya;* see Kolatt, "Organization," 218. Israel Bartal discusses this distinction in a historiographic essay, in which he analyzes the sources for the distinction between the "old" and "new" *yishuv* and examines the problems with it. See Israel Bartal, "ʻ*Yishuv Yashan*' ve-'*Yishuv Hadash*' – ha-Dimuy ve-ha-Metziut," *Kathedra* 2 (Nov. 1972): 3–19. For a critical analysis on the division between "old" and "new" *yishuv* as discursive categories in the Zionist national rhetoric, see Yehuda Shenhav, *Ha-Yehudim ha-ʻAravim: Leumiyut, Dat, Etniyut* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2003), 78–84.

6. Kaniel, *Be-Maʻavar,* 17–30, 54–58; Kark and Glass, "Eretz Israel/Palestine," 335–46.

7. On these definitions, see Itzhak Bezalel, *Noladetem Zionism: ha-Sfaradim be-Eretz Israel ba-Tziyonut uba-Thiya ha-'Ivrit ba-Tkufa ha-'Othmanit* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 2007), 38–46; Shlomo Alboher, *Hizdahut, Histaglut ve-Histaygut: ha-Yehudim ha-Sefardim be-Eretz Israel ve-Hatnuʻa ha-Tziyonit be-Yemey ha-Shilton ha-Briti, 1918–1948* (Jerusalem: The Zionist library, 2002), 11–19; Pnina Morag-Talmon, "Mekoma shel ha-Ziyonut be-Todaʻatam shel Bney ʻAdat ha-Sfardim be-Yerushalayim be-Shalhey ha-Meʻa ha-Tsha ʻEsre," in *Yerushalayim ba-Todaʻa uba-ʻAsiya ha-Ziyonit,* ed. Hagit Lavsky, 35–38 (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1989). On the internal divisions within the Sephardi community in Palestine, see Rachel Sharʻabi, "Hitbadlut ʻEdot ha-Mizrah meha-ʻEda ha-Sfardit 1860–1914," *Peʻamim* 21 (1984): 31–49. On the neglected history of non-Ashkenazi "Oriental" Jews, see Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue's introduction to *Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th–20th Centuries,* ed. Ester Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000). On the history of the Mistaʻarvim, and the encounter between them and the Sephardim and later Ashkenazim in Palestine, see Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, "Mistaʻarvim be-Eretz-Israel," *Sinai,* June 1939. "Oriental Jews," Jews who came to Palestine from the

Arab and Muslim countries, are known today as Mizrahim in Hebrew. On this terminology, see also Campos, "Shared Homeland," 283, especially note 7.

8. As Rabbi Meir 'Uziel said at the annual meeting of Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews on April 9, 1939: "Sephardim are not only those who came from Spain. 'Sephardim' are those who adopted Spanish influences. All those who are based in eastern countries, and adopted the Spanish influence, are called in the respectable name: the Sephardi tribe" (quoted in Alboher, *Hizdahut,* 11–12).

9. The number of Ashkenazi Jews in Jerusalem grew considerably from 1880. In 1910 there were around twenty thousand Sephardim and twenty-five thousand Ashkenazim in Jerusalem. See Morag-Talmon, *"Mekoma,"* 35–46.

10. Shar'abi, "Hitbadlut," 17–22; Benbassa and Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry,* 122; David Kushner, "Ha-Dor ha-Aharon la-Shilton ha-'Othmani be-Eretz Israel, 1882–1914," in *Toldot ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz Israel meaz ha-'Aliya ha-Rishona: Hatkufa ha-'Othmanit,* ed. Moshe Lissak and Gavriel Cohen, 56–60 (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1989); Mordechai Eliav, "Yahasim Ben-'Adati'im ba-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz Israel ba-Mea ha-Tsh'a 'Esre," *Pe'amim* 11 (1982): 118–34.

11. Kaniel, *Be-Ma'avar,* 20–26. One of the main criticisms of the Zionist Ashkenazim against the *old yishuv* regarded the latter's lack of productivity.

12. Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim,* 135–38.

13. Ibid., 44, 89–92, 131–32. Also see G. N. Giladi, *Discord in Zion* (London: Scorpion Publishing, 1990), 37; Eliyahu Eliachar, *Lihyot 'im Yehudim* (Jerusalem: Daf Heb, 1980), 70.

14. Yehoshua, *Yerushalayim,* 126; Eliachar, *Lihyot,* 72.

15. Kaniel, *Be-Ma'avar,* 28–29.

16. Anita Shapira, *Herev ha-Yona: Ha-Zionut ve-ha-Koach, 1881–1948* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), 97, 104.

17. According to Avraham Elmaliach, when it was most popular, the newspaper distributed up to two thousand to three thousand copies. An interview with Avraham Elmaliach, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Project 28, Interview 2.

18. Gideon Kressel, *Toldot ha-'Itonut ha-'Ivrit be-Eretz Israel* (Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1964) 108–9; David Yudolevitch, ed., *Kovetz Ma'amarim le-Divrey Yemey ha-'Itonut be-Eretz Israel,* vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Salomon Publishers, 1936), 138–41, 176–77.

19. Nurit Gubrin, ed., *Manifestim Sifruti'im* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ., 1988), 49.

20. In the struggle about the appointment of the *Hacham Başı,* the newspaper strongly supported Rabbi Ya'akov Meir, who was the representative of the progressive, educated circles among the Sephardi community and close to the Zionist movement. Bezalel, "'Al Yihudo," 121–47. See also Giora Pozailov, "Ha-'Eda ha-Sfaradit Be-Yerushalayim be-Hitpatchuta be-Shalhey ha-Shilton ha-Othmani 1870–1914" (PhD diss., Bar Ilan Univ., 2001), 325–27. On the history of the newspaper and the debates about its establishment, see Bezalel, *Noladetem Ziyonim,* 305–16.

