Codeswitching as an Index and Construct of Sociopolitical Identity

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Codeswitching as an Index and Construct of Sociopolitical Identity

The Case of the Druze and Arabs in Israel

By

Eve Afifa Kheir

BRILL

Dedicated to my son Rolan—my love, my life, my everything ...

*And to the loving memory of my parents Kheir and Anissa
who have gone too soon ...*

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Preface

The Druze community, although a very small minority in the world, have a substantial and influential status in the Middle East. The Druze story is an extremely mysterious and fascinating one, especially due to the fact that their religion—the most important characteristic—is held secret not only from non-Druze, but also from non-religious Druze. Thus, having an inner and authentic knowledge about the Druze is a very hard task without studying the foundations of their faith—which is concealed. This, obviously, led to manipulation of facts by certain scholars, politicians and other people of influence to present distorted facts about them in order to fit their views and serve their agendas. Therefore, one should be critical and careful of what he/she reads/hears about the Druze, especially as regards information coming from non-members of the community, or, alternatively, very biased members of the community. One of the hardest missions is to find out about their true origins, since there are numerous contradicting pieces of information, alongside the fact that the Druze have been persecuted in the Middle East and consequently, had to conceal their ethnic and authentic identity throughout history and live in disguise.

The present book is extremely sentimental to me personally, not only due to the fact that I am a member of the community. I have been fortunate enough to gain deep, inner knowledge of the foundations of the faith, while at the same time, growing up in a non-Druze locality with extremely few members of the community residing there at the time. Having studied at a non-Druze school without gaining any formal Druze education had increased my curiosity, thirst for knowledge and eagerness to learn about the faith. I am infinitely indebted to my late mother for all the inner knowledge I had gained about the faith for decades, most of which are unknown to even many insiders. I remember ever since I was a child, although I was never religious, my mother would ask me and my siblings to sit with her while she was praying with the holy books, would share with us invaluable knowledge, and hand each one of us religious books that we were 'allowed', as non-religious, to read and get religious insights from. My late mother, who was ʕaqela 'religiously wise', had such a great passion for the religion, a passion like no other. Throughout her life, she would re-read her great collection of religious and holy books, constantly pray and frequently go to the religious shrine. She gained insurmountable amount of knowledge about the faith, and she constantly tried to instill whatever knowledge she could in me and my siblings. During the last months of her life, I was glued to her bed at the hospital,

where I was astonished to discover that she memorised and recited each and every word of the six main Druze holy books. Although she had suffered from certain memory disorders at the time, I would only hear her 'read' the holy books from her memory over and over again. When the undesirable happened and I had lost the closest person to my heart; my mother, I vowed to gift her back for the invaluable knowledge that I acquired from her. At the same time, my late father, whom I lost when I was 16 years old in tragic circumstances, had gifted me with invaluable knowledge related to his passion-politics. Since my mother loved the religion in an inconceivable manner, I knew I had to connect it, somehow, to her passion. Having an innate talent in the study of languages, I decided to connect my linguistic study somehow, to my late parents' passions, in the form that I am sharing with you in this book.

Having lived among non-Druze, mainly pro-Palestinian Arabs for twenty years, and then among only Druze, mainly pro-Israeli for sixteen years, I had closely observed the sociolinguistics of the Arab population, witnessed their views of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and profiled them against that of the Druze. As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, the Druze people in Israel have their own distinct sector, separate from that of the Arabs. The Druze community has also gone through a process of gaining a distinctive political and national identity, different in many aspects from the Arabs in Israel. Although the sociolinguistics of the Arabs and Druze in Israel is a fascinating one, not enough fieldwork has been done to provide a thorough analysis of it. Therefore, I decided to dedicate my research to it. However, it was obvious to me that I needed to detach myself from the socio-political turmoil going on there, and conduct the study as much of an 'outsider' as I possibly could. Thus, the best option for me was to move overseas, disconnect myself from the socio-political situation in Israel, and try to come up with as much objectivity and neutrality as possible. The past six years I have been living in amazing Australia, completely detached from the Middle Eastern theme, and I was able to conduct this study neutrally from a far.

I have encountered numerous challenges throughout this study though, both on the academic as well as the non-academic levels that have inevitably had certain effects on the research processes and outcomes. Since my fieldwork had to be conducted in Israel, I had to go on several trips to collect data for my research. The logistics of the fieldwork, however, turned out to be more complicated than expected due to the following reasons: first, some of the participants who had agreed to take part in the study did not attend and so further attempts had to be made to recruit other participants under time constraints, which were not always successful; hence, I had to go on further trips to conduct

more fieldwork, which resulted in certain delays. Second, due to the nature of the journey back and forth from Australia to Israel, which required three flights in each direction each time, I have encountered numerous issues such as several cancellations of my flights without prior notice, contracting viruses at airports and not being able to get medical support in certain countries due to their refusal to issue me entry permits simply due to my passport's nationality, as well as the long jet lag that I had to suffer from each time, to mention but a few. All this and more, had certain effects on my overall wellbeing, which, in turn had certain implications on the study.

In addition, recruiting participants in the Golan Heights, which moved from Syrian to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967, has been challenging in itself. Since the Druze community in the Golan Heights lives under constant uncertainty regarding its future and the fear or hope that the Golan Heights would be returned to Syrian rule one day, the process of recruiting participants there has been more complicated than with participants in other regions. Furthermore, some of the participants who were willing to participate were, in fact, relatively reluctant to be fully open to express their true opinions and stances. Above all, it has been nearly impossible to recruit any first and second-generation participants with Israeli citizenship in the Golan Heights. This was mainly due to their fears of either being exposed or criticised by the community, despite the fact that they have been notified that all measures will be taken to assure the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, as well as the protection of their privacy. Nonetheless, I have very much enjoyed the extremely 'bumpy' ride knowing that I have achieved what I desired and quenched my thirst for more knowledge in the field.

The present book focuses mainly on the phenomenon of codeswitching among the Israeli Arab and Druze communities. Research into codeswitching, generally defined as alternating between two (or more) different languages in the same conversation, has been flourishing over the last few decades. Yet, especially in the field of social, political and collective identity, much is still open for investigation. Although codeswitching research has benefited from the development of models and theories, there is a certain gap in the scholarly literature when it comes to a model that further illustrates the link between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity. Moreover, research into Palestinian Arabic[1] and the dominance of Israeli Hebrew[2] in Israel and its effect on the Arab and Druze

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1 Palestinian Arabic, Palestinian Vernacular Arabic and Arabic will be used interchangeably to refer to the same variety.

2 Israeli Hebrew, Israeli and Hebrew will be used interchangeably to refer to the same variety.

sectors and their language is still in its infancy. Consequently, the present book has developed a new model of codeswitching and sociopolitical identity, while examining the various aspects of codeswitching behaviour among the Israeli Arab Muslim, Christian and Druze sectors. The findings show clear different codeswitching behaviours across the different sectors, and that such variance has a link to sociopolitical identity, which subsequently has brought about the introduction of the new model.

The present book consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents a thorough background information about codeswitching; Arabic, Hebrew and the Israeli 'Nation-State Law'; the Druze faith; the Arabs and Druze in Israel; and the link between language, codeswitching and identity. In the second chapter, I have examined the language of the Druze community in Israel as going through the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation, resulting in a mixed or split language, based on Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis (2002). Longitudinal data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching from the Israeli Druze community, collected in 2000 and 2017, indicate that there is a composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a mixed language. The third chapter presents the new mixed language and its special features upon application of Auer (1999) and Myers-Scotton's (2003) theoretical models pertaining to mixed languages arising out of codeswitching. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity, while testing the various aspects of codeswitching among the Israeli Arab Muslim, Christian and Druze sectors. Drawing insights from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the chapter attempts to offer a model that would facilitate the analyses of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity. Finally, the fifth chapter examines and compares language and identity among the Druze of the Golan Heights, who were moved from Syrian to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967, and the Israeli Druze. In light of the notion of the interrelatedness of language, social-political situations and identity; this chapter examines the relationship between codeswitching, mixed varieties of language, sociopolitical situations related to the case study and identity, reporting on a comparative study of the Druze in the Golan Heights and the Israeli Druze. After the application of various theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics, the chapter shows how 'sandwiched' communities create new quasi-national identities and language varieties.

It is my hope that the nature of the research and analyses suggested herein will be of use for others interested in investigating the field, and ultimately also contribute to the understanding of how dominant languages influence minorities and how sociopolitical identity influences and is influenced by language

behaviour, and how, specifically, the dominance of Israeli Hebrew influences speakers of Palestinian Arabic to varying degrees, depending on sociopolitical affiliations. Additionally, the present study aims to provide an insight into bilingual minorities' linguistic reaction to and processing of state-centered policies of distinction, inclusion and exclusion, especially in a conflict setting.

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September 2022

Acknowledgements

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XVII

cool and you have helped me put my pieces back together when I nearly gave up. I will forever remember you both as the angels who have helped me rise when I hit rock bottom and I will forever be extremely grateful to you. I would also like to thank the Walter and Dorothy Duncan Trust for providing a grant that has facilitated conducting the final fieldwork.

Finally, I am infinitely grateful to my late parents, who have long gone away, but their souls are forever here to stay. I know you are watching me from up above and I want you to know that it is all thanks to you being my inspiration, raising me with great values such as to always strive to be wiser, better, stronger, to try harder, make a positive impact wherever and whenever possible, and above all, that the sky is the limit. Thank you from the bottom of my heart: none of this would have been possible without you! Special thanks also go out to my siblings Saleem, Lina and Monira for all their unwavering love, encouragement and emotional support, and for helping me stay focused on my academic work as much as possible, despite all the extremely challenging personal issues that I have been facing throughout the entirety of this study. Above all else, all my gratitude and love go out to my son Rolan for being the sunshine of my life, and for giving me the strength to move on.

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1   Background Information

1.1   *Introductory Background*

It is often the case that whenever two or more languages come into contact, several linguistic outcomes occur. These outcomes may vary from the simple borrowing of lexical items, often termed as *loanwords*, to the extreme point of creating a new dialect or language. One phenomenon that lies in between the extremes is that of alternating between the languages that come in contact, within the same utterance. In linguistics, such a phenomenon is usually referred to as *codeswitching*.

Research into codeswitching has prospered over the last few decades and led linguists in the field of contact linguistics to the commonly accepted approach that bilingualism and multilingualism involve the speakers' tendency to use different linguistic varieties within the same conversation or talk-in-interaction. In other words, bilingual and multilingual speakers tend to switch from one language to another while conversing.

Different approaches for classifying codeswitching have been presented over the last few decades: one such approach is that which attempts to link codeswitching to questions of social identity. Obviously, if one considers native-like competence in different languages, then the choice of actually conveying a message in one language rather than the other is of utmost importance. The present book will therefore focus on one of the codeswitching approaches; namely, codeswitching as an index and construct of identity. More specifically, it introduces a model that facilitates analyses of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity (see Chapter 4). Since there has been no thorough research that examines codeswitching and sociopolitical identity among the three sectors within the Arabic speaking population in Israel, the present book investigates Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching and identity in the Israeli Arab Muslim, Christian and Druze sectors, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. While much attention has been given in research to codeswitching, very few investigations of the Arab and Druze sectors in Israel have been carried out, and research into

codeswitching and sociopolitical identity has been relatively limited; therefore, it is my hope that this book will contribute to this growing body of research by specifically broadening the scope of previous studies to include four sectors within the Arabic speaking population in Israel:[1] Muslims, Christians and Druze—both the Druze of the Golan Heights and the Israeli Druze. Additionally, this book will introduce a new mixed (split) language and therefore offers a contribution to the sociolinguistics of such languages. Furthermore, to fill the gap in the scholarly literature, it will introduce a new model that will link codeswitching to sociopolitical identity.

The following sections provide a literature review for the suggested study. To demonstrate why the current research focuses on codeswitching and identity, the introductory background begins by presenting the different definitions of codeswitching. It moves on to differentiate between the two different types of codeswitching, as well as their theories and models. The literature review section is then concluded by focusing specifically on various issues related to Israeli Hebrew and Palestinian Vernacular Arabic (PVA), thereby providing an overview of the Arabs and Druze in Israel and presenting the relationship between language and identity.

Section 1.1.1 reviews several approaches to the definition of codeswitching in general. Section 1.1.2 discusses the various types of codeswitching, as well as theories and models, respectively. To demonstrate the relationship between Israeli Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic, Section 1.1.3 presents a general background of both languages, as well as their status in Israel and the connection to the Israeli nation-state law. More specific reference to the native Arabic speakers in Israel is made in Sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5. Finally, to demonstrate the relationship between language, codeswitching and identity, Section 1.1.6 presents the general connection between them. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the four studies respectively. Section 6 briefly summarizes the significance of the suggested research to the fields of contact and sociolinguistics. The book is then concluded with the future directions of the research.

1.1.1   Codeswitching

Codeswitching has been defined by many linguists; however, not all linguists use the term in an identical manner, nor are they consistent with the realm covered by terms such as code-mixing, borrowing, codeswitching, code-changing or code-alternation (Pfaff, 1979). Therefore, different classifications and

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1 By Arabic speaking population/Arabic speaking communities, I refer only to the Muslims, Christians and Druze in Israel and the Golan Heights and not to the Jews of Arab descent.

corresponding terminologies have been developed and used in an attempt to define what 'codeswitching' really is. The term code in itself is a relatively neutral conceptualization of a linguistic variety, which can be linked to either a language, dialect, variety or style within a language (Boztepe, 2003). According to Einar Haugen, who was among the first language researchers to develop the concept of codeswitching, "code-switching occurs when a bilingual introduces a completely unassimilated word from another language into his speech" (1956: 40). In her pioneering work on codeswitching, Poplack (1980: 583) defines it as "the alternation of two languages within a single discourse, sentence or constituent," whereas Gumperz (1982: 59) broadens the scope of switching to include linguistic varieties, by emphasizing that codeswitching is linked to "the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems". A more recent general definition of codeswitching has been provided by Milroy and Muysken (1995: 7), who define it as "the alternative use by bilinguals of two or more languages in the same conversation". A further general definition is provided by Li, who defines bilingual codeswitching as "the alternation of languages in the same interactional episode" (2005: 275). Following such general definitions, it is widely accepted by scholars of codeswitching that the practice involves the alternating use of two or more languages in a single conversation. However, there is much debate regarding which type of language use and its authentic extent can actually be referred to as codeswitching. In this light, Poplack modifies her previous definition of codeswitching and redefines it as follows: "Code-switching is the juxtaposition of sentences or sentence fragments, each of which is internally consistent with the morphological and syntactic (and optionally, phonological) rules of the language of its provenance. Codeswitching may occur at various levels of linguistic structure (e.g. *sentential, intrasentential, tag*) and it may be *flagged* or *smooth*" (Poplack, 1993: 255–256). Myers-Scotton provides a further specific definition for codeswitching in one of the models that she presents, the Matrix Language Frame Model, where she defines codeswitching as "the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of forms from an embedded variety (or varieties) in utterances of a matrix variety during the same conversation" (1997:3). The matrix language, which is referred to as the base language by scholars such as Poplack and her associates (Poplack et al, 1989; Poplack, 1980), is a representation of the main language in codeswitching production; whereas the embedded language plays the role of the other language participating in codeswitching, though less dominantly so. The matrix language sets the morphosyntactic frame of sentences showing codeswitching. That is, it marks out the order of the morphemes and provides the syntactically relevant morphemes, mainly the system morphemes that have gram-

matical relationships external to their head constituent, in constituents containing morphemes from both languages; the matrix language as well as the embedded language (Myers-Scotton, 1997). Inspired by Myers-Scotton's definition, Kosta (2015: 116), who asserts that it is useless to start with attempts to define codeswitching as there are as many, or even more, definitions as theories, defines it as "the *use of lexical elements* of a *donating language* (DL) in the grammar of another *receiving language* (RL), accompanied either by the adaptation of the lexical material of the DL onto the morphological and syntactic elements of the RL, or by the exchange of lexical resources, including an exchange at the phonetic and prosodic levels".

As far as the codeswitching structure is concerned, it is accepted that it may be either inter-sentential or intra-sentential. Inter-sentential codeswitching is about alternating languages between sentences, that is, producing a whole clause in one language prior to switching to the other. Intra-sentential switches, which some researchers refer to as code-mixing, occur within the same sentence or clause, with the clause containing elements of the two languages (Myers-Scotton, 1997). The patterns of intra-sentential codeswitching are often different from one another, since there are several distinct processes at work: insertion of material from one language into a structure of another; alternation between structures of the languages; and congruent lexicalization of elements from different lexical inventories into a shared grammatical structure (Muysken, 2000). In the case of word-internally codeswitching, some scholars argue that it is not possible, while others argue against this restriction (Auer & Eastman, 2010), and several researchers, even as early on as Bentahila and Davies (1983), have provided empirical evidence showing that codeswitching is possible at the word level, and even at the level of phonetics (Kosta, 2015). Some authors use the term 'switching' to account for language alternation between sentences or clauses, and 'mixing' for intra-sentential alternation. This is due to the fact that code-mixing, aka intra-sentential codeswitching, necessitates an integration of the rules of both participating languages (Sridhar & Sridhar, 1980; Kachru, 1983; Singh, 1985; Muysken, 2000; Boztepe, 2003).

In the study of codeswitching, a vigorous debate exists as to whether the code-switchers—the people who alternate between two (or more) languages, perceive the languages as separate from one another or as one repertoire to select from. As Auer & Eastman (2010: 86) put it: "Are the distinctions introduced by the linguist, and held to be relevant under all circumstances (e.g. the difference between two 'languages'), relevant for the speakers, or do the speakers have their own unique perceptions and criteria for assessing what they do when speaking?". In light of this notion, codeswitching has mainly developed in two primary domains, sociolinguistic and structural/syntactic, following the

key, pioneering works of Blom and Gumperz (1972) and Poplack (1980) respectively. The structural aspect mainly engages with grammatical, syntactic and morphosyntactic constraints; whereas the sociolinguistic aspect is mainly concerned with the social meanings and functions attributed to codeswitching. Codeswitching, therefore, has developed "into a subject matter which is recognised to be able to shed light on fundamental linguistic issues, from Universal Grammar to the formation of group identities and ethnic boundaries through verbal behaviour" (Auer, 1998: 17).

Codeswitching has been a stigmatized form of speech. Such stigmatization and pejorative attitudes towards codeswitching have been linked to prescriptivism; the notion that a certain language variety has a higher value and status than the other varieties and that this should be deeply ingrained in the speech community (Crystal, 1997), and semilingualism; the notion that bilingual speakers incorporate codeswitching in their speech due to their lack of linguistic competence in the languages they speak (Edelsky et al, 1983). Such delegitimizing notions of codeswitching were promoted by renowned linguists such as Bloomfield (1927) and Weinreich (1978), among others. Although these linguists were reflecting attitudes of the past, such notions are still prevalent these days, especially in classroom settings where the notion of semilingualism is embodied in the form of negative attitudes of teachers towards those students who incorporate codeswitching in their classroom interactions. As with any other stigmatized variety, codeswitching is perceived as some sort of a deviation from the norm and, in many bilingual classroom settings, as the least acceptable form of discourse (Boztepe, 2003). The notion of codeswitching as a stigmatized form of communication not only stems from the association with deficient language abilities, but also from sociolinguistic motivations. In this study, I link the notion of codeswitching as a stigmatized form of communication with issues of sociopolitical identity and ideology (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Study of the alternating use of languages in the same interactional frame has largely benefited from the development of various theories and models. Such theories and models range from dealing with the structural aspects of codeswitching, which focus on syntactic and morphosyntactic constraints linked to codeswitching, to the sociolinguistic aspects of codeswitching, which focus on social settings, factors, reasons and motivations. The following section presents an outline of various prominent theories and models pertaining to the research into codeswitching.

1.1.2   Types, Theories and Models of Codeswitching
Extensive research on codeswitching has shown that different code-switchers within a certain community may have different switching ways and styles.

This has led scholars in the field to distinguish between possible types of codeswitching. Two major approaches exist as to which contact phenomena involving surface level morphemes from more than one language should be counted as codeswitching. Hence, codeswitching is distinguished by Myers-Scotton as two main types: *classic codeswitching* and *composite codeswitching* (2002; 2006).

Classic codeswitching refers to a speech that includes elements from two (or more) languages varieties in the same clause, but only one of these varieties is the source of the morphosyntactic frame for the clause, that is, the Matrix Language. The speakers, however, can insert content morphemes from the other participating language, that is, the Embedded Language, into mixed constituents of the Matrix Language or insert islands (expressions) from the Embedded Language or both.

Composite codeswitching is a speech in which, even though most of the morphosyntactic structure comes from one of the participating languages, the other language contributes some of the abstract structure underlying surface forms in the clause. The speakers, then, provide the morphosyntactic frame from more than one of the participating languages, resulting in a composite Matrix Language frame, which involves convergence of the morphosyntactic frame, as well as of the features of some grammatical structures (ibid, 2002; 2006). Both classic codeswitching and composite codeswitching can incorporate inter-sentential/inter-clausal codeswitching, as well as intra-sentential/intra-clausal codeswitching.

Such discernment between the different types of codeswitching is crucial in understanding the different motivations for codeswitching, as well as its causes and effects. These are discussed in detail mainly in the fourth and fifth chapters, where the different types of codeswitching are linked to issues of sociopolitical identity.

Different researchers have developed various theories and models of codeswitching, ranging from structural to sociolinguistic. The structural models are mainly concerned with certain structural and grammatical constraints pertaining to codeswitching. Although there is no general consensus on universal linguistic constraints, among the most influential models pertaining to the systematic linguistic aspects of codeswitching are Poplack's Free Morpheme and Equivalence constraints model (1980; 1981) and Myers-Scotton's prominent Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model (1997; 2002). Poplack's model incorporates both functional and linguistic factors. The model suggests two syntactic constraints on codeswitching: (a) *The free morpheme constraint*, which posits that "codes may be switched after any constituent in discourse provided that constituent is not a bound morpheme," and (b) *The Equivalence Constraint*,

according to which "code-switches will tend to occur at points in discourse where juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language, i.e. at points around which the surface structure of the two languages map onto each other (1980: 585–586)". According to the first syntactic constraint, a switch between two bound morphemes cannot occur unless one of the morphemes has been phonologically integrated into the language of the other. Hence, *the free morpheme constraint* permits prospective switches to occur solely at word boundaries. *The Equivalence Constraint*, on the other hand, inhibits prospective switches from occurring within a constituent generated by a rule of one of the participating languages, as long as it is not shared by the other participating language. Hence, the order of the constituents on both sides of the switch site has to be simultaneously grammatical as regards both participating languages. The equivalence or co-grammaticality of both participating languages in the vicinity of the switch site holds, given that the order of the constituents before and after the switch site is not excluded in either participating language. (Poplack, 1980; 1981; 1993; Sankoff & Poplack, 1981). Although Poplack (1980) proposed both constraints to be deemed generally universal, various criticisms were soon raised about both constraints as several scholars provided evidence of codeswitching violating those constraints (e.g. Bentahila & Davies, 1983; Berk-Seligson, 1986; Clyne, 1987). Such constraints were further criticized by scholars for lacking the asymmetry concept, which is prominent in cases of language contact. Following this, Joshi (1985), inspired by Sridhar's (1980) paper on the syntax and psycholinguistics of bilingual codeswitching, has identified the need for asymmetry to be recognized in the system. He proposed the terms the *matrix language*, and *embedded language* to account for such asymmetry, with each having corresponding grammars; i.e. the *matrix grammar*, and the *embedded grammar*. Therefore, the mixed sentence contains lexical items from both the *matrix language*, and the *embedded language*, with such sentences being recognized as "coming from" the *matrix language*, and permitting shifting control from the *matrix grammar* to the *embedded grammar*, but not vice versa. Inspired by Joshi's paper, Myers-Scotton (1997) encapsulated the notion of asymmetry in the context of a *matrix language* and an *embedded language* in her renowned *Matrix Language Frame* model.

In the Matrix Language Frame model, further supplemented by the 4-M model of Myers-Scotton and Jake (2001), four types of morphemes are classified: (1) content morphemes and (2) system morphemes that are subdivided into early system morphemes and two types of late system morphemes: (3) bridge late system morphemes and (4) outsider late system morphemes. The matrix language, which is the primary language in codeswitching production,

provides the morphosyntactic frame and the late system morphemes, with an exclusivity over the outsider system morphemes, unless there is a case of a matrix language turnover underway that results in a composite matrix language. The matrix language, therefore, determines the structural production of the codeswitched clauses. The embedded language may provide content morphemes and/or embedded language islands; that is, certain expressions. Although Myers-Scotton's model has been criticized for having a rigid understanding of a matrix language, the definition of system morphemes is problematic and the psycholinguistic model is not fully explicit, Myers-Scotton has brought the study of codeswitching to a deeper explanatory level by combining the psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic and structural perspectives on codeswitching (Muysken, 2000). The MLF and 4-M models, as well as the Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis, are discussed in detail in the second chapter (see Kheir, 2019).

Another prominent theory of codeswitching is that of Muysken (2000), who proposes a synthesis grounded in both structural linguistics as well as sociolinguistics, to account for the code-mixing phenomena. Muysken identifies three distinct processes found in the patterns of code-mixing: insertion, alternation and congruent lexicalization. These processes correspond with the dominant models for codeswitching by Myers-Scotton (1997), Poplack (1980) and Labov (1972), respectively. The process of insertion involves the insertion of an alien lexical or phrasal category, such as a noun or noun phrase, into the matrix structure. Approaches departing from the notion of insertion, called insertional code-mixing, view the constraints with respect to a matrix or base structure. In insertional code-mixing, what is inserted is a single, well-defined constituent, such as a lexical item or a phrase. Muysken identifies certain diagnostic properties of insertions: the majority of the insertions are single constituents; they exhibit a nested A B A structure (where A and B refer to the participating languages), with the fragments preceding and following the insertion being grammatically related; the insertions are often content words rather than function words; they are often selected elements and morphologically integrated. The matrix language in insertional code-mixing is maintained and determines the grammatical structure. Whilst for insertion the notion of matrix language is called for, in alternation, on the other hand, it is not. Alternation is a strategy in which the two languages in the clause are separate, a strategy that is similar to the notion of inter-clausal switching, since the switching of codes occurs between utterances. Approaches that depart from alternation, known as alternational code-mixing, view the constraints with respect to the compatibility or equivalence of the participating languages at the point of language alternation. Myusken identifies a number of features typical of

alternation: in alternational mixing the switches can involve several constituents in sequence; they exhibit a non-nested A B A structure where the elements preceding and following the switched string are not structurally related; alternations involve more words and a more complex structure in a switched fragment and, therefore, the activation of a matrix language decreases. The patterns of alternations also exhibit a certain diversity in the switched elements, which include functional elements; discourse particles and adverbs. Alternational code-mixing also involves switches at the periphery of a sentence, tag-switching, flagging and self-repair. Several scholars have focused on the phenomenon of codeswitching resulting from self-repair and other forms of repair (*see* Kosta, 2019). Muysken's distinction between alternational code-mixing and insertional code-mixing coincides with Auer's distinction between codeswitching and transfer/insertion (1995), where transfer involves the insertion of a word or structure from language B into a language A frame: such insertion has a predictable end and does not involve momentary departure from the base language, as opposed to codeswitching. The notion of congruent lexicalization involves a situation in which both participating languages insert elements into a shared grammatical structure, where they share the grammatical structure either fully or in part. The vocabulary comes from both participating languages and may also be shared. This process is characterized by a gradual shift from a base or matrix language to a shared matrix structure. Congruent lexicalization involves several properties. First, there will be linear and structural equivalence between the varieties, since they are identical at the syntactic level. Second, since the syntactic structure is shared by the two participating codes, there will be multi-constituent code-mixing at any point. Third, since the switching involves single elements within a shared grammatical structure, non-constituent or 'ragged' mixing (cf. Poplack, 1980) can be expected. A further feature to be expected in congruent lexicalization is non-nested A B A structures, since the elements from language B do not need to correspond with one well-defined constituent. In addition, since there is no single matrix language dominating the structure, all categories are expected to be switched, including content and function elements. Congruent lexicalization also involves switching of selected elements, bidirectional code-mixing and back-and-forth switches since there is no single matrix language. Other features that characterize congruent lexicalization include homophonous diamorphs, morphological integration, triggering of codemixing by words from the other participating language, and mixed collocations and idioms. (Muysken, 1995; 2000). This process corresponds with Labov's (1972) study of style shifting and dialect/standard variation since it involves related and similar languages; however, when compared with models relating to other, non-related languages,

then it also seems to parallel Myers-Scotton's notion of composite codeswitching and convergence in several respects.

It has been successfully argued by linguists that language choices are of considerable interactional and social significance; therefore, a number of theoretical models have been developed in an attempt to explain the motivations and mechanisms underlying these choices (Li, 2005). While the merely linguistic models of codeswitching pertain to the structural features of the speech, the sociolinguistic models provide an understanding of the social settings, contexts and conditions in which codeswitching takes place. Such models have developed under two primary approaches: *The Rational Choice Approach* and *The Conversational Analysis Approach*. Both approaches were, to a certain extent, influenced by Blom and Gumperz' (1972) pioneering study, in which they found that switching between standard and non-standard varieties in Hemnesberget, a village in Norway, was patterned and predictable, and identified two types of switching: *situational* and *metaphorical*. Situational switching assumes a direct relationship between the language and the social situation, as it involves changes in the interlocutors' definitions of each other's rights and obligations. Metaphorical switching, however, is affected by specific kinds of subject matter or topic, rather than by change in social situation. In addition, Blom and Gumperz have identified certain types of social constraints that affect switching: *setting*, which refers to the environment where the speakers experience social happenings; *social situation*, which involves activities done by certain participants gathered in a certain setting at a certain time; and *social event*, which refers to certain social definitions of the situation occurring in the same setting and dependent upon opportunities and constraints on both interactions and participants.

The Rational Choice approach to codeswitching argues that bilingual speakers make rational choices in their language use to signal their rational decisions alongside their own identities and attitudes, and that such choices follow rights and obligations that speakers perceive in a certain situation (Li, 2005). The rational choice model that is most explicitly linked to codeswitching is the *Markedness Model* of Myers-Scotton (1993), which was inspired by Fishman's (1965, 1972) approach to code choice and emphasizes that the habitual code choice of multilingual communities is not a random affair and is directly related to the type of speech activity, roles of interlocutors, kinds of occasions and topics. *The Markedness Model* argues for the focal role of cognitively-based valuations in bilinguals' linguistic variety choices. The bilingual speaker is given the option to make the best choice out of an array of given choices. According to the model, rationality indicates the reasons choices are made and paves the speakers' way to make optimal choices for themselves. While doing so, speakers

consider their desires, values and prior beliefs (Myers-Scotton, 1999). According to this model, speakers have a markedness evaluator, which refers to the capacity to develop the perception that relevant linguistic choices in a specific interaction fall along a continuum from more socially unmarked to more marked, while recognizing that such choices depend on the interaction type and its development, and speakers have the ability to provide relevant interpretations for their choices. Such an evaluator indicates which choices are more or less marked for the given interaction; that is, it evaluates potential choices. The interpretations of the linguistic choices are linked to the speakers' persona and relationships with other participants; thus the choices index a desired Rights and Obligations (RO) set amongst the participants, who interpret the choices that index the more unmarked RO sets for a given interaction, which varies according to the speech community. The RO sets are the elements deriving from the societal factors that are salient in the community, as well as the interaction type, and the unmarked choices are the more expected ones, given the salience of the participants and the situational factors. The markedness of an RO set is subject to change for the interaction and the linguistic choice, based on situational components or participants' negotiations. Most frequently, speakers select language choices that index what is conceived to be the more unmarked RO set, thereby accepting the prevailing community views for an appropriate choice. Thus, although speakers make choices as individuals, they generally follow their group, which makes the same or similar language choices, the unmarked choices. However, when speakers do make marked choices, they are negotiating some RO set different from the unmarked one in order to change it; that is, codeswitching will be employed as a marked choice (Myers-Scotton, 1993; 1999; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai, 2001).

The Conversation Analysis approach to codeswitching was developed against the tendency to explain codeswitching by attributing specific meanings to the switches and assuming certain intentions on behalf of the speakers. It agrees with the Rational Choice Model and the Markedness Model in the notion that bilingual or multilingual speakers are rational individuals, however, they are not motivated by rights and obligations, or attitudes and identities, but rather by selecting conversational structures attempting to convey clear messages in their utterances. Therefore, the speakers themselves arrive at local interpretations of code choices, based on detailed, turn-by-turn analysis (Li, 2005). The Conversational Analysis (CA) model explores codeswitching under specific social contexts and settings rather than examining grammatical or social patterns that overlook the specific situation of the interaction. That is, it seeks to understand codeswitching practices at the 'micro' sociolinguistic dimension, rather than the grammatical and larger societal, cultural and ideological

structures to which code choices are related. The conversational analysis of codeswitching is shown, for example, by the fact that switching is more likely in certain sequential positions than in others, (for instance; responsive turns or components are less suited for switching than initiative ones) or that certain sequential patterns of codeswitching direct participants' interpretations. The CA model applied to codeswitching addresses three main points: relevance, procedural consequentiality and the balance between social structure and conversational structure. It therefore has the advantages of giving priority to the effect of participants' code choice at a particular point on subsequent code choices by the same and other participants, and of limiting the external analysts' interpretation to the participants' mutual understanding of their code choices, as manifest in their behaviour. The CA approach, however, does not imply that 'macro' societal dimensions are irrelevant for the interpretation of codeswitching, rather, it argues that while codeswitching is indeed a socially significant behaviour, the analyst should show how his analyses are demonstratively relevant to the participants, that is, how the extra-linguistic context has conclusive consequences for the specific interaction. It is about balancing the social and conversational structures; therefore, the analyst must not assume that speakers in a given conversation switch codes in order to index speakers' identities, attitudes, power relations, formality, etc.; but rather to demonstrate how such identities and attitudes are presented, understood, accepted, rejected or changed within the interactional processes (Auer, 1984; 1988; 1995; 1998; Li, 2005).

For the purpose of the current study, the models provided in the scholarly literature barely relate closely to the link between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity. Therefore, there is a certain gap in the literature when it comes to a model that further illustrates this link. Drawing on insights from the above mentioned models, as well as intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the fourth chapter attempts to offer a model that facilitates analyses of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity.

There are many factors and motivations to be taken into account when it comes to codeswitching. Codeswitching may be the result of social, political, ideological, historical or economic factors. Such factors are affected by the linguistic resources available in communities, their unequal distribution and the institutions responsible for such distributions. Political-ideological affiliations, as well as social class consciousness, can be reflected in codeswitching (Auer and Eastman, 2010). It is, therefore, of utmost importance to understand the historical and political background of the languages at hand, namely Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew, and to investigate their legal status and mutual relationship in the given country, as presented in the following section.

1.1.3 Arabic, Hebrew and the Israeli 'Nation-State Law'

The first Zionists arrived in Ottoman ruled Palestine in the second half of the 1880s, where the Jewish National Movement and the Arab National Movement were brought into confrontation for the first time. The Zionist leaders laid the foundations for the Jewish homeland in the late Ottoman period, and totally ignored the Palestinian position. Towards the end of the 1880s, reports emerged of increasing friction between the communities which led to the first Arab attack and protests against Jewish settlement efforts, that were perceived as a direct threat to the Arab community. Around 1910–1911, Arab intellectuals and journalists in Palestine and the Arab world, as well as Jewish activists in Palestine began talking and writing about the national conflict. Towards the end of 1918, Palestine came under British rule, which hoped that the communities would accept coexistence with its power and authority. However, with great numbers of Jews migrating from around the world to settle in Palestine with the intent to implement the Balfour Declaration to build their homeland there, violence continued to erupt between Arabs and Jews, and the British made attempts to resolve the conflict through a plan involving the partitioning of the country. The plan, however, was unappealing to both the Arabs and Jews, and the inability to find a solution acceptable to both parties, inter alia, led to British to realize that the Palestine problem was insoluble, and to withdraw while submitting it into the hands of the United Nations (UN). The UN's committee manoeuvred the UN towards a pro-Zionist partition solution, which provided the Jews with an important victory in the diplomatic war over Palestine. For the Palestinians, this marked the end of their hopes for an Arab state in the entirety of Palestine as well as the beginning of a traumatic and tragic period, while for the Jews it meant international sanction for the Jewish state, and the start of a war of independence (Pappé, 1994; Gelvin, 2014)

By the creation of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948, many new Jewish settlements were established and were inhabited by fresh waves of immigration from Europe. These were followed by other mass immigration waves into Israel throughout the years, especially from Russia and Ethiopia at the end of the 20th century. With the existence of multiple cultures, Israel has become a multilingual nation: a nation with a plethora of languages, amongst which are Israeli Hebrew, Palestinian Arabic, Russian, English and Amharic. Since the majority of the population are Israeli Hebrew speaking Jews, the most dominant language is Israeli Hebrew. Native Arabic speakers in Israel constitute the largest non-Jewish minority, making Arabic the dominant minority language in Israel. Many Arab citizens in Israel are trilingual, with Arabic as their first language, Hebrew as their second and English their third. Most Jewish citizens, however,

are bilingual, with the majority of them having Israeli as their first language and English as their second. The second chapter presents the similarities and differences between the two spoken varieties (see also Kheir, 2019).

Although Israel is multicultural in terms of its society, it is neither considered a multi-cultural civic nation state nor a bi-national state, but rather a Jewish state with a pronounced affiliation with one national community: the Jewish community. Due to the definition of the state of Israel as a Jewish State, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the lack of certain minority rights and policies, the Arab's affiliation with the Palestinians inter alia, the Arabs in Israel have had a complex relationship with the state, and were perceived as a national threat. This, in turn, made the state exempt them from compulsory military service, which prevents them from receiving certain benefits and rights that are reserved only for individuals who complete their military service. As a result, the status of the Arab citizens in Israel, alongside their language, became unsettled (Smooha, 1992; Rouhana, 1997, Amara & Mar'i, 2002).

In 1948, Hebrew was declared as the official national language and the national symbol of the state of Israel. There were two important documents that have shaped the language policy and rights in Israel: The Declaration of Independence and Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-Council. In 1948, the Israeli Declaration of Independence declared the character of Israel as a nation-state, with no less than 20 references to the national character of Israel, such as: 'Jews', the 'Jewish people', 'the Jewish state', 'every Jew', 'the Israelite people' etc. Israel is thus an ethnic nation state, with the exception of previously having two official languages rather than the one-official-language policy that characterizes most ethnic nation states. Language policies usually include issues related to the use of official language/languages, as well as minority language rights, which involve the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities. The official languages in Israel were, up until 2018, Hebrew and Arabic respectively. Examining the Israeli language law exhibits the intricate relationship between legal policy, ideology and practice, which reflect the status of Hebrew as a national symbol of Israel as a nation-state (Saban & Amara, 2002; Deutch, 2005).

While the Declaration of Independence mainly recognizes individual rights, Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-Council stipulated a language policy which recognized collective rights of ethnic groups. The British Mandate authorities made English, Arabic and Hebrew the three official languages in the Mandatory Charter in 1922. The major provisions of the status of the three languages are contained in Article 82 under the subtitle *Official Languages* (Saban & Amara, 2002; Deutch, 2005). Article 82 states that:

> All ordinances, official notices and official forms of the government and all official notices of local authorities and municipalities in areas to be prescribed by order of the High Commissioner shall be published in English, Arabic and Hebrew. The three languages may be used in debates and discussions in the Legislative Council and subject to any regulations to be made from time to time, in the government offices and the law courts.
>
> DRAYTON, 1934

Article 82 defines the obligations pertaining to the languages in which the Central government must carry out entral functions; sets down the languages in which official notices must be issued, and names the languages in which individuals would be able to access the public service of the central government. This article was adopted into the first statute enacted by the Israeli government, namely, the Law and Administration Ordinance in 1948. The ordinance incorporated into the Israeli legal system almost all the legal norms of the Mandatory rule, but abolished the supremacy that was accorded to English in Article 82. Since Hebrew was recognized as an important symbol of the national revival, it had replaced English as the dominant official language in Israel, whereas the ststus of Arabic remained secondary. With article 82 being very central and the point of departure of legal analysis pertaining to the sphere of languages in Israel, Arabic remained an official language despite the fact that the UN partition resolution did not require the preservation of its official status in the Jewish state, but only the preservation of the minority's right to use it, making its status that of a "working language". Article 82, however, goes beyond recognizing the right of the Arab minority to use its own language. It shapes a framework in which the official languages co-exist, making the government legally bound to use Arabic, and ensure access in Arabic in every branch of the central authority on all levels. However, ideology and practice had played an important role in determining the actual status of Arabic and Hebrew, and they influenced the interpretations of the previous laws, as well as the enactment of existing and future laws and case law (Saban & Amara, 2002; Deutch, 2005).

Hence, despite the previous legal status of Arabic being a second official language, there have been many questions raised regarding the palpable discrepancy between the *de facto* and *de jure* status of Arabic (Saban & Amara, 2002). Indeed, it is the case that Arabic, on a practical level, has been far from experiencing the predominance that the Hebrew language has in the Jewish state. The discrepancy is mainly evident in a variety of public contexts, amongst which are the legal system, the education system, the media broadcasting and higher education institutions, in which Arabic has not received an equal status to that

of Hebrew. According to Saban & Amara (2002), that discrepancy is due to the fact that the Supreme Court Justice declared Hebrew as the national language of Israel, thus making its supremacy salient. Additionally, neither the Mandatory nor the Israeli laws formulated a comprehensive bilingual arrangement, therefore, Arabic was not granted the full and comprehensive status of an official language. Both laws lack explicit obligations around the "officiality" and the "equal status" of the languages, and fail to provide Arabic constitutional protection, which gave rise to Hebrew being nearly the only language of Israeli civic life, and the only language which the Israeli public domain "speaks". Indeed, ideology and practice have enhanced Hebrew's superior status in Israel. And while laws may reflect a certain country's ideologies and practices, they can also influence and shape them. If Israel were to become bilingual, it would have to be preceded by bi-nationalism. However, this is a very unlikely eventuality, since the on-going Arab-Israeli conflict makes options of change extremely difficult, and in the unlikely event that the conflict will be resolved, it will most likely revolve around a "two-state solution", rather than a bi-national solution (ibid, 2002). According to Deutch (2005: 261), "the national significance of both Hebrew and Arabic has created an ideological discord which has created an unavoidable influence on the legal policy-making authorities." After all, the recognition of Arabic as equal in status to Hebrew would undermine the character of the state of Israel as a nation-state which identifies itself as Jewish and Zionist, while Arabic has been symbolically reflecting Arab nationality and identity. Thus, the significance of Arabic as a national identity clashes with the national and linguistic aspirations of Israel as the Jewish nation-state. Hence, since Arabic's legal status was not constitutionally enough protected, and in certain ways, it was grasped as a threat to axioms of the majority, the whole lingual arrangement was susceptible to abrupt alteration (Saban & Amara, 2002).

Indeed, after two unsuccessful attempts in 1952 and 1982 to make Hebrew the sole official language in Israel, the status of Arabic in Israel legally changed in mid 2018, following the enactment of the Israeli 'Nation-State Law' by the Knesset—the Israeli Parliament (see appendix 1). This law downgrades the status of Arabic from an official language into a language with a special status, a status that is currently vague, unclear and unknown, due to the fact that the particulars of this status are left to future regulations. Under Article 4, entitled 'Language', the law specifically asserts that:

(a)   Hebrew is the State language.
(b)   The Arabic language has a special status in the State; arrangements regarding the use of Arabic in state institutions or vis-à-vis them will be set by law.

(c)   Nothing in this article shall affect the status given to the Arabic language before this law came into force (Kenesset, 2018, Unofficial translation by Dr. Sheila Hattis Rolef).

According to Yadgar (2020), this amounts to the national demotion or exclusion of Arabic. The undermining-in-practice of Arabic is part of a continuing trend in which Arabic has been perceived as the enemy's language, and as such, threatening the status of Hebrew and the State of Israel. Although Israel had not passed a previous law specifying the state's official languages that were identified by the British mandatory law (English, Arabic and Hebrew), Arabic has historically been described as 'official yet unrecognized', since its status has not received full application in the Israeli public sphere (Mendel et al, 2016; Yadgar, 2020). Since the previous legal status of Arabic has not been constitutionally protected and it might have been "grasped as a serious threat to axioms of the majority community", the entire lingual arrangement has made it relatively easily altered (Saban & Amara, 2002: 5). Hebrew, consequently, became the sole official language in the state. The status of Arabic in Israel, on the other hand, has gone through a similar process to the semiotic process of *erasure*. Irvine and Gal (2000), who have documented this process of linguistic ideology, describe it as a process in which elements go unnoticed or get explained away or in extreme cases, where they fit some alternative threatening picture, are eradicated in case they do not fit the ideological scheme. Such 'problematic' elements must be either ignored or transformed or acted against in order to remove the threat. Although the process of *erasure* has to do less with policy and more to do with the practices of downplaying linguistic features which might blur the boundaries between languages, it does have policy causes and implications. By "erasing" or "eroding" Arabic's status as a co-official language, not only does it cause its national exclusion as a repository of heritage, culture and identity, but also makes the primacy of Hebrew much more evident, and manifests the ideology of the fusion of the exiles, the melting pot according to which the different communities of Jewish immigrants are integrated in one socially and culturally unified nation grounded in Hebrew, the national language and carrier of all Jewish legacies (Ben-Rafael & Brosh, 1991). As Yadgar (2020: 82) points out, the political tension surrounding Israel's 'Jewish identity' "has culminated in a legislative initiative to formulate a constitutional anchoring of this identity through the passing of a basic law that would enshrine Israel's identity as *the* Jewish nation-state".

The basic law, which is parallel to a constitutional amendment, has resulted in tremendous disgruntlement, especially among the Arab and Druze minorities. A plethora of scholarly and non-scholarly critics have deemed the law dangerous, undemocratic, racist and discriminatory against the country's non-

Jewish citizens, leaving a great number of them dismayed and with a sense of being tagged as second-class, inferior Israeli citizens. Several critics perceive the law as carrying dangerous political and legal ramifications, particularly regarding the status and rights of the Israeli Arab citizens (see Abulhawa, 2018; Barzilai, 2020; Ben-Youssef & Tamari, 2018; Hass, 2018; Jabareen, 2018; Jamal, 2018; Jabareen & Bishara, 2019; Jamal, 2019; Lustig, 2020; Waxman & Peleg, 2020: Yadgar, 2020). The law is mainly construed as a threat to democratic rights and values, as well as a trigger which deepens discrimination between the Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Israel, since it exhibits explicit bias toward the Jews, and constitutes a serious impediment to achieving equality for the Arab and Druze indigenous minorities. Their protests are particularly based on the fact that the law asserts that "the Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established (Article 1. A)," and that "the exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people (Article 1. C)". It also establishes "the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and strengthening (Article 7)". It is argued that the law changes the definition of Israel, disregards democracy, and prioritizes the Jewish elements over the democratic ones by prioritizing and accentuating the Jewish character of the state, and violating the democratic right to equal citizenship. Of particular concern and controversy is Article 1. C., which is regarded as a contradiction between the notion of democracy and granting exclusive rights of national self-determination to the Jewish people, hence excluding the one-fifth of the population who constitute substantial indigenous minorities, and transforming them into citizens of a state that denies them the right to claim it as their national home. Critics have also been overtly angered by the stripping of Arabic of its status as a co-official language, which marks the beginning of the erasure of the Arabic language in Israel. Arabic is a repository of the Arab minority's culture, heritage and identity, and downgrading its status inevitably results in downgrading the status of its speakers and their culture. Furthermore, decreeing Hebrew to be the sole official language of the state while demeaning Arabic's status to a "special status" accentuates the division of the Israeli citizens into two types: first-class citizens who are the exclusive owners of the state and native speakers of the "superior" language; and second-class citizens who are alienated from their own homeland and the character of the state as they are the speakers of the "inferior" language (Abulhawa, 2018; Ben-Youssef & Tamari, 2018; Hass, 2018; Jabareen, 2018; Jabareen & Bishara, 2019; Jamal, 2018; Kenesset, 2018-Unofficial translation by Dr. Sheila Hattis Rolef; Jamal, 2019; Kheir, chapter 4).

The new demeaned status of Arabic and the indigenous minorities in Israel carries strong implications for the language and its speakers, which, as has been found in the fifth chapter, which examines the law's initial impact upon some participants from the Israeli Druze community, results in an inevitable gradual construction of an alternate collective identity and sense of belonging.

Language change, however, is not merely the result of the status of Arabic in Israel, but more so, of the ongoing language contact situation in Israel between the Arabic speaking communities and the Hebrew speaking community. The Arabs and Druze in Israel experience relatively intensive interaction with the Jewish people, thus experience ongoing language contact with Israeli Hebrew speakers and their culture. Such interaction mainly takes place at work, higher education institutions, public centres and institutions and, for almost all Druze males and some Arab volunteers, in the military. This language contact situation, alongside sociopolitical motivations, has brought about different linguistic practices among the different Arabic speaking communities, as is illustrated in the fourth and fifth chapters of this book. In cases where intensive language contact exists, the native language will be heavily impacted. As has been found, mainly in the second and third chapters (see Kheir, 2019; 2022), in certain Arabic speaking communities (such as the Druze, Bedouins and some Arabs residing in Jewish or Arab/Jewish mixed cities), such language contact situations result in inevitable language enrichment and change.

In order to understand the sociopolitical motivation for codeswitching, it is essential to understand the sociopolitical background of the communities in practice; therefore, the next sections explore some basic aspects of the Druze in general, and the Arab and Druze communities in Israel.

1.1.4 The Druze: An Overview

The Druze religion is a monotheistic secretive closed religion that emerged in 1017 under the Fatimid caliphate rule in Egypt, and closed its "gates" to new believers in 1043. Ever since, proselytizing has been forbidden. A common belief among the Druze is that the faith existed much earlier than its formal revelation in 1017, which coincides with the existence of the Druze prophets dating back to Biblical times (Kheir, 2019). It is perceived as an ancient belief in one God that existed in secret for many years, as its believers lived among various peoples without revealing their identity. The faith was publicly declared by the main and central figure of the Druze faith—the Caliph Al-Ḥakim bi-Amr Allah (Arabic: The ruler by command of the Deity), who is perceived by the believers as the divine manifestation of the Deity, though not the Deity itself. According to the Druze faith which endorses the belief in theophany, God revealed himself several times in human form, with the last revelation being in the form of

Al-Ḥakim bi-Amr Allah (ibid, 2019). According to Druze sources, the training of missionaries prepared the ground thoroughly for the establishment of *dīn at-tawḥīd* (the Unitarian Religion) long before 1017, and prior to its disclosure, it had many followers (Makarem, 1980; Firro, 1992).

From a religious perspective, the Druze are divided into *ʕuqqal*/ARAB/PL '(religiously) wise' (*ʕaqel*=SGM, *ʕaqela*=SGF) and *Juhhal*/ARAB/PL '(religiously) ignorant' (*Jahel*= SGM, *Jahela*= SGF). The *ʕuqqal* are the religious and highly revered amongst the two groups and have restricted access to the holy book. Someone who is *Jahel* can turn into *ʕaqel* after undergoing a series of tests and ethical requirements. The *shuyukh* 'religious leaders/chiefs' (*sheikh*= SGM, *sheikha*= SGF) constitute the religious leadership of the community in each locality with a Druze population. However, there is one chief religious figure for all the Druze, who enjoys the title *ar-raʔīs ar-rūḥī* 'the spiritual leader'. The spiritual leadership in Israel has been hereditary in the Tʕarīf[2] family from the village of Julis in the Galilee. The Druze people are called *Al-Muwaḥidūn*, that is, the Unitarians, or those who seek oneness (from the root WHD, meaning to be one). They are mainly concentrated in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, while the rest are scattered across the different continents worldwide. Their total population worldwide is less than one million (Kheir, 2019).

The Druze religion is secretive in the sense that its holy book—*Kitab al-Ḥikma* 'the book of wisdom', which was scripted in the 11th century by the principle missionary of the faith—Ḥamza Ibn ʔAli Ibn Aḥmad az-Zawzanī alongside Al-Ḥakim and Bahaʔ al-Dīn, is held secret from everyone except for the highly religious Druze men and women. The style of the epistles reflects the notion of esotericism of the faith that endow scriptures with subtle interpretations. Therefore, in case these were to fall into the wrong hands, their true meaning will be concealed from uninitiated readers. Thus, since the religion and faith are the essence of the Druze, finding out about them without prior know-

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2   Sheikh Mhanā Muḥammad Tʕarīf had initiated the reconstruction of An-Nabi Shuʔayb's *maqām* (the prophet Shuʔayb's shrine) in the 1880s, and as a result lent reverence to the family's spiritual authority. His brother, Sheikh Tʕarīf Muḥammad Tʕarīf was appointed *qāḍī* of the Druze community by the Ottoman authorities at the end of the 19th century. When the later died in 1928, his son Salmān Tʕarīf was appointed as the head of the Druze community, and was considered by the Druze *ʕuqqal* as *ar-raʔīs az-zamanī* (the temporal leader), and Sheikh Amin Tʕarīf as *ar-raʔīs ar-rūḥī* (the spiritual leader). Therefore, Tʕarīf family's paramountcy as the religious leaders was formally recognized. Owing to Sheikh Amin Tʕarīf's personality and the esteem in which he was held, he was regarded as the preeminent spiritual leader of all the Druze in the world. Sheikh Amin Tʕarīf was always openly lawyal to the Israeli government. After his death in 1993, his grandson, Sheikh Muwaffaq Tʕarīf was appointed as his successor and remains to the present day the spiritual leader of the community (Betts, 1988; Firro, 1992; Dana, 2003).

ledge of the foundations of their faith is a difficult task. In addition, research and publications about the Druze are relatively limited, and those that have been published should be critically assessed in terms of their reliability. For instance, there have been several cases in which Muslim and pro-Islamic rese=achers attempted to describe them as co-religionists, presenting distorted facts to portray them as Arabs or Muslims. In reality, however, the Druze have been prosecuted by the Muslims throughout history in the Middle East, and there-fore, have been unable to express themselves freely and kept certain aspects that separate them from the Muslims in secret. They followed the principle of *taqiyya* (dissimulation, prudence; from the root WQY-to guard/preserve)-a prin-ciple of adjusting behaviour and faith in accordance with the faith of the people controlling them for self-preservation. The Druze, thereby, acted as Muslims from the outside (*azˤ-zˤāher* 'the apparent') and as Druze from the inside (*al-bātˤen* 'the internal/concealed'). (Alamuddin & Starr, 1980; Betts, 1988; Firro, 1992; Falah, 2000; Dana, 2003; Kheir, 2019). Such behaviour, in many aspects, resembles that of the Anusim—the coerced Jews who were forced to give up their religion or live in disguise in Europe throughout history.

Furthermore, the vast majority of the Druze people do not perceive them-selves as Muslims or having any Muslim affinity. Moreover, the Druze faith clashes with the pillars of Islam (*arkán al-islám*) which each Muslim has to abide by, in the following manner:

(i)   The *shahada* (testimony/declaration): part of the *shahada* testifies to the Islamic prophet Muḥammad as being the messenger of God (*Muḥammad rasūl Allah*), whereas according the Druze faith, God exists alone, having no partner (*waḥdahu, lā sharīkan lahu*). The Druze separate themselves from Islam irrevocably by maintaining that the revelations of Al-Ḥakim bi-Amr Allah convey the ultimate truth, and not those pertaining to the prophet Muḥammad.

(ii)   The *sˤalāh* (prayer): according to this principle, the Muslims are obligated to five prayers a day, whereas the Druze are not obligated to any. However, the *ˤuqqal*, though not the *Juhhal*, conduct simple services of worship on Thursday and Sunday evenings in their place of prayer called *al-khelwa* (the sanctum/ the conclave).

(iii)   The *zakāh* (alms-giving): each Muslim has to pay a religious obligation or tax based on accumulated wealth, whereas the Druze have no practices resembling that. They are not expected nor demanded to donate.

(iv)   The *sˤawm* (fasting): while the Muslims are obligated to fast during the entirety of the *ramadˤan* month, the Druze are not obligated to fast at all. The Druze are free from all dogmatic obligations, whether they are literal or allegorical.

(v)   The *ħajj* (pilgrimage): the Muslims are required to follow the command-
       ment of pilgrimage to Mecca—Saudi Arabia, the holiest city for Muslims,
       which is a mandatory religious duty that each Muslim has to carry out
       at least once in their lifetime if their circumstances permit. The Druze,
       however, do not follow such a principle and do not acknowledge Mecca
       as a holy city. (Arberry, 1969; Asaad, 1974; De McLaurin, 1979; Betts, 1988;
       Falah, 2000; Dana, 2003)

Additionally, the Druze do not believe in angels, as opposed to Muslims. Ac-
cording to Islam, it is believed that the Islamic prophet Muḥammad has been
visited by the angel Jibrīl (Gabriel)—who revealed to him the Qurʾan, in a cave
called Ħira, which is located on a mountain called an-Nūr near Mecca (Weir et
al, 2012). Moreover, the Druze avoid worship of sanctified stones, whereas the
Muslims worship the Kaʾba (cube)—the black stone of Mecca. Furthermore,
polygamy, concubinage and temporary marriages which are allowed according
to Islam, are strictly forbidden in Druzism.

    Instead of the five pillars of Islam, Ħamza Ibn ʾAli Ibn Aḥmad az-Zawzanī
formulated the seven duties, known as *ash-shurūtˤ as-sabʾa*, which each Druze
has to observe:

(i)   Sˤidq al-lisān (having a truthful tongue): the Druze have to be careful of
       what they utter; keep their promises; admit wrongdoing; keep secrets;
       bear their pain with restraint; refrain from gossip etc. However, if a Druze
       faces danger presented by religious persecution, he/she is allowed to act
       according to the principle of *taqiyya* and to outwardly deny his faith.

(ii)   Ħifzˤ al-ikhwān (protection of the bretheren): the Druze have to exhibit
       solidarity with other Druze in times of distress, struggle, war etc., protect
       their honour and property, speak their praise and assist all Druze in need
       wherever they may be.

(iii) Tark ʾibadat al-ʾadam wal-buhtān (abandoning worship of the occult and
       falsehood): the Druze have to avoid worship of idols, sanctified stones,
       graven images etc.

(iv)   Al-barāʾa min al-abalesa watˤ-tˤuуyān (repudiation of the devils and
       forces of evil): the Druze have to observe acts of virtue and refrain from
       acts of evil by which they push the evils of the devil away.

(v)   Tawħīd al-Mawla fī kull ʾasr wa-zamān (belief in the uniqueness and one-
       ness of the Lord in every era and at all times): the Druze are required to
       believe in Al-Ħakim bi-Amr Allah who embodied the last divine revela-
       tion, and his faith *dīn at-tawħīd* (the Unitarian Religion) in all cycles and
       times.

(vi)   Al-ridˤā bi-fiʾlihī kaifa ma-kān (acquiescence in his deeds whatever they
       may be): the Druze are required to accept anything that comes from God,

the ills as the good. One should never question God's way and should accept all his deeds with grace.

(vii) At-taslīm li-Amrihī fī al-Sirr wal-Ḥadthān (absolute submission to his concealed and apparent decrees): the Druze must be submissive to God's will and observe total faith in their fate, which is predetermined by God's decree and cannot be altered in any way, shape or form. (Abu Izzeddin, 1984; Betts, 1988; Firro, 1992; Dana; 2003).

In addition to the belief in theophany that marks the Druze as theologically distinct from the Muslims, the belief in reincarnation, or transmigration of the souls which is nonexistent in Islam, is profoundly ingrained in the Druze faith. According to Druzism, all souls were created at once, with an eternal fixed number. The souls are paramount, and since the body perishes, it acts as a *qamīsˤ* (garment) that embodies the soul, therefore, the word for transmigration is *taqammusˤ*. Upon death, the soul passes from the deceased person to a newborn baby instantly by a system of metempsychosis, and is unable to pass to nonhumans. Furthermore, males can only reincarnate as males and females as females. The soul of a Druze can only pass to a body of a Druze anywhere in the world. It is believed that transmigration of the souls enables them to experience various conditions and circumstances, such as: liberality and tyranny, war and peace, wealth and poverty, health and sickness etc. Consequently, every person experiences balanced occurrences until Judgment Day, in which each person is equally judged in accordance with his deeds in all incarnations combined. Many people attribute the exceptional bravery of the Druze to this belief, as there had been many cases in which little children *natˤaqu* (uttered), that is, they remebered and told their current families at the time detailed accounts of their previous lifetimes with exact locations and names, and these were later confirmed by their families or acquantances from their previous lives. Many even managed to go to their previous homes and visit acquaintances from their past lives. There were also cases in which little children maintained certain talents, languages, characteristics or scars from past lives. Although reincarnation has not been scientifically proven, its notion does conform to the first law of thermodynamics, according to which energy cannot be created nor destroyed, it can only transform or change its state.

