Israel-Latin American Relations

By

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Middle East
Latin America

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Interaction with Latin America has held varying degrees of importance in Israel's foreign relations. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the patterns of continuity and change in Israel's relations with Latin America over a twenty-five year period, from the creation of the state to the 1973 October war.

The authors provide a factual survey of major developments in Israel-Latin American relations since 1948—and evaluate the attitudes of Latin American decision makers toward Israel. This latter evaluation is accomplished by studying patterns of behavior, grouping nations according to levels of support for Israel, and analyzing the influence of different variables on the policy-making process.

The volume includes a detailed analysis of Latin American voting on Israeli issues in the United Nations General Assembly.

Quite distinctive in subject and perspective. It is timely in its relevance to the Middle East conflict and the recent bid by Latin American leaders for greater influence in Third World politics. I consider it a valuable addition to the literature. John J. Bailey, Georgetown University

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Abbreviations

Interview with Jewish community leader (name witheld): JC
Interview with Latin American diplomat (name witheld): LAD
Interview with Israeli diplomat (name witheld): ID
Boletín Informativo del Congreso Judío Latinoamericano: OJI

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Introduction

Latin American decision makers and the Latin American public have shown and continue to show a persistent interest in Israel and the Middle East conflict. This intense interest in an extracontinental issue may be explained partially by the importance of the conflict in international politics and by its duration. Furthermore, the existence in nearly all Latin American countries of both Jewish and Arab communities makes the continent's attitude to the conflict unique. Latin American interest, therefore, is far greater than that shown by other developing nations.

Interaction with Latin America has held varying degrees of importance in Israel's foreign relations. While, for instance, Latin American influence in the United Nations in the late 1940s was instrumental in legitimizing the Jewish state, the rapid growth of Israel's relations with Asian and African countries, in later years, somewhat overshadowed the importance of interaction with Latin America. The developments of the post-October 1973 period have renewed the importance of interaction with Latin America; Israel now views Latin America as an opening to the Third World, a supporter of Israel's legimitacy, and a continent whose friendship could alleviate Israel's growing isolation.

It is the aim of this study to present a comprehensive analysis of the patterns of continuity and change in Israel's relations with Latin America over a period of twenty-five years, from the creation of the state to the 1973 October war. Our two major objectives are, first, to provide a factual survey of major developments in Israeli-Latin American relations since 1948. Besides being of general interest, such a survey is necessary because hardly any accounts are available, and because the empirical base is a prerequisite of our second concern, namely, to evaluate the attitudes of Latin American decision makers towards Israel, which entails a study of patterns of behavior, the grouping of nations according to levels of support for Israel, and an analysis of the influence of different variables on the policymaking process, both separately and in their interaction.

We have tried (a) to illuminate the general evolution of Israel's relations with Latin America, i.e., the major trends and processes characterizing Israeli-Latin American relations, and the patterns of behavior shown by Latin America vis-a-vis Israel; (b) to specify and discuss the major variables influencing the attitudes of Latin American states towards Israel; (c) to determine the importance of domestic and external factors, relatively and together, in shaping the attitudes of Latin America decision makers towards the Middle East conflict; (d) to assess the position of Latin America in Israel's foreign relations; and (e) to study the reasons for the considerable interest Latin American countries have in the Middle East issue as compared to their interest in other extracontinental matters.

As in most studies of international relations, the present research was hampered by the disadvantage inherent in an ex post facto approach: the variables included could not be manipulated as is the case in experimental research.[1] This weakens the accuracy of inferences made about causal relations between the independent variable (external and internal factors influencing Latin American decision makers on Israel) and the dependent one (level of political support for Israel). An attempt was made to control extraneous variables, which may have an effect on the output, by incorporating them into the research framework. This has increased the number of individual inputs.

The stimulus-response approach was considered to be the most appropriate. As can be seen in the research diagram, the inputs (stimuli) that influence the attitudes of Latin American decision makers are divided into two groups: external and internal variables.

The first of these two includes all major influences emanating from global, subsystem, and individual country levels. As regards the influences exerted by different state actors, or groups of actors, special emphasis is placed on the actions of the Middle Eastern protagonists themselves. Thus the activities of the Arab states in Latin America are dealt with at some length. In the case of Israel, the focus of our study, its foreign policy instruments are discussed in detail, in an attempt to measure the separate impact of each (diplomatic relations, cultural activities, technical and defense cooperation, trade, and propaganda) on the whole.

The variables of the internal setting include all the domestic parameters assumed to have significant influence on decision makers' attitudes toward Israel. Interest groups that act because of ideological motivation, or as a response to action taken by the parties to the Middle Eastern conflict or by their related communities in Latin America, have often influenced the decision-making process. Competing elites are investigated insofar as political parties tend to consider the Middle East issue as one of the international problems about which they must take a stand. Public opinion is also analyzed, but to a lesser extent due to a shortage of information.

Outputs (response) are measured against the expectations of Israeli policymakers. (We rank their foreign policy objectives according to their own evaluations.) Payoffs are measured on two levels: multilateral and bilateral relations.

Multilateral payoffs are gauged primarily at the United Nations, where Latin American voting has always had an influence on the continent's relations with Israel. A comparison is made with the voting patterns of non-Latin American countries on Middle Eastern issues at the United Nations, focusing on all pertinent debates and roll-call votes connected directly with Israel (and divided into periods). A comparison is also made between Latin American voting on Middle East issues and Latin American voting on North-South and East-West issues unrelated to Israel. Also considered in this connection are diverse independent variables (technical assistance, type of regime, relations with the United States, etc.).

Bilateral relations include: recognition of Israel; size, level, and location of diplomatic missions; and statements of support and conclusion of bilateral agreements.

The multiplicity and interaction of the variables make it a nearly impossible task to rank precisely their degree of influence at the macro level (18 inputs[2] times 20 countries over a 25-year period). It was therefore felt that arriving at generalizations on the basis of nonquantitative observation and interpretation would prove acceptable.

Another obstacle is that the decision-making process itself — that is, the sequence of events occurring between the input and output phases — is not elaborated in this project. It was strongly felt that this would be valuable only if we were to deal with single decisions made in individual countries. The focus of our study, however, is the macro level.[3] Furthermore, the input variables have to be understood only as they are perceived by Latin American decision makers. It is therefore of extreme importance to understand the belief system of these elites. Sentiments, predispositions, and ideology all screen the "objective reality." It was our intention to identify the decision-making elites and discuss their attitudinal prisms and subjective perceptions of external and internal inputs. However, a severe lack of information made generalizations hazardous. The scarcity of data about decision makers is also due to the fact that many decisions concerning Israel are converted in time into standard operating procedure, and it is consequently difficult to pinpoint the exact time at which these decisions were made by political leaders. The exception is crisis situations during which statements are made. Such situations, however, are not always indicative of general attitudes.

During the three years of research much data was gathered, but perhaps they do not cover the various topics evenly. We compensated for the difficulty of access to classified Foreign Ministry material by interviewing all available senior Israeli diplomats who had served in Latin America

since 1948. Documentation from the pre-1949 period was made available by the Central Zionist Archives, and selected documents were provided by many of the officials interviewed. In Israel, numerous officials from government ministries and public and private agencies, as well as experts who had served in technical assistance programs were also interviewed. Latin American ambassadors who had served in Israel during 1971-74, Latin American leaders of political parties, former presidents and ministers, congressmen, trade-union activists, trainees that had attended courses in Israel, leaders of numerous Jewish communities, and journalists, provided us with valuable data and insight. A large amount of unclassified material was used: press cuttings from Israeli newspapers covering the twenty-five-year period, Israeli government publications, proceedings of the Knesset (Parliament), and reports from various agencies. Similarly, press clippings covering various periods in the majority of Latin American countries (including all the major ones) were utilized, as well as books and various publications from the continent. The records, bulletins, and internal material of Jewish organizations, such as the Latin American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai Brith, were highly valuable source material. Primary sources were all the more important given the scarcity of secondary sources, even when dealing with specific aspects of relations between individual Latin American nations and Israel. Except for personal accounts, which we considered a primary source, there were remarkably few systematic studies on the subject. Books on Israel's overall foreign policy paid little or no attention to Latin America, a trait also characteristic of memoirs written by leading Israeli diplomats.

Several research techniques were used in the preparation of this study. Interviews with Israeli and Latin American decision makers served both as a source of information and evaluation. The findings of available public opinion polls were incorporated. Frequency counts of images appearing in Latin American newspapers were conducted. For the analysis of UN roll calls a compact scale was adopted for bloc as well as for total UN membership computations. Mean scores, median lines, and deviations were calculated to compare the voting behavior of Latin American nations.

The twenty Latin American republics are examined as a group. This is justified, we feel, for many reasons. Firstly, Latin America is bound together by common attributes.[4] It is a complex of developed and developing nations in which European and autochthonous Indian cultures are interacting, rapid urbanization is taking place, and nations are stuggling to fully realize the independence won in the early nineteenth century.

Second, Latin America constitutes a relatively cohesive international subsystem. Latin American republics display a historical uniformity far

greater than that displayed by other subsystems in the world. Spanish-Portuguese colonialism left common traditions and ethics, a common religion, and two languages. There are common social structures and economic problems. And the interaction of Latin American countries and "the rest of the world" is governed primarily by a common, geopolitical factor: the region's presence on the periphery of a world superpower. As one observer has stated: "The countries of Latin America are now, and have always been, client states, members of a sub-hierarchial structure within the overall international hierarchy."[5]

Third, Latin America has been recognized as an integral region by the international community. Latin American nations operate regularly as a coordinated bloc at the United Nations. The Latin American countries themselves consider that they are part of a supranational framework. Contradictory concepts such as "Latin American nationalism" and "pan-nationalism"[6] are further evidence that there is regional cohesion.

Fourth, on a practical level, major Israeli agencies (the Foreign Ministry and organizations such as the Histadrut) have subdivisions organized so as to deal with Latin America as a whole.

In this study, Cuba is considered a separate variable. We have adopted the concept which in Spiegel and Cantori's terms would characterize Cuba as a "peripheral"[7] state, i.e., an actor which interacts with another subsystem (in this case the Communist bloc) and not with its former geographically contiguous subsystem (Latin America). It should be remembered, however, that until the rise of Castro, Cuba was an integral and "typical" member of the Latin American subsystem.

Similar criteria led us to exclude the English-speaking, newly independent states of the Caribbean, except for the sections dealing with UN voting. Still very much peripheral to the Latin American subsystem, they were colonial dependencies during most of the period under study. Different characteristics (religious, ethnic, lack of Jewish and Arab communities, etc.) and their relatively small size and marginal impact on the Latin American bloc are additional reasons for not including them in our framework.

Let us conclude by emphasizing that different foci of Latin American-Middle East relations will produce different orders of research priorities. In this inquiry the interaction of Latin American countries with Israel and not with the Arab countries is of primary interest. As regards Latin American-Israeli relations, our aim was primarily to uncover explanatory attributes for the behavior of Latin American countries toward Israel rather than for Israeli behavior toward Latin America.

Research Design



NOTES

1. Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1972), pp. 359-75.
2. See Research Design chart.
3. In the future we plan to undertake an analysis of specific decisions made by states. In this way the psychological environment can be fully explored. Such decisions include: declaring an Israeli or Arab diplomat persona non grata; severing or establishing diplomatic relations with Israel; shifting an embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem; setbacks in technical assistance projects; and voting at the United Nations on issues like partition (1947), and those resolutions following the 1967 war. The selection of countries and decisions for the proposed analysis was based on the criterion of maximization of experimental variance (i.e., different types of regimes, small/large Jewish and Arab communities, small/large technical asistance programs, different power levels of the countries under consideration, different degrees of foreign policy alignment with the United States, etc.).
4. Edward Williams, "Comparative Political Development: Latin America and Afro-Asia," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 342-53.
5. Norman A. Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics* (New York: Walker, 1967), p. 16.
6. See Felipe Herrera, *Nacionalismo latinoamericano* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1967); and Víctor Alba, *The Latin American*, (New York: Praeger, 1969).
7. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 151-72.

ISRAEL-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

1

External Setting

GLOBAL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM

Changes in the international system have affected Latin America's outlook on world events, and thus its Middle East policies as well. Israel's policies have similarly been affected by these changes in the global system, as illustrated by Brecher's study of Israel's foreign policy.[1] We will examine these changes and consider their effects on Latin American-Israeli relations and on the subsystem itself.

The period from 1945 to 1948 was one of transition. The Allied coalition, which had defeated the Axis, persisted. Major Allied powers gained new areas of influence. Bipolarity and bloc conflict had not yet fully crystallized. In the Middle East Great Britain was still a quasisuperpower.

From 1948 till 1956, there existed a tight bipolar system, namely, one "in which non-bloc member actors and universal actors either disappear entirely or cease to be significant."[2] This was a very unstable system, in which high tensions between the superpowers often resulted in crises; this cold war atmosphere was accentuated by the escalation of nuclear power in the Soviet Union and the United States. The bloc system was reinforced by alliances in the military (NATO, Warsaw Pact), economic (ECSC), and political (Council of Europe, Coniform) spheres. Towards the end of the period a new subsystem appeared; at the Bandung Conference of 1955, Afro-Asian states formulated what was to be known as "nonalignment."

From 1956 to 1962, the global system changed into what Kaplan has described as the loose bipolar system.[3] Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, with China adopting an independent and antagonistic role. Within the

Western bloc, De Gaulle's France also pushed for autonomy, and in 1960 became the fourth nuclear power, following the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom (China detonated its first nuclear bomb only in 1964). The danger of nuclear destruction was epitomized by the Cuban crisis of October 1962. This fear also accelerated the superpowers' steps toward "peaceful coexistence" — which had been emphasized in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. In 1962, the superpowers hastened to reassess their military and political relations, and to embark upon the road to peaceful coexistence, a trend which has continued up to the present. Also evident in the sixties was the beginning of the developed states' interest in the new nations, when the latter — acting through the Afro-Asian bloc and the nonaligned — began to participate more actively in international affairs.

From 1962 until the present,[4] the superpowers' nuclear strength has divided the world into military bipolarity and yet, at the same time, has indirectly encouraged political multipolarity. For, since nuclear deterrence is the main strategy of the two superpowers, other powers are able to compete internationally in the political, and even military spheres — providing that military involvement is on the level of conventional armament. Thus most parts of Africa and Asia have become an area of unrestricted competition for the powers.

This is not the case, however, in Eastern Europe and Latin America, each an area adjacent to a superpower. For while in other areas of the world the general foreign policy aim of each superpower is to prevent its rival from achieving a favorable position, the United States seeks control in Latin America as does the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.[5]

The superpowers' interests in their neighboring territories are many. Ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century those interests have been a constant determining factor in their foreign policies. And despite the relative diminution of the strategic value of territory due to the range of nuclear missiles, control of adjacent areas nevertheless continues to be one of the basic principles of superpower policy. Each of the superpowers demanded the support of its satellites in international affairs.

Over the last few years, however, détente between the superpowers has enabled the Soviet Union to become more economically involved in Latin America, and the United States likewise in Eastern Europe. The positions of the two regions are not, however, exactly symmetrical. Individual Latin American nations have adopted an independent political stand in the international arena, and Latin America collectively has done so too, taking an autonomous and critical role vis-à-vis the United States. Such an independent attitude is far less frequent in Eastern Europe, and any steps in that direction in the future would depend upon a liberalization of the Soviet system. Let us consider, then, how these changes in the global

system have affected Latin America's relations with Israel. It will be necessary of course to consider these changes in relation to the issues which were of central importance in Israel and Latin America.

During the period of transition, from 1945 to 1948, the important issue was the Jewish struggle for independence against the British. The anticolonialist character of the struggle won the sympathy of many Latin American countries, for the struggle was identified with Latin American battles for independence. A concomitant factor was the feeling of solidarity with a people which has suffered at the hands of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the relationship of Latin America to Israel was dictated to a large extent by sentiment; Latin American countries had no economic or political ties with, nor any direct interest in the Middle East. The issue also provided Latin America with an extracontinental matter in which it could play a prominent role; and Latin American strength (35 percent of the United Nation's membership) was an important factor in securing recognition of Jewish aspirations to independence.[6] The first countries to become ardent supporters of Zionism were the more liberal and democratic regimes on the continent. Of the three Latin American delegates on UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), Guatemala and Uruguay's delegates not only supported the partition plan, but it was also their strategy that brought about the passing of the plan. Some conservative and authoritarian countries were more reticent in their support for a Jewish state, possibly because of the progressive character of the Zionist National Liberation Movement confronting traditional Arab regimes.

In 1948, at the beginning of the period of the tight bipolar system, both the Soviet Union and the United States supported the creation of a state of Israel. This showed Latin America that Israel was not a problem of the cold war (East/West) but continued to be an anticolonialist issue (North/South). And when in 1949 the issue at stake was the acceptance of Israel as a member of the United Nations, Latin America countries adhered to the organization's principle of universality and Israel's admission was supported by eighteen states (with two abstentions). However, on issues related to Jerusalem and the Arab refugees, Latin American positions were less favorable; this was due to the influence of other political forces and traditions.

During the initial period of the United Nations the inter-American framework had been strengthened,[7] and in 1948 the Organization of American States had been formed. Also, all twenty Latin American countries were members of the United Nations, and there were two Latin American representatives on the Security Council (only fifteen Latin American states joined the League of Nations). Cold war tensions and the potential threat of the Soviet Union caused Latin American regimes to

align with the West and adopt a strong anti-Communist line. At the same time the post-Stalin Soviet leaders began assisting the Arab regimes, and Israel identified more closely with the West.

Latin America's alignment with the West, and therefore with Israel, did not prevent Latin American condemnation of France, Britain, and Israel in the 1956 crisis, at the beginning of the period of the loose bipolar system. It should be remembered that this condemnation was demanded by both the Soviet Union and the United States — perhaps the first attempt at peaceful coexistence. The growing presence in the international scene of developing nations which adopted radical stands and were often supported by the Soviet Union, influenced Latin America to identify the South position (held by Egypt in 1956) with the East.[8] The Middle East conflict was increasingly regarded as a cold war confrontation and Latin America bolstered its support of Israel. By the beginning of the sixties, Latin America joined a group of moderate African states in launching UN proposals that called for direct Israeli-Arab negotiations, a trend supported by Israel. Latin America's voting power in the United Nations, however, was decreasing due to the rapid joining of new members.

During the 1967 war, too, Latin America's stand was more pro-Israel than that of any other bloc. All the Latin American countries, except Cuba, sponsored a resolution which made Israel's withdrawal conditional on the cessation of belligerence. By the end of the sixties Israel's continued presence in the occupied territories reduced much Latin American support. And over the last years there has been a slow but steady rapprochement between Latin American countries and Afro-Asian "nonaligned" states. For many different reasons, the Afro-Asians identify with the Arab cause, and their stance has influenced several Latin American nations to adopt either a neutral or negative position vis-à-vis Israel. There has also been a weakening of support for Israel in other subsystems and this too has influenced Latin America; it was easier for Latin America to support Israel while Western Europe and the rest of the international community did so too.

By the time of the Yom Kippur war Latin American attitudes also reflected changes that had taken place within the regional subsystem itself. From the beginning of the seventies, Latin America has been split. While some Latin American countries followed the so-called Havana-Lima Axis, others rallied around the Washington-Brazilia line. A third group of countries took an in-between position. Internal tensions severely debilitated the OAS at the beginning of 1973, jeopardizing U.S. hegemony. However, later developments, such as the overthrow of Allende, Argentina's move to the Right, and the military coup in Uruguay, shifted the balance back to the pro-U.S. states. Nevertheless, a feeling of independence has been engendered in Latin America, and there is open

dissent from Washington's line on matters to do with OAS structure, territorial waters, agricultural export subsidies, etc.

The strengthening of the superpowers' détente policy has resulted in the United States attributing a rather low priority to Latin America; Latin American countries thus feel freer to play a larger role in the international affairs, the Middle East conflict included. Added to this, is the growing political multipolarity in Latin America, which has resulted in Latin American interest in other subsystems for the furthering of political and economic aims. The influence of such considerations is manifested in the generally pro-Arab stand adopted by the leftist Havana-Lima group.

THE UNITED STATES

Much discussion has been devoted to the amount of influence exercised by the United States on Latin American governments with regard to Israel. Edward B. Glick tackles this issue with particular reference to some of the resolutions with which the United Nations dealt between 1947 and 1952. He contends that "there are as many different opinions on the subject as there are people writing about it," and that conclusions are usually determined by each writer's personal biases. Nevertheless, Glick quotes an experienced Latin American delegate to the United Nations who, at the second session of the Palestine partition deliberations, did not support partition. The delegate insisted that the United States "did not use very much pressure, if any at all. There was only a presentation of U.S. views. Even this was not very strong." Glick also reproduced a statement, made by a member of the U.S. mission, which denies the use of threats, intimidation, or pressure tactics in order to secure votes for partition.[9] And he quotes Thomas J. Hamilton, chief of the UN bureau of the *New York Times:* "It is an undisputed fact that the United States exerted its influence to the utmost to obtain acceptance of its proposals for the establishment of a Balkan Commission and the 'Little Assembly.' No such comparable influence was exerted on behalf of the partition plan."[10] Glick concludes: "Even if pressure was employed by the United States, there is no proof that it was effective." He cites examples of small, economically dependent Latin American countries which voted against partition (Cuba), or abstained (Honduras and El Salvador).

On several occasions some delegates, although representatives of small countries, were at odds with the United States on crucial issues related to the partition plan. These issues involved questions as important as Jewish independence in part of Palestine, and the inclusion of the Jewish parts of Jerusalem in the proposed state. Glick points out that García Granados, Guatemala's delegate, actively tried to prevent the adoption of a Palestine

trusteeship plan that would replace the partition plan, and that Uruguay's Rodríguez Fabregat was a staunch advocate of Jewish sovereignty over the Jewish part of Jerusalem. [11] These positions were definitely not congruent with the United States ones at that stage of deliberations.

Subsequent issues of importance (to Israel, if not the United States) strengthen the earlier observations that the United States — the hemispheric paramount — has not exerted pressure on Latin American countries. One such issue concerns the location of diplomatic missions. Israel considers Jerusalem its capital, and the location of a mission in Tel-Aviv implies a reluctance to acknowledge this. The U.S. Embassy is still in Tel-Aviv, but most U.S. "clients" in Latin America have moved their embassies to Jerusalem. Significantly, the countries which have kept their missions in Tel-Aviv are the larger and more independent ones: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba (until the 1973 break of diplomatic relations), and Peru.

On the other hand an instance of U.S.-prompted pro-Israeli action occurred during the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, convened in the wake of the 1967 war. Eighteen Latin American nations supported a draft resolution that received 57 votes in favor, 43 votes in opposition, and 20 abstentions. It thus fell short of the two-thirds majority required for passage. The draft resolution was, however, more favorable to Israel than the counter, pro-Arab draft resolution, initiated by Yugoslavia.

Most significant was the composition of the working group that shaped the Latin American draft. It included Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Trinidad-Tobago whose delegate, P.V.J. Solomon, was chairman of the Latin American bloc. Participation of the three major Latin American nations strongly indicates U.S. encouragement; direct involvement in an issue concerning the Middle East conflict has never been characteristic of any of the three nations, particularly not of Mexico. Admittedly, Argentina and Brazil were members of the UN Security Council during the 1967 deliberations. But the "big three," compared to more pro-Israeli Latin American nations, have traditionally been reserved. Their activism would appear to have been the result of Washington's urging.[12]

Washington's interest in exerting pressure is explained by the nature of the June 1967 conflict and its aftermath. This was a dispute wherein the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves diametrically opposed, their respective Middle Eastern clients involved in bitter warfare. Latin American support for the United States and Israel during the emergency session triggered a fierce reaction from the Soviet ambassador to the United States. Louis B. Fleming of the *Los Angeles Times* reported: "At the end of the emergency assembly last summer, there was a bitter break between the Soviet Union and the Latins. Gromyko, in an angry

speech of frustration after the failure of all the Soviet initiatives, said the Latins had been the victims of rude pressure and coercion by the United States. These charges brought a remarkably strong rejoinder from Dr. P.V.J. Solomon, ambassador from Trinidad-Tobago."[13]

These few examples indicate that while U.S. pressure was exerted in a case of extreme importance, there was generally little or no pressure, and that on the question of Israel, Latin America has been fairly independent of its traditional paramount. That until 1968 the voting scores of several Latin American countries on Israeli issues were similar to those of the United States suggests general acceptance of the U.S. voting pattern rather than a submission to specific pressures.

We would also like to comment on the influence of the United States on Israel's relations with Latin America — a subject to which little, if any, attention has been paid by commentators — because it would appear that U.S. policy on Latin America has had an impact on Israel's interaction with the region.

An example of this is the pattern of Israel's relations with Castro's Cuba. Ever since the United States banned economic relations with Cuba, commercial transactions between Israel and that country (primarily the sale of Israeli goods to Cuba) have been carried out with no publicity. But on at least one occasion this issue was brought into the open: a manufacturer of aluminum irrigation pipes accused Israel's Foreign Ministry of frustrating a $2 million export deal.[14] This episode had repercussions in the Knesset, where seven members tabled questions to which Foreign Minister Eban had to reply. In his question, Communist Knesset member Emil Habibi quoted Foreign Ministry sources which claimed that "U.S. policy towards trade with Cuba influences the policies of neutral countries and Israel cannot ignore this; a country that trades with Cuba or North Vietnam is not eligible for U.S. assistance."[15]

A second example, of much greater significance, that shows the convergence of the United States Latin American policy and Israel's relations with Latin America, is the interaction of Israel with the OAS. When a report appeared in the *New York Times* of an Israeli-OAS joint scholarship program for the training of Latin Americans in Israel, it also contained a specific reference to President Kennedy's claim that the new project would be a "counter attraction" to the Cuban plan for rapid development in Latin America.[16] We note that shortly afterwards a Peace Corps conference held in Puerto Rico was attended by Golda Meir (then foreign minister) and other ministry officials.[17] On the whole, it is noteworthy that Israel's assistance activism in Latin America followed the launching of the Alliance for Progress — President Kennedy's new policy for Latin America.

Israel has found the OAS a convenient multilateral framework in which

to develop technical cooperation programs. It would be difficult to find a regional organization as hospitable to Israel as is the OAS, with which close and fertile cooperation had been developed since the early sixties. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been most cooperative in providing financial assistance for such programs. A partial explanation of this hospitality and cooperation lies in the political structure of the OAS. Although tensions and demands for structural changes constantly plague the organization, it is nevertheless a regional grouping with hierarchical structure; of the member states, one is a superpower while the rest are relatively weak nations which are, to varying degrees, client states of the superpower. Israel maintains good relations with both the superpower and the clients. The one country that is clearly a nonclient of the United States, manifesting increasing hostility towards Israel, has been deprived, until now, of effective participation in inter-American affairs by the hemispheric paramount — although obviously for reasons unrelated to Israel's interests.

The cooperation that developed between Israel and the OAS has been significant, not only in terms of Israel's size, but also in terms of the OAS's relations with other countries. Other non-American nations besides Israel were encouraged to join the OAS's Extra-Continental Training Program in 1962 and yet, according to the OAS, Israel's contribution surpassed that of all the European countries that participated. In 1963-64 nearly half of the program's trainees went to Israel.[18] Israel's pledge of $72,000 in training services to the OAS Special Fund for Development Assistance, was the first such pledge to be made by a nonmember.[19] Similarly, Israel was one of the two non-American countries to subscribe to a short-term bond issue of the IDB in 1966.[20] In March 1974, another development took place in the special relations between Israel and the OAS-IDB, an Israeli ministerial committee for economic affairs approved Israel's associate membership of the IDB — a position reserved for only thirteen other nonmember nations.[21]

Israel's prominent place among extracontinental countries (primarily European OECD members) has been publicly acknowledged by the secretary-general of the OAS; he stressed that Israel has been involved since the days of the Alliance for Progress.[22] High-ranking officials of the OAS, including Secretary-General José A. Mora and the president of the IDB Felipe Herrera, have visited Israel (in October 1966 and July 1969 respectively). Israel's ties with the OAS are believed by some observers to have also strengthened Israeli-U.S. relations.[23]

CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Although Cuba and Soviet Union, the two Socialist-Marxist nations

most active in Latin America, have sided with the Arabs in the Middle East conflict, they have held significantly different positions. And even the local allies of the Soviet Union, the various Latin American Communist parties, evidence different shades of opinion.

The history of Cuban-Israeli relations is dotted with many peculiar episodes and contradictions. For instance, Raúl Castro rushed to see Egyptian president Nasser early in 1960,[24] and yet Israeli visitors to Cuba during the first years of Castro's regime could still report of the existence of warm relations and sympathetic coverage of Israeli issues in the government-controlled press.[25] And when Israeli president I. Ben-Zvi died, a three-day period of national mourning was declared in Cuba (an honor reserved to friendly states). This reportedly provoked Ben-Bella into cancelling Castro's proposed state visit to Algeria.[26]

But Cuban sympathy for Israel deteriorated as a result of profound policy changes in Cuba, which were themselves the result of a combination of factors. Some of these factors may be summed up as follows: Castro gradually evolved an ideology which was more Marxist-Leninist than it had been before, and his ties with the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp consequently strengthened. Cuba gradually became the champion of the world's national liberation movements; Cuba's ties with Third World nations strengthened. After 1968 relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union grew even stronger, and Cuba tended to coordinate with Soviet foreign policy. Finally, Cuba came under Arab pressure, and also wished to exploit the political and possibly the economic benefits that might accrue from impoved Cuban-Arab relations.

Cuba, in its attempt to be a leader in the world "revolutionary camp" and among radical leftist forces, has initiated and hosted several international conferences which have often been the venue for verbal attacks on Israel. Usually, however, such attacks were subsequently explained. And Cuba, despite Soviet pressures, did not sever diplomatic relations with Israel until the nonaligned conference of Algiers in 1973.

The Tri-Continental Conference of Solidarity of Peoples, attended by delegates from African, Asian, and Latin American liberation movements in Havana (January 3-12, 1966), signaled the anti-Israeli stand of Latin America's radical Left. Spurred by Arab delegations, the conference adopted an extreme anti-Israeli resolution. This resolution condemned the Zionist movement and the existence of Israel "in occupied territory"; considered Zionism "an Imperialist movement by nature," whose methods are "racist and fascist"; advocated combatting Zionist infiltration and penetration; and called for the cancellation of all treaties with Israel, immediate breaking-off of all political relations, the total economic and cultural ostracism of Israel, and the expulsion of Israel from all international organizations. Furthermore, it expressed full support for the

Palestine Liberation Organization in its "war of liberation."[27] Significantly, some delegations did not subscribe to these extreme formulae, and either abstained or were absent from the session. Among these were the delegations of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, high Cuban officials made it clear to Shlomo Levav, Israel's diplomatic representative in Cuba, that the Cuban government did not consider itself responsible for resolutions adopted at the Tri-Continental Conference and was not committed to them. They stressed that the conference's participants were representatives of political parties and organizations, not governments.[28] In Cuban publications containing the text of the Tri-Continental Conference, the resolution adopted against Zionism and the State of Israel was systematically omitted.[29]

The Organization of Latin American Solidarity Conference (OLAS), held in Havana in August 1967, was another occasion on which the Arab-Israeli conflict came to the fore. Here again, Cuba's independent posture within the Communist camp was made clear in a speech by Fidel Castro, at the conference closure. Castro began by condemning "Israeli aggression" and United States imperialism:

> A state such as Israel, at the service of the imperialist aggressors, gets hold of a great part of the territory of other countries, establishes itself there at the very margin of the Suez Canal and is already claiming the right to participate in the control of that Canal — so all that's lacking now is for them to ask that a pipeline be installed from the Aswan Dam to irrigate the Sinai Peninsula; they are there and nobody knows how long they'll stay . . . that is the order imperialism wants to establish.[30]

But in the same speech, he replied to the attack levelled at Cuba — mainly by pro-Moscow Latin American Communist parties — for its refusal to sever diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six-Day war, as did all other Communist countries except Rumania. He said:

> And it is worthwhile to speak about commercial relations, for some of the mafia — those who attack our revolution in such a slanderous and base fashion, without any serious and powerful argument — have spoken of our not breaking off diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. Neither did our country break off relations with Albania when a great number of countries from the socialist camp did.[31]

Castro also told K. S. Karol, correspondent for the British *New Statesman* and the French *Le Nouvel Observateur*, that Cuba condemned Israel unequivocally but did not question Israel's right to exist. He said:

> We have not broken off our diplomatic relations with Israel, and certain comrades asked us about it . . . during the OLAS Conference. We have responded to them that the socialist countries never upheld the principle of breaking relations with those who commit aggression. Had that been the case, they would have broken relations a long time ago with the American aggressor in Vietnam.[32]

Castro, according to Karol, was also critical of the conduct of Arab countries before and after the 1967 war. Referring to Arab propaganda on the eve of the war, Castro stated that true revolutionaries would never threaten a whole country with extermination. He also claimed that the United States was the "real instigator" of the war, and added that for Cuba the lesson of the Middle East crisis was clear: nobody can save a country if that country is unable to save itself.[33]

In January 1968, during yet another conference — the International Cultural Congress of Havana — Arab delegates threatened congress unity by insisting on a joint condemnation of American and Zionist imperialism. Non-Arab delegates did not entirely agree with the strong anti-Israeli resolution, and the Cubans had to mobilize Vietnamese and North Korean delegates to calm tempers and remove the Middle East topic from the agenda.[34]

Castro's stand on the Middle East conflict and his ideological allegiances have not altered his benevolent attitude towards what is left of Cuba's Jewish community. This community, concentrated in Havana, maintains several functioning synagogues and communal facilities where regular gatherings and other events are held. A Zionist Society and a Jewish Club are allowed to operate. A small Jewish school in which Hebrew, Yiddish, and Jewish history are taught, is government supported. Special efforts have also been made to provide "ethnic" food for Jewish holidays, despite austerity conditions in Cuba. Another gesture of goodwill is the "repatriated" classification given to Jews leaving for Israel; this is a respectable term not granted to most other emigrants.[35]

Nevertheless, Cuban mass media have systematically presented a definite pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian view. Middle Eastern news published in the major daily *Granma* comes from Arab sources. The verbal support given to the Arabs in the pre-1973 period was reflected in the frequent coverage of pro-Arab announcements, often made in the form of joint communiqués issued after visits by Arab delegates to Cuba and vice versa.[36] An anti-Israeli clause would occasionally be introduced into joint declarations which concluded visits of Fidel Castro to countries having no direct interest in the Middle East conflict.[37] Editorials, very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, were printed.[38] Cuba also became a "lobbyist" on behalf of "radical" Arab regimes, parleying with delegations of "progressive" Latin American nations at the United Nations when such support was called for.[39]

Long before the Cubans decided to side openly with the Arabs, they provided moral, propagandistic, and possibly other kinds of support to militant Palestinian organizations. This support was undoubtedly the result of Cuban ideology. The Cubans became ideologically committed to the Palestinians because the latter were part of the world "guerrilla fraternity." (This was so once Cuba had decided to accept the Palestinians' claim that they were guerrillas.)[40] However, the legitimization of terrorist organizations as national liberation movements did not only mean that the Cubans were taking a stand in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it also meant that they identified with the "progressive" Arabs against the "reactionary" Arabs.[41] The official Cuban press has long considered what it calls the "Palestinian Revolution" to be part of the national liberation movement in the Middle East.[42]

Evidence is very meager in regard to nonverbal Cuban support for the Palestinian organizations. One source reports that an Al Fatah delegation visited Havana in July 1970, that Cubans have been involved in training Palestinian guerrillas, and that Cubans have been involved in combat operations.[43] The first and only postrevolutionary Cuban minister in Israel was Ricardo Subirana y Lobo, a Jew and veteran Zionist who had provided aid to Fidel Castro during the difficult days of the anti-Batista struggle; Fidel reciprocated by making his friend the head of the Cuban legation in Israel.[44]

Diplomatic relations, on legation level, continued until September 1973. There was a mutual understanding that a low profile would be maintained, and agricultural experts from the Israeli kibbutz movement and Israeli scientific personnel visited Cuba unofficially. Castro, through Subirana y Lobo, was kept well informed about scientific developments in Israel. When a new idea was considered applicable to Cuban development needs, Castro did not hesitate to invite Israeli experts to familiarize Cuban personnel with it. D. Goldberg of the Hebrew University's Faculty of Agriculture at Rehovot, was invited to instruct Cubans on new irrigation techniques as well as on other agricultural matters. Israeli experts also helped Cubans improve their inland lake fisheries by introducing a new species of carp to the island.[45]

Then, while attending the fourth summit conference of nonaligned nations in Algiers, Castro suddenly announced his decision to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Not only Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem were caught by surprise;[46] the Cuban minister in Israel also expressed astonishment.[47]Israeli observers explained the unprecedented move in Castroite diplomacy as a spontaneous attempt to placate the Arabs, particularly Libya's Kadaffi, who had been denying that Castro could legitimately attend a "nonaligned" conference.[48] The official Cuban rationale, as explained by the government organ *Granma,* was that such an

act was in unison with Cuba's condemnation of Israel's "imperialistic aggression" and refusal to evacuate occupied Arab lands. The move, said *Granma,* was in response to the demands and sentiments of the nations represented at the Algiers conference.[49]

It might be suggested that, discounting whatever personal sympathies and precedents existed in Castro's diplomacy, the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel proved a valuable asset. It enabled Castro to demonstrate his autonomous position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, while it did not strain the good relations he maintained with "progressive" Arab regimes. Once, however, Castro became increasingly docile and conformist in his relations with the Kremlin — a tendency that gathered momentum after 1968 — the importance of maintaining relations with Israel was greatly reduced.

After October 1973 it also became apparent that Cubans were ready to lend more than verbal support to the Arab and Palestinian causes. Prior to October 1973, references to actual Cuban involvement were limited to sporadic reports of Cuban military personnel assisting the Republic of Southern Yemen.[50] But in April of 1974, reports of Cuban military presence in Syria reached the press. Later in the year, the Cuban presence was also reported on the Island of Perim, which controls the entrance to the Red Sea.[51] Cuban military presence in the Middle East signals not only a closer coordination of Castro's policy with that of the Arabs, but — more significantly — a synchronization of the policy of the once "independent" radical Latin American leader with that of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union possesses its own channels utilized for propaganda and political purposes in the Western Hemisphere. There are the local, pro-Moscow Communist parties which, with but few exceptions, follow the general Soviet line on the Middle East (see reference to Communist parties below). Then, Moscow's radio broadcasts occasionally attack Israeli activity in Latin America. A case in point is a commentary by Aleksey Serov which focuses attention on Israel's program of international cooperation with Latin America. Some excerpts from that commentary indicate the types of appeals and sentiments the Soviets use in their propaganda, particularly their allegation that there is collusion between Israel and "Yankee imperialism":

> The training of youth under *Gadna* and *Nahal* schemes is also carried out systematically in Israel itself. In recent years dozens of young Latin Americans . . . have completed courses in which they were taught Zionist and anti-Soviet ideas . . . *Histadrut* finances courses and seminars on problems of labour and the labour movement organized by Israel for trade union officials of countries of the Third World, including Latin American countries. As can be

> imagined, these problems are reduced to an apology for Israel's aggressive policy and defamation of the policy of the socialist countries, and primarily the Soviet Union. For these purposes *Histadrut* receives considerable sums of money from US trade union organizations, through which they get big grants from the CIA. The Israeli leaders are linked with the US Intelligence service through other unofficial channels. For example, for spreading its ideas Tel Aviv tries to use the Zionists who are in the Peace Corps, which is controlled by the CIA.[52]

In the post-1967 period, Jewish-Israeli lobbying and Soviet diplomatic and propaganda machinery contended for prominence in Latin American public opinion, and among the intellectual and cultural elites. The major issue has been the plight of the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union. This issue assumed alarming dimensions for the Soviets because it not only supplied new ammunition for the traditionally rightist and anti-Soviet sectors of the press, but, more seriously, because it also tarnished the Soviet image with prominent civic and cultural associations — such as SECH, Chile's writers' society.[53] Also because of this issue various "organizing committees" have been formed, and have undertaken to activate public opinion so that pressure will be applied in the Soviet Union on this issue.[54]

There has therefore been, in recent years, a rise in Soviet anti-Israeli propaganda effort. Many pamphlets on the subject of the Jewish minority have been distributed on the continent. These are mostly of a defensive nature, reflecting Moscow's uneasiness at public reactions to Soviet policy regarding Soviet Jewry. Typical are: *Soviet Jews: Myths and Reality: Testimonies of Those Deceived* (letters and declarations of, as well as interviews with "disappointed" Soviet Jews who emigrated to Israel); *We Cannot Remain Silent* (progovernment declarations obtained from Soviet rabbis); and *The Life of Soviet Jewry.*[55]

Other propaganda publications are more aggressive, attacking Israel and Zionism. Such a pamphlet is: *Anticommunism: The Occupation of the Zionists,* which includes sections devoted to "fascists in blue shirts" — Deir Yassin and Meir Kahane.[56] A much larger publication, purporting to be "scientific," and with numerous footnotes, is Yuri Ivanov's "study": *Attention! Zionism.*[57]

To improve its public relations in Latin America, the Soviet Union has also mobilized the pro-Moscow Communist parties (CP) and their press. Thus publications like Colombia's CP weekly *Voz Proletaria,* Costa Rica's *Libertad,* Uruguay's *El Popular,* and others, ford off attacks on the Soviet Union. Articles exhibiting Jewish life in the Soviet Birobidjhan and the religious and cultural freedoms enjoyed by Soviet Jews are published.

References to Jews holding high positions in the Soviet government are made, and attacks are launched against "Zionists who incite antisemitism."

NONALIGNED

Since the mid-fifties political support for the Arab states has been growing steadily among nonaligned and Afro-Asian organizations. Their attitude has probably influenced some Latin American countries, for these countries have taken to practicing a similar foreign policy, which includes voting against Israel.

"Nonalignment" or "third position" in foreign policy has not been practiced by many Latin American countries. The most notable attempts at such a foreign policy were the "first round" of Peronist administrations in Argentina, during 1946-55. There was also a short-lived experiment with neutralism in Brazil under the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart administrations (1961-64). To some extent Guatemala also practiced neutralism under Jacobo Arbenz in 1951-54.

With the "new wave" of Latin American regimes trying to develop foreign policies more independent of the United States than before, this concept now has important implications for Latin America and therefore for Latin American-Israeli relations. The movement has gained new momentum with the rise of radical-nationalist military regimes such as those of Peru and Panama in the late 1960s, with the ascendance of Allende's Socialist-Marxist administration in 1970, and with the 1973 comeback of an old champion of nonalignment: Juan Domingo Perón of Argentina.[58]

The impact of "neutralism" in Latin America's relations with Israel is therefore felt much more now than in previous years and is working noticeably to Israel's detriment, at least on the multilateral level. This is so because many elements combined in the 1960s to provide Arab action and influence with new leverage in the region: changes in the international system; the expansion and crystallization of groups with overlapping memberships like the "nonaligned" and "the 77"; growing Arab presence among such groups; radicalization of at least some of the Arab regimes; and certain internal developments in Latin America. The need that some Latin American governments feel to occupy prominent positions within the developing or nonaligned community has required moves toward rapprochement with the Arab countries, which constitute a large part of such groups, whereas Israel is not even a member.

This courting of the Arabs has already resulted in several diplomatic setbacks for Israel. The Arab delegations attending the Second Ministerial Meeting of the "Group of the 77," hosted by Peru from October 25 to

November 6, 1971, obtained approval for an anti-Israeli resolution. The resolution, presented to the meeting whose main concerns were economic, touched on economic matters, but its demands were clearly of a political nature. Entitled "Recommendation Concerning the Economic Consequences of the Closure of the Suez Canal," the resolution stressed the vital importance of that waterway for the development of international trade, and expressed "deep concern" about the economic effects of its closure, especially on developing nations. It included a statement associating the continued closure of the canal with the "occupation of Arab territories by Israel," and it expressed the conviction that "Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories is a requisite for reopening the Suez Canal and for its continued operation under peaceful and normal conditions."

The resolution ended with clauses expressing "firm support" for the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity's efforts to open the Suez Canal in accordance with Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council. It also recommended that the topic (economic effects of the closure of the Suez Canal) be included on the agenda of the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that was to convene in Santiago, Chile, in April-May 1972.[59] Consequently, the Third Session of UNCTAD took up the topic, and on April 13, 1972, the earlier resolution was adopted. Harsher anti-Israeli resolutions were passed in the Foreign Ministers' Conference of the nonaligned, which met in Georgetown, Guyana in August 1972.

These developments were only a prelude. A turning point in the attitude of Latin American nonaligned nations towards Israel came with the UN Security Council debate of June-July 1973. The two Latin American nations then serving on the Security Council were, by coincidence, Peru and Panama — the two "radical" military regimes with strong neutralist and anti-U.S. biases. The two joined six other nonaligned members to propose a draft resolution which censured Israel for its continued occupation of Arab territories, called for an Israeli withdrawal, and demanded that any Middle East solution take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.[60]

This anti-Israeli draft resolution, which threatened to undermine the delicately balanced and older Resolution 242 of the Security Council was vetoed by the United States. Still, the position taken by Peru and Panama alarmed Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[61]

In the post-October 1973 period, another significant development involving the two "radical" military regimes of Peru and Panama was the participation of military units fromt the two countries in the UN forces (UNEF and UNDOF) along the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and Golan, which were in effect until 1975. Some Latin American military personnel,

like Brigadier General Gonzalo Briceño of Peru, have occupied senior positions in these UN forces; Briceño became acting commander of UNDOF — the contingent along the Israeli-Syrian border.[62]

It would appear that for these two countries, participation in the UN forces provided them with another opportunity to play a more active and prestigious role in world affairs. The importance attributed by these two nations to participation in the UN force was clearly demonstrated by the Panamanian example. That country has a relatively small National Guard and yet sent no less than four hundred soldiers to the peacekeeping force. The Panamanian decision to participate was taken by President Omar Torrijos immediately after the 1973 cease-fire, and the vanguard of the Panamanian contingent had arrived by November 20, 1973.[63]

The amount of influence nonaligned nations can exert on Latin American-Israeli relations will be largely determined by the degree of cohesion such a subgroup can achieve in Latin America. Although some observers noted the emergence of a "club" which would include Argentina, Peru, Panama, and Cuba,[64] it is still far-fetched to visualize these nations formulating a joint policy on the Middle East.

Bilateral relations between Israel and the radical military governments continue to be good, and Israel's involvement in technical assistance programs (in Peru in agricultural areas, in Panama in the National Youth Movement) has even grown.[65]

ARAB STATES

Arab states' activity in Latin America in recent years has developed considerably. They have exploited diplomatic, economic, cultural, religious, and propaganda means as well as the use of violent means, and the growing involvement of local Arab communities. In this development, there are three distinguishable stages: first, from the creation of the State of Israel to the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the period is characterized by a limited network of diplomatic missions and only sporadic activities. In the second stage, 1957 till the Six-Day war, greater and more coordinated action is carried out, Nasserism became the main political theme used in propaganda campaigns. From 1967 to the present, Arab activity has been intensified, focusing on the Palestinian question.The oil crisis and the subsequent availability of vast financial resources to the Arabs enabled them to exert greater pressure upon Latin American governments to modify their traditional Middle East policies.

In the closing years of the British Mandate in Palestine, while pro-Zionist organizations were extremely active all over the continent, there was almost no trace of Arab opposition. In 1948, a total of five Arab resident diplomatic missions existed in three Latin American countries: Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Most of the political activity was centered in

Argentina, where the Arab community managed to develop close relations with Peronist leaders, while the Jewish community was identified with the "Democratic Union, " the wall-to-wall coalition, from Conservatives to Communists, which opposed Perón, and among whose ranks support was found for the Hebrew Palestine Committee. Attempts to gain Perón's friendship by the Arabs were symbolized by his being decorated with the Syrian Order of Umaya — the first non-Arab head of state to receive the honor — and the National Order of the Cedar, presented by Lebanese foreign minister Tacla.[66] Following the arrival of the Lebanese minister, Gabriel Tueni, to Buenos Aires in 1947, there was a marked increase in activities among pro-Arab institutions, such as The Syrian-Lebanese Club, Fatherland and Honor, The Central Arab Committee for Aid to Palestine, The Official Delegation of the Arab States Pro-Palestine, The Patriotic Lebanese Association, and the Arab Executive Committee for the Defense of Palestine.[67] These organizations arranged meetings, published leaflets, and collected funds. In September 1947, an official delegation from the Arab states visited Central and South America in order to mobilize support from among local Arab communities. In the same year Mahmoud Asmi Bey, Arab League official, gave a series of lectures in Argentina.

Following the establishment of the State of Israel, Arab propaganda in Latin America was aimed at arguing that Israel was a fictitious state doomed to failure, and also that it persecuted Christians. The Arabs also tried to gain public opinion support in regard to the Arab refugee question, and attacked Zionist and Jewish "imperialism" and "colonialism," especially when addressing the Left.[68]

Between 1947 and 1949, however, most Arab political activity was concentrated in New York, where pressure was brought to bear on Latin-American delegates at the United Nations — with little success, as demonstrated by the Latin American vote on partition. Until the late 1950s, Arab diplomatic activity on the continent was fairly limited, as shown in Table 1.

The data show that not all Arab countries have maintained a network of diplomatic missions in Latin America, and none has been represented in all countries of the continent. The Arab countries chose to establish diplomatic relations only with major Latin American countries, those with a substantial Arab community, and lately, those with a similar international political orientation. Of the Arab countries, Lebanon was the first to be represented in several Latin American nations. Since the 1960s, Egypt has come to play the leading role, being represented in thirteen countries, including all those which have other Arab missions.

Latin American representation in the Arab countries has increased considerably over the years. In 1974 thirteen of the twenty Latin American

countries maintained forty-three permanent diplomatic missions in ten Arab countries. Brazil and Venezuela had the biggest networks with eight missions each, followed by Argentina.

The majority of the Latin American embassies are concentrated in Lebanon and Egypt, which corresponds to the picture in Latin America

Table 1
Resident Arab Diplomatic Missions in Latin America[69]

Year and Country	Represented in:	No. of Latin American Countries with Arab Missions	Total of Arab Missions
1948			
Lebanon	Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (MS)		
Syria	Mexico (CHA)		
Egypt	Brazil (Special CHA)	3	5
1955			
Lebanon	Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (MS)		
Syria	Mexico (CHA)		
Saudi Arabia	Mexico (Special CHA)		
Egypt	Argentina, Brazil	3	7
1959			
Egypt	Argentina		
Jordan	Chile (CHA)		
Lebanon	Argentina (A), Brazil (A), Bolivia (M), Columbia (M), Mexico (M)		
Saudi Arabia	Mexico		
Syria	Argentina	6	9
1965-66			
Algeria	Brazil (A)		
Jordan	Chile (A)		
Iraq	Cuba (M), Venezuela (A)		
Lebanon	Argentina (A), Brazil (A) Bolivia (M), Columbia (M), Uruguay (CHA), Venezuela (A)		
Morocco	Argentina (A), Cuba (CHA)		
Saudi Arabia	Venezuela (A)		
Syria	Brazil, Chile, Venezuela (Dpl. reps.)		
Egypt	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, San Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela (AS), Ecuador (CHA)	13	30

Table 1 (continued)

Year and Country	Represented in:	No. of Latin American Countries with Arab Missions	Total of Arab Missions
1971-72			
Algeria	Argentina, Brazil, Cuba (AS)		
Jordan	Chile (CHA)		
Lebanon	Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Venezuela (AS), Mexico (CHA), Uruguay (CHA)		
Lybia	Venezuela (A)		
Morocco	Argentina, Chile (AS), Cuba (CHA)		
Saudi Arabia	Venezuela, Argentina (AS)		
Syria	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela (AS)		
Egypt	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela (AS), Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia (CHA)	13	33

CHA: Charge d'Affaires, A: Ambassador, AS: Ambassadors, plural, M: Minister, MS: Ministers, plural.

where these two countries are the most active diplomatically. Table 2 indicates a high degree of reciprocity in permanent missions, although Lebanon hosts nearly double the number of missions from Latin American nations than it has on the continent.[70] Table 2 shows that some Latin American countries were still in 1975 without diplomatic representation in the Arab world and a few of the smaller countries of the continent were without any links with the Arab states (Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala). Others remained with unilateral relations with one country only (Bolivia, Haiti, Panama, Costa Rica, and Ecuador). In addition one needs to take into account the presence of the Arab League in Latin America, inaugurated in 1952 when its representative, Issa Nakhle, was accredited as press attaché to the Egyptian Embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1957 he was replaced by Nazim Hakim, holding Syrian diplomatic credentials. Hakim was succeeded by Hussein Triki, who held Algerian credentials. Since 1970, Yussef Al Bandak[71] has served as director of the Arab League Office in Buenos Aires, while other offices were opened in Santiago de Chile and Brazil.

Following the Six-Day war, the Arab League intensified its efforts and activities in Latin America. A note was circulated by this organization to its member countries mentioning as major reasons:

> The similarity of the struggle against the American imperialistic influence to the one carried against world Zionism. The countries of Latin America find themselves in a stage of development and efforts for economic progress, exactly as the Arab countries; in Latin America there exist liberation movements that hold great confidence in the liberation movements of Africa and Asia, and the Arab communities in Latin America are waiting for orientation and guidance from their countries of origin; the proposal of the resolution presented by the Latin American countries at the United Nations with relation to the Middle East crisis brought to the

Table 2
Arab and Latin American Resident Missions

	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Syria	Southern Yemen	Tunisia	United Arab Emirates	Yemen	Sudan
Argentina	A L	A L				A L	A L	A L	A-	A L					
Bolivia		A-													
Brazil	A L	A L	A L			A L	A L	A L	A L	A L					
Chile		A L		A-		A L				A L					
Columbia		A L				A L									
Costa Rica						-L									
Cuba	A L	A L				A L			-L	A-		-L			
Ecuador		A L													
El Salvador		A -													
Guatemala															
Haiti						-L									
Honduras															
Mexico		A L				A L									
Nicaragua															
Panama		A L													
Paraguay															
Peru		A L				-L		-L							
Uruguay		A L				A L									
Venezuela	-L	A L	-L		A L	A L	A L		A L	A L					
Rep. Dominicana															

A : Arab resident missions in Latin American countries

L : Latin American resident missions in Arab countries

attention of the Arab countries the importance of the continent in the world.[72]

For these reasons and in the face of growing technical assistance by Israel to Latin American countries, it was recommended that the Arab countries should contain the Israeli influence by the use of economic and political means and by attending all conferences and congresses on that continent.

The Arab League, as an umbrella organization of countries with differing political leanings, appeals to both right- and left-wing circles. However, in most cases it was relations with the extreme Right and antisemitic groups that was stressed. This happened in the case of Hussein Triki in Argentina, whose scandalous behavior and relations with pro-Nazi circles provoked, in the early 1960s, reactions even from Arab diplomatic circles. Similarly in 1969, it was reported in the São Paulo newspaper *El Anba* that the declaration by three Lebanese deputies visiting Brazil stressing the need for the peaceful uses of funds "in order to improve the fate of the homeless rather than spending it on arms and bullets," invited criticism by the Arab League.[73] In exposing the right-wing tendencies of the Arab League, a leading Mexican newspaper commented that the Arab League will not invest its profits in the Third World because they do not want "their resources to be used for the promotion of socialist regimes. . . .The oil states do not wish that their own monies be used for aiding the elements that could conspire to overthrow them."[74]

Apart from permanent representatives, there are also special visits by Arab personalities and delegations to the continent, though less frequent than the official Israeli visits. The Lebanese and Egyptians seem to be the most active in this respect. Until a few years ago, these visits were sporadic. Today they are part of a planned strategy aimed at gaining anti-Israeli official statements. An example was the successful tour by Lebanese foreign minister Faud Naffah in 1973, and the resultant declarations by the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican governments upholding Palestinian rights.[75] Visits by officials from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, accompanied by the use of economic incentives, were in some cases no less successful. In 1973, Egypt's Hussein Zulfikar Sabri (who speaks fluent Spanish) visited Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru. Nongovernmental Arab organizations, such as the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, also paid visits to related bodies, such as local trade unions, universities, or Arab communities.

On the other hand, until the late 1960s, relatively few Latin Americans were invited to visit Arab countries. Chilean members of Parliament visited Egypt in 1963, and Uruguayan ministers visited Lebanon in 1964 and 1965,[76] but they seldom ended in much more than a statement about

the excellent mutual relations. Since the oil crisis of 1973, visits of an economic nature have become prominent, such as Argentine welfare minister López Rega's visit to Libya and the visits of the ministers of mines and energy of the military regimes of Chile and Peru to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, and other Arab countries.[77] The degree and intensity of the work undertaken by Arab embassies varies. All missions are active over a wide range of social activities. Honors and other rewards are given to individuals and groups who provide special services in assisting the Arab cause.[78]

Propaganda

Arab propaganda is directly controlled by local Arab and non-Arab organizations. Egypt, Lebanon, and the Arab League seem to be the major sources of Arab propaganda in Latin America. Publication of official bulletins and pamphlets from the different missions, such as *La Lucha de Liberación Palestina* issued by the Algerian Embassy in Argentina in 1969 has been irregular. The Arab League offices have been more consistent in their publications. Starting in 1952 with *América y Oriente* in Buenos Aires, changed in 1963 to *Nación Arabe,* and since 1969 entitled *Liga Arabe.* In Brazil, the Arab League published the biweekly *Noticias do Mondo Arabe* and participates — since 1969 — in *Oriente Arabe*, a magazine edited by the Delegation of the League of Arab States. A source of regular publications is the local Arab communities, which will be dealt with later. The missions have also published material attacking Israel and have produced documentation, mostly translations of materials already published in other languages, and only rarely works of Latin American pro-Arab authors, such as G. García's (Bar Association of Lima) interpretation of the legality of the "Resistance" of the Arab Nation of Palestine, published by the Arab League in Rio de Janeiro in 1969. Some of the pamphlets of the Arab League Office in Buenos Aires are translations of virulent anti-Zionist texts originating from the American Council of Judaism, written by authors such as A. Lilienthal, M. Menuhin, and Rabbi E. Berger. Recently, the Arab League financed the publication of Arab books, such as a Portuguese version of *Al Fatah* by Amilcar Al Nekastrah and *Colonialist Zionism in Argentina* by F. Sayegh.[79]

In the local press, growing activity by Arab diplomats has been witnessed in the form of letters to the editor over a pro-Israeli article, or press releases, as well as insertion of full-page advertisments[80] with the usual result of provoking a response from Israeli sources.[81] Publication by the Arab League in Buenos Aires of a full-page advertisment by the Comité Justicialista de Solidaridad con Palestina in *La Razón* (October 20, 1971)

and *Clarin* (October 14, 1971), was promptly answered by a counter-statement by DAIA, the Jewish representative organization of Argentina, in *La Nación* (October 26, 1971). A communiqué by the Arab League representative, Yusef Al-Bandak, followed suit.[82] Interviews with ambassadors and press conferences are occasionally published, as well as reports on visiting delegations and official guests.[83]

In addition to this open activity, there have been reports of attempts to gain control of some local newspapers. Rio de Janeiro's *Tribuna da Imprensa* reported that "the weekly *O'Cruzeiro* received substantial help in the form of capital from a group of Lebanese businessmen, in order to counteract Jewish influence in the Brazilian Press."[84] An Israeli newspaper claimed that for $2 million, Arabs had acquired partial ownership of some newspapers in Brazil.[85] Another Israeli newspaper maintained that Abu Dhabi had bought the influential *Jornal do Brasil* at a cost of $20 million. This allegation was emphatically denied by the editor and publisher of the newspaper.[86]

Cultural-Religious Activities

Arab cultural activities are of lesser significance than those sponsored by Israel. In a few countries Committees of Friendship with Arab countries exist (i.e., Uruguayan-Arab Friendship Committee, or the Brazilian-Lebanese Association), while in others we find cultural institutions such as the Brazilian Association of Arab Studies, or the Arab-Chilean Cultural Institute. In Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, the Arab countries encourage the furthering of Arab studies at universities, particularly of the Arab language.

Roman Catholic religious events are used on some occasions to promote the Arab cause, such as the memorial service held in a Buenos Aires church in 1968 for "those who fell in the struggle of the Palestine Liberation and for the Arab refugees victims of the aggression."[87] The strengthening of the Moslem religion in Latin America has, in recent years, become a policy aim for Arab governments, particularly in order to maintain the links with their own assimilating brothers. King Faisal donated $100,000 for the construction of the first mosque in Buenos Aires, linking to this project the teaching of the Arabic language.[88] In 1969 Sheik Abdalla Abdel Chakour Kamel, on behalf of Egypt, toured the continent and encouraged Arab communities to build schools and mosques.[89]

Economic Instruments

Even in the incipient stages of the Middle East conflict, Arab states have attempted to exploit economic resources in the furtherance of political

goals. During the crucial period of 1947-49 Chilean government sympathies towards Israel cooled, following Egyptian threats to cease buying Chilean minerals.

The Arab anti-Israeli economic boycott was not very effective in Latin America because of the small volume of Latin American-Israeli trade, as well as the balance of payments being generally in favor of Latin American countries. The Arab League Office in Buenos Aires tried, during the mid-1960s, to apply the Arab boycott to Argentine businessmen, but apparently without any significant success. It was only with the appearance of the Arab countries as potential suppliers, investors, buyers, and coproducers with Latin America that economic aspects became politically relevant.

The first to cooperate with the Arab countries was Venezuela, a fellow member in OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), established in Baghdad in 1960. This association gave strong impetus to Venezuela's ties with all the Arab oil-producing countries. Former Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt, referred to strain in Venezuelan-Israeli relations as a result of his country's rapprochement with the Arab world. When Golda Meir openly expressed her disappointment, the answer she received was that "the Venezuelan rulers are not Israelites but Venezuelans; and it is fundamentally the defense of national interest that determines and orients its international politics."[90] Oil is undoubtedly the determining factor in the adoption of a "cautious attitude toward Israel by Venezuela."

The oil crisis revealed for the first time the possible vulnerability of Latin American countries to Arab economic threats. Uruguay and some of the Central American countries faced with economic difficulties were reported to have been offered loans by oil-producing Arab states with the expectation of a change in the traditionally friendly attitude toward Israel.[91] However, the major economic efforts by the Arabs have been directed towards Argentina and Brazil.[92]

According to the Egyptian newspaper *El Akhbar,* Argentina and the Arab countries have much to gain by close economic relations: on the one hand a food-exporting country and on the other a 100 million-inhabitant market.[93] Already in 1970, while still in exile, Perón took interest in developing such relations and instructed his Argentine friend of Arab origin, Faysal Nefuri (head of the Syrian-Lebanese Association) to make an exploratory trip to the Middle East.[94] Following Perón's return to power in 1973, the same Nefuri was instrumental in opening diplomatic relations with Libya. The pressing need for additional sources for oil made this contact of immediate importance, and in January 1974 a high-ranking delegation was sent to Libya, that included social welfare minister and Perón's close aid, López Rega, and the president of the Chamber of

Deputies. Talks included the possibilities of Libyan investment in Argentina, the opening of food-producing enterprises in Libya under Argentine management (meat-packing plants, cereal mills), the establishment of a car factory, and prefabricated construction materials. In return, Libya promised to initiate large-scale banking activites in Argentina and to supply more than three million cubic meters of oil. These plans failed to materialize.

