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Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians' 'Limited Violence' in the *Intifada*

EDY KAUFMAN

This study examines the short-term effect of the use of 'limited' violence in the *Intifada*, or Palestinian uprising, in light of the avowed intention of communicating to Israelis a need to end occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. A consciously moderate message – acceptance of a two-state solution – is a *drastic* move away from the idea of liberating all of Palestine, but evidence shows that it is blurred by the merely *relative* move away from terror as a means to attain the goal. This is consistent with a general tendency in international conflict for actors to misperceive their adversary's intentions, and is strengthened by a history encouraging the conviction among Jews that the world is essentially hostile. Fear of Israel's annihilation and a perception of a high level of *Intifada* violence are closely related. Examination of such interrelationships leads to the conclusion that in terms of Israeli opinion, the inconsistency between aims and means is highly counterproductive.

Introduction

It has been difficult to characterize the methods employed in the *Intifada*. Proponents, sympathizers and analysts have variously described this phenomenon as 'restricted violence',¹ 'limited violence',² 'non-lethal power',³ 'restrained violence',⁴ 'symbolic violence',⁵ 'unarmed resistance',⁶ 'unarmed or primitively armed violence',⁷ 'offensive non-violence',⁸ 'relatively nonviolent',⁹ 'predominantly nonviolent',¹⁰ 'non-violent discipline',¹¹ 'nonmilitary uprising',¹² 'low intensity warfare',¹³ 'unarmed uprising',¹⁴ 'subnational violence',¹⁵ 'low level violence', 'popular violence', 'minimal violence', 'nonviolent violence' or other similar terms. Whether one viewed the *Intifada* as a retreat from full-scale violence or as an escalation from nonviolence, there seemed to be tacit agreement that it could be deemed a 'middle-of-the road' form of rebellion. *Intifada* methods are generally described as intending to intimidate, aggravate and/or cause minor injuries to the opposing party in the conflict. It is not aimed at causing great bodily harm; its main method, often highlighted, has been stone-throwing. Expressions such as the 'Children of the Stones' were ascribed to the basic nature of the *Intifada*.¹⁶

The explanations to come were truly *ex-post-facto* analyses of a spontaneous outbreak, unplanned in nature, a rapidly spreading rebellion

from Gaza to the West Bank and Jerusalem,¹⁷ with clear grassroots characteristics. It could be argued that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), after being driven out of military bases in Southern Lebanon by the Israeli invasion in 1982, had no military option left: hence the lower stage of nonlethal violence. However, as with many other important historical events, the outbreak of the uprising was unforeseen by Israeli and Palestinian leaders alike.

From a Palestinian perspective, there have been several different ways in which the *Intifada* 'limited violence' has been explained and justified, as is discussed in more detail elsewhere.¹⁸ Prevailing arguments refer not only to a restricted use of weapons other than firearms, but to limitations in terms of specific geographic areas (mostly the territories occupied by Israel), specific non-civilian targets (security forces and settlers), selected occasions (mostly retaliatory to Jewish violence), and a purpose that was not to kill but rather to intimidate or make symbolic gestures. The *Intifada* could moreover be deemed limited in comparison to previous standards: limited in terms of projectiles available for resistance (an abundance of stones as compared with scarce quantities of firearms in the Occupied Territories); limited in time by its conditional and situational nature that could escalate further in the future; limited in the sense of being sporadic and spontaneous rather than organized from above; limited to a level of violence adequate to sustain steadfastness in the face of an Israeli reaction of measurable, bearable proportions; limited by its nature as a moderate compromise between the deep-rooted advocacy and use of violence by major Palestinian organizations and the more recent proposals of nonviolence by some prominent West Bankers.¹⁹ The meaning of 'limited' has been summarized by those who stress that only a minority of acts were of a violent nature and that the overwhelming aspects of the struggle included nonviolent techniques that were not used in previous stages of the Palestinian struggle.²⁰

Until 1990, leaflets by the Unified Command of the Leadership of the Uprising specifically refrained from advocating the use of lethal weapons,²⁰ and viewed in isolation they suggest that violence was limited downwards only. However the rhetoric of many leaders from outside went often much further and can be illustrated with expressions such as 'children of the RPGs' (Soviet individual anti-tank rocket grenade-launchers used by Palestinian youngsters in Southern Lebanon), or 'the stone has become a rocket, and the *Intifadah* has become a nation's style'.²²

All in all, the message's lack of clarity may have camouflaged the Palestinians' original intentions in the territories and may have produced the Israeli perception of the 'worst possible scenario'.²³

The conceptualization of a moderate level of violence was one which ideally could encompass the relative benefits of both armed struggle and nonviolent methods rather than the disadvantages of either version at its extreme. Moderate violence appeared at first glance as an eclectic and reasonable way of reaching a middle ground from which the movement could achieve a significant level of visibility and relevance while at the same time showing a reluctance to inflict large numbers of casualties on the opponent. However, the *Intifada*'s mixture of violence and non-violence is not without its disadvantages and detractors. Gene Sharp has maintained that the use of violent means such as guns alongside non-violent struggle weakens the latter, since 'the several major advantages of nonviolent struggle may be lost if violence is used alongside it'.²⁴ In summing up the issue of the level of violence in the *Intifada*, I stated that 'in the final analysis, what comes across to Israelis is that 'limited violence' is more 'violent than limited',²⁵ and added: 'For the children of the *Intifada*, the STONE is a symbol of protest; for the majority of Israelis, the ROCK that can miss its target or injure can also predictably kill.'²⁶ An Israeli survey showed a more comprehensive list of the violent methods of *Intifada* 'nonviolence', including detonation of explosive devices, assault with handgun, assault with other types of small arms, throwing hand grenades, knife attacks, throwing Molotov cocktails, committing arson, and other means.²⁷

The entire issue of 'limited violence' has been treated within the framework of a larger study.²⁸ The aim of this article is to provide an in-depth analysis of the problem of misperception by the Israeli recipient of the *Intifada*'s message, by analyzing Israeli opinion as it is expressed by three sectors: public opinion, media reporting, and policy-makers. The assumption is that perceptions have been affected by the generic nature of international conflict, by the Jewish people's previous historical experience, by the media's emphasis on violence, and by the politicians' manipulative interpretations of events. All of these factors have tended to confirm that, in terms of effectiveness, restricted use of violence has not distinguished itself as a legitimate and unique strategy with significant pay-offs to its users.

This study does not cover the effects of 'limited violence' on the process of empowerment of the Palestinians themselves. Limited violence may well have served as a catalyst or as a conduit for diminishing fear towards the occupier and for enhancing the Palestinians' confidence in their ability to provide for their own security.

Neither is this article assessing the impact of limited violence on international public opinion and governments elsewhere, where perhaps the *Intifada*'s confrontational aspects may have contributed at a certain

stage in exposing the Palestinian plight to the public eye. There is no clear way of assessing if the main *Intifada* target audience was the West or Israel. One could assume that the first was the main concern of the PLO leadership in Tunis. Within the territories many realized that, after the war in Lebanon, the Palestinians were abandoned by the international community and the Arab world. The rebellion therefore had ultimately to confront and target the Israelis and find ways to make them understand that the continuous occupation could become more a liability than an asset.

Finally this article does not describe the humiliating and often repressive policies inflicted by Israeli occupation on West Bank and Gaza inhabitants, which could provide evidence for a better understanding of Palestinian behavior.

Rather, this study is confined to addressing questions directly relevant to the subject: If a primary purpose of the *Intifada* was to communicate to the Israelis the need to end the occupation of the territories, what was the short-term effect of the use of 'limited violence'? To what extent has the PLO's moderation, by moving *drastically* away from the idea of the liberation of the entire Palestine towards an acceptance of a two-state solution, been blurred by the merely *relative* move away from terror as a means for attaining this goal? In other words, would it not be more consistent for the Palestinians to match their apparently maximal willingness to compromise on the final *objectives*, with a similar shift in the selection of *means* from violent to nonviolent? And, a further related question: is a shift to moderate means a more preferred option for the Palestinians than a turn to moderate declared goals? This study discusses the possibility of long-term peaceful resolution as it relates to issues of instrumentality and the impact of the use of violence. While dwelling heavily on a specific case study's findings, the author expects that his conclusions will shed light on the wider issue of the validity and effectiveness of this newly conceptualized strategy midway between armed struggle and nonviolence.

International Conflict and Misperceptions

Many studies have indicated that there is a general tendency in international conflict for actors to misperceive their adversary's intentions, normally tending to interpret signs as portending the worst possible scenario. Robert Jervis has pointed out that 'The perceiver's expectations and needs strongly influence what he will see. Subtle messages are easily missed; when they are not, they are usually assimilated to the perceiver's pre-existing beliefs'.²⁹

Israeli Jews may associate the perception of contemporary violence against Jews with previous traumatic experiences in which survival in the Diaspora was seriously threatened by centuries of persecution. The Holocaust, the single most brutal event in human history, would be a ready association for many. According to Arye Carmon, 'in the cultivation of the ethos of survival, the Holocaust and its place in the collective consciousness plays an important, if not always conscious role. Perceptions of the Holocaust are related to the centrality of survival ... powerlessness in the Diaspora, which reached its apotheosis in the Holocaust, is one of the justifications for using force' in Israel.³⁰ A clear connection between the Holocaust and the *Intifada* is made in an Israeli newspaper:

Palestinians living in the territories controlled by Israel now frequently allege that they are victims of 'genocide,' that Israel's treatment of them ironically represents no less than another Holocaust. Yet, in the Middle East now, only Israel is a plausible victim of impending genocide. Although the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza face an increasingly harsh 'iron fist' response to the *Intifada*, it is only the Jews of the region who face annihilation.³¹

The Zionist motto away from 'Diaspora to Redemption' engendered the same idea of empowerment which the *Intifada* seemed to inspire in the Palestinians. On a more general level, the Jewish people's historic background has established deep-rooted beliefs that the world is essentially hostile.³² Within such a perspective, the Jews' perceptions of the use of violence by the Arabs at large and by the Palestinians in particular are not likely to adjust rapidly to the daily-changing reality, or to recognize the *Intifada*'s relatively low number of military and civilian Jewish victims.³³

Exacerbating this perception, the *Intifada* was preceded by a significant level of violence. In PLO documents the original formulations regarding survival of the Jews in Israel were of an extreme nature. The renowned and often-quoted PLO 1968 Covenant included still-unrescinded items used even now by Israeli officialdom for 'unmasking the true intentions' of the Palestinians. For such a purpose, it was sufficient to quote Arab sources, which stated not only that 'Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit' (art. 2), but also that 'armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine' (art. 9), and that 'commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war' (art. 10).³⁴

The continuation of such appeals is evident in wide dissemination in

Israel and elsewhere of the Charter of Allah, the platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Hamas*), released in late 1988 during the initial months of the *Intifada*. Raphael Israeli summarized its articles by stressing similarities with the 1968 PLO Covenant, noting its additional expressions of extremism such as the call for a Holy War in Palestine against the Jews, to be prosecuted until the victory of Allah was implemented; the notion that Muslims are under obligation, by order of their Prophet, to fight Jews and kill them wherever they can find them; and the assertion that the Land of Palestine is a holy Islamic Endowment (*Waqf*) until the end of time and cannot be negotiated away.³⁵ Close to the *Intifada*'s outbreak, it was widely perceived that 'the only lesson that the Palestinian 'armed struggle' has for the world's other ideologies and fanatics [is] its futility and self-destructiveness. Terrorism does not intimidate the West, and particularly not the United States and Israel. It simply enrages the victim and makes the possibility of rational discourse ever more remote'.³⁶

