KS

Dorothée Klaus ·
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 255

begründet
von
Klaus Schwarz

herausgegeben
von
Gerd Winkelhane

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN 2003

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 255

Dorothée Klaus

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon – Where to Belong?

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN · 2003

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

Klaus Schwarz Verlag GmbH, Postfach 41 02 40, D-12112 Berlin
ISBN 3-87997-311-3
Druck: Offsetdruckerei Gerhard Weinert GmbH, D-12099 Berlin

ISSN 0939-1940
ISBN 3-87997-311-3

Contents

Acknowledgements

I could not have completed this work without the support and contribution of many friends, mentors, and colleagues. Throughout the four years of research and writing, I spent fruitful periods in Bochum, Oxford, Cairo, Beirut, and Berlin.

Barbara Harrell-Bond (Oxford) welcomed me at the Refugee Studies Program, Oxford University, to outline and prepare my research under her guidance. Elisabeth Picard (Beirut) kindly opened the doors of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches en Moyen-Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) to me by integrating me into its working group on the Palestinians. Riccardo Bocco (Geneva) and the CERMOC/Amman warmly included me on their research team. Heiner Dürr (Bochum) patiently supervised the development of my thesis.

Angelika Neuwirth (Beirut) invited me to stay at the Orient Institute as an associate researcher. Rosemary Sayigh (Beirut) gave me her full attention in discussing the field-research process and generously provided me with materials and information. Gudrun Krämer (Berlin) took time to discuss my work in the context of a workshop on the Lebanon.

The Institute for Development Research and Development Policy (IEE) at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, directed by Wilhelm Löwenstein with an abundance of understanding for the researcher's needs, provided me with all necessary institutional facilities and structural securities. Both the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) furnished me with fellowships to carry out my research and finish my dissertation.

This work could never have been completed without the welcoming generosity of many people in Lebanon who granted me their time and who responded to my questions. I must thank all those who I am unable to name here. I am immensely grateful to those who have shared their friendship with me: Sivine al-Khatib and her cousin Ghada, Bernhard Hillenkamp, Mirella Abdel Sater, Marwan Chebaro, Maher al-Yamani, Clément Zakhia, Omar Nashabi, Tarek Sinno, Toufic al-Zein, and especially Chaza Charafeddine.

Among the many friends who sustained me through their solicitude I wish to thank Ghaith al-Omari (Oxford), Adel Abdel Moneim and Tamer Kirolos (Cairo), Eva Peters (Hamburg), Ingo Niermann and Antje Majewski (Berlin), Samira Gamal (Sana'a), Raphael Gross (Bochum) and Werner Konitzer (Berlin).

I am most grateful of all to my parents, who have enabled me to pursue my studies through their full-hearted support.

List of Acronyms

ANM	Arab National Movement
AUB	American University in Beirut
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
LF	Lebanese Forces
LNM	Lebanese National Front
NFLP	National Front for the Liberation of Palestine
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PA	Palestinian Authority
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
SSNP	Syrian Socialist National Party
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

Palestinian Camps in Lebanon

Nahr al-Bared (Tripoli)
Badawi (Tripoli)
Dbayeh (North of Beirut)
Wavell (Baalbak)
Bourj al-Barajneh (Beirut)
Shatila (Beirut)
Mar Elias (Beirut)
Ain al-Helweh (Sidon)
Bourj al-Shemali (Tyre)
Al-Buss (Tyre)
Rashidiyeh (Tyre)

Nabatiyeh (Nabatiyeh, destroyed by the Israeli army in 1973)
Tell al-Zatar (Beirut, destroyed by Christian militias in 1976)
Jisr al-Bacha (Beirut, destroyed by Christian militias in 1976)

Lebanese Presidents

Beshara al-Khoury	1943-52
Camille Chamoun	1952-58
Fouad Chehab	1958-64
Charles al-Helou	1964-70
Suleyman Franjieh	1970-76
Elias Sarkis	1976-82
Bashir Gemayel	1982 (assassinated)
Amine Gemayel	1982-88
Michel Aoun	1988-89 (appointed by A. Gemayel)
René Mouawad	1989 (assassinated)
Elias Hrawi	1989-99
Emile Lahoud	1998-

Palestinian Camps in Lebanon

Nahr al-Bared (Tripoli)
Badawi (Tripoli)
Dbayeh (North of Beirut)
Wavell (Baalbak)
Bourj al-Barajneh (Beirut)
Shatila (Beirut)
Mar Elias (Beirut)
Ain al-Helweh (Sidon)
Bourj al-Shemali (Tyre)
Al-Buss (Tyre)
Rashidiyeh (Tyre)

Nabatiyeh (Nabatiyeh, destroyed by the Israeli army in 1973)
Tell al-Zatar (Beirut, destroyed by Christian militias in 1976)
Jisr al-Bacha (Beirut, destroyed by Christian militias in 1976)

Lebanese Presidents

Beshara al-Khoury	1943-52
Camille Chamoun	1952-58
Fouad Chehab	1958-64
Charles al-Helou	1964-70
Suleyman Franjieh	1970-76
Elias Sarkis	1976-82
Bashir Gemayel	1982 (assassinated)
Amine Gemayel	1982-88
Michel Aoun	1988-89 (appointed by A. Gemayel)
René Mouawad	1989 (assassinated)
Elias Hrawi	1989-99
Emile Lahoud	1998-

Chronology

1943	Lebanese independence from French colonization
1947	End of British colonization of Palestine
1948	Expulsion and flight of Arab Palestinians from Palestine
	Defeat of Arab armies by Jewish armed forces in Palestine, establishment of Israeli state
1964	Establishment of PLO
	Installation of PLO representative in Lebanon (Shafiq al-Hout)
1966	Collapse of Intra Bank
1967	Arab-Israeli war, defeat of Arab armies
	Israeli occupation of West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem
1969	Cairo Agreement between PLO and Lebanese state
1970/71	"Black September," expulsion of PLO from Jordan
1975	Outbreak of Lebanese civil war
1976	Christian militias attack and destroy Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al-Bacha camps and expel Palestinians and Moslems from East Beirut
	Syrian army enters Lebanon
1982	Israeli army invades Lebanon
	President Bashir Gemayel, head of Kata'ib Party, assassinated
	Massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Shatila by Kata'ib militiamen in Israeli controlled area
1983	Withdrawal of Israeli army to southern Lebanon where occupation continues
1985-1988	"War of the camps"—Bourj al-Barajneh, Shatila, and Rashidiyeh camps are attacked and besieged by Shiite militias
1989	Outbreak of the "first intifada" in occupied West Bank
1989	Lebanese peace accords signed in Taif
1993	Oslo accords, resolution of refugee issue postponed to final negotiations
	Shafiq al-Hout resigns as PLO representative in Lebanon
2000	Withdrawal of Israeli army from southern Lebanon
	Withdrawal of Syrian army from Beirut (except for Palestinian camps) and Christian areas in Lebanon
	Outbreak of the "second intifada"

Introduction

This work is based on extensive field research carried out in Lebanon between April 1997 and June 1998. I conducted over 180 personal interviews with Lebanese and Palestinians of different social, confessional, and local backgrounds. This figure does not include the many informal discussions and encounters with friends and acquaintances that added to my understanding of Palestinian-Lebanese relations in Lebanon. Establishing close contact with various families and individuals allowed me to participate in the region's everyday life.

Preceding the actual field research were six months of study of relevant literature. Five months spent in an intensive Arabic course followed preparation of an outline for the research program. The interviews, some of them quite informal, were mainly conducted in English, but also in French, Arabic, and German. Following the research was a year and a half of writing, during which I returned to Lebanon twice to visit local libraries.

The framework for my research on the Palestinian community emerged during the first six months of preparation for the field. I realized then that most research on the Palestinian community in Lebanon, particularly from an anthropological point of view, had been carried out in the camps. Information on Palestinians living outside the camps, on their relation with Lebanese society and the Palestinian camp inhabitants, was limited.[1] Palestinians in Lebanon were discriminated against by law, deprived of basic rights such as that to work in many professions. I became interested in the survival strategies of those who had become socially, politically, or economically integrated into Lebanese society.

The fact that Lebanon was a highly fragmented country, consisting of a multitude of socially, regionally, and confessionally distinct communities. Posed clear questions regarding the relative extent of integration or segregation on the part of those Palestinian refugees who had arrived in 1948. Politically and economically, Lebanon was in postwar circumstances. The Palestinians were accused of having played a major

[1] For basic studies of the topic see Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies. The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994); Julie Peteet, Gender in Crisis. Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (New York: Colunbia University Press, 1991).

and destructive role during the civil war, and this had an effect on their civil image. Palestinians in Lebanon were without coherent and legitimate political representatives. Shafiq al-Hout, PLO representative in Lebanon from 1964 until 1993, had resigned after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and PLO chairman Yassir Arafat had not replaced him. Several Palestinian leaders took it upon themselves to deal with Lebanese government officials, usually without any wider resonance.

A great many Palestinian refugees felt themselves left without future prospects by the Oslo accords, and in its role as their host country, Lebanon, like Syria, refused to participate in the multilateral negotiations with Israel. Refusing to accept the accords, Palestinian representatives in Lebanon called for steadfastness. Meanwhile, the refugees in the camps endured deteriorating conditions and faced an unknown future. The Lebanese public feared that the international community would arrange to resettle the refugees in Lebanon—an idea a substantial portion of the Lebanese population had been against from the beginning. Because the Lebanese political system relies on a demographically defined balance between the confessional communities, a resettlement—*tawtin*—and naturalization of large numbers of Palestinians was seen as endangering the constitution, since most Palestinians are Sunni Moslems. The sense of insecurity could only be compounded by Lebanon's own future depending on overall regional political developments, since Syria directed national politics from Damascus. Israel occupied the south; following its withdrawal in 2000, it continued to be perceived as a potential threat.

The hostility of the Lebanese towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and to the prospect of integration was paralleled by Palestinian party officials who insisted on the right of return in line with UN resolution 194. In the case of Palestinians now living in Lebanon, this meant a return not to the West Bank or Gaza but to the Mediterranean cities in what had been northern Palestine. While Lebanese and Palestinian officials refused to compromise about this, Palestinians in the negotiation teams in Jerusalem were already thinking about solutions to be addressed in the "final status" discussions due to begin in late 1999.[2] Against this complex and conflict-laden international and domestic backdrop, my research approached the relation between Palestinians and Lebanese from a socio-political vantage point and with the use of

[2] For a general review of the negotiation process see: Salim Tamari, Palestinian Refugee Negotiations. From Madrid to Oslo II. A Final Status Paper. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996.

anthropological research methods, taking into account data on the Lebanese political system and the Lebanese civil war as they were relevant. My intention was to establish a context for the distinct experiences of Palestinians and Lebanese when interacting with each other on a variety of levels. In addition, I was interested in recording mutually held sentiments ranging from resentful to sympathetic in order to help understand the sources of both continuous stalemate and coexistence, that is, the persistence social, political, and economic exchange.

Some Theoretical Premises

My study, then, explores the different frameworks defining the relationship between the Palestinian refugee community and Lebanon as a state and society. To what extent have Lebanese economic, social, and political preconditions enabled or prevented Palestinian integration or segregation? What are the particular moments in which integration has been possible or impossible? Where have tendencies toward segregation developed, and on what grounds? And in what ways has the Palestinian refugee community developed within the fragmented Lebanese environment?

Two prominent theorists from very different historical and academic spheres have strongly influenced my approach to anthropological research: Max Weber and Clifford Geertz. In its emphasis on the importance of sociological or anthropological interpretation of a phenomenon, in contrast to its mere reproduction within a theoretical frame, Geertz's approach, particularly his well-known study of the social dimension of cock-fighting in Indonesia, has been central to my work.[3] This concept of interpretation has two dimensions: it relies on the discourse of the individuals being observed, but it also emerges from the researcher's particular perspective. The interpretation relates data to meaningful structures. The fact that several systems of meaning may coexist needs to be kept in mind when considering a given social field, for the sake of an ethnographical investigation that is at once interpretive and descriptive.

Geertz calls this form of investigation "thick description." It is uninterested in any verification of theories. Instead, it aims at a highly differentiated portrait of discourses and situations within a social context. Any

[3] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

anthropological research methods, taking into account data on the Lebanese political system and the Lebanese civil war as they were relevant. My intention was to establish a context for the distinct experiences of Palestinians and Lebanese when interacting with each other on a variety of levels. In addition, I was interested in recording mutually held sentiments ranging from resentful to sympathetic in order to help understand the sources of both continuous stalemate and coexistence, that is, the persistence social, political, and economic exchange.

Some Theoretical Premises

My study, then, explores the different frameworks defining the relationship between the Palestinian refugee community and Lebanon as a state and society. To what extent have Lebanese economic, social, and political preconditions enabled or prevented Palestinian integration or segregation? What are the particular moments in which integration has been possible or impossible? Where have tendencies toward segregation developed, and on what grounds? And in what ways has the Palestinian refugee community developed within the fragmented Lebanese environment?

Two prominent theorists from very different historical and academic spheres have strongly influenced my approach to anthropological research: Max Weber and Clifford Geertz. In its emphasis on the importance of sociological or anthropological interpretation of a phenomenon, in contrast to its mere reproduction within a theoretical frame, Geertz's approach, particularly his well-known study of the social dimension of cock-fighting in Indonesia, has been central to my work.[3] This concept of interpretation has two dimensions: it relies on the discourse of the individuals being observed, but it also emerges from the researcher's particular perspective. The interpretation relates data to meaningful structures. The fact that several systems of meaning may coexist needs to be kept in mind when considering a given social field, for the sake of an ethnographical investigation that is at once interpretive and descriptive.

Geertz calls this form of investigation "thick description." It is uninterested in any verification of theories. Instead, it aims at a highly differentiated portrait of discourses and situations within a social context. Any

[3] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

generalizing interpretations are only gained through detailed interpretative descriptions of daily events. There is no effort to develop a universally applicable system of laws—but instead a generalized view of a *particular*, that is geographically or heuristically limited, social field.

Cultural studies are naturally incomplete in the sense that a reproduction of reality is impossible. Heuristic and epistemological shortcomings are inevitable. Yet Geertz does not see these consequences as implying an impossibility of research in a social field. Instead, he advocates a type of cultural studies that sticks as closely as possible to concrete social situations and practices, thus producing concentrated or "thick" ethnographies. Geertz describes his approach as (1) generally interpretative and (2) interpretation of social discourses in particular, meaning (3) that situational discourse is related to the wider social context. Like Bourdieu, he emphasizes the *habitus*, the praxis of social rules that in the end affirm or negate ideological concepts and values.[4]

Geertz argues that the tension between ideology, value, and situational (pragmatic) action creates social dynamics. This tension reappears in contributions to social and cultural studies attempting to describe social contexts. The tendency of such efforts has been to emphasize either ideologies and values as prescribing and guiding human action and cultural processes or social and historical events as defining and transforming, social values. This dialectical problem has been discussed in terms of subjective versus objective or functional versus structural phenomena, and in certain philosophical contexts as the question of freedom and constraint. "Thick descriptions" address precisely this tension between situational and particular types of action on the one hand and systems of meaning on the other. The resulting detailed presentation of the social field involves describing the tension instead of treating it as a social paradox or deviation from a norm.

Within Geertz's cultural-theoretical framework, the concept of "meaning" has to be understood as closely related to that of "*value.*" Geertz, however, does not focus on the significance of values and ideology in social contexts. It is Max Weber, who does so, in his wide-ranging analysis of various cultural-historical systems. For Weber, only an approach to ideological concepts as imaginative contexts describing an ideal type of social reality allows an ascription of meaning to empirical data.[5] He assumes a potential incongruence between the ideas guiding

[4] Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
[5] Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr J.C.B., 1980, 1921.

human action and the ideal types used by the social scientist. This marks the point where my research has departed from Geertz' advocacy of methodological adherence to a social scientific discourse. In line with Weber's central argument, I would maintain the absence of any objective social science—rather the presence within that discipline of "ideal" concepts (e.g., identity, Islam, nationalism) allowing us to estimate the meaning of social reality, as in an epistemological looking glass.

I have followed Weber's sociology in attributing primary importance to sometimes intermeshing functional spheres such as economics, politics, and religion. Such spheres, I would argue, precondition culture, thus holding the key to understanding the meaningful structures emerging from a given social context. In this manner, both Geertz's "thick descriptions" and Weber's functional, value-oriented sociology inform the field data—the personal and collective narratives and related forms of discourse—presented in the following pages. Through an analysis of such data, I hope to clarify the conflict between Palestinians and their hosts in Lebanon, as played out in its everyday and political dimensions, as well as its "preconditioned" relation to broader social, economic, and political spheres.

1. *Observation-Linked Dilemmas and Modes of Self-Integration as a Researcher*

1.1. Becoming a Participatory Observer in a Heterogeneous Field

Needing to become familiar with the environment under observation and gain people's trust and confidence, the field researcher is caught in a dilemma. This act of socializing is generally a non-utilitarian act. In general, it is considered highly inappropriate to merge friendly social interaction with an overt interest, be it political, social, or economic. And yet, everyone involved with the researcher knows that the main reason—as it were the hidden agenda—for such social interaction is to study the social patterns of his or her hosts. At the same time, the more the researcher becomes intimately familiar with the latter, the more he or she is expected to forgo a research interest. On several occasions, my own hosts referred disparagingly to people engaging in such self-interest and self-promotion. Typical in that respect are the following remarks of a middle-aged male Palestinian camp inhabitant from Baddawi regarding a much younger female journalist—herself Palestinian--from Beirut:

They do not like her in the camp. She comes for visits to join the social activities here and says she is dedicated to the Palestinian cause. At the same time, she is very pretentious about it. Actually, they laugh about her in the camp. She thinks she can be one of us, but not the way she behaves. She wants to be something special here. She thinks she is better because she lives outside. She thinks she can use the camp to make herself feel as if she is something else.

The researcher's initial role as stranger is an obstacle and a privilege at the same time. To follow Clifford Geertz, the researcher has to transform this stranger-status to that of one who becomes initiated, the degree of initiation varying. At one point in his *Interpretation of Cultures,* Geertz reflects on the turning point following which he was accepted into the Indonesian village he wished to study.[6] The circumstances were ideal: the police, serving as outside enemy, were breaking up a communal gathering, the forbidden cockfights, and both the anthropologist and his wife reacted the same way as their hosts by running away from the police. This behavior pleasantly surprised the villagers, indicating that the couple had chosen to be like them, despite all possible disadvantages.

[6]Geertz 1973

Within Geertz's classical episode, a basis of trust and integration is firmly laid. However, such distinct, socially visible acts of initiation are only feasible in communities that are geographically limited and socially cohesive—and my locus of research was quite the opposite. My intention was not to concentrate on any one of Lebanon's various communities, but to meet as many people as possible, from different communities, Palestinians, *and* Lebanese—the *others*. I could not, of course, expect to receive the same degree of initiation on all occasions.

Marked by deeply felt mutual resentment and animosity, the post-civil war circumstances required a great deal of sensitivity when crossing communal borders. Although people from one community advised me to be careful not to believe *the others*, no one seemed to have any objections to me crossing such borders. Upon doing so, I soon discovered the extent to which, in this context, the categories of truth and falsehood were geographically and socially fixed—there *always* was an opposing perspective. But at the same time truth was not something here located "in between" received notions. Rather, it was attached firmly related to the subject in question and conceived of as an epistemological system with a social dimension.

If I was sitting with people, sipping coffee, smoking cigarettes, chatting and discussing, they assumed that I possibly could not do the same with *the others*. The others I would 'interview,' but it seemed impossible that I could relate to them in an informal and familiar way. For some it was even unimaginable that former mortal enemies might also have family gatherings with lunch, coffee, jokes, children, and countless hours of "hanging around."

Acceptance naturally came more easily when a friend or a family member had invited me, no matter how long I had known the person before. In general, my identity—a German female Ph.D. student, hopefully friendly and polite—was not questioned as much as my intentions. I was fixed more firmly in Lebanon than the majority of journalists or business people, driving around, buying groceries, and so forth like most Lebanese. Knowing the basic setting and being able to speak the local Arabic, I was not one of them but not a complete outsider. My open, clearly defined location in the community also made my identity easier to grasp: I was affiliated to the German Oriental Institute in Zokak al-Blat, and I was staying in the house of a respectable Shiite family. I had already been talking to this or that person, and so-and-so was a good friend.

Discussing social contacts sometimes needed to be approached carefully, with a mind to existing resentments. To mention acquaintance with prominent and wealthy persons was not necessarily tactful in more modest households, and had the potential for causing serious discomfort—having arrived as a stranger, having been welcomed and somehow integrated into a certain household setting for the time being, I now became locatable within the wider communal landscape—but somewhere on the distant, outside end. Inversely, mentioning acquaintance with modest households in wealthier ones created similar irritations, and even generated sarcastic queries such as *Do you really dare eat there, isn't it too dirty and disgusting?* In this more prosperous setting, my contacts with households on the lower end of the social stratum were only accepted as part of my work. The relation was considered time-restricted, for a certain purpose only, and expected not to include the usual forms of social reciprocity of friendship.

Sensitivity regarding my movement between different social levels was more pronounced in the intra-confessional than cross-confessional framework. A Shiite grocer would be much more concerned about my having close friends among a Shiite feudal family than about my visit to the house of a prominent Maronite family. The communal distance with the Maronite bourgeoisie was too great for the visit to have a significant social meaning—perhaps the grocer could not even assess the position of the Maronite family in social terms. At the same time, prominent Lebanese families recognized the influence and social position of families belonging to other confessional groups. Even if one or another group had been a recent political foe, it was seen as completely acceptable for me to have contacts with it, so long as the contacts were on an identical social level. Class-context was thus far more central than confession.

Throughout the time of my field work, my Roman Catholic religious background was never taken very seriously, and my own social background was of little interest—I would be asked if I had a family and siblings, but hardly ever about the living standards of my father or mother. Possessing a social and confessional identity not anchored in a local confessional community, nor in a family, and consequently being endowed with an ambiguous social-symbolic value, tended to serve as a distinct advantage: not being significantly pre-marked in a way posing an obstacle to open conversation about the Palestinian-Lebanese conflict, I was able to enter everywhere. And yet, it was paradoxically apparent to me that my incomprehensibility in terms of belonging was frequently

disconcerting, demanding clarification. Sometimes, I had the impression I was being transferred to a local context in order to fill the information gap. I realized that the statement "I am from the south" (of Germany), *min al-janub*, would stir associations with the particular meaning of *al-janub* in Lebanon. Once, a Shiite artist who perceived me as socially lost, simply integrated me into the Shiite family of a friend because he thought I looked like one of their daughters; to him, I became Dorothée Charafeddine. Family names readily indicated a person's locus: regional origins, confession, class. *People here are curious*, I was told. *They will insist on knowing who you are*, meaning my social and confessional identity. This was the primary basis for dealing with other people in general: how much respect they were owed; gauging how careful one had to be during conversation not to say the wrong thing. In this way, I began to sense what it would mean for a refugee to arrive in such an environment.

The extent to which one remains neutral and impartial in the field is largely a question of one's particular program, personality, and circumstances. On the one hand, it is impossible not to become involved somehow. On the other hand, the anthropologist's hybrid status prevails: it is impossible to abandon one's role as outsider, impossible to gain full confidence of one's hosts and fully integrate into their daily life. As long as I pursued my professional interest, my hosts could not be sure whether I was staying with them out of pleasure at their company or mere curiosity—and I could not be entirely sure myself. When does field-research time end and private time begin? There were of course dates and meetings , announced by telephone call or personal introduction. But such official meetings tended to turn into relaxed get-togethers, family members or friends joining in and leaving, the roles of researcher and object of research distinctly switched. Inversely, a simple shopping foray could unintentionally change into a research situation when a person met by accident showed promise of being an interesting interviewee.

I found myself embroiled in a standard parking-space battle on the jammed streets of Beirut one busy morning. My car had managed to dent one of several others, and my insurance having expired two days before, I had to arrange a special deal with the insurance company. I ended up chatting with the person responsible, a Lebanese Shiite man around thirty from Bourj al-Barajneh who lived near one of the Palestinian camps, and I took the opportunity to visit his family—he was the perfect informant for learning more about Palestinian-Lebanese relations from his generation's perspective. In general, I did not hide the fact that any person I met was of potential research interest.

Such a stance was in fact necessary if I was to establish a broad social network taking in as many social patterns as possible. I wanted to avoid the trap of following certain network-"paths" and missing others. This is because qualitative research has to develop its own control-measures when generalizing arguments are being drawn from empirical data, since such research does not produce a statistically secured representational survey of a social context. One of my main indicators of generalizable statements or instances of social behavior was repetition in comparative social contexts.[7]

It became a sort of obsession on my part to turn any encounter into a research situation. This attitude could provoke resentment. Once I was invited to join a Ramadan *iftar* (the fast- breaking after sunset) with a Palestinian family. The men were absent except for some of the sons. One of the aunts had come back from Dubai and now saw me for the first time. She voiced strong and certainly justified antipathy about being an object of my research—this despite my efforts to avoid radiating inquisitiveness, my cheerful participation in the story-telling process. In light of such experiences, I ended up avoiding homes where I caused discomfit—or felt uncomfortable--as much as possible, despite their potential usefulness for my project.

Three years earlier, I had conducted research in Egypt on the impact of Coptic monasteries on the Coptic community, returning there after submitting my thesis In Germany. I quickly noticed that both friends and acquaintances now approached me in a much more relaxed way than before. Some confessed that they had never felt comfortable in my presence, since they could never forget that I was there to observe their behavior and discourse. In Lebanon, I thus struggled not to furnish the same impression—an approach that itself. However, this proved utterly wrong in some circumstances, people often suspecting a lack of seriousness in the absence of a recorder and notebook. For Palestinians in the camps, it was especially important that I register their suffering and aspirations. In such a context, conveying official status as a bona fide researcher and not a guest took on importance.

[7] With reference to discussions with Rosemary Sayigh.

1.2. Trust and Transparency

In the course of my research, I had many opportunities to listen in on one or another intra-Lebanese political debate or discussion. Often, I would at some point be asked, spontaneously, to voice my own opinion. At such moments, offering a vague comment meant to placate both sides was frequently clearly deemed insufficient. In these cases, especially when it came to urgent issues, I was meant to have a distinct opinion—hence to become a "real" person, moving beyond my hybrid role, neutral-yet-friendly observer. And yet, I did not always have a clearly-shaped political opinion, preferring to reflect on different vantage points rather than towing a certain political line expected from me. It is quite likely that on some occasions, such reluctance placed me under a degree of suspicion, being read as a refusal on my part to become transparent.

In any event, in view of the explosive nature of my area of research, such suspicion did not need a concrete source such as my silence. The most menacing suspicion was of secretly participating in a feasibility study for pre-existing plans to resettle Lebanon's Palestinian refugees elsewhere than Palestine. While I took pains to clarify both my research purpose and institutional affiliations, the explanations were not always accepted—my identity was difficult to pinpoint and I appeared to either keep switching sides or have no side whatsoever. Moreover, research for the sake of more knowledge was suspicious because incomprehensible. Why was I so interested in a top political taboo, an issue in which a number of national governments and local actors were thought to be planning something, if there was no practical purpose? Who was really behind me and where did my money come from? Where was my university? Were there any German, American or Israeli interests involved? My repeated explanation that I was funded by Germany's Institute for Development Research and Development Policy only confirmed the suspicions—reinforced, in turn, by the fact that some researchers around were indeed working in the interest of one or another state.

In an overt suggestion that such was the case for me, I was told about familiar public figures who were discovered to be working for the Israeli secret service. Lebanon has a tradition of hosting spies. Shaykh Fadlallah, the Shiite leader in Lebanon and a man close to Hizballah, remarked in an interview that Lebanon preserved its existence because of its role for foreign powers it as a microcosm for the conflicts in the

Middle East.[8] These conflicts have obvious political and militarily but also intellectual repercussions in the Lebanese arena. Spies and agents were thus familiar figures, and it was probably more disturbing not to be able to detect for whom they were working, as was seen to be my case, than to ascertain their existence.

All in all, I thus encountered a great deal of suspicion, sometimes by those unconvinced that I was looking for some information in particular. It was enough that I was generally interested in the functioning of the whole system, the presumption being that, with the status of something between a spy and a foreign-government agent, I would observe and enter the system, then furnishing hints to my handlers about how to destroy it, hacker-like, from within. The situation framing such feelings had not changed much since the civil war, when all factions had had their agents and informants. Because the balance of power in Lebanon was always delicate, it was essential to be aware of who was allied with whom, where one's own potential friends or enemies were to be found. Apart from politicians who had been excluded since the war from the political decision-making processes, it was in fact mainly men who had formerly worked or still were working for one of the secret services (*mukhabarat*) who doubted my unaffiliated political identity. Their attitude toward me sometimes smacked of conspiratorial confidentiality: *Come on, don't tell me stories. I know, and you know, how we work.* This conspiratorial fraternization was at once upsetting and amusing—I was unable to convince them that I was *not* a spy.

During a political argument I had with a Maronite activist, he mentioned some secret files in order to bolster his case: always suspicious about such allusions, I asked him how he had got access to the files. Dryly and sarcastically, he responded that I probably knew much better than he did. And even if one began to doubt my spying identity, one could put forward the argument that many *mukhabarat* were *mukhabarat* without knowing—they merely had been integrated into research or professional institutions in order to serve the same purpose. Some alleged spies I met did have ways of conveying their particular political attachments. They would express the hope that I as well would give a sign of recognition, a sign such as the tie with Stars and Stripes one individual wore at our meeting.

[8]Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, The Palestinians, the Shia'a, and South Lebanon. Journal of Palestine Studies, no.2, winter 1987.

1.3. Plots and Conspiracy Theories

Although I knew that I would never hear anything considered really "top secret," it was still interesting to hear what speakers had classified as such. There was no consensus regarding the past, and many topics were simply not discussed in public. There was no institutional means of legitimizing a particular historical truth, neither an independent judicial system nor a commonly held historical grounding. Truth could always be easily manipulated, an entire culture of rumor, plots, and "unconfirmed" information proliferated. The instability of the Lebanese system created a steady dynamic of factional forming and splitting. Part of this process involved communication about political protagonists and events, oral propaganda being as important whereas the propaganda spread by the media. For politicians it was essential to have agents or sympathizers among the people: an inestimable advantage in an environment where oral communication and debate informed public and private life. Dominant political figures mobilized people during elections in particular, visiting houses, listening, and persuading. Every party and politician had agents on the ground, staying in contact and keeping the clientele loyal.

In this manner, an intensive process of exchanging and discussing information was unfolding within a highly politicized society--politicized in that politics were part of daily life, taking on deeper existential meaning the closer one felt to apolitical leader. This system seemed to substitute for transparently articulated public opinion. In regions where one party exercised strong control, it was unwise to publicly voice any criticism. Here such criticism, sometimes very harsh indeed, was voiced in familiar circles, not in the presence of strangers. And inversely, violent criticism of opponents could be spread to harm or destroy them, sometimes on grounds containing some grains of truth, as often not.

Naturally I had to accept that my research could be used or abused for political ends. Although I did not intend to produce a politically oriented study, my anthropological perspective could eventually clash with the political opinions acknowledged and accepted in the Lebanese political arena. Viewing social contexts in a manner running contrary the interests of various political groupings could easily be sensed as a threat by members of the Lebanese power elite.

The main sense of threat involved a programmatic deviation from the two dominant discourses concerning the Palestinian community in Lebanon. One form of discourse centered around an unequivocal Palestinian demand to return to Palestine. The other was the Lebanese argument

that Lebanon was incapable of accepting a Palestinian presence, either armed or civil—this in turn harmonizing with the principle of an absolute right to return. In approaching the Palestinian refugee community not as socially and ideologically cohesive, but rather as a community with many fault-lines reflecting manifold factors, my research was certainly at considerable remove from both the Lebanese and Palestinian positions. And I generally made no effort to disguise the difference in perspective. Although I did acknowledge valid elements in both the Palestinian and Lebanese political standpoints, I also thought that they had proved highly convenient in that they guaranteed a certain status quo. Palestinian parties could keep their autocratic grip on the camps' inhabitants, claiming to be their sole legitimate representatives. The Lebanese did not have to move away from their repressive policy towards the Palestinians—a neglect of basic social and economic rights that had been exercised from the beginning: from this standpoint, in the context of limited Lebanese resources, relief, not social-economic development, was what was required while waiting for the return.

For their part, Palestinian political activists spoke to me of the need to practice steadfastness for another fifty years. I would then meet camp inhabitants who, in the aftermath of dispersion, brutality, flight, and destruction, nurtured above all one, rather non-programmatic wish: an end to suffering and destitution. While the intent of my research was not to legitimate or not legitimate any particular position, I consequently did develop a great distaste for the arrogance of political activists ignorant of the suffering of those they claimed to represent. I saw that the stalemate between Lebanese and Palestinian officials was enhancing the resignation of the refugees in the camps. Left without representation and politically paralyzed, they based their hopes and fears on foreign visitors passing through the camps—visits that generated assumptions about imminent decisions by the international community concerning their future. At one time it was Canada, at other times the Scandinavian countries, that would surely open their borders for them soon.

It was such an atmosphere, characterized by a lack of transparency or participation in decision- processes, as well as the absence of knowledge of the Israeli adversary's real situation or even the actual, historical sequence of past events, that particularly encouraged the circulation of wild plot-rumors and conspiracy-theories throughout the entire Lebanese arena.

In the absence of a grounding for true political analysis, theories of this sort thrived about who was responsible for the war, who had been or was still conspiring to bring the country down or sell it out in his own interests.

Deeply distorted pictures of the Lebanese conflict, pictures overlain with a spectrum of ideologically-motivated interpretations, were widespread and common. To be sure, the theories were supplied with a concrete basis by a war in which warring factions had continued to shift alliances in sometimes breath-taking ways.

The conspiracy theories harmonized with a rich range of actual plots that had made Lebanon a nearly impenetrable social and political quagmire during the war—an endless series of assassinations, invasions, displacements and short-term coalitions, all aimed at destabilizing the country and altering its balance of power. It was evident to me that the ongoing, persistent communication having to do with past or current plots, , in various, sometimes contradictory versions revealed the intense suspicions continuing in the same country, showed the mistrust that continued to stamp relations between factions, parties, communities. Mistrust had not disappeared after the war—one core statement, repeated in many modulations, was *I cannot trust* anyone, anyone *in this country, except for my parents and maybe my siblings.* Myths about *the others,* once the basis of fear and terror had been neither demolished nor relativized—they *were* sometimes merely placed in a corner, sometimes kept "on hold."

As a result of their basic nature—centered on the question of who is supporting or manipulating whom or is engaging in strategic alliances, eliminating opponents and rivals, planning to overtake a territory, a constituency, a leadership—both real plots and conspiracy theories are self-evident elements in a political system with a constant potential for drastic upheaval. In turn, talking about plots means reflecting on this dynamic structure. Sometimes, when participating in such talk myself, I would be gripped by intense curiosity about details, connections, the people involved. As an anthropologist, I was in fact meant to decode meanings by putting them into broader or narrower contexts. But these meanings were meant to emerge, for instance, from ordinary day-to-day conversation. I was not supposed to pursue "political secrets"—especially as I was not supposed to be writing an account of alliances, intrigues, plots, and conspiracies. While realizing that I risked endangering my research, I occasionally could not resist going as far as possible in this direction, hoping to register the moment when an answer was refused because it was "secret." Mostly this involved information about military activities, or about previous political activities of those being interviewed or their former comrades.

The more I felt that people were reluctant to discuss a certain topic or were trying to hide something, the more I became fascinated and expected a piece of illuminating information. However, even the most

secret, the most sensational information could not really lead me to what I was looking for. All I could gain was one of a myriad scraps of knowledge in a vast range of scattered information. At some point, I recalled those myths in which the protagonist almost loses his cause by rushing for a phantom of glimmering gold, then finding what he has been looking for unexpectedly, in the course of a haphazard encounter. II had, then, to realize that the most banal stories about who was getting married to whom were more important than those about the involvement of so-and-so in this or that bombing.

2. Some Basic Patterns of Lebanese Society

2.1. Unsettled Populations: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanese Migrants, and the Displaced

As my research was centered on Palestinians in Lebanon within their Lebanese host society, it was necessary to understand the wider postwar environment. No matter if they had stayed or left, people I would meet had been affected by a civil war for at least fifteen years. A prominent feature of the Lebanese political system was its power division according to the (presumed) demographic size of various confessional communities.[9] One of the causes of the war had been a diminished acceptance of this political arrangement as the status quo. The arrangement was closely linked to the interests of the politicians heading the communities: the patrons. In this context, the following background information is relevant for the discussion that follows.

In 1989, after almost fifteen years of war, former members of Lebanon's parliament met in Taif, Saudi-Arabia, to agree upon a new Lebanese constitution.[10] The Taif accords largely reaffirmed the prewar Lebanese political system in that political power was proportionately distributed on a confessional basis. The prewar distribution of parliamentary seats had been in a 5:5 ratio of Christians to Moslems. It was altered to 6:5 in favor of the Moslem community. Of the various Christian communities in Lebanon, the Maronite is the largest, followed by the Greek-Orthodox. The Muslim community is comprised of Shiites, Sunnis, and Druze. Although Shiites are more numerous, they were granted less political influence on the national level than the Sunnis, which again meant confirmation of the pre-war system of power distribution.

The distribution of the highest political positions on a confessional basis also remained unaltered. The president was to be Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the leader of parliament a Shiite. Greek-Orthodox ministers were to hold significant portfolios such as the ministry of the

---

[9]Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic. Modernization in Lebanon. New York: Random House, 1982. p. 35, has termed the time-honored figure of six Christians to five Moslems—it relied on a census carried out during the French Mandate in 1932—legitimating Lebanese political-power distribution on a national level a myth. An update of this census has never been carried out.

[10] Theodor Hanf, Koexistenz im Krieg. Staatszerfall und Entstehen einer Nation im Libanon. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990. p. 725ff.

interior or foreign affairs. The Druze community was not represented in official positions.

The policies of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri (1992-98) dominated the political scenery of Lebanon at the time I was carrying out my research. His government focused on the reconstruction of Lebanon, particularly its capital, as an economic center of the Arab world: it was to become a "Singapore of the Middle East." This process was underlined by highly visible projects such as the rebuilding of the infrastructure and downtown area of Beirut. It aimed to make Lebanon suitable for regional development once the borders between Lebanon and Israel had been opened, a peace treaty had been signed, and Lebanon had been freed from Israeli occupation in the south. Hariri had promoted ambitious reconstruction projects leading to heavy state overspending. He aimed to attract foreign investment, provide a necessary infrastructure, and point to a possible future.

Many Lebanese wanted to believe in such a future. The successful businessman Hariri, fortune made in Saudi-Arabia, seemed to be its incarnation. Minds turned to what was often referred to as Lebanon's golden age, when the country had profited from tourism and foreign investment and held a central role in trade and financial transactions between the Arab Gulf countries and the Western world. The widespread, quasi-mythical memories of Lebanon as a booming, luxurious Arab haven gravitated around Beirut's the downtown district with its lavish hotels and night-life in the Lebanon of the 1960s and early 1970s. The war years having made life unbearable and people being exhausted, the promise of a Lebanon returned to what "it had been before", was fervently welcomed. [11]

At first, concrete hopes were as high as the promises. Lebanese emigrants started to return, pouring money made abroad into the consumer industry. But soon they left again, having discovered that market and job opportunities were in fact extremely limited. Continued insecurity over Lebanon's future and extremely untrustworthy paying habits added to the new exodus of commercially-oriented Lebanese returnees. Investments in the real estate sector had not produced the expected trickle-down effects. They had not added to the creation of a

[11]Georges G. Corm, La Politique de Reconstruction de la 2eme République. In: Le Liban à l'heure des négociations de paix au Proche-Orient. Actes du Colloque organisé par le CAIL en association avec le Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) à Paris les 15 et 16 Décembre 1995.

productive economic sector. Rather, they had added to skylines of empty buildings.

Nevertheless, with a visionary future dominating the political landscape, reflection on what Lebanon had become after the war, socially and politically, was neglected. Taboos about restructuring political-power division and participation were accepted out of fear of renewed internal instability. In general, the priority of economic development and the attraction of investment obscured the need to reflect critically on a political system meant to return to constitutional and institution-based praxis. Instead of respecting the sovereignty of legitimate procedures for creating legislation, the Hariri cabinet tended to circumvent them. Corruption in government administration became as accepted as it had been during and before the war.

With the exception of Hizballah and the Palestinian factions that had retreated to the camps, the militias were disarmed in line with the Taif accords of 1989.[12] These accords reaffirmed the basic governing structure of Lebanon and served as a reconciling amendment to the unwritten National Pact of 1943 (*mithaq al-watani*). Whereas the warring factions in Lebanon were integrated into the new government, the Palestinians, who had contributed significantly to the war, were completely marginalized, and left without any recognition in the process of reconciliation and political restructuring. This was, in effect, a continuation of the policy of refusing responsibility for the refugees that had been the reaction of the Lebanese State ever since they arrived. Now as then, this responsibility was instead attached to the international community, to Israel, and to a hypothetical Palestinian State.