As for the origins of the name Druze, there are various theories and speculations, with the commonly accepted one that it derives from one of the principle founders of the Druze *daʾwa* (mission/divine call)—the persian missionary Nashtakīn ad-Darazi. Ad-Darazi worked closely with Ḥamza Ibn ʾAli Ibn Aḥmad az-Zawzanī who co-wrote the Druze religious manuscripts known as *rasaʾil al-Ḥikma* (The Epistles of Wisdom). However, after a while a split arose between Ḥamza and ad-Darazi regarding the nature of bringing people into

the faith, as a result, Ad-Darazi was perceived as a divisive force in the faith and a heretic. Therefore, many Druze refute this theory. Another speculation stems from the Crusader times which portray the Druze as descendants of a French Count of Dreux who fled into the mountains of Lebanon with his soldiers, and afterwads built habitations and to honour their chief, they called themselves Druses. According to Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, who lived in Mount Lebanon for twenty years during the upheavals following the collapse of the Shihabo dynasty and the Egyptian rule, on the one hand, some Druze ʕuqqal said that the name Druze is derived from Arabic *Durs* (clever/industrious), which is characteristic of them. On the other hand, other ʕuqqal claimed that the name is actually derived from Arabic *Turs* (shield), owing to the times of the Crusades where they were selected to watch and defend the line of coast from Beirut to Sidon. A more recent speculation made by the Lebanese historian, Kamal Salibi, is that the origins of the name Druze stem from a pre-Islamic tribe called Banu Darrīza who resided in a place near Mecca prior to the emergence of Islam, and might have moved from there to Syria (Green, 1736; Churchill, 1862; Ethelson & Manzella, 1984; Betts, 1988; Firro, 1992; Falah, 2000).

Although the Druze faith is influenced by various doctrines such as Christianity, Judaism, Isma'ilism, Gnosticism, Buddhism and Pythagoreanism among others, its concept of creation specifically follows Neoplatonism. God created from his light Universal Intelligence, known as *al-ʾaql el-kullī*. With its supreme position, the *ʾaql* became proud and therefore, it was followed by the revelation of the Adversary, known as *adʕ-dʕedʕ*. Consequently, God created from the light of the *ʾaql* his partner, the Universal Soul, known as *an-nafs el-kulliyya*, to help fight against the *dʕedʕ*. From the *nafs*, emanated the Word, known as *al-kalima*—which created the Antecedent, known as *as-sābeq*, which brought about the creation of the Follower, known as *at-tāli*. Subsequently, God created the earth, spheres and elements. Man was created three hundred and forty-three million years later (Firro, 1992; Falah, 2000). The aforementioned cosmic principles, namely the Intelligence, Soul, Word, Antecedent and Follower, became known in the Druze faith as *al-khams ħdūd* 'the five luminaries/spiritual dignitaries'. Each dignitary is colour coded in the following manner:

(i)   Green: *al-ʾaql*, the cosmic intellect; which represents the intellect necessary to understanding what is real and true—known as Nous in Neoplatonism.

(ii)   Red: *an-nafs*, the universal soul; which represents an intrinsic connection between all living things on the planet—known as Anima mundi in Neoplatonism.

(iii) Yellow: *al-kalima*, the word; which represents the truth—known as Logos in Neoplatonism.

(iv) Blue: *as-sābeq*, the antecedent; which represents the importance of possibilities that become real when the conditions are right and nothing stops them. It is also perceived to represent the former revelation of God in the figure of al-Ḥakim—known as Potentiality in Neoplatonism.

(v) White: *at-tāli*, the follower; which represents the manifestation of the divine in the mundane world in the future. It is believed to represent the following revelation of God in the form of al-Ḥakim which will take place on Judgement Day. This virtue is equivalent to Immanence in Neoplatonism.

These virtues take the shape of five different luminaries which have been continuously reincarnated in the mundane world as prophets and philosophers who came down to teach humans the true path to God and faith. With them, however, came five other individuals, *adˤ-dˤedˤ*, who would lead people astray. One of the main prophets who took the shape of *al-ʾaql* was the prophet Shuʾayb (Jethro), who reincarnated at the time of Moses. An-Nabi Shuʾayb's maqām (shrine) is located in Israel. These virtues, prophets, and their corresponding colours are represented in the Druze star and flag, which became the emblem of the Druze identity.

1.1.5 The Arabs and Druze in Israel

Arab citizens in Israel are non-Jewish Israeli citizens who are ethnically and culturally identified as Arabs. Most Israeli Arabs[3] are functionally bilingual, their first language being Palestinian Arabic and their second being Israeli Hebrew (for the similarities and differences between the two spoken varieties, see chapter 2). The Israeli Arab citizens are Muslims and Christians who share a national Palestinian identity, origin and belonging. They are Palestinian in their national affiliation and identity, and Israeli in their civil identity. They have not become part of the Israeli-Zionist-Jewish political texture, but they are also not a fundamental organ of the Palestinian entity in the territories, although they mostly share the values of their Palestinian brothers in the Palestinian territories (Bligh, 2013). There is a significant debate, however, as to whether or not the Druze people are considered Arabs. Practically, the Druze people in Israel have their own distinct sector, separate from that of the Arabs. As an integral part

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3 Although many of the Arabs in Israel prefer not to identify as 'Israeli Arabs' but rather as 'Palestinians' or 'Palestinians in Israel', I refer to them as 'Israeli Arabs' in this book solely for the purpose of not confusing the reader whose connotation of Palestinians might be that of the Arabs residing in the Palestinian territories.

of their traditional and religious values, the Druze hold loyalty to the state in which they reside by adopting state ideologies, affiliations, identity and nationalism. Therefore, the Druze community has gone through a process of gaining a distinctive political and national identity, one that is totally different from the Israeli Arabs. Prior to 1962, all of the communities in the Arab sector, namely the Druze, Christians and Muslims, were legally counted as Arabs. In 1962, however, Israel took a major identity replacement step for the Druze, changing their nationality from 'Arab' to 'Druze', both on their birth certificates and their identity cards, while all the rest were still legally regarded as 'Arabs' (Firro, 2001; Halabi 2006). In addition to granting the Druze people independent status as a community and a distinctive political and national identity, they were also granted an independent education system, separate from that of the Arabs, thus encouraging the creation of a 'Druze and Israeli' consciousness through education. According to Firro (2001), in the early 1970s efforts were made to create an "Israeli-Druze consciousness" through education, in order to counteract a process of "Arabization" among the Druze youth. This consciousness became actualized when the Druze curriculum had been completely separated from the Arab one, creating a distinctive Druze education system (discussed in more detail in the fourth chapter). Moreover, in a *Nature* scientific report that investigated the genetic relationships between Israeli Druze and modern and ancient populations, Marshall et al (2016) show that the Druze exhibit a high affinity to their ancient Armenian and Turkish ancestry. Furthermore, their DNA study shows that the Druze people possess a significantly larger amount of ancient Armenian ancestry (79%) and significantly smaller ancient Levantine ancestry (14.9%) compared with other Levantine populations (36.07%–69.75%), especially Palestinian and Lebanese populations. Another scientific report published by Schaffer et al (2018) shows a genetic link between the Ashkenazi Jews and Druze, consistent with other published research employing whole genome data, which report on high genetic similarities between European Jews and Druze, who share similar Turkish-Caucasus origins (See: Atzmon et al, 2010; Behar et al, 2010; Elhaik, 2013).

The total number of the Arab community in Israel is 1,956,000,[4] which constitutes around 21.1% of Israel's total population, and that of the Druze community in Israel, including the Druze of the Golan Heights, is 145,000,[5] which constitutes approximately 1.6% of Israel's total population (CBS, 2020a; 2020b). Israeli Arabs and Druze mostly reside in the same localities or in adjacent

4   Data supplied by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics on 31 December 2020.
5   Data supplied by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics on 23 April 2020.

ones. According to Amara and Mar'i (2002), the Israeli Arabs are considered a sociological minority due to the fact that they do not have representation in the political, economic and military elites and are perceived as citizens whose loyalty to Israel is questionable. The Druze, however, exhibit a different reality by having a plethora of such types of representation and are perceived as extremely loyal and patriotic. In contrast with Arab Christians and Muslims, young Druze males are subject to compulsory military service. According to Smooha (1992), the authorities regard the Arabs as potentially disloyal and anti-Israel and, as such, exempt them from compulsory military service. However, many Bedouins, who also enjoy a separate status from the Arab community, as well as a small number of Christians, enlist in Israel Defense Forces (the IDF) on a voluntary basis.

The primary factor differentiating between Israeli Druze and Israeli Arabs is political. According to Rouhana (1997: 8) "most of the Arabs in Israel define themselves as Palestinians in Israel even when they have the option to choose other self-definitions, such as Israeli Palestinians or Israeli Arabs." The psychological component of identity, which encompasses attachment to the political system, loyalty, pride and inclusion, comes to the fore. Since Israel is officially defined in exclusive ethnic terms as the state of the Jewish people, which drastically affects the collective identities of its Arab and Jewish populations, many criticise its policies and practices as undemocratic and discriminatory. In practice, the Arabs in Israel have voting rights and use democratic means in electing their representatives to the Knesset, enjoy freedom of expression and a press through which they freely criticise Israel's policies and practices, and enjoy equal social services to a certain extent with the rest of Israel's citizens. Israel, however, has a unique deep security need and since its establishment has felt that it is a state under siege, with its foremost enemy being the Palestinians. Therefore, if the Arabs emphasize their Arab and Palestinian identities, it would be perceived as promoting the identity of the state's enemy (ibid, 1997). According to Smooha (1992), the Arabs tend to be seen as a hostile minority as they are sympathetic to the enemy and reject crucial aspects of the fundamental ideology of the Israeli regime, including the implementation of its national goals for the Jewish people and its stance in the dispute with the Arab world and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, most Israeli Arabs would not side with Israel in times of crisis, rather, with their brothers in the Palestinian territories, aka, "the enemy". During the two waves of Palestinian violence in the territories (1987–1992, 2000–2005), Israeli Arabs as a community sided with the Palestinians, and even helped them with outbursts of violence against Israel, showing opposition to their country in both non-violent and violent ways (Bligh, 2013).

This situation might be a major force hindering the inclusion of the Arabs within the state's goals and their integration into the power structure. This, in turn leaves the Arabs in Israel with a sense of exclusion from the state power structure and its identity, and develops their collective identity in reaction to the powerful social and political forces emanating from the state, region, and from within themselves. Thus, the accentuated Palestinian dimension of the identity of the Arab citizens in Israel is, in part, due to the fact that they have been excluded from the state's identity. Therefore, such accentuation is an act of compensation for deprivation of the Israeli identity and sense of belonging to the state. In other words, since most Arab citizens do not have a meaningful Israeli identity, they developed their collective self-identification as "Palestinians in Israel" as a reflection of the political reality and a collective response to their exclusion. This acts as a coping mechanism with the complexities of the political system and their complicated status as formal, yet alienated, not belonging citizens of their own state (Rouhana, 1997).

Most of the Druze people (around 97%), however, do not identify with the narrative of Palestine resonant among the Israeli Arabs (Radai et al, 2015). Even in as early as the 1930s, all the efforts that were made to recruit the Druze in the Galilee and the Carmel to the "Palestinian Cause" had been completely met with failure. Moreover, since at the beginning of the first Palestinian revolt in 1936, the Druze took a neutral position and were suspected to have pro-Zionist sentiments, mainly due to certain Druze-Jewish political cooperation at the time, the Palestinian rebels were aggravated by this and carried out collective punishments of the Druze including tortures and murders of prominent Druze personalities, robbing and destroying their houses, desecrating their holy books, beating Druze women and children, and raping Druze women (Azrieli & Abu-Rukon, 1989: 58–59; Dana, 2003: 11). These acts inflamed the Druze in Palestine as well as Lebanon and Syria and led many Druze to cooperate with the Jews during the upheavals and to favour the Jews (Azrieli & Abu-Rukon, 1989; Firro, 1992; Dana, 2003). This detachment from the Palestinian theme continues to the present day. Since the Druze are regarded as the most loyal of all the Arabic-speaking communities, especially due to their compulsory service in the IDF, there are many Muslim and Christian Palestinians who thoroughly resent their cooperation and mistrust them, especially those in the Palestinian territories where they are perceived as collaborators. As a result, they suffer from many acts of violence against them (Betts, 1988). Such acts further their detachment from the Palestine cause. Moreover, according to Nisan (2010), the Druze are opposed to the Arab political call proposing the nullification of Israel as a Jewish state and reconstructing it as a democratic, bilingual and cultural state denoting bi-nationalism and equality

between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish people of Israel, as proposed in Arab political manifestos by the Legal Centre for Arab Minority rights in Israel. Instead, the Druze perceive themselves as loyal, patriotic citizens who abide by the Israeli Declaration of Independence and accept Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state. There are, nonetheless, exceptions, such as "The Arab-Druze Initiative Committee" and "The Free Sons of Grace", which identify with the Palestinian cause and oppose the compulsory conscription of the Druze in the Israeli Defense forces; however, they are marginal and unable to attract sufficient support among the Israeli Druze since the majority of the Druze do not perceive themselves as Palestinians, do not have any connections or ties to the Palestinian people unlike the Arabs, and take action against the Palestinians in the territories as part of their duty in the IDF and other security services (Nisan, 2010; Zeedan, 2019). The exceptional groups' identity would therefore count ideologically as the marked choice or highly recognizable in relation to the opposing majority, which therefore, would have sociolinguistic implications (discussed in more detail in chapter 4).

Researchers such as Nisan (2010), Bligh (2013), Brake (2019), Zeedan (2019) and Shanan & Eilat (2021) continue to stress the disparity of Druze national political identification versus that of the Israeli Arabs by illustrating voting patterns and party preferences in Israeli elections that unequivocally substantiate that 'Druze vote for Jews, and the Arabs vote for Arabs (Nisan, 2010:585).' According to Shanan & Eilat's reasearch[6] (2021), the quantitative data and the long-term voting trends among the Druze in the Knesset elections show that the majority of the Druze voters have been favouring the Jewish parties over the Arab parties at least since 1996 when it became possible to vote separately for the parties. Labor was the dominant party in the Druze community until 1999. The identification of the Israeli Druze with the Labor movement began with the Haganah organization and the Histadrut labor union alliance, together with the Druze leadership already during the Great Arab Revolt in 1936–1939. The minority parties, such as the Democratic List for Israeli Arabs, Kidma ve'Pituah (Progress and Development) and Shituf VeAhva (Cooperation and Brotherhood), often included a Druze member of Knesset (MK) (Jaber Mo'adi or Labib Abu Rukun) in the period between 1951 and 1977. Although the

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6   Their research is based on a quantitative analysis of the ballot box results in ten localities with a Druze majority in Israel: Daliyat al-Carmel, Yarka, Beit Jann, Hurfeish, Kisra-Sumei, Yanuh-Jatt, Peki'in, Julis, Sajur and Ein al-Asad. The percentage of the Druze in these localities is 95% or higher. The villages of Maghar (proportion of Druze—57%) and Isfiya (proportion of Druze—75%) were not included because of the different voting patterns of the relatively large Muslim and Christian minorities living there and due to the inability to differentiate between the ballot boxes with certainty. Towns with a Druze minority, such as Shfar'am, Abu Snan, Rameh and Kfar Yasif, were not included for the same reason.

Likud party included Druze MKs starting from 1977 (Amal Nasaraldin and As'ad As'ad), the Labor party was still the dominant party in the community. In the 1996 elections, the Labor party had the largest number of votes in almost all of the Druze localities, with the rate ranging from one-third to one-half of the total votes (Shanan & Eilat, 2021).

The right-wing Zionist parties such as Kadima and Yisrael Beitenu added Druze candidates to their lists in the 1990s, and as a result, received a lot of support from the Druze community. In 2006, MK Majalli Wahabi was added to the Kadima list after leaving the Likud. He was on its list in 2009 as well and was joined by MK Akram Hasson (who was added to the Kulanu party in 2015). In 2009, Hamad Amar joined Avigdor Liberman's Yisrael Beitenu party. In those elections, six Druze MKs were elected along with candidates from Labor (Shakib Shanan), the Likud (Ayub Kara) and Balad (Said Nafa). Hence, Druze representation in the Knesset reached a peak of six MKs, which exceeded their proportion in the general population (Brake, 2019; Shanan & Eilat, 2021).

Although constituting a minority, there is a stable core of voters in the Druze community which supports the Arab parties that have included Druze candidates in their lists (for example, in Hadash: Mohammad Nafa, 1990–1992; Abdallah Abu Marouf, 2015–2017; and Jaber Asakla 2019–2021, and in Balad: Said Nafa, 2007–2013). However, "the political viewpoints promoted by the Arab parties (which make up the Joint Arab List) are unattractive to most Druze voters" (Shanan & Eilat, 2021: 10). The proportion of votes won by the non-Zionist parties rose from 9.58% in 1996 to 17% in 2013. Despite the creation of the Joint Arab List in the 2015 elections, which included Abdallah Abu Marouf from Yarka, the Druze support rate for the non-Zionist parties fell to 15%, and following its breakup, it fell to a low of 3.75% in the 2019 elections. Later in 2020, following the recreation of the Joint Arab List, the Druze support rate rose to 11.5%, similar to the support rate to Hadash, Balad and Ra'am combined in 1999.

According to Shanan & Eilat (2021), the downward trend in voter turnout among the Druze community and the low rate of support for the Joint Arab List are in fact an indication of the tight bond between the Druze society and the State of Israel. In sharp contrast to most of the Arab population in Israel, the Druze do not face the dilemma of joining the government and do not consider certain radical messages of the Joint Arab List as relevant. The fact that even following the passage of the Nation-State Law by the Knesset in 2019, the Druze support for the Arab parties dropped to a low of 3.75%, is a clear indication that the the Joint Arab List's political line does not attract the Druze voters. Despite the great disappointment of the Druze with The Nation-State Law, their response in the electoral arena was manifested in their support for the Blue-White Party rather than the Joint Arab List. In the 2019 elections, Blue-White

received the largest number of votes in almost all of the Druze localities. The voting patterns of the Druze show that "they are a society in which numerous groups and individuals have a clear Druze-Israeli identity but one that is more complex than in the past" (ibid, 2021: 13).

As for the Arab sector (excluding the Druze), since 1984, the major Arab parties that have surfaced were the United Arab List (UAL), the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) and the National Democratic Assembly (NDA, Balad). In addition, since 1999 the Arab voting pattern reflected the niche of each one of the parties, as each party attracted a different voting constituency, such as: the radical Muslim, the Palestinian and the pan-Arab, and joint Jewish–Arab representation. In 2006, the UAL sent four members to parliament after forming a coalition between Muslim and Palestinian ideologies. The list was based upon the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), formed by the former MK Abd al-Wahhab Darawshe (MK 1984–1999), who left the Labour party following the Palestinian uprising in 1988. After leaving Labour, Darawshe made the ADP party a coalition-type alignment within a defined political framework: Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims. Ever since, the ADP sent one member to the 11th Knesset (1988) and the 12th Knesset (1988–1992); two members to the 13th Knesset (1992–1996); four members to the 14th Knesset (1996–1999), as part of the Arab Democratic Party United Arab List; five members to the 15th Knesset (1999–2003), as the UAL; two members to the 16th Knesset (2003–2006); four members to the 17th Knesset (2006–2009), as the United Arab List–Arab Movement for Renewal; and four members to the 18th Knesset (2009), as the UAL. The Bedouin dimension was then reinforced with the addition of Talab El-Sana, a Bedouin lawyer, as the second MK of the party.

Before the 2006 elections, another alliance was initiated with the Arab Movement for Renewal led by Dr. Ahmad Tibi (MK since 1999). With that alliance, the ADP name was replaced by UAL in 1999. As of 2006 and 2009, this alliance that advocated an Israeli Arab Palestinian agenda and appealed only to Arabs attracted only Arab voters, whereas the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality which was always comprised of a majority of Arabs and a minority of Jews and advocated Palestinian issues rather than Israeli Arab issues, appealed to Arabs and some Jews. The National Democratic Assembly (NDA) was another addition to the Arab parties, and was led by Azmi Bishara (MK 1996–2007). In 1999 he ran with Ahmad Tibi, head of the Arab Movement for Renewal. Tibi has always been elected as a member of a coalition and ran after different titles such as: 'National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal'; 'Hadash-Ta'al' (DFPE and the 'Arab Movement for Renewal') and 'Ra'am-Ta'al' (UAL and the 'Arab Movement for Renewal'). (Bligh, 2013).

As opposed to the Druze, the quantitative data and the long-term voting patterns among the Arabs in the Knesset elections show that the majority of the

Arab voters have been clearly favouring the Arab parties over the Jewish parties at least since 1996, when the Israeli voter was given the option to elect a Prime Minister and parliament party in two separate votes.

In the 1996 elections, 34% of the Arab votes went to consensual parties, i.e. the Jewish-Zionist parties, whereas 68% went to the Arab parties. The 2006 and 2009 votes demonstrated the continued rise in voting for Arab parties and the continued decline in voting for Jewish-Zionist parties. In 2006, only 21.36% of the Arabs voted for Jewish-Zionist parties, whereas 78.64% voted for the Arab parties (NDA, DFPE, and UAL). In 2009, only 8.61% of the Arab votes went to the Jewish-Zionist parties, whereas 91.38% went to the Arab parties (NDA, DFPE, and UAL). It seemed that the UAL's message was the most attractive to the Arab voters in both the 2006 and 2009 elections. The party rose from third place among Arab parties in 2003 (two seats, 2.1%) to first in 2006 (four seats, 3%) and in 2009 (four seats). DFPE came second in 2006 and 2009 with three seats and four seats, respectively, after having won three seats and being first in 2003. NDA retained its three seats in all three campaigns. (Bligh, 2013).

In 2013, a total of about 27.8% of the Arab votes went for the Jewish-Zionist parties, whereas 72.2% went for the Arab parties. In 2014, a decision was made to form a joint list that unites forces of the active Arab parties. The fear that some Arab parties would not pass the threshold in the following Knesset elections influenced the parties to form an alliance in order to increase their chances of passing that threshold. The Joint List was officially established in late January 2015. The Joint List, with its leading campaign slogan *Eradat Sha'b* ('A Nation's Will'), became an expression of the Arab's self-definition as a consolidated national collective. In 2015, a total of about 16.5% of the Arab votes went for the Jewish-Zionist parties, whereas 83.5% went for the Arab Joint List. Support for the Joint List was highest in the Arab localities in the Triangle (central) region (94%), with high support in the Negev (87%), the Arab localities in the Jerusalem Corridor region (83%), and in the north (77%). The reverse picture emerged in the Druze and Circassian localities in the north, where more than 80% of the voters supported Jewish–Zionist parties. In terms of geographic areas; turnout was highest in the Triangle region and the north (between 65% and 70%), and was lowest in the Bedouin localities in the Negev (47%) (Rudintzky, 2016). In the 2019 election, 28.4% of the Arab voters supported Jewish–Zionist parties, whereas 66.3% gave their votes to the Arab parties (Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am Balad, Arab List, Hope for Change) (Rudintzky, 2019). In 2021, in the elections for the 24th Knesset, the election results for the Arab population shows that the Arab parties received 80.1% of the total Arab votes, whereas the Jewish-Zionist parties received 19.9% of the Arab votes. The Joint List was the leading party with 41.9% of Arab votes. Ra'am (UAL) came

in second place with 38.2% of the total Arab votes. Next is the Likud which won 5.2%; Meretz came in fourth place with 3.6%; Yisrael Beitenu came in fifth place with 3.3%; and Yesh Atid followed with 2.1%. The other parties each received less than 1.5% of the total Arab votes (Abu Habla, 2021).

As another sign of their assimilation in Israel, most of the Druze people do not tend to associate themselves with the Palestinian Arab identity but rather self-identify mainly as Israeli Druze, making their Israeli identity component salient, in contrast with the rest of the Arab citizens in Israel. According to research on identity affiliations of the Arabs in Israel conducted by Amara & Schnell[7] (2004), who introduce a multi-dimensional identity model, the majority of the Druze people refuse to identify as Palestinians and perceive the Palestinian identity to be totally irrelevant to their identity repertoire and 'are united in their rejection of the Palestinian identity' (p. 183). Most of them feel the same with respect to the Arab identity and attempt to integrate into the Israeli identity instead, which is assigned the highest priority alongside their Druze identity. Similar findings were demonstrated in Halabi's research (2014) and in the fourth and fifth chapters of this book. Muslims and Christians, however, almost unanimously emphasize the high salience of their Arab identity and 40 per cent of them assign the same salience to their Palestinian identity, while half of them assign the Israeli identity a moderate level of salience whereas the rest consider it either totally irrelevant or highly relevant (Amara & Schnell, 2004: 182). Not surprisingly, though, the Christians and Muslims who assign high salience to the Israeli identity are mainly Muslim Bedouins who serve in the Israeli army and Christians who live in Jaffa (Yafo)—a mixed city with a Jewish majority—factors that facilitate the desire to integrate into the Israeli society and disengage from the Palestinian theme. In support of this notion, Horesh (2015) asserts that many of the Arab Christian families in Jaffa prefer sending their children to Jewish schools rather than to Arab schools. The aforementioned identity affiliation trend was also evident in the results of the Statnet poll[8] conducted by Radai et al (2015), in which there was a noticeable difference in attitudes among the native Arabic speaking citizens of Israel. Again, the most common and best-known gap is between the Druze and the rest of the Arabic speaking community. While 71 percent of the Druze participants identified as Israeli, only 33 percent of Christians and Muslims identi-

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7 The sample consisted of 500 participants from Arab (100), Muslim (100), Bedouin (100), Druze (100), and Arab-Jewish mixed (100) localities.

8 In December 2014, Statnet conducted a comprehensive poll of the native Arabic speaking communities in Israel on several issues, such as state and society, terror, and identity. The poll included approximately 700 respondents (Radai et al, 2015).

fied as Israeli. And while 44% of Muslims and 24% of Christians identified as Palestinians, only 3% of the Druze identified as Palestinian. And while 47 percent of Muslims believed there was racism against the Arabs in Israel and 42 percent believed there was institutionalized discrimination, only 25% of Christians and 22% of the Druze believed there was racism, and 31% of Christians and 19% of the Druze believed there was institutionalized discrimination. Such results reaffirm again that "the Druze, as a community, have a much stronger attachment to Israeli identity", and that also the Christians tend to have a more positive attitude toward the Israeli state and society than Muslims (Radai et al, 2015: 107).

It is important to note that, for the Israeli Druze, the Israeli component denotes much more than a civic identity (see chapter 4): it denotes a deep connection to the state and profound sense of belonging that started with a blood covenant (*brít damím*) between the Druze and Jews prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, back in the early 20s (Azrieli & Abu-Rukon, 1989: 1). In the words of Nisan (2010: 576), "for the Druze, the Israeli identity, not just the formal citizenship, is a special communal badge that indicates that Israeli-ness sustains not only Jews but non-Jews as well". Moreover, the Druze community leaders have always been loudly supportive of the state, and although the Druze are the smallest of the country's three Arabic-speaking communities, they are "the most favored by an Israeli government that considers them to be the only Arabs who can be trusted" (Betts, 1988: xiii).

The Arabs and Druze in Israel have intensive interaction with the Jewish people, thus experience ongoing language contact with Israeli Hebrew speakers and their culture. Such interaction mainly takes place at work, higher education institutions, public centres, public institutions and for almost all Druze males and few Arab volunteers, in the military. This language contact situation, however, results in different linguistic practices among the communities that result from sociopolitical and historical contexts. Such contexts provide valuable insights into the nature of the identity affiliations and codeswitching behaviours of the different Arabic speaking communities in Israel, as is demonstrated in the fourth chapter of this book.

The Druze of the Golan Heights constitute yet another distinct community, different in certain aspects from the Israeli Druze. They are different in terms of their cultural practices, customs and habits, collective identity, level of secularism and linguistic practices. The primary factor differentiating between them, however, is ideological. While the Israeli Druze have assimilated in Israel through historic joint forces with the Jews, compulsory military service, adopting state-related ideologies, education and other domains, the Druze of the Golan Heights maintained complex relations with Israel due to a number of

socio-historical factors. A brief outline of these factors, as well as the community's linguistic practices and identity affiliations, are discussed in the fifth and final chapter of this book.

In a bilingual speech, the choice of linguistic varieties of one language over the other is of utmost importance. Such choice may reflect the speakers' desire to be seen as belonging to one group rather than the other, reflecting their identity through their speech. Codeswitching can practically index and shape the relationship between language and identity. Therefore, the next section explores the relationship between linguistic practices and identity, as well as how they influence each other.

1.1.6   Language, Codeswitching and Identity

The word 'identity' encapsulates several meanings. One of which is "to pick out as a particular person, category or example" (LePage & Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 2), in the sense that an individual can identify someone as being in a group of others, by certain idiosyncratic features. A further meaning includes the notion of recognizing a certain entity as being a part of a larger entity, in the sense that a person can identify himself or herself with a certain group, cause or a tradition. Both notions are symbiotically related in the sense that a person's idiosyncratic behaviour reflects attitudes towards certain groups, causes or traditions, while, at the same time, it is constrained by certain identifiable aspects (ibid, 1985). Identity matters in all sorts of ways in everyday life and has been applied in various fields of study. It derives from a multiplicity of sources, including age, gender, race, sexual orientation, class, generation, institutional affiliation, geopolitical locale, religion, community, society, status, ethnicity and nationality. Such sources may lead to a conflict in the construction of identity positions that could result in contradictory fragmented identities, based on one's varying positions in the world. Identity, nonetheless, provides the individual with a location in the world and presents the link between the individual and the community and social world in which s/he lives. Therefore, identities facilitate the understanding of social, cultural, economic and political changes, and can be viewed as an interface between subjective positions and cultural and sociopolitical situations. Identities are the manifestation of who we are, how we relate to others, and the ways in which we are similar to others sharing our position or different from those who have different positions. Identities can generally be marked by difference or oppositions, that is, what is not or what is the opposite; polarization, such as in the forms of national or ethnic conflict; and by inclusion or exclusion, that is, insiders versus outsiders, 'us' versus 'them'. The concept of identity is a significant marker in conflicts over cultural, religious, ethnic, racial and national differences, in which the concept of col-

lective identity has emerged as an outcome of political shaping. Identities can be viewed as 'fluid', in the sense that individuals perceive themselves differently across time and social domains; 'contested', in the sense that they are connected to power relations; and 'decentred' in the way that the individuals' sense of self is formed by many forces that make them susceptible to change under different circumstances. Reflecting on an individual's sense of self-esteem, security, pride, meaningfulness and sense of being accepted, the quest for collective identity has psychological manifestations in the need to belong to a group that shares experiences, values and destiny, and in many ways may be considered a basic human need that needs to be fulfilled. Belonging to the state, i.e. the civic collective identity, or to an ethnonational group within the state, has the potential to fulfil that need. Therefore, the emotional dimension of group belonging is of utmost importance in conceptualizing ethnonational identities. Citizens of multiethnic states share citizenship as a broader collective identity, while maintaining distinct ethnic, national, religious, or lingual identities, which might lead to conflict situations wherever there is no common and equally meaningful identity with those various ethnonational groups. (Tajfel, 1982; Weedon, 1996; Gilroy, 1997; Rouhana, 1997; Woodward, 1997).

Most experts view identities as nested, non-binary, cumulative, context-dependent, flexible and negotiated; frequently, in fact, negotiated, conveyed and regimented through language (*see* LePage & Tabouret-Keller, 1985; Weedon, 1996; Gilroy, 1997; Rouhana, 1997; Woodward, 1997; De Fina, 2016; Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). Therefore, linguistic processes are at the core of identity processes, and identity perceptions and constructions shape the deployment of linguistic resources. Since language varieties and differences can mark the boundaries of ethnic belonging among people, different linguistic elements can be created to mark differentiation of individuals and communities. Language can be used to convey and construct different types of identities, ranging from individual identities to collective identities. Therefore, while an individual may use particular language and linguistic strategies to convey something about their sense of self, language can also serve as a vehicle to construct, convey and negotiate collective identities in the sense that it can create images of groups and communities (De Fina, 2016). Hence, language is central to the production of identity and serves as the vehicle to index multiple ethnic and nationalist stances (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004).

Increased contact among people, and therefore identities, has brought about a plethora of linguistic varieties and resources through which those identities are indexed and conveyed. One such prominent contact phenomenon is codeswitching. According to Auer (2007:2), bilingual minorities may use language in order to establish their identity and have it serve as a natural link to

the community's identity. It is "the specific ways in which the majority and/or the minority language are spoken, as well as the various mixing and switching styles, which are considered to be the straightforward, 'natural' expression of the bilinguals' identity". According to Amara and Mar'i (2002), language can reflect an individual's thoughts, ideas and emotions while, at the same time, it has the power to convey his/her identity and group affiliation. Language practices, or the choices among linguistic varieties and languages accessible to a community, express social identity.

Social identity, the individual's sense of self based on group membership, is a concept that links language to the social structure of a given community. This echoes the notion of *acts of identity*, which people make within themselves and with each other, and through which "the individual creates for himself the patterns of his linguistic behaviour so as to resemble those of the group or groups with which from time to time he wishes to be identified, or so as to be unlike those from whom he wishes to be distinguished" (LePage & Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 181). In the words of Auer (2005:404), "it allows one to see inter-actants as being involved in linguistic 'acts of identity' through which they claim or ascribe group membership, or more precisely, through certain speaking styles (which usually incorporate certain linguistic 'variables')". In other words, through conversational structure (such as codeswitching and language preference), a social structure (such as identities and group membership) is constituted or changed (Gafranga, 2005).

There are two main approaches to identity: essentialist and non-essentialist. An essentialist approach would suggest that there is one clear, authentic set of characteristics shared by all members of a group, which do not change over time; whereas a non-essentialist approach posits that there are differences, as well as shared characteristics, both between members of a certain group and other groups, and that such characteristics alter across time (Woodward, 1997). According to Bucholtz & Hall (2004), identities are not only attributes of individuals and groups, but also of situations; thus identification is an ongoing social and political process. While identity work involves obscuring differences among groups with a shared identity, it also serves to highlight differences between in-group members and other groups. Thus, for instance, the creation and assertion of political identities are mainly defined by difference and underscoring the boundaries of 'us' versus 'them'. This involves the process of marking out an identity position as 'not another', or 'vis-a-vis the other', where the sameness, otherness and difference are socially marked through the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, and symbolically through representational systems. Symbolic systems present new ways of deciphering the experience of inequalities and social divisions and the means by which certain groups are

stigmatized or excluded. The language of identity is apparent when individuals work out how belonging to a group or community can become a dynamic form of solidarity, and where and how the boundaries around a group should be constituted and enforced (Gilroy, 1997; Woodward, 1997). Since language manifests the semiotic processes of practice, indexicality, ideology and performance, more often than not, this is realized through language and repetitive use of specific linguistic variables and styles that consequently symbolize and, iconically, embody the group's distinctive identity and way of being in the world (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004).

Given this notion of the interrelatedness of language, social-political situations and identity, the fourth chapter of this book examines the relationship between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity, reporting on a study of three native Palestinian Arabic speaking communities in Israel: Christian Arabs, Muslims and Druze. To emphasise the relationship between linguistic practices and collective identities, the fifth chapter examines such a link through a comparative study of the Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights, who have moved from Syrian control to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967.

1.1.7   Data Collection and Methodology

The data used in this book are based on different data sets recorded in 2000, 2017, 2018 and 2019. All the data were derived from recordings of spontaneous speech (i.e., naturally occurring conversations for which the researcher was not present). All the examples involving Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching and mixing were audio-recorded at different places in Israel including Druze villages and towns, Arab/Druze mixed villages, Arab villages, and the four different Druze towns in the Golan Heights. Each recording lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The participants were told that the researcher was conducting an ongoing linguistic research project comparing different naturally occurring conversations over time.

In addition, after recording the subjects, interviews were used to obtain subjective attitudes towards codeswitching and identity (*see* Appendix 1-Questionnaire). The questionnaires included a set of choices to choose from, as well as the option to concoct an answer. Notably, the participants were recorded two to three at a time, and were closely related (e.g., were friends, relatives, colleagues etc.). The researcher gave the participants the recording device, asked the participants to engage in a regular conversation on a topic or topics of their choice and made no mention of codeswitching or language styles. The researcher then left the room, returned to pick up the device around 60 to 90 minutes later, gave them questionnaires to fill out, left the room again and went back to

collect the questionnaires, therefore, the researcher's effect on the nature of the conversations, codeswitching, mixing styles and questionnaire responses was minimised. The researcher then asked the subjects a few questions about self-identification and their own perception of their relation to the state. The researcher shares the same L1 as the participants and had questionnaires in Arabic, translated into Hebrew, for the participants to choose from, add comments and amend to their own understanding and self-expression.

Subsequently, the study also compared the objective data collected from the spontaneous recordings to the participants' subjective responses to the questionnaires and open questions. In addition, the connection between sociopolitical identity and conversational structure (codeswitching, language preference) were examined using data from the spontaneous talk in interaction as well as the interviews. Specifically, the main examination regarding the connection between sociopolitical affiliations and codeswitching utterances was checked using the Chi-Square Test. The study examined two key variables: Codeswitching Scale and Attitude to Codeswitching. The aim was to check whether these variables depended on the type of group characterized by religion, self-identity or attitude to specific ethnicity (*see* Appendix 2-Classification and Categorization of the Questionnaire Statements). Different groups could include/exclude the Israeli component, Arab/Druze component, Palestinian component in their identity repertoire and have different attitudes (positive or negative) towards specific entities (Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli). To check if there was such significant dependence, Chi-Square Test was undertaken ($\alpha \leq 0.05$).

The participants of the study presented in the second chapter were ten Druze speakers, 6 females and 4 males, coming from different Druze villages (excluding the Golan Heights) and Arab/Druze mixed villages in Israel,[9] and their language behaviour reflected the language behaviour of the majority of the other residents in their villages. Six recordings included the same participants from the previous data set (2000). All participants were multilingual speakers, highly proficient in both Arabic and Hebrew, with Arabic occupying their L1 and Hebrew their L2. They ranged in age from 25 to 45. The speakers included 5 professionals (a TV journalist, a teacher, a shopkeeper, a manager and a customer service agent) and 5 students from different departments, at various degree levels. Switching between these languages is extremely common among the Druze community, and almost in all the Druze villages in Israel, it is considered the unmarked mode of communication.

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9   There are certain inter-village dialectal differences that are evident in the examples, however, these are not discussed in detail since they are beyond the scope of this study.

TABLE 1   Distribution of study 1 participants by gender, age, occupation and year/years of
             participation

Participant	Age	Gender	Occupation	Data set 2000	Data set 2017
1	25	F	Student		+
2	35	F	Student		+
3	45	F	Shopkeeper	+	+
4	39	M	Customer service agent	+	+
5	36	F	Student	+	+
6	44	M	Manager	+	+
7	42	M	Teacher	+	+
8	35	M	Student		+
9	33	F	Student		+
10	38	F	TV Journalist	+	+

The participants in the study presented in chapter 3 comprised 20 Druze males and females from different Druze and Arab/Druze mixed villages and towns in Israel. The sampled participants were mostly selected from different villages and towns (Osfiya, Daliat El-Carmel, Kfar Yassif, Julis). All of the participants were highly proficient speakers of both Arabic and Hebrew. The participants' ages ranged from 25 to 45 years, and the participants were a mix of students and professionals.

TABLE 2   Distribution of study 2 participants by age, gender, occupation and education

Participant	Age	Gender	Occupation	Education
1	27	F	Student	Tertiary
2	35	F	Student	Tertiary
3	45	F	Shopkeeper	Secondary
4	39	M	Customer service agent	Secondary
5	36	F	Student	Tertiary
6	44	M	Manager	Secondary
7	42	M	Teacher	Tertiary
8	35	M	Student	Tertiary
9	33	F	Student	Tertiary
10	38	F	TV Journalist	Tertiary

TABLE 2   Distribution of study 2 participants by age, gender, occupation and education (*cont.*)

Participant	Age	Gender	Occupation	Education
11	26	F	Student	Tertiary
12	45	M	Doctor	Tertiary
13	44	M	Passenger transport driver	Secondary
14	45	F	National Service coordinator	Tertiary
15	45	M	Book manager	Tertiary
16	25	F	Student	Tertiary
17	34	M	Police officer	Secondary
18	45	F	caretaker	Secondary
19	27	F	Student	Tertiary
20	44	M	Marketing manager	Secondary

The participants of the study presented in chapter 4 were 60 native Arabic speakers coming from different Arab/Druze mixed villages and towns in Israel. In order to make the comparison as 'fair' as possible, sampled participants from the different communities (20 Druze, 20 Christians and 20 Muslims) were mostly picked from the same mixed villages and towns with various majority communities (Osfiya—Druze majority, Kfar Yassif—Christian majority, Rama—Christian majority, Shefar'am—Muslim majority, Abu Snan—Muslim majority, Mghar—Druze majority and Daliat El-Carmel—Druze majority). All participants were multilingual speakers, highly proficient in both Arabic and Hebrew, with Arabic occupying their L1 and Hebrew their L2. They ranged in age from 25 to 45, both males and females.

The participants of the study presented in chapter 5 were 40 individuals coming from different Druze and Arab/Druze mixed villages and towns in Israel (50%) and the four different Druze towns in the Golan Heights (50%). All participants were multilingual speakers, highly proficient in both Arabic and Hebrew. The participants were unevenly males and females (23 females, 17 males), ranging in age from 25 to 55.

In study 4 of chapter 5, following the recordings of spontaneous speech, the researcher conducted interviews asking the participants questions about self-identification, group belongings, collective identities and their own perceptions of their relation to the state of Israel and, in the case of the Golan Druze, their relation to and perception of Syria as well. The researcher also engaged the participants with two main political debates happening within their communities at the time of the fieldwork.

Subsequently, the study also compared the objective data collected from the spontaneous recordings to the participants' subjective responses to the questionnaires and open-ended interview questions. Additionally, the connection between sociopolitical identity and linguistic practices (e.g. codeswitching, mixing and language preference), was similarly examined. Since the focus was mainly on participants' own views, self-expression, experiences, feelings, perceptions, identification, sense of belonging and affiliations, the 5th chapter mainly presents relevant participant statements in their own words.

1.1.8 Transcription, Translation, and Transliteration

For phonetic transcriptions of both Arabic and Hebrew in the examples, I mainly use the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA), unless stated otherwise. I use the Anglicized form of transcription for the following phonemes: [j] instead of [dʒ]; [y] instead of [j]; and [ch] instead of [tʃ].

In general descriptions, I use the Anglicized form of transcription as in [ts] instead of [ts]; [sh] instead of [ʃ]; [j] instead of [dʒ]; [y] instead of [j]; [ch] instead of [tʃ]; [gh] instead of [ɣ] and [kh] instead of [X].

For Israeli Hebrew morphemes, I use [x] for [ח׳]; [ħ] for [ח]; [ʕ] for [ע]; [ts] for [צ]; [y] for [י]; [g] for [ג]; [ṭ] for [ט]; and [š] for [ש].[10] For the rest of the morphemes, I use the Anglicized form. Stress is indicated in the following manner: í, á, ó, é, ú.

With regard to Arabic, I follow the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) also for the pharyngealized (emphatic) consonants. Thus, I use [sˤ] for [ص]; [dˤ] for [ض]; [tˤ] for [ط]; [zˤ] for [ظ]; [ʕ] for [ع]; [ħ] for [ح]; and [q] for [ق]. I also use [š] for [ش] instead of [ʃ] and [y] for [ي] instead of [j]. For the rest of the morphemes, I use the Anglicized form. Gemination is marked by doubling the consonants. Long vowels are represented by a bar over the vowel in the following manner: ā, ē, ō, ū, ī.

My transcription is descriptive in the sense that it represents the pronunciation of the speaker participants themselves. Therefore, in the mixed variety, the reader might notice that certain Hebrew vowels are used in an identical manner to the Arabic long vowels (i.e. lengthening of the Hebrew vowels), instead of Hebrew stress; absence of gemination in Arabic morphemes due to Hebrew influence, use of non-emphatic phonemes instead of their usual emphatic counterparts, to mention but a few.

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10   Classical Hebrew [q], [ʕ], [r], [ṭ], and [h] are usually pronounced as [k], [ʔ/o], [ʁ], [t], and [x] respectively in Israeli Hebrew.

For glossing, I follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules, unless stated otherwise.

All translations in this book are mine unless otherwise indicated.

For readers unfamiliar with Arabic, the relevant letters with their transliterating signs are as follows:

ARABIC IPA	English approximation (where possible)	Example	Arabic Letter
ʔ	A/E	[ʔebra] ”needle“ إبرة	ء
sˤ	S (Somalia)	[sˤandūq] صندوق ”box”	ص
dˤ		[dˤamīr] ضمير ”conscience“	ض
tˤ		[tˤajr] طير ”bird“	ط
θ	Th (Theology)	[θawb] ثوب ”garment“	ث
ðˤ		[ðˤarf] ظرف ”circumstance/condition“	ظ
ʕ		[ʕenæb] عنب ”grapes“	ع
ɣ	Gh	[ɣālī] غالي *expensive/precious“*	غ
q		[Qurʔān] قرآن	ق
dʒ/ʒ	Soft J (Taj Mahal)	[dʒameʕ] جامع ”mosque“	ج
ħ		[ħedʒab] حجاب ”hijab“	ح
x	Kh	[Xajr]”good“ خير	خ
ð	Th (there)	[ðubab] ذباب ”flies“	ذ
ʃ	Sh (shine)	[ʃajara] شجرة ”a tree“	ش
J	Y (yard)	[jad] يد ”hand“	ي

The Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis: The Case of the Druze Language in Israel

Chapter Preview[1]

This chapter examines the language of the Druze community in Israel as going through the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation, resulting in a split language, a.k.a. mixed language, based on Myers-Scotton's Matrix language turnover hypothesis (2002). Longitudinal data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching from the Israeli Druze community collected in 2000 and 2017 indicate that there is a composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a mixed language. Such a composite involves convergence features in congruence with stage II of the hypothesis, resulting in a composite morphosyntactic frame. The main features of convergence are the introduction of Israeli Hebrew system morphemes, including early system morphemes, bridge system morphemes and outsider late system morphemes—in some cases appearing independently, but in most cases, in conjunction with content morphemes. There are features of lexical conceptual structures and morphological realization patterns as well. Sociolinguistic factors are suggested as potential motivators for such composite and split language formation.

1 Introduction

Different theories and models of codeswitching have been introduced for further understanding and illustrations of codeswitching behaviour, though they almost all apply to one type of codeswitching, namely classic codeswitching. When it comes to composite codeswitching, however, the scholarly literature is very limited. One of the very few linguists to propose a theory about composite codeswitching is Myers-Scotton. Myers-Scotton (1998) proposed the Matrix Language Turnover hypothesis in order to test composite codeswitching cases.

In order to test that hypothesis, longitudinal data of the relevant sort is required, therefore, very few studies were conducted to test the hypothesis. The present study attempts to test convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a split language, a.k.a. mixed language, through a Matrix Language turnover. To test the hypothesis, the present study examines longitudinal data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching, taken from the same community, namely the Israeli Druze community, and some of the same participants from the different data sets overtime (2000 and 2017). In addition, the study examines the possible factors motivating convergence and composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a split language. The phenomena of codeswitching and borrowing in Israel were studied by several researchers (see Abu Elhija, 2017; Amara, 2010; 2017; Henkin, 2011; Mar'i, 2013); however, their research was aimed at different groups and localities. Isleem (2016) was among the very few researchers to study Druze codeswitching; however, his research was limited to video recordings taken from different websites and online written communication, unlike the present research which is based on actual fieldwork and longitudinal observations of naturally occurring speech.

The Druze community in Israel has a distinct speech that differs from that of the Christians and Muslims in the Arab sector. Although the Druze community shares the same first language as the Arabs in Israel, namely Palestinian Arabic, their speech is extremely unique in that it incorporates very extensive and frequent use of Israeli Hebrew. In comparison to Arabs who do not live in mixed cities with a Jewish majority, extensive codeswitching between Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew is considered the unmarked mode of communication in the case of the Israeli Druze community.

The Druze community in Israel shares many cultural similarities with the Israeli Arabs, however, as mentioned in the introduction of this book, the Druze people in Israel are not considered to be part of the Arab sector, but have their own distinct sector. There is a significant Druze population in twenty settlements[2] in Israel; thirteen of which the Druze constitute the vast majority, while in the rest they reside alongside Arab Christians and Muslims, in some as a majority while in others as a minority. There is only one village[3] in Israel in which the Druze constitute a majority while living alongside a minority of Christians and Jews.

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2   The thirteen settlements with the vast majority of Druze are: Daliat El-Carmel, Julis, Yarka, Sajur, 'Ein El-Asad, Beit Jann, Jath-Yanuh, Kisra-Smei', Hurfeish, Majdal Shams, Buq'ata, Mas'ada and 'Ein Qinya. The rest are Mghar, Peqi'in, Shefar'am, KfarYassif, Abu Snan and Rama.

3   Osfiya is the village in which the Druze live alongside Christians and Jews.

The Druze people in Israel have intensive interaction with the Jewish people, thus experience great language contact with Israeli Hebrew speakers and their culture. Such interaction mainly takes place at work, at higher education institutions and in the military. In contrast to Arab Christians and Muslims, young Druze males are subject to the compulsory military service. Many Bedouins, however, enlist in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on a voluntary basis.

2   Palestinian Vernacular Arabic and Israeli Hebrew

Palestinian Vernacular Arabic (henceforth PVA) is a subgroup of Levantine Arabic. It belongs to the Semitic language family and is influenced by different Middle Eastern languages, both ancient and modern, such as Aramaic, Canaanite, Ottoman Turkish, Standard Arabic and Hebrew. Its vocabulary is also influenced by European languages, such as Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and English. It is the mother tongue of Israeli Arabs and Druze and is used as a third language by some Israeli Jews. Arabic is also the mother tongue of some Jews who have migrated to Israel from different Arab countries. Within the native Arabic speaking community in Israel, Arabic is used in all domains of life. According to Amara (2017), the Arabic dialect of the West Bank is very similar to the Arabic dialect spoken in Israel. The differences between the two stem from contact with Hebrew. While native Arabic speakers in Israel start learning Hebrew at a young age and come in contact with Hebrew native speakers in various domains of life, such contact is very limited in the West Bank.

Israeli Hebrew (henceforth IH) is a multifaceted Semito-European hybrid language whose grammar is based mainly on Hebrew, and to some extent on Yiddish, Polish, Russian and Arabic. The phonetics and phonology of Israeli Hebrew are European, primarily Yiddish. Israeli emerged in *Eretz Yisrael* 'land of Israel' (which at the time was known as Palestine) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Israeli citizens speak it to varying degrees of fluency. It is used as a first language by most Israeli Jews, as well as by some Israeli Druze and Arabs who are born and raised in Jewish cities. It is used as a second language by Druze, Muslims, Christian Arabs and others in Israel. It is also used by some non-Israeli Palestinians, as well as Diaspora Jews. During the past century, Israeli has emerged as the official language in Israel, as well as "the primary mode of communication in all domains of public and private life among Israeli Jews" (Zuckermann, 2006, 2008, 2009: 41, 2010).

Coming from the same language family (West Semitic), PVA and IH share many linguistic similarities, however, they are not mutually intelligible and as such, there are many differences between them. Since the present study focuses

solely on the spoken varieties of Arabic and Hebrew in Israel, I briefly outline some of the similarities and differences between those specific varieties. Unless stated otherwise, the sources are the author's own material.

Articles: Both PVA and IH have definite articles, but no indefinite articles. In Arabic, the definite article is either *al-* or *el-*, and in Hebrew, it is *ha-*, which in most cases, is silent. In both languages, the definite articles are clitics prefixed to nouns and adjectives. However, in contrast to Hebrew in which the article has consistent pronunciation, the *l* in the Arabic article maintains its original pronunciation, unless it is prefixed to a word beginning with a sun letter (t, $t^ʕ$, d, $d^ʕ$, r, z, s, š, $s^ʕ$, ð, θ, $z^ʕ$, l, n), with which it assimilates. For example: ***ed-dahab**/*ARAB, ***ha-zaháv**/*HEB 'the gold'; ***et^ʕ- t^ʕawle**/*ARAB, ***ha-šolxán**/*HEB 'the table'; ***el-walad**/*ARAB, ***ha-yeled**/*HEB 'the boy'

Nouns: Most nouns in Arabic and Hebrew are made of lexical roots. Such roots are put into affix templates to form meaningful nouns. Nouns in Arabic and Hebrew show number and gender (see below, *Agreement*). Arabic nominals include singular, dual and plural features, whereas Hebrew generally uses only singular and plural. As for the gender feature, Arabic and Hebrew have two types of markers: masculine and feminine. The neuter marker is not morphologically encoded in either of them.

Pronouns: pronouns have similar case features in both languages, and they inflect for person, gender and number. Shared cases include: nominative: *neħna/iħna*/ARAB, *ʔanaxnó*/HEB 'we'; accusative: *-hon/-hen*/ARAB, *ʔot-ám*/HEB 'them'; genitive: *tabaʕ-ha/ taʕ-ha*/ARAB, *šel-á*/HEB 'her'; and dative: *il-na*/ARAB, *la-nú*/HEB 'to us'.

Adjectives: in both languages, adjectives agree in gender, number and definiteness with the modified nouns (see below, *Agreement*). In the comparative construction, however, Arabic conforms to the $aC_1C_2a(C_3)$ pattern of the masculine singular form across all genders and numbers to form the comparative, whereas Hebrew uses the adjective with either the word *yotér* 'more', or *paxót* 'less' preceding it: *hada el-ħsān **aħsan** men hadak*/ARAB (this the horse (is) better than that), *ha-sús hazé **yotér tóv** me-ha-šení*/HEB (the horse this (is) more good than the second) 'this horse is better than that one'. In the superlative form, Arabic uses the same form as in the comparative, whereas Hebrew uses the adjective with the word *haxí* 'the most' preceding it: *hāi **aħsan** sayyara*/ARAB (this better car), *zé ha-ʔauto **haxí tóv**/*HEB (this the car the most good) 'this is the best car'.

Verbs: In the two languages, verbs have either three or four consonants in their simple form, which is called *ʒaðer*/ARAB, *šóreš*/HEB 'root'. The two languages have three tenses: present, past and future (see below, *Verbal Sentences*).

Verbal forms in both languages inflect for person, gender, number and tense. However, unlike Arabic, Hebrew verbs in the present tense inflect only for gender and number, and there is no person distinction (cf. Zuckermann, 2006). In addition to the three tenses, verbs in both languages are conjugated according to person, gender and number in the imperative mood: *i-ftaħ el-bāb*/2SGM, *i-ftaħ-i* (*e*)*l-bāb*/2SGF, *i-ftaħ-u* (*e*)*l-bāb*/2PL/ARAB; *ti-ftáx et ha-délet*/2SGM, *ti-ftix-í et ha-delet* /2SGF, *ti-ftix-ú et ha-delet*/2PL/HEB 'open the door!'

Clitics: In addition to the definite articles, Arabic and Hebrew have other shared clitics. For instance, some of the prepositions act as proclitics in both languages: *ʕa-*/ARAB, *le-*/HEB 'to' *ʕa-lquds*/ARAB, *le-yerušalayím*/HEB 'to Jerusalem'; *be-/fe-*/ARAB, *ba-*/HEB 'in' *be-lbeit/fe-lbeit-*/ARAB, *ba-bayet*/HEB 'in the house'; *la-*/ARAB, *le-*/HEB 'for' *fi maktub la-ʕAnan* /ARAB, *yéš mextáv le-ʔAnán* /HEB (there (a) letter for 'Anan) 'there is a letter for 'Anan'. Possessive adjectives in Arabic are attached as enclitics to nouns. Although Standard Hebrew exhibits such enclitics, they are much less frequent in the spoken variety. Instead, the 'of' form (taba'/ARAB shel/HEB=of), which agrees in gender and number with the noun it describes in both Arabic and Hebrew, is more commonly used in spoken Hebrew: *ktāb-i*/ARAB, *sefr-í*/HEB (book my) 'my book'; *el-ktāb tabaʕ-í*/ARAB, *ha-sefer šel-í*/HEB (the book of me) 'my book'; *sayyaret-ha*/ARAB (car her), *ha-auto šel-á* /HEB (the car of her) 'her car'. Similarly, the Arabic possessive pronouns are attached as enclitics to the word *ʕend* 'at/to', to express the verb 'to have', whereas Hebrew uses *yéš* (there is) before the possessive pronouns, which are also attached to the preposition *l* 'to': *ʕend-ha beit kbir*/ARAB (at her (a) house big), *yéš l-á báyet gadól*/HEB (there is to her (a) house big) 'she has a big house.' While Arabic uses direct and indirect pronominal objects as enclitics, such a form is rare in Israeli Hebrew: *axadt-o* /ARAB, *lakax-tí ʔotó*/HEB '(I) took him'; *ʕmelt-tel-o akel*/ARAB, *hexant-í ló ʔóxel*/HEB ((I) made for him food) 'I prepared him food.'

Word order: Although the main word order in Arabic is VSO and in Hebrew is SVO, it is inconstant and changeable in the spoken varieties. *akal-et tof-faħa*/ARAB, *axal-tí tapuáx*/HEB (ate I (an) apple) 'I ate an apple', *ʔana ba-ʕallem tˤollāb*/ARAB, *ʔaní melam-éd stodent-ím*/HEB 'I teach students'.

Agreement: Arabic and Hebrew are languages with a rich agreement system. Agreement in Arabic and Hebrew usually involves the person, gender, number and definiteness features. Both Arabic and Hebrew exhibit two gender markers: masculine and feminine. Although both languages do not exhibit gender constraints, in most cases the suffixes *-e* or *-a* in Arabic and *-a* or *-t* in Hebrew indicate the feminine form: *mʕallem*/M, *mʕalm-e*/F/ARAB; *mor-é*/M, *mor-á*/F/HEB 'teacher'. Number markers in Arabic include singular, plural and dual, whereas in Hebrew the dual form is very rarely used. Generally, the suffixes *-in*/ARAB and

-im/HEB, as well as the infix *<ā>*/ARAB are used for the masculine plural form; *-āt*/ARAB and *-ót*/HEB are used for the feminie plural form: *mˤalm-in*/M, *mˤalm-āt*/F/ARAB; *mor-ím*/M, *mor-ót*/F/HEB 'teachers'. Unlike Hebrew, Arabic exhibits many other plural patterns in the broken plural form, i.e. the irregular form, which are usually formed by changing the pattern of the consonants and vowels of the singular noun. The Arabic dual form is expressed in the suffix *-ēn*: *binet, bint-ēn, ban-āt*/ARAB '(a) girl, two girls, girls'; *yald-á, yelad-ót*/HEB '(a) girl, girls'. The agreement features hold between subjects and verbs as well as nouns and adjectives: *akal-et el-binet toffaħa*/ARAB (ate the girl (an) apple) 'the girl ate an apple', *akal-o el-wl<ā>d toffaħ*/ARAB (ate the boys apples) 'the boys ate apples'; *ha-yald-á axl-á tapuáx*/HEB 'the girl ate (an) apple', *ha-yelad-ím axl-ú tapux-ím*/HEB 'the boys ate apples'. Although noun-adjective agreement in both languages involves definiteness, the definite article does not change and has a consistent form across all genders and numbers: *el-binet el-ħelw-e*/ARAB; *ha-yald-á ha-yaf-á* /HEB (the girl the beautiful) 'the beautiful girl', *el-ban-āt el-ħelw-āt*/ARAB; *ha-ban-ót ha-yaf-ót* /HEB (the girls the beautiful) 'the beautiful girls'.

Pro-drop: Arabic and Hebrew are considered pro-drop languages; hence allow the ellipsis of subject pronouns, except for the Hebrew present tense. The agreement elements (person, number and gender) within the verb conjugations make it possible to fully identify the empty category of the subject: *baħeb-ha*/ARAB '(I) love her', *aní ʔohev ʔota*/HEB (I love her) 'I love her'; *katab-It maktub*/ARAB, *katav-tí mextáv*/HEB (wrote (I) (a) letter) 'I wrote a letter'.

Nominal sentences: Arabic and Hebrew share many basic sentence structures. In present tense sentences (affirmative and negative), for instance, both Arabic and Hebrew generally have the subject linked with a predicate without using a copula, thus forming nominal sentences, often referred to as equational sentences. For example:

(1) *hāda ktāb*/ARAB   *zé sefér*/HEB
     DEM N/ARAB   DEM N/HEB
     this (a) book   this (a) book
     'this is a book'

(2) *hāda miš ktāb* /ARAB   *zé ló sefér*/HEB
     DEM NEG N/ARAB   DEM NEG N/HEB
     this not (a) book   this not (a) book
     'this is not a book'

Similarly, in both languages, interrogative sentences are formed by changing the intonation and tone of the voice: *hada ktāb?*/ARAB, *zé sefer?*/HEB (this (a)

book?) 'Is this a book?'; *hada miš ktāb?*/ARAB, *zé ló sefer? /*HEB (this not (a) book?) 'Isn't this a book?'