With such a background, what reaction was to be expected from the Israelis to a reduced level of Palestinian violence? Public renunciations of terror by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in 1985 and more specifically in Geneva in 1988 did not percolate strongly enough to dissipate previous fears accumulated over years of threatening statements. Also, the ambiguity in the formulation and the lack of repetition of such pronouncements let prevail the suspicion of a change that was only cosmetic. In the practice of violence, the Palestinians' use of terror was not perceived as targeting Israeli military installations or aiming for political assassination of leading politicians. At the same time, the Palestinians' violence was not regarded as indiscriminate, but rather as focusing primarily on the more defenseless sectors of the civilian population: children became targets of hostage-taking operations in schools; women were threatened by bombs in market places and senior citizens in buses. Innocent civilians and bystanders were considered to be preferred targets of a strategy perhaps intended to convince observers that the Palestinian movement was not only fighting an oppressive regime imposed upon them, but also trying, by violent means, to urge the country's entire Israeli population to move out to other more peaceful lands. It is extremely important to understand that this was the Israelis' perception of Palestinian violence, and that it existed before the *Intifada*'s more restrained 'limited violence'.³⁷

Without looking at the declarations and events that took place *prior* to the *Intifada*, there may be no clear understanding of why the effects of repression affected the victim so strongly, could be equated to the effects of lower forms of violence on the current oppressor.³⁸

The Israeli Public and the *Intifada*'s Violence

The importance of involving the adversary through nonviolent struggle has been emphasized by Johan Galtung and others.³⁹ It cannot be determined, with any certainty, what Israeli reaction the *Intifada*'s leadership expected to produce. A Palestinian intellectual insisted that there was a need to communicate to the Israelis, 'by stones and by words', the urgency of ending the occupation. In reality, many Palestinians may have emphasized communication 'by stones' by linking Palestinian empowerment to Jewish fear of entering the territories, and to the recreation of a *de facto* 'green line' across the pre-1967 borders. At the other end of the spectrum, other Palestinians have engaged in an effort to enroll active Israeli support for their struggle. Mubarak Awad was not averse to including all those willing to support his nonviolent actions, and was seen by some of his compatriots to have more Jewish followers and friends than Arabs. Faisal al-Husseini, aware of his central leadership position, cautiously declared the third year of the *Intifada* to be a time for 'dialogue with the Israelis'.⁴⁰

An Israeli press article on the *Intifada* summed up the findings of several public opinion polls with the title, 'The Stone that Did Not Hit Us', stressing that the overall political impact of the uprising had been negligible.⁴¹ Indeed, it could be maintained that many Israelis perceived events occurring in the territories to be detached from Israel's own deeds, and that the public could easily build an impenetrable wall separating 'them' from 'us'. If anything, those who previously held strong views seemed to have fresh confirmation of their opinions:

While doves ascribe the *Intifadah* to Palestinian frustration, and express the hope that Palestinian hostility will abate once they receive significant political concessions, the majority of the Israeli public is inclined to view the matter very differently; if this is how the Palestinians act when we can still control them with occupation forces, how much greater a danger will they pose when they possess a state of their own?⁴²

When queried on the issue of 'official handling of the riots', 46 per cent thought it was 'about right', yet 40 per cent thought it was 'too lenient', while only a trickle (7 per cent) thought it was 'too harsh'.⁴³ The question of disproportionality in the Israeli reaction could be partially resolved in many citizens' minds by stressing the massive and primitive nature of stone throwing or the treacherous use of knifings (in the back); the surprise attacks on innocent passers-by as compared with the use of instruments of war by Israeli soldiers which, even if they wound or kill,

are used in self-defence and in response to the other side's threatening violence. Don Peretz asserted that many Israelis saw the Arab attitude towards a settlement as 'not the end of the conflict but rather a ruse aimed at the destruction of Israel in stages'.⁴⁴ For Gene Sharp it was clear:

... The Israelis can almost never see a stone thrown at them as a relatively nonviolent expression of rage and a cry for justice. The stones are instead seen as more threats to the lives of Jews, calling up memories of past persecutions, pogroms, and the Holocaust and hence triggering highly disproportionate and irrational responses. In Israeli minds, because of the stones, petrol bombs and killings, the *Intifadah* becomes yet another attempt to kill Jews, proof that the Arab's real objective is to drive the Jews into the sea. These perceptions block the message that Palestinians want the Israelis to hear, help arouse support among Israelis for harsh repression, and promote greater willingness among the soldiers to carry out (or exceed) orders to beat and shoot'.⁴⁵

The fact that the Palestine National Council's official Algiers statement calling for the Partition of Palestine took place several months after both that declaration and Arafat's announcement condemning the use of terror may explain how little and how slowly the Palestinians' new stands overcame the Israelis' previous positions. In fact, changes of public opinion after the *Intifada* began reflected a strong decrease in belief in the likelihood of peace: 32 per cent believed more and 68 per cent believed less than before in the idea of peace with Arabs.⁴⁶

Such public attitudes could be related to the general feeling of insecurity, which seems to have increased during the first years of the *Intifada*. According to the Director of the Israeli Institute for Military Studies, the *Intifada*'s major failure has been that '... instead of bringing the two parties closer it seems like it has increased the hatred, increased the suspicion, and increased the fear'.⁴⁷

Leading Palestinians in the Territories became aware of the counterproductive aspect of stimulating the Israeli public's fears, particularly close to the 1988 elections, which might have resulted in a shift of voters towards the more extreme right-wing parties. The Unified National Command of the Uprising/PLO (UNC, or often also referred as UNLU, Unified National Leadership of the Uprising) made special efforts to forestall such a possibility, issuing a leaflet that urged the Israeli electorate to vote for those parties that had shown support for the ideas of peace, dialogue with the PLO and condemnation of Israeli 'terror' in the Occupied Territories. The leaflet portrayed the Palestinian insurrection as democratic and unarmed, and appealed for a genuine peace between

the Palestinian state and Israel.⁴⁸ This appeal's potential effect was wasted when immediately prior to the elections a Jewish mother and her three little children were burnt alive by a petrol bomb thrown on a bus in Jericho. Events thus confirmed opinions previously held:

of all the factors contributing to Israel's intransigence and right-wing postures, the most immediate and apparent is the violence inflicted on Israelis and Jews by Arabs in general and by Palestinians in particular. . . . The bloodier and more wanton such attacks seem to be and the closer to home they hit, the stronger the swing to the right.⁴⁹

Case Study: Israeli Attitudes Toward the Concept of 'Restricted Violence'

Late in 1990 a survey commissioned specially to assess the Israeli public attitude toward the 'restricted violence' of the *Intifada* was conducted by the Louis Guttman Institute of Applied Research.⁵⁰ What follows is a summary of the main findings (represented in three dimensions) as well as an analysis of the interrelationships among the variables.

(a) *Opinions on the Nature of the Palestinian Struggle:*

(1) There is a rather high degree of consensus (86 per cent) that the activities of the *Intifada* are more (and mainly *much more*) *activities of aggression* than just activities in self-defence.

(2) A rather widely-held opinion (49 per cent) is that the use of violence in the *Intifada* is mainly intended to *cause damage and injury* (and not to express protest); 35 per cent think it is intended equally to express protest and to cause damage.

(3) An absolute majority (80 per cent) think that the means taken by Palestinians to bring about the establishment of a Palestinian state are *mainly violent means*.

(4) A majority (66 per cent) think that the use of violence by Palestinians expresses a *struggle against the existence of the State of Israel* rather than a struggle for the liberation of the territories. The assessment that use of violence expresses mainly a struggle to liberate the territories is more prevalent among supporters of Labor and the left (46 per cent) than among supporters of the right (21 per cent).

(5) The study population was divided on the question of what was more extreme: the Palestinians' *aims* or the *means* they adopted to

achieve them. The most frequent reply (37 per cent) was that the aims and the means are equally extreme, while equal proportions (29 per cent) believe that either one is more extreme than the other.

The general Israeli view of Palestinian violence is unfavorable, as shown in (1). Beyond this finding, the data show several interesting correlations. Opinions stressing a link between Palestinian activities and aggressive intentions [in (2), (3) and (4)], tended to emanate from respondents on the political right. The responses shown in (3) and (4) are more prevalent among traditional observers of Jewish religion. Among respondents stressing the opinion in (4), many were of Asian-African origin (predominantly from Arab countries) or their Israeli offspring. In a way, it is not surprising that those who considered the Palestinians more of a threat to Israel perceived them to be more violent.

To question (5), the highest percentage of responses may include a large proportion of those who consider the Palestinians to be extreme in both their ends and their means. This group may not distinguish any significant difference between instrumentality and goals. For many, the PLO has gone as far as is feasible in endorsing the principle of a small Palestinian state side by side with Israel. However, the use of violence still conveys to 66 per cent of Israeli respondents the belief that the struggle is against Israel's existence as a state and not only for the liberation of the Occupied Territories, as the place to become the future Palestinian state. While it may be plausible that the newly defined (1988), more modest Palestinian goals may have not yet percolated into the consciousness of many Israelis, it seems quite clear that the widespread belief in the Palestinians' readiness to resort to violence is blurring the distinction between the ways to achieve such goals and the objective itself. One main assumption of this study has been that since 'security' is the most frequently mentioned Israeli priority, the current use of violence at any level generates fear and insecurity that spills over into mistrust of the stated objective of a peaceful resolution somewhere at a later stage.

(b) Opinions on the Degree of Violence Involved:

Findings related to the actual use of violence in the *Intifada* show a relatively high consensual bias toward the perception of high levels of violence.

(6) There is an overwhelming consensus (96 per cent) that the *Intifada* uses force (violent acts) *often* (and mainly *very often*).

(7) There is a similarly broad agreement (93 per cent) that the *Intifada's* activities are addressed *both towards civilians and towards the Army*.

(8) The majority (67 per cent) is of the opinion that these activities include *use of firearms*.

(9) A similar majority (66 per cent) define the *Intifada's* activities as *violent toward the Army and civilians, including use of firearms*.

(10) A majority (62 per cent) believe that the Palestinians use violent means *without restraint*.

(11) An even larger majority (74–78 per cent) believe that stone-throwing at civilians and/or soldiers constitutes *unrestrained violence*. Given the choice of 'definitely' or 'apparently' restrained violence, most answer 'definitely'. Among those who feel that stone-throwing constitutes *restrained violence*, 22 per cent think that it is 'apparently' (13 per cent) or 'definitely' (9 per cent) so.

In contrast to the findings in category (a), the views described in group (b) are not related to political or religious views, or to ethnic origin. This suggests a non-idiosyncratic but rather pragmatic perception that the *Intifada* involves significant levels of violence.

(c) *The Evolving Perspective, and the Projected Future of the Palestinians:*

(12) An absolute majority (77 per cent) believe that the PLO leaders's declaration that the Palestinians will stop terrorist activities is in fact 'not at all' maintained.

(13) The majority (67 per cent) think nowadays (approaching the end of the *Intifada's* third year) that there are *more* (and mainly many more) acts of violence than in the first year of the uprising.

(14) A majority (70 per cent) think that the *Intifada* increases the Israelis' fear of the Palestinians.

(15) There is no decisive opinion regarding how *cessation of violence* by the *Intifada* would affect the establishment of a Palestinian state: the most frequent response (38 per cent – and somewhat more among the political right) was that it would make no difference.