In 1998, the official number of registered refugees from Palestine furnished by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was 367,610, which was roughly ten percent of the population of Lebanon.[13] Of these refugees, about 200,707 were living in eleven camps. Typical of their conditions were extremely overcrowded houses with often no more than one room per floor, along with unpaved streets and alleys often with open sewage. Such conditions ostensibly demonstrated the intermediary status of the refugees: expecting and expected to return to their homelands and segregated from the host environment.

[12]For these accords, see The Beirut Review, vol.1, no.1, Beirut, 1991. pp. 119-172.
[13]UNRWA statistics, December 31, 1998.

Palestinian parties of a militia character (*tanzimat*) controlled the refugees. The camps in the north and around Beirut were under the control and surveillance of Syrian proxies. These were mainly the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command or *al-qayada al-ama*) and a renegade fraction of Fatah called Fatah Intifada or Fatah Abu Moussa. The Christian camp of Dbayeh was exceptional in lacking any *tanzimat*. Arafat's Fatah dominated the camps in the south, close to the border with Israel, with factions of the Islamist Hamas also present. Ain al-Helweh, located next to Sidon and the largest of the Palestinian camps, suffered from persistent indecision about who was in control: Instead of one popular committee representing the camp to the outside world and being responsible for internal organization—the case in all the other camps with the exception of non-politicized Dbayeh- three political committees were fighting over the representational role. Constant disagreements made it impossible for aid agencies to deliver effective services within the Ain al-Helweh camp, and inhabitants described life within as extremely dangerous. The Islamist groups gaining ground included the Moslem Brotherhood (*jamaa al-islamiya*),[14] the Jihad, and a radical group called *al-ansar*. This latter group was held responsible for terrorist acts both in the camp and in the nearby town of Sidon, including murder and the bombing of shops selling alcohol. Arafat's Fatah subsequently tried to regain its former position, recruiting followers by paying salaries, although Fatah had lost credibility after Arafat signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, seen as leaving left the Palestinian refugees living outside of Palestine without consideration.

Because of the unstable security situation, the Ain al-Helweh camp was seen as a hideaway for criminals operating in the vicinity and destabilizing the city of Sidon—after the Lebanese army ousted the Palestinians from areas around Sidon in 1991, Palestinian militias retreated to the camp, gradually engaging in increasingly intense feuding, including acts of great mutual violence. Rumors about the Lebanese army planning to enter the camp spread. But the Palestinian question being essentially absent from the Lebanese government's agenda, the unclear and unstable situation simply continued.

Since Syria had rejected the Oslo Accords, Lebanon was also absent from the multilateral "Working Group on Refugees," convened after the

---

[14] The Lebanese Moslem Brotherhood claimed to have no direct links with the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, which ws engaged in a violent battle against the Egyptian government; the Lebanese group did sympathize with the more moderate Islamic groups in Egypt. See: Interview with Zuhayr Ubaydi, leading member of *al-jamaa al-islamiya*. The Lebanon Report. vol.5, no.8, 1994. See also Nizar Hamzeh: Lebanese Islamism: A Guide to the Groups. Middle East Quarterly, September 1997. p. 49.

signing of the accords. But the refugees found themselves not only cut off from the negotiations between Palestinian representatives vis-à-vis Israel, but also vis-à-vis the Lebanese government itself. When Shafiq al-Hout resigned in protest of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Yassir Arafat refused to appoint a successor. Since the forced retreat of all Palestinian organizations (civil *and* military) into the camps, most Palestinian political party representatives were unwelcome guests in Lebanese political offices. In this manner, the question of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was left unsolved, the camps becoming de facto autonomous territories on Lebanese soil.

The large numbers of Lebanese migrants and displaced persons who had lost their homes during the war, many squatting in Beirut and its suburbs, continued to be a heavy burden on the social and political structure of the Second Republic. As was stipulated in Taif, all displaced persons had the right to return. However, despite the creation of a portfolio for them, action was delayed indefinitely—and many in any case had little enthusiasm for such a process.

A friend of mine, an architect, sometimes returns to his house in the Shouf to work on weekends. But every night, he locks his doors and closes the shutters carefully. He always is scared. Once, there was graffiti sprayed on the house telling him to stop showing up. Others have sold their houses and land for good. Some profit though.[15]

Shiites and Christians in the southern occupied zone were still waiting for the liberation of their land. Many settled in urban areas where job opportunities were better than in the abandoned rural periphery. To the extent that they were not able to integrate economically and socially within the urban setting, these people—still registered in the villages of their origin, where they most often spent weekends and holidays—were now without political representation or any connection to the political elite, i.e. their situation was the same as that of the Palestinian refugees. Lodged in the ruins of half-destroyed houses, the displaced would be compensated with several thousand dollars per house (not per family) before forced evacuation. The suburban migrant districts of Beirut were in a state of infrastructural catastrophe, with streets too narrow for the heavy traffic and insufficient water and sanitation everywhere due to illegal construction. People expressed general dissatisfaction with the lack of governmental services.

[15] Maronite male, student of architecture, 22, Hadath near Beirut.

We are made to live like animals as if we are humans of a lower standard.[16]

We are living in a house belonging to a Saudi businessman. There are no windows, no running water. No one is there to take care of us. If someone gets sick and we have to go to the hospital, we cannot pay. They would let us die on the threshold. The Palestinians over there in the camp are far better off; at least they have UNRWA.[17]

Mutual resentment resulting from the influx of displaced persons and migrants to Beirut thus developed between the Sunni and Shia communities. The Sunnis perceived Beirut as a stronghold now flooded with Shiite migrants. Members of the bourgeoisie, in particular, had seen their former residential areas taken over by squatters from the south and the Baalbak region.

Look how they walk down the street. This is a city, not a village! (He aggressively drives down the street.) *Move! They are dirty and smelly. They don't know how to dress or behave. They are just learning how to live in a city. Every time I meet someone from Bourj al-Barajneh* [southern suburb] *in the elevator, I have to close my nose. They came and took our houses. Now they want money from the government to move out. They are stealing! They all have their houses somewhere in their villages! They should go back!*[18]

Both the government's will and capacity to support integration of this part of the population economically, politically, and socially was limited. Since much of the housing in the southern suburbs was built illegally, the government disclaimed responsible for the basic infrastructure. But clearly, a large community's exclusion from the state within which it functions will generate intense antagonism, in the Lebanese context easily sliding toward subversion. This was particularly the case for the confessional parties of the Shiite Hizballah and the Sunni fundamentalist groups.

---

[16]Male Shiite teacher, 45, in southern suburb of Beirut.

[17]Maronite female, about 40, refugee from the occupied zone in southern Lebanon, currently staying in Dbayeh.

[18] Male Sunni architect from Beirut, 30, on-site conversation.

2.2. Continued Fear and Trauma in a Multiconfessional Environment

Displacement during the war was primarily due to confessional strife. Starting with the violent expulsion of Palestinians and Moslem Lebanese from East Beirut in 1975, Maronite militias homogenized areas that previously had been confessionally mixed. Most of the generation born at the start of the war had not seen places half an hour or less away from where they lived. It was impossible for them to cross the confessionally fixed lines dividing Lebanon. Some stayed for years in their immediate living quarters.

The territory of Lebanon had thus fallen apart into a multiplicity of segregated areas. After the war, checkpoints still in existence were controlled by the Syrian or Lebanese army, with the exception of the southern occupied zone under Israeli control. Previous divisions hindering people from moving freely had now solidified. Some areas were visibly demarcated, heavy red house-graffiti such as cross, hammer and sickle, crescent indicating the political fiefdoms of particular parties.

Crossing from one part to another could be life threatening if one was not of the right confession or political affiliation, the fear accompanying a crossing of former demarcation-lines thus taking on central importance. Many Lebanese expressed a constant feeling of insecurity when visiting areas belonging to the former enemy, areas avoided whenever possible. A Maronite living in Ain al-Rumaneh, a Christian suburb of Beirut, would for instance not cross the street separating it from Chiyah, today an exclusively Shiite area.

I have nothing to do there, I know no one. And there still is a feeling deep down that it is dangerous.[19]

I was acquainted with a Sunni university professor, looking desperately for a cheap apartment in a well-to-do area of Beirut, who refused an otherwise suitable offer because the house was located in Christian Ashrafieh, formerly a confessionally mixed quarter. And I knew a Maronite male student from Hadath, near Beirut, who had never been to Baalbak or Tyre (both now mainly Shiite) or the Shouf (now mainly Druze). And I noticed that people were willing to drive huge distances to avoid areas that had been dangerous during the war. A thirty year old Beiruti Sunni never drove through an area formerly occupied by Shiite

[19] Maronite female lawyer, 30, Ain al-Rumaneh.

militias and now by Shiite squatters despite its being the shortest way from his house to work.

What if my car breaks down or something happens to me? There would be no one I could ask for help. What if it happens during the night?

The Lebanese Sunnis claimed Tripoli, Sidon, and even Beirut as their cities, while the Shiites claimed the south, Baalbak, and Hermel. The Druze claimed the Shouf and the Maronites the Kisrwan and Metn. In contrast, Palestinians in postwar Lebanon did not have a specific territory. Although the camps were often viewed as such territory, these were in fact limited spaces within territories belonging to others. While some areas of Beirut had a high percentage of Palestinians, for example the area between Sabra and Mazraa or Ras Beirut and Hamra, they were not considered Palestinian districts. Neither could those Palestinian conglomerations in the south between Sidon and Tyre, the so-called *tajammuat*, be called Palestinian: they were themselves islands within a Shiite environment.[20]

When the PLO disappeared from the Lebanese scene in 1982, the territory controlled by the Palestinian militias had to be abandoned. The Palestinian- controlled camps remained the only areas where some sort of refuge seemed to be offered, some sort of safety felt. Even after being able to move out, many Palestinians thus preferred to live close to the camps, still considering them home despite the lower social status they connoted.

It is easier to live in the camp. Everyone is Palestinian, and everyone knows each other. You feel secure; it is cozy and familiar. Outside the camp, the atmosphere is hostile. During the war, we went through a lot of difficulties. We were always scared that the militias would enter the house and take our men with them. My husband and my eldest sons finally fled.[21]

This woman defined her feelings as very much influenced by her experiences during the late 1980s. The Shiite militia known as Amal (*al-muqawama al-lubnaniya* [Lebanese Resistance]) had then engaged in a fierce struggle to eliminate the Palestinian civil and military presence in

[20] There are also some Palestinian *tajammuat* in the north: Shabriha, al-Wasta, al-Itaniyyeh, al-Qasmiyyeh, Abu al-Aswad. They are included in the areas of UNRWA service.
[21] Palestinian female Sunni, about 45, Bourj al-Barajneh.

their areas of control. It is striking that her perspective does not, in fact, match the historical experience of the camps' inhabitants—the massacres, the complete destruction of the camps with heavy civilian losses (Dbayeh, Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al-Bacha in 1976, Nabatieh in 1979, Shatila in 1982), the long sieges (Shatila, Bourj al-Barajneh, Rashidiyeh between 1985 and 1987). By the time of my research, the Palestinian organizations and militias had turned the camps into sites of relative insecurity, a situation registered by many of those still living there.

It is impossible to live in Ain al-Helweh. It is dangerous; I cannot invite you to stay with us. It is a little like Chicago.[22]

Christian Palestinians had reached the point where they felt there was no secure haven for them in Lebanon. They had been in danger in Christian areas controlled by anti-Palestinian militias, but after moving to the Moslem-controlled west, they encountered anti-Christian resentment, threats, and military actions.

I could not leave the two square miles around Mazraa controlled by militias we had known for several years.[23]

With countless rounds of fighting, improbable shifts of alliances, and widespread destruction of civil and social life, the war had left its mark on everyone—naturally in terms of opposing perspectives. In the eastern part of Beirut, Palestinians were seen as the aggressors who had triggered the first rounds of war.

Suddenly the Palestinians attacked our quarters. We were not prepared but everyone took his gun, no matter what age, to defend ourselves. It was pure self-defense.[24]

Every night I was afraid to go to sleep. The front was very close and sometimes the Palestinians hit inside our area. My mother comforted me by promising that the Kata'ib were patrolling all night long beneath our house and that no Palestinian could ever enter. One afternoon I stood on the balcony. They dragged a man by his feet down the street. I laughed

[22] Palestinian female, about 35, Ain al-Helweh.
[23] Greek-Orthodox male journalist, 35, Palestinian origin with Lebanese nationality, Beirut.
[24] Maronite male, 40, owner of advertising company, Sin al-Fil.

and exclaimed, "Look, what a nice red scarf he has around his neck!" Then my mother told me it was blood. It was a Palestinian being dragged by the Kata'ib.[25]

Correspondingly, across the Green Line in the west it was the Maronite Kata'ib or the Lebanese Front (Christian militias) that were perceived as the aggressor.

The Lebanese Front attacked. They invaded the port and killed several hundred Moslems. Tell al-Zatar, Jisr al-Bacha, Dbayeh were destroyed, the Shiite enclave of al-Nabaa was "cleaned". We took our weapons and fought with the Palestinians to defend ourselves.[26]

The fighting was terrible. It didn't stop. Our house was on the front line, directly. When we returned years later, nothing was stolen. It had been too dangerous to enter. When the [Christian militia] *massacre of Sabra and Shatila happened, fear spread like waves through the country. We were in Tyre but we could feel that something terrible had happened.*[27]

With its agents, entanglements, and variegated sources of conflict, the war was difficult to grasp for anyone. Narratives about the war could be kaleidoscopically differentiated or narrowed down to one perspective, fed by the slogans of the militias; they could be completely apolitical and personalized. One sort of narrative both externalized all causal factors and rendered the Lebanese into simple victims; serving as a narrative of forgetfulness, it allocated the source of violence to foreign powers.

This was not our war. It was the war of others. It was a war of the Syrians against the Palestinians, the Palestinians against the Israelis, the Israelis against the Syrians, the Iraqis against the Syrians, the Egyptians against the Americans, the Iranians against the Americans, the Americans against the Soviets and so on. It was a war of the weapons dealers, the drug dealers, and other terrorists using our territory and destroying our country.[28]

---

[25]Maronite female, lawyer, 30, Ain al-Rumaneh.
[26]Shiite male, teacher and businessman, about 35, southern suburbs
[27]Shiite female, artist, 34, southern suburbs.
[28]Greek Catholic male, Palestinian origin, Lebanese nationality director of an insurance company, about 60, Dbayeh.

Trust in the political agendas and institutions of leaders and parties had vanished, since their involvement with the militias seemed to mainly serve their own personal interests. Obscure alliances and military actions led to something like a creeping, willful ignorance about the war and its protagonists, as events became increasingly irrational, concrete political interests increasingly less apparent. Framed by lack of any plausible peace plan or even any willingness of the warring parties to negotiate, personal disappointment, an inability to overview events, and sheer personal trauma meant that identifying with self-proclaimed political representatives, indeed any interest in politics, grew less and less likely.[29] Nevertheless, one strategy for gaining popular support was still

---

[29]Such a picture emerges from citations such as the following:

My parents sent me to France to stay with a stepfamily. It was too dangerous for me to stay in Lebanon, they thought. I was spraying graffiti all over. Against everyone. Against the quwat [Lebanese Forces], *against all the militias, politicians. I was full of hatred against them. I would even insult them personally. I was fourteen, fifteen.*
Maronite male, student, 22, from Metn.

I simply wasn't interested. I was reading. Reading literature all day or playing football. I was not interested in taking a gun. We lived next to one of the headquarters of a Palestinian party. Once a fida'i gave me a Kalashnikov and told me to be a guard. I soon leant the Kalashnikov against the wall and started playing football with the others. I was a teenager. When he came back he was very angry and said that as Palestinian I was a disgrace for my family.
Greek-Orthodox male, journalist, Palestinian origin with Lebanese nationality, about 35, Beirut.

I became totally excited during the war. I was always extremely happy when the shelling started hitting our area. I totally lost it. I wanted to have more of it when my sister and the rest of my family were crying. I did not care about anything. Sometimes I would take my pillow and blanket and sleep in the middle of the street. There were no cars passing because it was too dangerous. I loved the thrill of it and I was looking for it. I find politics ridiculous. They are liers, all of them.
Sunni female, artist, 20, Beirut.

I was working for an international organization. I was asked to go on a mission without ever speaking about it. We loaded the cars and crossed down to the Green Line. It had been closed for years, no one could pass. We crossed over and back within half an hour without any trouble. The militiamen at the checkpoints on both sides were well informed. It probably was an exchange of prisoners or something. But suddenly I realized that there always was communication, that they knew what was going on. And we did not have a clue to what really was happening.
Sunni male, bank accountant, 28, Beirut.

The general picture of collective trauma emerges from citations such as the following:

It is here where the shell fell down and cut a hole in my bedroom wall. My brother's room was safer, the shells were coming from this direction. We learned to identify them by looking at

successful: playing on the belief that the enemy was ready to extinguish one's own community.

---

what was written on them, we learned to tell from which direction they came, there were even specialists for that.
Maronite, female, lawyer, 30, Ain al-Rumaneh.

We stayed in West Beirut until my son was kidnapped. We did not know if it was political or not. We heard later on that it was two shabab who needed money to leave for the States. But we are not sure. They caught him on his way home from university. After that he had to stay at home. All his friends came to our place to visit him.
Greek-Orthodox female, about 70, Beirut.

It was difficult for us to move to the East. We had everything loaded. There were huge lines of people waiting to cross the checkpoint. If you could not make it before the evening, the border was closed. In the night the cars and wagons were robbed. Thank god we had connections and passed as the last car.
Greek-Catholic female, about 55, Jounieh.

I remember we fled to West Beirut by taxi. They were invading the camps. They continued shooting even at our car, my mother put my head down then. I never returned.
Palestinian Sunni, female, computer specialist, 24, Beirut.

We spent a lot of money on moving around, always running away from the war. Then my father became sick and we had to stay in a hotel.

Greek-Orthodox female, academic, 38, Beirut.
My mother died in the war. She was found near our house with her throat cut. We don't know who it was. Maybe the qawmiyun suriyun [SSNP]. *But we are not sure.*
Maronite widow, about 50, Beirut.

My father was assassinated. We don't speak about it. We want things to calm down.
Maronite male, lawyer, about 30, Metn.

I remember how it all started. We were living in Ain al-Rumaneh where the bus with Palestinians crossed through and all of them were shot. It was summer and my husband and me were thinking whether we should be spending the holidays in the mountains. He is always lazy so I nagged a bit. Then there was shooting. I saw the rifles coming out from behind the shutters across the street. We closed ours and went into the house. None of us thought this was the beginning of what would then follow.
Protestant female, about 50, Beirut.

An overview of diverse perceptions held by political and militia leaders can be found in:
Hanf, 1990. pp. 426-553.

2.3. A Shattered Lebanese State

Three main internal developments preceded the breakdown of the Lebanese state structure:

Firstly, the political elite was heading towards a confrontation over internal power distribution that threatened the National Pact. The national consensus upheld by the political elite was particularly contested by the Maronite and Druze leaderships.

Secondly, the political elite lost its representational legitimacy, as well as its ability to control those willing to fight the political status quo: secularists, socialists, anti-feudalists, hegemonists, pan-Arabists, anti-pan-Arabists. A crisis of political representation emerged as leadership and constituencies fell apart. This was particularly true in the Shiite community, which felt that their leadership was not serving its needs. In addition to poor conditions in the notoriously underdeveloped areas with a mainly Shiite population, the limited number of seats in parliament and representatives in the administration heightened disappointment. Migration from villages to cities loosened ties with the traditional leadership. Many Shiites in the south allied themselves with the popular leftist and Palestinian parties, from which they gained new patrons.

Thirdly, after Palestinian politicization and institutional expansion under the leadership of the PLO, the Palestinians strongly intensified tensions within Lebanese politics. Their presence divided the Lebanese political elite, with Maronite leaders opposing a pro-Palestinian internal and foreign policy. Palestinian political activists allied themselves with Lebanese counterparts, namely the popular leftist and secular parties, most of whose supporters were Shiites and Sunnis. After the beginning of the war, the secular parties soon fell apart with the conflict's confessionalization.

Although some were aware of the potential damaging effects of inner-Lebanese dissonance over the Palestinian issue, Sunni leaders were pushed to support a pro-Palestinian policy by their radicalized constituencies. Druze leader Kamal Joumblat found military and political allies among the Palestinian groups. He aimed to reclaim a political position within the Lebanese system that had been taken from the Druze

by the National Pact, with its allotment of political power largely between Maronite and Sunni leaders.[30]

As suggested, the war thus led to a conservatism tying people to their "primordial" identities of confession and location, and to a restructuring of the relation between communal leadership and constituency. This was particularly true for the Shiites, who largely dismissed the traditional leadership of the powerful landowning families (*iqtayin*), such as the Hamadeh, al-Assaad, al-Khalil, al-Zein and Osseiran, and reorganized themselves within the Amal and Hizballah movements in the 1980s.

Those who could not expect any services from the state in return for loyalty were ready to disrespect its claims of sovereignty. Because they could not expect anything from the status quo, they were prepared to radicalize their political goals and means. The fragmentation of the state has to be seen in relation to an already segmented political system favoring a vertical mode of communal solidarity—a solidarity of local confession and loyalty toward a patron. Many people believed that their confessional militias were better placed to deliver services and fight in their interests than the former state administration ever had been. The crisis of political representation due to migration and population growth, on the one hand, the development of popular parties opposing the extant political system, on the other, prompted a reshuffling of political identities.

At the start, this crisis over internal power distribution in Lebanon seemed to favor the popular secular parties, but the advantage soon shifted toward grouping according to confessional ties.[31] Despite rather secular programmes, the popular Kata'ib, founded by Pierre Gemayel (Maronite), as well as the Progressive Socialist Party (*hizb al-taqaddumi al-ishtiraki*; PSP), founded and headed by Kamal Joumblat (Druze), had in fact been confession-oriented from the beginning. The Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) had a large Greek-Orthodox Christian following, whereas the Arab nationalist parties such as the Nasserites were strongly Sunni.

Integration within the state system was effectuated through loyalty toward a local leader, a *za'im*, who represented his community on the national level and upheld ties to his constituency based on patron-client

[30] Bernadette Schenk. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Drusentums liegt im Libanon. Beirut: Beiruter Blätter 6-7, 1998-99. pp. 120-128.

[31] For example, the Imam Mussa al-Sadr aimed to strengthen the solidarity and self-presentation of the Lebanese Shiite community vis-à-vis the other communities. A first step was to initiate the break-away of the Shia from the Islamic Higher Council, which until then had been dominated by the Sunni clerics.

or feudal relations. Powerful land-owners acting as political leaders did not, to be sure, necessarily rely on a single confessional clientele: often their constituency was of mixed confession. This was especially true in the south, with its Shiite and Christian population, as well as the Beqa'a and north, with their mixed Sunni and Christian populations. In Mount Lebanon, the war of 1860 between Druze and mainly Maronite Christians had earlier established a sense of confessional belonging and following.

Despite such a division of power, alliances had to be formed across the confessions on the national level because of the limited number of higher posts allocated to each confessional group in the government. Accordingly, rivals of a *za'im* on the national level were not the *zu'ama'* of another confession, but those of his own confession, competing for a role in the national administration.[32]

State integrity was guaranteed by consensus on the national level as well as through legitimate representation by the political leaders in their constituencies. These leaders kept confessional strife in check. Weak leaders, with little representational clout and weak ties to their constituencies, endangered the integrity of a delicately balanced system. Michael Hudson asserts that the pre-war Lebanese political system relied on the ability of the *zu'ama'* to control their constituencies:

> Sectarian crises are settled largely through the intervention of the traditional notables, each of whom can calm excited feelings by personal access to his clientele. As long as the old notables as a group exercise dominant control and continue to act in a muted

[32] A member of the feudal al-Khalil family, which until the rise of the PLO in Lebanon dominated the south around Tyre, owning landed property up to Sidon, recalled during a visit at his residence Tyre in southern Lebanon the former rivalries with the al-Assaad family from Nabatieh. According to him, Ahmad al-Assaad, father of Kamil al-Assaad, attempted to invade Tyre in the early 1940s. He assembled between one- and two-hundred persons in the nearby town of Jouaya. Haj Ismail al-Khalil gathered several of his followers, who were called *zülim (*a Turkish-Ottoman term, not used in the vernacular--the colloquial term is *walaa,* those who have fidelity). These followers showed up at their adversaries' camp and hurled some dynamite, causing them to flee. In this way, the al-Khalil had managed to defend their territory. The al-Khalil-al-Assaad rivalry continued as a conflict over national political posts, mainly that of president of parliament, who was meant to be a Shiite according to the National Pact. Sunni *zu'ama'* were pitted against each other (Solh versus Salam versus Karami) in a similar manner, as were Maronite leaders (Eddé versus Gemayel versus Franjieh versus Chamoun) and the Druze (Joumblat versus Arslan). A regular shifting of government posts thus became necessary, in order so that every coalition would have an opportunity to distribute privileges to its constituency and net of clients.

manner to check sectarian explosions, Lebanon weathers the storm.[33]

Respect and awareness of the precariousness of the system's stability is the rationale for its existence and continuation:

> As a political culture, Lebanon is a collection of traditional communities bound by the mutual understanding that other communities cannot be trusted. Such a state of affairs may seem grim, but is assuredly several steps above a Hobbesian state of nature, in which a man is quite certain that all others are his enemies. In Lebanon, at least, the communities can be confident that the other groups, however untrustworthy they may be, have a common stake in the status quo; and the sophisticated Lebanese assume rightly that all important elements know that their counterparts are aware, as they are, that any one can pull down the entire structure. Mutual deterrence and actors with devastating but relatively equal power create an uneasy perpetual truce. Although this situation is better than anarchy, it is still not as good as a consensus founded on positive trust.[34]

The system relied on a political class that realized the delicacy of the balance, respecting it within certain limits. If on the national level the *zu'ama'* agreed on power distribution, the ties with the respective constituencies were maintained and the representational function fulfilled. Where the needs and changing circumstances of the constituencies were ignored, the *zu'ama'* were in danger of losing their power. Because they were local political leaders, presence in their constituencies was of high importance. And yet, playing high on the national level while having a low profile in their local constituencies accelerated the decline of feudal landlord power.[35]

---

[33]Hudson, p. 92.

[34]Ibid., p. 34.

[35]Qasem al-Khalil, political head of the al-Khalil family from the early years of the republic until the beginning of the 1980s, was struggling on the national level against his rival in the south, Kamil al-Assaad. Qasem was a close ally of Camille Chamoun, president between 1952 and 1958. He supported Chamoun's anti-pan-arabist policies. In 1968, he helped to unite the Christian anti-Arab nationalist alliance against the socialist Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and the Palestinians, named the *hilf al-thulathi*, the "triple alliance" of Camille Chamoun's liberals, Raymond Eddé's National Block, and Pierre Gemayel's Kata'ib. Such support was in his own interest as the coalition was fighting his own enemies in the south. Shiites in the south were mobilized by secular, leftist parties: and since the early 1960s, the Imam Moussa al-Sadr had been active gathering followers in Lebanon, having been invited to stay at the house of Jaafar Sharafeddine of Tyre after arriving from Iran. Sharafeddine represented another political opponent, one with religious support since his father was a

Ties of loyalty in the rural environment were based on a hierarchy that related the land-owning *za'im* to the people under his influence. Men loyal to the *iqtayin* enforced these ties through violence.[36] In contrast, the urban environment within which the Sunni *zu'ama'* were mainly based was much more complex, the needs of its clientele more sophisticated. The system of dependency between leader and constituency was not only based on "violence and narrative" (Gilsenan), but also on reciprocity of service. Confessional ties between clientele and patron were more important in the urban setting, solidifying a socially diverse and fluctuating constituency—[37] in the city, the social and economic elite is not composed of political leaders alone and its clientele is less dependent, more mobile, clients sometimes rising to become patrons. With its diversified social resources, the city did not favor a long-lasting political leadership unless a clientele could be linked to a patron through sustained forms of reciprocity.

Before the war, the mixed confession of some villages had not necessarily been a problem, as people were affiliated to the same landowning patron (and, often, political leader) irrelevant of their confession. Loyalties between a patron and the families of his subjects continued across generations. Ties began to erode with mobilization of the rural population according to confessional identity by the new populist leaders, who at the same time seemed to represent a more modern type of leadership with more convincing promises.

An important aspect of the success of the urban, modern *za'im* was the degree of social and symbolic proximity to the people, contrasting to social and symbolic distance by their rural counterparts. Michael Johnson has analyzed the shift of power from the notable Sunni family al-Solh to the Salam family of Sunni Beirut in the 1940s and 1950s. The Salam family understood how to mix with the people, settling into the popular area of Moussaytbeh—"the heart of Sunni Beirut" [38]—albeit into a *qasr*, a huge villa complex.

---

famous Shiite cleric. In the end, Qasem al-Khalil failed to hold his ties with his constituency and was ousted by the combined Palestinian-LNM forces along with his family, which was forced to flee to the Christian controlled areas. (Interview with Maamoun al-Khalil)

[36]Michael Gilsenan describes these mechanisms as operating in a rural Sunni area in Northern Lebanon, the Akkar, in Lords of the Lebanese Marches. Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society. London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 1996.

[37] As a political class, the *zu'ama'* nevertheless maintained ties irrespective of their confessional identity.

[38]Michael Johnson, Class & Client in Beirut. The Sunni Moslem Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985. London & Atlantic Highlands: Ithaca Press, 1986, p. 70. Johnson

> As Muhammad Jamil Bayhum explained in an interview the Bayhums were paternalist leaders. At the height of their power, Beirut was still a small city and they could easily act as 'fathers' of the Sunni menu peuple. As the city grew, more indirect patron-client structures were required in order to organize the specific support necessary to win elections, as opposed to the generalized and diffuse support needed to maintain the status of being of the a'yan at the turn of the century.[39]

The Salams not only shifted the politics of the Beiruti notables in a more popular direction; they also managed the largest and most wealthy welfare association in Lebanon, the Maqasid. This institution continues to comprise schools, hospitals, orphanages, and facilities for the disabled. Since its emergence in the early 1930s, leading members of the Salam family headed this philanthropic institution virtually without interruption. This furthered a policy of mutual exchange between patrons and clients: services for support and votes. It also enhanced the coherence of the confessionally defined communal group, while at the same time redistributing wealth. Through his powerful and respectable position, the *za'im* could invite the social elite of the confessional community to donate money and services to those in need.

The confessional character of the welfare institutions meant emphasis being placed on solidarity, which became the basis of communal political behavior and patterns of loyalty. Their institutions were a form of political organization that the militias later adopted. Welfare associations in fact proliferated in postwar Lebanon, becoming something like a precondition for entering the political arena. The attraction of Hariri, closely related, of course, to his personal wealth, involved his ability to render favors and services in an almost miraculous way.[40]

Reforms by President Fouad Chehab (held office 1958-64; saved the integrity of the Lebanese state in the 1958 civil war by refusing, as army general, to let the army enter the conflict between pan-Arab nationalists and anti-Arab Lebanese nationalist Christians) were aimed at making state services available to all of Lebanon's population, including the rural areas, and at installing an organizational framework for enhanced state

---

notes that "Salim's children were encouraged to mix with the local population, and some of them still use the local patois of the Basta region of the city." (ibid.)

[39]Ibid., p. 67.

[40]The Hariri Foundation concentrated on supporting students by paying university fees for elite universities in Lebanon and abroad. However, since Hariri's reelection as prime minister in 1996, no new scholarships had been offered.

sovereignty; and crucially, at curtailing the powers of the leading *zu'ama'*. Chehab's inclination to take up the struggle of state institutions against the patronage system resulted from his foresight regarding Lebanon's tendency towards fragmentation through eccentric patronage and unsatisfied populations. Disintegration was arrested under his rule, the stability of a state severely shaken through months of civil strife restored. In an unmistakable irony, persons and parties identified as illiberal were put under survey of the newly established and powerful secret service, the Deuxième Bureau (*maktab al-thani*). Politicians and potential opinion leaders, including the intellectuals and the media, were thus placed under strict observation. Hence what emerged to replace the shifting alliances and rivalries of the zu'ama', their manipulation of state institutions in order to broaden their power base, was state control of diverging interests. According to Salim al-Hoss (Lebanese prime minister 1976-1980, 1987-1990, 1999-2000) and Hussein al-Husseini (president of parliament 1984-92), both principal participants in the Taif discussions, this was one of the main principles at work in the signed accords.[41]

Following the civil war, the Syrians established a wide network of secret service agents in Lebanon, along with maintaining a presence of some 35,000 Syrian soldiers in the country, diminished to 20,000 soldiers in 2002. Damascus now supervised Lebanon's domestic and foreign policies. But whereas Chehab, as a man of the army, had seen the state as guardian of the monopoly of power, newly appointed Prime Minister Hariri, as businessman, was mainly interested in attracting investment within an aggressively liberal economic system. Reform of social services and judicial institutions was placed on a back burner; instead, political fragmentation and confessional clientelism was once more favored, state social services replaced by political leaders' welfare organizations. Once again, jobs and privileges were distributed, ties strengthened between the *za'im* and the state leader's clientele—this being the key to establishing a political stronghold, particularly necessary in Hariri's case as he had entered the political arena as a political and social outsider. Stemming from an insignificant family in Sidon, he had to find acceptance and support among the Sunnis of Beirut.[42] Those not

[41]Nevertheless, these principles were corrupted during the legislation period of Prime Minister Hariri, who was accused of operating the state structure as a super-*za'im*. In order to pursue his reconstruction projects (almost entirely located in Beirut), he directly or indirectly controlled the important departments and portfolios of the institutional apparatus.

[42]The Taif accords had fostered an expansion of influence by the prime minister and his cabinet. Hariri, backed by Sunni Saudi-Arabia (the accords' location), restored t confidence to Beirut's Sunni community, which felt it had lost control of the city by the late 1980s, after the PLO had left and Druze and Shiite militias had invaded West Beirut.

connected to one of the emerging circles attached to the prime minister felt pushed aside.

Social elites were centered around the patrons, closely tied to their rise and fall. Some remembered disgrudgingly the times when they were at the centre of another patronage system in former days:

The times with Chamoun were the good times in Lebanon. We used to be together, the social elite, meeting at all those nice cultural occasions. Today, this life is gone. People have disappeared. Only those who are close to Hariri, they may still get a chance.[43]

Despite the efforts to reform the system in Taif, the value- structure of the postwar social and political order continued to support a fragmented and heterogeneous constitution based on the primordial identities of confession, descent, local origin. These served as cohesive moments for the different local and confessional communities. The war had played on the division and regrouping of populations and territory according to these identities. The constitution of the Lebanese State emphasized such internal confessional division, all private affairs such as marriage or inheritance being regulated by the relevant religious institutions.

2.4. Reinforcing Patronage and the Honor-Code

Pre-war patron-client-relations had a violent component. Gilsenan has extensively investigated the violence within the feudal environment of Tripoli's hinterland. There, men named *aghas* supervise and enforce the loyalty of the *za'im's* followers, such control ranging "from physical coercion, expulsion from dwellings, seizure of produce and the threat of expropriation of means of production and livelihood, through debt and usury, to sharecropping agreements and long-standing labour association."[44] In the urban areas these men were called *qabadayat* (sing. *qabaday*), strongmen. They were intermediaries between patron and client, and controlled the constituency. However, they were not directly subordinated to the urban *za'im*. The *qabaday,* who controlled certain areas, became an intermediary for the political leader as he

[43] Greek Catholic female, Dbayeh, about 55.
[44] Gilsenan, p. xi.

provided the link between leader and constituency. As Johnson argues, the *qabaday* was a necessary ally in forming a popular base.

> For many of the *menu peuple* he was a moral leader. He was a man of the people, a helper of the weak and the poor, a protector of the quarter and its inhabitants, and a communal champion. For the *za'im* and the political system as a whole, however, he was a potential threat as a popular leader of the crowd or 'street.' Because, as one Beiruti expressed it to me, *qabadays* were leaders 'pushed forward by the masses,' a *za'im* had to co-operate with them even though he may have resented having to deal with men who were involved in protection rackets, gun running and smuggling. We shall see that in some cases the ties between a *za'im* and his *qabadays* developed into moral relationships, but initially they were usually transactional, with the za'im providing protection from the police in return for political loyalty. This loyalty was expressed by recruiting and controlling the clientele, working for the za'im in elections, organizing mass demonstrations of support and, occasionally fighting for the za'im in battles with his opponents.[45]

Johnson sees the *qabaday* as preserving a corporate identity at the basis of the patron-client relation, in face of other possible structures of popular coercion.

> The use of the *qabaday* as an intermediary helped to fragment the electorate and prevent the emergence of self-conscious interest groups or classes. By effectively forcing clients to approach him through their quarter or family *qabaday*, the *za'im* encouraged the individual client to see himself as a member of a particular locality or family and discouraged the formation of other social groups which might have posed a threat to the status quo.[46]

The *qabaday* was more than someone who enforced cohesion of a quarter or a street in respect to the *za'im*; he also represented the link between local and national level. By reinforcing the patron-client relationship, the representational function of the *za'im* on the national level appeared to be backed by a clientele and electorate that gained governmental resources and services on the local level. The *qabaday* himself was not necessarily involved in distributing or organizing these

[45]Johnson, p. 82f.
[46]ibid., p. 82f.

services, but rather someone who through his presence reminded the client of his loyalty.

Another important function of the *qabaday* was enforcing a kind of law and order. He and his kin defined rights and duties, operating on a local level and using violence when necessary. Sometimes, in overt contradiction to national law, a sphere of personally defined pragmatic law was practiced reflecting the extant power structures. The *za'im* had the power to prevent governmental agents from intervening. In this sense, the locality was confirmed as an entity cut off from a national context and possessing its own rules. Politics were practiced according to a fragmented pattern of different, geographically restricted areas, represented by *zu'ama'*.

This general framework was threatened with the PLO's gain of territory and influence. Disappearance of the traditional *qabadayat* of Beirut began when Palestinian commandos started taking control of certain areas of West Beirut.

I remember my uncle telling us about his men complaining that Palestinians were roaming through their areas.[47]

Armed militiamen (later also called *qabadayat*) replaced the traditional *qabadayat* who were said to have never carried firearms, but long thick sticks as symbols and executive means of authority. After the war, bodyguards took over their legacy and function. The strongmen, formerly independent, had become direct subjects of the patrons. Central to *qabaday* self-understanding was a code of honor (*sharaf, karama,* and *ihtiram*) and manhood (*marjalla*). Violence was complementary to this code of honor. For some Lebanese, the militiamen had corrupted the values of honor—the "real" *qabadayat* had disappeared with the war because the honor-code they followed had been wiped away by brutal and ignorant warlords. Instead of using personal charisma and the force of their reputation, the militiamen imposed their authority through the gun.

The qabaday had to be good-looking: they were always good-looking. Usually they wore big moustaches. The people whom they protected loved them.[48]

---

[47] Sunni Beiruti notable, nephew of a former urban *za'im*, lawyer, 55.

[48] Beiruti Sunni from bourgeois family, 30.

At one point, I met a former militiaman full of nostalgia for precisely the role the honor-code had succumbed to: that role itself, it seemed, had now been supplanted.

There are no more qabadayat now [he was referring to gunmen]. *Everyone has to work hard and make his living. There is no more time for these things. Times have changed; we don't run around with weapons anymore.*[49]

Contrary to the Beiruti, who stressed the myth of a moral and civil *qabaday*, the barber focused nostalgically on the *qabadayat* as controlling Lebanese streets with his Kalashnikov. He himself had been such a strongman in former days, fighting for the PFLP. Later, he fought against the Amal militia in Hamra. It was in his barbershop that I encountered a *qabaday* in the form of a bodyguard. I was told afterwards, that he had fought with the Amal militia, and because of his close personal contacts to Nabih Berri, president of parliament, had became a bodyguard at the Casino du Liban: part of the policy of dissolving the militias was in fact transferring them into the interior security apparatus or using them as bodyguards. His sleeves rolled up and his shirt unbuttoned gigolo-fashion, he kept the whole salon busy with his demands for special after-shave and perfume, ordering luxury cigarettes, offering me one, as well as, with a gesture of condescension, one to the barber, who had to refuse. Any time an attractive girl passed, he jumped from his chair as if in pursuit, but then calmed down again. He told us in a bored tone about the casino, entertained us with stories about who had spent tens of thousands of dollars the night before, well-known Lebanese and Arabs. He informed us indirectly about his closeness to those in power. Most important, however, was the gun he had in front of him next to the mirror, easily observed by several of the employees including the barber.

The point of this account is not the atmospherics. What is notable is that *both* the traditional strongman and the militiaman (as well as, to a lesser degree, the bodyguard), exercised a de facto justice guided by their political leaders. They were both agents protecting segregated fiefdoms and bypassing national codified law.[50]

---

[49] Shiite barber classified as 1948 refugee, coming from a village on the Lebanese-Palestine frontier.