21. This issue was raised mainly following the attempt made by the German "Ezra" society to encourage the use of German in the Jewish schools. "Ezra" also tried to make German the main language of instruction in the Technikum, the first technical higher institution in Palestine (and in the

Ottoman Empire), which had been established in Haifa in 1911. Bezalel, "'Al Yihudo," 137; Kressel, *Toldot,* 110; Bezalel, *Noladetem Ziyonim,* 332–37.

22. Ya'akov Ro'i, "Nisyonotehem shel ha-Mosadot ha-Zionim Lehashpi'a 'al ha-'Itonut ha-'Aravit be-Eretz Israel ba-Shanim 1908–1914," *Zion* 32 (1967): 213.

23. *Ha-Herut,* Jan. 2, 1916.

24. During the war, *ha-Herut* was placed under military censorship by the Ottoman authorities. In his diary, Mordechai Ben-Hillel Hacohen cites Ben-'Attar, who told him that the censorship demanded three copies of each article to be published in the newspaper for inspection and changed some of the articles. Ben-Hillel Hacohen, *Milhemet ha-'Amim,* 70, 399.

25. Campos, "Shared Homeland," 290–97. See a critique of this position in Louis Fishman, "Palestine Revisited: Reassessing the Jewish and Arab National Movements, 1908–1914" (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 2007), 173–85. Focusing specifically on the Poalei Tsion Party and ha-Shomer organization, and on the memoirs and writings of David Ben Gurion, Israel Shohat, Moshe Sharett, and others, Fishman claims that the difference between the Ashkenazi and Sephardi approaches to Ottomanism was quite narrow.

26. "To the Jews in Eretz Israel," *ha-Herut,* Oct. 29, 1912, 1.

27. "The End of the Year," *ha-Herut,* Sept. 9, 1912. The division made by the Sephardim between Jews, Muslims, and Christians, while viewing the Christians as the "worst enemies," appeared constantly in the Sephardi discourse, relating to the possible partnership and cooperation between Jews and Muslims in Palestine.

28. "Us and Them," *ha-Herut,* Aug. 22, 1913. For a different perspective on the same article, see Fishman, "Palestine Revisited," 160–61.

29. "The Time Is Here," *ha-Herut,* Apr. 1, 1914. It is interesting to notice the word "majority" here, because the Jews in Palestine were certainly not the majority in the country. In the same article, the writer Ben-'Attar also claims that many of the foreign citizens who immigrated to Palestine wanted to adopt Ottoman citizenship, but their request was rejected by the Ottoman government.

30. "On the Attacks in the Arab Press," *ha-Herut,* May 18, 1914.

31. In the Arab press in Palestine at that period there were already some manifestations of anti-Ottoman sentiments and the beginning of calls to separate from the empire.

32. "The Need for Ottoman Citizenship," *ha-Herut,* Apr. 2, 1914.

33. "The Hebrew *Yishuv* in Palestine," *ha-Herut,* Sept. 17–18, 1913. The writer expressed respect toward the Ashkenazi achievements, despite the ongoing criticism of the Sephardim toward the Ashkenazi Jews.

34. *Ha-Herut,* Sept. 19, 1913.

35. See, for example, "To Our Brothers the Sons of Jerusalem," *ha-Herut,* Dec. 31, 1914. The Ottomanization Committee in Jerusalem included fifteen members, among them David Yellin, Albert 'Antebi, Boris Schatz, Joseph Eliachar, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, and David Ben Gurion. See also Shimon Rubinstein, *'Al ha-Yetzia'a ve-ha-Hurban: Livtey ha-Yerida Mizrayma be-Re'shit Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona* (Jerusalem, 1988), JMA Box 609.

36. "To Our Jewish Brothers," *ha-Herut,* May 3, 1915.

37. On Jews serving in the Ottoman army during the Balkan wars, and the significance of their service, see Fishman, "Palestine Revisited," 181–84.

38. "The Conscription of the Hebrew Soldiers," *ha-Herut,* Aug. 7, 1914.

39. "Popular Defense," *ha-Herut,* Dec. 27, 1914.

40. A protocol from a meeting in the Zionist Office, May 17, 1914. CZA L2/170; Rubinstein, *'Al ha-Yetzia'a ve-ha-Hurban,* 9–10.

41. Moshe Sharett, *Nitraeh, ve-Ulay Lo: Michtavim min Ha-Tzava ha-Othmani 1916–1918* (Tel Aviv: Hidekel Publishing, 1998), 19.

42. David Ben Gurion, *Anahnu ve-Shchenenu* (Tel Aviv: Davar Press, 1931), 6–9.

43. Morag-Talmon, "Mekoma," 40–46.

44. Morag-Talmon does not refer to "Sephardi Zionism" as such. I am using it here as a way of distinguishing between the European perception of Zionism versus the Sephardi, local perception of it.

45. *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* was published in 1907 as a monthly and became a weekly newspaper a few years afterwards. As with other Hebrew newspapers, it ceased its publication following the outbreak of World War I. It was affiliated with ha-Po'el Ha-Tza'ir Party, and featured a rich chronicle of events in Palestine, mainly among the workers communities, debates about the Jewish community in Palestine and Zionism, as well as literature and opinion sections. The ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir Party did not follow Marxist ideology and rejected the need for class struggle in Palestine, which would divide the people who needed to be united in order to pursue the national struggle. The newspaper emphasized the idea of the creation of a Jewish working class as a key to the success of the national struggle in the country.