(16) The proportion of those who believe that cessation of violence would hasten the establishment of a Palestinian state is higher than those who believe it would delay it (29 per cent vs. 17 per cent)

(17) About half of the population (51 per cent) think that the Palestinians *cannot achieve an independent state without the use of force* (this belief is slightly more prevalent among respondents of Asian-African origin), as against one-third (34 per cent) who think they can achieve an independent state without the use of force. This latter opinion is held more by Labor and left supporters than by supporters of the right.

(18) The more frequent recommendation (43 per cent) to the Palestinians is *not to use any form of violence* for achieving results. When violence is recommended, only 'some' or 'little' violence (23 per cent) is suggested more than 'quite a lot' or 'very much' (16 per cent). Although this could be seen as a self-serving recommendation, it might also signal the possibility of a change in Israeli attitudes, if the Palestinians are perceived as having followed this advice to forgo violent means without necessarily giving up any of the current goals. If it is advisable or necessary for the Palestinians to make concessions to the Israeli public, it would seem more reasonable to yield possibly counterproductive means (especially since doing so might reduce the number of casualties incurred by the Palestinians themselves) rather than their cherished objectives.

The findings of item (14) (that the *Intifada* is perceived as increasing the Israelis' fear of the Palestinians), taken in combination with item (13) (that there are more acts of violence now than before), indicate that whether or not the use of violence affects the Israelis' appreciation of the need for peace, fear is seen as an increasingly prevalent feature in Israel. Such fear is a development that the political right may find embarrassing or difficult to acknowledge.

The respondents' uncertainty about how the adoption of a wholly nonviolent struggle could affect the Palestinian state's establishment shows an element of doubt which may be worth exploring. Since the respondents so clearly ascribe violent tendencies to the Palestinians, a cessation of Palestinian violence may contribute to a change of judgment among Israelis which may result in a greater acceptance of a future Palestinian state. At present, there is a strong correlation between the high percentage of respondents who believe that the PLO did not stop terror, and similar percentages of Israelis who reject the formation of a Palestinian state. This may indicate a possible connection of the two fears wherein respondents project the Palestinian state as a future terrorist base.

On the one hand, it seems to be the case that the political right's supporters who do not accept the emergence of a Palestinian state are more likely to cite the use of force as the only way of achieving such an undesired outcome. On the other hand, cessation of violence is seen as a means to accelerate the achievement of a Palestinian state, particularly among respondents who are more favorably disposed towards its establishment.

(d) Interrelationships among Variables:

Interrelationships among variables regarding the image held by the Jewish Israeli population about the nature of the Palestinian struggle show several interesting findings.

(19) The more the *Intifada* is perceived as a struggle against Israel's existence rather than as a struggle to liberate the Occupied Territories, the more it is perceived as intended to cause damage (rather than to express protest) and aggressive (rather than self-defensive), and vice-versa.

(20) The more the struggle is perceived as intended to destroy Israel, the more it is perceived as using mainly violent means and being less restrained *vis-à-vis* targets; and vice-versa.

(21) The more the Palestinian struggle is assessed as having a negative attitude toward the state of Israel, the more respondents believe that the PLO leader's declaration of non-violence is not maintained and that the means used in the struggle are more violent.

(22) The respondents' view of stone-throwing at civilians and/or soldiers is related to their perception of the Palestinian struggle's aims and of the use of violence.

(23) The respondents' assessment of the extent of fear aroused by the *Intifada* is not related to their perception of the Palestinians' aims and the use of violence.

(24) Likewise, the respondents' assessment of whether cessation of violent actions would hasten or delay the establishment of a Palestinian state is not significantly related to the perception of the Palestinians' aims and their use of violence.

(25) The more respondents perceive the Palestinians' aims and means as intended against the State of Israel, the more they recommend abstention from violence. The more respondents perceive the Palestinians' targets as more nationalistic and less violent, the more they recommend the use of violence.

Findings (19), (20), (21) and (22) show the close relationship between the fear of Israel's annihilation and a high perception of the current use of violence. This indicates a perceived projection from present purpose to future intentions. Stone-throwing becomes associated more with the expected future violent behavior of the Palestinians rather than with a decrease from actual previous levels of terror and a move towards the adoption of nonviolent modes of action. Extreme perceptions can be

found among individual Israelis who consider acts such as stoning to death to be part of a religiously sanctioned form of punishment.⁵¹

The second part of finding (25) may seem surprising at first glance. However, not a few among the 'doves' in Israel have become very skeptical as to the possibility of inducing their government and a majority of their fellow citizens to adopt a moderate approach toward the Palestinians. With the relative increase in stabbings during 1990, it was felt that Israelis may be led to disengage from the territories, if not by positive motives, then by the sheer fear of physical damage. Ideas such as the sealing-off of the territories, and particularly of Gaza, were advocated by segments of the left in Israel, not to make peace but rather to get rid of this 'dangerous' people.

Proposition (23) does not show an association between fear and violence, and it may not clearly describe the feelings of those Israelis who support a hard line toward the Palestinians: such individuals would likely be reluctant to disclose what could be perceived as a sign of personal weakness that, aggregated, could help the enemy. Perhaps the use of the term 'fear' (*Pahad*, in Hebrew) would have had a more precise connotation than the term 'insecurity' used in the survey [section (b)] whose results correlated insecurity with a heightened perception of violence.

Taken together, these survey results suggest that Israeli public reaction may be predicted by the extent to which respondents perceive the *Intifada* as a spontaneous rebellion caused by 'genuine despair' or as an 'outburst of a minority of PLO agitators manipulated from the outside'.⁵²

The Israeli Press and the *Intifada's* Violence

The media are generally known for reporting the exceptional rather than the normal, and from this perspective it may not be surprising that, at least in the beginning, they focus more on violent than on nonviolent news. While explanations can vary, the predilection of the media for portraying violence in all its forms has been highlighted.⁵³ In Israel, too, 'the media shows us only or mainly the violent angle of the *Intifada*'.⁵⁴ Israeli journalist Daniel Rubinstein is quoted as stressing the importance of nation-building as the *Intifada's* most important dimension. Yet, he says, '... I write about it so rarely, because, when I do, my editor will say, "But you already wrote about this"'.⁵⁵ Often journalists, and particularly foreign journalists, have been held responsible for inciting outbreaks of violence by their mere presence in a particular time and place where the *Intifada* protest is in progress.⁵⁶

On the other hand, there has been extensive reporting of cases of violence against the Palestinians, covering Israeli excesses by the armed forces, police, security services, settlers and mobs. The uncovering of

human rights violations often brought about the punishment of the elements responsible, and for that the media were prized for acting as a 'watchdog'.⁵⁷ Often enough, the electronic media and the press in Israel have been criticized by right-wing groups and public opinion for 'excessive coverage', for making difficult the work of the law enforcement agencies and for lowering the national morale. In general, it can be established that the written press was able to report violence by both sides and the interaction occurring within such violence without a particular bias. The publicly controlled radio and TV have been somewhat curtailed in their *Intifada* reporting by subtle administrative or budgetary constraints, while opinion programs and news analyses continued to be broadcast with relatively less interference.

Aharon Meged, a renowned mainstream Israeli writer, is quoted as reporting a review of a single weekend of Israeli press coverage; of 43 articles dealing with the *Intifada*, 36 supported the Palestinians and were 'full of terrible accusations' against Israel. Meged commented, 'I find no parallel in human history, where the media in the rear express an almost unanimous support and identification with an enemy fighting its own nation, as they do here and now.'⁵⁸ Perhaps the incentive for the media to provide accurate coverage of Israeli activities in the *Intifada* is enhanced by the fact that, during military and reserve duty in the West Bank (and particularly in Gaza) for the nearly four years of the uprising, a large part of the male population has confronted the real situation.⁵⁹

At the same time, serious articles have also investigated the extent of Arab violence, such as a lengthy report about 1,000 days of the *Intifada* in Jerusalem, covering changes produced by nonviolent action, but including also reports of

setting fire to tens of businesses of Arab residents (who) attempted to break the strike. . . . The Jewish neighborhoods on the borderline area are no longer secure. . . . more than 600 cars of Jewish owners were set on fire (something that was unknown before November 1987), (there were) 3,600 stone-throwings on buses (a third of the nation's total), 80 buses were totally burnt.... only in the last two weeks the city became acquainted with some of the most severe hours of the *Intifada*. Fourteen cars were burnt in one week. Tens of stone-throwing incidents were registered, a terrorist cell that murdered a collaborator in Silwan was caught and one of them wounded, four Israelis in cars were wounded because of stone throwing'.⁶⁰

Still, reports of Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations monitoring the situation in the Occupied Territories are carried by the

press.⁶¹ Such human rights news features appear more frequently than data about Arab violence provided by activist Jewish groups such as UVDA.⁶²

An analysis of the Israeli press was prepared for this study. Two newspapers were chosen, the first (*Yediot Hachronot*) being the paper with the country's largest circulation, and the second (*Ha'aretz*) being that which is particularly read by the political elites. The analysis focused on three different periods: the same month (April) in each of the three consecutive years since the *Intifada* began (1988, 1989, 1990). Data for a content analysis of the news items on the uprising were tabulated on a violent-nonviolent criterion. The first interesting observation is that the reporting of *Intifada* acts decreased in *Yediot Hachronot* during the three years (217 news items in 1988, 189 in 1989, and 118 in 1990) whereas it slightly increased for the *Ha'aretz* (177 in 1988, 186 in 1989 and 205 in 1990) as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
PALESTINIAN UPRISING EVENTS REPORTED IN TWO ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS

Type	<i>Yediot</i> 4/88	<i>Yediot</i> 4/89	<i>Yediot</i> 4/90	<i>Ha'aretz</i> 4/88	<i>Ha'aretz</i> 4/89	<i>Ha'aretz</i> 4/90	Total
Nonviolent	110	66	38	85	73	63	435
Violent	107	123	80	92	113	142	657
Total	217	189	118	117	186	205	1092

Percentages of nonviolent events reported in *Yediot Hachronot* declined from 50.6 per cent (1988) to 34.9 per cent (1989) and 32.2 per cent (1990). Similarly, the share of nonviolent reported events in *Ha'aretz* declined from 48 per cent (1988) to 39.2 per cent (1989) and 30.7 per cent (1990). One additionally infers from the data that the reporting on nonviolent events in absolute terms over the three years gradually diminished in both newspapers. At the same time, the reporting of violent activities increased in *Ha'aretz* and decreased in *Yediot Hachronot*, possibly reflecting the routinization of events in a large-circulation newspaper.

Both newspapers taken together reflect a decline in the reporting of nonviolent events from 44.8 per cent in 1988, to 31.9 per cent in 1989, to 23.2 per cent in 1990 (total=100 per cent). Violent events remained fairly constant over the same period: 30.2 per cent (1988), 35.9 per cent (1989) and 33.7 per cent (1990) (total=100 per cent).

Using the wording of the articles, 31 actions were identified as violent and 15 as nonviolent. The total list and categorization of the 46 *Intifada* actions is spelled out in Appendix B, and recorded in the following Table 2.