Copular sentences: Arabic and Hebrew share the copular sentence structure. In both languages, the sentences can be used with or without the copula. When the copulas are used, they agree with the subject in person, gender and number: *Sammy **bicun** ʕamm-i*/ARAB, *Sammy **hú** dód šelí*/HEB (Sammy is uncle mine) 'Sammy is my uncle'; *Einav **bitcun** mʕalmet-na*/ARAB, *Einav **hi** morá šel-ánu*/HEB (Einav is teacher ours) 'Einav is our teacher'. Although Hebrew sometimes maintains the copula in the negative form with the addition of the Hebrew negation marker *ló* 'no/not', Arabic omits the copula and only uses the negation marker *miš* 'not': *Sammy **miš** ʕamm-i*/ARAB (Sammy not uncle mine), *Sammy **hú** ló dód šelí*/HEB (Sammy is not uncle mine) 'Sammy is not my uncle'; *Einav **miš** mʕalmet-na*/ARAB (Einav not teacher ours), *Einav **hì** ló morá šel-ánu*/HEB (Einav is not teacher ours) 'Einav is not our teacher'.

Verbal sentences: (I) Verbal present tense sentences: Both Arabic and Hebrew have an equivalent to the English Present Simple tense. In Arabic, the verbs are conjugated according to the person, gender and number of the subject, whereas in Hebrew they are conjugated only according to gender and number (Zuckermann, 2006): *ʔana bakt-ob/bakt-eb*/ARAB, *ʔani kot-ev*/HEB 'I write'; *neħna mnukt-ob/iħna mnekt-eb*/ARAB, *ʔanaxno kotv-ím*/HEB 'we write'.

While Hebrew only adds a time expression to the above form to indicate the Present Continuous tense, Arabic attaches the prefix *ʕam-* to express such a form: *ʔana **ʕam-b**akt-ob/ʕam-bakt-eb issa*/ARAB, *ʔani kot-ev ʕaxšav*/HEB 'I (am) writing now'; *neħna **ʕam-n**ukt-ob issa/iħna **ʕam-n**ekt-eb issa*/ARAB, *ʔanaxno kotv-ím ʕaxšav*/HEB 'we (are) writing now'.

(II) Verbal Past tense sentences: Both Arabic and Hebrew have an equivalent to the English Past Simple tense. In the Past Simple, the verbs are conjugated according to the person, gender and number of the subject, in both Arabic and Hebrew: *ʔana katab-**It***/ARAB, *ʔani katav-**tí***/HEB 'I wrote'; *neħna/iħna katab-na*/ARAB, *ʔanaxno katav-nú*/HEB 'we wrote'. The Past Continuous tense, although common in Arabic, is generally not used in Hebrew. The Past Continuous in Arabic is formed by using the copula *kan* 'was' before the present progressive form. The Arabic copula *kan* agrees with the subject in person, gender and number: *ʔana **kun-et** ʕam-bakt-ob/ʕam-bakt-eb*/ARAB 'I was writing'; *neħna **kun-na** ʕam-nukt-ob/iħna **kun-na** ʕam-nekt-eb*/ARAB 'We were writing'.

(III) Verbal Future tense sentences: In both Arabic and Hebrew future tense ('will' form), the verbs are conjugated according to the person, gender and number of the subject. In addition to the verb conjugation, Arabic requires an auxiliary before the verb for both the 'will' and 'going to' forms, whereas Hebrew

only requires one for the 'going to' form. As opposed to Arabic, Hebrew uses the infinitive verb for the 'going to' form, which does not change for person, gender or number. The auxiliaries used for the 'going to' form are *raħ*/ARAB and *holex le-*/HEB 'going to'. In addition to the auxiliary *raħ*/ARAB, the word *bad-i* (want) 'will', is also used for the 'will' form and is usually shortened in the 1PL from *bad-na* into *na-* (we want) 'we will'. The auxiliary *raħ*/ARAB 'going to' does not change for person, gender or number unlike all the rest, but its following verb does: *ʔana **raħ** akt-ob/akt-eb*/ARAB, *ʔaní **holex** le-xtov*/HEB 'I (am) going to write'; *neħna **na**-nukt-ob/iħna **na**-nekt-eb*/ARAB, *ʔanaxno ne-xtóv*/HEB 'we will write'; *hunne **raħ** yu-kutb-ū/henne **raħ** ye-ketb-ū* /ARAB, *hem ye-xtev-ú*/HEB 'they will write'.

3   Theoretical Approaches

In this study, the language of the Druze community shall be examined as going through the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation, resulting in a mixed language, based on Myers Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover hypothesis, which necessarily involves composite codeswitching. According to Myers-Scotton (2002), the Matrix Language Turnover hypothesis requires longitudinal data of the relevant sort in order for it to be tested. The present study is based on data sets that were compiled in 2000 as well as 2017. Convergence is defined by Myers-Scotton (2006: 271) as "speech by bilinguals that has all the surface level forms from one language, but with part of the abstract lexical structure that underlies the surface-level patterns coming from another language (or languages)." Convergence occurs when there is a Matrix Language turnover in codeswitching. In between convergence and a complete turnover of the Matrix Language, there lies a stage of a composite Matrix Language formation. Composite Matrix Language formation occurs in a process called *composite codeswitching*. According to Fuller (1996), the defining feature of a converging language is the presence of this composite Matrix Language, which constitutes the second phase of a Matrix Language turnover.

Composite codeswitching is defined by Myers Scotton (2006: 242) as "a bilingual speech in which even though most of the morphosyntactic structure comes from one of the participating languages, the other language contributes some of the abstract structure underlying surface forms in the clause." According to Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Frame model (2006), in classic codeswitching, only one of the languages participating in the switch provides the morphosyntactic frame; namely the Matrix Language. In *composite codeswitching*, however, the morphosyntactic frame is provided from more than

one of the participating languages, resulting in a composite Matrix Language frame, which involves convergence of the morphosyntactic frame, as well as of the features of some grammatical structures. Myers-Scotton (2002: 9) states that according to the Asymmetry Principal for bilingual frames, even if the Matrix Language involves a composite of abstract features from more than one language, "asymmetry still marks the contributory roles of the participating languages" and there is always "a movement toward the morphosyntactic dominance of one variety in the frame." Myers-Scotton (2002) defines mixed languages as languages that are based on input from two other varieties, showing a split in their basic organization. Such split either occurs in the lexicon and the grammatical system, or within the grammatical system and some types of morphology and phrase structures. According to the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis, mixed languages arise when there is a matrix language turnover underway, but it does not reach full completion.

3.1   *The Matrix Language Frame Model and the 4-M Model*

According to Myers-Scotton (2002:247), "the Matrix Language is a theoretical construct, encapsulating the notion that all CPs in any language are structured at the abstract level by a morphosyntactic frame." Such a frame is defined as the Matrix Language. In classic codeswitching, the Matrix Language is the one providing the morphosyntactic frame under the Matrix Language frame model. In the "classic" Matrix Language frame model, further discussed in the 4-M model of Myers-Scotton and Jake (2001), four types of morphemes are classified: (1) content morphemes and (2) system morphemes that are subdivided into early system morphemes and two types of late system morphemes: (3) bridge late system morphemes and (4) outsider late system morphemes.

Content morphemes are morphemes that assign or receive thematic roles (theta roles). Given that verbs usually assign theta roles and nouns usually receive them, they are prototypical examples of content morphemes. According to the Matrix Language frame model, such morphemes frequently come from the embedded language. *Early system morphemes*, on the other hand, are morphemes that depend on their head for further information, yet they do not assign or receive theta roles. Such morphemes include plural markings, determiners, and some prepositions called satellites that affect the meanings of some phrasal verbs in English.

In Arabic and Hebrew, examples of such morphemes include demonstratives that show agreement with their heads in both gender and number, such as (hai/ARAB hazot/HEB=this/ SGF). *Bridge late system morphemes* are morphemes that occur between phrases to produce a larger constituent. Examples of such morphemes include the possessive elements, such as *of* and the pos-

sessive marker -*s* in English. In Arabic and Hebrew respectively, the possessive elements that show agreement in both gender and number, as well as the possessive suffixes in Arabic, are examples of such morphemes (taba'/ARAB shel/HEB=of). *Outsider late system morphemes* are morphemes which depend on information that is outside the element with which they occur. According to Myers-Scotton and Jake (2017), they are the agreement elements that make more transparent relationships between elements in the clause, especially in their roles as case markers or in co-indexing relations between arguments and verbs. For instance, the form of the agreement marker in subject-verb agreement in English depends on the subject, so whenever there is a third-person singular in the present tense, the suffix -*s* occurs, otherwise, it does not.

Similarly, Arabic and Hebrew subject-verb agreement is expressed through the addition of different clitics, depending on the tense, gender and number and cannot occur otherwise. Quantifiers in Arabic and Hebrew, such as *kull*/ARAB and *kól*/HEB 'all' look outside their maximal projection when they are added to clitics to show gender and number agreement as in *kull-hun/kull-ayat-(h)un*/ARAB/PL and *kól-am*/HEB/M/PL (usually pronounced *kúlam*) 'all of them'. Also, in both Arabic and Hebrew the object pronouns change depending on case markers and the type of verb that requires them, for instance in *hiyye naqalIt-ni*/ARAB, *hi he'vir-a ʔoti*/HEB 'she moved me', both the Arabic suffix -*ni* and the Hebrew object pronoun *ʔoti* appear as the accusative case of 'me'. Whereas in *hiyye šaraħIt-li ed-dars*/ARAB, *hi hesbir-a lí ét ha-še'úr*/HEB 'she explained to me the lesson' both the Arabic suffix -*li* and the Hebrew object pronoun *lí* appear as the dative case of 'me'. According to Myers-Scotton (2002:248) "the late system morphemes are of special interest because they are structurally assigned, called by the grammar rather than accessed to convey speaker intentions." Myers-Scotton (1993) also asserts that in classic codeswitching, the system morphemes coming from the so called Embedded Language must come in the form of embedded language islands. Such islands include: formulaic expressions and idioms, other time and manner expressions, quantifier expressions, non-quantifier, non-time NPs as VP complements, agent NPs and thematic role and case assigners. Myers-Scotton (2008, 2013), Jake and Myers-Scotton (2009) and Myers-Scotton and Jake (2009, 2017) further emphasize that in classic codeswitching, bridges and outsiders are never provided by the embedded language. Furthermore, in composite codeswitching, embedded language outsiders do not occur, except in the form of islands, which is also not very common.

Out of the category of system morphemes, one type of system morphemes, namely the outsider late system morpheme, plays a critical role in defining the

Matrix Language as is evident in Myers-Scotton's System Morpheme Principle (2002: 59): "in Matrix Language + Embedded Language constituents, all system morphemes which have grammatical relations external to their head constituent (i.e. which participate in the sentence's thematic role grid) will come from the Matrix Language."

According to Myers-Scotton (2002: 248), the outsider late system morphemes are of utmost importance, and when they are provided from the "previous" Embedded language, that is a sign that there is an evident change in the morphosyntactic frame structuring the language. Convergence, which involves the splitting and recombining of abstract grammatical structure, causes the frame to change and receive system morphemes from the second language. Therefore, "a chain of events, beginning with convergence, results in new grammatical outcomes on both abstract and surface levels".

This study examines convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a mixed language, mainly based on system morpheme occurrences. Since both Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages that share many similarities in morpheme order, The Morpheme Order Principle[4] is sparsely utilized in this study.

3.2   *The Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis*

In opposition to the Matrix language frame model in which only one language provides the morphosyntactic frame, the Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis suggests that there is a phase in which the Matrix Language becomes a composite, that is, both languages make up the morphosyntactic frame. Myers-Scotton (1998, 2002, 2003) and Fuller (1996) further explicate the stages of the Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis:

Stage 1: In this stage, intra-sentential codeswitching occurs frequently, though the Matrix Language is still the provider of the system morphemes and sets the morphosyntactic frame by itself. As in the "classic" Matrix Language frame model, the Embedded Language contributes the content morphemes as well as the Embedded Language islands to the Matrix Language frame. Borrowings from the Embedded Language become core borrowings, and EL structures may become lexicalized in the Matrix Language. Some of the Matrix Language categories may take on the functions of the Embedded Language.

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4   The Morpheme Order Principle of Myers-Scotton (2002:59): "in Matrix Language + Embedded Language constituents consisting of singly occurring Embedded Language lexemes and any number of Matrix Language morphemes, surface morpheme order (reflecting surface syntactic relations) will be that of the Matrix Language."

Stage II: In this stage, composite codeswitching occurs, as both languages begin to converge, causing the previous matrix language to lose its undisputed role as the source of the matrix language frame in bilingual CPs. Simultaneously, the embedded language gains power. Convergence is represented by the splitting and recombining of abstract lexical structure, having both the Matrix Language and the Embedded Language set the morphosyntactic frame, altogether forming a composite Matrix Language. There are three types of convergence that occur throughout the process of the composite Matrix Language formation:

(1)   The 'previous' Embedded Language provides late system morphemes, mainly with content morphemes from the same language. In comparison, bridge and outsider late system morphemes are strictly provided by the Matrix Language, in the case of classic codeswitching;

(2)   A violation of congruence requirements occur, since both the Matrix language and the Embedded Language provide lexical conceptual structures and morphological realization patterns. Such structures will come out from either or both of the languages, forming a composite language structure;

(3)   If the Matrix Language has a diversity of structures, such as word order possibilities, then the preferred structure would be that most resembling the Embedded Language construction.

Stage III: In this stage, there is a complete turnover of the Matrix Language. Such turnover is characterised by a turnover of the System Morpheme Principle. While in the Matrix Language frame model the Matrix Language was the main contributor of the system morphemes occurring with content morphemes from the Embedded Language; here it is the complete opposite: The previous Embedded Language, which becomes the new Matrix Language, provides the system morphemes, with the occurrence of content morphemes from the former Matrix Language, i.e. the new Embedded Language. Content morphemes may also come from both languages, though with the new Matrix Language lexical-conceptual and predicate-argument structures.

Myers-Scotton (2002: 249) argues that "split languages represent turnovers that do not go to completion, but stop 'along the way'; where they stop partly determines the form they show today." The main analysis of the data of this study assesses the language spoken by the Druze community in Israel as a Composite Matrix Language resulting in a split (mixed) language, that is, one that is constructed from linguistic varieties of two languages: Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew. Therefore, the second phase of the Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis is of utmost relevance to the current study.

4   **Mixed Languages**

Many researchers proposed different definitions as to what counts as a split language, a.k.a. a mixed language. Most of the definitions include lists of lexical and grammatical elements. However, Myers-Scotton (2002:249) contrasts such definitions and proposes two definitions, one strong definition and a less stringent one respectively:

I   A split language exhibits almost its entire morphosyntactic frame from a different source language from large portions of its lexicon; this frame includes almost all of its late system morphemes from the language of the morphosyntactic frame.

II   A split language exhibits a major constituent with its system morphemes and major parts of the morphosyntactic frame from a different source language from that of most of the lexicon and the morphosyntactic frame of other constituents.

Myers-Scotton explains that the overall difference between split languages and other languages lies in the sense that the splits occur not only in features, but also in systems of features. In the case of system morphemes, for instance, they count as a system, whereas late system morphemes count as a subsystem, hence a system of a feature.

When differentiating between a composite matrix language that is characterized as such for its composite abstract structure and a split language, she suggests two abstract constructs (2002: 252): (1) the notion of a composite Matrix Language that includes both abstract lexical structure and a split of the source for *grammatically crucial surface-level system morphemes* and the main source for content morphemes, and (2) the notion that this state of affairs begins a Matrix Language turnover, but a turnover that is arrested at some point.

Under such definitions, Myers-Scotton recognizes three languages that count as split languages: I-*Michif*, a unique mixed language which is composed of a mixture of Cree and French, and is spoken by fewer than a thousand people in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba in Canada and in North Dakota and Montana in the United States (Bakker, 1997). II-*Ma'a*, a.k.a. Mbugu, a split language that is spoken in the Usambara district of north-eastern Tanzania. Its structure mainly consists of a Bantu grammar (Pare and Shamba) and a Cushitic lexicon (Mous, 2003). III-*Mednyj Aleut*, which is a split language of the Copper Island Aleuts thus also known as CIA (Vakhtin, 1998). According to Thomason (1997), this language was moribund and was rapidly replaced by Russian. It is composed of Aleut lexicon and Russian grammar (see chapter three for more detailed accounts of those languages).

Such mixed languages, among the rest, generally come from the same sociolinguistic background. According to Bakker (1997:203), these languages "are spoken by ethnic groups who were originally bilingual but, for some reason, wanted to distinguish themselves collectively from both groups whose languages they speak. The speakers of each of these languages form a distinct group, either a subgroup of a larger division or a completely different group." Such mixed language formation stresses the distinctness of the group. Mixed languages have special names which distinguish them from other languages spoken in the area which consequently form a distinct identity of the speakers of such language. In the case of the Druze community in Israel that is "sandwiched" between the Arabs and Jews, forming a new mixed language denotes a distinct group, which is distinguished from both groups "whose languages they speak".

5   Examples and Analysis

To illustrate the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation through the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis in the given community, I present tables with data from the different years and analyse different examples of codeswitching between the two languages. The research questions addressed for the following examples are: Is there any difference between the types of codeswitching used in the different data sets? Is there a case of a turnover of the Matrix language? Is there a case of a mixed language formation?

The main premises to be supported, especially for these data, are the following: First, codeswitching among the Israeli Druze has been changing over the years from classic codeswitching to composite codeswitching. Second, the turnover does not go to full completion but stops along the way, forming a new mixed language.

Table 3 shows the total number of the sampled CPs,[5] as well as morphemes coming from both languages recorded in the previous data sets (2000).

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5   Myers-Scotton (2010) chooses the CP (projection of complementizer, i.e. a clause with a complementizer, where the complementizer is often null) as a unit of analysis for the following reasons: (i) A CP is the highest unit projected by lexical elements and can be defined in terms of phrase structure. (ii) It is used as a unit of analysis for different syntactic models. (iii) A CP can contain null elements, thus avoids problems regarding the status of constituents with null elements such as exclamations.

TABLE 3   Proportion of the languages in codeswitching (2000)

Language	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Both languages
Total number of CPS			602
Total number of morphemes	817	698	1515
Percentage	53.9%	46.1%	100%

5.1   *Examples of Codeswitching*

Examples (1) through (6) illustrate Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching from the previous data sets (2000). All examples are of multilingual speakers fluent in both Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew, with Palestinian Arabic being their native tongue. In classic codeswitching, the Matrix Language sets the morphosyntactic frame. Embedded Language lexemes, however, are either integrated into the Matrix Language frame; appear in bare form, or as part of an Embedded Language island. In the Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching data recorded in 2000, such constraints are realized. In (1) there is an instance of a common switch in which the definite article in Palestinian Arabic *el-* or *al-* 'the', which is not a free morpheme but is prefixed to nouns and adjectives in Arabic, is actually prefixed to nouns in Hebrew, thus Hebrew nouns are inserted into an Arabic frame. Hebrew-derived elements are marked in red; other elements are from Arabic, morphemes under discussion or focal are in bold.

(1) *šū   kanet **el-ṭaʕana** innu lamma daššar-u   awwal marra?*
     What was   the-claim that   when   split-PST-3PL first   time?
     'What was the claim when they split the first time?'

In (2) a young Druze lady, who is addressing a friend that she was supposed to meet with earlier, produces a Hebrew masculine noun inflected with the Arabic feminine plural suffix *-āt*, which is usually suffixed to the feminine singular stem of the nouns in Arabic, thus forming a hybrid plural. In Hebrew, the plural suffix *-ím* is added to the masculine singular nouns, thus the word *pkakím* '(traffic) jams' would be the standard. It is important to note that the word *pkák* '(traffic) jam' is a case of a core borrowing, since Arabic has the viable equivalents *izdiħam* '(traffic) jam' and *izdiħam-āt* '(traffic) jams'. This is a sign of phase I of the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis since the core borrowing of the Hebrew word *pkák* has its structure becoming lexicalized in the Matrix Language, Arabic, as it is given plural according to the Arabic pattern. Mat-

ras (2009) suggests viewing the phenomena of borrowing and codeswitching as related points on a continuum. According to his theory, the word *pkák*, for instance, would have started at one point and moved to the other end of the codeswitching-borrowing continuum.

(2) *Slixa* *inno t?akhar-et*   *heik*   *pašút* *kan fi ktir* *pkak-āt*
     Sorry that be late-1SG-PST like that simply was in a lot traffic-PL
     ʕa-tˤariq
     on-the way
     'Sorry that I was late, there was simply a lot of traffic on the way.'

In (3) a Druze male speaking to his wife uses an Arabic auxiliary for a verb in the future in Hebrew, in which auxiliaries are not commonly used in such a case. Instead, the verb itself is inflected for the future tense. In Hebrew the sentence would be: 'ani *i-stader* eito, al tid?ag-í'

(3) *ana* **raħ** *a-stad-er*   *maʕ-o*   *ál* *tid?ag-í*
     I   will 1SG-FUT-get/along with-him not worry-2SG-PRS
     'I will get along with him, do not worry.'

Example (4) shows a Hebrew verb which is inflected with the Arabic pronominal clitic *a-* and followed by an Arabic direct object. In Arabic *a-* is prefixed to the verb after an auxiliary to mark the future tense, whereas in Hebrew *lé* is prefixed to the verb in such cases.

(4) *ana raħ*   **a-nak-é**   *el-beit*   *issa*
     I   going to 1SG-clean-FUT the-house now
     'I am going to clean the house now'

In Arabic, the sentence would be:

     'ana raħ **a-nadˤef** el-beit issa'

     I going to 1SG-clean-FUT the-house now 'I am going to clean the house now'

And in Hebrew, the equivalent would be:

‘aní holex-et *le-nakót* ét ha-bayet ‘axšáv’

I going to-1SGF INF-clean the-house now ‘I am going to clean the house now’

Example (5) shows codeswitching that is reflected in change in word order. In the example below, a Druze lady switches the word order of the Hebrew determiner *ka-zot* and the noun *semlá* to match it to the order in Arabic. In Arabic it would be *heik festyan* (such (a) dress), whereas in Israeli Hebrew it would be *semlá ka-zót* ((a) dress such) ‘such a dress’. In addition, the speaker uses an Arabic copula *kon-et* ‘was’ with a Hebrew adjective *mogb-elet* ‘limited’ which shows agreement with the Arabic pronoun 1SGF. This example illustrates the role of Arabic as the Matrix Language, since it sets the morpheme order of the frame.

(5) *ei   ʕa-lʕaša   tabaʕ-ha jeb-et   kaz-ót semlá*
     Yeah on-the dinner of-her   bring-1SG-PST such   a dress
     bteʕer-fi   haða el.. bteʕer-fi   kon-et   mogb\<e\>l-et hai
     know-2SG-PRS this   the know-2SG-PRS was-1SGF limited-1SG   this
     el-marra ʕašan   batˤn-i
     the-time because of (pregnancy) belly-my
     ‘Yeah, I brought such a dress for her dinner party, you know this … you know I was limited this time because of my (pregnancy) belly.’

In (6) there is case in which the speaker uses a Hebrew verb and an adjective that agree with an Arabic pronoun in gender and number. In addition, the speaker uses an associative from Arabic *taʕ-hun* ‘their’ with a Hebrew noun *ʔofi* ‘character’.

(6) *hunni ʔoh\<a\>v-ím   derex agav šeʕmūm hunni mešaʕmem-ím*
     They   love-3PL-PRS by the way boredom they   boring-3PL
     b-el-ʔófi   taʕ-hun
     in-the-character of-them
     ‘They love, by the way, boredom, they are boring in their character.’

From the examples given above, it is evident that this level of codeswitching is part of the first phase of the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis. The first phase is reflected herein by the frequent Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching occurrences, while maintaining the role of the Matrix Language, Arabic, as the main provider of the system morphemes. Hebrew, which is the Embedded Language

TABLE 4   Proportion of the languages in codeswitching (2017)

Language	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Mixed
Total number of CPs			1412
Total number of morphemes	1267	1458	2725
Percentage	46.5%	53.5%	100%

in this data set, provides content morphemes and Embedded Language islands that fit into the Matrix Language frame model, thus maintaining its role as an Embedded Language.

Table 4 shows the total number of the sampled CPs, as well as morphemes coming from both languages recorded in the present data sets (2017).

In the 1993 version of the Matrix Language Frame model (MLF), Myers-Scotton presented one of the principles defining the Matrix Language as being the source of more morphemes in a given discourse sample. However, in her later version (1997), she completely rejected that claim and it no longer appeared in any of her publications ever since. The data presented in table 4, however, explicitly show that Israeli Hebrew is the source of more morphemes in the present sample. That obviously does not define Israeli Hebrew as the Matrix Language, but it definitely adds ambiguity and raises questions about its evident dominance and undermines the role of Arabic as a matrix language. The data specifically show that Israeli Hebrew is the unmarked choice that quantitatively supplies more morphemes to the discourse than Palestinian Arabic, which appears to be the marked choice in the present discourse sample. Table 5, however, reinforces the dominance of Hebrew and shakes Arabic's role as the Matrix Language since Hebrew introduces a significant number of total system morphemes and more late system morphemes than Arabic. It is important to note that such system morphemes appear both independently and in embedded language islands. The introduction of the different system morphemes is a clear indication of a change in the morphosyntactic frame structuring the language. Table 5 shows the total number of the different types of sampled morphemes used in each language, as well as the total number of the different morphemes coming from both languages recorded in the present data sets (2017).

TABLE 5   Breakdown of the types of morphemes (2017)

Language	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Total	Examples
Content morphemes	571	854	1425	*Eštaret*/ARAB 'bought' *xanút*/HEB 'shop'
Early system morphemes	401	273	674	*el-*/ARAB 'the' *zé*/HEB 'this'
Bridge system morphemes	102	147	249	*taʕ-hun*/ARAB 'of them= their/theirs' *šel-í*/HEB 'of me=my/mine'
Outsider system morphemes	193	184	377	*-li*/DAT/ARAB 'for me' *lí*/DAT/HEB 'for me'

5.2   *Examples of Codeswitching and Convergence* (*Composite Codeswitching*)

Examples (7) through (22) illustrate codeswitching and convergence to Israeli Hebrew in the present data sets (2017). All examples are of multilingual speakers fluent in both Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew, with Palestinian Arabic being their native tongue. Six of the participants are the same participants from the previous study conducted in 2000, thus the selected examples are taken mainly from their speech. The present data sets indicate that Hebrew plays a role in setting the morphosyntactic frame, which is a sign of a composite Matrix Language formation. Example (7) illustrates the Arabic determiner *el-* 'the' as a frequently reoccurring early system morpheme followed by Hebrew content morphemes, e.g. *xanoot* and *simla* in this specific example. This mixed DP structure is the most common DP structure found in the data. The uniqueness of the aforementioned DP structure is discussed in more detail in the following chapters. In (7), there is also an instance in which the Hebrew content morpheme *ve* 'and', which is usually prefixed to Hebrew morphemes, is actually prefixed to an Arabic content morpheme *eštar-et* 'bought' while assimilating the *e* from both languages. Example (7) also represents convergence of morphological realization pattern as the speaker puts an Arabic possessive phrase, that is, Arabic words, into a Hebrew pattern (*lal-ʕores tabaʕ ʕAnan*/ARAB, *laxatuna šel ʕAnan*/HEB 'for the wedding of ʕAnan') instead of the Arabic counterpart (*la-ʕores ʕAnan* 'for ʕAnan's wedding'). Hebrew-derived elements are marked in red; other elements are from Arabic, morphemes under discussion or focal are in bold.

(7) *Mbareħ roħ-et* *Sala **el**-xanút **ve**-štar-et* *hai **el**-simlá*
Yesterday go-1SG-PST To the-shop and-buy-1SG-PST this the-dress
lal-Sores tabaS SAnan
for the-wedding of SAnan
'Yesterday I went to the shop and bought this dress for 'Anan's wedding.'

In (8) there is an instance in which the Hebrew connector *ve* 'and' is prefixed
to an Arabic preposition *mIn* 'from'. Other common switches show multiple
instances in which Hebrew modifiers are used with Arabic elements.

(8) *áz ǧebet mIn Send-ha heik eši meʔód tsamúd*
So bring-1SG-PST from at-her like this something very tight
*mIn Hoan **ve**-mIn hoan byiji kazé koħli*
from Here and-from here come-3SG-PRS like this navy blue
'So I brought from her something like this, very tight from here and from
here it comes navy blue like this.'

In (9) we have a case of a Druze lady who prefixes the Hebrew preposition *be-*
'in' to an Arabic article prefixed to a Hebrew noun (*be-l-baSaya*), in addition
to using the Arabic grammatical rule of inflecting possessive adjective suffix
to a verb while assimilating the consonant, and applies it upon a Hebrew verb
(*yetapel-i*). In Hebrew, possessive dative pronouns occur as free morphemes
and are not suffixed to verbs. The speaker inflects the possessive dative pro-
noun *lí* 'for me' in Hebrew to a verb in Hebrew while assimilating the consonant
l instead of using the Hebrew counterpart (**yetapel li** *baba'aya* 'treat my prob-
lem'). In Arabic it would be **y-Sālej-li** (*e*)*l-moškle*. This example has two CPs with
the Arabic complementizer *Sašan* 'so that' between them, and the second CP
coming mainly from Hebrew.

(9) *roħet la-Send el-rofé Sašan yetapel-i*
Go-1SG-PST to-at the-doctor so that treat-3SG-FUT-for me
be-l-baSaya
in-the-problem
'I went to the doctor so that he would treat my problem.'

In (10) we have a case of a Druze lady who uses a Hebrew negation marker *ló*
'not' with an Arabic verb *ħat-eit* 'put'.

(10) *ana ló ħat-ēt yotér medái késef*
I not put-1SG-PST too much money
'I did not … put too much money.'

In (11) there is an opposite case in which speaker B uses the Arabic nega-
tion marker *miš* 'not' with a Hebrew verb *ʕokévet* 'follow'. In addition, speaker
A inflects the Arabic pronominal clitic *b-* to the Hebrew verb *yagiš* 'present',
which is an indication of a composite. In Arabic the equivalent would be *be-
qadem*, while in Hebrew it would be *mI-gíš*.

(11) a. *qadei?   kull waħad keʔelú akam men yom b-yagíš?*
        How many? each one   as if how many day PRS-present/3SG
        'How many (days)? That is, how many days does each one present?'

    b. *ba-ʕref-eš   ta-ʔemét ana miš ʕokev-et   wara ló*
       1SG-know-PRS-NEG the-truth I   not follow-1SG-PRS after not
       yodaʕ-at   nerʔá lí yomein fi-l-jomʕa   heik
       know-1SGF-PRS seems Me two days In-the-week like that
       eši
       something
       'I don't know, the truth is I am not keeping track (of them), I don't know,
       I think two days a week, something like that.'

Example (12) shows a Hebrew bridge system morpheme—the relative pronoun
še- 'that' being inflected with the Arabic pronoun *neħna* 'we'. In addition, the
example shows the use of an Arabic late system morpheme—the pronominal
clitic *m-*, which co-indexes the subject, inflected to the Hebrew verb *y-axlif*
'change', thus showing another indication of a composite. The Arabic counter-
part would be *m-In-ɣayyer* while the correct Hebrew form would be *n-axlíf*.

(12) *ed-dar   keʔelú Elli neħna axrei še-neħna nu-skun   fi-ha*
     the-house that is That we   after that-we 1PL-live-FUT in-it
     m-n-axlíf   el-rehút
     1PL-FUT-change the-furniture
     'The house, that is, that we, after, that we live in, we'll change the furniture.'

Example (13) shows an additional composite case in which the Hebrew neg-
ation morpheme *ein* 'not' is used with an Arabic pronoun. The speaker suf-
fixes the Hebrew dative pronoun *lí* 'for me' to the negation marker *ein*, a pat-
tern which is generally used in Arabic, but less so in Hebrew. In addition, an
Arabic early system morpheme—the singular feminine demonstrative *hai*, is
used with a Hebrew plural noun, thus the agreement rule for both languages is
violated. However, the Arabic feminine demonstrative *hai* was used instead of
the masculine demonstrative *hada* to show agreement with the gender of the

Israeli noun. However, the Hebrew noun is inflected with the Arabic determiner *el*, which would be incorrect in Hebrew as it will not take a determiner in such cases.

(13) *ana* *ein-lí*   *savlanút* la **hai**   *el-štuyót*
       I   not have-for me patience for this-SGF the nonsense-PLF
       'I do not have patience for this nonsense.'

In Arabic the sentence would be:

'ana **ma ʕend-īš** sˤaber la **hada (e)l-habal**'

I NEG have-not patience for DEM the-nonesense 'I do not have patience for this nonsense'

In Hebrew the equivalent would be:

'(ani) **ein lí** savlanút **la-štuyót ha-ʔele**'

I not-have for-me patience for-nonesense DEM/PL 'I do not have patience for this nonsense'

Example (14) represents convergence of lexical-conceptual structure that is reflected in change in the semantic meaning of a verb. In this example we have a case in which the Arabic verb *ʕabar* 'crossed' and the Israeli verb *ʕavar* 'passed/crossed', that are phonetically similar, though not semantically so, is used to covey the meaning of the Hebrew counterpart. The use of this verb is based upon the Hebrew verb *ʕavar*, which conveys two meanings; both 'passed' and 'crossed'. The existing sense of the Arabic verb *ʕabar*, has nothing to do with the meaning of *pass*, like the Hebrew one does.

(14) *hōwi* **ʕabar**   *el-mevxán be-hetstaynút*
       He   cross-3SG-PST the-test   in-excellence
       'He passed the test excellently.'

In (15) there is an example of inter-sentential codeswitching, in which speaker B, who produces a whole clause in Hebrew, uses a Hebrew early system morpheme—the singular masculine demonstrative *zé* 'this' as it would have been used in Arabic, but not as much in Hebrew though. In Hebrew, the plural form *elé* 'these' is usually used, whereas in Arabic, it would be the singular form *hai*

'this'. Therefore, the singular element in *zé* is co-indexed with the Arabic singular element of 'life' (ħayā). In addition, late outsider system morphemes in the form of verb agreement are taken from Hebrew, as both speaker A and speaker B use them with Hebrew verbs, showing agreement with Arabic pronouns. Such usage is quite recurrent in the present data.

(15) a. *kén* ana *ʕar-fe*   **hiye** kaman ma-kane-teš   *ló*
       Yes I   know-1SGF-PRS   she   also   NEG-is-3SGF-PST no
       yad-ʕá   *le-mtsó*   *ét ʕatsm-á*
       know-3SGF-PST INF-to find ACC herself-3SGF
       'Yes, I know, she also wasn't, didn't know (how) to find her way'

     b. *zé* *šū*   *badd-i*   *qul-ek*   *ló* *yod-aʕát*   *zé*
        this what want-1SG-PRS tell-2 SGF no know-1SGF-PRS this/DEM
        xayím *mešaʕmem-ím* *meʔód*
        life   boring-PL   very
        'This, what can I tell you, (I) don't know, this is a very boring life.'

Example (16) represents convergence of morphological realization patterns that is reflected in change in word order. In the example below, a Druze lady switches the word order of the Arabic adverb *nebqa* 'sometime' and the verb *nrūħ* 'go' to match it to the order in Hebrew. In Arabic it would be *la-wein na-nebqa nrūħ* (to where we'll sometime go), whereas in Hebrew it would be *leʔán ne-léx mataišehó* (to where we'll go sometime) 'where we'll go to sometime'. In addition, as in the previous example, the Hebrew outsider system morpheme *-aʕat* is inflected with a Hebrew verb to show agreement with the speaker (1SGF).

(16) *ló* *yod-aʕát*   *la-wein* **nan-rūħ**   *nebqa*
     not know-1SGF-PRS to-where 1PL-FUT-go sometime
     'I don't know where we'll go to sometime.'

In (17) there is another example of change in word order, which is reflected in switching the order of a noun and an adjective. In this example the speaker uses the Hebrew adjective *stám* 'nonesense/stupid' with the Arabic noun *šaɣlat* 'things' while flipping the order between the two to match the Hebrew pattern. In Arabic it would be *šaɣl-āt taf-ha* (things stupid), while in Hebrew the order of the two would be *stám dvar-ím* (stupid things) 'stupid things'. Also, the possessive Hebrew element *-i* occurs as part of the Hebrew island *me-bxenat-í* 'from my perspective' to agree with the Arabic pronoun *ana* 'I'. In addition,

as in the previous examples, Hebrew outsider system morphemes are inflected with Hebrew verbs to show agreement with the Arabic pronoun (1SG).

(17) *yaʕni* **ana me-bxenat-í** *ló* **a-škiyáʕ** *yoter medai*
meaning I from-perspective-my not 1SG-FUT invest too much
a-štri *dār* *ve-še-ye-hye-lí* *néxes* *wa-la*
1SG-FUT buy house and-that-FUT-be-for me asset and-not
a-škiyáʕ *ʕala* **stám** *šayl-āt* *bteʕer-fi*
1SG-FUT invest on purposeless things know-PRS-2SGF
'That means, from my own perspective, I will not invest too much, I will buy a house so that I will have an asset and I will not invest (money) on stupid things, you know.'

In (18) there is a case in which the quantifier *kol-am* 'all of them', which is an outsider late system morpheme that must look outside its verb for information about its form, is used in Hebrew instead of its Arabic equivalent *kull-hun* or *kull-ayat-(h)un*. Also, as in the previous examples, a Hebrew outsider system morpheme is inflected with a Hebrew verb to show agreement with the Arabic pronoun (1SG).

(18) *hunni* **kol-ám** *raħ-u* *ʕal-al-xatuná* **ana** *ló* **rats-ití**
They all-of them go-3PL PST to-the-wedding I not want-1SG PST
a-ruħ *la-ɣad*
INF/to-go to-there
'All of them went to the wedding; I didn't want to go there.'

Note that in (19) there is a case in which another outsider system morpheme is taken from Hebrew rather than Arabic, this time it is the complementizer *bešvil-á* 'for her', used instead of its Arabic counterpart *ʕašan-ha*. The complementizer *bešvíl* 'for', just like its Arabic counterpart *ʕašan*, has to look for information outside of its verb to shape its form. It is co-indexed with Eman (3SGF). Here again, as in the previous examples, a Hebrew outsider system morpheme is inflected with a Hebrew verb to show agreement with the Arabic pronoun (3SGF).

(19) a. *kén w-keef* *Eman* **me-stader-ét** *ɣad* *maʕ* *kull* *el-laxáts*
Yes and-how Eman PRS-manage-3SGF there with all the pressure
w-el-hai?
and-the-this?
'Yes, and how is Eman managing there with all the pressure and such?'

b. *besedér besáx hakól ein laxáts* yaʕni   šū   yaʕni
   fine   after all   no pressure meaning what meaning
   má?   *Im-ha* *kvár*   ʕemlet   *el-kababi* *bešvil-á* ʕend
   what-EXC mom-her already do-3SG-PST the-Kababi for-her   at
   oxt-ha
   sister her
   'Fine, after all there is no pressure, I mean, what for? Her mom had
   already done the Kababi (type of food) for her at her sister's.'

Interestingly, in (20) the Hebrew preposition *lé* 'to' is prefixed to the Arabic
proper name *elquds* 'the Jerusalem' (Jerusalem), where in Arabic the equival-
ent ʕala is used interchangeably with the inflected form ʕa-, thus 'to Jerusalem'
would be ʕala (*e*)*lquds*/ʕa-*lquds* in this sentence, whereas in Hebrew it would
be *lé-yerušalayim*. It is noteworthy that a phonetically similar preposition exists
in Arabic *la-* 'to/for'. Such a similarity may pose some confusion regarding the
origin of the morpheme. However, the Arabic preposition *la* is not used for
places but for people and things. For example: *aʕtʕet-ha **la**-ʕanan* 'I gave it to
'Anan'. This shift to Hebrew, the 'old' Embedded language, not only violates the
Uniform Structure Principle which gives preference to Matrix Language gram-
matical elements, but also illustrates a turnover of the system morpheme prin-
ciple of the Matrix Language frame. Here again, as in the previous examples,
a Hebrew outsider system morpheme is inflected with a Hebrew verb to show
agreement with the Arabic pronoun (2PL). It is interesting to note that although
the Hebrew VP *taʕvir-ú* 'move-2PL/FUT' is elected over the Arabic counterpart
tonoql-u, it is applied upon an Arabic pattern, since in Hebrew the correct form
of the verb in such a sentence would be *le-haʕvír* 'to move'.

(20) *badk-o*   *taʕvir-ú*   *ét zéh*   *lé-l-quds?*
     want-2PL/PRS move-2PL/FUT ACC this to-the-Jerusalem
     'Do you want to move this to Jerusalem?'

In (21) there is a case in which the speaker uses the bridge late system morph-
eme from Hebrew *šél* 'of' with nouns and determiners from Arabic. *Šél* is a
possessive particle that refers to the possessor of the discussed possession.
When a pronoun is used to express possession, a pronominal suffix is attached
to it to indicate the person, gender and number (Dekel, 2014). In this example
šel-í is co-indexed with first person (me) and *šel-xá* is co-indexed with second
person masculine (you). This example also contradicts Myers-Scotton's (1993)
principle that the system morphemes coming from the Embedded Language
must come in the form of embedded language islands, thus showing another
indication that there is a case of composite Matrix Language formation.

(21) *hada el-finjan šel-í   hadak šel-xá*
     this   the cup of-me that   of-you/2SG
     'This cup is mine, that one is yours.'

In (22) a Druze guy uses a Hebrew auxiliary for a verb in the future in Arabic. In addition, a Hebrew outsider system morpheme is inflected with a Hebrew verb to show agreement with the Arabic pronoun (2SGF).

(22) *ana holéx   a-ħleq   šaʕ-ri   tsrix-á   mašhó?*
     I   going to FUT/1SG-cut hair-my need-2SG/PRS something?
     'I am going to cut my hair, do you need anything?'

The above examples and tables indicate that there is a case of composite matrix language formation of Arabic and Hebrew. This composite conforms to stage II of the Matrix Language Turnover hypothesis. It is evident from the examples that both languages play the role of setting the morphosyntactic frame. There is an increase in the Hebrew lexical items and system morphemes are realized also in Hebrew, the previous embedded language, mainly in conjunction with content morphemes drawn from it as well. This significant introduction of Hebrew system morphemes appearing both independently and in embedded language islands shows a breakdown of the role of Arabic as the sole basis of the Matrix Language frame and a formation of a new, composite matrix language. As can be seen in the examples above, the composite language includes Lexical-conceptual and morphological realization structures coming from both languages; Arabic and Hebrew. The morpheme order similarity between Arabic and Hebrew makes it hard to categorize this as belonging to either language, thus there are few cases in which it is mentioned. For the reasons mentioned above and the fact that the turnover does not go to full completion but is arrested at some point, we have a case of mixed language formation.

6   'Israbic'[6]—A New Mixed Language

The data indicate a mixed language formation as there is a matrix language turnover underway which is arrested and does not go to full completion. It is evident from the examples that Arabic and Hebrew do not entirely change in

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6   I originally coined the name 'Palebrew' for this variety, however, after presenting it in a conference and realising that most academics perceived Palestinian Arabic to be the variety that is spoken in the Palestinian territories, I decided to change it to 'Israbic'.

matrix language dominance, but stop through the process to form a composite matrix language that is a combination of both languages. The turnover to Hebrew was arrested to the point of having extensive Hebrew morphosyntactic elements, though not to a complete shift. According to the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis and the definitions of mixed languages, here lies a case of a mixed language formation. This is reflected in the splits not only in features, but in systems of features as well, such as the split in system morphemes and in late system morphemes as well, with the Hebrew introduction of both bridges and outsiders. This illustrates a split in the morphosyntactic frame itself. Since this split language includes morphosyntactic elements from both Israeli Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic, I shall call it 'Israbic' (Israeli +Arabic). I do not call it 'Israeli Druze Arabic' due to the fact that it might be used by other individuals from the Arabic speaking community in Israel who are not Druze. I also do not call it Arabrew (Arabic + Hebrew) in order to distinguish it from the "variety" that some are trying to ascribe to the language that is spoken by Palestinians and the general Arab citizens of Israel, which is characterized by borrowings from Hebrew and classical codeswitching (cf. Hawker, 2018). It should be noted that the name of the language is used for research purposes only and was not intended to raise any socio-political issues.

It is noteworthy that the Israeli Arab citizens code switch as well, however, their codeswitching behaviour conforms to the classic type (Abu Elhija, 2017; Hawker, 2018). Codeswitching among Arabs who live in mixed cities with a Jewish majority and Bedouins who voluntarily serve in the Israeli army is much more intense than that of the rest of the Arab citizens (Christians and Muslims from the North and the Triangle region). However, codeswitching features of the majority of Arabs in mixed cities and the Bedouins also conform to the classic type since they exhibit mainly inter sentential switches and borrowings. The variety that is used by Druze speakers exhibits much more intense codeswitching and mixing of morphosyntactic features and conforms to the composite type that results in the mixed variety coined herein as 'Israbic'.

The main structural features that 'Israbic' includes are: (I) Hebrew and Arabic nouns both occur frequently and indistinctively; (II) Verbs come mainly from Hebrew; (III) Arabic definite articles inflected to both Arabic and Hebrew nouns; however, the mixed DP (an Arabic determiner inflected with a Hebrew noun) is the most common DP structure (IV) Hebrew definite article inflected solely to Hebrew nouns; (V) Hebrew possessive adjectives are used, agreeing in gender and number with both Arabic and Hebrew nouns; (VI) Arabic possessive adjectives are used, agreeing in gender and number with both Hebrew and Arabic nouns; (VII) Hebrew prepositions are used with both Arabic and Hebrew elements; (VIII) Arabic prepositions are used with both Hebrew and

Arabic elements; (IX) Hebrew adjectives that agree in gender and number are used with both Arabic and Hebrew nouns; (X) Arabic adjectives that agree in gender and number are used with both Hebrew and Arabic nouns; (XI) Hebrew demonstratives that agree in gender and number are used with both Arabic and Hebrew nouns; (XII) Arabic demonstratives that agree in gender and number are used with both Hebrew and Arabic nouns; (XIII) Adverbs come from both languages; (XIV) Quantifiers that do not agree in gender and number come mainly from Hebrew; (XV) Quantifiers that agree in gender and number come from both languages; (XVI) Numerals come mainly from Hebrew; (XVII) Discourse markers come mainly from Hebrew.

7   Conclusion

The different native Arabic speaking communities in Israel code-switch to varying degrees of intensity. The Arab citizens who reside in mixed cities with a Jewish majority and the Bedouins of the north who voluntarily serve in the Israeli army share much more codeswitching features in their speech than the rest of the Muslims and Christians in Israel. However, codeswitching behaviour of the majority of Arabs in mixed cities and the Bedouins conforms to the classic type since it is characterized mainly by inter sentential switches and borrowings that do not cause major language change. The language of the Druze community in Israel, however, appears to be undergoing a process of language change. This change is reflected in the extensive intra-sentential and word-internal codeswitching between Arabic and Hebrew that has brought about convergence toward Hebrew and a composite, split language formation (*See* Chapter 4 for detailed comparison of codeswitching behaviour of the different Native Arabic speaking communities in Isreal).

This split language formation can be explained under the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis. Codeswitching between both languages started at phase I of the hypothesis, which is reflected in frequent intra-clausal codeswitching occurrences, as well as core borrowings and lexicalization of embedded language structures in the matrix language. Along the path, a composite language is formed, carrying morphosyntactic elements of both languages in contact, the previous matrix language (Arabic) and the former embedded language (Hebrew). The Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching data herein indicate that over the years, convergence to Hebrew has brought about significant instances of Hebrew system morphemes brought into Arabic. The system morphemes introduced from Hebrew include all three types of system morphemes as outlined by the 4-M model: early system morphemes, and two kinds of late system

morphemes, namely bridge system morphemes and outsider system morphemes. Since the turnover into Hebrew did not go to completion but stopped "along the way", it was a clear sign of a split language formation. Since both Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew set the morphosyntactic frame of this composite language, we can call this new mixed language 'Israbic'.

Finally, identity factors and language attitudes are possible motivating features for such composite split language formation. In the case of the Druze community in Israel, such factors can play a prominent role in its language change. As the Israeli Druze people are "sandwiched" between the Arabs and Jews, they tend to seek distinctness through their language by forming a new, distinct speech that differs from that of both groups. Such distinct speech is reflected in convergence toward Hebrew and the extensive use of Hebrew lexemes and morphosyntactic structures and up to the point of composite mixed language formation. By forming this mixed language, not only do they distinguish themselves from both groups, but also emphasize their distinctness. It is also the case that since the Israeli Druze community generally holds Arabic in lower regard in comparison to Hebrew (Isleem, 2016), it decreases the feasibility of maintaining it and increases the likelihood of either creating a new mixed language, which is the case here, or getting to phase III of the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis, which is characterized by a complete matrix language turnover, hence a complete shift into Hebrew. At the same time, however, by not having a complete shift to Hebrew, they maintain a separate identity linking back to their historical roots.

Passing the Test of Split: Israbic—A New Mixed Language

Chapter Preview[1]

Israbic is a language variety that is spoken by a majority of the Druze community in Israel and is characterised by a mixture of Israeli Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic. Longitudinal data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching from the Israeli Druze community collected in 2000, 2017 and 2018 indicate that Israbic went through a gradual process of language mixing. The process started with codeswitching, was followed by a composite matrix language formation and ultimately resulted in a mixed language. Some linguists (see Backus 2003; Bakker, 2003) claim that mixed languages cannot arise out of codeswitching. Conversely, others (see Auer, 1999; Myers-Scotton, 2003) have proposed theoretical models to mixed languages as outcomes of codeswitching, and some (see McConvell, 2008; McConvel & Meakins, 2005; Meakins, 2012; O'Shannessy, 2012) have provided empirical evidence under which mixed languages arise out of codeswitching. This research sought to gather further empirical evidence showing that Israbic is another mixed language that arose out of codeswitching. This study also wished to emphasise the uniqueness of Israbic, which is a mixture of closely related languages. Such mixtures are scarce in the literature (Auer, 2014). An examination of Israbic in relation to Auer's and Myers-Scotton's models and general definitions in the literature and comparisons of Israbic with other widely accepted mixed languages reveals that Israbic is an excellent example of a mixed language. However, such models and definitions are based on existing languages that have been subject to discussion in the literature. Of these languages, the majority arose from contact between languages from different language families, whereas this study is concerned with investigating a mixed language from the same language family. Thus, this raises the question as to whether such concepts have the same validity for closely related languages.

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1   **Introduction**

Mixed languages, which are also referred to as split languages, intertwined languages, hybrid languages, fusion languages or *fused lects*, are a linguistically debatable issue. Language contact researchers accept that mixed languages are generally based on input from two different languages or varieties; however, debate continues as to which models of emergence, degree of convergence and structural features can actually be regarded as 'true' mixed languages. Some linguists such as Bakker and Muysken (1994) contend that the basic characteristics of such languages are the features of different whole subsystems and abrupt emergence. Conversely, others like Myers-Scotton (1998, 2002, 2003) and Auer (1998, 1999, 2014) contend that gradual codeswitching-based approaches provide the basis for the genesis of mixed languages. A number of mixed language researchers (see Backus 2003; Bakker 1997, 2003; Muysken, 1997), disapprove of codeswitching-based approaches while others such as McConvell (2008), McConvel & Meakins (2005) and Meakins (2011, 2012, 2013) assert that mixed languages can indeed be an outcome of codeswitching. These researchers cite the mixed Australian language Gurindji Kriol as a living proof of a language that is a direct result of pervasive codeswitching.

   In relation to codeswitching-based approaches, one of the main questions that arises is how mixed languages can be separated from other languages that exhibit intensive codeswitching, code-mixing or convergence. In an attempt to answer this question, codeswitching researchers have developed possible models for codeswitching-based mixed languages. Codeswitching specialists Auer (1999) and Myers-Scotton (2003) have proposed two main models to identify the uniqueness of such languages and distinguish them from other types of contact phenomena.

   In the previous chapter (see also Kheir, 2019) I used Myers-Scotton's matrix language turnover hypothesis to show that the language (i.e., Israbic) of the Druze community in Israel had undergone a process of convergence and composite matrix language formation, which resulted in a mixed language. In the present study, a more thorough testing of Israbic was undertaken to determine whether it can be categorised as a mixed language. This case study is important, as there is little evidence of mixed languages arising from codeswitching in the literature. Further, unlike the majority of 'true' mixed languages reported in the literature, this particular language comes from the same language family (West Semitic) and comprises a mixture that is scarce in the literature (Auer, 2014). Thus, the results may reveal different mixing styles. Further, the fact that the process of its change is ongoing, may lead to interesting linguistic behaviours in the future, such as a complete language shift to Hebrew

or another matrix language turnover back to Arabic. The process of the language change of Israbic has been well documented by the author from 2000 to present. Thus, the language has been subject to continuous study over time. The present study examined data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching and the convergence of the Israeli Druze community under the different models proposed by Auer (1999, 2014) and Myers-Scotton (2003). The data used in this study were based on different data sets from the years 2000, 2017 and 2018. All the data were derived from recordings of spontaneous speech of Druze interlocutors, who are proficient in both Arabic and Hebrew. The recordings were not made in the presence of the researcher. All the examples involving Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching were audio-recorded in different places in Israel.

This chapter begins by providing a general overview of the Israbic language. Next, general definitions of different contact phenomena and examples of mixed languages are provided, after which characterisations and special qualifications of mixed languages under Myer-Scotton's (2003) and Auer's (1999, 2014) models are detailed. Next, Israbic is examined in relation to these characterisations and qualifications and examples are provided for each. Israbic is then compared to four languages that have received considerable attention in the literature and that have been classified as true mixed languages (i.e., Michif, Ma'a, Mednyj Aleut and Gurindji Kriol). When considered in relation to Myer-Scotton's and Auer's models and general definitions, Israbic stands out as an excellent example of a mixed language. Further, compared to the other mixed languages mentioned in this chapter, the development and structure of Israbic most closely resembles the northern Australian language Gurindji Kriol. Based upon the results and the fact that both languages in contact (i.e. Arabic and Hebrew) come from the same language family (West Semitic), I argue in favour of the codeswitching-based approach, but emphasise that there is no one prototype for mixed languages and different contact situations may result in different types of mixed languages with different mixing strategies. Thus, mixed languages that come from unrelated languages must be differentiated from mixed languages that come from the same language family. Further, there is no one perfect universal model that can account for all types of mixed languages.

2   Israbic: The Language of the Druze in Israel

Israbic is spoken by a majority of the Druze people who reside in the northern part of Israel, especially in the Druze towns of Julis, Daliyat El-Carmel and Osfiya (see figure 1). According to CBS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018),

the total number of the Druze community in Israel is 141,000, which constitutes around 1.6% of Israel's total population. The total number of the Druze community in Julis is 6,200, which constitutes 100% of the total population of the village, the total number in Daliyat El-Carmel is 16,500, which constitutes 97% of the total population of the town and the highest number of Druze concentration in Israel, and the total number in Osfia is 9,100, which constitutes 76% of the total population of the town. Israbic is apparently the main language spoken by the majority of the Druze community in Israel. Speakers under the age of approximately 55 years use it as the primary mode of communication within the community.

Israbic is a mixture of Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew. The name 'Israbic' itself is a mixture of the words 'Israeli' and 'Arabic'. The Druze community in Israel experiences ongoing language contact and interaction with Israeli Hebrew speakers, mainly at the workplace, higher education institutions, shopping centres, public institutions, government services facilities and in the military (almost all Druze males are subject to compulsory military service). The Israeli Druze speak Palestinian Arabic (which the speakers consider their first language)[2] and Israeli Hebrew (which the speakers consider their second language). The majority of Israeli Druze are fluent in both languages (for the similarities and differences between the two spoken varieties, see Kheir, 2019). The language-change process started with the incorporation of and very extensive and frequent use of Israeli Hebrew, which continued to the point at which extensive codeswitching between Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew became the unmarked mode of communication, and ultimately resulted in the creation of a new mixed language.

According to Isleem (2012, 2013, 2016), who is among the very few researchers to study Druze language behaviour in Israel, Palestinian Arabic is held in lower regard than Israeli Hebrew by the three major populations of the Israeli Druze community (i.e., the young Druze, those with lower level of education and females). Isleem's findings are not sufficient to determine an equivocal trend; however, they do shed light on the ongoing process of the language change. According to Fishman (2004), when speakers of a certain language hold a language in low regard, this can decrease their desire to maintain it. A lack of desire to maintain a certain language may have a direct link to the process of its language change and the creation of a new mixed language.

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2   The Druze who reside in Druze localities speak a Druze dialect of Palestinian Arabic, which slightly differs from other Arabic dialects in Israel (of Arab Christians, Muslims and Palestinians). However, the Druze who reside in mixed Arab/Druze localities as a minority usually speak a similar dialect to the Arab Christians and Muslims in those localities.

The socio-historical origins, formation, development and typological composition of mixed languages have been subject to extensive debate; however, mixed languages can generally be traced to the same sociolinguistic background. According to Bakker (1997:203), these languages 'are spoken by ethnic groups who were originally bilingual but, for some reason, wanted to distinguish themselves collectively from both groups whose languages they speak. The speakers of each of these languages form a distinct group, either a subgroup of a larger division or a completely different group'. The creation of a new mixed language highlights the distinctiveness of a group. Mixed languages have special names that distinguish them from other languages spoken in an area and thus provide the speakers of such languages with distinct forms of identity. As discussed in chapter 2 (see also Kheir, 2019), the Druze community in Israel is 'sandwiched' between the Arabs and Jews; thus for them, the formation of a new mixed language (rather than a complete shift to Israeli Hebrew) denotes their status as a distinct group and distinguishes them from both groups 'whose languages they speak'.

I have only recently coined the term 'Israbic' (see Kheir, 2019). To date, the term Israbic has not been the subject of much research or use within or outside the community. It was not called 'Israeli Druze Arabic', as it may be used by other speakers from the Arabic speaking community in Israel who are not Druze. It was also not called Arabrew (a portmanteau of Arabic and Hebrew), as it can be distinguished from the 'variety' that some are trying to ascribe to the language spoken by Palestinians and the other Arab citizens of Israel, which is characterised by borrowings from Hebrew and classic codeswitching (cf. Hawker, 2018). It should be noted that the name of the language is used for research purposes only and was not intended to raise any socio-political issues. Its speakers perceive it as a form of Arabic that is heavily influenced by Hebrew. This chapter focuses on this unique language and the community that speaks it, as it is one of the most under-researched communities, particularly in the area of Sociolinguistics.

Taking into account its sociolinguistic and historical background (see §5.2), Israbic is a prime candidate for a mixed language and can be compared with language varieties that have been identified as such. Like Gurindji Kriol (Meakins, 2012), it is a mixed language that emerged from codeswitching. It is 'a bilingual mixture, with a split ancestry' that emerged in a situation of fluent bilingualism (see Matras & Bakker, 2003: 1), and developed as an in-group language rather than for communication-need purposes (see Golovko, 2003), i.e., it emerged not from the need to understand each other, as pidgins do, but as a product of identity construction (see Auer, 2014).

FIGURE 1   Map of the Druze distribution in Israel 2018
MAP AND DATA RETRIEVED FROM CBS (2018)

3   Contact Phenomena: Lexical Borrowing, Codeswitching, Convergence and Mixed (Split) Languages

When two or more languages come into contact, several linguistic outcomes may occur from the simple borrowing of lexical items, often defined as 'loanwords', to the more extreme creation of a new dialect or language or even a complete language shift. Other outcomes in between these two extremes include codeswitching and convergence. Borrowing refers to the 'long-term incorporation of an item into the inventory of the recipient language' (Matras, 2009:146). Conversely, codeswitching involves the spontaneous alternating use of two or more languages, either between sentences (where a whole clause is produced in one language before switching to the other) or within the same sentence or clause (where one clause contains elements of the two languages). The debate continues as to which type of use and to what extent each type can actually be referred to as codeswitching. Myers-Scotton (1997: 3) provides a more specific definition of codeswitching in her matrix language frame model in which she defined codeswitching as 'the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of forms from an embedded variety (or varieties) in utterances of a matrix variety during the same conversation'.

The matrix language is the dominant language in the codeswitching production, while the embedded language plays the role of the other language participating in codeswitching, albeit to a lesser extent. The matrix language sets the morphosyntactic frame of sentences in which codeswitching occurs; that is, it marks out the order of the morphemes and provides the syntactically relevant morphemes in constituents containing morphemes from both languages. Extensive research on codeswitching has shown that different codeswitchers within a certain community may have different switching ways and styles. Consequently, scholars in the field have distinguished between various possible types of codeswitching.

Myers-Scotton (2002), divides codeswitching into two main types: *classic codeswitching* and *composite codeswitching*. In *composite codeswitching*, the morphosyntactic frame is provided from both participating languages, resulting in a composite matrix language frame that involves the convergence of the morphosyntactic frame and the features of some grammatical structures. On the more extreme level, convergence involves the splitting of abstract lexical structures in one language and the recombination of them in another language, and thus, the formation of a restructuring of grammatical relations that includes surface-level grammatical morphemes from the stronger group.

There is no general consensus as to what constitutes a mixed language. Indeed, the field is still in transition and under development. However, it is

widely accepted by mixed language researchers that such languages exhibit unique mixtures that make them distinguishable from other languages that have intensive contact features. Due to a number of factors, including social, political, ideological, historical or economic factors, which are affected by the linguistic resources available to communities (Auer and Eastman, 2010), types of contact phenomena are usually analysed separately. It has been argued that such contact phenomena stem from the same processes and can be seen as inter-related mechanisms and outcomes on a continuum of an ever expanding language change.