Economic connections with Brazil have developed at such a rate and extent that it is difficult to decipher the intricate existing network. In banking, we find Brazil associated with International Arab Investment Trust,[95] as well as the Arabs establishing banks in Bzazil,[96] and the later in Beirut,[97] with the Arab community in Brazil acting as middlemen. Investments in industry are continuosly reported: Arab capital in the industrial complex of Suapte in Pernambuco,[98] ironmelting plants with Brazilian and Japanese capital in Libya and Egypt,[99] oil exploration by Egypt and Iraq.[100] There is an obvious and often-avowed relationship between these economic developments and the pro-Arab shift in Brazil's foreign policy since 1974, which culminated with Brazil's vote against Zionism in the 1975 UN General Assembly.

However, we already find elements of opposition and criticism to this acquiescence in the face of Arab pressure. The Algerian ambassador's statements in São Paulo, making Arab oil conditional on "a clearer definition of the Brazilian government's policy on the Middle East,"provoked a strong reaction from the prestigious *O Estado de São Paulo* which considered such a demand as "neocolonialist, of the worse old imperialist nations." and made clear that "Brazil is not used to receiving ultimatums and is even less ready to comply with them."[101] In Argentina too, a group of young Peronist parliamentarians made a demand to the administration for more information about the López Rega mission to Libya, charging that the operation would benefit mostly the Rockefeller group, as it would be through the Chase Manhattan Bank that Argentina's enterprises in Libya would be financed.[102]

Violence (Terrorism)

So far, Arab terrorism has been less present in Latin America than in other continents, contrasting also with the high record of violence in the political life peculiar to those countries. Apparently, both Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have established a network of delegates and sympathizers. The first organization has the possibility of using, for its own purposes, the Palestine Liberation Organization's representatives assigned to different embassies or at the different offices of the Arab League; the second, stressing the emotional connection with local Arab Christians, as has been the case with the Chabash family and other

Christian Bet Jalla descendants in Chile. It seems that those movements are still in the stage of building up their terrorist capacity. Terrorist activities were planned repeatedly but only one resulted in death with the killing of a secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Paraguay, Edna Peer, who was murdered in 1970 by two Palestinians. It was also reported that the government of Colombia expelled a high official of the PLO, Faud Habash Ansara, in April 1974, accusing him of trying to organize a terrorist cell in the Barranquilla region.[103] During the UN General Assembly in 1972, the Costa Rican delegate disclosed that he had been the object of threatening remarks by Arab delegates. Jewish community leaders have received threatening telephone calls;[104] bombs have exploded in Jewish institutions and shops;[105] letter bombs were received by Israeli diplomats and local Jewish leaders.

Very little is known about contacts of Latin American guerrillas with Arab Fedayun organizations. While mention was made of international connections through world gatherings of guerrilla groups in Switzerland, Beirut, and Glasgow, Latin American guerrillas seem to be more preoccupied with national and continental problems than with other issues. In Argentina, the militant Trotskyite ERP movement condemned and disassociated itself from a bombing attempt at the Hebrew Society in Rosario, stressing that the ERP "does not follow any discriminatory principles on racial or religious levels."[106] So far no terrorist acts by local guerrilla organizations against Israeli diplomats have been reported.

Yassir Arafat launched a special appeal to Latin Americans to join the Al Fatah as volunteers.[107] Little is known about the response to Arafat's appeal. The case of the Nicaraguan Patrick Arguello (son of an Arab mother) — killed in September 1972 in London after attempting to kidnap an El Al plane — appears to be exceptional. Nevertheless, the Tupamaros have been seen in an Al Fatah training camp in Lebanon.[108] Local pro-Arab elements have been instrumental in getting stolen passports to the terrorists, as in the case of Leilla Khaled and others that have used Honduran and Guatemalan documents. Security considerations caused Mexico to cancel Israeli participation in the Volley Ball World Championship.[109]

NOTES

1. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 23-35.
2. Morton Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the International System," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: Free Press, 1969) p. 298.
3. Ibid., pp. 296-98.

4. See Henry A. Kissinger, "The End of Bipolarity," in *The Theory and Practice of International Relations,* ed. Sondermann, Olson, and MacLellan (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970; 3rd. ed.), pp. 50-54.
5. See Edy Kaufman, "A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union and the United States in Latin America and Eastern Europe," *Coexistence* 8 (1971): 123-38.
6. Edward B. Glick, *Latin American and the Palestine Problem* (New York: T. Herzl Foundation, 1958).
7. Norman A. Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics* (New York: Walker, 1967), pp. 150-51.
8. This process is well documented by H. Alker Jr. and B. Russet, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 124-39.
9. Edward B. Glick, *Latin America and the Palestine Problem* (New York: Theodore Herzl Foundation, 1958), pp. 106-7.
10. Ibid., p. 107.
11. Ibid., p. 164.
12. An Israeli diplomat who was present at the UN Emergency Special Session confirmed this view.
13. *Los Angeles Times,* September 21, 1967, p. 24.
14. *Haaretz, Davar, Lamerchav* (Israeli dailies) March 21, 1967.
15. Question of Emil Habibi in the Knesset on March 28, 1964; *Divrei Ha-Knesset* 1967, p. 413.
16. *New York Times,* October 15, 1962; pt. 2, p. 7.
17. Budget law of 1963-64, March 4, 1963; *Divrei Ha-Knesset,* 1963, p. 1328.
18. Leopold Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), pp. 47-48.
19. Ibid., p. 48.
20. Ibid, p. 140.
21. *Maariv* (Israeli evening newspaper), March 31, 1974.
22. Address of José A. Mora as quoted in *Shalom,* organ of students and graduates of courses in Israel, no. 7 (August 1967): 10.
23. This opinion was expressed by N. Lorch, former ambassador to Peru and ex-director of the Latin American division in Israel's Foreign Ministry, in a lecture on Israeli-Latin American relations given at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, March 4, 1973.
24. *Haaretz,* February 26, 1960.
25. See "Impression from a visit to Cuba," *Davar,* November 4, 1960.
26. Congreso Judío Latinoamericano, Information Bulletin (OJI, Buenos Aries) no. 186, September 12, 1973.
27. For text of draft resolution see *Israel: un tema para la izquierda,* 2nd ed. enlarged and revised (Buenos Aires: Editoral Nueva Sión, 1968), pp. 218-19.
28. Ibid., p. 290.
29. Ibid.
30. Quoted from the official Cuban government translation in: *Latin American Radicalism,* ed. I.L. Horowitz, J. de Castro, and J. Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 543.
31. Ibid., p 565.
32. *Israel: un tema,* p. 291.
33. Ibid., p. 291.
34. K.S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), p. 400. See also Andrew Salkey, *Havana Journal* (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 208.
35. On Castro's attitude toward the Jewish Community, see Gertrude Miller "The Cuban Connection," *Jerusalem Post,* September 14, 1973; and Paul Jackobs, *Maariv,* May 14, 1973.
36. See for example the Syrian-Cuban communiqué issued while a Cuban delegation, headed by Armando Hart, visited Syria in July 1968. *Granma,* July 29, 1968.
37. See joint communiqué issued during a visit by Fidel Castro to Guinea, *Granma,* May 14, 1972.

38. See editorial by A. Zapata, issued in *Granma*, June 5, 1969, on second anniversary of the Six-Day war. His closing sentence reads: "As long as the voice of the Palestinian combatants — carried in the fire of their AK-10s, bazookas, and mortars — is not heeded and respected, there will be no solution in the Middle East."
39. See news item: "Sadat Convenes Defence Council to Discuss US Aid to Israel," Haaretz, November 22, 1970.
40. For Cuban commentators, the Jewish prestate underground organizations, such as the Hagana and what they label "Stern," were merely "paramilitary and terrorist organizations dividing their activities between sabotaging the British occupation forces in Palestine and harrassing the Arab population." See *Bohemia*, November 15, 1968, p. 84.
41. The Cuban ideological perception of the Palestinian armed movement is well presented in the article "Olor a pólvora," by Carlos Lechuga, in the Cuban major weekly *Bohemia*, March 8, 1968.
42. See article by R. Casals, "El pueblo palestino no se rendirá a los designios del imperialismo yanki y el sionismo," *Granma*, September 18, 1972.
43. Robert Peters, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, quoted in *OJI* no. 232, September 13, 1974.
44. Gertrude Miller, "The Cuban Connection." *Jerusalem Post*, September 14, 1974.
45. *El Mundo*, Cuba, July 3, 1968.
46. Joseph Harif in *Maariv, September 10, 1973.*
47. Dan Arkin in *Maariv*, September 10, 1973.
48. Joseph Harif in *Maariv*, September 10, 1973. Another Israeli nongovernment source familiar with Cuban affairs expressed the belief that the motivation was economic, but this has not been substantiated yet. See *OJI*, no. 186, September 12, 1973.
49. *Granma*, as quoted in *Maariv*, September 12, 1973.
50. Israeli Broadcasting Commission (Hebrew News), March 10, 1973; *Maariv*, April 18, 1973.
51. *Washington Post*, as quoted in *Maariv*, October 14, 1974,
52. Excerpts from commentary by Aleksey Servov, *Moscow (Radio) in Spanish for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean*, 03.OOGMT, June 27, 1971.
53. *Estrella de Panamá*, February 22, 1967.
54. See references to such an "organizing committee" in Venezuelan periodicals *El Universal*, August 27, 1969; and *La Religión*, July 30, 1969.
55. *Hebreos soviéticos: mitos y la realidad*, by Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1972; *Testimonios de engañados*, documents on the situation of immigrants in Israel, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1972); *No podemos callar*, documents of the conference of Jewish clergy and representatives of Jewish religious communities of the Soviet Union (Moscow, March 23, 1971); Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1971; Solomon Rabinovich, *Cómo viven los hebreos soviéticos* (Moscow: Editorial Novosti, 1971).
56. V. Bolshakov, *El anticomunismo: ocupación de los sionistas* (Moscow: Editorial Novosti, 1972).
57. Yuri Ivanov, *Ojo con el sionismo*, notes on the ideology, organization, and practice of Zionism (Moscow: Editorial Progreso, 1971).
58. Perón's comeback, though by proxy through the Campora presidency, aroused immediate hopes in Arab circles for a change in favor of the Arabs in Argentina's foreign policy. See news item entitled "Perón to Participate in Nonaligned Conference in Algeria," *Maariv*, June 26, 1973.
59. References to the Lima Resolution are based on the Spanish text of the resolution: "Resoluciones aprobadas por la Segunda Reunión Ministerial del Grupo de los 77," MM/77/11/R.2/Add. 22, November 7, 1971.
60. For commentary on the vetoed resolution see article by Philip Ben in *Maariv*, July 27, 1973, p 2.
61. *Jerusalem Post*, August 2, 1973.
62. *Jerusalem Post*, June 4, 1974.
63. Edgardo López, *Aurora*, April 5-12, 1974.

64. See article by Mario Monteforte Toledo, "Sudamérica se divide en zonas de influencia", in the Mexican weekly *Siempre,* no. 1042, June 13, 1973, p 40.
65. An internal report issued in late 1972 by the Centre for International Agricultural Cooperation in Rehovot, which conducts much of Israel's agricultural assistance program, considered Peru as one of the four "best" countries in Latin America from the point of view of Israeli assistance. At the same time the report admitted "difficulties" in Israel's assistance program in Chile. Internal unpublished report, "Agricultural Assistance Activity of the Centre," Rehovot, Israel, 1972.
66. In 1973, there was a drive to gain General Perón's support. A group of eight Arab ambassadors resident in Spain visited him in April of that year in order to reaffirm "the friendship of the Arab world towards Argentina and to remain at the disposal of the former leader and the future government of the Justicialist [Peronist] Liberation Front." The Syrian ambassador in Argentina defined himself as a "convinced admirer and not only a sympathizer of General Perón. For me it is not surprising that General Perón speaks about an opening of the Third World of which the Arabs are an integral part." *Cronista Comercial* (daily, Mendoza, Argentina), June 25, 1973.
67. DAIA, *Actividades antijudías de los árabes en la Argentina,* (Buenos Aires: Oficina de Prensa, 1958).
68. See article by Natan Lerner, "Arab Anti-Jewish Activities in Latin America," *Scope* (1964), p 2.
69. This data has been compiled from *The Middle East and North America: A Survey and Reference Books* (Europa Pub., Ltd., 1948, 1950, 1969, 1965-66, 1969-70, 1971-72).
70. Source: Israel's Foreign Ministry, 1974.
71. Al Bandak was expelled from the United States in the early fifties after the discovery of his relations with antisemitic groups. *Maariv,* March 24, 1972.
72. *Al Akhbar* (Cairo daily) August 5, 1968.
73. Survey of the Arab Press in Brazil, August 15-31, 1969.
74. *Excelsior* (Mexico City daily) March 27, 1974.
75. Radio Beirut of February 4 and 15, 1974, giving details of the mission of the Lebanese foreign minister.
76. Uruguayan foreign minister Cesar Charlone stressed in an interview on his return from Lebanon that friendly relations between both countries were based on cultural links, the important contribution of the local Lebanese community, and the common respect of democracy and the multiparty systems. *La Mañana* (daily, Montevideo, Uruguay), July 29, 1965.
77. Reports of Chilean minister general Arturo Yovana Zúñiga can be found in *OJI*, no. 23/73 (224), June 18, 1974, p. 4; and no. 25/74 (226), August 2, 1974, p. 4. the visit of Peruvian General Jorge Fernández Maldonado was accompanied by the issuance of clear pro-Arab commentaries in the Lima press, calling for the "immediate evacuation of Israel from occupied territories and the demand for respect of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." *OJI,* no. 18/74 (219), May 14, 1974, p.1.
78. Interview with Jewish community leader, *JC* (daily). Caracas, November 9, 1972.
79. Published through a pro-Nazi publishing house, Organización San José, Buenos Aires.
80. See full-page advertisment on "World Judgments on the Terrorist Zionism," published by the League of Arab States in *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), October 8, 1972.
81. See exchange of letter published by the United Arab Republic's ambassador to Mexico (June 24, 1969, *El Universal,* Mexico); the Israeli ambassador's reply (*El Universal,* June 28, 1969); and again the Egyptian ambassador (*Excelsior,* Mexico, September 4, 1969) and the Israeli (*Excelsior,* September 7, 1969).
82. The whole episode is detailed in *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA, Buenos Aires), no. 30 (September 31, 1971).
83. See for instance, interview with U.A.R. ambassador in Mexico, Mohamed Hamdi Abou Zeid in *Sucesos* (Mexico), May 3, 1969, or P.L.O. press conferences reported in *Acción* (Montevideo), December 14, 1964, or *La Hora* (Guatemala), November 20, 1964.

84. *Tribuna da Imprensa* (Rio de Janeiro), June 5, 1973.
85. *Yediot Achronot* (Tel Aviv), June 20, 1973.
86. *Jerusalem Post,* as quoted by *La Opinión* (Buenos Aires), April 2, 1974.
87. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA, Buenos Aires) year 5 (January-February 1969).
88. *OJI,* no. 18/74 (219), May 14, 1974.
89. JC 78, Rio De Janeiro, January 1970.
90. Rómulo Betancourt, "Recurso energético que no tiene igual," *Visión,* special report, February 12 and 26, 1972.
91. ID 99, Central America, July 1974.
92. "Aiming their initial efforts to Argentina and Brazil, the goal is to persuade the two largest and most highly developed Latin American countries to adopt a pro-Arab stance. If they succeeded in this, or even in neutralizing Argentina and Brazil, they may seriously undermine Israel's already weak political position in the United Nations. For if Argentina and Brazil shift their positions on Israel, other Latin American states might follow their lead." Morton M. Rosenthal, "Economics: The New Arab Weapon," *ADL Bulletin* (1973): 7.
93. *El Akhbar* (Cairo), May 10, 1973.
94. Most information is taken from "Libia: operación 'oro negro,' " *Panorama,* Buenos Aires, January 31, 1974, pp. 14-15.
95. The Banco do Brasil is an important shareholder since 1973 of the Compagnie Arabe et Internationale d'Investissements (CAII), holding company of twenty-four banks and finance companies. *Jornal do Comercio* (Rio de Janeiro), August 1, 1974.
96. The announcement of an Arab Brazilian Bank, with a capital of $100 million was announced in São Paulo. *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), August 18, 1974.
97. *Jornal do Comercio,* August 1, 1974.
98. *OJI,* no. 219, May 14, 1974.
99. *Folha de São Paulo,* August 1, 1974.
100. *La Opinión* (Buenos Aires), August 11, 1972. With Iraq, Brazil is planning to increase trade relations by starting to export maize *(Jornal do Comercio,* Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, July 30, 1974) and by active participation in the Baghdad Fair in October 1974 aimed at encouraging the use of Brazilian agricultural machinery and technology *(Correio do Povo.,* Porto Alegre, R. G. do Sul, July 30, 1974).
101. *OJI,* no. 204, February 1974. The Brazilian press also published articles relating to the Arab pressure on African countries to cut relations with Israel under the heading "Imperialism and Oil," *Jornal do Comercio* (Rio de Janeiro), August 1, 1974.
102. *OJI,* no. 255, July 1, 1974.
103. Mentioned in an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* reproduced in *OJI,* no. 232, September 13, 1974.
104. In Argentina, threats have also been made to assassinate the children of Jewish leaders at the community schools, and in Honduras, there were extortion threats from Arab radicals menacing kidnapping if a substantial sum of money was not paid.
105. Synagogues in Buenos Aires have frequently been objects of such threats, and in Venezuela cinemas exhibiting a film on the Six-Day war were warned to stop the screening under threats of planting explosives. *Ultimas Noticias* (Caracas daily), January 20, 1968.
106. *OJI,* no. 27/73, 1973, p. 4.
107. *El Heraldo de México,* May 19, 1970; interview of Agustín Barrios Gómez.
108. Relations between the Tupamaros and Arab countries have been referred to by the former president of the Latin American Jewish Congress, I. Goldenberg. I. Goldenberg, *La década del setenta en un continente en proceso de cambio: América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Congreso Judío Latinoamericano, 1972). Another possible manifestation of cooperation between guerrilla movements of the two areas was the attempt on the life of the Chilean ambassador to Lebanon, Alfredo Canales Marquis, by members of an extreme left-wing Lebanese organization, the Revolutionary Socialist Organization. *Jerusalem Post,* July 23, 1974.
109. *Maariv,* May 21, 1974.

2
Internal Settings

INTEREST GROUPS[1]

Jewish Communities

Political Resources and Handicaps

The importance and influence exercised by Latin American Jewish communities on their countries' political systems is not comparable to that of U.S. Jewry. All the same those interviewed considered that the presence of Jews in Latin America and their attachment to Israel constitute a factor affecting their governments' positions vis-à-vis Israel. The major resources providing the basis of power for Latin America Jewish communities are discussed below.

Numerical Strength and Degree of Involvement. As shown in Table 3, the Jewish population in Latin America is concentrated in the more developed countries of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay). Even within this division, there is a disproportionate population distribution — Argentina with 450,000 Jews accounts for more than half the Jewish population of Latin America; Brazil, with the second largest community, trails far behind. The remaining communities are very small, and with the exception of Uruguay, none reaches the 50,000 mark, with most of them not even nearing this figure.

As an electoral force, the Jewish communities are limited by two basic factors. First, in the majority of Latin America countries the democratic process does not fully function. Second, the size of the respective Jewish communities is small in comparison with the Arab communities. The respective figures for the main Latin American countries are: Argentina, 450,000 Jews and 450,000 Arabs; Chile, 30,000 and 70,000;

Table 3
Jewish Communities in Latin America[2]

Country	Estimated Number of Jews			General Population 1970[7]
	1917-18[3]	1950[4]	1970[5]	
SOUTH AMERICAN				
Argentina	123,000	385,000	450,000	23,364
Chile	500	32,000	30,000	8,835
Uruguay	1,700	38,000	50,000	2,886
Brazil	5,000	125,000	140,000	92,238
Paraguay	600	4,000	1,200	2,386
Bolivia	25	5,000	1,700	4,931
Peru	300	4,000	5,000	13,586
Ecuador	?	5,000	1,100	6,093
Colombia	80	9,000	11,000	21,117
Venezuela	500	5,000	12,000	10,399
Guyana	?	1,500	40	714[6]
CENTRAL AMERICA				
Panama	500	1,500	1,807 (1961)	1,425
Costa Rica	?	2,000[5]	1,000	1,649[8]
Nicaragua	50	450-600[5]	130	1,848[8]
Honduras	1	150[5]	100	2,582
El Salvador	60	600-800[5]	300	3,534
Guatemala	75	2,000	1,100	5,111
Mexico	(?) 500	20,000	35,000	48,377
CARIBBEAN STATES				
Dominican Republic	35	1,500	280	4,012
Haiti	50	?	50	4,867
Cuba	1,000	11,000	1,500	8,553

Mexico, 35,000 and 30,000; Uruguay, 50,000 and 15,000; Venezuela, 12,000 and 60,000; and Brazil, 140,000 and 400,000. However, the electoral importance of the Jews cannot be discounted; concentrated mainly in urban areas, they may succeed in preventing the election of anti-Zionist and antisemitic candidates to Parliament. In the April 1973 elections in Argentina, the rightist Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, running on the Peronist ticket, failed to receive a majority of the votes in Buenos Aires, while the Peronists were sweeping home in most of the country. Generally, the Jewish vote supports Centrist democratic parties, and as such may

influence certain parties to adopt a pro-Israeli stand[9] as in the cases of Acción Democrática in Venezuela and the Colorados in Uruguay, among others.

Numerical strength alone is insufficient as an explanation of the Jewish communities' ability to influence. Of paramount importance is the active involvement of the rank and file, as well as the group's commitment in supporting Israel and related causes.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, most Jewish institutions and organizations identified with and supported the Zionist ideal,[10] and as with the majority of the world's Jewish population, World War II intensified the feeling for the need to create the State of Israel. However,

Table 4
Jewish Population and Zionist Membership in Latin America[14]

Country	Jewish Population (approx.)	Members of Zionist Federations
Argentina	450,000	19,660
Bolivia	1,500	250
Brazil	160,000	11,500
Colombia	10,000	1,350
Cuba	2,100	
Chile	35,000	2,000
Ecuador	1,200	150
Mexico	30,000	3,350
Paraguay	1,000	130
Peru	6,000	1,100
Uruguay	50,000	8,400
Venezuela	12,000	1,800
CENTRAL AMERICA:[15]		
Costa Rica	1,500	
El Salvador	300	
Guatemala	1,030	
Honduras	150	
Nicaraguay	200	
Panama	1,800	
CARIBBEAN:		
Haiti	30 - 40	
Dominican Republic	200	

this position was not unanimous; Jewish anti-Zionist factions existed within some of the region's Communist parties (Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico); and those groups that were non-Zionist were basically indifferent to the whole issue. It should be stressed that the significance of these two groups was marginal.

Both the Zionist Federations and individual Jews played important roles in the early 1940s in forming Committees for a Hebrew Palestine, in representing the Jewish Agency on the continent. After the establishment of the State of Israel, a number of local Jewish leaders were appointed by the Israeli government as honorary consuls, and in that capacity also carried out diplomatic activities. The South American Zionist Congress in Montevideo, in 1947, received the support of many political leaders of the continent, and at the Council of Latin American Foreign Ministers meeting in Quintandinha, Brazil, in 1947, Jewish representatives lobbied on behalf of the Zionist cause.[11]

The Six-Day war of 1967, a shock for world Jewry, had also strong repercussions in Latin America. Anti-Zionist groups split, some members joining the Zionist establishment; Jewish social and cultural organizations with only tenuous links to Israel became active on behalf of Zionism; while at the individual level the great majority of Jews became concerned about Israel's destiny. In a survey of 207 individuals, 93 percent answered that "a Jew has to participate in the problems of the State of Israel."[12] This feeling of identification among the Jewish masses was not translated or transformed into increased support of, and participation within, the existing institutional framework. The 1970-71 membership drive for the World Zionist Organization[13] met with disappointing results, as shown in Table 4. Of approximately 750,000 Jews living in Latin America, about 50,000 registered as members of Zionist Federations, or only 6.5 percent.

The misperception of the real power of the Jewish community in the minds of the general public, which usually overestimates its strength, is a result of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. Not only is there a concentration of the population in urban centers (usually the largest cities), but within those cities they usually confine themselves to the same neighborhoods. This demographic concentration, in conjunction with the economic characteristics (narrow range of occupations followed by the Jews) and socioeconomic positions occupied by Jews, has led to an exaggeration of both their number and influence.[16]

The gap between the size of the Jewish communities and the membership of the Zionist organizations, is described as "a repercussion of the solidarity that was so strong that it overflowed the routine frameworks of the exisiting institutions that were regarded in the new situation as detached from reality and even superfluous."[17]

The October 1973 war reinforced this impact on the Jewish

communities, but this time it affected to a greater extent the institutional framework, whereas in 1967 the greatest impact was at the individual level. Venezuela's Jews were described "as a community willing to do something in competition with the rest of the continent, over who can win more medals in loving Israel."[18] In one day alone thousands of Jews attended pro-Israeli demonstrations and meetings, raised money, and many even volunteered for agricultural work in Israel.

In spite of the positive impact of the 1967 war on Latin America Jewry, leading to a greater involvement and solidarity in regard to Israel, longer-term tendencies contain negative implications for involvement in Jewish and Israeli affairs, and even for the viability of some Latin American communities. There are indications of a wide retreat from organized Jewish activity, and the existence of a generational crisis within most local communities. This crisis is the basic weakness of many Jewish institutions; they have failed to attract the younger generation and to have an impact on their lives. Recent elections for community leadership in Buenos Aires and São Paulo revealed a marked lack of mass participation in both, especially among the younger segments.[19] Reports and statements emphasizing the deteriorating situation within these communities (decreasing involvement, lack of consciousness, loss through intermarriage, etc.) are appearing ever more frequently and receiving greater coverage in the Israeli press.[20]

Organization. Latin American societies, where Jewish communities exist, can be divided into two basic types, with the differing national environment both affecting the outlook of their Jewish communities as well as reinforcing Jewish communal identity. The more pluralistic and, formerly, immigration-encouraging societies (the "White" southern republics of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile), favored greater ethnic and cultural homogeneity, and encouraged the freedom of voluntary organizations. In the immigration-restricting and relatively closed mestizo societies, national identification and the organization of Jewish communities was given an impetus by the societal attitude that viewed all immigrants and their descendants as aliens. As a result of existing conditions, in the former types of countries larger Jewish communities became established, thus providing greater anonymity within the intergroup relationship, facilitating speedier assimilation within the general society and the abandonment of the Jewish framework.[21] In smaller countries where social control is greater and more keenly felt, the Jewish community's grip is stronger. The tendency of a local Jewish congregation to maintain an organized community structure can be considered an important political resource. Generally, Jewish communities in Latin America are well organized, supporting educational, welfare, cultural, social, and religious activities.[22] The most outspoken,

active, and militant pro-Israeli supporters vis-à-vis Latin American governments and other local political forces have been the local representative Jewish institutions and not the Zionist Federations as would logically have been expected. During the last decade, it has been the Jewish communities at large that adopted the task of staying alert to all anti-Israeli attacks. One should be impressed by the amount of political support that these community organizations have extended to Israel, even considering that an attack on Israel might possibly have unfavorable repercussions for the local community.

Speaking on behalf of the Jewish community of Argentina, DAIA declared: "(1) To fully support Israel's efforts for direct negotiations with the Arab states; (2) to endorse unconditional support for the people of Israel in its just struggle in the defense of its integrity and security; (3) to ratify its full solidarity with the State of Israel, and to invest all its efforts for the cause of peace in the Near East."[23]

This same organization quickly reacted in support of Israel after the alleged arson at the Israeli exhibition in Buenos Aires;[24] to pro-Arab statements by some trade unions;[25] a pro-Arab petition brought DAIA into a direct confrontation with the local Arab League Office.[26] These are just some of the issues in which they involved themselves. At their meetings in Montevideo (1968) and Lima (1972), representatives from Jewish communities of the continent expressed unrestricted support for Israel: umbrella organizations, such as the Latin American section of the World Jewish Congress, the WJC lobby for Israel in diplomatic gatherings, e.g., at the UNCTAD meeting in Santiago, where the WJC was permitted a representative. It has also interceded with governments with the aim of mobilizing their support on matters of importance to diaspora Jewry, i.e., the solidarity campaign with the Jews of the U.S.S.R. and of the Arab countries. At the same time, the general political instability in the region, the polarization of political forces, and the guerrilla movements, have intensified or evoked feelings of insecurity among many Jewish communities, with Israel now being considered as a potential haven should the need arise.[27] Although under the Socialist regimes in both Chile and Cuba, Jews did not suffer from any official discrimination, many were affected as a result of their socioeconomic position in society. As for the future, there is always the fear that as a result of radical changes the Jews may be singled out as a victim and a scapegoat.

Legitimacy. A basic factor shaping attitudes toward local Jewish communites is the fact that they constitute a minority group possessing unique national, ethnic, and religious characteristics. The religious aspect is of prime importance, especially when one considers the role of the Catholic church in the Latin American cultural heritage. In a society composed of a Catholic majority, equal room could not always be

allocated to other religions; some constitutions provide for a secular society, but when there is a provision that the president must be a Catholic, differences and discrimination are institutionalized. Therefore, by maintaining adherence to the Jewish religion, a Jew automatically becomes a little less equal.[28] Religious nonconformity combined with strong emotional ties to Israel, are confronted with nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments which tend to undermine the legitmacy of pro-Israeli activities by local communities.

These Jewish community ties with Israel are often faced by society's general hostility towards pluratist loyalties. Argentine nationalist Arturo Jauretche stated: "I want to make the Jews born here Argentines. . . .My opinion on Zionism is based on an Argentine nationalism that aims to see the sons of Jews incorporated into the nation, as the sons of Spaniards were absorbed, the sons of Italians, etc."[29]

All the same, some Gentiles are receptive to Jewish particularism, and accept the intense relationship of the local Jewish community to Israel as a natural occurrence;[30] perhaps they are still influenced by a sense of world responsibility for the holocaust. In societies where the forces for assimilation are strong, the reaction of many Jews has been to reinforce the main expression of their Judaism, their bond with Israel. When one takes into consideration the lack for most of the older generation, of a cultural and religious background, it becomes even easier to understand how Israel becomes their identifying factor or tie to Judaism. Without delving deeply into this intricate problem, it should suffice to point out the close relations existing between most local communities on the continent and the Israeli representatives. In many countries, the Jews have come to regard the Israeli ambassador as their "spiritual leader."[31]

Immigrant communities are usually called "the colony." The general image of the Jewish community is of being one of such groups. It is to be noted that the terms *Israeli* and *Israelite* bear no basic difference for most Latin Americans.[32] This lack of differentiation between the images of the local Jew and that of the Israeli is pregnant in its implications for both. When the image of Israel is high, the local Jew will benefit from a higher status, and vice versa. Whenever the local Jews become unpopular, a corresponding deterioration takes place in Israel's image. Most interviewed considered that such a parallelism does exist, but mainly among the uneducated stratum of society.

The fact that Jews show concern *both* for their country of citizenship and for Israel helps counter accusations of double loyalty. They express this duality of national sentiment by the use of both the term *patria* (fatherland) and *madre patria* (motherland). While their major involvement is with Jewish matters, these communities have also been active in general voluntary associations and contribute to national social

welfare programs. This behavior pattern has been described in a booklet dealing with the Jewish contribution to Brazil's development.[33] The Mexican Jewish Women's Association listed the projects which they undertook, and it included help to general hospitals, schools, scholarships for university students, an audio-visual campaign against illiteracy, donations to the Red Cross, etc.[34] Usually, such efforts have been formally acknowledged, as when former Argentine president General Lanusse expressed his thanks in a New Year's address: "The spiritual, material, and cultural contribution of this (Jewish) community over more than a hundred years of activity for the enlightenment of the nation, evokes our gratitude and is an encouragement to follow this path."[35]

Economic Power. Economic power can affect the attitudes of groups and decision makers, either by its actual use toward that end, or by its assumed existence, resulting in a reaction toward those believed to possess it. Economic power can be both a reality and a myth. A survey conducted among Argentine non-Jews revealed that a substantial proportion believed that Jewish economic power was greater than that of Americans, Britishers, or Italians.[36] The reaction may be to try not to antagonize what is perceived to be an economically powerful community; on the other hand it may provoke hostility (particularly among leftist elements and trade-union circles) when Jews are identified as "capitalists" and "exploiters."

The use of economic power in support of political parties and candidates is an atypical phenomenon. When it does occur, it usually involves only individual members of a community, but not the whole Jewish community. Cases of individuals providing substantial financial support to political figures have occurred, as in the presidential campaigns in Chile in 1964 and in Venezuela in 1973.

While second-generation Jews generally belong to the liberal professions, the immigrant generation — which provides the majority of the adult Jewish institutional leadership — is mostly involved in commerce and industry. In Central America and the Andean countries, which have relatively small Jewish communities, their economic importance (mainly manufacturers and merchants) in the capitals far exceeds their numerical strength, providing them with considerable influence as a result of their personal wealth and social contacts.

A related source of power is the inflated importance ascribed to Latin American Jewry's relationship with U.S. Jewry and the resultant assumption of their ability to influence U.S. policy through their northern brethren. The difficulties experienced by Perón in his relations with the United States during the beginning of his first presidency were possibly a factor influencing his decision to establish and maintain good relations with world Jewry and Israel, in the hope that the American Jewish

community would act as a bridge in creating understanding between him and Washington.[37]

Social Power: Interaction with Power Elites. Until recently, Latin America has known few cases of Jewish parliamentarians, with the exception of Chile and Argentina under president Frondizi. They have not considered themselves representatives of the Jewish communities, and if they adopted a positive attitude toward Israel, they only tended to influence their fellow parliamentarians indirectly. An outstanding exception was Senator Guelman in Uruguay, who defined his role in Parliament as, inter alia, defending the causes championed by the Jewish community of his country.[38]

During 1973 and 1974 Jews held cabinet positions in several countries — economic ministers in Argentina and Uruguay, two deputy ministers in Venezuela, and the minister of health in Costa Rica. In nearly all the democratically elected regimes — with the exclusion of Mexico, where Jews in particular[39] and European immigrants generally tend not to participate prominently in political life — the Jews reached ministerial positions representing more moderate and liberal opinion. Allende's administration in Chile also included many Jews; the extreme right-wing opposition charged that the Popular Unity government was infiltrated by Jews, including Allende himself.[40]

Even though such Jews in public life showed no particular loyalty to organized Jewry, during times of crisis, their Jewishness was stressed and used against them. Uruguayan minister of economy Moisés Cohen was accused in antisemitic terms by the right-wing in 1972 of selling part of the nation's gold reserves. José Ber Gelbard, minister of economy in Argentina, faced even worse problems. When José López Rega, then minister of welfare and former private secretary to Perón, returned from a trip to Libya in February 1974, he denounced the existence of erroneous information concerning Argentina's position vis-à-vis the Arab countries, and he blamed it on officials of "Jewish origin" — meaning Gelbard.[41] A right-wing campaign, especially from within the Peronist ranks, alleged that Gelbard had had illegal transactions with a Swiss-Israeli Bank, and on walls in downtown Buenos Aires there were such slogans as: "Down with Gelbard the Jew," "Gelbard, Zionist Jew," and "Gelbard Bolche [Communist] Jew."[42] In most cases, Jewish institutions do not look favorably upon active involvement in politics by their members, they prefer an official neutral position on national issues, so as to avoid identification with a particular political body, especially in countries known for their political instability.

In Latin America it is unusual for Jews to belong to traditional elite groups, such as the military or the landed oligarchy.[43] Few Jews pursue diplomatic careers or hold high political positions. Sebreli considers that

the oligarchy is a closed circle, which excludes Jews; but in those few cases where Jews married into traditional families, they "have become part of the oligarchy, they have renounced their Judaism, severed all connections with the community, abandoned tradition, and have accepted Catholicism even if only nominally."[44]

While it is true that economic development has helped to forge links between the new interest groups and the ruling elites, with a greater acceptance of Jewish entrepreneurs, technocrats, and mass media purveyors, only a minority of those accepted have undertaken to overtly defend Israel's position. Those Jews who are important in trade groups, the liberal professions, and university circles, while perhaps more actively pro-Israeli, only exercise a marginal influence on foreign policy.

Information and Influence on the Mass Media. A growing number of second-generation Jews are involved in the mass media of the continent; characteristic of them is their integration into the national life and mentality and their devoting little attention to Middle Eastern topics. Exceptions are J. Zablodovski (popular commentator of the Mexican television news program "24 Hours") and J. Timmerman, editor and owner of the daily *La Opinión* in Buenos Aires. Timmerman, in his newspaper, has combined a pro-Israeli line with support for Cuba, Socialist Chile, Peru, and the Vietcong.[45]

The Jewish Press has always been quick to react to anti-Zionist policies. *Mundo Israelita* (Buenos Aires) severely condemned the participation of a correspondent from the newspaper *Mundo Arabe* on a television program, where it was alleged that "Zionism manipulates and controls the press, radio, and TV."[46] In Chile, both Jewish newspapers — *Mundo Judío and Palabra Israelita* — openly criticized the pro-Arab role of Allende's government at the United Nations, as it deviated from the traditional government line of impartiality and neutrality with regard to the Middle East conflict.[47] An indirect source of pressure on the mass media is the commercial relations of Jews with the private press. Advertisement is occasionally used as a leverage to influence newspapers' policies.[48]

Arab Communities

Political Resources and Handicaps

Jewish-Arab relations, at the personal level, have traditionally been cordial, especially as many members of both communities are in the same fields of activity (i.e., commerce and industry). Before 1948, reasonable intercommunal relations also existed at the institutional level, for example, many Jews were members of Lebanese and Syrian social clubs

and banks. Even in 1956 it was still considered "that in general, there is no animosity on the part of the Arabs, taken as individuals, against their Jewish neighbors, that among the Arab masses there is no deep-rooted anti-Jewish feeling, though the division makes itself felt among leading groups, among institutions, and those who play a representative role and avoid being seen publicly in friendly relations with Jews."[49]

The breach between the two communities widened with the 1967 war. The Jewish community became even more strongly identified with Israel; while the Arab community came under increasing pressures by representatives of the Arab countries to actively support the Arab cause. Many small social, sports, and cultural organizations, especially in the Arab-Christian community, attempted to avoid the issue, while the major representative bodies supported the Arab League. Although tension increased, there was no overt conflict between the two communities.

Numerical Strength and Degree of Involvement. The Arab population of Latin America is estimated at around 1.5 million persons, two-thirds of whom belong to various Christian denominations, the remainder of Moslem and Druse origins. Throughout the continent, they are distributed as follows:

Argentina	500,000	Brazil	400,000	Venezuela	60,000
Chile	70-120,000	Mexico	30,000	Cuba	30,000
Colombia	20,000	Honduras	10,000	Uruguay	15-30,000
Paraguay	4,000				

El Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Panama, Nicaragua, Educador — several thousands.[50] .

Though numerical advantage is with the Arabs they tend, unlike the Jews, to be widely dispersed between city and countryside. In Argentina, out of an Arab population of half a million, only 50,000 live in Buenos Aires (10 percent), while nearly 400,000 Jews reside in the capital (90 percent of the total Jewish population).

The largest single group of Arabs (according to origin) is the Lebanese community, mainly Christians of diverse denominations. A Beirut newspaper in 1967, estimated a total of 1,138,782 Lebanese throughout the continent — 180,000 in Argentina, 879,000 in Brazil, 12,000 in Venezuela, 10,000 in Colombia, 25,800 in Mexico, 20,000 in Cuba, 694 in Peru, 5,630 in Ecuador, 1,530 in Bolivia, 1,211 in Haiti, and 917 in Jamaica.[51] This community is usually more reluctant than those from other Arab countries to get actively involved in anti-Israeli campaigns. One of the reasons for this is that the Arab representatives interested in activating such a position, are those of the more radical countries, such as Syria and Algeria. Some members of this community stress that they are Lebanese Christians, and as such, not hostile to Israel.[52]

Organization. The main source and center of anti-Israeli activity

appears to be the Arab embassies, with the local communities preferring a more passive stance.[53] Among the younger and more politically oriented elements of the community, there seems to be a greater willingness to rise to the banner of the Arab cause. Arab institutions are usually established according to the place of origin of the members (e.g., the Homs Club or Tripolitan Society), some according to country of origin (such as the Lebanese Association in Brazil and the Palestinian, Syrian, and Jordanian clubs in Chile). Other groups base their institutions according to religious or ethnic differences, i.e., Sociedad Islámica, Asociación Panislamista, Union Alawita, Juventud Alawita, and Asociación Drusa; "they carry out social, sports, and cultural activities and seldom participate in actions of a political character."[54] The Arab embassies encourage and have furthered the formation of ad hoc organizations, even though rudimentary and sporadic in character, to agitate on behalf of the official Arab policy, e.g., Juventud de Ascendencia Arabe de Chile, Unión de Estudiates Argentino-Arabes, Juventud Argentino-Arabe por la Liberación de la Palestina, Arab Youth of Bolivia, etc. Additional forms of Arab institutions are bilateral friendship associations between country of residence and country of origin (Alianza Mexicano-Arabe, Asociación Cultural Siria in Argentina, Arab-Uruguayan Friendship Association, Chilean-Arab Cultural Institute); the more radical elements formed leftwing committees supporting the Arab cause (Movimiento de Solidaridad con la Liberación y el Desarrollo in Argentina, Comité pro-Paz en el Medio Oriente in Tucumán (Argentina), Asociación Amigos de los Pueblos Arabes en México, Comisión de Apoyo y Solidaridad con los Pueblos Arabes (Argentina), and the Palestine Resistance Organization in São Paulo (Brazil). The main activities of their members is participation in public demonstrations and meetings,[55] formulation of public statements, distribution of anonymous leaflets,[56] printing of commemorative posters, etc.

The tactics employed by Arab embassies in order to mobilize local communities often emulate those of the Israeli embassies in their relationship with the Jewish communities. Fund-raising campaigns usually meet with a poor response; the Syrian ambassador to Brazil thanked the local community for its $100,000 aid for the Syrian refugees from the Golan Heights.[57]

One project was the establishment of organizations at the national and continental levels to act as spokesmen of the whole Arab community — similiar to the existing Jewish organizations; it was believed that this would provide a stronger power base for the community in its relations with the continent's regimes. Until recently, this had not fully materialized. On May 15, 1962, the Unión Nacional Arabe de Chile was formed — "a political instrument of the Arab League and of Egyptian financing and

inspiration."[58] A subsequent attempt was made in Argentina, where in the space of one year three national congresses of Arab organizations took place; in Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza.[59] This intensive campaign received the full cooperation of the Syrian ambassador and the director of the Arab League Office; though the resolution adopted by the third congress, "recommending the intervention of Arab diplomats for the achievement of institutional unification"[60] implied that difficulties existed in mobilizing support from all Arab groups and institutions in the country. At approximately the same time, similar meetings took place in Chile and Brazil, resulting in the formation in Brazil of the Federation of Arab Institutions (FEARAB) at São Paulo in May 1974,[61] with the purpose, according to official Arab sources, of "creating a regional League of the Arab immigrant in each of the republics of the continent."[62] The second Arab Congress in Argentina, in November 1972, decided to establish a Federation of Arab Institutions of Latin America, and a year later, in Buenos Aires, the First Pan Amercian Arab Congress convened, with participation of delegations from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.[63] As in Venezuela, it was decided to establish pro-Arab committees and information and tourist centers in each country, as well as cultural and financial institutions for the promotion of trade between Latin America and the Arab world.

Taken as a whole, the Arabs have not constituted an electoral force, in spite of their numerical strength in some countries. This relative weakness can be attributed to their geographical dispersion and to the fragmentation of their institutions.

Legitimacy. Arab immigrants in Latin America have assimilated to a greater degree than their Jewish compatriots. They have been praised for possessing the following characteristics: a readiness to settle anywhere in the country, to engage in hard physical work, to intermarry, to devote themselves to national politics, to maintain a high birthrate, to have physical and psychological characteristics akin to the native mestizos, and to have a blood relationship with the Spanish majority immigrant group. Perón's special emissary to Egypt, Faysal Nefouri[64] (of Syrian descent) explained: "With regard to the Arab colony [in Argentina], till now nobody took interest in this Middle East affair. This is due to the fact that Arabs tend to integrate in their new society and regard themselves as loyal citizens . . . Perón tends to side with Arabs and not with other immigrants . . . because the Arab immigrants have always proved their loyalty to Argentina."[65] This statement explains the dilemma the Arab nations face in trying to get these communities to support them. The communities pride themselves on being fully integrated, and this integration undermines political support for the Arab cause. In general their attachment to their

country of origin is similar to that of any other immigrant group. Their descendants seldom visit the relatives "back home" and, even if they do, this does not necessarily lead to political involvement.

The Arabs have used this legitimacy as a progaganda weapon in attacking the relationship of the Latin America Jewish communities with Israel. An advertisement by the Arab-Mexican Alliance stated that: "In Mexico, members of the Jewish colony and their sons publicly collected funds to buy arms for Israel and volunteered to take an active part in the armed conflict, in gross violation of this country's international policy of nonintervention and self-determination for all peoples. It is our citizens' duty to prevent Mexico's clean international record being sullied by the defamations and hypocrisy of those unable to appreciate thc honor of Mexico's hospitality."[66] This argument generally fell on fertile soil. A group of Latin American journalists visiting Israel were unanimous in their conviction that the people of Latin America are more sympathetic to their Arab cocitizens than to their Jewish ones. They specifically mentioned that in Mexico Arabs mixed with the population while Jews are a closed society: "When a Jew becomes rich, he sends his money to Israel or America . . . Jews live a 'capitalist' way of life and do not realize that they lead a luxurious life compared to the majority of the population . . . The Arabs contribute more than the Jews to the development of the country, they are ready to settle in the countryside . . . In the Dominican Republic the Arabs are preferred to the Spanish immigrants because they do not leave the country once they become rich."[67] Furthermore, they tended to agree that even if an Arab achieves a privileged position, he will use his influence less in support of the Arab cause than the Jew in support of Israel.

Social Power: Interaction with Power Elites. In spite of their rapid integration, Arabs have not either generally become integrated into the traditional elite, nor have there been any intermarriages with families of the upper class. However, in Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, many of Arab origin follow army careers.[68] In countries of an autocratic character — Paraguay and Honduras — small groups of Arabs, as a result of economic deals with the ruling inner circle or the president, have achieved strong personal positions. Generally their social power is a function of economic power or political position.

In Chile "many Arabs are activists in political parties, from Conservative to Communist . . . they have mayors, magistrates, judges, deputies, and senators in a much larger quantity than Jews, who have only one mayor, three magistrates, one deputy, and one senator."[69] This predominance not always translated itself into support for the Arab cause, as many leading community members preferred to remain neutral toward the Israeli-Arab conflict. There have also been cases in Latin America, of

Arab politicians taking a pro-Israeli position. Senator Abdala of Uruguay, of Lebanese origin, a former member of the Colegiado (Swiss-style collective presidency) and Vice-President, visited Israel and proposed a peace plan.[70] Senator Turbai Ayala of Colombia, also of Lebanese origin, leader of the Liberal party and President of Congress made pro-Israeli statements. With the more active role of Arab embassies and the greater international weight of the Arab states, the number of outspoken supporters of the Arab cause in Venezuela has significantly increased: Jorge Dager, of Lebanese origin, former chairman of the Chamber of Deputies and Fuerza Democrática Popular (FDP) candidate for the presidency in 1973, was openly anti-Israeli and pro-Arab.[71] In Brazil, members of Congress of Lebanese and Syrian origin continually attack Israel.[72] The resurgence of Peronism in Argentina was accompanied by a marked increase in the number of parliamentarians of Arab origin.[73]

Economic Power. The economic position of the majority of Arabs in Latin America is largely similar to that of their Jewish fellow citizens, being mainly middle class with a few very wealthy individuals. However, some recent Arab immigrants belong to the working class, without having established themselves economically. In Chile, until the beginning of the Allende regime in 1970, the Arabs controlled 85 percent of the textile industry (enterprises included Yarur, Said, Hirmas, Chuaqui, Commandari, Samar, Anania) and had large holdings in other industries and five banks.[74] The exertion of this economic influence by the Arabs toward political ends related to the Middle East conflict is constrained by the fact that they are usually involved in the same sectors of industry and commerce as the Jews, and furthermore share with them the marketing process (wholesale and retail). As in the Jewish communities, second- and third-generation Latin America Arabs have also become attracted to the liberal professions.

Until a few years ago, the bilateral chambers of commerce with the Arab countries were inactive and nominal, as were those with Israel. Of greater interest is the possibility of a rise in the economic position of Arab citizens in Latin American countries, as a result of the economic drive of several Arab countries, which could use local Arab citizens as agents in their large investments and financial operations.

Influence over Mass Media. Arabs are not very prominent in Latin American journalism, and when involved in this field, it is usually only with provincial newspapers. In Chile and Paraguay, there are commercial radio stations under Arab ownership, as well as special transmissions in many countries in both Spanish and Arabic for internal community consumption. There are also newspapers published in Arabic *(El Nafir, El Arabi, El Arz* in Brazil; *Al-Taura* in Venezuela; *Assalam, El Rafik* in Buenos Aires) as well as in Portuguese or Spanish, or bilingual *(Diario*

Sirio Libanés[75] in Buenos Aires, *Mundo Arabe* in Chile). While varying in the degree of their anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish content, most Spanish-language newspapers repeat the arguments put forward by the Arab governments, and in some cases they even succeed in having their articles republished in the general press, especially that of the Left.[76] Furthermore, channels for pro-Arab publicity are statements by the Arab associations, which are sometimes published as news items,[77] but mostly as advertisements in major newspapers.[78] On occasions anonymous leaflets are distributed, containing provocative texts, in the hope that they will initiate public controversies in the general press, as happened in Buenos Aires.[79] Antisemitic writings and wall posters have appeared in many city streets, e.g.: "The Year of Argentine-Arab Fraternity. United for the same cause we shall fight for liberation and restitution of our usurped and occupied territories: the Argentine Malvinas [The British Falkland Islands] and Palestine and the Arab Territories."[80]

The Military

The importance of the military in the Latin American political process cannot be overstated. Most Latin American nations are directly controlled by military governments. In other nations, the armed forces keep a sharp eye on civilian politicos and function as a veto group. Even in countries with strong civilian traditions, like Chile and Uruguay, the military have recently become directly involved in governmental affairs. Only in Mexico, which successfully curbed military intervention in politics decades ago, and in Costa Rica, which deliberately dismantled its military establishment, can one consider the military an insignificant political factor. The military's perception of political phenomena therefore assumes greater importance in the policymaking process.

Influences that shape the military's attitude toward Israel come from different sources. First, there is the "professional" point of view. There is little doubt that Latin American military have been profoundly impressed by Israel's military capability as it has been demonstrated in four major wars and in innumerable military operations of a minor nature. The words of Ecuadorian general Gustavo Banderas are representative: "For us small countries, Israel is an inspiring example of courage and faith, of ability and high moral standards."[81]

Second, in addition to being a professional elite, several Latin American military establishments are unmistakably modernizing elites. They therefore find Israel a source of inspiration as well as a guide for action. Egypt, however, also had an impact on military thinking in Latin America in this regard (but not in regard to the "professional" point of view).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Nasserism struck Latin America. This

did not mean solidarity with the political aims of the Egyptian ruler or the adoption of a pro-Arab stand in the Middle East conflict. For Latin American adherents Nasserism implied, rather, a strategy of nonalignment in the international arena and the acceptance of aid from both East and West. Internally, it meant imitation of a process of socioeconomic change directed from above by a ruling military elite.

Although Nasserism had civilian sympathizers as well, the majority of those attracted were found in military circles, particularly among the young, nationalistic, and change-oriented officers. For most of these officers the Castroite alternative was much too radical, too dependent on the Soviet Union and, anyway, presented a threat to their very survival.

When the Peruvian military intervened in the 1962 presidential elections, the Argentine press referred to a "Nasserist tendency" among the young officers. Nasserist groups also existed in the military establishments of Brazil, Colombia, and especially in Argentina. In Argentina, a book entitled *The Nasserist Revolution,* published in Buenos Aires in 1962, had a wide circulation in the armed forces. [82] The initial spread of Nasserism was facilitated by the fact that several Egyptian officers staffed Egypt's diplomatic apparatus in Latin America and Latin American officers served as military attachés in Cairo.[83] During the early stages of the military government's takeovers in Peru and Panama in 1968, some Latin American observers tended to identify those governments as manifestations of Nasserist regimes.[84]

Nasserism remained an example for emulation until the Peruvian military government offered an indigenous model of a nationalistic developmental-mobilizational regime. Added to this, the image of the "founding father" was tarnished: Nasser had difficulties in the Arab world, the leadership of the "neutralist camp" declined, and Nasser's showing in the 1967 war was disastrous.

Also, because the applicability of Nasserism as a tool for comprehensive change was dubious in Latin America, it was impractical for the majority of military establishments. They preferred to experiment with limited changes. For this reason they found in Israel a source of inspiration; in the area of development assistance there was a fundamental difference between Israel and its major antagonist: Israel offered concrete and adaptable programs, as well as the experts needed to help carry them out. Israel's experience with Nahal, where military training is combined with settlement and agricultural development, aroused much interest as a way of developing "civic action" by the armed forces.[85] This interest was dramatically expressed by an Ecuadorian military publication:

> The State of Israel, through the Units of Nahal, shows us a new road in military organization and philosophy. It is showing us that the armed forces can widen the scope of their activities, for the benefit of

> the rural population, with a humanitarian mission . . . and even more, it has demonstrated to us that the soldier-farmer is the one who defends his farm with greater eagerness and heroism, and while defending his land, his family . . . he is defending his fatherland.[86]

Latin American officers have also been impressed by Israel's socioeconomic progress.[87] Those armed forces orientated toward civic action have found that the harnessing of the military, in the way that Israel does, offers advantages absent in the technical assistance programs sponsored by the big powers. Israel's assistance is also considered "disinterested," with no strings attached. So the military establishments have always considered Israel's aid as effective as big-power assistance, while at the same time it does not jeopardize the national sovereignty of their nations.[88]

Third, the Latin American military are a governing elite. Often characterized by anticommunist fervor,[89] the military — either in government or "close" to it — have seen Israel as a Western outpost standing in the way of the Soviet Union and revolutionary leftist governments. This community of interest, be it real or imaginary, has become more pronounced since the Arabs moved Left, and since the 1960s when Cuba was busy fermenting revolutions in Latin America. Thus, Israel's triumph in the Six-Day war was seen by the more conservative and pro-Western establishments as a victory over a common enemy.[90]

When, during a home leave, Brazilian ambassador to Israel J.O. de Meira Pena lectured to one hundred officers at the Military Academy in Rio, the Brazilian press gave wide coverage to his speech, stressing his analogy between Arab terrorist activity and pro-Castro terror tactics in Latin America. He argued that since the Tricontinental conference (in Havana, January 1966), there had been a coordination of the terrorism launched against Israel and against Latin American governments.[91] This argument was repeated by J. del Valle, rector of Chile's national university, during a visit to Israel. Although a civilian, the rector is close to the military junta that toppled Allende. In an interview, he said: "You are attacked systematically by Arab countries and the Soviet bloc, and Chile is subject to worldwide Communist defamation. The enemy is the same enemy."[92]

There is evidence that in Brazil, which has been ruled by the military since 1964, official positions adopted on the Middle East conflict have not been shared by some nonmilitary elements in the governmental bureaucracy which were apprehensive about Brazil's oil interests in the Arab world. In this case, then, sectors of the civilian bureaucracy of Brazil's foreign ministry (the Itamaraty) have influenced the governing military elite to take a less favorable stand vis-à-vis Israel. And the

"pro-Arab" group within the Itamaraty was strengthened with the rise to power, in 1974, of General Ernesto Geisel. Before occupying the presidency, Geisel served as chief of Petrobrás, Brazil's state oil monopoly. Under his management Petrobrás developed close contacts with Arab oil-producing countries. The appointment by Geisel of Antonio Azeredo de Silveira to the post of foreign minister in 1974 was seen by observers as a reflection of Geisel's desire for closer relations with the Third World — particularly the Arab and African countries.[93] Actual proof of a change in Brazil's Middle East policy of "sympathetic neutrality" came with the visit to Brazil of Ommar Sakkaf, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister. In his welcoming speech, de Silveira adopted the standard Arab formula for such occasions when he stated: "We believe that the departure from all territories subdued by force, and the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians, are fundamental components for any constructive treatment of the question. Objection to wars of conquest is a constant in Brazilian history."[94]

On the whole, the "military factor" as an "independent variable" seems to have worked toward intensification of relations between Israel and several Latin American nations, primarily in the field of civic action technical assistance programs. The influence of this factor has been most noticeable in the case of the Andean republics — Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, as well as Brazil and, to a certain extent, Panama — all developmental military regimes.

The Catholic Church

Latin America's population is predominantly Roman Catholic. The impact of this on attitudes and belief systems is not uniform; views on Jewish and Middle Eastern issues may be influenced in diametrically opposite ways. Catholic-inspired attitudes may range from doctrinaire or latent antisemitism to pro-Israeli attitudes rooted in philosemitism.[95] At times Catholic attitudes even produce pronounced anti-Arabism.[96]

It is best to focus on the Roman Catholic church on the institutional level; that is, as an interest group trying to influence foreign policy decisions. The first major issue which brought about direct and intensive intervention on the part of the Catholic church in order to influence policy decisions of Latin American governments, concerned the political, territorial status of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem question was already the subject of hectic diplomatic debate during the preindependence Palestine deliberations at the United Nations. And it was repeatedly on the General Assembly's agenda during that body's third, fourth, and fifth sessions (September-December 1948, 1949, and 1950 respectively). It is worth noting that the pressures exerted by the Holy See on Latin American

governments were not restricted to the Jerusalem question. The correspondence of Israeli-Zionist functionaries shows that the Vatican was also trying to block Israel's entry into the United Nations. Evidently these efforts were to no avail; eighteen out of twenty Latin American countries supported Israel's entry.[97]

The Vatican believed that the best way to protect Roman Catholic interests was to set up an international enclave in Jerusalem (*Corpus separatum)* under exclusive UN jurisdiction. The internationalization of Jerusalem was conceived of in the UNSCOP report and was recommended in the Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jewish Agency's initial consent to this plan was motivated largely by the fear that refusal might endanger the passage of the entire Partition Resolution.[98] Acceptance of internationalization was reversed after the Israeli-Arab war of 1948 broke out. Both Israel and Jordan were vehement about not relinquishing control of their respective parts of the Holy City.

The Vatican continued pressing for total internationalization of Jerusalem. In December 1949, an Australian resolution calling for full internationalization and requesting the Trusteeship Council to prepare a statute for the city was passed in the General Assembly with thirty-eight votes for, fourteen against, and seven abstentions. While the United States opposed the resolution, thirteen Latin American states supported it, three (Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Uruguay) opposed it, and four abstained.[99] Edward Glick, who studied the Vatican's influence on Latin America's stand vis-à-vis the issue, observed: "There seems little doubt that the showing of the Latin American states in this ballot was in large measure the result of both the public and private efforts of the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church."[100]

Glick considers the changes from opposition or abstention in a preliminary committee vote to support within a matter of days a proof of last-minute pressures by the Vatican. He also notes the uniqueness of the Uruguayan voting record on the Jerusalem issue: on five out of six occasions in the UN Jerusalem vote, Uruguay adopted a pro-Israeli stand. this fact might be explained by Uruguay's anticlerical tradition.[101]

Although the Australian resolution remained the official UN line on Jerusalem, the issue was, to all intents and purposes, forgotten. It should be stressed that while the Vatican did not recognize Israel's sovereignty over the New City[102] and also refused diplomatic recognition of the Jewish state, most Latin American countries established embassies in Israeli Jerusalem.

An attempt to resurrect the International Jerusalem scheme was made when the entire city fell under Israeli control in 1967. Thus, the abortive Latin American draft resolution was submitted to the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly on June 30, 1967. The draft

contained a clause reaffirming earlier recommendations urging the establishment of "an international regime for the city of Jerusalem which should be considered by the General Assembly at its 22nd session."[103]

An observer from Buenos Aires, commenting on the Latin American performance during that Special Session and on Latin American political attitudes during the Middle East crisis, suggested that their position on Jerusalem was conditional upon the Vatican's: "If the Vatican agrees to internationalization restricted to the Holy Places proper, the Latin American nations will not object to unification of Jerusalem under Israeli control."[104]

Although the Vatican position on the issue of Israeli control of Jerusalem finds support among devout Catholics and the church hierarchy,[105] there is no consensus on this subject. Since June 1967 a number of prominent church leaders have openly expressed their support of Jerusalem's unification under Israeli control, as well as their satisfaction with Israel's treatment of the Holy Places.[106] Six members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, including a Catholic priest, even called upon the Vatican to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and to recognize Jerusalem as its capital.[107]

Some of the clergy's pro-Jewish, pro-Israeli feeling has been institutionalized. There is, for instance, the Office of Jewish-Catholic relations, founded in 1971 in Buenos Aires, on the recommendation of the Jewish-Catholic Conference of Bogota (August 1968). This conference was organized by the Department of Ecumenism of the Latin American Episcopalian Council (CELAM). Among other activities, the Buenos Aires office has propagated the case for a unified Israeli Jerusalem with limited extraterritorial status for the Holy Places.[108]

Both Israel and the Arab countries are well aware of Christian-Catholic sensitivity as regards the Holy Places. Israel's care of the Holy Places has generally been acknowledged as satisfactory. Nevertheless, Arab propaganda has not failed to exploit isolated incidents — such as the arson at the El Aksa mosque, caused by an insane person, or a theft at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre — in an attempt to trigger Christian reactions that might prove useful to Arab political objectives.[109] Such attempts are often counterproductive. In a well-informed article, Monsignor Juan F. Hernández — a columnist for the Caracas daily *El Nacional* — denounced this Arab tactic. He exposed the role of Syria's commercial attaché in Venezuela who was making accusations at the same time that the Syrian government was persecuting its Christian minority.[110] (Some Latin American commentators have even been inclined to interpret the uproar over the *El Aksa* incident as an Arab attempt to heighten religious tensions and fanaticism).[111] Israel's ability to safeguard the Holy Places remains an

important factor in the establishment of its claim that a united Jerusalem under Israeli control is the most viable solution.[112]

The importance of the church may also be gleaned from the fact that both Israel and the Arab countries appeal to church personalities to support causes the two sides consider of political consequence. This indicates the weight attributed by both Israel and the Arab countries to public statements that come from church figures as a significant factor in Latin American public opinion. Thus we read of a pro-Arab act in the form of a ceremony held at the main cathedral of Buenos Aires. The occasion was a mass conducted by Archbishop Antonio Caggiano "in memory of victims of a recent attack on Lebanese territory by Israeli troops." The ceremony was attended by the Egyptian and Syrian ambassadors, a Lebanese diplomat, and the director of the Arab League offices in Argentina.[113] Some leading members of the radical "Third World" clergy have signed pro-Arab petitions.