[50] When newly appointed resident Nabih Berri moved into his official residence, located near the residence of his predecessor Hussein al-Husseini, the bodyguards of both immediately engaged in a shoot-out after an exchange of insults. This shoot-out was not motivated by any

At the same time, the political and social role of these men centered around insults to honor and honor's subsequent reinstatement: a crucial process in that it publicly demonstrates the de facto imposition of order and regulates positions of power. An insult attempts to discredit for the sake of contesting social position. It forces the one insulted to prove his value and reputation. The means used to reinstate honor or defend a position within a hierarchy may be as extreme as necessary, including the elimination of the adversary. A passive reaction toward an insult indicates either the luxury of ignoring or else powerlessness and weakness. Either the insulted party considers his adversary of too low a status to react personally, or as possessing a status that is too high. In this regard, Gilsenan indicates how the *zu'ama'* demonstrated power and superiority through the unanswered infliction of harm on his subordinates.[51]

The code of honor inscribes social hierarchies. Whoever is able to defend his honor secures his social status. The one who is defeated is weak and therefore of a lower social status than the victor. The one who insults without fear of revenge is socially superior. Violence used in an uncensored way can mark such superiority.

With the proliferation of arms and the establishment of militias in Lebanon starting in the late 1960s, previous hierarchies were called into severe question, with people of minor social status stopping notables and other leaders at gunpoint at unofficial checkpoints. The contesting of power took on an uncontrolled and impersonal character. When a Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon spilled beyond the borders of the camps in the early seventies, after the expulsion of the PLO and its *fidayin* from Jordan in 1970-71, many of the Lebanese notables, political leaders, and strongmen who had been in control felt humiliated by a people disrespectful and ignorant of the unspoken social hierarchy and honor code.

---

order of their leaders. The discipline of the lower ranks followed a different logic. It did not conform to a diplomatic or ideological rationale but required immediate reaction when power, strength, reputation, or honor were directly threatened. Territories had to be marked and defended. Who was able to challenge whom? Such incidents may have even embarassed the leaders by undermining a diplomatic strategy through overt violence. The war saw many such incidents, amounting to a general torpedoing of official policy lines. However, instead of these incidents being contextualized, they were endowed with a far-reaching meaning for the political power constellations.

[51] Gilsenan, p.191

I used to support the Palestinian cause. We even staged some little operations against the Israelis in the 50s. It was a question of honor to attack them. Minor operations, but we had to do something. I also smuggled guns into the Palestinian camps in the 60s with my car. And we hid some in our house. Once the secret service investigated the house but did not find anything. But, it started getting out of hand. I was deeply shocked when I was stopped one evening by a fifteen-year-old Palestinian kid with a Kalashnikov when passing in my limousine in the street. How could they dare to stop me like this?[52]

My father was well known. He had a reputation allowing him to make contracts by word – he never learnt how to read or write. Until today, people tell me that Saadallah was a real Beiruti. He was strong and he did not refrain from using violence when necessary. But when these roadblocks started and these kids stopped him randomly, he felt, that this was not his city anymore. Today he is a legend, but without any power.[53]

The social hierarchy defines the honor code through exclusionist and discriminatory boundaries.[54] Although honor can be attributed to an outstanding and charismatic individual, it is often attributed to a group of which he is part. This may be a class, a tribe, or a confession. Honor identifies social status, which defines the relations between members of a group and towards other groups. Within this context, justice is understood as regaining one's honor within the framework of the social hierarchy. Frank Stewart refers to the right of a person to be respected, relating it to social position as *rank honor*.[55]

At a meeting of some Lebanese friends, one arrived very late. Someone had blocked his car and he was still angry. He had yelled at the responsible party to move immediately. That person felt insulted and things got out of hand, a direct quarrel then breaking out, people around them holding them back. A policeman arrived, and requested that both men accompany him to the police station. However, the late-arrived friend was from a well-known bourgeois Beirut family; refusing to comply, he offered, his name, adding the policeman could not touch him—which

[52] Shiite notable and politician, Tyre, 70.

[53] Son of a Sunni businessman and well-known wealthy *qabaday*, Sunni, Beirut.

[54] Cf. Gilsenan, p. 197: "For a challenge to be made, the challenger must consider whoever challenges to be worthy of it—to be, that is to say, in a position to riposte. This means that he must recognise him as his peer in honour."

[55] Frank Henderson Stewart, Honour. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

was in fact the case. Returning home because his shirt was sprayed with blood, the friend was received with pride and pleasure by his father: his son had proved that the family name was still powerful enough to challenge state authority, while also concretely demonstrating his social superiority and capacity to defend his honor.

Being unregulated by a generalized and positive legal codex, the code of honor must be constantly enacted on a practical level. Pierre Bourdieu has observed that

> In practice, the system of the values of honor is lived rather than clearly conceived. Thus, when they spontaneously believe that such and such a mode of conduct is dishonoring or ridiculous, the Kabyles are like someone who picks out an error of language without being in command of the syntactical order that it infringes.[56]

For Bourdieu, beyond an intentional rationality or codified set of rules, the structure of social actions evolves according to changing contexts. And there are always two options. Alongside a strong, unspoken interest in conforming to tradition, there is also the option of pragmatic action. This can involve either some sort of isolated action or an effort to transform or disturb social consensus by establishing new codes of behavior.[57]

Bourdieu argues that individuals dominating the social hierarchy have an interest in a stable status quo—one upholding the habitus in that it defines social action and relations within the hierarchy. A clear definition of rules for such action involves its rationalization—at times repressive—within a temporal dimension. In the context of state organizations, codification and generalization of action can mean integrating the claims of local, subordinate powers into a common framework. The weaker the power within the state institutions, the more effective the local power's implementation of its attempt to implement their own rules or social organization.

In Lebanon, local powers pitted their interests against other interests on the basis of an honor code centered on class and local and genealogical belonging and persisting in the face of state power.[58] But significantly,

---

[56] Pierre Bourdieu, The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society. In: J.G. Peristiany, Honour and Shame. The Values of Mediterranean Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965. p. 231f.

[57] Pierre Bourdieu, Rede und Antwort. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992. p. 99; cf. ibid., p. 100f.

[58] For example, the village of Zghorta in northern Lebanon was divided over family feuds for about twenty years starting around 1950. See Chawqi Douayhi. Tripoli et Zghorta, deux villes

the honor code does not define a fixed set of values, but rather itself represents a value transcending confessional and political ties, hence affirming itself in an absolute sense. This is apparent in the experience of a former cadre in the Lebanese Forces. During the late 1970s when the Maronites were fighting the Palestinians, he was at a checkpoint, controlling people crossing from east to west. They caught a Palestinian *fida'i* who wanted to join his comrades in West Beirut. Asked about his intentions, he looked straight into their eyes—so the cadre's description—explaining that he was going to fight for the liberation of his homeland. Impressed by his *sharaf* and *karama*, his sense of honor, they let him go. On the one hand, he was distinguished through his bravery and courage; on the other hand, it distinguished them to appreciate such qualities.

People from lower classes than ours would have killed the Palestinian. They would not have had this sense of respect for the bravery and pride he had. They would not have appreciated it. But we saw in his eyes he was like us.[59]

Another aspect of the concept of honor here becomes obvious: the individual's life or death is in principle irrelevant when honor is in question. Fear of death threatens honorable behavior—this because the individual is never a person on his own but is related to a wider group. The *fida'i* did not succumb to fear because he represented the Palestinian liberation struggle. The confirmation of honor as an abstract principle of bravery and manhood through laughter in the face of death is at the same time a confirmation of the superiority of the collective over the individual.

In this context, the funeral rite takes on an essential function in publicly presenting group honor gained through individual sacrifice. The commemorations for "martyrdom" enacted during the war, practiced in particular by Palestinian groups fighting against Israel, later by Islamic groups of the same nature in particular, underscore the importance of sacrifice for group representation.

In 1973, an Israeli elite squad killed three leaders of the PLO in their apartments in Verdun, Beirut after a spectacular undercover operation. The funeral for the Palestinian leaders, now seen as martyrs, was the largest funeral procession Lebanon has seen. Lebanese and

---

en quête d'un espace commun. In: Eric Huybrechts/Douayhi, Chawqi. Reconstruction et Réconciliation au Liban. Beirut: Cahiers du Cermoc, 1999. p. 69.

[59] Former Maronite militiaman, 40, Sin al-Fil.

Palestinians followed the coffins in a demonstration of solidarity.[60] But as the war unfolded, the Lebanese presence in Palestinian funeral rites decreased, reflecting deteriorating relations. The commemoration site in the Shatila camp was exclusively Palestinian—a burial area where visitors were always taken to share a sense of the honor bestowed on men considered exceptionally brave and strong, as well as to share an intense sense of Palestinian Arabic grievance.

The attachment of a code of honor to wider social entities like the ethnic or confessional group through political propaganda was part of the explosion of internal antagonisms in Lebanon. It was in the interest of militants within the communities to drive the differences between them past the point of common aims. It became a question of honor to fight against, on the one hand, the Palestinian armed presence on Lebanese soil or, on the other hand, the Israeli "occupation of Palestine" and their Christian allies. The expansion of the social and political boundaries in which honor had to be defended generated an unlimited spiral of violence and revenge. With honor defining an asymmetrical relation, legitimization had been furnished for crimes against those not belonging to the same group.

2.5. Kinship as the Core Affiliative Concept

With huge amounts of propaganda focused on the exclusive links of a particular group with a specific locality, the basis for questioning the presence of those defined as not indigenous was thus laid, expulsion becoming a real possibility. Attachment to a particular locality had been underlined by endogamous marriage strategies affirming group characteristics, genealogical descent and kinship ties consequently forming the core of the group. The connection between locality and kinship over generations despite migration. Lebanese who had moved to urban centers still considered themselves as belonging to their villages of origin, to which they often returned on weekends.

I consider myself as coming from Shehour [village in southern Lebanon]. *My great grandfather came to Beirut. When someone from the family dies, everyone returns to Shehour for the funeral. I will be buried there. It is not a must. It's just that all of my family is buried there, except for my uncle who's buried in Beirut because he died during the war and they could not take him. Everyone who comes from a village does this.*[61]

---

[60]Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon. London: Hutchinson, 1985. p. 112f.
[61] Shiite male, former feudal family, 36, Beirut.

Zu'ama' would return to their villages for weddings as well as funerals, weddings being the key symbolic statement of group integrity: with choice of in-laws reflecting a continuum of social, economic, and political values, such integrity is only guaranteed, when criteria for affiliation with the endogamous group are respected. The Arab Levant's pronounced patrilinealism means that the social identity of the father must be transparent and acceptable.

Within this matrix of social-political values, a girl endangers the honor and integrity of her group if she produces illegitimate offspring. Inversely, by guaranteeing that her offspring will be legitimate, the virgin upholds such group honor. The relation between the concept of honor and genealogical values is analogous to that between of honor and territorial purity. In this sense, rape strikes at the core of the enemy's identity, destroying his genealogical integrity by symbolically or actually implanting foreign offspring. It is an act operating on the same level as the invasion of a territory and elimination of those affiliated with a different group. Purity of territory and purity of female sexuality are analogous values in Lebanon, constituting twin aspects of its social structure. In the first case, as indicated, virginity of the female as a precondition for controlled reproduction guarantees a legitimate and transparent genealogy. In the second place, social identity is exclusively related to a particular place of origin. The development of nationalist ideology among the Maronite and Shiite communities has emphasized preservation of affiliative purity within such territory in the face of foreign elements. Concomitantly, losing one's territory and becoming a refugee are defined as reflections of group weakness and group loss of honor. The Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory was thus viewed as both a besmirching of Maronite honor and a result of dishonor as the Palestinians lost their homeland now occupied.

In Lebanon, then, there is a close interrelationship between premarital female virginity,[62] endogamous marriage preferences, and exclusivity of the affiliative group, often defined in relation to territory. An identity between place of origin and genealogy is confirmed in one term, *min bayt so-and-so* meaning both house and family. Endogamous marriage practice consequently defines the group in terms of strictly drawn social boundaries. The more a group is eager to emphasize and conserve its

[62]Despite a liberal attitude towards pre-marital sexual activity on the part of the male, female virginity is a precondition for marriage, irrespective of confession or class. If necessary, an operation is carried out to sew the hymen.

social boundaries, the more exclusive and strict its marriage practices will be. It seemed impossible that a person can here be identified in terms other than those of origin and social belonging—in the end, an absolute precondition for being recognized as a person deserving respect, the concept of an individual devoid of social determinations being largely absent. Discourse against inter-confessional marriage, (civil marriage does not exist in Lebanon) is based on the following argument: "The children will not know where they belong and will exist in a state of confusion."

I am not baptized and do not belong to any confession. People here don't understand when they ask for my religion and I say that I have none. It is something that never occurs to them. They ask for my father's religion and when I say he's a Maronite, they insist that I must be a Maronite. It makes the whole difference.[63]

Fragmentation of the country unfolded during the war on many levels: social, political, administrative, confessional, military, economic, territorial. At the same time, affiliation based on confession, locality, and family received heightened attention. The group one was related to through kinship ties proved the most reliable.[64] In this sense, establishment of family associations (*jamaa* or *rabta a'iliya*) among all confessional groups carried on the tendency to rely on primordial structures of security. Although some such associations existed long before the war,[65] this concept spread among many families during it, and even intensified in the postwar period. Under the increasingly unstable circumstances, there was an increasing need to find trust and security in the immediate social environment.

Family associations thus became part of the non-governmental welfare system, their form and organization differing from family to family, depending on size and wealth. Some were loose and informal gatherings, others, taking in several hundred or even a thousand

[63] Educational adviser, male, 27, Kisrwan.

[64] According to a study Halim Barakat conducted in the prewar period among Lebanese students, "familism" is a crucial element in a most important factor of social identity and organization—something in any event true for the Arab world in general. Halim Barakat. Lebanon in Strife. Student Preludes to Civil War. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1977. p. 33.

[65] The Beiruti Sinno family has had an established association since 1909, now counting about 6,000 members. An annual meeting in one of the more exclusive Beirut hotels during Ramadan when charity is valued especially highly) underlines the strong sense of social cohesion as well as religious and confessional ties at work here.

members, had an organized institutional framework with a president, fixed unions, and regularly held meetings. The issues debated within these associations ranged from sharing school fees to gathering money for a divorced woman or for chairs needed at a funeral. Scholarships, support for hardship cases, and helping out with connections were some of the services offered.

Family associations furnish a sense of stability through their acts of solidarity. With individuals perceived primarily in relation to their family background, being associated with a wider, institutionalized family framework means added social weight—the reputation of coming from a "good family." And this reputation, while carrying with it certain duties and expectations, in turn enhances the individual's credibility.

For the *zu'ama',* being connected with large, well-organized families is a pronounced political asset. Often, whole families are associated with a particular political leader. In return for their support, they can expect privileges. Arriving in Beirut as a social outsider, Prime Minister Hariri was thus particularly eager to find a base among the Beiruti Sunni families; he did his best to recruit a wide-sweeping whole clientele, one enhanced substantially by members of one or another prominent family running on his list, with the potential of monolithic family support in the event of victory.

Family associations have even more stable structures than patron-client relationships. In the urban setting, where a clientele is not necessarily bound to a patron through a traditional, feudal genealogical "charisma" Max Weber), that clientele is more independent. Correspondingly, Beirut has seen a frequent turnover of political leaders.

The war accelerated social restructuring, impoverishing formerly wealthy families and enriching others. To considerable extent, the former social elite lost its economic basis—factories, real estate—the manifest loss of wealth's trappings bringing with it a threat of plunging social status. In this regard, still-wealthy families did their best to bolster their needy relations for the sake of the wider family's reputation, negotiating loans and various crucial status symbols like property, cars, clothes at especially good terms. Social life might be restricted to the family alone, however, but at least general appearances and reputation were saved.

2.6. Conclusion

Lebanon's segmented, client-based, and confessionalist socio-political order was reflected in the organization of the state, politically, economically, and legally.[66] The weakness—some would insist non-existence--of the state has been defined as a major problem affecting all efforts at broad development and national cohesion.[67] In any event, the particularly Furthermore, the communally fragmented character of Lebanon seems to bring with it the requirement of continued, accepted mechanisms of balance between communities. Until the present, every effort at social homogenization is perceived with alarm as threatening the integrity and authority of the confessional communities, their privileges and patronage.[68]

When politicized and designating various groups competing over limited resources, individual social identities correspond with a fragmentation of power, preserving a stratified hierarchic order favoring clientelism and patronage. Attached to particular communities, the honor-code transcends and revokes communal boundaries. With Lebanese clientelism's reliance on confessional belonging, centered on a sense of solidarity between genealogically defined kin groups, families identified with a particular locality formed the most stable of the country's political and, at times, economic entities.

We will see below how these characteristics have interacted negatively with a Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon, and how they eventually led to a fifteen-year long war.

---

[66] Antoine Messara has pointed to the predominance of kinship groups in the Lebanese Parliament, where they appear to have inherited seats. Antoine Messara, La structure social du Parlement libanais (1920-1976). Beirut: Lebanese University Press, 1977.

[67] See, e.g., Hudson; Barakat.

[68] See Antoine Nasri Messara, Le Pacte libanais. Le message d'universalité et ses contraintes. Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1997.

3. Responses to the Palestinian Refugee Influx

3.1. The Flight from Palestine

Starting in 1947, Palestinian Arab refugees fled Palestine in waves. In an increasingly unstable situation marked by Arab guerrilla warfare against the incipient Jewish state and indisputable Jewish military pressure - indirect and direct - on Palestinian Arabs to leave, much of the elite ended up emigrating before the rest of the population, expecting to return once the situation had calmed down. In the absence of a co-ordinated leadership, in part under continued pressure from the Jewish military forces, many of the remaining Arabs living in Palestine fled their towns and villages, sustained by the promise of armed intervention on their behalf from neighboring Arab countries in 1948.

Palestinian Arabs living in southern Palestine fled to Egypt and what would then become Egyptian-controlled Gaza. Those in the central parts left for Syria, Jordan, and the West Bank, the latter to be annexed by Jordan. Palestinians living in the Mediterranean coastal towns and those living in the north went to Lebanon, from where some continued to Syria. The wealthy among them were able to go by car, some even by plane; others left by boat, but the majority arrived on foot. Choice of destination was made chiefly on the basis of geographical proximity, but also of kinship or trade ties in the surrounding Arab countries.

Soon after their mass flight and the defeat of the Arab armies, it became clear that the refugees would not be able to return—and that imperatives of survival made social and economic integration into the host countries a good idea. UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was formed in 1950 with this end in mind. But its original purpose, as envisioned by the mainly European donor countries was soon subverted by its Palestinian employees themselves.[69]

The Palestinian Arabs in general were convinced that they would eventually return to Palestine, hence did not need to resettle. Lebanese nationality would thus be seen as a betrayal, and even early on, there was considerable refusal of such benefits offered.[70] Over the following

[69]Yusif A. Sayigh, Economic Implications of UNRWA Operations in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1952.

[70]Cf. following recollection by a leader of a Palestinian welfare organization, about 50, in Tariq al-Jedideh: *We were staying in the Beqa'a, because we had distant relatives there. My grandfather was offered nationality for the whole family but he refused. He said that they would go back to Palestine. Maybe it was a mistake.* Cf. Rosemary Sayigh, 1994, p. 52: "One

decades, a distinct Palestinian national consciousness would develop—one that in retrospect would seem to have been strongly promoted by the existence of both refugee camps and numerous "Palestinian" institutions supported by UNRWA. In fact, wherever possible, the agency's facilities furthered Palestinian political and national aspirations. For instance, although UNRWA schools adopted the curricula of their host countries, school education was "Palestinianized" through the promulgation in classrooms of the idea of a Palestinian national people living in a diaspora. In this manner, UNWRA emerged as a body substituting for an institutional Palestinian presence in the international community, providing material support and working opportunities. However, essential for the further understanding of the evolution of the Palestinian cause was that, following dispersion and widespread expropriation of lands and property, the Palestinians remained without a political body able to shape its destiny. Even before the political and military defeat in 1948, their leadership had been deeply divided. A Palestinian government that had been established in Gaza lacked both was devoid of any executive powers and links with the community. It was only in 1964 with the establishment of the PLO that the Palestinian refugees gained a kind of official integration into a national political will, then gradually becoming registered in international awareness, with the political struggle being paralleled by a series of Palestinian terrorist activities.

Despite this political development, the refugees had virtually no control of their own future. In a world where state identity is a precondition for acknowledged presence, a stateless person is deprived not only of the right to movement, but even to establishing an economic basis existence. A stateless person is nobody's responsibility and claiming justice is a near impossibility. In the Palestinian context, such a plight—from our perspective, a violation of human dignity—amounts to a drastic assault on personal and collective honor—an assault stemming from its Israeli source, but also perpetuated by the refugees' Lebanese hosts, for a start in terms of persistent condescension.

As we will observe in more detail below, relations between the refugees and Lebanese fate, painful and damaging for both sides, were stamped by the state's insistent neglect—a neglect that needs to be viewed in relation to both Lebanon's high degree of political fragmentation and the crucial role played by personal and communal honor in defining Lebanese and Palestinian social relations.

---

sign of how little camp Palestinians were interested in Lebanese politics is their lack of response to offers of nationality made by various *zu'ama'*."

3.2. The Rejection of Resettlement

As early as 1949, the British Chatham House and the Royal Central Asian Society commissioned a survey of resettlement policies; the ensuing report evaluated the capacities (primarily economic) of the main host countries to absorb the refugees.[71] Such plans, however, ran counter to the reluctance of most Palestinian refugees to abandon the hope of a return to Palestine. Official plans for resettlement in Arab host countries were seen as a capitulation to Israel[72] and an admission of defeat. The camps, within which the Palestinian population largely depended on relief aid, reflected the intermediary status of the refugee's presence.

As indicated, many (but as we will see, not all) Lebanese themselves opposed any policy of resettlement. The British survey examined the resettlement possibilities of an estimated 100,000 refugees in a country whose total population was estimated at 1,127,000.[73] According to the survey, in 1944 750,000 Lebanese depended on cultivating a land hardly sufficient to the rural population.[74] Despite official words of welcome, the high unemployment rate, the Lebanese government thus passed a law allowing foreigners to work in the country only under reciprocal arrangement with their national states which effectively prohibited the stateless Palestinians from working in most professions.[75] Nevertheless,

---

[71]S.G.Thicknesse, Arab Refugees. A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities. London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949.

[72]See: Nur Masalha. Israeli Plans to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees 1948-1952. Ramallah: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre Shaml, 1996.

[73]Demography of the Arab refugees fleeing Palestine in the wake of the events of 1948 has been contested from the beginning. Thicknesse refers to a total refugee population of 713,000 in September 1949 with an error-margin of 33,000. The population-estimate by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East from 29 December 1949, as quoted by Walter Pinner, is 726,000 refugees in total. (Walter Pinner. How many Arab Refugees? A Critical Study on UNRWA's Statistics and Reports. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1960.) Benny Morris refers to a total Arab refugee population of between 600,000 and 760,000. (Benny Morris. 1948 and After. Israel and the Palestinians. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Nur Masalha sets the number at 750,000 (Nur Masalha. Expulsion of the Palestinians. The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought 1882-1948. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992.) Differences in numbers may in part reflect, on the one hand, an interest in downplaying the humanitarian catastrophy on the Israeli side, and, on the other hand, an interest in inflating them on the Palestinian side, itself partly based on the registration of refugees being linked to amount of food rations.

[74]Thicknesse, 1949. p. 44.

[75]Cf. Souheil el Natour. Les Palestiniens du Liban. La Situation Sociale, Economique et Juridique. Beirut: Dar Al Taqqadom Al Arabi, 1993. p. 166:"Le ministère du travail et des

the main Lebanese grounds for refusing the Palestinians settlement-rights were not economic but rather political. Because, as we have seen, the distribution of power in Lebanon depended on demographic composition according to confession, such settlement would have endangered the internal power balance, the vast majority of the refugees being Sunni Moslems.[76]

Strikingly, fifty years later, opposition to resettlement was still on the main political agenda of the Lebanese parties. The arguments here had not changed, all parties continuously reaffirmed opposition to *tawtin*, at the same time reaffirming the Lebanese political status quo. Now as then, only a complete restructuring of the political system and its constitution would make such a process feasible, and since resettlement and the end of the civil war and the reconfirmation of confessional democracy in Taif, with concessions made to the Moslem community, additional attempts to reshuffle the positions of political power had become unwelcome.

On the basis of a survey taken among all relevant communities after the war, Hilal Khashan has concluded that a significant majority have resisted any program of *tawtin*.[77] Lebanese parties supporting the Palestinian cause, as well, of course, as the various Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, equally refused any abandonment of the principle of the right of return (*al-haq al-aawda*) of all the refugees and their descendents, understood as being stipulated in UN Resolution 194.

Nevertheless, a frequent shunting the possibility of resettlement—in the Lebanese context, not separable from the right to work--aside has clearly meant frequently neglecting Palestinian social and economic well-being.

---

affaires sociales put même un arrête demandant aux refugiés de cesser de travailler sans prétexte qu'ils n'etaient pas munis de permis et qu'ils concurrencait la main d'oevre libanaise."

[76]Cf. Hudson, p. 46. According to a British Mandate census the Christian proportion of the population in Palestine in 1931 was about 11 per cent, the Moslem proportion 88 per cent, the Druze 1 per cent. Palestine Government, Census of Palestine 1931. Alexandria: Whitehead Morris Ltd, 1933. vol.II, table 13B, p. 232. Yussif Sayigh, p. 13, puts the percentage of Christians among the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon at 19,6% and the percentage of Sunni Palestinians at 80,4%. Unfortunately he does not mention a source for this data, and the number of Shiite refugees who had lived in villages along the Lebanese-Palestinian border is not included. The backdrop to this exceptionally high concentration of Christian Palestinian Arabs would presumably be their desire to settle in a Christian dominated state. Furthermore, a large portion of Christian Palestinians had been part of the urban labor force and would have felt that the Lebanese economy would have more room for their skills and aspirations than other host countries. p. 46.

[77]Hilal Khashan, Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon. Behind the Debate. Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World. April, 1994.

In line with what has already been indicated, during the period of my research, Palestinian professionals could not generally work outside the camps, many thus leaving for the Gulf or other countries—a situation that has remained unchanged. It is the case that despite Lebanon's economic difficulties, some Palestinians with an unusually fine education and social or political connections are able to work—while remaining excluded from the Lebanese social security system. Likewise, there is a "gray zone" within which ordinary Palestinians can occasionally find employment.[78] Broadly speaking, restrictions are tightened or loosened depending on the prevailing attitude of the authorities towards Palestinians; legal aspects are dealt with quite pragmatically according to the financial, political, and social resources of the persons wishing to work. In general it is easier for Palestinians outside the camp, since they tend to have far greater contact with the Lebanese environment. In addition, foreign companies are much more likely to employ Palestinians than are Lebanese companies; in such cases, the employees are officially registered and receive social security, albeit no pensions despite mandatory contributions. Finally, a small number of Palestinians are both willing and able to pay several thousand dollars for a work permit, which then may be considered like a bribe to the government. But all in all, despite the occasional opportunities, a great many Palestinians in Lebanon suffer from radical disillusion when it comes to any serious job prospects, having been repeatedly rebuffed as a result of their social and existential situation.

I came back first to reconstruct our house. It's forbidden to build in the camp, but I bribed the Syrian controls and brought in the cement. I used to trade in goods from Poland and do some manufacturing. I had already established a small workshop on the roof. But I could not travel and leave the country and I did not want to leave everything to a Lebanese partner. I finally gave up. Now I do some small work here and there. We are waiting. Waiting until something happens.[79]

The complete absence of clearly defined state guidelines for dealing with the refugees, and the constant replacement of such guidelines with straightforward repression, has not merely prevented legal naturalization, but any form of basic social integration. It is only natural that the widespread presence of a deprived and non-integrated community, possessing a broad, multi-layered sense of social-historical resentment,

[78]For an evaluation of the legal aspects of the employment question, see: Souheil el Natour, 1993; and Souheil Al-Natour, The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon. Journal of Refugee Studies. vol. 10, no. 3, 1997, pp. 360-377.

[79]Unemployed Palestinian male from the Gulf, about 50, returned to Bourj al-Barajneh camp in 1995 and now living off his savings.

will threaten the integrity of the Lebanese state: a threat that became concretely manifest when circumstances seemed to favor a Palestinian usurpation of power.

3.3. Syria and Jordan: The Rationale for Integration

Lebanon has been the Arab country most manifestly hostile to the large-scale integration or resettlement of Palestinian refugees, both Syria and Jordan attempting to relocate them within a national legal and economic framework. For newly-created state-entities still in the process of state-building, allocating a shared identity to all the people living on its territory was in fact a necessity. The situation facing the incoming mass of refugees had to be stabilized. In both countries, a programmatic approach toward the refugee community was thus made possible through the formulation of detailed administrative and political guidelines.

Establishing a governmental agency for the refugees in 1949 immediately after the Palestinian influx,[80] Syria has integrated Palestinians on all levels except citizenship and franchise,[81] Palestinians now being found in all areas of civil and political life, including the diplomatic corps and army.[82] Avi Shlaim has shown that Syria once even considered integrating three times the number of refugees that actually entered Syrian territory, 90-100,000 having entered, 300,000 being under discussion for acceptance.[83] Husni Za'im, originally chief of staff of the Syrian army before seizing power but already deposed by a military coup in 1949, launched this initiative during his four-month leadership, his main aim being to secure an Israeli-Arab peace with stabilized frontiers—a concern in fact not yet addressed by the Ben-Gurion government. Another central motivation for integrating Syria's Palestinians may well have been a lack of skilled agricultural workers in the country, as well as the need to develop other economic sectors. Syria subsequently allowed Palestinians to organize within political parties, which were placed under

[80]Palestine Arab Refugee Institution (PARI), succeeded by the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR).

[81]Laurie Brand, Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration. Middle East Journal, no.4, 1988. pp. 621-637.

[82]Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law. Catholic University of Nijmegen, 1997.

[83]Avi Shlaim, Husni Za'im and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria. Journal of Palestine Studies, 15:4, 1986.

close surveillance and kept strictly in line with government policy.[84] The Syrian government encouraged the creation of Palestinian branches of Syrian organizations such as the Palestinian party al-Saiqa, and the Palestinian Worker's Union. Under such circumstances—the intertwining of successful social and economic integration with strictest control--there was no room for the emergence of "strong indigenous institutional expressions of a separate Palestinian national identity" in Syria.[85]

Jordan reacted towards the crisis of 1948 by annexing the West Bank in 1950 and then, in 1954, nationalizing both the West Bank's residents and the refugees in Jordan proper, thus doubling the country's total population.[86] As a result, Palestinians contributed significantly to the process of state building in Jordan, their professional knowledge contributing to the development of basic industrial, agricultural, and financial programs and institutions. Correspondingly, 1948 Palestinians in Jordan enjoy guaranteed rights—while refugees from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war citizens of the West Bank have a different status. Yet, both groups receive national legal recognition.[87]

Despite such largely successful integration, Palestinian-Jordanian tensions had a considerable impact on Jordan's political life—these tensions culminating in 1970-71 in the expulsion of Palestinian guerrilla forces who both wished to turn Jordan into the main base for their war on Israel and posed a threat to the kingdom's leadership-structure. Predictably, the kingdom had always insisted on subordinating Palestinian national interests to Jordanian national interests, and in Jordan as in Syria, there has been close monitoring of the Palestinian refugees. And as in Syria, long-term policies of state-steered integration have been viewed as the most secure mode of defusing a potentially explosive conflict with the Israeli neighbor.

---

[84]This was largely sen to by GAPAR—"a department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour...[that] closely watches all activities related to the refugees in Syria, including UNRWA's operations." Takkenberg, 1997. p. 172.

[85]See Brand, pp. 622; 624.

[86]Takkenberg, 1997.p. 159. see also: UNHCR, Centre for Documentation on Refugees, REFLEG database (DOCID 3878).

[87]For an indepth analysis of Palestinians in Jordan concerning the first years of exile reconsider: Avi Plascov. The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-57. London: Frank Cass, 1981.

3.4. The Refugees in Lebanese Demographic Politics

The situation facing the refugees in Lebanon was far more complex and unfavourable than was the case in either Syria or Jordan, successive Lebanon governments wavering, for over half a century, between resentment and complete neglect of the refugees in their policy formulation. As suggested, this approach is best viewed in light of a confessionalism, clientelism, and regionalism representing, the main factors guiding the Lebanese government's executive capabilities. Those politicians participating in national decision-making processes were primarily interested in securing state resources for their own constituencies, a pattern rendering any national development program virtually unfeasible.[88] In the same manner, few political leaders felt responsible for the Palestinian refugee community at large, and when any efforts were made in this direction they were immediately quashed by other patrons.

A good example of this procedure is the so-called Quraya-affair of 1994, in which the Druze patron Walid Joumblat—Minister for Displaced Persons in the Lebanese government—tried to help some refugees who—their own houses and camps destroyed during the war— had taken up residence in private houses now reclaimed by the owners.[89] With, according to UNRWA, existing camps not being able to absorb more than 2,000 of 6,000 displaced families, the Palestinian side suggested three options for dealing with the housing problem.[90] The first two, rebuilding the destroyed camps or enlarging the existing ones, were both turned down. The third suggestion, to establish a new camp, was taken up by Joumblat, who chose the town of Quraya, close to Sidon in the southern Shouf mountains and located within Joumblat's own area of influence, as the best location. With mainly Christians inhabiting the area, there was predictable resistance to such an influx—Joumblat's efforts being understood as embracing a general policy of resettlement. The ensuing public uproar was echoed in the media, and opposition eventually becoming so fierce that the plans had to be dropped. As the Palestinians saw things, Joumblat, the Druze *za'im*, had no choice but to plan for a new camp within his own area of influence, rather than imposing such plans on another constituency or confession. Yet according to Lebanese political logic, no move would be made without political profit. And so rumors spread among the Lebanese over

[88]Cf. Hudson, 1968. p. 313ff. (re. The 1960s).
[89]On this episode see: Fida Nasrallah. Palestinians in Lebanon. Conference papers. 1996. Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme
[90]Interview with Salah Salah, former head of the PFLP in Lebanon. 8.10.97

Joumblat's hidden intentions. Some assumed that he wanted to establish a "bumper-zone" against the Shiite population in the south, although the area around Quraya had a small Shiite population and was mainly settled by Christians. Others thought that Joumblat had found a way of attracting large sums of money by establishing a Palestinian community in his fiefdom of Iqlim al-Kharroub and the Shouf.[91] Still others claimed that Joumblat wanted to increase the Sunni population in order to gain potential voters in a region hosting a mostly Christian population.[92] Supportive offers from UNRWA, financed by the international community, generated Lebanese suspicions that an international plan to resettle Palestinians in Lebanon existed.[93] It was thought that a final decision would be made, not by the international community, but through negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Strikingly, such political logic, framed by confessionalism, clientelism, and regionalism, was not only manifest in a concerted effort to neglect the Palestinians, but in the contrary manner as well. Despite general government policies and widespread Lebanese feelings, *tawtin*, resettlement, along with incorporation of Palestinians into the Lebanese patronage networks, has in fact been at play—facilitated by several distinct periods of naturalization—from the start: this to the extent that the particular interests of major *zu'ama'* have indeed been met. While the figures involved here were not made accessible to me, they are kept in the archives of the *Direction Générale des affaires refugiés palestiniens* in Beirut.

In 1943, the new Lebanese republic was in the process of gaining a sense of both political balance and identity. The Sunni community still had to be convinced of the validity of an independent Lebanese state, many Sunnis favoring a reunion with fellow-Arab Syria. In order to appease the Sunnis, President Beshara al-Khoury (serving between 1943 and 1952) agreed to assimilation of a refugee community amounting to roughly ten per cent of the Lebanese population. While most of the refugees were Sunni Moslems,[94] Christian and the wealthier

[91]See also: Junblat and the Palestinian Refugees. The Lebanon Report, vol. 5, no.9, 1994. p. 6.
[92]Fida Nasrallah. Lebanese Perceptions of Palestinians in Lebanon: Case Studies. In: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 10. no. 3, 1997. p. 353.
[93]ibid.
[94]Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979. p. 37. For the sake of confessional balance and placating the Christians, al-Khoury ended the economic union with Syria in 1951.
When the Lebanese labor ministery issued restrictions on work for Palestinians, Khoury opposed such an act. It has to be assumed that he was fearing for the integrity of the government as Prime Minister Rachid al-Solh pressed to treat the Palestinian refugees not like foreigners. See: El Natour, pp. 166; 167.

Sunni Palestinians were nonetheless more likely to receive nationality under al-Khoury's corrupt regime in part as a simple result of being able to pay the legal fees. Camille Chamoun (serving between 1952 and 1958) succeeded al-Khoury, continuing his nationalization policies. As with al-Khoury, it was in Chamoun's interest to create a loyal following by enlarging his constituency.

It appears that most of the Christian and Sunni Palestinians who received Lebanese nationality did so during the presidencies of al-Khoury and Chamoun.[95] The other confessional communities have broadly viewed these naturalizations as tampering with Lebanon's demographic balance. The next naturalization period came several decades later, and was ushered in by a decree issued in 1994 affecting 400,000 people[96]--a decree that needs to be seen in light of national elections pending in 1996 together with the weak constituencies on which the ruling governmental "troika"—composed of President Elias Hrawi, Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and President of Parliament Nabih Berri—had to rely. None of these political figures could rely on strong traditional popular constituencies or, Hrawi excepted, the backing of a traditional political family,[97] or an extended social and political network—the latter with the possible exception of Berri's badly organized Amal movement. For all three politicians, naturalization was the easiest way to gain an additional electorate—whose potential could be gauged through "escorts" furnished on election day and last minute promises outside election centers. Hrawi's presidential term was due to end in 1995, but he was hoping for an extension, while Berri was facing serious opposition by Hizballah in his power base in the south. Roughly eighty percent of those nationalized would be Syrian—a reflection of Hrawi's need for Syrian approval of his presidential term's unconstitutional extension.

---

[95]Data in this regard being unavailable, I have based this observation on interviews: all interviewees with bourgeois Sunni and Christian backgrounds confirmed having received Lebanese nationality during these two regimes.

[96]See: *al-jarida al-rasmiyya* (The Official Gazette) 4, 1994. According to Farid al-Khazen, the Lebanese population was increased by ten percent in 1994. See: Farid al-Khazen, Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict. Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 1997.

[97] Hrawi came from a family in Zahle; while he had beenin the Lebanese chamber of eputies, he did not count among the first range of politicians, lacking charisma and hence not managingto establish a popular base. Berri, a businessman in West Africa who had returned to Lebanon (as was in fact the case for Hariri as well), was shunned by large parts of the Lebanese bourgeoisie on account of his modest for his minor social background and extremely bad command of both English and French; he also had difficulties courting the Sunni vote (in this regard, see Lebanon Report, vol. 4, no. 12, 1993. p. 7.

An estimated 27,000 Palestinians, many of them Shiites, would also receive Lebanese nationality. They originally came from seven villages, the so-called *al-Quraa al-Saba,* located along the Lebanese-Israeli border and now part of Israel, the argument being that the villages had belonged to the *vilayat* of Sidon and Marjayoun during Ottoman rule and were thus to be reclaimed symbolically in the face of their allocation to the British in the 1920s. An additional twenty-five hamlets from the Sidon region, some of whose inhabitants were Sunni, were included in the naturalization arrangement. This was Hariri's home-base, where his sister Bahia was electioneering. According to the Lebanese national newspaper *al-Nahar* (25 May 1996), about 5,000 Sunnis were naturalized in the electoral district of Sidon—and 8,000 more in the district of Beirut. The same article indicated that naturalizations had increased the total of available voters in the electorate for the elections of 1996 elections by 4.18 percent to bolster the electoral standing of particular politicians. According to the paper, a total of 50,000 Palestinians had received Lebanese nationality by 1994. Some two years later (*al-Nahar* 13 November 1998) the figure was contested by Palestinian representatives who put it at 30,000.

Whatever the true figure, it is the case that Palestinian refugees continued to be part of a demographic battle fought over enlargement of constituencies, and it is evident that most Christian Palestinians and many Shiite Palestinians had been nationalized. One question that subsequently needs to be posed is why, for their part, the Sunni *zu'ama'* failed for so long to press for a similar large-scale naturalization of Sunni Palestinians. It is true that individual middle class and upper class Sunni Palestinians gained Lebanese nationality by using their connections and financial resources. However, the ordinary Sunnis living in the camps, where the bulk of Sunni refugees lived, were never an issue due to the following factors.

Firstly, the Lebanese Sunni community was not afraid of being eradicated, the case with the Maronites and the Druze, or marginalized, as had been the Shia. For the majority of Sunnis, the creation of the state of Lebanon had at the start been merely an artificial outcome of the Mandate period. In contrast to the other confessions, the Sunnis had a sense of being different from the other confessions, they felt that they were the majority in the wider region. The Sunni bourgeoisie, like their Greek-Orthodox counterparts, had traditional family and trade ties with the Syrian bourgeoisie of Aleppo and Damascus. Hence the Sunni community only gradually developed sympathy with the concept of a greater Lebanese state—since Syria had developed into a relatively

impoverished despotic police-state, political or economic unity was now unattractive.[98]

Secondly, with the 1943 Taif accords, the Sunni political establishment profited from a mutual power-sharing understanding with the Maronite community, guaranteeing it a secure power base in Lebanon. The accords even strengthened the executive power of the Sunni prime minister by restricting the executive power of the Maronite president.[99] Although the Sunnis had originally disapproved of the National Pact, they gradually came to act according to its premises.