46. First published as a monthly in 1910 and then becoming a weekly, *ha-Ahdut* was the first socialist newspaper in Palestine. It was affiliated with the Russian-based Po'aley Tzion political movement. Among the contributors to the newspapers were David Ben Gurion (who was to become the first prime minister of Israel) and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (who would be the second Israeli president). The Palestinian branch of Po'aley Tzion, which established the newspaper, was a Zionist-socialist party. The newspaper too stressed the need for Hebrew labor and linked "Hebrew Labor" ('Avoda 'Ivrit) and the national struggle in Palestine. Although the tension between socialism and nationalism existed throughout the years in Po'aley Tzion, the socialist component was pushed aside and the national agenda became the central theme of the party, as well as of the newspaper. See more on *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* and *ha-Ahdut* and the political ideologies of the two parties in Kressel, *Toldot,* 101–3; Mordechai Eliav, *Eretz Israel ve-Yeshuva ba-Mea ha-Yud Tet: 1777–1917* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1978), 338–40; Yosef Gorny and Yitzhak Greenberg, *Tnu'at ha-'Avoda ha-Israelit: ha-Yesodot ha-Ra'ayon'im, ha-Megamot ha-Hevratiyot ve-Ha-Shita ha-Kalkalit* (Tel Aviv: Open Univ. Press, 1997), 60–62; and Yosef Gorny, "Shorasheha shel Toda'at ha-'Imut ha-Leumi ha-Yehudi-'Aravi ve-Hishtakfuta ba-'Itunut ha-'Ivrit ba-Shanim 1900–1918," *Zionism* 4 (1975): 72–113. Parts of this section are based on Abigail Jacobson, "Sephardim, Ashkenazim and the 'Arab Question' in Pre–First World War Palestine: A Reading of Three Zionist Newspapers," *Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (Apr. 2003): 105–30

47. Ze'ev Sternhall, *Binyan 'Uma o Tikun Hevra? Leumiyut ve-Sozyalism bi-Tnu'at ha-'Avoda ha-Israelit 1904–1940* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1995), 26–28; Yosef Gorny, *Ha-She'ela ha-'Aravit ve-Habe'aya ha-Yehudit* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985), 78–91; Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 60.

48. "The Idea of the Labor," *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir,* Sept. 18, 1912, 1.

49. "The Idea and the Action," *ha-Ahdut,* vol. 24 (1912), 1.

50. "Regarding the Condition of Labor," *ha-Ahdut,* vol. 20 (1912), 5.

51. Some employers employed Sephardi or Yemeni workers, whose wages were also low. This was another source of class tension between the Ashkenazi workers of the second *'aliya* and the employers, but also between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. On this tension, see Yehoshua Kaniel, "Anshy ha-'Aliya ha-Shniya u-Bney ha-'Eda ha-Sfaradit," in *ha-'Aliya ha-Shniya,* ed. Israel Bartal, 307–19 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1997).

52. "Protection of the National Labor," *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir,* Jan. 13, 1913, 6–8.

53. "The Solution," *ha-Ahdut,* vol. 32 (1912), 1–2.

54. It is interesting to note the editorial remark at the bottom of the page: "We present this article despite our objection to its contents regarding the workers' question in *Eretz Israel.*"

55. "National Protection and Proletarian Perspective," *ha-Ahdut,* vol. 16–17 (Jan. 1913). For a discussion on this article, see Gorny, "Shorasheha," 102–5.

56. *Ha-Ahdut,* vol. 16, 5.

57. Ibid., vol. 17, 3–7.

58. Gorny, "Shorasheha," 105–9.

59. Gorny, *Ha-She'ela,* 91.

60. See, for example, "On Our Current Situation in the Country," *ha-Herut,* July 1, 1912; "The End of the Year," *ha-Herut,* Sept. 9, 1912.

61. The writers in *ha-Herut* referred to the two major Arabic newspapers in Palestine at the time, *al-Karmil* and *Filastin,* as "Christian newspapers." These newspapers were obviously not Christian in nature, but were owned by Christians: Najib Nassar *(al-Karmil)* and Yusuf and 'Isa al-'Isa *(Filastin).* The editor of *al-Muqtabas* was a Muslim, Muhammad Kurd 'Ali. Moreover, many of the writers in *al-Karmil* and *Filastin* were Muslims, and some writers in *al-Muqtabas* were Christians.

62. See, for example: "On the Arab Hostility towards the Jews," *ha-Herut,* Dec. 17, 1912; "On our Current Situation in the Country," *ha-Herut,* Mar. 11, 1914.

63. See more on the "Arab question" in *ha-Herut* and the debates in the newspaper in Bezalel, *Noladetem Ziyonim,* 365–402.

64. "On Our Current Situation in the Country," *ha-Herut,* July 1, 1912.

65. "On the Arab Hostility Towards the Jews," *ha-Herut,* Dec. 17, 1912.

66. "Our Current Status in the Country," *ha-Herut,* June 17–19, 1913. See also Campos, "Shared Homeland," 357–60.

67. *Ha-Herut,* June 17, 1913. The parenthetical asides are part of the original text.

68. Ibid., June 19, 1913.

69. Ibid. In his article, Yosef Gorny analyzes Malul's essay, and ascribes to him what he calls "the assimilating-altruistic view regarding the Arab question." Gorny, "Shorasheha," 81–82.

70. *Ha-Herut,* June 18, 1913. This argument is not quite accurate, as many of the Jews in Arab-speaking countries were familiar with French and were greatly influenced by French culture.

71. See, for example, "The Triumph of the Will," *ha-Herut,* July 21, 1913.

72. See, for example, "Get Ready for Tomorrow!" *ha-Herut,* Aug. 1, 1913; "This Is Not the Way!" *ha-Herut,* Aug. 8, 1913.