On the other hand, there are instances of distinguished church leaders lending support to Jewish and Israeli causes. A major contemporary issue concerns the freedom of Soviet Jewry. Prominent Latin American figures such as Sergio Méndez Arceo, bishop of Cuernavaca (Mexico) and active in the World Christian Movement of Fraternal Solidarity with the Jewish Community of the Soviet Union,[114] have been involved in this issue. There have also been numerous statements from Latin American ecclesiastic circles supporting the worldwide campaign for Soviet Jewry.[115]

Cultivating relations and understanding with the Catholic church is also a task that reaches beyond Israeli policy objectives. Resident Jewish communities living in predominantly Catholic societies are also involved. However, much local Jewish activity as well as whatever Israeli initiatives exist, are usually mutually supportive. Local Jewish activity in the realm of interfaith contacts embraces all levels of organized Jewish action, from the Latin American Jewish Congress' interaction with the Catholic CELAM,[116] to the maintenance of contacts between national Jewish bodies and the church hierarchy,[117] as well as to intellectual contacts (on the public forum level) maintained by individual members of the two communities.[118]

Israeli initiatives have been largely directed at the encouragement of Catholic pilgrimage. This activity had a late start, has been fairly sporadic, and its political significance is not always appreciated. Catholic pilgrimage should not be considered solely from an economic angle. In addition to the economic aspects involved, an Israeli policy promoting organized pilgrimage may reap important political dividends, such as a first-hand acquaintance with Israeli reality for Latin Americans, and may thereby contribute to stronger interfaith connection in Latin America. Pilgrimages also offer an opportunity for developing contacts with the multifaceted

Catholic establishment which includes not only Catholic officialdom, but also a wide range of educational institutions, press, radio and TV programs, and numerous social and political organizations.

Some work has been done in this area, primarily by Israel's Ministry of Tourism. Several pilgrim groups — some on official invitation — have included important office bearers in the Church hierarchy and persons occupying positions of influence in the media,[119] in Catholic institutions of higher learning,[120] and social organizations.[121]

In order to encourage future pilgrimages and to strengthen interfaith relations, Israel's Ministry of Tourism coinitiated the first seminar on pilgrimages to the Holy Land in September 1969.[122] Nevertheless, there is still room for further Israeli encouragement of pilgrimages, as well as for study programs for church personnel on topics of interest to the increasingly socially oriented church — such as aspects of community work and organization, adult education techniques, etc.

Trade Unions, Students, and Intellectuals

The adoption of a political stand on the Middle East conflict by trade unions, student organizations, and intellectuals has been a function of two factors: the salience of the issue in world politics, and the efforts of both Israel and the Arabs in attracting the sympathies of these sectors. In 1946, an activist of the Pro-Hebrew-Palestine Committee quoted Chilean foreign minister Joaquín Fernández's view that in his country, "the leftists are friendly to the Jews and the Jews are left-wing, while the rightists are friendly to the Arabs and the Arabs are right-wing."[123] In fact, only small circles of the Right opposed the Jewish cause, while the overwhelmingly left-wing and centrist trade unions and student organizations were supportive. However, over the last years, the erosion of Israel's position has affected all these sectors. A recent paid announcement published in Argentina in support of the Palestinian people was signed by three hundred persons including prominent trade-union and university leaders, as well as intellectuals from both Right and Left.[124]

Before the creation of the State of Israel and during its first years, the general trend in the Latin American Trade Union Movement was pro-Israeli. A cable sent by the then powerful president of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, stressed the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and full independence.[125] The convention of the Latin American Federation of Labor in Cali, Colombia, in 1944, passed a strong resolution in favor of a Jewish Palestine. This was also the position of some distinguished Communist trade unionists, e.g., Pedro Saad of Ecuador, whose efforts on behalf of Israel's Federation of Labor (Histadrut) at the

ILO Conference in Philadelphia in 1945 were acknowledged with gratitude by the Jewish Agency representatives.[126]

Since then, while part of the trade union leaders have followed the Soviet line in hardening their position towards Israel, most of the moderate organizations affiliated with ORIT (Interamerican Regional Workers Organization) have been outspokenly pro-Israeli. José Mercado, president of the Colombian Workers Confederation, declared that "the nineteen million members of South America's Labor Unions will not remain indifferent to the fate of Israel," and would be ready to defend it.[127] Another statement of support for the workers of Israel "struggling for their own existence" went on to condemn "Nasserism, ally of Soviet totalitarianism."[128] Recently support has been diminishing. For example CLAT, the Catholic Labor Confederation, which is particularly strong in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela, signed an agreement with ICATU (International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions)[129] issuing pro-Arab statements.

Jews in Latin America are primarily middle class; their presence among workers of the industrial proletariat is insignificant. Thus they carry little weight within the trade-union movement. Furthermore, as Avni has pointed out, "the economic and social stratification of Latin American Jews is not, of course, conducive to lessening left-wing hostility. The absence of Jews from the trade unions makes it difficult to check the spread of dangerous moods there."[130] Hence the importance of the work carried out by Histadrut.

A steady flow of Latin American visitors to Israel begins as early as 1949, with a two-man delegation from the left-wing Confederacíon de Trabajadores de Guatemala.[131] Since the 1960s Histadrut representatives have served as labor attachés in a few Latin American countries, and since 1970 a permanent Histadrut bureau has been operating in Buenos Aires. Delegations headed by Histadrut secretary generals visited several Latin American countries in 1967 and 1970.[132] In 1971, nineteen Latin American labor leaders visited Israel as special guests of Histadrut. Another twenty-four such guests followed in 1972.

Although ruled by the same political party coalition as the Israeli government, Histadrut has rarely spoken out independently on either Middle Eastern problems or world and Latin America affairs. It did so under Secretary General Ben-Aharon (1970-73), who did not hesitate, for instance, to strongly deplore the overthrow of Chile's President Allende.[133]

Since the early 1960s most of Histadrut's international cooperation activity for Latin America has centered on study programs in topics like trade-union leadership.[134] The Centro de Estudios de Cooperativisimo y Cuestiones de Trabajo en América Latina, founded by Histadrut, organizes courses in Israel and Latin America, provides advisors, and

publishes material on syndical affairs. These efforts have been acknowledged in many articles[135] and declarations by Latin American trade unionists.[136] The Sindicato de Empleados de Comercio del Distrito Federal y el Estado Miranda of Venezuela (SIDEC) awarded the Israeli Embassy a diploma on May 1 (International Worker's Day) for "its role in the growing links and cooperation between Venezuela and Israel."[137]

Special emphasis on the development of political relations was given to countries where the trade-union movement was considered to be a significant factor. This was the case in Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina. The Histadrut representative devoted much attention to develop relations with Argentina's CGT (General Confederation of Labor) — a decisive political force in Argentina. But already in 1969, following the visit of an official delegation of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), the CGT issued a press statement siding "with the Palestinian and Arab peoples," raising its voice of protest against "the United States and its aggressive base, Israel."[138]

Another statement was published in 1971 by Andrés Framini, and yet another by the Bahía Blanca branch of the CGT decried the selling out of Argentina to international imperialists, among them "international Zionism." These pro-Arab efforts were mainly guided by the Arab League office in Buenos Aires which succeeded in attracting primarily right-wing CGT leaders. Still, at the special CGT Congress that took place in June 1973 in Buenos Aires, the representatives of the trade-union organizations of Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions walked out of the meeting when the organizers, after consulting the highest Peronist leaders, refused to request the Histadrut delegation to leave.[139]

Visits by Arab delegations took place in 1969 in Costa Rica and in 1972 in Peru.[140] On the whole, Arab efforts to create liaisons with Latin American trade unions have been intensified. Still, the balance appears to be positive for Israel, as evidenced by the close links between Israel and most trade-union movements on the continent, in the participation of Latin American delegations at Histadrut conventions, and in a generally pro-Israel voting record at the ILO (International Labor Organization).[141]

As to student bodies, support for Zionism was already voiced in the 1940s.[142] In 1948 the Cuban Federation of University Students (FEU) demanded that the government establish diplomatic relations with Israel.[143] From then until the early sixties, the attitudes of student organizations were mostly positive. Left-wing Latin American student groups defended the right of the Israeli delegation to participate in the pro-Soviet International Union of Students Congress at Sofia in 1964. They similarly supported the participation of an Israeli youth delegation at the International Youth Festival in Algiers, which failed to take place.

Since the 1967 war, left-wing student organizations have adopted a pro-Arab line; hence the joint communiqué signed by the Organización Continental Latinoamericana de Estudiantes (OCLAE) and the National Union of Students of Syria.[144]

Leftist student organizations have also subscribed to the Jewish conspiracy theory. An Arab-inspired left-wing Peruvian accusation connects Israel with preparing General Hugo Banzer's coup d'état in Bolivia.[145] The anti-Zionism of the extreme Left is matched by that of the extreme Right. A right-wing student organization in Argentina, UNES, denounces "Marx the Jew," and in a leaflet argues that Zionism is "ideological imperialism operating all over the world." It continues: "The fundamental motivation of the Basel Congress (first congress of the World Zionist Organization in 1897) was the establishment of a Jewish state as a starting point for the future fulfillment of plans for a world government, guided by the nasty code which is the Talmud."[146] This argument of an "international Zionism" linked with obscure world forces is also mentioned by trade-union declarations and left-wing "progressive" student organizations.

The National Union of Israeli Students (NUIS) has kept up only sporadic contact with Latin American student unions, but when such relations were established they were generally of a positive nature. Jewish involvement in left-wing student organizations has had various effects. Those participating in Castroite and radical leftist organizations have not been as actively hostile toward Israel as some Communist Jewish militants. There are also Jewish pro-Soviet anti-Zionist "cultural" clubs and institutions in Uruguay, Argentina, and Mexico.

Finally, pro-Zionist leftist groups do exist in major Latin American Jewish communities. Although isolated from national politics — since emigration to Israel is part of their ideology — they are nevertheless sympathetic to student and worker left-wing groups. Though sometimes critical of Israeli policies, they defend Israel's cause at the universities, where they appear as supporters of the progressive Zionist sector of Israel.

The intellectuals — writers, artists, scientists — are an important group. Apart from those who follow the Soviet line, they supported Israel for its first twenty years.[147] In the mid-sixties however, there was a break between pro-Israeli and pro-Arab intellectuals. The reaction to the anti-Israeli resolution adopted at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, and the criticism aimed at those Latin American participants who did not oppose it, points to the new situation.

Pro-Israeli intellectuals[148] are often organized into peace committees by left-wing Zionist groups related to MAPAM (United Workers party in Israel). Some of their publications are *Claves* in Montevideo and *Indices* and *Raíces* in Buenos Aires. In most cases, these committees functioned for a short period of time.

The pro-Soviet Jewish Communists have sporadically tried to create rival committees,[149] but with no real success. Other pro-Arab intellectual groups are organized in Special Committees of Solidarity with Palestine. In Argentina, the editor of a pro-Communist weekly *Política Internacional* has announced the establishment of a Latin American Committee for Palestine, that has published declarations in support of the Palestinians.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESS

A comprehensive picture of Latin American public opinion regarding Israel over the different periods of its history is very difficult to construct. Since the June 1967 war, the Middle East attracts more attention than any other extracontinental issue. Perhaps this is due to the extension of the problem over a long period of time and to the fact that both the Arab and Jewish communities have been active since the 1940s.

Both immediately before and after the June 1967 war, a public opinion poll in Buenos Aires indicated that the attitude of those concerned with the Middle East problem was moderately pro-Israel; however, the largest proportion of those interviewed had no opinion on or no knowledge of the Middle East situation, (see Table 5). The general ignorance of the problem suggests that those active on the question were mostly organized groups and public opinion makers.

Table 5
Public Opinion on Israel, Question 1
"Question: Which party, in your judgement, has a more just claim: Israel or the Arab countries?"[150]

	1st Poll May 31 - June 3, 1967	2nd Poll June 8 - June 10, 1967.
	%	%
Israel	22	31
Arab Countries	8	11
Equal	13	7
Neither	3	11
Don't know, no answer	54	40
	100% (169)	100% (179)

In a specific case, when Israel had been involved in a conflict with a particular Latin American country, the figures differed, as shown by a public opinion poll in Montevideo, Uruguay, following the kidnapping of

Adolf Eichmann in 1960, with the distribution of answers according to age groups (see Table 6).

Table 6
Public Opinion on Israel, Question 2
"Question: How do you judge Israel's actions? Were they right or wrong?"[151]

	AGE 18-30 %	31-50 %	51 and over %	All %
Right	25	16	21	19
Wrong	47	42	28	38
No opinion	-	-	-	-
Don't know	28	42	51	43
	100	100	100	100
(population sample unknown)				

It is noteworthy that Latin Americans friendly to Israel have no inhibitions about airing their views in letters to newspapers, in live broadcasts, etc. Before, during, and after the Six-Day war, Israeli embassies received hundreds of letters of support and sympathy. Some of those published showed a very strong commitment and even readiness to volunteer to fight for Israel.[152] In Venezuela, for example, support came from the provinces and the capital, from all strata of the population, though mainly from teachers, physicians, and Catholic and Protestant priests. Support also came from associations such as the Spanish Socialists, the Cuban exiles, the Basque community, the Rotarians, and a Cooperative of Services. Similar events are mentioned in Natanel Lorch's memoirs of his diplomatic service in Peru.[153]

To a large extent, the mass media molds the general attitude towards the Middle East conflict. In Cuba, the state-controlled press faithfully represents the official government view; but most Latin American countries are more flexible in allowing independent opinions on extracontinental issues. Press coverage of the Middle East is very intensive; most of the cables are reproduced from Western agencies,[154] but many articles are contributed by local journalists, politicians, and visitors to the area. Excluding left-wing newspapers, rightist antisemitic leaflets, and occasional sensationalist weeklies, the attitude of the press has been generally favorable to Israel, covering not only the military angle but also Israel's social achievements.[155] Special supplements devoted to Israel have often appeared.

Although not always willing to take a direct stand on the issue, Jewish

professionals, employed in all aspects of the media, partially account for the sympathetic attitude toward Israel. On the other hand, quite a few radio stations and newspapers are owned by local Arabs which partially accounts for pro-Arab attitudes in their Middle East coverage.

A survey of 683 press cuttings from sixteen Latin American countries (Cuba excluded)[156] from August 1971 to June 1972 showed the following: 76 percent favorable to Israel; 14 percent unfavorable; 6 percent took no stand; 4 percent opinion unknown. A breakdown of the articles showed that: 24 percent dealt with social progress in Israel; 23 percent with current events in the Middle East; 13 percent with the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union and in Arab countries; 10 percent with terrorist activities and the Palestinian problem; 9 percent with the status of Jerusalem, the occupied territories, and the Arab minority in Israel; 7 percent with Israel and Latin America, Asia, and Africa; 6 percent with nazism and antisemitism; 3 percent with public declarations of Latin American public opinion makers.

In another survey we have examined a much larger sample of Latin American press references extending over a longer period of time. We have analyzed 1,157 press cuttings of fourteen of the most important Latin American countries, covering the period between 1967 and 1973. We have made a table measuring positive/negative attitudes toward Israel as well as classifying attitudes according to categories of images.[157]

A. GLOBAL
   1. U.S. Responsibility
   2. Soviet Responsibility
   3. UN role
   4. Threats to world peace
   5. Middle East conflict and world economy
   6. Middle East conflict and Europe

B. MIDDLE EAST REGION
   1. Israel as expansionist and aggressor
   2. Israel's need for vital space
   3. Israel/Nazi Germany
   4. Israel's need for recognition
   5. Occupied territories as a guarantee for negotiating peace
   6. Israel's nuclear capability
   7. Israel under attack
   8. Israel's existence as irrevocable fact
   9. Israel seeks peace
   10. Israel as part of the modern world
   11. Palestinian problem: refugees
   12. Palestinian problem: terror, guerrillas

13. Arab aims: elimination of Israel
14. Holy War
15. Arab aggressors.

C. LATIN AMERICAN REGION
1. Jewish Community
2. Arab community
3. Diplomatic repercussions of Middle East conflict
4. Anti-Zionism = Antisemitism.

D. INTERREGIONAL
1. Israel/Latin America :International cooperation and relations
2. Israel/Latin America :Military
3. Israel/Latin America :Trade
4. Israel/Latin America :Regional institutions (OAS-BID)
5. Arab countries/Latin America : Trade
6. Arab countries/Latin America :Military
7. Israel/Latin America :Cultural
8. Israel/Latin America :Diplomatic
9. Arab countries/Latin America :Diplomatic

E. ISRAEL — INTERNAL
1. Cultural
2. Political
3. Economic
4. Military
5. Interfaith relations

F. ARAB COUNTRIES — INTERNAL
1. Cultural
2. Political
3. Economical
4. Military
5. Summit and other conferences

G. LEGALISTIC IMAGES
1. Israel does not respect UN resolutions
2. Arab states do not respect UN resolutions
3. Israel respects UN resolutions

H. HISTORICAL IMAGES
1. 2,000 years of Jewish suffering
2. Historical roots of the Middle East conflict

I. OTHER IMAGES
1. Soviet Jewry

2. Jews in Arab countries
3. Need of direct negotiations

J. EVALUATION OF PEACE PROSPECTS

1. Real possibilities of peace

The proportion of positive images is high (53.27 percent), while negative images account for only a quarter of this figure.[158] In the Global category (A) the ratio positive/negative is 10 to 1 favorable to Israel, which indicates that in the framework of the world outlook of the leading Latin American newspapers, Israel occupies a decidedly positive place. Equally favorable to Israel is the 10 to 1 ratio concerning Israel's relations with Latin America as compared with the Arab countries' Latin American relations. This positive view of Israel's relations with Latin America is underscored by the fact that no neutral articles have been traced. On the other hand articles dealing with the assessment of peace possibilities (J) are mostly neutral (see Table 7).

Table 7
Latin American Newspapers' Images vis-à-vis Israel

Category	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total
A	91	9	160	260
B	123	56	26	205
C	19	10	19	48
D	83	8	-	91
E	232	42	89	363
F	101	17	58	176
G	6	1	3	10
H	18	2	11	31
I	40	7	9	56
J	29	30	94	153
	742	182	469	1393
%	53.27	13.06	33.67	100

From our sample we learn that in Mexico and Argentina the neutral articles are nearly as numerous as the positive ones, but in the case of the former, the negative articles represent not less than 60 percent of the positive, while in the latter only 25 percent. In the cases of Uruguay and Venezuela, the positive images are more numerous than the negative and

neutral together. In Brazil the positive/negative ratio was more than 17 to 1 (see Table 8). Table 9 provides a breakdown according to countries, categories, and individual images.

Table 8
Five Most Represented Countries in Sample: Newspapers' Images vis-à-vis Israel

Country	Pro-Israeli	Pro-Arab	Neutral	Total
Argentina	122	30	110	262
Brazil	86	5	56	147
Mexico	57	34	50	141
Uruguay	123	49	48	220
Venezuela	99	18	54	171
	487	136	318	941

In accordance with the percentages of each category, the ranking is as follows. Israel — Internal (E), the leading category, with 363 images, represents more than a quarter of the press coverage of Middle East topics. The overwhelmingly positive relationship to Israel (232 positive, 42 negative, and 89 neutral) seems to prove that "positive" propaganda, stressing the achievements and problems of Israeli society, is more effective than reacting "negatively" to continuous Arab recriminations. Arab countries — Internal (F) ranks only in the fourth place, and with a noticeably negative balance (101 positive to Israel, 17 negative, and 58 neutral). Among the many factors contributing to the existing gap between the appreciation of Israeli and Arab society in the Latin American press is Israel's policy of focusing propaganda on Israel society.[159]

The ten most represented images, out of a total of fifty-seven, are not evenly distributed, and we can broadly classify them into three categories:

1. HIGHLY REPRESENTED

	Image		Total
A-2	Soviet responsibility	108	
E-1	Israel — internal; cultural	103	
E-2	Israel — internal; political	144	
F-2	Arab countries — internal; political	133	
I-3	Possibilities of peace	153	641

2. WELL REPRESENTED

	Image	
B-15	Palestinian problem: terrorist activities	58

E-4	Israel — internal; military	71	
A-1	U.S. responsibility	48	
A-3	UN role	47	224

3. MILDLY REPRESENTED

	Image		
D-11	Israel-Latin America; cultural	33	
B-2	Israel expansionist	32	65

The infrequent appearance of the other images prevent us from drawing any significant conclusion. On the other hand, the images included in the "highly represented" category elicit further comment. First, images appearing with the highest frequency are those which refer to "possibilities of peace." The fact that the Latin American continent did not suffer from serious and prolonged internal wars over the last century accounts for the idealistic attitude manifested by Latin Americans toward peace in the Middle East. The continuous preoccupation with the lack of peace in the Middle East suggests a readiness on the part of Latin America to play a more active role in peace-seeking in this area. The great insistence on the "Soviet responsibility" (108 references) compared to "U.S. responsibility" (48 references), indicates that in the perspective of the global cold-war situation, the Latin American press, being identified with the Western world, strongly tends to blame the intrusiveness of the Soviet Union for the persistence of conflict in the Middle East. While this region is considered to be penetrated by the Big Powers, this does not reduce the interest shown in the specific countries of the area — particularly Israel. Israel is much better known than the Arab countries; its internal social and political structure is frequently described in the press.

A further effort has been made to compare these results with a survey of the Mexican press during the Yom Kippur war, to check possible changes in the press attitude toward Israel.[160] The survey classified 304 articles, a total of those published by the national press during October 8-31, 1973 (the month of the war). The survey presented the following results:

Positive articles (toward Israel)	80	26.3%
Negative	29	9.3%
Neutral	195	64.4%
Total:	304	100%

A breakdown according to the periods of the war shows that the steadily positive image of Israel is accompanied by a decline in the number of pro-Arab articles and a fluctuation of the number of neutral articles.

Table 9
Newspapers' Images vis-à-vis Israel:
Individual Latin American Countries

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Brazil	11	24	1	2	-	8	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	5	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	2	2	4	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Dominican Republic	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Argentina	10	15	7	4	1	13	8	-	-	2	7	-	-	1	1	6	3	9	3	1	3	6	-	2	2	-	-	6	-	1	-	7	2	-
Uruguay	4	9	9	1	-	2	9	-	2	3	-	1	1	-	1	3	-	9	2	2	2	5	-	9	1	3	-	3	-	-	-	10	6	-
Panama	-	10	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Mexico	4	12	7	2	-	3	10	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	8	1	-	3	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
Guatemala	-	1	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
Ecuador	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	3	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
El Salvador	-	2	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
Venezuela	7	11	3	1	-	4	3	-	1	-	3	1	-	-	2	3	4	9	1	-	-	2	-	-	4	3	-	-	-	2	-	6	1	2
Peru	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colombia	5	16	6	1	-	4	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	3	2	1	5	-	4	-	5	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	48	108	47	16	2	39	32	1	3	9	14	7	1	3	7	15	13	58	21	10	11	21	1	16	10	20	8	10	1	3	2	33	12	2

Table 9 (continued)

Country	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	Total
Brazil	10	21	-	16	2	-	14	-	6	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	2	2	13	46	11	0	0	49	21	1	2	4	13	147
Costa Rica	4	2	1	2	1	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	2	9	11	5	2	6	10	18	1	1	4	9	67
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	13
Argentina	25	22	4	9	4	-	12	1	2	6	-	1	-	3	3	4	2	2	42	50	44	10	16	64	21	1	6	8	42	262
Uruguay	16	34	4	9	6	-	18	-	1	2	2	1	-	-	5	6	2	3	13	25	35	15	22	69	21	3	6	11	13	220
Panama	6	6	-	2	1	-	7	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	3	1	5	11	5	0	6	15	8	0	2	4	5	56
Mexico	6	20	2	7	2	1	15	1	2	6	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	15	28	28	2	4	37	23	1	1	0	15	141
Guatemala	3	3	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	3	5	4	0	5	9	1	0	0	4	3	31
Ecuador	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	4	-	1	4	1	0	0	3	0	0	3	4	1	16
Chile	4	6	1	1	-	-	6	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	5	5	12	3	2	12	7	0	3	1	5	50
El Salvador	3	-	4	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	5	3	0	5	11	5	0	1	0	3	33
Venezuela	17	16	2	11	4	-	16	-	3	-	-	-	1	3	1	4	3	1	16	26	27	6	14	50	19	1	4	8	16	171
Peru	2	5	-	1	-	1	4	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	5	6	11	0	0	8	8	1	0	3	5	42
Colombia	7	8	-	5	5	5	16	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	4	-	1	22	32	18	9	9	25	21	1	2	5	22	144
	103	144	19	71	26	7	133	2	17	17	2	5	3	9	21	24	18	14	153	260	205	48	91	363	176	10	31	56	153	1393

Table 10
Latin American Newspapers' Images vis-à-vis Israel according to Categories

Rank	Category		Percentage
1	E	Israel-Internal	26.00
2	A	Global	18.65
3	B	M.E. region	15.00
4	F	Arab countries-internal	12.65
5	J	Possibilities of peace	10.95
6	D	Inter-regional (M.E. - LA)	6.55
7	I	Other images (Soviet, M.E. Jewry)	3.85
8	C	Latin American Region	3.45
9	H	Historical Images	2.20
10	G	Legalistic images	0.70
		TOTAL	100.00

Although this can be partly attributed to the development of events in the field, mention should be made of the work done in Mexico by the diplomatic missions of the countries involved in the conflict.[161] If we compare these findings with our results on Mexico (40.6 percent positive, 23.8 percent negative, and 35.6 neutral), we find a slight change favorable toward Israel in the proportion of pro-Israeli articles, but also a massive increase in the amount of neutrality. This situation could well be identified as a transitional one toward a more pro-Arab attitude. Current Arab efforts to attract the Latin American press are considerable, with the

Table 11
Attitudes of the Mexican Press during the Yom Kippur War

	October 8 - 16 (first week of war)	October 17 - 22 (Israel offensive till cease fire)	October 23 - 31 (last military activities)	Total
Positive	30	22	28	80
Negative	13	7	9	29
Neutral	86	40	69	195
TOTAL	129	69	106	304

addition of Israel's growing isolation in the previously well-established pro-Israeli attitude of the Latin American press.

COMPETING ELITES

Political Parties, Parliaments, and Nonparliamentary Movements

Within the Latin American political party spectrum there are discernibly different attitudes towards Israel. The position of an individual political leader is sometimes based on emotional factors[162] or on his ethnic origin.[163] Our discussion tries to focus on those differences based on ideological-political considerations, which are more easily detected.

Criteria employed for classifying Latin American political parties range from the general distinction between ideological as opposed to pragmatic parties, to the standard Left and Right classification, to the grouping of parties according to inspirational origin or the party model adopted. Robert Alexander has proposed a triple division: traditional parties (conservatives and liberals, rooted in nineteenth-century politics); European-patterned parties, (radicals, socialists, christian democrats, fascists, communists); and the indigenous parties of change.[164] (The last category would include the social democratic Aprista type, the PRI and MMR national integration parties of Mexico and Bolivia, and populist parties. Castroite and urban guerrilla groups are nonparliamentary movements rather than political parties proper.) We only refer here to a limited number of parties, representative of the main political currents and categories.

On the whole, anti-Israeli attitudes are seen on the fringes of the political spectrum. Extreme rightist ultra-Catholic conservative groups are often antisemitic and anti-Israeli. Such are the cases of marginal but noisy Mexican groups: the Unión Nacional Sinarquista (UNS) and the student group Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientación (MURO). In Argentina Tacuara is a similar group. The right wing continually belabors Jewish double loyalty. In some cases, it has also taken to violence: bombs in synagogues and hooliganism against individual Jews. Such incidents increased markedly in certain periods, such as the one following the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli security agents in 1960.[165] At that time, rightist extremists argued that Argentine sovereignty was violated. Tacuara and Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista talked of a "Jewish fifth column" and called for severance of relations with Israel.[166] Antisemitic and anti-Israeli activities by militant right-wing organizations

included small demonstrations against Jewish or Israeli institutions, and public meetings. Rightist antisemitic publications do not appear regularly, but publishers such as Posadas in Mexico or Nuevo Orden in Argentina have released original and translated, antisemitic texts. Some of the original literature is reproduced in Arab publications like *Patria Arabe* in Argentina or *Mundo Arabe* in Chile. In such cases it is clear that representatives of the Arab governments and of the Arab League have encouraged it.[167] Groups within the militant Left and the Communist parties are also anti-Israeli, each group having its own rationale.

Support for Israel tends to come from the Center and Center-Left parties, and in several cases from the moderate Right. Apparently the strongest support for Israel comes from those parties often called "Aprista" or social democratic: the Peruvian APRA, Costa Rica's PLN (Partido Liberación Nacional), the Domincan Republic's PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano), etc.[168] Party identification is most pronounced in the case of Costa Rica's PLN.[169] José Figueres, PLN leader and twice the president of his country, said: "In the last four decades, Social Democratic parties have placed the Scandinavian nations at the top of the world community, and have forged the State of Israel. Today, the two most distinguished Social Democratic leaders are Willy Brandt and Golda Meir."[170]

In an essay, Alberto Baeza Flores, one of the ideologues of Latin American social democracy, asserts that social democracy is allied with the Latin American democratic Left in achieving its "great strategic objectives." In specifying social democratic allies, he cites the Socialist parties of Western Europe and the Israeli Labor party (MAPAI).[171]

Venezuela, which since its 1958 return to constitutionality has possessed one of the few truly competitive party systems in Latin America, is a country with a major social democratic party: Acción Democrática (AD). Although the same domestic and external factors have caused both of Venezuela's leading parties (the other one is COPEI, a Christian democratic party) to have a "neutral" stand on Middle East issues — namely Venezuela's interests as an oil-producing country and member of OPEC, and the need not to antagonize either the Arab or Jewish communities at home — AD is still regarded as more pro-Israeli and more sensitive to the local Jewish community's aspirations than COPEI. For example, while AD officially adopted a stand in defense of the rights of Soviet Jewry, COPEI remained aloof.[172]

Among Latin America's "indigenous" political parties and movements, populism has occupied a prominent place. Within this group, Argentine populism of the Peronist variety is of prime importance; it has had a central role in national politics for the last three decades.[173] The decisive weight of personalism and the blurred ideological boundaries of Peronism

have allowed considerable internal pluralism. Thus Peronist statements on issues related to the Middle East do not represent unanimity and often reflect personal biases, generational differences, and intraparty political diversity. Within Peronist ranks, some support for Israel has come from the more veteran party members and from the syndicalist affiliated (CGT) leadership.[174] Hostility towards Israel and anti-Jewish attitudes — either for secular ideological reasons or because of traditional antisemitism —are more common among the younger leftist militants or in the various rightist factions which are part of the movement.

Perón himself showed positive attitudes towards Israel.[175] During his first administration, which coincided with the birth of the Jewish state, Perón made several sympathetic overtures; e.g., he appointed a Jewish ambassador to represent Argentina, provided important meat supplies and an emergency shipment of blankets desperately needed in the early 1950s (years of mass immigration and austerity in Israel). Between 1947 and his fall in 1955, there even emerged a pro-Peronist Jewish organization (Organización Israelita Argentina — OIA) that enjoyed official favor and temporarily overshadowed the more veteran and "nonaligned" DAIA. In later years, Perón is also believed to have exerted a mitigating influence on anti-Israeli and antisemitic factions within the Peronist conglomerate, and was apparently the only one that could keep them in control. Confirming such an evaluation were press reports appearing after his death. One such report reads: "On the whole, the return of Perón was welcomed by the Jews, who saw in him the main hope for a period of stability, and who were also encouraged by his expressions of friendship for Israel. It was thought that he (and only he) would be able to control groups to the far Left and the far Right within the Peronist movement which had adopted antisemitic attitudes."[176]

On the negative side, from the Jewish and Israeli viewpoints, a few expressions of overt and crude antisemitism have been heard in Peronist circles. In its July 18, 1972 issue, the periodical *Las Bases,* official organ of the Movimiento Nacional Justicialista, carried an article by Perón's own secretary entitled "What Do We Understand by Imperialism?" In the article the author refers to the Jews as "this ancient people . . . that by its fraudulent actions did everything possible to earn the distrust of the non-Jewish world." More of the same has been produced by other organs of the Peronist press. *Primicia Argentina,* a periodical of a right-wing faction, showed its antisemitism by defaming ex-economy minister José Ber Gelbard, despite the fact that he served in the Cámpora and Perón cabinets.[177]

Another right-wing Peronist publication, *El Caudillo,* "studying" that popular Argentine myth of an international conspiracy called *sinarquía,* found that "capitalists and Marxists are cultivated in the Jesuit

universities. Also not absent are the Zionist claws. *Sinarquía* works from all angles."[178]

Chile's political party system offered an example of party support for Israel, for Chile was, until late 1973, Latin America's best example of a multiparty system. The entire political range was represented, and from that range the Center and Center-Right parties were the most outspoken in support of Israel. On the occasion of Israel's twenty-third anniversary (1971), representatives of the Christian Democratic and the Radical party delivered most sympathetic statements in honor of Israel, at a special session held by the Chilean Chamber of Deputies.[179] The following year the Chilean Senate commemorated Israel's twenty-fourth anniversary, and several senators from the Radical party and one from the right-wing National party expressed warm sympathy.[180] In the case of the Radical party — which dominated the Center of Chilean politics until the rapid rise of Christian Democracy in the early 1960s — party ideology as well as personal contacts with local Jewish personalities played an important role in shaping party attitudes. The Radical party maintained fraternal ties with Israel's Labor party through the Socialist International,[181] and manifested solid sympathy for Israel. Nevertheless, a radical politico would occasionally maintain close contacts with Arab circles.[182]

There are important differences in attitudes toward Israel among Socialist parties. The small Uruguayan Socialist party (PSU) offers an example of the more hostile posture. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of a visit to Algeria, the PSU delegation "categorically condemned Zionism and imperialism and reiterated its effective support for the Palestinian people's battle against imperialism and Zionism for regaining its homeland."[183]

Diverse shades of opinion have come from what had until recently been the continent's most powerful Socialist party — the Socialist party of Chile. In a special homage to Histadrut on its fiftieth anniversary, Socialist representative Erich Schnake addressing the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, praised "one of the world's most organized labor unions — an institution that represents, to a great extent, what the ideal of labor organization is for a socialist." While giving much credit to various Histadrut achievements and enthusiastically extolling the kibbutz, the deputy was, however, critical of Israel's policy towards its Arab neighbors. Schnake eulogized Israeli Socialists, Communists, and people of the Left who, according to him, live in a country where it is difficult to be a leftist and where the threat of war induces nationalism and chauvinism. Nevertheless, he continued, Israeli leftists have stood up bravely and with dedication, and they manifest class attitudes which will bring peace and tranquility to the Middle East.[184]

While Schnake, as well as the party's central figure, Salvador Allende,

manifested favorable attitudes toward Israel,[185] other important socialist functionaries, including two ex-secretary generals of the party, have been anti-Israeli. One of these two, Aniceto Rodríguez, has been openly involved in pro-Arab activities. The other, Carlos Altamirano, leader of the far Left of the Socialist party, was antagonistic as part of his general stance.[186] Still, compared to figures of Communist orthodoxy like Luis Corbalán, Altamirano was not so dogmatic, as a Jewish community leader testified: "With Altamirano you could at least talk and try to reason."[187] Another socialist, ex-senator Alejandro Chelen, of Arab descent, was also one of the nonsympathizers.[188]

Many of Latin America's pro-Moscow Communist parties echo the Soviet's anti-Israeli line, with the same propaganda appeals and rhetoric. Among the various Communist parties, however, there are variations. On the extreme side are the Peruvian Communists. In an article issued by the Lima-based Communist periodical *Unidad,* entitled "Zionism, Aggressor against the Arabs, Makes a Call at Peru," the Sixth Conference of Latin American Jewish Communities was virulently attacked: "We Peruvians shall not tolerate that foreign Jews (hebreos) come to realize acts of provocation in our homeland, and much less so when the CIA and other imperialist agencies are involved."[189] More moderate, though still very critical, have been statements by the large Chilean Communist party which, at the outbreak of the 1967 war, blamed the "rulers" of Israel for subordinating themselves to U.S. policy in the Middle East. The party also said the war worked against the interests of both sides, and called for direct negotiations. Although "supporting resolutely" the fight of the Arab people for their liberation, the Chilean Communist party clearly asserted the "legitimate right of the state of Israel to exist."[190] It is worth noting what Volodia Teitelbaum, a senator of Jewish origin and a central figure in the Chilean Communist party, said in an interview with the Israeli Communist daily *Kol Ha'am* in May 1967. Teitelbaum not only expressed a conviction that Israel had a right to exist, but also condemned the "racist attitudes" of the Arabs who wish to erase Israel from the map. He even stated that the resolution made at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana was a grave mistake and had seriously damaged the Communist movement.[191]

Some of Israel's staunchest supporters in Latin America have been ex-Communist party leaders disenchanted with the Soviet Union. Two personalities that "defected" from the Communist cause are of importance because of their past roles as party militants and because both have been frequent contributors to various Latin American newspapers. We refer to the Peruvian Eudocio Ravines and to Guatemala's Carlos Manuel Pellecer who also served as his country's ambassador to Israel in the early 1970s.[192]

The more radical segments within the Marxist Left — i.e., those militant

groups not controlled by the pro-Moscow CPs — have often had less disciplined and less dogmatic interpretations of Middle East problems than the CPs have; for instance, when Venezuela's far-Left Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) campaigned in the 1973 presidential elections, its leadership was split between a pro-Arab and a moderately "pro-Israeli" stand (meaning, in that context, acceptance of Israel's right to national existence as an independent and sovereign state and support for the Israeli people "struggling against its incumbent rulers").[193]

One of the best examples of dogma-free treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict appeared in the Chilean *Punto Final,* an ultra leftist publication, on December 23, 1969. The article was written by a member of the journal's editorial board, Carlos Jorquera Tolosa, after he had visited Israel. Showing an awareness of the complexities and difficulties involved in any attempt to categorize and define Israeli government and society, Tolosa gave credit to those phenomena characteristic of Israeli society that are appealing to a socialist. (He mentioned the kibbutz's collective life, Israel's spirit of sacrifice and hard work, the unhindered operation of two Communist parties with parliamentary representation, state ownership of most land, and considerable public-sector ownership of the means of production.) He even acknowledged that while *Punto Final* would have no difficulty in being published in Israel, this would not be the case in Arab countries. He went on to say that "conversing with a settler in a kibbutz of MAPAM . . . is finding ideological identification with many of the fundamental postulates of the theses of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara concerning the 'New Man,' the man of the twenty-first century . . . For this, one can frequently hear among them the phrase: Fidel is making of Cuba one big kibbutz."[194] Warning against what he called an anti-Israeli "ideological crusade" and alluding to views held by some radical leftists, he stated that "the government of Israel is not a socialist one . . . Nor is the government of Frei, but no one has preached for the extermination of the whole Chilean people for the crime of not having a socialist government."[195] He refuted the "axiom" of Israel's aggressiveness by pointing at the Arab-Israeli demographic imbalance and by resorting to Czech writer Ladislav Mnacko's sarcastic comment that "small nations seem to have a perverse tendency to threaten and destroy the big powers: this is valid in the case of Israel as in the case of Vietnam." The Chilean leftist ridiculed the farcical ultra left hypothesis that Israel was the creation of imperialist powers which were attempting to prevent socialism from flourishing in the Middle East. He concluded: "It is absurd that an Israeli socialist, for the mere fact of being of that nationality, appears as an imperialist, and conversely, an Arab owner of oil interests — also because of his nationality — would appear as a socialist. Indeed, this is a situation that would not stand even a minor analysis, but submissively following mechanistic schemes leads to these absurds."[196]

An important outlet for expressing stands and sympathies concerning Middle East issues are the various national parliaments (be they unicameral or bicameral congresses, composed of a senate and chamber of deputies). This is particularly relevant to those countries with strong parliamentary traditions like Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Brazil.

Until recently, the most systematic and frequent sounding board for statements related to the Middle East has been the Chilean Congress. Between 1948 and 1972, sixty-seven separate statements related to Israel, the Arab states, and Middle East issues, were made in the Chilean Congress (either in its Chamber of Deputies or in its Senate).[197] Over the years, the Chilean Congress has developed the tradition of paying homage on the occasion of the national day (Independence Day, revolutionary anniversary, etc.) of several Middle East countries. These homages may serve as an indicator of support and provide insights into divisions along party lines or other relevant details. During the 1948-72 period there were eleven homages honoring Israel as against nineteen in honor of four Arab states combined. The Arab states that were honored were Egypt (nine times), Lebanon (five times), Syria (three times), and Jordan (twice). Up to 1963, there were nine homages for Israel's Independence Day, as against only one for an Arab state (Lebanon in 1953). This indicates a greater "balancing" of these expressions of sympathy since 1963. While the peak for "Israeli" homages was the years 1961-63 (six times by both houses) homages for Egypt started rather late (only in 1963), but their recurrence remained fairly stable (all nine were made from 1963 onward).

The fact that there were no homages for Israel during 1964-69 — i.e., during the Christian Democratic (PDC) administration of President Eduardo Frei — is not considered by Jewish community activists as a manifestation of PDC attitude, but rather a temporary decline in the alertness of Jewish and Israeli diplomatic circles.[198] These homages were renewed in 1971-72. The data also illustrates the role played by ethnic origin in parliament. While Jewish parliamentarians try to keep a low profile on Israel, their colleagues of Arab descent do not hesitate to come out in the open and provide support to their motherland. This, together with lower intensity of community activism on the part of local Arabs, suggests a higher level of sociopolitical assimilation. The presence of congressmen of Arab descent among the ranks of those congratulating Arab countries on their national days is very noticeable: Senator A. Chelen in 1963 (honoring Egypt); Senator R. Tarud in 1965 (Egypt); Deputy Juan Dip in 1965, 1966, and 1967 (honoring Lebanon, Syria, and again Lebanon); Deputy Sabat in 1969 and 1970 (Egypt). The participation of congressmen of Arab descent was fuller until 1967, and was important in institutionalizing the homage "ritual." From 1967 on, this "ethnic"

participation in Arab independence day homages dropped and was picked up by "non-Arab" members. Participation in the latter part of the period under review cuts across party lines, and representatives of all major parties — from Conservative to Communist — pay homage to Egypt and other Arab states. Comparatively, homage statements for Israel in the post-1967 era represent much less unanimity, as the Socialists shun them, and a change in tone of Communist speakers is very marked. On Israel's fourteenth anniversary, for example, Communist senator Barros praised the Macabees who fought for a "better destiny for humanity."[199] In 1971 (Israel's twenty-fourth anniversary) Communist deputy Mireya Baltra did not hesitate to use such an inappropriate occasion to insert a critical note on the "aggressive war" of the Israeli government.[200] If Chilean congressional speeches delivered on such occasions were an indication of changes in party attitudes toward Israel, then we note a marked attrition in the support of the leftist parties for Israel during the 1960s — June 1967 apparently being the turning point. By way of comparison the declaratory support given by radical and liberal-conservative political figures remains more or less stable.[201]

The ethnic factor mentioned previously was much more pronounced in the more politically charged congressional statements. In most cases where the statement had a decidedly pro-Arab or an open anti-Israeli content, the sponsors were congressmen of Arab descent. Such were the cases of the 1956 homage for the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone by British forces (deputy Salum); comments on Anglo-French assistance to Israel during the 1956 conflict (Salum); the first homage to Palestine in 1962 (deputy Tuma); the 1965 statement praising the contribution of the Arab community to Chile's development (deputy J. Dip); and the 1968 statement concerning Israeli attacks on Lebanon (Dip).

The above pro-Arab statements were balanced by several pro-Israeli ones. In 1956, the Senate heard a declaration of the Latin American Congress for solidarity with Israel. In 1969, the chamber was informed of the call of Israel's parliamentarians to their colleagues around the world to express support for the "peace in the Middle East" initiative. In the same year, Socialist senator Schnake paid special homage to Israel's Histadrut. In 1970, Deputy Sivori presented a report to the chamber on the state of Jewish communities in Arab countries.

The balancing tendency that gathered momentum in Chilean congressional references to the Middle East was no less pronounced in Brazil's parliament. A proposal advanced by several deputies to the MDB opposition party — that Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary should be commemorated by the chamber sitting in special session — ran into difficulties. Representatives of both the MDB and the government party, Arena, expressed misgivings; they said that such a ceremony might trigger

a racial clash in the chamber. Some deputies argued that removing the proposal altogether would be better for Israel. Views were expressed that celebrating such an event would be imprudent, if Petrobras' oil interests in the Arab world were taken into account. The problem was resolved by the event being celebrated with the chamber convened in a regular session. Two deputies made speeches, Nina Ribeiro for Arena, and Francisco Studart for the MDB.[202]

An outstanding manifestation of cross-party parliamentary support for Israel took place in Costa Rica's legislative assembly. A motion sponsored by deputies Garron, Salazar, Molina Quesada, and Vicente Castro expressing strong support and solidarity with Israel was approved unanimously two days after the 1967 war had broken out. The resolution and accompanying speeches of support, reflected a clear pro-Israeli commitment based on what the deputies perceived to be common national traits: a small nation, democratic, progressive, anti-Communist, etc. The assembly was obviously not constrained either by concrete interests in the Arab world or by the weight of a strong and active local Arab community — constraints relevant in some other Latin American countries. The text of the resolution read:

> The Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica resolves: First, to give its moral support to the State of Israel in solidarity with its heroic fight for preserving its nationhood and millenial historical patrimony. Second, to condemn the constant aggression of the Arab countries against the State of Israel, in collusion with international Communism. Third, to recognize the right of the State of Israel to fight for defending the survival of its people, a luminous example of social justice, of sacrifice and spiritualism, of confidence in man and custodian of historic ideals. Fourth, to recognize the right of every people to fight for the inalienable freedom of navigation and confirm the internationality of the seas and maritime routes.[203]

The Costa Rican government distributed this resolution among members of the United Nations.

As is reflected in instances cited here, parliaments have been a forum sympathetic to Israel; they have often served as a stage for expressions of support. Attitudes of Argentine parliamentarians strengthen this observation. A survey among members of Argentina's multiparty Congress conducted in 1964 — during a period of intense activity by the Arab League — notes that 47 percent took the pro-Israeli stand of Socialist congressman Alfredo Palacios, a mere 3 percent supported the pro-Arab position of right-wing congressman Cornejo Linares, while 42 percent agreed with neither.[204]

As has already been indicated elsewhere in this study, Israel has not been a serious issue for the significant guerrilla movements in Latin America, be

they urban or rural. The Tupamaros have thus far refrained from making public statements on the Middle East conflict, and have denied having any contact with Palestinian terrorist organizations. In contrast, the small Uruguayan Frente Armado Popular (FAP) issued a statement in the Communist daily *Puro Chile* of Santiago, making known its views. FAP proclaimed that one of the reasons for it having robbed the Banco Israelita del Uruguay was that the Zionist movement of Uruguay was a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict because of its "permanent and important contributions to the State of Israel." FAP identified with the Arab cause "as with all revolutionary causes in the world," and asserted that such "expropriation, like the others that might follow in the future, will harass the Zionist economy."[205] The Argentine ERP condemned a bombing attempt at the Hebrew Society in Rosario.[206]

The importance of party orientation in shaping foreign policies in Latin America should be kept in proper perspective. First, the free competition of political parties is more an exception than a rule in Latin America. The party factor may only assume importance where there are regular transfers of power between parties or where there is an uninterrupted electoral process -- for example in Costa Rica, and until recently, Chile and Uruguay. In some countries (Argentina, Venezuela) such transfers were possible between periods of military rule. Party differences are almost irrelevant in the case of Mexico where the ruling PRI has been unchallenged, and make little sense in the majority of the Latin American countries governed directly by the military, or in countries under traditional autocratic rule.

Another reservation to be made is that within the party spectrum the forces at the political extremes, where much anti-Israeli sentiment concentrates, have at best a marginal influence on the policymaking process. This is due either to their being alienated by hostile civilian or military elites, or because they are numerically weak or political anachronisms (for example, the extreme Right). In certain situations, antigovernment criticism from opposition forces may alter the government's position on Israel. The political-economic situation prevailing in Uruguay during 1972 rendered the government extremely vulnerable to attacks by leftists and radical forces. Its support of Israel in the United Nations, a traditional and almost uninterrupted support, brought it under heavy fire from the Communists in Parliament and from the leftist press. At a meeting with leaders of the Uruguayan Jewish community, a former minister of foreign affairs intimated that such attacks put the Uruguayan government in an uncomfortable position, and he pointed to the growing difficulties of being the only champions of Israel on the continent.[207]

The final comment to be made about the party factor is that most parties

which assume actual power have to reconcile interparty affinity with wider state interests. This usually works towards the neutralization, in varying degrees, of ideological proximity to Israel.

NOTES

1. For the sake of uniformity in comparing Jewish and Arab communities, we utilize in both cases the same six categories of political resources. These are based on the categories expounded by Robert C. Fried in *Comparative Political Institutions* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p.2.
2. Haim Avni, "Latin America," in *World Politics and Jewish Condition,* ed. Louis Henkin (New York, Quandrangle Books, 1972), pp. 270-71.
3. On Argentina: Simon Weill, *Población israelita en la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1963). On other countries: Harry O. Sandberg, "The Jews of Latin America," *American Jewish Yearbook 5678, 1917-18.*
4. Y. Lestschinsky, "America," in *Hebrew Encyclopedia.*
5. Jacob Schatz, Comunidades judías en Latinoamérica (Buenos Aires, 1952).
6. See *Encyclopaedia Judaica* on Latin America.
7. *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1970,* 22nd issue (New York, 1971).
8. Inter-American Development Bank, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America,* Social Progress Trust Fund, Tenth Annual Report, 1970.
9. Such a position is not always accurately perceived by the general public. In a survey made by the Argentine Institute of Social Studies on 440 civilians and 60 army men, all tended to identify Jews mainly as supporters of the Communist party. Juan José Sebreli (ed.), *La cuestión judía en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1968), p. 174.
10. One example: "At the beginning of organized Jewish life in Uruguay, a strong Zionist movement developed, composed of several groups and parties, [made up] according to the political and social ideology that each immigrant had in the Zionist framework of Europe. The majority of Jews from Europe and Russia were definitely Zionist." José Jerosolimsky, "Apuntes sobre la vida de los judíos en Uruguay," *Comentario* (Buenos Aires), 1967, p. 83.
11. JC 10, Jerusalem, April 1972.
12. Norberto Litvinoff, "Estudio de actitudes en la comunidad judía argentina," *Judice* (DAIA, Buenos Aires), year 2 (April 1969): 98.
13. Membership Drive Committee, *Report Submitted to the Session of the Zionist General Council,* Jerusalem, June 1971.
14. *OJI* (Buenos Aires), no. 21/71 (38), September 1971.
15. Individual Central American figures are taken from Nathan Lerner, "The Latin American Crisis and Its Effects upon the Jewish Communities" (Hebrew), *Gesher,* no. 3-4 (1971): 135-36.
16. Symptomatic of this outlook is an article published in a Colombian newspaper, "How many Jews in Bogota?" The figure of 4,000 provided by a leader of the local Jewish community was viewed with some skepticism by the journalist, who considered that it should be at least 4,000 families, or even higher. *El Espectador* (daily), September 2, 1969.
17. Leon Peres, "Zehut Vehitnakrut Yehudit Beamerika Halatinit" (Hebrew), *Gesher,* no. 3-4 (1971): 119.
18. JC 73, Caracas, November 1973.
19. In 1969, 70 percent of the Buenos Aires Jewish community membership was in the over-fifty age group. When comparing the figures with those of twenty and thirty years ago, one sees a decrease in membership in community institutions. See conclusions of research project of E. Rogovsky, quoted in *Mivne Yahadut Amerika Halatinit* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Horowitz Institute for the Study of Developing Countries, Report No. 1, 1972), p. 48.

20. Pinhas Sapir (then chairman of the Jewish Agency) said upon his return from a visit to Latin America that the rate of intermarriage is 40 percent, and that 75 percent of Latin American Jews have no contact with Jewish affairs. *Haaretz,* September 2, 1974.
21. A survey carried out among both Jewish and non-Jewish students in Buenos Aires presented, among its conclusions, the observation of a greater tendency of Jewish students to involve themselves in university and national politics, of stronger leftist tendencies, and lesser attendance in Jewish synagogues than that shown by Catholic students in attending church. See research project by A. Monk and E. Rogovsky on *Changes among Jewish and non-Jewish students of the Buenos Aires University* (Buenos Aires: American Jewish Committee, Department of Social Research, 1964).
22. The highly structured and complex networks (central and local representative organizations; cultural, sports, and university associations;Zionist and Israel-oriented associations; libraries and community centers; publishers and bookshops; schools and other teaching institutions; publications and journals; synagogues, philanthropic, and mutual aid associations; hospitals, etc.) can be better appreciated by comparing the number of registered Jewish institutions to the size of the Jewish populations. In 1972, Argentina had 470 such institutions for a population of 450,000; Uruguay 113 for 50,000; Colombia 14 for 11,000. See directory in: Comité Judío Americano, *Comunidades Judías de Latinoamérica, 1971-72* (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Relaciones Humanas, 1974).
23. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA Buenos Aires) (April 1970): 21.
24. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires daily), September 9, 1968.
25. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA) (September 9, 1971): 10. DAIA rejects the terms of a resolution passed by the CGT branch in Bahía Blanca, Argentina.
26. The DAIA statement was published in *Clarín* (Buenos Aires daily), October 14, 1971, and the Arab League's in *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), October 29, 1971.
27. This potential danger has been expressed repeatedly by both Israeli and local leaders. See *Maariv,* December 12, 1972, and February 13, 1973.
28. Avni, "Latin America," p. 266.
29. Interview with Arturo Jauretche, published in *Horizonte* (Buenos Aires), November 25, 1964.
30. JC 70, speaking about Uruguay, said that "government circles do not differentiate between local Jewry and Israel; while considering local Jewry as Uruguayan citizens first, they feel that it is perfectly legitimate to regard them as defenders of the State of Israel."
31. Interview with Jewish leader, JC 72.
32. At the time of the Eichmann trial, Argentina's president Frondizi confused the two words in a statement, when he said that "hundreds of thousands of Israelis live in Argentina protected by democratic legislation." The reaction of the ArgentineJewish Institute was to clarify the difference, and to stress that only few Israelites living in Argentina are of Israeli origin. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), August 10, 1960.
33. Samuel Malmud, "Contribuicão judaica ao desenvolvimento brasileiro nos 150 anos da independencia." Servicio de Divulgacão da Federacão Israelita de Rio de Janeiro; speech by the president of the Jewish Federation delivered at the Legislative Assembly of the State of Guanabara, 1972.
34. Consejo Mexicano de Mujeres Israelitas, A.C., 30, years 1941-71.
35. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA) (September 30, 1971).
36. Juan José Sebreli, p. 174. The above-mentioned survey shows that 55 percent of the military believe that Jews have the greatest economic power, and 39 percent of them believe that North Americans do.
37. ID 100, Jerusalem, 1973.
38. JC 28, Jerusalem, 1973.
39. See article in *Haaretz,* March 22, 1971.
40. Mentioned in an article on "Sinarquía internacional," in the right-wing publication *Patria Peronista* (Buenos Aires), March 1974. Quoted from OJI, April 9, 1974, p. 4.
41. *OJI,* February 27, 1974, p. 1. The implication was that the presence of a Jew in the Argentine government undermined possible beneficial relations with Libya.

42. *OJI,* no. 27/74 (228), August 16, 1974, p. 3.
43. The case of Brigadier José Berdichewsky, of the Chilean Air Force, is an exception. As one of the highest-ranking officers in the air force, he served as the principal assistant to a leading member of the military junta, Brigadier General Leigh.
44. Juan José Sebreli, p. 248.
45. This attitude has made him a target for threats and accusations by the right-wing "Nationalist Motherland" elements, who describe him as a "Zionist-Communist" Bolche (Communist) to be hanged"; and included the call: "Zionist to the crematorium," signed, "Catholic anti-Zionist Commando." *La Opinión* (Buenos Aires), April 23, 1974. He is presently (February 1978) in jail, although the nature of charges against him is shrouded in mystery.
46. *OJI,* March 5, 1974, p. 1.
47. *OJI,* December 9, 1970, p. 2.
48. JC 31, Jerusalem, November 1972.
49. See DAIA, *Actividades antijudías de los árabes en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Press Office, 1958), pp. 2-4.
50. Figures are compiled from various Jewish sources; principally data from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, Washington, D.C., according to reports provided by the Jewish communities of the countries. Estimates also given by the Latin American Jewish Congress office in Buenos Aires.
51. *El Amal,* Beirut, September 5, 1967. These figures confirm the high degree of inaccuracy among the various sources on the size of the Latin American Arab population. Estimates of 2 million Arabs in Brazil have also been suggested, while the most acceptable is an estimate of 400,000 (of whom 300,000 are Lebanese). The small group of Lebanese in Chile was omitted in the estimate.
52. This position was explained by a Lebanese Christian in a letter to the Israeli ambassador in Montevideo: "You know that we Christians suffered difficult times because of the Moslems. I wrote with all frankness to my government and told that if Lebanon does not want war with Israel it should not permit the Arab guerrillas to take position in Lebanese territory against Israel... The only enemies of Lebanon are Syria and Egypt." *Haint* (Montevideo), December 12, 1969.
53. Interview with JC 89 (Caracas), April 1973, and Anti-Defamation League report on Uruguay (unpublished), 1970.
54. *Actividades antijudías de los árabes en la Argentina,* p. 27.
55. The demonstration that took place in Buenos Aires on the sixth anniversary of the 1967 war, organized by the Arab Argentine Youth for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Peronist Youth, burned the Israeli flag. OJI (Buenos Aires), 24/73/73 CI, June 13, 1973.
56. A text distributed in Honduras reads: "Did you know that the lands of Salvador are in the hands of fourteen families? Did you know that out of the fourteen Salvadorian families, eight are of Jewish origin? Did you know that Salvador's governments are ruled by these families? Did you know that the agrarian problem that Salvador is facing is due to the latifundia of these families that force Salvadorian peasants to continue emigration? Did you know that Salvador's planes were sold by Israel? Did you know that the international news agencies of the world are Jewish property? Did you know that the policy of Salvador's government lying before the international organizations and world public opinion is similar to Israel's lies in relation to our Arab brothers?" The leaflet appeared during the Salvador-Honduras "soccer" war of 1969-70.
57. *Al Anba,* São Paulo, August 15-31, 1969.
58. Report of JC 88 (Santiago), Chile, 1964.
59. *La Luz* (Buenos Aires), May 19, 1972, covers the first congress. OJI, no. 145 (November 29, 1972), no. 175 (June 27, 1973), and no. 177 (July 11, 1973) covers the second and third congresses. The last congress repeatedly stressed the Arab financial commitment to Argentina's national development. *Los Andes* (Mendoza, Argentina), June 23, 1973.
60. *OJI,* no. 177, July 11, 1973.

61. *OJI,* no. 219, May 21, 1974.
62. *OJI,* no. 116, May 10, 1972.
63. *OJI,* no. 193, October 30, 1972. The Syrian minister of tourism also participated, as well as the ambassadors of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya. King Hussein sent a message which was read to the congress together with messages of solidarity from members of the Argentine Parliament. In the speeches, Israel and the United States were accused of "expansionism" and "imperialism."
64. Santiago M. Peralta, "La acción del pueblo árabe en la Argentina," in *Actividades antijudías de los árabes en la Argentina,* pp. 1-2. The same author though, expressed reservations about the Arab League and other "foreign agents" trying to connect the local Arabs to an external nationalist movement.
65. *El Akhbar* (Cairo daily), May 10, 1973.
66. Alianza Mexicano-Arabe, *The Truth about the Middle East* (in Spanish), advertisement, Mexico, D.F., June 12, 1967.Accusations against Jewish fund-raising for Israel were also exploited extensively in Argentina (see declaration by the Argentine Arab Union of Students, Causa Arabe, Buenos Aires, August 1969) where there was also a request for a parliamentary investigation.
67. *Maariv,* March 7, 1974. Interview with journalists from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Brazil, in Israel to attend Symposium of Journalists from seventeen Latin American countries.
68. Salient are the cases of generals Wessin y Wessin of the Dominican Republic and Lechín of Bolivia. It is also worth mentioning Brigadier Lacabanne and Commodore Almalli of Argentina. The latter served as chairman of the Mendoza branch of FEARAB.
69. JC 88, Santiago de Chile, 1964.
70. Alberto Abdala subsequently visited Lebanon where he was decorated by the government with the Great Cross of the Order of the Cedar. *Al Gurba* (Mexico City), May 1968.
71. Jorge Dager appealed to his constituency also in Arabic.
72. *Maariv,* October 6, 1972.
73. *OJI,* no. 222, June 4, 1974. According to Arab sources, under the new Peronist regime, there are twenty-six Arab members of Congress and five provincial governors out of twenty. *Crónicas* (Buenos Aires), June 21, 1973.
74. JC 88, Santiago de Chile, 1964.
75. Closed down after forty-five years of publication.
76. The newspaper *Nueva Jornada* (Bolivia), had reproduced material originally published in La Voz del Mundo Arabe (La Paz).
77. Political statements opposed to "International Zionism" issued by the Comité de Solidaridad Arabe Palestino Peruano, were reproduced in *Clarín* (Buenos Aires). See *OJI,* no. 72, June 30, 1971. The announcement of a Study Day on the Palestinian problem by the Unión Nacional Arabe de Chile and the Comité Chileno de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia y Africa was reproduced in *Ultima Hora* (Santiago), May 22, 1969, and in other left-wing papers.
78. Statements by the Arab and Palestinian Colony in Venezuela were published as such in *El Nacional* (Caracas), February 6, 1969, and August 28, 1969. In Chile, they are usually placed in *El Mercurio* (right-wing) and in *Ultima Hora* (left-wing), e.g., the "Resurrection of the Arab Palestinian People."
79. A leaflet signed by the Pro-Liberation of Palestine accused Israel of being a fictitious state "built by Russia, North America, and England for colonialist purposes . . . The State of Israel is an aggression against all nationalities, including the Argentine; because the Jew born in Argentina renounces his duty toward this country and to the glorious blue and white flag (Argentina's), in order to travel to Palestine and kill the natives, the real owners of the country," *Actividades Antijudías de los árabes en la Argentina,* pp. 39-40.
80. Signed by CASPA (Committee of Support and Solidarity with the Arab Peoples), *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA), no. 14.
81. *El Comercio* (Quito), May 26, 1970 (Letters to Editor section).