The Sunnis had even greater appreciation of the pact after the war had furthered the political aspirations of the Shia, perceived as a potential threat. Beforehand, the existential paranoia characterizing Maronite Christian politics played no role in Sunni communal identity. Their political position only came under threat in the mid 1980s when Druze and Shia militias paralyzed Beirut in continuous street-battles. In that period, the Sunni community lost its militias (mainly the *murabitun*) and the PLO—the Sunni's military mainstay during the civil war—was ousted from Lebanon.

Thirdly, the Sunni community relied, as we have seen, on an exchange of services between patron and client. In the cities in particular, especially Beirut, the *zu'ama'* had to help their constituencies. It was vital for the Sunni urban *za'im* to maintain close popular ties, or he would be in danger of losing his constituency to more popular *zu'ama'*. Every patron had a limited number of services to offer: jobs, so-called connections (to institutions, doctors, lawyers, and other important people), and financial and material gifts. For their part, most Palestinian refugees arrived in Lebanon as landless *fillahin* and did not fit into this urban patron-client structure. Educated Palestinians were able to adapt to an urban social environment, but an estimated 70 percent of the refugees were *fillahin*.[100] They were of no interest to the Lebanese Sunni *zu'ama'*, who could not afford to extend their limited range of services and had little desire to integrate rural Palestinians into their networks.

Finally, social and political spheres were closely connected in Lebanon. Social values demarcating social hierarchies were reflected in political behavior. The attitudes of the Sunni community toward impoverished refugees influenced political behavior concerning integration. The Sunni

[98]Cf. Hilal Khashan. The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the Sunni Moslem Position. In: International Sociology, vol. 7, no.1., March, 1992, p. 93f.
[99]See: The Taif Agreement. The Beirut Review. vol. 1, no. 1, 1991. pp. 119-172.
[100]Thicknesse, p. 11f.; cf. Yussif Sayigh, appendix c, item IV. .

political establishment shared the core values of all traditional bourgeois urban families; even the highly educated Palestinian bourgeoisie could not rely on its automatic sympathy, but had to prove itself through hard work.[101] That bourgeoisie was in fact feared as a potential competitor and rival.

In any case, the majority of Palestinian refugees were isolated and miserable in the camps. Aziz Haidar has described the social status linked to their plight as follows:

> ...after 1948 the Palestinians were for the most part penniless refugees, dependent for their existence and livelihood on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). They lacked the crucial criterion for respect and status in Arab society—ownership of land. The host peoples viewed and related to them as 'inferiors.' Sharing the same social values, the Palestinians saw themselves in the same light, and therefore social meetings and exchange were both difficult and painful for them....Dwelling in the midst of relatively urban populations, they were treated as inferiors because of their subhuman living conditions and their rural origins. The attitude was so demeaning that; for example, the residents of Sidon in southern Lebanon termed the Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp a 'zoo.' In Lebanon, there were many stories of children who asked their parents to buy them 'a Palestinian' (as a pet). Even the Palestinian refugees of fellahin origin living in rural fellahin areas had a difficult time establishing ties because of religious barriers. The refugees were for the most part Sunni Moslems, while the Lebanese fellahin were Shi'ites, Druze, and Christians."[102]

When the Palestinians arrived in Lebanon in 1947-48, locality, confession, and class all affected their patterns of distribution and first settlement. The urban middle and upper classes, among them traders, professionals, and large landowners, moved into the cities and rented apartments. Yet, the majority of refugees, mostly from lower or uneducated classes, often from the rural areas, did not have the means to immediately set up base in the Lebanese social and economic fabric. The various accounts of their flight tend to share one underlying narrative: arriving exhausted and disoriented at the Lebanese border,

---

[101] Cf. Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War. Lebanon 1958-1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1976. p. 29.

[102] Aziz Haidar, "The Different Levels of Palestinian Ethnicity." In: Esman and Rabinovich (eds.), Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East. Ithaca and London: Cornell Universtity Press, 1988. p. 100f.

they waited for their fate to be decided—by the Lebanese army, Lebanese civilians, local authorities, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and scattered individual Lebanese civilians—in one or another nearby Lebanese village. At first, the Lebanese population hosted them in a more or less friendly manner; with a little time, there was an increasing sense of the potential burden they represented. The refugees were asked not to pick fruit from the trees; they were asked to pay for their water. The Lebanese army showed up, taking refugees away on trains and wagons from Bint Jbeil and Tyre in the south to camps further north or to the Syrian border. Many families were split up in the chaos.[103]

In my own interviews, particularly with intellectual Palestinians, they often expressed considerable resentment at the newly established camps being strategically located according to the needs of the Lebanese economy—either near agricultural areas or close to industrial centers, the Lebanese planning to profit from cheap refugee labor. But the fact is that any state hosting a large refugee community will follow rational considerations in the process—including enabling self-sufficiency. For the real source of Palestinian resentment in this regard, we need to dig deeper, such feelings clearly being connected with the subsequent, above-discussed Lebanese decision to impede free Palestinian entry to the labor market, to limit their possibilities to low-paid jobs, combined with the refusal of any state assistance (see below).

In general, Lebanese government policy can only be interpreted as reflecting an effort to economically marginalize the refugees. But to what extent were the camp locations part of a wider governmental plan? Most of these locations evolved from the refugees' original gathering places during their initial influx. The southern camps around Tyre—Rashidiyeh (which had served as a refugee camp for Armenians at the beginning of the century), al-Buss, and Bourj al-Shemali, accordingly reflected the high concentration of refugees there. This was also true for the Nabatiyeh camp (destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 1973 and not rebuilt). The arbitrary development of the first camps in the south is underscored in an account offered by Jaafar Sharafeddine, a *za'im* from a religious Shiite family and a former deputy, of the situation in Tyre.

A lot of refugees arrived by boat in 1948. They were accommodated in the churches, the mosques, and the schools. The Jaafariye [a school] *had to send the children home and grant vacation for ten days. After ten days, we had to grant ten more days of vacation and so on. That is how it*

[103]For numerous accounts of the refugees' flight to Lebanon, see Rosemary Sayigh.

went. The Palestinians have become hard inside because of all the expulsions and hardship they suffered, the many disillusions. Finally, they were settled on government ground close to the seashore, some in a former Armenian camp.[104]

To judge from a 1983 survey by the UN Economic Commission for Western Asia,[105] the assumption holds true that the camps were almost always established in areas where refugees had already settled. The Lebanese authorities were only active in the establishment of Nahr al-Bared and Mar Elias, in the former case after refugees from Bourj al-Shemali were stopped while trying to cross into Syria in the north. While Nahr al-Bared was located in an agricultural area, the Beddawi camp, inhabited by refugees that UNRWA had moved in 1955-56 after houses close to the beach had been flooded or destroyed by the Lebanese authorities, was in a rather barren environment, far from the city of Tripoli. Greek-Catholic refugees previously living in the nearby center of Azarieh would similarly be moved to Jisr al-Bacha camp, and UNRWA would likewise establish Mieh-Mieh camp after refugees had gathered at the location. Ain al-Helweh had been established by UNRWA in 1949 after the Red Cross had first set up a tent-camp, and both Al-Buss and Rashidiyeh were originally Armenian camps then taken over by the refugees. UNRWA also leased land for a camp in Nabatiyeh. For its part, Mar Elias was only established in 1952 when Christian refugees were moved by the authorities from a nearby monastery, while Bourj al-Shemali would emerge in 1955 for refugees from the Beqaa and the southern border villages. Wavell and Tell al-Zatar had been old colonial military barracks (French and British respectively) in which the refugees then took shelter, the Dbayeh camp being established in 1955 when the government rented land to accommodate refugees sheltering in the nearby monastery.

In light of this brief survey—and keeping in mind that the smallest refugee camp, the Wavell camp in the Beqaa Valley, would never be enlarged although the Beqaa was a prime agricultural area—speaking of camp-location as reflecting a will toward economic exploitation seems rather odd. At the same time, depriving the refugees of legal status, aggravating their vulnerability in a competitive labor market and pressing them to accept low salaries, was a strategy that benefited agricultural and industrial production. Palestinians served as cheap field workers and

[104]Interview with Jaafar Sharafeddine, 18 April 1998. The 'Jaafariye' is a religious primary and secondary school in Tyre founded by the father of Jaafar Sharafeddine, a Shiite notable from Tyre, Abdel Hussein Sharafeddine.

[105]See: UN Economic Commission for Western Asia. The Demographic Characteristics of the Palestinians in Lebanon. New York, January, 1983.

formed a sub-urban proletariat in the camps' environments, of which the locations probably reflected more political and military concerns than economic ones. But all told, the Lebanese state not only lacked an interest in dealing with the influx of Palestinian refugees in anything but a repressive and restrictive way, but also an organizational capacity to do so. In light of the potential demographic upheaval, it is certainly unsurprising that the Lebanese State did its best to control and monitor the size of the refugee community from the start.[106]

The Cénacle was a Lebanese group of mainly Christian intellectuals; in March 1949 the group arranged a conference focusing on the Lebanese refugees' plight and their future; it would receive a great deal of public attention.[107] One of the group's members, Fouad Karam, had visited several refugee camps in Lebanon and recorded his impressions of the overall misery. Affected by chaotic and insufficient assistance, epidemics were spreading among the refugees. They were forbidden access to public baths, and sanitary needs were met neither by the Lebanese government nor by the Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge, the two parties engaging in mutual recriminations. In response to this situation, and to confront what was perceived as the threat posed by Israel, the Lebanese government had created a coordinating body called the Bureau Permanent pour la Palestine. The Bureau, however, had soon been overwhelmed by the refugee problem. Its effort to collect money from the general populace was sabotaged by corruption.[108]

The conference was characterized by two contradictory moods: on the one hand, a strong sense of sympathy with the masses of arriving refugees, and of urgency about alleviating their misery and misfortune; on the other hand, deep concern about the inevitable costs and rising burden.[109] In the end, the perception of the refugees as intruders and burdensome petitioners seems to have prevailed—this perception, however short-sighted and ultimately self-destructive, becoming generalized in Lebanese society and politics over the coming months and years.

---

[106]Cf. Pinner, states that Lebanon is the only host-Country which in the early years after 1948 carried through a refugee-census which UNRWA accepted as reliable.

[107]Les Conférences du Cénacles. IIIéme année. no. 3-4, 25 mars, 1949. Témoignage sur les Réfugiés Palestiniens. Conférence par Fouad Karam. For a brief overview on the activities and composition of the Cénacle see: L'Orient-Express, no. 3, 1996.

[108]Fouad's assessment was supported by others, including a mukhtar (official head of a town or village) from one of the camps, who observed that "Les Réfugiés se trouvant au Liban ont besoin d'aide plus que partout ailleurs: en Transjordanie, Syrie et la zone arabe de Palestine, ils peuvent travailler. Ici, ils sont condamnés au chomage." ibid., p. 68.

[109]Ibid., p. 60f.

In his discussion of Palestinian refugee identity-formation, Aziz Haidar has indicated that "at the group level, the Palestinians were accused of eating the bread of the host countries, of betraying their country, of spying for Israel, and of being responsible for their downfall and their fate. On the individual level the Palestinian was teased and accused of weakness, cowardice, and lack of self-respect"—this in turn generating feeling of alienation and exclusion.[110] In Lebanon, such perceptions and self-perceptions were reinforced by restrictive state policies. The failure of Lebanese governments to develop anything but repressive and demoralizing refugee policies naturally led to a sense of oppression and demoralization in the camps. Dependence on aid, with accompanying passivity and apathy, became a modus vivendi. [111]

As late as 1998, the director of UNRWA in Lebanon, Wolfgang Plasa, thus complained about the incapacity for any initiative by the refugees when it came to developing institutions in order to become self-sufficient or economically productive. On the one hand, this needs to be seen against the backdrop of the camps' paralysis by ruling Palestinian organizations of militia character and at the same time the disappearance of the PLO from the camps. Before 1982, the PLO had established a vast organizational framework with, in actuality, controlling a work force taking in something more than 20,000 Palestinians. On the other hand (and most importantly), it needs to be seen in relation to the Lebanese state's virtual incapacity, in a popularly oriented political system based on patrons and clients and lacking adequate administrative structures, to take widely unpopular but still necessary decisions—something doubtless easier in centralized oligarchies or dictatorships like Jordan and Syria. In Lebanon, the strong links between political leaders and their constituencies do not allow abstract policies difficult to communicate and without immediate benefit or policies that are perceived as threatening the constituencies of certain patrons and thereby the fragile consensus of the entire system.

[110] Haidar, p. 102.

[111] Compare: Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

4. Palestinians as Strong Players in the Lebanese Arena

4.1. The Camp Refugees before 1964

The refugees spent their first years in the camps under tents, which, especially during the winter rainy season, meant hardship and disease. The subsequent image of weakness and poverty was not viewed with respect by the surrounding Lebanese population. The initial response of the refugees to the contempt they were widely held in was internalization: the emergence of the self-image of a "lowly minority."[112] The restrictive Lebanese policies regarding on the camps combined with the resentments they had to face reinforced a sense of intense isolation; accusations that they had left their homeland without putting up a fight were turned into self-accusations.

But with time, another response became apparent, one which we might term something like an inverted value system. Viewed by the Lebanese as dirty slums, the camps began to be defined as loci of moral purity by the Palestinians, contrasting radically with the corrupt Lebanese environment. This contrast was especially manifest when the camps were close to Beirut. Rosemary Sayigh thus describes how the opening of a coffee shop at the entrance of the Shatila camp alarmed the inhabitants because it was seen as an encroachment of the impure environment. Despite a gradual breakdown in the camps' isolation, and the increasing presence of Lebanese rural migrants in the Beirut camps in particular, such a moral demarcation line persisted. In general, Palestinians from the camps clung to the values of their rural life and practiced habits common in the countryside, including generosity to guests and strictly guarding female honor. Palestinians would often describe their daughters to me as *akthar muhafizin*, "more conservative," as compared to their Shiite neighbors (the Baalbak Shiites excepted).[113]

In this way, the differences between camp Palestinians and the Lebanese in, say, the southern suburbs of Beirut began to be taken as signs of a fundamental difference between different people. Nevertheless, with time, and as a result of the political and social opening of the camps to the Lebanese outside between 1969 and 1982, the perception of such moral asymmetry has both weakened and become more complex.

---

[112]Haidar, p. 102.

[113] Rosemary Sayigh, 1994, p.49

What has now emerged is a more relaxed differentiation into group terms defined by habit (*"We Palestinians are more conservative."*). However, the system of high and low, moral and immoral has ceased to be absolute but is now relative, the distance articulated being not merely with the Lebanese but also with other Palestinian communities: the Palestinians in Israel, or in the occupied territories, or in other Arabic countries. (There, for instance, girls are married at fourteen or fifteen instead of sixteen or seventeen). And increasingly, Palestinians in Lebanon have come to see themselves as relatively well adapted to a modern urban environment, when compared to their counterparts elsewhere, meaning that a certain inner-Lebanese leveling process seems to be at work within their own self-awareness.

The rigid parameters and holistic exclusiveness of the Palestinian camp refugees' early self perceptions was transparently related to their isolated economic, legal, and political status—their sense of isolation intensified in the unaccustomed urban environment. Self-assertion became an urgent necessity in such circumstances, adherence to familiar social and kinship structures made possible through the resettlement of entire village complexes in the camps. Until today, some leading families of former villages have managed to preserve their reputation in the camps, although this has been partly eroded by migration, emigration and the destruction resulting from the civil war. Heads of families are still consulted in the event of problems or trouble, and are relied on for permission to marry or to intermediate if the bride's family refuses to give her away. Despite all the changes, then, the particular Palestinian social cosmos of the camps has persisted.

In contrast, the Palestinian refugees living outside the camps did not share the inversion of values that had come to construct the identity of many camp Palestinians. For the Palestinian bourgeoisie in particular, the regaining of economic and hence social status remained indispensable. At the same time, that bourgeoisie widely doubted the social legitimacy of its Lebanese counterpart, casting doubt on its genealogical purity and dismissing it as composed of *nouveaux riches,* with the exception of a few landowning aristocratic families.

The emergence of reverse value systems in marginalized and oppressed communities is a widespread phenomenon, the valorization of spiritual as opposed to material factors in the framework of a political or religious ideology often serving as a radical response to a hierarchized social and economic environment. Such a response involves a denial of the hierarchy's legitimacy, since economic and political power are equated

with corruption and immorality. The opposing values include authenticity, trustworthiness, honesty, and moderation. Luxurious symbols of power and wealth are seen as indicators of an impure life and impure social sphere. In religious terms that cut through many cultures: they are symbols of the devil. At work here is a hierarchical inversion defines that the lowest as the most sublime.[114]

Precisely this conceptual structure informs the Islamic and Islamist religious and political ideologies and idioms that spread in the camps with the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent social and economic deterioration. With the use of such idioms, Islamism successfully superseded socialist ideology in helping the Palestinians cope with fresh—and freshly humiliating—asymmetries of economic and political status. The attempted Palestinian revolution in Lebanon had failed; running along with—and up against—other perceptions that had evolved over half a century, disillusionment with secularism had spread. It is telling that many of those who had worked for leftist Palestinian parties and militias found religion.

In one form, religious practice and belief eases depression passively. In another, more active and radical form, it strives for the establishment of a common social habitus based on a universal moral code. The strict adherence to those values and habits advocated by the Islamic popular groups furnished a new sense of security to camp Palestinians, now able to evoke a clearly defined moral and legal code, and draw on its discourse, in circumstances perceived as lacking justice. In this sense, Sunni Palestinian camp inhabitants now found common ground with those Sunni Lebanese themselves attracted to radical Islamic ideologies, sometimes to the point of becoming members of the Islamic popular groups themselves.

The entrance of Lebanese security forces into the camps in 1958 after Lebanese civil unrest over the Arab identity of Lebanon, undermined the refugees' structure of internal authority, based as it had been on cooperation between former local Palestinian leaders and authorities, the *makhatir*, with the Lebanese authorities. Palestinians I interviewed recalled that even setting up small gadgets to ease daily life could be punished by the *maktab al-thani,* the security service created by President Fouad Chehab. As Chehab aimed to strengthen the state's central authority, and as Palestinians posed a particular threat to the state as a potentially politicized destitute and angry population, they were

[114]Cf. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus. The Caste System and its Implications. London: Weidenfeld, 1970.

especially monitored. In this respect, it is interesting that in contrast to Palestinians living outside the camps, those inside did not participate in the 1958 Lebanese unrest marking the Lebanese Sunni opposition to the Lebanese government's cooperation with the Eisenhower doctrine—one manifestation of general Arab opposition to the doctrine. Still, with Nasserite Egypt and Syria moving toward political unification in 1958, the danger of a Palestinian-Lebanese Sunni alliance seemed real enough.

Due to their presence in Lebanese universities and socio-political institutions, Palestinians outside the camps joined Arab nationalist political and intellectual institutions at an early stage. Those in the camps did receive the attention of Lebanese opposition parties like the Baath Party and the Syrian Socialist National Party, which had attempted a coup d'état in 1961, but, it seems, with widely unsatisfactory outcomes.[115] Of more centrality were the activities of the Arab national movement, which was initiated in the camps in the early 1950s. Ahmad al-Yamani (Abu Maher), a UNRWA schoolteacher from the Bourj al-Barajneh camp, had opposed UNRWA's management of the camps, which he thought was not supporting the main aim of the Palestinain refugees, the liberation of their homeland. In 1953, together with Wadia Haddad and George Habbash (both Palestinian medical students at the American University of Beirut), he began establishing political cells in the camps, the general aim being the emergence of a national awareness among the refugees. The group quickly antagonized *makhatir* who were working with the Lebanese and UNRWA authorities and felt primary allegiance to the pre-1948 nationalist Palestinian leadership of Haj Amin al-Husseini. Habbash and his associates represented a younger, more radical leadership from a different background—mainly an urban, middle class background, although some in the movement were from rural areas, sometimes related to local village leaders, less often not.

In 1955, the new movement's leading members were expelled from Lebanon's universities, UNRWA likewise dismissing Ahmad al-Yamani from its service. Some of the movement's members went to Cairo.[116] They would only regain their influence in 1964, with the establishment in Lebanon of a Palestinian branch of the movement. It was named the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine—a predecessor of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[117]

---

[115]Interview with Fouad Awwad, former leader of the SSNP.

[116]Walid W. Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World. Habbash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism. London & Tonbridge: Charles Knight, 1975, p. 30f.

[117]Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. People, Power, Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 142 f.

4.2. The Cairo Agreement: a Landmark in Palestinian-Lebanese Relations

The new leadership with its new roots was itself the outcome of a more general phenomenon: the emergence of a generation of Palestinians that had profited from the educational services of UNRWA, was literate, and had entered higher educational institutions and Lebanese universities. In Beirut, Gamal Abdel Nasser sponsored several such institutions, offering Palestinians contact with Nasserite political programs; inevitably, this development had its impact on the camps. The establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 in Cairo under Nasser's auspices was a powerful step toward an institutionalized national consciousness: a legitimized international political representation with strongly unifying regional effects. In Lebanon, while, as already noted, Shafiq al-Hout was appointed the first (and until now only) PLO representative, in the middle of the 1960s he was not able to operate freely, even having to ask government permission to enter the camps.[118] Fear of a Palestinian uprising was too high.

The defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in the 1967 "Six-Day War" was a regional political development with powerful repercussions in the Palestinian community, and decisively influencing the character of their presence. The defeat marked the onset of profound disillusionment for all those who had wished to believe in the potential of Arab unity; with Arab governments discredited, Arab nationalist enthusiasm was transferred to the Palestinian cause. Whereas the Arab masses looked favourably on the formation of armed units to launch attacks against Israelis, their governments had more practical fears concerning Israeli retaliation and the emergence of Palestinian-linked internal opposition. Reflecting the seriousness of such fears, Jordan launched a major military campaign against the *fidayin* based in its territory in 1970, a process that culminated in what they would term the "Black September" of their defeat and expulsion.

Both growing popular support for the Palestinian cause among the Lebanese and the continuous influx of *fidayin* from Jordan decisively altered the social and political situation for Palestinians in Lebanon.[119] Within popular perceptions, they underwent transformation from impotent pariahs into courageous martyrs. [120]

---

[118]Interview with Shafiq al-Hout, 13 February 1998.
[119]Cf. Cobban, 1985, p. 103.
[120] Haidar, 1988. p. 104.

On the state level, they now found themselves with political and military influence. The political turning point was the Cairo Agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese government, signed by the Lebanese army's commanding General Emile Boustani in 1969.[121]

A severe Lebanese state crisis had preceded the agreement. Allied in a struggle to bring down the al-Helou government, Maronite leaders Gemayel, Chamoun and Eddé had adopted strongly anti-Palestinian positions and a policy of strict opposition to all the pro-Palestinian parties. While still maintaining a relatively neutral position, the army (condescendingly named a "boy scout army" by the Palestinians) was engaged in fighting Palestinian commandos. After clashes in Sidon, Rashid Karami resigned as prime minister.

Charles al-Helou had believed that the evolving Palestinian military confrontation with Israel could only be supported within the limits of a sovereign Lebanon, but Karami hoped to go further, proposing coordination between the army and the Palestinian military-political leadership.[122] Army-head Boustani's signing of a bilateral agreement with PLO-chairman Arafat solved the crisis for the time being.[123] In the form of the PLO, Palestinians were now recognized as a legal-contractual body and acknowledged as having a powerful institutional presence on the Lebanese political scene. This was, of course, very much to the dismay of those perceiving the PLO as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.

Former president Chehab had masterminded the agreement.[124] He was still effective behind the scenes of the Helou government and had decided that the Palestinians had to be contractually bound to a recognition of Lebanese sovereignty. A statesman and practitioner of realpolitik, Chehab preferred diplomatic to military methods, in the awareness that the Lebanese army was unequal to the challenge of the Palestinian armed organizations and that constant confrontation would split the state internally.[125] Unable to defeat a dangerous opposing force, the alternative was to legalize and channel them, in conformity with the constitutional framework. This logic conformed to Chehab's belief that

---

[121]For the text of the agreement, see: Walid Khadduri (ed.), International Documents on Palestine. Beirut, 1969.
[122] Salibi, 1976. p. 41.
[123] Cobban, 1985. p. 109.
[124]Interview with Shafiq al-Hout, representative of the PLO in Lebanon from 1964 until his resignation in 1993, 13 February 1998.
[125]See: Farid al-Khazen, Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: Recipe for a Conflict. In: Journal of Refugee studies. Vol.10, No.3, 1997.

para-state developments should be subordinated to the central state institutions.

Palestinians thus arrived on the official Lebanese political stage not as civilians but as an armed group capable of challenging the Lebanese army. The leaders of the PLO established themselves in the manner of strongmen and patrons, with their own constituencies. Nevertheless, the symbolic significance of the Palestinian fighters far exceeded that of the traditional strongmen, the *qabadayat*, as protectors of the power radius of the *za'im*. Structurally and programmatically, they were more than followers, rather being perceived, directly and indirectly, as inheritors of the pan-Arab movement, fighting for what was felt to be a sacred aim of the Arab world, an aim towering over all other national pretensions in the Arab region, the liberation of Palestine. Its popular appeal supported military and political activities that most Arab regimes held at careful distance from their own territory and political affairs. The danger was too great that the fervor involved would set a revolutionary fire to their populations.[126]

In entering the political scene, the PLO thus changed the Lebanese political structure, radicalizing the policies and customs of the strongman to become a dominant political player, with the gun legitimizing power. And it transformed the traditional relations between leader and follower into an activation of broad segments of the population—significantly, Lebanese as well as Palestinian. The agreement covered both military and civil aspects of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, attempting to reconcile Lebanese security interests with Palestinian objectives. The military side of the document centered on the right of the *fidayin* to maintain their military activities on Lebanese territory, guaranteeing easy movement and the delivery of arms while requesting discipline on the part of armed groups, as well as a cessation of anti-Lebanese propaganda, liberation of Lebanese prisoners, and cooperation with the Lebanese army—measures that would prove necessary in clashes between the PLO and the Lebanese army in 1973 around Sidon. The antithetical interests being addressed here left a huge amount of space for negotiations and de facto decisions. Shafiq al-Hout has described the text such activity was based on as follows: "It was a formal, not a practical agreement. Palestinians and Lebanese were kidding each other with it. A revolution does not match a state."[127]

---

[126]Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament. Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 174-182.
[127]Interview with Shafiq al-Hout, 13 February 1998.

The agreement's military dimension was already a de facto reality. More than twenty years later, in 1989, the Lebanese parliament would abrogate the agreement, thus confirming the defeat and impotence of the Palestinian armed struggle and its organizations in Lebanon.

4.3. The Benefits of the Cairo Agreement for the Palestinian Refugees

For many Palestinians living in Lebanon as refugees since 1948, the Cairo Agreement articles dealing with the status of Palestinians as civilians were a revolutionary breakthrough. For the first time in twenty years, the Palestinians were recognized as having civil rights such as free movement through the country and (even more importantly) the right to work. The opening of the labor market came just when Palestinians who had attended UNRWA schools and graduated from university were in a position to take advantage of the development (this often marking a break with their parents' poverty and unemployment).

The Palestinian camps now came under the control of the PLO and its different political organizations. At first, the Lebanese authorities closely surveyed these organizations; eventually, the *fidayin* who had slipped in from Jordan through Syria since 1967 began to supersede the authorities. Palestinians could now engage in formerly forbidden activities such as refurbishing or building houses. The camps began to grow, brick makeshift housing replacing aluminum huts. Because of the easing of restrictions on movement and the subsequent increase mingling with the outside environment, the camps' ghetto character became less marked. At the same time, the camps became heavily politicized, a development that until then had been forestalled.

Before the agreement, Palestinians participating—in the wake of Nasserism and the founding of the PLO— in secret actions and meetings had been jailed or otherwise punished; now, the PLO could focus primarily on the camps and surrounding areas in both its military-political recruitment and training and the establishment of social-welfare organizations. This takeover injected a new dynamism into the social and political structure of the camps,[128] a distinct national consciousness emerging and drawing support from both the general Arab and local Lebanese popular environment. In the following years, the new

[128]On the social and political evolution of the Shatila camp after the arrival of the *fidayin* and the rise of the PLO, see Sayigh, 1994.

Palestinian leaders would establish themselves as important power brokers within the Lebanese political system; it would become impossible to arrive at any major political decisions without their participation.

While strengthening Palestinian civil rights, the PLO's military presence Palestinian military emancipation in Lebanon created an ambiguous image of the Palestinian community as a whole: On the one hand, the Palestinians were now viewed in the framework promoted by the PLO: as a people in its own right, with national aspirations and communal power. On the other hand, they were viewed as a group hostile to the Lebanese system and bent on implementing the agenda of an occupying force. The negative side of this evolving Lebanese attitude menaced the position of those Palestinians who, in contrast to their counterparts in the camps, had successfully become part of Lebanese society. Nevertheless, aside from certain sectors of the Christian, mainly Maronite, population, anti-Palestinian Lebanese sentiments were still far from prevalent in the late 1960s, most Lebanese continuing to see Palestinian national aspirations as a legitimate answer to the Jewish takeover of Palestinian Arab territory in 1948, and to the flight and expulsion. The Palestinians profited from the spread of pan-Arabist, Nasserite ideology that defined their cause as central to Arab sentiments and political aims. The 1967 defeat of the Arab armies legitimized a strengthening of Palestinian nationalist aspirations—aspirations being steered by the leadership of the PLO.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie that had established itself in Lebanon observed the activities of the *fidayin* with mixed feelings. The now-prevailing image of the Palestinian as resistance fighter was not something they could match with their middle-class entrepreneurial or intellectual values. For these Palestinian Lebanese, being Palestinian meant memories and family relations, perhaps participation in Arab cultural and political clubs and debating societies. Having followed their individual survival strategies and being able to rely on their Lebanese connections if necessary, they felt no need to curry favor with a *za'im.* Class-awareness prevented them from associating on ethnic or national grounds with people they had previously avoided. All in all, the socialist impetus of the Palestinian revolution did not conform to their ideas. No doubt, they had a sense of solidarity, but personal engagement would be articulated in non-military or militant domains.

In this light, it is striking that many children of these Palestinian bourgeois Lebanese would end up joining the ranks of the PLO. They did so in a period when socialist movements, guerilla warfare, and a revolutionary spirit had gained worldwide middle-class popularity. For those sharing this spirit in Lebanon, the idea of a national resistance movement

included internal social reform; ideologically there were no longer any difficulties in overriding class differences for the cause. Becoming a political activist or even a fighter was the outcome of both intellectual debate and national conviction.

4.4. Symbols of Empowerment: the Palestinian Fighters

Depicted in graffiti, caricatures, and various forms of propaganda with his *kuffiya* (the black and white checkered scarf) and AK-47, the *fida'i* or fighter thus came to personify newly gained Palestinian power and the restoration of both Palestinian and Arab honor in the late 1960s. This amounted to a potent counter-image to that of the downtrodden and demoralized Palestinian refugee.

The historical and political circumstances in which the *fida'i* appeared transcended his role as bearer of a sacred mission: he became sacred himself. The martyr cults developed sophisticated and inalienable rituals following the death of a *fida'i*. According to his level of importance, these rituals were accompanied by mass popular demonstrations and by visits of the highest political leaders to the family's house. The *fida'i*'s quasi-mythic qualities made it attractive to become a *fida'i* oneself. In essence, Palestinian teenagers and young men—the *shabab*— were lured by the image, then joining training sessions and commando units.

The price paid for what was viewed as heroism was, to be sure, mundanely personal and existential: the loss of close family members. The institutions set up to care for the families of deceased "martyrs" were meant to breach the gap between nationally oriented heroism and private misery. At the same time, a revolutionary spirit and the principle of restored honor was defined as more important than any private fears that might lead parents and wives to hold back children and husbands. The official ideology did not recognize doubts or reservations. In this respect, the *fidayin* simply adhered to the tenets of all militant fighters for a cause: it was not that the enemy was dangerous, but that fear of death meant weakness. A former fighter put it to me thus:

If you are afraid you have already lost. When you look in the eye of death, when you face death without fear, nothing can happen to you. I have survived. I am still careful, I always watch my environment. No one knows where I sleep. I change my place. I never sit with my back to

people in the restaurant. I am not afraid; I have nothing to loose. What do I have to loose?[129]

In this individual's case, an internalized fighter's ethos meant living permanently in extremis: a neglect of the ordinary habits structuring daily life; an integration of death into daily awareness. His family lived in exile for reasons of safety and to guarantee his undisturbed devotion to the cause. He and his family were supported by his brothers and, to a lesser extent, by his party. He did not reveal his militant identity to everyone—some knew, others, including his children, never would. In general, truth was for him less precious than faithfulness to the cause. But in the tradition of the *qabaday* defending his people and redistributing resources, he invited those in need to ask him for services. He spent much of his time putting people in touch, negotiated jobs and financial support through the widespread network of contacts he retained from his days near the top echelons of the Palestinian political party he belonged to.

While some Palestinians lived out such a heroic habitus, many others were attracted by the image without fulfilling the role. They relied on symbolism: the gun, the *kuffiya*, and the membership card. These permitted them to exercise a previously inaccessible authority in the Lebanese environment. For young men, recruitment offered a chance to achieve two goals simultaneously: to gain a reputation by becoming a fighter and to improve one's income through a relatively secure source, the parties. In this manner, the "liberation struggle" was part of an awakening that, beyond its military dimension, was also important socially and economically. The camps became the popular bases of that struggle, their inhabitants now being caught up in both its discourse and organizational framework: it was almost impossible to escape from the control of the *fidayin*. Especially for those with nothing to lose, the struggle supplied new honor. No longer were they left to Lebanese whims in cases of dispute and conflict. They now had powerful patrons.

Palestinians in Lebanon had thus finally achieved what neither the Lebanese state nor the socio-political environment had readily granted. They were now a recognized and to some extent powerful political force in the Lebanese arena. Socially, they had managed to upgrade their status to the point of inversion of previous circumstances. The defense and protection of their honor was now in their own hands. Julie Peteet has described it, "Palestinians found not only services and national pride

[129] Palestinian Sunni, Beddawi camp, 50.

in the PLO but most essentially protection from abuse by sectors of the host population. The open, armed presence of the resistance movement ensured the borders of a community where trust was possible, even if only in clearly demarcated spaces."[130]

Nevertheless, with time this new mythic-heroic image was bound to become tarnished in the realm of everyday affairs, many Lebanese and Palestinians coming to feel the *fida'i's* presence—despite both an abstract sympathy with the Palestinian plight as well as martyrs' commemorations—as a form of harassment. Quite rapidly, in fact, within popular awareness the *fidayin* were transformed from courageous fighters into strongmen controlling turf. Before the Israeli invasion in 1982, marking the end of a powerful Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, sympathies had reached a low-point even among the Palestinian camp inhabitants. The militias had become parasitical.

The influx of large sums of money had enticed most of the Palestinian organization's upper to become involved in Beirut's entertainment world, now a magnet for Arabic tourists. At the same time, the PLO had established a paid infrastructure equivalent to a minor state administration. Those who weighed means against realistic options probably understood that an overt military attack against Israel would end in crushing defeat. Nevertheless, the inflated apparatus, ongoing recruitment, and propaganda created an expectation of military action. Replacing an impossible grand invasion, scattered individual attacks were now lauded as victorious feats; the *fida'i* involved embraced as national heroes. Serving to disguise actual political, diplomatic, and military weaknesses, rhetorical assertions of strength represented a trap to which the Palestinian leadership and its constituency all too readily fell prey.[131]

---

[130]Julie Peteet, "Transforming Trust: Dispossession and Empowerment among Palestinian Refugees," in: E. Valentine Daniel/John Christian Kundsen (eds.), Mistrusting Refugees. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p.180.

[131]Fouad Ajami (1981) has analysed this trait within Arab ideological political self-representation. Rashid Khalidi (Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) cites Shafiq al-Hout's speech at the first Palestinian National Congress in Tunis after the exodus of the fidayin from Lebanon—a speech in which al-Hout strongly attacked the leadership for turning defeat into victory.

4.5. The New Patrons in the Lebanese Arena

The presence of the PLO polarized the Lebanese public and Lebanese politics. Among those sympathetic to the Palestinians, the dominant perspective was that they were political allies and a welcome counterbalance to Maronite pre-dominance. For those who identified strongly with the political aims of the Palestinian-Arab cause, the cause being sacred, criticism of those representing it was taboo. Some soon understood that good relations with the Palestinians were profitable, the PLO having large sums of money to spend. Lebanese businessmen, often from the Sunni community, thus co-operated with the PLO if they were sympathetic to the cause and could make a profit.

Others, many of whom would later join the Christian Lebanese Forces, neither accepted an Arab identity nor an Arab political orientation for Lebanon, firmly believing that the Palestinian cause was neither theirs nor matched their interests. Realistically enough, they saw Lebanese political and public support for the Palestinians as reflecting the emergence of an opposition willing to topple Lebanon's political system and threaten Christian predominance.

Many authors have commented on the effects of the Palestinian political and military presence on the Lebanese system and its contribution to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Perspectives vary according to political position. The thrust of these analyses ranges from assigning main responsibility for the war to the PLO[132] to seeing it as an internal Lebanese political and social crisis compounded by the PLO's presence.[133] Two effects of this presence on the Lebanese system should be pointed out here.

Firstly, it triggered the advanced militarization of other Lebanese groups, increasing inter-Lebanese tensions through an undermining of the status quo. Although the warring factions were not highly equipped armies, the spiraling militarization rendered the Lebanese arena highly explosive. People often bitterly warned that the civil war could easily erupt again, as most households owned a gun. Experience had shown that nothing more was needed.

Public displays of weapons by armed groups made it possible for a minor shootout between two individuals to end up much more. The paramilitary groups that had evolved parallel to the Palestinian arming in the early

[132]Farid al-Khazen, 1997
[133] Cobban, 1985.

1970s now had more of a monopoly on armed violence than the state. Openly declaring the need for self-protection against the threat of a coalition between the LNM, led by Kamal Joumblat, and the PLO, the Maronite militias set up their own training camps. An interview with a former member of the *al-numur* (Tigers), the militia led by Dany Chamoun (son of President Camille Chamoun), helped illuminate these developments for me.

The interviewee was a Maronite lawyer from Beirut. He often frequented the house of Camille Chamoun, being a personal friend of Dany. With a group of other friends, they would often dive in the sea nearby. In 1968, following an assassination attempt on Chamoun, the group decided that instead of learning how to dive, they should learn how to protect that figure; *al-numur* was founded as a result. The question of where to train was difficult as the secret service, *al-maktab al-thani*, active until 1970, would have soon closed any training camp. They decided to go to the Palestinian camp in Dbayeh, disguised as sympathizers, and they in fact learnt how to handle Kalashnikovs there. Fifty members of the group—enough to control a city quarter—received training in that way. Later, Chamoun bought them Kalashnikovs. The lawyer himself had brought them from the Palestinian camp at Jisr al-Bacha. In 1975 *al-numur* joined *al-ahrar*, Camille Chamoun's militia, constituted by Christian Syrians to whom he had given Lebanese nationality in the 1950s.

When asked why the Christian organizations had not united to face the Palestinian threat, the interviewee answered that they did not trust each other. However, at the start of the civil war, they had indeed rallied together, *Al-ahrar*, the Kata'ib, and allies encircling Chiyah and battling f the Palestinian-Lebanese leftist coalition. However, while there had been coordination, all were eager to take the credit. And in any event, when *al-ahrar* attacked the Palestinian camp of Tell al-Zatar, the Kata'ib only interfered when it appeared that victory was possible. Tell al-Zatar was an industrial zone, and the PLO disturbed the factory owners— after the civil war began, they did not want Palestinians working in their factories, now that they were enemies.

We liberated Tell al-Zatar. And the East of Beirut. We expelled all those Palestinians in revenge for the fall of Damour where Chamoun lived. The whole war, it seems, was a big "guerre de vengeance". Every expulsion called for another expulsion so that the demographic balance could be held.

The attack on the camps of Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al-Bacha (and Dbaye, which in contrast did not end up eradicated) was launched in 1976 on

command of Chamoun by the Christian militias with the aid of internal security units. When Palestinians asked for support from Syria, they were sent Syrian Palestinian units that destroyed Damour, where Chamoun's residence was located. The Palestinians then attacked the Maronite village of Kahaleh. In response, the Kata'ib massacred 200 unarmed Moslem port workers.[134] In this way, each round of war produced another.

Militias emerged from a former troupe of bodyguards like *al-ahrar*, from a boy scout group like the Kata'ib, and from a kind of bravery contest of young men, *al-numur*. They were both a reflection of and response to a heavily armed environment. Although parties like the Kata'ib and the SSNP had trained its people earlier, a broader recruitment started in the early seventies. With declared political enemies suspected of militarization and political rivals from the same confessional camp, the violent potential was bound eventually to disrupt the internal peace.