73. An interview with Avraham Elmaliach, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Project 28, Interview 2.

74. Issues 77 and 78 of the newspaper, from August 27 and 30, 1914, are located in the Israel State Archive in the files of the German consulate in Jaffa. These issues consist mainly of reports from the war front. One of the writers is Nadim (Abdallah) Moyal, Shimon and Esther's son. See ISA, record group 67, box Peh 533, file 1493. I thank Michelle Campos for drawing my attention to this file. These are the only issues of the newspaper that I was able to locate. Ya'akov Yehoshua mentioned the newspaper several times, and claimed that it is located at the National Library in Jerusalem. However, I failed to locate it there. Yehoshua claimed that the newspaper was first published on January 28, 1913, and that the last issue appeared in November 1914. See Ya'akov Yehoshua, "Sahifat "Sawt al-'Uthmaniyya": al-Sihafa al-'Arabiyya fi al-Bilad fi Matl'a al-Qarn al-Hali," *al-Sharq* 9, no. 3 (1973): 49–50. See more on *Sawt al-'Utmnaniyya* and Dr. Shimon Moyal in CZA K13/91; David Tidhar, ed., *Inziklopedya le-Halutzei ha-Yishuv u-Bonav* (Tel Aviv: Rishonim Library, 1971), 3:1219; Moshe David Gaon, *Yehudei ha-Mizrah be-Eretz Israel- 'Avar ve-Hove* (Jerusalem: self-published, 1937), 2:381.

75. Campos, "Shared Homeland," 354. See her discussion on *ha-Magen* association on pages 353–56. The documents of the association seem to have been burned by Nissim Malul when he fled from Cemal Paşa during World War I. On *ha-Magen,* also see the memoir of Yosef Eliyahu Chelouche, *Parashat Hayai, 1870–1930* (Tel Aviv: Strud Publishers 1931), 166–70; Bezalel, *Noladetem Ziyonim,* 382–85.

76. *Ha-Magen* founding manifesto, Tel Aviv Municipal Archive (TAMA), File 8, Folder 729/5235, 2.

77. Ibid., 3.

78. Ibid., 4–5.

79. See also Campos, "A Shared Homeland," 355.

80. An interview with Avraham Elmaliach, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Project 28, Interview 2.

81. Esther Benbassa, "Zionism and the Politics of Coalitions in the Ottoman Jewish Communities in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Ottoman and Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership,* ed. Aron Rodrigue (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992), 225.

82. Campos, "Shared Homeland," 310–13. See also Michelle Campos, "Between 'Beloved Ottomania' and 'The Land of Israel': The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine's Sephardi Jews, 1908–1913," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 4: 461–83.

83. As Israel Bartal argues in his article, some of the Sephardi figures discussed here, such as the Moyal, Chelouche, and Amzalek families, were situated between the "old" and "new" *yishuv* in their perception about the modernization of Palestine. The distinction between these two communities was clear when the future of the *yishuv* was discussed. See Bartal, "*Yisuiv Yashan,*" 16.

84. Bezalel, *Noladetem Ziyonim,* 7, 406–7.

85. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism,* 130; R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity,* 124–26; Nissim Malul, "Ha-ʻItonut ha-ʻAravit," *ha-Schiloah* 31 (July-Dec. 1914): 364–74, 439–50.

86. In his analysis of Arabic (mainly Egyptian) writing on the Balkan wars, Eyal Ginio argues that people in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were aware of the fate of Muslims following the wars. Muslims in the Arab provinces viewed themselves as loyal to the empire but at the same time also emphasized the importance of decentralization of the Arab provinces as a way of safeguarding the Ottoman Empire. See Ginio, "Between the Balkan Wars."

87. Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire,* vol. 1, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 426 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982).

88. An interview with Avraham Elmaliach, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Project 28, Interview 2.

89. "The American Section of the International Commission and the Situation," CZA, L3/426 (King-Crane Commission's file); italics mine.

90. "The Representatives of the Sephardim Before the American Commission of Inquiry," CZA, L3/426.

91. "The Muslim Notables and Zionism," *ha-Herut,* Mar. 30, 1914.

92. "To the Jewish Arabs and the Zionists," *al-Quds al-Sharif,* July 8, 1920, 1.

93. Salim Tamari, "Ishaq al-Shami and the Predicament of the Arab Jew in Palestine," *Jerusalem Quarterly File* 21 (Aug. 2004): 10–26.

94. Yehuda Shenhav, "Ethnicity and National Memory: The World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC) in the Context of the Palestinian National Struggle," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 1 (2002): 37; Shenhav, *Ha-Yehudim,* 7–23.

95. Ella Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives,* ed. Anne McClintock, Samir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, 39, 47 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1997); Ella Shohat, "Zehut Hatzuya: Mahshavot shel Yehudiya-ʼArviya," in *Zichronot Asurim: Likrat Mahshava Rav Tarbutit,* ed. Ella Shohat, 242–51 (Tel Aviv: Bimat Kedem le-Sifrut, 2001). For a broad historical and literary analysis of the concept "Arab Jews," see Lital Levy, "Historicizing the Concept of Arab Jews in the *Mashriq,*" *Jewish Quarterly Review* 98, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 452–69. Among other things, Levy views this concept as complicating the categories of "Jewishness" and "Arabness" as independent trajectories of modernity.

96. On Nissim Malul, see Tidhar, *Inziklopedya,* 2:696; Gaon, *Yehudei,* 432–34; Yehoshua Ben Hanania, "The First Jewish-Arab Journalist," *ha-Poʻel ha-Tzaʻir* 32 (1959): 12–13. On the newspaper *al-Salam,* see CZA Z4/1250; JMA Box 4622/2. On Shimon Moyal, see CZA K13/91 (a file on the

Moyal family); Tidhar, *Inziklopedya,* 3:1219; Yehoshua Ben Hanania, "Dr. Shimʿon Moyal ve-ha-Beʿaya ha-Yehudit ha-ʿAravit," *Hed ha-Mizrach* 3 (Oct. 10, 1944): 25; On Esther Azhari Moyal see: Yehoshua Ben Hanania, "Ha-Soferet Esther Moyal u-Tkufata," *Hed ha-Mizrach* 3 (Sept. 17, 1914): 17–18; Lital Levy, "Partitioned Pasts: Arab Jewish Intellectuals and the case of Esther Azhari Moyal (1873–1948)," in *The Making of the Arab Intellectual (1880–1960): Empire, Public Sphere, and the Colonial Coordinates of Selfhood,* ed. Dyala Hamzah, chap. 6 (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

97. Nissim Malul's series of essays ("Our Situation in the Country," *ha-Herut,* June 17–19, 1913), which were discussed at length earlier, serve as a good example of his unique perspective and his location within the political discourse of his time.