82. Natan Lerner, "Arab Anti-Jewish Activities in Latin America," *Scope* (1964): 6.
83. Ibid.
84. See Eudocio Ravines, "Nasserismo en América Latina," *La República* (Bogotá), July 19, 1969.
85. Romualdo Fajardo Alvarez, "Rápida visión de Israel," *Revista del Ejército de Colombia,* February 1964, p. 94.
86. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, "Conscripción agraria militar Ecuatoriana," CAME, Ecuadorian Army, Quito, January 12, 1970, p. 3.
87. Rodolfo G. Proano, "Israel, estado del futuro," *Revista del Colegio Militar "Floy Alfaro"* (Quito), June 5, 1966, pp. 21-22.
88. Oscar Torres Llosa, "El ejército de defensa de Israel: un caso de participación de la fuerza armada en el desarrolo," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra del Perú,* December 1964.
89. John J. Johnson, "The Thinking of the Military on Major National Issues," in Peter G. Snow, *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1967), p. 572.
90. On the impact of Soviet ties with Arabs and Castro on Latin attitudes, see F. Lerner in *Davar,* August 6, 1967.
91. David Marcus in *Maariv,* May 8, 1970.
92. Interview with R. Bashan, *Yediot Aharonot,* October 24, 1974.
93. *Latin America* (a London weekly political and economic report) 8, no. 10 (March 8, 1974): 79.
94. *Jerusalem Post,* September 6, 1974.
95. For sample expressions of philosemitism and Catholic-motivated indentification with Israel, see B. Londono Villegas, "Nuestros padres los judíos," *La República* (Colombia), November 9, 1968. Also letter from a Catholic priest to U Thant comparing Israel to Castilla, cited in *La Nación* (San José, Costa Rica), August 1969.
96. An example of this is in the article of R. Capistrán Garza, "Israel y un servidor," *El Sol* (Mexico City), July 23, 1969.
97. Letter to Benno Weiser, Director of the Latin American Department at The Jewish Agency in New York to Moises Freudmann, Panama, dated May 20, 1949. Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. References to anti-Israeli statements and pressure by Vatican circles including particular reference to Colombia's Vatican-influenced church establishment, in letter of Salvador Rozental — representative of the Jewish Agency in Colombia — to Benno Weiser, dated August 10, 1949. Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.
98. Glick, p. 142.
99. Ibid., p. 147.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., p. 162.
102. During his visit to the Holy Land in January 1964, Pope John XXIII conspicuously avoided crossing the border from Jordan to Israel via Jerusalem.
103. "Latin Nations Bid Israel Withdraw," *New York Times,* July 1, 1967, p. 1.
104. F. Lerner, "Latin America Will Make Its Stand in Coordination with the Vatican," *Davar,* August 6, 1967.
105. The Vatican is particularly influential among conservative Catholic circles and with segments of public opinion and press of "Church-oriented" nations such as Colombia. The statement in a Colombian newspaper: "The Holy City should not belong to any nation, but to all of humanity," is representative. *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), December 31, 1969, p. 4. See also Alfonso Galvis, "La Vía Dolorosa debe ser salvada," *El Colombiano* (Medellín), November 17, 1969.
106. See statements by Bishop José Gonçalves Da Costa, secretary general of Brazil's National Conference of Bishops, in *El Día* (Panamá), September 26, 1967, in support of Jerusalem's unification. Among those publicly praising Israel's treatment of the Christian Holy Places was Monsignor Alfredo Vicente Scherer, archbishop of Porto Alegre.
107. David Marcus in *Maariv,* August 4, 1971.
108. The case was presented in a pamphlet distributed by the office. F. Delpech, "Los

cristianos y Tierra Santa: sugerencias para una mejor comprensión del problema de Jerusalén," Buenos Aires, Oficina de Relaciones Judeo-Católicas, 1972.

109. An example of this is a newspaper article sponsored by the Arab community of Venezuela in *El Nacional* (Caracas), August 29, 1969. It included letters to the president and to Cardinal Quintero blaming Israel for anti-Moslem and anti-Christian acts, and illegal annexation of the Holy City.
110. Monsignor J.F. Hernández, "Respuesta al encargado de negocios de Siria," *El Nacional* (Caracas), July 2, 1968; and "El régimen pro soviético de Siria," *El Nacional,* July 3, 1968.
111. "La grave situación del Cercano Oriente," *La Estrella de Pañamá,* August 25, 1969.
112. See the commentary "Santos Lugares," *Excelsior* (Mexico City), September 26, 1969.
113. *OJI,* no. 42/72 (140), October 25, 1972.
114. *OJI,* no. 41/71 (86), October 15, 1971.
115. See *OJI,* no. 29/72 (126), July 19, 1972.
116. The Latin American Jewish Congress and the Department of Ecumenism of CELAM have jointly organized Jewish-Catholic encounters to strengthen mutual understanding. The first of such meetings took place in Lima in October 25-26, 1972. The second encounter was held in San Miguel (Argentina) in 1974. See *OJI,* no. 210. 9/1974.
117. See for example "Una delegación de la DAIA visitó a Monseñor Aramburu," *Boletín Informativo (DAIA),* year 3, no. 8 (September 1967).
118. A good example of this type of activity is represented by the book edited by Moisés Gerber, *Cristianismo, judaismo e Israel,* compiling essays by Christians and Jews on Jewish-Christian relations. The book was widely reviewed by the Montevideo press. See *El Diario,* July 21, 1968; *La Mañana,* July 22, 1968; and *Boletín del Buro Coordinador de la Internacional Socialista en América Latina* (Montevideo), third trimester 1968.
119. Among the visiting Catholie media personalities: N. Mancera, TV Channel 13, Buenos Aires. See *Noticias Breves* (Israel), no. 104, January 1, 1968. E. Cardoso de Menezes, at the time vice-president of the Brazilian opposition UDN party, who conducted a daily radio broadcast over thirty-two radio stations in Brazil with estimated four million listeners, devoted numerous broadcasts to Israeli topics. See *Jerusalem Post,* June 20, 1960; A. Luchia Puig, director the Argentine Catholic weekly *Esquiu; La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), June 19, 1969.
120. On visit of a group of directors and teachers of Catholic universities and colleges. See *Noticias Breves,* no. 105, March 15, 1968.
121. For example, representative of Argentine Movimiento Familiar Cristiano. See *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), June 19, 1969; and ex-president of Acción Católica Argentina. See *La Prensa,* September 3, 1970.
122. "Primeras Jornadas Sudamericanas sobre Peregrinajes a Tierra Santa," *(DAIA, Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas) Boletín Informativo,* year 6, no. 18 (December 1969): 16-18. In this seminar, held in Argentina, over eighty Catholic clergymen of various ranks and representing five South American nations participated. They discussed not only the "technical organization of a pilgrimage" but also topics such as "The People and the Land of Israel in Catholic Education and in the Christian-Jewish Dialogue."
123. *Zionist Archives,* Z5 1340. Report on Latin American tour by Gustavo Gutiérrez, New York, September 19, 1964.
124. Comité Judío Americano, *Comunidades Judías de Latinoamérica,* 1971-72, pp. 77-78.
125. "The Confederation of Workers of Latin America has been extending its support to the cause of the Jewish people and has explained to the peoples of the twenty sister nations of the Western Hemisphere what the persecution against the Jews represents and the significance of a homeland in Palestine for persecuted Jews from Europe and those who wish to settle there." *Zionist Archives,* Z5/856, July 15, 1964.
126. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/2418, letter from Mereminsky, Jewish Agency for Palestine to Pedro Saad, Federación de Trabajadores del Ecuador, N.Y. January 12, 1945.
127. *OJI,* no. 42/72 (140), October 25, 1972.

128. Communiqué of the "32 Democratic Syndicates," Buenos Aires, February 26, 1969.
129. See "Agreement of Cooperation and Solidarity," *CLAT* Newsletter (Caracas), year 5, no. 39 (December 1971).
130. Haim Avni, p. 264.
131. When Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, secretary general of the Guatemalan CTG, wished a fruitful visit to the delegates departing for Israel as guests of Histadrut, he also used the occasion to praise the "illegal Jewish army, the Haganah," to reject the idea of the Jewish people as an "exploiting class," and emphasize the feeling of solidarity between the Guatemalans' struggle for Belize (British Honduras) and the anticolonial struggle the Jews had carried out against the British in Palestine. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/856, July 1949.
132. In 1967, Secretary General Becker visited Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia. In Colombia he was received twice by President Lleras Restrepo who declared at one point that "the government of Colombia will help Israel achieve peace and security through international treaties and direct talks with the Arabs." *Jerusalem Post,* November 16, 1967. In 1970, acting secretary general Meshel headed a delegation which visited Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, but this time, upon his return, Meshel expressed concern, stating: "The Arabs and Russians are spreading anti-Israeli venom," *Maariv* (Tel-Aviv), October 11, 1970.
133. "Israeli Workers and their Labor Movement Histadrut are shocked by the tragic death of President Allende, an idealist and a man of vision who saw in the socioeconomic advancement of the Chilean working people one of his prime objectives. The military coup in Chile which brought about the death of President Allende, his colleagues, and many other innocent citizens, is a crime against the very essence of democracy and the principles of justice. Histadrut condemns the overthrow by force of arms of a democratically elected president, an act strongly contrary to the democratic and freedom-loving spirit of the Chilean nation which prides itself on a longstanding tradition of parliamentary rule. Adherence to the values of democracy and freedom as one of the fundamental principles should arouse all those concerned with protecting the interests of the working people. Histadrut expresses its solidarity with the workers of Chile and their Labor Movement and calls upon the International Free Trade Union Movement to assist the Chilean workers to overcome their difficulties and preserve and further their social and economic achievements." International Relations Department of Histadrut, September 1973.
134. A further explanation of Histadrut's contribution to the international cooperation schemes of Israel is dealt with below.
135. See *Excelsior* (Mexico City), February 10, 1969; *Prensa Gráfica* (Salvador), February 2, 1970; and Carlos Burr P., "Contribución de Israel al cooperativismo chileno," *Boletín Informativo Sociedad Benei-Israel* (Santiago de Chile), June 1966.
136. See speech by Ricardo Vásquez Díaz, on behalf of the participants in the 1974 Trade Union Leadership Seminar. Díaz praises the delegates' contribution to the seminar as well as Israel's achievements in social justice, and expresses the hope for similar achievement in the search for peace. Report on the Course for Trade Union Leaders, Centro de Estudios Cooperativos y Laborales, Histadrut, January 9, 1974, pp. 16-17.
137. *Boletín de Actividades,* Insituto de Relaciones Culturales Israel-Ibero América, Jerusalem, September 7, 1971, p. 11.
138. Confederación General del Trabajo de Argentina, press release 93, Buenos Aires, May 1969.
139. *OJI,* no. 24/73 (173), p. 4.
140. *OJI,* no. 123, June 28, 1972.
141. At the Geneva 1972 meeting of the ILO plenary, Israel's workers' representative was elected to the governing body with the support of the Latin American Trade Union Movement's delegates, who voted twelve in favor, five abstentions, and the rest were not allowed to vote due to unsettled debts to the organization. Report of activities of the Department of International Relations, 1969-73 submitted to the Twelfth Conference of Histadrut. In 1975 Israel was reelected to the governing body of the ILO.

142. *Zionist Archives*, Z5/24218, letter of president of University Student Union of Ecuador to Mrs. Rajel Sefaradi Yarden, May 12, 1944.
143. *Zionist Archives*, Z5/558, letter from M. Kaplan to Benno Weiser, Havana, December 23, 1948.
144. "The undersigned delegations support the legitimate armed struggle of the Palestinian people as the only means to regain its national rights in its motherland occupied by Israeli colonialism and considers this battle to be a part of the movement of liberation of the world." *Juventud Rebelde* (Havana), August 2, 1968.
145. Signed by the Comité Arabe-Palestino Peruano and the president and organizing secretary of the Student Federation of the San Marcos University in Lima. It mentions that "the conspiracy of international Zionism ruled by the financial oligarchy that controls the American government and actually allied to the neofascists all over the world, including the usurpers of the Arab territory of Palestine, the so-called State of Israel, has launched ferocious aggression against the Bolivian people in order to prevent the exercise of its sacred right, collective right of selfdetermination." Statement published in *Clarín* and reported in *OJI*, no. 42/71 (87), 3, October 20, 1971.
146. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA), no. 27 (September 15, 1971): 9. In Mexico, a student group, Frente Universitario Mexicano, used the slogan "Jews, hands off Mexico!" *Excelsior* (Mexico City), February 2, 1969; and another student organization, while denying any sort of antisemitic attitude condemned "Judaic Zionism," censuring the policies of the Israeli government as racist and subversive of world peace. *Impacto* (Mexico City), no. 1003, quoted in *Information Bulletin* (Congreso Judío Latinamericano), no. 2 (1969): 21.
147. In 1956 in Montevideo, a Latin American Conference of Solidarity with Israel took place, where strong support for Israel was expressed by intellectuals from Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia. *La Luz* (Buenos Aires), March 23, 1956.
148. See interview with Ernesto Sábato, *Fraie Schtime* (Buenos Aires bimonthly), year 3, no. 16-17 (November-December 1969); and another interview with the same writer in *Raíces* (Buenos Aires) (September 1969): 24-26.
149. Efforts in this direction have been made by pro-Soviet International Movement for Peace Council in several countries. See *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA) 8, year 23 (April 1971): 71, about such an attempt in the city of Tucumán, Argentina.
150. Results of a public opinion poll by the IPSA Institute, ordered by DAIA, Centro de Estudios Sociales, *Boletín Interno*, July 24, 1967, p. 1.
151. *El Plata* (Montevideo daily), January 13, 1961. Public opinion poll organized by the Instituto Uruguayo de Opinión Publica. The figures of Table 6 indicated that the younger generation was more aware of the issue, apparently for being more sensitive to questions of national sovereignty.
152. Israeli Embassy, Caracas, Press Department, July 5, 1967. *Algunos extractos de prensa y radio, mensajes, cartas y telegramas . . .*
153. Natanel Lorch, *Hana'har Halochesh* (Hebrew), pp. 156-66.
154. Such is the case in Mexico concerning all topics of foreign affairs. Modesto Seara Vázques, *La política exterior de México* (Mexico City: Editorial Esfinge, 1969), p. 19.
155. "Israel: en la Tierra Prometida," *Ercilla* (Santiago de Chile weekly), January 17-21, 1970; "Los judíos sin miedo," *Extra* (Buenos Aires weekly), May 1969; and many others.
156. Source: Foreign Ministry of Israel, *Report on the mass media* (Hebrew), Monthly Bulletin, August 1971-June 1972. The compiled data might be slightly biased by the fact that the press cuttings were collected by Israel embassies in Latin America and not by an independent agency.
157. The data has been composed of all articles (1,157) available at the Foreign Ministry Archives for the years 1967-73, of which 1,393 major images were selected (usually a central one for each article with more than one image marking exceptional occasions). Articles are usually taken from leading national newspapers in each country. The fact that they have been sent to Israel by the country's diplomatic missions on the continent has probably influenced the rather pro-Israeli bias in the sample. But in spite of this

limitation and although we assume that we reviewed only a part of all articles published during this period, we can nevertheless regard the data as relevant. The sample does not include news items and cables from international press agencies, which are almost invariably Western and mainly American.

158. If we compare these results with those of the previous survey which was based on the evaluation of single articles by Foreign Ministry officials, we can observe a considerable difference in the proportion of positive articles (76 percent as against 53.27 percent), a similarity with regard to the negative (14 percent and 13.06 percent), but a great difference in the neutral category (10% and 33.67%). Although one could attribute the differences to the fact that the latter survey used a larger and more comprehensive sample, one could also stress the point made previously as to the positive bias resulting from the subjective perceptions of the Israeli diplomats.
159. ID 51, Israel, July 1972.
160. Data taken from "Análisis de la prensa mexicana dedicado a la repercusión de la guerra del Medio Oriente," October 31, 1973, unpublished report.
161. During this period there were twelve official diplomatic interventions in the Mexican press. The Israeli ambassador was interviewed four times; and the Israeli Ministry of Tourism released one official communiqué (a total of five interventions). On the other hand, seven Arab interventions can be cited — four by Egyptian ambassadors, two by the Lebanese, and one joint declaration by both ambassadors.
162. One example of this is a staunchly pro-Israeli president of Ecuador, who explained his attitude toward the Jewish state as follows: "For me Israel is a metaphysical need for humanity." ID 69, March 1972.
163. One of the smaller parties campaigning in the 1973 presidential elections in Venezuela was Fuerza Democrática Popular (FDP). The leader, Jorge Dager, is of Lebanese descent and has received funding from Arab embassies and is militantly anti-Israeli.
164. Robert Alexander, "The Emergence of Modern Political Parties in Latin America," in *Government and Politics in Latin America,* ed. Peter G. Snow (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1967) pp. 385-403.
165. A detailed report of these anti-Jewish activities can be found in the bulletins of representative organizations of the Jewish community in Argentina (DAIA) and in the regular information bulletins (*OJI)* of the Latin American Jewish Congress, Buenos Aires.
166. Sensationalist right-wing magazines have published headlines such as "In Israel There Are Less Jews Than in Our Country," and "The Espionage of the Most Racist Race, via Zionist Organizations," *Propagando Verdades,* (Buenos Aires weekly), June 28, 1960.
167. Cooperation with Latin American antisemitic groups has long been an Arab tactic. A curious result of this policy occurred at the United Nations in 1962. Ahmed Shukairy, then head of the Saudi Arabian delegation, openly praised the Argentine Nazi group Tacuara. The Argentine delegate expressed dismay. Another example of cooperation between pro-Nazi groups and the Arabs is the Chilean publication Cruz Gamada (swastika), most of which is devoted to "Palestine, Arab land" and "Communist-Jewish infiltration," or "Capitalist-Jewish exploitation." See *Cruz Gamada* (Santiago de Chile) Partido NacionalSocialista, year 6, December 1969. Another curious result of this sort of collusion took place in Buenos Aires in 1964. At a public meeting called to express solidarity with the Arab states, the Arab League delegate was greeted with the shout "Expel the Jews to Israel" and with the Nazi salute.
168. This statement was confirmed by party activists from the Venezuelan Acción Democrática, Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), Febretistas from Paraguay, and the Chilean Partido Radical interviewed during a seminar for the study of the Israeli experience in socialism, held in Beit Berl, Israel, May 10, 1972.
169. Andrés Townsend Ezcurra, an APRA politician and ex-president of Peru's Chamber of Deputies, intimated in an interview that within the Social Democratic group itself there were varying degrees of sympathy towards Israel, with the Costa Rican PLN and the Peruvian APRA ranking highest in support. He also noted that the position of

Haya de la Torre, the founder and leader of APRA, had been strongly pro-Israeli. Beit Berl, Israel, May 10, 1972.

170. "Relaciones de Costa Rica con la Unión Soviética." Reply by President José Figueres to a public letter. Publicaciones del Ministerio de Gobernación, San José, April 6, 1971, p. 3.
171. *América Latina y el Socialismo Democrático*, Colección Seminarios y Documentos, Centro de Estudios Democráticos de América Latina (CEDAL), San José (Costa Rica), 1970, p. 41.
172. JC 89. Interview with Venezuelan Jewish community activist who was in frequent contact with national party leadership, April 9, 1973.
173. Characterized by social reformism and strong personalism — the impact of Juan Domingo Perón's charisma over the party-movement which never faded even during his extended exile — the party has drawn heavily on caudillistic traditions and personal loyalty patterns inherent in Latin America's political culture. Its leaders manifested traditionally paternalistic concern for the marginal lumpenproletriat *(descamisados)* while also commanding massive support in the ranks of unionized workers. Party ideology, named "Justicialismo" for its domestic platform, and "Tercera Posición" in the realm of international relations, has always been flexible if not opportunistic. The permanent component in this ideology has been its strong nationalism.
174. Such is the case of Raúl Bustos Fierro, who participated in a seminar on social democracy conducted in Israel. See *OJI*, no. 30/72 (127).
175. Several excerpts from speeches by J.D. Perón in the 1946-53 era, containing benevolent expressions toward Argentine Jewry and Israel, in Juan José Sebreli, *La cuestión judía en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1968), pp. 147-55.
176. G. Wigoder, "After Perón: Bleak Future for Argentina's Jews," *Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1974.
177. The periodical provided some "essential biographical data" about the "ungrateful Jewish minister whose parents . . . immigrated with the rest of the family to this generous land . . . Thus, since childhood, José Ber encountered true Christian prodigality and spirit of a people that does not make distinctions between races and religions." Quoted in *OJI*, no. 27/74 (228).
178. *OJI*, no. 27/74 (228).
179. See statements of deputies Eduardo Sepúlveda Muñoz of the PDC and of Camilo Salvo of PR. República de Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Sesión 39a Extraordinaria, May 19, 1971, *Diario de Sesiones*.
180. *OJI* (Buenos Aires), Servicio de Información no. 18/72 (115).
181. In a seminar on the Israeli socialist experience organized by Israel's Labor Party, of the twenty-five participants representing Social Democratic parties from eight Latin American nations, Chile was represented by six delegates, all of them from the Partido Radical or the splinter Partido Izquierda Radical. Other Latin American parties represented were the Peronist, PSD, and PSP of Argentina; PLN and Renovación Democrática of Costa Rica; PRD of the Dominican Republic; the Mexican PRI; the Febrerista of Paraguay; the Peruvian APRA, and the Venezuelan AD. See list of participants and affiliation in "Misión latinoamericana de estudio sobre la experiencia socialista Israelí, Abril 29-Mayo 14, 1972 (Memoria)." Partido Laborista Israelí, Departamento Internacional, 1972.
182. Of significance here is the case of Radical senator Isauro Torres, who changed his posture over the years, and from a pro-Israeli activism turned to open proArabism, and was rewarded with a Jordanian decoration bestowed on him by Jordan's head of legation Nicolas Kattan. JC 88; JC 201.
183. *OJI* (Buenos Aires), Servicio de Información no. 8/72 (105), February 23, 1972.
184. República de Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Legislatura Extraordinaria, Sesión 22a, December 17, 1969, *Diario de Sesiones*.
185. See statement by Allende "We Have Always Recognized the Rights of the Jewish Poeple and of Israel," quoted in *Haaretz*, April 12, 1971. Also "Chile's President

Refused to Make an Anti-Israeli Statement," in *Maariv*, December 5, 1972; and "Allende reclama libertad para los judíos soviéticos," *La Opinión*, November 24, 1972.

186. Some of Altamirano's views found expression in an interview he gave in "exile" after the anti-Allende coup. Interviewed in Belgrade for the Italian *L'Expresso*, Altamirano talked most favorably about the Arabs uniting against "Zionist aggression" and stated that "the mechanism designed by Arab states to employ the oil as a defensive arm, has great significance for the underdeveloped world." Quoted in *OJI*, no. 16/74 (217).
187. JC 201, December 30, 1974.
188. It should be noted that A. Chelen did subscribe to the call issued in 1967 for "peace in the Middle East," which upheld the principle of direct negotiations between the Middle East parties. See *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), July 23, 1967.
189. *OJI* (Buenos Aires), Servicio de Información no. 43/72 (141), November 10, 1972.
190. *El Siglo* (official daily of the Chilean Communist party), June 6, 1967.
191. *Israel: tema para la izquierda*, pp. 304-5.
192. For typical expressions of the pro-Israeli stand of the two writers-politicians see, Eudocio Ravines, "Israel repite la historia bíblica de David y Goliath," *La Verdad* (Caracas), May 19, 1970; and Carlos Manuel Pellecer, "Evolución del conflicto arabe israelí," *El Universal* (Mexico City), November 19, 1968.
193. JC 89, April 9, 1973.
194. This quotation is taken from the *Punto Final* article as reprinted in the March 3, 1970 issue of the Uruguayan periodical *De Frente*.
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid.
197. The following data is based on a detailed list of congressional statements related to the Middle East, prepared for the authors by Chile's Library of the National Congress.
198. JC 201, December 30, 1974.
199. Quoted in *Crónicas de Israel*, June-July 1962, p. 11.
200. *OJI*, no. 22/71 (67).
201. This observation is based on comparison of speeches delivered in the Chilean Congress in 1963, 1971, and 1972. The sources for 1971 and 1972 are cited in previous footnotes. The 1963 speeches were published by *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), May 9, 1963.
202. JC 202, internal Jewish community report, May 1973.
203. Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria Número 23, June 7, 1967, p. 52 (motion by deputies Garrón, Salazar, Molina Quesada, and Vicente Castro).
204. Internal Jewish report (full title withheld) *JC* 203, December 1964. Congressman Cornejo Linares was influenced by Arab League representative Hussein Triki into proposing that an inquiry committee be set up to investigate "Anti-Argentine activities of the Zionist Organization," and to spread rumors of a Zionist plot to create a Jewish republic in Southern Argentina known, at one stage, as "Andinia." See Juan Carlos Cornejo Linares, *El nuevo orden sionista en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Tacuarí, 1964.) There he mentions "separate" Jewish education, the "Zionist military camps," the deformation of news, etc.
205. *OJI*, Servicio de Información no. 17/72 (114), April 26, 1972. Ironically, the bank involved in the cited incident is owned by a left-wing anti-Zionist Jewish group (ICUF) which, in the last Uruguayan presidential elections, supported the leftist Frente Amplio.
206. *Boletín Informativo* (DAIA, Buenos Aires), no. 27 (September 15, 1971): 10.
207. JC 50.

3

Israel's Instruments of Foreign Policy

LATIN AMERICA IN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY

The major aims of Israel's foreign policy are, for obvious reasons, connected with strategic and military issues. Israel's major goal is to secure sources of military supply and economic aid. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the creation of the state, Israel has been primarily involved with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and with the secondary powers of the Western European subsystem. The two superpowers are also the countries with the two largest diaspora communities.

Thus the developing worlds of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have held a less important position on the priority scale of Israel's foreign policy; Israel's aims in the developing world have been more of a diplomatic character, i.e., attempts to gain recognition, establish permanent representation on a bilateral level, gain votes at the United Nations, obtain political support for its stand against terrorism, etc. With regard to certain adjacent African and Asian states, Israel has also taken into account military and geopolitical considerations.

The position commanded by each of the three continents in Israel's foreign policy is difficult to determine, especially as the importance of each has fluctuated over the years. But by checking the number of offical policy statements related to Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the *Israeli*

Government Yearbook from 1949-50 to 1967-68, it is possible to draw some conclusions.

The prominence accorded to Asia and Africa (in particular to the latter) is confirmed by an analysis of the annual speeches delivered in the Knesset by foreign ministers submitting the ministry s budget (see Chart 12). Golda Meir, when submitting the 1961-62 budget, devoted the equivalent of 165 newspaper column lines to Africa, 86 to Asia, and 22 to Latin America, even though she noted the multiple opportunities available to Israel for strengthening its ties with Latin America.[1] There was also a similar disproportion in Abba Eban's budget speech of 1973-74.[2] That Latin America has received less attention than the other two continents is confirmed by an analysis of Ben Gurion's foreign policy concerns; they rank Latin America last, after the Arab countries, the four Great Powers, peripheral states, and Asia and Africa.[3] Israeli diplomats with Latin American service background were sensitive to this disproportion, particularly as Israel has received greater political support from Latin America than from other developing areas.[4]

Chart 12
Analysis of Israeli Foreign Ministers' Budget Speeches at Knesset



Source: Israel Government Year Book
(Jerusalem: Hamadpis Hamemshalti, 1949/50, 1967/68)

Let us consider summarily the evolution of Latin America's role in Israel's foreign policy. The first large-scale and coordinate "charge" on Latin America was initiated by the prestatehood Jewish-Zionist leadership. Their aim was to enlist the support of the elites and general public of Latin America for Zionist aspirations. For, even while World War II was raging and the United Nations was not yet in existence, the

Zionist leadership was preparing for the possibility that the Palestine question would be brought up before the international community. This was the primary reason for the establishment of the Pro-Hebrew Palestine Committees of the mid 1940s in numerous Latin American countries, and for the intensive lobbying engaged in by a handful of dedicated representatives of the Jewish Agency, in Latin American capitals and later at the United Nations. Latin American countries constituted, on the eve of Israel's birth and during its first years of statehood, more than one-third of the total UN membership. Latin America's importance in the international arena was already appreciated in that period. The Israeli delegation to the United Nations included a special section which dealt with Latin America, whereas, at that time "no other geographic regions of the world merited separate and clearly defined sections or advisors within the Israeli UN delegation."[5]

Israel's foreign service developed gradually. Until the mid-fifties not even in Europe was Israel represented by resident missions in most countries. This was due to a policy wherein priorities had to be fixed according to limited budgets and personnel. The peripheral areas, including Latin America, were given low priority. Why an intensification of relations with Latin America was thus postponed until the early sixties, may be partially explained as follows. First, Israel felt it imperative to overcome its isolation in Asia which was due to these main factors: a barrier of Arab countries; the existence in Asian countries of large Moslem populations; a general incomprehension of the Jewish people's biblical roots in the land of Israel, and the feeling that Jewish settlement in Israel was a "white colonialist venture." Second, the trend of the Israeli government at that time was towards nonidentification with East or West, and it was felt that there was a convergence of Israeli and Asian views on these matters.

Israel's Asian drive continued over the fifties, until the Sinai war of 1956. Subsequently, Africa became Israel's major foreign policy goal in the developing world. The African trend was particularly strong under Golda Meir's tenure as foreign minister, coinciding with the creation of a large number of new states, aspiring for rapid development and with no traditional positions on the Middle East conflict. Israel thus had an opportunity to establish ties with African nations, offering them its cooperation (e.g., technical assistance programs). The possibilities presented for trade with Africa by the opening up of the Strait of Tiran, and the need to preempt Arab influence made the Israeli drive even more urgent.

Until the late sixties, Israel directed only sporadic diplomatic campaigns to Latin America, usually connected with UN debates; the content of Israeli-Latin American relations was thus limited and of a political,

noneconomic nature. Factors which contributed to the increase of Israeli attention to Latin America in the late 1960s were the crisis in Israeli-Argentine relations precipitated by the Eichmann kidnapping of 1960 and the emergence of new trends following the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

Post-Yom Kippur war developments heightened Israel's interest in Latin America. Friendly relations with Latin America assumed greater importance after the rupture of diplomatic relations with African, Eastern European, and some Asian countries.

There is also another influence in Israel's Latin American policy which must not be underestimated: relations with the Jewish communities of Latin America. Sharett referred to Israel's relationship with Latin America as a "triangular harmony": Israel's relations with Latin American governments; Latin American governments' relations with local Jewry; and Israel's relations with Latin American Jewry."[6] The interaction of these three actors is of great importance to Israel. We shall proceed to analyze Israel's foreign policy instruments applied to Latin America: diplomatic, cultural, military, economic, technical, and informational.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In establishing diplomatic relations after independence, Israel benefited from a solid and well-developed base of intensive pro-Zionist activity sustained by the Latin American Jewish communities, dating from the prestatehood period. Latin America's connections with the Zionist movement can be traced back to its first steps in world politics. Already in 1921 a book written by Rudesindo Martínez on Jewish people and political Zionism[17] provided eloquent support for the Jewish struggle for a national homeland in Palestine. With the approval, in the 1920 San Remo Conference of the British Mandate in Palestine, support for the Balfour Declaration came also from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Practically till the very days of the creation of the United Nations, the frame of reference was not of a clash of nationalities (Israeli-Arab problem) but an overwhelming positive identification with the Zionist aspirations for a Jewish homeland.

The atrocities committed by the Third Reich and the problems created by the large number of unabsorbed Jewish refugees from Europe gave an added impetus to Latin American ruling circles to endorse Zionist claims for an independent Jewish state.[8] Representatives of the Latin American Zionist federations and of the Jewish Agency were highly instrumental in establishing Pro-Hebrew Palestine Committees in 1945-46 in all Latin American countries except Haiti, which continued to function until 1949, when Israel was accepted as a member of the United Nations. The creation of such committees must be attributed in most cases to the personal

initiative of a few individuals: the envoy of the Jewish National Fund, Nathan Bistritzki; Jewish Agency officials Moshe Tov, Beno Weiser, Abraham Mibashan, and Rachel Sefaradi Yarden[9] of the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency in New York. A declaration of the Argentine committee explains the motivations for the formation of such bodies:

> Contemporary history records as one of the most shameful facts that antisemitic persecution was carried out with the premeditation and cruelty characteristic of regimes which destroy human dignity wherever they establish themselves or strike temporary roots. Our country, which harbors extensive settlements established by Jewish effort and which counts in all fields of endeavor with Argentines coming from Jewish homes, has not been free from such objectionable movements. We have heard in our very streets voices which are contrary to our democratic constitution and to the established standards of peaceful cooperation. The policy which was carried out in the Third Reich and in the countries occupied by it, the most cruel extermination, has impelled the Jews to place an even greater stress on their demand for their historic land of Palestine, where they may, within the British Commonwealth of Nations, establish a home for the Jews persecuted in other lands. The Balfour Declaration had solemnly promised such a homeland. Various factors have greatly hampered the realization of this idea. Inveterate prejudices and ill-advised political expediency have presented the greatest obstacles . . . Convinced that the full implementation of the Balfour Declaration will contribute to the welfare of the Jewish people and will remove the blot of persecution from civilized society, we invite all those who are inspired by the ideal of human solidarity to join the Pro-Palestine Committee. Through this committee we shall add strength to the efforts of those who promote the creation of the Jewish homeland in Palestine.[10]

Committee members were mostly from liberal elements; in some cases they had been involved in supporting the Spanish Republic, and during World War II, in the Anti-Fascist Committees. They readily joined the new just cause to appear in the middle 1940s — the establishment of a Jewish state.[11] The Society of Freemasons gave ample support to the Jewish struggle and many of its active members enrolled in the pro-Zionist committees[12] as, for example, in Uruguay. In Chile and El Salvador devout Catholics became activists within and on behalf of these bodies, with, in many cases, outstanding political leaders heading the drive. In Chile, past and future presidents particpated in the cause — Arturo Alessandri (Conservative), Gabriel González Videla (Radical), Salvador Allende

(Socialist), and Eduardo Frei (Christian Democrat). In Mexico, expresident Lázaro Cárdenas — the center figure of the Mexican Left — was among its members. In El Salvador, Reinaldo Galindo Pohl, one of the five members of the junta installed following the coup d'état of December 14, 1948, continued to serve as vice-president of the El Salvador Pro-Palestine Committee. The president of the El Salvador committee, Rubén H. Dimas, was appointed minister of culture.[13]

Although most of the daily work was carried out by local representatives of the Jewish Agency on the continent, some non-Jewish committee members were no less active. International law professor Gustavo Gutiérrez, of Cuba, toured all the Latin American countries in 1946.[14] Chile's Gabriel González Videla represented Latin America and the International Christian Conference for Palestine in the World Committee for Palestine Congress held in the United States in 1945. In the same year, the first Latin American Zionist Convention took place in Uruguay and an impressive number of messages of solidarity were received from prominent political leaders and intellectuals from all over the continent. The committees addressed public opinion, lobbied in parliaments,[15] and sought statements of support from political personalities. The main task however, was to obtain favorable "instructions to the delegations of these countries to the UN General Assembly."[16] In some cases, in spite of existence of an influential Pro-Hebrew Palestine Committee, the votes cast at the meeting of the UN General Assembly were disappointing. In the case of Cuba, the well-organized committee directed by Ofelia Domínguez which included personalities ranging from the Communist Left to the ruling Center and enjoyed the support of the trade unions, the university committee for the recognition of the State of Israel, and the legislature, could not prevent the Cuban delegate at the United Nations from casting the only Latin American vote against the November 1947 Partition Resolution. Chile, in spite of the fact that the newly elected president Gabriel González Videla was a former chairman of the committee, abstained at the final voting. The explanation is that other factors influenced the vote at the United Nations, e.g., in Chile, Arab economic threats apparently made the government decide to change course. Altogether, pro-Palestine committees were instrumental in increasing support for the Zionist cause; the outstanding cases were Paraguay, Brazil, Panama, Guatemala, and Bolivia. In the latter, the committee was successful in achieving a change in Bolivia's initial position and obtaining its support for Israel's admission to the United Nations in May 1949.[17]

During the early years following independence, Israel's representation was carried out, in most cases, on an honorary consular basis, with a local Jewish representative continuing his prestatehood functions on behalf of the Jewish Agency. Many of them displayed remarkable ability and

dedication in representing Israel for many years, such as Samuel Goren in Chile, Salvador Rosenthal in Colombia, Eric Heinemann in Guatemala, Benjamín Shapira in Paraguay, and Adolfo Fastlicht in Mexico. The first Israeli head of the diplomatic mission in the continent was Jacob Tsur, who presented his credentials as minister to Uruguay in October 1948.[18] Later on he was transferred to Buenos Aires, where he presented his credentials to President Perón on August 1, 1949[19] and was also credited in 1950 as nonresident minister to Chile and Paraguay. In 1951, an Israeli legation was opened in Rio de Janeiro and in 1953 one was also opened in Mexico. In all cases, the countries reciprocated by opening diplomatic missions in Israel. In the remaining Latin American countries there were no permanent Israeli representatives. In Latin America most responsibilities were carried by Moshe Tov, who in 1955 was appointed director of the Foreign Ministry's Latin American Division.

Although some Latin American countries were willing to exchange diplomatic missions with Israel at an early stage,[20] Israel chose to invest most of its energies in other areas. It is reported by Israeli official sources that "in the spring of 1954, the governments of Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua announced their readiness to exchange diplomatic representatives with Israel,"[21] but in most cases it took nearly two decades to establish permanent representation.

A crisis in Israel's relations with Argentina erupted in 1960. On May 30, Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped in Buenos Aires and flown to Israel in the official airplane that had brought the Israeli delegation to participate in Argentina's 150th Independence Anniversary celebrations. Argentina saw in the kidnapping a flagrant violation of its sovereignty and Israel's subsequent explanations which stressed the unique character of the case were rejected. In June, Ambassador Levavi was declared persona non grata and the Argentine government brought up the matter before the UN Security Council, pressing for condemnation of Israel. The council requested Israel to give Argentina "adequate compensation." At the beginning of August, Israel's special envoy, S. Rosenne, met with Argentine officials and a communiqué was issued declaring the incident between the two countries closed.

A conference of Israeli diplomats in Latin America took place in Montevideo (February 1961), attended by the director general of the Foreign Ministry, Haim Yachil, and the director of the Latin American Division, Abraham Darom, where relations with Latin America were reassessed. While in the past friendly links were based mainly on humanitarian and moral support, it was decided that a more concrete basis should be developed. Following Israel's successful technical assistance programs to Africa, similar projects were offered to Latin America;

diplomatic representation was considerably enlarged, as shown in Chart 13.[22] Chart 14 confirms once again that intensification of the Israeli diplomatic drive in Latin America took place in the 1960's. Legations were raised to the rank of Embassies and new missions opened — immediately at the higher diplomatic rank.

At present, Israel has full diplomatic relations at the embassy level with nineteen Latin American countries, and until September 1973, also maintained a legation in Cuba. In seventeen countries it had permanent

Chart 13
Growth of Israeli Diplomatic Network in Latin America



Chart 14
Israeli Embassies and Legations in Latin America



missions, while in Honduras and Nicaragua the representation is through nonresident Israeli ambassadors posted in neighboring countries. Israel is thus the fourth extracontinental state, after France, Great Britain, and Spain in size of representation on the continent. Most embassies function with a small diplomatic staff: an ambassador and one or two secretaries.

Those in Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil (besides the embassy in Brasilia, consulates function in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), and Mexico have larger staffs. At present there are three military attachés in Latin America. They are stationed in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, and are accredited also to neighboring countries.

In addition to permanent missions, Israel uses other means in furthering its aims. There are frequent visits of leading political figures to the continent. Among them, Foreign Minister Sharett in 1953, 1957, and 1960; Foreign Minister Golda Meir in 1959 and in 1965; President Zalman Shazar in 1966; Foreign Minister Abba Eban in 1960, 1964, 1965, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973; and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon in 1976. While many of these visits are of an offical nature, many other ministers and members of parliament visit Latin American countries in private capacities or in connection with the Jewish communities, particularly during periods preceding elections for the World Zionist Organizations, in order to mobilize support for their own political parties in the diaspora.

Latin American official visitors to Israel rarely include presidents in office (the exception being the cases of Costa Rica and Nicaragua), but ministers and diplomats; they come from all the Latin American countries, while small countries like Costa Rica and Uruguay have sent as many visitors as have large countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil.

Special Israeli visits are usually planned before the beginning of the UN General Assembly, in order to enlist support from Latin American governments. We should mention particularly the successful missions of roving ambassadors Itzhak Harkabi and Jacob Tsur, who toured Southern and Central America twice during and after the Six-Day war; their meetings with presidents and foreign ministers were instrumental in promoting the Latin American stand at the United Nations against the demand for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Apart from the official implications of such visits, they are usually accompanied by extensive press coverage. An example was the four-day visit to Peru of Ambassador Barromi, then director of the Latin American Division — within the framework of a three-week tour of South American countries — in March 1972; in a country with a "neutralist" foreign policy, twenty-four news items and articles were published. Israel has also sent high-ranking representatives — often cabinet ministers — to inauguration ceremonies of presidents or national anniversaries.

It is difficult to assess the quality of Israeli diplomacy and diplomats with those from the Arab countries, though they also specified that there is a wide gap between the highly successful and average Israeli representatives. Some criticism was directed at the appointment of ambassadors through the Israeli political parties key system.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

An experienced Israeli diplomat has noted that Israeli and Latin American intellectuals play an important role in bringing their two peoples closer.[23] We also agree that in the main intellectuals have a large influence on Latin American public opinion. The public has a distrust of políticos, but respects writers, artists, university professors, and even folk singers — all of whom involve themselves willingly in political life. Cultural relations are therefore particularly relevant to Israel's contacts with Latin America.[24] Furthermore, a basis for the development of cultural relations has existed for many years due to Latin American familiarity with the Bible, proximity to Jewish communities, guilt feelings after the Holocaust, and acquaintance with Zionist ideals. The lively interest in Jewish topics is reflected by the fact that by 1970, according to figures of the American Jewish Committee, 424 books dealing with such topics were published in Spanish and Portuguese.[25]

To a large extent a positive image of Israel determined the support it received from Latin America during its early years. And Latin American intellectuals were largely responsible for that image. When Israel gained independence, Israeli diplomats and honorary counsuls took care of political representation and "the pro-Palestine Committees became cultural institutions whose duty was to serve as an intellectual link with Israel."[26]

The Instituto de Relaciones Culturales México-Israel[27] was formed in 1949, and in 1950 a similar body was organized in Chile. Judges, politicians, clergymen, university professors, journalists, and artists headed them. Most were non-Jewish. In 1956 the Central Institute of Cultural Relations Israel-Ibero-America was formed in Jerusalem. Its aim was to strengthen ties with existing institutes in Latin America and promote the establishment of new ones.[28] At its peak the institute had eighteen affiliated institutes in Latin America and one in New York.[29] In 1972 there were twelve functioning institutes.[30] The reason for the decrease was not only because many of the younger intellectuals, influenced by other developments, had become less sympathetic to Israel; it was the desire to keep old friends in office that hampered the efforts necessary for finding a new generation to take over. Another reason for the relative diminution of cultural interaction was the development since the sixties of additional foreign policy instruments such as technical assistance programs. In its cultural drive Israel could draw on its Spanish-Sephardic background.[31] One of the advantages of the cultural institutes' activity has been their ability to maintain relations with intellectuals of all political currents, including opposition circles in authoritarian regimes.

The institutes' activities are not only of a cultural nature; its members have not hesitated, in times of crisis, to call for solidarity with Israel. The late president of the Chilean institute, Vergara Bravo, said in a message to his fellow member organizations in the continent:

> We believe that the activities of Latin American-Israeli institutes, no matter how modest and reduced in some cases, constitute nevertheless a significant contribution to information about Israel; no efforts are irrelevant for its [Israel's] definitive consolidation as a sovereign state, through a stable peace, with historical, natural, and secure borders, free for ever from the fear of a surprise attack or guerrilla warfare of armed groups supported or at least tolerated and acclaimed by the opponents who given them refuge in their respective territories. We are conscious of the extraordinary renaissance of Israel as a progressive people and a political community that rigorously follows the path fixed by principles of justice, culture, and peace among nations. Our institute invites the institute under your honorable chairmanship to intensify to a maximum the striving for contributing to revitalize the public opinion and feelings of America, already favorable to its just cause, encouraging the rapprochement of American sensibilities and feelings, entirely propitious for Israel.[32]

In countries such as Uruguay, institute members have organized a Committee of Support for Israel. In June 1974, the first continental conference of the institutes took place in Caracas, attended by sixty delegates from fifteen Latin American countries. A declaration calling to identify with Israel was endorsed. Visiting intellectuals, writers, and artists are often guests of the central institute in Jerusalem. Israel also offers scholarships, lectures, seminars, special weeks devoted to the study of the cultures of different countries, and radio programs on Latin America. Streets, squares, schools, and forests have been named after Latin American heroes, personalities, and countries. Awards are offered to Latin American writers, and the García Granados prize is granted annually to personalities who have contributed to Israeli-Latin American relations. Besides the central institute, there is also in Jerusalem, the Argentine House in Israel/Holy Land which promotes cultural activities. In Tel-Aviv the Israel-Brazil Cultural Center operates.[33] Several Latin American intellectuals who served as ambassadors to Israel have published literary works dedicated to Israeli themes.[34]

Israeli programs take place in different Latin American countries as well.[35] The Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra and Israeli ballet troupes have performed in Latin America. Football games and other sports activities also take place. Exhibits on contemporary Israel and special aspects of its society have been organized.[36] Books about Israel, travelers' impressions,

supplements in newspapers and magazines, Biblical contests, etc., are now common. The Israeli Ibero-American Institute in New York offers lectures by Latin American intellectuals and diplomats, as well as exhibits by Latin American artists.

The Hebrew University and institutes of higher learning and research make an important contribution to relations between Latin America and Israel. Associations of Friends of Israeli Universities in most Latin American countries organize cultural events. There are teacher and student exchanges and some joint research projects. The existence of a Latin American Studies Department at the Hebrew University facilitates direct contact with Latin America's academic community. In 1973, sixty-two courses on Latin America were offered at the various universities in Israel (see Table 15).[37] Studies on Judaism, Israel, and Hebrew exist at several Latin American universities (Chile, Mexico, Brazil) and are assisted by The Hebrew University and local Jewish communities. At the beginning of 1974, there were cultural agreements between Israel and fifteen Latin American countries.

Table 15
Number of Courses on Latin America
Offered at Israeli Universities (1973)

Discipline	Universities					
	Jerusalem	Tel-Aviv*	Haifa*	Bar-Ilan	Beer-sheva	Total
Sociology and Anthropology	2	-	2	-	-	4
Political Science & International Relations	4	2	1	-**	-	7
Geography	3	1	-	-	-***	4
Spanish & Portuguese	8	2	2	2	-	14
Literature	12	-	-	-	-	12
History	13	1	-	-**	-	14
Economics	1	2	-	-	-	3
Contemporary Jewry	4	-	-	-	-	4
TOTAL	47	8	5	2	-	62

* Include courses only partly dealing with Latin America.

** In 1974, three courses in history and one in political science were offered.

*** In 1974, one course was offered.

MILITARY AND DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Israel has no strategic or military interests in Latin America vital to its own security. The reason prompting Israel's activity in some East African states — their geographic proximity to Israel which made them of strategic importance — has no application whatsoever to Israel's relations with Latin America. Nevertheless, during the course of the last decade, Israel has developed an extensive program of cooperation with Latin America which, until recently, was directed by a special department of Israel's Ministry of Defense (the Department for Cooperation and Foreign Liaison).[38]

Despite the fact that much of this work has never been military in nature, but consisted of "civic action" programs relating primarily to Nahal type military-agricultural projects, as well as the establishment and organization of youth movements, it involved direct interaction between Israel's Ministry of Defense and Israeli military (and at times civilian) personnel on the one hand, and Latin American establishments on the other (in some cases the youth movements are civilian-controlled, e.g., Costa Rica). These programs have at times constituted an important part of the total volume of bilateral relations between Israel and Latin American nations.

The development of the civic action type program catered to mutual interests. For Israeli policymakers, deeply conscious of the strategic political importance of the Latin American military establishment, this was an effective and respectable way of maintaining a presence close to the locus of political power.[39] Here Israel could contribute from its unique experience in Nahal and in the organization of youth movements which, for several Latin American military establishments, provided not only a relevant model for civic action and a way of tackling national problems, but was no less instrumental in building a positive and constructive image of the armed forces in their respective nations.[40] Since 1963, Israel has successfully promoted the idea of using the military as a factor in national development.[41] Nahal type programs, utilized by the armed forces for agricultural and colonization tasks, were adopted by Bolivia, Ecuador (1963-64), Peru, and much later (1971) by Colombia; Israeli personnel assisted in their organization.

Another type of activity has been the development of national youth movements, also directed by Israel's Defense Ministry, but mainly carried out in cooperation with civilian authorities. The first pilot experiment with a national youth movement in Latin America was conducted suecessfully in Costa Rica — with Israeli involvement and organizational aid during its first years, 1966 through 1969. The Costa Rican experience had a strong

demonstrative effect and similar programs were initiated in Panama (1971), El Salvador (1972), and Venezuela (1973).[42]

In promoting national youth movements in Latin America, Israel was extremely careful not to indiscriminately copy its own Gadna paramilitary program, despite requests from several governments to do so.[43] Thus the Costa Rican National Youth Movement (MNJ), the first to be established under Israel's guidance in Latin America — in a country where the military establishment had long been dissolved — aimed at purely civic targets: the promotion of educational and cultural activities in youth centers, and the organization of pioneering activities and special operations to instill a sense of purpose and volunteering spirit among Costa Rican youth. Such activities included the construction of schools and community facilities, public health activities, fund raising for welfare purposes, tree planting, road paving, etc.[44]

The other facet of Israel's military relations with Latin America concerns its purely military aspect — primarily the selling of military equipment to Latin American countries. Due to the nature of the subject, very little information is available. Nevertheless, even on the basis of the few scant references in the Israeli and foreign press, certain trends have recently become apparent. There are several reasons for Israel's entry into the group of arms suppliers to Latin America: First, Latin America is interested in alternative sources for armaments in order to reduce its dependence on one dominant supplier; second, Israel's credibility as a military power engendered confidence in the equipment used by its own armed forces. The previous factors would have little relevance without recognizing a third: since the later 1960s, Israel has become a producer of sophisticated and important military items.[45]

With its new industrial technological capabilities, largely a result of post-1967 developments, Israel's defense establishment has considered the exporting of military hardware as an important end in itself.[46] Major Israeli firms engaged in the production of arms and military communications equipment have embarked upon an active sales policy.[47] For Israel's increasingly export-oriented defense industries, breakthrough year for military exports to Latin America was 1973, that continent having rapidly become the major foreign market.[48] Recent sales to Latin America also differ qualitatively in that they include aircraft and armaments, as well as communications and electronic equipment. Within the widening circle of Latin American clients, specific mention by open sources was made of Mexico (sales of Arava, light military transport planes produced by Israeli Aircraft Industry — IAI),[49] Nicaragua (Arava),[50] El Salvador (twenty-five airplanes of various types),[51] and Ecuador (purchase of several Boeing 720s reconditioned by IAI, as well as Arava).[52]

The sale of armaments to El Salvador is of particular significance. The

reported contract, a relatively large one in Central American terms, is unique in that it was concluded with one of the parties to a pending conflict within Latin America, originating with the 1969 "Football war" between El Salvador and Honduras. There is more than suggestive chronological closeness between reports of the arms contract (September 1973) and the announcement in March 1974 that Israel and El Salvador decided to open embassies in their mutual capitals.[53] Although Israel never took a stand on the El Salvador/Honduras conflict, some circles in Honduras saw Israel as supporting the adversary.[54] An editorial in the major Tegucigalpa daily interpreted the purchase of arms by El Salvador as aimed at exerting pressure on Honduras while negotiations between the two countries to resolve their dispute were still under way.[55] Since the war between the two countries, and even prior to the arms deal, there have been several negative references to El Salvador by Honduraneans as the "Israel of Central America," i.e., of a densely populated small country seeking territorial expansion, an image propagated by Arab-influenced media and finding echo in some circles.[56] However, the Israeli equidistant position was later proved by the fact that in 1975 Israel concluded an arms deal with Honduras as well.

Another, more recent, type of cooperation, involving military as well as commercial implications, is the development of joint industrial ventures between Israeli and Latin American interests. The first such case to be publicized is the establishment of an aircraft industry in Mexico with the direct involvement of the Israeli Aircraft Industry. The project calls for an initial investment of over $30 million and will provide direct and indirect employment for 12,000 workers.[57] While most of the financing is to come from Mexican governmental sources, the IAI will plan the project, provide the technological expertise, and serve as management.[58] When materialized, the project will have important implications for both countries. For Israel it will introduce a new content into, as well as broaden its bilateral relations with the second largest Latin American nation. For Mexico, the project means the acquisition of new capability in a vital field of industrial activity. The fact that this new industry is to be located in the city of Mérida, on the Yucatan Peninsula — an economically depressed and largely underdeveloped region of Mexico — may give it a special national impact.

Another field offering possibilities for joint ventures with the more developed Latin American nations is the production of military communications equipment. In this specialized field the Israeli firm Tadiran (Israeli Electronic Industries Ltd.) is one of the world's leading concerns.[59]

Israel's defense system and industries are not unknown to the Latin American military elite. In order to cultivate relations with the armed forces of Latin American nations and facilitate further mutual contacts, visits to Israel's military establishment were initiated in 1964, a policy

which has been thereafter systematically pursued. Between 1964 and 1971 some one hundred and sixty visits were made by Latin Americans to Israeli military bases, defense industries, and other related installations. Of these visits, well over one hundred were made by military personnel representing eighteen Latin American nations (with the exception of only Cuba and Haiti).[60]

A review of these visits shows a clear evolution. While the beginning of the period witnessed familiarization tours, coupled with an effort to promote the special assistance semimilitary programs, the visits since 1970 have become much more businesslike, and interest has clearly shifted to sales of military equipment. This trend reflects the changes in Israel's developing military ties with the Latin American continent. Chronologically, the first significant contacts were made with the Andean republics. Bolivia sent a high-level delegation, headed by its chief of staff, as early as 1964. Ecuador followed in 1965 by dispatching the graduating class of its top military academy. In most cases visits became more frequent after the 1967 war, the success of Israel's armed forces having also sparked the interest of the larger, more sophisticated military establishments (Argentina, Brazil). The most recent wave, starting in 1969 (Peru) and receiving impetus in 1970-71 (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua), had as its primary interest the procuring of armaments, military communications equipment, etc.

Within the last group, military ties developed rapidly with Peru through 1970. Despite a substantial reduction of activities in 1971, sales of military communications and other equipment to Peru have continued, as well as visits to Israel by officers in high governmental positions. In numerous cases, the visiting military personnel included top echelon officers, including: chiefs of staff (Bolivia's both in 1964 and 1974, Chile, 1967, Peru, 1970, Guatemala, 1971, Venezuela, 1971, and Ecuador, 1974); chiefs of navies (Venezuela and Chile, 1970) and air forces (Guatemala, 1971); defense ministers (Colombia, 1964 and 1967, Guatemala, 1971); senior defense officials (Ecuador and Peru, 1971); as well as several ex-defense ministers and retired chiefs of staff (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Uruguay). In addition, visits were paid by key military men holding nonmilitary cabinet posts (Bolivia's foreign minister, Colonel J. Zenteno Amaya, in 1966; Brazil's minister of interior, General A. Albuquerque Lima, in 1967; and Bolivia's new foreign minister, General A. Guzman Soriano, in 1974, and others). In at least two instances, visiting chiefs of staff later became heads of state: Alfredo Ovando Candía visited Israel in 1964 as commander in chief, and became Bolivia's president in 1968; Kjell Laugerud Garcia visited Israel as chief of staff in 1971 and became Guatemala's president in 1974. In the case of General Laugerud, of special interest is the fact that on the eve of entering office he

made another private "pilgrimage" to Israel (April 1974) announcing upon his departure his wish to widen cooperation with Israel.[61] The fact that some visiting officers have been directors or on the staffs of their nation's highest military academies (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay), may have provided greater resonance to their visits. Tours of military sites and defense industries have also been made available to a number of civilians. These include parliamentarians, officials in the spheres of education and agrarian reform interested in Gadna and Nahal programs, civilians close to military circles, and journalists.[62]

There could scarcely be an event which could better dramatize the long road traveled by Israel in its defense contacts with Latin America than a tiny news item on a display of Israeli-made arms held in early 1974 in Managua for Nicaragua's strongman Anastasio Somoza.[63] His father, "Tacho" Somoza, twenty-six years earlier had provided Hagana agents with Nicaraguan diplomatic passports and other necessary cover in order to facilitate their efforts in procuring armaments for the War of Independence.[64] Israel's role had undergone a complete change by the time defense ties were initiated with Latin America in the 1960s. The development of cooperation facilitated contacts with omnipresent Latin American military elite, both through the sending of Israeli personnel for civic action and other programs in Latin America and through the flow of visitors to Israel from that continent. Arms sales and Israel's growing capability to provide military technological know-how are providing influence hitherto nonexistent, at a time when Arab pressures have become more effective.

While the economic significance of recent military sales to Latin America is evident, political advantage is not always measurable. In the case of El Salvador, the political dividends accrued from defense ties proved tangible. It remains to be seen whether in the case of the larger regional powers (i.e. Mexico) Israel's readiness to transmit and provide advanced military technology can affect the level of political support.

Economic and Trade Relations

There have been several objective and subjective impediments to the expansion of trade between Israel and Latin America. Distances between them are great and transport routes irregular, prolonged, and expensive. In addition, high tariffs, protectionist policies, and other restrictive measures on imports have been practiced by many Latin American countries. The economic instability of the latter is almost structural, manifested in high inflationary rates and frequent currency devaluations. Also, Israeli entrepreneurs are unfamiliar with Latin American market conditions. Furthermore, with the Soviet bloc's recent economic and other aid pro-

grams in Latin America (in Allende's Chile, Peru), it was feared that neutralist tendencies would develop on that continent which would affect Israel unfavorably. For these reasons Israel hesitated in entering the Latin American market, accounting for the marginal, if not insignificant, amount of mutual trade, as reflected in Table 16.

Table 16
Latin America in Israel's Foreign Trade
(in millions of $U.S.)

Year	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Total Israel Imports	496	584	626	662	815	815	817	457	1093	1302	1426	1786
Total Imports from LA	3	3	8	7	11	15	22	16	22	26	32	32
Total Israel Exports	211	584	271	338	352	406	477	517	602	689	734	915
Total Exports to LA	4	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	9	10	11	16

Source: Halishka Hamerkazit Lestatistika, Shnaton Statisti le Israel. (Israel's statistical yearbook), Jerusalem, 1972.

As late as 1971, senior officials at Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry still did not expect significant expansion in trade with Latin America "even in the future," due to distance and tariff barriers.[65] Different, more optimistic appraisals were sounded in 1972, which were later reinforced. The new emergent optimism is based on statistical data: an upward trend in commercial trade relations since 1967, dramatized by a 46 percent increase in Israel's exports to Latin America in a single year (1970), with a further leap in 1973. When measured over the six-year period of 1967-73, the expansion rate in volume of trade in both directions is astounding. In 1967, the amount of Latin American-Israeli trade amounted to slightly more than $20 million. In 1973 the figure reached almost $100 million, an increase of approximately 500 percent. In 1973, as in previous years, the trade balance was decidedly in favor of Latin America, as Israel's purchase of regional commodities totaled $75 million as compared to approximately $24 million in exports.[66] Nevertheless, Israel's exports to Latin America continued to expand rapidly during 1974. Tentative export figures for January-October 1974, showed a rise to $36 million with a total of $45 million expected by the end of the year.[67] With the rapid increase in volume of trade, Latin America has become a significant supplier of certain foodstuffs and raw materials to the Israeli market.[68]

Several factors support expectations of further expansion of Israeli-Latin American economic relations. These include the desire of the latter

for reduced economic dependence on the United States and hence a broadening of its relations with other countries, and, with the acceleration of development projects in Latin America, both agricultural and industrial, new possibilities for commerce have been created.[69] Developments since 1973 have added new momentum to this trend. Important new factors are the low ebb in Israel's relations with Africa and the consequent shift of Israel's attention, commercially as well as in other ways, to Latin America, and the availability of vast financial resources in several Latin American oil-producing countries (currently Venezuela and Ecuador).

Although several governmental, public, and private bodies have been striving to promote wider trade and economic relations with Latin America,[70] this potential is clearly undertapped, with the Latin American market still being regarded as only in its discovery stage for Israel's firms and entrepreneurs. Table 17 shows Israel's major trading partners in Latin America. Note that with regard to imports, the major partners have remained the same in almost unchanging order, i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay. With regard to exports, the pattern has been more fluid and, alongside stable markets (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico), others show sharp fluctuations (e.g. Peru)[71]

Table 17
Israel's Trade with Latin America
(1967-1973, in millions of $U.S.)

	1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
Argentina	10.6	0.5	13.0	1.4	13.4	2.3	15.6	1.3	12.9	2.0	14.5	0.8	40.5	1.2
Brasil	0.7	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.9	1.8	4.6	2.7	9.0	3.5	13.5	3.4	22.2	8.7
Mexico	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	1.1	0.3	2.0	1.2	1.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	4.1
Panama	0.3	0.9	-	0.6	0.2	2.2	0.1	0.2	-	0.4	0.1	0.9	-	2.2
Peru	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.1	2.3	0.3	3.7	2.2	2.1	4.9	1.8	2.7	-	1.1
Venezuela	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.4	0.8	1.5	1.5	0.2	1.0	-	2.0	1.0	1.7
Uruguay	1.4	0.1	3.3	0.2	4.4	0.2	4.5	0.2	5.5	0.4	2.9	0.4	8.2	-
Others	0.5	1.7	1.8	2.7	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.8	2.2	1.3	2.8	1.1	4.8
TOTAL	14.3	5.9	22.0	8.9	26.3	10.1	31.6	11.1	31.7	16.1	34.9	14.0	75.0	23.3

Source: data provided by Israel's Ministry of Commerce & Industry

International cooperation programs and the presence of Israeli experts have contributed to the development of economic relations (irrigation equipment for the use in projects, etc.).[72] Israel's purchases in Latin America have been mainly of basic foodstuffs. Among these, meat

occupies an unchallenged and by far the leading place. Trailing much behind are items such as rice, wool, coffee, etc.

As indicated in the previous section, sales of arms and military equipment to Latin America, which have increased significantly since 1973, are drastically changing the previous pattern of exports to the area. It is estimated that about one-half of Israel's total military exports are now sold to Latin America (these are usually reported in official export statistics as "metal products" and "electronic equipment"), which is reflected both in terms of the composition and volume of trade.

Within the growing web of economic relations with Latin America, Israeli companies offering technical services and know-how on a commercial basis occupy an important place. Several companies have been engaged in construction work (Vered in road building in Peru, Brazil, and Honduras; Solel-Boneh in construction of housing projects in Buenos Aires, Caracas, and San Salvador), a number of others in planning, specialized engineering, and other professional services. To date, their activities have been mainly concentrated on the preparation of feasibility studies for diverse economic enterprises, market research surveys on export prospects for Latin American products, and detailed designs for a wide range of industrial and agroindustrial plants, irrigated agricultural development schemes, and water supply, sewerage, and a few other planning studies. For most of the firms concerned, with the exception of Tahal which began operations as early as 1962, this type of commercial activity in Latin America is of recent vintage, as the majority of these studies were only made after 1970.[73]

Special mention should be made of Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd. as the major Israeli firm selling planning services to Latin America. This firm, specializing in water resources and agricultural development, is not only the oldest and most outstanding in terms of volume of earnings and number of projects and countries involved, but the services it supplies provide the best example of the type of economic activity that can be developed successfully in Latin America, overcoming the difficulties presented by more conventional or space-consuming export items. Tahal, whose majority shares are held by the Israeli government, bases its operations on a high level of professional expertise and adaptability to the development requirements of Latin America. Its planning projects, sold mainly to government agencies in Latin America, are not only in its "classic" fields of water resources, irrigation, and related development, but also include project-ranking and decision-making methodologies.