TABLE 2
CATEGORIZATION OF PALESTINIAN UPRISING EVENTS AS REPORTED IN
TWO ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS

Act	Yediot 4/88	Yediot 4/89	Yediot 4/90	Ha'aretz 4/88	Ha'aretz 4/89	Ha'aretz 4/90	Total
Acid (V)	1					2	3
Attack (V)	7	5					12
Beating (V)		2		3			5
Bomb (V)		13	7	2	7	13	42
Boycott (V)						1	1
Clash (V)	3	1	4		11	19	38
Crowd (NV)				1			1
Demonstration (NV)	16	7	2	15	10	2	52
Disorder (NV)	21	22	12	14	15	10	94
Field Damage (V)			3			1	4
Flags (NV)	15	6	4	11	8	5	49
Forest Burning (V)		3	1				4
Graffiti (NV)	2	2	2	1	1	3	11
Grenade (V)	1						1
Hunger Strike (NV)	1					1	2
Incitement (V)	6	2		6		4	18
Knifing (V)	1		1	1	1	2	6
Leaflet (NV)	7	6	1	10	6	6	36
Masks (V)	2	13	5		10	18	48
Membership (NV)	5	1	2	5	6	8	27
Molotov Cocktail (V)	16	8	5	14	7	15	65
Murder (V)					1		1
Object Thrown (V)	4	3	3	2	2	3	17
Palestinian Attacked (V)			3	2		1	6
Palestinian Interr. (V)	1	1	1		3	2	8
Palestinian Killed (V)	1	8	3		11	13	46
Palestinian Property (V)		1	1		2		4
Palestinian Vehicle (V)			1	1	1	1	4
Parade (NV)	4		8	6	9	13	40
Prayers (NV)	3	3	1	1	1		9
Property (V)	2	4	3	1			10
Roadblock (NV)	5	8	2	2	8	4	29
Rape of Palestinian (V)		4					4
Resignation (NV)				1			1
Runover (V)	1		1				2
Shooting (V)	2		1			3	6
Stone (V)	44	45	28	25	36	33	211
Strike (NV)	13	9	4	15	6	7	54
Tires Burned (NV)	18	2		3	3	3	29
Vehicle Burning (V)	2	1	3	2		2	10
Violent Attack (V)	4	4	5	8	6	4	31
Violent Demonstration (V)	2	1		11	6	1	21
Violent Disorder (V)	5	2		8	8	4	27
Violent Incitement	1	1	1	6			9
Weapon Possession (V)	1	1			1		3
Window Brackage (V)						1	1
Total	217	189	118	177	186	205	1,092

Notes: 1. (V) = Violent events; (NV) = Nonviolent events.

2. Definitions of Acts are provided in Appendix A (p.35).

At first glance, the mere reporting of more types of actions as violent (two-thirds), prior even to the counting of the events, can provide the reader with the feeling that most of the types of activities mentioned are of a violent nature, a sense that contradicts many of the statements made by foreign experts and Palestinians, who have estimated that around 85 per cent of *Intifada* actions are nonviolent.⁶³ This figure is based on UNC appeals and instructions in tracts or leaflets. In our study, in order to prevent a bias towards the exaggeration of violence, categories such as 'demonstrations' and 'disorders' were subdivided into cases in which violence was reported or not, assuming that in the latter cases the reader would perceive the events as nonviolent. That may not necessarily be the case, given the serious problems of misperception highlighted above. However, even with such relative underestimating of the meaning of words, the results clearly show a majority of events reported as violent ($V = 60.1$ per cent) versus only nonviolent ($NV = 39.9$ per cent) in 96 articles in *Yediot Hachronot* and 110 articles from *Ha'aretz*. Among the most reported categories among a total of 1,092 reported incidents, we found stone-throwing (211), disorders (94), Molotov cocktails (65), strikes (54) and demonstrations (52).

Illustrating this survey with some of the titles of the news items may be of relevance, given the assumption that some of the readers may only glance through the headlines, particularly if an element of 'bad news' is involved. It would be too lengthy to list all the headlines of *Intifada* events reported in the two newspapers for the three months surveyed. A sample in Appendix B will suffice; the first month of *Ha'aretz* and the last of *Yediot Hachronot* may give the reader a sufficient albeit rather impressionistic picture. Articles reporting Israeli repression are not included in the tabulation unless specific reference is made to a Palestinian action as either violent or nonviolent. The high exposure given violence is self-evident and is fully displayed in the Appendix B headlines. Editorials and op-eds of the two newspapers over the same period tended to be more moderate in tone in *Ha'aretz*, including some written by Palestinians themselves.⁶⁴ By contrast, *Yediot Hachronot* carried lead articles that presented and often described high levels of violence among the Palestinians.⁶⁵

Often, the salience of the issue of limited violence was not visible at all in the newspaper reports. Many book reviews and articles by Israeli journalists, commentators and analysts did not recognize the existence of an intermediate category of 'limited violence' or in some cases spoke about the diversity of violent means, excluding firearms.⁶⁶ Eventually, the continuous sequence of political crises diverted the media's focus to economic, immigration, religious or ethnic and social issue areas. Thus

Galili's statement that 'the stone did not hit' was a reality for many Israelis most of the time during the *Intifada*.

The Israeli Policy-Makers and the *Intifada*'s Violence

Opinions of political actors are affected first by their own perceptions of reality, which may mirror views held by the general public. Policy-makers' opinions are also shaped by ulterior goals or by more strategic thinking, in this case *vis-à-vis* the Arab rival. With particular reference to crisis situations, the importance of taking into account possible distortions of objective reality resulting both from attitudes, shaped first by previous historical experience and personality; and, second, by 'elite images', namely, group readings of the situational attributes.⁶⁷ Hence, we can assume that responses to the use of 'limited violence' by the Palestinians have been shaped in a way that will serve not only deterrence of enemy threats but also party, coalition and electoral considerations. Other factors, such as international image, hidden agendas or issues interconnected with other problems, are also linked to the policy-makers' expressed views. We shall dwell only briefly on this matter, since it is reasonably expected that the current ruling Likud-led coalition has found it beneficial and expedient to exaggerate perception of the Palestinian use of violence.

One of the coalition's basic assumptions is that

no lasting peace is possible among the Arab states as long as the tendency for violence remains central in Arab political life, and every Arab regime will continue to depend on force for its internal survival. . . . The ongoing unrest in the Middle East is not generated by the Palestinian problem, but by the propensity for violence in the Arab world and the general intolerance toward non-Arab peoples.⁶⁸

This perception justifies and facilitates the related strong opinion that the Occupied Territories are historic Judea and Samaria, and must remain under Israeli sovereignty. It is therefore advantageous to maintain that Palestinian violence is part of a larger norm. 'The PLO seeks to destroy Israel', according to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and the Palestinian rioting was 'not civil disobedience against occupation but war against the existence of Israel'.⁶⁹ The Prime Minister's reticence towards any peace initiative was clearly represented in an American 1988 political cartoon in which he said in the first box, 'Israeli policy won't be influenced by a few rocks', in the next box, 'bricks', the next box, 'firebombs' and the last box – when a dove with an olive branch is flying in Shamir's direction – 'or any

other flying objects'.⁷⁰ The assumption that Shamir should differentiate between the dove of peace and the previous flying objects, so logical in the eyes of many Palestinians, is totally illogical in the eyes of many Israelis. To those who shared Shamir's perspective, it was gratifying to be able to find and disseminate a statement issued by Fatah (the PLO mainstream faction) in Tunis on 8 August 1989 which called for 'continuing to intensify and escalate armed action and all forms of struggle to eliminate the Zionist Israeli occupation of Occupied Palestinian land.'

Prime Minister Shamir's warnings to the Palestinians have been categorical: 'Not one Arab would survive if the residents of the Occupied Territories began to use live weapons.'⁷² Stone-throwing incidents, such as the one that triggered the October 1990 machine-gunning of 17 Palestinians in the Temple Mount area, were considered by the Prime Minister to be 'a well organized act of provocation'. In the same article, National Religious Party Minister Avner Shaki pleaded 'that ways must be found to avoid this terrible phenomenon of stoning praying Israelis', and called the Israeli public to come and pray at the Wailing Wall and 'not to permit the rioters and the terrorist violence to paralyze the Holiday's joy.'⁷³

The unwillingness to recognize 'limited violence' also appears in the words of Defence Minister Moshe Arens: 'The Palestinians' hatred of the Jews is characterized by the stones and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinian men, women and children'.⁷⁴ According to Sharp there have been many signs that the Israeli government prefers to deal with Palestinian violence rather than with nonviolent struggle.⁷⁵ Attempting to avoid cognitive dissonance, the government clearly showed its determination to crush peaceful dissent when it expelled Mubarak Awad, the most outstanding advocate for nonviolence among the Palestinians. Awad, the founder of the Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence, was arrested and eventually deported a few months after the *Intifada*'s outbreak by a personal decision of Shamir, who could also have been influenced by electoral considerations and the accusation by the militant anti-Arab parties of softness towards the *Intifada*. At the same time, as written elsewhere,

... rather than regard him [Awad] as a positive influence with the potential to lead the Palestinians away from terrorism, certain quarters in the Israeli government, together with the settlers in the Occupied Territories, perceived Awad as a grave threat precisely because he has the potential to demolish the equation: 'Palestinian = terrorist'.⁷⁶

The repression of advocates of nonviolence has been seen in the arrest of

other Palestinian personalities, including the repeated detention without trial of Faisal al-Husseini and others, such as Drs Sari Nuseiibeh and Mamdouh Akkel during the Gulf War.

The more militant wing of Likud and extreme right satellite parties considered Israeli military reaction insufficient, and advocated more drastic measures such as giving orders 'to flatten a refuge camp' at which a lost reservist had been stoned to death in Gaza.⁷⁷ Retired General Ariel Sharon urged the use of tanks against demonstrators in the territories. Others would suggest less violent but nonetheless severe forms of punishment, such as the deportation of the person and the family of the stone throwers (Knesset Member Prof. Y. Ne'eman), or simply massive expulsions of villagers where riots take place.⁷⁸

The Labor Party, often in government and occasionally in opposition, reacted in a similar manner. In terms of policies related to Palestinian 'limited violence' rather than to the goals in the Israeli/Arab conflict, the Labor party leadership has not been necessarily more moderate than that of Likud. As early as 1984, then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin established the parameters guiding the use of violence by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Three years prior to the *Intifada* and perhaps one of its triggers, he launched a policy of widespread arrests and the use of administrative detention aimed against the generally nonviolent Palestinian nationalist leaders. The desire to speak to the Palestinians 'from a position of strength' has often been more common among those who eventually wanted to engage in negotiations about a compromise solution rather than among those whose intransigence about territorial compromise made them paradoxically more flexible in terms of tolerating Palestinian expressions of self-reliance today.⁷⁹

A comparison between Rabin and Arens as defense ministers explains the change from the 'iron fist' policy⁸⁰ to the 'clever hand' policy. Rabin considered even the display of the Palestinian flag as a kind of security threat and instructed the Army to prevent its display in every remote corner of the territories.⁸¹ For Arens, what counted most was to provide Jews with security on both the roads and in the settlements so that more would be attracted to go and live there. Consequently, he adopted a more *laissez faire* policy towards events occurring within the confines of an Arab refugee camp or village. Rabin felt that Israel should not make concessions to Palestinian violence. Otherwise terrorism might prevail. 'By violence you will gain nothing,' he stated, and implemented a policy of 'force, might and beatings' which resulted in large numbers of Palestinians having their arms and often their legs broken.⁸²

Typical of an effort to fit such views into a centrist line, both left and right are criticized as viewing the uprising through an ideological lens.