4. WHEN A CITY CHANGES HANDS: JERUSALEM BETWEEN OTTOMAN AND BRITISH RULE

1. "With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby: the Conqueror" (1919), the introduction to a film that documents the entry of General Allenby to Jerusalem. Imperial War Museum, (IWM), Film and Video Archive, IWM 45.

2. "The State of Affairs in Palestine by a Native of Jerusalem," Sept. 17, 1914, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14 PA/14/1, 254–56. The report is signed by Anis el-Gamal. The writer's name indicates that he was either Egyptian or wrote under an Egyptian pseudonym.

3. "The Politics of Jerusalem," Dec. 29, 1916, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14 PA/16/2, 259–62.

4. "Palestine: Geographical and Political," Apr. 1917 (writer unknown), TNA: PRO, CAB 21/15, 3.

5. Eitan Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917–1918," *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 91, 98. The Balfour Declaration was officially published in Palestine by the British administration in February 1920. There is a debate on whether people in Palestine, mainly the non-Jews, were aware of the declaration before 1920. According to some British reports presented here, the local population was very much aware of the declaration and its meaning. Perhaps people read about it in the Egyptian press, which arrived with the British army. Philip Graves, in his memoir, refers to this question as well, while arguing that he remembers people talking about the declaration in Jerusalem and Jaffa shortly after the British occupation, and that the Germans spread the news about its publication. Philip Graves, *Palestine: The Land of Three Faiths* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1923), 49–50. See also Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917–1948* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 2000), 38–39.

6. Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand,* 8; Anthony Bruce, *The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War* (London: John Murray, 2002), 165.

7. "Palestine: Geographical and Political," Apr. 1917 (writer unknown), TNA: PRO, CAB 21/15, 4, 6. The clear emphasis of the writer on the importance of Damascus to the Arab cause, and as the capital of a future Arab state, is interesting, judging from the vague and contradictory promises given to Sherif Hussein in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence on the one hand, and the Sykes-Picot British-French agreement on the other hand.

8. Bruce, *The Last Crusade,* 165; Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade?" 107. It is important to note that the location of some Ottoman forces east of Jerusalem had some disadvantages, too, from the British point of view, as it disconnected Palestine from its main source of grain supply from eastern Jordan.

9. Bishop Rennie MacInnes replaced the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem, G. F. Popham Blyth, who served as a bishop for more than twenty-five years. On the local support of Bishop Blyth, see Lambeth Palace Library (LPL), R. T. Davidson's papers, vol. 396, ff. 48. Blyth resigned from his post on June 1914, and was replaced by MacInnes. The latter spent most of the war in Cairo and arrived into Jerusalem only after the British occupation, in 1918.

10. On the Anglican Church in Palestine and the British interests in Palestine, see Riah Abu el-Assal, "The Birth and Experience of the Christian Church: The Protestant/Anglican Perspective. Anglican Identity in the Middle East," in *Christians in the Holy Land,* ed. Michael Prior and William Taylor (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1994), 131–40; Alexander Schölch, "Britain in Palestine, 1838–1882: The Roots of the Balfour Policy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 39–56.

11. MacInnes to the High Commissioner in Egypt, May 2, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/7, 304–6. Clayton was critical of the British policy of granting a national home to the Jewish people, represented by the Balfour Declaration. On his and the general military administration's attitude toward the developing national tension in Palestine, and their attitudes toward Zionism, see John J. McTague, "The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917–1920," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 55–76.

12. Colonel Wyndham Deedes served as the intelligence officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and later as the chief secretary of the Palestine government between 1920 and 1922. He worked closely with the Arab Bureau in Cairo. Tom Segev describes him as a pious Christian and pious Zionist who believed in cooperation between the British Empire and the world Jewry. See Segev, *Yemey ha-Kalaniyot,* 79.

13. Deedes to the High Commissioner in Egypt, July 5, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/8.

14. Cantuar to MacInnes, July 18, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/11, 317.

15. Graves to Deedes, Oct. 15, 1917 (italics mine), TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/12. Captain Philip Graves served as a staff officer of *The Times* before 1914, and during the war served in different positions in the British army. Among other things he was a member of the Arab Bureau and of the Arab section of the military headquarters in Palestine.

16. Archbishop to Feynes-Clinton, Nov. 26, 1917, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 400, ff. 26.

17. Cantuar to MacInnes, July 18, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/11, 316.

18. Clayton to Wingate, Oct. 25, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, PA/17/13, 320.

19. Anthony O'Mahony, "The Religious, Political and Social Status of the Christian Communities in Palestine c. 1800–1930," in *The Christian Heritage in the Holy Land,* ed. Anthony O'Mahony, Goran Gunner, and Kevork Hintlian, 245 (Jerusalem: Swedish Christian Study Centre, 1995).

20. Davidson to MacInnes, Dec. 6, 1917, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 400, ff. 38.

21. MacInnes private letter, Jan. 19, 1918, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 397, ff. 124–25.

22. "Roman Catholic Affairs in Palestine," Feb. 4, 1918, TNA: PRO, FO 141/667/6.

23. A report on a visit to Paris, communicated by Sir Mark Sykes, Dec. 25, 1917, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 400, ff. 73.