A second effect of the PLO on the Lebanese system involved exacerbating an ideological question that continued to disturb Lebanese political and intellectual life: Was Lebanon an Arab country or did it belong to the occidental world? In Helena Cobban's words, "the deciding factor on the Palestinian issue in Lebanon was not so much whether one was Lebanese or Palestinian, or Christian or Moslem, as whether one confined oneself 'an Arab' or not. Most of the Lebanese Sunnis and Shiites instinctively did feel so. So did Kamal Joumblat and his many supporters among the Druze. So did most Greek Orthodox Christians and sectors within most other Christian communities in Lebanon."[135] The 1958 civil riots divided the country over this issue because Chamoun's foreign policy, contrary to that of most Arab countries, involved acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine. The unification of Syria and Egypt in 1958 had caused further instability.[136]

The Triple Alliance (*al-hilf al-thulathi*) of the main Maronite leaders, Gemayel, Chamoun, Eddé, represented the main force opposing a pro-Palestinian policy. The Alliance was partly initiated to counteract the Palestinian military presence and partly to prevent another "Chehabist" President succeeding in the 1970 elections. Politics in Lebanon always

---

[134]Hanf, 1990. p. 273f. See also: Sayigh, 1997. p. 359ff.

[135]Cobban, 1985. p. 103.

[136]Another major motivation for the riots was Chamoun's the curbing of the electorates before the parliamentary elections in 1957. The leading Lebanese *zu'ama'* lost their seats in parliament, ultimately sparking great anger. Among the figures involved were Saeb Salam (Sunni), Kamal Joumblat (Druze) and Kamil al-Assaad (Shiite). See: Hanf, 1990, p. 154f.

had a flexible trend; nothing was ever clear-cut. According to Kamal Salibi, Gemayel's Kata'ib Party had agreed in a 1974 party congress to back an Arab line of support for the Palestinian cause in a Middle East peace conference.[137] Yet the Kata'ib's decision to take up arms against the Palestinians in 1975 marked marking the start of the Lebanese civil war. On the political and diplomatic level, the Palestinians could not be brought in line with this opposition's program. Despite the military coordination affirmed by the Cairo Agreements, relations remained bad and clashes between Palestinian commandos and the Lebanese army continued.

Opposition to the Palestinian presence was more complicated for Moslem leaders than for those of other confessions. Sunni leaders perceived Palestinians as both potential rivals and as allies against Maronite predominance. Saeb Salam, who resigned as prime minister after the 1973 assassination of PLO leaders by an Israeli commando squad in Beirut, was nevertheless critical of the organization's expansion. A Sunni *za'im,* Salam was a leading Lebanese Arabist figure. One of the leaders of the popular uprising in 1958, he showed increasing caution in the seventies when it came to supporting to give full support to the Palestinians--ideological sympathies were less important than the direct threat they now posed to his constituency.[138]

The threat the Palestinians posed to Sunni leaders was not only that they occupied parts of their constituency. They also lured many Lebanese to join in the popular movements allied to the Palestinian cause. Although these leaders needed the Palestinians in order to gain and hold power, they were also endangering the loyalty of their clientele - more the case, to be sure, with Salam in Beirut than Karami in Tripoli. On the one hand, Maronite leaders were able to mobilize their constituencies against the visible expansion of *fidayin* in the environs of the camps around Dbayeh, Tell al-Zatar, Dekwaneh and elsewhere through nationalist and anti-Arab, anti-Islamic rhetoric. On the other hand, Moslem leaders could not act against a popular sentiment widespread among their people.

---

[137]Salibi, 1976. p. 83.

[138]Salibi, 1976. p.77. One of the more prominent examples of a figure who changed from being a Sunni strongman to a PLO supporter was Ibrahim Qulaylat. He became leader of the Nasserite militia *al-murabitun*--the only Sunni Lebanese militia mainly financed and equipped by Fatah. The Palestinians recruited Qulaylat, who had been serving Saeb Salam during the 1958 riots. See Hanf, 1990. p. 245. In contrast to Salam, Rashid Karami (Sunni leader from Tripoli) viewed the Palestinian presence as a force for expanding Sunni power. See Sayigh, 1997. p. 358.

After the expulsion of Palestinians and Moslems from the east of Beirut in 1976, the Christian *zu'ama'* thought they had solved their problems by "cleaning" 'their' territory and controlling autonomous areas in a crumbling country. In West Beirut, the PLO expanded its institutional framework. Whole quarters like Fakhani, Sabra, Mazraa, and Tariq al-Jedideh were under their control, marked by checkpoints. This urban take-over had started years before as competition for territory with the Lebanese Sunni *qabadayat* and gangs. In Sidon, Nabatiyeh, and Tyre, the Palestinians soon became the strongest parties. Beginning in the early seventies, the Palestinians established themselves according to the same patron-client-based socio-political structures as the Lebanese. The Palestinian commandos were thus themselves in competition with each other for areas to control.

The widespread, radical political activities were clearly a threat to the traditional Lebanese system of co-existence. Those who, from mainly ideological conviction, had a sense that the Lebanese system had nothing to offer, joined the secular, multiconfessional and socialist parties, whose popular following was mainly but not exclusively Moslem. The LNM emerged in 1975 as a formal unification of these parties: At the start, the Movement represented an alliance between Kamal Joumblat's PSP and the Communist Party (*hizb al-shuyuaiy*). Sympathetic parties were the Baathists, the Nasserites, and the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (*hizb al-amal al-shuyuaiy*), as well as the non-leftist but pro-Palestinian fraction of the SSNP.[139] The left-wing parties of the PLO, mainly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP or "*jabha shabiya*") and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP or "*jabha dimukratiya*") were the supporting Palestinian elements of the Movement, ideologically and militarily. These parties mainly controlled all areas not controlled by the Christian militias, but they also held their own turf.

As head of the Lebanese Movement, Kamal Joumblat intended a complete elimination of confessionalism and proportional power division and was inclined to fight together with his strongest allies, the leftist Palestinian fractions. He was, in fact, able to attract many of those disappointed over the actual state of Lebanese power-distribution.[140] Despite Joumblat's apparently noble intentions, Goria Wade considers him—on solid grounds—his policies to have had the single most disastrous effect on internal Lebanese relations preceding the war.[141]

---

[139]Hanf, 1990, p. 244

[140]Hanf, 1990. p. 168f.

[141]Goria Wade. Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1985. p. 250f.

The Druze community had not been integrated into any dominant political positions by the national pact. And there was no reason for Joumblat, doomed to play a marginal role because of the institutional framework, to support the pact's idea.

In any event, those whose political stronghold was most endangered by the Movement's popular attraction were not the Christian leaders whom Joumblat despised most, namely Gemayel and Chamoun, but the Shiite and Sunni *zu'ama'*, the feudal and city notables. The patron-client relations these political leaders relied on were seriously eroded by the attraction the Movement held for their traditional constituencies. The success of the popular parties had resulted from Lebanese social and economic developments creating an environment that required changes. With the breach between the urban centers—mainly Beirut—and the rural hinterland becoming extremely wide, the (Shiite) rural population demanded action. The Shiite *zu'ama'* failed to draw sufficient governmental support to their regions, out of disinterest or incapability. Migration to the cities deepened a sense that the periphery was being utterly neglected.[142]

Whereas the Shiite *zu'ama'* in the south persistently lost followers, their territory being controlled by the Palestinian commandos, the Sunni *zu'ama'* seem to have remained closer to the changes among their people by adopting an Islamic identity. Under the threat of the popular secular movements, they rallied to the *al-tajammua al-islami*: Saeb Salam, Rashid Karami, and Takieddine al-Solh, Mufti Hassan Khaled, Shafik al-Wazzan.[143] But while these conservative forces were preoccupied with the Moslem-Christian balance, the progressive forces were working to restructure the Lebanese social and political system.

The Palestinian position was consequently not a homogeneous one. However, differentiation between the positions of the various Palestinian factions was rarely made when Lebanese talked about the PLO and its effects on Lebanese politics. Views on the PLO presence in Lebanon did vary: One perspective was that the organization had intended to follow a policy of non-interference in Lebanese internal matters after having been expelled from Jordan, but had them been lured into the Lebanese quagmire. Another was that it had actually been planning to take over the

---

[142]Wade, 1985, *160f.* Nevertheless, this population may have been somewhat less isolated than Wade suggests. It was backed by institutions such as the labor syndicates, the student unions movement, the union of the agricultural regions. (Interview with Saadallah Mazraani, member of the politbureau of the Communist Party, 26 March 1998.)

[143]Interview with Mounah al-Solh, 19 February 1998.

state of Lebanon as a substitute for Palestine[144], or, in a less radical version, to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Israel.

Many Lebanese who had seen the Palestinian organizations rule their villages and neighborhoods with ruthless and arrogant manner were convinced that Palestinians aimed to dominate Lebanese political life. Whereas Christians, and later the Shiites, argued in terms of territorial occupation by the PLO military, the Sunnis complained of Palestinian intrusion into political institutions. What ultimately fostered a widely held belief in a Palestinian takeover of the state was the alliance between the leftist Palestinian groups and the LNM. This alliance, in fact, deeply worried the political establishment. In actuality, following 1976, the PLO had emerged as the main political power in the Moslem part of the country.[145]

In contrast to the socialist PFLP and DFLP, Fatah was more cautious in polarizing the political scene, its members stemming from the rather conservative and Islamic elements in Palestinian society. When interviewed, Mounah al-Solh, a Sunni notable and intellectual from Beirut and one of the intermediaries between Palestinians and the Lebanese establishment, indicated that Arafat had been trying to contain the more radical factions. Arafat, he asserted, was not interested in seeing Lebanon fall apart, as this would have given Syria reason to intervene. Reflecting his desire to create a Lebanon supportive of the Palestinian cause, Arafat, Solh indicated, wanted to initiate an alliance between the LNM and the Islamic grouping (*al-tajammua al-islami*) of the Lebanese Sunni establishment. This would have neutralized both Palestinian and Lebanese radicalism.

With the LNM gaining power and threatening to produce an imbalance in the system, it was necessary to moderate the movement. A combination of conservative Sunni *zu'ama'* willing to cooperate with their Christian counterparts and the radical popular parties could have upheld the Lebanese constitutional status quo. At the same time, such an alliance would have had repercussions on Palestinian left-wing parties intent on breaking away from a policy line that Arafat intended to maintain. Saeb Salam was the only Sunni *za'im* who refused the proposal to join such an

[144] There was widespread belief among Christian Lebanese in a so-called Kissinger plan: Palestinians would be resettled in Lebanon, whereas Lebanese Christians would be exiled to Algeria. See Asad Abu-Khalil. Arab Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. In: The Beirut Review. vol.1, no.2, fall 1991. pp. 37-53.

[145] Farid al-Khazen. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-76. London: I.B.Tauris, 2000. Chapter IV.

alliance.[146] One can only speculate about his motivations—Al-Solh suggested Salam's "aristocratic sense" as a reason. It may be that Salam was not willing to submit to a power he saw as a threat to his patronage, and to the system guaranteeing his position. He may have found Maronite encroachment less threatening than an alliance with forces set to alter the power balance completely in favor of a secular constitution.

The Lebanese saw Palestinian activities as motivated by self-interest.[147] For their part, Palestinians would stress how some Lebanese political sectors used Palestinian military strength and influence for their own benefit, or simply as an excuse for their war.[148] Heated discussions regarding the extent to which the PLO contributed to the breakdown of the Lebanese state continued, the focus now often being on painful questions of guilt and responsibility.

For ordinary Lebanese, the rise of the PLO contrasted sharply with the disintegration of the Lebanese state. This development promoted the image of a force parasitically indulging on its host while destroying it. The metaphor appeared to have materialized in the PLO functionaries who enjoyed themselves in Lebanon thanks to the petrodollars that came pouring in after the oil boom of 1973.[149] Financial support from Gulf countries has allowed the PLO to broaden its support and establish a well-paid network of clients, gangs, and militiamen. This situation was vividly recalled in a number of interviews:

We used to have a restaurant in Mazraa. Every evening about twenty to thirty Palestinians came for a feast. They would have several lambs and gave enormous tips. Even the cook and the kitchen staff were given generous tips. They had a lot of money to spend.[150]

Ironically, I met Palestinians in Karim Pakradouni's house.[151] *Not necessarily intellectuals, but men of politics. It was Pakradouni's policy to keep contacts with all sides so he would become indispensable himself. As the most intelligent of his party he was the only one to be taken seriously. These meetings were held at very expensive dinners. The Palestinians always asked for exclusive cigars. The revolution in Cuba*

---

[146]Interview Mounah al-Solh, 19 February 1998.
[147]See Ahmad Beydoun. The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective. In: Journal of Palestine Studies XXI, no.3, Spring 1992. pp. 35-53.
[148]See Khalidi, 1986, p. 22.
[149]ibid., p. 32.
[150] Sunni from Beirut, male school director, about 40.
[151] Karim Pakradouni was the intellectual leader of the Kata'ib (or Phalanges), the right-wing Christian party of Pierre Gemayel.

was different: Fidel Castro and Che Guevara had decided to sell everything, to give up their offices. It was meant to be a struggle without return. The Palestinians, in contrast, were there to make money.

I was working for a journal at that time. I scanned foreign press articles on the subject of how Palestinians and the Arabs were represented in the Western world. Every time I went down from Kisrwan to Beirut for a meeting, I found the Palestinians absent. They were too busy following their business deals! They drove limousines and lived in big apartments. At one point, I told my wife: We are more Palestinian than the Palestinians, for what am I doing all this work?

In Paris it was up to me to discuss in the intellectual circles, propagating the Palestinian and Arab cause until the early morning hours. The Palestinians had always gone to bed long before. Those who were supposed to lead the struggle did not live in the camps. They lived in Hamra. There was a huge discrepancy. Only Habbash and Hawatmeh lived modestly. They never stayed in expensive hotels and they knew about Palestinians in the camps. The fact that Arafat does not think about the refugees in the peace negotiations is not surprising. He has always been ignorant in this respect, like those working in the Palestinian Authority today. Otherwise, they could not accept there being no solution for the refugees.[152]

At the start, support for the Palestinian cause had been a question of political orientation and idealism for many Lebanese. Disillusionment predominated in the end. Political allies fell out and became increasingly sensitive to perceived Palestinian arrogance. Predictably, anti-Palestinian propaganda was strongest in areas dominated by Christian militias. In West Beirut, where the ruling PLO controlled the media, anti-Palestinian resentment erupted in daily life. Yet among the interviewees, those who profited economically recalled their connections to the Palestinians positively, their memories remaining closely linked to a temporary period of plenty. Many of these individuals were members of the Sunni community who had held, in the words of one interviewee "good contacts" with the most conservative and affluent Palestinian faction, Fatah, and who had no ideological obstacles to being "highly sympathetic with the Palestinian cause":

At that time, I had a pharmacy. Abu Hassan [Salameh] *sent nineteen Palestinians to protect it night and day. The dollar was strong as long as*

[152] Maronite, male lawyer, Kisrwan, about 70.

the Palestinians were in Lebanon. Everyone benefited from the PLO. Later all those who had been close to them became poor.[153]

I used to ship in weapons for the Palestinians, big-scale loads. Sometimes I did the shipping free because I sympathized with the cause. The Israelis are our most serious enemies.[154]

Once I had trouble with a customer. He claimed that a whole stock of television sets had been stolen. I knew he was lying. So, I went down to Sabra to see some Fatah people to take care of the matter. That is how we used to arrange things.[155]

It is hard to estimate when the turning point was reached in the Moslem sector, when sympathy and support changed to opposition and distaste. Ironically enough, the feeling of being faced with colonization increased as the system of Lebanese patronage, backed as it was by a security apparatus, came under Palestinian attack as an alien element aiming to dominate.

Once I saw a group of Palestinians coming out of one of their compounds, driving with great speed and making all the cars and people move. One of them suddenly shot at a group of Lebanese security guards. The Lebanese was outraged and was going to shoot but his comrades held him back, using force. The Palestinians passed and nothing happened. How is it that they could get away with things like this?[156]

In 1976, I was driving down Corniche Mazraa; some Brazilian girls were with me. We wanted to have some ice cream. At a roadblock, Palestinians figured from my ID that I was a Maronite. They took me to the 'studio.' that's what their subterranean jail was called in Sabra. After they released me, I did not become anti-Palestinian, but I couldn't really be with them anymore. Anyway, where could I have still been pro-Palestinian? In the east one had to be in line with the propaganda that said that the enemy was trying to eliminate us and had to be eliminated himself. If something had happened to me then, my mother would have blamed the Kata'ib, not the Palestinians. The Kata'ib were uneducated people living in the bidonvilles next to the Palestinians. They are not from the city; they came from their villages with their habits and norms.[157]

---

[153] Sunni, female, from Beirut, about 60.
[154] Sunni businessman from Beirut, about 75.
[155] Greek-Catholic director of an insurance company, male, about 60, Palestinian origin.
[156] Sunni from Beirut, male shop-owner, about 30.
[157] Maronite businessman, notable from Beirut, 45.

In the war, there was a lot of money around. Drugs, weapons, the PLO caused a high turnover of capital. Today a lot of money is with few people. During the time of the PLO, it seemed as if they wanted to establish themselves in Lebanon. It was the plan of the US to settle them somewhere, no? In the siege of Beirut, 1982, flour and other products coming in from the port were first distributed to the Palestinians, then to the Lebanese. My father was a custom's officer at the port. Palestinians controlled the American University. If one wanted to go to medical school before 1982, it was better to have a Palestinian "wasta" [connection]. The Palestinians gave money to Lebanese parties; they sold weapons to them, even to the Kata'ib. They went to Jounieh, mingled with the Christians there, and had a lot of women. Palestinians and Israelis have ruined the country. I don't want to compare them. Of course, Palestinians are closer to us...they did contribute to our economy, the universities...but they benefited, not us. They had a lot of military parades, parading in front of the Lebanese. They had their kuffiyas on; even the girls paraded with their Kalashnikovs. All on Corniche Mazraa. When someone was killed, the picture was carried down Corniche Mazraa. Once I was playing heads and tails in Tariq al-Jedideh. A PFLP guy came and asked if I wanted a Kalashnikov. - What for? - To shoot someone from Fatah. - What if they shoot me? - Believe me, we will hang a picture of you everywhere and you will be a martyr! When they left, some Lebanese cried out, "Khaie, it's over."[158]

Sunni attitudes towards the presence of the PLO were very ambivalent at the time of my research. As West Beirut had for many years been the PLO's base, the intermingling between the social, economic and political establishments was inevitable. Through generous donations to Lebanese welfare associations like the Sunni Maqasid,[159] the PLO attempted to appease the Lebanese and win their support. Generational differences had a strong influence on attitudes, younger people having only experienced the years of crises with the PLO—the years of cruelty and violence and of destructive militias.

Christian perceptions in this regard were generally more clear cut, except in some bourgeois Maronite and Greek-Orthodox circles who had originally sympathized with the Palestinian cause, while despising Kata'ib propaganda because of class difference. In general, the anti-Palestinian

[158] Sunni from Beirut, male supermarket owner, 32.

[159] This today is denied by Maqasid officials, but was confirmed by Palestinian party members.

(and anti-Moslem) propaganda of the early 1970s was engrained in the later political discourse and self-representation of large parts of the Maronite population. Yet, there was often a tone of defiance in the accounts, a stubborn affirmation that what was done had to be done—itself a tacit acknowledgment that the price paid had been too high.

On April 15, 1998, the General Secretary of the Kata'ib gave a press conference to announce that the organization had not been responsible for shooting up a bus carrying thirty Palestinians through the Beirut suburb of Ain al-Rumaneh in 1975. The incident has been generally considered the trigger for the war that followed. His statement exemplified the need to distance the party from its former actions. This form of historical revisionism meant to soften the aggressive character of earlier political aims in a period of postwar distaste for them. Anti-Palestinian attitudes meanwhile gave way to anti-Syrian ones. Concern over the Palestinian presence was now largely concentrated on the question of *tawtin*. The Palestinian military presence had in fact become more of a problem for the Moslem communities, because the camps were in Sunni and Shiite areas (Dbayeh being the exception).

Paradoxically, in contrast to the situation for many Lebanese Moslems, for Christians Palestinian *fidayin* were remembered as committed and honorable men. The internecine Christian warfare of the late eighties had left traces darkening their memories of the first years of the war against the Palestinians. While residents of the western (Moslem) sector had seen growing corruption and lack of discipline among the Palestinian organizations, those of the eastern (Christian) sector remembered the Palestinian fighters as patriotic and loyal to their cause. The propaganda of the Christian militias about the *fidayin* preserved a mythical dimension of Palestinian heroism—a dimension that had been demolished in the west.

To a certain extent, we admire the Palestinians. They have a national cause for which they fight. They are like us; we also fight for a free Lebanon. They have a sense of pride and honor. In those days, two national causes in one country were incompatible. They should have fought in their own country as we fight in our own.[160]

Having been born toward the civil war's beginning, the students I met at the almost exclusively Christian Université de Saint Esprit de Kaslik, near Jounieh, had a relatively moderate, even understanding attitude towards the Palestinians and their cause—most in any case indicated they had

[160] Maronite, male Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation employee, 30.

never met a Palestinian. On the other hand, many slightly older Christians I encountered seemed still caught in the traumatizing events of the first years of the civil war. For those ensconced in a Christian area, resentments often could not be erased, despite sometimes cannot be erased even through daily cooperation in business and commerce.

We have two Palestinians in our office. Our relations are full of distrust. They know that I am a Lebanese Christian and they think I despise them. We Christians are better, more efficient, and more successful than the Moslems. That is why they hate us, because they think we look down on them. Although we never say it. My boss only employed them because he couldn't find anybody else. He would have preferred a Christian like me. He is a Christian himself. He told me in the beginning to teach them some basic manners. They are very uncultivated. And, what no one tells you, but what everyone thinks is that they are somewhat dirty. When things become serious, we cannot trust each other. They know that.[161]

In these not entirely untypical remarks, the Maronite survival-mythology of dominance is reflected by way of various self-contradictions. While the interlocutor included Palestinians in the Moslem world to which he felt superior, his mistrust of the Palestinians was even greater—and their location on the social scale even lower. From various interviews, I had the impression that for their part, the Palestinians had not developed an inverse, specifically anti-Christian idiom. The negative sentiments they expressed were, for the most part political, focused on the Christian occupation of the most important governmental positions, their diversion of government money. The leaders of the PFLP and DFLP, George Habbash and Nawaf Hawatmeh, were in fact both Christians and Fatah, despite its Islamic wing, had always maintained proper relations with the Christian sector.[162]

[161] Maronite technician, mid twenties, Mount Lebanon area.

[162] During the inter-Maronite war in the late 1980s between the army general Awn and the militia leader Geagea and the Syrians, pro-Arafatist Palestinians were allowed to enter Lebanon through the Christian port of Jounieh. The background was that Awn was fighting Syrian occupation and the Syrians had attempted to oust all pro-Arafat Palestinian units from Lebanon.

4.6. Parallel and Conflicting Developments: The Emancipation of the Palestinians and the Shiites

Within the Shiite community, attitudes towards the Palestinians took some diametrically juxtaposed turns. It is worthwhile to cast a closer look on this relationship as its often quite unpredictable evolution has implications regarding the Palestinian sense of vulnerability. From the start, Shiites had swelled the ranks of Lebanese pro-Palestinian organizations. But at the same time, Palestinians and Shiites engaged in ferocious mutual conflict, taking place in successive rounds between 1985 and 1988—what became known as the "war of the camps" (*harb al-mukhayamat*). For Palestinians, this meant month-long sieges of the camps of Shatila and Sabra, Bourj al-Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and Rashidiyeh in the south near Tyre. In these circumstances, both camp residents and Palestinians in the environs were menaced with murder, rape, and other violent crimes, as well as various forms of harassment.[163] All Palestinians living in the areas controlled by Amal became potential targets in a war Palestinians interpreted as a sustained effort to extinguish a Palestinian Lebanese presence in toto—the Shiites seemed to be deliberately continuing what the Maronite militias had initiated in the early 1980s.

Ten years after the civil war had finished, these events were still in the minds of both Shiites and Palestinians, although life in the mixed Palestinian-Shiite southern suburbs of Beirut appeared calm and friendly on the surface. Many Palestinians I interviewed indicated they had never understood the political background of the earlier events, which were thus viewed as an extended unmotivated outrage. Memories of neighbors betraying neighbors were now being shrugged off sadly—having neighbors who once were enemies was simply an unpleasant fact. Palestinian and Shiite Lebanese men thus met on a daily basis at work and in public places. There were also exchanges of visits between neighborhoods--exchanges in which Palestinian women rarely participated. When asked why this was so, the women would indicate that they wanted to avoid gossip and simply preferred staying home with the children. And yet gossip constitutes a central institution within any society and culture in general, defining degrees of social inclusion or exclusion since the information exchanged is of an intimate nature. The

[163]For an autobiographical account of the Shatila siege by a doctor who treated the sick and wounded see Chris Giannou, Vie et mort au camp de Chatila. Le drame palestinienne. Paris: Albin Michel, 1993.

skilled gossiper displays access to many sources, and knowledge concerning those with whom one may discuss private and personal manners. Gossipers consequently control a severe, even cruel institution of sociomoral judgement; and the non-participation of Palestinian women in this activity signified their marginality--exclusion from the social network of their Shiite neighborhood.

During the years of fighting and danger, those Palestinians who could afford it left the southern suburbs. Many who stayed were unwilling to talk freely about what had happened. One reason for this was an unmistakable fear of mentioning the Syrian involvement in the events, the Syrians still maintaining a strong grip on the Palestinian camps. Another reason may well have been a strong internalized sense of the lack of any logical explanation for the sudden outburst of Shiite-Palestinian bloodletting, and for the cruelty it involved—a sense inducing silence in face of the need for daily contact with Shiites.

No one knows who was responsible for harb al-mukhayamat. *No one. It happened all of a sudden and it was over all of a sudden. Don't ask me, I don't know. I was visiting some friends in the Shatila camp. We were playing cards. A few days before, Amal had set up checkpoints. Everything was still calm, then suddenly we heard shooting. That was the beginning. I was caught in the camp. Probably it started with a shoot-out between a Palestinian and an Amal-fighter; maybe it was a personal story. Who knows? I knew the fighters of Amal. We played football together next to our house. Then we shot and killed each other. We continued to know each other after the war. We even greet each other.*[164]

Interviewing Palestinians who had been through the conflict with the Shiites, I was offered a long litany of deepest suffering. The above interviewee had three brothers, one—himself a fruit-seller-- with bomb splitters permanently embedded in his head, another an emigrant to Germany, and the third living in the south. They all had had to leave Sabra with their father, they explained, because Amal was killing male Palestinians. The mother had stayed with her four daughters. Electricity and water supplies had been cut, and the daughters never left the house for fear of rape or murder. Once Amal broke open the door and threatened to shoot the mother--a bullet hit the wall behind her. Since then, she had repeated nervous breakdowns. Amal took everything they found in the house. The mother, born in Palestine, had lost her

[164] Palestinian from Sabra, male, about 25, works in the central vegetable and fruit market of Beirut.

possessions three times: in 1948 in Palestine, in 1976 fleeing from Tell al-Zatar, and in Sabra in the late 1980s. One of the daughters had become mentally ill, and now insisted on living on the balcony, which she had covered with plastic sheets. She refused to talk to family members and occasionally stole food from the kitchen. She had studied medicine but then gave up all her studies. She had not left the house since 1988, and did nothing but pray from morning to night. All the sisters wanted to follow their brother to Germany but knew this was almost impossible.

In one way or another, all the stories had a similar tenor:

Our neighbors, our own neighbors who still live next door told Amal that Palestinians were living in the house. They came: my husband and my elder sons had left long before to hide somewhere. Only the little one, of five years, was still with me. They came with their guns and asked for him. They wanted to take him. He ran and hid under the bed so they would not see him. I told them I was Lebanese. They finally left. We don't talk to our neighbors anymore. Maybe I say hello sometimes.[165]

I can't talk to you in English. My English used to be good, but now I have forgotten most of it. We all lost our minds during harb al-mukhayamat, we can't think. They were constantly shooting from the houses all around. We had nothing to eat. We ate everything, grass, wallpaper, wood, even rats.[166]

They were shooting at the camp from the roof of our house. We were Palestinians living inside, so Palestinians from the camp destroyed our house in retaliation. Amal did that on purpose. We had to leave for our old apartment in Mazraa. After what the Shiites did to us, I know that I can never ever become a close friend to a Shiite. There is so much hatred between us. And never ever could I marry a Shiite, never. My parents would never allow me to. When we drive through certain areas, my father always curses them. I don't know people in our area; we don't mingle with them.[167]

During harb al-mukhayamat, Shiite women attacked Palestinian women in the street. Palestinians outside the camps used to bring food into the camps. They were easy to detect from the way they wore their veil and from the fact that they were carrying a lot of food, more than one simply carries from one house to another. The Shiites grabbed the food they

[165] Lebanese housewife married to a Palestinian from Haret Hureik, about 45.
[166] Palestinian from Bourj al-Barajneh camp, male sometimes works as plumber, 62.
[167] Palestinian from Tariq al-Matar, female, works in the field of business administration, 24.

had on their heads, threw it on the ground, and trod it underfoot. Inside the camp, they were starving. The Shiites were the underdogs for long, and then they took revenge.[168]

Harb al-mukhayamat was particularly terrible for my mother. One of her brothers was living in Bourj al-Barajneh camp during the siege. We used to go there with food and medication, as one of the daughters was very sick. We also drew pictures for the children and took some toys. When we arrived, we had to cross a checkpoint of Amal. They said they had to check us for weapons. What could we have hidden? They checked everything, everything on our body. They took the food and threw it on the ground. They took the medicine and the toys and destroyed them. Pill after pill they let fall on the ground and trod on them. They ripped up the pictures we had made for our cousins. Then they said we could pass. We went there and they had nothing and were in complete misery. We just sat around. There was no tea and no coffee. We came and had nothing to bring them. My mother went crazy. And we couldn't do anything about it.[169]

There was this family in the neighborhood. Four boys and one daughter. Amal broke into the house and took the four boys and the daughter. The boys were all killed; the daughter was raped by all of them. Then she went home. That night the mother died of a heart attack.[170]

Palestinians who had suffered through the conflict with Amal tended to draw above all one lesson from their experience: that no outside environment could ever be as safe as the camps, where Palestinian organizations guaranteed a certain degree of security. Concomitantly, a vast feeling of insecurity stamped the everyday life of Palestinians in the southern suburbs. Particularly younger Palestinians would adopt low profiles, masking their accents and avoiding any potential a low profile by neglecting the accent and by avoiding all provocations. In Christian suburbs, the large camps had been eliminated; Christian Palestinians succeeded in more or less disappearing into a Christian Lebanese environment, sometimes even by conforming to anti-Palestinian political idiom. Mingling in the Shiite suburbs was more difficult, in part simply because of the confessional barrier.

---

[168] Palestinian journalist living outside the camp in Beirut whose family lived inside during the war, about 40.

[169] Lebanese Sunni, female, with Palestinian mother from Beirut, artist, 22.

[170] Palestinian from Bourj al-Barajneh camp, male, electrician, 29.

For a long time, having listened to the long series of Palestinian reminiscences concerning *harb al-mukhayamat*, with their repeated references to merciless and sadistic acts, I lost interest in crossing the border to talk to Shiites. I could hardly imagine that there was a rational explanation for deeds that seemed like attempted genocide. Despite his many friendly gestures, the Shiite *natur* (porter), where I lived turned into a monster when I learnt that he had fought in the "war of the camps." Not expecting a truthful or convincing answer, I was reluctant to ask why he had fought. When I did ask, he replied that he would fight against anyone endangering his country. My instinctive response was to see his activities as a young man's military-initiation ritual. But it was becoming clear to me that I had swerved from my intention of maintaining the neutral stance of the researcher. I had to explore the Shiite position, and to do so with the same seriousness as I had the Palestinian.

Around this time, I had the already above mentioned minor car accident and met the Shiite insurance officer from Bourj al-Barajneh. He opened up concerning the "war of the camps" without hesitation.

Before harb al-mukhayamat, everyone went to school together. I had Palestinian and Lebanese friends. During the war, three Palestinians from the school were kidnapped, most probably by Amal. They were tortured. Palestinians killed my neighbors who were fighting for Amal.

How could this happen when the Palestinian organizations (*tanzimat*) were still there?

Everyone has a sister, a girl friend. The Palestinians said things and harassed them. They were armed. They had guns. They stole, broke into houses, and took expensive things. After the Israeli invasion, Palestinians were restricted to the camps. During the war, they sniped at everyone who passed. My uncle was killed when he drove down Tariq al-Matar. Two guys I knew caught a Palestinian. One said to the other, kill him. But he refused. So, the other killed both of them.

My barber fought for Amal. The Palestinians kidnapped him. I saw his corpse later; they threw him out of the camp. They had stubbed cigarettes out on his face. He also had deep scars on his face, his chest, and his whole body. Both sides were very cruel. There is a Hussainiya [mosque] *next to my house. I heard families screaming. The corpses were put inside for identification. One day I saw twenty-three corpses. I was seventeen.*

Did you carry a gun?

No.

Why did *harb al-mukhayamat* happen?

It's politics. The leaders themselves never do the dirty jobs. They just stand there and command. They say, kill your enemy! Kill him. Protect your family! Take a gun, go and fight!

Did you know then how Palestinians in the camp suffered because they did not have food?

A friend of mine, killed in the war, worked with one of the Amal leaders. This leader once told him something but warned him not to talk. Palestinians had given him money so that he would let some food in. Everything goes by money. I talked to Palestinians from the camp afterwards. They told me how horrible it was—that they were eating cats. But I don't believe it. Someone told me they had underground tunnels for food storage. And their leaders could provide food by paying for it. But we don't talk a lot about it when we meet. At that time, I could only reach my home by secret paths. I was always afraid of snipers.

Once Amal caught me. They thought I was a Palestinian because I was passing by the camp. I didn't have my ID. I swore I was Lebanese—I wasn't speaking with a Palestinian accent. They said some Palestinians knew how to speak like Lebanese. Fortunately one of them knew me, so they took me to my house to check. Those two and a half years were very bad. Everybody hated the Palestinians because they sniped at everyone. I had a pretty girl friend who they shot in the eye. She died—she was sixteen.

Why did the Palestinians do that?

Maybe because they were surrounded. War brings out the worst in people. Amal was shelling the camp everywhere. There was a lot of revenge. I know about one of two brothers they killed from Amal. The other brother was so sad that he went to a Palestinian family living outside the camp and shot them all.

Listening to all the horror stories on both sides of the divide, it became clear to me that the depth of personal experience far outweighed any political context. Once the war began, cruelty required revenge, creating

a vicious circle of aggression. Shiite hatred grew of those sniping from inside the camp, while Palestinians knew that the fall of the camp would mean a terrible massacre.

When I moved to Chiyah in the southern suburbs I decided to ask about *harb al-mukhayamat* in the market, where people knew me. I was not sure whether my questions would be well received, but this turned out completely wrong, several men immediately offered their opinions. At the start, they had in fact fought with the Palestinians against the Christian militias, Chiyah marking the front line. The Palestinians did not control Chiyah; they were further away, in Sabra and Bourj al-Barajneh.

I was introduced to a Shiite *sayid*[171]: the one person in the quarter who had studied English and who spoke it fluently. He had fought with the PFLP in 1975-76—an elite fighter, I was told—and had married a Palestinian. He maintained relations with both Amal and Hizballah, but favored the latter. He regularly shopped at the grocery store next to his house, owned by a former Amal-fighter, a Shiite from Baalbak, who had participated in the war of the camps and to whom he introduced me.

This grocer welcomed me on the street with a mass of papers under his arm and told me immediately that these were from his former place of work, the archives of the Sunni Maqasid. I wondered if this was to give me the impression that he was a knowledgeable and serious person or to show the neighborhood that I had come to discuss his time at the Maqasid: in other words, to show that I had not come to discuss something unimportant, or to ask for "secret information" as this would discredit both of us. When I entered the apartment I was asked to sit in the salon; a w Kalashnikov lay on the sofa. I asked why it was there. He explained proudly that he sometimes worked as bodyguard for a Shiite minister and had just returned from duty. His wife served juice and coffee. After explaining my background and interests, as usual, we approached the subject.

He had been working for the Sunni Maqasid when *harb al-mukhayamat* broke out. He continued to work in the morning for the Maqasid and in the afternoon he took his gun and fought. When the Maqasid found out, they fired him. While they said they did not want to employ anyone participating in the war, he thought the real reason was that he was a Shiite and they wanted to get rid of him. It was the time, he explained, when the Palestinians were asserting themselves and wanted to take

[171] A person with the prefixed attribute *Sayid* is able to trace his descent in direct patrilineage from the Prophet.

over the country, the mid-1980s. Palestinians set up roadblocks and controlled certain areas. This had to be prevented, Fatah extinguished. In addition, the Fatah fighters were in the camps, so they had to attack the camps. I reminded him that there were also women and children inside. No, he replied, that was nonsense, only fighters hiding in a system of tunnels underground. But, I protested, I had been talking to Palestinians who assured me their families were all in the camps. "Well, you know, maybe you don't understand but it was a war. You don't make distinctions then. Fatah had to be extinguished. They were a threat to the Lebanese State."

The implicit parallels at work here with Maronite political idiom and ideology were striking. The Shiites, it seems, had developed a nationalism with strong anti-Palestinian undercurrents—indeed, a nationalism with an eliminationist tenor. Structurally, the Kata'ib and Amal movements were similar in being supported by a sector of the population that had just migrated to the cities and was still attached to the rural hinterland of Beirut. Neither movement was integrated into the urban patron-client system; both were eager to gain power. Their social status was low, their own patrons and the bourgeoisie viewing them as something akin to a mob, hence not meriting a chance for social mobility. In the case of the Maronites, the extreme nationalist idiom was combined with an exclusivist Christian content. In their revolt against the Lebanese political system, the Shiites repeated the modernist anti-feudal themes of the early Kata'ib, which would later be corrupted. The main difference, though, between the Kata'ib and Amal movements was that the Shiites took a different road to arrive at the same point: from allies of the Palestinian cause to *harb al-mukhayamat*.

It is startling, in fact, to realize that the majority of those who initially had formed the pro-Palestinian LNM, as allies of the PLO, were Shiites. But after two years of fighting, the fronts in the „war of the camps" had become broadly recognized along Shiite-Palestinian lines, in disregard of the official policies of the Hizballah, which did not support this war.[172] The Shiite fury directed at Palestinians during the war requires an explanation.

In her study of the political transition of the Shiite community in Lebanon, Elisabeth Picard refers to historical ties that bound southern Lebanon closer to the urban centers of Palestine, in particular to Haifa, then to

[172]See Asad Abu Khalil. The Palestinian-Shi'ite War in Lebanon. An Examination of Origins. In: Third World Affairs 1988, London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, pp. 77-89.

what became Greater Lebanon.[173] The south of Lebanon was only, suddenly, cut off from the Palestine Levant and located at the periphery of greater Lebanon after the establishment of Mandate Palestine and Lebanon in 1920-21. Palestine fell under British rule, Lebanon under French rule, as stipulated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. With the establishment of Israel in 1948, the border became unfeasible in that southern Lebanon was severed from its traditional Palestinian urban centers in Palestine. But inner-Lebanese economic relations did not produce a common identity—according to Abu Khalil the source of a resentment later directed at the arriving Palestinian refugees. The labor market in more prosperous Palestine was highly attractive; many Shiites thus migrating to urban centers where they suffered from harsh employment conditions.

In any event, we need to approach Abu Kalil's argument with caution. Although it might be true that frequent trade relations could not establish long term Lebanese solidarity, it is Past situations are often defined and redefined in terms of current circumstances and shifting alliances|--according to myths of coercion and coherence. Khalil gathered his information in the late 1980s when resentment against the Palestinians was part of an official and common political line. Then, Palestinian and Lebanese identities were said to be antagonistic in principle. Khalil goes so far as to deny that there had ever been fraternal sentiments between Palestinians and the Lebanese Shiite community.

During my own research, ten years after the "war of the camps" when relations had relaxed, many people told me that there had been a brisk trade over the Lebanese-Palestinian border before 1948 and that relations were normal in those days. Currencies were valid in both areas; ownership of land and even political loyalties crossed borders. In the end, it in fact appears that when it comes to Palestinian-Shiite relations, as well as those between Palestinians and the Lebanese in general, both resentment and sympathy would be voiced to varying degrees according to shifting political situations, these in turn shaping personal experiences, sometimes more radically, sometimes less so. Popular memory, taking the form of past-centered narratives, inevitably means selecting from events that are felt to have meaning for the present. By understanding such construction and destruction of loyalties, Shiite popular support in the 1970s for the Palestinian cause—for instance, the massive Shiite demonstration after the assassination of three Palestinian leaders in Beirut by the Israelis in 1973—can be understood as equally an authentic

[173] Elisabeth Picard. De la "Communauté-classe" à la Resistance "Nationale". In: Revue Francaise des Sciences Politiques, 6 (35), December, 1985.

a position as the Shiite popular antagonism to the Palestinians of the late eighties.