Matras (2009:111) suggests that the phenomena of borrowing and code-switching should be viewed as related (not separate) points on a continuum. According to Matras, as codeswitching involves an increase in the usage frequency of words and forms from the donor language and their potential adoption by the recipient language, the connection between borrowing and code-switching is essentially diachronic. However, such a continuum is dynamic, as it not only represents the length of time of lexical items usage, but also 'certain constraints and preferences conditioning its employment in a variety of interaction contexts and settings'. Such constraints and preferences include bilingualism, compositionality, functionality, specificity, operationality, the regularity of occurrence and structural integration continuums. The continuum emphasises that these contact phenomena are not easily distinguishable and are affected by several criteria that knits them together as related points.

Similarly, as frequent codeswitching might be perceived as the first step towards mixed speaking styles (Auer, 1999, 2014; McConvell, 2008; Myers-Scotton 1988, 1999), and all languages have undergone different degrees of contact-induced changes and many others have undergone considerable restructuring as a result of language contact (Thomason, 2003), it is useful to view the other contact phenomena, such as convergence and mixed (split) language formation, as extreme cases along a continuum of more intensive language mixing. Auer (2014) views mixed languages as extreme cases of borrowing and uses the term *fusion* to describe the process of extensive borrowing into the recipient language and the term *fused lects* to describe the extreme outcome of mixed varieties. The basis of the language fusion is referred to as *language mixing*, which is best known as *codeswitching*.

In this chapter, I adopt the continuum view propagated by some mixed language researchers (e.g. Auer, 1999, 2014; Myers-Scotton, 2003; Thomason, 2003) and argue in favour of the codeswitching-based approach. Under this approach, it is feasible to emphasize that intensive codeswitching and language convergence may lead to different levels of mixed languages. Thus, there is no one prototype for mixed languages; rather, different contact situations,

including the different structures of the languages that are in contact, may yield different types of mixed languages with different mixing strategies. Mixed languages derived from unrelated languages should be distinguished from mixed languages derived from the same language family; however, they should also be placed side by side at the extreme end of the continuum, as they both stem from identical processes.

3.1   *Mixed Languages: Definitions and Examples*

Many linguists have sought to define mixed languages; however, not all linguists use the term in an identical manner, nor are they consistent in the way in which they employ terms, such as language mixing, intertwined languages, hybrid languages, fusion languages, mixed languages, bilingual mixtures, split languages and fused lects. Different classifications and corresponding terminologies have been developed and used in an attempt to accurately define the term 'mixed-language'. Meakins (2013: 159) generally defines mixed languages as 'the result of the fusion of two identifiable source languages, normally in situations of community bilingualism'. Bakker (2000: 30), who was among the first of the mixed language researchers to develop a detailed account of a mixed language, defines intertwined languages as 'languages which show a dichotomy between the language of origin of the lexicon and the language of origin of the grammatical system. The vocabulary is from language A, and the phonology, morphology, syntax from language B'. Conversely, Thomason (2003:21) defines a mixed language as 'a language whose grammatical and lexical subsystems cannot all be traced back primarily to a single source language'.

To summarise, most of the proposed definitions of mixed languages include lists of lexical and grammatical elements. However, Myers-Scotton and Auer dissent from such definitions and propose different views. Auer (1999: 321) views a *fused lect* as a fossilised pattern of unmarked codeswitching in which there are massive combinations of elements from both contributing languages and in which new mixed structures are developed that are different from both languages. Myers-Scotton (2002:249) provides two definitions to what she terms as split languages, one strong and the other less stringent respectively: I-A split language exhibits all—or almost all—of its morphosyntactic frame from a different source language from large portions of its lexicon; this frame includes all—or almost all—of its late system morphemes from the language of the morphosyntactic frame. II-A split language exhibits a major constituent with its system morphemes and major parts of the morphosyntactic frame from a different source language from that of most of the lexicon and the morphosyntactic frame of other constituents. Myers-Scotton explains that the overall

difference between mixed languages and other languages relates to the fact that the splits occur not only in features, but also in systems of features. For example, in the case of system morphemes, they count as a system; however, in the case of late system morphemes, they count as subsystems and thus a system of a feature.

When differentiating between a composite matrix language that is characterised as such for its composite abstract structure and a mixed language, Myers-Scotton (2002: 252) suggests two abstract constructs: i) a notion of a composite matrix language that includes both an abstract lexical structure and a split from the source for *grammatically crucial surface-level system morphemes* and the main source for content morphemes; and ii) a notion that this state of affairs begins a matrix language turnover that is arrested at some point.

Both Myers-Scotton (2000, 2003) and Auer (1999) cite three languages, which have received considerable attention in the literature, as true mixed languages: Michif (a mixture of Cree and French), Ma'a, a.k.a. Mbugu (a mixture of Bantu and Cushitic), and Mednyj Aleut a.k.a. CIA (a mixture of Russian and Aleut). McConvel & Meakins (2005), McConvell (2008) and Meakins (2011, 2012, 2013) cite the mixed Australian language Gurindji Kriol as living proof of a mixed language that grew out of codeswitching.

3.1.1   Michif

According to Bakker (1997), Michif is a unique mixed language that is composed of a mixture of Cree and French and is spoken by fewer than a thousand people in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba in Canada and in North Dakota and Montana in the United States. Its uniqueness can be traced to a number of factors: i) Michif speakers are rarely proficient in both languages; ii) Michif is problematic in relation to the 'family tree' model of genetic relations, as it is equally French and Cree; iii) Michif poses a problem for theories of language contact; and iv) Michif poses a problem for all theoretical models of language, as it has two completely different components, different sound systems, morphological endings and syntactic rules.

In terms of its structure, Bakker found that Michif is composed of Cree verbs and verb patterns, demonstratives, personal pronouns, some noun affixes and question words and French nouns and noun-related parts of speech, articles and prepositions. In terms of the development of Michif, Bakker does not accept the hypothesis that it emerged from codemixing, but rather argues that it developed through a process he calls 'language intertwining'; that is, the combining of a grammatical system of one language with the lexicon of another. Conversely, Myers-Scotton (2002) argues that its basis comes from Cree/French codeswitching and convergence. She further argues that in terms of the matrix

and embedded language relations, Cree was the matrix language, and French assumed the role of the embedded language.

3.1.2   Ma'a (Mbugu)

Ma'a is a mixed language that is spoken in the Usambara district of north-eastern Tanzania. Its structure mainly comprises Bantu grammar (Pare and Shamba) and a Cushitic lexicon. According to Mous (2003), who distinguishes between 'normal' Mbugu and 'inner' Mbugu (Ma'a), the lexemes come mainly from the Southern Cushitic languages (i.e., Iraqw and Gorwaa). In terms of its origin, Goodman (1971) states that at a certain time, a Bantu and non-Bantu language came into contact. In relation to its development, he hypothesises that throughout the contact process Bantu incorporated a number of words from the non-Bantu language and adapted them to the Bantu grammatical system. Subsequently, the Bantu and the non-Bantu languages gradually became more alike. Later, the non-Bantu forms were favoured over the Bantu forms. Finally, a third linguistic group entered the situation and contributed to mixing them.

Mous (2003) agrees that codeswitching was relevant to the development of Ma'a; however, he argues that it did not play a decisive role in developing the structures of Ma'a. To describe the shift from the Cushitic language, he postulates that: i) speakers of 'Old Kenyan Cushitic' became bilingual in their language and Pare; ii) Pare gained power and had a substantial influence over their language; iii) the vocabulary of the original language became equal to the vocabulary of the empowered Pare and was expanded with non-Bantu material; iv) a move to the Usambara mountains led to frequent contact with the Bantu and the Mbugu from the Pare Mountains; v) both groups became one and went to South Pare for their initiation at which they may have learnt a secret language that contributed to the expansion of the parallel lexicon.

Myers-Scotton (2002), explains the development of Ma'a in terms of the matrix language turnover hypothesis. Specifically, she contends that: i) speakers of Cushitic moved into Tanzania and come in contact with speakers of Bantu; ii) these speakers became bilingual in one of the Bantu languages; iii) despite extensive communication with their neighbours, the Ma'a people wished to maintain their language, and to do so, they used codeswitching as their unmarked mode of communication; iv) codeswitching promoted the convergence of the Bantu languages, especially at the abstract lexical structure level; v) the Ma'a people adopted their normal style as the dominant variety; vi) the abstract grammatical frame of Ma'a was modified, causing a change in the morphosyntactic frame that was characterised by the insertion of surface-level Bantu system morphemes; and vii) Bantuisation occurred gradually, especially

in relation to the late system morphemes, which was then followed by the entire grammatical system, and some influence upon the lexicon.

3.1.3   Mednyj Aleut (CIA)

Mednyj Aleut is a mixed language of the Copper Island Aleuts that is also referred to as CIA. It is not known whether there are any remaining active speakers of CIA. According to Thomason (1997), this language was moribund and was rapidly replaced by Russian. In terms of its structure, it resembles Michif. In general terms, it is composed of an Aleut lexicon and Russian grammar. According to Vakhtin (1998), Aleut supplies the majority of the verbal stems, noun stems and derivational morphology, while Russian supplies most of the auxiliaries and adverbs and all the verbal morphology. In terms of codeswitching, Myers-Scotton (2002) argues that in both languages, codeswitching was the original mechanism at work; however, in CIA, there was also a process of extensive convergence. Myers-Scotton further explains the development of CIA in terms of the matrix language turnover hypothesis that ended in an arrested shift. Specifically, Myers-Scotton contends that i) unmarked codeswitching became the main mode of communication (with Aleut taking the role of the matrix language and Russian as the embedded language); ii) as the matrix language, Aleut remained the source of the frame elements outside verbal inflections; iii) Convergence occurred at the abstract lexical structure level, changing the morphosyntactic frame with the insertion of late system morphemes from Russian, the previous embedded language; iv) due to the occurrence of mostly Russian inflections, Russian started gaining power and began to take over as the matrix language; v) the fossilisation of codeswitching occurred when Aleut was largely in place, arresting the shift to Russian, and resulting in a shift back to Aleut, the previous matrix language; and vi) the arrested shift occurred due to social motivations that were established according to structural mechanisms.

3.1.4   Gurindji Kriol

Gurindji Kriol is a mixed language from northern Australia and is spoken by the Gurindji people. Gurindji Kriol is the result of contact between non-indigenous settlers and Gurindji people and its source languages are Gurindji (a Pama-Nyungan language) and Kriol (an English-lexified creole language). The speakers of Gurindji Kriol speak both languages. It emerged from Gurindji/Kriol codeswitching that was the predominant mode of communication among adult Gurindji speakers and was passed on as the main input to children in the 1970s. Most adult Gurindji people at the time were fluent in both source languages. The codeswitching started with an alternation between both languages; however, the question of the matrix language was unsettled. The next

stage was characterised by the domination of the Kriol verbal structure and a turnover began; however, the turnover was arrested before the full replacement of the Gurindji nominal structure by the Kriol nominal structure. Thus, a full language shift did not occur; rather, there was a formation of a mixed language. The mixed variety emerged as an in-group language rather than out of a need for communication. Structurally, it is mostly composed of a Gurindji nominal structure and Kriol verbal grammar. Although its structure resembles the verb-noun (V-N) mixture described by Bakker's typology (2003), both source languages contribute nouns and verbs. Thus, unlike Michif, it does not completely conform to an equal split between the verbal and nominal systems. Further, as both languages contribute certain amounts of grammar to the grammatical systems in Gurindji Kriol, neither dominates. The lexical items are also relatively even in terms of amounts. Despite the fact that Gurindji Kriol resembles both source languages, some of the forms derived from the source languages function in a unique manner within the context of the mixed language (McConvell, 2008; McConvel & Meakins, 2005; Meakins, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013; Meakins & O'Shannessy, 2012).

In section 4.4, Israbic will be compared to the above mentioned mixed languages in terms of proficiency of source languages, structure, genesis and development.

4   Characterization of Mixed Languages

According to Myers-Scotton (2003), specific features of a language turnover can distinguish mixed languages from other languages showing convergence, i.e. languages that have all the surface-level morphemes of the recipient language, but have parts of the abstract lexical structure of another language. According to the 4-M model of Myers-Scotton and Jake (2001), there are four types of morphemes: i) content morphemes and ii) system morphemes, which are subdivided into early system morphemes and two types of late system morphemes; iii) bridge late system morphemes; and iv) outsider late system morphemes. *Content morphemes* are morphemes that assign or receive thematic roles; for example, verbs usually assign thematic roles and nouns usually receive them; thus, they are defined as content morphemes. *Early system morphemes* are morphemes that depend on their head for further information, but do not assign or receive thematic roles. Examples include plural markings, determiners and some prepositions called satellites that affect the meanings of some phrasal verbs in English. *Bridge system morphemes* are morphemes that occur between phrases to make up larger constituents; for example, the

possessive elements, such as *of*, and the possessive marker *-s* in English. *Outsider system morphemes* are morphemes that depend on information outside the element with which they occur; that is, from an element of another constituent in the clause or the discourse. According to Myers-Scotton and Jake (2017), these are agreement elements that make more transparent connections between elements in the clause. They serve as case markers or co-index relations between arguments and verbs. For example, in English, the agreement marker form in the subject-verb agreement depends on the subject; thus, the suffix *-s* occurs with a third-person singular in the present tense, but otherwise, does not occur.

Myers-Scotton (2003:91) distinguishes mixed languages based on the following features. *First*, all mixed languages have a composite structure that goes beyond a composite at the level of the lexical-conceptual structure (semantics and pragmatics involving content morphemes or early system morphemes). In other words, the changes go beyond changes to the semantic structure of content morphemes and other conceptually based elements, which represent the most frequent form of convergence. Thus, to qualify as a mixed language, the morphosyntactic frame must contain abstract grammatical structures, mainly related to late system morphemes, from both participating languages. According to Myers-Scotton (2002: 248), the outsider late system morphemes are of utmost importance, as languages do not easily take substitutions for them. Further, the provision of outsider late system morphemes from the former embedded language is a sign of an evident change in the morphosyntactic frame that structures the language. Convergence involves the splitting and recombination of the abstract grammatical structure and causes the frame to change and receive system morphemes from the second language. Thus, 'a chain of events, beginning with convergence, results in new grammatical outcomes on both abstract and surface levels'. *Second*, at the morphosyntactic level, all mixed languages exhibit a composite structure in at least one entire component and not simply incidental examples. *Third*, mixed languages represent matrix language turnovers that do not reach completion, but stop along the way before an actual matrix language turnover occurs.

5 Specific Qualifications

In addition to the three specific features (discussed above), Myers-Scotton (2003:92) also suggests three types of scenarios in which languages can qualify as mixed languages if they conform to at least one of the three types. The types are arranged from the strongest to weakest. Type A: *Actual surface-level late*

system morphemes are derived from the less dominant[3] *language in one or more constituent types and function as they would in that language.* Myers-Scotton suggests that the Ma'a and Mednyj Aleut languages (§ 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) qualify as Type A mixed languages. Type B: *The less dominant language supplies abstract grammatical structure underlying surface-level late system morphemes in one or more constituent types of the dominant language. Loss of surface-level late system morphemes in the more dominant language also can be considered evidence that part of the abstract grammatical structure underlying the realization of these morphemes (their absence) comes from the less dominant language.* Myers-Scotton considers Gangou Chinese (see Zhu, Chuluu, Slater & Stuart, 1997) as a language that qualifies as Type B mixed language. Type C: *Morphemes from the less dominant language appear in the dominant language's frame, but these are reanalysed to function in syntactic roles that are different from those they have in their home language so that some of them may function as late system morphemes.* Myers-Scotton perceives Michif (§ 4.1.1) as a language that qualifies as Type C mixed language.

Myers-Scotton emphasises that all types contain the same feature: an outside language that supplies some of the abstract lexical structure and directs the realisation of the morphosyntactic frame, which refers to at least one set of late system morphemes. Myers-Scotton claims that this particular adjustment is what distinguishes mixed languages from other types of contact phenomena and emphasises the importance of the role of late system morphemes in determining what counts as a mix, as opposed to the simple allocation of general lists of lexical and grammatical elements. Myers-Scotton's model has certain limitations, as it was based upon pre-existing mixed languages that all come from unrelated or genetically very distant languages. Further, the nature of the usage of outside system morphemes and other grammatical structures might be different to others. Its applicability may be limited to specific types of language mixtures. Thus, the question arises as to whether it can be applied to closely related languages or whether such languages must exhibit different mixing structures to be characterised as mixed.

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3 The term dominant language is controversial since it is often perceived as the speaker's L1, however, under certain circumstances this may not hold true; for example, less frequency of usage in comparison to L2. In addition, asking bilinguals to decide which language they think is their more dominant one is also problematic (Myers-Scotton, 2006). The present study takes into account both the speakers' L1 and their own perceptions of what they think their dominant language is, which happen to be concurrent.

5.1   *Israbic—A Mixed Language?*

To determine whether Israbic is a mixed language, it is examined in relation to Myers-Scotton's proposed special features of and qualifications for mixed languages. Auer's model is then applied and it is subsequently compared to other matching mixed languages.

First, Israbic is a language that has a composite structure beyond the lexical-conceptual structure. It shows the convergence of a morphological realisation pattern and the convergence of grammatical structures. Table 6 reinforces the dominance of Hebrew that shakes Arabic's role as the matrix language, as Hebrew introduces a significant number of total system morphemes and more late system morphemes than Arabic. Such system morphemes appear both independently and in embedded language islands. The introduction of the different system morphemes indicates a change in the morphosyntactic frame structuring the language. Table 6 shows the total number of different types of sampled morphemes used in each language and the total number of the different sampled morphemes from both languages recorded in 2017 and 2018.

Example (1) represents the convergence of the morphological realisation pattern as the speaker inserts an Arabic possessive phrase into a Hebrew pattern (i.e., a recipient language phrase is inserted into a donor language frame). *El-ʔimmay-āt tabˤet el-sˤħāb-hun* 'the mothers of their friends'/ARAB is matched to *ha-emahót šel ha-xavirím šilám*/HEB ('the-mothers of their friends') instead of the Arabic counterpart *ʔimmay-āt sˤħāb-hun* ('their friends' mothers'). It should be noted that in Arabic, even with the usage of the possessive exponent *tabaˤ* 'of', the noun *sˤħāb-hun* cannot take the determiner *el* as it is used in this example, whereas in Hebrew it does, therefore, it is a clear sign that it is totally copied into the Hebrew pattern. Notably, the use of the Arabic possessive exponent *tabaˤ* 'of' is subject to certain restrictions. Such restrictions include: foreign words and words ending in a long vowel that cannot take pronoun suffixes and do not fit into Arabic morphosyntactic patterns and thus do not occur in a construct but with a possessive exponent; duals that generally cannot be used in construct phrases, multi-term annexation (of three or more nouns), the presence of modifying adjectives; parallel phrases with more than one head noun; and professional relationships (Brustad, 2000). However, in the present data, the use of the Arabic exponent is not bound by any restrictions and follows the use of the Hebrew possessive structure that is categorical and consistent throughout the data. Such usage might be related to the extensive usage of Hebrew nouns that are matched to the Hebrew pattern when used to express possession, even if the rest of the phrase is expressed in Arabic (for example: *el-tuxnìt tabˤ-et Einav* 'the show of Einav'). Thus, this usage becomes

TABLE 6   Breakdown of the types of morphemes

Language	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Total	Examples
Content morphemes	2248	3332	5580	*Eštar-ēt*/ARAB 'bought' *xanút*/HEB 'shop'
Early system morphemes	1568	1056	2624	*el-*/ARAB 'the' *ze*/HEB 'this'
Bridge system morphemes	396	528	924	*taʕ-hun*/ARAB 'of them= their/theirs' *šel-í*/HEB 'of me'='my/ mine'
Outsider system morphemes	752	696	1448	*-lī*/DAT/ARAB 'for me' *lí*/DAT/HEB 'for me'

also automatic for Arabic nouns. It should be noted that in the quotations from the transcriptions, Hebrew morphemes and their glosses are marked in red, other morphemes come from Arabic, and morphemes under discussion or focal appear in bold.

(1) *Axré še-hém   misay-mím   el-kaytaná   bederex-klál*
     After that-2PL finish-2PL-PRES the-day camp usually
     baxud-hun   ʕala Gán-misxak-ím kazé ʕen-na hōn ve-áz   aní
     1SG-take-2PL to Playground such at-1PL here and-then 1SG
     mazmin-á   kull El-ʔimmay-āt tabʕet el-sˤħāb-hun   w-hēk
     invite-PRES-1SG all The-mother-PL of   the-friends-2PL and-such
     ve-áz   mamáš nehen-ím Xozr-ím   keìlu hōn meklax-ót
     and-then really enjoy-2PL Return-PL that is here shower-PL
     ve-lišón   še-zé   haxí   kál avál kén zé kéf gám yaʕni
     and-to sleep that-this the most easy but yes this fun also meaning
     keìlu   t-yod-aʾát   zé   meód intinsiví maʕ le-wlād
     that is you-know-2SGF this very   intensive with the-kids
     we-š-šuɣul
     and-the-work
     'once they are done with the day camp, I usually take them to a playground here, and then I invite all their friends with their mothers and such, and so they have a lot of fun, they come back here, take showers and go to sleep, which is the easiest thing, you know, it's also fun, but it's quite intensive with work and kids.'

Example (2) shows composite codeswitching and convergence in the form of mixed morphology and grammar. The speaker, who produces mixed clauses throughout her conversation with a friend, mixes Hebrew and Arabic tenses as she inflects Arabic auxiliaries with Hebrew verbs as is the case with the mixed, *ʕam-ta-škíaʔ* 'AUX-2SGM/FUT-invest' (are investing) and *ʕam-ya-škíaʔ* 'AUX-3SGM/FUT-invest' (is investing). The phrases *ʕam-ta-škíaʔ* and *ʕam-ya-škíaʔ*, which are a combination of the Arabic auxiliary *ʕam* (am/is/are) and the Hebrew verb *le-haškíaʔ* (to invest), comprise a mixture of an Arabic Present Progressive frame with the Future form of the Hebrew verbs (see Table 9). In Hebrew, the correct form in such a case would be *maškíaʔ* 'invest/PRS'. Similarly, the speaker uses the Hebrew Future verb form *na-gúr* '1PL/FUT-live' (will live) in the 'going to' sense instead of *la-gúr* 'to live' to denote a 'going to' clause. There is also a case of convergence of a lexical-conceptual structure that is reflected in the Arabic/Hebrew mixed expression *ʕmel-et stóp* 'make-1SG/PST stop' (put a stop), which is used to convey the meaning of an Israeli Hebrew expression that does not exist in Palestinian Vernacular Arabic. Additionally, late outsider system morphemes in the form of verb agreement are taken from Hebrew, as the speaker uses them with Hebrew verbs to show agreement with Arabic pronouns (*neħna na-gúr, ente ʕam-ta-škiáʔ, hoū ʕam-ya-škiáʔ, hoū ya-mšíx*). Such usage occurred recurrently in the data. According to Myers-Scotton (2002, 2003), the outsider late system morphemes are of the utmost significance. Their provision from the 'previous' embedded language is a sign that there is an evident change in the morphosyntactic frame structuring the language. Thus, it is the nature of late system morphemes in mixed languages that distinguishes them from other languages and contact phenomena.

(2) *kén ana ban-ye   inno neħna keʔílu meš raħ   na-gúr*
      yes I   count-1SGF that we   as if not going to 1PL/FUT-live
      hón áz befvíl má   bexlál ente ʕam-ta-škíaʔ   la-mīn? issa
      here so for what at all you AUX-2SGM/FUT-invest to-whom? now
      hoū bid-a   fī švúng inno hoū ʕam-ya-škìaʔ
      he start-PST/1SGM in a drive that he AUX-3SGM/FUT-invest
      yotér midáy áz hoū ya-mšíx   ʕem zé ve-áz   ana
      too much   so he 3SGM/FUT-continue with this and-then I
      ʕmel-et   stop!
      do-1SG/PST stop
      'yes, I am counting that as if we are not going to live here, so why at all are you investing? What for? Now he was driven into investing too much with that continuously until I put a stop (to it).'

TABLE 7   The verbal morphological forms of Present/Imperfective and Future in the different spoken
            varieties (the verb 'calculate' is used for illustration)

	Palestinian Arabic (Present/imperfective)	Israeli Hebrew (Present/imperfective)	Israeli Hebrew (Future)	Israbic (Mixed: present/ ARAB+ future/HEB)
	Prefix+stem+/–suffix	Stem+/–suffix	Prefix+stem+/–suffix	Prefix+ARAB+prefix/HEB+ stem/HEB+/–suffix/HEB
1SGM/F	b(a)+stem/ARAB (*ba-ḥseb* '(I) calculate')	stem/HEB (*mexašév/ mexašev-ét* '(I) calculate')	(y)a/(y)e/(y)i+stem/ HEB ((*y)a-xašév* '(I) will calculate')	b(a)+stem/HEB (*b-a-xašév* '(I) calculate')
1PLM/F	men/min/mnā/mne/ mni/mnu +stem/ ARAB (*mne-ḥseb*)	stem/HEB+ím (*mexašv-ím/mexašv-ót*)	na/ne/ni+stem/HEB (*ne-xašév*)	m+ na/ne/ni+ stem/HEB (*m-ne-xašév*)
2SGM	bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB (*bte-ḥseb*)	stem/HEB (*mexašév*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (*te-xašév*)	b+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (*b-te-xašév*)
2SGF	bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB+ī (*bti-ḥesb-ī*)	stem/HEB+et/a (*mexašev-ét*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+ì (*te-xašv-í*)	b+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB+í (*b-te-xašv-í*)
3SGM	bi/by/byā/bye/byi/ byu+stem/ARAB (*bye-ḥseb*)	stem/HEB (*mexašév*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB (*ye-xašév*)	b+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB (*b-ye-xašév*)
3SGF	bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB (*bti-ḥseb*)	stem/HEB+et/a (*mexašev-ét*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (*te-xašév*)	b+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (*b-te-xašév*)
3PLM/F	bi/by/byā/bye/byi/ byu+stem/ARAB+ū (*bi-ḥesb-ū*)	stem/HEB+ìm (*mexašv-ím/mexašv-ót*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB+ú (*ye-xašv-ú*)	b+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB+ú (*b-ye-xašv-ú*)
2PLM/F	bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB+ū (*bti-ḥesb-ū*)	stem/HEB+ìm/ót (*mexašv-ím/mexašv-ót*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+ú (*te-xašv-ú*)	b+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB+ ú(*b-te-xašv-ú*)

Second, Israbic shows composite structures in entire components of its morphosyntactic frame and not just incidental examples. For example, Hebrew Future forms are systematically suffixed to the Arabic habitual indicative morphemes *b-* and *m-* to denote mixed imperfective forms. Table 7 shows verbal morphological forms of the Present and Future tenses in the different varieties. Table 8 illustrates the Hebrew form, the Arabic form and the mixed Israbic form of the verb 'wait'. The Hebrew elements of the mixed variety are marked in red for further clarity.

TABLE 8   The different forms of the verb 'wait' in vernacular Arabic, Hebrew and the mixed
            variety

	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Israeli Hebrew	Israbic
	(Present/imper-fective)	(Present/imper-fective)	(Future)	(Mixed)
1SGM/F	*ba-stanna* '(I) wait'	*mamtín/mamtin-á* '(I) wait'	*(y)a-mtín* '(I) will wait'	*b-a-mtín* '(I) wait'
2SGM	*bte-stanna*	*mamtín*	*ta-mtín*	*b-ta-mtín*
2SGF	*bte-stann-ī*	*mamtin-á*	*ta-mtin-í*	*b-ta-mtin-í*
3PLM/F	*bye-stann-ū*	*mamtin-ím/mamtin-ót*	*ya-mtin-ú*	*b-ya-mtin-ú*
3SGM	*bye-stanna*	*mamtín*	*ya-mtín*	*b-ya-mtín*
3SGF	*bte-stanna*	*mamtin-á*	*ta-mtín*	*b-ta-mtín*
1PLM/F	*mne-stanna*	*mamtin-ím/mamtin-ót*	*na-mtín*	*m-na-mtín*
2PLM/F	*bte-stann-ú*	*mamtin-ím/mamtin-ót*	*ta-mtin-ú*	*b-ta-mtin-ú*

Similarly, Israbic exhibits a mixture of the Hebrew Future form and the Arabic
Present Progressive form to denote a Present Progressive sense. Table 9 illus-
trates verbal morphological forms of the Present Progressive and Future tenses
in the different varieties, and Table 10 shows the Hebrew form, the Arabic form
and the mixed Israbic form of the verb 'present/serve'.

TABLE 9   The verbal morphological forms of Present Progressive and Future in the different spoken
            varieties (the verb 'calculate' is used for illustration)

	Palestinian Arabic	Israeli Hebrew	Israbic
	(Present progressive)	(Future)	(Mixed: present progressive/ARAB+Future/HEB)
	ʕam+prefix+stem+/–suffix	Prefix+Stem+/–suffix	Auxiliary/ARAB+prefix/HEB+stem/HEB+/–suffix/HEB
1SGM/F	ʕam+b(a)+stem/ARAB (ʕam-ba-ħseb '(I) am calculating')	(y)a/(y)e/(y)i+stem/HEB ((y)a-xašév '(I) will calculate')	ʕam+b(a)+stem/HEB (ʕam-b-a-xašév '(I) am calculating')
1PLM/F	ʕam+men/min/mnā/mne/mni/mnu +stem/ARAB (ʕam-mne-ħseb)	na/ne/ni+stem/HEB (ne-xašév)	ʕam+ na/ne/ni+ stem/HEB (ʕam-ne-xašév)
2SGM	ʕam+bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/btu+stem/ARAB (ʕam-bte-ħseb)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (te-xašév)	ʕam+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (ʕam-te-xašév)

TABLE 9   The verbal morphological forms of Present Progressive and Future in the different spoken varieties (the verb 'calculate' is used for illustration) (*cont.*)

	Palestinian Arabic (Present progressive) ʕam+prefix+stem+/–suffix	Israeli Hebrew (Future) Prefix+Stem+/–suffix	Israbic (Mixed: present progressive/ ARAB+Future/HEB) Auxiliary/ARAB+prefix/HEB+ stem/HEB+/–suffix/HEB
2SGF	ʕam+bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB+ī (*ʕam-bti-ḥesb-ī*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+í (*te-xašv-í*)	ʕam+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB+í (*ʕam-te-xašv-í*)
3SGM	ʕam+bi/by/byā/bye/byi/ byu+stem/ARAB (*ʕam-bye-ḥseb*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB (*ye-xašév*)	ʕam+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB (*ʕam-ye-xašév*)
3SGF	ʕam+bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB (*ʕam-bte-ḥseb*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (*te-xašév*)	ʕam+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (*ʕam-te-xašév*)
3PLM/F	ʕam+bi/by/(b)yā/(b)ye/ (b)yi/(b)yu+stem/ARAB+ū (*ʕam-bi-ḥesb-ū*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB+ú (*ye-xašv-ú*)	ʕam+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB+ú (*ʕam-ye-xašv-ú*)
2PLM/F	ʕam+bet/bit/btā/bte/bti/ btu+stem/ARAB+ī (*ʕam-bti-ḥesb-ī*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+ú(*te-xašv-ú*)	ʕam+ ta/te/ti + stem/HEB+ú (*ʕam-te-xašv-ú*)

TABLE 10   The different forms of the verb 'present/serve' in vernacular Arabic, Israeli Hebrew and the mixed variety

	Palestinian Arabic (Present progressive)	Israeli Hebrew (Future)	Israbic (Mixed)
1SGM/F	ʕam-ba-qaddem '(I) am presenting'	(*y*)a-gíš '(I) will present'	ʕam-b-a-gíš '(I) am presenting'
2SGM	ʕam-bet-qaddem	ta-gíš	ʕam-ta-gíš
2SGF	ʕam-bet-qaddm-ī	ta-giš-í	ʕam-ta-giš-í
3PLM/F	ʕam-by-qaddm-ū	ya-giš-ú	ʕam-(b)-ya-giš-ú
3SGM	ʕam-by-qaddem	ya-gíš	ʕam-(b)-ya-gíš
3SGF	ʕam-bet-qaddem	ta-gíš	ʕam-ta-gíš
1PLM/F	ʕam-men-qaddem	na-gíš	ʕam-na-gíš
2PLM/F	ʕam-bet-qaddm-ū	ta-gíš-ú	ʕam-ta-gíš-ú

A further case of such systematic mixed construction can be observed in the mixing of the Arabic auxiliary *raħ* 'going (to)', which is used for Future verbs in the 'going to' construction with Hebrew Future verbs that are used in the 'will' construction. Notably, in Hebrew, the morpheme *holéx* 'going' is used before verbs prefixed with *le-* 'to' in order to form the 'going to' construction. This mixed construction is also used alternately, such that the Hebrew morpheme *holéx* is conjoined with Arabic verbs. Table 11 shows verbal morphological forms of the different Future constructs of the different varieties, followed by table 12 which shows the Hebrew form, the Arabic form and the mixed Israbic form of the verb 'clean'.

TABLE 11   The verbal morphological forms of the different Future constructs in the different spoken varieties (the verb 'calculate' is used for illustration)

	Palestinian Arabic (Future-'going to') Going (to)+prefix+ stem+/−suffix	**Israeli Hebrew** (Future-'going to') Going (to)+/−suf-fix+to+stem	**Israeli Hebrew** (Future-'will') Prefix+stem+/−suffix	**Israbic** (Mixed: future-'going to'/ARAB+future-'will'/HEB)// Going (to)/ARAB+prefix/ HEB+stem/HEB+/−suffix/ HEB
1SGM/F	raħ+(a)+stem/ARAB (*raħ a-ħseb* '(I am) going to calculate')	holex+le+stem/HEB (*holex le-xašév/ holex-ét le-xašév* '(I am) going to calculate')	(y)a/(y)e/(y)i+stem/ HEB ((*y)a-xašév* '(I) will calculate')	raħ+a+stem/HEB (*raħ a-xašév* '(I am) going to calculate')
1PLM/F	raħ+n/nā/ne/ni/nu +stem/ARAB (*raħ ne-ħseb*)	holx+ím/ót+le+stem/ HEB (*holx-ím le-xašév/ holx-ót le-xašév*)	na/ne/ni+stem/HEB (*ne-xašév*)	raħ+na/ne/ni+ stem/HEB (*raħ ne-xašév*)
2SGM	raħ+t/tā/te/ti/tu+ stem/ARAB (*raħ te-ħseb*)	holex+le+stem/HEB (*holex le-xašév*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (*te-xašév*)	raħ+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (*raħ te-xašév*)
2SGF	raħ+t/tā/te/ti/tu+ stem/ARAB +ī (*raħ ti-ħesb-ī*)	holex+et+le+stem/ HEB (*holex-ét le-xašév*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+í (*te-xašv-í*)	raħ+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB+í (*raħ te-xašv-í*)
3SGM	raħ+y/yā/ye/yi/yu+ stem/ARAB (*raħ ye-ħseb*)	holex+le+stem/HEB (*holex le-xašév*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB (*ye-xašév*)	raħ+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB (*raħ ye-xašév*)
3SGF	raħ+t/tā/te/ti/tu+ stem/ARAB (*raħ te-ħseb*)	holex+et+le+stem/ HEB (*holex-ét le-xašév*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB (*te-xašév*)	raħ+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB (*raħ te-xašév*)
3PLM/F	raħ+y/yā/ye/yi/yu+ stem/ARAB+ū (*raħ ye-ħesb-ū*)	holx+ím/ót+le+stem/ HEB (*holx-ím le-xašév/ holx-ót le-xašév*)	ya/ye/yi+stem/HEB+ú (*ye-xašv-ú*)	raħ+ya/ye/yi+ stem/HEB+ú (*raħ ye-xašv-ú*)

TABLE 11   The verbal morphological forms of the different Future constructs in the different spoken varieties (the verb 'calculate' is used for illustration) (*cont.*)

	Palestinian Arabic (Future-'going to')	Israeli Hebrew (Future-'going to')	Israeli Hebrew (Future-'will')	Israbic (Mixed: future-'going to'/ARAB+future-'will'/HEB)//
	Going (to)+prefix+ stem+/−suffix	Going (to)+/−suf- fix+to+stem	Prefix+stem+/−suffix	Going (to)/ARAB+prefix/ HEB+stem/HEB+/−suffix/ HEB
2PLM/F	raħ+t/tā/te/ti/tu+ stem/ARAB +ū (*raħ ti-ħesb-ū*)	holx+ót+le+stem/ HEB (*holx-ót le-xašév*)	ta/te/ti+stem/HEB+ú (*te-xašv-ú*)	raħ+ta/te/ti+ stem/HEB+ú (*raħ te-xašv-ú*)

TABLE 12   The different forms of the verb 'clean' in vernacular Arabic, Israeli Hebrew and the mixed variety

	Palestinian Arabic (Future-'going to')	Israeli Hebrew (Future-'going to')	Israeli Hebrew (Future-'will')	Israbic (Mixed)
1SGM/F	*raħ a-nadˤdˤef*	*holéx le-nakót/ holex-ét le-nakót*	*ye/a-naké*	*raħ a-naké/ holéx/ holex-ét a-nadˤdˤef*
2SGM	*raħ t-nadˤdˤef*	*holex le-nakót*	*te-naké*	*raħ te-naké/ holéx t-nadˤdˤef*
2SGF	*raħ t-nadˤdˤf-ī*	*holex-ét le-nakót*	*te-nak-í*	*raħ te-nakí/ holex-ét t-nadˤdˤf-ī*
3PLM/F	*raħ y-nadˤdˤf-ū*	*holx-ím le-nakót/ holx-ót le-nakót*	*ye-nak-ú*	*raħ ye-nakú/ holx-ím/ holx-ót y-nadˤdˤf-ū*
3SGM	*raħ y-nadˤdˤef*	*holéx le-nakót*	*ye-naké*	*raħ ye-naké/ holéx y-nadˤdˤef*
3SGF	*raħ t-nadˤdˤef*	*holex-ét le-nakót*	*te-naké*	*raħ te-naké/ holex-ét t-nadˤdˤef*
1PLM/F	*raħ n-nadˤdˤef*	*holx-ím le-nakót/ holx-ót le-nakót*	*ne-naké*	*raħ ne-naké/ holx-ím/ holx-ót n-nadˤdˤef*
2PLM/F	*raħ t-nadˤdˤf-ū*	*holx-ím le-nakót/ holx-ót le-nakót*	*te-nak-ú*	*raħ te-nakú/ holx-ím/ holx-ót t-nadˤdˤf-ū*

In addition to systematic tense mixing, Israbic also exhibits the systematic inflection of the Arabic determiner *el-/al-* 'the' with Hebrew nouns, thus forming mixed determiner phrases (DPs). Under the 4-M model, determiners are considered early system morphemes (Myers-Scotton & Jake 2017). Notably, such mixing is the most frequently used form of this type of DP in Israbic (see §5.2 for more detailed explanation). Similarly, the Arabic conjunction marker *w-* 'and' is usually inflected to Hebrew morphemes and vice versa (i.e., the Hebrew conjunction marker *ve-* 'and' is often inflected to Arabic morphemes). This is evident in the following example as in the prefixing of w- to the Hebrew verb *ʕavar-tí* 'passed', as well as to the Hebrew quantifier *kól* 'all'. Additionally, example (3) illustrates the consistent prefixing of the Arabic determiner to Hebrew nouns.

(3)   *qlāl elli nevxer-ú   la-hai el-melgá   w-ʔana*
      few   that select-3PL-PST-PASS for this the-scholarship and-I
      el-emét kaman el-rékaʕ   tabaʕ-ī fī el-akademía šoɣl-ī   fī
      the-truth also   the-background mine   in the-academy work-my in
      el-akademia w-el-maxkár   nafso yaʕni   ktīr herším
      the-academy and-the-research itself meaning a lot impressed
      ʔot-ám   w-ʕavar-tí   sedrat mevxan-ím w-kól   miné
      ACC-3PL   and-pass-1SG-PST series test-PL   and-all sorts
      ve-reʔyonót   w-hēk   w-el-ħamd-ella   basóf
      and interviews and-such and-the-grace-to God eventually
      nevxar-tí
      select-1SG/PST
      'very few were selected for this scholarship, and I think that my background in the academy and work experience in the academy as well as the research itself made a good impression on them. I went through a series of tests and all sorts of things and interviews and such and thank God, eventually I was selected.'

Third, Israbic is an example of a language that went through the phases of the matrix language turnover hypothesis and stopped before an actual matrix language turnover. According to Kheir (2019), longitudinal data illustrates that Israbic started at phase one of the hypothesis, which is characterised by intensive intra-sentential Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching. In this phase, core borrowings from Hebrew and Hebrew structures became lexicalised in Arabic (the previous matrix language). Such that some of Arabic categories assumed the functions of Hebrew, resulting in utterances that are foreign and mostly incomprehensible to monolingual speakers. In phase two of the hypothesis,

which is characterised by composite codeswitching, both languages began to converge. In this phase, Arabic began to lose its role as the only source of the matrix language frame, as the previous embedded language (i.e., Hebrew) gained power. Convergence is represented by the splitting and recombining of the abstract lexical structure. Thus, both Arabic and Hebrew set the morpho-syntactic frame and together formed a composite matrix language. However, the turnover into Hebrew did not reach completion; rather, it stopped 'along the way', which according to Myers-Scotton (1998, 2002, 2003), is a crucial step in the genesis of a mixed language.

5.1.1   Israbic—Which Type of Mix?

In this section, the applicability of Israbic to types of mixed languages (from Type A to C) is examined.

5.1.1.1   *Type A—Actual Surface-Level Late System Morphemes Coming from the Less Dominant Language*

According to Myers-Scotton (2003, 2008), very few mixed languages meet the Type A definition, as even in situations of intense or long-standing contact, changes in basic structure are resisted and thus, outsiders rarely transfer across languages. Due to the fact that in Israbic the verbs were mainly derived from Hebrew and the pronouns from Arabic and the Hebrew verbs agree in person, gender and number with the subject, the grammatical elements that knit clauses together frequently come from Hebrew (*neħna ló hetparaʔ-nú* 'we not go wild-1PL/PST' (we did not go wild) *ló heškaʔ-nú* 'not invest-1PL/PST' (we did not invest), *bad-na na-gúr* 'want-1PL/PRES 1PL/FUT-live' (we want to live), *henmax-tí ana* lower-1SG/PST I (I toned down), *ʔipas-tí* 'reset-1SG/PST' (I toned down)). It should be noted that while Hebrew outsider system morphemes in the form of agreement markers are inflected to Hebrew verbs, they still agree with Arabic pronouns and thus play a major role in knitting together clauses in mixed constituents.

Example (4) illustrates the frequent use of the aforementioned Hebrew late outsider system morphemes in the form of verb agreement in conjunction with Hebrew verbs, showing agreement with Arabic pronouns. In addition, the Hebrew accusative marker *ʔotó* 'him', which is another example of an outsider system morpheme encoding agreement in person, gender and number that is frequently used in Israbic, is co-indexed with the speaker's partner Eyal. The usage of Hebrew outsider system morphemes in the form of agreement markers, primarily in conjunction with Hebrew content morphemes is the most prevalent structure in the data.

(4) *má še-kén* *inno* **neħna** *ló* **hetparaʔ-nú** *fī* *hāi* *yaʕnī* *ló*
     The case is that we   not go wild-1PL/PST in this meaning not
     heškaʔ-nú *fī* *ed-dar* *halqade* *kí* *ʕrif-na* *inno*
     invest-1PL/PST in the-house that much because know-1PL/PST that
     bad-na **na-gúr** *barra* *w-hēk* *áz* **henmax-tí** **ana**
     want-1PL/PRES 1PL/FUT-live outside and-such so lower-1SG/PST I
     ktīr *ʔipas-tí* *ʔotó* *la-Eyal*
     a lot reset-1SG/PST him to-Eyal
     'the case is that we did not go wild with this, that is, we did not invest
     in the house that much, because we knew that we are going to live out-
     side (of the village) and such, so I toned him down a lot, toned Eyal
     down.'

In addition to the verbal agreement and accusative markers, quantifiers in
Arabic and Hebrew, such as *kull*/ARAB and *kól*/HEB 'all', look outside their max-
imal projection when they are added to clitics to show gender and number
agreement as in *kull-(h)un/kull-ayat-(h)un*/ARAB/PL and *kul-ám*/HEB/PL 'all of
them' (Kheir, 2019). Israbic speakers tend to use the Hebrew quantifier *kól* 'all'
that looks outside its maximal projection when added to clitics; thus, consti-
tuting an outsider system morpheme. In Examples (5) and (6) there are cases
in which the Hebrew quantifier *kól* is co-indexed with Arabic pronouns, as in
hunni kúl-am 'all of them', where *kúl-am* is co-indexed with the Arabic pronoun
hunni 'they'; and in *hoū kúl-o* 'all of him', where *kúl-o* is co-indexed with the
mixed pronoun *hoū* 'he', which is a mixture of the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* 'he', and
the Hebrew pronoun *hú* 'he'. The usage of this mixed pronoun is consistent in
the data. Pronoun mixing is also evident in the pronoun *hī/hīy* 'she', which is
a mixture of the Arabic pronoun *hiyye* 'she' and the Hebrew pronoun *hí* 'she'
(See example 16, chapter 4, and appendix 4, excerpt 1). In addition, as in the
previous example, Example (5) shows a Hebrew outsider system morpheme
inflected with a Hebrew verb encoding agreement with the Arabic pronoun
(3PL) in *hunni megiʕ-ím* 'they come'.

(5) **hunni** *kul-ám* *otó* *davár* *be-sofó* *šel* *davár* *yaʕni*
     they all-of them same thing at-end of thing meaning
     bi-rūħ-u *wi-b-yej-u* *wi-bye-rjaʕ-u* *kull-en* *nafs*
     HAB-go-3PL And-HAB-come-3PL And-HAB-return-3PL all-3PL same
     eš-ši *w-ló-mešané* *Šū* *el-rekáʕ* *tabaʕ-hun*
     the-thing and-no-difference What the-background of-3PL
     w-min-ēn **megiʕ-ím**
     and-from-where get-PRS-3PL

'they are all the same at the end of the day, that is, they come and they go, and they come back the same, no matter what their background is or where they come from.'

(6) **hoū** *kul-ó*   *ʕādi*   *yaʕnī*   **kul-ó**   **meʔód** *b-teʕerf-ī*
     he   all-of him normal meaning all of him very   HAB-know-2SGF
     baxúr tiposí
     guy   typical
     'he is, all in all, simply normal, I mean he is, all in all, a very typical guy, you know …'

5.1.1.3   *Type B—Abstract Grammatical Structure Underlying Surface-Level Late System Morphemes*

Israbic frequently uses a number of Hebrew complementisers and discourse markers that function as late system morphemes, therefore, it also meets this requirement. Such morphemes include the Hebrew discourse marker *beglál* 'because of' and the complementiser *bešvíl* 'for' that combine with inflectional markers to express person, gender and number agreement and thus function as late system morphemes. Such Hebrew morphemes are quite often used in Israbic to co-index relationships with Arabic pronouns. Example (7) shows the Hebrew outsider system morpheme *bešvil-ó* 'for him' being used in place of its Arabic counterpart *ʕašān-o* 'for him'. The complementiser *bešvil-ó* is co-indexed with the speaker's father. In addition, as in previous examples, Hebrew outsider system morphemes are inflected with Hebrew verbs agreeing with the Arabic pronoun (1SG), as in *ʔasit-í* 'I did', *halax-tí* 'I went' and *ló hay-ití xayav* 'I was not obliged' respectively.

(7) *ana roħ-et*   *ʕa-l-ʔoniversita* **bešvil-ó**   **ʔasit-í** *tova*
     I   go-1SG/PST to-the-university   for-ACC/3SGM   did-1SG favour
     *w-**halax-tí***   *laɣad ana* *ló* **hay-ití xayáv**   *bas qolt*
     and-go-1SG/PST   there I   not was-1SG obliged/ 1SGM but said
     yalla   *še-yihyé*   *yihyé* *beséder má*   *aní ya-gíd*
     whatever that-will be will be alright what I   1SG/FUT/tell
     le-xá
     to-ACC/ 2SGM
     'I went to the University for him, I did (him) a favour and went there. I did not have to, but I said, whatever, so be it … it will be alright what can I tell you.'

5.1.1.3　　*Type C—Reanalysed Morphemes from the Outside Language*

Arguably, the lenition process of the Arabic emphatic phonemes [tˤ], [sˤ], [dˤ] and [zˤ] that appear to be merging with their non-emphatic counterparts [t], [s], [d], and [ð] respectively could fit into this category. Such merging is seemingly influenced by Israeli Hebrew, which has undergone a complete merger of its historical emphatic consonants and as a result, a loss of emphatics (Horesh, 2015). Although the contact with Hebrew may not have created this process of de-emphatisation, but it certainly facilitated it as it also occurred in the language of other Arabic speakers who live in Jewish/Arabic mixed cities and mainly use Hebrew as a medium of communication (ibid, 2015). Such phonological mergers might not appear to be encoding late system morphemes at first glance; however, they have two features that make them feasible as such. First, they are irreversible (i.e, they cause a permanent structural phonological shift in the language). According to AL-Wer (2008:605) 'it is conceptually impossible for native speakers to unmerge a merged word class'; thus, they become, what I call, 'code-imprinted' in the language. Second, they carry a certain degree of prestige, as they reflect a more contemporary and classy style of speech that resembles the country's dominant language that is conceived as a symbol of modernity. Thus, switching phonemes to non-emphatic counterparts demonstrates modernity and currency.

5.2　　*Israbic—From Codeswitching via Language Mixing to Fused Lects?*

Another model accounting for the transition from codeswitching into a mixed language is presented by Auer (1999) and is elaborated upon through a continuum of language alternation phenomena. At one end of the continuum, Auer posits alternational codeswitching, which is reserved for locally meaningful language alternation. In the middle, Auer uses language mixing to account for globally meaningful language alternation (i.e., a sociolinguistic recurrent pattern, which is equivalent to Myers-Scotton's (1993) notion of codeswitching as the unmarked choice). At the opposite extreme lies the stabilised mixed variety labelled as *fused lects*. The main reasons for the transition from codeswitching to language mixing are sociolinguistic, as it is bound to the speakers' perception of the codes used. Conversely, the transition from language mixing to *fused lects* is primarily grammatical.

In applying Auer's model to Israbic, a longitudinal study conducted by Kheir (2019) showed that the 2000 data set exhibited codeswitching combined with a certain extent of language mixing (i.e., both codeswitching and language mixing co-occurred). It might be that the juxtaposition of the two languages was characterised by alternational codeswitching at a much earlier stage; however, there is no documentation to support this, rather, the assumption that was

made is based on the longitudinal observations of the author. The second phase of the language mixing constituted the language of interaction or the unmarked choice, where 'as a consequence of the frequent intra-sentential juxtaposition of the two languages it [became] difficult to maintain the distinction between insertional and alternational juxtapositions' (Auer, 1999:315). Indeed, in the language mixing stage of Israbic, the alternational and insertional strategies converged almost to the point of indistinction, making it difficult to assign a matrix language to a clause. As Examples (8) and (9) show, it is difficult to assign a matrix language, as Arabic and Hebrew provide content morphemes and different types of system morphemes and the alternational and insertional strategies are also indistinctive. Such mixing was quite recurrent in the data.

(8) *ló avál* kull el-*migiš-ím* ana *ló ratsi-tí le-hyót*
    no but all the-presenter-PL I not want-1SG/PST to-be
    migiš-á γād *mišúm-še* kull el-*migiš-ím* hunni *xayav-ím*
    presenter-SGF there because-of all the-presenter-PL they must-PL
    yī-ju ʕala etˤ-tˤaybe ana *ló ló ba-kétaʕ*
    3PL/FUT-come to the-Taybe I not not in-the-thing
    'No, but all the presenters ... I did not want to be a presenter there because all the presenters have to go to Taybe, I am so not into this'

(9) *maximúm* ba-fūt *ʕa-s-sayyāra ló baʕayá* ana *mekav-á innu*
    maximum 1SG-enter to-the-car no problem I hope-1SGF that
    še-ló te-mšóx el-*reʔayón yótér midaí ve-áz keʔilú*
    that-not 3SGF/FUT-stretch the-interview more too and-then that is
    el-tséváʔ b-*ye-tfakšéš*
    the-colour 3SG-FUT-fall through
    'Worst case, I will enter the car, no problem, I hope that she does not stretch the interview too much because it might ruin the (hair) colour.'

According to Auer (1999), the selection of a mixed mode over a more monolingual mode may have social significance and may index group identity. In the case of Israbic, the mixed variety reflects the distinct identity of its speakers, who are 'sandwiched' between the Arabs and Jews. While the 'Arab/Druze' identity component can be linked back to their historical roots and the fact that they share cultural similarities with the Arab citizens, the Israeli component of their identity has formed over time due to a combination of social, religious, historical and political factors. These factors are discussed in detail in chapter 4, and they include: the Druze joining forces and sharing wars with the Jews; the

establishment of the Druze unit in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); using a Druze religious shrine (the Nabi-Shu'ayb shrine) as the site for its first swearing in ceremony to symbolise the historical connection between the Druze and the Jews; making the conscription of Druze males into the IDF compulsory; extending legal recognition to the Druze community as a religious community, making them legally independent from the Arab community; changing their nationality legally from 'Arab' to 'Druze'; founding the Druze-Zionist Movement; creating a distinctive Druze education system, completely separate from the Arab one (discussed in detail in Chapter 4, section 6.1) etc. (Azrieli & Abu-Rukon 1989; Landau 1993; Gelber 1995; Firro 2001; Court and Abbas, 2010; Nisan 2010).

All of these factors made Hebrew a very dominant constituent of the Druze linguistic and identity repertoire and the formation of a new *fused lect*. As Auer (1999:320) argues, in cases of frequent codeswitching, 'the identity-related purposes of this style may become more important than the discourse-related tasks codeswitching has served so far. The prevalent scenario for such a re-evaluation of functions is one in which a bilingual group needs to define its own identity vis-a-vis both contact groups'. For the Israeli Druze, the formation of a new *fused lect* (rather than a shift to Israeli Hebrew) denoted them as a distinct group and distinguished them from both groups 'whose languages they speak'. Auer (2014: 329) suggests that 'the scarcity of examples of radical fusion between two languages from the same family is probably not due to structural factors but rather a result of the social conditions under which such extreme cases arise'.

In the third phase, language mixing involves some measure of structural mixing that contributes to the creation of *fused lects* that differ from language mixing at a deeper grammatical level. A certain degree of structural mix is necessary for a language to qualify as a *fused lect*. *Fused lects* may require structural adaptation to the massive combination of elements from both languages via the development of new structures that are identical to neither language. Auer (1999; 2014) views the complete replacement of a particle subsystem of one language by another and the 'grammaticalisation' of discourse markers, adverbials or conjunctions as clear cases of fuses. According to Auer (2014:315), 'to speak of a fusion, a substantial part of the system of discourse markers/particles has to be borrowed, not just a single marker, either replacing the system of the receiving language or adding to it'. Israbic most obviously meets this requirement in its distinctive and almost exclusive use of Hebrew discourse markers and complementisers. Such discourse markers include, inter alia: *kí* 'because'; *avál* 'but'; *afílo* 'even'; *bexól ófen/bexól mekré* 'anyway'; *má šekén* 'regardless'; *deréx ágav* 'by the way'; *keílú* 'that is/as if'; *kanerʔé* 'seem-

ingly/so it seems'; *áz* 'so'; *bexlál* 'at all'; *kvár* 'already'; *še-* 'that'; *mamáš/legamré* 'totally'; *pašút* 'simply'; *taluì* 'depending'; *basóf/besofő šel davár* 'eventually'; *bemyuxád* 'specifically/especially'; *bertsinút* 'seriously'; *lexʔurā* 'prima facie'. Additionally, a prominent example in Israbic would be the prevalent usage of the mixed DP construction (an Arabic definite article prefixed to a Hebrew noun/adjective). The uniqueness of this construction does not lie in the fact that it represents a mixture of the two languages in one combined DP, but that it changes the intrinsic rule of prefixing.

Both Arabic and Hebrew have definite articles (*al-* or *el-* in Arabic, *ha-* in Hebrew) which are clitics prefixed to nouns and adjectives. However, while in Hebrew the pronunciation of an article is consistent, the *l* in the Arabic article maintains its original pronunciation unless it is prefixed to a word beginning with a sun letter (t, θ, d, ð, r, z, s, š, sˤ, dˤ, tˤ, zˤ, l, n) with which it assimilates. For example: *ed-dahab*/ARAB, *ha-zahav*/HEB 'the gold'; *etˤ-tˤawle*/ARAB, *ha-šolxan*/HEB 'the table'; *el-walad*/ARAB, *ha-yéled*/HEB 'the boy' (Kheir, 2019). Conversely, in Israbic, the assimilation constraints are violated. Example (9) shows the assimilation rule applied when prefixing the Arabic definite article *el-* to an Arabic noun beginning with a sun letter *d* (*dār*), thus forming *ed-dār* instead of **el-dar* 'the house'. Notably, when it is prefixed to a Hebrew noun beginning with a sun letter *r* (*rehút*), the assimilation rule is violated and *el-rehút* is used instead of *er-rehút* 'the furniture'. Such usage is systematic throughout all the data without any exception, and it is a structure that is distinct to the mixed variety (i.e., it became part of the language structure of this *fused lect* as it began affecting Arabic nouns as well, in terms of the violation of the assimilation constraints) and thus also qualifies as a *fused lect* under Auer's terms.

Example (9) also considers the use of the Hebrew discourse marker *keʔílu* 'that is', which occurred extremely frequently in the data. The Hebrew bridge system morpheme (the discourse marker *še* 'that') is inflected with the Arabic pronoun *neħna* 'we' and an Arabic late system morpheme (the pronominal clitic *m-*) is used, which co-indexes the subject, and is prefixed to the Hebrew verbs *ya-xlíf* 'change' and *ya-skír* 'rent out'. The Arabic counterparts would be *m-en-ɣayyer* 'we will change' and *m-en-ʔajjer* 'we will rent out' respectively, while the correct Hebrew forms would be *na-xlíf* 'we will change' and *na-skír* 'we will rent out'. The speaker also inserts an Arabic possessive phrase into a Hebrew pattern as seen in previous examples. In this example, *ed-dār tabˤet-na* 'the-house of ours'/ARAB is matched to *ha-bayét šel-anó*/HEB ('the-house of ours') instead of the Arabic counterpart *dār-na* ('house-ours') 'our house'.

(10) **ed-dār** *ke̞ʔílu* elli neħna *axré* *še-neħna* no-skon   *fĭ-ha*
      the-house that is that we   after that-we 1PL-live-FUT in-it
      m-na-xlíf   *el-rehút*   *šám* *fĭ-el-rehút*   *tabaʕ-na*
      1PL-FUT-change the-furniture there in-the-furniture of-1PL
      we-m-na-skír   *ed-dār*   **tabʕet-na** *ló* *meruhet-ét*
      and-1PL-FUT-rent out the-house of-1PL   not furnished-3SGF
      'The house, that is, that we, after that we live in, we'll change the furniture
      there with our furniture, and we'll rent out our house unfurnished.'

As evident in previous examples, Israbic applies the possessive L1 pattern upon
the L2 frame. The normal Arabic structure of such a possessive construction
is a noun conjoined with an enclitic pronoun or a noun, and in Hebrew, the
genitive exponent *šel* 'of' plus a noun or a pronominal suffix; for example,
*sayyāret-**ha**/*ARAB 'car her', *ha-óto **šel-á** /*HEB 'the car of her' (her car). In Isr-
abic, such a possessive phrase takes the form of Hebrew and changes from
*sayyāret-**ha**/*ARAB 'car her' to *es-sayyāra **tabaʕet-ha*** 'the car of her', which is lit-
erally copied from the Hebrew expression *ha-óto **šel-a** /*HEB 'the car of her' (her
car). In Example (11), as in Examples (1) and (10), the speaker uses the Arabic
possessive phrase *el-ašyaʔ tabʔ-et-ha* 'the stuff of her', which is copied from the
Hebrew *ha-dvarím šel-á* 'the stuff of her' instead of the Arabic normal expres-
sion *ašyaʔ-ha* 'stuff hers' to denote the expression 'her stuff'. Both constructions
take on the form of outsiders; however, Israbic copies the Hebrew construc-
tion into the Arabic construction; thus, forming converging outsiders towards
Hebrew, which are subsequently followed by the complete Hebrew clause *be-
nigúd le-harbé axirím* 'in contrast to many others'. Such usage is systematic in
Israbic.

(11) *ana Michal Nagarin b-ħob-eš*   **el-ašyaʔ tabʔ-et-ha**
      I   Michal Nagarin HAB-love-NEG-1SG the-stuff of-her
      be-nigúd   *le-harbé axirím*
      in-contrast to-many others
      'I don't like Michal Nagarin's stuff (Israeli brand), in contrast to many oth-
      ers'

5.3 *Discussion*

Myers-Scotton's model stresses the grammatical importance that is mainly
dependent on late system morphemes as the crucial factor for mixed languages.
Conversely, Auer's model stresses that the sociolinguistic factors involved in
the fusion process, including their sociolinguistic status and history (i.e., the
circumstances that led to such splits), is what makes them unique. The struc-

tural concepts of fusion presented in both models are applicable to the data presented herein in many aspects. However, those concepts are mainly based on pre-existent mixed languages coming from contact between languages from different language families and are radically distant. In this study, the fact that the contact languages come from the same language family raises questions as to whether the same structural concepts of mixing have the same validity in relation to such languages or whether different structural concepts are required. Such questions cannot be answered on the basis of a single case study. However, in relation to the sociolinguistic factors stressed by Auer (2014), they appeared to serve as an overriding factor in the creation of this mixed language.