24. Storrs, *Orientations,* 326.

25. Rachela Makover, *Sidrey Shilton ve-Minhal be-Eretz Israel 1917–1925* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1988), 30–33.

26. Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade?" 87–90.

27. Beer-Sheva was occupied on October 31, Gaza on November 7, and Jaffa on November 16. See Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet,* 200.

28. On the official history of the capture of Jerusalem, see Cyril Falls and A. F. Becke, *History of the Great War: Military Operations Egypt & Palestine, Part I* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1930), mainly 243–64. On the description and analysis of the capture of the city and its surrender, see Brian Gardner, *Allenby* (London: Cassell, 1965), 155–64; Bruce, *The Last Crusade,* 154–70.

29. Gardner, *Allenby,* 158–59.

30. Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand,* 25–26. On this version of the event, and for the translation of the letter of surrender, see T. Canaan, "Two Documents on the Surrender of Jerusalem," *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* 10, no. 1 (1930). The Ottoman version of the writ of surrender stated: "To the English command, since two days howitzer-shells are falling on some places in Jerusalem which is sacred to all nations [*milla,* can be translated also as religion]. The Ottoman government, for the sole purpose of protecting the religious places, has withdrawn its soldiers from the city, and it installed officials to protect the holy places such as the Holy Sepulchre and the al-Aqsa Mosque, with the hope that the same treatment will also continue from your side. I am sending this letter to you by the acting mayor, Hussein Bey al-Husayni, signed: Mutasarif of the independent Jerusalem, 'Izzat." I thank Roberto Mazza for drawing my attention to this article.

31. Bruce, *The Last Crusade,* 163; Luke McKernan, "The Supreme Moment of the War: General Allenby's Entry to Jerusalem," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 13, no. 2 (1993): 171–72.

32. McKernan, "Supreme Moment," 172–73; Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade?" 99–100. Interestingly, the proclamation was not read in Armenian, despite the existence of an Armenian community in the city.

33. The northern border of OETA-S was located a little north of Jaffa and included Jerusalem, Ramleh, and Jericho. After the conquest of Syria, OETA (East) was created, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Trans Jordan. Storrs, *Orientations,* 342.

34. Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade?" 99.

35. McKernan, "Supreme Moment," 177–78.

36. Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade?" 101.

37. Storrs, *Orientations,* 353.

38. Allenby to the War Office, Mar. 2, 1918, TNA: PRO, T1/12278 File 5140/17511.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid. La-Régie Imperiale Company received its initial rights for the sale of tobacco from the Public Debt Administration in 1883. The contract with it was renewed in 1913, but on April 7,

1921, the contract was canceled, and from March 1, 1921, the sale of tobacco was free. In 1923 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration turned all the taxes it collected to the British Mandatory government in Palestine. See Makover, *Sidrey Shilton,* 34 n. 58, 59. On the changes in the tax collection system, see 72–73.

41. Makover, *Sidrey Shilton,* 33–35.

42. Storrs, *Orientations,* 343–44; Makover, *Sidrey Shilton,* 48, 63–67. Mufti Kamal al-Husayni is described as a moderate figure who had good connections with the Jews and the military authorities. He passed away in March 1921 and was replaced by his brother, Haj Amin al-Husayni. See 'Adel Manna', *A'lam Filastin fi Awakhir al-'Ahd al-'Uthmani* (Jerusalem: Jami'yyat al-Dirasat al-'Arabiyya, 1986), 124.

43. L. G. A. Cust, *The Status Quo in the Holy Places* (Jerusalem: Ariel Publishing House, 1980), 3–12.

44. On the status quo regarding the Holy Sites, see Marlen Eordegian, "British and Israeli Maintenance of the Status Quo in the Holy Places of Christendom," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003): 307–28; Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem,* 15–43; Mazza, "Jerusalem," 162–65; Yair Wallach, "Readings in Conflict: Public Texts in Modern Jerusalem, 1858–1948" (PhD diss., Birkbeck College, Univ. of London, 2008), 96.

45. Makover, *Sidrey Shilton,* 47–48. As Yair Wallach demonstrates regarding the case of the Wailing Wall and Awad Halabi in the case of the Nabi Musa celebrations, the status quo served as a framework that enabled all parties involved to negotiate the meanings of these contested holy sites while claiming to speak in the name of "age-old traditions." See Wallach, "Readings in Conflict," 96–97; Awad Eddie Halabi, "The Transformation of the Prophet Moses Festival in Jerusalem, 1917–1937: From Local and Islamic to Modern and Nationalist Celebration" (PhD diss., Univ. of Toronto, 2006), 117–18.

46. Some of the diaries also include photographs that were taken by the soldiers. According to one of the soldiers, the army ordered to destroy the negatives of these photos because only official pictures of the British forces were allowed to be kept and recorded. See a note on this in the diary of Lt. Chippertfield, IWM, Department of Documents, 75/76/1.

47. Diary of Private C. T. Shaw, Dec. 9, 1917, IWM, Department of Documents, 81/23/1.

48. Ibid.

49. Diary of Private Herbert Empson, 2/5 London Field Ambulance, 180 Infantry Brigade, 60th Division, IWM, Department of Documents, 2/12/1, 28 (Dec. 9, 1917).

50. Diary of Private Shaw, 10.

51. Diary of Private Empson, 31 (Jan. 2, 1918).

52. Ibid. (Jan. 3, 17, 1918).

53. The American Red Cross Commission was sent to Palestine in March 1918 and began operating in Jerusalem in July 1918. Its first and most urgent mission was to carry out relief work among the homeless refugees. It also instituted industrial workrooms in which fifteen hundred women from Jerusalem—Muslims, Jews, and Christians—were employed and engaged in various works. The organization's policy was to help the refugees help themselves, and not just provide them with

charity. The American Red Cross established ten refugee centers around Jerusalem, an orphanage house, a hospital and some clinics for children and adults. See Henry P. Davison, *The American Red Cross in the Great War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1919), 261–66. For the American Red Cross' statement of operations in Jerusalem, see *The Work of the American Red Cross During the War: A Statement of Finances and Accomplishments (July 1, 1917-Feb. 28, 1919)* (Washington, D.C.: American Red Cross, 1919), 87–90.