According to Picard, Shiite anti-Palestinian sentiments were grounded in a political awakening expressed in terms of both confessionalism and nationalism. This suggests that the roots of such sentiments were rather shallow, the historical sequence being quite easy to trace. The geographical and political marginalization of the south had shaped the preconditions for a Shiite opposition to the government in Beirut. Shiites had swelled the ranks of the Communist and leftist parties, which proclaimed a program of secularization and radical political and social change, in the hope of producing access to modern social services.[174] Political mobilization thus resulted from a general discontent with the state of the economy and living conditions. The spectrum of leftist parties and movements followed the program of eliminating political confessionalism and its patron-based structures. Correspondingly, the alliance with the PLO was an expression of discontent with the government and not motivated by some deep-rooted interest in the future of the Palestinians.

As has been indicated, the ties binding Shiites to their patrons started to loosen when migration to the urban centers began. Shiite population growth led to a disproportionate patron-client relation, with poorly educated patrons, and an increasing difference in living standards between the urban centers and rural periphery. In this context, the free-floating clientele of the previously landowning patrons were ready to commit themselves to the newly ascendant patrons of the PLO. They were also interested in radically altering the socio-political system. With its considerable financial resources, the PLO was able to recruit fighters, and allies by rendering services or distributing salaries. Fatah, in particular, developed a reputation for enlarging its membership through exploitation of its financial resources.

An intertwining of Palestinian and Lebanese interests thus produced a chain of events later attributed to Palestinians alone, now accused of having desired to usurp power in Lebanon. Ironically, during the period at play here, the late 1970s, the Palestinian commandos were blamed for *not* supporting the interests of the Lebanese allies, rather concentrating on their own struggle to eliminate the Jewish state and "liberate" Palestine. It is important to here keep in mind the revolutionary potential of the Lebanese Shiite community, whose aspirations matching those of the Palestinian refugees. In any event, the alliance between the two

[174]Ibid., p. 1003.

communities quickly crumbled after the start of the civil war—the goal of Shiite emancipation, originally clothed in an anti-confessional socialist ideology, now emerging as confessional emancipation.[175] The more the confessional character of the Shiite struggle became clear, the more the Shiite antagonism towards the Palestinians was itself apparent.

The establishment of Shiite institutions ran parallel to the rise of the leftist parties. In 1967 the Shiites broke away from the Higher Islamic Council dominated by Sunnis to form, on the initiative of Imam Mussa al-Sadr, the Higher Shiite Council.[176] The Imam, a Shiite scholar of Lebanese origin raised in Iran, had come to Lebanon in 1958 on the invitation of Abdelhussein Sharafeddine, a fellow Shiite scholar from Tyre. Mussa al-Sadr studied the conditions of the Shiite community and established close links to the religious, intellectual and political authorities of the other confessional groups in Lebanon.[177] In line with the goals outlined above, his intent was to give the Shiites an adequate position within the Lebanese system through confessional emancipation.[178] His rather conservative and moderate program, however, was not in harmony with Shiite demands for radical change. The Imam's proximity to the Syrian regime severely damaged his popularity. In 1974 in Baalbak, he founded his "Movement of the Deprived" (*harakat al-mahrumin*); in 1975, this was transformed into Amal.

With the establishment of the PLO in Lebanon in the late 1960s, the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted from Jordan to Lebanon.[179] Israeli reprisals against villages the Palestinians used as basis for attacks increased, as did Palestinian activities in the south, the Palestinian presence this taking on its colonizing character. Added to the notorious deportment of the in their Lebanese environment was the fact that many of them came from Syria and Jordan and had not been raised in Lebanon. Resentment of them by the impoverished Shiite population was aggravated by the Palestinians receiving international aid, sanitation, medical aid, and education not always being available to their hosts—in the rural and underdeveloped Shiite areas in Baalbak and the south, public schools did not exist long after UNRWA had begun its services.

---

[175]Cf. Asad Abu Khalil, 1988. Draft paper.
[176] Picard, p. 1006.
[177]Interview with Rabab al-Sadr, sister of the Imam.
[178]See: Fouad Ajami. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.
[179]According to a PFLP cadre I interviewed in his home in Beirut, Jordan was eager to keep the front active in Lebanon in order to hinder the *fidayin* from returning back to Jordan, from where they had been expelled 1970-71.

I was consequently not surprised at being informed in the Shiite towns of Baalbak and Nabatiyeh that Palestinians were rich and that many of them kept boxes filled with gold hidden in their houses. Whereas Palestinians enjoyed the services of UNRWA, poorer Lebanese would die on a hospital's threshold if unable to pay. In such a situation, once Palestinian commandos had been identified as aggressors on the local level—aggressors who also invited Israeli raids--having a common enemy in the Israelis was insufficient. But in order to face up to their former allies, the Shiite community would need wholesale political restructuring.

The LNM's reputation and clientele had diminished steadily among Shiites since the beginning of the war. This was partly due to the politics of confession that also affected the secular leftist parties. The war had come to be seen as between progressive Islamists and conservative Christians, and not even the leaders of the LNM were able to resist this logic.[180] The Shiites were left without a leader until Mussa al-Sadr filled the vacuum, combining progressive and conservative ideas in propagating a system of social justice for the deprived without threatening political confessionalism in its basic structure.

The strengthening of the Shiite community was accomplished in two ways. Firstly, al-Sadr worked toward Shiite representation in the national Lebanese arena, and secondly, he heightened a specific religious culture. As Picard notes, the attitudes of members of the National Movement and Amal towards the *ashura* festivities, so central to Shiite religious life, were in sharp contrast. The National Movement members ridiculed the ritual and dissuaded their members from participating. In contrast, in 1974 the Imam chose to voice his political claims in Nabatiyeh, the center of the *ashura*-festivities in Lebanon. By using familiar Shiite religious terminology, he was more easily understood than the leftist cadres, who used a foreign terminology based on socialist and Marxist ideology.[181] The disappearance of the Imam in 1978 on a trip to Libya and the Iranian revolution of 1979 then decisively increased the popularity of Amal, confrontations with the PLO over political and military issues now becoming inevitable. Both groups were present on the same territory, the south and southern suburbs of Beirut.

Amal was being supplied and armed with Palestinian aid from the Syrian-backed Palestinian organization Al-Saiqa.[182] Syria had developed a

[180]Picard, 1985. p. 1014.
[181]ibid., p. 1013.
[182]Asad Abu Khalil. Syria and the Shiites. In: Third World Quarterly. April 1990, vol.12, no.2. p. 9.

multifold interest in promoting Amal over the years and continued to be its most important foreign patron. In the 1970s, the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad, was being confronted with growing confessional tension in his own country from a rising Sunni movement that questioned his legitimacy because of his Alawi identity: that of a sect the Sunnis considered a postate. He thus looked to Imam Mussa al-Sadr, a Shiite religious authority, to provide him with the necessary religious legitimacy, since the Imam officially acknowledged the Alawis as being part of the Shiite community.[183] However, what was probably a more decisive factor was that Syria was looking for military allies strong enough to curb Arafat's influence in Lebanon and to dominate or destroy those Palestinian factions loyal to him.

Developments accelerated after the Israeli withdrawal to southern Lebanon. The PLO left the country, and the Moslem part of Lebanon lost its most important powerbroker. Syria, interested in keeping a strong grip on the country, wanted an alliance that would be easy to control. With Lebanese forces controlling the east and Amal dominating the west, both Sunni and Druze political and military influence was marginalized.[184] At the "reconciliation conference" in Lausanne in 1984, younger cadres of the Lebanese Forces such as Elie Hobeika, approached the Amal leader Nabih Berri, who had succeeded the interim leader Hussein al-Husseini in 1980. Berri proposed a reshuffling of the Sunni-Maronite alliance in favor of a Shiite-Maronite alliance,[185] which would have meant a decisive curb in Sunni influence.

Extinction of the only Sunni *murabitun* militia was a clear message for the Sunni community on the intentions of Amal and Syria. Amal would take over the main power position in the south, the Beqaa and southern Beirut. Nabih Berri became a reliable and dependent ally of Syrian power politics, indispensable for Syria's aim of controlling her western neighbor. However, the political idiom with which Amal was playing was a national one. War with the Israelis in the south furnished them with a great deal of credit with the Shiite population. With Palestinian fighters struggling to re-establish their base, a severe confrontation with Amal was on the immediate horizon. Wishing to diminish Arafat's influence over the Palestinian refugees— he had refused to follow Asad's policies—Syria supported Amal's effort to defend and expand its dominance. Once the PLO returned to Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal, the resurgence of the PLO endangered this strategic alliance.

---

[183]Ajami, 1986. p. 174.

[184]Naseer H. Aruri. Pax-Syriana and the Palestinians in Lebanon. In: Elaine Hagiopan (ed.). Amal and the Palestinians: Understanding the Battle of the Camps. AAUG Press, 1985.

[185]Picard, 1985. p. 1019.

Picard views the "war of the camps" more as an inter-communal Lebanese struggle for hegemony between the Sunnis, the Druze, and the Shiites, less as an explicit move against the Palestinian resistance.[186] It is the case that Lebanese Sunnis saw the war against the Palestinians as bound to spread into their territory with Amal and the PSP fighting in Beirut. The concept of national cleansing appealed to large parts of the Shiite forces, not only in the south but also the Beqa'a. In this manner, commonly held ideologies no longer had paramount importance. Shiites were encouraged to liberate themselves as a distinct and influential community by extinguishing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The common ideologies ceased to function and former allies became bitter enemies. The end result of the "war of the camps" was the destruction of Palestinian political presence in Lebanon. At the time of my research, despite private comments by scattered intellectuals, Palestinians seemed more or less inclined to refuse any public confrontation with possible lessons to be learned from their defeat—and any public acknowledgment of the negative impact of their armed groups' presence in Lebanon. Palestinian-Lebanese relations were hence now stalemated, the widespread Lebanese belief that Palestinians had caused the breakdown of the Lebanese State serving as a simplifying common denominator in a fractured political environment. Careful analysis of the actual causes would have eroded the superficial harmony preserved by the ongoing explanation of recent history. All said and done, few Palestinians or Lebanese had an overriding interest in soberly analyzing their common experience—a process that would have deconstructed the self-representation on which both relied.

[186]Picard, 1985. p. 1019.

5. Finding Partners in Lebanon Today

5.1. Ideological Umbrellas

By the late 1980s, with the weakening and disappearance of Palestinian institutional bases, the nationalist idioms of the Maronite and Shiite factions had come to dominate the Lebanese scene. The Taif peace accords of 1989 did not tackle the question of Palestinians in Lebanon; rather, the issue of their resettlement was unequivocally neglected. With the Lebanese government aimed at reinstalling governmental sovereignty over Lebanese territory, the decision to dissolve the militias took in the armed Palestinian organizations—this in the face of Palestinian protests that they were part of the regional and not the domestic scene.[187] What, then, was left of an ideological grounding for Palestinians to establish a common identity with Lebanese partners after the war? In the past, the obvious possibility for such a grounding had been pan-Arabic nationalism, with its inherent potential for overcoming social and economic differences, as well as those between various regional loyalties and confessions. Its origins among the educated Arabic middle classes was expressed in a liberalizing and mercantile tendency—and Christians and Moslems could struggle for the same political goals. In this way, it represented an alternative to feudal structures and clientelism, centered on genealogical and local-regional belonging. At the same time, there was a rejection of colonial rule and the Zionist project in Palestine, both these tenets framed by an affirmation of a common "Arab" identity. Pan-Arabic nationalism was thus a perfect ideology for the community of refugees, offering a sense of belonging in exile. Nevertheless, in actuality the camp-refugees did not benefit from the turn toward pan-Arabism, since the government's basic strategy was to accord them a legal status inferior to foreigners.[188] The resulting sense of difference and exclusion intensified after the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, cooperation with the various Arab regimes thus having proved ineffective in achieving Palestinian political aims. Palestinian parties like the PFLP, while originating from Arab nationalism, thus ended up turning towards a more specifically Palestinian nationalism stressing the establishment of separate Palestinian institutions.

187"Taif faces important test as government moves to dissolve militias and appoint deputies." In: The Lebanon Report, vol.2, no.4, 1991.

[188]See: Souheil al-Natour. The Legal Status of Refugee in Lebanon. In: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.10, no.3, 1997.

As we have seen, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were confronted with a social and political structure in which an elite maintained hierarchic superiority through principles of genealogy and local inclusion. Assimilation into this elite was only possible through intermarriage—something impossible for the camp-Palestinians because of their poverty. As a response to their social and political exclusion, these Palestinians developed a form of self-segregation, with resettlement structures within the camps according to wider family units reproducing the earlier local and genealogical ties, even the previous patterns of preference and aversion. The camp of Bourj al-Barajneh, for example, inherited the earlier antagonism between two villages, Kwikat and Tarshiha, where a majority of the inhabitants had their origins. The antagonism was rooted in a difference already at play before 1948: Palestinians stemming from Tarshiha claimed to be more educated and liberal than those from Kwikat, considered more conservative. Tarshiha was a town of mixed confession and educational institutions—an infrastructure Kwikat lacked. The antagonism was reproduced in exile through endless narratives of the older generation, and through marriage preference. Yet, despite these circumstances and patterns of behavior, intermarriage between Palestinians and Lebanese remained possible, simply needing a socio-ideological environment conducive to a sense of unity. But where such an environment was absent, the refugees remained socially segregated and politically ignored. To avoid such a fate, the Christian Palestinians tended to cover up their origins in public, conforming to the Christian political mainstreams of the areas they lived in. To the extent that they did preserve a political Palestinian identity, they supported those groups with pan-Arab nationalist programs. This was the case as well for educated upper middle-class Moslem Palestinians. However, after the pan-Arab ideologogy lost its momentum, Palestinians turned to other ideologies that served as common ground of cooperation or integration in the Lebanese environment, which at the same time provided social frameworks for possible intermarriages. The most important of these ideological grounds are discussed below.

5.2. Islamic Parties and Congregations: The Moslem Brotherhood, Ahbash, Maqasid, and Hizballah

The Islamist groups proliferating in Lebanon after the war attracted many Moslem Palestinians, most of whom had formerly been Palestinian fighters. Claiming opposition to nepotism, clientelism and oligarchy, the Lebanese Moslem Brotherhood challenged the Sunni leadership in its basic political structure. It sprang from strong anti-Israeli resistance and

then further developed in opposition to traditional Sunni institutions and powerful families.[189] Expecting nothing from the Sunni establishment, Palestinians shared much with this portion of the Sunni population, and actually radicalized it further. In Sidon, destabilizing acts of violence such as the bombing of stores and restaurants serving alcohol, the murder of policemen, and the assassination of four judges took place in the spring of 1999; these deeds were attributed to the radical Islamist group *al-ansar,*[190] thought to be a group with mainly Palestinian members. In 1995 the Palestinian head of the group, Abu Muhjin, had already received a death sentence from a Lebanese court for killing the head of the Ahbash, a Sufi religious group, but since then he was believed to be in hiding in the Ain al-Helweh camp.

Advocating implementation of Moslem religious law (*sharia*), the Moslem Brotherhood had seen a significant increase in members since the second part of the 1980s. For the marginalized Palestinians, the ideal principle embedded in the *Sharia* of equal rights for all believers regardless of class, nationality, and genealogy was a great attraction. The basic collective unit under Sharia is the *umma*, the religious community, and this offered Palestinians the chance for affiliation with a political grouping on the basis of their confession, their nationality and local descent not constituting any sort of barrier. They were naturally also drawn to the Brotherhood's anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish resentment, and to its devotion to the "liberation" of both Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular. In addition, in a situation where neither present nor future seemed to have any structure, a strictly religious life had great appeal, offering an antidote to the material and spiritual corruption of the secular Palestinian organization.

The Palestinian ideology of "liberating" Palestine was transformed into political Islamism after the secular Palestinian organizations had been severely weakened and anger at the Oslo Accords had become widespread. The process had already been pushed forward by the Israeli invasion of 1982:[191] under Israeli occupation and the rule of the Lebanese forces in West Beirut, the only public locations from which resistance could be expressed, were the mosques at Friday prayer.

Before 1982, Palestine was one cause among others. We did not deal so much with the question of Palestine, but with Islam spreading in the

[189] Nizar Hamzeh. The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. vol.16, no.3, 1993. p.31.
[190] Hamzeh, 1997. p. 52.
[191] Marius Deeb. Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology. Washington: Georgetown University, Occasional Papers Series, November, 1986. p. 4.

Philippines, Indonesia, or Afghanistan this changed completely, particularly after 1982. The Palestine conflict came to be the center of the umma's attention....The Lebanese state has no interest in the Palestinians in Lebanon. It cares neither for the camps nor for the Palestinian community. Neither does the PLO. There is neither a discussion about nor a solution for the current situation. There is chaos among the Palestinians....The jammaa al-islamiya *is a Lebanese organization. Yet, there is no difference between the organization in Jordan or Palestine or in Lebanon. Hamas*[192] *and the jammaa al-islamiya originate from the same school of thought, but carry different names.*[193]

One branch of *jammaa al-islamiya* had been set up in the Ain al-Helweh refugee camp—the largest camp in Lebanon, with an estimated 70,000 inhabitants—specifically for the Palestinians. The Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood intended to establish its own Palestinian branch. Such an internal differentiation was an asset if executed on an institutional and not an ideological basis, since close contact with the social basis could be maintained. However, it could also facilitate estrangement. It is true, that the Palestinian and Lebanese members of each respective organization together opposed the Sunni establishment. However, according to one of the *jammaa*'s leading heads, the organization abstained from heavy criticism of the Sunni prime minister as he represented the Sunni Lebanese community[194] and they would not place their loyalty in doubt.

In contrast to the general Palestinian position, which did not involve absolute respect for the stability of the Lebanese system, that of the *jammaa* involved respect for the principle of compromise. The *jammaa* rejected resettlement since it endangered communal consensus.[195] Such a stance certainly reflected respect towards the multi-confessional arrangement in Lebanon. Nevertheless, members of parliament from the *jammaa* repeatedly spoke up for Palestinian needs and addressed Palestinian issues, demanding social and economic rights for the refugees.

Palestinians in general tended to give their support to any politicians willing to publicly voice their needs in the Lebanese parliament. Some

---

[192]Now extremely well-known in the West because of recent events, Hamas (*harakat al-muqawama al-islamiya*) was founded as an offshoot of the Moslem Brotherhood in Gaza by Shaykh Yassin in 1973. Hamzeh, 1997.

[193] Abu Ayoub, *jammaa al-islamiya,* Ain al-Helweh camp.

[194]The Lebanon Report. vol.5, no.8. Interview Zuhayyr Ubaydi.

[195]Dalal el-Bizri. Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais. Les interventions à l'Assemblée des élus de la *Jama'a Islamiya* et du *Hizb Allah* (1992-1996). Beirut: CERMOC, 1999. p. 14.

examples: Palestinian members of the *jammaa al-islamiya* worked as election aids for the Brotherhood in 1996 and were present at the group's public activities. In 1997 Palestinians participated in *jammaa*-sponsored demonstrations staged in opposition to the introduction of civil marriage, although they did not act as official speakers. The PFLP supported the electoral campaign of the Greek-Orthodox MP Najah Wakim in return for his concern about the Lebanese Palestinians. When Rafiq Hariri used cash to take over the election aids of his Sunni rival Salim al-Hoss, who had played a supportive role for Palestinians during, especially, the war of the camps, Palestinians from the student's unions quickly replaced them. In any event, it was the Islamist organizations that were especially well received in the camps—something not only due to religious and political factors, but to the immediacy of economic decay. Put briefly, they offered welfare services unavailable elsewhere due to decreased funding from the PLO. Other factors involved here were the Gulf States' withdrawal of their extensive funding for the PLO when oil prices decreased; Arafat's disastrous alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991; the effects of the end of both the cold war and the Soviet Union; and withdrawal of PLO remittances for Lebanon following 1993. At the same time, UNRWA was struggling for funds, sits donations from the international community threatened with curtailment.

In addition to the *jammaa al-islamiya*, the Sufi philanthropic religious group known as the Ahbash (literally: the Ethiopians; *jama'iyat al-mashari al-khayriya al-islamiya* / Association of Islamic Charitable Projects) recruited many Palestinians. This needs to be understood against the backdrop of the group's great success among the Lebanese Sunni community's rising middle class, particularly in Beirut. The Ahbash had gained ground during the civil war by capturing several strategically located mosques, on the one hand, expanding its welfare programs, on the other.[196] Originating with an Ethiopian Moslem community claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammad before his decisive battle against Mecca, it is stamped, in line with Sufism in general, by political moderation and an acceptance of the modern world. In its explicit rejection of violence and loyal stance towards both the Lebanese state and confessional coexistence (*al-aysh al-mushtarak*),[197] the Ahbash was highly compatible with policies aiming at stabilizing governmental power. Its closeness to the Syrian regime,[198] itself struggling against violent political Islamism, facilitated expansion into the main Moslem cities of Lebanon. In any case, the group's purported quietism was contradicted

[196]Nizar Hamzeh/Hrair Dekmejian. A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 16:3, 1993. pp. 25-42.*
[197] ibid.
[198]Ibid. p. 50.

by violent efforts to seize certain mosques, thus threatening the Sunni establishment.[199]

The Sufi and Islamicist groups were engaged in a fierce ideological and sometimes physical struggle.[200] By virtue of superior organization and access to significant financial resources the Ahbash's proselytizing activities were much more effective than those of the Islamicists, who accused their opponents of intentionally depoliticizing Palestinians as politics were subordinated to spiritual development, and thus of trying to break their will to resist.

Despite fundamental ideological disparities, the groups did share some characteristics such as an openness to Palestinian social integration. Both organizations offered the Sunni Palestinian camp inhabitants access to social welfare institutions; each offered a covering ideology decreasing Palestinian marginalization in the public and social sphere. By joining either group, Palestinians were admitted to an institutional and political network from which they were deprived by the Lebanese State and most of its representatives.[201] The desire to become part of a power-holding group not based exclusively on patron-client relations and genealogy was shared with Lebanese Sunni Moslems, religious dogma here serving as a point of legitimizing reference.

The politics of confession defined power structures in postwar Lebanon. Palestinian identification with their confessional counterparts helped to overcome marginalization and restructure the shattered daily life of camp-dwelling Palestinians. The organizations to which one retreated served as a welcome alternative to the traditional Palestinian organizations in power in the camps.

In this period, the *tanzimat* were continuing to hold power at gunpoint. For its part, the Maqasid donated land to the Shatila camp and accepted a limited number of Palestinians onto its staff. Its various welfare institutions also partly served Palestinians.[202] At the same time, there was a clear policy of not being excessively generous to the Palestinians, the organization's board of Sunni notables deciding that Lebanese

---

[199]The Lebanon Report. "True Believers? The Ahbash and the Sunni Community." vol.6, no.1, 1995.

[200]Hamzeh/ Dekmejian, 1993.

[201]The *jammaa* won three seats in parliament in 1992 and one in 1996. The Ahbash had one representative in 1992 as it rivaled over the Sunni community with the *jammaa*, but none in 1996.

[202]The Maqasid orphanage serves 5,500 children, of whom 400 are Palestinians. (Figures given through oral communication at the orphanage of the Maqasid in 1997.)

should have first priority when it came to donations.[203] This policy reflected the Sunni political establishment's policy regarding *tawtin*, the Maqasid agreeing to equal acceptance of Palestinians at whatever point they would be officially resettled in Lebanon.

Another Lebanese party combining charity and politics was Hizballah, which used its significant institutional framework to support the two camps in its areas of influence, Rashidiyeh in the south and Bourj al-Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut, by installing drinking water tanks. Hizballah's *mu'assasa al-shahid* ("Agency for the Martyrs") included a Palestinian branch, which distributed funds from Iran to the families of Palestinian men who had died fighting against Israel. In 1996, the number of supported families in Lebanon was 617, with 1,180 families supported in the occupied territories. In the camps of Ain al-Helweh and Bourj al-Barajneh, the *mu'assasa* also financed two smaller hospital stations named *markaz al-quds* (Jerusalem center).

Military cooperation between Palestinians and Shiite members of Hizballah against Israel began during the Intifada in 1988 and intensified in 1991. For both sides, guerrilla warfare against Israel was a question of both ideology—for Hizballah, "liberation" of Jerusalem as a holy Moslem city—and honor. Transcending national and inter-confessional differences, radical anti-Zionism and the *muqawama* ("resistance struggle") tied to it enabled a Sunni Palestinian - Shiite Lebanese alliance.[204]

Although many Lebanese Shiites did not support the Palestinian cause and preferred a nationally oriented discourse, Hizballah's extreme, eliminationist anti-Zionism corresponded to radical Palestinian ideology—a correspondence confirmed by Hizballah's spiritual leader Muhammad

[203]The PLO in reverse had largely donated to the Maqasid, a means of Arafat to win support of the Lebanese Sunni establishment. However, this was denied by an official spokesperson of the Maqasid's Dar al-Aytam (orphanage) in an interview.

[204]Middle of November 1999, the Palestinian Jihad in Lebanon carried out operations in cooperation with Hizballah and announced itself as an active player in the south. Until then, it had not been participating in the struggle against Israel as far as known to the public in a significant way (Daily Star, 14 November 1999 and 16 November 1999). The operations staged coincided with the assassination date of its founder Fathi Shekaki in 1995, as well as with the resuming of negotiations between the Israeli government headed by Ehud Barak and the PA headed by Yassir Arafat. However, one week after, the Jihad backed down and vowed not to stage anymore operations, meeting with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss and the head of the Higher Shiite Council, Muhammad Shamseddine. It was generally thought of that Syria had staged the events in order to point out that a unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon without negotiating withdrawal of the Golan heights would not give Israel the desired peace guarantees.

Husayn Fadlallah in the late 1980s.[205] However, strategic military alliances have generally proved short term for the Palestinians. During the "war of the camps," cooperation between them and the Hizballah came to an end. As one PFLP member put it to me, "We are fighting with them today, but tomorrow they will be against us. They do not support our progressive and secular policies." Many Hizballah fighters joined the Shiite militias and fought against the Palestinians although its leadership called for restraint. The two sides even briefly battled in Sidon in 1990, Hizballah having taken over a strategic location in the south, close to the PLO controlled zone.[206]

Because of differences of confession central to a religiously endowed organization like Hizballah, Sunni Palestinians did not have integrative structures at their disposal similar to those offered by the Sunni popular parties, depending as they did on the relationship between Sunnis and Shiites. In the end, this relationship depended on Syrian monitoring. As a Shiite Alawi in search of religious legitimacy, Hafiz al-Asad supported those Sunni groups ideologically bridging the gap with Shiite Islam. Should Hizballah cease its military attacks after a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanese south (meaning a return of the disputed Shaba farms), Palestinian operations would destabilize the south and could not be accepted. But as long as Israel declined to return the whole of the Golan, Syria would not be willing to end occasional attacks from Lebanese soil. Military alliances thus shifted according to regional developments and did not serve as a stable basis for social integration.

"Hizballah's strategy of *jihad*... insists that the presence of Israel in Palestine is illegal and that it is an imperialist base which represents a great danger to the Arab and Islamic world. It must, therefore, be removed from the map completely. This is what the slogan of liberating Jerusalem represents, since Jerusalem is the Islamic symbol for all of Palestine. As for Amal, it may consider the liberation of the south as its sole task, at least at this stage, and may not have plans beyond that goal." However, he estimates chances to win broad support as relatively low: "I believe that the Arab political scene, and particularly the Lebanese scene, is moving to free itself from the burden of the Palestine problem. It acts to liberate itself from this problem instead of acting to liberate Palestine. Only Moslem fundamentalists and some national and Palestinian groups that are referred to by the media as extremists have adopted the Palestinian problem as a sacred spiritual, intellectual, and political stance." Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah: The Palestinians, the Shi'a, and southern Lebanon. Interview from 21 November, 1986. In: Journal of Palestine Studies, 16:2, Winter 1987. p. 5f.

[206]The Lebanon Report. vol.1, no.7, July 1990.

5.3. Discrimination and the Legacy of the Past

During the time of my field research in 1997, Lebanese Christian clerics regularly voiced resentment against the Palestinian presence, urging other representatives to affirm cabinet unity on the issue. Along with repeatedly affirming that Palestinian refugees would not be resettled in Lebanon, politicians denounced the camps as sources of instability and criminality and as de facto weapons depots. The Ain al-Helweh camp in particular was threatened with invasion and forcible disarmament by the Lebanese army.

The camps' inhabitants were now suffering from bad communication between many self-appointed Palestinian political representatives and the Lebanese government. As had been the case before the Cairo Agreement was signed, their weakness in the Lebanese environment was broadly perceived as a transgression of dignity and sense of honor. This weakness pushed many refugees to seek a third exile somewhere abroad. The *tanzimat* kept a tight grip on the camps' inhabitants, monitoring their actions and political preferences and disturbed internal freedom by means of frequent shoot-outs.[207] Both the traditional parties and welfare organizations attached to them were deeply corrupted.

Young Palestinian men without jobs or prospects, vulnerable to humiliation by Lebanese outside the camps, were ready to take a limited salary from the *tanzimat* and carry a gun. The *shabab* reversed their powerless status outside the camps by assuming a higher status inside them, displaying otherwise forbidden guns as well as much general arrogance to vaunt their power. Palestinians were vulnerable to deliberate provocation by the Lebanese authorities, humiliating acts in public constantly reminding them of their lowly status.

Something like two years ago, I went out one night with some of my friends. We had to pass a roadblock of the Lebanese army. They wanted to see our passports. The others were alright but the officer who looked at my Palestinian identity card took me to the station. They locked me away for several hours. They did not want to let me go. I finally managed to get some connection, the father of a friend who is director of a school in Jounieh, to talk to the authorities and I was released. I was about 18, and it was because they were Christians and did not like a Palestinian

---

[207] Faisal Jalloul. Naqd al-salah al-filistini. Bourj al-Barajneh: ahlan wa thawratan wa mukhayaman. Beirut: jamiyaa al-huquq mahfutha, 1994.

crossing their territory. I couldn't tell the others why it had happened to me, because I did not want them to know that I was Palestinian. Only one of them, a very close friend, knew.[208]

In the case of difficulties with the authorities, the Palestinian organizations could not intervene. Although some former leaders maintained relations with Lebanese politicians, they had lost their legitimizing function as patrons and protectors. And the influence of the *tanzimat* was completely restricted to the camps.

At the same time, the struggle for liberation of the homeland seemed to have lost its popular support. With the obvious defeat of the Palestinian forces in Lebanon, the shift of attention to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank and a peace process going ahead that did not seriously tackle the question of the refugees, Palestinians in Lebanon had lost faith in those officially representing the cause. The character of the *tanzimat* had always been predominantly militant. With most Palestinians no longer believing in armed struggle for the "liberation" of Palestine and all political aspirations confined to rhetoric, lack of experience in developing democratic and civil forms of organization became apparent. Although scholars discussing former PLO institutions emphasize that capacities for statehood emerged when the PLO expanded its base in Lebanon in the 1970s,[209] the civil and democratic character of that apparatus was limited or used in uncivil and undemocratic ways. In the Palestinian camps, power was to a great extent being determined by the capacity of various organizations to put people on their payroll, as well, of course, by the number of fighters controlling certain areas. As Yezid Sayigh observes, *tafrigh* (to place on a payroll) became part of the internal Palestinian hierarchy.[210] Thoughts about a civil administrative structure did not receive much attention. Because resources of the Palestinian parties then were plenty and not self-generated but donated, corruption was not viewed as an issue.

The leadership's corruption was repeated at the level of the recipients, who shifted loyalties to patrons according to potential profit. Stable patron-client-networks could not evolve in such a context. This added to the instability of power structures within the camps, a situation compounded by minimal income-generating opportunities. There was, to be sure, always a core group of ideologically convinced supporters. In

---

[208] Greek-Catholic Palestinian, 23, male, student, Jounieh.

[209] See, for example: Laurie A. Brand. Palestinians in the Arab World. Institution Building and the Search for State. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

[210] Yezid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. pp. 460ff.

addition to political loyalties, those oriented towards primordial principles like kinship and locality continued to play a role and could even undermine both national idioms of solidarity and the parties' integrity. Violence in the camps erupted over inter-factional and inter- or intra-family rivalries. [211]

Sayigh notes the tendency of Yassir Arafat to monopolize the organization's apparatus and control its funds during the Lebanese period. Such a military and autocratic leadership style was reflected downward in the way the PLO institutions were run. Expansion of the military-intelligence branch and the encouragement of parallel agencies revealed the desire to checkmate opponents by establishing a wide field of power.[212] This strategy was continued by the type of rule in the regions governed by the PA in Gaza and the West Bank.[213] This does not mean that job- and income-creating Palestinian institutions in Lebanon were entirely negligible in their impact. But under militarized conditions, democratization was of little interest to Palestinian leaders.[214] The Palestinian organizations that finally seized control of the camps from the Lebanese authorities were guided primarily by a desire to display strength and military power. And the violent internal leadership struggle continued, irrespective of an evolving nationalist discourse.[215] At every incident, Israel could be accused of instigating friction, discrepancies between the fiction of national unity and the reality of internal tension thus being bridged by a handy scapegoat.

While I was interviewing one of the Lebanese leaders of a former leftist party allied to the PFLP, the *hizb al-dimucrati al-shabi* (Popular Democratic Party) in Sidon, shots rang out in the camp. My interlocutor was informed immediately by telephone about the background of the event: two brothers belonging to rival factions were fighting over the same woman. A few minutes before, he had offered a pacific description of the Ain al-Helweh camp, which, he indicated, was free of violence and shooting. Trivial in itself, this incident reflected the absence of legal sovereign institutions and the prevailing "law of the *tanzimat*"—problems solved through violence and intimidation. Nevertheless, some of the *tamzim* members had become thoughtful.

---

[211] ibid., p. 98.
[212] ibid., p. 456.
[213] ibid., p. 457.
[214] ibid., p. 457, citing Jamil Hilal. Problems of Change in the Palestinian System. (Arab.) Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filistiniyya, no.15, Summer 1993, 25.
[215] Sayigh., 1994. p. 98.

There are anti-democratic sentiments. It is mirrored in the situation of the camps, the PA, the PLO. We are responsible for this way of thinking. We always dealt with weapons. It was the voice of the Kalashnikov that counted. It is the Arafatist way. The democratic way is, to inform the people, to let them know what is happening. Another mistake that Arafat made was to ostracize the intellectuals. He never wanted to include them. He also never tried to include the Palestinian bourgeoisie, the rich. They were ready; they could have helped.[216]

5.4. Reconnecting with Civil Society

I gained the impression during my field research that the time of armed struggle seemed over to many Palestinians. This did not mean abandoning a desire to return to the homeland, but that the economic situation and years of the war had taken their toll. Younger *shabab* were undecided and ambivalent, a main goal being immigration to the States or a wealthy country in Europe. The talk of the day was how to obtain visas or enter the desired country without one.

Despite continued Palestinian military training and operations (this usually in cooperation with Hizbollah), and respect for members of Hamas, a sense of resignation and skepticism concerning the ideas of return and armed struggle had set in since the signing of the Oslo Accords. The social and institutional restructuring of the Palestinian community, particularly in the camps, was a pressing necessity--especially in light of the glaring incongruity between a Lebanese society struggling for a civil and demilitarized definition and Palestinian camps under the rule of the *tanzimat.* In response to an increasing sense of dissatisfaction, small groups emerged informally to develop areas of camp-life: neighborhood ties, street cleaning, services for the needy.

We started as a couple of younger men who gathered in one of the houses. We decorated the room and decided to meet once a week and just talk about the situation in the camp. We wanted to take care of our area. We also read the Qur'an each time. Shortly afterwards, the tanzimat [in this case the PFLP-GC] *began to harass us, personally. Every time we met, one of them would go past with a gun. We couldn't continue. This is even more frustrating as the situation is bad already, but now we are even held back from doing something about it. Some of us have now joined the Islamic organizations. The* tanzimat *are afraid they*

[216] Abu Ali Hassan, head of PFLP in Ain al-Helweh.

will lose their power. They want to stay in control. It is they who form the Lijna Sha'biya, *the popular committee in the camp.*[217]

A project with far wider scope was the Palestinian Organization for Human Rights (*al-munazamat al-filistiniya li-huquq al-insan*), founded in 1997 by people themselves enduring camp conditions and the refugee's legal status.

Under the current disastrous conditions for Palestinians, many are ready to take foreign passports. We are in fact forced to get rid of our identity, the camps' destabilization being meant to disperse us and make us emigrate. The camps have actually conserved Palestinian traditions and dignity—a collective awareness fundamental to the revolution.

UNRWA has not done anything in the last few years to improve the camps, and neither has the international community. Health and educational services exist, but tare insufficient. For this reason, we want the Lebanese authorities in the camps. Someone has to collect the weapons and prevent crimes and violence. We need services in exchange. We need to solve our problems on a humanitarian basis, with cooperation of all political forces—we certainly can't wait until the international community solves our problems. Why do we always blame the Lebanese for the present-day trouble and corruption? It's dangerous living in the camps with the power vacuum the lack of discipline and security.

Our organization shouldn't be political; the political organizations should continue with their own strategies. We are supporting the rights of ordinary people, trying to spread our ideas among the Palestinians with free professions, the intelligentsia. Some of the parties try to threaten us, and others spread bad news about us—that we are former terrorists who now want to fight for human rights. We do not want political leaders to be members of our group, since they would try to dominate us. They should be consultants. We are trying to cooperate with various parties at once—Lebanese organizations, governmental organizations, politicians, UNRWA.

We need an authority in the camps, and the right to work and the right to travel. Amnesty for war criminals should be extended to Palestinians. The camps should be clean and have electricity and water. The traditional party leaders are skeptical, so we are facing a generation

---

[217] Palestinian, Sunni, male, 24, works in a theatre in Beirut, Bourj al-Barajneh camp (controlled by the PFLP-GC).

conflict. They had their past role, and are afraid we will replace them. The first right mentioned in our program is the right of return.[218]

Abdel Salam Akl had proclaimed himself president of the organization. Following our interview, at a Ramadan *iftar* (fast-breaking before dawn) in the Shatila camp to raise funds, he emphasized a rather different dimension to his idea of Palestinian social and economic rights, stressing in an emotional speech that Palestinians had to be able to defend themselves when insulted, even by using violence. Being able to guard a sense of honor, as individuals and as a community, was essential to the men who had once demanded respect with guns. In the end, even to the organization's members, retreat of the *tanzimat* to the camps was a kind of symbolic castration—a truncation of honor and, with it, manhood (*marjalla*). This state of mind has remained central to the wider Palestinian perspective, reinforcing structures grounded in violence in an environment where this seems to continue being a necessary means of protection.

A still younger group of Palestinians, people in their twenties and thirties whose parents had migrated to the Gulf and hence could afford to send their children to the elite universities of Lebanon, were themselves skeptical about this initiative. Initially, they had supported the human-rights organization and had wanted to join it. They withdrew their support upon discovering that the committee was unelected and self-appointed. Opting for an activist focus on education as an alternative, they would visit the camps to offer free instruction in subjects such as English and basic computer programming. Their central concern was instilling a sense among the refugees that someone simply cared, helping to end a sense of segregation and diminished self-esteem.

When listening to these younger people, I often had the sense of an utter loss of confidence in those officially representing the Palestinian cause. They would assert that the party officials uttered empty words: *Haki fadi.*

No one is interested in politics anymore. Everyone wants to go to the movies. If you talk about al-haq al-awda *everyone laughs at you. We want to gather the* shabab. *We want to help the cultural clubs that exist in the camps, like the football club and the little libraries. We should try to donate equipment and establish a network so people can find jobs more easily.... People have to gain confidence, have to be brought to the point where they ask for their rights. The activities involved here are not in the*

[218] Abdel Salam Akl, President of the Palestinian Organization for Human Rights.

public sphere. Empowering the community like this is much more useful than having a press conference. We have to rise from ashes.[219]

[219] Palestinian, male, Sunni, co-owner of software company, 29, Beirut.

6. Coherence and Diversity in the Palestinian Refugee Community

6.1. Palestinian Identities near and within the Camps

We have thus far looked at various issues, social, economic, political, confessional, that have had an impact on the Palestinian-Lebanese relationship. The focus in the last chapter was mainly on Palestinians living in the camps and environs—the central staging post for the rise of the PLO in Lebanon. Because of their ghetto-like nature, the camps served as an excellent locus for total politicization, thus providing an effective evolved. They provided the popular basis for armed action against Israel. In the camps, Palestinian identity became inextricably linked with supporting nationalist ideology, the degree of "Palestinianness" being inextricably tied to the intensity of the willingness to give oneself to the Palestinian cause.