Knesset Member Michael Bar Zohar, while acknowledging that '... the uprising also raised a cruel mirror to our faces ... soldiers beating up and firing at youngsters, jailing thousands of Palestinians',⁸³ stressed at the same time that '... The revolt of 1987 troubled us deeply by suddenly exposing this intense hatred that had been simmering in the hearts of the Palestinian people; this determination of an entire nation to fight us with stones, knives, axes, and firebombs; this ugly violence, and the deadly dangers suddenly brought to our very doorsteps.'⁸⁴

In similar terms, the biblical expression of '*haba lehorgecha*' (the individual is permitted – moreover in Jewish law, obliged – to anticipate the one who comes to slay him) is translated as the obligation of the state to defend itself and citizens. Arafat is quoted as equalizing 'stone and rifle':

Evidently, in his (Arafat's) conception, the *Intifada* inside the territories, terrorist actions outside them and armed infiltrations from outside are part of the same struggle. This would justify the application of the same means in all three circumstances. ... However, Arafat cannot be Israel's mentor ... we have to act in a manner which will enable us to look straight into the eyes of enlightened men and women, including fellow Jews ... and of our children and grandchildren.⁸⁵

Within the Labor Party, other voices called for the reduction of Israeli troops in the territories so as to alleviate some points of friction between the two parties⁸⁶. They are critical of use of collective punishment and advocate beginning negotiations for peace without waiting for the *Intifada*'s violence to cease.

Finally, segments of the dovish lobby developed a more objective picture of reality by making a priority the monitoring and exposure of the disproportionate Israeli reaction as a gross 'overkill'.⁸⁷ Picturing a difficult and fearful present, and hoping for a brighter future, a Labor Knesset Member pointed out that

After two years of *Intifada* the Israeli street no longer talks about the next war, the battlefield of the future, tomorrow's jets, it talks about the event, the hit, the rocks and the firebombs. The concept of security no longer involves the strategy of experts and statesmen, but rather the daily fears of the individual *vis-à-vis* the fearsome threat of the Palestinian uprising. ... In the end, logic will lead to the inevitable conclusion: Israel's delegation will meet the Palestinian delegation. ... and peace be to Israel.⁸⁸

The more radical sectors of the 'peace camp' have, on the other hand,

tended to minimize the relevance of the Palestinian use of violence, and even justified it on moral or utilitarian considerations.

In the *Intifada*'s early stages, Sharp's assessment was that all across the Israeli political spectrum, '... there was agreement that (a) Palestinian nonviolent struggle would be much more difficult for the Israelis to deal with than Palestinian violence'.⁸⁹

In security matters, it is worth mentioning opinions within the Israeli military that have as much influence on the public and on policy-making as those of civilian politicians.⁹⁰ The general military reaction to the *Intifada* was, on the one hand, that it could not be put down by military means, and that political engagement was the way to curb it. On the other hand, while showing flexibility as to military operations' level of response, the IDF leadership was generally reluctant to escalate to more violent forms of combat and weaponry, fearing mostly that the wide but fragile consensus of support among soldiers and officers on active and reserve duty could split down the middle, as was characteristic of cleavages over so many other political controversies in Israel.⁹¹ Analysts close to military circles recognized the *Intifada*'s distinct nature and the PLO's initial encouragement to achieve its aims by 'unarmed, albeit violent' means, mainly through mass demonstrations, riots, and stone-throwing attacks on Israelis, along with severe punishment of Palestinians including the execution of alleged collaborators and the burning of stores whose owners disobeyed the leaflet's commands. At the same time, the main explanation given is that 'the failure of the uprising to advance to a phase of a large-scale armed struggle has resulted more from lack of capability than from political considerations'.⁹²

Conclusions

Several observations arise from the previous analysis. The use of a widespread though relatively restricted type of violence on the Israeli public seems clearly to have had a negative effect. One way or another, the use of a 'limited' level of violence has not paved the way towards positive reinforcement of Israeli positions favorable to the Palestinians. Whereas the idea of a continuation of the status quo is no longer a popular option, the trend has not been clearly pointing in the direction of further compromise and reconciliation with the Palestinians.⁹³

We can derive a number of more specific conclusions from this analysis.

I. Conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of restraint in the use of violent means as compared with the adoption of moderate aims. An Israeli expert on the *Intifada* has been quoted as arguing that 'to most of us, it doesn't make any difference whether the *Intifada* is nonviolent or

violent. For most of the Israelis . . . as I see it, the problem is the goal of the Palestinians and not the means'.⁹⁴

A deeper look into the matter shows that the fear of violence is making more difficult acceptance of the principle of relinquishing territories, since security considerations seem to be the prevailing reason for their retention.

To a majority of Israelis, the resolution of the *Intifada* and the ultimate disposition of the West Bank are basically a matter of security. If the Israeli state can give up most of the West Bank for genuine peace, and if the security threat of a West Bank in Palestinian hands can be reasonably resolved, then many would settle for resolving the national crisis by handing the territories over to the Palestinians as the lesser evil. However, observation of the PLO over the past twenty years has not reassured the bulk of the Israeli public that it could ever live with the organization, or that genuine peace with the Arab world is ever possible. Suspicions will die very hard.⁹⁵

The question of personal insecurity is closely related to the issue of national security, which, in relation to the withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, is perceived as a zero-sum issue.

II. All in all, the transition from short-term tactics to long-term ends is not clearcut, and the Palestinians' current use of violence is perceived by Israelis as an early indication of what more is to come if and when occupation ends. According to Bar-On, a double trend is evident in the polls wherein there is '... on the one hand a noticeable hardening on questions of short-term policies, along with a simultaneous softening on longer-term issues.'⁹⁶

In recent polls the idea of a staged peace is considered by a majority of Israelis to be the most realistic option: an interim period of autonomy in which peace prevails in the territories could be followed by continued movement toward further devolution. The stress on the need for confidence-building measures at the beginning of what was expected to be the launching of a peace process after the 1991 Gulf War also indicated the need to lower the degree of violence as a major precondition for further moves towards peace.

III. The use of 'limited violence' has strongly colored the Israelis' image of the *Intifada* to the point that they are unable to recognize the essentially nonviolent nature of the majority of the uprising's measures. According to Peretz, 'Most Israelis perceived the uprising only in terms of its violence and were unaware of its nonviolent aspects. Like the world at large they saw the uprising through television images of petrol bombs,

the masked shabab, and the confrontation between Israeli soldiers and screaming, stone-throwing youths.⁹⁷ This study coincides with Kelman's assessment that

this element of violence contributed in some ways to the effectiveness of the *Intifada*. It has also, however had damaging side effects from the point of view of achieving the goals of the *Intifada* ... my own assessment is that the cost of escalating the violence, by introducing firearms, for example, would be horrendous.... But even if the present level of violence is maintained, in my assessment the costs outweigh the benefits, particularly if you assume, as I do, that the major strength of the *Intifada* is its role in transforming the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis on a long-term basis.⁹⁸

It should not be too surprising, at this point, to realize that the Israelis did not perceive the message intended by the Palestinians. Such miscommunications are common. In general, one engaged in diplomatic signaling 'usually will realize that the perceiver may dismiss his messages as deceptive, (yet) he is likely to conclude that the perceiver at least has understood what it is the sender is trying to say. In fact, this is often not the case'.⁹⁹ The exaggerated image of violence projected in the Israeli press and surely in the more closely state-controlled radio and television coverage contributes nearly to erasing the boundaries between limited violence and terror. And, not surprisingly, most political leaders find it expedient to underline the enemy's violent nature as a rallying point for mass support, hence reinforcing the already acute perceptions of fear in large sections of the population.

IV. Advocacy of 'limited violence' as a positive transitional process shifting away from a high level of terror towards a totally nonviolent strategy is not conducive to the immediate achievement of expected results when it has evolved from previously sustained high levels of violence and intimidation. For some Israelis, the gains from a mere reduction in the level of violence, if they were perceived at all, were seen to have been incidental by-products of a shift that was simply tactical in nature. Dismissing the effectiveness of the uprising in self-righteous terms, a Labor-oriented writer categorically stated,

If the *Intifada* lasted so long, it is only because of the existence of moral criteria in Israel. ... (Without such criteria) the *Intifada* would have been 'crushed' in a single blow, as demanded by the right wing, the same way the Jordanians crushed the terrorists in Black September, the Syrians the Halebb rebels, the Russians the Georgians, and the Chinese the students in the squares of Beijing.¹⁰⁰

Moving back to a higher level of violence – which occurred in the third year of the *Intifada* – was risky in that it could provoke Israeli retaliatory measures leading to massive expulsions. In any case, Palestinian escalation has contributed to promoting a widespread Israeli inclination to cut off and seal their country from the Occupied Territories. Hence, reinstalling the Green Line on the map may have some long-term gains from the Palestinians' point of view. A higher perception of violence has stimulated an overwhelming desire among Israelis to disengage from the Gaza Strip, and it may have some influence in generating a similar feeling towards the West Bank. The prior, more 'limited' violence has not aroused a degree of anxiety among Israelis comparable to that elicited by the use of knifings and Molotov cocktails. If anything, the late escalation and especially the stabbings seem to have contributed to a wide appeal for Israel's 'disengagement' from the territories, without a clear indication of how their future status could be affected by such a disengagement through fear.

V. One of the major problems with identifying the *Intifada* 'limited violence' as an effective middle-of-the-road use of violence is that the 'slippery slope' effect led to an increased use of firearms and knifings as well as a concentration of threatening actions by the 'masked gangs' of much more restrictive and secretive membership.¹⁰¹ By 1989, Israeli attention shifted, to a large extent, away from the popular incidents of stone-throwing to the more intimidating acts of the '*mulathamin*', the hooded gangs. Though frightening, the *mulathamin* actions have been more demonstrative in form than really dangerous in substance, if one counts only Jewish casualties. The principal effect of the *mulathamin*'s introduction has been to turn Palestinians against each other, as evidenced by growing rates of political assassination of alleged collaborators.¹⁰²

The instability of an intermediate form of violence is clearly a liability when it is difficult to restrain escalation. It remains unclear if the main cause for the escalation of violence was the PLO headquarters decision in December 1988 to form the Palestine Popular Army or if it was simply the natural result of a need to look into newer and higher forms of violence following the routinization of an increasingly exhausted model.¹⁰³

Following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on the brink of the Gulf War, Yasser Arafat threw the PLO's weight behind Saddam Hussein, because of his strong anti-Israeli stand and the credibility of an immediate Scud missile attack on Israel. This alliance and the subsequent attacks made a connection that will be difficult to erase from Israeli minds: 'I say, welcome, welcome to war . . . Iraq and Palestine represent a common will. We will be side by side and after the great battle, God

willing, we will pray together in Jerusalem . . . the Iraqi fighters and the Palestinian stone-throwers have an appointment with victory together'.¹⁰⁴

VI. Declared or verbal support of violence seems to be equally or more devastating than its actual use in sporadic cases that occurred since the *Intifada* began. The advocacy and justification of such acts is immediately perceived by the adversary's government or media without waiting to see how much such advocacy is reflected on the ground. In retrospect, it would have been interesting to see how Israeli attitudes could have been affected by the existence of 'limited violence' as a manifestation of spontaneous and uncontrollable rebellion against occupation, in the face of *rejection* of it by the Palestinian leadership. Much of the Israeli reaction has been to verbal behavior rather than to concrete acts, except when killings of Israelis were the direct result of dramatic occurrences such as stabbing. Recall that one of the survey findings indicated that the more the PLO declaration condemning terror was perceived to be violated, the more violent and unrestrained was the visualization of the stone-throwing.¹⁰⁵

VII. The widespread use of stone-throwing and isolated instances of petrol bombs or other lethal artifacts in the West Bank and Gaza against Israeli settlers and visitors have the contradictory effects of reinforcing settlers' decisions to stay in the 'liberated territories', while deterring visitors from entering and moving around and through such areas. Paradoxically, the degree of fear from 'limited violence' provoked in the Israeli public a stronger concern than that elicited by the earlier, more precisely targeted acts of terrorists; hence, the gains expected to result from reductions in the level of violence were nullified by widespread apprehension stemming from the likelihood of being hit by one of thousands of flying stones and objects.