One identified case of a mixture of closely related languages is Barranquenho, which is arguably a fusion of Portuguese and Spanish. According to Clements et al. (2008, 2011), Barranquenho does not exhibit a clear division between the origin of its grammar versus that of its lexicon, but it possesses a good deal of both Portuguese and Spanish phonology, morphology, syntax and lexicon. The speakers of this variety belong to a distinct culture, which is neither entirely Portuguese nor entirely Spanish, and have a hybrid Portuguese/Spanish cultural identity. Clements et al. (2008, 2011) argue that Barranquenho is a consequence of this distinct culture and reflects the distinctness of the cultural identity of its speakers. Although Clements et al. argue that Barranquenho is a mixed language, but not a prototypical one, Meakins (2013) doubts its status as such claiming that it is in fact Portuguese with some Spanish influence, and that its close proximity to the Portuguese/Spanish border makes it unclear how it would differ from varieties found along a dialect chain.

Although Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew are allegedly from the same language family, they are not as closely related as Portuguese and Spanish are, given that Israeli Hebrew exhibits much influence from Indo-European languages. While the traditional views suggest that Israeli Hebrew is Semitic like Palestinian Arabic, some scholars, such as Horvach and Wexler (1997) argue that it is in fact Indo-European, specifically Yiddish relexified (Yiddish using Hebrew lexicon), and Zuckermann (2008) argues that it is both Semitic and Indo-European. Nonetheless, Israbic's status as a mixed language is hardly doubtful. Clearly, Israbic is not a case of Arabic with some Hebrew influence or vice versa, however, it is not a prototypical mixture since Arabic and Hebrew are not radically distant as in most cases of mixed languages. Therefore, there is a need to identify which traits of mixed languages can actually be applicable to mixtures of closely related languages.

Based on the cases of Israbic and Barranquenho, it can be argued that certain features that apply to prototypical mixtures are also salient in non-prototypical mixtures. For example, unlike pidgins and creoles, the genesis of these lan-

guages was a product of expressive needs rather than for communication purposes (Golovko, 2003). Therefore, just as the prototypical mixed languages are created in places where a common language already exists and communication is not an issue (Meakins, 2013), so are the non-prototypical mixtures. More specifically, the speakers of each of these languages wished to form a distinct group, with creating a new mixed language that highlights their distinctiveness and reflects their distinct forms of identity (Bakker, 1997). Thus, the mixed language mainly serves as an expression of a distinct identity. In addition, just as most prototypical mixed languages arise in situations of community bilingualism, and are the native language of a group while still spoken alongside one or more of their source languages (Meakins, 2013), so is the case with the non-prototypical mixtures. Additionally, codeswitching presumably preceded the formation in many mixed languages, and the mixed language may continue to co-exist with codeswitching among the speakers of such languages (ibid, 2013). This has been demonstrated in both cases of Israbic and Barranquenho.

In terms of structure, however, it seems that in both cases of Israbic and Barranquenho, the mixtures are a-symmetrical and there is no even lexicon grammar distinction as is the case in most mixed languages. Rather, in both cases the source languages contribute significant amounts of grammar and lexis with varying degrees of mixtures. According to Meakins (2013: 190), 'the maintenance of inflectional morphology from both languages in mixed languages would suggest a relatively equal weighing given to both languages, with neither language definitely stronger.' Inflectional morphology is therefore not selected by one language, but rather the morpho-syntactic frame represents a composite of both languages. As Matras (2003) suggests, a certain feature of mixed languages is the incorporation of grammatical elements such as inflectional morphology, from the other language. Such borrowing, which has been labelled as 'loan proof', constitutes a violation of borrowing processes and therefore, is unique to mixed languages. These include definite articles, bound and personal pronouns, possessive markers, negation markers, demonstratives, existentials and interrogatives among other elements. Such structures are salient in the case of Israbic.

Eventually, 'what distinguishes mixed languages from other contact varieties is that they emerge as expression of identity rather than a result of a communicative need' (Meakins, 2013: 186). Thus, the question is not whether mixtures of closely related languages can be labelled as mixed languages or not, but whether the same set of traits that is used to test mixtures of radically distant languages can be used to test mixtures of closely related languages or whether there is a need for a different set. I argue that their genesis and general features are nearly identical to the prototypical mixtures, therefore, the same set

of traits can be used to test such mixtures. In terms of structure, however, different measures might need to be taken into account. Based on the current case of Israbic, although its structure conforms to most structural features of prototypical mixtures, I argue that the overriding structural feature that makes it stand out as an excellent example of a mixed language lies in the systematicity of the structural mixtures and as Auer (1999) posited, the development of new unique structures that are identical to neither source language, which makes it an autonomous language.

5.4 *Israbic in Comparison to Michif, Ma'a, Mednyj Aleut and Gurindji Kriol*

Unlike Michif speakers (§ 3.1), Israbic speakers are proficient in both languages (i.e., Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew). They speak Hebrew to varying degrees of proficiency but are generally highly proficient in both. In addition, Israbic is not equally Arabic and Hebrew; rather, it exhibits asymmetric mixtures from both languages. Unlike Michif, Israbic's structure is not composed of two subsystems; rather, it shows convergence of mixed morphology and grammatical structures as mentioned above. Thus, according to Bakker's (1997) description of the genesis and composition of Michif, it appears to be very different from the genesis and composition of Israbic. However, if compared to Myers-Scotton's (2002) view that its basis comes from Cree/French codeswitching and convergence, then it does display resemblance to Israbic, which has its basis in Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching and convergence.

In terms of its development, Israbic is more similar to Ma'a than Michif. When compared to the development hypotheses proposed by Goodman (1971) and Mous (2003) (see Section 3.2), Israbic development is similar in many aspects to that of Ma'a. Notably: i) Certain Druze speakers of Palestinian Arabic became bilingual in their language and Hebrew; ii) Hebrew gained power and had a massive influence over Arabic; and iii) Arabic incorporated Hebrew words and adapted them to the Arabic grammatical system. Similarly, when compared to the development of Ma'a (as per Myers-Scotton's 2002 matrix language turnover hypothesis), Israbic's development began in the same process of language contact and bilingualism, and then progressed to the phase of codeswitching to become the unmarked mode of communication that later promoted convergence, causing a change in the morphosyntactic frame that was then followed by the formation of a new mixed language.

Structurally, Israbic differs to Mednyj Aleut (see § 3.3), as it does not conform to the V-N (Verb-Noun) mixture described in Bakker's typology (2003); rather, it has a mixed morphology and grammar composed of both languages. However, when compared to its development under Myers-Scotton's (2002) hypothesis,

both languages are similar as: i) In both cases, unmarked codeswitching became the main mode of communication, and the main languages (Aleut, Arabic) took the form of the matrix languages while the secondary languages (Russian, Hebrew) became the embedded languages; ii) Both matrix languages remained the source of frame elements outside verbal inflections; iii) In both cases, convergence occurred, changing the morphosyntactic frame via insertions of late system morphemes from the previous embedded languages; iv) In both cases, the embedded languages started gaining power and began to take over as the matrix languages; and v) The fossilisation of codeswitching occurred in both languages, and the shift to the previously embedded languages was arrested.

Israbic resembles the northern Australian language Gurindji Kriol (§ 3.4) more than the above-mentioned languages in most aspects of its development and structure. Both languages emerged in a situation of fluent bilingualism in which codeswitching was the unmarked mode of communication and there was vagueness in relation to the matrix language. In addition, both languages experienced a turnover in progress that was arrested before a full language shift and fossilised at the point of mixed language formation. In terms of structure, in both languages, the source languages (Grundji and Kriol, and Arabic and Hebrew, respectively) contribute nouns, verbs and certain amounts of grammar to the grammatical systems in the mixed varieties, and while the mixed varieties in both cases resemble their source languages, some of the forms function in a special manner in the mixed varieties.

6   Conclusion

Based on Myer-Scotton's (2003) and Auer's (1999) models and the general definitions and qualifications of mixed languages, Israbic appears to be a mixed language. Israbic underwent a gradual process that began with a phase of extensive codeswitching between Arabic and Hebrew that brought about convergence towards Hebrew and ended with a phase of composite mixed language formation. This mixed language formation can be explained by both Myer-Scotton's (2003) and Auer's (1999) models. When tested against Myer-Scotton's proposed special characterisations of and qualifications for mixed languages, Israbic shows a composite structure beyond a lexical-conceptual structure. It displayed a convergence of morphological realisation patterns and the convergence of grammatical structures and composite structures in entire components of its morphosyntactic frame, rather than in incidental examples. In addition, Israbic is an example of a language that underwent the phases described

in the matrix language turnover hypothesis and stopped before an actual matrix language turnover. In testing the applicability of Israbic to the types of mixed languages, Israbic can be categorised as the strongest type. When tested against Auer's model, in the first phase, Israbic began with codeswitching combined with a certain extent of language mixing. In the second phase, language mixing constituted the language of interaction or the unmarked choice, which brought about structural mixing in the form of convergence of a mixed morphology and grammatical structures that were not identical to either source language.

Finally, when compared to other mixed languages that have been the subject of much attention in the literature, Israbic shows a certain amount of resemblance to Michif, Ma'a and Mednyj Aleut in terms of its development. However, it appears to most resemble the northern Australian language Gurindji Kriol in terms of both its development and structure. Like Gurindji Kriol (Meakins, 2012), Israbic is a mixed language that emerged from codeswitching as the unmarked mode of communication. It experienced a turnover in progress that was arrested before a full language shift and fossilised at the point of mixed language formation. It is 'a bilingual mixture, with split ancestry' that emerged in a situation of fluent bilingualism (cf. Matras & Bakker, 2003: 1) and developed as an in-group language rather than for communication purposes (cf. Golovko, 2003). In addition, similar to the structure of Gurindji Kriol, in Israbic, the source languages (Arabic, Hebrew) contribute nouns, verbs and certain amounts of grammar to the grammatical systems in the mixed variety.

Myers-Scotton's model emphasises the importance of late system morphemes as a crucial factor in defining mixed languages. Conversely, Auer's model emphasises the importance of the sociolinguistic factors involved in the mixing process. Despite the fact that the structural concepts of mixing presented in both models are aligned with the data in many aspects, such concepts are largely based on mixed languages that come from different language families and are radically unrelated. As the present case deals with languages that come from the same language family, it raises questions as to whether the same structural concepts of mixing can have the same validity for such languages or whether different structural concepts are required in such cases of language contact. These questions cannot be answered on the basis of a single case study. However, the sociolinguistic factors stressed by Auer appear to have played an overriding role in the creation of this mixed language.

To Codeswitch or not to Codeswitch? Codeswitching and Sociopolitical Identity among the Druze and Arabs in Israel

Chapter Preview

This chapter comprises the first thorough research which examines and compares codeswitching and sociopolitical identity among the three sectors within the Arabic speaking communities in Israel: the Druze, Christians and Muslims. As previously mentioned, there is a certain gap in the scholarly literature when it comes to a model that further illustrates the link between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity. Therefore, the present study introduces a new model that would facilitate the analysis of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity. Drawing insights from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the present chapter aims to provide an insight into bilingual minorities' linguistic reaction to and processing of state-centered policies of distinction, inclusion and exclusion, especially in a conflict setting. The findings show clear different codeswitching behaviors among the different sectors, and that such variance indexes sociopolitical identity.

1 Introduction

Many linguists have asserted that there is a clear link between language and identity, with language being central to the production of identity and serving as the vehicle to index multiple ethnic and nationalist stances (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). According to Auer (2007:2), bilingual minorities may use language in order to establish their identity and have it serve as a natural link to the community's identity. It is "the specific ways in which the majority and/or the minority language are spoken, as well as the various mixing and switching styles, which are considered to be the straightforward, 'natural' expression of the bilinguals' identity." In other words, through codeswitching and language preference, identities are shaped, reshaped or demonstrated.

According to Auer & Eastman (2010: 90) "whether code-switching occurs in a bilingual group of speakers, which form it takes, and how it is evaluated, is largely a result of political, economic, and historical forces at work." In this

respect, a plethora of research on codeswitching indicates that different code-switchers within a certain community demonstrate different switching ways and styles. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this has led linguists, such as Myers-Scotton, to distinguish between two main types of codeswitching: *classic codeswitching* and *composite codeswitching*. Classic codeswitching is defined by Myers-Scotton (2006:241) as switching that 'includes elements from two (or more) languages varieties in the same clause, but *only one of these varieties is the source of the morphosyntactic frame for the clause*', that is, the Matrix Language. In comparison, composite codeswitching is defined as a 'bilingual speech in which even though most of the morphosyntactic structure comes from one of the participating languages, the other language contributes some of the abstract structure underlying surface forms in the clause' (Myers-Scotton 2006:242). It is called a composite since it is a combination of codeswitching and convergence. According to Myers-Scotton (1998, 2002, 2003), this type of codeswitching can result in a mixed language formation as demonstrated in her Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis. Such distinction between the types of codeswitching is crucial for comprehending the various motivations for codeswitching, its causes and effects, and the role it plays in demonstrating identities.

Given the notion of interrelatedness of language, social-political situations and identity, the present chapter examines the relationship between code-switching and sociopolitical identity, reporting on a study of three native Palestinian Arabic speaking communities in Israel: Arab Christians, Muslims and Druze. According to Smooha (1992), Rouhana (1997), Amara & Schnell (2004) and Amara (2010, 2016, 2017), collective identities among the Arabs in general and the Israeli Arabs in particular, are the result of a complex sociopolitical context including religious, Pan-Arab, cultural, political-Islamic, national ideological and kinship identities all in the midst of a national and religious conflict. Therefore, I refer to their identity spectrum as sociopolitical identity. Drawing insights from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the current chapter attempts to offer a framework that would serve as a basis for analyses of codeswitching as an index of sociopolitical identity.

Since the Druze people were granted not only an independent status as a community and a distinct political and national identity as an act of inclusion vis-à-vis exclusion, but also an independent education system, separate from the Arab one, this encouraged the creation of a 'Druze and Israeli' consciousness (Firro, 2001). This, in turn, helped shape their collective identity as Israeli Druze, with the Israeli component being inseparable from the Druze one, both consciously and on the sub-conscious level, thus being their unmarked or default collective identity.

Moreover, since the Druze males are subject to the compulsory military service as opposed to the Arab Christians and Muslims, this led to the inclusion of the Druze in the state's identity, and conversely, to the exclusion of the Arabs. According to Zeedan (2019), a positive peace, which involves a sense of cooperation and integration, was achieved between the state of Israel and the Druze following their integration in the army, whereas a negative peace, the absence of war and violence, is maintained with the Arabs, following the state policy to exclude them.

This chapter focuses on the phenomena of composite codeswitching among the Israeli Druze community and codeswitching resistance among the Israeli Arab community and their relationship to sociopolitical identity. The Druze in Israel have a distinct speech that differs from that of the Christians and Muslims in the Arab sector who do not reside in mixed cities with a Jewish majority. As previously mentioned, although the Druze community shares Palestinian Arabic ('code 1') as the same first language with the Arabs in Israel, their speech is extremely unique in that it incorporates very extensive and frequent mixing of Arabic and Hebrew ('code 2'). In fact, Arabic/Hebrew composite codeswitching is considered the unmarked mode of communication in the case of the Israeli Druze community as opposed to the Arab community in which codeswitching is the marked mode of communication (excluding the Arabs residing in mixed cities alongside a Jewish majority and the Bedouins). The underlying hypothesis for the current case study is that when speakers include both the Arab/Druze as well as the Israeli component in their identity repertoire, they exhibit more intensive codeswitching between the languages, therefore, there is clear interrelatedness between codeswitching and sociopolitical identification.

2   The ICM: A Sociopolitical Model of Codeswitching

The present study examines the relationship between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity among three native Palestinian Arabic speaking communities in Israel: Arab Christians, Muslims and Druze. Drawing insights from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the study presents a theoretical model that attempts to facilitate the analysis of codeswitching as an index of sociopolitical identity. I shall call the model *The Identity Code Model* since it reflects identity issues within the context of codeswitching. This model provides an explication illustrating speakers' sociopolitical motivations as they codeswitch or refrain from codeswitching. It integrates different branches of linguistics with the main ones being sociolinguistics and contact linguistics.

Taking into account the performance and style theory (Eckert, 2004), I suggest codeswitching to be viewed as a stylistic resource that people standing in a variety of positions with respect to conflict/political issues will show variability in the ways in which they select, combine and situationally deploy it. Eckert (2004) views style not as a thing, but as a practice, that is, an activity through which people create social meanings, making it the visible manifestation of social meaning. In addition, performance, a marked speech event that is more or less sharply differentiated from a mundane interaction is a highly deliberate and self-aware social display that involves stylization in highlighting ideological associations (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). Based on this view, codeswitching can be embedded in the speaker's linguistic practice as the visible manifestation of sociopolitical identity. According to Eckert (2004), selecting variables is based upon the speaker's interpretation of its meaning potential, and since "a stylistic move is to be put out into a community for the purpose of being interpreted, speakers select resources on the basis of their potential comprehensibility in that community" (p. 44). Therefore, I suggest that since the use of codeswitching can be perceived by the speakers as adding the identity dimension affiliated with the state, it will be cautiously selected, combined, situationally deployed and perhaps even amended to match the speaker's ideology. Moreover, Eckert (2004) adds that prestige and stigma have become the primary social meanings associated with variables, bringing a focus on prestige and an attempt to avoid stigma and the speaker may manage style to call upon a certain identity or to create distance. Similarly, Irvine and Gal (2000) have documented a process of linguistic ideology which they term *erasure*; a process in which elements are eradicated in case they do not fit the ideological stance. Such "problematic" elements must be either ignored or transformed or acted against in order to remove the threat. Irvine and Gal have identified another semiotic process called *iconization*, in which linguistic features become the ideological index of a social group's essence. Denoting 'state identity' or a mixed identity, I suggest that codeswitching can presumably be viewed as a stigmatized variant to be avoided by those who wish to create distance from that specific identity, and more radically, to be acted against. Conversely, those who wish to make that identity salient, will embrace it as their iconic style. In a similar notion, Myers-Scotton (1993) asserts that unmarked codeswitching can be viewed as an index of intergroup harmony and marked codeswitching as an indicator of conflict, thus little unmarked codeswitching is expected in places where languages symbolize intergroup conflict.

In addition, Bucholtz & Hall (2004) have explored similar notions in their model *Tactics of Intersubjectivity*—the relations that are created through identity work, which includes three different pairs of tactics that pertain to marked-

ness, essentialism and institutional power. The first set, adequation and distinction, involves the pursuit of socially recognized sameness (via adequation) or difference (via distinction). Adequation can be used as a tool to preserve a community identity in the face of dramatic cultural shift while at the same time as a way of bilingual speakers "to locate themselves simultaneously within two different identity frames, by syncretically combining elements of each language into a single sociolinguistic system" (p. 383). Distinction is one of the sociopolitical relations whereby salient difference is underscored rather than erased. It is a tactic of underscoring differentiation of identity through resisting the assimilating forces of modernity and the nation-state, thus "speakers of minority or unofficial languages often elaborate linguistic differences between their own language and the language of the state" (p. 384). Although distinction mainly operates in a binary manner establishing a dichotomy in which social identities are constructed as oppositional or contrastive, it may facilitate a process in which groups establish an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy. The second set, authentication and denaturalization, respectively relate to the construction of a genuine identity and an identity which is non-authentic, and it involves the rewriting of linguistic and cultural history in which the speakers are repositioned as more "authentic" to the historical workings of the nation-state. Accordingly, when the identity of a language and its speakers becomes authenticated through nationalistic rhetoric, the variety then indexes ways of being and belonging to the nation-state, thus people may index multiple ethnic, nationalist and political stances through their linguistic practices. The third set, authorization and illegitimation, involves speakers attempt to legitimate particular identities through co-legitimating an institutional power or authority, or conversely to suppress or withdraw such identities through removing or denying such structural power, therefore, illegitimation can serve as a mode of resistance to the state or the dominant authority.

Drawing insights from the above mentioned theories and the links to codeswitching that I have postulated, I propose a framework that further explicates and specifies the link between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity. *The Identity Code Model*'s fundamental premise is that codeswitching occurs to varying degrees of intensity according to the bilingual/multilingual speaker's wish to make an ideologically-based identity component more salient than the rest out of a set of identity choices, by either excessive codeswitching into the dominant culture's language or conversely, refraining from it. Hence, there is a connection between the linguistic code used, the sociopolitical context and social identity. The model is specifically designed to show sociopolitical motivations found in codeswitching. *The Identity Code Model* is primarily based on a series of studies that was conducted for the purpose of a research project

on Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching in the native Palestinian Arabic speaking communities in Israel. *The Identity Code Model* (*ICM*) is composed of a set of theoretical premises that relate to the essence of influences of sociopolitical identity affiliations upon the intensiveness and type of codeswitching used.

First, the ICM presupposes that within a community of bilinguals whose sociolinguistic setting and intensive language contact with the language of the state make them susceptible to intensive codeswitching and language change, differences in sociopolitical identity affiliations position these individuals differently along the codeswitching scale. The levels of the codeswitching scale can be defined as light, moderate and heavy. Light codeswitching is characterized predominantly by borrowings and monolexemic switching, moderate codeswitching by 'classic' codeswitching and heavy codeswitching by intensive codeswitching that approaches convergence and composite codeswitching. It is therefore expected that when bilingual individuals include an identity constituent of the state/dominant culture into their identity repertoire, the more the codeswitching components will prevail within their speech. Specifically, when a bilingual community/individual is highly socially and politically identified with the state/dominant culture, codeswitching by members of that community/that individual into the state/dominant culture's language would constitute the composite type; for others, codeswitching into the state/dominant culture's language would constitute the classic type. In a similar notion, when a community is highly socially and politically identified with the dominant culture/state, codeswitching by members of that community into the dominant state/culture's language would constitute the unmarked mode of communication; for others, codeswitching into the dominant language would constitute the marked mode of communication. Furthermore, when a community exhibits positive attitudes toward the state/dominant culture's identity, language and codeswitching into its language, it demonstrates high levels of codeswitching into the dominant language. On the other hand, when a community exhibits negative or neutral attitudes towards the state/dominant culture's identity, language and codeswitching into its language, it demonstrates low to medium levels of codeswitching.

The second hypothesis is that the higher the degree of a bilingual community's/individual's affiliation with the dominant culture/state, the more prominent its/his codeswitching into the language of the dominant culture/state will be. Therefore, the more included minority communities in a given state will show much higher levels of codeswitching into the state language. Conversely, the lower the degree of a bilingual community's/individual's sense of inclusion in the dominant culture/state, the more refrained a community/

individual is from codeswitching into the language of the state—limiting it to a restricted number of borrowings and monolexemic switches (light codeswitching). In addition, the more a community/individual demonstrates an inclination towards sociopolitical convergence with the dominant culture/state, the more the features of language convergence will emerge in its/his speech. The converse notion is that sociolinguistic convergence will be consciously impeded and resisted if a bilingual community/individual is reluctant to affiliate socio-politically with the dominant culture/state. Also, when a community is more socially and politically identified with the dominant culture, it maintains the phonological pronunciation of 'code 2', conversely, when a community is less socially and politically identified with the state/dominant culture, it tends to make phonological adaptations of 'code 2' into 'code 1'. In unique cases, the more a bilingual community/individual demonstrates an inclination towards sociolinguistic convergence with the dominant culture, the more forenames are code-imprinted from the dominant culture, despite the fact that those forenames are alien to the recipient culture/individual.

The final presupposition is that in some cases of minority groups/communities who wish to create an alternative to a dichotomy between contrastive or oppositional identities, a new language or dialect will be created, presumably by mixing both languages, which is often the outcome of extremely intensive codeswitching. According to Bakker (1997:203), mixed languages 'are spoken by ethnic groups who were originally bilingual but, for some reason, wanted to distinguish themselves collectively from both groups whose languages they speak. The speakers of each of these languages form a distinct group, either a subgroup of a larger division or a completely different group.' Therefore, by forming a mixed language or dialect, the group/community stresses its sociopoliticalinguistic distinctness.

3   Arabic/Hebrew Codeswitching among the Muslim and Christian Participants: Borrowing and Classic Codeswitching

The speech data of the Muslim and Christian participants evidenced mainly borrowing and codeswitching of the classic type, mainly inter-sentential. Taking into account the performance and style theory (Eckert, 2004), codeswitching can be perceived as a stylistic resource that people standing in different positions with respect to conflict/political issues will show variability in the ways in which they select, combine and situationally deploy it. As is evident in the following examples, the Christian participants speech data exhibit more usage of Hebrew than their Muslim counterparts whose data yielded

very few to no Hebrew usage at all. In fact, when the speakers felt the need to codeswitch, they mainly used English and Modern Standard Arabic elements rather than their Hebrew equivalents. Examples (1) through (6) illustrate borrowing and Arabic/Hebrew 'classic' codeswitching from the Christian participants and examples (7) through (12) are of their Muslim counterparts. All examples are of multilingual speakers fluent in both Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew, with Arabic being their L1 and Hebrew their L2. According to Myers-Scotton (2002), in classic codeswitching, the Matrix Language sets the morphosyntactic frame. Embedded Language lexemes, however, are either integrated into the Matrix Language frame; appear in bare form, or as part of an Embedded Language island. In the Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching data of the Christian and Muslim participants, such constraints are realized.

Example (1) is taken from a speech of a Christian female student talking to a friend. The speaker self-identified as Arab stating that she tried to refrain from the insertion of Hebrew elements into her speech since it sounds more prestigious without the Hebrew influence. According to Eckert (2004:45) "prestige and stigma have come to be the primary social meanings associated with variables, and formality brings a focus on prestige and an attempt to avoid stigma." In the sociopolitical context of the present case study, codeswitching into Hebrew is associated with 'Israeliness' or a mixed identity and can presumably be viewed as a stigmatized variant to be avoided. The speaker used the Hebrew word *davkā*, which is a case of Hebrew borrowing into Arabic. The Hebrew word *davká* does not have an equivalent in Arabic since it denotes various meanings and its meaning is contextually bound and therefore counts as a cultural borrowing. It has also been phonologically adapted by the speaker by lengthening of the vowel [á] to [ā]. It should be noted that in the quotations from the transcriptions, Hebrew elements are marked in red in the transcriptions as well as their glosses; other elements are from Arabic, and morphemes under discussion or focal appear in bold. The transcriptions follow the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) system.

(1) *wow ʔana b-astannā-ki   davkā*
     wow I   will wait-2SGF   actually
     'Wow, I will wait for you, actually.'

Example (2) is taken from a speech of a Christian female worker talking to her colleague. In (2) there is a case of inter-sentential codeswitching in which the speaker produced one clause completely in Arabic and the following one completely in Hebrew. It is important to note that within the Hebrew clause there is a usage of the Hebrew loanword *klitˤa* 'network coverage'. The word *klitˤa*

does not have an equivalent in Palestinian Arabic in its technological meaning (network coverage), and it is also used by Arabic speakers in the territories. The technology domain introduced many Hebrew borrowings mainly due to the fact that they are new concepts that fill in a linguistic void in the colloquial Palestinian Arabic dialect. The Hebrew words *harbe* 'a lot of' and *klitˤā* were phonologically adapted into Arabic as the former is pronounced (*h*)*aʁbé* and the latter *klitá* in Israeli Hebrew. The speaker replaced the lax uvular approximant [ʁ] with the alveolar trill [r], the alveolar plosive [t] by the pharygealized [tˤ] and used the lengthened vowels [ē] and [ā] instead of the short [é] and [á] respectively. The speaker self-identified as Israeli-Arab, stating that Israeli represents her civic identity and Christian-Arab her nationality. The speaker stated that when she inserts Hebrew elements into her everyday speech, it is done as a means of comfort and assimilation.

(2) *šu   maʕak-i   ent-i,   Orange, Pelephone? b-Orange yeš*
     What Have-2SGF you-2SGF Orange, Pelephone? *in-Orange there is*
     harbē   klitˤā
     a lot of reception
     'What do you have, Orange, Pelephone (mobile phone brands)? Orange
     has a good reception'

In (3) a Christian male speaker used the Hebrew expression *bezxut ʕatsmen-ū:* 'in our own right', which is more commonly used than its Arabic counterpart *befadˤel-na* due to the fact that the Arabic equivalent is related to Modern Standard Arabic and is therefore considered more formal and less colloquial. The Hebrew word *ʔatsmen-ú* 'ourselves' was phonologically adapted into Arabic as *ʕatsmen-ū* with the speaker changing the glottal plosive [ʔ] into the pharyngeal fricative [ʕ] and lengthening the vowel [ū].

(3) *noškor   Allah, wēin   iħna mnūsˤal miš bezxut ʕatsmen-ū la-inn-o*
     we thank God   where we   reach   not **in our own right** because
     Allah raħme w-maħabbe
     God   grace   and-love
     'Thank God, wherever we get to is not in our own right but due to God's
     grace and love.'

In example (4) a Christian male hairdresser talking to his client inserted the colloquial Hebrew expression *ma šeken* 'that said'. The choice of the Hebrew expression *má šekén* stems from the fact that it does not have an exact equivalent in colloquial Arabic and its meaning is contextually bound; therefore,

it is a borrowed Hebrew expression that fills in a lexical gap. The speaker self-identified as a Christian, with Israeli occupying his civic identity. The speaker had mixed feelings about the integration of Hebrew elements into his speech. On the one hand, he felt comfortable doing so, on the other hand he tried to refrain from doing it with certain interlocutors, taking into account its controversial 'role' in reflecting affiliation with the state. According to Eckert (2004), the issues associated with social difference may have been quite different at another time, and the speakers may have deployed the linguistic variables in very different ways. Based on this view, codeswitching may have been deployed very differently if it were not for the conflict setting.

(4) *ma baʔref kif etˤ-tˤaʔes   ɣad   w-el-manāx   tabaˤ-hen bas*
    not   know   how the weather there and the climate of-3PL   but
    ma šeken istaˤeml-i silicon
    that said   use-2SGF   silicone
    'I don't know how the weather is like there and their climate but, regardless, use (hair) silicone'

Example (5) shows another instance of inter-sentential codeswitching in which the speaker produced the first clause entirely in Arabic and the following clause entirely in Hebrew. This is a classic example of classical codeswitching, which is mainly characterised by inter-sentential codeswitching and monolexemic switches and borrowings.

(5) *ɣad   šu   el-ˤemle   dollar? kama   hú šavé?*
    there   what   the-currency dollar? how much   he worth?
    'what is the currency there, dollar? How much is it worth?'

Example (6) is taken from a Christian male worker, who resided in a mixed town with a Druze majority, talking to a repeat customer asking her about a relative's mental condition. The speaker showed a much higher level of codeswitching than the other Christian participants. His speech is characterised by the relatively high usage of Hebrew morphemes, which outnumber the Arabic morphemes in many of the clauses that he produced. In a morpheme count of example (6), seven out of the twelve morphemes are taken from Hebrew. It is noteworthy that this specific participant, when asked about self-identification and his relation to the state, he stated that he self-identifies as Israeli-Arab, feeling a sense of inclusion and belonging to the state and is very pleased to be an Israeli citizen, and that he feels detached from the Palestinian theme. This example stresses the benefit of codeswitching in

constructing identity which lies in its inherent voicing of various identities simultaneously, such as indexing an affiliation with the local community as well as with one's ethnic heritage in cases where both identities hold value and are thus claimed publicly through language use (Fought, 2006; Woolard, 1998).

(6) *zé pagaʕ   la   ba-ʕatsabím fi el-mox? fi šu pagaʕ?*
     this harm-PST for her in the-nerves *in the-brain?* in what harm-PST
     'Did this harm her cranial nerves? What did it harm?'

The following examples of borrowing and codeswitching are taken from the Muslim participants. In (7) a Muslim multilingual female student produced three different clauses; the first completely in Arabic, the second using the English expression *Oh my God*, and the third in Arabic with the hesitant insertion of the Hebrew loanword *reʔayon* '(job) interview'. The word *reʔayon* is borrowed from Hebrew *ʁeayón* since it does not have an equivalent in the vernacular variety and fills in a linguistic void, and has been phonologically adapted primarily in lengthening the vowel [ó] to [ō]. The speaker tried as much as possible to refrain from the use of Hebrew elements until she was faced with no other choice. It is evident in her linguistic choice that even for Hebrew loanwords that are more commonly used than their Arabic equivalents, she nonetheless sticks to the Arabic equivalent, as in her choice of the Arabic word *wadˤife* 'assignment'. The Hebrew counterpart *ʕavodá* 'assignment', has almost replaced the Arabic word *wadˤife*, which is much less commonly used among Arabic native speakers, to the point that it is nearly becoming archaic in its academic sense. This participant had proudly self-identified as a Palestinian Arab, stressing her Arab nationality and positive attitude towards Arabic, stressing that since she feels that the language she speaks determines her identity, she tries to avoid insertion of Hebrew items into her speech. Since in this conflict situation codeswitching is perceived to serve both as a linguistic tool as well as an ideological tool, this speaker stressed the fact that she uses it purely for linguistic purposes.

(7) *tˤayeb xali-na neħki ʕan el-**wadˤife**   oh my God! ʔay sēʕa*
     Ok   let us talk about the-assignment oh my God! what hour
     *nazl-e   ʕala el.... **reʔayōn?***
     going down-2SGF to   the ... interview?
     'Ok, let us talk about the assignment. Oh my God! What time are you going to the (job) interview?'

Example (8) is taken from another Muslim female multilingual student who shows the same pattern as the previous one. The speaker produced three clauses, two completely in Arabic and the last in Arabic with a hesitant insertion of the borrowed Hebrew phrase *šaʕōt kabalā* 'reception hours' which is phonologically adapted into Arabic, since the Israeli Hebrew pronunciation is *šʔót kabalá*. *šʔót kabalá* was borrowed from Hebrew since it does not have an equivalent in Palestinian Vernacular Arabic, therefore, it fills a lexical gap. As in the case of the previous participant, this speaker carefully chose to refrain from Hebrew insertions, even in the case of preferred borrowed Hebrew counterparts, as in the case of her usage of the Arabic word *laʔtʕa* 'scene'. *laʔtʕa* is much less frequently used than its Hebrew borrowed equivalent *ketáʔ* among the Israeli Arabs and Druze, yet, the speaker remains loyal to the Arabic choice. This speaker self-identified as a Palestinian Arab, stating her nationality as Palestinian while highlighting the importance of Arabic in relation to her identity; further stating that she refrains from insertion of Hebrew elements into her daily speech, as she feels excluded from the state. Therefore, it is probable that the phonetic adaptation of the Hebrew elements by the speaker serves as a vehicle to stress its use for merely linguistic purposes.

(8) *bas ʔana sʕafan-t   in-na   da-titrek   w...   baʕre-š.*
     but I   shock-1SG-PST that-she want-leave and ... know not.
     *kān-et   **laʔtʕa** yaʕni   ktīr betsʕaffen. Be-ʔul-la   taʕal-i*
     was-2SGF scene meaning very shocking. 3SGM-tell-3SGF come-2SGF
     *ʕala... **šaʕōt** el-**kabalā**   taʕon-i*
     to ...   hours the-reception of-1SG
     'but I was shocked that she wants to leave and ... I don't know. It was, I mean, a very shocking scene. He tells her "come during my consultation hours".'

Example (9) is taken from a Muslim male student whose speech is also characterised by very few mono-lexemic switches and borrowing. As in other cases of the Muslim participants, the speaker tried to stick to Arabic even in the case of the alternative more common Hebrew switches; such as *ʕavoda* 'assignment', for which he uses the Arabic equivalent *wadʕife*. The speaker, however, inserts the Hebrew adjective *mogzám* 'too much' in two separate clauses, which is again, a case of a Hebrew borrowing that is used in the context of an assignment given by an Israeli Jewish lecturer. In this case, as with *ma šeken* 'that said' and *davká* 'actually', there really is no Arabic equivalent. The Hebrew adjective *mogzám* was phonologically adapted into mogzām by vowel lengthening, presumably to make it sound more native. The speaker self-identified as

Arab who feels excluded, stating his nationality as a Muslim-Arab and stressed the fact that he tries to avoid the use of Hebrew in his speech; expressing his concern of the rising influence of Hebrew upon Arabic and the rising usage of Hebrew by Arabic speakers in the state. Following the performance and style theory (Eckert, 2004), codeswitching can be perceived as a stylistic resource that is carefully selected, combined and situationally deployed according to the positions with respect to the political issues, as is the case here.

(9) *ktīr   ktīr   el-yōm hēk.   mogzām.   wadʕif-tu   hada*
     Much much today   like this. too much. Assignment-of him this
     Uriel el-mogzām
     Uriel the-too much
     'today is just really too much like this. Too much. The assignment of this Uriel is 'the' too much.'

Example (10) is taken from the speech of a Muslim female student sitting in a coffee shop, after her friend read out a public message in Hebrew asking to evacuate the place (the coffee shop) between 12:15pm and 01:30pm. The speaker produced a clause in Arabic with the mono-lexemic insertion of the Hebrew noun *ħēder* 'room'. This is an instance of a common switch in which the definite article in Palestinian Arabic *el-* or *al-* (the), which is not independent, but rather is prefixed to nouns and adjectives in Arabic, is prefixed to a noun in Hebrew, thus the Hebrew noun is inserted into an Arabic frame. In addition, the Hebrew noun *ħēder* is phonologically adapted into Arabic. The Israeli Hebrew pronunciation of the noun is *xedéʁ*, thus the speaker used the pharyngeal [ħ] instead of the voiceless velar fricative [x], the long vowel [ē] instead of the short equivalent [e], and the alveolar trill [r] instead of the lax uvular approximant [ʁ]. The speaker self-identified as Palestinian-Arab and chose to refrain from embedding Hebrew elements in her speech, stating that it is important to keep her Arabic pure, for it reflects her identity. According to Eckert (2004), selecting variables is based upon the speaker's interpretation of its meaning potential, and since this speaker perceives insertions of Hebrew elements as a "stain" to her speech and identity, she attempts to resist it and presumably use phonetic adaptation as a way of "camouflaging" its source.

(10) *ʔawwal marra beʔol-u fadʕdʕu   el-ħēder*
     First   time   say-2PL evacuate the room
     'It is the first time that they ask to evacuate the room.'

In example (11), there is a case in which a Muslim female worker is talking to her co-worker about yet another fellow worker who is unwell due to fasting. The speaker produces four clauses, three of which are completely in Arabic and one with an insertion of a Hebrew verb, which she phonologically adapted into Arabic as *atˁabēl* 'take care of'. The common Hebrew pronunciation is (*y*)*e/ata-pél*, which the speaker replaced the alveolar [t] by the pharygealized [tˁ], the vowel [è] by [ē], and the voiceless bilabial [p] by the voiced [b]. The Hebrew verb is a case of a Hebrew borrowing from the domain of health services, which, according to Amara (2010, 2017), is a domain in which the influence exerted by contact with the Jewish culture is evident due to the many Hebrew borrowings from it. The speaker self-identified as Arab, stating her nationality as a Muslim-Arab who feels excluded and tries to resist the integration of Hebrew elements stating that she is against it and against its growing influence on Arabic as she feels that language determines one's identity. It seems that the speaker is following the process of adequation (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004), which is used to preserve a community identity in the face of dramatic cultural change.

(11) *Saħar dayx-a heik   taˁban-e šwai. ʔoltel-ha   ida meš*
     Saħar dizzy   like that tired-3SGF a bit. 1SG told-3SGF if   not
     *ʔādr-e   ifetr-i.   issa aʔˁod **atˁabēl**   ʔana*
     able-2SGF break the fast-2SGF. now start take care of I
     b-moradˁa?! ma-liš   xlaʔ!
     in-patients?! not-have patience!
     'Saħar is kind of dizzy, and a bit tired. I told her if you are unwell, then break the (Ramadan) fast! Now I will start taking care of patients? I do not have the patience (for that)!'

Example (12) is taken from a Muslim male worker who did not want to go to work but was reluctant to tell his employer and suddenly the employer calls him to permit him an absence from work on that day. The speaker expressed his happiness to his friend while producing three clauses; the first two completely in Arabic and the third includes an insertion of the phonologically modified Hebrew word *mezalzél* 'irreverent', after a failed attempt to produce an equivalent in Arabic. The Hebrew word *mezalzél* does not have an equivalent in Palestinian Arabic; therefore, it fills in a linguistic void. The speaker self-identified as a Palestinian-Arab who feels excluded from the state and connected to the Palestinian nation, and tries not to insert Hebrew elements in his daily speech, seemingly as a way to index his sociopolitical stance.

(12) *el-ħamd-ella*   *ʔana mabsutˤ! ma kont-eš ʔana badd-i*   *alɣ-i*
     the-gratitude-God I   happy!   not was-not I   want-1SG cancel
     laʔenno men jehat-i   *ʔana ba-bayyen heik...*   *mezalzēl*
     because from side-1SG I   will-seem like this ... irreverent
     'Thank God! I am happy! I did not want to cancel (it) because from my
     side it would have seemed kind of … irreverent'

According to the examples above of the Christian and Muslim participants that constitute a typical and comprehensive sample of the rest of the data, it is evident that this level of codeswitching is characterised mainly by borrowing and classic codeswitching, and constitutes the marked mode of communication. It is reflected herein by the infrequent Arabic/Hebrew codeswitching and borrowing occurrences, and maintaining the role of Arabic as the undisputed Matrix Language and the main provider of the system morphemes. Hebrew, which is the Embedded Language in this data, provides some content morphemes and Embedded Language islands that fit into the Matrix Language frame model, thus maintaining its role as an Embedded Language. The findings demonstrate language loyalty, which according to Hesbacher & Fishman (1965:163) and Szecsy (2008:446), denotes a desire to retain an identity that is articulated through the use of that language and maintain the language in question even under adverse conditions and is 'unleashed' in response to an impending language shift, in an attempt to preserve the threatened language. This conforms to Myers-Scotton's (1993:128) notion of markedness, which expects that "where there is a good deal of intergroup tension and this tension is expressed by language loyalty, little unmarked CS is predicted."

Recent similar findings are discussed in Abu-Elhija's (2017) research on borrowings among the Israeli Arabs, and Hawker's (2018) research on borrowings and codeswitching among the Israeli Arabs. Abu-Elhija (2017) concluded that despite the high intensity of contact between the languages, her data yielded a scarce corpus of borrowings and very restricted types of borrowings. She explained the findings to be a possible result of the political struggle between the Arabs and Jews, and that the political and cultural situation of the Israeli Arabs is what actually hinders the process of borrowing.

Similarly, Hawker (2018) came up with evidence suggesting that the few borrowings and codeswitching data that were traced, were limited by specific forms and pragmatic functions, mainly borrowing of nouns for specialist terminology and inter-sentential codeswitching. She summarised the ideologies into the premise that two languages index two national identities and mixing them might index a subversive mixture of the identities, which is highly controversial among the Israeli Arabs.

4   Arabic/Hebrew Codeswitching among the Druze Participants: Convergence and Composite Codeswitching

In recent studies, Kheir (2019; forthcoming) has examined and proved the language of the Druze community as going through the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation, resulting in a mixed language; based on Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis (1998, 2002), Auer's (1998, 1999) and Myers-Scotton's (2003) models of mixed languages. Examples (13) through (18) illustrate codeswitching and convergence to Israeli Hebrew from the Druze participants' data. The speakers are highly proficient in both Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew, with Palestinian Arabic being perceived by them as their L1. The examples indicate that Hebrew plays a role in setting the morphosyntactic frame, which is a sign of a composite Matrix Language formation.

In example (13), the speaker used the Hebrew negation morpheme *éin* 'not' with the Arabic pronoun *ana* 'I'. The speaker suffixes the Hebrew dative pronoun *lí* 'for me' to the negation marker *éin*, a pattern which, as mentioned previously, is mainly used in Arabic, but rarely in Hebrew. Example (13) also represents convergence of morphological realization pattern as the speaker inserted an Arabic possessive phrase into a Hebrew pattern, that is, L1 phrase was inserted into an L2 frame. *Fi et-talifon tabaʕ eš-šuɣul*/ARAB is matched to *ba-telefón šel ha-avodá*/HEB ('in the phone of the work') instead of the Arabic counterpart *fi talifon eš-šuɣul* ('in the work phone'). In addition, the insertion of the Arabic definite article *el-* 'the' to the Hebrew noun *tviʕá* 'law suit', does not conform to the Arabic grammatical rule which states that the *l* in the Arabic article maintains its original pronunciation, unless it is prefixed to a word beginning with a "sun" letter (t, tʕ, d, dʕ, r, z, s, ʃ, sʕ, zʕ, θ, ð, l, n), with which it assimilates. Conversely, it follows Hebrew in which the article has consistent pronunciation and does not assimilate, thus conforms to Auer's (1999: 321) characterizations of fused lects, which suggest that "structures from language A and B which are more or less equivalent in monolingual use may develop specialized uses in the fused lect AB. Also, fused lects may have to adapt structurally to the massive combination of elements from A and B by developing structures identical neither to those of A nor B." Furthermore, the assimilation rule was violated using Arabic elements, presumably as a result of the massive combinations of mixed DPs, which in turn, have resulted in automatic violation of the rule in either case. The violation of the rule in Arabic is evident, for instance, in example (14) B, where the speaker did not assimilate the sun letter *d* with the prefixing of the Arabic article, and instead of uttering *fi-d-dinya* 'in the universe', the speaker said *fi-l-dinya*. It should be noted that in the quo-

tations from the transcriptions, Hebrew morphemes are marked in red in the transcriptions and their glosses; other morphemes come from Arabic, morphemes under discussion are in bold.

(13) *Lazem el-wāħad kull el-waqet yinadnéd ba-qull-ek*   **ana**
     Must   the-one all   the-time nag-PRES HAB-tell-2SGF I
     én-lí   *el-mespár tabaʕ-o Mevin-á?*   *yaʕni ana*
     not have-for me the-number of-3SGM Understand-2SGF meaning I
     aslan   kull el-waqet lamma kān tekšurét   *fi āxer fatra*
     actually all the-time when was communication in Last period
     *miš áz   awwal **el-tviʕá** kan-u hunne yenadned-ú ló*
     not then first   the-suit was-3PL they   nag-3PL   for him
     Mevin-á?   *inno ana ló hay-ití ba-tmuná*
     Understand-2SGF that I   not was-1SG in the-picture
     mevin-á?   *fi hada el-hekšér. Ma hou el-muškle   kān*
     understand-2SGF? in this the-context That he the-problem was
     yomet-ha el-mespár   taba ʕ-o fi et-talifon tabaʕ eš-šuɣul
     day-that the-number of-3SGM in the-phone of   The-work
     yaʕni qabel ma abatˤtˤel
     meaning before than quit
     'One must always nag (him), I'm telling you, I don't have his number, do you understand? In fact, whenever there was any communication (with him) recently, not then at the beginning of the law suit, they were nagging him, do you understand? I was not part of this, in that context, do you understand? The problem was that his number was in my work phone, that is, before I quit (my job).'

Example (14) is taken from the speech of two Druze female workers discussing speaker A's new apartment. Their speech is characterised by very intensive intra-sentential and word-internal codeswitching and mixing of constituents of both languages, showing indications of a composite. In addition to the prevalent number of Hebrew morphemes, both speakers mix the morphology of both languages such as the mixing of the discourse marker *afilú*/HEB *iða*/ARAB 'even if', inflecting the Hebrew relative pronoun *šé* 'that' which is a bridge system morpheme, with the Arabic pronoun *ento* 'you-2PL' and prefixing the Arabic indicative morpheme *b-* to the Hebrew verb *tamtin-ú* 'wait-2PL/FUT'. It is important to note that in Hebrew the correct equivalent of the mixed *b-tamtin-ú* in such a case would be *mamtin-ím*, therefore, *b-tamtin-ú* exhibits tense mixtures of the Arabic present tense and Hebrew future tense. Speaker A self-identified as Israeli-Druze and speaker B as Israeli, with both speakers

expressing their nationality as Druze. Both speakers expressed positive attitude towards Hebrew and the integration of Hebrew elements into their speech stating that they think that the Israeli-Druze speak a special, distinct language. This conforms to Irvine and Gal's (2000) notion of iconization, through which linguistic features indexing social groups appear as iconic representations of them.

(14) A: *neħna nan-ruħ n-biʕ-ha* **afilú** **iða** *heye baʕedha meš mabniye* **avál**
        we   going to sell-it   even if   it   still   not built   but
        keʔelú *bteʕer-fi* **zé** **xozé** **avál** *hiy* **bebniyá** *issa* **avál**
        as if   know-2SGF   this contract but   it   being built now   but
        baʕed-ha meš xalsa **avál** *iða bad-na* *n-biʕ-ha fi*
        still-it   not finished but   if want-1PL sell-it   there is
        ifšarút **ve-áz** **badak-nú** **šu** *el-***mexirím**
        possibility and-then   check-1PL-PST what the-prices
        ve-gili-nú **še-zé** *yaʕni* *fi* **révax** **šel**
        and-find out-1PL-PST that-this meaning there is profit of
        metein *alf* *shekel*
        two hundred thousand shekels
        'we are going to sell it even if it is not built yet, but, you know, there is a contract, but it is being built now but is not completed yet, but if we want to sell it, it is possible, so we checked what are the prices and found out that there is a profit of 200,000 shekels.'

      B: **kén** **ve-kexól** **šé-ento** **b-tamtin-ú** **yotér** **zé** *b-yetlaʕ* **yotér**
        Yes   and-as   that-you   wait-2PL/FUT   more   this go up   more
        ve-yotér **zé** **haškaʔá** **haxi** **meštalem-et** **fi-l-dinya**
        and-more   this investment   the most pay off   in-the-world
        *el-***nadlán** *elyom* **zé** **há-txúm**
        the-real estate today this the-field
        'yes, and as you wait longer, it goes up more and more, this is the best investment in the world, real estate is the best area (for investment) nowadays.'

In example (15) there is a case of convergence of lexical-conceptual structure that is reflected in change in the semantic meaning of the Arabic verb *ʕabar* 'crossed' to convey the meaning of the Israeli Hebrew verb *ʕavar* 'passed/crossed'. Although both verbs are phonetically similar, they are semantically different. The Hebrew verb *ʕavar* conveys two meanings; both 'passed' and 'crossed' while the existing sense of the Arabic verb *ʕabar*, has nothing to

do with the meaning of *pass*, like the Hebrew one does (Kheir 2019). This is followed by the mixed DP *el-mevxán* 'the test', and the Hebrew adverb *be-hetstaynút* 'excellently'. In addition, the Hebrew adjective *madhím* 'amazing' shows agreement with the Arabic pronoun (3SGM), and the rest of the clause is almost exclusively Hebrew, which makes his utterances predominantly Hebrew and mixed. The speaker self-identified as Israeli-Druze, stating his nationality as Druze and feels proud to incorporate many Hebrew elements into his speech, as he feels it reflects his distinct identity, which is a combination of his religion and his citizenship in a country that he feels proud to be a part of. According to Irvine and Gal (2000), linguistic forms can become an index of the social identities and speakers as well as hearers notice, rationalize and justify those linguistic indices, thereby creating linguistic ideologies, which purport to explain the source, and meaning of such linguistic differences.

(15) *Hōwi* *ʕabar*   ***el-mevxán be-hetstaynút*** *Hōwi* *pašút*
      He   pass-3SG-PST the-test   in-excellence He   simply
      madhím   *éin dvar-ím ka-elé*
      amazing-3SGM no   thing-PL like-these
      'He passed the test excellently. He is simply amazing. There's no one like him.'

In (16) there is an example of composite codeswitching and convergence in the form of mixed morphology and grammar. The speaker, who produced mixed clauses throughout her conversation with a friend, had mixed Hebrew and Arabic tenses as she inflected Arabic auxiliaries with Hebrew verbs, as is the case with the mixed *ʕam-yišakér* 'is lying'. *ʕam-yišakér* is a combination of the Arabic auxiliary *ʕam* (am/is/are) and the Hebrew verb *le-šakér* 'to lie', in which the speaker combined an Arabic Present Progressive frame with a Future form of the Hebrew verb. In Hebrew, the correct form in such a case would be *me-šakér*. Similarly, the speaker mixes the Arabic auxiliary *raħ* 'going (to)', which is used for Future verbs in the 'going to' construction with Hebrew Future verb *te-réd* 'drop', which in Hebrew is used in the 'will' construction instead. Notably, in Hebrew, the morpheme *holéx* 'going' is used before verbs prefixed with *le-/la-* 'to' in order to form the 'going to' construction, as in *hí holex-ét la-redét* 'she is going to drop'. However, in Hebrew the correct form in such a case would be *hí te-réd* 'she will drop'. Additionally, late outsider system morphemes in the form of verb agreement are taken from Hebrew, as the speaker used them with Hebrew verbs and adjectives, showing agreement with Arabic pronouns as in *hīy yard-á* 'she dropped', *hīy hivin-á* 'she

understood', *hōwi mekabél—zorék* 'he gets and dumps', *ʔna yatsa-tí* 'I left', *hīy bariran-ít* 'she is picky', *hīy hirgiš-á, hīy oved-ét sotsyal-ét* 'she sensed, she's a social worker', *hīy ló frayer-ét* 'she's not a sucker', as well as with the Hebrew bridge late system morpheme *šel-ó* 'his', which is co-indexed with the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* 'he'. As previously mentioned, *šel* is a possessive particle that refers to the possessor of the discussed possession. When a pronoun is used to express possession, a pronominal suffix is attached to it to indicate the person, gender and number (Dekel, 2014). In this example *šel-ó* is co-indexed with third person singular male (he). There are also cases of convergence of lexical-conceptual structure that are reflected in several mixed islands as in *hitxíl maʕ-ha* 'hit on her', *ʕemlet stop* 'put a stop', and *ʔišī xolé* 'something ill'. The expression *hitxíl maʕ-ha* 'hit on her', is a combination of Hebrew *hitxíl* 'started' and Arabic *maʕ-ha* 'with-her', which is used to convey the Hebrew expression *hitxíl ʔit-á* 'hit on her', which is non-existent in Arabic. Similarly, the expression *ʕemlet stóp* 'put a stop', which is a combination of Arabic *ʕemlet* 'made' and Hebrew *stóp* 'stop', is used to convey the meaning of the Israeli Hebrew expression *ʔastá stóp*, which does not exist in spoken Arabic. Also, the expression *ʔišī xolé* 'something ill', which is a combination of Arabic *ʔišī* 'something', and Hebrew *xolé* 'ill', is used to describe a toxic relationship, a notion which exists in Hebrew, but not in Arabic. Notably, the mixed utterance *akam men six-át/sg telefón* 'several phone calls' is used to match the Arabic plural pattern, but not the Hebrew one. In Hebrew the phrase would be *kamá six-ót/PL telefón*, whereas in Arabic it would be *akam men mokalame/sg* 'several phone calls.' In addition, the pronouns *hoū* 'he' and *hīy* 'she' are in fact a merger of both the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* and the Hebrew pronoun *hú* for 'he', and the Arabic pronoun *hiyye* and the Hebrew pronoun *hí* for 'she'. Such usages are quite recurrent in the data of all the Druze participants. The speaker, who has Hebraized her forename—an act which is very common amongst many Druze individuals in Israel, self-identified as Israeli-Druze, and feels a strong sense of belonging to the state, and further senses that it is very natural for her to combine Hebrew elements in her speech. This conforms to Myers-Scotton's (1993) notion that unmarked codeswitching can practically be an indicator of intergroup harmony.

(16) *baʕdiy ma* **hitxíl**   **maʕ-ha**   *hīy* *yardá*   *men*
    after   that   start-3SGM with-3SGF she drop-3SGF-PST from
    el-ʕenyán   mahér meʔód **hīy** **hivin-á**   *innu* **hōwi**
    the-matter quick   very   she understand-3SGF-PST that   he
    mekabél   **zorék**   *yaʕni* *zé* *kól ha-ʕinyán šel-ó*
    get-3SGM-PRS throw-3SGM-PRS meaning this all the-matter of-3SGM

innu sˤār   *yqull-ha   āh tˤālˤ-a   maʕ sˤaħebt-ek*
that become-3SGM-PST tell-3SGF yes go out-2SGF with friend-2SGF

balki   betˤlaʕ   maʕk-on? ʔšyāʔ ʕan haz-zay yaʕni   áz
perhaps 1SG-go out with-2PL thing-PL like this   meaning then

hīy kéilu ʕeml-et   stóp yaʕni   hīy bet-qull-ī   ʔna
she as if make-3SGF stop meaning she HAB-3SGF-tell-1SG I

yatsa-tí   men maʕrexet yaxas-ím ellī ló mitsit-í
leave-1SG-PST from system   relation-PL that no exhaust-1SG-PST

ét   ʕatsm-í ʕašān fūt ʕa-ʔišī   xolé? zé ló bá
ACC myself so that enter to-something ill?   this no come

ba-xešbón.   hīy meʔód bariran-ít yaʕni   hīy ló... ʔamma
in the-calculation she very   picky-2SGF meaning she no but

hīy bet-qull-ī   ʔna-ló aní ló mekir-á   ta-benadám w-hoū
she HAB-3SGF-tell-1SG I-no I   no know-1SGF ACC-person and-he

ħak-a   maʕ-ha   ʔakam men six-át   telefón yaʕni
talk-3SGM with-3SGF several from Call-SG phone meaning

w-basóf   ʔamma hīy hirgiš-á   hīy ʕoved-ét
and-eventually but   she feel-3SGF-PST she worker-3SGF

sotsyal-ét áz hīy hirgiš-á   inno ha-benadám ló dovér
social-3SGF then she sense-3SGF-PST that the-person   not tell

emét qal-it-lī   inno hirgiš-á
truth tell-PST-3SGF-DAT-1SG that sense-3SGF-PST

fi-el-six-ót   in-no   ʕam-yišakér l-á   fi kθīr
in-the-conversation-PL that-3SGM is-lying   to-3SGF in many

šayl-āt hīy ló frayer-ét hīy hivin-á   tóv-meʔód
thing-PL she not sucker-3SGF she understand-3SGF-PST good-very

inno yaʕni raħ-te-réd   mi-zé mahér
that meaning going to FUT-3SGF-go down from-this quickly

'after he hit on her, she dropped it very quickly. She got it that he is the type of guy that treats women as disposable, that that's his thing. He went on telling her "oh, so you're going out with your friend, how about I join you too?" Stuff like that. So she made a stop to it, that is, she went on telling me "I left a relationship which wasn't good for me so that I'll end up in a toxic one?? No way!" She's very picky, that is, she's not … But she kept on telling me that "I don't, I don't know the guy." And he spoke to her several times, and eventually, she sensed (that something was wrong). She's a social worker, so she sensed that the guy is not telling the truth. She told me that she sensed during their conversations that he was lying to her in many things. She's not a sucker, she understood well that she was going to drop it quickly.'

Example (17) represents convergence of morphological realization patterns, which is reflected in the change in word order. In the example below, speaker A switched the word order of the Arabic adverb *nebqa* 'sometime' and the verb *nrūħ* 'go' and applied it to the word order in Hebrew in the expression *la-wein nan-rúħ nebqa* (to-where we'll go sometime) 'where we'll go to sometime'. The original order in Arabic is *la-wein na-nebqa nrūħ* (to-where we'll-sometime go) 'where we'll go to sometime', and in Hebrew *le-ʔán ne-léx mataišehó* (to-where we'll go sometime) 'where we'll go to sometime'. Additionally, as in the previous example, the Hebrew outsider system morpheme *-aʕat* '1SGF-PRS' is inflected with the Hebrew verb *yodeyá* 'knows', to show agreement with the speaker (1SGF) (Kheir, 2019). Similarly, speaker B uses Hebrew outsider system morphemes to show agreement with the Arabic pronouns, as in *ʔent-i yadaʕ-t* 'you knew', *bad-ko taʕavr-ú* 'you want to move', and *ló zoxer-ét* 'I can't remember'. Additionally, speaker B mixes the Arabic *badk-o* 'you want', which is used here to convey Future verb in the 'going to' construction, with the Hebrew Future verb *taʕavr-ú* 'will move', which is normally used in the 'will' construction. Notably, in Hebrew, the morphemes *rotsé* 'want', and *holex* 'going' are used before verbs prefixed with *le-/la-* 'to' in order to form the 'going to' construction. Therefore, in Hebrew the correct form would be *ʔat-ém rots-ím/holx-ím la-ʔavór* 'you want/going to move', whereas in Arabic, it would be *bad-ko tonoql-u* 'you want/going to move'. Speaker A self-identified as Israeli-Druze, and speaker B as Israeli. They both feel proud to be Israeli and have a very strong sense of belonging to the state. In terms of their language, they both stated that it is the most natural thing for them to speak that way, that this is the 'automatic' or the 'default' language for them. They added that, to them, and others around them, their language is perceived as 'different' from the rest of the Arabic speaking communities, while stressing that they are, in fact, different from the rest, socio-politically speaking, while at the same time, different from the majority community as well. This conforms to Bakker's hypothesis that mixed languages 'are spoken by ethnic groups who were originally bilingual but, for some reason, wanted to distinguish themselves collectively from both groups whose languages they speak. The speakers of each of these languages form a distinct group, either a subgroup of a larger division or a completely different group (1997:203).' Therefore, forming such a mixed languag, the community in fact accentuates its sociopoliticalinguistic distinctness.