54. Theodore Waters, "Palestine after the War," in Jerusalem: Its Redemption and Future. The Great Drama of Deliverance Described by Eyewitnesses, ed. Hemda Ben Yehuda, Kemper Fullerton, and Edgar J. Banks, 191–95, 200–204 (New York: The Christian Herald, 1918).

55. Ibid., 221–22.

56. Storrs, *Orientations,* 336–38.

57. The Syria and Palestine Relief Fund was an organization established by Bishop MacInnes in order to assist the population of Syria and Palestine. The organization did not target any specific community and was intended to be administered without distinction between race and creed. The organization began its activities before the occupation of Jerusalem, but, once the city was occupied, it became active on a larger scale. On the organization, its activities, and sources of funding, see LPL, MS. 2611–2613.

58. Storrs, *Orientations,* 346–47. For more information on the distribution of relief funds in Jerusalem following the war, see W. D. McCrackan, *The New Palestine* (Boston: The Page Company, 1922), 46–55. According to McCrackan, the following communities received assistance from the military administration: Muslim community (ten thousand people), Greek Orthodox (fifty-three hundred), Syrian Orthodox (169), Russians Orthodox (six hundred). The communities that did not receive assistance from the administration were the Latins (thirty-two hundred, including Arab-Syrian, Armenian, and Abyssinian Catholics), Copts (140), Armenians (928,) and Abyssinians (sixty-nine). The latter received aid from various countries, or carried out their own communal relief work. Regarding the Jews, McCrackan claimed that all Jews who came to Jerusalem had some money, either their own or relief funds they received from some source. After the war, the Zionist commission continued the support work that had begun with the American support during the war.

59. Storrs, *Orientations,* 345–46; Segev, *Yemey ha-Kalaniot,* 55–56.

60. Deedes to Ablitt, Dec. 16, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 141/746/4.

61. Report from Deedes, Dec. 19, 1917, TNA: PRO, FO 141/746/4.

62. "The Politics of Jerusalem," Dec. 29, 1916, TNA: PRO, FO 882/14 PA/16/2, 259–62.

63. Storrs, *Orientations,* 414; Norman Bentwich and Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948* (London: Hogarth Press, 1965), 47.

64. Bentwich and Bentwich, *Mandate Memories,* 27–28, 46–47; Porath, *Zmichat,* 26–27.

65. MacInnes to the archbishop, Jan. 24, 1918, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 397, ff. 120–23.

66. "Affairs in Palestine," Feb. 4, 1918, ISA, Microfilm Collection of the British Foreign Office, FO 371, microfilm 640, document 36575.

67. Clayton to Foreign Office, June 16, 1918, TNA: PRO, FO 371/11053/130342, quoted in McTague, "British Military Administration," 57–58.

68. Captain William Yale served as the US special agent to the Middle East in 1918, and also joined the King-Crane Commission in 1919. He wrote many dispatches to the State Department regarding the situation in the Middle East, tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and relations between Great Britain and France. Before his work for the American intelligence, he served as the representative of the American Standard Oil Company in Jerusalem, and supposedly also worked for British intelligence. "The Situation in Palestine," Apr. 1, 1918, CZA, CM/241/33, Report no. 21, 11–13.

69. MacInnes to Archbishop, Feb. 28, 1920, LPL, Davidson Papers, vol. 400, ff. 187–99.

70. MacInnes to the Lambeth Conference, July 5, 1920, LPL, Lambeth Conference Papers, 242–43.

5. BETWEEN THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS AND THE MUSLIM NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: THE RISE OF INTERCOMMUNAL TENSION

1. Storrs to OETA headquarters, Nov. 4, 1918, ISA 1/140/4A. Quoted in Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 31–32; and in Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a National Movement* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979), 85–86. It is important to note how the writers identify themselves collectively as Arabs, Muslims, and Christians.

2. Porath, *Zmichat,* 31–32.

3. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 9–10.

4. Isaiah Friedman, *Palestine: A Twice Promised Land? The British, the Arabs and Zionism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 177; Storrs, *Orientations,* 414; Porath, *Zmichat,* 34–35.

5. Interview with Avraham Elmaliach, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Project 28, Interview 2, number 7.

6. Storrs, *Orientations,* 399, 414–15. Storrs alludes here to the tension between the military administrators in Palestine and the decision makers in London, who did not always see eye to eye regarding policies in Palestine, and especially on attitudes toward the Zionist movement. He also mentions that the main charge of local Zionist leaders against the OETA administration was that of anti-Zionism. As he wrote in *Orientations,* "some of us were very soon on the Black List of Zion, an injustice which, though not prejudicing our work, did entail some needless irritation" (425–26).

7. Quoted in Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 24–25.

8. Porath, *Zmichat,* 35–37.

9. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 26–27; Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917–1925* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 22.

10. Petition from Nov. 8, 1919, consular correspondence, American Consulate in Jerusalem, record group 84, vol. 87, NACP. The petition was signed by the following people: Fakhri al-Din al-Husayni (president of the Arabic association in Jerusalem), Fakhri al-Din al-Nashashibi (secretary of the Literary Association), Mahmoud Said al-Gimai (Association of Brotherhood and Chastity in Jerusalem), and Zakieh al-Husayni (president of the Arab Association of Ladies).

11. Porath, *Zmichat,* 42–43, 71–72.

12. "Jerusalem Defense Scheme," 1919. ISA 2/1/43.