Eventually, the idea of transforming the Palestinians into the David fighting the powerful Israeli Goliath may have succeeded in impressing public opinion worldwide. However, the Israelis' attitudes and psychological environment led them to reinforce and perhaps even aggravate previously expressed fear. The asymmetry evident in the attacks by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, the endorsement of those attacks by the Palestinian leadership whose opinion was reportedly widely shared by the Palestinians in the Territories, and the lack of Israeli response made it impossible for the Israelis to conceive of themselves as a Goliath facing a David.

VIII. Adapting to the new situation, the IDF were able to adjust to continuous control over the Occupied Territories, limiting even more the outburst of violence by the organized gangs to the point where the Arab casualties inflicted by the Palestinians themselves exceeded those

inflicted by Israelis. Although it was recognized that the use of force was insufficient for crushing the *Intifada*'s nonviolent aspects, eventually 'limited violence' became a more routinized, expected and tolerable problem. While the international community and domestic Israeli cleavages made it difficult for the IDF to upgrade its use of repression, the adaptive nature of the existing level came to be considered sufficient for coping with the uprising's violent dimension.

IX. Intransigent and deliberate Israeli policy poses serious problems for the *Intifada* leaders, who realize that both concurrent violent and nonviolent expressions of protest are equally repressed. Even in the case of Mubarak Awad, the authorities accused him of advocating the use of violence since in his writings he advocated the use of 'obstruction', including the cutting of electricity, telephone and water lines but clearly rejecting stone-throwing.¹⁰⁶ Confining use of violence to only that against objects and strictly in a defensive capacity as a reaction to land expropriation could truly signify a most significant departure from previous levels, but nevertheless Awad was considered a most dangerous person by Prime Minister Shamir's aides.

While the situation may be seen as gloomy and as offering no choice to the Palestinians, it may still be possible to argue in favor of experimenting with a totally nonviolent strategy, under the assumption that the physical cost at least would be relatively minor and that widespread participation could be easier to achieve and sustain. The use of nonviolent sanctions as a sole tactic remains to be explored within the context of the Israeli/Arab conflict. Given the historical experience of the peoples involved, there is some expectation that an experiment with such a strategy may have a powerful effect on many Jews and possibly accelerate a peaceful outcome toward the Palestinian claim for self-determination. In other words,

There is an important positive capacity among Israelis which can assist (a) Palestinian nonviolent struggle. There are positive elements in Israeli society, and the history and principles of Judaism have major stress on the importance of justice. Israelis of various religious and political views often think of themselves as very moral people.... The memories of brutalities against their own people in Germany would no longer bolster support for harsh repression of Palestinians but might instead trigger sympathy for another rejected group.¹⁰⁷

There may be enough truth in Sharp's assessment to warrant experimentation with this approach.

In the final analysis, the strategy of 'limited violence', adopted as

perhaps adequate to the changing nature of international politics and terror's decline in popularity, does not pay off, judging from the *Intifada* experiment. Even if the level of violence is reduced and the commands effectively emphasize nonviolent means, the mix is not sufficiently persuasive to change perceptions within the enemy's ranks.

While it has been possible to affirm that stress on moderate aims without a similar emphasis on moderate means is not an effective tool for a national struggle, it may be difficult to determine the opposite. What has been clearly established in our case study is that the inconsistency between aims and means is counterproductive. This finding in turn clearly signals the potential of nonviolent sanctions in the pursuit of a peaceful resolution of conflict among nations.

NOTES

1. Study submitted to E. Kaufman by Irah Kahneman, *Public Assessment of the Activities and Violence of the Intifada* (Jerusalem: Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Publication No. (s)IK1124/E&H, Dec. 1990).
2. Gene Sharp, 'The Intifada and Nonviolent Struggle', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Autumn 1989), pp. 3-14.
3. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, 'Introduction', in Phyllis Bennis, *From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising* (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 1990), p. 12. It has also been called 'white (bloodless) intifada', 'a struggle in which defiance and self-reliance, not terrorism, were the means by which the Palestinians would redeem themselves', in A. Friedman, 'Postwar Pessimism', *The Jewish Journal* (Los Angeles), 2-8 Aug. 1991.
4. Helena Cobban, 'the Palestinian National Movement and the Tactics of Restrained Violence', (Washington, DC: Middle East Peace Institute, Project Manuscript, c. 1989).
5. Interview with Nafez Assaily, Acting Director, Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-Violence, Jerusalem, 9 June 1989.
6. Yasser Arafat, quoted by Don Peretz, *Intifadah: The Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 289.
7. Ariel Merari, Tamar Prat and David Tal, 'The Palestinian Intifada - An Analysis of a Popular Uprising After Seven Months', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1989), p. 192.
8. Faisal Hussein, quoted by Helena Cobban, *World Monitor*, March 1990, p. 64.
9. Ryad Malki (Bir Zeit University), quoted by Daoud Kuttub, 'Which Way Now?', *Middle East International* (21 Dec. 1990), p. 10. A close variation is the term 'almost nonviolent' used by Johan Galtung, *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), p. 62.
10. William B. Voegle, 'Deterrence and Nonviolent Resistance: Learning from the Intifadah' (Clark University, unpublished MS, c. 1990, p. 7.
11. Souad Dajani (University of Jordan), quoted in 'News from the Albert Einstein Institution' (Cambridge, MA: A. Einstein Institution, 1990), p. 7.
12. Salah Khalaf [Abu Iyad], 'Lowering the Sword', *Foreign Policy*, No. 78 (Spring 1990), p. 92.

13. The *Intifada* is classified under such a rubric in the database of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' Project on Low Intensity Warfare; quoted by Merari *et al.*, op. cit., p. 191.
14. Helena Cobban, 'Gunless in Gaza', *World Monitor*, March 1990, p. 58.
15. See Gilboa on questioning the characterization of the *Intifada* by authors Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari not clearly as war, terrorism or civil insurrection but as '... a popular war fought not only by conventional armed forces with standard weapons but by masses of civilians using other violent means' (Eytan Gilboa, book review in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, No. 2 [Summer 1991], p. 115).
16. The vision of the Palestinian uprising that has captured the imagination of the world is that of the 'children of the stones', young Palestinians facing the might of the Israeli military machine armed with nothing but stones'; P. Bennis, op. cit., p. 44. See also Jonathan Kuttab, 'The Children's Revolt', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer 1988), p. 31.
17. 'At the outset there was little question but that it was a genuine popular uprising against the Israeli occupation. ... 'What the *Intifada* demonstrated, in part, was how out of touch Arafat and the leadership of the PLO had become. Most of their political ties were to a generation on the West Bank whose time had passed.' Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (New York: Quill, 1990), p. 26.
18. Edy Kaufman, 'The Intifadah's Limited Violence', *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 109-21.
19. I.e. Sari Nusseibah, Faisal al-Husseini and particularly Mubarak Awad developed the idea of 'Nonviolent Resistance as a Strategy for the Occupied Territories' (Santa Cruz, CA: New Society Publishers, n.d.; *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1984), pp. 22-36.
20. See an analysis of the first 60 leaflets of the *Intifada* Unified National Command by Nafez Assail, Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, Jerusalem, June 1991.
21. Leaflet 5 of the Unified National Command of the *Intifada* (30 Jan. 1988) included the exceptional statement: 'Our masses know no fear ... their stone has become a kalashnikov (Soviet assault rifle)'.
22. 'Arafat Speaks on 1,000th Day of Intifadah', FBIS-NEW-90-172, 5 Sept. 1990. In the same speech Arafat called to 'escalate, escalate the intifadah'.
23. For discussion of the role of ritual in making sure that the meaning of an assault cannot be misinterpreted, e.g., ancient assassins, see David C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (1984), pp. 665.
24. Interview, 'Gene Sharp: Nonviolent Struggle', conducted by Afif Safieh, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Autumn 1987), pp. 46-47.
25. An expression coined with the creative input of Prof. Johan Galtung. Also see his *Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine*, op. cit.
26. Kaufman, op. cit., p. 120.
27. Headings for a table comparing the frequency and types of Palestinian terrorist incidents in the first months of 1987 and 1988, derived from the database of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, in Merari, op. cit., p. 191.
28. The study on the 'Limited Violence of the *Intifada*' has been made possible by a generous fellowship of the Albert Einstein Institution (Cambridge, MA) and covers the following subjects: (a) Methodologic introduction; (b) Palestinian Definitions and Characterizations of 'Limited Violence'; (c) Israeli Perceptions of 'Limited Violence' (covering the subject of this article); (d) The Use of Violence in the *Intifada* within an Historic Context; (e) Violence in the *Intifada* through 1991; and (f) Comparative and Concluding Remarks.
29. Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. xix. C.f. Rapoport, op. cit., loc. cit.
30. See draft by Arye Carmon, 'Political Education in the Midst of an Identity Crisis', presented to the Conference on *Israeli Democracy Under Stress* (Tel Aviv: Israeli-Diaspora Institute, 1990), p. 32. The importance of Holocaust images and the need for

- self-reliance in the leading politicians of Israel's formative years has been studied by Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 230.
31. Louis René Berres, 'The Real Threat of Genocide', *Jerusalem Post* (daily), 5 June 1988.
 32. See draft in Yoram Peri, 'The Israeli-Arab Conflict and Israeli Democracy', *ibid.*, p. 112. He quotes a study by Asher Arian in which a correlation was found between unwillingness to return the Occupied Territories and the affirmative attitude towards the question: 'Is the whole world against us?', *ibid.*, p. 113.
 33. According to B'Tselem, there were 19 Israeli deaths in the territories during the first two years (of whom 10 were soldiers) and 27 fatalities within the green line (of whom 4 were soldiers), for a grand total of 46; B'Tselem, the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, *Annual Report - 1989* (Jerusalem, 1990), pp. 23-24. This decreased to 12 for 1990;; Amnesty International, *Annual Report - 1991* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1991), p. 126.
 34. Quoted from a leaflet reproducing Leila S. Kadi (ed.), *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Movement* (Beirut: PLO Organization Research Centre, Dec. 1969), pp. 137-141.
 35. Raphael Israeli, 'The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)', from Y. Alexander and A. H. Forman (eds.), E. Mastrangelo (contributing ed.), *The 1988-1989 Annual on Terrorism* (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp. 104-105.
 36. Anthony H. Cordesman, 'Terrorism and the Arab Cause: The Lesson of 20 years of Failure', *Los Angeles Times*, 17 Sept. 1986.
 37. 'In the case of the PLO, the image of armed terrorists killing Jewish women and children is a terrible one, conjuring up at least an unconscious connection with the image of the murderous Nazis'. Samuel J. Roberts, *Party and Policy in Israel: The Battle Between Hawks and Doves* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 161.
 38. Speaking of the Israelis, about past perceptions, and comparing them with the Palestinians' current perceptions of personal and group vulnerability, Montville has passed the attributes of the first nation to the latter. Joseph V. Montville, 'Psychological Considerations in the Peace Process', in Yehuda Luckacs and Abdalla M. Battah (eds.), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict - Two Decades of Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 164-69. However, historical memory and current episodes of low widespread violence do not reduce vulnerability; hence there is no effect of transition. Rather, both groups feel mutually threatened.
 39. 'What should be needed is an equally massive participation of Israeli Jews and Arabs alongside the Palestinians, but then obviously only in nonviolent actions. In other words, and this is not quite a tautology, for a nonviolent chain to be built it has to be nonviolent. It makes no sense to demand or expect Israelis to join the stone throwers'. Galtung, *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (op. cit.), p. 68.
 40. Faisal al-Husseini is quoted as stating: 'We are trying to tell the Israelis that to reach a real peace, both of us must get rid of two things - dreams and fears of each side. . . . 'So we are trying to reach Israelis by all means: meetings, leaflets, international conferences, political messages between us and them. We believe this will work'. Quoted in Ashmore, op. cit., p. 97.
 41. Lily Galili, 'The Stone that Did Not Hit Us', *Ha'aretz*, 24 Oct. 1989.
 42. Roberts, op. cit., p. 163.
 43. A *Newsweek* poll conducted in late Jan. 1988, mentioned by Mordechai Bar-On, 'Israeli Reactions to the Palestinian Uprising', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1988), p. 52.
 44. Dom Peretz, op. cit., p. 120. A March 1989 survey by the *New York Times* is mentioned with the observation that those surveyed believed the Arabs would commit a holocaust against the Jews in Israel.
 45. Sharp, 'The Intifada and Nonviolent Struggle', p. 7.
 46. At the same time, the poll showed the highest-ever percentage (59 per cent) of Israelis