(17) A: *ló* *yod-aʕát*   *la-wein* **nan-rūħ**   **nebqa**
     not know-1SGF-PRS to-where 1PL-FUT-go sometime
     'I don't know where we'll go to sometime.'

B: *bet-ajjrī-ha*   *kén?* *ʔent-i*   *me-rúš*   *yadáʕ-t*   *inno*
IMP-rent out-3SG yes? you-2SGF from-start know-PST-2SGF that
bad-ko   *taʕavr-ú*   *kén?* *ló-zoxer-ét*
want-2PL move-FUT-2PL yes? not-remember-PRS-1SGF
'You will rent it out, right? You had known from the start that you're
going to move, right? I can't remember.'

Example (18) is taken from the speech of a Druze male student talking about
his identity. The example shows another outsider system morpheme that is
uttered in Hebrew rather than Arabic. In this case, it is the complementizer
bešvil-í 'for me', which was used instead of its Arabic counterpart *ʕašan-ī/ell-
ī*. The complementizer *bešvíl* 'for', just like its Arabic counterpart *ʕaʃan*, has to
look for information outside of its head to shape its form (Kheir, 2019). It is co-
indexed with the speaker (1SG). Here again, as in previous examples, Hebrew
outsider system morphemes are inflected with Hebrew verbs to show agree-
ment with the Arabic pronouns, as in *ʔohév* 'I love', *yodʔ-ím* 'they know' and
ʁots-é 'I want' respectively. His utterance was almost exclusively in Hebrew
with almost a pure Israeli Hebrew accent. The speaker, who self-identified as
Druze, stating his nationality as Druze, felt that it is natural for him to incorpor-
ate Hebrew elements into his speech; and that language shapes one's identity,
which he felt that, in his case, is very distinct. This conforms to the notion
of distinction (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004), in the sense that the difference is
underscored through establishing an alternative to either pole of the dicho-
tomy.

(18) *ʔad*   *ha-yóm* *ana* *ló* *ʔohév*   *še-yodʔ-ím*   *mí* *aní* *má*
Until DET-day I   not love-PRS-1SGM that-know-2PL who I   what
aní *ʁák* *ím* *aní* *tsaríx*   *le-hagíd* *ʔó* *pgišá*   *ʁišun-á*   *aní*
I   only if I   Need-1SGM to-say   or meeting first-3SGF I
yaxól   *le-hagíd* *šné* *mel-ím* *aní* *Dʁuzí* *ve-zehó*   *ana* *ló*
can-1SGM to-say   two word-PL I   Druze and-that's it I   not
ʁots-é   *le-dabéʁ* *ʔál* *zé* *ve-zehó*   *zé* *šel-í* *ve-bešvil-í* *zé*
want-1SGM to-talk   On this and-that's it this of-1SG and-for-1SG this
keílu *šoné*   *ve-meyuxád*
that is different and-special
'Until this day, I don't like that people know who I am, what I am. Only if
I have to say, or if I'm in a first meeting, I can say two words: I'm Druze,
and that's it. I don't want to talk about it, end of story. This is mine, and
for me, this (identity) is actually different and special.'

The above examples of the Druze participants indicate that there is a case of composite matrix language formation of Arabic and Hebrew. As has been proven in a recent research (Kheir, 2019), this composite conforms to stage II of the Matrix Language Turnover hypothesis of Myers-Scotton. It is evident from the examples that both languages play the role of setting the morphosyntactic frame. There is a plethora of Hebrew lexical items and system morphemes. This significant introduction of Hebrew system morphemes appearing both independently and in embedded language islands shows a breakdown of the role of Arabic as the sole basis of the Matrix Language frame and a formation of a new, composite matrix language. As can be seen in the examples above, the composite language includes lexical-conceptual, morphological realization and grammatical structures coming from both languages: Arabic and Hebrew. The fact that the turnover into Hebrew does not go to full completion, but is arrested at some point, indicates that there is a case of mixed language formation.

In addition, In applying Auer's (1998, 1999) model to the data from the Druze community, Kheir (2022) shows that the first step of the continuum towards a mixed code started with codeswitching combined with a certain extent of language mixing, the second phase of the language mixing constituted the language of interaction or the unmarked choice, where "as a consequence of the frequent intrasentential juxtaposition of the two languages it [became] difficult to maintain the distinction between insertional and alternational juxtapositions" (Auer, 1999:315). In the third phase, where language mixing projects some measure of structural mixing that contributes to the creation of fused lects, the language of the Druze community exhibits a split structure in the form of convergence of mixed morphology and grammatical structures that is identical to neither language as well as a distinctive and almost exclusive use of Hebrew discourse markers and complementizers; therefore, it qualifies as a fused lect under Auer's terms as well.

5   Identity Factors and Attitudes

When bilingual speakers choose to codeswitch or not to codeswitch, it usually involves factors outside the structural realm. Such factors range from social to psychological. According to Auer & Eastman (2010: 90), "code-switching can index social class consciousness, political-ideological or ethnic affiliations and preferences, and so on." Obviously, in politically sensitive environments such as in the present study, whenever one chooses to speak one language rather than the other, or include more or less elements from one language rather than the

other, it might signal an indication of affinity to one group and distancing from others. However, affinities might be more complex, and can be linked to class and late capitalism as well.

The questions that are relevant to the present study are the following: What are the factors motivating the extensive use of intra-clausal codeswitching and mixed language formation among the Druze community in Israel? What are the factors hampering the process of codeswitching among the Arabs in Israel? My basic premises are: I-In the case of the Druze community, the main reason for selecting extensive codeswitching between Arabic and Hebrew as the unmarked choice causing a mixed language formation is to call up the sociopolitical affiliations that are associated with the 'other' language, the 'dominant code', namely; Israeli Hebrew while at the same time, express distinctness from both groups. II-In the case of the Israeli Arabs, historical, national ideological conflicts and lack of sense of belonging to the Jewish state is what causes 'codeswitching resistance.'

In order to check the factors motivating the language behaviour of the Arab and Druze communities in Israel, follow-up questionnaires were used to obtain subjective attitudes towards Arabic, Hebrew, codeswitching and identity affiliations (*see* Appendix 1-Questionnaire). It is noteworthy that the questionnaires included a set of choices to choose from, as well as the option to insert a free-text response. Chi-Square Test was employed to check the relationship between identity affiliations and codeswitching (*see* Appendix 2-Classification and Categorization of the Questionnaire Statements).

The following results were found:

Codeswitching Scale: As previously mentioned, light codeswitching is characterized predominantly by borrowings and monolexemic switching, moderate codeswitching by 'classic' codeswitching and heavy codeswitching by intensive codeswitching that approaches convergence and composite codeswitching.

1. Codeswitching Scale is independent on Gender ($\chi^2_{(2)}$ = .310, p = .856).

TABLE 13   Gender * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale			Total
			Light	Moderate	Heavy	
Gender	M	Count	12	6	8	26
		% within Gender	46.2%	23.1%	30.8%	100.0%

TABLE 13   Gender * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation (*cont.*)

| | | | Codeswitching scale | | | Total |
			Light	Moderate	Heavy	
	F	Count	16	6	12	34
		% within Gender	47.1%	17.6%	35.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20	60
		% within Gender	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%	100.0%

2. Codeswitching Scale depends on Religion ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 52.629, p < .05): Most Druze have a heavy Codeswitching Scale whereas most Christians and Muslims' level is only light or moderate.

TABLE 14   Religion * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

| | | | Codeswitching scale | | | Total |
			Light	Moderate	Heavy	
Religion	1-Druze	Count	0	2	18	20
		% within Religion	0.0%	10.0%	90.0%	100.0%
	2-Christian	Count	10	8	2	20
		% within Religion	50.0%	40.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	3-Muslim	Count	18	2	0	20
		% within Religion	90.0%	10.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20	60
		% within Religion	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%	100.0%

3. Codeswitching Scale depends on Self-identity ($\chi^2_{(12)}$ = 79.363, p < .05): Most participants who self-identify as Israeli-Druze, Israeli and Israeli-Arab exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale whereas all the others' level is only light or moderate.

TABLE 15   Self-identity * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale			Total
			Light	Moderate	Heavy	
Self-identity	Israeli-Druze	Count	0	0	10	10
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Arab	Count	10	4	0	14
		% within Self-identity	71.4%	28.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	Druze	Count	0	0	2	2
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Israeli	Count	0	0	6	6
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Christian	Count	0	2	0	2
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Israeli-Arab	Count	2	6	2	10
		% within Self-identity	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	Palestinian-Arab	Count	16	0	0	16
		% within Self-identity	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20	60
		% within Self-identity	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%	100.0%

4. Codeswitching Scale depends on Self-identity-2 ($\chi^2_{(2)}$ = 32.889, p < .05): Most participants with the 'Israeli' identity component exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale whereas all the others' level is only light or moderate.

TABLE 16   Self-identity-2 * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale			Total
			Light	Moderate	Heavy	
Self-identity-2	Israeli	Count	2	6	18	26
		% within Self-identity-2	7.7%	23.1%	69.2%	100.0%
	Not Israeli	Count	26	6	2	34
		% within Self-identity-2	76.5%	17.6%	5.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20	60
		% within Self-identity-2	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%	100.0%

5. Codeswitching Scale depends on Attitude to Palestinian Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 50.859, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Palestinian Identity, exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Palestinian Identity, exhibit a light Codeswitching Scale.

TABLE 17   Attitude to Palestinian Identity * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale		
			Light	Moderate	Heavy
Attitude to Palestinian Identity	Negative	Count	2	4	20
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	7.7%	15.4%	76.9%
	Neutral	Count	6	6	0
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Positive	Count	20	2	0
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	90.9%	9.1%	0.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%

6. Codeswitching Scale depends on Attitude to Arab Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 46.800, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Arab Identity, exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Arab Identity, exhibit a light Codeswitching Scale.

TABLE 18   Attitude to Arab Identity * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale		
			Light	Moderate	Heavy
Attitude to Arab Identity	Negative	Count	0	0	12
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

TABLE 18   Attitude to Arab Identity * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation (*cont.*)

			Codeswitching scale		
			Light	**Moderate**	**Heavy**
	Neutral	Count	0	2	6
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	0.0%	25.0%	75.0%
	Positive	Count	28	10	2
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	70.0%	25.0%	5.0%
Total		Count	28	12	20
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%

7. Codeswitching Scale depends on Attitude to Israeli Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 47.143, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Israeli Identity, exhibit a light Codeswitching Scale and vice versa—those who have a positive attitude to Arab Identity, exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale.

TABLE 19   Attitude to Israeli Identity * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

			Codeswitching scale		
			Light	**Moderate**	**Heavy**
Attitude to Israeli Identity	Negative	Count	18	0	0
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Neutral	Count	6	6	0
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Positive	Count	4	6	20
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	13.3%	20.0%	66.7%
Total		Count	28	12	20
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%

8. Codeswitching Scale depends on Attitude to Palestinian Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)} = 18.462$, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Palestinian Identity, exhibit a heavy Codeswitching Scale and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Palestinian Identity, exhibit a light Codeswitching Scale.

TABLE 20   Attitude to Palestinian Arabic * Codeswitching Scale Crosstabulation

| | | | Codeswitching scale | | |
			Light	Moderate	Heavy
Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	Negative	Count	0	0	4
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Neutral	Count	0	0	4
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Positive	Count	28	12	12
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	53.8%	23.1%	23.1%
Total		Count	28	12	20
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	46.7%	20.0%	33.3%

Attitude to Codeswitching:

1. Attitude to codeswitching depends on Gender ($\chi^2_{(2)} = 8.460$, p < .05): Most men have a positive attitude to codeswitching whereas most women have a negative or neutral attitude to codeswitching.

TABLE 21   Gender * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

| | | | Attitude to codeswitching | | | Total |
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Gender	M	Count	10	2	14	26
		% within Gender	38.5%	7.7%	53.8%	100.0%
	F	Count	8	14	12	34
		% within Gender	23.5%	41.2%	35.3%	100.0%

TABLE 21   Gender * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation (*cont.*)

		Attitude to codeswitching			Total
		Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Total	Count	18	16	26	60
	% within Gender	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%	100.0%

2. Attitude to codeswitching depends on Religion ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 28.833, p < .05): Most Druze have a positive attitude to codeswitching whereas most Christians and Muslims have a negative attitude to codeswitching.

TABLE 22   Religion * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

			Attitude to codeswitching			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Religion	1-Druze	Count	0	2	18	20
		% within Religion	0.0%	10.0%	90.0%	100.0%
	2-Christian	Count	8	6	6	20
		% within Religion	40.0%	30.0%	30.0%	100.0%
	3-Muslim	Count	10	8	2	20
		% within Religion	50.0%	40.0%	10.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	16	26	60
		% within Religion	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%	100.0%

3. Attitude to codeswitching depends on Self-Identity ($\chi^2_{(12)}$ = 40.212, p < .05): Most participants who self-identify as Israeli-Druze, Israeli and Israeli-Arab have a positive attitude to codeswitching whereas all the rest have a negative attitude to codeswitching.

TABLE 23   Self-identity * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

| | | | Attitude to codeswitching | | | Total |
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Self-identity	Israeli-Druze	Count	0	2	8	10
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Arab	Count	4	6	4	14
		% within Self-identity	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%	100.0%
	Druze	Count	0	0	2	2
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Israeli	Count	0	0	6	6
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Christian	Count	0	0	2	2
		% within Self-identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Israeli-Arab	Count	2	4	4	10
		% within Self-identity	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	Palestinian-Arab	Count	12	4	0	16
		% within Self-identity	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	16	26	60
		% within Self-identity	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%	100.0%

4. Attitude to codeswitching depends on Self-identity-2 ($\chi^2_{(2)}$ = 14.934, p < .05): Most participants with the 'Israeli' component have a positive Attitude to Codeswitching whereas all the others have a negative/neutral Attitude to Codeswitching.

TABLE 24   Self-identity-2 * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

| | | | Attitude to codeswitching | | | Total |
			Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Self-identity-2	Israeli	Count	2	6	18	26
		% within Self-identity-2	7.7%	23.1%	69.2%	100.0%
	Not Israeli	Count	16	10	8	34
		% within Self-identity-2	47.1%	29.4%	23.5%	100.0%

TABLE 24   Self-identity-2 * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation (*cont.*)

		Attitude to codeswitching			Total
		Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Total	Count	18	16	26	60
	% within Self-identity-2	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%	100.0%

5. Attitude to Codeswitching depends on Attitude to Palestinian Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 52.049, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Palestinian Identity, have a positive Attitude to Codeswitching and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Palestinian Identity, have a negative Attitude to Codeswitching.

TABLE 25   Attitude to Palestinian Identity * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

			Attitude to codeswitching		
			Negative	Neutral	Positive
Attitude to Palestinian Identity	Negative	Count	2	2	22
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	7.7%	7.7%	84.6%
	Neutral	Count	0	8	4
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%
	Positive	Count	16	6	0
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	72.7%	27.3%	0.0%
Total		Count	18	16	26
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Identity	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%

6. Attitude to Codeswitching depends on Attitude to Arab Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 28.010, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Arab Identity, have a positive Attitude to Codeswitching and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Arab Identity, have a negative Attitude to Codeswitching.

TABLE 26   Attitude to Arab Identity * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

			Attitude to codeswitching		
			Negative	Neutral	Positive
Attitude to Arab Identity	Negative	Count	0	2	10
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	0.0%	16.7%	83.3%
	Neutral	Count	0	0	8
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Positive	Count	18	14	8
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	45.0%	35.0%	20.0%
Total		Count	18	16	26
		% within Attitude to Arab Identity	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%

7. Attitude to Codeswitching depends on Attitude to Israeli Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 45.627, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Israeli Identity, have a negative Attitude to Codeswitching and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Israeli Identity, have a positive Attitude to Codeswitching.

TABLE 27   Attitude to Israeli Identity * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

			Attitude to codeswitching		
			Negative	Neutral	Positive
Attitude to Israeli Identity	Negative	Count	16	2	0
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	88.9%	11.1%	0.0%
	Neutral	Count	0	6	6
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	Positive	Count	2	8	20
		% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	6.7%	26.7%	66.7%

TABLE 27   Attitude to Israeli Identity * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation (*cont.*)

| | | **Attitude to codeswitching** | | |
		Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Total	Count	18	16	26
	% within Attitude to Israeli Identity	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%

8. Attitude to Codeswitching depends on Attitude to Palestinian Identity ($\chi^2_{(4)}$ = 12.071, p < .05): Those who have a negative attitude to Palestinian Identity, have a positive Attitude to Codeswitching and vice versa: those who have a positive attitude to Palestinian Identity, have a negative Attitude to Codeswitching.

TABLE 28   Attitude to Palestinian Arabic * Attitude to codeswitching Crosstabulation

| | | | **Attitude to codeswitching** | | |
			Negative	**Neutral**	**Positive**
Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	Negative	Count	0	0	4
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Neutral	Count	0	0	4
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Positive	Count	18	16	18
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	34.6%	30.8%	34.6%
Total		Count	18	16	26
		% within Attitude to Palestinian Arabic	30.0%	26.7%	43.3%

5.1 *Discussion*

The questionnaire responses exemplify how the language behaviour in everyday life is closely related to sociopolitical identity affiliations and notions of distinction, inclusion and exclusion. According to Gal (1988: 247), in order "to explain variation in codeswitching, an integration of conversational, ethnographic and social historical evidence is required." In the case of the Druze community in Israel, a special combination of social, religious, historical and political factors facilitates a situation of convergence and composite mixed language formation.

First, The Druze began joining forces with the Jews in the 1930s and together they fought side by side against the Arab uprising and insurgency that were mainly catalysed as a result of Muslim assaults against the Druze and murders of prominent Druze personalities who encouraged collaborations with the Jews. Druze-Jewish cooperative efforts reached a new peak in the War of Independence in 1948 when the Druze volunteered to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and share the war with the Jews against the Arabs, which led to the establishment of the Druze unit in the IDF (Azrieli & Abu-Rukon, 1989; Firro, 1999; Gelber, 1995; Nisan, 2010). Later in 1949, the Israeli army utilized a Druze religious shrine (an-Nabi Shu'ayb shrine) as the site for its first swearing in ceremony when new Druze recruits were asked to pledge their allegiance to the Jewish state. The prophet Shu'ayb (Jethro according to Judaism) is believed to be the father-in-law of the prophet Moses. This choice symbolised the historical connection between the sons of Shu'ayb (i.e., the Druze) and the sons of Israel (i.e., the Jews).

At the same time, the Israeli media regularly used the terms 'Druzes' and 'Druze community' to highlight the separateness of the community from the country's Arabs (Firro, 2001). This step was followed by a declaration that made the conscription of Druze males into the IDF compulsory in 1956. One year later, just before the *ziyara* (pilgrimage) to the Nabi-Shu'ayb shrine, Israel's minister of religions signed a regulation extending legal recognition to the Druze community as a religious community, making them legally independent from the Arab community. Shortly after, in 1962, Israel made a major identity replacement step in relation to the Druze by changing their nationality from 'Arab' to 'Druze', both in their identity cards and birth certificates. Notably, Arab Christians and Muslims were still legally regarded as 'Arabs' (Firro, 2001; Halabi, 2006). One decade later, in 1973, Amal Nassr Ed-Din founded the Zionist Druze Circle. The movement aimed to encourage the Druze people to support the state of Israel fully and unreservedly (Landau, 1993). Shortly thereafter, in 1975, Yusef Nasr Ed-Din initiated the Druze Zionist Movement to strengthen the ties between the Druze and the Jews and to spark the Zionist consciousness among

the Druze youth and raise awareness of the historical collaborations and covenants between the two communities through conferences, joint social activities and education. According to Nisan (2010:576), Nasr Ed-Din recommends that 'the Druze show complete solidarity with Israel by going as far as to adopt the national Zionist ideology of the Jewish people.'

Second, in the early 1970s, efforts were made by Israeli officials to create an 'Israeli-Druze consciousness' through education, in order to counteract the process of "Arabization" (Firro, 2001). This consciousness became actualised in 1977, when the Druze curriculum was completely separated from the Arab curriculum, creating a distinctive Druze education system. The main factors present within the Druze schools that distinguish them from the Arab schools are mainly: i) Special citizenship education classes that are designed to solidify the Druze sense of belonging to the state of Israel; ii) Special military service preparation programs and workshops that are tailored to strengthen the youth's sense of contribution and commitment to the state of Israel; iii) Special days that are designated to mark both Druze and national ceremonies, such as *yóm hazekarón* that signifies the commemoration of the Druze and Jewish soldiers who have lost their lives for the sake of the country. Such commemoration activities deepen the sense of a blood covenant that exists between the Druze and the Jews and create a sense of pride over the shared collective memory that contributes to the Israeli-Druze identity; iv) Special symbols of the state of Israel, such as the Israeli flag, the Israeli Declaration of Independence and pictures of Israeli political leaders, that are part of the Druze school landscapes; and v) Hebrew being used alongside Arabic in the Druze school langscape, i.e., the linguistic landscape (for more on the role of Druze high schools in shaping students' identity see Court and Abbas, 2010).

Finally, many of the Druze towns in Israel receive a great number of tourists from the Jewish cities who travel to these towns to enjoy the local Druze markets and special restaurants that offer a great variety of authentic traditional Druze food. This has created very frequent language contact among the older generations as well, who work in these towns, thus contributing to the Israeli-Druze consciousness and positive outcomes on the collective identity. Usually, tourists from the Jewish cities do not speak the local language, and therefore, they expect to only use Hebrew when they go to the market and restaurants in those Druze localities. This is also evident in the linguistic landscape (signage etc.) which is predominantly in Hebrew (*see* Isleem, 2013). Tourism plays an important role in social change and affects both language and identity (*see* Heller, Jaworski and Thurlow, 2014), therefore, needs to be considered as another possible contributing factor in creating such a distinct language and identity.

Although the Druze/Arab identity component links the Druze to their historical ethnic roots in addition to sharing cultural and linguistic similarities with the Arabs, the aforementioned factors made Hebrew a very dominant constituent of the Druze linguistic and identity repertoire and contributed to the formation of a new mixed language. As Auer (1999:320) argues, in cases of frequent codeswitching, "the identity-related purposes of this style may become more important than the discourse-related tasks codeswitching has served so far. The prevalent scenario for such a re-evaluation of functions is one in which a bilingual group needs to define its own identity vis-a-vis both contact groups." On the one hand, the 'Arab/Druze' identity component stresses their historical roots and the sociocultural similarities with the Arabs. On the other hand, the Israeli component of their identity has formed over time due to the aforementioned factors. Therefore, being sandwiched between the Arabs and Jews, the Druze define their identity through their distinct speech which is a combination of both, while at the same time, is different from both.

As opposed to the Druze participants who have, to a certain extent, marginalized the Arab identity component and completely rejected the Palestinian component and embraced the Israeli identity, the Christian and Muslim participants demonstrate a completely different pattern. The Arab Christian participants alongside the Muslims have almost unanimously embraced the Arab identity while remained divided in including their Israeli and Palestinian identity component. 40% of the Christians included the Israeli identity component as opposed to only 10% of the Muslims. The Muslims, however, have emphasized their sense of belonging to the Palestinian identity by 60% of them choosing it as a main component of their identity as opposed to 20% of the Christians. Codeswitching into Hebrew is consistent with including the Israeli identity component and having a positive attitude towards the Israeli identity, Hebrew and codeswitching. The participants' negative attitude towards codeswitching relates to the fact that they perceive it as a form of *crossing*—a special type of codeswitching in which the 'invading' language is perceived as the language of the 'other'—neither belonging to the speakers nor do they want to be affiliated with (Rampton, 1995; 1999). As in the case of the Druze community in Israel, sociopolitical and historical contexts provide valuable insights into the nature of the identity affiliations and codeswitching behaviours of the Arabs in Israel.

Prior to the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, Arabs in Israel were relatively indifferent regarding identity matters, although there were many Arabs' attacks and violent cases against the Jews in the country in the 1920s and 1930s. Following the defeat of the Arab states, the Arabs who remained in Israel were faced with a new reality, disconnected from their relatives bey-

ond the closed borders, and influenced by the Jewish majority and the State of Israel while accepting its existence. The Arabs have absorbed education, democratic values and modernization from the Jewish society which in effect have strengthened their Israeli identity while at the same time, being exposed to nationalist and Pan-Arab slogans through the Arab media has fostered the Arab circle among them, thus creating an inner conflict between Israeli and Arab identities (Landau, 1993).

The events of 1948, which are known as the *Nakba* for the Arabs and Palestinians, and war of independence for the Jews and Israelis, were the main catalyst for the Arab-Israeli conflict. During those events, the Palestinian society and homeland were destroyed and occupied, and over 700,000 Plestinians were expelled by force and many others left on their own. The Nakba considerably shaped the Palestinian identity and culture, which influenced the Arab citizens in Israel as well. Following the events of 1948, the Palestinian identity dimension became further salient among the Arabs in Israel during the Six-Day war of June 1967 in which Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, which formed the central focus of the Arab-Israeli conflict and brought about contact between the Arabs in Israel and those in the territories. Such contact contributed to the increasing political consciousness of the Arabs in Israel, especially in the context of Palestinian nationalism, increasing the Palestinian component of their political identity, which became especially salient after the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973-Yom Kippur War, and the international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative body of the Palestinian people (Tessler, 1977; Lustick, 1993; Pappé, 1994; Tessler & Grant, 1998).

An important landmark contributing to the militancy of Israel's Arabs and stressing Arab nationalism is Land Day protests, which took place on 30 March 1976. The protests were sparked by the confiscation of Arab land for Jewish settlements. Protest demonstrations of Israeli Arabs took place in many parts of the country, which brought about confrontations with the police and resulted in the deaths of six Arab protesters who were killed by Israeli police. Land Day is marked annually as an expression of grievances by the Arabs in Israel (Tessler & Grant, 1998).

Further developments in the 1980s had a critical impact on the political development of the Arabs in Israel which contributed to the creation of a complex sociopolitical identity: the Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) and the emergence of the Islamic movement in Israel. The Palestinian *intifada* broke out in December 1987 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The uprising marked the beginning of the rebellion in the territories against Israel. Although the Israeli Arabs did not actively participate in the uprising, they held a general

strike to express sympathy for the struggle of their brethren in the territories and supported the intifada and the demonstrators. The Arabs in Israel provided the Palestinians with money, food and medicine, raised PLO banners during protests and strikes, wrote articles, stories and poems about it and felt a sense of pride in its development (Smooha, 1992; Landau 1993; Tessler & Grant, 1998; Al-Haj, 2005). Both the *intifada* and the emergence of the Islamic movement in Israel strengthened the Arab nationalism and the Palestinization of the Israeli Arabs, while at the same time, weakening the Israeli identity component, thus making the Palestinian dimension of their identity extremely salient.

Another major event in the history of the Israeli Arabs was the El-Aqsa intifada—or the second Palestinian intifada, which broke out on 28 September 2000, and brought about the October 2000 events. The Palestinians used weapons and suicide attacks against Israel during the intifada. The Israeli Arabs shared this intifada with the Palestinians from the beginning, declaring a one-day strike, accompanied by demonstrations which spread to various Arab localities and mixed Jewish-Arab cities. The mass protests in October 2000 escalated into rioting by Israeli Arabs throughout Israel and was met by clashes with the Israeli police and security officers and resulted in the deaths of 13 Arab demonstrators who were killed by the Israeli police, 12 of whom were Israeli Arabs (Al-Haj, 2005). The October 2000 events sharpened the Arab nationalism and their affinity towards the Palestinians alongside their sense of alienation as the citizens of Israel.

The division between the Christians and Muslims regarding their Palestinian identity affiliation can be explained in the context of the rise of political Islam. According to Smooha & Ghanem (1999), the support of political Islam generates tension between Muslim supporters of political Islam, non-Muslims and the state, thus separating them from the Christians and other communities. The rise of political Islam strengthened Islamist tendencies among Palestinians in the territories and the Muslims in Israel, thus causing the Palestinian component to coincide in a way with Islam, which gave rise to discouragement among the Christians to adopt it. Moreover, in recent years, following the political turmoil in the Arab countries and the events of the 'Arab Spring', as well as the militancy and religious intolerance of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, primordial identities came to the forefront, and some Israeli Christian circles have been emphasizing their collective sectarian–religious identity as Christians rather than as Arabs as a result (Rudintzky, 2016).

6   Application of the ICM

Testing the ICM shows that the 60 L1 Arabic speakers from the different communities form different groups with various codeswitching behaviour. The groups are mainly dissimilar in the intensity of codeswitching and the type of codeswitching used. The findings show that codeswitching behaviour is linked to sociopolitical identity affiliations. The findings coincide with the ICM presupposition that individuals with different sociopolitical identifications are placed in different spots along the codeswitching scale. The groups are divided into three: the heavy codeswitchers (90% Druze, 10% Christians), the moderate codeswitchers (10% Druze, 40% Christians, 10% Muslims) and the light codeswitchers (50% Christians, 90% Muslims). In alignment with the ICM premises, the heavy codeswitchers exhibit high affinity and identification with the dominant culture and its identity (Israeli) and demonstrate positive attitudes towards its identity, language (Israeli Hebrew) and codeswitching into its language. The moderate codeswitchers show either neutral or positive attitudes towards the dominant culture's identity, language and codeswitching into its language and moderate to high levels of affinity and identification with the dominant culture and its identity. The light codeswitchers, however, show low to no affinity and identification with the dominant culture and its identity, and demonstrate neutral to negative attitudes towards its identity, language and codeswitching into its language in accordance with the first ICM premise.

Testing 37 most common boys' forenames and 37 most common girls' forenames among the Druze, Christian and Muslims shows predominant Israeli Jewish names among the Druze community whereas no Jewish names at all among the Christian and Muslim communities (CBS, 2016). Among the common Jewish names code-imprinted by Druze are: Eyal, Roni, Raz, Avi, Ilan, Ran, Carmi, Daniel, Tamir and Tomer for boys; Anat, Osnat, Ilana, Sigal, Tamar, Einav, Mirav, Talia and Inbal for girls. The findings support the ICM presupposition that in unique cases, the converging community will code-imprint given names from the dominant culture as a sign of sociolinguistic convergence.

Testing the phonological pronunciation of the code-switched elements reveals that the Druze participants predominantly maintained the Israeli Hebrew pronunciations with a few exceptions, whereas the Christian and Muslim participants made phonological adaptations of the Hebrew elements into Arabic (see the table below). The findings are in alignment with the second ICM premise.

TABLE 29   Phonological maintenance/adaptation of Israeli Hebrew pronunciation

Hebrew consonants	Israeli-Hebrew pronunciation	Druze pronunciation	Christian pronunciation	Muslim pronunciation
[ʕ]	[ʔ]	[ʔ/ʕ]	[ʕ]	[ʕ]
[p]	[p]	[p]	[b/p]	[b]
[tˤ]	[t]	[t]	[tˤ]	[tˤ]
[ħ]	[x]	[x]	[ħ]	[ħ]
[r]	[ʁ]	[r/ʁ]	[r]	[r]

In support of the ICM premises, many of the Druze people who had undergone a process of sociopolitical convergence towards the Israeli culture through historical joint forces with the Jews, the compulsory military service, adopting state related ideologies, education and other domains revealed features of language convergence, composite codeswitching and mixed language formation as the unmarked mode of communication. The Christians and Muslims, however, showed no linguistic convergence at all, their codeswitching behaviour was mainly of the classic type and is mostly considered the marked mode of communications. Being 'sandwiched' between the Arabs and Jews, the Druze community has nonetheless created an alternative to the dichotomy by forming a mixed variety which stresses its distinctness from both groups "whose languages they speak".

7   Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to to provide an insight into bilingual minorities' linguistic reaction to and processing of state-centered policies of distinction, inclusion and exclusion and to introduce a theoretical framework of the sociopolitical motivations found in codeswitching, as a result of a comparative study of three native Palestinian Arabic speakers in Israel who experience ongoing language contact: Arab Christians, Muslims and Druze. The model, termed here the Identity Code Model (ICM), nonetheless, may have a potential general applicability that explains codeswitching as a signal and construct of sociopolitical identity, especially in similar settings with indigenous minorities, as well as the traditional bilingual immigrant communities. It also helps shed light on how bilingualism functions in conflict settings, such as in the present study. It is my hope that the data collection and analysis suggested here will be

of use for others interested in investigating the field and ultimately also contribute to the understanding of how dominant languages influence that of minorities, how sociopolitical identity influences language behavior and vice versa, and how specifically the dominance of Israeli Hebrew influences speakers of Palestinian Arabic to varying degrees, depending on sociopolitical affiliations.

The qualitative and quantitative methods used herein, as well as the application of the ICM show that the different sampled communities have clear different codeswitching styles, types and levels resulting from sociopolitical identifications. While the speech of the Christians and Muslims who mainly identify as Arabs and Palestinians and rarely as Israeli exhibit limited borrowings and classic codeswitching maintaining Arabic as the undisputed Matrix Language, the language of the Druze community who proudly and patriotically identifies as Israeli, appears to be undergoing a process of language change. Such change is evident in the extensive intra-sentential and word-internal codeswitching between Arabic and Hebrew that has brought about convergence toward Hebrew and a composite, mixed language formation. This mixed language formation has been tested under the Matrix Language turnover hypothesis of Myers-Scotton as well as the different models proposed by Auer (1999, 2014) and Myers-Scotton (2003) (see Kheir 2019, 2022). While the findings cannot be considered definitive due to the small data size, they do shed light on the sociolinguistic situation of the different native Arabic speaking communities in Israel.

Identity factors and language attitudes have been examined as motivating features for composite mixed language formation in the case of the Druze community, and codeswitching resistance in the case of the Arabs. Upon applying the Chi-Square test, it was found that there is a clear link between sociopolitical identity and attitudes towards languages and codeswitching. In the case of the Druze community in Israel, such factors play a prominent role in its language change, and in the case of the Arabs; they play a role in their language maintenance and purism. As the Israeli Druze people mainly identify with Israel and the Israeli identity, rather than with the Palestinians, they tend to emphasize such affinity through their language by forming a new, distinct speech that differs from that of the other Arab communities in Israel. Such distinct speech is characterised by convergence towards Hebrew and the extensive use of Hebrew lexemes and morphosyntactic and grammatical structures, and up to the point of composite mixed language formation. Through forming this mixed language, they maintain a separate identity denoting their distinctness. According to Bakker (1997), mixed languages are spoken by ethnic groups who wanted to distinguish themselves collectively from other groups whose languages they speak by forming a distinct group, either a subgroup, or a completely different one. The

Druze community in Israel is practically 'sandwiched' between the Arabs and Jews, thus forming a new mixed language denotes a distinct group, which distinguishes them from both groups 'whose languages they speak' (Kheir, 2019).

The Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, seem to consciously and explicitly resist borrowings and codeswitching, by trying to stick to Arabic under all circumstances unless they are left with no other choice, as in the case of borrowings which fill in lexical gaps, thus demonstrate language loyalty and purism. According to Pfaff (2003: 209), "mixed varieties may be seen as emblematic of the mixed cultural affiliation" and as feasible as it practically is, mixing both languages is seemingly not taken as an option by the Israeli Arabs since, according to Hawker (2018), the two languages index two national identities, and mixing them might index a subversive mixture of the identities which, from my own long term observations and the participants' responses, a great number of them are not necessarily interested in.

One Religion, Two Regions, and Multiple Linguistic Practices and Identities: The Case of the Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights

Chapter Preview

This chapter examines and compares language and identity among the Druze of the Golan Heights, who have moved from Syrian to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967, and the Israeli Druze. Both communities are 'sandwiched' communities, with the Golan Druze being sandwiched between Israeli and Syrian nationalism; and the Israeli Druze, between Israel and the Arabs. Since collective identities are dynamic and are shaped and reshaped by sociopolitical forces in and outside the state, the present study examines two major political debates happening within the respective communities at the time of fieldwork and their gradual impact on the communities' collective identities. The findings show how being sandwiched between two sides of a dichotomy creates new national identities and new language varieties.

1 Introduction

Identity is defined by Bucholtz & Hall (2004: 382) as 'an outcome of cultural semiotics that is accomplished through the production of contextually relevant sociopolitical relations of similarity and difference, authenticity and inauthenticity, and legitimacy and illegitimacy'. Therefore, in addition to being attributes of individuals and groups, identities are also attributes of situations; thus, identification is an ongoing social and political process. While identity work involves overlooking differences among groups with a shared identity, it also serves to highlight differences between in-group members and other groups. More often than not, since language manifests the semiotic processes of practice, indexicality, ideology and performance, this is done through language and the deployment of specific linguistic features and styles that consequently symbolise and iconically embody a group's distinctive identity and way of being in the world (ibid, 2004).

Indeed, many linguists and identity scholars have highlighted the clear link between language and identity, with language being central to the production

of identity and serving as the vehicle to index multiple ethnic and nationalist stances (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). Identities are manifested in language as the categories and labels that individuals and collectivities, to signal their belonging, attach to themselves and others—the indexed ways of speaking through which they perform their belonging and the interpretations that are made of such indices (Joseph, 2016). According to Auer (2007:2), collectivities are treated as unique quasi-beings that express their identities through linguistic features unique to them and may also use language to establish their identities. Bilingual minorities, for example, may use language to establish their identity and have it serve as a natural link to the community's identity. It is 'the specific ways in which the majority and/or the minority language are spoken, and the various mixing and switching styles, which are considered to be the straightforward, 'natural' expression of the bilinguals' identity'. In a nutshell, linguistic practices—the choices among linguistic varieties and languages accessible to a community—express, shape and reshape a collectivity's identity.

In light of this notion of the interrelatedness of language, sociopolitical situations and identity, the present study examined the relationship between codeswitching, mixed varieties, sociopolitical situations related to the case study, and identity, reporting on a comparative study of the Druze of the Golan Heights and in Israel. Upon the application of theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics, the current chapter shows how 'sandwiched' communities create new national identities and language varieties.

2   The Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights

The Druze people, as already described, are called *Al-Muwaḥḥidūn* (the Unitarians, or those who seek oneness), and mainly reside in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, while the rest are scattered worldwide. The Druze do not have a homeland, but, as an integral part of their traditional and religious values, they hold loyalty to the state in which they reside by adopting state ideologies, affiliations, identity and nationalism. Therefore, the Israeli Druze adopt Israeli national consciousness, whereas the Syrian Druze adopt Syrian nationalism. In certain cases, such as in the Golan Heights, which passed from Syrian to Israeli control following the Six-Day War (1967), the situation becomes precarious and bears heavy implications and uncertainties upon the community and its collective identity.

The population of the Druze community in Israel, including those in the Golan Heights, is 145,000, which constitutes around 1.6% of Israel's total popu-

lation (CBS, 2020). There is a significant Druze population in 20 settlements in Israel, 13 of which the Druze constitute the vast majority, while, in the rest, they reside alongside Arab Christians and Muslims—in some as a majority, while in others as a minority. In the Golan Heights Druze settlements, namely Majdal Shams, Buqʾata, Masada and Ein Qiniya, the Druze constitute 100 % of the total population. The total number of Druze in the Golan Heights is 23,000 (CBS, 2019).

As mentioned in the introduction of the book and in the previous chapter, the Druze community in Israel has gained a distinct political and national identity as part of the Israeli state's policy to make a clear distinction between the Israeli Druze and Arabs. Such separation was enthusiastically encouraged by the Israeli government, to the point that it officially adopted the view that the Druze were in fact, not Arabs at all, but rather a separate ethnic entity that somehow became Arabicized. Thus, the Druze were recognized as a separate religious community, were authorized to establish their own courts, and to separate them even further from the Muslim and Christian Arabs, their affairs were no longer handled by the same government departments in charge of Arab minority matters. Furthermore, in 1962, in a successful attempt to make an identity replacement for the Druze, the state legally changed the nationality of the Druze from Arab to Druze in their birth certificates and identity cards. The Arab Christians and Muslims, however, were still legally termed as Arabs (Firro, 1992; Betts, 1988; Firro 2001; Halabi 2006). Additionally, the Druze were granted an independent education system—completely separate from the Arab one— thereby encouraging the formation of the aforementioned 'Druze and Israeli' consciousness. According to Firro (2001), in the early 1970s, efforts were made to create an 'Israeli-Druze consciousness' through education to counteract a process of 'Arabisation' among the Druze youth. This consciousness was reflected in many educational aspects that highlight the historical and contemporary connection of the Druze, the Jews and the state of Israel (for more details see chapter 4 of this book). This process has sandwiched the Israeli Druze between Israel and the Arabs, since they share cultural and linguistic similarities with the Arab citizens, while, conversely, their connection to Israel has formed over time due to a combination of social, religious, historical and political factors (*see* chapter 4 and Kheir, 2022).

To highlight their sense of belonging to the state of Israel, most of the Druze people self-identify mainly as Israeli Druze. As already mentioned, thorough research on identity affiliations of the Arabs and Druze in Israel shows that the majority of the Druze people assign highest priority to their religious identity as well as to their citizenship in Israel (Amara & Schnell, 2004; Halabi, 2014). According to Nisan (2010: 576), 'for the Druze, the Israeli identity, is a

special communal badge that indicates that Israeli-ness sustains not only Jews but non-Jews as well'.

The Druze of the Golan (*Julān*) Heights, however, constitute a distinct community, different in certain aspects from the Israeli Druze. They are different in their cultural practices, customs and habits (such as dress code, exogamy practices, religious practices and attitudes towards consumption of alcoholic beverages, especially among women), collective identity, secularism and linguistic practices. The primary factor differentiating them, however, is ideological: while the Israeli Druze have assimilated in Israel through historical joint efforts with the Jews, compulsory military service and adopting state-related ideologies, education and other domains, the Druze of the Golan Heights have maintained complex relations with Israel due to a number of sociohistorical factors; a brief outline of the main factors follows.

At the end of the Six-Day War (June 1967), the Golan Heights (including the aforementioned four Druze villages) passed from Syrian to Israeli control, and a new border was created between Syria and Israel, which divided Druze families. At the end of 1981, when the annexation of the Golan to Israel was formally accomplished, the Knesset decided to apply Israeli law and regulations to the Golan Heights, an act which resulted in unrest and a non-violent campaign against Israel. This was because, in a way, it imposed upon the Golan Druze a political identification with Israel through receiving Israeli residence or citizenship. The Golan Druze religious leaders, with encouragement and pressure of pro-Syrian parties in the Golan and their relatives in Syria, threatened to ostracise anyone accepting Israeli identity cards and citizenship. Consequently, most of the Golan Druze at the time objected—some willingly, others out of fear of being cast out—to even receiving Israeli residence certificates (Scott Kennedy, 1984; Dana, 2003).

There were two main factors motivating their objection. First, most Druze families and their fields were split, which resulted in the Golan Druze being pressured by the Syrians to not to collaborate with the Israeli authorities, with the fear that the former's families and properties might be harmed by Syrian authorities. Second, the Golan Druze feared, and some hoped, that the Golan Heights would be returned to Syrian rule one day, which forced them not to identify with Israel in any way—an act that might have had dire consequences, as they would be considered 'traitors' by the Syrians. Fear was reignited following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which Syria tried to return the Golan to Syrian control, which resulted in the Golan Druze display of Syrian affiliation and Israeli alienation. This fear also stemmed from the fact that there were already precedents for the return of Israeli-occupied lands, the Israeli Cabinet vote to return the Golan to Syria, declarations of Israeli politicians about

palpable options to compromise on the Golan and the Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations (Scott Kennedy, 1984; Dana, 2003).

The Israeli Druze, headed by the Druze spiritual leader at the time, Shaykh Amin Tarif, tried to close the rift between the Golan Druze and the Israeli authorities but failed to do so as the Golan Druze explained that political circumstances forced them to act with extreme caution. Due to their fears and uncertainties regarding their future, opposition to the Israeli move to grant them Israeli identity cards, which meant Israeli citizenship, continued to grow, and those who accepted them were often shunned by the entire community; therefore, only a few took advantage of the Israeli identification offer. Being caught between Syria and Israel—while both countries in collaboration with local allies had attempted to inculcate Syrian and Israeli national consciousness within the population through a variety of practices and discourses— many remained on the fence, while others attempted to cultivate an alternative form of national consciousness in the Golan (Scott Kennedy, 1984; Dana, 2003; Phillips, 2016). This alternative national consciousness arose mainly as a result of the Syrian state's chronic inability and unwillingness to recapture the Golan and an increasingly growing and publicised speculation that Assad's regime had conducted secret negotiations with Israel and had actually sold the Golan to Israel rather than 'lost a war'. Talks about this 'Golan secret deal' began around 2011 and had been continuously gaining publicity as more Syrian army generals provided 'evidence' of the deal. Golan activists, therefore, called for the Golan Druze to detach their sense of belonging to the Syrian nation from their community's endorsement of Assad within the context of debates over the position of the Druze in the Syrian civil war ongoing since 2011 (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2015; Phillips, 2016).

Nowadays, things have changed for the Golan Druze, as those who do not have citizenship maintain Israeli permanent residency and, as such, enjoy benefits from the state. Some even claim they are going through a gradual 'Israelisation' process. This process is manifested through the assimilation of the younger generation; the adoption of a westernised lifestyle; the growing number of individuals applying for and receiving Israeli citizenship; the permanent move to Israel of those who study and work in Israel; and also, in their linguistic landscape, which, in certain towns, is now predominantly Hebrew. While demonstrations still take place on the Syrian national holiday, many locals claim that it is well known to everyone that they are just 'an act of loyalty out of precaution'. However, it is very important to note that the Golan Heights has passed from a dictatorial regime into a democracy; Syrian nationalism has been instilled in the elders at the conscious and subconscious level, and their love and loyalty to Syria cannot be denied. Many have tried to pass this nation-

alism on to the next generations; however, while some have succeeded, others have completely failed to do so as, according to the participants in the current study, they have moved out of their parents' doctrine into a completely different reality in which they can distinguish between the oppressed way in which their parents have lived and their own freedom of choice. Obviously, as one of the participants has wisely pointed out, 'there are always exceptional cases, to either extreme side of the dichotomy'.

3   Theoretical Approaches

Identity, which is derived from many sources including, inter alia, institutional affiliation, geopolitical locale, religion, community, society, ethnicity and nationality, provides the individual a location in the world and presents the link between the individual and the society in which they live. Identities can be viewed as 'fluid', in the sense that individuals perceive themselves differently across time and social domains; 'contested', in the sense that they are connected to power relations; and 'decentred', in that an individual's sense of self is formed by many forces that make them susceptible to change under different circumstances. While individual identity addresses the question, 'who am I?', collective identity engages with the issue of 'who are we?' (Weedon, 1996; Woodward, 1997). Throughout history, collective identities have been shaped by social forces and historical developments, including tribal, religious, family-based, racial, linguistic, ethnic, national and civic developments, and they continuously affect and are affected by the evolving political and social forces in and outside the state. In conflict settings, an ethnic group's collective identity can become a major force in their relations with other ethnic groups in the state and with the state itself, and the role of identity becomes inextricably related to the nature of the conflict. However, since identities are fluid and contested, they evolve in response to major social forces as manifested by new loyalties, groupings, identifications and commitments; thus, they simultaneously influence and are transformed in response to sociopolitical change (Rouhana, 1997).

As already mentioned, the increased contact among people—and therefore identities—has brought about a plethora of linguistic varieties and resources through which those identities are indexed and conveyed. One such prominent contact phenomenon is codeswitching. Since extensive research on codeswitching has shown that different code-switchers within a certain community may have different switching ways and styles, it has led scholars in the field to distinguish between various possible types of codeswitching. Such discern-

ment between different types of codeswitching is crucial for understanding the different motivations for codeswitching as well as its causes and effects. Drawing insights from the performance and style theory of Eckert (2004), in chapter 4 I suggested viewing codeswitching as a stylistic resource and that people—standing in a variety of positions with respect to conflict/political issues—will show variability in the ways in which they select, combine and situationally deploy it. According to Eckert (2004), style is not a thing but a practice—that is, an activity through which people create social meaning—as style is the visible manifestation of meaning, and neither are static. In addition, performance is a highly deliberate and self-aware social display that involves stylisation in highlighting ideological associations (Bucholtz & Hall 2004). Based on this view, codeswitching can be thought of as the stylisation that manifests and highlights sociopolitical identity. According to Eckert (2004), the selection of variables is based upon the speaker's interpretation of meaning potential, and, since 'a stylistic move is to be put out into a community for the purpose of being interpreted, speakers select resources on the basis of their potential comprehensibility in that community' (p. 44).

Accordingly, since the use of codeswitching can be perceived by the speakers and the community as portraying a state identity dimension, it will be cautiously selected, combined, situationally deployed and, in certain cases, even amended to match the speaker's ideology and the community's expectations. Moreover, Eckert (2004) added that prestige and stigma have become the primary social meanings associated with variables—bringing a focus on attempts to reflect prestige and avoid stigma—and the speaker may manage style in certain ways to call upon a certain identity or to create distance.

In a different model, Irvine and Gal (2000) have documented a process of linguistic ideology called erasure: a process in which elements go unnoticed, are explained away or, in extreme cases where they fit some alternative threatening picture, are eradicated in case they do not fit the ideological scheme. Such 'problematic' elements must be either ignored, transformed or acted against to remove the threat. Additionally, Irvine and Gal have documented another semiotic process termed iconisation: a transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic features and the social image to which they are linked, and through which linguistic features become the iconic ideological index of a social group's essence. Since codeswitching has the power to denote a state identity or a mixed identity, it can itself potentially be perceived as a stigmatised variant to be avoided by individuals who wish to create distance from that specific identity or, even more radically, a variant to be acted against. Conversely, those who wish to make that identity salient will embrace it as their iconic style (see chapter 4). In her Markedness Model, Myers-Scotton (1993)

asserted that unmarked codeswitching may be perceived as an index of intergroup harmony; and marked codeswitching, as an indicator of conflict and tension. Thus, little unmarked codeswitching is predicted in places where languages symbolise intergroup conflict or a good deal of tension.

In addition, Bucholtz and Hall have described similar notions in their model Tactics of Intersubjectivity, which describes the relational dimensions of identity categories, practices and ideologies, and includes three different pairs of tactics that pertain to the interrelated concepts central to identity-markedness, essentialism and institutional power. The first pair, adequation and distinction, involves the pursuit of socially recognised sameness between individuals or groups by setting aside potentially salient differences (via adequation) or by underscoring difference (via distinction). Adequation can be a means for preserving a community identity in the face of dramatic cultural shift while allowing bilingual speakers 'to locate themselves simultaneously within two different identity frames, by syncretically combining elements of each language into a single sociolinguistic system' (p. 383). Adequation can often serve as a basis for political organisation and alliance through either building coalitions across lines of difference or collapsing such boundaries for the sake of a politically motivated strategic essentialism, whereby such unity creates a common identity, which is a social achievement. Distinction is one of the sociopolitical relations whereby salient differences are underscored rather than erased. It can serve as a tactic for underscoring the differentiation of identity through resisting the assimilating forces of modernity and the nation-state; thus, 'speakers of minority or unofficial languages often elaborate linguistic differences between their own language and the language of the state' (p. 384). Although distinction most often operates in a binary manner, establishing a dichotomy in which social identities are constructed as oppositional or contrastive, it may facilitate a process in which groups establish an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy.

The second pair of tactics, authentication and denaturalisation, relate respectively to the construction of a genuine or credible identity and of an identity that is non-authentic. These tactics involve the rewriting of linguistic and cultural history by which the speakers of a national language are repositioned as more 'authentic' to the historical workings of the nation-state. Language, then, contributes to nationalist identity formation through bestowing unity and cohesion to speakers of the language. Accordingly, when the identity of a language and its speakers becomes authenticated through nationalistic rhetoric, the variety then indexes ways of being and belonging to the nation-state; thus, people may index multiple ethnic, nationalist and political stances through their linguistic practices.

The third pair of tactics, authorisation and illegitimation, involves speakers attempting, respectively, to legitimate particular identities through co-legitimating an institutional power or authority or, conversely, to suppress or withdraw such identities through removing or denying such structural power. Therefore, illegitimation can serve as a mode of resistance to the state or the dominant authority, while authorisation involves invoking language in ways recognised by the state.

The analysis of the conversational, interview and survey data of this study was mainly framed by an application of these theories and concepts as well as an examination of the micro- and macro-level aspects of language and identity, drawing on insights gained through theories of language and identity contact as well as sociolinguistics.

4   Language and Identity among the Druze of the Golan Heights: Classic to Composite Codeswitching and a Collective 'Undefined' Identity En Route to a New Proto-National 'Hadʕbawi/Jūlani' Identity

According to Bucholtz and Hall (2004:372), while the unmarking of powerful identities is supported by a variety of supra-local ideologies, the process involves the local level at which 'unmarked identities may be reproduced as well as challenged and reinscribed with identity markings'; therefore, the present study investigated how the 'Syrian–Israeli secret Golan deal' speculation played out in the consciousness of the study's Golan Heights participants and its impact on their collective identity. Following performance and style theory (Eckert, 2004), in the previous chapter I suggested codeswitching to be seen as a stylistic resource in which people—with different positions with respect to conflict/political issues—will show variability in terms of the ways they select, combine and situationally deploy it. It is important to note that the Golan Druze experience less language contact than their Israeli Druze counterparts since, unlike the latter, they do not serve in the Israeli army, and they mainly work in their own region. Following chapter 4, the levels of the codeswitching scale were defined as light, moderate/average and heavy. Light codeswitching was characterised predominantly by borrowings and monolexemic switching; average codeswitching, by classic codeswitching; and heavy codeswitching, by intensive codeswitching that approached convergence and composite codeswitching. The data yielded five categories, out of which five participants were chosen to be representative, one for each category:

a)   'without citizenship/without nationality', with average codeswitching (15 %)
b)   'Druze including the Israeli component, excluding the Syrian component', ranging from average to high codeswitching (15 %)
c)   'salient Syrian identity component', with light codeswitching (25 %)
d)   'unknown/undefined', ranging from average to high codeswitching (35 %)
e)   'salient Israeli identity component', ranging from high codeswitching to predominantly Hebrew (10 %).

The great majority of the interviewees emphasised the 'Jūlani' identity component: some directly, while most, indirectly. The speech data of most of the Druze participants from the Golan Heights evidenced mainly classic codeswitching with varying instances of composite codeswitching. This is reflected in Examples (1)–(4) by the insertion of Hebrew content morphemes and expressions, and by the maintaining of Arabic as the matrix language and the main provider of relevant morphemes. Hebrew, which is the embedded language in this data, provides content morphemes and embedded language islands that fit into the matrix language frame model (Myers-Scotton, 1997, 2002), thus maintaining its role as an embedded language.

Example (1) is taken from the speech of a male participant in his 30s, who stated that he is 'an individual without citizenship, does not belong to any nationality' and perceives his identity as 'undefined'. The participant stated that he grew up in an environment that voiced an issue of a struggle with a 'sense of belonging'; however, he felt that this issue was not a local issue, but rather a global one or, in his words, 'the whole world suffers from a sense of belonging and the next step for humanity is a life without national belonging'. When asked about Syria, this participant said he followed the public's belief in the conspiracy theory according to which Syria had a secret agreement with Israel by which 'the Syrian authorities sold the Golan to Israel and that all the signs, according to his own experience and the stories of the elders who lived throughout the duration of the war, alongside recent testimonies of Syrian soldiers and commanding generals who took part in the war, prove that the theory is grounded in reality' and also said that he wishes the Golan 'never goes back [to Syria], ever'. According to the participant, 'the public opinion is very powerful in the Golan, and it is a composite of highly educated individuals and those who work down [in Israel]'. According to this participant, the public opinion had been successfully promoting the collective undefined identity among the Golan Druze to the point that one of the popular bars in Majdal Shams was called 'Undefined' and later renamed 'Why' by the new owners as a concept of 'why do we need identity at all, what for, who cares?' In terms of his language practices, the participant usually integrated Hebrew elements in

his speech and said it was natural for him, and he did not think that language had anything to do with identity. His codeswitching style conformed mainly to the classic type: mainly inserting content morphemes and expressions from Hebrew. There were a good number of instances of a composite, such as in Example (1), where he inflected the Arabic habitual pronominal clitic *b-* to the Hebrew future verb *yestadr-ú* 'get along', which is an indication of a composite, since it denotes a mixed imperfective form of Arabic and Hebrew tenses. In Arabic, the equivalent would be *b-yetdabbar-ū* 'get along', while, in Hebrew, the correct form would be *mestadr-ím* 'get along' or *yestadr-ú* 'will get along'. Additionally, the speaker inserted monolexemic switches in the form of nouns, such as *zxoyót* 'rights'; discourse markers, as in *bexlál* 'at all'; and the expression *ló kayám* 'non existent'. Hebrew elements are marked in red in the transcriptions as well as their glosses, other elements are from Arabic and morphemes under discussion appear in bold. The transcriptions follow the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) system.

(1)　*men naħet*　　*inno ʔāxð-in*　　*zxoyót meš ʔāxð-in*　　*zxoyót*
　　 with regards to　that take-PRS-1PL　**rights** not take-PRS-1PL　**rights**
　　 bexlál hāi eš-ši　　*ló kayám* *ʕen-na lēš laʔenno wēn*
　　 at all　this the-thing **not** exist　at-us　why because wherever
　　 matħutʕi-na en-nās　　*hāi elli hōn* **b-*yestadr-ú***
　　 put-PRS-1PL the-people this that here FUT-**get along**-3PL
　　 'With regards to receiving rights or not receiving rights, that does not apply at all in our case since we, the people here, will get along anywhere, anyway.'

Example (2) is taken from a female participant in her 50s, who was born when the Golan was still a Syrian territory, but had moved into Israeli control when she was very young. She stated that Syrian affiliation is not part of her consciousness, but rather, her parents'. 'Other than being historically Syrian, it is completely alien to me', she continued:

> My parents say we are Syrian, but I do not have any ties to the place, I do not know anything about it other than the destruction we see on TV that I do not want to be a part of, I feel very scared to live in a place where it is not safe, and I would choose to stay only here [in Israel], I am happy in my own place, I am a citizen [of Israel], giving my duties to and receiving benefits from the state. Do I feel completely Israeli? No, Do I feel Syrian? No. There is some sense of bewilderment. I do not have a sense of belonging to Syria nor do I feel completely Israeli. I have almost fully assimilated in Israel in

> terms of work, education, social ties etc., but Israel has this discrimination
> of first-class and second-class citizens, with the Jews being first-class and
> everyone else classified as second-class. However, I do perceive myself as a
> first-class citizen unequivocally. I respect this state, and this state respects
> us; this is the place I live in, and I belong to my nation—here, to my land,
> to my town, to Majdal Shams, to my home, to my life. However, the fear
> [of the Golan returning to Syrian control] is always resonant, so we are on
> the fence, uncertain about our future and our destiny.

When the participant was asked about self-identification, she stated that, above
all, she was a human being, not belonging to geography nor to individuals, but
'in our core definition, we do not really know where we are, undefined'. When
asked about the growing suspicion about the Israeli–Syrian deal theory, she
said:

> we know for sure that it is true since my parents said [Syrian authorities]
> told us the Quneitra fell when the Quneitra had not fallen yet; the Qun-
> eitra has been sold, all the signs show that [the speculation of selling the
> Golan] is true.

In terms of her linguistic practices, she integrated many Hebrew elements
into her speech, had a positive attitude towards Hebrew and codeswitching,
believed that language plays an extremely important role in determining one's
identity and said that it felt natural for her to use Hebrew elements in her daily
speech and did it mainly out of comfort and assimilation. Her codeswitching
style conformed mainly to the classic type and was characterised by frequent
usage of Hebrew nouns, verbs and expressions, with some instances of com-
posite codeswitching, such as in Example (2), where she mixed the Arabic
habitual pronominal clitic *b-* with the Hebrew future verb *yeštalév* 'integrate',
which is an indication of a composite, as it exhibits a mixture of Arabic and
Hebrew tenses that results in a mixed imperfective form. In Arabic, the equi-
valent would be *b-yenexretˤ*, while, in Hebrew, the correct form would be
meštalév.

Additionally, the usage of the mixed determiner phrase (DP) construction
(Arabic definite article prefixed to a Hebrew noun), as in *el-šinúi* 'the change'
and *el-tsaˤád* 'the step', is another indication of a composite. As previously
mentioned, the uniqueness of this construction does not lie in the fact that
it represents a mixture of the two languages in one combined DP, but rather
in changing the intrinsic rule of prefixing. While both Arabic and Hebrew have
definite articles—*al-* or *el-* in Arabic and *ha-* in Hebrew—and they are pre-

fixed to nouns and adjectives, in contrast to Hebrew in which the article has
consistent pronunciation, the *l* in the Arabic article maintains its original pro-
nunciation unless it is prefixed to a word beginning with a sun letter (t, θ, d, ð, r,
z, s, š, sˤ, dˤ, tˤ, zˤ, l, n), in which case it assimilates. However, in the mixed DPs,
the assimilation constraints are violated, as is evident in Example (2), where
the assimilation rule was applied when prefixing the Arabic definite article *el-*
to an Arabic noun beginning with a sun letter *s* (*siyase*), thus forming **es-siyase**
'the politics' instead of *el-siyase; however, when it was prefixed to a Hebrew
noun beginning with a sun letter *š* (*šinúi*), the assimilation rule was violated
and, instead of **eš**-*šinúi* 'the change', **el**-*šinúi* was used. The speaker also inserted
monolexemic switches, as in the Hebrew adverb *kvár* 'already'. It seems that the
speaker was following the process of adequation (Bucholtz and Hall 2004) as a
way 'to locate [herself] simultaneously within two different identity frames, by
syncretically combining elements of each language into a single sociolinguistic
system' (p. 383).