13. As was discussed in the Introduction, there was historical tension between Muslims and Christians in the Ottoman Empire, following the Balkan wars and the persecution of Muslims by the Christians. This tension, however, was seemingly, at least, forgotten following the political developments.

14. Porath, *Zmichat,* 32; Lesch, *Arab Politics,* 83–84.

15. Porath, *Zmichat,* 74–77.

16. "Arab Movement and Zionism," Aug. 12, 1919, TNA: PRO, FO 608/99, 479.

17. Ibid., 478–79.

18. "Statutes of the Muslim and Christian Society in Jerusalem," ISA 2/5/155 2185/POL (no date).

19. Porath, *Zmichat,* 33.

20. Ibid., 33–34.

21. According to the military administration's records, in 1918 there were 512,000 Muslims, sixty-six thousand Jews, and sixty-one thousand Christians in Palestine.

22. Porath, *Zmichat,* 39–41.

23. Ibid., 42–43.

24. Ibid., 79–80; Lesch, *Arab Politics,* 87–88; Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Khamsa wa Tis'una 'Aman fi al-Hayat: Mudhakirat wa-Tasjilat,* vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1993), 327–30.

25. Lesch, *Arab Politics,* 87; Porath, *Zmichat,* 82–85.

26. "The Palestine Conference," A report by J. N. Camp, Feb. 15, 1919, TNA: PRO, FO 608/98, 360.

27. Ibid., 360–61.

28. Report by Major General Money, Mar. 31, 1919, TNA: PRO, FO 608/99, 348–53.

29. Quoted in Porath, *Zmichat,* 61.

30. Ibid., 62.

31. "The Muslim-Christian Associations," CZA S25/10295.

32. Cohen, *Tzva ha-Tzlalim,* 20–23. These two other organizations will not be discussed here.

33. Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts 1913–1931,* vol. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1983), 64–65.

34. Neil Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts in Palestine after the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1977): 641–42.

35. "Manifesto of the Muslim National Association in Jerusalem," CZA J15/6484.

36. Ibid.

37. "List of the people who established the Muslim National Associations in Jerusalem," CZA S25/4380.

38. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts," 642–43. The frustration of Kalvaryski with the British attitude toward the Muslim National Association appears many times. One example is a report he submitted to the Zionist Executive in June 1923, in which he complains, "The government flatters

the Muslim-Christian Associations, and our friends from the Muslim National Associations are being rejected by it, and the government shows that it doesn't care about them" (CZA S25/4379).

39. Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy*, 63–64; Cohen, *Tzya ha-Tzlalim,* 20–21. See examples of such petitions in CZA S25/10301.

40. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts," 636.

41. Tidhar, *Inziklopedya,* 2:801–2; Pinhas Shneorson, "Kalvaryski," CZA A113/1, 1–6.

42. Cohen, *Tzva ha-Tzlalim,* 17–19. This image is also portrayed by Porath, *Zmichat,* 68–69.

43. "Relations with the Arab Neighbors," Discussion in the Provisional Council of Palestinian Jews, June 9–11, 1919, CZA J1/8777, 107–8.

44. "Aide Mémoire," CZA A113/1, 1.

45. Ibid., 2–3.

46. "Relations with the Arab Neighbors," CZA J1/8777, 108–9.

47. Ibid., 104–5.

48. Ibid., 125–26, 129.

49. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts," 637.

50. "Relations with the Arab Neighbors," CZA J1/8777, 142–43. Italics in the original.

51. Ibid., 145, 149.

52. Ibid., 249–50.

53. Ibid., 133, 137, respectively.

54. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts," 652–53.

55. Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians 1920–1925* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 15; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 39.

56. Harry Howard, *The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East* (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), 31–34.

57. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 39–40; Huneidi, *Broken Trust,* 15; Darwaza, *Khamsa,* 345–46.

58. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry,* 35–36.

59. Quoted in Howard, *King-Crane Commission,* 89.

60. Some of the reports on the interviews held by the King-Crane Commission in Jerusalem are located in CZA L3/426.

61. "Report on the reception of the Arabic Associations of the Youths of Jerusalem by the American section of the Inter-Allied Commission," 6–7. CZA L3/426 (written in English, copied from the original).

62. "The representatives of the Sephardim before the American Commission of Inquiry," 3–4. CZA L3/426.

63. Howard, *King-Crane Commission,* 97–98.

64. Ibid., 102.

65. Ibid., 225–26.

66. Huneidi, *Broken Trust,* 18–19.

67. Storrs, *Orientations,* 385.

68. In his analysis of the Nabi Musa Riots, Roberto Mazza claims that the riots proved the political limits of the military administration and became a catalyst for the ending of the British military rule in Palestine and for the transition into a mandatory rule. Mazza, "Jerusalem," 273–74.

69. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 59–60.

70. *Jerusalem News,* Feb. 28, 1920, 1. The *Jerusalem News* was a newspaper published in Jerusalem and edited by W. D. McCrackan, an American relief worker who lived in Jerusalem after the British occupation. The statement is not accurate because demonstrations and political protests did occur in the late Ottoman period, as was also discussed in previous chapters.

71. "Statement of the Jerusalem Jewish delegation on the disorders in Jerusalem, Apr. 1920," CZA A145/102, 1.

72. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 59–60.

73. CZA A145/102, 6.

74. Wasserstein, *British in Palestine,* 60–64.

75. Ibid., 64. Interestingly, both ʿArif al-ʿArif and Jamil al-Husayni were opposed to any violence during the celebrations, as was mentioned in both Zionist and British reports. See Porath, *Zmichat,* 98.

76. CZA A145/102, 11–15, 19–30.

77. Ibid.

78. *Jerusalem News,* Apr. 7, 1920, 1.

79. Huneidi, *Broken Trust,* 35–38, 302–3.

80. Storrs, *Orientations,* 390–91.

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Index