- willing to open talks with the PLO 'if the PLO officially recognizes Israel and ceases terrorist activities'. *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, No. 1, p.451 (week ending 27 Aug. 1988).
47. *News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, 1990, p.7.
 48. Special Hebrew leaflet issued 26 Oct. 1988.
 49. Mordechai Bar-On, 'Trends in the Political Psychology of Israeli Jews, 1967-1986', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Autumn 1987), p. 29. Such was the effect on the 1988 elections which eventually paved the road for a Likud-led coalition that included the most extremist anti-Arab groups. According to the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, 'Each stone thrown is a vote for the *Kach* (his) party. (J. Galtung, op. cit., p.69).
 50. Louis Guttman Institute, op. cit., quoting a study sample comprising 635 persons, representing the Jewish adult urban population of Israel between 28 Oct. and 20 Nov. 1990. Carefully designed to address the steady level of violence, the findings may have been affected by the unforeseen clash that occurred in Jerusalem's Temple Mount only a few days prior to the fieldwork in which, following a massive stone-throwing on praying Jews at the Wailing Wall, about 17 Palestinians were killed by the border police shooting with live ammunition.
 51. Based on a discussion of the *Intifada* in kibbutz Heftzibah, May 1990.
 52. While massive protest is seen as less violent, acts of gangs or groups are seen as provocative and threatening. Yehoshua Porath is quoted saying that mass participation 'divides Israeli society while terrorist activity unites Israeli society' against the Arabs (Peretz, op. cit., p.43).
 53. See University of Amsterdam introduction to Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p.ii. The authors stress that since the aim is to alter the enemy's behavior the message's transmission to the masses rather than the damage to the individual victim is the most important motivation for the insurgent terrorist (the term refers to a non-state actor attempting to inflict the 'systematic production of chronic fear', *ibid.*, pp.15-16).
 54. Daniel Rubinstein, Israeli journalist, quoted in *News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, 1990, p.7.
 55. Rubinstein's remarks in the National Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 8-11 Feb. 1990), quoted in Robert Ashmore, 'Non-violence as an Intifada Strategy', *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 32 (1990), p.92.
 56. Elaborating one of Walter Laqueur's concepts - that 'the media are the terrorists' best friend' - one of the arguments advanced about the excessive reporting on violence has been, particularly for television, 'that the medium demands or favors violent over nonviolent content. News on television has to be visually attractive'. Schmid and de Graaf, op. cit., pp.71-72.
 57. Ya'akov Eban (former IDF spokesman), 'Hatikshoret b'Intifada' [in Hebrew], 'The Media in the Intifada', in Reuven Gal, (ed.), *The Seventh War - The Effects of the Intifada on the Israeli Society* (Tel Aviv: Kav Adom, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1990), p. 129. An additional view established that 'wide media coverage of extreme instances of oppression has played some part in removing Israel's internal masks (Lockman and Beinun, *Intifada*, p.223).
 58. Michael Bar-Zohar, *Facing a Cruel Mirror: Israel's Moment of Truth* (New York: Scribner's, 1990), p. 197. Megeed reported that the Palestinians were presented '... as innocent victims of abuse by the army, the police, the courts, the central and local government ... The Palestinians' testimonies were accepted at face value. ... There was no mention whatever of their violence against soldiers and civilians, including attacks intended to kill'.
 59. It is worth illustrating the press coverage: The press described how the 10,000-20,000 soldiers who served in the Gaza Beach prison '... have done their work faithfully ... have opened the heavy iron door of the isolation cell and then closed it. Have led the man from the interrogation chamber ...' '... Most of them are shaken when they first hear the screaming ...' '... After a day or two here it already seems quite natural to see

people enclosed behind barbed wire ...' ... And these people, your friends, ordinary Israelis, who sit in the canteen in front of the TV with you to watch a repeat screening of *Gandhi*, or "Thirty-Something" or "LA Law" – these good people who are solid citizens of a consumer-oriented technological democracy – undergo here, without the slightest difficulty, the silent metamorphosis that is required of them'. 'On Gaza Beach', published by Ari Shavit in *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv, daily), translated and reproduced in *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 38, No. 13 (18 July 1991), p. 4

60. Nadav Shragai, '1000 days of the Intifada in Jerusalem', *Ha'aretz*, 28 Sept. 1990.
61. B'Tselem provides monthly reports of casualties of both sides, reporting by 31 May 1991 a total of 65 Israelis (45 civilians and 20 military) and 4 tourists, as well as 823 Palestinians in shooting incidents, 86 after exposure to tear gas and 11 in the hands of alleged collaborators. During the same period Palestinians killed by the *Intifada* were estimated by the news agencies to be 394. B'Tselem, *Information Sheets* (Jerusalem), June 1991, p. 11.
62. UVDA (in Hebrew, 'Fact'), the Center for Data, Documentation and Communications, based in Hebron (West Bank), published a report on the first 30 months on 'Arab Violence on the Land of Israel', reporting in the cover story about 3,033 Israeli wounded (2,065 soldiers and 968 civilians) and 789,796 violent incidents, and on the next page 15 deaths for all of 1988 and half of 1989 (6 soldiers and 9 civilians) next to figures of 'rioters' casualties totalling 256.
63. Sharp, 'The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle', op. cit., p. 7. The original study was conducted by Nafez Assaily, 'Intifada: Palestinian Civil-Based Defense – Analysis of Leaflets 1–66, Including the Work of the Popular Committees' (Jerusalem: The Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence, c. June 1991). The study shows a slight increase over time to a total of 8.3 per cent advocacy of violence – 1.4 per cent advocating 'attack traitors' and 6.9 per cent advocating violent confrontations.
64. Editorials in *Ha'aretz* include articles by Palestinian Daoud Kuttab, 'On the Way to Palestine' speaking about the nonviolent work of organizations, universities, leaflets, strikes, etc. (1 April 1988).
65. *Yediot Hachronot* (Tel Aviv, daily), included articles entitled, 'PLO DEMANDED DEMONSTRATION, THE HEADS OF WAKF – MOSLEM RELIGIOUS TRUST WANTED QUIETNESS – Nine days ago the Friday prayer ended with a violent demonstration and stone throwing' (Roni Shaked, 16 April 1989); 'I AM AFRAID THAT THEY WILL RETURN – For 3 successive nights she was tortured, raped and beaten by young men with hooded faces. They introduced themselves as members of the "Shock Committees"' (Anat Tal-Shir, 16 April 1989); 'EXTERMINATING COLLABORATORS – Leaflet 38 declared April 26 as "closing accounts with collaborators" day. More than 20 collaborators were attacked' (Roni Shaked, 28 April 1989).
66. Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada – Causes and Effects* (In Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papirus, 1990), p. 72. (In English) (Boulder, CO and Jerusalem: Westview Press and Jerusalem Post, 1991).
67. M. Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein, 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 75–101.
68. Publicity leaflet with excerpts from an article that appeared in *Wall Street Journal*, 5 April 1983.
69. Quoted by William B. Vogeles, op. cit., p. 20.
70. Caricature circulated by Palestinian sources, from the *Houston Post*, 1988.
71. Consulate General of Israel, 'For Your Information: The Fatah Conference in Tunis: More of the Same', New York, 9 Aug. 1989.
72. *Jerusalem Post*, 10 July 1989.
73. *Ha'aretz*, 9 Oct. 1990.
74. Moshe Arens editorial: 'The Uprising Lesson', *Ha'aretz*, 6 April 1988.
75. Sharp, 'The Intifada and Nonviolent Struggle', p. 12.
76. Edy Kaufman, 'Mubarak Awad's Offense Lies in Rebutting the Equation "Palestinian = Terrorist"', *Los Angeles Times*, 27 May 1988.

77. Knesset Member Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan, *Yediot Hachronot*, 24 Sept. 1990, p. 1.
78. For a survey of expressions for calls for using greater force see Mark Tessler, 'The Palestinian Uprising and the Israeli Response: Human Rights, Political and Security Dimensions', *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 328-29.
79. Defense Minister Arens, in 'Palestinian violence postpones the political negotiation for peace', *Davar* (Tel Aviv daily) 22 Nov. 1990.
80. The 'iron fist' policy was designed to suppress Palestinian nationalism and included such practices as the frequent closure of Palestinian universities, deportation, press censorship, and such forms of collective punishment as curfews and demolition of homes. Mark Tessler, 'The Impact of the Intifada on Israeli Political Thinking', in Rex Brynen (ed.), *Echoes of the Intifada* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 45.
81. 'In this connection, Israeli forces have not only sought to disperse demonstrations and apprehend protest organizers, they have also attempted to establish the IDF's authoritative presence in all parts of the occupied territories', *ibid.*, p. 48.
82. Raja Shehadeh, 'Israel and the Palestinians: Human Rights in the Occupied Territories', in Brynen, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Shehadeh mentions an estimate of 3,500 Palestinians severely beaten during the first few months, so that they would no longer be able to throw stones. For incidents in which firearms could be used rather widely, the Israelis restricted the use of live ammunition by using alternative plastic and rubber bullets which, while reducing the numbers of fatalities, could wound a large number of protesters, thus removing them from the action.
83. Bar-Zohar, *op. cit.*, p. 3-4.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Netanel Lorch, 'On Hillel, Kant and the Intifada', in Daniel J. Elazar, *Morality and Power* (New York: University Press of America, 1990), p. 76.
86. Gad Ya'akobi, *Davar*, 14 Nov. 1990. On minimizing use of live ammunition, see Tessler, p. 329.
87. Parliamentary initiatives of the Civil Rights and Peace Movement, RATZ, MAPAM, SHINUI and other groups were aimed at combating the excessive use of violence by Israelis, and made recommendations 'including that "orders to beat in order to break bones are unlawful and should be refused" '; Knesset Member Tsaban, quoted in Tessler, p. 33.
88. Avraham Burg, *Ha'arets*, 20 Nov. 1989.
89. Gene Sharp, 'Considering Policy Options and Consequences for Israel Facing the Intifada', MS of a memo of notes presented at the Israeli Institute of Military Affairs, 10 July 1989, p. 4.
90. Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
91. Ron Ben Yishai, *Yediot Hachronot*, 23 Dec. 1990; and M. Tessler, 'The Palestinian Uprising', *op. cit.*, pp. 337-40.
92. Merari, Prat and Tal, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
93. *Yediot Hachronot*, 21 June 1991. According to the Continuing Survey of the Guttman Institute conducted in May 1991, approximately 80 per cent of Israeli Jews are opposed to the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza. The same percentage is willing to withdraw from Gaza; but in terms of the willingness to compromise on the West Bank, 7 per cent are ready to give back all, 12 per cent most, 30 per cent some, 20 per cent a small portion and 31 per cent none at all. Not less relevant is the opposition to a Palestinian state (79 per cent) and to negotiations with the PLO (74 per cent).
94. *News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, 1990, p. 7.
95. Graham E. Fuller, 'The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return?' (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, circulated by US State Dept. on 17 Nov. 1989, STORY: NX 5031117), p. 13. According to Gal-Or, 'One interpretation presents all Palestinian violence as terrorism The lesson is that Palestinian terrorism is an existential threat not only on the personal, individual level, but also on the national level since it serves those whose Covenant proclaims the goal of annihilating the Zionist state'. Noemi Gal-Or, 'The Israeli Defense Forces and Unconventional