Tahal's activities culminated in 1974 with a prestigious contract for crop and irrigation evaluation projects in several Latin American republics (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and El Salvador — their total population representing some 80 percent of that of Latin America as a whole).[74] The

$1 million contract was won by the company over highly competitive bids by several foreign firms and despite Arab opposition in the international financing agency.[75] Although no precise figure on Tahal's Latin American earnings is available, the above provides an idea of the scope of its activities in that region, which in recent years represents the lion's share of Tahal's total overseas earnings.[76]

Israel's economic relations with Latin America have been occasionally marred by unsuccessful ventures, the two most publicized being the Flota Bananera episode, involving the now defunct private Israeli shipping company Somerfin and the government of Ecuador,[77] and Vered's operations in road building in Peru and Honduras. It may be argued that these are the inevitable "tuition fees" incurred by enterprising but inexperienced business ventures (a newspaper source puts Vered's losses in the two Latin American countries at $5 million)[78] and that Vered's experience will serve as a lesson for concerns operating in an unfamiliar environment.

Although part of Vered's failure can be explained in purely economic and managerial terms unrelated to specific conditions in Latin America,[79] other factors are clearly characteristic of "environmental" conditions in this region.[80] Another Israeli firm operating in Latin America, Solel-Boneh, has been careful to maintain a proportion of two-thirds construction work to one-third road-building operations, thus minimizing the risks involved in the latter type of activity.[81]

Tourism is another field offering possibilities for further expansion. The main pool for tourism from Latin America to Israel is concentrated in the Jewish communities of the southern republics (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), a tourism "reservoir" which has aroused keen interest on the part of El Al, Israel's national carrier. Tourism from these countries to Israel had been fairly static from 1965 to 1967, reaching a total of 8,558 tourists arriving in Israel by air and sea in 1967. Since 1968, tourism from these countries has increased considerably, amounting to 15,253 in 1971, of which 14,581 came by air.[82] Overall tourism from Latin America in 1973 reached 25,000, compared to 23,600 the previous year (Argentina 7,700; Brazil 5,000; Mexico 4,300; others 8,000).[83] While El Al's Commercial Planning and Market Research Department considered these figures "not bad at all," particularly in view of existing fares, it saw room for further expansion. This assessment is based on several factors: that South American tourists traveling to Israel constitute only a small proportion of the number of Jews of that region visiting Europe, that strong sentiment toward Israel exists among Latin American Jews, that El Al has not as yet sufficiently developed this market, and the belief that once El Al starts direct flights to Latin America, a further boost will be given to Israeli tourism.[84]

According to a survey conducted by El Al, annual traffic is expected to reach 22,500 persons within a two-year period after the commencement of operations in South America. The company's share of this potential traffic is estimated at two-thirds of the direct traffic from Argentina and Brazil, and one-half of the stopover traffic from these two nations in a projected South Atlantic route.[85] Not surprisingly, El Al's interest has been particularly focused on landing rights in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires, with much lower priority alloted to Montevideo and Santiago.

Despite optimistic reports in 1973 that the opening of a direct line from Israel to South America was in the offing, contacts with the governments concerned have not yet produced a conclusive agreement. Brazil rejected El Al's request for the opening of a line in March 1973. Arab political pressure and fear that Varig (Brazil's national carrier) would lose some of its local clientele were apparently the main reasons for this government decision.[86]

A potentially important group within the tourism "reservoir" in Latin America are Catholic pilgrims. Visits by such groups have been sporadic so far and volume of participation limited, mainly due to indirect air routes and high fares. Nevertheless, there is economic interest in developing this traffic; Aerolíneas Argentinas, the Argentine national airline, and Avianca (Colombian), opened branches in Israel to promote pilgrimage flights.[87]

ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Some Characteristics of Assistance Extended and Experts Dispatched

Less than a decade after its independence, Israel was offering technical assistance to both newer and older developing states. Israel believes its contribution to international cooperation can be unique. An official Israeli government publication presents the major advantages of its program:

1. Israel's independence — post-World War II — allows it to share its experience in rapid institution building with nations which have only recently made the transition from colonial to independent status. Israel has accumulated a rich fund of agricultural development and vocational training expertise, two basic needs for developing countries.
2. Israel's climatic and ecological characteristics are closer to many other developing nations than are those of the typical northern donor

countries. The small size of Israel's economic units, plants, and bureaucracies, often make them more applicable to most developing nations than those of the big powers.

3. To a great extent an immigrant nation, Israel has diverse population groups speaking a wide range of languages. It is thus possible to train cadres of experts fluent in or familiar with the language of the country in which they will serve.
4. Israel was never a colonialist power, itself a small nation, and is sufficiently remote so as not to pose a threat to other developing countries.
5. For at least some national elites, the democratic character of Israeli society projects the attractive concept of development and freedom successfully combined.
6. Israelis have no racial prejudice and the Israeli expert has no colonial "boss" qualities. He participates with the local population in simple tasks and hard work, often in remote areas.
7. Zionist ideology has traditionally stressed the importance of manual labor and pioneering virtues.
8. Israel's international cooperation, based mainly in the export of knowledge without large capital investments, does not create a psychological atmosphere resembling exploitation.[88]

One might add another important feature, Israel's mixed social and economic structures which do not lend themselves to simple characterization as either "capitalist" or "socialist." They thereby present special models which the developing states may view as different and perhaps applicable experiences. Although the entire model may not be accepted, aspects of it — settlement and organizational patterns in the agricultural section, labor and youth movement organizations, etc. — may.

How do some of the oft-cited intuitive arguments compare with opinions and data provided by specializing groups (Israeli experts and diplomats, Latin American trainees) interviewed in the course of this study? We wish to present here only a small selective part of our survey findings, corresponding to the arguments advanced above or to basic expert and assistance characteristics that are of general interest.[89]

Of the Latin American trainees interviewed, 78.4 percent praised Israel's assistance as succesful, with no reservations. Within this subgroup, reasons advanced were: (1) Israel's assistance is useful, concrete, practical, and efficient in solving problems of underdevelopment (52.7 percent of the subgroup); (2) Israel's assistance is based on expertise — both the expert's theoretical specialization and practical experience (15.8 percent); (3) Israel's development makes its assistance attractive (15.8 percent); (4)

Israeli projects achieve their goals because they adapt to local conditions (10.5 percent). Those maintaining reservations (13.5 percent of all answers) argued that effectiveness is limited by nonapplicability to local conditions.

Of the Israeli experts interviewed, 61.6 percent considered Israeli's assistance as successful (including 15.4 percent with no reservations, and 46.2 percent mentioning some handicaps). Deficiencies that were most often mentioned included the inappropriate level or insufficient preparation of experts, and that activities are too dispersed over too many fields.

For most trainees (95.9 percent), their stay in Israel created a positive appraisal or fulfilled previously-held expectations of Israel and the assistance it provides. In accounting for their positive impressions, more trainees referred to the exposure to Israel's general technological-economic advances (16) than to the specific training program in which they participated (11).

Asked to compare the effectiveness of training in Israel to on-the-spot training in Latin America, 48.6 percent of the trainees considered training in Israel more effective, compared to 13.5 percent who though it would be more effective in Latin America. A combination of both alternatives was advocated by 21.7 percent.

The majority, which thought training in Israel was more effective, explained that in Israel one could see the real process as it functioned, and could be impressed by actual results. This serves as an example and encouragement for trainees.

Those that preferred training courses in Latin America argued that courses would be more adapted to local conditions, would focus on specific problems, and therefore would be more effective, at the same time allowing for much large trainee participation.

Asked about possible political motives behind the assistance, 56.8 percent of the trainees believed that the assistance was extended disinterestedly, while 35.1 percent thought that it was politically motivated. (Of this second subgroup, 53.8 percent specified the motives as the desire to create favorable public opinion towards Israel in Latin America and to obtain support for its stand.)

Comparatively, 80.7 percent of the Israeli experts believed that there was either strong (57.5 percent) or slight (23.2 percent) political motivation behind the assistance. (Of the motives mentioned by the experts, 61.6 percent referred to either political support — UN voting — or economic benefits — contracts, commercial sales; 11.6 percent mentioned only the desire to create an image of a nation willing and able to contribute to the progress of other developing states.)

The answers of Israeli diplomats who were asked the same question

reveal a similar distribution. Of twenty diplomats with a background of Latin American service, 60 percent admitted to clearly political connotations in Israel's assistance, while 20 percent acknowledged only indirect effects. Diplomats were less reserved than experts in evaluating the success of assistance programs (75 percent positive appraisal).

Asked whether assistance and courses were adapted to Latin American needs or merely based on Israel's ability and experience, trainees were equally divided: 32.4 percent thought it was geared to Latin American needs, the same proportion contending that it reflected more Israel's specific experience; 21.7 percent believed it was a combination of both.

Of the experts, 53.8 percent believed that Israeli projects were clearly geared to Latin America's basic needs, while 23.1 percent thought they were only moderately so. Questioned about differences between Israeli assistance and that of other countries, 64.9 percent of the trainees noted some trait they considered characteristic of Israel's assistance and comparatively absent in other national programs: (1) Israel's assistance is disinterested, with no "interventionist" motives (24.3 percent); (2) it combines theory with a practical approach, while other donors stress theory (16.2 percent); (3) The difference lies in the attitudes of Israeli experts who are sensitive to the social-human aspects, show greater involvement, and do not shun actual field work (10.9 percent); (4) Israel has a particular advantage in specific fields such as agriculture and cooperativism (8.1 percent). Only 5.4 percent of the trainees felt there was no difference between Israel's assistance and other national programs.

When asked whether they considered themselves different from experts of other countries, 80.8 percent of the Israeli experts replied strongly in the affirmative. Only 3.8 percent insisted that there was no difference at all. The experts maintained that: (1) Israel's assistance is superior because it is more efficient, effective, realistic, and capable of improvisation (30.8 percent); (2) it is more specific and practical compared to the greater theoretical emphasis given by other donors (23.3 percent); (3) the difference lies with the expert's characteristics — his interest in social-human aspects,his involvement, his participation in field work (11.5 percent); (4) some thought that Israel's assistance was more superficial (less comprehensive and of shorter range), aimed at obtaining faster results (11.5 percent). Only 7.6 percent believed there was no difference between these characteristics of Israel's assistance and that of other countries.

The typical expert participating in the survey did not look upon his mission as a move that would advance him either professionally (57.7 percent) or economically (73.1 percent), but would rather expand his horizons (73.1 percent) and would constitute a humanitarian challenge (57.7 percent). For most (61.6 percent), their identity as Israelis preceded their identity as professional experts.

Most worked in the capital city or its vicinity (42.3 percent) and lived in housing quarters that were either of a high (53.8 percent) or average (46.2 percent) standard. Only a small segment (15.4 percent) was Latin American born. Most had backgrounds of higher education (72.2 percent), and a large proportion (53.8 percent) were at some time members of an agricultural settlement (kibbutz, moshav).

Prior to their assignment, most had worked in the specific field they were engaged in abroad (88.5 percent), although most did not receive professional instruction before departure (73.1 percent), or did not participate in any preparatory course (88.5 percent). Many did not receive orientation concerning general Latin American topics (69.2 percent). Only 11.5 percent considered the instruction they received before leaving as sufficient.

The majority considered their assignment as a clear success (88.5 percent), and 65.4 percent thought the project they participated in produced good results. A relatively high proportion believed that the Israeli presence clearly influenced the stand taken by the recipient country at international forums (61.6 percent), while 14.4 percent thought there was some influence.

Initiating the Program and Shaping Criteria

As early as 1949, Panama had expressed special interest in citrus growing and proposed to finance a trip to Israel for a group of farmers if Israel would provide the cost of three to four months of training.[90] Israel, however, opted to start its technical assistance program in other continents. Historically, the first recipient of Israel's technical assistance was an Asian country (Burma in 1954). In the aftermath of the Sinai campaign of 1956, attention and resources were shifted to the emerging states of Africa. Latin America trailed behind as the last developing area to receive Israel's assistance. This cooperation program began only in 1961.

The program's initiation widened significantly the scope of Israel's relations with Latin America, which had heretofore been predominantly political, with negligible economic transactions and virtually no technical assistance. The reasons for this belated start may be attributed to the fact that relations with Latin America were existent, firm, and on the whole cordial. It was not until 1960, coinciding with the crisis in Israeli-Argentine relations precipitated by the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann and the appearance of radical trends in Latin America following the Cuban revolution, that serious consideration was given to a redefinition of Israel's policy in Latin America.[91] By then, technical assistance was facilitated by the initial success and experience accumulated in the other two continents, and apparently enhanced by the new spirit of the Alliance for Progress being launched then in Latin America.

After the need to bring new life into Israel's continental relations was discussed by Israeli diplomatic personnel convened at Montevideo in 1960, A. Remez — head of the Assistance Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and Yitzhak Levi — director general of Israel's Ministry of Agriculture — were dispatched to study the possibilities of technical assistance. The first bilateral programs were soon concluded with Bolivia (April 1961) and Brazil (March 1962), ushering in an era of international cooperation with Latin America. Since then, bilateral relations with other countries in this field have rapidly proliferated to include all of Latin America except Cuba (see Table 18).

Table 18
Israel's Cooperation Agreements with Latin American Countries

Bolivia	(1961, 1972)	Haiti	(1972)
Brazil	(1962, 1973)	Honduras	(1967)
Chile	(1965)	Mexico	(1966, 1972)
Colombia	(1965)	Nicaragua	(1966)
Costa Rica	(1965, 1971)	Panama	(1970)
Dominican Republic	(1963)	Peru	(1963)
El Salvador	(1971)	Uruguay	(1968)
Guatemala	(1971)	Venezuela	(1966)

* Adapted from Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, 1973, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division for International Cooperation, Jerusalem, 1973, 63. To this Foreign Ministry list should be added technical cooperation agreements with Ecuador (1963) and Paraguay (1974), in addition to the cultural scientific cooperation agreements with Argentina.

In shaping the technical assistance program for Latin America and determining its direction, considerable weight was exercised by the practitioners or chief experts. At first, basic approaches were debated between the senior diplomats and expert personnel. Golda Meir, then Israel's foreign minister, considered transplanting the Israeli moshav (agricultural cooperative settlement) to the Latin American rural context. This notion was contested by Itzhak Levi, who preferred technological and organizational improvements within the existing socioeconomic framework. He suggested short-term, limited budget projects yielding fast, tangible results to prove the effectiveness of Israel's assistance. This approach was indeed applied in the case of Israel's first operational project in Latin America, the Petrolandia seed improvement farm in Northeast

Brazil. Results fell short of the planners' expectations. Gideon Naor who, jointly with S. Regev, conducted an evaluation study of that project explains: "Within the limitations of Israel's capacity it was not possible to attack the whole spectrum of problems within a relatively short period of time and over as large a geographic area as the Northeast region. Under the circumstances, therefore, it might have been better to concentrate on a limited area, but within it to tackle all the obstacles to development."[92] The major Petrolandia lessons were applied to subsequent projects.

The question of the geographic distribution of the Israeli effort also arose at this initial stage. Here too approaches differed. Arieh Eshel (then ambassador to Brazil) argued for in-depth concentration on a few (four to five) countries, in addition to possibly one regional project. He objected to spreading experts thinly among numerous projects, and cautioned against Gadna and Nahal paramilitary programs.[93] Levi's counterapproach placed a premium on small but "zesty" projects that promised immediate impact with the recipient government. He believed that Israel's assistance had particular impact in the smaller republics, hence multiple small projects should be initiated so long as these were feasible for Israel and desired by the Latin American government.[94]

Later changes in emphasis also bore the impact of leading professional personalities. The shift in agricultural assistance — which has constituted the bulk of Israel's programs for the continent — to longer-range, more comprehensive, interdisciplinary projects was heavily influenced by the approach of Yitzhak Abt. Abt had been one of the architects of the celebrated Lachish regional development scheme in Israel,[95] and later headed the team of planners in Venezuela (Las Majaguas). He promoted this concept as head of the Ministry of Agriculture's Center for International Agricultural Cooperation (CIAC).

While debates on approaches and targets of Israel's assistance program continued,[96] several basic principles nevertheless crystallized as guidelines for optimal allocation of the assistance effort. A first-hand account by an official assistance policymaker specifying the general criteria guiding Israel's assistance policy is provided by Shimeon Amir.[97] A less committed version, supported by his findings of the La Joya case, is offered by sociologist Erik Cohen who underlines three strategic considerations behind Israel's decisions: (1) That a proposed project be of considerable importance to the government of the recipient country; (2) that the project enjoy high visibility vis-à-vis strategically-placed local groups; (3) that it have a multiplier effect on the recipient country, i.e., desirably serve as a model for larger schemes.[98]

An insight into the dynamics concerning the choice of projects by Israel's assistance decision makers is provided by the very few available project case studies conducted by Israelis in Latin America. Outlining the

reasons for the great national impact achieved over a short period of time by a small Israeli team working within the framework of the Venezuelan CIARA (institution for training manpower required for the agrarian reform), G. Naor commented: "The team members concentrated on a very important problem which at that time was deeply worrying the leaders of the Venezuelan economy and society at large, who sought ways of ushering in extensive reforms."[99]

Comparable considerations lay behind the decision to enter the La Joya project, located in southern Peru. This was a prized development scheme for the then incumbent president Belaúnde, himself a southerner and politically committed to the development of that region.[100]

Although the decision to aid Costa Rica in organizing its national youth movement (the MNJ) was not motivated by the need to strengthen political support, the choice of this project reveals again a familiar pattern. Establishment of a national youth movement was a topic strongly advocated by younger activists in the two major national parties (Liberación Nacional and Unificación Nacional), and it tackled a problem of national significance — i.e., the integration of nonmobilized youth into socially productive activity. It aimed at harnessing youth into community development and pioneering tasks, instilling in them civic awareness and patriotism. Success in the project meant also a strong demonstration effect on other Latin American nations.[101] Here indeed, a tiny team of Israeli experts managed to achieve unquestionable national impact.[102]

The selectivity of Israel's effort has been dictated overwhelmingly by financial necessity.[103] Funding limitations caused Israel to concentrate almost entirely on technical assistance activities rather than venture into the funding of capital projects. Scarcity of resources also forced emphasis to be placed on relatively small projects, maximization of local cost sharing to be sought, and active support to be solicited from multilateral agencies and organizations, primarily the OAS and the IDB.[104] This major feature of Israel's international cooperation program placed heavy strain on its effectiveness. It creates much greater dependence, compared with other donor countries, on the recipient's willingness to cooperate. Studying the La Joya project in Peru, E. Cohen observed:

> The most serious problem is that Israel does not provide any financing for the projects to which it contributes technical aid . . . . The financing of the projects comes from sources over which Israel has no control: the La Joya scheme is financed by the Peruvian government. Therefore, the Israelis are not able to ascertain the realization of the plans they helped to prepare in the manner and pace originally envisaged. The Peruvian case seems not to be an isolated instance of that problem: similar problems have been reported from other countries in which Israelis worked. . . . There are

two distinct dangers involved here: one is that well-prepared plans will never be executed or will be carried out at such a slow pace that much of the expected impact of the plan will be lost. The other is that the general public will ascribe faulty or slow execution to the Israelis.[105]

Program Content

The International Cooperation Division (Mashav) of Israel's Foreign Ministry coordinates technical assistance programs abroad. Actual operation is left to the functional ministries and agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture accounts for the bulk of Israel's cooperation program with Latin America. Within this framework and since 1965, the Center for International Agricultural Cooperation (CIAC) located in Rehovot occupies a pivotal position, being the ministry's specialized professional arm for planning and operating its projects abroad. At the same time the Foreign Training Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of Israeli-based and on-the-spot training courses. The research and training Settlement Study Center (SSC), also based at Rehovot, gives year-long advanced courses on regional planning and development, in cooperation with Mashav and the United Nations.

In addition to agriculture, most of the other assistance activities in Latin America may be clustered into three major groups: cooperativism and labor; youth movements; and public and business administration topics. Institutionally, activities concerning youth movements began under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense (October 1962) and were transferred in

Table 19
Israeli Experts by Continent (1958-1972)

	1958-71	1972	TOTAL
Africa	2,763	254	3,017
Asia, Mediterranean Area and others	935	109	1,044
Latin America	643	178	821
TOTAL	4,341	541	4,882

* Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, 1973. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Division for International Cooperation, Jerusalem, 1973, 62.

1973 to a new unit for youth program in the Foreign Ministry (see section on "Military and Defense Program"). Cooperativism, trade unionism, and labor leadership topics are covered largely by the activities of Histadrut's Center for Cooperation and Labor Studies for Latin America, which began its operations in 1962. Until mid-1971, the center trained, through courses in Israel and on the continent, over 2,000 Latin Americans.[106] Cooperativism assistance has also been extended in the fields of transportation and workers' banks. Since 1965, Israel's Institute of Productivity has been providing training courses in industrial and public management, budgeting, development planning, etc., aimed at Latin American personnel.[107]

While the dominance of agricultural and cooperative themes in Israel's program of international cooperation is a well-established fact, this has been even more pronounced in its program for Latin America. Cumulative statistical data for 1962-70 indicate that of 357 experts' assignments to Latin America (and English-speaking Caribbean nations), 229 were in agricultural specialties. Likewise, out of 2,192 Latin American (and Caribbean) students and trainees participating in various training and study programs in Israel during the same period, 1,012 were specializing in agriculture and 472 took labor and cooperation studies, far outnumbering trainees in other fields. Table 19 shows the comparative position of Latin America within the allocation of Israel's experts to developing areas. Table 20 shows Latin America's share in the total number of trainees from developing areas studying in Israel.

Table 20
Trainees in Israel by Continent (1958-1972)

	1958-71	1972	TOTAL
Africa	6,797	402	7,199
Asia, Mediterranean area and others	5,938	446	6,384
Latin America	2,523	246	2,769
TOTAL	15,258	1,094	16,352

* Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, 1973, op. cit., 63.

In terms of content, the programs evolved through two major stages. The first began with the initiation of the first assistance agreement (1961) and lasted through 1967. During this stage, the program took shape and expanded rapidly to include special assistance programs under Defense

Ministry auspices, the establishment of the Center for Labor and Cooperation Studies, together with the main emphasis on agriculture-related projects. The most recent stage, which extends to the present, gets its impetus from post-1967 developments. Within the realm of technical assistance, there has been a tendency for greater emphasis on integral multifaceted rural development projects.[108]

Work in the area of youth movements has been greatly intensified. During this period, the first serious attempt was also made to conduct project evaluations and examine the effectiveness of some of Israel's technical assistance programs carried out in Latin America. Technical cooperation gained a new dimension with its extension into new fields of scientific activity (e.g., nuclear research, water desalination, arid zones research, etc.). Although the concept was already pronounced in 1969[109] and some contacts in these fields had been made before 1967, considerable progress — both substantively and contractually — has been made since then. Development of this program, run by Israel's National Council for Research and Development, was made possible by Israel's advances in various scientific and technological fields, and by its willingness to incorporate them into its international cooperation program with Latin America.

In this field of scientific-technological cooperation, Latin America offers particular possibilities because of the possession, at least by major Latin American nations, of a relatively advanced scientific and industrial establishment, as compared with other developing nations. Nonetheless, Israel for them constitutes a small country capable of providing scientific expertise on a "big power" level.[110] Most interaction between Israel and other developing nations in this field has taken place with larger, technologically advanced Latin American nations, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.[111] This is of particular importance considering the position of leadership held by these states and their traditionally low level of political support for Israel within the Latin American bloc.

The Program's Effects and Bonuses

The question of assistance evaluation can be tackled from many angles. Generally, criteria fall into two major categories: technical-professional and political. Professionally, project effectiveness may be evaluated on the micro level, i.e., success in achieving the project's limited targets. In turn, there are aspects related to the macro level, i.e., the impact of the project on the wider socioeconomic development process taking place in the recipient country, and in training local cadres so as to make the learning experience meaningful and long-lasting. Sometimes a real conflict between these two sets of goals arises. This was the case of Israel's pioneering project in Latin

America, the Petrolandia, which is also one of the few Israeli assistance projects that were critically evaluated for follow-up purposes.[112]

In what they called the "Petrolandia Dilemma," the authors of the Petrolandia evaluation study referred to the zealousness of the Israeli team determined to attain project objectives within reasonably short time. Encountering administrative and operational difficulties, the Israeli experts, highly identified with the project targets, chose to bypass intermediate levels; they discharged incompetent workers and assumed direct implementation tasks instead of giving priority to the training of local personnel. While this dedication earned them much respect among top officials, it antagonized lower-echelon technocrats. This ran counter to longer-range objectives, such as the gradual transfer of the project to local management.[113] As indicated by G. Naor, this was corrected in subsequent projects, some of them extremely successful.[114]

On the whole, evaluation studies share the opinion that Israel's involvement in the projects reviewed has been essentially successful, effecting a strong positive impact.[115] Conclusions of professional evaluations are reinforced by the "good press" Israel assistance operations receive in Latin America.[116] An indirect acknowledgment of Israel's success is reflected in an Egyptian offer, made in May 1974, of fellowships for Latin Americans to study irrigation techniques. Egypt also gave indication of its desire to join the OAS as an observer.[117]

Much more difficult to ascertain are the political dividends accrued by Israel's international cooperation activism. Such dividends may be manifested in diverse forms. The first that comes to mind is the correlation between assistance provided and payoffs received in terms of voting in international organizations and in declaratory support. No clear-cut conclusion can be reached as to the relationship between assistance allocations and the level of political support provided by a Latin American country, because of the difficulty involved in isolating this input from the cluster of multiple factors influencing Middle East-related decisions. Generally, the influence of technical assistance on the level of support is more pronounced in the case of some of the smaller Latin American republics, such as Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In such cases, a well-conceived and well-executed project (e.g., El Sisal, Bas-Boen) has greater impact and is more likely to be felt than projects carried out in much larger nations (e.g., Brazil, Peru) which usually receive assistance from a large number of donor countries. Velasco Alvarado's Peru has noticeably reduced its support in international organizations, at the same time receiving increased delegations of Israeli experts. Likewise, Israel's significantly increased interaction with Mexico during the incumbent Echeverría administration has been coupled with attrition in Mexico's stand at the United Nations, and a gradual departure from the previous

"neutral" stand to greater declaratory support for the Arabs.[118] Contrary examples are also available. Uruguay, topping the list of Israel's Latin American supporters at the United Nations,[119] received only two experts in the 1962-70 period. Nicaragua has been another salient case of a country providing a high level of support at the United Nations,[120] with relatively small expert and trainee allocations. Somewhat similar is the case of Panama. Interestingly, expert assignments to Panama increased after semi-nonaligned Omar Torrijos took office. Greater correlation between expert allocations and support in the United Nations is to be found in the cases of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.

The presence of Israeli personnel engaged in various assistance activities, alongside training programs conducted in Israel, created contacts with members of civilian technocratic and military elites, as well as with trade-union leadership, youth movements (as future political cadres), and the broader, primarily peasant population. Trainees that participated in courses in Israel (2,769 in the 1958-72 period) returned home with positive impressions. Many of these have maintained contact through the various national Shalom clubs organized in 1963 for that purpose. Although underfinanced, these proved to be of diplomatic value during the 1967 Middle East crisis.[121]

Assistance may also have had an impact on other aspects of bilateral relations (economic relations,[122] military sales, academic-scientific interaction, etc.), and may be important in creating sympathetic public opinion for Israel in the recipient country. Concerning this last point, despite positive references in the Latin American press to Israel's assistance activism, our partial press survey (see chapter 2) reveals that this important area in Israel's interaction with the continent is badly underrepresented in press coverage. On the continental average, assistance was not even among the ten most frequent Israeli themes or images reported by local newspapers. This may indicate insufficient utilization of the topic on the part of Israel's information apparatus.

The uniqueness of Latin America as a developing region with important Jewish communities makes Israel's assistance a factor in bolstering the status of these communities within their national societies.[123] Assistance enhances Israel's prestige within the international community. The program contributes as well to Israel's national morale, self-image, and feeling of purpose, by proving that Israel is not only at the receiving end of a constant flow of economic aid coming from abroad, but that it is actively contributing to other developing nations from its accumulated experience in various specialized fields. This is also a factor in alleviating a feeling of relative isolation.

As can be seen in Tables 19-20, comparing Israel's expert and trainee allocations to various developing areas, Latin America was trailing far

behind other regions as a recipient of technical aid.[124] It appears that in the case of Latin America, assistance activity was less important in obtaining immediate rewards and was designed more to build and maintain political support in the long run. This pattern has been altered in recent years.

Even prior to the collapse of diplomatic relations with African countries in late 1973, some central assistance agencies already considered Latin America as Israel's "best" continent. In late 1972 and early 1973, Latin America was the continent in which the CIAC had the greatest number of expert assignments in the largest number of countries (totalling twenty-one, if Caribbean English-speaking nations are included). It was also the continent offering the best prospects for significant and rapid expansion of Israel's technical assistance activities.[125] A similar shift in geographic emphasis was reported in early 1973 concerning the activities of the SSC.[126]

Our final observation concerns aspects of the program's follow-up and future direction. To date, only a few evaluation studies have been conducted to assess the effectiveness of Israel's assistance projects. As indicated previously, four reports were prepared for the Ministry of Defense concerning its special assistance projects, and three professional studies were ordered by Mashav from the SSC. All seven appeared in 1970 and 1971, some eight years after the program for Latin America was initiated. Although the selection of projects for evaluation was guided by careful considerations,[127] the studies remained an ad hoc venture. In their study of the El Sisal project, G. Naor and S. Regev called for the development of a general evaluation system that would be an integral part of the assistance program, based on separate information mechanisms for each project.[128] A related phenomenon is also the absence of a knowledge bank that would systematically register, document, and study the experience of experts returning from overseas assignments for utilization as a planning aid.[129]

With all its imagination, resourcefulness, and ability to innovate, Israel's technical assistance program to Latin America has largely maintained its traditional foci, i.e., overwhelmingly directing its effort into the fields of agriculture, cooperativism, and youth movements (in that order). This stable pattern might be attributed to the composition of the assistance decision-making community, functionally dominated by agencies directing these programs. It seems that expansion of the assistance planning community to include practitioners and academic elements occupied in diverse fields will facilitate entry into new areas of assistance activism reaching new groups in Latin America.

PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION

The emphasis placed on propaganda to the continent by both Israel and the Arab countries was noted by the *Los Angeles Times:* "What it costs, neither Israeli nor Arab diplomats will say. But the bill must be impressive, for the slick pamphlets and mimeographed broadsides flood the mails."[130] Even before the establishment of the State of Israel Zionist activists were well aware of its importance. In 1948, the New York Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency published a review of the Latin American press on Palestine called "Ojeando la prensa latinoamericana."[131] In 1949 three volumes of press cuttings were collected from the Jewish and non-Jewish press of Argentina.[132] The ANA news agency, to a lesser extent also the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), were instrumental in this period in providing information about Jewish Palestine, as did the New York-based newsletter *Sucedió en Nuestros Días.*[133]

Subsequently the Israeli embassies assumed information functions, being aided in that task by local Jewish groups and the Zionist organizations. Major publications were catered for the intellegentsia, e.g., *Indice* (Buenos Aires), *Comentario* (Buenos Aires), *Claves* (Santiago de Chile).

The duties of press officers in the Israeli embassies were entrusted to local personnel and even that only in the major Latin American countries. Nonetheless, relations with the press have generally been effective. Greater efforts in the field of propaganda have been invested in Argentina and to some extent in Brazil. The means at Israel's disposal are comprehensive. In 1960, there were eighteen publications published in Spanish by the Foreign Ministry (several in cooperation with the Jewish Agency). Material taken from the embassy bulletins is often reproduced by the local press, as well as articles prepared in Israel.

According to Israeli sources, fifty broadcasting stations in Latin America carry half-hour programs prerecorded in Israel, while many local Jewish communities have their own broadcasting hours (in Spanish or Yiddish). These programs are assisted with material from Israeli representatives. The Israeli embassies provide documentary material to many newspapers and television networks.[134] Catholic festivities in Israel, such as Christmas, receive special attention, with emphasis being placed on religious tolerance.[135]

A growing number of representatives of the media in Latin America have been invited to Israel. Such efforts have often proven fruitful. Thus, in a matter of a few days, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires could report the appearance of four articles in *La Nación;* four articles in *La Prensa,* and an interview with General Rabin in *Confirmado.* At the same time

most newspapers published reports on Passover celebrations in Israel.[136] The views of many journalists, writers, and intellectuals have been recorded in collections of articles under such headings as "Israel Seen by Argentines," (Costa Ricans, etc.)[137] and in travelogues.[138] Israeli diplomats express divergent views as to what priorities should be set in the projection of images and what themes should be emphasized. Only sporadic public opinion polls (Chile, Argentina) or press surveys (Mexico) have been carried out so far, but this data are not enough to enable broad propaganda planning.

Following the Six-Day war, there has been a tendency to provide informative material (news items) and avoid polemical topics. Less emphasis was placed on material devoted to the Israeli-Arab conflict than in the past, and greater attention was paid to insights into Israeli society, its internal structure, problems, and achievements. It was hoped that this would lead to a decrease in the polarization that existed on the subject, and would instead reorient attention to the positive features of Israeli life. However, the new situation caused by the Yom Kippur war again brought to the fore the political aspects of the conflict and its worldwide repercussions (primarily the Palestinian question, the energy crisis, Arab economic power, etc.), forcing the Israeli information services to concentrate on those issues.

Recently, a regional center for Israeli Information Services was established in Buenos Aires. Insufficient coordination with Jewish organizations engaged in information activity reduces the overall effectiveness of the effort. While Israel's objective situation in the international arena has caused a noticeable attrition in its standing with public opinion, it is still hard to say whether existing opportunities have been fully exploited and that the resources allocated to propaganda activities in Latin America were commensurate with the new needs.[139]

NOTES

1. *Davar* (Tel-Aviv) March 21, 1961.
2. Foreign Ministry, Information Division, *Middle East Background*, Jerusalem, May 28, 1973.
3. Michael Brecher, p. 283.
4. Interviews with Israeli diplomats, nos. 18, 19, 44, 45.
5. Edward B. Glick, *Latin America and the Palestine Problem* (New York: Theodore Herzl Foundation, 1958) p. 35.
6. *Davar*, June 6, 1956.
7. Rudesindo Martínez *El pueblo hebreo y el sionismo político* (Santa Fe, Argentina: Editorial La Unión, 1921).
8. Very indicative is the recollection from letters and statements of more than fifty Latin American politicans, diplomats, and intellectuals during 1942-44 compiled by Rufino Marín, *Lo que piensa América del problema judío* (Buenos Aires, Ed. América, 1944). Nazi antisemitism strongly influenced the author's claim for a

Jewish state as a "human need" of "an expression of international social justice."

9. Mrs. Sefaradi-Yarden founded in 1943 the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency in New York, taking the initiative of writing to hundreds of selected personalities on the continent, helping to organize pro-Zionist groups in Brazil, and establishing close contacts with Latin American diplomats at the incipient United Nations.
10. *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires daily), February 8, 1946.
11. Interview with former Uruguayan Blanco party minister Adolfo Tejera, October 1972.
12. Interview with Eduardo Correa Aguirre, Montevideo, October 1972.
13. *Zionist Archives* (Jerusalem), Z5/577, letter to Carlos E. Bernhard, secretary of the Zionist Organization of El Salvador to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Latin American Dept., New York, December 23, 1948.
14. A complete record was submitted by Gutiérrez to the representatives of the Jewish Agency in New York. In fifty intensive days, he managed to meet foreign ministers or presidents of nearly all twenty countries, gave lectures, organized committees, coordinated between Jewish and non-Jewish pro-Zionist elements and was interviewed by radio and press. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/1340, September 19, 1946.
15. See the resolution passed by the Senate of Cuba in February 1949 saluting the establishment of the Constitutional Assembly of Israel. *Zionist Archives* (Jerusalem), Z5/556, letter of Santiago G. Rey Perina to Sender M. Kaplan, political director of Unión Sionista de Cuba, February 15, 1949.
16. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/1087, letter of Nahum Goldman to A. Mibashan, July 31, 1946.
17. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/515, letter of the United Zionist Federation of Bolivia to Benno Weiser, May 11, 1949.
18. At that time Israel had only three other legations abroad.
19. *New York Times,* August 2, 1949. Argentina and Israel raised their legations to the rank of embassies in 1955.
20. In a report on his visit to Paraguay, A. Mibashan, Keren Hayesod representative to South America, stressed that Israel should establish normal diplomatic relations. He reported that the Paraguayan government was surprised that, having been one of the countries that voted for partition and the seventeenth to recognize Israel, "considers it a lack of consideration that till now there is no form of official representation of Israel in Paraguay and vice versa, in Tel-Aviv." He added that Bernardo Ocampos, minister of foreign relations, had told him: "In my file on Israel there is only one document: a cable from Mr. Toff from New York thanking for the recognition; we have not even a cable directly from Tel-Aviv." *Zionist Archives,* Z5/513, November 14, 1949.
21. *Israeli Government Yearbook,* 1954 (5715), p. 128.
22. Data compiled from the Israeli Government Yearbook (Hebrew), 1968-72/73. The reference is only to the twenty Latin American republics. Additional information was supplied by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
23. I. Harkabi, *The Israel Economist Journal* (May 1968): 8.
24. Most Latin American and Israeli diplomats interviewed tended to agree on the importance of cultural relations. But whereas for many Israeli diplomats cultural relations were an important instrument for the furthering of general aims (ID 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 18, 19, 20), some Latin American diplomats considered the cultural aspect one of the most important benefits their countries could get from a relationship with Israel (LAD, 2, 7, 8).
25. Yosef Govrin,"Israel-Amerika Halatinit Bemishor Kishrei Hatarbut"(Israel-Latin America in the Field of Cultural Relations), *Gesher* year 17, no. 68-69 (December 1971): 251-54.
26. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/513, letter of Mibashan to Weiser, Buenos Aires, December 19, 1949.
27. "When the Mexican Committee for Palestine that so efficiently defended the just cause of the Israelite people was dissolved, the idea of creating an institute for

cultural relations between Mexico and the State of Israel emerged. Members are writers of continental fame, diplomats, journalists and commentators, university teachers, physicians." *Zionist Archives* (Jerusalem), Z5, Agencia Judía para Palestina, Mexico City, December 14, 1949.

28. Instituto Central de Relaciones Culturales Israel-Iberoamérica, Bulletin no. 2, Jerusalem, August 1956. The existence of fifteen institutes was reported, and two more were said to be in the process of being inaugurated. Seven institutes were created during that year.
29. *Crónicas Israel - América Latina,* year 5, no. 48-49 (March-April 1965): 1.
30. Yosef Govrin, 256.
31. A salient example of this was Israel's support of the adoption of Spanish as an offical language in the United Nations. Israel's ambassador, Moshe Tov, at the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1952, supported Spanish as a working language in ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council). He stressed the contributions of Sephardic Jews at the court of Alphonse the Wise, the enrichment of the Spanish language, the printing of the first Jewish dictionary in Spanish in 1552, and other features linking the Jewish people to the Spanish language. Israel, Brazil, and Haiti were the only non-Spanish-speaking countries that favored the acceptance of this language. The text of Tov's appeal was widely circulated in Latin America, and he was effusively greeted in several countries. *Instituto de Relaciones Culturales Guatemala-Israel: Israel y el Idioma Español en las Naciones Unidas* (Guatemala City, 1970).
32. Instituto Central de Relaciones Culturales Israel-Iberoamérica, Boletín Actividades (September 1969): 1.
33. *Centro Cultural Israel-Brasil, Resumo das Actividades do Centro no Ano de 1973,* Tel-Aviv, April 1974.
34. Ambassadors Germán Arciniegas of Colombia, Vicente Gerbasi of Venezuela, Rosario Castellanos of Mexico, and Carmen Naranjo of Costa Rica, have written extensively about Israel in books and articles published in their own countries.
35. A report on cultural relations between Israel and Guatemala, 1948-73, put out by the Institute of Guatemala, has a long list of activities: lectures; round-table discussions; joint declarations against the conditions of Jews in Iraq and the Soviet Union; concerts; theater shows; TV; cinema and radio programs; press conferences; exhibits; receptions; school competitions; gala balls for Israel's Independence Day; book donations, etc.
36. To take just one example: in Guatemala 20,000 people visited a fifteen-day exhibit on Israel. *La Hora Dominical* (Guatemala City), March 2, 1969.
37. Table quoted from H. Avni and Y. Shapira, "Teaching and Research on Latin America in Israel," *Latin American Research Review* (Fall 1974): 31-51.
38. At the end of 1972, the nonmilitary functions of the veteran Department for Cooperation and Foreign Liaison of the Ministry of Defense were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See note in *Maariv,* December 12, 1972.
39. An official of Israel's Ministry of Defense admitted that this was indeed a consideration.
40. In this connection, see comment made by Shlomo Erel in *El ejército como factor de desarrollo* (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense, June 1968), p. 86.
41. Ibid.
42. Information provided by Department for International Cooperation of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
43. Interview with Defense Ministry official (name withheld).
44. Detailed analysis of Costa Rica's MNJ was prepared for internal use of the relevant government agencies by Rina Shapira of Tel-Aviv University.
45. In late 1967, Israel's Defense Ministry already reported that its arms industries had received $ 20 million worth of export orders from foreign countries. See *New York Times,* November 25, 1967, p. 13.
46. See article by Yuval Elitzur, *Maariv,* May 18, 1973, p. 18.
47. Ya'acov Ardon, "SOLTAM sells arms abroad," *Jerusalem Post,* November 5,

1973; Gil Keisary, "SHAFRIR and GAVRIEL in the SALON," *Maariv* (Friday supplement, Yamim Veleylot), May 25, 1973; Shmuel Segev, "Exports of Israeli Military Electronics, $ 40 million," *Maariv*, June 7, 1973; Rachel Primor, "Israeli Aircraft Industry to Participate in Brazilian Air Salon," *Maariv*, July 8, 1973; Shmuel Segev, "Mexico Unravels Secrecy over Cooperation with Israel in Aircraft Production," *Maariv* May 10, 1973.

48. *La Opinión*, March 27, 1974, quoted the figure of $ 200 million in orders placed by Latin American countries, out of a total of $ 283 million worth of export orders submitted to Israeli firms in the immediate post-Yom Kippur war (October 1973) period, to be delivered over a three-year period.
49. *Maariv*, August 2, 1973.
50. *The Observer's Book of Aircraft* (London, Frederick Warne, 1974), p. 114.
51. *Maariv*, September 23, 1973; *El Día* (Mexico City), September 22, 1973.
52. The contract with Ecuador in late 1974 provided that country with the nucleus of a national airline. The $ 4.7 million contract provided for the purchase and lease of three Boeing 720 jets, their maintenance, and pilot training. The deal was concluded at the request of the Ecuadorian Defense Ministry. See *Jerusalem Post*, September 19, 1974; *Haaretz*, September 15, 1974.
53. *Maariv*, March 15, 1974.
54. Interview with a well-informed Honduran personality, Tegucigalpa, September 1973.
55. El Día (Tegucigalpa), September 28, 1973.
56. The Honduran daily *La Prensa*, partly controlled by local Arab interests, based in the economically important city of San Pedro Sula, published an article on July 10, 1969, entitled "The Thesis of Hitler, of Israel, and of Salvadoreans." In another instance, a book on the 1969 Central American war states: "The [Salvadoreans] dreamed of being the Jews of Central America and were confident that in the same way as the Arab lands — as the Golan Heights fell — so would the mountains of the West [of Honduras], and, like the Arab desert, so the fertile Sula Valley would change hands." See Orlando Henriques, *En el cielo escribieron historia* (Tegucigalpa, 1972).
57. *Maariv*, May 10, 1973.
58. *Maariv*, July 7, 1973.
59. *Tadiran's* exports in the first eight months of 1974 reached $ 100 million. See item in *Haaretz*, September 5, 1974.
60. Data concerning visits was pieced together from fragmented information received from government sources and Israel's daily press.
61. *Maariv*, April 30, 1974.
62. Since 1964, editors and reporters from major Latin American newspapers have visited Gadna, Nahal, women's corps bases, etc. These inelude representatives of Argentina's *Panorama* (1964), *La Nación* (1965), *Temas Militares* (1967), *Siete Días* (1968), and *Clarín* (1968); the Brazilian *Jornal do Brasil* (1968); and Colombia's *El Tiempo* and *El Siglo* (1967).
63. *Jerusalem Post*, February 8, 1974.
64. See story by A. Gazit in *Maariv*, December 29, 1972.
65. See Adin Talbar, then assistant director of the Department for Foreign Trade at the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry, "Prospects and Dangers in Export Markets," *Maariv*, April 14, 1971.
66. Figures provided by the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
67. Interview with Y. Fenig, in charge of trade with Latin America in the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry, November 29, 1974.
68. Y. Fenig, "Israel encausa sus esfuerzos al mercado Latinoamericano," *Israeli Export and Trade Journal* (Spanish version), (July 1974):3.
69. See Moshe Pinsky, "Relaciones comerciales con América Latina," *Israeli Export and Trade Journal* (October 1972):5.
70. Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains such activities through its unit for trade with Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which began in 1964.

Initiatives include exhibits and fairs in Latin America, sponsorship of visits of Latin American businessmen to Israel, symposia for Israeli exporters, and compilation of statistical data on trade. The Department for Foreign Trade of the Ministry compiles relevant data from the foreign publications on various aspects of Latin American economic activity of interest to Israeli exporters. Some of this current information appears in the publication *Yedion*, issued by Israel's Export Institute, and is distributed among prospective exporters. Another body, the Institute for Planning and Development (IPD), was established jointly by the Israeli government and the Association of Engineers and Architects in 1962 to help promote the sale of technical, planning, engineering, and other specialized services abroad. Its operations in Latin America began in 1971. Among private commerical concerns, the marketing firm Israeli General Trading Company (ISREX) has been the most active, with a tendency to specialize in the Latin American market. In 1968, the company began to participate in commercial fairs on that continent, and a year later established an export-import firm there. In 1972, ISREX began to market planning services for entire agroindustrial projects.

71. In 1971, 29 percent of Israel's exports were chemicals, 19 percent textiles, garments, and leather products, and 17 percent electric and electronic equipment. The last group of items has been a rapidly expanding industry since 1967, representing the rising export potential of Israel's industrial establishment. The export-import data for individual countries is taken from: *Israel's Trade with Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America, 1970-71*, issued in Hebrew by Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the unit for trade with Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America (June 1972):48-49.
72. Moshe Pinsky, p.5.
73. Life (Industrial Planning and Engineering Company), specializing in planning and industrial design services for oil refineries and chemical and petrochemical plants, has been active in Latin America since 1965. Isrex (Israeli General Company) began operations in Latin America in 1969, its ventures including promotion of sales of industrial equipment and know-how. Sherutei Handassa Be-Israel (Engineering Services of Israel Ltd.) prepared three agricultural and rural development projects for Venezuela in 1971-73, conducted market research on the exporting of the agricultural products of Brazil's Northeast (1971-72), made a feasibility study for meat production and processing in Venezuela (1973), and prepared a master plan for water supply and sewerage for urban centers in Guiana (started in 1973). Industries Development Corporation (IDC) prepared several detailed economic studies on a wide range of export industries in Venezuela (1969-73),in addition to planning and market research operations in other Latin American countries. Seker International Consultants, in cooperation with another Israeli firm, carried out a feasibility study on irrigation and agricultural development planning in 1971-73 and prepared a detailed design for an irrigated agricultural project (Pirapora) in Brazil. Another commercial concern, the Israeli Institute for Transport Planning and Research, has been involved in transport planning for the Economic Development Ministry of Guiana since 1973.
74. *Jerusalem Post*, April 24, 1974.
75. *Maariv*, May 3, 1974.
76. These amounted to some $ 3 million in 1973. See *Jerusalem Post*, April 24, 1974.
77. See *Maariv*, March 16, 1974, and question of Knesset member Y. Tamir to minister of transport, *Divrei Ha'Knesset* booklet no. 39, session of August 8, 1967.
78. Y. Labib, "The Vered Collapse," part 5, *Haaretz*, December 15, 1971.
79. Lack of prudent management practices, poor business judgement, eagerness for fast expansion while lacking sufficient experience and know-how, shaky financial and professional resources and worsening market conditions for credit and export services, high ratio of capital investment in relation to total turnover, characteristic of road-building operations (in 1969-70 almost 1 to 1), and resultant heavy outlays of interest and depreciation creating pressure to operate almost at any cost. See Y. Labib, "The Vered Collapse," part 6, *Haaretz*, December 16, 1971.

80. Operations that extended over a long period of time may expose firms to political difficulties (the 1968 coup in Peru and its business ramifications); currency devaluations, unfavorable weather conditions (excessive rains and ensuing massive landslides in Peru), unfamiliarity with local topographic and geological conditions; the desire to maintain good standing with the World Bank, etc: See Y. Labib, "The Vered Collapse," part 4, *Haaretz,* Decemher 11, 1971; M. Golan, "In the Knesset," *Haaretz,* December 21, 1971; "Vered's Losses. . .," *Haaretz,* December 13, 1971; "Vered to Stop Operations Abroad," *Maariv,* January 13, 1972.
81. S. Rapaport in *Maariv,* February 2, 1972.
82. Of the 15,253 tourists in 1971, 7,759 were from Argentina, 4,853 from Brazil, 1,032 from Uruguay, and 1,609 from Chile. Data provided by El Al.
83. OJI, No. 9/74 (210).
84. "Survey of Expected Revenues from Flights to South America," El Al, Commercial Planning and Market Research Department, July 30, 1968, pp. 1-2.
85. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
86. *Yediot Aharonot,* March 27, 1973.
87. *Jerusalem Post,* October 18, 1974.
88. *What is the Character of Israel's Contribution to the Developing World? Sherutei Hasbara, Sherut Hapirsumim,* Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem, March 1969 (Hebrew). A senior OAS official, Gonçalves de Sausa, attested to the most of these characteristics. He praised Israeli experts, citing their informality and practicality, their command of Spanish and Portuguese; by sharing responsibilities with local personnel, they return to Israel with an ongoing project still functioning in the local area (lecture during a visit to The Hebrew University, October 27, 1974). For further discussion of the characteristics of Israeli experts, see L. Laufer, "Israel's Technical Assistance Experts," *International Development Review* 9 (1967).
89. The Trainee Pilot Survey included 37 trainees from fifteen Latin American nations, constituting those responding to a questionnaire sent to approximately 1,000 ex-trainees in Latin America who attended training courses in Israel at various periods. The Expert Pilot Survey included 26 Israeli experts who served in fourteen Latin American nations on various technical assistance assignments in the 1960-72 period. The small expert sample was largely dictated by budget restrictions.
90. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/611. Letter of M. Froidmann to Benno Weiser, director of the Latin American Section, Jewish Agency, New York, Panama, December 2, 1949.
91. For reference to the Eichmann affair as influencing Israel's policy towards Latin America, See Nathanel Lorch, "Israeli-Latin American Relations, 1971," *Gesher,* no. 68-69 (December 3-4, 1971): 98 (Hebrew).
92. Gideon Naor, "Israel's Cooperation Projects Observed," part 1, *Kidma-Israel Journal of Development* 2 (1973): 20.
93. N. Lorch, lecture at Hebrew University, March 4, 1973.
94. Ibid.
95. L. Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), p. 97.
96. See particularly, "Shituf Ha'Pe'ula Ha'Bein'Leumi: Ba'ayot Ve'Megamot" (International Cooperation: Problems and Trends), Symposium at Rehovot, November 5, 1968, in *Hityashvut Ve-Pituach,* ser. B., Settlement Study Center, Rehovot, April 7-8, 1969.
97. Shimeon Amir, *Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia, and Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 5-8.
98. Erik Cohen, "Israeli Technical Aid to Peru: A Case Study of International Cooperation," in S.N. Eisenstadt, D. Weintraub, and M. Lissak (eds.), *Comparative Analysis of Processes of Agricultural Development and Modernization,* European Regional Research Office, Agricultural Research Service, Rome, Project no. A-10-ERS-17, Final Report, part 3, pp. 116-17.

99. Gideon Naor, "Israeli Cooperation Projects Observed," part 2, *Kidma: Israeli Journal of Development* 3 (1974): 40.
100. Erik Cohen, p. 117.
101. These considerations are mentioned by Rena Shapira in her report, "The Youth Movement in Costa Rica, 1965-70," prepared for the Department for Cooperation and Foreign Liaison, Ministry of Defense, 1971 (mimeograph, Hebrew).
102. Upon their departure for Israel after four years of organization work with the MNJ, Israeli experts Mordechai Hatzor and Abraham Matzamri received a letter from Costa Rica's president thanking them for their services. It concludes: "Your stay in Costa Rica leaves an unforgettable impression of affection and gratitude in the hearts of thousands of Costa Ricans." Official letter of President J.J. Trejos Fernández, San José, March 12, 1969.
103. Israel's disbursements on bilateral cooperation activities for all continents totalled $6,861,000 in 1971. Shimeon Amir, Appendix A, p. 94.
104. For major characteristics of Israel's cooperation program, see Leopold Laufer, "Israel and the Third World," *Political Science Quarterly* 87 (December 1972): 619-22.
105. E. Cohen, pp. 112-13.
106. Report on activities of Histadrut's Department for International Liaison, presented to the Twelfth Conference of Israel's General Federation of Labor, - TelAviv, January 1974.
107. For a full picture of the content, organization, and financing of Israel's program of international cooperation, see Leopold Laufer, Shimeon Amir, and *Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, 1973,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division for International Cooperation, Jerusalem, 1973.
108. The CIAC classifies its programs into four categories, from limited-purpose professional advisory operations for advancing a specific crop or agricultural branch, through pilot and experimentation farms, to wider-front rural community development, with integrated rural regional development at the peak of these activities. It is the center's policy to emphasize this last type operations, and of its current twenty-six operational projects in Latin America, ten are comprehensive rural development schemes. See, Center for International Agricultural Cooperation, "Agricultural Assistance Activities of the Center" (internal mimeographed summary), Rehovot, 1972.
109. See "The Rehovot Declaration," pamphlet of the International Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States, American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science, New York, 1960. This served as the "ideology" of the "Rehovot movement" and the ensuing conferences held since 1960.
110. See the article by S. Segev, "Know-How Is Power, Mexicans say," *Maariv,* May 22, 1973. The author also quotes E. Tal, director of Israel's National Council for Research and Development, comparing Israel's 6,000 scientists to Mexico's mere 1,500.
111. This new type of technical cooperation is best exemplified by the Agreement for Scientific Cooperation signed between Israel and Mexico's National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) in June 1972. The agreement with Mexico soon evolved into the most comprehensive scientific-technological cooperation program Israel has with any developing nation. Data on scientific cooperation with Latin America in Ana Flaschner, "Intercambio científico entre Israel y América Latina: una nueva dimensión en la cooperación," *Aurora* (Tel-Aviv), Special supplement, (December 1973): 20-31.
112. The Rehovot-based Settlement Study Center (SSC) has been instrumental in promoting the first evaluation studies concerning Israeli assistance projects in Latin America. These studies, three in all, follow criteria developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development. They measure effectiveness, efficiency in achieving the goals, and significance of the project for the recipient country. They were carried out for the center by Gideon Naor and Shaul Regev, and focused primarily on aspects of agricultural development and rural settlement. The first

and second reports were published by the center in October and December 1970, and dealt with the Petrolandia project in Brazil's Northeast and the *El Sisal* project in the Dominican Republic. The third report, dealing with Israeli assistance projects in Veneuzuela, was issued in December 1971.

The only other agency that initiated several follow-up reports relating to its activities in Latin America was the Department for Cooperation and Foreign Liaison of the Ministry of Defense. These reports, prepared in 1971, review agricultural-military assistance projects in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the organization of youth movements in Costa Rica and Panama. (They are all internal, not for circulation.)

113. Gideon Naor, part 1, pp. 19-20.
114. See for instance Naor's comments on the *El Sisal* project in the Dominican Republic in the above-cited article, and his evaluation of the CIARA, Las Majaguas and the directed credit system projects in Venezuela; G. Naor, part 2.
115. See the studies by G. Naor and S. Regev on Israeli activities in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, and E. Cohen's study of La Joya in Peru, all cited above. R. Shapira's report on Costa Rica's national youth movement considers the work of the Israeli experts there highly successful.
116. There are numerous positive press references to Israel's assistance activities. These are often cited in "Doch Matsav Emtsaei Hatikshoret" (Report on the Mass Media), monthly bulletin, Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Hebrew).
117. Reference to these Egyptian moves in *OJI* (232), September 13, 1974.
118. See the declaration of Mexican foreign minister E. Rabasa in Lebanon in support of the Arabs while on a tour to the Middle East that did not include Israel. "Mexican Foreign Minister Fully Supports Arabs," *Jerusalem Post*, October 3, 1974.
119. Uruguay occupies first place in a ranking based on the mean voting score at the UN General Assembly for the years 1947-68. Yoel Barromi and Carlos Feldman, "Latin American Voting on Israeli issues in the UN General Assembly, 1947-1968," *Jewish Social Studies* 35 (April 1974): 153.
120. In the Barromi-Feldman ranking, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic occupy second, third, fourth, and fifth places respectively, on the scale of Latin American support at the United Nations (for 1947-68).
121. According to N. Lorch, to operate Shalom clubs, Israel's Foreign Ministry allocated a budget of $50 a month per country, later to be increased to $100. N. Lorch, lecture at The Hebrew University, March 4, 1973. On manifestations of strong solidarity with Israel during the 1967 crisis by Peruvian ex-trainees, see N. Lorch, *Hanahar Ha'Lochesh* (The Whispering River) (Tel Aviv: Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1969), p. 145 (Hebrew).
122. For reference to the economic motives of Israel's technical assistance, see Erik Cohen, pp. 116, 119.
123. N. Lorch, comment made during a study day on urban and regional development in Latin America conducted at the Truman Research Institute of The Hebrew University, May 4, 1972.
124. This is also reflected in the proportion of financial allocations for Latin America. Of the $65 million spent until 1973 on Israel's international cooperation program, 60 percent was earmarked for Africa. See Israel's Program of International Cooperation.
125. Center for International Agricultural Cooperation, "Agricultural Assistance Activities of the Centre" (mimeograph).
126. See news item "Center of Gravity Moves to Latin America," *Maariv*, January 28, 1973 (Hebrew).
127. For the project selection criteria, see G. Naor, p. 17.
128. G. Naor and S. Regev, "The Settlement Project and Directed Farm: El Sisal, Azua, the Dominican Republic," (unpublished report) Settlement Study Center, Rehovot, December 1970.
129. Initial steps in that direction are currently being taken by Mashav in cooperation with the Truman Research Institute of The Hebrew University.

130. "Mideast Feud Rages in Latin America," *Los Angeles Times,* May 20, 1969, part 1, p. 20.
131. *Zionist Archives,* Z5/548, letter of Enrique Weisleder to the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency, New York, San José, Costa Rica, January 10, 1949. He suggested including a pro-Israel article published in the *Diario de Costa Rica.*
132. *Zionist Archives,* Jerusalem Z5/513, letter of Benno Wèiser to A. Misbashan (no place), November 10, 1949. The same letter pointed out the difficulty of having articles accepted by major newspapers such as *La Prensa* and *La Nación.*
133. *Sucedió en Nuestros Días,* published by the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency, New York, 1949.
134. Within one week (1965) in Uruguay, six illustrated articles appeared in important dailies (about the Israeli National Museum, the celebration of African Liberation Day in Jerusalem, two acts of sabotage in Kibbutz Ramat Hakovesh, Afula, and Student Day Festivities in Jerusalem).
135. E.g., reports of Argentina's saint, the Virgin of Luján, painted in the Basilica of the Assumption in Nazareth, January 1968.
136. ID 30, reports of April 1969.
137. Instituto Chileno-Israelí de Cultura, *Israel visto por los chilenos* (Santiago de Chile, circa 1961); Ibid., 1965; Tribuna Israelita (ed.), *Misión en Israel)* (Mexico, D.F., 1968); Ibid., *El conflicto del medio oriente visto por mexicanos* (Mexico, D.F., 1967); Ed. Tribuna, *Voces mexicanas en la guerra de Yom Kippur* (Mexico, D.F., 1973); Instituto Judío Argentino de Cultura e Información,, *Israel visto por ojos argentinos en su XX aniversario* (Buenos Aires, 1968); *Israel visto por ojos costarricenses* (San José, circa 1973).
138. Agustín Antonia Albarrán, *Un reportero en Israel* (Mexico, D.F.: El Universal and Tribuna Israelita, 1972); Adolfo Tejera, *La fuente de los milagros* (Montevideo: Ed. Piedra Alta, 1962); Angel María Cusano, *Presencia de Israel en Medio Oriente* (Montevideo: Omega, 1958); Alberto Baeza Flores, *Poemas escritos sobre la tierra de Israel* (San José, Costa Rica: Epoca y Ser, Poesía de América Latina, 1972); León Felipe, *Israel: Finisterre* (Mexico, D.F., 1970).
139. See articles in *Haaretz* (Tel-Aviv), December 26, 1969, and *Maariv* (Tel-Aviv), May 14, 1973, where the failure in achieving a dialogue with left-wing circles was particularly stressed.

4

Latin American Decision Makers and Their Psychological Environment

To understand the complexities of the decision-making process it is necessary to take into account an additional input: the psychological environment of the decision makers — their attitudinal prism and perceived images of both the external and internal setting.[1] It is almost impossible to present a coherent picture of the attitudes of decision makers from twenty Latin American countries — over a period of almost three decades — vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict. This problem is complicated by the fact that decisions related to this issue are not of sufficient salience to find expression in many public speeches and writings of the relevant actors. Therefore we shall confine ourselves to representative examples of main categories.

The fact that most Latin American countries have had a minimum of direct political interests in the Middle East, has maximized the discretion available to individual decision makers. This was particularly relevant during the early years of the Zionist struggle for independence and until the late 1950s where the lack of direct involvement by Latin America in the Middle East caused decisions to be based on belief systems and the ideological and personality background of the decision maker. The greater the absence of direct involvement, the greater the importance of the belief system. Political realism only started to play a pivotal role with the

universalization of the implications of the Middle East conflict (oil crisis, threat to world peace, etc.).

To clarify this point we shall discuss some of the most frequent images prevailing during various periods and in varying forms. Prior to independence and until the beginning of the 1950s, Israel was considered part of the anticolonialist liberation struggle by most political circles, especially by left-wing groups, labor movements, and intellectuals. A country like Guatemala, claiming to have suffered from British colonialism, could identify with Israel's struggle. A Guatemalan journalist argued that "Israel's destiny has never been and shall never remain indifferent to the Guatemalan people. We always deplore the Arab aggressions and spiritually we are with Israel. Israel, in 1947, claimed its rights in the face of Great Britain; the same way we demanded and continue to demand the restoration of our historical and legitimate rights over Belize."[2] Uruguay's diplomat Rodríguez Fabregat confirmed that his Guatemalan colleague García Granados's anti-British outlook nurtured on opposition towards British possessions on the new continent.[3] García Granados, in describing his visit to Palestine in 1947, said: "Waiting for me were many sociological and political analogies between Palestine and Guatemala, in spite of being remote from each other. Palestine emancipated from the Ottoman yoke and became the victim of tremendous social and political pressures. Guatemala was forged in a similar struggle. Over the centuries, from the time of the conquistadores in 1524, Guatemala has been suffering from absolutism."[4]

Identification and sympathy with Israel is sometimes based on a sense of community of interest, of small countries facing similar difficulties.