(2) *el-waḥad* **b-**_yeštalév_   *ʔāni lamma* ʕ*melt* _toʔár_   _rišón_ *w-*ʕ*melt*
     the-one FUT-**integrate** I   when did degree first and-did
     toʔár   _šení_   **kvár**   *ʔāni* ʕ*melt ha* **el-**_šinúi_   *ya*ʕ*ni ʔāni*
     degree second **already** I   did   this **the-change** meaning I
     bd-īt   **b-el-**_tsa_ʕ_ád_ *w-ha*   *behem-ni*   *ktir* **el-**_tsa_ʕ_ád_
     start-PST-1SG **in-the-step** and-this important-1SG a lot **the-step**
     *et-ta*ʕ*limī*   _paxót_ *siyasi* *la*ʔ*enno* **es-siyase**   *bḥes*
     the-educational less   political because **the-politics** 1SG-PRS-feel
     *mas*ʕ*aleḥ fiya-š*   *ḥaq* *w-*ʕ*adl*
     interests has-not right and-justice
     'the person assimilates, when I did a first degree and a second degree I
     have already made that change, that is, I have already started that step
     and it is very important to me, the educational aspect, rather than the
     political aspect, because I feel that politics is all about self-interests and
     lacks fairness and justice.'

Example (3) is taken from a female participant in her 40s, who was born when
the Golan was already under Israeli control. It is noteworthy, however, that the
participant's parent was a pro-Syrian activist during what they termed 'the war
of identities' in 1982, following Israel's attempt to grant Israeli citizenship to the
Golan Druze in which some, including the participant's parent, had refused to
receive it. Therefore, the participant did not hold an Israeli citizenship, but a
permanent residency status. The participant described the event as:

an act of fear and resistance, and we, as **Syrians**, it was as if you are taking away our nationhood from us, and while some have refused to receive it, others have accepted it out of fear over themselves and their children since their children will have automatically received it. We have not [accepted it], we have permanent residency. I am one of the mothers who got doomed as my [parent] have thrown away the identity card and stepped on it. My [parent] was one of the activists. (emphasis in original)

When asked about the suspicion about the Israeli–Syrian deal theory, this participant said, 'we hear about it all the time, but it is not certain, it has not been 100% proven, you cannot enter this politics and you cannot believe it'. When asked about identification, the participant had a long and enduring sense of bewilderment. She stated:

we are **Syrians**, and we're in an occupied territory, no one can deny that, it is true that we live here in Israel, but one cannot say I am an Arab-Arab, nor can he say I am Israeli. I was born in Israel; however, I love Syria, I am Syrian, Hadˤbawiyye ['Heightetian', from *Hadˤabe*, 'highland', referring to 'the Heights'], I do not say I am Israeli, the Golan is Syrian; however, we are not traitors, we do not stand with Israel against Syria nor do we stand with Syria against Israel, but there are ever exceptional cases. (emphasis in original)

When asked about Syrian oppression she said:

It is true that, in Syria, you are not allowed to say 'I am Druze, Muslim or Christian'; you are only allowed to say 'I am Syrian-Arab', which, in a way, although seems oppressive and imposing an identity upon a nation, it is a sign of equity.

After some thought she added:

I am neither Syrian nor Israeli, I cannot say I am a 100% [Syrian] national because I work with the state, I receive payslips and receive benefits from the National Insurance Institute of Israel for me and my children. Whoever wants to say I am a free Syrian-Arab should not receive benefits from the state, so I cannot say I am Syrian nor can I say I am Israeli. I live in Israel; in fact, I live in the Heights, meaning not Syrian and not Israeli. If I were to state my identity, I will unequivocally say I am Hadˤbawiyye, Jūlaniyye [Golani], I am a Hadˤabe native.

The participant's final statement about her identity immediately sparked an inevitable comparison to the situation in Alsace, which has moved back and forth between German and French control; while both the Germans and the French have tried to instil their own nationalism upon the locals, the people have established their own distinct Alsatian identity which is neither French nor German. When the participant was told by the researcher about the situation in Alsace, she said 'that is exactly the case here, exactly the same case here, for sure'. This is where Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) process of distinction can be applied: not in the sense of operating in a binary manner, establishing a dichotomy in which social identities are constructed as oppositional or contrastive, but in facilitating a process in which groups establish an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy, with *Hadˁbawi/Jūlani* being the alternative to either Syrian or Israeli. In terms of her linguistic practices, the participant integrated very few Hebrew elements in her speech, had a negative attitude towards Hebrew and did not think that there was any link between language and identity. Her speech yielded only few instances of codeswitching and borrowings, such as in Example (3), where she used borrowings mainly from the technology domain, which had introduced many Hebrew borrowings primarily due to the fact that they were new concepts to fill a linguistic void. Such borrowings include *matˁˁen* 'charger' and *maxšír* 'device'. Notably, the noun *matˁˁen* and adjective *sbēr* 'spare' were phonologically adapted into Arabic, as the former is pronounced *matʔén* and the latter, *spéʁ*, in Hebrew. As mentioned in chapter 4, when a community or an individual is less socially and politically identified with the state or dominant culture, they tend to phonologically adapt 'code-2' into 'code-1'. In this participant's case—as in others who showed more affinity to Syrian nationalism—codeswitching is the marked mode of communication. It seems that the processes of erasure (Irvine & Gal, 2000) and illegitimation (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004) are applicable to such participants both in language and identity, as both the state's effort to instil Israeli nationalism as well as the pervasive Hebrew influence upon their language are rendered invisible, suppressed or denied. Since codeswitching has the power to denote a state identity or a mixed identity, codeswitching is presumably viewed as a stigmatised variant to be avoided by those who wish to create distance from that specific identity.

(3) *badd-ek   fi   **matˤˤén** ϑani   fik-i   tjib-i batˤariyye*
     want-PRS-2SGF there is **charger** second can-2SGF bring battery
     sbēr *itzˤalla maˤk-i   ʔaw btisʔal-i   hinaki baˤrefe-š el-iphone*
     spare stay   with-2SGF or ask-PRS-2SGF there know-not the-iphone
     *btiji batˤariyt-o bti-tɣayar-š   ɣēr   la-tɣayr-i   **el-maxšír***
     come battery-its PASS-change-not other until-change-2SGF **the-device**
     fi   iphon-āt   hēk
     there are iphone-PL like it
     'If you want, there is another charger, you can also bring a spare battery
     to stay with you, or, you may ask there. I do not know, there are iPhones
     whose batteries cannot be changed unless you change the device itself.'

Example (4) is taken from the speech of a male participant in his late 20s. The
participant, who claimed an unknown or undefined identity, stated that 'our
nation is not Syria, we are way before Syria, we are native to this region, we
do not come from Syria, it is believed that we are originally Armenian'. The
participant's belief coincided with findings in a report in *Nature* that investig-
ated the genetic relationships between Israeli Druze and modern and ancient
populations, in which Marshall, Das, Pirooznia, & Elhaik (2016) showed that
the Druze exhibit a high affinity with ancient Armenian and Turkish ances-
try. Furthermore, their DNA study showed that the Druze possess a signific-
antly greater amount of ancient Armenian ancestry and significantly smaller
ancient Levantine ancestry compared to other Levantine populations, espe-
cially Palestinians and Lebanese. The participant continued:

> If they tell us the borders are open, go to Syria, we will say 'no way', this
> is our land, and the land is here. Syria can come, Mozambique, America,
> England, Jordan—we are here, you are all welcome, we will not move from
> our land.

The participant stated that there was a huge sense of bewilderment among the
people when it came to identity and belonging. He added:

> whenever I am overseas and someone asks me 'where are you from?', do
> you know how many things flow in my head? It is really very perplexing;
> some say, 'from Israel', some say, 'from Syria', others say, 'Golan Heights',
> then they ask 'what is the Golan Heights?' and you start explaining.

He added that the locals had been trying to resolve the issues of collective
identity and nationality for a while until they reached the conclusion that 'we

do not need an identity, why would we need one? What is identity anyway? "Undefined" or "lacking identity" is the solution'. While telling the researcher about some Golan history and stories, the participant raised the Golan deal theory completely on his own, unprompted. Providing details of testimonies from locals who were active during the war, he said:

> I believe that the Golan has been sold, and I have personally heard the true story of what had actually happened there from a local who was an active soldier in the Syrian army back then. Everything he said made perfect sense and all the signs show that it is true, and the whole world knows that they declared that the Golan has fallen 17 hours before the Israelis even got there and that the Syrian authorities have publicly executed the Syrian soldiers who refused the order to retreat and go back!

He believed that this speculation affected the locals' collective identity in a way that he was unable to explain. In terms of his language practices, he frequently integrated Hebrew elements in his speech and said it was automatic for him and that he is unsure whether or not there is a link between language and identity. He codeswitched frequently, using a good number of Hebrew content morphemes and expressions, with several instances of a composite, such as his frequent use of the mixed DP construction, as in Example (4). Just as in in example (2), the assimilation rule of the definite article *el* 'the' was violated when prefixing the Arabic definite article *el-* to a Hebrew noun beginning with a sun letter, as evident in *b-el-texat-év-ʔotí* 'in the CC', where normally the *l* would assimilate into *t* and would thus be pronounced as *b-et-texat-év-ʔotí*. The uniqueness of this mixed DP construction is discussed in detail in Example (2) above.

(4) *hati-hin   feš maʕ-i   wrāq **la-l-medpesét** kil   ma*
     give-IMP-them not have-1PS papers **for-the-printer** each that
     *iysīr   maʕ-i   ḥelék baʕmal sriká **w-ʕa-l-mél**   el-ek*
     become with-me part   will do scan **and-to-the-mail** to-2SGF
     *w-il-ha   **b-el-texat-év-ʔotí** ʕašan t-kūn   heiy **b-el-ʕenyaním***
     and-to-3SGF **in-the-CC**   so that FUT-be she   **in-the-matters**
     'Give them to me, I do not have papers for my printer, whenever I will have some, I will scan them and send them to your email cc'ing her so that she will be informed as well.'

Example (5) is taken from a female participant in her 40s. The participant had moved permanently to Israel in her early 20s, seeking what she called 'a genu-

ine life'—a life that she wanted to live, a life where people choose to think and not are told what they may or may not think. The participant, who resided in a Druze locality in Israel, stated that she was negatively affected by what she called the 'brainwashing' that she had experienced as a child living through the 'war of identities', in which activists were inculcating Syrian nationalism and hostility towards Israel:

> It really upset me, so I wanted to get away from all that; I wanted to get lost in a city where no one knows who I am, what I am... I am still deeply affected by it and, until today, I do not like anyone to know who I am or what I am. I usually hide any trace of identity, whether it is Hadˤabe or Druze. Nothing. I only say if I have to once, and I refuse to talk about it any further. I was always rebellious; I was the child that went according to 'not what he has been told' so I have never believed their stories. True, I have felt for them, humanely speaking, but I have always looked for a better place, more neutral, more quiet, more 'lacking stories', 'lacking miseries', so I wanted to be like them [Israelis], like them is the Western culture.

In her analogy, the participant compared the situation to a confused child of divorced parents, 'a child who does not know who is right, his mother or his father, what is better for him: here or there?' and she believed that this confusion created a new nation. In her words:

> this creates a new generation, a completely different one, and we can already see this. They are extremely accomplished, desiring to advance, to be different, to be dissimilar, even speaking a different language, everything is different ... if we compare the situation 35 years ago, in which the place was completely in dire straits and now, they are top-Westernised, secular, highly educated, engineers, high-tech experts etc., and they are completely detached from the whole Syrian theme. They are neither Syrians nor Israelis. They have completely embraced the 'undefined' or 'lacking' identity, and they do not even bother themselves with the whole issue. They do not care, and they have fully assimilated [presumably into late capitalist economy].

When the participant was told about the similarity to the situation in Alsace, she said, 'definitely the same thing here, it is all about the need to be distinct, completely different from all'. When she was asked about her affiliation to Syria, she responded that, other than it being the place to which her parents belong,

she had no connection to it whatsoever: no emotional attachment, no affiliation, no sense of belonging. Israel, conversely, was the default for her:

> I am enchanted by the West. I love democracy. I love seeing people advance. I am very proud of this state, and I do very much love Israel, very much. It is enough for me that it is a democratic state; it respects me and my children, and we are all very proud of it, very proud to be Israelis.

When asked about the Israeli–Syrian Golan deal theory, she took a neutral stance at first but later added that 'there are very high chances that there was a deal there, I tend to believe the conspiracy theory'; however, she was unsure in what ways this might have affected the collective identity. In terms of her linguistic practices, her speech was predominantly Hebrew, with very few switches to Arabic, as illustrated in Example (5), and was consistent in her speech and in the interview (see Apendix 4, Excerpt 5). The participant, who had a great appreciation of and an extremely positive attitude towards Hebrew in contrast to Arabic, had in fact experienced a complete language shift into Hebrew, alongside all her (Druze) family members, which she was very proud of. She believed that language determines the speaker's identity. This is where Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) process of authentication can be applied to both language and identity, as the participant adopted the national identity (Israeli) and spoke the national language (Hebrew) as a vehicle for authentication practices to index ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state.

(5) *láxats láxats aní gám ʔóved-et me-a-bayet ʔóvedet*
pressure pressure I also work-1SGF from-the-house work-1SGF
me-šama ʔóvedet kól a-zmán šiší laxúts **fī** *tkufá*
from-there work-1SGF all the-time Friday stressed **there is** period
qal-et-lī *a-yaldá má má kará gám ba-bayét át keʔilú*
tell-3SGF-me the-girl what what happened also at-home you that is
kól a-yóm b-a-maxšév gám át megiʕ-á meʔuxár má
all the-day on-the-computer also you get-2SGF late what
kará má la-ʔasót **kill-u** *kašé zé má še-tsaríx šúm*
happened what to-do **all-it** hard this what that-needed no
davár ló kál
thing no easy

'There is so much pressure, I work at home, as well as there. I work all the time, even on Fridays. There was a time in which the kid has asked me "what is going on? You are working on your computer all the time and you get home late, what is going on?" What can I do? It is all hard, I do what needs to be done. Nothing is easy.'

The conversational data, followed by the additional interview data and surveys, sparked an inevitable comparison to the situation in Alsace, a region that has moved back and forth between German and French control, and while both the Germans and the French have tried to inculcate their own nationalism and language upon the locals, the people of Alsace have established their own distinct proto-national Alsatian identity and Alsatian language, both of which are neither French nor German.

Prior to the 'Golan secret deal' theory, the Syrian dimension in the Golan Druze collective identity was extremely salient. It seems, however, that ever since the theory started gaining publicity in 2011, the Syrian component has been gradually declining in salience and, thus, a new collective identity has been emerging. In applying the tactics of intersubjectivity (Bucholtz & Hall 2004), it is evident that, following the tactic of adequation, the Druze of the Golan Heights are establishing political organisation and alliance by setting aside potentially the salient differences that are echoed in pro-Israeli versus pro-Syrian voices, and are consolidating a unified, seemingly denaturalised, undefined identity through the tactic of distinction. It seems, however, that the process of distinction—in establishing an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy—alongside that of authentication, is cultivating a new authentic, proto-national *Hadˁbawi/Jūlani* identity that is neither Syrian nor Israeli, and a new dialect that is neither Arabic nor Hebrew, but *Hadˁbawi/Jūlani*. Initial examination shows that certain salient features of the new emerging *Hadˁbawi/Jūlani* dialect include mixtures of English and Hebrew elements and structures; terminology and slang unique to the region; a lenition process of the Arabic emphatic phonemes [tˁ], [sˁ], [dˁ] and [zˁ] that are merging with their non-emphatic counterparts [t], [s], [d], and [ð] respectively; and emphatic vowel lengthening, among other structures that have yet to be thoroughly examined. Since authorisation can also be a local practice to contest or confirm dominant forms of power, such a variety may confer an 'alternative legitimacy' to its speakers.

5 Language and Identity among the Israeli Druze: From Composite Codeswitching to a Mixed Variety and a Collective 'Israeli Druze' Identity En Route to a 'Druze' Ethnonational Identity

Since collective identity is dynamic and 'affects and is affected by the evolving political and social forces within the state and outside it' (Rohana 1997: 4), the present study tested how Israel's controversial nation-state law plays out in the political consciousness of the Israeli Druze participants and its poten-

tial impact on collective identity. The nation-state law has been criticised by many as being racist and undemocratic in that it downgrades the minority rights and the status of the Arabic language in Israel. It is noteworthy that all Druze representatives in the Knesset except for Ayub Kara voted against the Nation-state Law (and broke party ranks to do so), and some high-ranked military and police officers resigned from their position to express their disappointment with this law, and their demotivation to serve the country further. Most of the participants in this study self-identified as Israeli Druze and believed this to be their collective identity. Similar findings were demonstrated in Amara and Schnell (2004), Halabi (2006, 2014) and chapter 4 of this book. However, a recurrent component for almost all the participants in this study was the Druze identity component—they all highlighted that it is not in merely the religious/ethnic sense, but senses beyond that. In terms of linguistic practices, recent studies (Kheir 2019, 2022) have shown that the language of the Israeli Druze community is going through the process of convergence and a composite matrix language formation, resulting in a mixed variety, based on Myers-Scotton's matrix language turnover hypothesis (1998, 2002) and Auer's (1998, 1999) and Myers-Scotton's (2003) models of mixed languages. Such findings are consistent with those in the present study, in which the mixed variety was observed to predominantly be the unmarked mode of communication. The data were divided into five main categories, out of which five participants were sampled respectively:

a) 'salient Israeli identity component', with unmarked mixed variety (15%)
b) 'Israeli Druze', with unmarked mixed variety (35%)
c) 'Druze/Arab', ranging from average codeswitching to marked mixed variety (10%)
d) 'Druze', with unmarked mixed variety (25%)
e) 'Israeli Druze', with a predominantly Hebrew speech (15%).

Example (6) is taken from the speech of a female participant in her 30s. The participant identified as Israeli and emphasised that it reflected her sense of belonging to and love of the state, and not merely citizenship per se:

> I feel Israeli at my core being. It reflects who I am and how I was raised; it feels that it is my natural way of being. The Druze have always had a special connection to the state and feel inseparable from it.

When she was asked about her stance towards Israel's controversial nation-state law, which has sparked great disappointment and fury among the Druze and Arabs, who view it as racist and undemocratic, she said she did not understand 'what is the fuss all about'. She felt like it was a reality that had always

been there, as Israel had always been a primarily Jewish state, and Arabic had always been inferior to Hebrew even with its previous 'official' status:

> It does not mean anything, and I do not get it. They took a living reality and made a law out of it. Were people ignorant to the situation that was always like that? It was always a Jewish state, which is good, in my opinion, it is excellent, at least it is a democracy. The Druze in Israel live in a much better place than the Druze who reside in Arab countries that is for sure. The fact that Israel is a Jewish state is what makes it different from the Arab countries. I am grateful to be here, and this law has not changed anything for me and, in my opinion, people just misinterpreted it, that is all.

The participant, whose speech was characterised by a mixed variety of Arabic and Hebrew, had a very positive attitude towards Hebrew and felt that the mixed variety is the default for her:

> When I am overseas and I encounter people from Arab countries with whom I try to speak pure Arabic, I make myself completely conscious about my speech. It is as if I am speaking a foreign language, as if I am making an effort because the mixture is my natural way of speaking. It is effortless, it comes naturally to me. That is my way of speaking, my language.

The process of iconisation (Irvine & Gal 2000) is applicable in this case, in the sense that linguistic features become the ideological index of a social group's essence. Denoting a state identity or a mixed identity, a mixed variety will be embraced by those who wish to make that identity salient as their iconic style (see chapter 4). In Example (6), the mixed variety is mainly evident in the systematic tense mixture of the Hebrew future form and Arabic past progressive form to denote a past progressive sense, as in *kan-ye-sté* 'was deviating' and *kan-ye-stór* 'was contradicting'. These verb phrases are a combination of the Arabic auxiliary *kān* 'was' and Hebrew future forms of the verbs *ye-sté* 'will deviate' and *ye-stór* 'will contradict' respectively. In Hebrew, such a construction would be the auxiliary *hayá* 'was', with the present forms of the verbs; therefore, their Hebrew equivalents are *hayá soté* 'was deviating' and *hayá sotér* 'was contradicting', whereas, in Arabic, they would be *kān ye-neħref* and *kān y-naqedˤ*, respectively. Additionally, the pronoun *hoū* 'he' is in fact a merger of both the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* 'he' and the Hebrew pronoun *hú* 'he'. Such usages were quite recurrent in the data from all the Israeli Druze participants.

(6) *qult-ilo*   *fī*   *tsviʕút*   *mesuyem-ét* *qal-i*   *āh*
    1SG-PST-tell-him there is hypocrisy Certain-F   3SGM-tell-me yeah
    hai *meʔa-axúz*   **hū** *kaman* **kān-*ye-sté***   *men* *el-ʕinyán*
    this hundred-percent **he** also   **was- deviating** from the-matter
    kān-*ye-stór*   *ét*   *ʕatsmó* *b-šaɣlāt*
    was- contradicting ACC himself in-things
    'I told him there is some kind of hypocrisy, he said, "yes, for sure", but he
    was also deviating from the issue and was contradicting himself in certain
    ways.'

Example (7) is taken from a male participant in his 40s, who identified as Israeli
Druze. The participant believed that:

> the Israeli Druze have a serious issue when it comes to identity and lan-
> guage. It is like schizophrenia. On the one hand, they are not Arabs; their
> mother tongue is not Arabic. And on the other hand, they are not Jew-
> ish, and their language is not Hebrew. They are a bit of both, we speak
> both Arabic and Hebrew in one language, and even our education system
> is neither Arab nor Jewish—it is Druze. Even in the academy it is well
> known and proven that there is a problem in our identity and language.
> It is, as they say [in Hebrew], 'yoshev 'al hagader, regel po, regel sham'
> (sitting on the fence, one foot on this side and one on the other) … The
> Druze, in general, do not have a fixed identity. Historically speaking, since
> they were coerced, like the Jews, their survival tactic was to assimilate, as
> 'in Jordan, I am Jordanian; in Syria, I am Syrian; in Israel, I am Israeli; in
> Lebanon, I am Lebanese' etc., meaning 'a nation without an identity'. They
> were hiding their true identity, living in secret. Their true religion was only
> revealed about [1,000] years ago. Only then, they received a definite iden-
> tity, but they are still affected by that survival tactic, probably a genetic
> thing.

When asked about the nation-state bill, he said 'it does not mean nor change
anything, it just affirms the Jews' status in their homeland. It does not under-
mine the status of the Druze'. He further added:

> some say that the Arab and Left parties incited the Druze against it in
> order to make them stop voting for the right-wing parties like they usu-
> ally do. The truth is, the Druze in Israel are a minority, just like they are
> in the Arab countries, but in contrast to Arab countries, the Druze here
> are in a much better position: they live in a democracy, they enjoy the

> freedom of speech, they can complain about the most prominent Jewish figure, be it a president or a prime minister etc.

To reinforce his point, the participant further explained that they also have representations in the government, Knesset,[1] aviation, elite combat units in the military and so on. He furthered his statement by claiming that:

> none of the Arab countries compare to the democracy in Israel, none! And every minority in the world faces discrimination. The Jews themselves face discrimination in other parts of the world, but they are aware of their status as a minority and accept that. At least we are a minority under a democracy, unlike the Druze minorities in the Arab countries.

In terms of language practice, the participant's unmarked mode of communication was the mixed variety, as evident in Example (7) in *b-yekáx* 'takes', where the Hebrew future form *yekáx* 'will take' is suffixed to the Arabic habitual indicative morpheme *b-*, thus denoting the mixed imperfective form. In Arabic, the correct form would be *b-yāxod* 'takes', whereas, in Hebrew, it would be *lokeáx* 'takes'. The speaker also inflected a Hebrew masculine noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix *-āt*, which is usually suffixed to the feminine singular stem of nouns in Arabic. In Hebrew, the plural suffix *-ìm* is added to masculine singular nouns; thus, the word *kibuts-ìm* 'collective settlements' would be the standard. Notably, the data show that this common hybrid plural form (a Hebrew noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix *-āt*) is only used when the Hebrew singular noun is masculine, when it is feminine, it is either used completely in Hebrew (a Hebrew noun with the Hebrew feminine plural suffix *-ót*), as in *baxor-ót* 'ladies', which is the plural form of the Hebrew singular feminine noun *baxor-á* 'lady'; or completely in Arabic (an Arabic noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix *-āt*), as in *ħanafiyy-āt* 'taps', the plural form of the Arabic singular feminine noun *ħanafiyye* 'tap'. There was also an instance in which the Arabic content morpheme *w* 'and', which is usually prefixed to Arabic morphemes, was prefixed to the Hebrew passive construction *me-tupál* 'taken care of'.

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1 As previously mentioned, all Druze representatives in the Knesset back then, except for MK Ayub Kara, voted against the Nation-state Law (and broke party ranks to do so).

(7) *harì*   *bi-ruħ*   *el-lakox-ót*   *tabaʕ-ono*
     that is IND-3SG-go the-client-PL POSS-3SGM
     fī-l-kibuts-āt   *b-yekáx*   *men*
     in-the-collective settlement-PL IND-3SGM-take from
     el-kibuts-āt   *w-me-tupál*   *hétev*
     the-collective settlement-PL and-PASS-take care-3SGM very well
     'that is, he goes to the collective settlements, his clients are from there. He
     takes (clients) from the collective settlements and is very well taken care
     of'

Example (8) is taken from a female participant in her 40s. The participant, who
identified as Druze, 'not in a religious sense but beyond that', felt deeply hurt
by the nation-state law:

> they took away an integral part of our identity. The Druze have always had
> a deep connection to the state, and now, it is, as if we are being cast away
> from our Israeliness. I do feel much less Israeli now than I did before, for
> sure. It is as if we are no longer included there. I hope that Bibi [the pre-
> vious Prime Minister of Israel who passed the law] will be kicked out.

In terms of her language practices, the participant, who had a negative attitude
towards Hebrew, exhibited a bit less frequent mixing than the average parti-
cipant in certain utterances, even though the default for her was the mixed vari-
ety. The participant, who believed that language, in a way, determines identity,
stated that she tries to consciously limit the integration of Hebrew elements
into her speech, since it sounds more elegant without the Hebrew elements;
however, mixing is inevitable, as illustrated in Example (8). Such mixing is evid-
ent mainly in the recurrent use of the mixed DP construction as well as in
tense mixing, as in *b-a-tlabéš* 'get dressed', where the Hebrew future form *a-
tlabéš* 'will get dressed' is suffixed to the Arabic habitual indicative morpheme
b-, thus forming the mixed imperfective form. In Arabic, the correct form in
such a case would be *b-albes* 'get dressed', while in Hebrew, it is *me-tlabéš-et*
'get dressed'. According to Eckert (2004:45), 'prestige and stigma have come to
be the primary social meanings associated with variables, and formality brings
a focus on prestige and an attempt to avoid stigma'. In the sociopolitical con-
text of the present study, codeswitching into Hebrew and the mixed variety
are associated with 'Israeliness' or a mixed identity and can be viewed as a
stigmatised variant to be avoided by those who wish to distance themselves
from that identity. Additionally, since through linguistic means one can keep
their ethnicity salient rather than assimilating fully into the dominant culture

(Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001), the participant had attempted to make the mixed variety her marked mode of communication.

(8) *yomet-ha kān fī* *irúaʕ keʔìlú pridá*   *la-hada* **el-menahél**
     day-that   was in event that is farewell to-this   the-manager
     el-kodém   *tabaʕ-na issa kān etʕ-tʕaqes*   *ħelu w-ʔana dāyman*
     the-previous POSS-1PL now was the-weather nice and-I   always
     b-a-tlabéš   *tóv* *w-bemyuxád*   *la-kull* **el-irúʕ-ìm**
     IND-1SG-get dressed well and-especially for-all the-event-PL
     el-kšur-ìm   *b-eš-šuɣul*
     the-related-PL in-the-work
     'that day there was a farewell party for our previous manager. Now the weather was nice and I always dress up, especially for all the work-related occasions.'

Example (9) is from a female participant in her 40s, who identified as Druze. The participant held a neutral stance towards the nation-state law:

> I am not sure about this whole thing. There are both proponents and opponents of it among the Druze; some say it downgrades the Druze status in the state, while others say that Leftist politicians are manipulating the uncertainties surrounding it to incite the Druze against Bibi and the right-wing parties. It is unclear, and before we see its actual impact on the Druze, we cannot really judge it as good or bad. The Druze are Israelis in their core being, and I do not believe that this law is going to affect that in any way; their love to the state is stronger than that, but you can never know, we shall wait and see.

The participant held Hebrew in very high regard, and this is reflected in her unmarked mixed variety, as in *ʕam-b-ya-tsdìk* 'is justifying', in Example (9), where she mixes the Hebrew future form of the verb with an Arabic present progressive form and auxiliary to denote a present progressive sense. *ʕam-b-ya-tsdìk* is a combination of the Arabic auxiliary *ʕam* (am/is/are) and the Hebrew verb *le-hatsdìk* (to justify). In Hebrew, the correct form would be *matsdìk* 'justify/PRS', whereas, in Arabic, it would be *ʕam-bi-barrer* 'is justifying'. This conforms to Myers-Scotton's (1993) notion that unmarked codeswitching—or in this case, a mixed variety—can practically be an indicator of intergroup harmony. Additionally, the participant exclusively used the merger pronoun *hoū* 'he' throughout her speech, which is a mix of both the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* 'he' and the Hebrew pronoun *hú* 'he'. The merger pronoun *hoū* is followed by an

entirely Hebrew clause, which includes yet another merger morpheme-*yaʕní* 'that is', which also has the variation *yaʕnú*. *yaʕní* is originally an Arabic word that was borrowed into Hebrew, and then re-borrowed from Hebrew, and is often used in both of its variations *yaʕní* and *yaʕnú* in the mixed variety.

(9)   *b-tij-ī*   *la-zurūf*   *el-bēt*   *keʔilú* *el-waħad* *meš*
     IND-come-2SGF to-circumstances the-house that is the-one not
     ʕam-b-ya-tsdik   *avál* **hoū** *apáti*   *keʔilú* *avál* *én*
     AUX-IND-3SGM/FUT-justify but he   apathetic that is but there not
     má   *le-hašvót*   *yaʕni*   *ét-am*   *bexlál*
     what to-compare meaning ACC-3PL at all
     'you go back to the situation at home, that is, I am not trying to justify it, but he is apathetic. But you cannot really compare it to them at all'

Example (10) is from a male participant in his 20s. The participant, who identified as Israeli Druze, held a very negative stance towards the nation-state law; however, he believed that it had actually strengthened the Druze sense of belonging to the state, as it has emphasised the historic Druze connection to the state. He stated that 'those who thought that this extremely racist and undemocratic law will take away our Israeliness are so mistaken. We now feel more Israeli than ever before, and we are displaying it publicly. Bibi represents only himself and his followers'. To reinforce the connection of the Druze to the state, he then added that:

> no one can deny the Druze contribution to the state that started even before the establishment of the state. We have fought wars with the Jews and helped them win the wars that they would have lost without us. We are an integral and inseparable part of the state and if people were unaware of our contribution, now everyone knows and they will have to revere us and will amend the law to fix our status.

In terms of his linguistic practices, his speech was predominantly Hebrew, with very few switches into Arabic. In Example (10), he uses almost exclusively Hebrew morphemes, except for two instances of mixtures: *hoū* 'he', a mix of the Arabic pronoun *hōwi* 'he' and the Hebrew pronoun *hú* 'he', and *yaʕni* 'that is', which is originally an Arabic word that has been borrowed into Hebrew and can therefore count as a mix. This conforms to Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) notion of authentication, as the participant's language preference was the national language, and it was used as a vehicle for authentication to index ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state.

(10) **hoū** *kafé-misʾadá   ka-zé   ve-hém   os-ìm   t-a-kafé   itsl-ám*
     he   café-restaurant like-this and-they do-2PL ACC-the-coffee at-them
     yaʕni *anì mamáš ohév ta-makóm a-zé*
     that is I   really   love the-place the-this
     'It is like a coffee restaurant, and they make the coffee in their place. I really love this place.'

The conversational data, followed by the additional interview data and surveys, have highlighted the distinct identity and linguistic practices of the community. Prior to the nation-state bill, the Israeli dimension in the Israeli Druze collective identity was extremely salient and proudly paraded. However, it appears that, since the bill was enacted in 2018, the Israeli component is becoming less salient, and a new collective identity might potentially be emerging. Following the tactics of intersubjectivity (Bucholtz & Hall 2004), it seems that, in applying the tactic of adequation, the Israeli Druze are pursuing sufficient socially recognised sameness and establishing coalition-building across lines of difference by setting aside potentially salient differences pertaining to the 'more Israeli'/'more Arab' dichotomy, sparked by the nation-state law, and are consolidating a unified Druze identity through the tactic of distinction. This Druze identity is not merely a religious or ethnic identity, but rather a national one. Thus, through the process of distinction, the Israeli Druze are seemingly establishing an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy by cultivating a new authentic, national Druze identity that is neither Israeli nor Arab and a new language variety that is neither Hebrew nor Arabic, but rather a salient mixture of both (for a thorough examination of the features of the mixed variety see Chapter 3). Subsequently, through the tactic of adequation, they locate themselves simultaneously within both identity frames while maintaining their distinctness through the tactic of distinction: salient differences from both are produced, yet are realised through a binary logic, as differentiation is produced along multiple axes simultaneously. Unlike the Druze in most Arab countries, being in a democratic country facilitates a process in which the local Druze can claim an authentic, collective, national Druze identity. Through the tactic of authentication, the mixed variety indexes ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state; thus, it is all interrelated. At the same time, mixed languages are spoken by ethnic groups who want to distinguish themselves collectively from other groups by forming a distinct group: either a subgroup or a completely different group altogether (Bakker 1997). Since the Israeli Druze community is practically sandwiched between the Arabs and Jews, forming a new mixed variety and a unique identity denotes a distinct group that distinguishes them from both groups whose languages they speak (Kheir, 2019).

6   Conclusion

In light of the interrelatedness of language, sociopolitical situations and iden-
tity, the present research examined the relationship between codeswitching,
mixed varieties, sociopolitical situations related to the case study and iden-
tity, reporting on a comparative study of the Druze of the Golan Heights and
the Israeli Druze. Applying theories and concepts from intersubjective con-
tact linguistics and indexicality, the current chapter shows how sandwiched
communities create new quasi-national identities and language varieties. In
the case of the Druze of the Golan Heights, conversational data, followed by
the additional interview data and surveys, have revealed similarities to the
situation in Alsace, a region that has moved several times between German
and French control, each attempting to inculcate their own national con-
sciousness and language upon the locals. However, the locals have established
their own distinct proto-national Alsatian identity and their own language. In
applying the tactics of intersubjectivity (Bucholtz & Hall 2004), it is evident
that, following the tactic of adequation, the Druze of the Golan Heights are
establishing alliances by obscuring salient differences of pro-Israeli versus pro-
Syrian struggle, mainly reignited by the Israeli–Syrian Golan secret deal theory,
and are consolidating a unified, seemingly denaturalised, undefined identity
through the tactic of distinction. However, with the tactic of distinction—in
establishing an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy—alongside that of
authentication, a new authentic, proto-national *Hadˤbawi/Jūlani* identity is
being constructed, alongside the emergence of a new dialect that may confer
an alternative legitimacy to its speakers.

    In the case of the Israeli Druze, upon application of the same tactics (ibid,
2004), it seems that, through the tactic of adequation, the Israeli Druze are
pursuing sameness and establishing coalition-building by obscuring differ-
ences arising from the 'more Israeli'/'more Arab' dichotomy, mainly reignited
by the nation-state law, and are consolidating a unified quasi-national Druze
identity through the tactic of distinction. Thus, through the tactic of distinc-
tion, the Israeli Druze are cultivating a new authentic, quasi-national Druze
identity and a new mixed variety. Being in a democratic country facilitates
a process in which the local Druze can claim an authentic, collective, quasi-
national Druze identity. Through the tactic of authentication, the mixed variety
indexes ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state. At the same time,
however, mixed languages are spoken by ethnic groups who want to distinguish
themselves collectively from other groups through the formation of a distinct
group (Bakker 1997). Thus, by being sandwiched between the Arabs and Jews,
forming a new mixed variety and a unique identity denotes a distinct group

that distinguishes the Israeli Druze from both groups whose languages they speak (Kheir 2019).

Finally, although both the Golan Druze and Israeli Druze are going through similar processes and outcomes (each their own way in terms of identity constructs and language change), it seems that the move from a dictatorial regime into a democracy (that was experienced firsthand by the first-generation Golan Druze and second-hand by the second and third generations) still plays a certain role in their identity construction and language change. While the Israeli Druze easily and proudly incorporate the Druze identity component—beyond the religious/ethnic aspects—as a default in their identity repertoire and also freely mix languages, the majority of the Golan Druze, whose first-generation elders were 'not allowed' to identify as Druze, were quite reluctant to do so.

Concluding Remarks

1 Significance and Contribution of the Present Study

Much progress has been made in the field of codeswitching research and it has certainly benefited from the development of various codeswitching models and theories in recent years. Yet, especially in the field of social-political identity, much is still open for investigation. In addition, linguistic research into Palestinian Arabic and the dominance of Israeli Hebrew in the state of Israel and its effect on the speakers of Palestinian Vernacular Arabic and their language is still in its infancy. The originality of the book stems inter alia from the fact that it explores the sociolinguistics of under-researched minorities, namely the Israeli Druze and Arab Christians and Muslims, as well as the Druze of the Golan Heights who have moved from Syrian control to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967. The book makes a significant contribution to research on bilingualism. It unprecedentedly presents a strongly empirically based examination of the particular patterns of language and bilingualism found among the Druze community in Israel, which is profiled mainly against that of the Arabs in Israel, and is one of the rare studies that documents the emergence of a mixed language in the process of its development. Furthermore, it makes a considerable contribution to research on bilingualism in general, to the debate on "mixed languages" in particular, since it presents a novel example of a mixed language which has not been previously unveiled, and it additionally provides a thorough socio-political analysis of it.

The present book consists of five chapters. The first chapter provides thorough background information about codeswitching including different definitions, theories and models of codeswitching; Arabic, Hebrew and the Israeli 'nation-state law', the Druze faith, the Arabs and Druze in Israel and the link between language, codeswitching and identity. In the second chapter, I have examined the language of the Druze community in Israel as going through the process of convergence and a composite Matrix Language formation, resulting in a mixed or split language, explained under Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis (2002). Longitudinal data of Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching from the Israeli Druze community, collected in 2000 and 2017 in actual fieldwork and observations, indicated that there is a composite Matrix Language formation resulting in a mixed language. The main features of the mix included Israeli Hebrew system morphemes of the type that is crucial for the creation of a mixed language. The third chapter presents the new mixed language and its special features upon application of Auer (1999)

and Myers-Scotton's (2003) theoretical models pertaining to mixed languages arising out of codeswitching. The new mixed language is then compared to some of the main existing mixed languages that have been thoroughly analysed in the scholarly literature. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity, while testing the various aspects of codeswitching among the Israeli Arab Muslim, Christian and Druze sectors. Drawing insights from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, the chapter attempts to offer a model that would facilitate the analyses of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity. It also provides insights into bilingual minorities' linguistic reaction to and processing of state-centered policies of distinction, inclusion and exclusion, especially in a conflict setting. Finally, the fifth chapter examines and compares language and identity among the Druze of the Golan Heights, who were moved from Syrian to Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967, and the Israeli Druze. In light of the notion of the interrelatedness of language, social-political situations and identity; this chapter examines the relationship between codeswitching, mixed varieties of language, sociopolitical situations related to the case study and identity, reporting on a comparative study of the Druze in the Golan Heights and the Israeli Druze. After the application of various theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics, the chapter shows how 'sandwiched' communities create new quasi-national identities and language varieties.

Each one of the chapters makes its own significant contribution to the science of contact linguistics and sociolinguistics. A brief outline of the contributions of each chapter follows.

The second chapter, entitled "The Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis: The Case of the Druze Language in Israel", which has been published in the *Journal of Language Contact*, is one of the very few pieces of research to test Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis (1998, 2002); the first thorough research of the Israeli Druze sociolinguistics and the first research that shows the typological similarities and differences between the two spoken varieties in Israel: Israeli Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic. The study provides insights into codeswitching in communities, such as the Druze, that are in the process of experiencing language shift.

The third chapter, entitled "Passing the test of Split: Israbic, a new mixed language", which has been also published in the *Journal of Language Contact*, introduces a new mixed/split language after being tested under different existing models in the scholarly literature. While a number of linguists (Backus 2003; Bakker, 2003) have decried the genesis of mixed languages arising out of codeswitching, others (Auer, 1999; Myers-Scotton, 2003) proposed theoretical models for mixed languages as outcomes of codeswitching and some (McConvell, 2008; McConvell & Meakins, 2005; Meakins, 2012; O'Shannessy, 2012) have

provided empirical evidence for such cases. Therefore, this chapter provides further empirical evidence by giving Israbic as another living proof of a mixed language arising out of codeswitching, stressing its uniqueness as a mixture arising from closely related languages; a mixture which is scarce in the literature (Auer, 2014).

The fourth chapter, entitled "To Codeswitch or not to Codeswitch? Codeswitching and Sociopolitical identity among the Druze and Arabs in Israel", is the first thorough research to examine and compare codeswitching and sociopolitical identity among the three sectors within the Arabic speaking communities in Israel: the Druze, Christians and Muslims. As previously mentioned, there is a certain gap in the scholarly literature when it comes to a model that further illustrates the link between codeswitching and sociopolitical identity. The present research will contribute to the general field of codeswitching research, as it introduces a new model (ICM) that would facilitate the analysis of codeswitching as an index and construct of sociopolitical identity. The ICM is primarily based on a series of studies that have been conducted for the purpose of the present research project on Palestinian Arabic/Israeli Hebrew codeswitching in the under-researched Arabic speaking communities in Israel. The findings, nonetheless, may have a general applicability that explains codeswitching as a signal and construct of sociopolitical identity.

The fifth and final chapter, entitled "One Religion, Two Regions, and Multiple Linguistic Practices and Identities: The case of the Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights", is one of the first attempts to assess the language behaviour and identity issues of the Druze in the Golan Heights, who have moved from Syrian control into Israeli control following the Six-Day War in 1967, and compare them with those of their Israeli Druze counterparts. Since collective identities are dynamic and are shaped and re-shaped by sociopolitical forces in and outside the state, and both communities are "sandwiched" communities, with the Golan Druze being sandwiched between Israeli and Syrian nationalism and the Israeli Druze between Israel and the Arabs, the chapter examines two major political debates happening within their communities at the time of the fieldwork and their gradual impact on the communities' collective identity. The findings shed light on how being 'sandwiched' between two sides of a dichotomy creates new national identities and new language varieties.

Finally, research of this nature can shed light on important aspects of the Israeli-Arab and Druze societies specifically, and contact phenomena in general, such as majority-minority relationships, culture, belonging, sociopolitical identity and the inevitable effect these have on the languages of their speakers. It is my hope that the data collection and analyses suggested herein will be of use for others interested in investigating the field and ultimately also contrib-

ute to the understanding of how dominant languages influence minorities and how sociopolitical identity influences and is influenced by language behaviour, and how, specifically, the dominance of Israeli Hebrew influences speakers of Palestinian Arabic to varying degrees, depending on sociopolitical affiliations.

2   Future Directions

This research has uncovered certain knowledge gaps and opportunities for further research. Based on the findings of this study, research into borrowing, codeswitching, language preferences and their link to both individual and collective identities among the Druze and Arabs in Israel can be expanded by examining larger samples of participants from the different Druze, Arab and mixed Druze/Arab localities in Israel. In addition, the models and analyses suggested herein can be applied for other Arabic speaking communities in Israel who are undergoing language change, such as the Bedouins in the north and the Arabs who reside either in mixed Jewish/Arab cities or in mainly Jewish cities such as Yafo (Jaffa) and Tel-Aviv. Since it is generally perceived that from a LGBT perspective, "supporting Israel is the gay thing to do" and that Palestine is hostile towards the gay community (Hochberg, 2010: 502), it would be interesting and enriching to investigate such language behaviours and individual and collective identity affiliations among the Arab LGBT+ communities in Israel, some of whom might be more assimilated into the Israeli Jewish society than others of the Arab communities who do not reside in mixed Jewish/Arab cities or in mainly Jewish cities.

Moreover, the models and analyses suggested herein can be more broadly applied for other minorities in the world where tensions and conflicts between governments and ethnic minorities exist, and where such conflicts may raise language conflicts and issues. These, for example, may include Serbs in Croatia, the Hungarian minority in Romania, the Albanian-speaking population in Macedonia, Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Lativia, and Catalans in Spain, to name but a few.

Since this is the first thorough research of the sociolinguistics of the Druze of the Golan Heights, the preliminary examination shows that a new, distinctive dialect is emerging among the newer generations. Further research can be conducted to investigate and uncover the specific structural features of this dialect, and compare it with that of the older generations. In addition, since the study uncovered a gradual process of gaining a new proto-national identity, future research could examine how it unfolds.

Finally, since the Israeli 'nation-state' law was enacted in mid-2018, towards the end of this research, I have only been able to examine its initial impacts

upon some participants from the Israeli Druze community. This law, inter alia, downgrades the status of Arabic from an official language into a language with a special status, a status that is currently vague, unclear and unknown, since the particulars of this status are left to future regulations. This is evident under article 4 (b) of the law, which specifically asserts that "the Arabic language has a special status in the State; arrangements regarding the use of Arabic in state institutions or vis-à-vis them will be set by law" (Kenesset, 2018—Unofficial translation by Dr. Sheila Hattis Rolef). In many ways, this law acts as a legislative initiative to formulate a constitutional anchoring of Israel's 'Jewish identity' (Yadgar, 2020). Many scholarly and non-scholarly critics have denounced the law as undemocratic, racist and discriminatory toward the country's non-Jewish citizens, leaving them feeling like second-class Israeli citizens (see Abulhawa, 2018; Ben-Youssef & Tamari, 2018; Hass, 2018; Jabareen, 2018; Jabareen & Bishara, 2019; Jamal, 2018; Jamal, 2019). Their claim is particularly based on the fact that the law asserts that "the Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established," and that "the exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people." It also establishes "the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and strengthening" (Kenesset, 2018, Unofficial translation by Dr. Sheila Hattis Rolef). Therefore, future research should specifically focus on the impacts of this law on the Druze, as well as the Arab communities in Israel, in terms of linguistic practices and individual and collective identities.

As previously mentioned, the nation-state law has been perceived by many Druze individuals and groups as being racist and undemocratic, specifically since it is perceived to downgrade the minority rights and the status of the Arabic language in Israel and create a prominent sense of second-class citizens. Moreover, the Druze collectively felt a sense of betrayal from their own country and a big 'stab in the back' after decades of service, loyalty, and sacrifice to the country they felt was appreciative of their indisputable contributions prior to the passing of the law. In addition, all Druze representatives in the Knesset except for Ayub Kara voted against the Nation-state Law (and broke party ranks to do so), and some high-ranked elite military and police officers resigned from their position to express their disappointment with this law, and their demotivation to serve the country further. Such outcomes, inter alia, might shape the future of the Druze in Israel.

The future of the Israeli Druze might be characterised by a new collective identity and further development of their mixed language. It seems that the Israeli Druze are setting aside potentially salient differences pertaining to the 'more Israeli'/'more Arab' dichotomy, sparked by the nation-state law, and

are consolidating a unified Druze identity. This Druze identity is not merely a religious or ethnic identity, but rather a national one. The Israeli Druze are seemingly establishing an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy by cultivating a new authentic, national Druze identity that is neither Israeli nor Arab, and a new language variety that is neither Hebrew nor Arabic, but rather a salient mixture of both. Subsequently, they seem to locate themselves simultaneously within both identity frames while maintaining their distinctness. The mixed variety which has been created over decades, indexes ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state. However, since mixed languages are spoken by ethnic groups who want to distinguish themselves collectively from other groups by forming a distinct group: either a subgroup or a completely different group altogether (Bakker 1997), forming a new mixed variety and a unique identity denotes a distinct group that distinguishes them from both groups-socially, politically, and linguistically. It seems that this distinctness will be more and more accentuated in the future, which, in turn, will contribute to the creation of a new separate nation.

Questionnaire*

*You may change, edit, omit, ignore or add questions/answers/statements/ comments at your discretion.

1   **I currently reside in:**
   a   An Arab village/town: _____
   b   A Druze village/town: _____
   c   A Jewish town/city: _____
   d   other: _____
2   **Gender:**
   a   male
   b   female
3   **Age:**
   a   21–30
   b   31–40
   c   41–50
   d   51–60
4   **Marital Status:**
   a   single
   b   married
   c   other
5   **Education:**
   a   primary-junior-high school
   b   high-school
   c   vocational education
   d   University
   e   other
6   **Military Service:**
   a   soldier
   b   completed military service
   c   haven't served
   d   not applicable

7   **Arabic Proficiency:**
     a   excellent
     b   above average
     c   average
     d   below average
     e   low
8   **Hebrew Proficiency:**
     a   excellent
     b   above average
     c   average
     d   below average
     e   low
9   **Having high competence in Israeli Hebrew is important for me:**
     a   strongly agree
     b   agree
     c   no stand
     d   disagree
     e   strongly disagree
     f   other: _____
10   **I would prefer Israeli-Hebrew as my/my children's L1 rather than Pales-tinian-Arabic:**
     a   strongly agree
     b   agree
     c   no stand
     d   disagree
     e   strongly disagree
     f   other: _____
11   **I am able to express myself in Israeli-Hebrew more effectively than in Palestinian-Arabic:**
     a   strongly agree
     b   agree
     c   no stand
     d   disagree
     e   strongly disagree
     f   other: _____

12   **Arabic is imperative to maintaining my Arab identity:**
  a   strongly agree
  b   agree
  c   no stand
  d   disagree
  e   strongly disagree
  f   other: _____

13   **Israeli-Hebrew speakers are considered more Israeli than Arabic speakers:**
  a   strongly agree
  b   agree
  c   no stand
  d   disagree
  e   strongly disagree
  f   other: _____

14   **High competence in Israeli-Hebrew is imperative to assimilating in Israel:**
  a   strongly agree
  b   agree
  c   no stand
  d   disagree
  e   strongly disagree
  f   other: _____

15   **Arabs/Druze who are perfectly competent in Israeli-Hebrew are perceived as more Israeli:**
  a   strongly agree
  b   agree
  c   no stand
  d   disagree
  e   strongly disagree
  f   other: _____

16   **I naturally express myself better in:**
  a   Palestinian-Arabic
  b   Israeli-Hebrew
  c   other: _____

17   **Arabs/Druze who mainly express themselves in Israeli-Hebrew with other Arab/Druze interlocutors are more interested in the Israeli identity than in the Arab identity:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   other: _____

18   **I notice that the Druze in Israel speak a different/special language:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   other: _____

19   **I notice that the Israeli Druze in general prefer Israeli-Hebrew over Palestinian-Arabic:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   other: _____

20   **I personally prefer Israeli-Hebrew over Palestinian-Arabic:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   other: _____

21   **If someone speaks 'pure' Arabic, he can therefore be considered more Arab:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   other: _____

22 **I prefer to be more competent in Israeli-Hebrew than in Palestinian-Arabic:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   not applicable
   g   other: _____

23 **I prefer to send my children to a Hebrew school rather than to a Druze/Arab school:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   not applicable
   g   other: _____

24 **I am personally appalled by the ubiquitous integration of Israeli-Hebrew in the speech of the Israeli Druze:**
   a   strongly agree
   b   agree
   c   no stand
   d   disagree
   e   strongly disagree
   f   not applicable
   g   other: _____

25 **My nationality is:**
   a   Muslim-Arab
   b   Christian-Arab
   c   Druze
   d   other: _____

26   I identify myself as:
 a Arab
 b Druze
 c Israeli
 d Israeli-Arab
 e Israeli-Druze
 f Palestinian-Arab
 g Palestinian-Druze
 h Palestinian
 i Syrian
 j I have no clear identity
 k other: _____

27   I feel a strong sense of belonging to the State of Israel:
 a strongly agree
 b agree
 c no stand
 d disagree
 e strongly disagree
 f not applicable
 g other: _____

28   I personally prefer using the Palestinian Arabic language in my speech to sound more elegant:
 a strongly agree
 b agree
 c no stand
 d disagree
 e strongly disagree
 f not applicable
 g other: _____

29   When I get stuck with words in Arabic, I retrieve them from:
 a Hebrew
 b English
 c other: _____
 reason:
  a ideological
  b comfort
  c solidarity
  d assimilation
  e other: _____

30   **If I insert much Israeli-Hebrew into my spoken Arabic, that will make me more Israeli:**
      a   strongly agree
      b   agree
      c   no stand
      d   disagree
      e   strongly disagree
      f   other: _____

31   **I try as less as I can to insert Israeli-Hebrew into my spoken Arabic:**
      a   strongly agree
      b   agree
      c   no stand
      d   disagree
      e   strongly disagree
      f   other: _____

32   **I usually use Israeli-Hebrew in my everyday speech:**
      a   exclusively Hebrew
      b   very much
      c   quite much
      d   little
      e   very little
      f   not at all
      g   not applicable
      h   other: _____

33   **The language I speak defines my identity:**
      a   strongly agree
      b   agree
      c   no stand
      d   disagree
      e   strongly disagree
      f   other: _____

34   **My General attitude toward Israeli-Hebrew is:**
      a   positive
      b   neutral
      c   negative
      d   other: _____

35 **My General attitude toward Palestinian-Arabic is:**
    a   positive
    b   neutral
    c   negative
    d   other: _____

36 **My General attitude toward the integration of Israeli-Hebrew elements in one's spoken Arabic speech is:**
    a   positive
    b   neutral
    c   negative
    d   other: _____

37 **My General attitude toward Israeli Identity is:**
    a   positive
    b   neutral
    c   negative
    d   other: _____

38 **My General attitude toward Arab Identity is:**
    a   positive
    b   neutral
    c   negative
    d   other: _____

39 **My General attitude toward Palestinian Identity is:**
    a   positive
    b   neutral
    c   negative
    d   other: _____

* Some of the questions were inspired by Isleem's (2012) work.

Classification and Categorization of the Questionnaire Statements*

*The statement responses follow a three or five-point Likert Scale (1932): **Five-point Likert Scale:** *0-No Stand, 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-Disagree and 4-Strongly Disagree.* **Three-point Likert Scale:** *0-Neutral, 1-Positive, 2-Negative.* Some of the statements had additional categories such as *Other* and *Not Applicable*, the *Other* responses were matched according to the responses where applicable, whereas the *Not Applicable* options were removed from the data.

Category 1: Attitude towards Israeli-Hebrew*

Statement 9   Having high competence in Israeli Hebrew is important for me.
Statement 10   I would prefer Israeli-Hebrew as my/my children's L1 rather than Palestinian-Arabic.
Statement 20   I personally prefer Israeli-Hebrew over Palestinian-Arabic.
Statement 22   I prefer to be more competent in Israeli-Hebrew than in Palestinian-Arabic.
Statement 34   My General attitude toward Israeli-Hebrew is:
*Positive: A total score of between 4–9. Negative: A total score of 11 or higher.

Category 2: Attitude towards Palestinian-Arabic*

Statement 12   Arabic is imperative to maintaining my Arab identity.
Statement 28   I personally prefer using Palestinian Arabic in my speech to sound more elegant.
Statement 35   My General attitude toward Palestinian-Arabic is:
*Positive: A total score of between 2–5. Negative: A total score of 6 or higher.

Category 3: Attitude towards Palestinian Identity*

Statement 39   My General attitude toward Palestinian Identity is:
*Positive: A total score of 1. Negative: A total score of 2.

Category 4: Attitude towards Arab Identity*

Statement 38   My General attitude toward Arab Identity is:
*Positive: A total score of 1. Negative: A total score of 2.

Category 5: Attitude towards Israeli Identity*
Statement 37   My General attitude toward Israeli Identity is:
*Positive: A total score of 1. Negative: A total score of 2.

Category 6: Attitude towards Codeswitching*
Statement 24   I am personally appalled by the ubiquitous integration of Israeli-Hebrew in the speech of the Israeli Druze.
Statement 31   I try as less as I can to insert Israeli-Hebrew into my spoken Arabic.
Statement 36   My General attitude toward the integration of Israeli-Hebrew elements in one's spoken Arabic speech is:
*Positive: A total score of 7 or higher. Negative: A total score of between 4–6.

Category 7: The Link between Language, Codeswitching and Identity**
Statement 13   Israeli-Hebrew speakers are considered more Israeli than Arabic speakers.
Statement 14   High competence in Israeli-Hebrew is imperative to assimilating in Israel.
Statement 15   Arabs/Druze who are perfectly competent in Israeli-Hebrew are perceived as more Israeli.
Statement 17   Arabs/Druze who mainly express themselves in Israeli-Hebrew with other Arab/Druze interlocutors are more interested in the Israeli identity than in the Arab identity.
Statement 21   If someone speaks 'pure' Arabic, he can therefore be considered more Arab.
Statement 30   If I insert much Israeli-Hebrew into my spoken Arabic, that will make me more Israeli.
Statement 33   The language I speak defines my identity.

Category 8: Perception of Self and Community Language Proficiency and Use**
Statement 7   Arabic Proficiency:
Statement 8   Hebrew Proficiency:
Statement 11   I am able to express myself in Israeli-Hebrew more effectively than in Palestinian-Arabic.
Statement 16   I naturally express myself better in:
Statement 18   I notice that the Druze in Israel speak a different/special language.
Statement 19   I notice that the Israeli Druze in general prefer Israeli-Hebrew over Palestinian-Arabic.

Statement 29   When I get stuck with words in Arabic, I retrieve them from:
Statement 32   I usually use Israeli-Hebrew in my everyday speech:

Category 9: Sense of Identity and Belonging**
Statement 23   I prefer to send my children to a Hebrew school rather than to
               a Druze/Arab school.
Statement 25   My nationality is:
Statement 26   I identify myself as:
Statement 27   I feel a strong sense of belonging to the State of Israel.

****Statements in these categories were used for individual assessment and
analysis of the sampled participants in the third and fourth articles.**

The Israeli 'Nation-State Law'

Basic law: Israel—The nation state of the Jewish People

Basic Principles	1.	(a)	The Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established.
		(b)	The State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People, in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.
		(c)	The exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People.
State Symbols	2.	(a)	The name of the State is "Israel".
		(b)	The State flag is white, with two light-blue stripes close to the edge, and a light-blue Star of David in its centre.
		(c)	The State emblem is a seven-branched menorah with olive leaves on both sides, and the word "Israel" at its base.
		(d)	The State anthem is "Hatikvah".
		(e)	Details regarding the State symbols shall be determined by law.
State Capital	3.		Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.
Language	4.	(a)	Hebrew is the State language.
		(b)	The Arabic language has a special status in the State; arrangements regarding the use of Arabic in state institutions or vis-à-vis them will be set by law.
		(c)	Nothing in this article shall affect the status given to the Arabic language before this law came into force.
Ingathering of the Exiles	5.		The State shall be open for Jewish immigration, and for the Ingathering of the Exiles.
The Connection with the Jewish People	6.	(a)	The State shall strive to ensure the safety of members of the Jewish People and of its citizens, who are in trouble and in captivity, due to their Jewishness or due to their citizenship.
		(b)	The State shall act, in the Diaspora, to preserve the ties between the State and members of the Jewish People.

Basic law: Israel—The nation state of the Jewish People (*cont.*)

	(c)	The State shall act to preserve the cultural, historical and religious heritage of the Jewish People among Jews in the Diaspora.
Jewish Settlement	7.	The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and strengthening.
Official Calendar	8.	The Hebrew calendar is an official calendar of the State, and the Gregorian calendar shall serve alongside it as an official calendar; the use of the Hebrew calendar and the Gregorian calendar shall be determined by law.
Independence Day and Memorial Days	9.	(a) Independence Day is the official national holiday of the State. (b) Memorial Day for the Fallen in Israel's Wars, and the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day, are official memorial days of the state.
Days of Rest and Statutory Holidays	10.	The Sabbath and the Jewish holidays are the established days of rest in the State; non-Jews have the right to observe the days of rest on their days of Sabbath and holidays; details regarding this matter shall be determined by law.
Entrenchment	11.	This Basic law shall not be modified except by a Basic Law, passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

Excerpts from the conversations and interviews

Excerpt 1 (Israeli-Druze participants who reside in an Israeli-Druze locality).[1]

A: w-hāy el-baxorá kīf? faltsanít?
'And this girl, how is she like? Pretentious?'