96. Warfare: The Palestinian Factor and Israeli National Security Doctrine', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 221.
Mordechai Bar-On, 'Israeli Reactions to the Uprising', op. cit., p. 53.
97. Peretz, op. cit., p. 121.
98. *News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, op. cit., p. 7.
99. Jervis, op. cit., p. xix. The Israelis have not been an exception to this observation.
100. Bar-Zohar, op. cit., p. 197, quoting Aharon Megeed.
101. For a change in the leaflets' content, see Shaul Mishal with Reuven Aharoni, *Speaking Stones: The Words Behind the Palestinian Intifada* (In Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1989).
102. In 1988, 16 were killed and 90 injured, but 1989 numbers went up to 135 Palestinians killed by Palestinians and around 400 injured; Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 9 March 1990. These numbers increased further during 1990 to some 150; Amnesty International, op. cit., p. 126.
103. According to a reliable Israeli journalist, in terms of shootings, detonation of charges, arson, stabbing and Molotov cocktails, the daily average number of incidents went up from 7.9 incidents a day in 1988 to 8.9 in 1989, more than a 10 per cent increase. An average of 150 stone-throwing incidents a day has continued. Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 9 March 1990.
104. Associated Press, 7 Jan. 1991; quoted in Israel Foreign Ministry brochure.
105. Kahneman, op. cit., p. 11.
106. Awad, op. cit., p. 29.
107. Interview, 'Gene Sharp: Nonviolent Struggle', pp. 50, 51. According to Galtung, op. cit., p. 69, 'Anybody using violence against Jews, Israelis or not, should contemplate the symbolic function of violence to the people who have suffered most from genocidal action in this cruel century. Any single stone evokes memories, and plays on dangerous chords in the collective subconscious. It does not communicate what to the Jews, rightly, is their major concern: security. The only thing that could communicate security would be acts of compassion and cooperation, and nonviolence as the major form of fighting....'

APPENDIX A

TYPES OF VIOLENCE REPORTED DURING THE INTIFADA:
DEFINITIONS AS USED IN CONTENT ANALYSIS
OF MEDIA REPORTING

Abbreviation	Definition
Acid	Any chemical that has been thrown on a person or object.
Attack	An attack upon an Israeli (soldier, settler, etc.) that was either done without a weapon or not reported as a violent attack.
Beating	Beating of a Palestinian by other Palestinian(s).
Bomb	A bomb (either home-made or ready-made, like a mine) that was planted, which either exploded or was dismantled.
Boycott	Declaration of boycott on Israeli products.
Clash	Reported as clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers.
Crowd	Crowd or gathering surrounding Israeli soldiers in order to harm them.
Demonstr	Demonstration that was not reported as violent.
Disorder	Causing disorder.
Field	Burning of field crops, usually in the settlements in the Territories.
Flags	Raising or hanging of flags [Palestinian, black, organizational (Fatah, Hamas, etc.)] in demonstrations or any other situations.
Forest	Burning of forest either within the territories or inside the green-line boundaries.

Graffiti	Writing slogans, drawing flags or any other kind of graffiti.
Grenade	Grenade thrown that could cause either slight or serious damage to humans or objects. Includes cases in which the grenade did not explode.
Hunger	Hunger strike by one or more Palestinians.
Incitement	Incitement by masked gangmember, preacher or any other person. Could be in any situation and could call for violence, but any resulting violence is not mentioned in the report.
Israeli Vehicle	Burning of a vehicle owned by an Israeli.
Knifing	Stabbing of Israeli soldier or citizen; could be fatal.
Leaflet	Publication or distribution of heralds written by the United Command or any other group.
Masks	Veiled faces.
Member	Membership in organizations ruled illegal by Israeli law (Fatah, Hamas, Democratic Front, etc.).
Molotov	Throwing of Molotov cocktail bottle which either exploded or did not.
Murder	First-degree murder of an Israeli citizen.
Object	Throwing of any object that may have hit somebody. Varies from iron bars to laundry machines.
P. Attack	An attack made on a Palestinian suspected of collaborating with Israeli sources.
P. Interrogation	Violent interrogation of person suspected of collaboration with Israeli sources; includes torture which may end in death.
P. Kill	Murder of a Palestinian suspected of collaboration with Israeli sources. Can happen as a result of torture or any other type of violent interrogation by Palestinians.
P. Prop	Damage of Palestinian property by other Palestinians.
P. Vehic	Burning of vehicle owned by a Palestinian.
Parade	Procession of a group of people in mark of celebration, funeral, or any other event.
Prayers	Incitement during Muslim prayers by preachers or any other religious person.
Property	Damage as an act of vandalism against Israeli property, e.g., houses, vegetation or anything else. Damage could be inflicted by various means: burning, smashing, etc.
Roadblock	Roadblock by Palestinians, usually blocking the entrances to Arab villages to prevent entry of Israeli soldiers.
Rape	Rape of a Palestinian female suspected of collaboration with Israeli sources.
Resign	Resignation of a Palestinian from work involved with Israel, as an act of protest.
Running over	Attempt to run over an Israeli soldier or citizen, successful or not.
Shooting	Shooting toward soldiers, buses carrying Israeli passengers, or any other Israelis.
Stone	One or more stones thrown by Palestinians at Israeli targets.
Strike	Trade strike or sit-in strike by Palestinians.
Tires	Burning of tires.
V. Attack	An attack against an Israeli soldier or citizen by one or more Palestinians armed with daggers, iron bars, or other weapons.
V. Demonstration	A demonstration, usually organized, that involves violent acts such as stone-throwing or other attacks.
V. Disorder	Causing disorder which involves violent acts.
V. Incitement	Incitement calling for violence.
Weapon	Possession of firearms or other lethal weapons.
Window	Smashing of window(s) with stone or any other object.

APPENDIX B
NEWS ITEM HEADLINES

Ha'aretz main headlines (April 1988):

LAND DAY RESTRICTIONS ON TERRITORIES REMOVED;
8 KILLED IN TERRITORIES OVER WEEKEND EVENTS, AMBUSH IN GAZA;
ARABS THREW STONES - I.D.F. CHASED;
2 ELECTROCUTED TO DEATH ON ELECTRICAL POLES;
AFTER LEAFLET 12: STRIKE IN THE TERRITORIES;
LEAFLET IN HEBREW: SOLDIERS - DO NOT RESPOND;
16-YEAR-OLD LOST EYE FROM RUBBER BULLET;
FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD IS KILLED AFTER STONE HITS HEAD;
I COULD NOT BREATHE BECAUSE ARABS THREW STONES;
GENERAL STRIKE IN [GAZA] STRIP'S MARKET FOR THE FOURTH DAY;
TIRZA PORAT WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD BY ROMAN ELDOBI;
3 GAZA WORKERS ARRESTED WHEN LEAFLETS FOUND;
10 INTIFADA LEADERS FROM GAZA ARRESTED;
2 RESIDENTS OF VILLAGE NEAR JENIN KILLED;
8 FROM TERRITORIES DEPORTED TO LEBANON;
TERRITORIES CALM - DESPITE DEPORTATION OF 8;
LIFE RETURNING TO NORMAL IN HEBRON: STORES OPEN;
COMMOTION AFTER DEATH IN NABLUS: ANOTHER KILLED;
11 KILLED IN PROTESTS AFTER MURDER IN TUNISIA [ABU JIHAD];
2 MOLOTOV BOTTLES THROWN ON HOTZEH SHOMRON ROAD;
RELATIVE CALMNESS BECAUSE OF CURFEW AND RAMADAN;
I.D.F. ALERT IN TERRITORIES - BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS;
MOLOTOV BOTTLE IN JERUSALEM;
TOMORROW: FURY DAY - A WEEK AFTER ABU JIHAD'S MURDER;
3 KILLED AND 13 WOUNDED: FULL CURFEW IN [GAZA] STRIP;
2 PALESTINIANS WHO THREW STONES APPEAL TO COURT;
25 MERCHANTS DID NOT OPEN STORES IN JERUSALEM;
20 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND FINE TO 15-YEAR-OLD;
SECOND DAY NO KILLINGS: ATTEMPT TO BREAK STRIKE;
3RD QUIET DAY: ATTEMPTS TO STOP STRIKE CONTINUE;
GIRL AGED 14 WHO WAS SHOT 2 DAYS AGO DIED -
MAN FROM VILLAGE NEAR RAMALLAH KILLED.

Yediot Hachronot main headlines (April 1990):

MINOR CHARGED WITH ATTEMPT TO BLOW UP MEMORIAL NEAR RAMAT-
RACHEL KIBBUTZ;
GROUP SUSPECTED OF 15 CASES OF MURDER AND SABOTAGE
EXPOSED;
EGGED BUS DRIVER AND QIRYAT-ARBA RESIDENT WOUNDED FROM
STONE-THROWING ON BUSES IN HEBRON;
STONE HIT HEAD OF ELECTRIC COMPANY WORKER;
I.D.F. COMMANDER SEVERELY WOUNDED FROM TRUCK HIT NEAR
NABLUS;
'I WAS ATTACKED WITH KNIFE IN BUTCHER'S STREET IN MUSLIM
QUARTER AND I SHOT IN THE AIR';
MALE AND FEMALE SOLDIERS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN GAZA -
SECURITY PERSON WHO SHOT IN HEBRON ARRESTED;
SCHOOL IN EAST JERUSALEM CLOSED AS A RESULT OF STUDENT RIOTS
SMALL BOMB BLEW UP IN HOLON JUNCTION;

UPRISING AND PARADES IN TERRITORIES MARK SECOND YEAR OF
THE DEATH OF ABU-JIHAD;
SEVERE DISORDERS IN STRIP DURING ANNUAL MARKING
OF ABU-JIHAD'S KILLING;
I.D.F. SOLDIERS IN STRIP KILLED ARAB WHO INCITED YOUNGSTERS
TO DISORDER;
SHOOTING TOWARDS BUS ON WAY TO JERUSALEM;
10-YEAR-OLD FROM SHATI REFUGEE CAMP WHO WAS SHOT BY SOLDIERS
DIED OF WOUNDS;
3 KILLED AND 180 WOUNDED IN JEBALIA IN THE 'MOST SEVERE
INCIDENTS IN THE *INTIFADA*';
GRENADE EXPLODED IN HAND OF COMMANDER WHO WANTED TO
THROW IT TOWARDS PROTESTERS IN GAZA.