> This reality shows once again the condition of deplorable inferiority that small nations suffer in the United Nations, to which little or no attention is given when they intend to defend themselves of injustices . . . especially when the authors of such injustices are world powers or powerful countries. Israel's specific case enjoys all our sympathy, not only because it is just to protect the free existence of an exemplary nation, but because we deal with a country similar to ours, at least in size, which struggles boldly for its survival.[5]

Uruguayan president Batlle Berres, at the accreditation ceremony of Israel's first minister to that country in 1949, stated: "It is natural that Uruguay supported Israel in its political struggle. What this people suffered in Europe during the war was followed with fear, when after the Holocaust, the Jewish people rose to fight its struggle for liberation, then the heart of our people was with them. The struggle of Israel is a struggle for justice, and honesty and justice are the only guarantees for the existence of small countries in this complex world of today. The moment these two

principles are violated, there will be no room for the existence of small states. To struggle for you is to struggle for ourselves."[6]

Other expressions indicate sentimenal identification often based on feelings of closeness to Judaism or of philosemitism. On a tour of Israel, Reverend E. Cardoso de Menezes, vice-president of Brazil's major opposition party Unión Democrática Nacional, explained: "My excitement is understandable since spiritually I consider myself a Jew."[7]

The image of a persecuted people that suffered inhuman atrocities throughout history and particularly during the Holocaust of World War II is a further source of identification and support for Israel: "Long were the tribulations suffered by the Israelites, or the Jews, in order to establish themselves as an organized nation. The absurd persecutions that they had to endure at the hands of the Hitlerist barbarity and the Fascist dictatorship, remain fresh in the memory of all citizens."[8]

Legal arguments are often used to justify a stand adopted. Commenting on Mexico's decision to recognize the Jewish state and to support its admission to the United Nations, a Mexican reporter explained: "In this case — like in others — Mexico has proceeded with an impeccable juridical touch. Every time when dealing with an international problem Mexico — through its representatives — teaches another lesson in international law."[9]

The image of Israel as a democratic nation is often cited to explain affinity toward it and support for its struggle. Declared a Chilean senator of the Conservative party: "That nation has joined the community of democracies with a firm step and in a manner that constitutes an example for the rest of the nations."[10]

Anticommunism is often used in explaining support of Israel, which faces nondemocratic, procommunist enemies. A statement made by the legislative assembly of Costa Rica reads:

> We see the situation clearly and we feel that endorsement could be given to a nation unjustly attacked and surrounded by totalitarian groups among which international communism wishes to infiltrate, as usual, in order to take advantage of conflicts which the same communism wants to create. We could, as a legislative assembly of a sovereign country, of a free and independent country, ratify our endorsement to a nation which wants to be as free and sovereign and as independent as we have been for a long time.[11]

A recurring image of Israel is that of a dynamic country rapidly developing under unfavorable conditions. An Ecuadorian officer said, after visiting Israel: "It (Israel) has built great projects for the use and exploitation of water, it has prepared a vigorous agricultural infrastructure, it has built functional cities in the midst of the desert with all

facilities for human life . . . summing up, it has developed a solid economy. That is to say, it is a nation which has not let itself be dissuaded by geography; rather it has contradicted the latter's impositions.[12]

An interesting though not very common argument used to justify support is that this has been the traditional policy followed by several administrations. The minister of foreign relations, of the Dominican Republic, Dr. Fernández, remarked: "The Dominican Republic has a moral and material commitment to defend the existence and integrity of the State of Israel. This is not a contemporary policy of the incumbent minister but the attitude of various Dominican administrations maintained since the creation of Israel."[13]

Occasionally, the unique and attractive aspect of Israeli society is that it incorporates both socialist and capitalist principles concurrently.[14] While the lower level of technological advancement of some Latin American countries occasionally prompted some of them to identify with the Arab world, in other countries it is Israel's technological development that has generated a positive image.[15] This perception already prevailed with Israel's achievement of statehood. In 1949, at the creation of the Mexican-Israeli Institute, its president, Alfonso Francisco Ramirez, predicted: "Israel will give us, as it has always given the world, the treasure of its millennial wisdom always renewed in the wishes of perpetual enrichment; the marvelous things of its soul, flourishing in the purest essence of the arts and literature; the genius of a technical knowledge which has risen to heights of undreamed of perfection; its splendid will to live, reaffirmed in the incomparable triumphs after centuries of silent and fecund suffering."[16]

Lack of self-interest occasionally results in noninvolvement by some Latin American states, e.g.: "The delegation of Haiti has not taken an active part in the discussions on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, since our country is not directly concerned."[17] On the other hand, Panama, an interested party, expressed its attitude thus:

> The question of Suez is of special importance to the Panamanian delegation for four reasons: first because our own territory is also cut by an artificial waterway which reduces distances and brings together the peoples of the world; second because of the similarities between the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal; third because the merchant marine of Panama is the sixth largest in the world; and fourth, because regulations regarding the neutralization and use of the Suez Canal set forth in the Constantinople convention of 1888 also apply to Panama. In Suez territorial sovereignty is vested in Egypt; in the Panama Canal Zone, it is vested in the Republic of Panama.[18] As a result, Panama sided with Egypt on this issue.

In recent years extreme left-wing groups regard Israel as imperialist or as the "spearhead of imperialism," as stated in a document of the Cuban-sponsored Tricontinental Executive Secretariat: "Israel confirms time and again that it is an imperialist base because of its continuous aggression against the Palestinian people and the Arab regions."[19] Israel's militaristic image has had both positive and negative implications. The Cuban press has condemned Israel's material chauvinism.[20] On the other hand, more common are positive expressions such as "... the Israeli Defense Army for its many proofs of heroism in the battlefield and especially for its exemplary spirit in the time of peace."[21]

"Advocacy of justice" has often been used in Israel's favor, as expressed by Colombian writer and former ambassador to Israel, Germán Arciniegas.[22] Sometimes it works in the Arab's favor,[23] while still in other cases it is applied to both sides. The Cuban delegate to the UN General Assembly had this to say: "This principle is applicable to both the people of Palestine which has been crassly, unjustly, and brutally despoiled of its territory, and to the Hebrew people, which for 2000 years has undergone persecution, racial prejudice, and in the Nazi period not so long ago, one of the most inhuman attempts at mass extermination recorded in history."[24]

The Catholic motive can work to Israel's detriment, as over the issue of the internationalization of Jerusalem.[25] At the same time, religious convictions may create a specific image associating the Holy Land with the people of Israel, as shown in the following statement:

> There emerged a predestined people in the Land of Israel. The history of the Bible is united to these lands and this people. Moses received a guideline for all the world. In the town of Bethlehem Jesus was born, descendent of the shepherd David, the King of Israel. And the New Testament emerged as a continuation of the Old Testament. The history of Israel is the history of a unique book: the relation of God to the people. After World War II, a dramatic necessity was imposed: the creation of the State of Israel. And in which place? Hitler thought to concentrate the survivors on the island of Madagascar. But a fatherland is a historic land, a national mysticism to be founded above the glories and misfortunes of ancestors. And this land was Palestine. It could not be elsewhere.[26]

Foreign policy decisions not involving the Latin American subsystem or the United States are usually restricted to a small group of decision makers. Debates in parliament might affect public opinion or express a moral position; in regard to Israel as in all foreign policy decisions in Latin American countries, policymaking is the absolute prerogative of the executive.[27] In most cases, the president, the foreign minister, the representative at the United Nations, and sometimes diplomats in Israel

(and in the Arab countries, if existing) are usually involved in decision making on Middle East issues. In military regimes, special bodies composed only or mainly of senior officers (such as CONASE in Argentina or COAP in Peru) have played an important rolc. On matters affecting economic and military interests, one also has to include in the decision-making process the relevant functionaries (minister of defense, military officers, the director of agrarian reform, civil aviation authorities, etc.). All Israeli as well as Latin American diplomats interviewed stressed the importance of personal relations in influencing policymaking, i.e., certain individuals, not in an official capacity, whom as a result of personal close relationships with the president or relevant minister, can successfully influence decisions in favor of either side in the existing conflict. In the case of the pro-Israeli lobby, such strategically placed persons are often also members of the Jewish community — though not necessarily active within its framework — who may be close friends of the Israeli ambassador and prominent in national business or intellectual circles.

It is necessary to differentiate the less developed and smaller countries on the continent, where the decision-making process is comparatively uncomplicated, from those where the Middle East conflict is dealt with by the institutionalized and hierarchical framework — the foreign ministries of the larger and more developed Latin American countries. The above description of the decision-making group is perhaps more relevant to the first type of country than to the second, more complex societies.

Before embarking on a content analysis of declarations made by distinct groups of policymakers, it is necessary to stress the importance of the time and place context of a statement, for these determine to a large extent the type of image presented. For instance, declarations made by Latin American personalities on visits to Israel, or to an Arab country, will differ from diplomatic statements made at the United Nations. The status of the individual making the statement — i.e., whether in an official capacity or as a private citizen — also has a bearing on the image created.

Decision makers usually avoid statements on the Middle East problem, except when requested by one of the sides to the conflict, or under circumstances such as during a visit to the region, when such a statement is unavoidable. Until the Yom Kippur war — with the exception of left-leaning and radical Peru, Chile, and Cuba — the majority of Latin American decision makers expressed a more positive position toward Israel than to the Arab countries, an attitude influenced by the greater and more intense interaction with Israel (reciprocal visits, ceremonies, etc.). There has always been a gap between the voting behavior of Latin American countries in international forums and the more public statements of its leaders. As previously stated, a differentiation needs to be made between the more cautious and uncommitted public expressions of

presidents and ministers of such countries as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, and those of the more sympathetic and less reserved verbal support for Israel by leaders of the smaller Latin American nations.

A content analysis of 7,889 words from declarations by the political decision makers of six countries (Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) over the period 1967-73[28] presents the following ranking of themes mentioned (based on a frequency count):

Rank	Theme	No. of times mentioned
1	Promotion of peace and security	23
2	UN role, conciliation, UN mediation	22
3	Responsibility of U.S.S.R.	10
4	Responsibility of U.S.A.	9
5	Rights of Israel to exist, direct negotiations	7
6	Arab belligerence, threat destruction of Israel	5
7	Arab terror, guerrillas	5
8	Small state's rights	4
9-13	Struggle against antisemitism	
	Justice	
	Holocaust	
	Israel's Democracy	
	Technological achievement	1

Latin American diplomats in Israel usually come from a variety of backgrounds: career diplomats, literary figures, political appointees, etc. Usually the latter can exercise greater influence on decisions back home, as normally they have direct access to the president and can bypass the usual channels. Furthermore, political appointments as ambassadors to Israel often reflect personal involvement or attachment to the Jewish people and Israel — the desire to help Israel becomes translated into a readiness to forward its cause back in their country. In spite of the fact that extended service in Israel creates an awareness among diplomats of both the country's virtues and failures, publie statements on the Israeli experience usually stress, as is customary on such occasions, the positive aspects. Typical of this was the evaluation by the departing Uruguayan ambassador, after five years of service in Jerusalem: "The sympathy that Israel enjoys among the Uruguayan people is widely known, and to that we have to add affection and understanding of its problems. I knew the Israeli people held equal feelings towards the country I represented. Here, many of my opinions consolidated. We met a hard-working people; a dedicated

people; a people that has aims above the individual ego; a people that keeps high ideals and strives not to depart from them; a people that succeeds in achieving the ascribed objectives and what is fundamental, that consolidates daily its state."[29]

A content analysis of 25,640 words from interviews with twelve diplomats in Israel representing ten countries (Mexico, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Venezuala, Ecuador (2), Costa Rica (2), Argentina, Panama, and Guatemala), conducted in the years 1971-73, showed the following themes according to frequency:

Rank	Theme	No. of Times
1	Responsibility of U.S.A.	44
2	UN role, conciliation, UN mediation	31
3	Responsibility of U.S.S.R.	15
4	Religious interests, Catholicism	11
5	Israel's technological achievements	7
6-8	Struggle against antisemitism, withdrawal from occupied territory, promotion of peace and security	6
9	Israel's right to exist, independence, and territorial integrity	5
10-14	Holocaust, democracy, military strength, direct negotiations, bilateral exehanges Israel-Latin American country	4
15-17	Justice, danger of world war, Arab economic potential	3
18-20	Rights of Palestinian refugees, respect for international law, Israel as example for Latin America	2

Representatives of Latin American countries at the United Nations are of considerable importance to Israel for their potential political support in international organizations. Although some interviewees tended to dismiss the importance of these delegates[30] — particularly those from major countries — there still exists a consensus among Israeli and Latin Americans that they (UN delegates) still have an important role to play. This is especially so when they are not given precise instructions as to the position to be adopted at the United Nations, as well as in the cases where their government's position has either changed or can be interpreted in several ways. Personality is also a determining factor as to the extent of involvement in lobbying for or against a certain motion, and will also influence one's readiness to speak out on the issue in the United Nations.

The importance of the Latin American representatives to the United Nations is emphasized by the fact that the Israeli Mission to the United Nations includes a senior member who maintains liaison with the Latin American bloc.

For obvious reasons, it is not possible to detail the role played by certain Latin American representatives at the United Nations over the more recent years. However, we can give examples from the more remote past. In Havana during 1947-48, a campaign was mounted to influence the anti-Zionist attitude of Dr. Belt, Cuban delegate to the United Nations. According to a Cuban Zionist leader "Dr. Belt, instead of taking orders from this end, is at present the individual who has most to say about the foreign policy of Cuba. I am also convinced that the president in the present domestic crisis would consider the Palestine question of too little importance to direct a course to Belt."[31] The small Cuban Jewish community with the help of Bistritzky (emissary of the Jewish National Fund) promoted the establishment of the Pro-Hebrew Palestine Committee representing all political circles coordinated by Ofelia Domínguez as secretary general. They launched an intense propaganda campaign aimed at influencing Dr. Belt. Even his father-in-law gave a speech at the Havana Rotary Club in support of the Partition Plan. A meeting was held with Foreign Minister Muñoz, "with promises both for help to us and instructions to Dr. Belt to follow the traditional Cuban policies which have always been for a pro-Hebrew state."[32] A meeting with the president of Cuba was also requested, but failed to take place, as a cabinet crisis was in progress. In search for a wider base of support, a motion was submitted to Congress, aimed at mobilizing support from all political parties, including the Communist (8 out of 160 congressmen). Miguel Suárez, president of the Senate, sent a cable to Dr. Belt asking him to act in accordance with the traditional policy of Cuba.[33] In the end, however, they were unable to prevent Dr. Belt from casting the sole Latin American vote opposed to the Partition Plan. In 1948 he was considered a staunch supporter of the U.S. Trusteeship Plan aimed at delaying the establishment of an independent Jewish state.[34] At the end of 1948, it was reported from Havana that Cuba would have a new representative at the Security Council and a new ambassador, in place of Dr. Belt, in Washington; both friendly to the Zionist cause.[35]

In contrast, the Uruguayan representative to the United Nations and member of UNSCOP,[36] Rodríguez Fabregat, when faced with instructions from his government to support the American plan for trusteeship over Palestine, decided to disregard instructions and oppose the plan.[37] However, before voting took place, it was announced that President Truman had already recognized the newborn Jewish state. The debate was then adjourned.

In the 1960s we also have two conflicting cases. Carlos Velázquez, head of the Uruguayan delegation to the United Nations, abstained on an issue of importance to Israel, in opposition to a continuous traditional pro-Israeli line. Apparently he acted on his own at the risk of being recalled. The inverse happened when Costa Rican delegate to the United Nations Benjamín Núñez decided to bypass instructions and take a position more favorable for Israel.

A content analysis of 9,884 words from speeches or interventions of delegates from Latin American countries during U.N. General Assembly debates in 1950, 1952, 1957, 1961, and 1966-68 on the Middle East, presented the following:[38]

Rank	Theme	No. of Times
1	UN role, concilation, UN mediation	82
2	Promotion of peace and security	33
3	Inadmissibility of occupation of territory and expansion	24
4	Israeli aggressiveness, intransigence	10
5	Existence of war, danger of war, threat to world peace	9
6-7	Dircct negotiations, rights of Palestinian refugees	7
8	Justice	6
9	Holocaust	4
10-12	Self-determination Palestinians; U.S. responsibility; Catholic, religious interest	3
13-14	Israel's right to existence	2

A comparison of three categories of decision makers must take into account intrinsic differences:location (either UN General Assembly, Israel, or own countries); audience (multilateral forum hostile to Israel, Israeli public opinion, internal public opinion); circumstances (position forced by roll-call voting, a declaration upon the request of one side); decision maker's personality (diplomatic, political, intellectual, etc.). In a range of very positive (+2) to very negative (–2), we present the following picture:

Category	Mode	Median
Representative at the UN	–1	–1
Ambassadors in Israel	+1	+1
Political leaders	+2	+2

The results confirm a previous remark that the more professional-diplomatic the policymaker is, the cooler his attitude towards Israel. Exposure to developments in the global system, strong pro-Arab and Arab pressure, the fear of being isolated on a specific issue, low exposure to pressure groups within his own country — all these account for the difference. Differences can also be found in the dominant images of the attitudinal prism of decision makers. Leaving aside the perception of objective international and national situations, we find the following reference to main principles or normative patterns:

Representatives at UN	Ambassadors in Israel	Political leaders
1. Promotion of peace and security	Catholicism, religious interest	Promotion of peace and security
2. Inadmissibility of occupation of territories	Israel's technological development	Israel's right to existence
3. Israeli aggressiveness, intransigence	Struggle against anti-semitism, withdrawal from occupied territory, promotion of peace and security	Arab belligerence, against Arab terror

It should also be noted that Latin American perceptions of Israel are subject to change. Images that were prominent during the early days of Israel's existence (Holocaust, humanitarian, anticolonial) were superseded in later years by others (dynamic, militaristic, imperialist, anticommunist, etc.). Images that reflected certain perceptions of Israel were later attributed to the Arab countries. (For example, radicalism and socialism, Israeli traits in earlier days, now apply to "progressive" Arab regimes.) These changes were the result of a multifaceted process which affected Israel, the Arab countries, and the nations of Latin America. Of consequence were the substantial changes in the composition of the decision-making elites in Latin America and in particular the increase of the technocratic element within them.

NOTES

1. M. Brecher, B. Steinberg, and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research of Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (March 1969): 75-101.
2. A. Manuel de J. Cellar, "Puertas abiertas a Guatemala en Israel," *Diario de Centro América* (Guatemala), January 12, 1965.
3. LAD 67, interview with Enrique Rodríguez Fabregat, Montevideo, April 1973.
4. Jorge García Granados, *Así nacío Israel* (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Oriente, 1949), p. 26.
5. José E. Aybar, *Listin Diario* (Santo Domingo daily), October 10, 1969.

6. ID 44, Jerusalem, June 1973.
7. *Jerusalem Post,* June 20, 1960.
8. Diputado Molina Quesada, Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, *Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria,* no. 23, June 7, 1967, p. 38.
9. Alvaro Aruaz, *El Universal* (Mexico City), April 9, 1949.
10. *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), September 5, 1963.
11. Asamblea Legislativia de la República de Costa Rica, *Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria,* no. 23, June 1967, p. 45.
12. Rodolfo G. Proano, "Israel, estado del futuro," *Revista del Colegio Militar "Floy Alfaro"* (Quito) (May 6, 1966): 21.
13. *Actualidades* (World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem) no. 7 (1971): 9.
14. José Alvarado, "Las dos revoluciones," *Misión en Israel* (Mexico City: Tribuna Israelita, 1968), p. 17.
15. See reference to the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, in Germán Arciniegas, *Entre el Mar Rojo y el Mar Muerto* (Barcelona-Buenos Aires: EDHAGA, 1964), p. 104.
16. *Diario Novedades* (Mexico City daily), December 15, 1949.
17. Speech by Mr. Hudicort of the Haitian delegation to the 7th Session of the UN General Assembly, December 11, 1952.
18. Speech by Mr. Boyd, Panamanian delegate to the 11th Session of the UN General Assembly, 597th Plenary Meeting, November 27, 1956.
19. *Granma* (Havana), February 5, 1969.
20. Commenting on the "defiant parade" of May 2, 1968 in Jerusalem, Osvaldo Ortega, Cairo correspondent of *Prensa Latina,* the Cuban News Agency considered it "militaristic trumpeting." *Granma* April 27, 1968.
21. Statement by Major Augusto Calderón Miranda of the Bolivian army, *Nueva Sión* (Buenos Aires weekly), November 29, 1963.
22. Germán Arciniegas, p. 102. "The just character of Weizmann's demands — Palestine a Jewish republic — were unobjectionable. For twenty centuries the Jews were always wandering, expelled from the land in which they had a history which Jews as well as Christians daily remember, strongly holding their Bible, wandering through the world, subject to all sorts of humiliations, discriminations, and persecutions."
23. Speech by Mr. Arenales Catalán, Guatemalan delegate at the 11th Session of the UN General Assembly, 610th Plenary Meeting, December 5, 1956.
24. Speech by Cuban delegate Alarcón Quesada to the 5th Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 1534th Plenary Meeting, June 23, 1967.
25. "As a representative of an overwhelmingly Catholic people, we desire a vision which will offer complete safeguards for the Holy Places and ensure free access for the faithful of all religions. This General Assembly resolution providing for the internationalization of the Holy City is still in force and Colombia respects it." Speech by Mr. Arbeláez, Colombian delegate at the 285th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 26, 1950.
26. Ismael Diego Pérez, "Fondo y significado de la contienda Israelita-Arabe: el conflicto," in *El conflicto del Medio Oriente visto por mexicanos* (Mexico D.F.: Tribuna Israelita, July 5, 1967), pp. 89-90.
27. LAD 68, interview with former Latin American diplomat, San José (Costa Rica), July 11, 1974.
28. This sample includes texts of declarations of Latin American presidents or ministers — excluding those at UN meetings — that were available in Israel. Most of them are related to visits to Israel. While being aware of the reduced scale of the sample we decided to include it, as it enables us to make a better comparative picture later on when dealing with the other categories of decision makers.
29. Interview with Ambassador Yamandu Laguarda, *Aurora* (Tel-Aviv), May 3, 1974.
30. LAD 15, Jerusalem, 1972.
31. *Zionist Archives* (Jerusalem), Z5/1347, letter from Charles Chapler to Moshe Toff, April 24, 1947: "In this matter, the president, with the close relationship to the U.S. State Department, would accept Dr. Belt's opinion as to what the State

Department really wants, regardless of what one might read to the contrary, and Dr. Belt would be the individual to carry the ball for those wishes."

32. Ibid, Charles Chapler, "Report of My Activities in Cuba from April 20 to March 3," letter of March 8, 1947.
33. Ibid.
34. Jorge García Granados, p. 305.
35. *Zionist Archives,* 25/1347.
36. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.
37. LAD 67.
38. These results are partially congruent with those given in greater detail and on the basis of a different and larger sample in chapter 5.

5

Latin American Voting at the UN General Assembly

Ignoring for a moment the Jewish aspect, the most important potential payoff in Latin America for Israel in the realm of foreign policy is the region's political support. Since the Middle East issue recurs so frequently in international forums, where members are forced to take a stand, Israel's efforts have been directed towards mobilizing support at the multilateral level. In nearly all cases, Israeli diplomats in Latin America interviewed, concurred that the government's main objective on the continent was the assurance of a positive vote at the United Nations. Bilateral relations such as representation, recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, increased trade, arms deals, or air traffic, have been till recently important but not primary. However, following the Yom Kippur war and the deterioration of Israel's position in international organizations, greater emphasis has come to be laid on the maintenance, at present levels, of bilateral relations.

Voting at the United Nations played an important role in the development of Latin American-Israeli relations. Indeed, it was the inscription of an item in the UN agenda — the submission of the Palestine question to the United Nations in April 1947 — that brought Latin American states in contact with Israeli and Middle East issues. Until the end of World War II most Latin American countries had a basically insular range of view in foreign affairs, encompassing only the Latin American area, the United States, and a few European powers. The creation of the United Nations brought about a radical change. Membership in the organization entailed the necessity of taking a stand on

the whole gamut of world affairs. Some Latin American states took a serious interest in the Palestine question from the very beginning. Israel was obviously eager to get in touch with Latin American delegates and governments and gain their support. Thus the UN debates on Palestine provided the first meeting ground between Latin American states and Israel and promoted the establishment of the first bilateral links. Substantial bilateral ties of a different kind developed later, but UN affairs continued to figure high in Latin American-Israeli diplomatic exchanges. All through the years, voting at the United Nations gave a tangible expression to the state of relations existing between each of the Latin American states and Israel. The vote of any country is always the result of a complex interplay of many factors, such as bilateral considerations, international alignments and orientations, and group loyalty. An analysis of the voting patterns of regional groups and individual states offers an insight into motivations, shifts in attitudes, and past and present trends.

From a methodological standpoint, the study of Latin American-Israeli relations through the analysis of UN voting presents many advantages. They may be defined as continuity, periodicity, thoroughness, comparability, and possibility of quantification. Issues affecting Israel were debated practically every year at the United Nations, usually under the same heading and at the same time of the year, namely at the regular session of the General Assembly. All Latin American states took a stand on the issues related to Israel. They did so by positive or negative votes, by abstention, or absence. Votes cast in similar situations can be validly compared and their mathematical analysis leads to inferences and conclusions.

Certain methodological limitations should be kept in mind. The first arises from the availability of a category of data and the unavailability of another. The General Assembly dealt extensively with Palestine and the Middle East, but held only occasional debates on Latin America. There were few serious international crises in the Latin American continent, and some were deliberately kept out of the General Assembly's agenda by entrusting their handling to the regional agency, the U.S.-led Organization of American States. The consequence was that only seldom did Israel vote on Latin American issues.[1] We were therefore compelled to concentrate on one facet of the problem — Latin American attitudes toward Israel — and could not deal with the other — Israeli attitudes toward Latin American states — for lack of relevant information.

Another limitation is that many UN votings cannot be satisfactorily analyzed. The complexities of vote selection are explained below. Finally, one should never lose sight of the fact that only politically equivalent data can be computed and compared. UN votings fall into different categories, according to their political implications. It is only too easy to blur

diversities or bring together contradictory elements by mechanical addition and juxtaposition of votes, or by overreliance on factor analysis.

In our study we did our best to avoid these pitfalls. Special techniques of vote selection and interpretation were elaborated. Vote analysis was compounded by a survey of UN action and jurisprudence on Israeli issues and by a broad analysis of Latin American and Middle Eastern developments against the background of a changing world environment. This comprehensive approach proved well fitted for the needs of our work. However, its validity is not restricted to the Latin American-Israeli context. It constitutes — as shown in Chart 21 — a general method applicable to a wide range of UN problems and especially to the investigation of regional groups.

Chart 21
UN Voting: Political Evaluation Model



Significant Notes

The groundwork for our research was the compilation of a list of all significant votes cast on Israeli issues. The advantage of focusing on a limited set of UN items was that we could scrutinize all pertinent votings and debates, with the purpose of including in our list every vote which fulfilled certain conditions. The hazards of a more or less arbitrary roster of selected issues was thus avoided. Votes were considered significant if five requirements were met:

1. *The proposal voted upon had a clear pro- or anti-Israeli connotation.* An example of an obviously pro-Israeli proposal is Resolution 272 (III) of May 11, 1948, under which Israel was admitted to the United Nations. Supporting the resolution meant taking a pro-Israel stand, and vice versa. Let us now consider the case of Resolution 1123 (XI) of January 19, 1957, which noted with regret and concern the failure of Israel to withdraw from

Egyptian territory (occupied in the 1956 Sinai campaign) and requested that the secretary general secure the complete withdrawal of Israel. This proposal did not refer to Israel as such, but only to an aspect of Israel's policy. Yet it was clearly critical of Israel's action and ran counter to Israel's aim of obtaining international guarantees as a precondition for territorial withdrawal. In the political context of that time to vote in favor of the resolution implied antagonizing Israel, to vote against implied supporting Israel.

2. *The pro- or anti-Israeli connotation was the only or the central element of the proposal.* When this was not so, a nearly insoluble methodological problem arises. Let us for instance compare Resolution 1123 (XI), mentioned above, with an earlier one, Resolution 1120 (XI) of November 24, 1956 — adopted when not only Israel but also France and Britain kept certain areas of Egypt under military occupation —which called upon France, Israel, and the United Kingdom to comply forthwith with the request of immediate evacuation from those areas. The anti-Israeli connotation here is evident but the presence of other equally important elements prevents us from singling it out as the key factor in the stand taken by any given state. It is practically impossible to establish with certainty whether the vote was determined by the attitude toward Israel, Britain, and France, or by any combination of these variables. We therefore considered that the voting on this resolution did not produce significant votes to be included in our list. The accuracy of this distinction is confirmed by the difference in the vote tally of the two resolutions: 63 votes in favor, 5 against, and 2 abstentions for Resolution 1120 (XI); 74 votes in favor, 2 against (France and Israel), and 2 abstentions for Resolution 1123 (XI). Many countries who abstained or voted against Resolution 1120 (XI), probably out of regard for France and Britain, switched to a vote in favor when faced with a proposal directed only against Israel. Only the voting on Resolution 1123 (XI), which can unequivocally be interpreted in terms of pro-Israeli/anti-Israeli stand, is listed as significant.

3. *Israel voted in favor or against the proposal.* The significance of a voting must be corroborated by the Israeli vote. It is obvious that Israel would vote as a rule in favor of any pro-Israeli proposal, against any anti-Israeli one, and would abstain on proposals not strongly controversial from the Israeli standpoint. An Israeli abstention is therefore prima facie evidence of a nonsignificant voting.[2] On the other hand, it is obvious that the Israeli vote is a necessary but not sufficient condition for determination of the pro-Israeli character of a proposal. Any technique based on simple mathematical correlation with the Israeli vote is bound to lead to faulty conclusions.[3]

4. *The Arab states voted in favor or against the proposal.* The Arab

vote on issues affecting Israel[4] tends to be an obverse or mirror image of the Israeli vote and can be validly used to verify the exactitude of our analysis.[5] A positive or negative vote on the part of the Arab states is a necessary condition for a significant voting. The Arab states' abstention corresponds to a nonsignificant voting. As in the case of the Israeli vote, the vote of the Arab states does not constitute a definite proof of the pro-Israeli/anti-Israeli connotation of a proposal. Yet checking together the Israeli and Arab votes reduced the possibility of error. A voting is certainly not significant if the position of Israel and the Arab states coincided, or if one side voted affirmatively or negatively and the other side abstained. To illustrate this point let us consider, for instance, Resolution 1121 (XI) of November 26, 1956, on the administrative and financial arrangements for the UN Emergency Force and subsequent resolutions on the same item. The establishment of a UN force along the demarcation line in the Sinai desert and the Gaza Strip was essentially acceptable to both Israel and Egypt. The voting was therefore not controversial from the Israel-versus-Egypt viewpoint and consequently not significant. This analysis is confirmed by the voting pattern. Israel abstained on Resolution 1121 (XI), while the Arab states voted in favor. After 1956 and up to the disbanding of the UN force in 1967, Israel voted in favor, while the Arab states switched to abstention. Finally, it should be mentioned that in a few cases coincidence between the Israeli and Arab votes was the product not of lack of real controversy but of antagonistic polemical attitudes. This occurred when Israel voted against a proposal in view of its anti-Israeli features, while the Arab states voted against it (or abstained) because they considered it insufficiently anti-Israeli. This happened, for instance, in the voting on Resolution 1604 (XVI), mentioned in note 3. Israel and Jordan voted against it, while other Arab states abstained. These votings were considered nonsignificant because of the difficulty in evaluating the votes cast by other countries in such a confused situation.

5. *A full record of the vote is available.* According to the rule of procedure, the General Assembly normally votes by show of hands. Only the numerical result of the voting is recorded. Many delegations try to keep a state-by-state record of their own, based on observation. This has become increasingly difficult in recent years, with the growth of UN membership. These lists are therefore by force incomplete and not necessarily exact. They are kept, if at all, in the archives of member states and cannot be gathered and checked.

When a member state requests it, a roll-call vote is taken. Since the twenty-second session (December 1967) mechanical means of voting were installed. A new possibility was now offered, that of having a mechanically recorded vote, also at the request of a member state. Only roll-call votes or mechanically recorded votes were included in our list of significant votes.

On the basis of the five criteria just explained, we drew a list of fifty-four votes. In certain cases only the committee vote qualified as significant, while the plenary vote did not. This happened whenever the committee deleted, in the course of the voting, the controversial elements of a draft resolution. The text which reached the plenary session had no more a clear pro- or anti-Israeli connotation and the voting on it lacked significance.

Among the fifty-four votes, we found a number of "double votes," that is, votes cast on the same proposal in committee and in plenary session. We reduced double votes to a single mean figure. Usually states take a consistent stand in the committee and in the plenary, but sometimes they deliberately change their position, expressing, for instance, their individual propensities in the committee vote and following the majority or bloc line in the plenary vote. The mean figure summarizes the stand taken by a state on the issue in question. We did the same also in the case of "multiple votes," namely, paragraph by paragraph votes on the same resolution, when the political implications of the different paragraphs were similar. Mean figures were given, as well, for repetitive resolutions, namely resolutions practically identical in their text and political implications (at least from the Latin American states' standpoint). Repetitive resolutions occurred in 1956-57 after the Suez crisis and in 1967 after the Six-Day war. The list of significant votes was thus reduced to thirty. It is given in Appendix A.

It is interesting to note that the thirty votes do not spread equally over the twenty-year period, but cluster in fourteen general assemblies. There were not significant votes in the sixth, eighth, ninth, twelfth, thirteenth, or eighteenth General Assembly. In the nineteenth General Assembly, no votes were taken because of the U.S.-Soviet dispute on contribution arrears. The main reason for this lack of data was the lack of roll-call votes. On the whole, roll-call votes were less frequent in the first years of the organization, when the UN membership was smaller. They became common practice after 1960, as a result of enlarged membership. Since any state may obtain a roll-call vote by simply requesting it, increased membership invariably leads to a proliferation of roll-call votes. On the other hand, we may accept the proposition that really important issues were generally decided by roll-call votes, while votes by show of hands were usually taken on routine issues, or whenever an overwhelming majority was assured in advance. This applies to the "lean years" of no roll-call votes in the 1950s, when the resolutions adopted aimed only at reviewing the activities carried out by the UN Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and at renewing its mandate. Conversely, the concentration of roll-call votes in certain periods clearly indicates the existence of acute problems. The three major crises of 1948, 1956-57, and 1967 produced large numbers of roll-call votes.

A final remark is that our list of significant votes unavoidably marshals factors which are to a certain extent disparate. A vote on the Jerusalem question is not politically identical to a vote on the refugee question or on the evacuation from occupied territories. We will examine in the course of our study the impact of these distinctions. However, we must remember that there is always a relationship between votes cast by a state at a certain time. Occasionally the vote on one issue may exert a direct influence on the vote of another issue. A state which voted in favor of an anti-Israeli resolution on the occupied territories may wish to balance this act by a vote more favorable to Israel on the refugee question. On the whole, we believe that our list gives a faithful rendering of political attitudes and situations and provides a comprehensive set of comparable data.

COMPUTATION OF VOTING SCORES

We compared the vote of each country according to three different scales. The first, the "intensity scale," focuses on the intensity of the decision which led to the vote. It ranges from 10 to 1. Actions favoring Israel are assigned high scores, actions unfavorable to Israel are marked by low scores. Sponsorship of a pro-Israeli proposal ranks 10. Sponsorship of an anti-Israeli proposal ranks 1. An affirmative vote on an "unpopular" pro-Israeli proposal, that is, one drawing the support of a small group of states, or a negative vote on a "popular" anti-Israeli proposal, that is, one opposed only by a small group of states, ranks 9. Conversely, an affirmative vote on an unpopular anti-Israeli proposal, or a negative vote on a popular pro-Israeli proposal, ranks 2. Intermediate positions — affirmative or negative votes cast together with a sizeable group or together with the majority — are weighted accordingly. The markings showing the lowest intensity are 6 for abstention on an anti-Israeli proposal and 5 for abstention on a pro-Israeli proposal. Between them runs the 5.5 median line. The full list of rankings is given in Table 22.

The intensity scale underlines individual state behavior and magnifies its fluctuations to a somewhat larger-than-life size. This enlargement is helpful to state-by-state analysis, but is unsuitable for the analysis of bloc behavior. By the intensity scale, a state or small group of states taking an "unpopular" position sometimes receives a higher cumulative score than the states belonging to the larger group, which voted closer to the median line. The total score of a minority taking an unpopular position would thus be similar to that of the majority holding to the median line.

To avoid such distortions, we introduced the "compact scale," which focuses on the objective fact of the vote. We adopted it as the standard measurement for bloc vote and made use of it for the individual states as a simpler though less sensitive computation. The compact scale is based on four positions: pro-Israeli vote (affirmative or negative); abstention on an

Table 22
UN Voting: Intensity Scale Scores

Sponsorship of a pro-Israeli proposal	Score: 10
Votes in favour of a pro-Israeli proposal or against an anti-Israeli proposal, being part of a small group (up to 5 states for the period 1947-59; up to 10 states for the period 1960-68).[6]	Score: 9
a. Abstention on anti-Israeli proposal being part of a small group as above. b. Votes in favour of a pro-Israeli proposal or against an anti-Israeli proposal, being part of a large group (more than 5 states in the period 1947-59; more than 10 states in the period 1960-68; less than the majority).	Score: 8
Vote in favour of a pro-Israeli proposal or against an anti-Israeli proposal, being part of the majority	Score: 7
Abstention on an anti-Israeli proposal, being part of a large group as above, or of the majority	Score: 6
Abstention on a pro-Israeli proposal being part of a large group, as above, or of the majority	Score: 5
Vote in favour of an anti-Israeli proposal or against a pro-Israeli proposal, being part of the majority	Score: 4
a. Abstention on a pro-Israeli proposal being part of a small group, as above. b. Vote in favour of an anti-Israeli proposal or against a pro-Israeli proposal, being part of a large group, as above.	Score: 3
Vote in favour of a pro-Israeli proposal or against an anti-Israeli proposal, being part of a small group, as above.	Score: 2
Sponsorship of an anti-Israeli proposal.	Score: 1

Table 23
UN Voting: Compact Scale

1. Vote in favour of a pro-Israeli proposal	Score: 8
2. Vote against an anti-Israeli proposal	Score: 8
Abstention on an anti-Israeli proposal	Score: 6
Abstention on a pro-Israeli proposal	Score: 5
1. Vote in favour of an anti-Israeli proposal	Score: 3
2. Vote against a pro-Israeli proposal	Score: 3

anti-Israeli proposal; abstention on a pro-Israeli proposal; anti-Israeli vote. The scores are 8, 6, 5 and 3, respectively. Score 8 — the pro-Israeli vote — corresponds to scores from 10 through 7 in the intensity scale; score 3 — the anti-Israeli vote — corresponds to scores from 1 through 4 in that scale. The rankings of the compact scale are listed in Table 23.

The performance of the Latin American bloc and of each Latin American state on any issue may be considered from another viewpoint, namely their deviation from the total UN vote. This is expressed by the "UN deviation scale," based on the comparison between Latin American scores and the UN mean score, computed according to the compact scale. When Latin American scores are higher than the UN mean score, the resulting difference is a positive figure, smaller than +5. If the Latin American score is lower than the UN mean score, the difference becomes a negative figure, smalle than –5. As shown in Table 24, the UN deviation scale transforms these figures into scores comparable with those of the intensity scale and of the compact scale, by setting them on a vertical axis,

Table 24
UN Voting: Deviation Scale

Positive and negative difference between LA scores and UN mean scores	Scores of the UN deviation scale
5	10.5
4.5	10
4	9.5
3.5	9
3	8.5
2.5	8
2	7.5
1.5	7
1	6.5
0.5	6
0	5.5
- 0.5	5
- 1	4.5
- 1.5	4
- 2	3.5
- 2.5	3
- 3	2.5
- 3.5	2
- 4	1.5
- 4.5	1
- 5	0.5

parted by a 5.5 median line. The positive figures are added to the median line figure of 5.5; the negative figures are subtracted from it.

The advantage of these three scales of measurement lies in greater flexibility and in the reduced risk of errors. In bloc computations, the UN

deviation scale registers a factor which is not perceived by the compact scale: that of the "effort" made by the Latin American group, when its behavior substantially deviates in a pro- or anti-Israeli direction from total UN behavior. In the study of individual states, the intensity scale and the UN deviation scale complement each other. Both scales are sensitive to the "effort" factor. However, the base of the intensity scale is the factual element of the vote, while the base of the UN deviation scale is the historical framework represented by the general attitude of UN membership. For example, the vote in favor of Resolution 1123 (XI) of January 19, 1957, which requested the complete withdrawal of Israel from occupied Egyptian territories, received, according to the intensity scale, a score of 4 (vote in favor of an anti-Israeli proposal as part of the majority). The UN deviation scale produces a higher score, close to the median line of 5.5, which reflects the political and parliamentary situation at that time, when the Latin American states, with few exceptions, concurred with the practically unanimous anti-Israeli vote of the total UN membership.

On the whole, the three scales behave closely and consistently. The UN deviation scale usually shows slightly higher scores, reflecting the Latin American countries' positive attitude toward Israel in comparison with the total UN membership. The Latin American bloc mean score according to the UN deviation scale is 6.21 (ranging from 7.60 as the highest score and 4.61 as the lowest); according to the compact scale the score is 5.81. The mean score of Uruguay is 7.6 according the the UN deviation scale, 7.4 according to the intensity scale, and 7.2 according to the compact scale. As many measurements in the social sciences, the three scales fall into the category of "artificial measurements." Their use is justified insofar as they provide a helpful and reliable dimension to the research work.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ACTION ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION, 1947-1948

The question of Palestine was first brought before the UN early in 1947. On April 2, the United Kingdom requested the convening of a special session on the future government of Palestine. The session met between April 28 and May 14, 1947. At the closing day, it established an eleven-member Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), composed of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia, to investigate all matters relating to the Palestine problem and to make recommendations. Guatemala and Uruguay played a leading role in the special committee's deliberations and were instrumental in the drafting of the Partition Plan, which called for the termination of the British Mandate in Palestine, the establishment of independent Jewish and Arab states, and a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. When the Partition Plan was put to a vote in the special committee, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Peru

supported it. So did three Western countries, Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and one Eastern European country, Czechoslovakia. India, Iran, and Yugoslavia voted in favor of another plan according to which the Arab majority and the Jewish minority would constitute a single independent federal state with an Arab region and a Jewish region. Australia abstained. The vote was indicative of the positions that the different blocs would take in future debates.[7] On August 31, 1947 the two sets of proposals were submitted to the General Assembly. After a long and bitter discussion, the Partition Plan was adopted by the assembly and became Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947. Among the thirty-three countries which voted in favor, thirteen belonged to the Latin American bloc, thirteen to the Western European bloc (including the United States),[8] and five to the Eastern European bloc.

The votes against, came mainly from Arab and Moslem countries or from countries with large Moslem populations. Cuba was the only Latin American state which joined the pro-Arab group and cast a negative vote. The United Kingdom who as Mandatory Power had opposed the demand for the creation of a Jewish state, abstained. Resolution 181 (II) was a fateful step. It set off a chain of events which led to Israel's independence on May 14, 1948 and to the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war.

Technically, this resolution lies outside the scope of our research, since it was voted upon half a year before the State of Israel came into existence. Yet we took it as the starting point of our study in view of its historical importance and of the role played in it by Latin American countries.

The resolutions passed by the General Assembly in the course of 1948 were stopgap measures aimed at checking the hostilities which erupted between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and later between Arab states and Israel. Only at the end of the year did the General Assembly engage in a full debate of the Palestine question. The United Kingdom, which remained basically pro-Arab and anti-Israel, submitted a draft resolution calling for the assembly's endorsement of the progress report presented by the UN mediator, the late Count Folke Bernadotte; the report proposed new boundaries for Israel on an area smaller than that envisaged in Resolution 181 (II). Australia introduced an amendment to the British draft, reaffirming the validity of the territorial settlement provided by Resolution 181 (II). It drew the support of the Soviet bloc and of some Latin American and Commonwealth pro-Israeli countries. A pro-Israeli draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union requested the immediate removal of all foreign troops and military personnel from the territory of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. It was directed in particular against the British-trained and led Arab Legion, which had brought parts of Palestine under the control of the Kingdom of Transjordan. Only the Soviet bloc and Guatemala voted in favor.

The militant Arab viewpoint was expressed by two Syrian draft resolutions. The first, calling for the abrogation of Resolution 181 (II), drew scant support. The second, requesting the International Court of Justice to give a legal opinion on the validity of the partition of Palestine, resulted in a tie: twenty-one in favor and twenty-one against. A number of Latin American countries moved in this vote to the pro-Arab camp. The Soviet bloc, the majority of the Western countries, and a few pro-Israeli Latin American states voted against.

Since no draft resolution commanded a majority, the task of preparing a new draft was entrusted to a subcommittee. The text approved by the majority of the subcommittee members was finally adopted and became Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Its central features were:

1. It established a Conciliation Commission consisting of three member states which would, inter alia, assume the functions of the UN mediator in Palestine (paragraph 2).
2. It called upon the governments and authorities concerned to seek agreement by negotiations, conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them (paragraph 3).
3. It resolved that the Jerusalem area should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective UN control; it instructed the Conciliation Commission to present the fourth session of the General Assembly with detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area (paragraph 8).
4. It resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors, should be permitted to do so, at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return; it instructed the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation (paragraph 11).

We found it necessary to reproduce in detail the provisions of these paragraphs, and in particular of paragraph 11, because of their bearing on future developments. In later years they became focal points of the General Assembly's debates.

The imprecise and sometimes contradictory language of the resolution was the outcome of the political tug-of-war which preceded its final formulation. The Arab states asserted that Israel had caused the refugee problem and bore the responsibility of their present plight. The only solution was, in their view, the immediate and unconditional return of the refugees to their homes. Israel rejected this notion, seeing in the refugees'

return a political and security danger, particularly in a war situation. Israel stressed that the Arab states had deliberately unleashed the war and were responsible for its consequences; however, the refugee problem should be solved through a joint international effort, with the cooperation of the Arab states, directed mainly to the settlement of the refugees in the neighboring Arab countries. Paragraph 11, as finally adopted, made the refugees' return conditional on their wish to live at peace with their neighbors. Resettlement and rehabilitation were mentioned as additional objectives. The controversial question of the timing of the return was also settled by a compromise. Britain wanted the return to take place "at the earliest possible date"; Guatemala proposed to add the words: "after the proclamation of peace between the contending parties in Palestine, including the Arab states." The formula eventually adopted was "at the earliest possible date." From the Israeli standpoint, paragraph 11 retained, even after these modifications, an unfavorable connotation; by its advocacy of the early return of the refugees to their homes, it ignored Israel's stand, as well as Israel's vital interests. Israel was opposed also to the permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. Israel had accepted Resolution 181 (II) in spite of its provisions on Jerusalem. However, after Arab rejection of the Partition Plan and the outbreak of war, it considered itself freed from obligations in this regard. Jews in Jerusalem constituted a majority of the city's population. At the end of 1948 Israel held most of the Jerusalem area and had no intention of handing it over to an international administration. The Israeli-controlled western sector of the city, with its large Jewish population, contained the central Jewish institutions and was due to become the seat of the Israeli government.

Paragraph 2, on the establishment of the Conciliation Commission, was for Israel a reason for concern. Recent experience gave Israel no reason to welcome the creation of a permanent UN body on the Palestine question and entrusted with the UN mediating functions. On the other hand, paragraph 5 on negotiations represented the acceptance of one of Israel's fundamental theses.

The vote tally reflects the ambiguities of the text and the possibility of contrasting interpretations. Most of the thirty-five votes in favor came from Western or Latin American countries, including countries like Uruguay, well known for their pro-Israeli attitude. The fifteen countries which voted against, belonged to two distinct groups. The Arab and pro-Arab states, including Cuba, did so to emphasize their rejection of the existence of the Jewish state and of any request of negotiation and conciliation with it. The Soviet bloc opposed Resolution 194 (III) because it considered it unfavorable to Israel and prejudicial to the authority and the terms of Resolution 181 (II). The eight abstentions came from both

usually pro-Arab countries and usually pro-Israeli countries, such as Guatemala. Altogether, it was a characteristic case of nonsignificant voting.[9]

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION

The General Assembly's handling of the refugee question starts with Resolution 212 (III) of December 8, 1948. Assistance to Palestinian refugees was seen then as an emergency program to alleviate temporary conditions of starvation and distress; and help was to be extended to refugees of all communities, that is to Arab refugees from areas held by Israel and to the small group of Jewish refugees from parts of Palestine under Arab control. The refugee question became a permanent UN item only with Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, which established the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and requested the agency's director to submit an annual report to the General Assembly. Resolution 302 (IV) expressly reaffirmed paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), and by singling it out conferred to it a special status, later enhanced by subsequent resolutions. The yearly debate on the report of the director of UNRWA became an Israeli-Arab battlefield, where not only the refugee question, but all facets of the Arab-Israeli conflict were fought out time and again. Another occasion of Arab-Israeli confrontation was the progress reports from the Conciliation Commission.

The ups and downs in this political contest found a semantic expression in the language of UN resolutions. For many years the struggle turned upon subtle modifications in references made to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). The Arab states strove for making paragraph 11, through progressive interpretation, the cornerstone of a UN anti-Israeli policy. One of their objectives was to achieve, on the basis of paragraph 11, UN involvement in the protection of the refugees' property rights and, possibly, UN administration of property abandoned by refugees in Israeli territory. Conversely, Israel tried to get renewed endorsement for the principle of direct negotiations (already called for by paragraph 5 of Resolution 194 (III), with the purpose of breaking down the Arab policy of nonrecognition and counterbalancing Arab pressure on refugees' repatriation and property rights.

The outcome of these conflicting efforts depended on the changing of power within the UN system. For a long time the United States and the Western countries had the say. The United States wielded a decisive influence in UN affairs; moreover it supplied, together with the Western countries, the contributions which enabled UNRWA to function. This situation scarcely changed in the period under consideration, even after the

enlargement of UN membership and the consequent growth of the Afro-Asian bloc and of the nonaligned countries group. On the other hand, the UN output was affected by changes in the relative strength of Israel and of the Arab states. Israel's standing as an independent UN factor was debilitated when the Soviet bloc moved to outright support of the Arabs. The Arab group membership grew because of admission to the UN of new Arab states. In the 1960s, Israel and the Arab states vied for winning the favor of the new African nations.

The first development in this trial of strength was Resolution 394 (V) of December 14, 1950 on the progress report of the Conciliation Commission, which laid emphasis on negotiations and compensation and mentioned repatriation only as one of the objectives to be pursued. As most Western-sponsored resolutions, it tried to heed the antagonistic viewpoints of both sides. The parties were urged to seek agreement by negotiation, conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly; an office of the Conciliation Commission was established to make arrangements for the assessment and payment of compensation and to consult the parties regarding protection of refugees' rights, property, and interests. The next resolution on the progress report of the Conciliation Commission, 513 (VI) of January 25, 1952, stressed the governments' primary responsibility for reaching a settlement and urged them to seek agreement.

At the next session, Israel tried to obtain an unequivocal reaffirmation of the necessity for direct negotiation. Eight friendly countries, Western European and Latin American (Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, and Uruguay), submitted a special draft resolution to this effect which achieved the majority in the committee, but was rejected by a roll-call vote in the plenary.

At the ninth session the Arab states' pressure provoked the introduction of an implicitly anti-Israeli element in the resolution on the report of the director of UNRWA. Resolution 818 (IX) of December 4, 1954 contained a preliminary paragraph which read: "Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11, has not been effected and that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern." Resolution 1315 (XIII) of December 12, 1958 went a step further: the opening words of the pertinent paragraph were "noting with regret."

While the resolutions previously mentioned aroused no major controversy, and were voted by show of hands, a roll-call vote took place at the fourteenth session on the amendments submitted by Indonesia and Pakistan to a draft resolution on the report of the director of UNRWA, sponsored by the United States and other Western countries. The Moslem countries' motion requested, among other things, that the Conciliation

Commission make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). Israel opposed this move, viewing it as an attempt to confer enforcement power to the Conciliation Commission. The amendments were, nevertheless, carried by a large majority. Israel cast the lonely negative vote. The abstentions came mainly from Western and Latin American countries. The U.S.-Western-sponsored text, to which the amendments were incorporated, already contained another change unfavorable to Israel: the usual preliminary paragraph on repatriation or compensation of refugees opened now with the words "noting with deep regret." It became Resolution 1456 (XIV) of December 9, 1959.

At the fifteenth session, the Arab states continued their offensive along new lines. They were encouraged by the admission to the United Nations of a large number of African and Asian countries, many of them Moslem. They could count on the Soviet bloc which, since the 1950s, consistently voted in their favor. Afghanistan, the Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Somalia submitted an amendment to the U.S.-Western draft resolution on the report of the director of UNRWA, recommending the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding property rights of Arab refugees. The amendment was approved by the committee, against the votes of the Western bloc and part of the Latin American bloc, and got a plurality in the plenary, but was rejected for failing to obtain a two-thirds majority.

The original draft resolution, however, which became Resolution 1604 (XV) of April 21, 1961, represented a shift in favor of the Arab viewpoint. It stated in an operative paragraph that the General Assembly "notes with regret that the Conciliation Commission has not yet been able to report progress and again requests the commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III)." The preliminary paragraph starting with the words "noting with deep regret" was retained as in the previous year's resolution.

A turn in favor of Israel occurred at the sixteenth session. Israel was able to muster support among the new African states, especially those of the Brazzaville group, composed of former French colonies. Sixteen pro-Israeli countries — six of them Latin American — (Central African Republic, Chile, Congo [Brazzaville], Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Niger, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, and Uruguay), introduced a draft resolution, renewing the appeal to the governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations, with a view to finding a solution for all questions in dispute, particularly the question of the Arab refugees. The proposal failed to get a majority in the committee. The vote tally shows that most Western, Latin American, and new African states voted in favor,

while a minority joined the traditionally pro-Arab Asian and African countries and the Soviet bloc in the negative vote. The United States voted against and stressed its opposition to both Israeli and Arab efforts to transform the discussion of the refugee question into an overall political debate.

To counteract the Israeli pressure, four pro-Arab countries — Afghanistan, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan — introduced a proposal aimed at drawing the sympathy of the new countries. According to it the Conciliation Commission would be enlarged to five members and the reconstituted commission would take measures for the protection of the rights, property, and interests of refugees. The Conciliation Commission since 1948 counted only three members, all of them Western: the United States, France, and Turkey. The demand for a larger and more balanced composition was intended to raise widespread support. The four-power motion, which was submitted as an amendment to a U.S. draft resolution on the report of the director of UNRWA, was carried in the committee but failed to get the two-thirds majority in the plenary. The United States voted against, but as in previous years, agreed to include some of the Arab demands on its own draft. Resolution 1725 (XVI) of December 20, 1961 contained an operative paragraph which requested that the Conciliation Commission intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), and further requested that it intensify work on the identification and evaluation of Arab refugees' property.[10]

A pro-Israeli and a pro-Arab proposal faced each other again at the seventeenth session. The pro-Israeli draft resolution on direct negotiations identical to that of the preceding session was tabled by twenty-one sponsors — fourteen African, two Western European, and six Latin American (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Uruguay). Afghanistan, Indonesia, Mauritania, and Pakistan submitted a draft resolution requesting the secretary general to appoint a UN custodian for the administration and protection of Arab property, assets, and property rights within Israel. While the committee was debating, the United States convinced the two groups of sponsors not to press their motions to a vote.[11] Before the committee remained now only the U.S. draft resolution on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA,[12] which this time did not contain the customary "noting with deep regret" preliminary paragraph. The paragraph was reintroduced by an amendment submitted by Cyprus and the text thus amended became Resolution 1856 (XVII) of December 20, 1962.[13]

At the eighteenth session, Israel and the Arab states fielded once more, through friendly countries, opposite proposals. A draft resolution sponsored by nineteen countries, thirteen African, one Western European, and five Latin American (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El

Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras), called for direct negotiations on the refugee question. A proposal by Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan directed the Conciliation Commission to further efforts regarding measures for the protection of property, property rights, and interests of the refugees. Both motions were withdrawn by the sponsors at the request of the United States.[14] The U.S. draft resolution on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA was the only one voted upon and became Resolution 1912 (XVIII) of December 3, 1963. It repeated the text adopted in the preceding session including the "noting with deep regret" preliminary paragraph.

After the no-vote nineteenth session, the struggle was resumed at the twentieth session. The Arab states launched, through friendly Moslem countries, a two-pronged attack. Afghanistan and Malaysia sponsored a draft resolution on the appointment of a UN custodian for the protection of Arab property in Israel; the custodian would be entitled, among other things, to receive income derived from such property on behalf of the rightful owners. The motion was rejected in the committee, the negative votes coming from the Western bloc and from Latin American and African countries. Pakistan and Somalia tabled a number of amendments to the U.S. draft resolution on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA, including an operative paragraph which deplored Israel's continued refusal to implement paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) and urged it not to obstruct any further such implementation. The amendments were adopted in the committee, with the support of the Afro-Asian countries, the Soviet bloc, and a few Western countries. However, before the convening of the General Assembly's plenary meeting, behind the scene negotiations were held between U.S. and Arab delegations. Only after a deal was struck, did the plenary meeting take place. According to the prearranged agreement, the assembly decided not to vote upon the text transmitted for approval by the committee and to consider a new draft resolution, introduced by Nigeria. In the new text, the anti-Israeli elements inserted by the Pakistani-Somali amendments were eliminated. On the other hand, the "noting with regret" preliminary paragraph of the U.S. draft resolution was transformed into a "notes with deep regret" operative paragraph. The compromise text became Resolution 2052 (XX) of December 15, 1965.

At the twenty-first session the Arab-inspired effort developed along the same lines. Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia jointly tabled the former year's proposal on the appointment of a UN custodian for Arab property in Israel. Somalia submitted an amendment to the U.S. draft resolution on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA, calling on Israel to cooperate in the implementation of Resolution 194 (III). Both the four-power draft resolution and the Somali amendment were turned

down by the committee by a small majority. The vote tally shows a shift in a pro-Israeli direction of some African and Western countries, mainly from vote in favor to abstention, in comparison with the twentieth session, while there was no substantial change in the breakdown of Latin American votes. The U.S. draft resolution which retained the "notes with deep regret" operative paragraph, as in the previous year's resolution, was left alone in the field and became Resolution 2154 (XXI) of December 17, 1966.

In the Fifth Special Emergency Session, convened in June 1967 in the wake of the Six-Day war, a new refugee problem came up for consideration: that of the refugees who fled during the war operations from the areas occupied by Israel. Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967, unanimously adopted, called, inter alia, upon the government of Israel to facilitate the return to those inhabitants and endorsed the efforts made by UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance on an emergency basis.

At the twenty-second regular session, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia reintroduced the preceding year's draft on the appointment of a custodian. The five-power draft was adopted in the committee, but not voted upon in the plenary.[15] The assembly adopted, with no votes against, a resolution on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA, composed of two parts: Part A repeating the text of the previous year's resolutions on the commissioner general's report, and Part B reaffirming the Fifth Emergency Session resolution on the 1967 displaced persons (Resolution 2341 [XXII] of December 19, 1967).

The gradual erosion of Israel's position, aggravated by the superimposition of the postwar problems, became more evident at the twenty-third session. Argentina, Iran, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution which called, inter alia, on the government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return of the inhabitants who fled the occupied areas. It was adopted in the committee by an overwhelming majority. The roll-call vote tally shows that only Israel voted against. Nine Latin American and African countries abstained. After approval by the plenary it became Part A of Resolution 2452 (XXIII) of December 19, 1968 on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA. Part B of the resolution dealt in the customary terms with the 1948 refugees. Part C reiterated the endorsement of UNRWA's emergency efforts to extend humanitarian assistance to the 1967 displaced persons.

The twenty-third session dealt once more with the proposal on the appointment of a UN custodian for Arab property in Israel. A draft resolution to this effect submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia was defeated in the committee by a slim margin, the

increased number of negative votes coming from African and Latin American countries.

THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

Unlike the refugee question, the question of Jerusalem was not a straight Arab-Israeli issue. It was for Israel and for Arab and Moslem counties a religious problem, emotionally charged. The attitude of third countries was often affected by their own religious attachments and loyalties. However, the political implications of the issue were paramount. Sovereignty over part or over the whole of Jerusalem brought to Israel added prestige in the area and in the world. On the other hand, the adoption of UN resolutions against Israeli control of Jerusalem exposed Israel to adverse international public opinion, religious and secular. Resolutions that would debilitate Israel's standing on the Jerusalem question were from the Arab viewpoint a valuable asset. Around them, moreover, it was possible to promote the creation of a widc anti-Israeli alignment that could constitute a stepping-stone for a more comprehensive political offensive.

The General Assembly gave special attention to the religious issues connected with Jerusalem since the beginning of its involvement with the Palestine question. The first special session of April 1947 included the protection of religious interests in the terms of reference for the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947, based on the UNSCOP plan, provided in Part III that the City of Jerusalem be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and be administered by the United Nations, with the purpose "to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city, of the three great monotheistic faiths, Christian, Jewish, and Moslem."

However, when the third session of the General Assembly considered again, in 1948, the question of Palestine, Jerusalem was already split in two sectors under Israeli and Transjordanian control. In view of this situation, it preferred not to take hasty action and in Resolution 194 (III), mentioned above, requested of the Conciliation Commission to prepare a detailed proposal for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem.

At the Fourth General Assembly, two distinct conceptions clashed. The first, based on the Conciliation Commission report and embodied in a draft resolution submitted by Australia, demanded as a matter of principle the reaffirmation and early implementation of the corpus separatum. The second favored functional internationalization of the Holy Places alone; a UN body would supervise the protection of the Holy Places and free access

to them, while the administration of the city would be left to the authorities in control of the two sectors. This approach found expression in separate draft resolutions submitted by the Netherlands, Uruguay, Sweden, and Cuba. The Australian proposal[16] was carried in the committee and in the plenary by a large Moslem-Catholic-Soviet[17] majority, over the opposition of Israel and some Western and Latin American countries. It became Resolution 303 (IV) of December 9, 1949.

Under Resolution 303 (IV), the UN Trusteeship Council was designated to adopt the Statute of Jerusalem and to discharge the responsibilities of administering authority. In June 1950, the council reported that the governments of Israel[18] and Jordan had refused to cooperate in carrying out the statute, thus making its implementation impossible.

At the fifth session, in 1950, functional internationalization was proposed again. Sweden tabled a draft resolution on the appointment of a UN commissioner entrusted with the wide powers to this effect, while Britain, the United States, and Uruguay, in a joint amendment, recommended sending to Jerusalem a UN representative with more limited authority. Belgium introduced a draft resolution aimed at keeping alive the full internationalization plan, by requesting the preparation of a new version; four persons were to study the conditions of a settlement, "in accordance with the principles already adopted by the assembly." The Belgian draft resolution was adopted by the committee, but failed to obtain in the plenary the two-thirds majority. The negative votes mainly came from Protestant and a few Latin American countries. The Soviet bloc abstained. Two years later, at the seventh session in 1952, the General Assembly rejected an amendment by the Philippines, reaffirming the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem.[19] It was the last endeavor in this field for many years.