B: ló mekirá yotér midái, amma ēih, ištarit ϑrayya qad hēik be-švá't alafím šáx!
'(I) don't know (her) too much, but yeah, she bought a chandelier that big which had cost seven thousand shekels.'

A: ritsiní?? Šū bteʕmel fī ʕišitha hī?
'Seriously?? What does she do in her life?'

B: btišteɣel hī fī xivrá w-hēik, amma ló yoda'át, ana ba'āmen inno 'ʕa-qad bsāt'ak mid ijrēk', át ló tsrixá tqasti la-baʕed sine.
'She works at a company and such, but (I) don't know, I believe that (proverb-English equivalent is provided rather than literal translation) 'Cut your coat according to your cloth', you don't need to make payments for a year ahead.'

A: ēih, amman šū? Be-'ay xivʁá btištɣil?
'Yeah, but what? Which company does she work in?'

B: baʕrifiš, fi xivrá fi Karmiel, mašú kazé.
'I don't know, at a company in Karmiel, something like that.'

*A: **ok**, wēin tʕallamit, b-el-oniversitá?*
'Ok, where did she study, at the university?'

B: be-oniversitát xifá
'At the University of Haifa.'

A: *kén? Tov, má zé, xád xogí yaʕni?*
'Yeah? Alright, what is it, single major that is?'

B: *laʔ, ló nirá lí*
'No, I don't think so.'

A: *ok, me'anyén.*
'Ok, interesting.'

B: *ló yoda'át, ló mikirá* hāða el-*tχúm* ana *yotér medái avál*...*kén*, hou issa byišteγel, w-hī btišteγel, *áz ló amoχím* inno...
'I don't know, I'm not too familiar with this area but ... yeah, he now works, and she works, so they are not supposed to ...'

A: *hou šū byištγel?*
'What does he do for work?'

B: *hou fī el-jēiš, avál* hou *ló mikabél maskorét, mekabél ezé xaméš, mašó kazé*...
'he's in the army, but he doesn't get a salary, (he) gets something like five (thousand), something like that.'

A: *šū, šū el-tafkíd* taʕo?
'What, what is his role?'

B: *hú ló katsín, wa-la išī kazé, hou* ...
'he's not a commander, nothing like that, he's ...'

A: *bas kevá' yaʕni?*
'But (in) the standing army that is?'

B: *kén, mitadlék sáx a-kól.*
'Yes, (he's) just a gas jockey.'

A: *má?!*
'What (seriously)?!'

B: *kén, mitadlék*...
'Yes, gas jockey ...'

A: *tóv, sababá.*
'Alright, cool.'

B: kén, ana axaðit el-mihandés, w-hī axaðet el-mitadlék.
'Yes, I got the engineer, and she got the gas jockey.'

A: yāh, gám tóv...
'Yeah, that's also fine ...'

B: kén.
'Yes.'

A: kullo holéx a-yóm...
'Anything goes nowadays ...'

B: zé xašúv, xašúv.
'That's important, (quite) important.'

A: betáx...
'of course ...'

B: kén, ló xašúv. laʔ, amma má še-kén inno...b-yaspík lanó?
'Yes, never mind. No, but the thing is that ... would this be enough for us?'

A: kén, b-yaspík lanó, malo? Lā, taʁgiší xofší yaʕni še-ló...
'Yes, it will be enough for us, what about him? No, feel free, that is, don't ...'

B: Lā, ʕamqullik, tipusí...
'No, I'm telling you, typical ...'

A: min ay nāħye?
'In what way?'

B: Hoū kul-ó, ʕādi yaʕnī kul-ó meʔód, b-teʕerf-ī baxúr tiposí...ló, yaʕni davká hoftáʾ inno, miš hoftáʾ, btiʕirfī, típus tabaʕ dār...
'He is, all in all, simply normal, I mean he is, all in all, a very typical guy, you know ... not, that is, he was actually surprised that, not surprised, you know, the type of that family ...'

A: kén, legamré...
'Yeah, totally ...'

B: *keilu maqalāt, w-hēk yaʕni, btiʕirfi, "mīn hāða, w-šū hāða, wēn btištiɣlu, w-šū hāy…"*
'I mean, gossip and these things, you know, "who's that, and what's this, where do you work at, and what's that" …'

A: *wēn pagášt otó?*
'Where did you meet him at?'

B: *fī el-ʕīd milād.*
'At the birthday (party).'

A: *āh, naxón…*
'Yeah, right …'

B: *kén. Amma hī ḥassētha maskine šwaī…*
'Yeah. But I had a feeling that she was a bit of a poor thing …'

A: *min ay naḥye?*
'In what way?'

B: *át yodaʾát kīf, hī keílu kanit tišaʔér maʕ el-benit, maʕ le-wlād.*
'You know what it's like, she was kind of staying with the girl, with the children.'

A: *nú?*
'And?'

B: *w-hou keílu šēix suʕūdi…*
'And he was kind of like a Saudi Sheikh.'

A: *bas hī elli hirgilá otám hék, innun ykūnu tloyím fīha deréx ágav, miš…*
'But she was the one who had accustomed them to that, that they become dependant on her, by the way, not …'

B: *āh, kén?*
'Oh, really?'

A: *kén.*
'Yes.'

B: *w-issa fitʕnit tilmád?*
'And now she's reminded to start learning?'

A: kén, ló yodaʾát…marra tliʕna maʕhun tiyól…
'Yeah, I don't know … we once went on a trip together with them …'

B: barra?
'Overseas?'

A: laʔ, barra?? Xás ve-xalilá! ma ʕassēna el-nabed awwal išī, qulna yalla, Eilat, ifšár el-waħad yaʕni…ittallaʕi má zé! rák rotsím le-hišaér fi-el-xedér, wala badhun yħāi, ittallaʕi, kunt atħašamha, aqulha…, issa ana ben-adám, btiʕirfī, biħub…
'no, overseas?? God forbid! We 'tested the waters' the first time, and thought, whatever, Eilat, it's possible to … look, what was that! (They) just want to stay in the room, they don't want to do this, look, I used to beg her, telling her …, now I'm a person, you know, who loves …'

B: titʕlaʕī titaylí…
'That you go out to travel …'

A: āh, bedyúk, atayél, w-dafʕa masʕarī, aní ʁotsá le-natsél kól ʁegáʾ.
'Yeah, exactly, to travel, and-I've paid money (for it), I want to make the best of every moment.'

B: naxón
'right.'

A: ana hēk el-típus tāʕī, baħub atayél. ħatta iza fī Eilat, baħubiš adalnī fi-el-bét-malón ve-zehú. ittallaʕi, atħašamma, aqulha tab ana baddī atlaʕ, baddīš atlaʕ la-ħāli, btiʕirfi mesukán kamān ɣād, ló haxí kéf baʾulám el-wāħad, baxorá titlaʕ la-ħālha šamá…
'Me, that's the kind of person that I am, I love to travel. Even in Eilat, I don't like staying at the hotel and that's it. Look, I used to beg her, telling her now I want to go out, I don't want to go out by myself, you know, it's also dangerous there, it's not the most fun thing in the world for someone, for a lady to go out by herself there …'

B: umm…
'umm…'

A: ēh, "laʔ, iħna taʕbanīn, laʔ, badna ndalna fī el-xedér, laʔ…" ittallaʕi má zé!
'yeah, "no, we're tired, no, we want to stay in the room, no …" look, what on earth!'

B:qulilī, ibinha híper-aktiví?
'tell me, is her son hipper active?'

A: éh, ló híper, bas keílu miš qalīl, ʕendo harbé tˤāqāt.
'umm, not hipper active, but kind of not easy, (he) has a lot of energy.'

B: lainno hivantí inno kān myallebha, hēk iši...
'because I understood that he was giving her trouble, something like that ...'

A: ló yodaʾát...
'I don't know ...'

B: umm...
'umm...'

A: avál kén, laʔ, baħubbiš hāy el-tipusím.
'but yeah, no, I don't like their type.'

Excerpt 2 (Christian participants who reside in an Israeli-Arab Christian locality).

A: esˤ-sˤarāħa ʔanā ħassēt inno fī ʕinna tfisōt ʕolām ktir mitšabha, yaʕni men nāħet inno ʔalīl ma tlāʔi nās elli ʕan jad hiʔrāb men allah, elli hinne fahmanīn inno ʕalašān tkūn ʕarīb la-rabna, ente miš šartˤ itkūn mutadayyen. inno ktīr nās ma byifhamu hāda el-eši, inno el-bani ādam howwe ʔīmano be-ʔalbu, rabna be-ʔalbu.
'The truth is, I felt that we have very similar world views, that is, there are few people who are really close to God, who understand that in order to be close to our Lord, you don't need to be religious. There are many people who don't understand this, that the person's faith is in his heart, our Lord is in his heart.'

B: fāhmanīn allah ɣalatˤ.
'They understand God in a wrong way.'

A: āh, fa-mnīħ el-wāħad iylāʔī bani ādam hallī fahmān hēka w-msallem ħasab hāī el-tfīsa w-ʔadēh el-ešī...
'Yeah, so it's good to find a person that understands that and follows that view and how much this thing ...'

B: *byaʕtˤī salām, lal-ʕēile, laš-šaxs nafsu, ʔente ʔīdak fī ʔīd allah, kullayātna maʕ allah. Lawla allah iħna ʕāyšīn? Hāy el-ʔawanīn elli bala raħme w-bala tˤaʕme...allah miš hēka.*
'gives peacefulness, to the family, to the person himself, your hand is in God's hand, we're all one with God. Would we be living without God? These laws are heartless and tasteless … God is not like that.'

A: *āh, bezˤ-zˤabetˤ.*
'yeah, exactly'.

B: *allah byurfudˤa.*
'God rejects that.'

A: *āh*
'Yeah.'

B: *miš inno ka-bashar iħna, laʔ, laʔ, allah nafsu byurfudˤa.*
'not us as humans, no, no, God himself rejects that.'

A: *sˤaħ, maʕak ħaʔ.*
'true, you're right about that.'

B: *fī nās inno kamān, lō maħšivā...ibʕid ʕannen.*
'there are people who also don't ascribe importance to … stay away from them.'

A: *umm...*
'umm…'

B: *allah...biʔūlna rabnā, bemyuħād lal-ʕadra...*
'God … our Lord tells us, especially to the-Virgin (Mary) …'

A: *yaʕni ʔente btitwajjah lal-iršād el-ʔelāhi hallī fīk w-btutˤlub minno inno ywarjīk etˤ-tˤarīʔ esˤ-sˤaħīħ.*
'that you turn to the divine guidance that's within you and you ask it to show you the right path.'

B: *āh, ħelow, hāy. w-kamān muhim ħub el-ʕatˤāʔ. Hēka fadia trabbat bel-bēt kamān, ʔal-basātˤa, etˤ-tˤawādoʕ w-el-maħabbe. El-maħabbe btilɣī kull el-baɣdˤ.*
'Yeah, that's nice. The love of giving is also important. That's how Fadia was raised at home, to be modest and loving. Love cancels all loathing.'

A: āh, bezˤ-zˤabetˤ. Iħna ajīna min makōm tabaʕ maħabbe, amma el-mušukle kānat el-sivīā elli ente ʕayeš fiyya betħāwel teʕmallak nitūk min hāda el-ʕālam esˤ-sˤaħīħ. ʕala-šān hēka, el-wāħad lāzem ykūn haðer inno yiʕref ayya en-nās yitʔarrab minnen w-ayya en-nās laʔ. La-anno en-nās halli beħawlu yiʕmalūlak nitūk men hāda el-ʕālam halli howwe sˤaħ, hinne nās tʕabʕin wisex, w-sˤeʕb ʕalehin innak ente tʕabʕak mnīħ, fa biħawlu innen yuxdūk lal-maħal el-wisex intaʕun.
'yeah, exactly. We came from a place of love, but the problem was that the surrounding that you live in tries to disconnect you from this right world. That is why, one must be cautious and know which people to get close to and which not. Because the people who try to disconnect you from the world that is right, are people who are evil in their nature, and it's hard for them that you have a good nature, so they try to drag you to their place of evil.'

B: sˤaħīħ, hāda dˤuʕuf bikūn ʕend en-nās. El-wāħad…kull ħayātak bes-sābʔa, w-tˤufūltak, w-šabābak, w-taʕlīmak, w-kullo la-hāy el-laħzˤa…ʔēid allah wādˤħa w-mitjalle, w-mitjalle, yaʕni mrāfʔak zaī ma el-ʕabd mrāfeʔ bi-ibnu w-byimsek be-ʔēid ibnu aħsan ma yūʔaʕ. akīd fī hōn w-hunāka sˤuʕūbāt, w-fī taħadiyāt w-dˤuɣūtˤāt ħayā, akīd, ħatta ʕāʔiliyye, anā maʔmīn fiš ʕeile bitmurriš fī mašākel.
'That's right, that's a weakness that people suffer from. The person … your whole life in the past, and your childhood, and your adulthood, and your education, and everything up until this moment … God's hand is clear and evident, and evident, that is, he accompanies you like the servant accompanies his son and holds his son's hand so that he doesn't fall. Of course there are hardships here and there, and there are challenges and life pressures, of course, even familial, I believe that there's no family that doesn't go through problems.'

A: akīd. Hallī biʔullak ɣiriy hēika bikūn ʕenden aktar šī mašākel.
'Sure. Whoever tells you otherwise has more problems than anyone else.'

B: ʔēid allah wādˤħa. W-noškor Allah, wēin iħna mnūsˤal miš bezxut ʕatsmen-ū la-inn-o Allah raħme w-maħabbe. Baddak hēika, tfadˤdˤal…
'God's hand is upon us. And thank God, wherever we get to is not in our own right but due to God's grace and love. If that's what you want, that's what he'll give you.'

A: sˤaħ, miyye bel-miyye. Ana baʔullak šayle, ana la-inno baʔāmen inno eš-šaxs lamma ykūn ʕendo hāda el-kēšer el-ħaʔīʔī, miš le-mzayyaf zaī elli biħutˤtˤu qināʕ w-biʔulūlak iħna haʔrab iši la-rabna…
'that's right, a hundred percent. Let me tell you something, because I believe that when the person has this real connection, not the fake one like those who put on a mask and say 'we are the closest to our Lord' …'

B: hayōl aktar nās, awwal nās w-aktar nās allah baddo yḥadˁdˁerlen xazūʔ yitˁlaˁ men nafūxen.
'those people are the first ones that God will prepare the worst penalties for them.'

A: sˁaḥ, ana baʔāmen inno eš-šaxs lamma howwe biykūn ˁendo kēšer ḥaʔīʔī, bel-ʔalb, maˁ rabna, rabna bisaḥello kull šī.
'True, I believe that when the person has a sincere connection, in his heart, to our Lord, our Lord will facilitate everything for him.'

B: miyye bel-miyye.
'a hundred percent.'

A: yaˁni ʔaddem xitˁwe waḥde la-ˁend rabna, rabna bijīlak tˁnaˁ-šar xitˁwe nawaḥīk, bas xitˁwe waḥde ente ʔaddem.
'that is, take one step towards our Lord, and our Lord will take twelve steps towards you, you only need to take that one step forward.'

B: hāy umme xārtˁa, ummet ed-dīn. Ana ʔišīt bitmalilīš rāsī. Kullo kidb, ðiʔāb xātˁfe, kidb, luʔum, sirʔa, w-qawanīn bala raḥme w-bala tˁaˁme. W-zaī ma ʔul-tellek, men ʔasˁlo allah rafidˁa la hāī el-qawanīn. men ʔasˁla allah rafidˁa. yaˁni antˁāna ˁašer wasˁāya, lō meˁēver. ˁa šū ˁam-bitḥutˁilli wasˁāya habla, faqatˁ men sˁunˁ el-bašar?? Miš men sˁunˁ rabna? La-inno rabna ḥikimto ˁazˁīme, w-bifakker la-ʔuddām, miš zaī en-nās, biḥutˁtˁu qawanīn bas ˁašān el-masˁlaḥa. laʔ, laʔ, ˁazōv. bimisˁdāqiyye kilmet el-llāh muqaddase, bitšikiš fīya. ˁēib ˁalēik, ˁēib ˁalēik. baˁdēin rabna biyʔūl miš kull wāḥad ʔallī 'yā rab yā rab' baddu yfūt ˁaj-jinne, laʔ yā ḥabāyeb, raḥ aḥutˁilku xawazīʔ titˁlaˁ men nafūxku. Kūnu busˁatˁa, w-kūnu mitwādˁˁīn, w-kūnu zaī el-ʔatˁfāl. La-inno el-tˁefil howwe sˁedeq, waˁī, maḥabbe, ḥub, raḥme, binsā w-bisāmeḥ, binsā w-bisāmeḥ. Izā en-nās mā bitkūn zaī el-ʔatˁfāl, allah ykūn bˁōnna, allah ykūn bˁōnna.
'This is a dubious community, the community of religion. Personally, it doesn't add up to me. It's all lies, savage wolves, lies, meanness, appropriation, and tasteless rules. And as I've already told you, basically God rebuffs these rules. He rebuffs these rules. That is, he had given us ten commandments, not more than that. On what grounds are you adding inane commandments, solely made up by humans? Not by our Lord himself? Because our Lord's wisdom is mighty, and he thinks forward, unlike the people, who come up with rules solely for self-interest. No, no, give me a break. God's word is rightfully holy, and indisputable. Shame on you, shame on you. Additionally, our Lord says that not everyone who calls me 'dear Lord, dear Lord' will enter heaven, no beloved, I will give you the

worst penalties. Be simple, and be modest, and be like children. Because the child is sincerity, perception, affection, love, grace, forgets and forgives, forgets and forgives. If people don't become like children, then may God help us all, may God help us all.'

A: ʕal-ʔāxer...
'totally.'

B: baʕdēin ʔana baʔūl ʕannen innen aɣbiya.
'Besides, I say that they're ignorant.'

A: mamāš.
'Totally.'

B: aɣbiya w-ʔana masʔūl ʕan kilimti. W-baʕdˤ rijāl ed-dīn aɣba aɣbiyāʔ el-ʔardˤ.
'They're ignorant, and I take responsibility for my word. And some of the religious people are the most ignorant people on earth.'

A: kull elli bitʔūlu sˤaḥīḥ miyye bel-miyye.
'Everything you say is true, a hundred percent true.'

B: allah maḥabbe w-raḥme, howwe elli rāʕinī, w-howwe elli ʕam-biʔūdnī, w-howwe elli ʕam-bidʕninī. ʔana insān mnawwar, miš insān elli tofaʕāt ha-ʕeider, lō. ʕala kull ḥāl, ʔana ktīr mabsˤūtˤ. Baddi abʕat hodaʕā la-fadia, dāyman fi sˤalātik tozokrek.
'God is affection and grace, he's the one who's supporting me, and he's the one who's guiding me, and he's the one who's holding me. I'm an enlightened person, not a person who follows herd behavior, no. Anyways, I am very happy. I want to send a message to Fadia, telling her to always mention you in her prayers.'

A: wāw, tislam, tislam, kullak zōʔ!
'Wow, thank you, thank you, that's so kind of you.'

B:bel-ʕaks, yawmiyyan bi-sˤalātna mnidʕīlek bel-bēit. Yōm, yōm, yōm!
'On the contrary, we mention you daily in our prayers at home. Every single day!'

A: maḥlā!
'That's wonderful!'

B: akīd. ʕenna nawāya, mnuzkorin.
'Sure. We have intentions, we mention them.'

A: ittʕallaʕ, lamma ente btʕūsʕal la-hāda el-maħal ennak ente fahmān el-asās tāʕ ed-dinya, fahmān el-asās tāʕ rabna, ente btʕurbutʕ nafsak la-hāī el-maħal el-mnīħ, fiš ʕendak daʔagōt, fiš ʕendak mašākel, fiš ʕendak išī la-innak hal-ʔadde ʔarīb men rabna inno fiš iši tāni bihem, fiš iši elu mašmaʕūt, zaī ma biʔūlu, bas rabna el-ħaʔīʔī, w-bas el-maħabbe hiyye el-ħaʔīʔīyye, kull šī tāni behemmiš.
'Look, when you reach that point that you understand the essence of the world, and understand the essence of our Lord, you connect yourself to this place of good, you don't have worries, you don't have problems, you don't have any of that since you are that close to our Lord, that nothing else matters, nothing else has meaning, as they say, only our Lord is real, and only love is real, nothing else matters.'

B: bātʕel el-abatʕīl. tʕabʕan, miyye bel-miyye.
'Vanity of vanities. Of course, a hundred percent.'

A: bel-injīl biʔūlu 'dawru ʕal-mamlake elli mawjūde fī nafskon bel-awwal.' yaʕni, kull elli btiħtāju mawjūd bdāxelku.
'In the Bible they say 'seek the kingdom within first.' That is, everything you need is within you.'

B: malkūt el-lāh hiyye fī el-ʔalb.
'The kingdom of God is in the heart.'

A: bezʕ-zʕabetʕ, aywanat!
'Exactly, spot on!'

B: malkūt el-lāh, ok?
'The kingdom of God, ok?'

A: āh, hiyye el-malkūt...dawru ʕal-malkūt...
'Yeah, it is the kingdom, seek the kingdom ...'

B: ed-daxiliyye
'Within.'

A: elli fī daxelku bel-awwal.
'That is within you first.'

B: *hiya fal takun mašīʔatuka.*
'Ask and it will be given to you.'

A: *hiyye elli ʔolta, malkūt. Inno lāʔu el-malkūt elli mawjūd fī nosˤku bel-awwal, malkūt, jannet ˤadan mawjūd b-dāxelkun yaˤni, bas izā btusˤalūla.*
'It is what you said, the kingdom. That is find the kingdom within first, the kingdom, heaven is inside of you, only if you reach it.'

B: *rabna, miš biʔūlu subħān allāh dayman? subħān allāh maħlā, subħān allāh ittˤalaˤ hal-manzˤar...dayman mnozkor allah, el-bašariyye ħādinu w-ħātˤinu bas fī ktāb. Allah miš fī ktāb. Miš halʔadde rabna ˤaʔlu zyīr ta-yiħšir ħālu be-ktāb. Allah xārej el-makān wez-zamān, tˤabˤan, ēin safēk. Wēin makanu? Fī el-ʔalb, ˤfal yaʔtī malkūtak'. Šū malkūtak? Raħimtak we-mħabtak ˤal-ʔalb.*
'Our Lord, right they say 'praise the Lord' always? 'he's so beautiful praise the Lord, look at this view praise the Lord ...' We always mention God, humanity had limited him only in a book. God is not in a book. God's mind is not that small to compress himself in a book. God is beyond space and time, of course, no doubt about that. Where is his place? In the heart, 'let thy kingdom come on us.' What is your kingdom? Your grace and love, in your heart.'

A: *āh, bezˤ-zˤabetˤ, bezˤ-zˤabetˤ, wāw!*
'Yeah, exactly, exactly, wow!'

B: *w-hāda howwe es-salām elli el-bašariyye kullayāta faʔedtu.*
'And this is the peace that all of humanity is lacking.'

A: *āh, sˤaħ, kullu mawjūd ɣād.*
'Yeah, right, it's all there.'

B: *ēin ma laˤasōt. Kullu bitɣayyar.*
'There's nothing that can be done about it. Everything will change.'

Excerpt 3 (Israeli-Arab Muslim participants who reside in an Israeli-Arab Muslim locality).

A: *Nazle ˤala el...tˤetˤbīʔ?*
'Are you going to the practical training?'

B: *ˤal-waħade*
'At 1pm.'

A: lazem tenzali ʔabel. batˤalt aˤref aħki...
'You must go there before that. I don't know how to speak anymore ...'

B: baddi haʔollek ešī
'I want to tell you something.'

A: ħarām, kīf el-ʔostaz insˤadˤam. Kunna ˤam niħkī ana we-yyato, hēika, sˤafan, ʔālu badda titrek yaˤni, hēika ma kanš baddo iyyanī asmaˤ kamān.
'Poor thing, how the teacher (lecturer) was shocked. We were talking me and him, like that, he was pondering, they said she was going to leave, he kind of didn't want me to hear that either.'

B: āh, laʔenno entī...
'Yes, because you ...'

*A: laʔenno ana dī atrek? Ajīt hēika, kān zaī ellī du yebˤednī, bas ana yaˤni hēik sˤafant ana inna da titrek w...baˤreš. Kānet laʔtˤa yaˤni ktīr betsˤaffen. beʔulla taˤali ˤala šaˤōt el-*kabalā* taˤon-i. absˤar šū du yiħkī maˤha. Āh, w-hēik.*
'Because I want to leave? I came over like this, it was as if he wanted to create a distance between us, but I was kind of shocked that she wants to leave and ... I don't know. It was, I mean, a very shocking scene. He tells her "come during my consultation hours". I'm not sure what is it that he wants to talk to her about. And, yeah.'

B: lāzem arūħ ˤa-tˤtˤetˤbīʔ, w-bnafs el-waʔt lazem xallesˤ el-wadˤīfe.
'I must go to the practical training, but at the same time, I must finish the assignment.'

A: bas ʔaddē yaˤnī du yoxed el-tˤetˤbīʔ?
'But how long is the practical training going to last for?'

B: sēˤa rōħa, sēˤa rajaˤa.
'One hour going there, one hour coming back.'

A: w-ʔiħna el-yōm hōna lat-tamane, w-ʔiħna elyōm hōna lat-tamane!
'And we here today until 8pm, and we here today until 8pm!'

B:bas bnafs el-waʔt in dˤallētnī miš raħ ʔaˤref ˤan šū di akteb.

*A: bas enti ya Hind lazem textarī, ana ʔoltellek awwal isˁsˁa w-xallasˁ. Ana hēik yaˁni, ida ma laʔēteš iši ellī aħki ˁalē, miš raħ haʔdar, ēhh, aˁmal el-wadˁīfe yaˁni, baddi iši **argyument**. asˁlan yimken hiyye tijī. yaˁni el-iši wasˁfi, lā?*
'But at the same time, Hind, you must choose, I told you the first story and that's it. I'm going like this, that is, if I don't find something to talk about, I won't be able to, umm, do the assignment, I want some type of argument. Actually she might come. Meaning, the thing is descriptive, right?'

*B: **deskriptiv**?*
'Descriptive?'

*A: ˁan el-**dōg**, hāi el-**dog ϑing**?*
'About the dog, that dog thing'

*B: laʔ, inno **yū argyū** inno, inno da ʔūl yaˁni inno, inno hiyye bteˁˁeleš yaˁni, la-had-daraje, inno hāi **argyū** lāʔ? Inno hiyye bteˁˁeleš?*
'No, that you argue that, that is what I want to say is that, that she is insane you know, to this degree, that this is an argument, no? That she is insane?'

*A: **yū argyū ðat in lav θēr iz no**…*
'You argue that in love there is no …'

B: "mā fi ˁāšiʔ ya zɣīri ˁaʔlāto kbār". Hēik yaˁni. yaˁni issa baddi akteb el-neʔātˁ. Hāda e-lʔalam lamīn?
'"There is no lover, you little one, whose brain is big" (A quote from a song by Fairuz). That's what it means. Now I want to write the points. Whose pen is this?'

A: elī
'Mine.'

B: ktīr ħelew. Menēin? Hadōl elli aju?
'Very beautiful. Where is it from? (From) those who came over?'

A: hāi el-yōm. elli aju.
'that's from today. (From those) who came over.'

B: tˁab wēin ʔalami?
'Then where's my pen?'

A: baʔreš. Bel-bēit yimken.
'I don't know. At home, perhaps.'

B: sˤaħ antˤetˤna ʔalamēin? Ktīr xatˤtˤo ħelew. Ida bešūfu du yōxdo minnī.
'She gave us two pens, right? It has a really nice way of writing. If he sees it, he will take it away from me.'

A: ʕazzartī ʕalē...
'You've shamed him.'

B: kull ma iyšuflī ʔalam baddu yōxdu.
'Each time he sees I have a pen; he'll want to take it.'

A: issa, miš ʕārfe ʕan šū baddī ektib, sāʕdinī.
'Now I don't know what I am going to write about, assist me.'

B: ismaʕī, awwal ʔesˤsˤa mniħa ellik, ismaʕī šū...
'Listen, the first story is good for you, listen to this ...'

A: benfaʕš aktib išī benāʔedˤ šū besˤ-sˤaf.
'I can't write something that contradicts what (was discussed) in class.'

B: lēh benfaʕš? Kullo hēk ʕāmel. Fiš ħada ʕāmel iši, yaʕni, min ʕendo. asˤlan Ranin ʕaraya datɣayyer, ʔāl ʕaraya, baʕreš, inno kēif ħakatli Dima, iši mnīħ, bas ʔāl ʕarāy Ranin inno, ʔayeltella inno el-mawdˤūʕ tāʕha **diskriptiv**, *w-badda tɣayyer kamān el-ʔetˤʕa.*
'Why not? Everyone had done that. No one is doing something, that is, theirs (original). In fact, Ranin says she's going to change (her topic), according to her, I don't know, from what Dima told me, it's a good thing, but according to Ranin, she told her that her topic is descriptive, and she wants to also change the passage.'

A: šū yaʕni **diskriptiv**? *Ana miš fāhmi ʕalēh!*
'What does descriptive mean? I can't understand him.'

B: yaʕni badda tiħlīl aktar. yaʕni matlatan badda hāy el-kilme lēh hōna itħatˤat. Lēh miš kilme tāni, fahme? Inno dik tħalilī aktar. ʔāyeltella, miš šartˤ titmakdī *b-talatīn šatˤer, binfaʕ matlatan, ēh...yaʕni akam min šatˤer, aw binfaʕ* bexlāl... *baʕrēš, bas inno ʕarāy...matlatan hāy issa, ħakat bas ʕan akam min šatˤer. yaʕni ana baʔdar matlatan aħkī ʕan hāy el-laʔtˤa kulla, bas inno aħkī ʕan hāy el-kalb*

*θing, inno a-**menšen it** ktīr yaʕni fī mawdˤūʕ el-inša.*
'It means that it requires more analysis. That is, for example, she wants you to say why this word was used here. Why not a different word, do you understand? That you need to analyse it more. She told her, you don't need to focus on thirty lines, it is possible, for example, just a few lines, or it's even possible … I don't know, but according to … for example, she now talked only about a few lines. That is, I can, for example, talk about this entire scene, but that I talk about that dog thing, that I mention it a lot, that is, in the essay.'

*A: āāh, binfaʕ turobtˤiya, ikitbi **sityuwēšen** el-**āyroni**.*
'Yeah, you can connect it, write that the situation is the irony.'

*B: **sityuwēšen**…*
'Situation …'

*A:inno kīf howwe baddoš iyyaha w-baʕdēn **hī endz ap wið hēr**.*
'That how he doesn't want her and then later he ends up with her.'

*B: **āyroni,** āāh, āāh, inno hāy, tˤayyeb.*
'Irony, yeah, yeah, that this (is what's ironic), ok.'

A: wēin el-wrāʔ tabaʕo?
'Where are his pages?'

B: lainno hīyye btˤenesˤdˤem bas teʕref inno, inna bitħib… innen biħibbuha. Fahme šū ʔasdˤī?
'Because she gets shocked when she realizes that, that she loves … that they love her. Do you know what I mean?'

A: bas hīyye…, baddek tiħkī ʕan išī la-ʔoddam? tˤabaʕten, maʕki yemken?
'But she …, do you want to talk about something further on? Theirs, perhaps you have it?'

B: bas inno howwe biħibba hāy kaman išī la-ʔoddam.
'But that he loves her, that's also something a bit further on.'

A: āāh, sˤaħ. āāh, āāh, benfaʕ, benfaʕ yemkin.
'Yeah, right. Yeah, yeah, it's possible, it's possible I think.'

*B: inno baʔdar aʕmel **sityuwēšenal, dramatic**.*
'That I can do a dramatic situation.'

A: bas enti baddik wāḥad.
'But you want one.'

B: bas inno baʔdar aʕmelin min nafs el-faʔra.
'But I can do them from the same paragraph.'

A: tˤayyeb, w-ɣēro?
'Alright, other than that?'

*B: inno miš šartˤ. W-el-**dōg** hāy hōna el-kilme inno bitšabbeh ḥāla la-išī miš ʕāʔel. Inno hiyye miš ʕāʔle yaʕni. Inno bas baʕreš šū hāy biʔolūla. Āāh, bas inno hāy btiʔdˤar tkūn el-hāy tāʕti. W-ēiš kamān iḥna tʕallamna??*
'That's not a must. And this dog word here (means) that she compares herself to something inanimate. That is, that she herself is inanimate. But I don't know how they call this. Yeah, but this can be my thing. What else did we learn?'

A: miš ʕārfe.
'I don't know.'

*B: bas hiyye ma ʔalatš inno baddi iyyako tišraḥūli iyyah. yaʕni inno, baʕreš šū daktibla ana **divaysiz** yaʕni. Inno hiyye jaybitilna **dayalōg** bēin itnēn yaʕni. mneʔdarš niktib ʕan el-**dayalōg** kamān.*
'But she didn't say that she wanted us to explain this. That is, I don't what I'll write to her. That is, she's giving us a dialogue between two (people). We can't also write about the dialogue.'

*A: mballa. btiʔdari tikitbi **in da dayalōg** hāy, matlatan, hōna šūfi šū katbe.*
'Yes, we can. You can write in the dialogue, for instance, look what's written here.'

B: wēin? Āāh, hāy b-el-mitāl tāʕha, maʕki?
'Where (is that)? Oh yeah, this is in her example, do you have it?'

*A: umm, **yāh**.*
'Umm, yeah.'

B: mneʔdar niktib inno hōna…tawani šwaī
'we can write that here … (give me) a few seconds.'

*A: ēiš el-**prablematik** ʕendik?*
'What is the problematic (thing) at your end?'

B: šū ʔasʕdʕa fīha hāy?
'What does she mean by that?'

*A: wēin ʕamtiʔri? Min el-**modern**?*
'Where are you reading from? From the modern?'

*B: baʕrif, yaʕni hōna howwe, yaʕni hōna hiyye btiħki ʕanno inno howwe **crūl**.*
'I know, that is, here he, I mean here she talks about him that he's cruel.'

A: umm…
'Umm…'

*B: yaʕni zaī kīf bejurr el-kalb, yaʕni, šū baʕarrifni, inno, **ok**, hāy lazem aħallila. benfaʕ aktib ʕan hāy awwal ma hiyye tfassidlo.*
'That is like how (he) drags the dog, that means, how should I know, that, ok, I must analyse this. I can write about that when she starts to denounce to him.'

A: āāh, kont jāy haʔollek, inno et-tifsīd, ʔāl šū betʔūl le-mʕalme "ana baʕreš ʕan šū ʔasʕdʕa lēh fassadatlo."
'Oh yeah, I was just about to tell you, that the denouncement, listen what the teacher says "I don't know what she means as in why she denounced to him".'

B: ana baʕref lēh, ʕanšān…
'I know why, because …'

*A: aju el-ʕarabiyyāt kollin ʕirfo, inno šikla ʕaʔel ʕarabi hiyye el-eši, inno fassadatlo ʕnašān inno tbayyen inna **trastworði** w-inno, btiʕerfi hāy el-ašyāʔ kulla, w-inno ysʕīr yħibba w-ma-yiltfitš la-hadiki, yettʕallaʕ ʕa hadiki ka-xāyni.*
'Now all the female Arab (students) knew, she seems like she has an Arab mind this one, that she denounced to him so that she would be perceived as trustworthy, you know all these things, and so that he'll start loving her and not notice that other one, so he'll perceive that other one as disloyal.'

B: tʕayyeb, wēin hāy mawjūde?
'Alright, where does this appear at?'

A: umm…baʕreš, bakker mawjūde maʕāy, yimkin. Ma-kanateš ʕārfe šū badda, bas ana anšān hēika ʔolt baddi aħki maʕa. šāfna el-ʔostāz inno badna niħki. Kont daterko.

'Umm, I don't know, I think I have it, maybe. She didn't know what she wanted, but that's why I said I want to speak to her. The teacher saw that we wanted to speak. I wanted to leave him.'

B: tˤayyeb??
'And??'

A: ana hōna…
'I am here …'

B: miš ʕārfe, kont baddi axtār hāy. Hāy bas yitʔābalo awwal marra bitʔolla, biʔolūla inno hinne baddin yrawħu.

'I don't know, I wanted to choose this. This when they meet for the first time and she tells her, they tell her that they want to go home.'

A:āāh?
'And?'

B: w-baʕdēin…wēin el-laʔtˤa elli bitʔulla, šū ismo, ʕannen?
'And after that … where is the scene in which she tells her, what's it called, about them?'

*A: bas ēiš dik tikitbi ʕanna? **Argyūmentativ?** Lazim tlāʔi hēika kilme, jumle, išī elli hiyye…, šwaī, hiʔri, hiʔri el-kalimāt, xallina niʔra el-kalimāt.*

'But what do you want to write about it? Argumentative? You must find some word, sentence, something that she … wait a second, read, read the words, let's read the words.'

B: miš ʕārfe, kollo nafs…
'I don't know, it's all the same …'

A: sˤeʕbi. El-ēih? nafs el-ēih? El-maʔātˤeʕ?
'That's hard. The what? The same what? The (same) sections?'

Excerpt 4 (Golani-Druze participant who resides in a Golani-Druze locality).

men naħet inno ʔāxð-in zxoyót meš ʔāxð-in zxoyót bexlál hāi eš-ši ló kayám ʕen-na lēš laʔenno wēn matħutˤi-na en-nās hāi elli hōn b-yestadr-ú. Kinna taħt

tirkiyya, kinna taħt faransa, kinna taħt baʕrefš mīn...ayyamāt elli kinna tābʕīn la-Suriyya, beʕetsém el-fatra elli bēn faransa w-israʔīl, suriyya ma-kanitš qāʕde bexlál. Kanet mðʕaʕðʕaʕa, yaʕni bfatrit el-inqilabāt. yaʕni niħna wala marra ʕišna, ok, yaʕni inno niħna suriyyīn w-ʕam neʕmil ruxsʕet swāqa b-suriyya w-kill šī, wala marra kæn el-fatra hā, ma kanitš suriyya kmó šetsaríx. Be-l-fatra el-mkarkabe hā, fiš ɣēr el-drūz ha-elli hōn kanu mestadrím. yaʕni mustaqellīn lé-xól davár, ʕārfe šū qasdi? Fa-ʕašān hēk, niħna miš kθīr mnihkal el-ham inno ʔāxð-in zxoyót meš ʔāxð-in zxoyót. ʕada ʕan hēk, b-ħayātna el-yawmiyye iħna beʕetsém xliqna la-l-binyán. Kilayātna mhandsīn, kablaním, kilayātna binyán, binyán, binyán. Én matsáv tjībi ħada men barra byištyel binyán kīf ma-mništtyel hōn. Fa-iħna elnā hašpaʕá kθīr kbīri ʕa-kil šī ħawalēna. Mušavím, kibutsāt, mivním, ħatta mivním lal-jēš ʕam yiʕimluha nās min ʕinna. Iħna ʕārfīn ħālna, fa-kamān nawʕan mā, fī nās ma-biħibbūš kilmet "saxír herév" bas beʕetsém iħna... ok, niħna miš ʕam-nixdemen jēš, bas niħna ʕam-ništyillen.

'With regards to receiving rights or not receiving rights, that does not apply at all in our case since we, the people here, will get along anywhere, anyway. We were under Turkish rule, under French rule, under whatever rule ... when we used to belong to Syria, in fact that period between France and Israel, Syria wasn't stable at all. It was shaky, that is, during the revolts. That means we have never lived as if we were Syrians and that we were doing driving licences in Syria and all of that, we have never lived that, Syria wasn't the way it should've been. During that chaotic period, the Druze who were here (in the Golan Heights), were the only ones who got along well. That is, they were totally independent, do you get what I mean? That is why, we don't really care whether we're receiving rights or not receiving rights. Other than that, in our daily lives, we were actually made for construction. We're all engineers, contractors, we're all involved in construction, construction, construction. There's no way to bring someone from outside this place who can do construction work the way we do it here. So we have a big influence on everything around. Moshav settlements, Kibutz-collective settlements, buildings, even military buildings are being done by people from our place. We know our worth, and also, there are people who kind of don't like the term 'mercenary', but in fact, we are ... ok, we're not serving in their army, but we are working for them (the Israelis).'

Qabl el-sabʕa w-sitīn, zalame min jīl bayyī, jārna beʕetsém, yaʕni hōn, kān ʕumru tʕnaʕ-šar sine, qāl "kinna ʕam-nilʕab b-el-ħāra, ʕam-nilʕab, kān maʕna šab ismu ʕalī, kanu ahlu ʕam-biʕamru bēit, qabl israʔīl el-ħaki, issa fī tʕarīq hēik, kān ʕam-yelʕab hōn, wel-bēit hōn. Kil šwaī yrūħ ysāʕed ahlo w-yerjaʕ yelʕab. Issa w-hou kān hināk baddo yīji, kānu mārqīn jyābēn jēiš tabʕen suriyya, qabl el-ħarb, ma kanš ħdūd, kān le-ħdūd tʕabariyya, kinna beʕetsém b-nisʕ suriyya, le-ħdūd kānet

*tˤabariyya, kinna bˤād kθīr. maraqu jyābēn, waqqafu, fataħ wāħad minnin eš-
šibbāk, ˤayyatˤ la-hā el-walad ˤali, qallu yā walad, wēin btijī ˤein qasˤab? Qallu
"hināk, btinzal hēik šwaī ˤaš-šmāl, ˤa ēidak el-baˤrifš šū, bitlāqiha". Ħaku maˤ
baˤdˤ hēik šwaī, kān fī šī dˤabitˤ jiwwa, fataħu eš-šibbāk, qālū "fīk tijī maˤna
itdilna w-brajˤak?" Qallu "ēih." Issa ˤa-dōrna el-wāħad yitlaˤ bi-sayyara hēik,
hā šī kθīr meyuħád, byitlaˤ byiħkī la-sˤħabu "tˤliˤt b-ej-jīb, šift hā..." tˤileˤ b-ej-
jīb, qallen "rūħ yamīn, yamīn, šmāl šmāl...", qallen "hā hīy ˤein qasˤab." Nizlu
θamān, θamān jnūd, killen men es-sayartēn, w-ħatˤtˤu ˤalamāt b-ˤein qasˤab,
ħatˤtˤu hēik ˤalamāt w-fallu. baˤed šahrēin, indalˤat el-ħarb, wēin ħatˤtˤu le-
ħdūd? B-ˤein qassab." Fa-kamān hā aħad el-qisˤasˤ ha-ellī btidˤam el-girsá inno
"niħna mabyūˤīn." ʔanā bʔāmen inno hā eš-šī du iydˤallu maftūħ. ʔanā maʔmín
inno nbæˤat. btiˤirfī līš? La-inno el-wāħad awwal ma yixlaq bequlūlek ahlek
walla ʔentī min yanūħ, ʔentī jinsiytik israʔīliyye. issa iħna lamma nikbar, biysˤīr
ˤomerna θlāθ, arbaˤ snīn, minballiš nismaˤ qisˤasˤ ɣarībe, inno iħna hōn hēik
zmanít. btiˤirfī, ok, kint walad, sˤirt atˤtˤallaˤ, ˤallamūna ahelna issa ʔente b-
isrāʔīl zmanít w-datirjaˤ ˤa-suriyya, hēik el-kontsípt. Issa ʔānī sˤirt ikbar šwāī
šwāī w-ˤamšūf ha-šrītˤ maħallu, wala marra šifna dabbabe jāy, wala marra šifna
ħada jāy iyqātel, ħajar, ħada yidˤrib ħajar, ma šifnāš, men el-sabˤa w-sittīn la-
issa. Fa-kamān, taˤ tanqūl inno neħnā muħtallīn b-l-qiwwe, áz éx zé inno fiš ħada
ˤam-yijī? Ħatta mufawaðˤāt mā fī, klúm, mayyte el-qisˤsˤa legamré.*

'Prior to 1967, there was a man at the age of my father, our neighbor in fact, that
is, right here, when he was 12 years old, he said, "we were playing in the neigh-
borhood, were playing, there was a kid called Ali who was with us, his parents
were building a house, that is, prior to Israel, now there was a path like this,
he was playing here, and the house was over there. Every short while, he'd go
to help his parents and come back to play. Now when he was there wanting
to come over here, two Syrian military jeeps were passing by, before the war,
there were no borders, the borders were Tiberias, we were in fact in the middle
of Syria, the borders were Tiberias, we were very far. Two jeeps had passed by,
they stopped, one of them opened the window, he called this Ali kid, he asked
him 'hey kid, where is Ain Qasab located?' He told him 'over there, you go down
a bit to the left, to your I don't know why, you'll find it.' They spoke to each other
a bit, there was some sort of a commander inside, they opened the window and
asked 'would you be able to come show us and we'll bring you back?', he said
'yes.' Now in our times, for someone to go in a car like that, that was something
very special, he'll go tell his friends 'I went in the jeep, saw this ...' so he went in
the jeep and told them 'go to the right, to the right; to the left, to the left ...' he
said 'this is where Ain Qasab is.' Eight of them got out, eight soldiers, all of them
got out of the two cars, they put signs there in Ain Qasab, they put signs like that
and left. Two months later, the war broke out, where did they mark the borders?

In Ain Qasab." So this is another one of those stories that support the version that says 'we've been sold.' I believe that this thing will remain open. I believe that it (the Golan) was sold. Do you know why? Because when you are born, your parents tell you 'you are in fact from Yanuh, and your nationality is Israeli.' Now when we grow older and become three or four, we start hearing strange stories, that we're here (in Israel) only temporarily. You know, ok, I was a kid, I used to look around, our parents told us that 'you're in Israel only temporarily and it (the Golan) will go back to Syria', that was the concept. So I started growing up bit by bit and I still see the fence in its same place, we never saw a tank coming here, we never saw anyone coming to fight, a stone, someone throwing a stone, we've never seen that either, from 1967 till now. So let's say that we've been occupied by force, then how come no one is coming? There aren't even negotiations, nothing, the story is totally dead.'

Suriyya, kīf kinna, kān fī fatrit inqilabāt qāyme qāʕde, w-baššār el-ʔassad tʕeleʕ *beʕetsém b-el-inqilāb, ħāfeðʕ, baʕrifiš, lamma axað ħāfeðʕ el-ħikim, bšakil ʕām ʕend el-ʕarab, iða ibnak zˁɣīr, xayyak mafrūðˁ yiwirθak. Issa ħāfeðʕ el-ʔassad kān fī ʕindu xay ismu rifʕat, ok? tirjaʕī la-wara, ʔāni baʕref men ahlī yaʕnī, b-el-tkufót hadīk, kanet fī munawašāt qāyme qāʕde, kān baššār zˁɣīr, w-bāsell inqatal, miš maʕrūf kīf inqatal. rifʕat kān mqayyem ed-dinya w-imqaʕʕeda, kān hoū wazīr ed-difāʕ, baʕriš šū kān ʕindu, kān el-mafrūðˁ ykūn raʔīs miθlu miθel ħāfeðʕ, aw ʕal-qalīle hoū wara ħāfeðʕ, ħāfeðʕ badduš, ðˁallu ʕa-fatra tˁawīle munawašāt: "rifʕat šū el-tafkíd tabaʕu, w-mīn raħ yiwraθ ħāfeðʕ?" pitʔóm mātat el-qisˁsˁa hā, intahat. Šū biqulu hōn? En-nās men ʕinna yaʕni, fī nās bteʕref bedyúk má kará. Yuqāl inno rifʕat, ħāfeðʕqallu "xōð el-haðˁabe, bitbīʕha, btiqbaðˁ, btidʕaseš suriyya men lamman tiqbaðˁ el-masˁāri." Yuqāl, axað el-..., bāʕ biraqam miyye w-sittīn malyōn, baʕriš, fiyya raqem sitte, baʕriš, tˁeleʕ ʕa-faransa, w-men hāk el-yōm ma daʕasiš b-suriyya, w-ma-ħada šī simeʕ ʕanno, wala axað tafkíd, wala jāb sīret tafkíd, wala qallen ʔāni baddī wazīr ez-zbale wala qallen baddī šī. El-jnūd el-suriyyīn ðˁallen saktīn tˁūl fatret ħukem baššār. Lamma sˁār fī inqilabāt b-suriyya issa jdīd bi-mufawaðˁāt er-rabīʕ el-ʕarabī, fī nās, jnūd, tjarraʔu w-ħaku. Qālu "kinna btʕabariyya, w-kinna mitʔakdīn inno én matsáv ħada iyqarreb, kinna juɣrāfiyyan hāktīn ʔem el-yahōd, w-kinna mitmarikzīn, w-kinna, w-kinna, w-kinna...biqūlu "fajʔa ʔjāna balāɣ 'go bāk!'" mamnūʕ tisʔalī b-suriyya.*

'Syria, the way it was, it was a time of chaotic revolts, and Bashar al-Assad actually got the presidency during a revolt, Hafez (al-Assad), I don't know, when he became the ruler, usually when it comes to the Arabs, if your son is too young, then your brother should be the successor. Now Hafez al-Assad had a brother called Rifaat, ok? If you go back, and I know this from my parents actually, during those times, there were many skirmishes, Bashar was young, and Bas-

sel was killed, I don't know how. Rifaat was going berserk, he was the minister of defence, I don't know what he had, he was supposed to be a president just like Hafez was, or at least he was supposed to become one after Hafez, Hafez didn't want that, they had skirmishes going on for a while: "Rifaat, what's his role, and who will be Hafez's successor?" Suddenly, this whole story had vanished, faded away. What do they say over here? The people from this place that is, there are people who know exactly what happened. It is said that Rifaat was told by Hafez "take the Haddabe (the Golan Heights), you'll sell it, you'll get paid, and you'll never step in Syria after receiving the money." It is said that he took the ... sold it for the price of one hundred sixty million, I don't know, it has the number six in it, I'm not sure, went to France, and ever since then, he never stepped in Syria and no one has heard anything about him, he didn't take any role, he had never mentioned anything to do with any role, he never told them 'I'd like to be the minister of crap' and never told them 'I want anything.' The Syrian soldiers remained silent throughout the entirety of Bashar's rule. When they started with the uprisings in Syria recently with the Arab Spring protests, there were some people, soldiers, who had the courage to step forward and speak out. They said 'we were in Tiberias, and we were certain that there's no way that anyone would come near us, geographically speaking, we had the upper hand over the Jews, and we were very well-positioned, and we were, and we were, and we were ... Suddenly, out of nowhere, we received an order to retreat!' You're not allowed to ask in Syria.'

Excerpt 5 (Golani-Druze participant who resides in an Israeli-Druze locality).

Anī ben-adám še-eín ló šúm kešér, xóts men Fairuz we-lʔakel, eín lí šúm kešér la-mezráx. Aní ló ohevét šúm davár šekašúr lahaða eššī ellī ana xleqet fī. ló ohevét, ve-haʁbé men el-hadˤabe el-tarbút tabˤetin maʁavít, meúd. Ló yodaʔát má hasibá, ulaíy zé genetiká, ló yodaʔát eíx le-hasbíʁ. Ħatta šeklen, ħatta el-tarbút tabˤeten, ħatta lebsen, ħatta tasˤarrufen, én lahém šúm kešér. metsád šení, ˤamentalíot ve-má še-heʔxilú otám me-befním w-suriyya w-haða, zé tamíd yeš-šaéʁ laˤém. ˤaxšav ahavá la-makóm še-bó noladtá támid yéš, yéš lí aʔavá, yéš lí xibá, yéš lí kén ʁegéš la-makóm, avál metsád šení, zé bedyúk yeléd mevulbál, yeléd še ló yodeˤá mí tsodék, ʔíma šeló ó abá šeló, má yotéʁ tóv ló, pó ó šám, at mev-iná?? Zé kén yotséʁ súg šel belbúl. metsád šení, zé kén yotséʁ ˤám axér, zé kén boné gíl axér, dóʁ axéʁ bexlál veʁuím ét zé, ˤem meúd hesigiím, meúd hesigiím, meúd ʁotsím lehetkadém, lehiót, laʔasút, lehiót axerím vešoním veló domím, afiló el-safá šoná, a-kól šoné… Áz ím ben-adám byoxeð elxamse wϑlaϑīn sine, kíf rbīna bamakóm kmó ˤazzá, garuáʔ beyotér, beʔmet, šúm kedmá, ve-tiʁí otám

ayóm, sí ha-maʾʁaviyút, xiloniím, maskilím beyotér, mehandesím, haytikistím, ve-xolé...bemét, zé, uláy kól el-hisardutiyút hāy wel-ʿirbúv tarbuyót yotséʁ mašú... ħatta el-safá šoná, hakól šoné.

'I am a human being that does not have any connection, other than Fairuz (a Lebanese singer) and the food, I don't have any connection to the Orient. I do not like anything that has to do to this thing that I was born into. I just don't like it, and a lot of people from the Hadˁabe (the Golan), their culture is very Western. I don't know what the reason is (for that), perhaps it's genetics, I don't know how to explain (this). Even the way they look, their culture, their clothing style, their behaviour, they have no connection whatsoever (to the East). On the other hand, their mentality, and what they've been brainwashed with, and Syria and all of that, this they will always have. Now, love to the place that you were born in you'll always have, I have love (for the place), I have affection, I do, in fact, have feelings for the place, but on the other hand, this is exactly a confused child, a child who doesn't know who's right, his mother or his father, what is better for him, here or there, you understand? It does create some sort of bewilderment. On the other hand, this does create a new nation, this does build up a new generation, a completely different one, and we can already see this. They are extremely accomplished, extremely accomplished, very much desiring to advance, to be, to do, to be different and distinguishable, and dissimilar, even speaking a different language, everything is different ... So if someone compares the situation 35 years ago, in which the place we were raised in was like Gaza, completely in dire straits, honestly, no advancement whatsoever, and look at them now, (they are) top-Westernised, secular, highly educated, engineers, high-tech experts etc., honestly, it might be this whole survival thing and the mixing of cultures that create something ... even the language is different, everything is different.'

yesʁaél, kodém kól, zé habʁiʁát mexdál, kí aní amartí veód paʾam aní yagíd, hamaʾʁáv kosém lí yotéʁ, aní ohevét maʾʁáv, aní ohevét dimokʁatyá, aní ohevét še-anaším metkadmím ve-še-kól zé. Aní kén geʔá bamdína hazót ve-kén ohevét otá. Aní ohevét ét yesʁaél besáx hakól baklalí. Yéš lí beʔayót ʿím haʁbé dvaʁím avál maspík še-yéš pó dimokʁatyá. Mexabdím otí ve-ét yeladáy, zé má šexašúv. Paxót gezʾanút klapé bné adám, ló klapé otí išít. Aní boʁaxát me-ha-"ʦaygú otí". Zé kosém lí, avál ʿadayén, aní meúd ohevét ét yesʁaél, meúd, meúd ohevét, meúd geʔá, a-yladím šelí meúd geʔím ba-mdína.

'Israel, first of all, is the default for me, because I have already said this, and I will say it again, I'm more enchanted by the West, I love the West, I love democracy, I love that people advance and all of that. I am, in fact, proud of this country, and I do love it. I love Israel all in all. I do have issues with many things, but at least

it's a democracy. They respect me and my children, that's what it is important. (There is) less racism towards people, not only towards me personally. I run away from the so-called "tag me." I am enchanted by this, nonetheless, I love Israel very much, very much, I love it very much, very proud, my kids are very proud of this country.'

Aní yoda'át še-adór azé hú dóʁ še-ló domé le-kodmáv, zé dór šefá, ve-'asúk be-'inyanáv. Ló me'anyén óto bexlál hasipúʁ. Menutakím legamʁé me-kól a-'inyán šel el-watˤaniyye tabˤet Suriyya wtabˤet Israʔīl, mamaš, én lahem kešéʁ bexlál. dóʁ šliší ve-ʁevií keilú. 'avʁú tahlíx šel yisraelizatsyá, afilú ktsát yotéʁ, hetma'ʁevú 'ad a-sóf, afilú ktsát yotéʁ kitsuní men Israʔīl. Hém ma'ʁaviím legamʁé, ħatta bel-tsurát xaiím tabaˤhen, hirgelé xaiím, ém zé heʁgelé pnáy, mes'adót yotéʁ ma'ʁaviyót meašéʁ otentiyót, vešmuním axúz me-a-oxlosiyá magdiʁá ét 'atsmá xilonít legamʁé šám. agdaʁá šél šeyúx? Ló, hém ló magdiʁím ét 'atsmám yesʁeilím, ve-gám ló suʁím, ló zé ve-ló zé. Hém baketá šel "andefāynd", mamaš, legamʁé. Leda'tí hém imtsú ét zé, hém imtsú ét ha-teʔuryá hādi inno neħna "én lanó zehút", hém ló 'asukím bi-zé gám. Menutakím legamʁé me-kól a-'inyán šel Suriyya. hém ló suʁím, ve-gám ló yesʁeilím. hém imtsú ét ha- "andefāynd"ó"én lanó zehút"legamʁé, ve-hém gám ló 'asukím bi-zé. Ló me'anyén ótam bexlál, ve-hém netmi'ú legamʁé. El-xiloniyút tabaˤhen w-el-haskalá w-el-yotér ma'ʁaviyút kazé lokaxát otám laxšóv tamíd, bexlál latsét me-ha-bu'á hazót le-yotéʁ ʁaxúk yaˤni, hém imtsú kil el-heʁgelím. Hém mesaymím oniveʁsitá pó, nos'ím le-hodú ezé šaná, ve-metaylím 'ém kól a-ma'ʁáv ve-xózʁím le-šegʁát xaiím. A-safá šela-hém šoná. Hí me'odenét, yéš bá aʁbé..., afiló el-safá notá la-l-ma'ʁáv, afiló el-safá, el-sláng šoné, kθīr beyfawto fi inglīzi, kθīr, akθar men el-ˤibrāni, killo me'udán la-taħt, el-[r]ajnabiyyé, w-bimut'u el-ħaki, mušpá' men kil el-kidmá hāy, hatsoréx be-lihyót šoné, el-havdalá. "iħna julaniyyīn, iħna hadˤbawiyyīn", hém ma'tsimím ét 'atsmám ve-mavlitím ét 'atsmám keílu še-hém elitistím yotéʁ, súg šel; elitizém mesuyám "taˤi šufí ˤenna b-el-hadˤabe kīf, kīf le-wlád..." lehyót maskíl ve-šeyehyé lexá ma'mád ve-šetehyé mehandés, status, ve-aní, ve-yéš lí keséf ve-xulé...kθīr maħallāt ló maxnisím drūz men hōn, la ˤarab, wa-la drūz; yahūd kén, ajaneb kén, ha-hém ló ba-statús šelahém. Hém mavdilím ét 'atsmám ˤan drūz israʔīl legamʁé. Kamút ha-hipstʁím šám me-haxí gdolím be-yisʁaél, ma'óz ha-hipstʁím. Ha-kól bá me-"lehavdíl ét atsmexá", me-"lehyót šoné", "atá ló kazé ve-ló kazé, ve-ló metyaméʁ". Súg šél hatʁasá.

'I know that this generation is a generation that is not similar to the previous ones. It's a generation of abundance and is busy in its own thing. (This generation) is completely uninterested in the "story." (They are) completely detached from the whole nationalism of Syria and of Israel, totally, they have no connection whatsoever. I mean when it comes to third and fourth generation.

They had gone through a process of Israelisation, even further, they became completely Westernised, even more extreme than Israel itself. They are totally Western, even in their lifestyle, in their way of living, if it's in their leisure, their restaurants are more Western than authentic, and eighty percent of the population define itself as secular over there. (Is there) a definition of belonging? No. They do not define themselves as Israelis nor as Syrians. Not this and not that. They are totally into the "Undefined" (identity) thing, totally. In my opinion, they have adopted that. They have adopted the theory that "we do not have an identity", and they don't even think about it. They are completely detached from the whole Syrian theme. They are neither Syrians nor Israelis. They have completely embraced the 'undefined' or 'lacking' identity, and they do not even bother themselves with the whole issue. They do not care, and they have fully assimilated. Their secularism, their high education, and their enhanced Westernization kind of drive them always to think, and even to get out of this bubble, to places further than that, they've adopted all the habits. They finish their University studies here (in Israel), and (then) fly to India for nearly a year, and travel like Westerners, and get back to their routine. Their language is different, it's more delicate, it has many ... even the language is kind of Westernised, even the language, the slang is different, they incorporate a lot of English elements, a lot, even more than Hebrew, it's all more delicate, their [r] sounds foreign (as in native English speakers), and they stretch the words, it's all influenced by all this advancement, the need to be different, the distinctness. "We are 'Golani', we are 'Hadˁabe natives'." They empower themselves and give special prominence to themselves as if they are more of the elite, some form of superiority, "come and see how in the Hadˁabe the young ones are ..." to be highly educated, and to have a high status, and to be an engineer, high status, and the "I am", and the "I have money" etc. There are a lot of businesses who don't allow local Druze in, neither Druze nor Arabs. They do allow Jews in, and they do allow foreigners in, those (Druze and Arabs) are not in their league. They differentiate themselves from the Israeli Druze, for sure. The number of hipsters there is one of the biggest in Israel. It's the sanctuary of the hipsters. It's all a byproduct of the need to "differentiate yourself", and "to be distinct", "you are not like this and not like that, and don't pretend to be either." (It's) some sort of defiance.

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