It was in the camps that everything happened. People were extremely poor and desperate, but still, it was there that the Palestinian national spirit was and still is burning. They are real Palestinians. You should go and listen to them. That is where you will encounter real Palestinians.[220]

The criteria defining who was a real Palestinian could even exclude party leaders if they did not share the modest life-style of the camps. A Maronite lawyer (already cited above), formerly involved in the Palestinian cause, indicates that

Those supposed to lead the struggle did not live in the camps. They lived in Hamra. There was a huge discrepancy. Only Habbash and Hawatmeh lived very modestly. They never stayed in expensive hotels and they knew about the Palestinians in the camps....Every time I went down from Kisrwan to Beirut for a meeting, I found the Palestinians absent.... At one point, I told my wife: We are more Palestinian than they are!

Another dimension of the poverty-identity connection emerged when I tried to arrange an interview with a Palestinian of bourgeois background. I called his mobile number, and located him skiing in the Lebanese Mountains near Ferraya: "Listen, I don't think I am the real Palestinian you are looking for. Here I am, with my mobile, my chalet, skiing."

When visiting the camps, I would first introduce myself at the *lijna shabiya*, the popular council, in order to avoid arousing suspicion over

[220] Palestinian political activist, male, 55, Mar Elias camp.

my intentions or endangering those I visited. I would usually be invited to have a look at the camp institutions. It was obligatory to visit those households where I would only learn about Palestinian hardship and the "real Palestinian spirit." Some of these visits seemed to have been rehearsed. In Ain al-Helweh, I was "escorted" by a party official to visit the house of an elderly couple. I had hardly sat down on one of the floor-mattresses when, in order to demonstrate his desire to continue the armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine, the host brought out his Kalashnikov. He suffered from both eyesight and concentration problems incurred from a blow to the head incurred during the Israeli invasion of 1982, and was unable to work in his profession as a mechanic. His sons supported the family with remittances from the USA. No other discourse but that related to the Palestinian revolution appeared possible. He talked nostalgically about the *ayam al-thawra*, the days of the revolution, when his children went to school, came back for lunch, and then went to the military training camp. When I asked to speak with his wife, the "escort" suggested I ask her if she wanted to return to Palestine.

Of course. What shall we do here? This is not our country. Do you see how we are suffering in the camp? Back there we have everything: houses, land, fields. We can live there happily.

The follow-up question was then suggested:

If you could return to Gaza, for instance, but not to your original town [in northern Palestine]*, would you do so?*

Ghaza mish baladna! La! Badna baladna! Badna nirja li-baladna! - Gaza is not our country! No! We want our land! We want to go back to our land!

Despite the emotional response, I in fact felt that I was witnessing a staged performance of genuine Palestinianness—a stance apparently disconnected from political reality, most Palestinians in the camp I had met "unofficially" being inclined to mock such presentations. While the life story of this elderly couple was indeed bound up with a bitter struggle to return to Palestine, their earlier political slogans and way of life had lost persuasive power, even in the camps. The identity crisis accompanying the now widespread ambivalence and skepticism was complicating the younger generation's search for a place in Lebanese society.

Haissam, 26, a shop clerk, had elder brothers who had been heavily involved in the fight with Israel in both Lebanon and abroad. He had

himself received some military training in the youngsters' group of Fatah, the *ashbal* ("lion cubs"). Haissam now supported Hizballah and found it depressing to talk about what had become of the Palestinian nationalist movement. We were driving down the Corniche next to the beach. It was cruising time for young people up and down the seaside, flirting from behind the windows of their air-conditioned limousines in the traffic jam.

Look at these Lebanese show-offs! They're liars and actors—only half what you see is real. Where do they get all that money? Politics, drug-trafficking? The girls here know. They don't trust Lebanese men. I've played the Lebanese game myself, driving a borrowed car and wearing a neat shirt with money to spend for the evening. I had a lot of girl friends back then-- told each she was the one but never took anything seriously. Now I'm tired—I just got married. - I really don't know if I'm Lebanese or Palestinian or if there is any difference.

Youssef, a young man from Bourj al-Barajneh with a Palestinian father and Lebanese mother, was caught in a similar dilemma of loss of focus involving "real Palestinian identity." To cope, he rather arbitrarily defined his own existence. With a Palestinian camp in his backyard, he carried an identity card designating him as a Palestinian refugee, although his working environment was Lebanese. Depending where he happened to be, at home, at work, among Palestinian or Lebanese friends, he was vociferously supportive of the ideological program of armed struggle or resigned and critical. This approach was clearly a reflection not of opportunism but simply confusion and deep ambivalence. When I asked Youssef if he lived in the camp, he indicated that he had never done so, and generally presented the image of someone removed from either militancy or social hardship. I was thus surprised to discover that he lived in a house directly bordering the camp, the window of the room he shared with his three brothers looking down on its houses. I received an even more painfully evasive response from Muhammad, 29, who worked as a mechanic close to the Bourj al-Barajneh camp, when I asked him if he lived within it or outside: "I live outside. Well, sort of outside, I live at the very beginning - *awl mukhayam.*" The impression Muhammad tried to convey was that the further away a refugee was from the camp's center, the less "Palestinian" he was in the sense of a destitute camp-dweller, hence the higher his social status.

Since Youssef wanted to present to me a 'real Palestinian', we crossed the camp together. He ostentatiously carried his cellular telephone—this, transparently, as a means of distancing himself from the camp inhabitants. Although the streets were extremely narrow and the traffic

troublesome, he insisted on driving through the camp to reach the house. On the way, he explained why he himself was very different from the camp Palestinians—he spoke another dialect.

The "real Palestinian," Youssef's friend Shebib, had joined the *jamma al-islamiya*. Youssef thought it might not only have been for religious reasons but because the family received support in this manner. In fact, although it was religiously forbidden, Shebib smoked cigarettes, indicating God would forgive his little sins. Shebib opened our encounter with a salvo of heavy anti-Israeli rhetoric, recalling the beautiful lands that had belonged to them and that they would "liberate" one day:

We love our land, al-ard, *like we love our baby. How can you sell your baby? We are Palestinians in our hearts and minds. We will always be Palestinians.*

The emotional political arguments of his friend intrigued Youssef, who indicated support in his presence. But after we left, with Shebib's four shy smiling children receding along with the house, he fell very silent.

You know, when I hear him speaking like this I think he is completely right. But then I am different from him.

Later on, when I asked him what he wished to do with his life, he indicated he would love to become one of the traffic policemen riding around town on a Harley Davidson. But for a Palestinian this was not possible.

Another acquaintance of mine from the same basic social circumstances, 24 year old Sivine, revealed an alternative approach to "being Palestinian":

Seeing that I'm well educated and well dressed, that I work in a good environment and enjoy my life, people often don't want to believe that I am *Palestinian—after all I'm neither unwashed nor uneducated. At university I tried out one of those Palestinian clubs but found the program ridiculous. Arafat made us lose our identity. What I didn't like was that the activities were always political instead of humanitarian. I won't return to Palestine, I've grown up here and this is my environment. It's true that sometimes my Palestinian accent slips out - we speak with a Palestinian accent at home.*

You see that I don't feel really Palestinian all the time like people in the camps. I don't go there very often, since I don't feel comfortable there.

I'm dressed differently and when I enter with my Audi I feel conspicuous. And maybe in a way guilty since I'm not sharing that destiny. My uncle decided to stay in the camp, saying he wanted to share the destiny of his people. He regrets it now that his daughters are getting older. They're embarrassed to tell people outside where they live. Their options for marrying someone eligible are very restricted.

Sivine's house was in eyesight of the Bourj al-Barajneh camp where her maternal uncle lived. There was thus a constant exchange between the family and the camp. And yet, the effort on her part to "neutralize" her identity, ironically equated with that of a destitute camp-dweller or radical militant, was quite apparent. The negative self-image at play here was something she had in common with Mohammed, Youssef, and Haissam—all of whom had experienced and observed the same set of social and historical developments. Strikingly, I only realized the extent to which this self-image reflected general prejudices after having inquired into marriage strategies--even the Sunni community, it turned out, disliked Palestinians as potential partners, equating them all with those vegetating in the camps.

I want my children to marry a Lebanese. They have different customs. They think differently. I want them to be like us....I don't want my children to marry from Ain al-Helweh. They are not suitable. There are not so many Palestinians around who would be suitable[221].

6.2. The Palestinian Middle Class – Far away from the Camps

It is nevertheless the case that a significant segment of Lebanon's Palestinian population had never lived in the camps, and in fact had little sense of or empathy with camp values and mores. Forming part of Palestine's Arab elite before 1948, these middle class and upper middle-class Lebanese Palestinians were not considered "real Palestinians" by camp inhabitants and activists. Still, they did maintain their own quite strong sense of Palestinian identity, a self-awareness based on three factors: genealogy, territory, and political identification with the Palestinian National Movement.

[221] Hoda, about 45, middle-class Sunni from Sidon.

Many of Lebanon's prosperous Palestinians had already left Palestine by 1947, due to the rising insecurity. Some had left considerably earlier, in the 1930s, during Arab revolt against British rule. Crucially, while circulating freely in their Lebanese environment, they were able to cultivate their own strong sense of Palestinian nationalism. It is the case that those Palestinians living outside the camps were rarely willing to sacrifice their achievements in favor of militant national struggle aimed at homogenizing the Palestinian community. Perhaps in part as a reaction to this stance, George Habbash, in a chapter dedicated to the Palestinian "bourgeoisie" in his *Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine*, argues that its members inevitably reject national goals in favor of status or class[222]: an argument assuming that a national struggle has to be combined with a socialist and secular program, in a form of Jacobine social revolution. But in an implicit refutation to such Jacobinism, Lamia Radi has insisted that Jordan's own Palestinian bourgeoisie, while siding which sided with the Hashemite establishment during the Palestinian rebellion of 1970-71, nevertheless did not abandon their strong sense of Palestinian identity. In other words, a disinterest in Palestinian armed struggle was here paralleled by a strong consciousness of Palestinian origin and family history.[223] And it is apparent that in Lebanon, as well, the Palestinian middle class continued to maintain a sense of Palestinian belonging, geographical and genealogical in nature, despite a provisional shattering of national and political aspirations.

This portion of Palestinian society, not only in Lebanon but also in general, has until recently been treated with marginal scholarly interest—a neglect that appears to be grounded, to some considerable extent, in a desire by those sympathetic to the Palestinian Arab cause to maintain an image of Palestinian national unity, with concomitant emphasis being placed on social coherence instead of heterogeneity. From this perspective, the geographical dispersion of Palestinians had to be overcome through national myths transcending unsettling forces such as social class, family and village or city origin, and confession.[224] Another

---

[222]George Habbash. A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine. Amman: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), Information Department, 1969. p. 36.

[223]Lamia Radi. La gestion d'appartenances multiples. Les Cahiers de l'Orient, no.35:3, 1994. p. 99.

[224] Palestinian and other Arab intellectuals and artists have engaged energetically in this process of national myth making. It is significant that in November 1982, at a meeting of the PNC in Algiers after the PLO had to leave Lebanon under a US-brokered treaty, Mahmud Darwish was invited to speak. For hours the PNC members listened to poems. In fact, the recital of poetry as a way to reinforce collective memory has broadly served the Palestinian as a help in persisting against the odds. Rashid Khalidi (1997 p. 195) has stressed that within the poetical-mythological structure defeats could be celebrated as victories.

source for the neglect is related to the Lebanese Palestinians alone--a reluctance to tackle the issue of their integration into Lebanese society, which might be interpreted as supporting positions hostile to Palestinian nationalism.

By and large, the scholarly literature on both the refugees and the Palestinian nationalist movement has run parallel to and in sympathy with the development of Palestinian political structures and in harmony with the movement's dominant idioms. The political structure of the PLO, its activities, aims, and inter-party conflicts provided the backdrop for constructing a socio-political national formation, the Palestinian people. With the Palestinian claim to a state being premised on the existence of a territory, a people, and a representative government, an approach stressing the diversity of the refugees was thus politically incorrect. As Khalidi has indicated, in defining both political national aspirations and the boundaries of who is Palestinian, intellectuals and artists have helped construct a national identity. In this regard, a survey conducted by Palestinian researchers (including Khalidi) for the UN on the situation of Palestinian refugees came to a conclusion that is strikingly salient: "The cohesion of Palestinian communities is, partly, a result of their thirty-five years of geographical dispersion, statelessness and minority status."[225]

But as I have suggested, the Palestinian community can equally be understood in terms of heterogeneity and diversity. In order to understand the various ways Palestinians have settled and interacted in Lebanon, it is useful to consider the social configuration of Palestinian Arab society in Palestine before 1948. This configuration would turn out be highly influential regarding the Palestinians' economic and social situation in Lebanon.

6.3. Palestinian Society before 1948

The Arab population of pre-1948 Palestine was to great extent (about 75 percent) situated in rural areas.[226] Ties of loyalty toward the extended

---

Khalidi's recent criticism of Palestinian national myths does not strike against the idea of Palestinian national identity and unity as such, but against those who have been chosen to voice, define, and promote it. Khalidi himself is part of the process of defining Palestinian national experience. In his latest book (1997), he stresses the role intellectual urban Palestinians have played in the process, in the absence of national institutions.

[225]Final Report on the Economic and Social Situation and Potential of the Palestinian Arab People in the Region of Western Asia. Presented to: United Nations/Economic Commission for Western Asia. 1983. p. 187.

[226]Pamela Ann Smith. Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984. p. 31ff.

family (*hamula* or *aashira*) organized this rural population. The latter term was used in the context of political affiliation through blood ties, covering both the social structure of the village and its local authorities and the large landowning families who exercised regional political, economic, and social power.[227] These landowning families made up part of the Palestinian elite, some of them holding important religious functions.[228] Smith divides this elite into those who were able to trace their descent back to the Prophet (*ashraf*) and whose power thus relied on their distinction by birth, on the one hand, and the large landlords (*iqtayin*), on the other.

The *ashraf* held a privileged position during the Ottoman Empire that exempted them from either taxes or criminal law. They were responsible for managing the religious endowments, the *awqaf* (sing: *waqf*), which constituted the basis of their wealth and social position.[229] Once the religious offices became hereditary in the late Ottoman Empire, the *ashraf* controlled huge revenues and established a strong position in opposition to the traditional landowning families. Because of the heavy tax imposition during this period, many *fillahin* registered their land with the *awqaf*.[230] However, during the Mandate period the *awqaf*'s secularization affected their range of influence, in contrast to the position of the *iqtayin*, whose property was registered as family holdings. Henceforth, they would depend on governmental goodwill to maintain their position and income.[231] This structure of dependency inherited from the British Mandate became a major factor in generating Palestinian elite's internal rivalries over wealth and power—particularly rivalries between the Husseini and Nashashibi families—thus seriously affecting its struggle against British pro-Zionist policy.

According to Granott, the position of the *fillahin* was extremely weak, as they were exposed to the rigidity of the tax collectors, often allies of the local authority—the *shaykh* or *mukhtar*—or moneylender, who charged interest of up to 30 or 40 percent. People relied on the moneylender in order to buy grain for the following year in case of an insufficient harvest,

---

[227] See also: David Waines. The Failure of the National Resistance. In: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.). The Transformation of Palestine. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971. p. 217f.

[228] Alexander Flores. Die Entwicklung der palästinensischen Nationalbewegung bis 1939. In: H.Mejcher/A.Schölch (eds.). Die Palästina-Frage 1917-1948. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1981. p. 94.

[229] Smith, 1984. p. 19.

[230] A.Granott. The Land System in Palestine. History and Structure. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952. p. 56.

[231] Smith, 1984, p. 61.

or for reasons such as the marriage dowry. Indeed, the indebtedness of the *fillahin* to moneylenders became such a serious issue, that the Mandate government initiated some measures to alleviate their plight.[232]

The absentee landlord, mainly concerned with extracting as much profit as possible from the land, further afflicted the peasantry, the land they worked on being sold at a high price, particularly to Jewish immigrants and the Jewish National Fund. Whereas Khalidi views the sale of land by ignorant and absent landlords as actually cementing ties between Palestinians on both anti-Zionist and Arab-nationalist grounds, Porath stresses the deeply disturbing effect it had on the coherence of Palestinian society and the effectiveness of Palestinian Arab nationalism.[233]

According to a survey for the 1878-1936 period, 52.6% of land sales were conducted by non-Palestinian landowners, mainly Syrians and Lebanese, 24.6% by Palestinian landowners, and 9.4% by *fillahin*.[234] The social and economic turmoil in rural areas due to land sales produced a landless, proletarian peasantry. With a money economy having become increasingly important, the economic transformation of cities in the Levant had begun to have its repercussions in the agrarian society of the hinterland.

The establishment of the Zionist movement in Palestine, protected by the British Mandate and observed with hostility by Palestine's Arabs, created an environment of latent instability. Palestinian Arab society was in a process of transformation, facing a growing influx of people from an alien culture with strong and well-organized goals. Where after the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, a process of nation building was unfolding among the newly created Arab states, for the Palestinians, anti-British

---

[232] Granott, 1952. p. 68f.

[233] Yehoshua Porath. The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939. From Riots to Rebellion. vol.II. London: Frank Cass, 1977. p. 86.

[234] Porath, 1977. p. 84. From 1928 onwards, an increase is registered in land belonging to small, non-absentee landlords, as most of the major landowners now resided in the cities. Porath continues: "These developments can be explained as follows: so long as large tracts of land were available the Jewish buyers preferred them, but only in the late 1920s and early 1930s when most of the large tracts of the desolate or half-desolate land in the coastal plain and the Jezreel and Jordan valleys had already been bought, did the Jewish buyers begin to buy land owned by Palestinians which was more often than not cultivated. For the local owner-occupants, both big and small, there were special incentives in that period to sell land: the migration to coastal towns such as Jaffa and Haifa, but mainly the growth of the citrus industry." Ibid. As the citrus industry was a capital intensive agriculture, cash had to be available. Another important factor for the land sales may have been the indebtedness of the *fillahin*, as mentioned by Granott.

and anti-Zionist actions and sentiments were not a source of unity, but rather of a continued erosion of national solidarity.

Khalidi's argument that local loyalties were vital for the development of a Palestinian nationalism is, in the end, untenable.[235] The romantic national myth of the olive and the orange groves was created much later, through Palestinian nationalist propaganda and poetic metaphor. Local Palestinian loyalties had, in fact, adhered to a political structure of dissolution rather than coherence. The vertical relation between the *iqtay* and the subservient *fillah* was detrimental to other patron-client relations. Trying to expand their influence over subjects and territory, the patrons mobilized their followers but antagonized others.[236] Important families in the cities themselves had allies supporting them in the struggle for predominance and influence.

In addition, any possible coherence within Palestinian Arab society was rendered difficult through the steadily growing gap between *fillahin* and *madaniyin,* the urban dwellers, with the urban areas enjoying a far more diversified economic and educational sector. This gap would be reflected in attitudes persisting many decades later: In my interviews, older rural Palestinians would often express strikingly intense distrust of city people, viewed as immoral, untrustworthy, superficial, and stingy. The reverse perception was naturally that the hinterland was backward, uncultivated, ignorant, unsophisticated. The negative feelings here seemed mutually directed at people from not only a separate society, but another world.

The existence of confessional differences within Palestinian society has been a taboo subject in nationalist Palestinian ideology. In ostentatious opposition to their Lebanese environment, where confessional loyalties were of utmost importance to socio-political life, the Palestinians have often professed ignorance of the confessional divide—this in face of a Lebanese society shattered by civil war. It was a matter of national pride to ensure that confessional loyalties as well as "traditional" ties were overcome. The fact that many Christian Palestinians joined the ranks of the armed groups, that, for instance, George Habbash was a Christian, only seemed to underscore affirmations of national cohesion irrespective of confession.

Discussing confessional difference in pre-1948 Palestine, Smith points out that rural Christians and Moslems were loyal to the same landlord,

---

[235]Khalidi, 1997, p. 21.

[236]For a further understanding of these rival patron-client structures in the rural northern area of Lebanon, see: Gilsenan, 1996.

whatever the confession, the reason for this being privileges granted non-Moslem communities—the Greeks, Italians, Armenians, and Jews—under Ottoman rule.[237] Exclusive access to imported Western goods led to an increase in wealth in the Christian community,[238] contributing to the emergence of a Christian middle class. Small traders, shop-owners, and the intelligentsia profited from the existing Christian educational institutions, which produced lawyers, teachers, journalists, and civil servants.[239] In her study of the transformation of Haifa (in the late nineteenth century almost fifty percent Christian[240]), Seikaly shows that the privileged economic and educational situation of the Christian community produced a process of social ascent in that city. This process was supported by an overall expansion in Palestinian trade and commerce at the end of the century, Palestine thus gaining the most dynamic economy in the region.[241] However, this dynamism was primarily due to activities within the growing Jewish community, Arab merchants not entering the industrial sector on a broad scale.[242]

During the Ottoman period, Christians had been deprived of administrative power and thus of direct political influence and access to resources. They were granted specific economic privileges, which would improve their social position and allow them to compete with Moslem Palestinians. In the Mandate period, Christians, especially urban intellectuals, were thus able to enter the political arena, many becoming activists in the world of journalism and elsewhere, in the anti-Zionist cause.[243]

Nevertheless, both Porath and Seikaly refer to friction between Moslems and Christians during the 1930s due to the reluctance of the majority of Christians to confront the British government and the Zionists. Seikaly also notes a continued alienation between Christian and Moslem anti-

---

[237]Smith, 1984, p. 25. Smith bases her account on: Bernard Lewis. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London, 1968, and: Albert Hourani. The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century. Studia Islamica, vol.13, 1957.

[238]ibid., p. 26f.

[239]ibid., p. 28.

[240]May Seikaly. Haifa. Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918-1939. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1995. p. 21.

[241]See: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. The Transformation of Palestine. Essays on the origin and development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

[242] Seikaly, 1995. p. 7.

[243]The Jaffa dailies Filistin and al-Karmil (Carmel), both playing a central role in mobilizing anti-Zionist sentiments, were both owned by Christians. See Smith, 1984. p. 29. It is striking that Kayyali, who emphasizes the national character of the pre-1948 Palestinian resistance does not mention the confessional identity of the newspaper owners. See A.W. Kayyali, 1981. p. 32.

Zionist activists in Haifa, with Moslem associations becoming more inclined to formulate resistance in exclusively Islamic terms.[244] The anti-Zionist struggle thus gradually took on a Moslem character, with Christians despised for their privileged positions in the governmental administration during the Mandate, partly due to their more qualified education in missionary schools.[245] In this way, confessional antagonism set in despite some attempts at moderation by the Palestinian leadership (Sunni Moslem notables based in Jerusalem).[246] Christians were now excluded from a developing political movement that drew its strength from an already existing institutional framework, the Moslem Sunni constituency. The entwining of religious and political authority held by Moslem notables fostered the Islamic idiom, hence the ideological coherence of the opposition to Jewish settlement.[247]

Nevertheless, such coherence could not prevent a fracturing of the Palestinian Moslem itself, struggling internally for important administrative positions. The main antagonism, as indicated, was between the Husseini and Nashashibi families; it severely damaged the possibility of a unified front against the British pro-Zionist policy. The Nashashibi clung to the British, receiving influential posts in return. For their part, the British did not wish to promote an escalating struggle between the two factions, but rather to maintain a balance and secure the loyalties of both.[248]

According to Kayyali, the paralysis of the Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem led to the rise of other opposition groups from both the educated middle-classes and the peasants. In the early 1930s, the former grouped around the *istiqlal* (Independence Party). He stresses that the party moved to abolish feudal titles and launched a heavy attack on the political notability.[249] But according to Porath, the *istiqlal* was ephemeral, since it existed only from 1932 to 1933 and was close to the Husseini family, from whom it received financial support.[250] In the face of contacts crossing class and confession, it may be inappropriate to assign Palestinian opposition to British policies to clear-cut groups. However,

---

[244] Seikaly, 1995. p. 192.
[245] Porath, 1977. p. 109.
[246] ibid., p. 109.
[247] Nels Johnson. Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism. London: Kegan Paul, 1982. p. 16.
[248] Johnson, 1982. p. 18f. See also: Ann Mosley Lesch. The Palestine Arab National Movement under the Mandate. In: William Quandt et al. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. Berkley: Campus, 1973.
[249] Abdul Wahab Said Kayyali. Palestine. A Modern History. London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1978, p. 167.
[250] Porath, 1977. p. 138.

there were clear tendencies on the part of the urban and landowning notables, the urban middle-class, and the lower classes and peasants regarding the manner in which such opposition was voiced.

As Kayyali indicates, the peasants' rebellion of the mid-1930's was staged by an underprivileged population unsatisfied with an indecisive Palestinian leadership. He views the peasants' readiness to participate in an unprecedented revolt as resulting from being freed, in a society in transition, from traditional ties of loyalty toward the notables. He points toward an increase in land sales that left behind landless and politically free-floating peasants. The economic pressures on these individuals drove them to despair, the policies of the notables not addressing their basic needs.[251] A central figure in the revolt was a Moslem cleric, Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who had fled from the French authorities in Syria to Palestine and was now calling for anti-British and anti-Zionist action. Using anti-imperialist arguments formulated in Islamic terms,[252] he succeeded in appealing to a popular audience—this in contrast to the *ayan*, who failed despite the broad respect they might have claimed. Qassam's death in 1935 sparked a sudden popular rebellion, armed bands emerging in several towns to fight directly against the British. The Jewish population did not participate, using the opportunity to expand its own infrastructure.[253] Meanwhile, Palestinian notables were engaged in diplomatic encounters with the British and continued their internal feuds. The Palestinian elite was mainly motivated by the urge to secure family predominance; the Husseinis and Nashashibis competed, now as before, for administrative posts in the religious and governmental sectors.

In 1937, in response to the ongoing events, the British Government issued a Royal Report that advocated a partition plan for Palestine. That same year, the "higher committee" composed of the traditional Palestinian Arab leadership was dissolved, the British deporting their leaders.[254] Despite the continued absence of a coherent leadership, the peasant rebellion persisted.[255] According to Porath, its main participants were Moslem villagers from lower social strata, with some very limited participation on the part of educated urban Arabs or notable families.[256] Over the course of that same year, the rebels gained control over significant parts of Palestine, but even at the peak of their effectiveness

---

[251]Johnson, 1982. p. 38.
[252]ibid., p. 32ff.
[253]Flores, 1981. p. 113.
[254] Barbara Kalkas. The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events. In: Abu-Lughod, 1971. p. 273.
[255] Cf. Flores, 1981. p. 114.
[256]Porath, 1977. p. 264.

they failed to implement a consistent form of rule or execute any effective social program in their areas of control.[257] To the contrary, the fracture running through Palestinian society became obvious, the political elite having been ostracized and the rebellion taking on the character of a struggle against urban society. [258]

When the rebels entered the towns of Haifa and Nablus, and the Old City of Jerusalem, many of the rich inhabitants, land-brokers and pro-government notables fled. The townspeople were forced to wear rural dress in order to make it easier for the rebels to disguise themselves.[259] The Christian population became increasingly alienated during the rebellion, with a refusal by Christian villages to supply the rebels nurturing the widespread Moslem sense that Christians were receiving privileged treatment from the British.[260] In any event, the rebellion petered out unspectacularly, as a result of its various internal problems.[261]

The diverse and internally antagonistic structure of Palestinian society thus worked powerfully against unified opposition to either the British or the Jewish settlers. Clearly, in the absence of a powerful set of shared goals and interests, and in the context of unstable political and economic conditions, a society in turmoil will have trouble undertaking any effective political action. This would depend on the presence of either a strong and charismatic leadership or the unambiguous dominance of one social segment, then acting in everyone's name. In the case of the Palestinian Arabs, centrifugal forces continued to weaken any ability to organize in face of the rising pressure from Jewish settlement, preparing the road to exodus of most of the Arab population with establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

---

[257]ibid., p. 265.
[258]ibid., p. 267.
[259]ibid., p. 268 and Kayyali, 1982. p. 214.
[260]Porath, 1977. p. 269.
[261]Kayyali, 1982. p. 223; Porath, 1977. p. 269.

6.4. Becoming Refugees and Dissolving of Former Ties

To what extent did the economic, social, and political conditions of Arab society in pre-1948 Palestine affect the survival strategies of the Palestinian refugees?

The geographical separation between the camp refugees and their urban counterparts after 1948 was so extreme that it hindered virtually all communication, the camps developing into isolated, internally organized zones. We have seen that the social fragmentation in play here were linked to structures of family, geography, and confession, and to the vertical organization of patron-client relationships. At the same time, the flight and, at times, expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948 resulted in the emergence of a Palestinian refugee society structured according to what may be called class, here signifying criteria of economic capacity.[262] Landlord-peasant or patron-client loyalties disintegrated in exile. Unsurprisingly, wealthy Palestinians were able to establish themselves nearly immediately, while the lower urban strata, the *fillahin* as well as the Bedouin, joined the refugee camps. Their scant assets, carried on their shoulders or packed on a horse or donkey, did not last long— the women's jewelry soon sold, the livestock that some had managed to bring along soon slaughtered or sold as well because of lack of fodder.[263] The only resource they could count on was their labor, which they sold at a low price in the agricultural areas of Lebanon or in the small but growing industrial sector.

Although socio-political structures were partly reproduced within the camps, the severe conditions there consequently led to further dilution of former loyalties. A former *shaykh* could not keep up his duties of generous hospitality in a refugee tent. In this sense Khalidi is correct in stating that many gaps within Palestinian society were erased after 1948[264] - at least regarding the former rural population. A self-perception as underprivileged victims added to a balancing of asymmetrical internal relations, this being paralleled by the complete disappearance of the

---

[262] The notion of class struggle as a unifying force in the Arab struggle against Jewish settlement of Palestine in the 1930s is very much influenced by the vocabulary of Palestinian militancy during the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the intellectuals and scholars close to the Palestinian cause had a Marxist intellectual stance. But although there might have been elements of something like class struggle in the peasants' rebellion of the late 1930s, use of the concept as a kind of covering principle too strongly suggests the existence of a homogeneous and united society of *fillahin* anticipating a united Palestinian movement.

[263] Smith, 1984. p. 122.

[264] Khalidi, 1997. p. 193f.

former political leadership of notable families. From the outset, the urban middle classes had vanished from the destiny of those stuck in the camps.

Nevertheless, within the Lebanese Palestinian population in its entirety, social divisions deepened in the first years of exile. After the exodus, relations between major landlords and the peasants that had defined the social order were almost completely severed. The landlords usually abandoned their land at an earlier stage than the *fellahin*, many privileged Palestinians already leaving in 1947 to flee the turmoil. Through such a response, the Palestinian elite lost popular respect and credibility I thus found it striking when I asked for names of former prominent landowning families in Palestine, most of my interviewees were unable to come up with a single name—such individuals had simply been erased from the commonly accessible refugee narrative.

The landowning and wealthy class, now deprived of the social environment that had affirmed their social status, was primarily concerned with their own strategies of survival. This included cultivating mobility for the sake of whatever job opportunities were available. They could frequently rely on kin in Syria or Lebanon. Familiarity with the surrounding Arab countries was a further advantage on which most of the Palestinian refugees could not rely. Nevertheless, not all the accounts I listened too fully harmonized with this general pattern of easy resettlement:

We are from Acca. My father owned large estates and two cars. We were quite well off. In 1948, we fled to Tyre where my mother's family is from. She was Lebanese. We left almost everything behind. My mother had a lot of gold jewelry which we sold piece by piece, but then there was no more. My mother's family was quite wealthy but my father refused to accept financial support from his father in law. He was very proud a nd it would h ave hurt his pride too much. Instead, he went to work on the fields. He had been a former landowner himself. We moved into a small two-room apartment. There were three children. My father worked day and night. He had two jobs. He also had to support the families of his two brothers. They had been extremely rich in Palestine but were incapable of taking care of themselves after the expulsion.

We received Lebanese nationality in 1957—President Chamoun wanted to secure his reelection in 1958, and my father was able to talk to him personally through connections. We had to pay but not very much, maybe something like a month's income. My father profited from the former connections he had in Lebanon. But soon after our standard of

living had reached the point we could again live comfortably, he died. He had also bought a piece of land in southern Lebanon, north of the Litani River, as he believed that the Israelis would eventually occupy the land to the south.

He had always told us that our education was the most important thing. We went to Lebanese schools and had to excel so that our school fees would be reduced. Today I support Palestinians in the camps by buying their handcrafts and knitting. That is the least I can do.[265]

The situation in northwestern Galilee, the Hula district, represented an exception to the pattern of dissolution of former patron-client ties. Such ties had always transcended the geographical border between Lebanon and Palestine—a situation threatened by continued Israeli confiscations of Arab land, along with expulsions, until 1950.[266] Nevertheless, some of the former patronage relationships did continue afterwards in the border districts.[267] But the exception underscored the general rule: most Palestinian refugees lacked patronage, hence representation in a time they needed it most.

In effect, the only normal way to fulfill some kind of patronage role was to enter the administrative ranks of UNRWA. Depending on their familiarity with Lebanese politics, some notables acted as intermediaries between the camp Palestinians, UNRWA, and the Lebanese secret service until the PLO took over all such functions. In order to collect information on the activities in the camps, the *maktab al-thani* was eager to find allies in the UNRWA administration. Some of these officials would later be killed as traitors and collaborators.[268]

---

[265] Sunni Palestinian, former landowning family, Ras Beirut.

[266] Frederic C.Hof. Galilee Divided. The Israeli-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985. p. 57.

[267] In an interview with a group of Palestinians originally from the *Ghur*, in northwestern Palestine, I learned that Kamal Hussayn had been a strong regional patron and political figure in that district, located north of lake Tiberias. This *za'im* had lived in Marjayoun (Lebanon) where his wife came from. Kamal Hussayn continued to exercise his power after 1948, at a time when the northern border of Israel had still not been completely sealed off. Many Palestinians, the nterviewees explained, had tried to return to their villages, sometimes only to retain or sell some of their property - usually under danger of being expelled immediately when caught by the newly established Israeli authorities. The Lebanese secret service also employed Palestinians to collect information across the border. Hussayn was eventually murdered, apparently by the Syrians because he had been trying to open negotiations with the Israelis and had discovered that the Syrians were doing the same. I was also told that a strong Lebanese Shiite *za'im* from Taibeh, Ahmad al-Asaad, controlled Palestinians and Shiites living along Palestine's northern border; they also maintained their loyalty after 1948.

[268] Interview with Muhammad Mukhtar, Palestinian UNRWA-official.

In any event, the generation that had held positions of influence in Palestine never lost a sense of leadership—of being at the top of the social hierarchy with the duty to define moral, ethical and above all political standards guidelines—even though they were not recognized by their own people and often encountered difficulties in being recognized by the Lebanese elite. Any such recognition, however, derives mainly from those claiming similar social status, not from those with less. Hence the camp refugees, detested by the Lebanese bourgeoisie, were simply of no social capital for the latter's Palestinian counterparts.

An older member of a former landowning family thus explained to me that "To be honest, according to Arab tradition, without being arrogant or snobbish, I don't mingle with people from the lower classes." The camps were places such individuals never visited. Being driven through Beirut with a lady of Palestinian origin (Greek-Orthodox, about 70) by her chauffeur, we passed the suburbs. Waving in the direction of the poorly constructed housing areas, she explained to me that "Over there are some of the Palestinian camps. Poor people." Curiously, the areas she pointed to were in fact Lebanese, with perhaps Syrian immigrants and seasonal workers. I asked her if she ever had visited a camp. She looked at me with utter astonishment and wide eyes-- "No! What should I be doing there?"

At one point, I visited the Palestinian general director of a well-known insurance company in Dbayeh, in the formerly Christian controlled part of Lebanon. We stepped onto his balcony to look down to the sea. He pointed to an area outside Dbayeh. "Look, over there used to be a Palestinian camp for the refugees. Today, no one is living there anymore." I told him, that I recently had visited the camp and found that at least half of it was still inhabited by Palestinians, the other half by Lebanese migrants. He did not want to believe it, stressing his general lack of knowledge about the camps and implying that he was far from being involved with such people--he was surprised to learn that Shatila still existed. He even called up one of his employees, who had once worked for UNRWA, to check on the information. While we were visiting some Maronite friends of his in the mountains, my research came up, and they warned me to watch out when going to the camps—the inhabitants might want to eat me. My Palestinian host laughed with them, apparently not feeling addressed by the remark.

Still, back at his place he proudly showed me a book listing the well-known families of Jaffa, where his own family name had its place. He wanted me to see what his family had managed to rescue from their

houses in Jerusalem: furniture, pottery, carpets. Along with several houses, the family had had land and a company. He described in detail what his childhood home looked like, showing me photographs of the shops they had owned. For this individual, Palestine was not a political legacy but a place from which assets needed to be reclaimed and where the family had held privileged status. He would immediately, as one of his Palestinian friends told me later, return to Jaffa to open a business if he could.

6.5. The Question of Palestinian Return

The ideas of reclaiming property and returning to Palestine were widespread among the Palestinian bourgeoisie, especially among the merchants.

My father told me to register as a 1948 refugee so that in case of any compensation for Palestinians we could claim back our property, our houses, and our lands. If there is peace in the Middle East with an economic free-trade area why shouldn't we return? We can go back with the money we've made in exile. I'd even buy back what had belonged to us. We can wait. We've been waiting for fifty years, and we can wait for another fifty.[269]

As soon as it's possible I'll return to Haifa and open my jewelry shops. In Haifa and Jaffa. We're well known internationally and especially among the Palestinian community.[270]

In conversation with the son of a Maronite patron, about 30, I observed that his self-presentation completely focused on his economic and political inheritance from his father. But at one point, he did mention his Palestinian maternal origin, which, he indicated, was important in one respect: "My grandmother actually was a Palestinian from one of the most wealthy and prominent families of Haifa. There is land belonging to me worth billions of dollars." But even when Palestinian origin was a fully suppressed, unspoken feature of one's identity, especially among Christian Palestinians living in Christian Lebanese areas, memories of lost property in Palestine were conserved. This was not, however, necessarily equated with a particular feeling of national belonging, and it did not necessarily involve national political ambitions. This attitude contrasted sharply, of course, with the ideology of a lost land needing to be recaptured collectively. For Palestinian nationalists, the nonpolitical

[269] Merchant, Sunni, male, Palestinian origin, Beirut, 32.
[270] Owner of a jewelry shop, Palestinian origin, male, Greek-Orthodox, Beirut, about 60.

and individualistic attitude of privileged Palestinians served as a continuous rebuff.

For their part, younger camp dwellers tended not to identify with the places from where their grandparents had come from, but instead with the Lebanese environment they were raised in.

Why should I go back to Palestine? I know no one there. I would be a refugee, just as my parents had been in Lebanon before.[271]

If you go to the camps and talk about the right of return, people will simply laugh at you--no one will believe you. Most of them are in favor of Hamas; it is the only party they believe is serious enough to follow through on its program.[272]

Disillusion over political programs upholding the idea of such return was in fact widespread among camp Palestinians. This formed one of the most marked contrasts with middle-class and upper class Palestinian city dwellers, comfortable enough to consider the possibility of a return that was privately financed some time in the future. For them, while a collective and politicized memory of the orange and olive groves had lost its intensitity, individual memories of lost villas, conserved in black and white photographs, upheld individualistic thoughts about strategies for a homecoming on civilian grounds, perhaps through business relations. Ironically, then, the relation between intensity of national identity and the notion of return had taken on an inverted logic.

Not only upper middle class and aristocratic families tended to preserve memories of their assets, but also Palestinians from peasant families. At the same time, in the absence of social status or a sizeable amount of abandoned property, both former peasants and lower middle class Palestinians were more often ready to abandon the idea of return. In the case of the former peasants, often still residing in the camps, needs regarding the immediate present and future prevailed; whereas the Christian petit-bourgeoisie in particular-- adapted easily to Lebanon's urban Lebanese environment—it had made up a large proportion of the small merchant and administrative sectors of the urban areas in pre-1948 Palestine. Because of their confession, many of these Christians had been granted Lebanese citizenship. Their participation in Lebanese society was often not limited to social and economic realms but included politics, since many came to sympathize with Christian anti-Moslem

[271] Palestinian shop clerk, male, Sabra, 26.
[272] Palestinian pupil, male, 18, Ain al-Helweh, Sidon.

sentiments. Later on, such biases would be widely shared among them, the rise of militant Palestinian movements posing a concrete threat. Pressure to disguise their Palestinian past became correspondingly high. For many, identifying with Palestinian national ideologies would have meant rejecting what they had achieved after expulsion. During the time of rising anti-Palestinian feelings, they thus often simply denied their background a Lebanese identity appearing much more secure.

Emilio, a 27 year old man of Greek-Orthodox confession, informed me in an interview that his maternal grandfather came from Palestine. He asked me to keep the information confidential—no one around him knew this and he wanted to keep it that way. It might have a bad influence on his business (his family owned a shop in Hamra. Politically he supported the movement of exiled Maronite army general Awn. When I asked him about his grandfather's place of origin he was unable to answer.

We never talked about it. I was never interested. I am Lebanese and follow my father. The others all live in the States. It is only when my grandfather comes to visit us and there is news on television about Palestinians and Israelis that he makes some comments. That's all. We're not interested in politics.

Again, where defining one's identity through genealogy was irrelevant, lost assets minimal, politicization absent, any sense of belonging to a Palestinian communal entity was more than tenuous, the idea of returning to Palestine without real meaning. This was the case, as well, with a the retail businessman I encountered who had been living in Hamra for almost 50 years, running his shop as a family business-- Palestine had become something excluded from any personal future projects.