Only in June 1967, at the Fifth Special Emergency session, did the question of Jerusalem come up again for discussion, this time as a result of Latin American initiative. The draft resolution on the question of the Middle East, introduced by twenty Latin American states, stated, in its last operative paragraph: "Reaffirms as in earlier recommendations the desirability of establishing an international regime for the city of Jerusalem." The Latin American proposal failed to obtain the two-thirds majority.[20]

While the Latin American draft represented a continuation of the previous approach to the Jerusalem question, two draft resolutions introduced by Pakistan and subsequently adopted by the assembly dealt with the new developments: the occupation by Israel of the eastern sector of the city, as a result of the Six-Day war, and the announcement by the government of Israel, made on June 28, 1967, regarding the unification of Jerusalem. Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967 stated that the assembly

considered invalid the measures taken by Israel and called upon Israel to rescind them and desist from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Resolution 2254 (ES-V) of July 14, 1967 deplored Israel's failure to implement the previous resolution and reaffirmed its provisions. Both resolutions were carried by a large majority, with no votes against and with the abstention of a few Western European, Latin American, and African countries.

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

The review of the UN General Assembly's proceedings and action on the main issues affecting Israel would not be complete without a brief survey of territorial questions. The General Assembly dealt with Israel's boundaries at the second session, when it adopted the partition plan and again at the third session, following the progress report of the UN mediator. The assembly refrained from taking a stand on the mediator's territorial proposals and confined itself to pass on — by Resolution 194 (III) — the mediator's functions to the newly established Conciliation Commission.

The first Israeli-Arab territorial settlement was reached outside the United Nations but through its good offices. Between February and July 1949, with the assistance of the UN acting mediator Ralph Bunche of the United States, Israel negotiated and signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The armistice lines were given UN recognition on August 11, 1949, when the Security Council, in Resolution S/1736 expressed its approval of the agreements.

The question of occupied territories arose twice: in 1956-57 after the Suez crisis and the Sinai campaign, and in 1967 after the Six-Day war. In both cases the Security Council was unable to act[21] and a Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly was convened. The first Special Emergency Session adopted between November 2 and November 11, 1956, three resolutions on withdrawal from occupied territories — while other resolutions dealt with the establishment of a UN Emergency Force (UNEF). The eleventh regular session of the General Assembly resumed the consideration of the matter and adopted three additional resolutions. Resolutions 997 (ES-I) of November 2, 1956; 999 (ES-I) of November 4; 1002 (ES-I) of November 7; and 1120 (XI) of November 24, urged the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice line and of the British and French forces from Egyptian territory. Resolutions 1123 (XI) of January 19, 1957 and 1124 (XI) of February 2, 1957, adopted after completion of the evacuation of French and British forces from Egypt — referred only to the Israeli withdrawal.

The voting pattern bears out the close cooperation between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which prevailed on

the occasion. Both voted consistently in favor. So did the Soviet bloc, the Afro-Asian bloc, the Latin American bloc (with sporadic exceptions), and part of the Western bloc. Israel voted against all pertinent resolutions. The other negative votes and abstentions came mostly from Western countries. When Israel was left alone their number dwindled. The General Assembly's treatment of the Suez crisis ended with the withdrawal of Israeli forces, initiated on December 21, 1956 and concluded on March 8, 1957.[22]

The Fifth Special Emergency Session convened after the Six-Day war, on June 19, 1967, and was confronted by two different sets of proposals. The anti-Israeli proposals ranged from the draft resolution of the nonaligned countries — which demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they held prior to June 5, 1967 — to the more extreme draft resolutions and amendments submitted by the Soviet Union, Albania, and Cuba, containing additional elements, such as condemnation of Israeli agression, compensation payment by Israel, and condemnation of the United States as instigator. The draft resolution sponsored by twenty Latin American states set forth two parallel sets of requests: Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and an end of the state of belligerence by the parties in conflict. By linking the two requests in a single paragraph, the Latin American proposal implicitly made Israeli withdrawal conditional on a change of policy on the part of the Arab states. As such it was considered pro-Israeli. The real contest took place between the Latin American resolution and that of the nonaligned countries. Both obtained a plurality but were rejected for lack of a two-third majority.

The analysis of the voting shows the concurrence of two factors: the pro-Israeli/anti-Israeli division and the East/West division, provoked by the conflicting stand of the two superpowers. Consequently, the Western bloc, the Latin American bloc, and some pro-Western or pro-Israeli Afro-Asians voted in favor of the Latin American text and against the text of the nonaligned. The same interplay of forces influenced the abstentions.

The continuation of Israeli occupation gave rise to many General Assembly debates on this subject in the following years. In the period under consideration, the only resolution connected with this problem was Resolution 2443 (XXII) of December 19, 1968 on "Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories." It was carried by a large majority, composed mainly of Soviet and Afro-Asian countries, while only a limited number of Latin American, African, and Wetern countries — including the United States — joined Israel in the negative vote.

This concludes the examination of the principal General Assembly moves and pronouncements on Israeli issues. As already explained before,

only part of this material is suitable for voting analysis according to the specifications we established. The elements which could not be brought into the general framework of quantitative analysis were used whenever possible — as in the case of draft resolutions — in the study of individual states' behavior. Statements made in the course of debates were also helpful in clarifying official viewpoints and underlying motivations. Statements made during the three great crises of 1948, 1956-57, and 1967 were examined by content analysis. The pertinent inferences and conclusions are given in Appendix B.

VOTING ANALYSIS: RECURRING ISSUES

Latin American voting behavior in the thirty significant votings is shown in Chart 25. The striking feature is the apparent lack of a consistent attitude. The voting line zigzags up and down, repeatedly crossing the median line. The high points are the markedly pro-Israeli scores of 6.8 in vote 1, of 7.6 in vote 7, and of 7.8 in votes 24 and 25; the low points are reached in vote 3 with a score of 3.8 and in vote 13 with a score of 3.2. A closer look reveals that the turns of the curve are caused, quite often, by different attitudes toward different issues. Some issues were voted only once in the years 1947-68, as for example the Partition of Palestine (1947), Israel's admission to the United Nations (1949), or the question of the participation of the Palestine Arab Delegation in the UN committee's debates (1962). Other issues that came up several times over the years enable us to analyze certain basic trends.

Chart 25
Latin American Bloc Vote at UN:
Compact Scale (score 5.81)



We were able to identify six main recurring issues.[23] Three of them were debated at the United Nations within the framework of a single item, the report of the director (later commissioner general) of UNRWA, but represent distinct political approaches to the problem. They may be defined as: (1) Implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III); (2) UN arrangements or action for the protection of refugees' property rights in Israel; (3) negotiations between the parties. The three remaining issues are: (4) The question of Jerusalem; (5) withdrawal from occupied territories; (6) supranationalism.

Latin American voting on the question of Jerusalem shows a particularly high degree of consistency. The issue was voted upon in 1949, 1950, and 1952 (votes 8, 10, and 12), and again, in a different context, in 1967 (vote 26). The Latin American scores are 4.6, 4.4, 4.4, and 3.6, all of them well below the 5.81 Latin American mean score and the 5.5 median line. In the first three votes the Latin American scores deviated negatively from the corresponding UN mean scores. This is illustrated in Chart 26 which describes the Latin American bloc's behavior, according to the UN deviation scale. The question at stake was, up to 1967, the internationalization of the city and the protection of the Holy Places. In these matters the Latin American attitude was more radical than that of the total UN membership. In the 1967 vote, the Latin American score was lower than in previous votings but coincided with the UN mean score. The subject matter was at that time the unification of the city carried out by Israel after the Six-Day war, on June 28, 1967. Countries like Mexico, particularly sensitive to the issues of occupation and annexation, switched, in the new situation, from abstention, practiced in the years 1949-52, to an affirmative vote.

As mentioned above, the Latin American bloc made an attempt, at the same session, to reopen the old internationalization issue by introducing a paragraph to this effect in its draft resolution on the question of the Middle East. On the whole, the factor underlying the Latin American stand on Jerusalem seems to be a religious attachment, rooted in the internal structures and belief systems of Latin American societies, and therefore comparatively insulated from current political interests and from the influence of international developments. Latin American societies, however, do not hold uniform attitudes on religious matters. In certain Latin American countries a strong anticlerical tradition still prevails. In others there is a deep internal cleavage on this matter. Our study reveals that on the Jerusalem question liberal regimes usually deviate in a pro-Israeli direction from the Latin American mean scores.

The issue of negotiations was voted upon in 1952 and 1961 (votes 11 and 16). The Latin American scores were 6 and 6.8. It should also be recalled that in 1962 and 1963 several Latin American countries cosponsored draft

Chart 26
Latin American Bloc Vote at UN: Deviation Scale (score 6.21)



resolutions in favor of direct negotiations which were not pressed to a vote. The constant here is Latin American support for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Israel's existence and freely agreed to by Israel. Negotiations are a customary attribute of sovereign states. They also constitute an obligation under the UN Charter (negotiations are listed in Article 33 of the charter among the peaceful means of settlement of disputes). By supporting negotiations, the Latin American states rejected Arab negation of Israel's right to exist as well as the notion that Israel's sovereignty could or should be whittled down by UN action.

Israel's existence and sovereignty bears also on the issue of UN arrangements for the protection of refugees' property. The crux of the matter was whether the United Nations was entitled to set up bodies such as a UN custodian for refugees' property, with the purpose of supervising certain activities of the Israeli government in its own territory and of taking direct action there, such as collection of income. The Latin American states generally opposed or refused to back proposals of this kind which would in their view, infringe upon Israel's sovereignty. Their scores on this question were 6.1, 6.5, 7.0, 6.6, 6.9, and 6.90 (for votes 15, 17, 21, 23, 27, and 29 taken in the years 1960-68). All of them are above the 5.5 median line and the 5.81 Latin American mean score.

The issue of implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) was generally considered by UN members not directly involved in the

Arab-Israeli conflict as primarily humanitarian. Even pro-Israeli states would have welcomed gradual steps, which seemed compatible with Israel's security and population problems and needs. In 1959 and in 1962 (votes 14 and 19) the Latin American scores were markedly low: 4.3 and 4.2. However, in later years the pro-Arab states submitted draft resolutions openly critical of Israel ("deplores Israel's continued refusal...urges it not to obstruct any further") which contained an implicd threat of future enforcement action. The Latin American states, as well as many others, particularly Western and African ones, apparently drew a line between the request for a voluntary act by a state and attempts to make the implementation of paragraph 11 compulsory. Consequently, thcy opposed these Arab-inspired demands. The Latin American score for vote 20 in 1956 was 7.0. In 1967, when the pro-Arab draft resolution was couched in more guarded language, the score was 6.7 (vote 22). The firm stand taken by the Latin American states on Israel's sovereignty did not detract from their traditional support of supranationalism. Most of them voted in favor of resolutions with supranational implications which ran counter to Israel's interests. In vote 5, in 1948, on the proposal to submit the Palestine question to the International Court of Justice, thus postponing the establishment of the Jewish state, the Latin American score was 5.4. In vote 9 in 1950, when the issue was the extent of the role which the UN Conciliation Commission should play in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, the Latin American score fell to 4.2. There were no more straight votes on supranational questions after that. However, the Latin American states' oft-repeated commitment to Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, as expressed by the speeches of Latin American delegates in the general debate at the twenty-third and at later sessions, has a component of supranationalism. In general, Latin American support for supranationalism in the United Nations is also a constant, which occasionally prevails over any other allegiance or propensity.

The only recurring issue on which Latin American voting was seemingly preponderantly affected by global considerations is that of withdrawal from occupied territories. In 1956-57, the Latin American states followed the lead of the two superpowers and concurred with practically the whole UN membership in voting in favor of Israel's unconditional withdrawal. Their score for vote 13 was 3.2. In 1967, after the Six-Day war, in a situation of world confrontation, Latin America drcw close to the United States and far apart from the Soviet Union. Factual differences between the two chains of events which set in action the crises of 1956-57 and 1967 were certainly taken into consideration by Latin American states. The Latin American draft resolution at the Fifth Special Emergency Session reaffirmed the principle of inadmissibility of conquest and demanded

Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories, but made it implicitly conditional on the cessation of Arab belligerence. The Latin American score in vote 24 was 7.8. The same score appears in vote 25 which refers to pro-Arab proposals demanding Israel's unconditional withdrawal.

Voting Analysis: The Time Element

The breakdown of voting scores by issues is only one of the approaches to vote interpretation. Focusing on issues alone would overemphasize the relative rigidity of certain attitudes, losing sight of the inherent flexibility characteristic of political decisions. In actual practice there is always a political connection between the votes cast by states at a UN General Assembly session on Israeli issues. In certain cases, countries obviously tried to balance their votes on diffcrent issues in order to express a given overall political attitude. An anti-Israeli vote on the Jerusalem question could for example be "corrected" by a more pro-Israeli vote on another issue such as negotiations. Therefore, the mean score of a number of votes over a sufficient span of time does summarize with relative accuracy the basic attitude of a country or a regional group toward the whole spectrum of Israeli issues.

The political significance of a given vote cannot be gauged by its absolute score alone. It is no less important to see it in the context of the vote of other specific countries and of the whole UN membership. The deviation from the UN mean score in a pro- or anti-Israeli direction is politically meaningful. The behavior of the Latin American bloc according to this criterion has been shown in Chart 26 based on the UN deviation scale.

The comparison between Charts 25 and 26 indicates that in both it is possible to draw a dividing line between votes 1-13 and votes 14-30. On the whole, the second group of votes has higher scores and in Chart 26 its graph runs consistently above the median line. Votes 1-13 occurred in the years 1947-57 (Period A: from the second to the eleventh session of the General Assembly). Votes 14-30 belong to the years 1959-68 (Period B: from the fourteenth to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly). The cumulative scores are listed in Table 27.

The figures point to a shift in Latin American attitudes toward Israel: from mildly positive in Period A to distinctly favorable in Period B. The explanation is to be sought in changes which took place in the global environment, in regional situations, and in domestic policies. We will draw first a general outline and will later examine certain aspects in detail.

Period A opens concomitantly with the cold war and the freezing of the temporary settlements, zones of influence, and other demarcation lines, established at the end of World War II. The antagonism between the two

Table 27
Latin American and UN Mean Scores

	Latin American mean scores		UN mean scores
	Compact scale	UN deviation scale	compact scale
Period A (1947-1957)	5.38	5.68	5.20
Period B (1959-1968)	6.12	6.59	5.03
Total score (1947-1968)	5.81	6.21	5.10

superpowers continues unabated, through times of lull and crises. In the 1950s it is accompanied by a growing discord within the Western camp on colonial issues. The efforts made by Britain and France to retain their possessions in the Middle East and in South East Asia meet with an increasingly critical response by the United States. The salient events are the Korean War, the Hungarian revolt, and the Suez crisis.

In Period A, Israel was still struggling for recognition and legitimacy. Its creation had represented a disruption of the existing order. Its capacity to survive against great economic and military odds seemed in doubt. In the first year or so, Israel enjoyed the firm diplomatic and military backing of the Soviet bloc and the diplomatic and economic support of the United States. The Western bloc, however, was divided. Britain remained hostile and its attitude influenced other Western European countries. Israel's image at the beginning was of a liberal socialist young nation with strong radical leanings. Israel's declared international policy was nonidentification with either the Soviet or the Western bloc. After the Korean War Israel moved toward the United States and the rapport with the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated, leading in 1953 to the temporary breaking off of diplomatic relations.

The Arab states, on the other hand, were at first ruled by conservative, mainly monarchical, pro-Western regimes. The situation changed in Egypt with the 1952 Free Officers' revolution and the 1955 Egyptian-Czech arms pact, which heralded an era of close military and economic cooperation between Nasser's Egypt and the Soviet bloc.

In Period A, Latin America was on the whole deeply conservative, solidly pro-Western, vehemently anti-Communist, and closely tied to the United States. On the North/South issues its attitude was cautious and gradualist. Unlike Eastern Europe, Latin America upheld the principle of colonial emancipation but saw it as a distinct goal to be achieved by a slow

process, without basically altering, for the time being, the status quo in the non-self-governing territories.

The Latin American states had been late joiners of the military anti-Axis Powers Alliance which became, at the end of World War II, the United Nations. During the initial stage of UN work, they were eager to prove the sincerity of their adherence to the democratic coalition. Most of them felt under an obligation to support the Jewish people, the principal victim of Nazi Germany, in its struggle for statehood. Sympathy for the Jewish cause, characteristic of many postwar Latin American governments, was reinforced by an array of mainly psychological factors, such as uneasy memories of restrictive policies practiced in previous years against Jewish refugees' immigration to Latin American countries, at a time of great need; the impact of the horrors of the Holocaust, which became fully known in the aftermath of the war; admiration for the Jewish population's struggle against British rule, combined in certain Latin American countries with local anti-British feelings; disapproval of the Arab states' invasion of Israel, in violation of Latin America-supported Resolution 181 (II); a feeling of closer affinity, on cultural and religious grounds, with the Jews rather than the Arabs. A component of pro-Israeli attitudes was sometimes a distorted and exaggerated view of the Jewish diaspora's wealth and influence, particularly in the United States. However, Israel itself, as a potentially revolutionary element in the Middle East with far-reaching international repercussions, aroused not a few misgivings. An element of friction was the question of Jerusalem, an item fraught with divisive religious and emotional charges. Unreserved support for Israel on this issue was given by only a few liberal Latin American states.

The lack of substantive bilateral economic or political ties with any Middle Eastern states in Period A allowed for the unusual weight of psychological and ideological factors in the Latin American attitude toward Israel. The different facets of Latin American attitudes in Period A are shown by the widely diverging scores which range from 6.8 for vote 1 (on the Partition Resolution which provided for the establishment of a Jewish state) and 7.6 for vote 7 (on Israel's admission to the United Nations), to 3.8 for vote 3 (on the Soviet proposal for the removal of foreign troops from Palestine) and to 4.6 for vote 8 (on the internationalization of Jerusalem). The balance for Period A as a whole is given by scores close to the 5.5 median line (5.38, just below the line, according to the compact scale and 5.68, just over it, according to the UN deviation scale).

In Period B, Israel earned full legitimacy and respect by its war victories, economic achievements, and stable democratic regime. At the international level, Israel took a firm pro-American and pro-Western stand and enjoyed growing American and Western support. In the 1960s

programs of Israeli technical assistance to Latin American countries were instituted. The Arab states, on the other hand, went through much violence and instability. Left-wing regimes were installed in Iraq (1958), Syria (1958), and Algeria (1962). In the international arena, most Arab states moved closer to the Soviet orbit.

Latin America also experienced grave political turmoil in Period B. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 was followed by the emergence of short-lived, left-wing, anti-American regimes and by the spread of radical revolutionary political parties and guerrilla groups all over the area. This was followed by a period of reaction and stabilization. In the 1962 missile crisis all Latin American states except Cuba rallied to the U.S. side. The dynamic and interventionist policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Alliance for Progress in 1961, Dominican crisis in 1965) contributed to the establishment of anti-Communist and in many cases military regimes. In Period B, Latin American governments showed growing awareness of economic and social problems. Their approach tended to be not conservative but developmental.

Period B is characterized in the global environment by a partial shift from bipolarity to multipolarity. Both the Latin American and Middle Eastern subsystems remained basically bipolar. With the Cuban crisis, Latin America became one of the focal points of world tension. Other major international developments were the Vietnam War and the Six-Day war. In Latin America they temporarily reinforced the image of U.S. leadership and militancy.

In Period B, there was a striking parallelism between the increasing support given by Latin American states to Israel and the similarity of Latin America's and Israel's international orientations. Israel's image improved. It became achievement-based (the Israeli "economic miracle") and gained a new aura of middle-of-the-road respectability. A reinforcing positive factor was Israel's technical assistance. The Arab image, which had been vague in Period A, acquired in Period B an unfavorable connotation, connected with Arab turmoil and leftism. Reinforcing negative factors were the close relationship between Cuba and certain Arab states (Algeria, Syria), and the ideological ties between Castroist Cuba and Arab parties and organizations formally institutionalized at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966.

A numerical expression of changes in the attitudes of Israel and of certain Arab states toward the two superpowers can be found in Jaffrey Milstein's study of Israeli and Arab East/West vote. Egypt moved from a highly pro-Western mean score of 74 in 1948-55 to a pro-Eastern mean score of 28 in 1956-68. The shift in Iraq's position was even sharper, from a mean score of 88 in 1948-57 to 25 in 1958-68. Syria too, moved from a mean score of 70 in 1948-55 to 25 in 1958-68. A similar course was followed

by Yemen. Other Arab states such as Algeria took a pro-Eastern line since their admission to the United Nations. Israel's range for the period 1949-68 (58-100) shows a consistent pro-Western trend. It must be remembered, though, that some Arab countries also maintained a pro-Western position (Lebanon, with a range of 50-100, Jordan with a range of 43-100, and Saudi Arabia with a range of 33-89). In spite of the different approach, Hayward Alker and Bruce Russet's study leads to similar conclusions. Their 1961 voting dimensions table shows Israel and the Latin American countries in close proximity in the Southwestern area with the Arabs in the Southeastern area.[24]

In Period B new factors appeared which in subsequent years worked in favor of a Latin American-Arab rapprochement. One is the numerical growth of the Arab states' group in the United Nations: from five states in 1947 to thirteen in 1968. In view of the expansion in general UN membership, the proportional increase of the Arab group was limited (from 10.5 percent in 1947 to 11.1 percent in 1968). However, it was compounded by the rise of a group of Moslem Arab-oriented states, like Somalia and Mauritania in Africa and to a lesser extent Pakistan and Malaysia in Asia. In the same span of time the Latin American bloc grew from twenty to twenty-four, with the addition of four Caribbean states. From the political viewpoint, however, it counted only twenty-three, due to the secession of Cuba after 1960. As a political caucus, the Latin American group, which in 1947 constituted 35.1 of the total UN membership, decreased in 1968 to 18.2 percent. For the new less influential Latin American bloc the support of the Arab group and the pro-Arab subgroup became more valuable, particularly in elections to UN bodies. The other factor was the growing cooperation in economic matters between Latin America and Afro-Asian countries which in 1964 led to the creation of the "group of the 77," a coalition of developing countries aimed at extracting benefits and preferences from developed countries. The importance of these developments began to be felt only toward the end of the period under consideration. Their full impact became evident in the post-1968 era.

LATIN AMERICAN VOTING ON EAST/WEST AND NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES

By applying our techniques of selection and interpretation to votes cast by Latin American states on East/West and North/South issues, we obtained a set of data parallel to those gathered in our study on Latin American voting on Israeli issues. We took, as samples of East/West votings, those held in the General Assembly's plenary meetings on the question of Korea, and of China's representation in the United Nations.

Both items were objects of continuous consideration by the General Assembly over a long period of time and produced a sufficient crop of significant votes. High scores, from 5.5 upward were used for pro-Eastern votes.

The problem of racial policies in South Africa was taken as a sample for North/South issues. Its consideration started as early as 1946 under the title of "Treatmcnt of Indians in South Africa." In 1952 the broader question of racial conflict in South Africa was also placed upon the assembly's agenda and in 1962 the two items were combined under the title of "The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa." The new item has remained since then in the assembly's books. In our computation we attributed high scores, from 5.5 upward, to pro-Southern votes, and low scores, from 5.5 downward, to pro-Northern votes. A vote favoring wider rights for the Indian and African population in South Africa is, of course, a pro-Southern vote, and a vote in favor of the South African government policy is a pro-Northern vote.

Comparison of political data is a complex and dubious undertaking. Each of the three issues just mentioned is not a pure East/West or North/South question, but possesses other distinctive characteristics and implications. The question of China's representation, for instance, involved the widcr problem of UN universality. The apartheid question was viewed by some states in the context of interference in domestic jurisdiction. Another difficulty is the lack of full chronological concurrence. The treatment of the Korean and Chinese questions started later than the Palestine question.[25] There is also a discrepancy in the dividing line between Periods A and B. Latin American attitudes toward Israel underwent a change after the 1956-57 Suez crisis.[26] On East/West and North/South issues the change in Latin American voting patterns is evident only after 1960, following the Cuban Revolution and the influx of many African and Asian coutries in the United Nations. But these differences do not detract from the practical usefulness of the comparative analysis of the sets of data illustrated in Table 28[27] keeping in mind that our purpose was to examine only general trends and basic similarities or dissimilarities.

A glance at Table 28 shows that Latin American behavior on Israeli issues is clearly distinct from that on East/West or North/South issues. The lower scores in the Israeli column show the existence of conflicting attitudes among Latin American countries on these matters. Conversely, the high scores on Korea and China are indicative of a nearly unanimous and consistent pro-Western stand. Any attempt to equate the attitudes of Latin American countries toward Israel with their attitudes toward the Western bloc or to the United States would be misleading and mistaken.

Latin American scores on Israeli issues are higher in Period B. On

Table 28
Latin American Voting on Israel:
East/West and North/South Issues

	Israeli Issues	East-West Issues		North-South Issues
		Korea (Unification)	China (Representation)	South Africa (Racial Policies)
Period A*	5.38	7.97	8.00	7.11
Period B*	6.12	7.77	7.69	8.00
Total	5.81	7.88	7.85	7.27

* Period A runs from Israeli issues from 1947 to 1957; for the Korean question from 1952 to 1959; for the Chinese question from 1954 to 1959; for South African question from 1946 to 1959.

Period B starts for Israeli issues in 1959 (there were no significant votes on these issues in 1958); for the question of Korea, China and South Africa, Period B starts in 1960. It ends in all cases in 1968.

East/West issues, on the contrary, we find a slight decrease in Period B's scores. The main reason is the emergence of Cuba as a militant anti-U.S. and anti-Western factor. The rest of the Latin American countries continued to follow, up to 1968, a basically pro-U.S. and pro-Western line. The North/South column shows a sharp increase in Period B's scores. This does not necessarily mean that the Latin American states took a more critical view of South Africa's racial policies. The explanation lies rather in the growing Latin American acquiescence with the Afro-Asian group's leadership on colonial matters. This tendency will extend in the 1970s to other fields of UN concern and will have a negative repercussion on Latin American voting affecting Israel.

WESTERN AND AFRICAN VOTING ON ISRAELI ISSUES

We have compared in Table 27 Latin American mean scores and UN mean scores on Israeli issues. UN mean scores are obviously a mathematical abstraction, based on the computation of widely diverging positions, including those of the parties to the conflict — Israel and the Arab states. Moreover, UN mean figures are affected by the numerical importance of the different UN blocs. It is therefore worthwhile to evaluate Latin American voting in comparison with that of two other groups of UN member states not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely the Western European bloc and the Sub-Saharan African countries.[28]

Table 29
Latin American, Western, and Sub-Saharan African Voting on Israeli Issues

	Latin American Bloc	Western Bloc	Subsaharan African States
Period A	5.38	5.80	4.40
Period B	6.12	6.03	5.40
Total	5.81	6.00	5.00

We can see from Table 29 that in Period A the Western bloc's mean scores were higher than the Latin American ones. Most of the factors which in Latin America acted in favor of the emerging Jewish state — such as empathy with Jewish suffering, guilty feeling for former indifference to the Jewish plight or for war-time collaboration with Nazi Germany —were present and stronger in Western Europe. Western European governments were directly concerned by the problem of the Jewish survivors, massing in refugee camps in Europe, and were worried by the prospect of a new Jewish refugee wave, should Israel fall or fail. At the ideological level there was solidarity between the antifascist left-wing coalition governments which rose to power in many European countries, and socialist-oriented Israel. On the other hand, most Western European countries had substantial interests in the Arab world and close connections with still pro-Arab Britain. At the end of Period A, France and Britain clashed with Egypt and the other Arab countries over the Suez Canal issue. France faced the Algerian revolt and veered to an openly pro-Israeli position.

In Period B, the Western European scores do rise, but lag behind the Latin American ones. After the Suez crisis, Britain mends its fences with the Arab countries and France follows suit, a few years after the end of the Algerian war. In Period B, a group of states, members of the Western group, takes a clear anti-Israeli line. Greece and Turkey, who during the cold war moved in the footsteps of the United States, switch to a pro-Arab (and anti-Israeli) stand in Period B. Spain, admitted to the United Nations in 1955, becomes a staunch supporter of the Arab position. On the whole, the underlying reason for Western Europe's more moderate backing of Israel is the geographic proximity to the Arab countries and its economic, political, and military implications.

African scores are low throughout, though evidencing a marked increase in Period B. The pro-Israeli attitude of many new African nations, particularly those of the Brazzaville group, has already been mentioned. A positive factor was the swift and imaginative Israeli action in the field of technical assistance, from 1958 onwards. However, propinquity to the

Arab states restrained pro-Israeli leanings and eventually proved decisive.

The mean scores of five non-Latin American case-study countries, the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium, Liberia, and the Philippines, are compared with the Latin American mean scores in Table 30.

The difference between the scores of Protestant-governed Holland and Catholic Belgium, in Period A, point to the religious factor and to the influence of the Vatican's negative attitude toward Israel, particularly on the Jerusalem question, during the reign of Pope Pius XII (1939-58). Belgium's low score derives in part from its votings on the Jerusalem issue. In Period B, the scores of Holland and Belgium are nearly identical. Protestant Liberia has a slightly higher score than Catholic Philippines in Period A. In Period B, Liberia moves to a clear pro-Israeli position, following a trend established by a considerable number of new African countries.

Table 30
Five Case-Study Countries' Voting Scores

LA mean score	US	Netherlands	Belgium	Liberia	Philippines
5.38	7	6.7	4.6	5.3	5.2
6.12	6.7	7.8	7.7	6.4	5.4
5.81	6.8	7.3	6.4	5.9	5.3

United States scores are markedly high in both periods. The wide scope and manifold nature of the United States' relationship with Israel are only partly reflected in the UN mirror. Many substantial moves, such as economic aid and the arms embargo under Truman and Eisenhower, and the gradual shift to increasing military aid from Kennedy onwards, found no expression in votings at the United Nations. The same applies to fluctuations in U.S.-Arab relations, such as for example the policy of large-scale economic aid to Egypt followed during the Kennedy administration. Within the UN system the United States can be considered, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict as in most other issues, more as an actor than a third party. The U.S. delegation at the United Nations often operated by behind-the-scene negotiations and indirect pressure. There were no votings on the yearly financial pledges of the United States to UNRWA, which provided the agency with most of its budget. Yet these contributions were politically important and could be used, when the need arose, as political leverage.

The full impact of U.S. action in the United Nations cannot therefore be gauged by voting scores alone. An additional point is that our method of

votes selection does not encompass all the votings relevant to the understanding of U.S.-Israeli relations. The U.S.-sponsored draft resolutions on the report of the commissioner general of UNRWA contained anti-Israeli elements (the "notes with deep regret" paragraphs). Israel, from time to time, openly opposed these proposals, while on other occasions preferred to abstain or vote in favor. Israel did so for tactical and political considerations, mainly in order to avoid an open clash with the United States. These subtle situations defy objective quantitative measurements. Yet they were the result of U.S. moves and should be taken into account for a full appraisal of the U.S. position. By reducing the U.S. mean score by nearly 10 percent — computing the effect of about four additional anti-Israeli votings — we would reach a figure closer to political realities.

In any case the U.S. scores would remain markedly pro-Israeli. According to our present computations, they are topped only by the Netherlands (7.3 total mean score) and Uruguay (7.2). The slight decrease in U.S. scores in Period B is mainly due to its anti-Israeli votes on the questions of negotiations and of the 1967 displaced persons. The U.S. pro-Israeli attitude affected only to a limited extent the votings on Israeli issues of client states. Liberia and the Philippines were certainly in this situation in Period A. Still their scores on Israeli issues were relatively low (below the median line), though higher than those of other African and Asian states. The high scores of Nicaragua (6.7, see Table 32 below) cannot therefore be attributed to its dependence relationship with the United States.

These observations confirm our analysis on the distinction between Israeli and East/West issues. States which took different stands on Israeli issues ranged themselves together in the Western camp on crucial East/West issues, whenever the United States brought to bear the full weight of its political power. The similarity between the scores of the Netherlands and Uruguay suggest the possibility of a connection between voting and internal regimes, a point that will be elaborated further on.

EXTENT OF LATIN AMERICAN INFLUENCE

The fact that the main scores of the Latin American bloc were lower in Period A than in Period B contradicts the commonly accepted notion of a massive Latin American backing of Israel at the birth of the state, gradually diminishing over the years. What really happened is that the upward trend of Latin American support for Israel in the 1960s was outstripped by the sudden expansion of UN membership in the same period. Increased Latin American support became less effectual in terms of influence over UN outputs. The Latin American states constituted more

than one-third of the organization's membership at its foundation. During the 1950s their proportional strength remained basically unchanged. In Period B, however, it declined to 18.9 percent.[29] In Table 31 an attempt is made to measure the extent of Latin American influence in the UN General Assembly during both periods, by relating the size of Latin American membership to two additional criteria: (a) The ratio of Latin American participation in the voting to the participation of the whole UN membership; and (b) the ratio of Latin American scores to UN total scores.

Table 31
Comparison of Latin American UN Total Scores

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g
Period A	63	20	55.7	17.5	31.7	30.8	31.7
Period B	111	21	103.1	19.5	18.9	18.9	22.9

a. Whole UN membership (average).

b. Number of LA states (average).

c. Whole-UN membership's participation in the voting (average figure).

d. LA states' participation in the voting (average figure).

e. Ratio of LA states to whole-UN membership.

f. Ratio of LA total voters to UN voters.

g. Ratio of LA total scores to UN total scores.

In Period A, the ratio of Latin American participation lagged behind that of the whole UN membership, thus showing that Latin American willingness to take a stand on Israeli issues was less pronounced than that of the international community, as represented at that time in the United Nations. Yet Latin American total scores constituted a considerable portion of UN total scores, by virtue of the numerical importance of the Latin American states in the United Nations and of their slightly higher level of support for Israel. In Period B, the ratio of Latin American participation increased, surpassing that of the whole UN membership, and the Latin American level of support for Israel rose. Nevertheless, the ratio of Latin American total scores to UN total scores shrunk to 22.9 percent. The reduction of Latin American influence in Period B is even more evident when compared with the situation existing at the voting on Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947. The Latin American states formed at that time 35.1 percent of UN membership and the ratio of their total scores to UN total scores was 38.8 percent. The Latin American

contribution to that historical decision was rightly described as momentous.

Another way to assess the Latin American role is to examine what would have been the UN output without the Latin American states. In Period A, the non-Latin American mean score was 5.17, namely 0.03 less than the UN mean score of 5.20. In Period B, the non-Latin American mean score dropped to 4.79, that is 0.24 less than the UN mean score of 5.03. In political terms the lower non-Latin American scores would have resulted in a larger number of anti-Israeli resolutions and in harsher wordings and provisions. The Latin American states filled the gap between this hypothetical situation and actual UN behavior. However the greater effort that they made in Period B (the addition of 0.24 to the UN mean score, as against the addition of 0.03 in Period A) did not suffice to keep the UN mean score to its Period A level.

COHESIVE AND DEVIANT LATIN AMERICAN STATES

The mean score of each Latin American state is given in Table 32.[30] The twenty original members of the UN Latin American bloc (old Latin Americans), including Cuba, are listed in column one. Cuba has not taken part in the Latin American bloc's activities since 1960, but is still formally a member. The four Caribbean states are listed in column two. Their scores look surprisingly high in view of the different course followed by them in recent years. The explanation is that these countries, admitted to the United Nations between 1962 and 1966, participated until 1968 in only a small number of significant votings. In the Fifth Special Emergency Session of 1967, after the Six-Day war, the Caribbean states followed the old Latin American's lead in cosponsoring the Latin American draft resolution and in opposing the Soviet, nonaligned countries', and other draft resolutions. The high scores of the emergency session weigh heavily on the narrow-based average. After 1968 the Caribbean states with the exception of Barbados moved to a position between the median line and the lower end.

The grouping of states according to their levels of cohesion is illustrated in Table 33, which indicates each state's deviation from the 5.81 Latin American mean score. States whose deviation does not exceed the 0.6 mean are considered cohesive. By this standard, fourteen states qualify. We have before us a three-way split: a large group of fourteen countries at the center, five pro-Israeli deviants at the higher end (Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic), at the lower end, the lonely anti-Israeli deviant, Cuba.

A political interpretation of the divergence of Latin American votes is

given in Table 34, which shows the old Latin American's deviation from the 5.5 median line, the line of political neutrality towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Table 32
State-by-State Mean Score Scale

	Old Latin Americans			Caribbeans
	Period A	Period B	Total	1962 - 1968
1. Uruguay	7.3	7.1	7.2	1. Barbados 7.2
2. Nicaragua	6.3	7.1	6.8	2. Jamaica 6.7
3. Costa Rica	6.2	7.1	6.7	3. Trinidad & Tobago 6.3
4. Guatemala	7.2	6.2	6.6	4. Guyana 6.2
5. Dominican Republic	5.6	7.2	6.5	
6. Paraguay	5.0	6.8	6.4	
7. Panama	6.4	6.3	6.3	
8. Ecuador	5.6	6.7	6.1	
9. Chile	5.1	6.5	6.0	
10. Haiti	5.1	6.9	5.9	
11. Colombia	5.0	6.5	5.8	
12. Bolivia	4.3	6.6	5.6	
13. Honduras	5.3	6.0	5.6	
14. Venezuela	5.6	5.5	5.5	
15. Argentina	4.9	5.6	5.4	
16. Brazil	4.5	6.0	5.4	
17. Peru	4.5	6.1	5.4	
18. Mexico	5.2	5.3	5.3	
19. El Salvador	3.3	6.8	5.2	
20. Cuba	4.0	3	3.8	

The pro-Israeli group with a positive deviation of more than 1.0 is formed by the same five countries, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. The cohesive group splits into two: eight countries with pro-Israeli scores, ranging from 0.9 to 0.1, and

five countries with negative scores from 0.1 to 0.3. Venezuela stands in between with an absolute neutral position. Cuba is alone again with a negative score of 1.7. It is interesting to note that the negative-score group includes the three Latin American big powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. This point will be referred to later. The differing performances of Uruguay with a mean score of 7.2, Chile with 6.0, Bolivia with 5.6, Argentina with 5.4, of the whole United Nations with 5.10, and of Cuba with 3.8 are shown in Charts 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40.

Table 33
Deviation from the Mean Latin American Score

1. Uruguay	+1.4	1. Paraguay	+0.6	1. Cuba	–2.0
2. Nicaragua	+1.0	2. Panama	+0.5		
3. Costa Rica	+0.9	3. Ecuador	+0.3		
4. Guatemala	+0.8	4. Chile	+0.2		
5. Dominican Rep.	+0.7	5. Haiti	+0.1		
		6. Colombia	+0.0		
		7. Bolivia	–0.2		
		8. Honduras	–0.2		
		9. Venezuela	–0.3		
		10. Argentina	–0.4		
		11. Brazil	–0.4		
		12. Peru	–0.4		
		13. Mexico	–0.5		
		14. El Salvador	–0.6		

Table 34
Deviation from the 5.5 Median Line:
Old Latin American Countries

1. Uruguay	+ 1.7	1. Paraguay	0.9	1. Argentina	- 0.1	1. Cuba	-1.7
2. Nicaragua	+ 1.3	2. Panama	0.8	2. Brazil	-0.1		
3. Costa Rica	+ 1.2	3. Ecuador	0.6	3. Peru	-0.1		
4. Guatemala	+ 1.1	4. Chile	0.5	4. Mexico	-0.2		
5. Dominican Republic	+ 1.0	5. Haiti	0.4	5. El Salvador	-0.3		
		6. Colombia	0.3				
		7. Bolivia	0.1				
		8. Honduras	0.1				
		Venezuela	0.0				

Chart 35
Uruguay's Voting Scores: Compact Scale (score 7.2)



Chart 36
Chile's Voting Scores: Compact Scale (score 6.0)



Chart 37
Bolivia's Voting Scores: Compact Scale (score 5.6)



Chart 38
Argentina's Voting Scores: Compact Scale (score 5.4)



Chart 39
UN Mean: Compact Scale (score 5.10)



Chart 40
Cuba's Voting Scores: Compact Scale (score 3.8)



INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATIONS

While the state-by-state mean score scale constitutes a useful tool for comparison purposes, the actual behavior of a state can be seen only in the course of its votings on different issues over a certain period of time. The fluctuations illustrated in Charts 35 to 40 are sometimes due to the nature of the issues in question. However, the sharp bends of the graphs often reveal changing political attitudes and motivations. The Cuban graph is notable in this respect because of its swing from initial low scores in the 1940s to high scores in the 1950s, and to consistent low scores after 1960. It is obvious that these shifts are connected with changes of government and regime. Under President Grau San Martín (1944-48) Cuba ranked last in the state-by-state mean score scale with a score of 4.0. Cuba was the only Latin American country which voted against Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947. Cuba's score rose to 5.80 under Prío Socarrás (1948-52),and to 6.57 under Batista (1952-59), slumping to 3.67 under the Castro regime. Each of these periods has distinct political connotations. During the terms of Grau San Martín and Prío Socarrás, the ruling party was the liberal-socialist Authentic party. However, Grau San Martín's epoch was marked by his charismatic power and had a strong populist-personalist-nationalist character. Prío Socarrás followed a mildly liberal line. The Batista regime was military, at least at the beginning, and basically conservative. Castro's regime started as left-wing and soon became communist. Internal developments, socioeconomic pressures, and ideological postures have a bearing on foreign policy. Grau San Martín, who clashed with the United States during his short-lived 1933 presidency, remained bitterly anti-Yankee; Prío Socarrás was friendly to the United States; Batista was fervently pro-American; Fidel Castro assumed a resolute anti-U.S. and later pro-Soviet stance.

The relationship between Latin American governments' internal and international attitudes and their scores on Israeli issues was examined through the comparative analysis of ten countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The selection took into account several factors: importance in Latin American affairs; role played in UN proceedings on the Arab-Israeli conflict; domestic structures, attitudes, and doctrines. The scores of the ten countries were tabulated according to two criteria: internal regimes and foreign policy.

In view of the diversity of Latin American societies and their turbulent political life, it is practically impossible to draw up a list of Latin American governments that would classify all shades of opinion and all actual practices. We opted for a condensed list with five headings: military,

conservative, liberal, populist, and radical. Military regimes include all those where real political power is exercised by the armed forces and usually originating from a military coup, even if subsequently confirmed by popular elections or by the legislature. Military rule does not by itself imply a clear-cut set of attitudes and policies. Military regimes in the 1950s were mostly personalist and socially conservative. Yet the Pérez Jiménez regime (1952-58) in Venezuela and even the Batista regime (1948-52, but more so in the earlier 1940-44 term) in Cuba, had a populist flavor. In the 1960s, many military governments became development-minded and ruled with the help of a technocratic elite. Political power was often vested in a collective body representing the armed forces as an institution. On the whole, during the years 1947-68 military governments can be described in Latin America in 1968, with the Peruvian military revolution. It should also be recalled that some conservative governments like that of Ydígoras Fuentes (1958-60) in Guatemala, were led by generals, and had strong military foundations, thus constituting borderline cases between military and civilian regimes.

The governments listed as conservative, liberal, populist, or radical vary mainly in their social content, from the conservative Right to the radical Left. They generally acted within legal democratic frameworks, though some of them, such as Arévalo's (1944-51) in Guatemala or Betancourt's (1959-64) in Venezuela, were the result of revolutionary upheavals. In populist regimes like Perón's (1946-55) in Argentina and Paz Estenssoro's (1952-56) in Bolivia, power was the virtual monopoly of the charismatic leader, exercised through a firmly entrenched government party. The legislatures had no more than a ritualistic role. In both cases there were, at the initial stage, ideological links and affinities with European fascism, later superseded by newly shaped left-wing nationalist doctrines. At the extreme Left is the special case of Cuba, ruled since 1959 by a radical totalitarian dictatorship. Political classification is unavoidably arbitrary. Our list of liberal governments includes Arévalo's moderately left-wing regime, considered radical in its time in traditionalist Guatemala, and the Chilean governments of González Videla (1946-52) and Alessandri (1959-64),viewed as conservative in the context of their country's political strife.

For the second criterion of our classification, foreign policy, we chose a simple indicator, namely each country's relationship with the United States. This approach is pragmatically valid for our purposes, because throughout 1947-68, the United States was, aecording to Norman Bailey's definition, the paramount power in Latin America. This dominance was not substantially affected by the Cuban challenge. The situation evolved after 1968 as a consequence of basic changes in the global environment and within some Latin American countries. Our foreign policy tabulation is

based on the following four headings: (1) Staunchly pro-American; (2) pro-American with independent attitudes; (3) independent; (4) radical anti-American; or in short, pro-U.S.; pro-U.S.-independent; independent; anti-U.S.

Each of the nine headings (five types of governments and four categories of foreign policy) was given two columns — one for Period A (1947-57) and one for Period B (1959-68). The full picture is shown in Table 41. We listed in the first column each country's successive governments by the name of their presidents, provided that at least two significant votes were cast on Israeli issues during their tenure. We felt that a government's attitude would not be properly evaluated on the basis of a single vote. Table 41 is computed on the intensity scale, which better reflects shifts in individual states' behavior. The classification by governments indicates that the liberal ones are the most consistently pro-Israeli, with an average score of 6.39. They are followed by conservative governments with a score of 6.20. Military regimes rank 5.95, populist 4.83, and radical 4.74. The breakdown by periods is particularly revealing.

In Period A, liberal governments rank first with a score of 6.41, followed by radical regimes with a score of 5.80. Military regimes rank 5.69, conservative 4.87, and populist 4.56. In its emerging stage Israel enjoyed the support of the Center and the Left, but did not fare well with populist regimes. It will be recalled that in the 1940s and 1950s, Latin American populist regimes had not shed all their right-wing doctrines and practices, and clashed with liberal and socialist parties and public opinion. In international affairs populist governments sometimes adopted extreme right-wing positions, as for example the support given by Argentina under Perón to Franco's Spain.

In Period B, conservative governments get the highest scores (7.09), followed by liberal (6.39), military (6.14), populist (5.35), and radical (3.67). The general trend is from high scores for right-wing regimes to low scores for left-wing regimes. The liberal group maintains a distinct pro- Israeli stance.

In the foreign policy column, the pro-U.S. group and the pro-U.S.independent group rank first with average scores of 6.26 and 6.22. They are followed by the independent (5.26) and the anti-U.S. (4.74).

In Period A, the preeminence of the pro-U.S.-independent group, which by and large overlaps with the liberal governments group, is clear cut with a score of 6.53. The anti-U.S. group, which coincides with the radical governments group, comes second, with a score of 5.80. The pro-U.S. and the independent follow with scores of 5.40 and 5.39 respectively.

In Period B the alignment is more orderly, from pro-U.S. governments supporting Israel to anti-U.S. governments opposing it. The scores are: pro-U.S., 6.72; pro-U.S.-independent, 6.05; independent, 4.92; anti-U.S.,

Table 41
UN Voting Correlations with Political Variables

Regime	Period	Military		Conservative		Liberal		Populist		Radical		Pro-US		Pro-US Ind.		Independent		Anti-US		Jerusalem
		A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	
ARGENTINA																				
1. Perón	1946-55							5.25								5.25				4.00
2. Frondizi	1958-61						4.25								4.25					
3. Guido	1962-63		5.00										5.00							
4. Illía	1963-66						6.50								6.50					
5. Onganía	1966-70		6.23										6.23							4.00
BOLIVIA																				
6. Hertzog Urriolagoltía	1947-51			5.20								5.20								4.00
7. Paz Estenssoro	1952-56							3.50								3.50				4.00
8. Paz Estenssoro	1960-69								5.70						5.70					
9. Barrientos	1965-69				7.28								7.28							6.00
BRAZIL																				
10. Dutra	1945-52			4.54								4.54								4.00
11. Vargas	1951-54							5.50				5.50								4.00
12. Kubitschek	1955-61						5.40						5.40							
13. Goulart	1961-64								5.00								5.00			
14. Castelo Branco	1964-67		6.75										6.75							
15. Costa e Silva	1967-69		6.58										6.58							4.00
CHILE																				
16. González Videla	1946-52					5.45						5.45								5.00
17. Alessandri	1958-64						6.84						6.84							
18. Frei	1964-70						6.45								6.45					4.00

Table 41 (continued)

Regime	Period	Military A	Military B	Conservative A	Conservative B	Liberal A	Liberal B	Populist A	Populist B	Radical A	Radical B	Pro-US A	Pro-US B	Pro-US Ind. A	Pro-US Ind. B	Independent A	Independent B	Anti-US A	Anti-US B	Jerusalem
COSTA RICA																				
19. Herrera	1946-49					6.50								6.50						
20. Ulate	1949-53					5.40						5.40								5.00
21. Echandi	1958-62						8.34						8.34							
22. Orlich	1962-66						6.25						6.25							
23. Trejos	1966-70						7.25						7.25							4.00
CUBA																				
24. Grau San Martín	1944-48							4.00						4.00						
25. Prío Socarrás	1948-52					5.80								5.80						5.00
26. Batista	1952-59											6.67								
27. Dorticós	1959-									3.67									3.67	4.00
GUATEMALA																				
28. Arévalo	1944-51					7.77										7.77				8.00
29. Arbenz	1951-54									5.80								5.80		6.00
30. Ydígoras Fuentes	1958-62			7.75									7.75							
31. Ydígoras Fuentes	1962-66			6.25									6.25							
32. Méndez Montenegro	1966-70						6.16						6.16							4.00
MEXICO																				
33. Alemán	1946-50					5.43										5.43				6.50
34. Ruiz Cortínez	1952-58					5.00										5.00				6.00
35. López Mateos	1958-64						4.84										4.84			
36. Díaz Ordaz	1951-70						6.10								6.10					4.00

Table 41 (continued)

Regime	Period	Military		Conservative		Liberal		Populist		Radical		Pro-US		Pro-US Ind.		Independent		Anti-US		Jerusalem
		A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	
URUGUAY																				
37. Batlle Berres	1947-51					7.84								7.84						7.50
38. Colorado Gov.	1951-55					8.50								8.50						7.00
39. Blanco Gov.	1959-63							6.67							6.67					
40. Blanco Gov.	1963-67							7.34							7.34					
41. Gestido	1967-							7.75					7.75							6.00
42. Pachero Areco	1967-72							7.00					7.00							
VENEZUELA																				
43. Delgado Chalbaud	1948-50	6.00										6.00								5.00
44. Pérez Jiménez	1952-58	4.40										4.40								4.00
45. Betancourt	1959-64							5.10							5.10					
46. Leoni	1954-66							6.30							6.30					4.00
Frequency		3	4	2	3	9	17	4	2	1	1	8	15	5	9	5	2	1	1	
Average		5.69	6.14	4.87	7.09	6.41	6.39	4.56	5.35	5.80	3.67	5.40	6.72	6.53	6.05	5.39	4.92	5.80	3.61	

3.67. The Jerusalem column offers additional proof of the relationship between regimes and scores. Of the seven scores above the median line, five belong to the liberal group. In this study we have limited ourselves, by force, to general considerations. The interpretation of each country's voting would require a thorough analysis of its domestic developments and international problems and connections. For instance, Venezuela's voting was certainly affected by the close ties it established with many Arab states through common membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The creation of OPEC was the result of a Venezuelan initiative, taken during the liberal-leftist Acción Democrática regime led by Rómulo Betancourt. The relatively low scores of Venezuela at that time indicate that economic considerations and national interest viewpoints outweighed ideological affinity.

Sometimes specific situations produce apparently surprising voting patterns. Argentina's scores under Perón were higher than under the liberal government of Arturo Frondizi and of his successor José María Guido. However the Frondizi regime was based on a coalition with different political forces, among them extreme nationalist groups, basically unfriendly to Israel. These groups were particularly influential in the foreign policy area. Moreover relations between Argentina and Israel were marred, during Frondizi's presidency, by the kidnapping and subsequent trial in Israel of Adolph Eichmann (1960-62).

THE QUESTION OF MOTIVATION

The evident connection between changes in the political setting of Latin American countries and their voting on Israeli issues raised the question of motivation. We have already mentioned certain of the reasons for a pro- or anti-Israeli stand; for example the case of Latin American governments interested, in the aftermath of World War II, in strengthening their connections with the Western democracies; or Cuba, following the Communist bloc and adopting anti-Israeli policies. In other cases, hard-pressed governments, such as the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, took a pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli line with the aim of improving their image abroad, particularly among Jewish and liberal circles in the United States.

The analysis of UN speeches, of statements by Latin American political leaders, and press editorials, points to the existence of a broad general factor of motivation: the belief that Israel's problem was in some way relevant to Latin American affairs. This was particularly true in times of acute crisis in the Middle East (1948 and 1967), when Israel's very survival seemed at stake. In Period A, antifascist and antidictatorial forces, both liberal and leftist, saw the victory of Israel as a source of strength for their

own political battles. In Period B, conservative and liberal forces were genuinely interested in Israel's successful resistance to the Soviet and Communist advance in the Middle East. For the same reason the radical Left adopted a pro-Arab stand. The overall feeling was that events affecting Israel would reverberate in Latin America, producing a demonstration effect. Israel's success or failure would, by its example, promote or deter certain political processes in Latin America. The presence of Jewish communities, passionately identified with Israel, reinforced in some countries the sense that Israeli questions did not pertain only to the realm of foreign policy but belonged also to Latin American domestic affairs.

Israel was not the sole example of a foreign problem exercising a political and emotional impact on local developments. Another case in point was Spain. The attitudes taken toward the Franco regime at the first and second UN General Assembly (1946-47) were determined by a similar set of political and ideological factors. In Table 42 we compared Latin American attitudes on Israel and on Spain through the classification of types of governments. Support for resolutions adverse to the Franco regime was considered as parallel to support for Israel and assigned high scores; opposition to these resolutions was marked by low scores.

Table 42
Latin American Voting on Israel and Spain

	Military	Conservative	Liberal	Populist	Radical
Israeli issues (1947-57)	5.69	4.87	6.41	4.56	5.80
Spanish issues (1946-47)	3.00	4.85	7.47	5.50	-

In both cases the liberal governments scored high and the conservative ones low. In 1946-47 the era of radical Latin American regimes had not begun, and for this reason the radical Left had no score on Spanish issues, while its score on Israeli issues for the period 1947-57 was rather high. On the other hand military regimes rated much lower on Spanish issues than on Israeli ones. All in all, the similarity in political alignments vis-à-vis the two sets of issues is striking.

The comparison with Spain refers to Period A. In Period B, Israel and the Latin American countries underwent great changes. In foreign policy in particular, Israel moved very close to the United States and consequently enjoyed strong support from the pro-U.S. group, while incurring the hostility of the radical Left. Yet it would be erroneous to

interpret Latin American attitudes toward Israel, even in Period B, only in terms of pro- or anti-U.S. motivations. As we have seen, the Latin American states remained divided on Israeli issues, while they usually took a unanimous stand (with the obvious exception of Cuba) on crucial East/West issues. The pro-U.S. motivation which proved decisive in East/West confrontations was only a contributing factor in the determination of Latin American states' positions on Israeli issues. Certain pro-U.S. countries like Honduras took a rather reserved position, while others like Uruguay, or Costa Rica, or Nicaragua were often ahead of the United States in their support of Israel.

It would be attractive to measure motivation by indices based on objective quantitative data. The first obvious line of thought is to correlate the size or social weight of the Jewish and Arab communities in Latin American countries with their countries' voting scores. This approach has proven unsatisfactory, however. Uruguay with the highest Latin American score, has a sizable Jewish community of about 40,000 (in a total population of 3 million). But the four other high-score states (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic) have only tiny Jewish communities. Conversely the two countries with large Jewish communities, Argentina and Brazil (500,000 and 150,000 respectively), have followed a cautious line on Israeli issues and rank fifteenth and sixteenth in the state-by-state mean score scale. This is not to say that the Jewish communities do not wield political influence. In countries characterized by an intense democratic life and by a plurality of political parties, even small Jewish groups may have a weight in public life, including foreign policy decisions. Such situations arise, in particular, when general elections are approaching. Among the countries where the Jewish community constitutes at times a political factor, are Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and recently Venezuela.

The rise of Latin American Jews to leading positions including participation in government at key ministerial posts is an increasingly common feature. Some Jews involved in political life have scant or no connections with Jewish communal institutions. In any case, Jewish political figures did not exercise — as yet — a noticeable influence on their countries' attitudes on Israeli issues.

Statistics on Arabs in Latin America are incomplete and hardly reliable. Large Arab populations can be found in Argentina, Brazil (about half a million), and Chile (100,000). In Chile the Arab community has been traditionally active in support of the Palestinian cause. Yet Chile, where the Jewish community numbers only 35,000, has a pro-Israeli score and ranks ninth in the state-by-state mean score scale. The presence of an Arab community of 10,000 is felt in Honduras, where no more than a few scattered Jewish families live, and has a bearing on Honduras's relatively low ranking.[31]

There is a negative correlation between support for Israel and the size of Latin American states. The Latin American "Big Three" — Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico — are grouped together at the lowest half of the state-by-state mean score scale. The larger countries have a wider range of international interests and are more keenly aware of the political and economic importance of the Arab countries. Within the United Nations they often lead the Latin American bloc and maintain contacts with other geographic blocs, including the powerful Arab group. Sometimes deals are struck which may affect the vote on Israeli issues. On the whole, big-power realism is not conducive, in the UN context, to pro-Israeli attitudes. It should be added that the large Latin American countries have at different times followed at the United Nations and elsewhere a policy of independence from the United States and of opening toward the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs. Due to the structure and composition of the UN system, these postures lead to a closer tie with the Arab states and negatively affect attitudes toward Israel.

The call for full protection of small states' rights and for their greater participation in UN affairs often rings in statements by Latin American UN delegates. Small-state solidarity may have been in the beginning a factor in the positive attitude toward Israel by countries like Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. However, since the admission of a host of new ministates, many of them Arab or Afro-Asian, this factor no longer works in Israel's favor.

Bilateral relations between Latin American states and Israel or the Arab states, lie outside the scope of our study. Our working assumption is that, because of the geographic distance between the Latin American continent and Israel, and the lack of large-scale economic exchanges or other weighty common interests, bilateral relations have had, by and large, only a marginal effect on Latin American voting. In 1962, Israel launched a program of technical assistance credited with outstanding achievements. Technical assistance could be gauged by quantitative indices, as soon as Israel makes public the size and distribution of its technical assistance allocation. In any case it is worth mentioning that Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic — all high-score states — were among the principal beneficiaries of Israeli expertise and development projects. On the other hand important recipients of Israeli assistance (Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil) had lower scores. Technical assistance therefore seems to be only a contributing factor. A new field of technical assistance to Latin American states, entered by Israel in the late 1960s, is scientific cooperation. In view of the growing needs of scientific and technological advance felt in many Latin American countries, this area of cooperation is likely to expand and to have long-range effects on Latin American-Israeli relations.

EPILOGUE: 1968-1973

Since 1968, momentous changes have taken place in the global environment — in the United Nations, in Latin America, and in the Middle East. The United States, entangled in the Vietnam War, lost part of its grip on world affairs. The American-Chinese rapprochement of 1971 restored the U.S. capability of maneuvering and facilitated the pursuance of détente with the Soviet Union, as well as negotiations on Vietnam. However, the short-term price of the American abrupt abandonment of its long-held, uncompromising opposition toward the People's Republic of China was a credibility crisis among the United States' most faithful followers, particularly in Latin America. A grave repercussion of this crisis was the failure of the U.S. attempt to ensure the continuance of Nationalist China's UN membership. The U.S. strategy was to secure, as in previous years, the adoption of a draft resolution cosponsored by the United States and by a number of Latin American and other countries, requesting that the question of China's representation in the United Nations be decided by a two-third majority. While the majority of the Latin American bloc, led by Costa Rica, cooperated with the United States in the efforts to rally all available support behind the draft resolution, other Latin American countries proved reluctant or hostile. Some of them (Argentina and Mexico) were brought into the common line at a late stage; others remained impervious (Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and of course Cuba) and voted against the proposal, contributing to its defeat. The long tradition of nearly unanimous Latin American backing of the United States on crucial East/West issues was thus dramatically broken. The American setback on the China question revealed that the United States was no longer able to muster a majority at the United Nations, even in a major confrontation, and showed that international bodies could now be controlled at any time by a coalition between the group of nonaligned countries and the Communist bloc.

China's reentry into the world's political life was heralded as the final transition from global bipolarity to multipolarity. Other manifestations of the emergence of new centers of power were Gaullist France's nationalist and generally anti-American policies, and Germany's *Ostpolitik*. The apparent decline of U.S. power was felt in Latin America. Its negative effect on Latin American-U.S. relations was heightened by the policy of benign neglect toward Latin America, introduced by the Nixon administration. The feeling of political vacuum in the Western Hemisphere reinforced the Latin American states' ingrained tendency to seek in international institutions a remedy for their own political and economic vulnerability. The Organization of American States which had been active in the 1960s during the Cuban and Dominican crises, was the

expression of U.S. hemispheric supremacy; as such, it was of no avail in the new situation. Many Latin American countries became actively involved with the group of the 77, the "Southern" economic alignment, which encompassed in the 1970s about one hundred African, Asian, and Latin American states. Some Latin American states joined the politically radical group of nonaligned countries, either as full members (Chile, Peru, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, and later Argentina) or in the capacity of observers.

Important milestones in this political process were the 1971 Lima conference of the group of the 77; the April 1972 (Santiago) UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and the August 1972 Georgetown (Guyana) conference of nonaligned countries. The choice of Latin American capitals as venue for these meetings was intended to show appreciation for the new international role played by Latin America. In practice, the Southern and politically anti-Western international alignments continued to be dominated by African and Asian countries, led by smaller groups or committees of politically active states, within which the Arab and Arab-oriented states were always prominent. Thus, one of the consequences of the Lima, Santiago, and Georgetown conferences was to bring the Latin American countries under growing Arab influence.

The militantly radical attitudes taken by certain Latin American states originated in changes of regimes. Such was the case of Peru, where a leftist military junta was installed in 1968. In Chile, the 1969 electoral victory of Salvador Allende's Popular Union brought to power a left-wing coalition led by the Socialist and Communist parties. In Bolivia, successive leftist military governments maintained a hold between 1969 and 1971. Disputes with the United States over economic interests (expropriation of American oil companies in Peru, and of American-owned copper mines in Chile) soon embittered the new left-wing governments' relations with Washington. Conversely, territorial and economic conflicts between the United States and other Latin American states prompted these countries to assume an anti-American international posture. An example was the U.S.-Panama dispute over the Canal Zone, which affected Panama's stand in the United Nations and in the world arena, particularly since the 1969 nationalist-leftist coup of General Omar Torrijos. Similarly, the U.S.-Ecuador dispute over fishing rights and territorial waters drew Ecuador, under the presidency of José María Velasco Ibarra (1968-72), to an anti-U.S. position.

Another major event in Latin America was the triumph of Peronism in Argentina in July 1973. The first moves of the Cámpora government were the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and formal adherence to the nonaligned countries. A separate process of radicalization, particularly in the field of foreign policy, took place in the English-

speaking and African-oriented Caribbean countries. Guyana, beset by racial tensions at home and by a border dispute with Venezuela, sought a solution in militant international activism and took the lead in the Caribbean area. In 1973, the Caribbean countries established diplomatic relations with Cuba.

By 1973, the Latin American political system presented a structure very different from that of 1967. At the international level, the main feature was the existence of a large group of states affiliated with the nonaligned countries, which, for the first time in Latin American history, was under a full or partial commitment of allegiance to a political body, centered outside the Western Hemisphere and openly antagonistic to the United States. At the United Nations, this unprecedented situation deprived the Latin American bloc of much of its value as a political forum.

Latin American attitudes toward Israel, at the United Nations at large, were affected by the new developments. States members of the group of nonaligned countries, or close to it, adopted an anti-Israeli line. Even a right-wing military regime like Brazil's, which remained basically pro-U.S. and rejected the nonaligned countries' philosophy, established a working relationship with them. However, the traditional high-score group composed of small countries — liberal and conservative — retained its pro-Israeli stance. In 1971, at the twenty-sixth session, it was strong enough to submit a pro-Israeli draft resolution, upholding the principle of a negotiated peace between Israel and the Arab states. This proposal, introduced by Costa Rica and Uruguay,[32] cosponsored by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and defeated by the Latin American tally — eight in favor, two against, thirteen abstentions, and one absent — shows a marked shift to the abstention position. Yet the Latin American mean score was relatively high, 6.4. The majority of the Latin American states supported a resolution, carried by a large margin with the concurrence of the Western European bloc, which criticized Israel's negative reaction to the memorandum submitted in February 1971 by Gunnar Jarring, the secreatry general's special representative (proposing an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement based on the return to the previous international borders); the mean score in this case was 5.2. However, when confronted, during the same session, with proposals clearly hostile to Israel or inconsistent with Israel's sovereignty (those on the inclusion of Palestine among the colonial countries to be liberated; on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; and on the violations of human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories), the Latin American states, on the whole, gave heed to the Israeli viewpoint, scoring 6.7, 6.6, and 6.7, respectively. Their mean score for the entire twenty-sixth session was 6.3.

The Latin American states did not maintain this course — which differed from that of the majority of the UN membership —for long. Two

years later, at the twenty-eighth session, the Latin American mean scores on the same items dropped to 5.05 (inalienable rights of the Palestinian people) and 5.19 (violations of human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories).

In spite of unfavorable international conditions, bilateral relations between Israel and Latin America expanded in many fields, including technical assistance and scientific cooperation. In 1972, Israel was invited as permanent observer to the Organization of American States — the only other country outside the American continent to which this capacity was conferred being Latin America's motherland, Spain. Yet increased Israeli activity earned only diminishing UN dividends.

After 1967 Israel's image in Latin America slightly declined as a result of a sustained attack by the extreme Left, often supported by the extreme Right, focusing on charges of expansionism and militarism. The Arab image benefited from the natural sympathy for the human sufferings of the losing side and from emotional factors arising from the Palestinian question. On the other hand, the Arab reputation was tarnished by Arab terrorist operations, particularly those carried out outside Israel, such as the massacre of the Israeli team at the Munich Olympic Games of 1972.

After the Yom Kippur war new events have occurred, the full impact of which cannot yet be gauged: the energy crisis, the sudden rise of Arab wealth and influence, the rupture of diplomatic ties with Israel by the African states. Cuba broke diplomatic relations with Israel shortly before the war, during the Algiers nonaligned conference of September 1973. Guyana took the same step in March 1974. In the global environment, the Yom Kippur war has sparked a new trend toward bipolarity. The two superpowers' intervention proved effective in stopping hostilities and in the subsequent negotiations. The overall result has been a resurgence of American prestige and influence.

In Latin America grave political convulsions have occurred; the violent overthrow of the Allende government in Chile by the military revolution of September 11, 1973; the return of Juan Perón to the presidency of Argentina in October 1973 and his death in July of the following year; the ascendency of rightist forces inside the Peronist regime accompanied by bitter civil strife and a military coup in March 1976. A political overview of Latin America shows a reduction of the strength of the radical Left and a shift to the Right.

The repercussion of the new developments within the international organizations has been a further tilt in favor of the Arab states and against Israel. It is likely that this general trend will continue and will exert a negative effect on Latin American attitudes toward Israel. However, the present situation contains contradictory elements and many unknowns. Among them should be mentioned the capability of the Arab states to

satisfy the growing Latin American expectations, by making substantial resources available to Latin American states for development purposes; the success of efforts made by many countries, including Latin American ones, to secure new sources of energy, both hydroelectric and nuclear; and finally Israel's ability or inability to live up to its tradition of resilience and flexibility in the face of adversity. Another question is for how long will rapidly industrializing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela continue to find the relationship with Southern, anti-Western, and anti-Israel alignments beneficial to their fundamental economic and national interests.

NOTES

1. There were no Latin American-Israeli disputes in UN history with the single exception of Argentina's complaint against Israel for kidnapping, on Argentine soil, Nazi criminal Adolph Eichmann (1960). The complaint was debated by the Security Council and did not reach the General Assembly.
2. The only exception was the voting on draft resolution L.523 submitted by twenty Latin American states in the Fifth Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly (July 4, 1967). In the political context of that session the Latin American draft, which made Israeli withdrawal conditional on the ending of the state of belligerency, had a pro-Israeli connotation. Israel abstained as a matter of principle, because the wording included the demand of withdrawal from all occupied territories. The Latin American draft played a central role in attracting votes of undecided countries and provoking the failure of unequivocally anti-Israeli proposals. The voting on it was included in our list of significant votes.
3. An additional reason for caution is the fact that sometimes Israel's vote was motivated by factors extraneous to the substance of the proposal under consideration. An example is the zigzag pattern of Israeli votes on similar proposals on the Arab refugee issue, submitted year after year by the United States and other countries under the heading "Report of the Director [later "commissioner general"] of UNRWA." Israel's vote ranged from affirmative during the 1950s, to negative on Resolution 1604 (XV) of April 21, 1960, to affirmative again on Resolution 1856 (XVII) of December 20, 1962. Israel voted against Resolutions 1912 (XVIII) of December 2, 1963 and 2052 (XX) of December 10, 1965. Subsequently Israel returned to the absention line. These apparent inconsistencies reflected the complexities and fluctuations of Israeli-U.S. relations. The other countries, including usually pro-Israeli ones, supported these resolutions by overwhelming majorities. They considered essential the continuance of assistance to Palestinian refugees and attributed secondary importance to changes in the language of the resolutions and to shifts in the Israeli vote. These votings cannot be viewed as significant.
4. The issues affecting Israel brought before the General Assembly were all connected with the Israeli-Arab conflict, with one exception: the debate held in 1965 in the Third Committee on the proposal to include in the draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination an article expressly condemning antisemitism. Even in this case the Arab states' position was antithetical to Israel's. The debate ended with no significant vote taken. (Twentieth General Assembly, 1311 Plenary Meeting, October 20, 1965.)
5. In the period under consideration the Arab states usually voted en bloc on Israeli issues. However, differences of approach between them were visible all through the years. Since 1970 certain Arab states have occasionally taken a clear, separate stand, by refusing to support (through nonparticipation or abstention) proposals backed by

the majority of the Arab group. Their purpose was to give expression to a more radical and more anti-Israeli ideological position.

6. UN membership rose from 57 in 1947 to 123 in 1968. In 1960 seventeen Afro-Asian states were admitted to the United Nations and since then UN membership continued to grow rapidly year by year. It reached a new plateau of more than 130 states in the 1970s.
7. Yugoslavia still belonged to the Eastern European — or Soviet — bloc but was on the verge of secession from the Soviet camp. The split occurred at the beginning of 1948 and became final in June 1948. At the end of 1948 Yugoslavia switched temporarily to a pro-Israeli position.
8. The United States is not part of the UN Western European bloc. However, in the period under consideration, it held a position of uncontested leadership among the Western countries.
9. Israel did not take part in the vote, since it was not yet a member of the United Nations.
10. A previous evaluation had been made in 1951. The Arab states objected considering the assessment too low. In pursuance to Resolution 1725 (XVI), a new study was made. It was submitted to the Conciliation Commission in April 1964. The assessment was a step which enabled the Arab states, in the following years, to demand that the income deriving from the refugees' property be devolved to a UN custodian.
11. At the beginning of this debate a roll-call vote was taken on the Arab states' request that the Palestine Arab Delegation, "sole representative of the Arab people in Palestine," be invited to participate in the debate. Arab representatives had been allowed to take part, in various capacities, in the committee debates on the Palestine question, since the first special session in April 1947. However, the Arab states' request at the seventeenth session aimed at enhancing the political status of the Palestine Arab Delegation. The motion was carried. In the following years similar requests were accepted without a formal challenge. Since 1965, representatives of the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Palestine Liberation Organization were invited to participate in the committee debate under a compromise formula, proposed by Costa Rica and El Salvador, stating that invitation of the delegates did not imply a recognition of their respective organizations.
12. The title of Director of UNRWA was raised that year to "Commissioner General of UNRWA."
13. The Cyprus amendment was carried by a roll-call vote. Israel and the United States voted against. The abstentions came from Western, Latin American, and African countries. The voting was considered significant because it centered on the question of non-implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). The situation was different when resolutions on the report of UNRWA's director were put to a vote as a whole, the central element being then the function and mandate of the agency.
14. U.S. capability for manipulating UN debates on the Palestine question reflected U.S. influence both on Israel and the Arab states, which reached a high point during the Kennedy administration (1960-63), but continued to be felt through the Six-Day war of 1967. At the eighteenth session, though, Israel tried to prevent disappointment by voting against the U.S. draft.
15. Again this was due to behind the scene negotiations. The Arab delegations gave in to U.S. pressure. They were aware at the same time that they stood no chance of achieving in the plenary the required two-third majority.
16. The Australian proposal was first adopted with some modifications by a seventeen-member subcommittee which discarded the other draft resolutions. The subcommittee rejected an amendment by El Salvador, requesting that the Israeli-held city of Nazareth be included in the Jerusalem international regime.
17. The Soviet attitude was in conformity with the Soviet policy of strict adherence to the Partition Plan, sanctioned by Resolution 181 (II). The Soviet Union had, moreover, an evident interest in participating in the Jerusalem international administration. On April 17, 1950, the Soviet Union notified the UN secretary general that it had become clear that Resolution 303 (IV) did not satisfy the Jewish and Arab populations and that therefore the Soviet government felt compelled to withdraw its support from it. This abrupt change was considered a shift to a more pro-Israeli position.

18. In November 1949 the government of Israel had announced its decision to establish Jerusalem as Israel's capital and transfer its officers there.
19. The Philippine amendment was aimed at a previously mentioned draft resolution on direct negotiations submitted by eight pro-Israeli countries. The main operative paragraph of the eight-power proposal ended with the words "bearing in mind UN resolutions and objectives, including the religious interests of third parties." The Philippine amendment, submitted at the plenary meeting, would have added the words "and in particular the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem."
20. See the section on territorial questions below. The provision on the internationalization of Jerusalem was a secondary element in the Latin American draft resolution. Its political significance came from the provisions on Israeli withdrawal and the end of the state of belligerence.
21. In 1956 the Security Council was paralyzed by a British and French veto. In 1967 the United States succeeded in blocking the passage of Soviet proposals, by rallying a sufficient number of votes, thus avoiding the need to interpose the veto.
22. On March 1, 1957 Israel announced to the General Assembly its intention to withdraw its forces from the Strait of Tiran and the Gaza Strip on the assumption that there would be freedom of navigation in the area for international and Israeli shipping. This assumption was supported by statements made by the United States and other maritime powers in the same meeting (including Argentina).
23. At the end of the period we find issues (displaced persons of the 1967 war or Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Arab population in occupied territories) which became subsequently recurrent.
24. See Hayward R.J. Alker and Bruce M. Russet: *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, p. 117). On colonial issues not connected with Arab countries Israel's stand was more firmly anticolonialist than that of Latin America. Israel's position on issues related to Sub-Saharan Africa would be more to the South, closer to the Brazzaville African group. This stand was one of the reasons for the pro-Israeli attitude of the Brazzaville and other African countries over many years.
25. The Korean War broke out in 1950, but the first significant roll-call voting is to be found only at the Sixth General Assembly's session in February 1952. Similarly, the question of China's representation was brought before the General Assembly in 1950, but the first voting which met our criteria of significance took place at the ninth session in 1954. On the other hand the first significant voting on the South African item occured at the first session in 1946.
26. The change is visible at the beginning of Period B, at the bilateral level. Suitable indicators are the opening of new Israeli embassies in Latin American countries and official visits, such as that of Israeli American countries in 1959.
27. For East-West and North-South issues we adopted a simpler method of computation, based on plenary meetings votings by which resolutions were adopted. By this method the majority positions are slightly magnified. Committee votes, separate votes, and votes on unsuccessful motions give expression to certain shades of opinion and dissent. Their quantitative effect is to bring the scores closer to the median line.
28. The Western European bloc at the UN General Assembly includes also Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. South Africa took part in the bloc until 1960. *Sub-Saharan Africa* is a convenient term to differentiate the Black African states from the Arab states of North Africa, located north of the Sahara desert. Since 1963 all African states, including the Arab ones participate in the Organization of African Unity. Yet on Israeli issues Sub-Saharan Africans followed for many years a separate line, very different from the ex parte position of the Arab states.
29. After the adoption of Resolution 1990 (XVIII) of December 17, 1963, which gave formal recognition to the so-called geographical blocs and made them constituencies of the elections to UN bodies, two newly admitted Caribbean states (Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, admitted to the United Nations in 1962) joined the Latin American bloc. They were followed by Barbados and Guyana, admitted to the United Nations in 1966. With the addition of the Caribbean states the Latin American group rose in 1966

to 19.6 percent of a total UN membership of 122. It dropped again with the admission of the new Afro-Asian states which brought total UN membership to 126 in 1968 and to 135 in 1973. In political terms, the weight of the Latin American bloc was reduced by the secession of Cuba, since 1960.

30. Table 32 was computed by the strictly objective compact scale. The intensity which takes into account more data (sponsorship, votes cast in a minority situation) would produce a slightly different order of ranking. In particular, El Salvador, a country which was very active in favor of Israel in Period B would precede Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico. El Salvador's score would be 5.4 and could reach by computing also the sponsorship given in 1962 and 1963 to draft resolutions which were not brought to a vote. Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico would receive a score of 5.5.
31. Special appreciation for the contribution of the Arab population to the well-being of Honduras was voiced by the permanent representative of Honduras at the United Nations in his statement at the Fifth Special Emergency Session on July 3, 1976.
32. In 1973 a coup established indirect military rule in Uruguay.

6

Diplomatic Bilateral Relations

Israel's good bilateral relations with most Latin American countries were an important factor in legitimizing its place in the international community. With the deterioration of support for Israel in multilateral organizations, diplomatic bilateral relations have come to assume an importance far greater than previously experienced. The Latin American countries have shown consistency in their support for Israel, in contrast with other developing states.

Among the nations who granted recognition to Israel at its birth, Latin American countries played a prominent role. They can be divided into three groups depending on the time of recognition: those which extended recognition to Israel soon after it declared independence, (Guatemala, Uruguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica); those that recognized Israel only after September 1948 (the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay); and those that only granted recognition before and during the debate on Israel's admision to the United Nations (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Peru).

In 1949, Argentina was the first Latin American nation to establish a legation in Israel, followed by Brazil, Uruguay, and Guatemala. Until 1955, when Guatemala became the first Latin American nation to move its embassy to Jerusalem, all these four diplomatic missions were situated in Tel Aviv. In 1972, fourteen countries maintained permanent diplomatic representatives in Israel, with all but Cuba at the ambassadorial level.[1] This support is impressive, especially when compared with Africa and Asia: four permanent African missions (one of them representing three countries) and four permanent Asian missions, until the October 1973 war.

Cuba severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973. By 1975, with the exception of Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which did not maintain resident diplomatic missions in Israel, all remaining Latin American nations had embassies there. Israel had embassies in all these countries as

well as in Paraguay. This situation is similar to that of Israel's relations with Western Europe, where Israel maintained diplomatic relations with all countries except for Portugal and Spain. On the whole, the principle of reciprocity in diplomatic exchanges was followed (see Table 43). However, on several occasions it was Israel, or less often some Latin American country, which took the initiative.[2]

Table 43
Growth of Latin American and Israeli Diplomatic Representation (1948-1974)



Of even greater significance is the fact that during the 1960s, ten of the fourteen Latin American missions moved or were set up from the outset in Jerusalem, Guatemala being the first to do so in 1955 (see Table 44). This gave Latin American diplomats an absolute majority among the missions

located in Jerusalem before the 1973 October war, an important fact, since situating the missions in Jerusalem implied its acknowledgement as the capital of Israel. (When the Dominican Republic's mission moved from Tel Aviv in 1965 and was raised to ambassadorial level, it was announced that the Dominican Republic considered Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.)[3] There were cases where the Arabs unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the transfer of an embassy to Jerusalem, e.g., Venezuela.[4] The "big three" nations (Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil) have their missions in Tel

Table 44
Latin American Diplomatic Representation in Israel (1948-1974)



Aviv (as does Peru). In spite of the fact that the United States established and continues to maintain its embassy in Tel Aviv, many pro-American Latin American governments have accepted Israel's request to locate their missions in Jerusalem. Furthermore, even during Allende's leftist regime, the Chilean Embassy continued residing in the capital.

Relationship with Israel and political support have been expressed in various other ways. One manifestation is declaratory support, such as has been expressed following terrorist acts directed against Israel. For example, both Allende's left-wing government in Chile and the right-wing Bolivian government of General Banzer, deplored the killing of innocent civilians at Lod airport. On that occasion, Bolivia went further to condemn energetically "the horrendous crime perpetuated in the Lod airport in Israel, by hired terrorists and guided from alien territories."[5] Already mentioned were the "homages" honoring Israel on its Independence Day taking place in national legislatures. Parliamentarians were also actively involved in actions of solidarity with persecuted Jewish communities. As early as 1953, the Brazilian Senate condemned "Moscow's anti-Jewish policy."[6] More recently, other parliaments (Uruguay, Guatemala) have joined in criticizing discrimination of Jews in the Soviet Union. Parliamentarians have also participated in meetings dealing with this problem (Montevideo in 1967, Bogotá in 1969, San José in 1970, Lima in 1971, Bogotá, Montevideo, and Mexico in 1972, and Buenos Aires in 1973).[7] In a conference on Syrian Jewry held in Paris in 1974, sixteen Latin American intellectuals and politicians represented twelve countries out of the thirty that participated.

The flow of visitors, which has been detailed in previous chapters, may also be considered an indicator of the level of bilateral relations. This is particularly true of official visits. During these visits, many of the personalities expressed support for Israel. Similarly, Latin American parliamentarians on their return from visits to Israel have publicly expressed support for Israel.[8]

Finally, close relations are also expressed in the many treaties signed between Latin American countries and Israel. Treaties are sometimes associated with visits of ministers, or special delegations. The first agreements were made in the early 1950s; they were of a commercial nature and stipulated the terms of trade with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Later, cultural agreements were signed, and with the expansion of relations, similar agreements were signed with the other nations of the continent. Since 1961, agreements of technical cooperation have been negotiated with most Latin American countries, and are periodically renewed.

On the basis of data compiled from various sources,[9] the following picture can be composed of the number of formal treaties existing with

Table 45
Treaties Signed between Israel and Latin American Countries (1948-1973)



Latin American countries, starting from the establishment of the State of Israel (see Table 45). Until the 1960s there is a low level of activity, while in the second half of that decade the greatest interaction is recorded. The countries involved in the greatest number of treaties are Uruguay, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Peru, followed by Brazil, Bolivia, and Colombia.

As shown in Table 46, most treaties are in the field of technical cooperation, followed by cultural, economic, and diplomatic (visa exemption, extradiction) agreements. The largest number of treaties were signed with the smaller and traditionally friendly countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica, followed by larger countries who play leading roles in the continent (Argentina, Peru, and Brazil).

Table 46
Bilateral Conventions, Treaties, and Agreements:
Israel with Old Latin American Countries (1948-1973)

Conventions, Agreements and Treaties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Countries	Treaties
Economic and Commercial	x x x x		x	x		x						x			x			x x x x x x x			7	16
Technical Cooperation		x x x	x	x	x x		x	x	x x		x	x x	x		x x	x	x	x		x	15	22
Cultural	x x	x	x	x	x			x	x		x	x			x	x	x	x x		x	14	16
Diplomatic (visas)	x			x x	x x		x x	x	x		x			x	x			x x		x	11	15
Friendship										x x											1	2
Tourism																		x			1	1
Nuclear Research Cooperation			x												x	x		x			4	4
Economic, Cultural Technical and Scientific		x			x														x		3	3
TOTAL	7	5	5	5	6	1	3	3	4	2	3	5	1	1	6	3	2	13	1	3		79

NOTES

1. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Liste des Membres du Corps Diplomatique en Israel, January 1972.
2. Both Guatemala and the Dominican Republic opened embassies in Israel several years before Israel reciprocated.
3. LAD 31, March 1972, referring to statement made by president Reid Cabral during his visit to Israel in 1965.
4. *JC* 11.
5. *OJI,* no. 125, July 12, 1972.
6. *Noticias de Israel* (Jerusalem), no. 126, February 6, 1953.
7. In 1973 a special three-man commission visited the Soviet Union and published a report critical of that government's policy toward Jews.

8. See statement by Manuel Francisco Villamar Contreras, president of Guatemala's Congress. *El Imparcial* (Guatemala), June 9, 1969.
9. The major source was the register of treaties *Kitvei Amana,* provided by the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, as well as references in the *Israel Government Yearbook*. Some treaties were not recorded as such since they were protocols related to technical matters, or did not reach ratification by the governments or parliaments, simply because they had from the very beginning only a declaratory value. In other cases, treaties expired without being renewed or were signed twice, the parties involved ignoring the existence of previous agreements. This clarification not only relates to the problem of accuracy of the numbers referred to in our tables, but also points out that in many cases treaties were more an expression of goodwill than an instrument for strengthening bilateral relations in specific fields (the agreements of technical cooperation excluded).

Concluding Remarks

EXTERNAL SETTING

The growing influence of the external setting in the foreign policy calculations of Latin American decision makers produced a negative effect on that policy vis-à-vis Israel. The cumulative result of Latin America's more active involvement in world affairs; the salience of many conflictive issues affecting Latin America's relations with the United States; greater interaction with the Soviet Union; the development of ties with the nonaligned countries and participation in Third World forums; and particularly the growing activity of the Arab countries — all have been determinant in weakening overall support for Israel.

Continuing escalation of the Middle East conflict led many Latin American leaders to perceive a real danger to world peace. Furthermore, the economic effects of measures adopted by oil-producing countries have affected Latin American economies. This growing universalization of the Middle East problem prompted many Latin American states to redefine their attitude toward the parties involved in the conflict — being influenced to a greater extent by perceptions prevailing in other areas. In the context of the isolation which Israel is increasingly experiencing, traditional support has thus far been affected.

On the whole, the United States did not influence or exert pressure on Latin American governments to adopt specific stands on Israeli-related issues. For some Latin American countries, attitudes toward the United States played a role in shaping their voting pattern concerning Israel. Those with close client-paramount relations often reveal a high degree of congruence with the U.S. position in Middle East voting. Conversely, countries aspiring for greater autonomy in their relations with the hemispheric paramount might demonstrate this tendency by not siding with the United States on Middle East issues. Nevertheless, there were few deviations from the general pattern of noninvolvement where the United States did exert pressure concerning a particular Middle East issue. In

1956-57, during UN deliberations on the Suez crisis, the United States used its influence in an anti-Israeli direction. The other occasion occurred following the June war of 1967. Then the United States was actively seeking Latin American support for a pro-Israeli resolution in a diplomatic confrontation at the United Nations facing a Soviet-Arab alliance. The most recent instance of U.S. active involvement in favor of Israel was the 1975 UN debate. Despite the United States' increasingly eroded position in the OAS, the inter-American system, compared to other world areas, has been the most ideal regional setting for Israeli activity.

The Soviet Union, as a rule, has not given high priority to the Middle East conflict in its bilateral relations with Latin American governments. This pattern was not much altered even when the United States allowed it greater latitude in Latin America. The salient exception has been Cuba, on which pressure was exerted by the Soviet Union to modify its independent stand on the Middle East. The marginal Soviet interest finds its main expression in some propaganda activity and through standing policy guidelines for its major local allies, i.e., the various national Communist parties.

For Cuba, relations with Israel were one of the manifestations of its foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis its Soviet paramount. Since 1968, Cuba has moved closer to the Soviet Union, increasingly synchronizing its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. The break of relations with Israel, prompted by Arab pressures at the conference of nonaligned states in Algiers, removed one of the last stumbling blocks on the road to full synchronization. In addition to actual lobbying, Cuba's capabilities to influence Latin American attitudes on questions concerning the Middle East remain very restricted because of the relative absence of foreign policy instruments at Cuba's disposal, an absence dictated by its continuing, though lessening, regional isolation. This last feature still overshadows other issues as Cuba's major problem within the hemispheric context.

Latin American neutralists have been developing a growing interaction with Afro-Asian nonaligned nations. This fact, coupled with Arab weight and influence within the nonaligned camp — long transformed into an anti-Israeli stage — has also had its impact on those Latin American governments maintaining looser ties with the group. An ensuing reduction in the level of support for Israel by these countries has been expressed primarily in international organizations, while bilateral relations have remained unharmed and sometimes even intensified. Despite the temporary rise of neutralism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the tendency has been checked, and nonalignment remains marginal in Latin America.

Relations between Arab countries and Latin American states were marginal until the mid-fifties. The influence of Arab diplomatic activity was then felt only in a small number of countries. Only since the late 1960s,

and after 1973 in particular, did a more intensive and coordinated drive take place, through the proliferation of contacts and particularly through transactions in the economic field. The importance of the Arab states as oil suppliers, as potential investors in Latin American countries, and their growing number as a caucus in international organizations (nearly equaling the Latin American bloc) were major factors in causing a pro-Arab shift in the policy of a number of Latin American countries. The Arab drive in Latin America did not display its full potential. Still, many of the smaller countries of the continent have no resident diplomatic representation of any Arab state. An intensification and diversification of policy instruments on the part of the Arabs might produce a further change in the present stance of Latin American states toward the Israeli-Arab conflict.

INTERNAL SETTING

The Middle East problem has been a major issue of debate and has received wide coverage within Latin American countries; in all likelihood, the extracontinental issue that has most drawn their attention. Interest groups, political parties, and mass media involvement have been impressive. An important explanatory element is found in the presence of local Jewish and Arab communities in all countries of Latin America, in some in significant numbers and in similar proportions — a fact encouraging competitive political activism on behalf of the parties to the Middle East conflict.

Yet most Arab communal institutions in Latin America are decentralized, grass-roots organizations of a social or cultural nature, characterized by a separatism according to place of origin. Their low political involvement over a long period of time hampered the attempt of Arab diplomats to mobilize support for the Arab cause. The geographic dispersion of Arab communities and high level of assimilation into the national culture were additional impediments on their political effectiveness. In many countries, however, the Arab states succeeded in creating umbrella organizations working in defense of official Arab policy.

Jewish communities have been well organized and active since the immigrants' settlement in Latin America. Community services became increasingly centralized, and many educational, social, cultural, and communal institutions aligned themselves with Zionism. Zionism as a central force in the Jewish communities enlarged its base of consensus with the Six-Day war, when even more lukewarm organizations openly identified as supporters of Israel. While Jewish community leaders played a significant role before and shortly after Israel's independence, the establishment of Israeli diplomatic missions reduced their former importance. The steady support of Israel is being partly undermined by

long-run processes, such as growing assimilation, weakening of the Jewish educational system, and the generation gap. The result is a leadership crisis now evident in important communities.

Still, organized Jewish communities in Latin America have generally been instrumental in obtaining political support for Israel with governments and public opinion. Their effectiveness seems to be greater than that of the Arab communities. However, over the last years, the Arab countries have intensified their activity within Latin American Arab communities, often following the same patterns employed by Israel in the diaspora.

Political party support for Israel comes from the center of the party spectrum. It is most pronounced in the case of the Social Democrats or Aprista group — in some cases the governing parties — because of ideological affinity with Israel's dominant Labor party. Center-Right parties tend to sympathize because of their Western and anticommunist ethos, and their commitment to democratic values.

Hostile attitudes are characteristic of both ends of the political spectrum. However, the extreme Left and Right, albeit vociferous, are numerically small and lack legitimacy. Guerrilla groups are absorbed by national and continental concerns, so far committing only meager declaratory or practical support to the Arab cause. Parliaments, on the whole, have served as a supportive, pro-Israeli forum. Although pro-Arab expressions still trail behind, they have become more frequent.

Even though interparty fraternal contacts have proved instrumental in strengthening solidarity, the only Israeli party to develop noticeable interaction has been the Labor party, maintaining sporadic contacts with Latin America's democratic Left. Mapam's initiative has been much more limited. Histadrut activities have occasionally catered to party activists. For other Israeli parties, including those having ideological counterparts in Latin America, forays into the continent never reached beyond the confines of local Jewish communities.

The military have acted as a positive factor in the context of Israel's continental relations. The record of Israel's Defense Forces (IDF) earned it respect and created a favorable image with Latin American military circles in their capacity as a professional elite. The IDF's experience in agromilitary settlement tasks was found applicable by development or civic-action-oriented Latin American armed forces. For conservative anticommunist military circles, Arab military cooperation with the Soviet Union provided another rationale for sympathizing with Israel. However, in the government other intervening influences — nonalignment, economic interaction with Arab countries — may alter the initial positive disposition of the military.

The fact remains that the predominantly Catholic societies of Latin

America are also ones whose governments (with only a few exceptions) are represented in Jerusalem on the ambassadorial level. Thus, Vatican-inspired negative pressures during Israel's early statehood years proved generally ineffective. Attitudes within the church microcosm reflect, to some extent, divisions prevalent in the wider national context. The extreme Right on one hand and leftist church militants on the other, hold largely shared attitudes with their secular counterparts. The church mainstream is either supportive or apathetic. The church, as an influential interest group and one of Latin America's public opinion makers, merits greater attention by Israel. Interfaith contacts engaged by local Jewish elements also benefit Israel indirectly.

Within the politically relevant elements of trade unions, intellectuals, and students, attitude distribution on the Middle East issue is comparable to the one prevailing at the level of political parties. There is also a noticeable difference between generations, primarily within the Left, where younger militants are less restrained by a past pro-Israeli stance than are some of the older activists. As against the secular anti-Israeli attitudes of the far Left, there is the antisemitic, anti-Zionist bias of the traditionalist variety, held by the extreme Right. Interaction with trade unions by both Israel (mainly through Histadrut auspices) and the Arabs has also served as a vehicle for gaining support with parent parties. Students do not consider the Middle East conflict a prime theme, but universities are one of the foci of anti-Israeli activity, mostly as a part of antiimperialist sloganeering. The heavy presence of Jews in the student body in some countries has not manifested itself as a mitigating factor. The intellectual community — where leftist trends are pervasive — has been on balance sympathetic. This posture has been influened by cultural interaction with local Jewish circles and by some Israeli-initiated activities in this realm. The weight of intellectuals as political and moral orientators may assume particular importance where constraints are imposed on a pluralistic political proccss.

In the press — still largely pro-Israeli — the last years have witnessed an erosion of the traditional pro-Israeli stand and the adoption of a more neutral attitude toward the Middle East conflict. Press reporting of Israeli themes is often characterized by a keen interest in the different facets of Israeli society (its technology and development, its experimental, democratic, and pioneering nature, etc.). This does not imply a similar preference for Israel as regards its foreign and security policy vis-à-vis its neighbors; it is in this field that criticism is being voiced, and some pro-Arab argumentation is earning wider acceptance. On the other hand, the newly acquired Arab political and economic power has noticcably improved the media's attitudes toward the Arab countries.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

In the first years after Israel's independence many statements made by Latin American decision makers revealed a reference to their belief systems, with strong ideological and normative overtones (justice, small-state solidarity, democracy, Jewish suffering, etc.) as well as personal traits of those decisiom makcrs. The dominant role of this personal attitudinal approach has steadily decreascd with Latin America's growing involvement in world affairs, the worsening of Israel's international position, and the universalization of the implications of the Middle East conflict. A stronger perception of the Israeli-Arab issue in real politik terms by Latin Americans is evident.

Another factor with profound implications for the continent's relations with Israel is the process of social change and radicalization taking place in Latin America. These developments have affected — along with important changes in the Middle East — the perceived images of Israel and the Arab countries.

Since the Six-Day war, Israel's dependence on the United States has become more evident. Israel's own economic development has altered its image as a developing country. This, together with its repeated military victories and occupation of territories, has cost Israel support among leftist and radical circles in Latin America. The radicalization of some Arab regimes, on the other hand, has enhanced the "progressive" Arab image. The combined effect has been a change in the base of support for Israel. While in the first years of its existence Israel was supported by more progressive types of decision makers in Latin America — because it represented a radical force in a largely feudal and reactionary Middle East — support for the Jewish state now comes more from centrist and conservative regimes in Latin America.

Significant differences are apparent among professional diplomats and politicians in their references to the Middle East conflict. The political strata (presidents, ministers, parliamentarians) are clearly more positive towards Israel, reflecting greater activity on the part of the Israel-Jewish side. However, this trend has begun to change as the Arab countries have increased their transactional activity.

INSTRUMENTS

After a period characterized by greater emphasis on other parts of the world, the network of Israel's missions in Latin America expanded steadily since the early 1960s. However, even now two small Latin American states remain without resident Israeli embassies — one state providing traditionally high political support, the other moving toward a more

positive stand. The apparently low priority attributed to Latin America finds expression in the relatively limited number of Israeli diplomats assigned to the region.

Israel's cultural relations have long been instrumental in raising the level of Latin America's support, which contained a strong normative element. An organizational infrastructure of Pro-Jewish Palestine Committees existing in all Latin American countries became, with Israel's independence, the nuclei for the establishment of bilateral cultural institutes. Since the 1960s, the development of Israel's new instruments — and particularly technical assistance — overshadowed the important function fulfilled by cultural links.

Trade relations with Latin America have been very limited in absolute terms. Nevertheless, official skepticism concerning expansion prospects have proved unfounded by actual developments. The rate of expansion in trade relations with Latin America over the last few years has been remarkable. Considering this late start and relative unfamiliarity with local conditions by Israeli exporters —together with internal developments in Latin America — trade potential with the continent is still undertapped. Latin America is rapidly becoming an important market for Israel's defense industries and an important supplier of basic foodstuffs and raw materials. The balance of trade has favored the Latins heavily, providing a certain leverage for Israel. Latin America offers a good setting for the export of know-how and a variety of planning services, activities already engaged in successfully by several Israeli firms. Good potential for tourism (Catholic pilgrimages) remains little exploited at present.

Israel's technical assistance programs to Latin America got off to a late start but proliferated, geographically and substantively, at a rapid pace. Technical assistance was rarely used in Latin America for the attainment of short-range political goals. In most cases no direct connection is evident between assistance given by Israel and political support provided by the Latin American recipient, although in a few cases such a connection is apparent. The overall positive impact of the programs, including some political and other advantages, has been obtained through a remarkably small investment of financial resources. Scientific-technological cooperation may provide some leverage with the larger, more developed Latin American nations, which are also the least supportive within the continental bloc. Despite the rapid development of the program, its geographic inclusiveness, and relatively wide range, three major groups of topics have dominated it throughout. Renewed momentum for the program requires surveys of new fields of activity. This might be facilitated by redeployment and expansion of the assistance decision-making community.

Since the inception of contacts between Israel and Latin America's

military establishments in the early 1960s and within a decade, emphasis in content has shifted from civic-action programs to pure military themes. This reflected the growth of Israel's defense industries, a late development contributing to the range of foreign policy instruments. The pure military interaction has been limited almost entirely to the sale of arms, aircraft, and communications equipment. Unlike Israel's relations with some African and Asian states, no large-scale training in military skills of Latin American personnel has been carried out by Israel. Except for their obvious economic importance, the new type of military transactions, as well as the older civic-action programs and the flow of visits by Latin American officers, have been politically significant. They have created liaison with what is the most significant political elite in the majority of Latin American countries.

Israel's official and semiofficial propaganda publications have increased considerably, both in quantity and quality, in recent years. The production apparatus in Israel has been improved, although the line of distribution is not always effective in carrying the message to the target audiences.

OUTPUT

Payoffs in terms of Latin American support for Israel have been consistently higher than those, at various times, of Afro-Asian countries, where Israel invested greater resources. Erosion of support for Israel in Latin America has been comparatively milder than in any other region.

On the multilateral level, Latin America's support has been diminishing, particularly after 1967. However, there is no concurrent deterioration of bilateral relations; in some cases, bilateral transactions and exchanges have been intensified (trade, technical assistance, scientific and military cooperation, etc.). Ignoring for a moment the influence of other variables, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the power level of a given Latin American state and its support for Israel. Over more than twenty-five years, those Latin American countries which ranked highest in capability, support Israel least (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). Medium-capability nations (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela) show greater support, and small nations (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Guatemala) tend to provide Israel with the highest level of political support. Most Latin American states show a high degree of consistency in their position vis-à-vis Israel, maintaining stable voting patterns, in accordance with the issues at stake. Bilateral payoffs were accrued from the early stages, a number of Latin American countries being among the first to recognize the existence of the new state. Furthermore, until Cuba broke relations with Israel in September 1973, Latin America was the only continent in which all states maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. Sixteen out of the nineteen

remaining Latin American countries have resident embassies in Israel, an outstanding fact if one bears in mind the limited diplomatic network of many Latin American states. Moreover, the majority of Latin American missions reside in Jerusalem, constituting the bulk of diplomatic missions in Israel's capital. Bilateral agreements and declaratory support are additional outcomes of the close ties between Latin American states and Israel. The overall picture of Israel's relations with Latin America shows an increase in Israeli activity in the continent, concomitant with a decline in Latin American support for Israel. At the United Nations decrease in the level of support reached a low in the crucial voting on the invitation of the PLO to the General Assembly in 1974. On that occasion only two Latin American countries voted against the resolution and the Latin American voting score plummeted to 4.68, well under the average of 6.15 maintained during 1957-68. On the other hand the reservoir of potential support for Israel still existing in Latin America was manifested in 1975, in the voting on the resolution equating Zionism to racial discrimination. Ten countries pertaining to the Latin American UN group voted against this resolution. The Latin American voting score rose on this particular issue to 6.19. The difference between these figures is indicative of the degree of fluidity in the present state of Israeli-Latin American relations.

Appendix A
List of Significant Votes, 1947-1968

SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. *Resolution[1] 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, which recommended the partition of Palestine into two independent states: a Jewish state and an Arab state with a special international regime for Jerusalem. Adopted by 33-13-10.[2] Latin American tally: 13-6-1.

THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

2. *Draft resolution submitted by Australia (A/C.1/396 + Add 1)[3] as an amendment to the draft resolution of the United Kingdom (A/C.1/394/Rev.2). The British draft recalled inter alia the progress report of the UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte (which proposed new boundaries for the Jewish state, making its area smaller than that provided for by Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947) and endorsed the specific conclusions contained in the report as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. The Australian amendment aimed at maintaining the territorial settlement established by Resolution 181 (II). Significant votes were taken on the following paragraphs:
   a) Preambular paragraph 1 ("Being of opinion that the Assembly's resolution of 29 November is the basic starting point of settlement

by the Assembly of the Palestine question"). Rejected by 12-24-12. Latin American tally: 4-4-6/6.

b) Preambular paragraph 3 ("Noting the establishment since 15 May 1948 of civil and military authority, under the Provisional Government of Israel, over substantially the area which, under the resolution of 29 November 1947, was recognized as delimiting the Jewish state in Palestine envisaged in that resolution"). Rejected by 13-25-11. Latin American tally: 3-4-7/6.

c) Preambular paragraph 4 ("Noting further that the establishment of the Provisional Government of Israel and the exercise by it of the administrative functions is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the resolution of 29 November 1947"). Rejected by 12-24-13. Latin American tally: 4-4-6/6. 2 December 1948.

3. *Draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/401), containing the following main points: (a) The presence of foreign troops in Palestine prevents the establishment of peaceful relations between the Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine as well as the normal development of the State of Israel and the creation of an Arab state in Palestine. (b) The General Assembly recommends the immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine of all foreign troops and military personnel. Rejected by 7-33-8. Latin American tally: 1-9-3/7. 2 December 1948.

4. Draft resolution submitted by Syria (A/C.1/402), containing the following main points: (a) The resolution of 29 November 1947 was not accepted by the Arabs of Palestine and the neighboring Arab states and gave birth to the disastrous situation of the Holy Land. (b) The General Assembly is not empowered to make compulsory recommendations for splitting countries. (c) The General Assembly decides to constitute a commission to study proposals for the establishment of a single state in Palestine, on a cantonization or federal basis. Rejected by 14-26-8. Latin American tally: 0-8-3/9. 2 December 1948.

5. Draft resolution submitted by Syria (A/C.1/403), which requested the International Court of Justice to give a legal opinion on the power of the General Assembly to partition Palestine for the creation of a Jewish sovereign state against the wishes (the words *"against the wishes"* were later deleted by an amendment which inserted instead the words *"without first obtaining the consent")* of the majority of the Palestinian population and on the legal international status of Palestine upon the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948. Rejected by 21-21-4. Latin American tally: 5-4-2/9. 2 December 1948.

6. Draft resolution submitted by Lebanon (A/AC./24/62/Rev.3),

which took note of the unsatisfactory report presented by Israel on the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte and requested that action on the admission of Israel to the United Nations be deferred to the General Assembly's fourth regular session. Rejected by 19-25-12. Latin American tally: 1-11-6/2. 9 April 1949.

7. * a) Draft resolution submitted by Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, United States, and Uruguay (A/AC./24/68), which decided to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations. Adopted by 33-11-13. Latin American tally: 17-0-1/1. 9 April 1949.
   b) Adopted in the plenary as resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949 by 37-12-9. Latin American tally: 18-0-2.

FOURTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

8. Draft resolution on the question of Jerusalem submitted by Subcommittee 1 (A/AC. 31/11), containing the following main points:
   a) Preamble stating that in relation to Jerusalem the resolution of 29 November 1947 represents a just and equitable settlement of the question. Adopted by 35-13-10. Latin American tally: 12-4-4.
   b) Paragraph 1, which stated in its first part, inter alia, that Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. First part of the paragraph adopted by 33-13-11. Latin American tally: 12-4-4.
   c) Paragraph 2, point (2), which stated that the Trusteeship Council shall be the Administering Authority. Adopted by 36-16-11. Latin American tally: 10-5-5.
   d) Paragraph 2, which requested the Trusteeship Council to complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem. Adopted by 31-15-13. Latin American tally: 9-4-7.
   e) Draft resolution as a whole. Adopted by 35-13-11. Latin American tally: 12-4-4. 7 December 1949.
   f) Adopted in the plenary as Resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949 by 38-14-7. Latin American tally: 13-2-5.

FIFTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

9. Draft resolution submitted by China (A/AC.38/L.34) as an amendment to the draft resolution submitted by France, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States (A/AC.38/L57). The four-power draft resolution in paragraph 1 urged the governments concerned to engage without delay in direct discussion, under the

auspices of the Conciliation Commission or independently, in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of all questions outstanding between them. The Chinese amendment read as follows: "Urges the governments and authorities concerned to seek agreement by negotiations conducted, either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them."[4] Adopted by 33-13-9. Latin American tally: 10-1-5/4. 6 December 1950.

10. a) Draft resolution submitted by Belgium (A/AC.38/L.71), which stated in the preamble that the Trusteeship Council had been unable to give effect to the statute on an international regime for Jerusalem and that new efforts must be made to settle the question in accordance with the principles already adopted by the assembly; and recommended, in the operative part, that the Trusteeship Council appoint four persons to study the conditions of a settlement of the Holy Places and religious interests in the Holy Land. Adopted by 30-18-11. Latin American tally: 12-3-4/1. 13 December 1950.

b) Rejected in the plenary by 30-18-9 (for lack of a two-third majority). Latin American tally: 12-4-2/2. 15 December 1950.

SEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

11. * Draft resolution submitted by Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, and Uruguay (A/AC.61/L23. Rev.4), which reaffirmed the principle that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement and to enter at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of a settlement of their outstanding differences, bearing in mind UN resolutions and objectives including the religious interests of third parties. Adopted in the plenary by show of hands. 18 December 1952. Submitted to the plenary (document A/2310) and rejected, for lack of a two-third majority, by 24-21-15. Latin American tally: 8-2-10. 18 December 1952.

12. Amendment submitted by the Philippines to document A/2310, inserted after the mention of the religious interests of third parties the words "and in particular the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem." Rejected by 28-20-10. Latin American tally: 13-3-4. 18 December 1952.

ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

13. a) Resolution 1123 (XI) of 19 January 1957, which requested the secretary general to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel, behind the demarcation line established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly, within five days. Adopted by 74-2-2. Latin American tally: 18-0-2.

b) Resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957, which called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the demarcation line without further delay. Adopted by 74-2-2. Latin American tally: 20-0-0.

FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

14. Draft resolution submitted by Indonesia and Pakistan (A./SPC./L.38/Rev.1), which requested, inter alia, that the Conciliation Commission make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). Adopted by 54-1-18. Latin American tally: 8-0-6/6. 8 December 1959.

FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

15. Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Federation of Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Somalia (A./SPC./L.61/Rev.2), containing the following main points:

a) Fourth preambular paragraph: "Recognizing the need to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees in Palestine." Adopted by 46-20-20. Latin American tally: 4-4-6/6.

b) Operative paragraph 2, which recommended the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the refugees. Adopted by 46-18-22. Latin American tally: 4-2-8/6.

c) Draft resolution as a whole. Adopted by 47-19-20. Latin American tally: 5-4-5/6. 18 April 1961.

d) Fourth preambular paragraph. Rejected (for lack of two-thirds majority) by 44-38-12. Latin American tally: 3-9-3/5.

e) Operative paragraph 2. Rejected (for lack of two-third-majority) by 44-35-15. Latin American tally: 3-8-4/5. 21 April 1961.

SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

16. * Draft resolution submitted by Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Netherlands, Niger, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, and Uruguay (A/SPC./L.80), which renewed the appeal to the governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations — with the assistance of the Conciliation Commission if they so desire — with a view to finding a solution for all the questions in dispute between them, particularly the question of the Arab refugees. Rejected by 34-44-20. Latin American tally: 12-1-6/1. 19 December 1961.
17. Amendment submitted by Afghanistan, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan (A/SPC./L.81) to a draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/SPC./L.79), containing the following main points:
    a) Operative paragraph 3, which decided that the Conciliation Commission shall be composed of five members. Adopted by 47-27-24. Latin American tally: 3-6-10/1.
    b) Operative paragraph, which requested that the Conciliation Commission take measures for the protection of the rights, property, and interests of the refugees. Adopted by 42-36-20. Latin American tally: 2-11-6/1. In the plenary the voting was as follows:
    c) Operative paragraph 3. Rejected (for lack of a two-third majority) by 44-29-25. Latin American tally: 3-7-9/1.
    d) Operative paragraph 4. Rejected (for lack of a two-third majority) by 40-37-21. Latin American tally: 2-12-5/1. 20 December 1961.

EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

18. Motion submitted by Arab delegations on the question of granting hearing to the representative of the Palestine Arab delegation (Report of the Special Political Committee A/5387). Adopted by 42-16-34. Latin American tally: 1-0-15/6. 29 November 1962.
19. Amendment submitted by Cyprus (A/SPC./L.93) to a draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/SPC./L.91), "noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) has not been effected and that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern." Adopted by 68-2-34. Latin American tally: 12-0-8/2. 18 December 1963.

TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

20. Draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and Somalia (A/SPC./L.114) as an amendment to a draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/SPC./L.113), which stated in the preamble that necessary action should be taken to ensure the full restoration of the rights of the Palestine refugees and deplored in an operative paragraph Israel's continued refusal to implement paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) and urged it not to obstruct such implementation any further. Adopted by 43-34-18. Latin American tally: 1-11-6/4. 17 November 1965.
21. Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and Malaya (A/SPC./L.116), which requested the secretary general to take all appropriate steps to have a custodian appointed to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel, and to receive income derived therefrom, on behalf of the rightful owners. Rejected by 34-38-23. Latin American tally: 1-11-6/4. 17 November 1965.

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22. Draft resolution submitted by Somalia (A/SPC/L.127) as an amendment to a draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/SPC/L.126), which in operative paragraph 3, as redrafted, noted with regret that the Conciliation Commission had been unable to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), and called upon the Government of Israel to cooperate with the commission in this regard. Rejected by 33-39-38. Latin American tally: 1-9-12/1. 14 November 1966.
23. Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia (A/SPC./L.128), which requested the secretary general to take all appropriate steps to have a custodian appointed to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel, and to receive income therefrom, on behalf of the rightful owners. Rejected by 36-38-36. Latin American tally: 1-8-12/2. 14 November 1966.

FIFTH SPECIAL EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

24. a) Draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/L.519) containing the following main points:

1. Operative paragraph 1, which vigorously condemned Israel's aggressive activities and the continuing occupation by Israel of territories of the Arab states, which constituted an act of recognized aggression. Rejected by 36-57-23. Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1.
2. Operative paragraph 2, which demanded Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Rejected by 44-48-23. Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1.
3. Operative paragraph 3, which demanded that Israel make good all damage and return seized property and material assets. Rejected by 34-54-28. Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1.
4. Operative paragraph 4, which appealed to the Security Council to take immediate action. Rejected by 36-54-26. Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1.

b) Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and eighteen other countries (A/L.522/Rev.3), which requested Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967. Rejected by 54-46-19 (for lack of a two-third majority). Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1.

c) Amendment submitted by Albania (A/L.524) to the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and eighteen countries (A/L.522 Rev.1), which strongly condemned Israel for its aggression. Rejected by 32-66-22. Latin American tally: 1-22-0/1. All votes taken on 4 July 1967.

25. * Draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venczuela (A/L.523/Rev.1), which urgently requested that Israel withdraw all its forces from all the occupied territories and that the parties in conflict end the state of belligerence; reaffirmed its conviction that the validity of acquisition of territory by force should not be recognized; requested the Security Council inter alia, to carry out the provisions regarding withdrawal, to guarantee freedom of transit in the international waterways in the region, to achieve an appropriate and full solution of the refugee problem; reaffirmed, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international regime for Jerusalcm. Rejected by 57-45-18 (for lack of a two-third majority). Latin American tally: 22-1-0/1. 4 July 1967.[5]

26. a) Resolution 2253 (ES V) of 4 July 1967 on "measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem," which considered these measures invalid, and called upon Israel to rescind measures already taken and to desist from taking any

action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Adopted by 99-0-20. Latin American tally: 16-0-3/5.

b) Resolution 2254 (ES V) of 14 July 1967 on "measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem," which deplored Israel's failure to implement Resolution 2252 (ES V) and reiterated its call to Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Adopted by 99-0-18. Latin American tally: 18-0-5/1.

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

27. Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia (A/SPC./L.157), which requested — as in previous years — that the secretary general appoint a Custodian for the protection and administration of Arab property in Israel and for receiving income therefrom. Adopted in the committee by 42-38-24. Latin American tally: 1-10-8/5. 16 December 1967.

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

28. Draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Iran, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (A/SPC.166), which called upon the government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return of inhabitants who fled the occupied areas. Adopted by 91-19. Latin American tally: 12-0-5/7. 19 December 1968.

29. Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia (A/SPC./L.168), which requested — as in previous years — that the secretary general appoint a custodian for the protection and administration of Arab property in Israel and for receiving income therefrom. Rejected by 42-44-27. Latin American tally: 2-13-7/2. 11 December 1968.

30. a) Draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and seventeen other countries (A/C.3/L.1626 and Add. 1) on "respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories," noting Resolution I adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 1 May 1968, which, inter alia, expressed grave concern at the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel, and drew the attention of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from the disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories; which decided to establish a special

committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Adopted in the committee by 55-16-41. Latin American tally: 4-7-10/3.

b) Adopted in the plenary as Resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968, by 60-22-37. Latin American tally: 2-8-12/2.

NOTES

1. Pro-Israeli resolutions or draft resolutions are marked by an asterisk. Anti-Israeli resolutions or draft resolutions are unmarked.
2. Votes in favor, votes against, abstentions. In the Latin American tally a fourth figure is given after a stroke to indicate the absents.
3. The symbol A/C. means First Committee. A/AC. means Ad hoc Committee. A/SPC. means Special Political Committee. A/C.3 means Third Committee.
4. The comparison between the four-power draft and the Chinese amendment shows the following main differences: (a) instead of "governments" as in the four-power draft, the Chinese amendment proposes "governments and authorities"; (b) instead of "direct discussion under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission . . . or directly," the Chinese amendment proposes "negotiations *with* the Conciliation Commission or directly." These changes were introduced to allay Arab objections to the recognition of Israel and its government on the same level as Arab states and governments, as well as to the principle of direct negotiations with Israel.
5. Votings on the amendments submitted by Cuba (A/L.525) to draft resolution A/L.522 and on the draft resolution submitted by Albania (A/L.521) were not included in our list because these proposals were directed at the same time against the United States.

Appendix B
Content Analysis, 1948, 1956, 1967

We submitted to content analysis the statements made by Latin American delegates[1] at three sessions of the General Assembly,[2] held after three major crises in the life of Israel: the third regular session, which took place in autumn 1948, when the first Arab-Israeli war was approaching its end; the first special emergency session, which met between November 2 and 11, 1956, after the Sinai campaign; and the fifth special emergency session, convened on June 19, 1967 after the Six-Day war and finally closed on July 30, 1967.

Relevant passages were classified into twenty items. Passages which referred to or supported a given concept were recorded by the ordinal number of the corresponding item accompanied by a plus sign. Passages which denied the existence or the validity of the same concept were recorded by the ordinal number accompanied by a minus sign. For instance, a passage dealing with the subject of negotiations was recorded as 8+, while a passage denying the necessity, possibility, or desirability or negotiations was recorded as 8–. As will be seen, the incidence of negative pronouncements is extremely low. The list of items and the incidence of positive pronouncements by items is given below. The items are grouped into four categories: (1) supporting the United Nations, law, and justice: 1-5; (2) pro-Israeli: 6-11; (3) anti-Israeli: 12-18; (4) small states versus great powers: 19-20.

Number of item		Incidence of positive pronouncement
1.	UN role, supranationalism, conciliation, UN mediation	374
2.	Respect of international law	111
3.	Promotion of international peace and security, upholding of existing agreements	199
4.	Existence of war, danger of war, obligation to prevent it	115
5.	Justice, morality	32
6.	Right of Israel to existence, independence and territorial integrity, validity of Resolution 181 (II)	166
7.	Right of Israel to security, secure borders, freedom of navigation, prevention of or retaliation to Arab terror raids, Arab belligerence	96
8.	Negotiations, dialogue, agreed solution, negotiated peace treaties	128
9.	Jewish communities abroad, Jewish culture and history	32
10.	Relations with Israel, achievements of Israel, and its contribution to the world	17
11.	Arab belligerence, threats, use of force, raids, aggression, intransigence, noncompliance with legal undertakings	68
12.	Palestinian rights, refugee problem, refugees' plight	97
13.	Arab states' right to security, territorial integrity, self-defense	65
14.	Inadmissibility of conquest, of territorial expansion, annexation, military occupation, withdrawal from occupied territory	113
15.	Arab communities abroad, Arab culture, history	26
16.	Relations with Arab states	9
17.	Israel's use of force, aggression, threats, intransigence, noncompliance with legal undertakings and treaties, necessity of condemnation of Israel, of measures against Israel	158
18.	Protection of religious interests and Holy Places, internationalization of Jerusalem	151
19.	Small states' rights	49
20.	Great powers' intervention, role, duties	32
	Total	2038

Items from 1 to 5 come under the heading of supranationalism; items from 6 to 11 are either pro-Israeli or anti-Arab; items from 12 to 17 are either anti-Israeli or pro-Arab; items 19 and 20 refer to small powers versus great powers.

The cumulative scores for the four categories are:

1.	Supranational	831
2.	Pro-Israeli	507
3.	Anti-Israeli	619
4.	Small states/great powers	81
		2038

Negative pronouncements are as follows:

1.	Negation of supranationalism	11
2.	Negation of pro-Israeli concepts	36
3.	Negation of anti-Israeli concepts	15
4.	Negation of small states/great powers	0
		62

By adding to the pro-Israeli scores the negations of anti-Israeli concepts, the figure rises from 507 to 522; by adding to the anti-Israeli score the negations of pro-Israeli concepts, the figure increases from 619 to 655. The breakdown of pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli scores in the three sessions and their ratios is the following:

Pro-Israeli and Anti-Israeli Scores

Periods	Pro-Israeli	Anti-Israeli	Ratio (Pro-Israeli = 100)
1948	159	125	79
1956	119	182	153
1967	244	348	143
TOTAL *	522	655	125

*The pro-Israeli total includes 15 negative.

In 1948, pro-Israeli scores rated higher than anti-Israeli scores, while in the two subsequent periods the situation was reversed. Anti-Israeli scores, which in 1948 constituted 79 percent of pro-Israeli scores, became 153 percent in 1956. In 1967 their ratio slightly decreased to 143 percent.

Among the pro-Israeli items, item 6 (Israel's right to existence, independence, and territorial integrity) ranks first, with a 166 score, followed by item 8 (negotiations) with 128. Among the anti-Israeli items, item 17 (Israel's use of force, aggression) ranks first, with 158, followed by

item 18 (protection of religious interests) with 151 and item 14 (inadmissibility of conquest) with 113.

Item 18 (protection of religious interests) is different in nature from the purely pro-Israeli/anti-Israeli items. By detracting it from the anti-Israeli score, we would reach a figure lower than the pro-Israeli score. However, item 18 is not unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab states had a clear political interest (as explained above, in the section on the Jerusalem question) to exploit Israel's vulnerability to international criticism on the Jerusalem issue; the other states were fully aware of the anti-Israeli implication of a stand favoring the internationalization of Jerusalem or opposing the unification of the city, carried out by Israel in June 1967.

It is interesting to note that item 17 (Israel's use of force, aggression), which leads the anti-Israeli list, is openly derogatory toward Israel. The pro-Israeli list is headed by item 11 (Israel's right to existence, independence, territorial integrity), which has no anti-Arab connotation. Item 11, critical of the Arabs' belligerence, use of force, raids, aggression, comes fourth in the pro-Israeli list with a score of 98. It appears that the Latin American delegates did not refrain from censuring Israel, if they thought fit, but were reluctant to voice open criticism of the Arabs. When they opted for a pro-Israeli viewpoint, they gave their preference to the least controversial and least binding pro-Israeli item, namely the one centered on Israel's right to existence. This situation was due to the Latin American states' unwillingness to be drawn into heated arguments with the large group of Arab states and their supporters. Latin American reluctance grew with increased Arab and pro-Arab UN membership and became particularly evident in the Fifth Special Emergency Session, when the Latin American states acted in Israel's favor, by introducing a draft resolution of their own, beneficial to Israel, but included in their statements more anti-Israeli than pro-Israeli elements.

Items 9 and 15 (Jewish communities abroad and Arab communities abroad) are of minor importance. The same observation applies to items 10 and 16 (relations with Israel, relations with the Arab states). Supranationalism tops all other categories. Latin American support for supranationalism has already been underlined. Yet some allowance should be made for the presence of lip service to the United Nations, to be found in practically every speech made at the UN General Assembly. A significant aspect of content analysis is the state-by-state distribution of the scores. The scores of the Latin American states, which participated in the debates only by perfunctory or occasional remarks, are given in Table 47.

The pro-Israeli attitudes and voting scores of Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are borne out by the content analysis of the statements of their delegates. A similar connection exists between the anti-Israeli content analysis scores of Cuba (pre-Castro), El Salvador (Period A), Honduras,

Table 47
Latin American States' Scores

State	Pro-Israeli	Anti-Israeli
Bolivia		
1948	0	3
1956	27	44
1967	2	5
Brazil		
1948	10	10
1956	0	1
1967	31	25
Colombia		
1948	23	13
1956	16	21
1967	52	50
Costa Rica		
1956	10	5
1967	57	37
Cuba		
1948	3	25
1956	0	3
Ecuador		
1956	25	40
1967	53	84
El Salvador		
1948	2	27
1956	0	16
Guatemala		
1948	59	1
Honduras		
1967	7	54
Peru		
1956	0	2
1967	26	39
Venezuela		
1948	6	1
1967	8	23
Uruguay		
1948	47	10
1956	40	31
1967	3	14

and Venezuela and their voting scores. Content analysis should not be overestimated. Participation in a given debate is only a possible course of action for a state interested in making its influence felt. Argentina, for instance, which played an important role on Israeli issues, is conspicuously absent from this list.

NOTES

1. Only statements of delegates of old Latin American states were analyzed.
2. While plenary meetings debates are recorded verbatim, committee debates are condensed in the summary records. The 1948 debate took place mainly in the First Committee. Figures for 1948 are consequently smaller than those for the following periods.

Appendix C
Israel's Technical Cooperation with Latin America: Exchange of Trainees and Experts

Table 48
Technical Cooperation Afforded during 1962-1970:
Israeli Experts (by Country and Profession) Including Ad Hoc Missions

Country	Total	Agriculture	Health	Engineering	Education	Cooperativism and labor matters	Others
Argentina	4	2	-	-	1	-	1
Bolivia	23	17	-	-	4	1	1
Brazil	38	26	-	4	1	-	7
Chile	29	21	-	2	3	-	3
Colombia	30	18	-	4	1	4	3
Costa Rica	21	3	2	-	13	-	3
Dominican Republic	18	13	-	2	-	1	2
Ecuador	27	15	-	5	4	2	1
Guatemala	18	13	-	2	1	-	2
Guyana	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	7	6	-	-	-	1	-
Honduras	6	3	-	1	-	1	1
Jamaica	4	3	-	-	-	-	1
Mexico	11	1	4	-	-	2	4
Nicaragua	5	3	-	1	-	-	1
Panama	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	3	3	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	36	22	-	1	-	4	9
El Salvador	12	11	-	-	-	-	1
Trinidad	10	6	-	1	-	1	2
Uruguay	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	49*	37	6	3	-	1	2
TOTAL	357	229	12	26	28	18	44

Source: America Latina e Israel, Sumario de los Programas de Cooperacion Internacional en las Americas. Division de Cooperacion Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Jerusalem, 1971, p. 52.

*Including the central Israeli team for Latin America.

Table 49
Trainees in Israel by Country and Profession (1962-1970)

Country	Total	Agriculture	Cooperativism and labor	Medicine and health	Vocational training	Community Development Social Work	Academic Studies	Education	Youth Movements	Others
Argentina	119	58	29	-	-	4	5	3	-	20
Barbados	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	108	25	28	-	-	-	-	16	24	15
Brazil	152	96	28	3	-	3	5	-	-	16
Chile	158	77	36	2	-	3	3	2	14	22
Colombia	222	87	71	2	-	2	4	1	26	29
Costa Rica	87	15	11	1	8	2	-	-	34	18
Dominican Republic	55	27	15	-	-	1	3	-	5	4
Ecuador	129	59	20	-	-	1	3	-	30	16
Guatemala	72	22	18	-	-	1	-	10	11	10
Guyana	65	17	16	15	-	-	8	1	-	8
Haiti	25	10	13	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Honduras	43	18	15	-	-	2	-	1	-	7
Jamaica	63	35	7	-	-	-	6	6	7	2
Mexico	199	135	31	1	-	1	1	-	18	14
Nicaragua	41	21	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Panama	45	17	3	2	-	-	1	-	14	8
Paraguay	42	24	10	-	-	2	-	-	-	6
Peru	167	74	37	2	-	1	3	9	21	20
El Salvador	61	25	13	-	-	2	2	-	9	10
Trinidad	26	17	6	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
Uruguay	98	30	24	1	-	4	2	2	14	21
Venezuela	214	125	29	2	-	4	7	-	18	29
TOTAL	2.192	1.012	472	31	8	35	53	52	243	285

Source: America Latina e Israel, p. 53.

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