I am one hundred per cent Lebanese.

They had been small merchants in Acca and left for Christian Jezzine in southern Lebanon in 1948. Many Christians from Palestine had gathered there. The family then started working extremely hard in the retail business. He did not feel that he had to feel particular sympathy or solidarity with Palestinians, let alone a Palestinian "people." He knew no one in the camps and was unwilling to employ Palestinians who lacked work permits.

It is the memories that bind you and I don't have any memories. We were always busy. There was not a lot of time to socialize with the family.

George, a Roman-Catholic from Haifa who was about 70, did not agree with the notion of statehood at all. He believed in a mercantile world in which people move to where capital was available. Sentimental links might exist, but ultimately they were irrelevant.

My father was a merchant. He had a garage and sold car items. They owned some land, though not on a large scale. They were based in an urban not a rural setting. The family left Palestine in 1948; some went to Syria, some to the USA. They had a trading business with Lebanon. The money they brought was spent within one year, as all the children were supposed to continue their education. They rented a house in the Beiruti area of Ras al-Nabaa everyone working fourteen hours a day until they made it. We are all people of the coast, Palestinians, and Lebanese, like other Mediterranean people. We are merchants and we move easily. We take the capital with us. We are liquid. Liquidity is transferable, it can move. Those who are not liquid cannot move. We don't need a nation. We might be a people, but not a nation.

A Maronite woman I interviewed—about 55 years old, born in Palestine to Lebanese parents and considered a Palestinian refugee in 1948—indicated that when they arrived in Beirut from Haifa, her father had decided, when to stay away from Palestinian groups-- he wanted to become Lebanese again. In Haifa, they had socialized in the Maronite community; they were a group of their own. At school in Beirut, the nuns would mock her Palestinian accent. She had opted for marriage with a Lebanese Maronite--a final decision, she felt, to depart from any Palestinian belonging. Her mother still could tell endless stories about Palestine, but she did not want to listen or be contaminated by them. The war had been especially difficult for the family since there was a great fear of being stigmatized as Palestinians by the Christian militias.

At this point in her account, she mentioned that her brother became completely politicized and a member of the PLO. When he died recently of age, there was a big ceremony for him by the PLO; she had been shocked by the public attention her family received then. She did not want to be mentioned in this context or even simply associated with him as a Palestinian. And then, halfway through our interview, she asked to stop—I had made her talk about horrors that still terrified her; it was impossible for her to continue. She now realized that being interviewed had been a mistake. The Christian militias had forced her to adopt a clear-cut identity she loathed. During the war, clarity over the difference between friend and foe defined those to be fought and those to be trusted.

Perhaps her brother had been one of those young men who, were "somewhat lost"—the term used to describe Wadia Haddad by his sister in-law in another interview. They were lost in the sense of lacking a social group to belong to or a representational political structure. The intellectually hungry and ambitious among them were often ready to embrace the Arab nationalism that later turned into a militant Palestinian nationalism.

Wadia was young, born in 1928. He had no family, no responsibility. He and his brothers were studying at AUB in 1948. It hurt him so much to lose his country. He started hijacking planes and made the Palestinian cause famous. Until then, they were just refugees. They were somewhat lost, this generation.

6.6. Between Integration into the Host Country and Loyalty to the National Cause

For the Palestinian middle classes, intermingling with privileged Lebanese and accepting Lebanese nationality did not conflict with their Palestinian background. This was a very different attitude to that of the Palestinians in the camps, for whom seclusion and the inability to gain Lebanese nationality reinforced a sense of transitional status—hence a thirst for return to Palestine. Time and again in my camp visits, I would listen to remarks such as the following, mixing heartfelt sentiment with political sloganeering:

I would never accept Lebanese nationality. I am Palestinian![273]

I live in the camp. I have to be with my people. I want to share their destiny. It is mine as well.[274]

The camp is my home. I have grown up there and I have to be close to the people. Things that matter always happen in the camps.[275]

Such sentiments were very far from those of the bourgeois Palestinian, Greek Orthodox insurance-company general director..

---

[273] Palestinian, male, Sunni, Ain al-Helweh, about 60.

[274] Palestinian, Sunni, doctor, male, about 50, Bourj al-Barajneh camp. He refused to live with his Lebanese wife in her house in Beirut.

[275] Palestinian political activist, male, Sunni, about 50, Beddawi camp.

We lived in Beirut, close to the beach. My parents had many visitors; ministers and other important people were often there for dinner. Our neighbors would congratulate my mother on her prominent guests. All we cared about were parties, movies, girls, and cars. Then suddenly guns and weapons became an issue; war was on the horizon.

At some point, he decided to join the Lion's Club of Beirut. After 1984, the family had to move from West Beirut to the Christian areas, where they made their way within the Lebanese Christian establishment, participating in its welfare activities—in particular an orphanage for Lebanese Christian children founded by Amin Gemayel. At first communion in the monastery where the orphanage was situated, they were delighted by the chance to talk to Gemayel's wife and her entourage. In other words, that Gemayel's Kata'ib party had been fighting ferociously against a Palestinian presence in Lebanon was no obstacle. And seeking engagement with a Palestinian institution instead was unthinkable, incompatible with their social environment. But at the same time, the insurance director would occasionally benefit from business arrangements with the PLO in West Beirut.

Although many middle class Palestinians had developed sympathy for Palestinian nationalist aims, they were nevertheless far more sensitive to Lebanese concern about Palestinian military activities, since they immediately felt the repercussions. Many thus declined any direct support for the cause, preferring to watch from a distance. They often felt insulted by seeing the PLO take their support for granted and felt threatened by Palestinian leftist, anti-capitalist ideology.

The PLO had allies among the poor Palestinian masses. Unfortunately, it became very arrogant. In 1975-76 it took over our land in the south and established a military base there. We weren't allowed to enter. They also confiscated three apartments in a building we owned in Verdun and settled Lebanese families there as a way of dampening the rising resentment of the Lebanese population. My father had always donated money to Palestinian organizations, but I stopped doing that when I found out the money was being squandered. I now donate money to a Shiite welfare organization in Tyre.[276]

Another interviewee, the owner of a beach club in Beirut, expressed reluctance to scare away his clientele by associating with the PLO. He was a Roman Catholic from Haifa, born 1927, who received Lebanese nationality under Beshara al-Khoury in 1950.

[276] Palestinian with Lebanese nationality, Sunni, male, Beirut, 33.

During the time of the PLO, I didn't get involved. No one approached me; I did not approach them. We did not like the way they were controlling the country. After 1976, there were checkpoints everywhere. I did not let any member of the PLO enter the club unless he had been member before. No member of any political party was admitted. In 1958, I refused entrance to the Americans. If I had let in the Palestinians, I would have been stamped a Palestinian myself. That would have scared away my customers. I was extremely selective with my customers. Although I desperately needed money in the beginning, I only gave membership to the elite. It was supposed to be an exclusive club.

More prosperous Palestinians thus often demarcated their social position from both poorer Palestinians and Lebanese, the rise of Palestinian political populism not really corresponding to their own sense of identity. With the middle-class Palestinian refugees in Lebanon succeeding because they had convertible assets, their own collective narratives tend to stress the circumstances of "how we made it". As many of the above interview-citations have suggested, education was a high priority--in sending their children to Lebanese schools rather than the free-of-charge UNRWA schools, they furnished their children with a chance to intermingle with the Lebanese elite.

It is the case that since in 1948 even the middle class Palestinians had assumed they would soon return to Palestine, almost all their bulky belongings of personal value had been left behind. In the camps, the situation was naturally much more extreme, the only material objects that had survived the exodus often being the keys to the dwellings that had been left behind. The keys thus often served as the camp dwellers' symbols of return, as well as indicators of a former status from which self-esteem could be drawn. Keys, however, were rarely mentioned by the middle class Palestinians; other objects were mentioned: a fur coat, a radio, photographs of lost property—any items encapsulating the difference between what had been theirs and what could be theirs again.

Since the middle classes could not rely on the potential of ownership, they immediately put all their efforts into creating a material wealth that would allow retention of social position. Coming from the urbanized areas of Palestine, they easily integrated into the urban economy developing in Beirut. The Lebanese commercial sectors, and in particular foreign companies, were ready to employ skilled Palestinians, who knew English, in contrast to the French speaking Lebanese. [277] Palestinians

[277]Smith, 1984. p. 124.

who had formerly worked in petroleum companies in Palestine were able to work with the Lebanese oil companies such as the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had built a second pipeline to Tripoli.[278] In this manner, educated Palestinians contributed to Lebanon becoming one of the most important trading centers of the Arab world. They settled—after a period of reorientation and recuperation—in the areas of Hamra and Ras Beirut, where many wealthier migrants from throughout the Arab world already lived. Known for their cosmopolitan ambiance, these areas were close to the American University, where the Palestinians enrolled or taught.[279]

For the social and confessional reasons outlined above, not all bourgeois Lebanese appreciated this development. The concrete fear was basically of a Palestinian network emerging in certain economic sectors, especially banking, to threaten the closely knit Lebanese political-financial network. With Beirut having become the financial center of the Arab Middle East, managing transactions between the Gulf and the oil-consuming countries, the question of who ran the banking sector was crucial.[280]

The Lebanese have always looked down on other Arabs; it was like this in the 50s and 60s. While the rich Iraqis, Egyptians, Syrians, and Palestinians who fled their countries after various upheavals brought money and knowledge, the Lebanese thought it was their genius that had accomplished everything. They have always had something against the Palestinians.

I became Lebanese in 1956 under Chamoun. When I applied to work for a bank in 1962, Palestinians with Lebanese passports told me not to mention my origins. The Lebanese at that time were complaining that too many Palestinians were working in the banking sector. The banking director, an Englishman, asked me, in a way that let me know he didn't mind Palestinians: Have you always lived in Lebanon?

The Lebanese destroyed the Intra-bank, wanting Palestinians to stay in the camps. Still, there were many banks owned by Palestinians-- it was only natural for Palestinians to enter the banking sector. When Lebanese got educated, they often continued living off their lands, or else they would enter their fathers' businesses. The Palestinians had nothing like that, so they went to work in banks or in the big foreign companies.[281]

---

[278] Thicknesse, 1949. p. 45.

[279] Cf. Samir Khalaf/Per Kongstad. Hamra of Beirut. A case of rapid urbanization. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973. p. 112.

[280] On inter-communal dynamics in the Hamra district, see ibid., p. 113.

[281] Lebanese of Palestinian origin from Haifa, Protestant, female, about 55, Beirut.

The tinge of resentment in this interviewee's statement points, in fact, to a mutuality of prejudice between many middle class Lebanese and Palestinians. To some extent, the Palestinians felt that Beirut was not as culturally advanced as the Palestinian coastal cities had been. They tended to look down on Lebanese society, viewing it as having only begun to develop into what they had possessed long before.

My mother told me how disappointed her family had been when they arrived in Lebanon. Nightlife was not as sophisticated as it had been in Jaffa or Haifa. Lebanon at that time was a poor country-it only became rich when the oil money came. And in the beginning there was basically no one, some feudal families and a couple of nouveaux-riches![282]

Khalidi points out, that Palestinians arrived when Lebanon was restructuring its economy after the termination of economic unity with Syria in 1950.[283] Lebanon thus benefited from the incoming capital and skilled labor. Considered dispassionately, Palestinians were in fact largely responsible for the economic growth Lebanon saw in the 1950s and 1960s—growth thus due to the creation of the Israeli State. In contrast, however, to the situation in Jordan, where the contribution of the Palestinian refugees to the economy and institutions was generally acknowledged, in Jordan, the Palestinian contribution to Lebanon's economic boom was at times ignored, at times resented. The camp inhabitants, potentially a source of cheep labor, were of course treated as an aesthetic and social scandal, *tout simple*.

Analyzing Lebanon's economic development since 1950, Gates notes the influx of both skilled and unskilled Palestinian labor, the transfer of capital and companies, and the arrival of the International Petroleum Company. She also notes the large amount of financial support for the refugees from international aid organizations.[284] She points out that only 22 percent of Lebanese land was cultivated in 1946—too little for the country to be self-sufficient, meaning it had to import agricultural goods.[285] It was only in 1948/49 when private investments improved the technical means for agricultural production leading to an increase in fruit

[282]Owner of real estate, Beirut, Palestinian parents, male, Lebanese nationality, 32.
[283]Walid Khalidi. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East. Harvard: Center for International Affairs, 1979. p. 37.
[284]Carolyn L. Gates. The Merchant Republic of Lebanon. Rise of an Open Economy. London: I.B.Tauris, 1998. p. 95.
[285]Ibid, p. 45.

production that it became economically important. Although no direct relation with the influx of Palestinian refugees to southern Lebanon in that period is drawn; the timely coincidence seems striking.[286] And Seguin, in contrast to earlier studies claiming that the agricultural sector of Lebanon was unable to integrate the Palestinian refugees economically,[287] likewise stresses that their cheap labor contributed to Lebanon's agricultural areas in the south near Sidon and Tyre, in the Beqaa next to Baalbak, and close to Tripoli in the north: because many Palestinians preferred working as black-market labor in order to cash in their UNRWA rations, Lebanese patrons could without hesitation, lower their salaries significantly.[288]

Lebanese fears that access to relevant markets was being limited by Palestinian monopolies began to be openly voiced once Palestinians began to establish links with the Lebanese *zu'ama,* indispensable for business expansion. In setting the groundwork for such contacts and promoting Palestinian business ventures in various ways, Emile Boustani—mentioned earlier as the army general who signed the Cairo Agreement—played a central role. Boustani was himself a Lebanese Maronite entrepreneur who had emigrated to Palestine from Great Britain after studying engineering there, returning to Lebanon after 1948. Both as a member of parliament (1951) and public works and planning minister (1956), he repeatedly called for Palestinian integration for the sake of social stability.[289] Boustani, however, died in an air crash before running for the Lebanese presidency - for many Palestinians part of a conspiracy to thwart their prospects throughout the Arab world.

The most prominent Palestinian tycoon in Lebanon was Youssef Baydas, who ruled an economic empire at the center of which was the Intra-Bank—the largest financial institution in Lebanon.[290] Baydas transformed Lebanon's banking system to fulfill the needs of the regional oil industry. A significant number of Lebanese deputies was assumed to be on his payroll,[291] and for this and related reasons he seemed destined to becoming an increasingly powerful figure in Lebanon. While it appears that Baydas was of Palestinian origin, he had Lebanese nationality and for a long time this was not an issue. When Shafiq al-Hout tried to raise funds for the PLO in 1964, he called upon Baydas for support. Shortly

---

[286]Ibid., p. 133f.
[287] Thicknesse, 1949.
[288]Jacques Seguin. Le Liban-Sud. Espace périphérique, espace convoité. Paris. Editions Harmattan, 1989. p. 69.
[289]Smith, 1984, p. 136.
[290]ibid., p. 133.
[291]For this and the following: interview with Shafiq al-Hout, 13.2.1998.

afterwards he received a visit from the Lebanese secret service, who asked him if the Palestinians were starting to impose taxes on the Lebanese.

And yet only two years later, articles appeared "exposing" Baydas as a Palestinian. In 1966, Intra-Bank collapsed when it failed to prove liquidity, although its assets far exceeded its liabilities. The background of the crash and the different actors involved was never completely cleared up. According to Smith, several interests collaborated in bringing down the bank: those of the Arab Gulf states, the West, and Lebanon itself. The Gulf states had wished to shift oil money from Lebanon to the Western markets because of more profitable investments, the sudden high financial withdrawals thus threatening the bank's liquidity. At the same time, the Lebanese central bank failed to cover the subsequent lack of liquidity, declaring the bank bankrupt in 1967.[292] Although the failure of Intra Bank was due to its general policy of high investment, it seems that the bank was also let down because of a power struggle in the Lebanese banking sector.[293]

According to Palestinians who were involved in the failure, it resulted from the Maronite elite wishing to expand into commercial Beirut, which until then was the territory of mainly Sunni and Greek-Orthodox merchants. Several well-known Maronites were in fact planning to enter the financial sector, among them the family of the wife of the Lebanese president at the time, Charles al-Helou. In interviews and conversations with me, many Palestinians thus voiced the opinion that an alliance of Lebanese feudal lords destroyed the Intra Bank: while Christians were the active parties, others had agreed to distance the economic sector from Palestinian influence. In any event, the crash of Intra Bank resulted in the dissolution of fourteen Lebanese banks, a pair of other banks having to merge. But strikingly, Palestinians with Lebanese nationality still owned the important banks in Lebanon, e.g. the Arab Bank, Bank al-Ittihad al-Aamal, and Bank Beirut li-Tijara.

In Lebanon, economic interests were tacitly and actively defined in terms of the interests of specific communities, namely the families of the elite. This elite was able to legitimate its self-serving strategies through an ideology claiming to secure the power base of the community as a whole. The Maronite elite staved off the threat of internal class strife by a cohesive extreme nationalist ideology, one constantly evoking the spectre of cultural destruction through Moslem Arabs. Such sentiments

[292]See Smith, 1984. pp. 140 ff.
[293] Oral communication, Palestinian professor of economics, Jerusalemite notable family.

undoubtedly pushed forward the determined Maronite effort to secure access to resources for distribution among its clientele.

It is significant that the Union of Banks (*jama'iyat al-massarif*) organized itself according to the political power division: the director's position was reserved for a Maronite. When Anis Bibi's Palestinian Greek-Orthodox background became public knowledge, he himself was forced to step down as head of the organization, again despite his Lebanese citizenship. Despite the fact that most middle class Palestinians in Lebanon had been naturalized by the middle of the 1960s, they were still identified as primarily loyal to their Palestinian community. The resulting inhibition of cohesive development may partly explain the lack of exchange between the Palestinian middle class and those in the camps. It also certainly plays a role in the reluctance of Palestinian employers, nearly all holding Lebanese or Jordanian passports, to have a disproportionately high number of Palestinians working for them: it simply would attract excessive attention.

6.7. The Concept of Origin in a Competitive Environment

Resentment against Palestinian communal links, seen as a corporate body or network of clients making inroads into the Lebanese society and economy, ultimately necessitated a way of singling Palestinians out—a distinguishing mark or moment of stigmatization. Accent represented such a stigma. It may be the only cultural difference between Palestinians and Lebanese in general. The reality of social heterogeneity notwithstanding, all basic tenets of social order and communication were actually shared with the Arab people neighboring Palestine.

For Palestinians, however, accent marks both a distinction between themselves and the Lebanese and, when spoken among each other, an affirmation of commonality and familiarity. Still used in the second, third or fourth generation, it has become a political statement—an expression of the will to constitute a separate group.

With escalation of the war between the Kata'ib militia and Palestinian fighters in 1975 and the emergence of checkpoints dividing the city, accent became one of the main keys to checking identity. Regardless of political, confessional, social, and economic background, Palestinians were now threatened in their own neighborhoods. To identify Palestinians, those manning the checkpoints often asked passers-by to

pronounce the Arabic word for "tomato," the Lebanese pronunciation being "bandura," the Palestinian "banadura".

I remember how my mother was terrified to leave the house - we were living in Ashrafieh. She still spoke with a Palestinian accent. So for hours each night we practiced pronouncing "bandura".[294]

Discrimination by accent hits at the heart of social communication, identity becoming obvious at the first moment of verbal interaction. The resulting threat of stigmatization can produce a social muteness.

A couple of weeks ago I was invited to a Ramadan dinner at the prime minister's residence. The guests being invited to ask questions, I was going to join in but then suddenly felt afraid that they would all recognize my Palestinian accent. So I didn't say anything.[295]

My daughter had serious difficulties in school. She started to stutter and could not speak correctly anymore. She was afraid because of her Palestinian accent—it was a Lebanese school.[296]

For those hostile to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the Palestinian Arabic accent was equated with a collective political identity antagonistic to Lebanese national interests. Those Palestinians who did not want to be identified with the Palestinian nationalist movement and its political and military program had difficulties in extricating themselves from the equation—this especially the case with the PLO representing the main vehicle for internal solidarity.

There was in any case one source of unity running through Palestinian society stronger than political nationalism or collective consciousness—the ties of kinship. While at least for the middle classes acting according to principles of Western economics and civil democracy was looked on positively, in situations of conflict or tension the tendency was still to rely on kinship relations. Many professions required a respectable family before considering an applicant's record preceding one's own initiation in terms of experience, financial and material resources, and social and political connections. Heads of families integrated sons and sons-in-law into their businesses.

---

[294] Lebanese academic, daughter of a Lebanese father and Palestinian mother, 37. Int
[295] Palestinian Sunni university professor, about 60, male, former notable family.
[296] Palestinian Sunni political representative, male, Beirut.

For both social interaction in general and—business being conducted within a comparatively weak judicial framework—economic transactions in particular, who to be able to trust, and who not to trust, was an essential criterion in Lebanon. In such circumstances, the possibility of being cheated by someone within the kin group seemed less likely. Nevertheless, the overriding Lebanese *and* Palestinian criterion for deciding group affiliation remained *asl,* "origin," denoting an entire complex of shared social, economic, political, and genealogical identities. Since Palestinians were ascribed a common "origin," they were assumed to form a power group that was distinct and self-contained.

Importantly, the homogenizing Lebanese perception of the Palestinians did not have a precise counterpart among the Palestinians themselves, since their social and institutional networks were not fully synchronized with a sense of commonality through exile. As indicated, neither this sense nor kinship ties ever fully crossed class barriers or achieved the cohesive strength of the Lebanese patronage networks, the Palestinian community thus remaining largely divided.

For a time, Palestinians, especially from lower social strata, did benefit from institutionally structured communal power. The PLO, in fact, established what the Palestinian bourgeoisie was accused of attempting; a network of far-ranging institutions allowing it a major role within Lebanese politics. Ironically, that bourgeoisie would then inevitably be identified with the political program of the PLO. Some middle class Palestinians, profiting economically from the PLO's influence, came to support its ideology. Others maintained a critical distance. For its part, the PLO did not need to rely on the bourgeoisie.

In response to their experience of prejudice, suspicion, and abuse, many Palestinians from various backgrounds eventually ended up embracing a highly politicized, nationalist identity; for others, it simply amounted to a trauma not to be talked of, the source of undesired attention. Wishing to avoid identification with a political Palestinian collectivity, they did their best to hide their identifying features, overtly embracing a Lebanese identity instead. Often, personal historical pasts had to be erased. But with the social environment insisting on the stigma, avoiding its presence was anything but easy.

One individual I interviewed who epitomized what could sometimes amount to a Palestinian ordeal of identity was a 36 year old journalist and author related to the head of one of the Palestinian parties. *Moi, je ne suis pas un palestinien!* he stated at the interview's beginning. In part, his account seemed to contradict the statement.

Palestine is a personal story. I only remembered Palestine when my father died and I began to write his story. It was the first time I ever mentioned the city of Haifa in something I wrote. Palestine used to be something in my mind that did not exist. I don't know the camps. I speak like a Beiruti. There was a time when I thought I was not an Arab: that I was closer to Europe. Only since Oslo have I started to like the Palestinian accent. When I was fourteen or fifteen I wrote an article entitled something like: "I am a Palestinian and why I don't want to return."

We lived in my grandfather's house close to the headquarters of the party that headed by his cousin's son. My mother is a Lebanese Maronite. My father was still living in Mar Elias camp when they got to know each other. Her father did not reject my father because he was a Palestinian. I used to love going to the camp in the early days, there were trees and gardens, no politburos. Despite the fact that I was growing up in the center of the Palestinian revolution, in Mazraa, I was not interested. I was interested only in literature. I read literature during the war or I played football.

Because of my family name, I'm expected to be involved. When I wrote a critical article about Fidel Castro, one of the party leaders asked me how someone with my family name could write such an article. I was asked to join the Palestinian Association of Journalists but I refused. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, the Lebanese Forces caught us. But we had a wasta, a connection, so we got off free.

What I never liked was the collective memory. To me, only the individual memory is relevant. My own story is that of the Lebanese civil war. My family name keeps me involved. It was my father's dream to return. But he became Lebanese and married a Lebanese. He thought about the future of his children. Being a Palestinian was the food, the accent. Today I am a Lebanese who is interested in the Palestinian cause like other Lebanese. I never wanted to have an identity as a refugee. I wanted to be myself and develop my own style.

7. Kinship as a Form of Integration

7.1. Who is going to marry whom?

Within Lebanese Arab society, primordial identity is defined in terms of belonging to a specific genealogical group—one that in turn confines individuals to certain patterns of identity and political, economic, and social behavior. At this time, this genealogical principle has its extension in definitions of belonging based on confessional group or nation. Fundamental here is defining a common origin—an ancestor, a founder of a religion, a locality, a territory. Crucially, none of these concepts of belonging is absolute, all depend on the perspective at play in the classification. Blood ties may be undermined by ideologies that attribute more importance to socially defined ties like class. Territorial belonging may vary according to the definition of the territory. Confessional ties may be limited or enlarged depending on the non-religious interests at stake in defining the group's boundaries.

In their discrimination against Palestinians, Lebanese thus consider the Palestinians as part of an antagonistic group defined by territorial, cultural, historical, and genealogical affiliation. For those Palestinians wishing to resist such a definition, an important option was to become part of a Lebanese endogamous group through intermarriage. As such in-laws, Palestinians were automatically drawn into the Lebanese system of reciprocity, power, and influence. But that Palestinians and Lebanese intermarry does not mean that Palestinians have been generally accepted as Lebanese in-laws.

The main Palestinian social event centered on genealogy is, of course, the wedding ritual. Weddings are occasions for displaying social status—in part through the celebration arrangements, mainly through presentation of the newly established kinship link. As descent in the Arab world is defined through the paternal line and most often with reference to the paternal village, it is the bride's identity that is meant to become identical with that of the groom. As the mother of his offspring, she must conform to the habitus of her husband's family, especially as she now represents its genealogical history. Her personality, her social contacts, her outward appearance, her way of speaking, will be carefully monitored. The marriage partner is thus an issue for the whole family. The criteria of preference were voiced to me in a highly general way: *She has to be one of us. - Badna wahida minna,* basically signifying "one of the paternal line". Choosing the bride from that line secures the highest

measure of social identity,[1] the dowry confirming stability through economic exchange between the families. With divorce, the dowry is lost when the bride returns to her family.

The preference given to the patrilineal cross cousin, i.e. the paternal uncle's daughter, meant the closest form of social proximity possible while still respecting the incest taboo. But there is a functional aspect to this preferred kinship relation. Whereas the taboo means expanding the basic reproductive unit's kinship ties and consequently reinforcing a system of exchange, the value of social closeness again underlines the core structure of this society, the genealogical relationship. With the exchange system forming the basic social structure, it is in the interest of all to establish a widespread net of connections, thus increasing social influence. Only a large family will have secure, loyal, and diversified relations, with every member having privileged access to services. Hence the greater the number and influence of its members, the more often they tend to be related to each other by kinship ties, and the greater the likelihood of their recognition as a power group within the wider social context.

The principle of proximity as a criterion for choosing the marriage partner is itself relative. Closeness can be understood in the genealogical sense. In addition, it can also mean equality of economic and social status, or identity of either confession or religious habitus. Ideally, all criteria should be fulfilled. Equality of social status means the offspring would have a clear identity. Inversely, an asymmetrical match endangers that identity, as it became unclear to which side it should be aligned, although in such cases the paternal side usually takes precedence. Preferably, a socially equitable match emphasizes existing characteristics. Compatibility depends on a family's self-understanding and social context—these varying according to class, confession, and geographical area.

7.2. Genealogical Purity, the Ideal Match, and its Pitfalls

The criteria for an auspicious match extend beyond considerations of social and economic adequacy; the dogma of genealogical purity extends through manifold aspects of marriage, revealing itself in one realm in particular: the bride must be a virgin. As already indicated in

[1] I have chosen to focus on the perspective of the family of the prospective groom, since it is the relevant perspective for integration into one's own lineage. Criteria for the bride's family differed slightly, the economic potential of the groom being central: Is he able to support the girl in an appropriate manner?

chapter 2, virginity and absolute faithfulness are the fundamental preconditions for a "pure" lineage. As is to be expected, wedlock is the only acceptable institution for genealogical reproduction. Purity before wedlock augurs faithfulness, itself the guarantee of a pure genealogy—of clear and legitimate patrilineal descent.

Heavily reinforced by stigma and exclusion from social life and defining the sexual economy, this ideology has serious consequences for the code of behavior of Palestinian girls and women and affected various dimensions of practical life. For instance, the offspring of illegal sexual activity, the bastard, is without recognized identity or affiliation as long as he is not recognized by the father and legitimated by wedlock.

If the restrictions placed on female sexuality help to ensure purity of the lineage, then male virility and unrestricted sexuality demonstrate that lineage's strength. Consequently, where female promiscuity is condemned, male promiscuity is accepted, hierarchical values resolving the apparent contradiction.

It is common for unmarried Palestinian men from the privileged classes to maintain an empty apartment, often shared with brothers and cousins, as a place to take "girl-friends". To be sure, their parents are not supposed to know about their adventures. Those who cannot afford such luxury have to be more inventive, using cars. When referring to such mores in interviews, they would often, they stress that the girl they would marry would have other than erotic qualities—never a central criterion when seriousness is in order. Correspondingly, the young men tended to assert that their choice would not be guided by their drives but by the prospects for a secure and auspicious future.

All choices contrary to the socially acceptable indicating weakness, the socially unacceptable match is viewed as a result of the male not controlling his sexual desires. The sexual economy is thus regulated by the imperative of reproducing in terms of the reproduction of the genealogical lineage according to accepted values. Within this system love is meant to mediate the difference between pure and impure relations; it does not necessarily represent a subversion of the dominant discourse, only taking on this role when merging with erotic feelings and desires.

I used to have this lover. She would come over once or twice a week. This continued even when I met my wife. But it was clear from the first that the girl I would marry would be decent. The other one I couldn't talk

with, she was only there for sex; with the one I'm with now I can talk about everything.[2]
When I saw her, my first thought was that I wanted to hug her. I did not think of having sex with her at all. Then I knew that I really had fallen in love with the girl at first sight.[3]

For their part, girls aspire to social advantage and economic stability as central goals in choosing a husband. This reflects the reality of social position being defined by the husband's status. However, obvious expression of such aims is vulgar. A main obligation of the girl is to nurture and make manifest pure and uncalculating sentiments concerning her future husband—his character and kindness. While in general, it appears easier for women to marry upwards, the fact that sexual desire as a basis for marriage is aligned with weakness means that upwardly mobile women are treated with reservation or even long-term hostility.

In arranging for marriage it is important for girls to present a charming appearance and a range of authentic feelings; the men have to present themselves as economically potent. Both sides maintain skepticism when first meeting, since self-representation could be false. The girls and their families will try to find out about the man's family--its social position and economic capacity. Of course, it is always possible to read the most obvious signs, like cars, clothes, watches, mobile telephones. But it is very easy to create false impressions through rented status symbols; therefore, inquiries are in order. In general, care is shown about trusting the seriousness of the young man, since the girls are aware that their reputation will be damaged by showing interest, agreeing to a closer relation, and then being refused.

I don't know, but among my friends, there have been several cases of guys taking out girls and then just letting them down suddenly. They come and check if she is willing to get engaged and then suddenly they decide to change their minds.[4]

In the beginning, I thought he was the one I wanted to marry. We got along quite well. He owned a large house worth a lot of money. He was the son of a famous politician. However, I began to realize after a short time, that after our engagement his reputation increased while mine deteriorated. They congratulated him but they wondered why I wanted to

[2]Palestinian, male, Sunni, 27, from Beirut, shop clerk.
[3] Sunni Beiruti, male, 30, architect.
[4] Palestinian, female, Bourj al-Barajneh, 24, accountant.

marry someone like him. In the end, I could not stand the situation anymore. I felt very uncomfortable with the relationship because I was losing my social status the longer it went on. This finally resulted in the breaking of our engagement.[5]

After I bought my new car, the number of phone calls of girls who wanted to go out with me suddenly increased by four hundred per cent![6]

I know that when I meet a girl from my background and she's interested, she'll immediately go around to ask about my family: how rich we are and if we own property or land.[7]

Whatever doubts are generated by a lack of economic symmetry between the prospective marriage partners, these doubts can be overcome if other criteria are met such as most pointedly, the retention of genealogical charisma. This can be conveyed through local, national, or even transnational memory—historical narratives or informal, local ones, either connected to central events or remembered in stories repeated in social circles. The fact that the overwhelming majority of streets in Beirut are named after members of the city's bourgeoisie or national politicians reflects a social policy of locating personalities and families within an enduring mnemonic context. Here genealogy has become intertwined with geographical space. Temporal depth of genealogy was an essentially constituting element of life for both the urban middle class and feudal aristocracy. Its range of influence and socio-economic potential has its concrete expression in inherited property. Within this framework, a "good family" is a family with many generations behind it; a lack of such temporal depth—and subsequent social insignificance—is addressed by the statement "we don't really know who they are."

When entering a social gathering, mentioning one's family name is essential. Members of reputable families do not miss any occasion to point out their background, which is presented with a sense of pride and natural relevance. While the elite is thus secure in a hierarchy separate from social newcomers, the lower social strata maintains its own family narratives, however extending beyond an immediate social circle. A family might be known in a certain village but not in the next one. In contrast, a landowning family or a family that had been present in public

[5] Shiite, female, 33, well-known religious family, Beirut.
[6] Maronite from Metn, 23, male, mechanic.
[7] Sunni Beiruti, male, 30, architect.

urban life over several generations would always be much more widely known.

7.3. Palestinian-Lebanese Intermarriage: Varying Contexts

Palestinian refugees encountered considerable obstacles when wanting to become accepted as potential in-laws by Lebanese families. Having left the environment where genealogical memories were conserved, their descent and socially relevant information had become inchoate. Only those who had established social links before 1948 could count on recognition of their former social status. Some families who continued to enjoy a transnational reputation, such as members of the Jerusalem aristocracy whose family names were renowned in Lebanese society, were exceptions. This was sometimes crucial for them as their economic situation often did not live up to their social status.

When a Palestinian origin was not being hidden, black and white photographs of family life in Palestine frequently documented the past. There were other important tokens. When I visited my Greek-Catholic Palestinian interviewee from Haifa, I noticed how important it was for him to show me a written record of all the relevant family names in Haifa. How else could he have proved to me beyond doubt that he came from a bourgeois family? He also showed me some of his family's good furniture, transferred from one of their Jerusalem houses via Jordan after 1948. Affecting their sense of honor, a widespread inability of middle-class Palestinians to prove themselves respectable became an issue in attempted intermarriage with the Lebanese. Conflicts over intermarriage between members of the Palestinian and Lebanese bourgeoisie with identical confessional backgrounds occurred because the Palestinians not display an equally prominent *local* range of reputation. Palestinian girls would often thus be seen as aspiring arrivistes. Nevertheless, other Lebanese did view members of the Palestinian middle class in a far more positive light. The acceptance of Palestinians as in-laws thus depended on whether they were seen as people with whom one shared similar interests and characteristics or as strangers with obscure origins and alien habits.

I want my children to marry Lebanese. Palestinians are fine, but they have different customs. The mother-in-law would try to dominate. I don't want my daughter to live under such conditions. They think differently. The mother-in-law would insist on how things are supposed to be done.

Of course, some are educated and have gone to university. There are not many suitable Palestinians. My husband's brother married a Palestinian, but her mother is Lebanese. And her father is from Jerusalem - a city. I want my in-laws to be like us. They have different customs. They stick together. I want my grandchildren to be Lebanese. I also want them to marry from Sidon, not Beirut. There I know the families. It is better. All social activities happen within the family. One has to get along with them. I want them to stay in Sidon. Most Palestinians go to the Emirates. We are closed concerning families. My husband's aunt married my uncle; my sister married my husband's brother. But when my nephew wanted to get married, I told them about the daughter of friends of ours. They are a good and nice family. We've known them for a long time. They're Palestinians with Lebanese passports. I did not tell him that they were Palestinians but that they had a good daughter.[8]

Palestinians might have similar reservations about their daughters marrying Lebanese men.

My mother wants me to marry a Palestinian. I'm expected to. They would feel more comfortable about it. We have shared the same destiny. We're well off now but we used to come from the camp and still have family there. A Lebanese family may not understand. My mother is afraid that I'd be treated disrespectfully. They consider it normal to marry a Palestinian.[9]

Those Lebanese who had entered elite social circles through becoming rich in the first generation, the so-called nouveaux-riches, tended to be more conscious about their in-laws than others. They generally preferred marrying into the local Lebanese middle class rather than a Palestinian with, as they saw it, less stable status. The views of Ahmad, a Sunni Beiruti around 30 years of age, whose father had become wealthy during the war, expressed such a standpoint. During our interview, he asked an employee in his newly opened shop to buy two pairs of Versace jeans from the shop next door—a rather transparent effort to give me an impression of the amount of money he was able to spend at random.

We are more civilized than the Palestinians are. We built our own country. We graduate from our own universities. In the Gulf, relations between Palestinians and Lebanese are not good. Palestinians know

[8] Sunni from Sidon, female, housewife, about 55.
[9] Palestinian, Sunni, female, accountant, 24, Beirut.

that the only ones able to compete with them are the Lebanese. Palestinians should go back to Palestine. We can't have them staying here. We are a small people and I'd like to stay small.

My grandmother married a Palestinian when my grandfather died. He's a chairman of a big bank. I can't speak about politics with him; he'll always be with his cause, like all Palestinians. Because they don't have land, they envy us. They like to group together and speak in their dialect. They like to show how Lebanese they are and how integrated into Lebanese society they have become.

Once I was introduced to a Palestinian of high rank. I mentioned my name. He replied in a rude tone so that everybody around could hear: Who? What family? I was boiling with anger. Who was he to speak like that? They came here with nothing and we gave them food and shelter. They were nothing but farmers. How could he dare ask for my name like that?

They are la'im. That is what we say about them. They are like the gold that disappears when you scratch it. There are no good Palestinian families. They're so arrogant but they don't have real class. I'd never marry a Palestinian. The woman I marry has to be classy. She has to know how to talk and how to dress. The Palestinians hurt us too much. How can one of them be the mother of my children? Palestinian girls have less of a sense of honor than Lebanese girls.

Everyone in a group of middle class Sunni women of Palestinian origin I spoke to in an organization selling Palestinian embroidery admitted to great difficulties becoming accepted into their husband's families at the beginning. They all felt stigmatized as not belonging to one of the well-known Beirut Sunni families. Nevertheless, it seemed that they had become well integrated—they felt uninhibited enough to show open solidarity with Palestinians in the camps through their organization, and all received support from their husbands. They expressed pride in receiving an order for a wedding dress from one of the wealthiest Palestinian families living in Greece, the al-Sabaghs.

The Palestinian middle classes continued to maintain widespread links throughout the Arab world through family members and in-laws. Some families kept a sense of interlinkage through inter-familial marriages over generations, thus reproducing a particular Palestinian sense of belonging and the coherence of an endogamous group.

Yes, there is a lot of intermarriage between the Haddad, Sabagh, and Khoury. They are all Catholic. We are always invited to the big weddings and funerals. We receive invitations from Kuwait, Greece, the Gulf, Canada.[10]

Some of my uncles went to Britain after 1948. They were well educated. My father went to Iraq to work for a petroleum company. He was a computer pioneer. He came back to Lebanon briefly to get married to a Palestinian. This is how it goes in the Middle East—you marry someone from your people because you feel more related to them, more comfortable.[11]

The regrouping of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in Hamra and Ras Beirut enhanced Palestinian social life and inter-familial marriage was frequent. Many of those born between 1930 and 1940 married Palestinians who were very often distant relatives or cousins. Others decided to marry a Lebanese in order to throw off the refugee image and become part of Lebanese society. Samia, 40, a Sunni Palestinian, grew up in Bourj al-Barajneh. Her marriage to a Lebanese Sunni from Beirut was informed by common political activities in Palestinian and Lebanese leftist parties. Both had emancipated themselves from conservative family structures.

My father worked for UNRWA, and the family managed to leave the camp. He was a member of the Syrian Socialist National Party murdered by the maktab al-thani in 1962.[12] *I was 5 years old. My brothers took care of me—one of them let me read Simone de Beauvoir and Lenin and Nawal Saadawi.*[13] *When I was seventeen I started training with Fatah and was put in charge of a girl's group. I got to know my husband at school, a Lebanese high school. We had the same ideas and were both politically active.*

I decided that I would opt for my future husband over my mother and uncles, and refused to have a dowry paid for me. I didn't want the shabka, *the jewelry that the bride traditionally receives from the groom. A woman has a certain role among Palestinians. She has to cook, clean, take care of the children, and always has to be ready for sex when he wants it. It's shameful to refuse. I didn't want to hand out the bed-sheet*

---

[10] Lebanese of Palestinian origin, female married to a Palestinian with Lebanese passport, 55, Beirut.

[11] Daughter of above interviewee, about 30, Beirut.

[12] The SSNP attempted a coup d'état in 1961.

[13] Contemporary Egyptian author whose novels and other writings deal with the repression of women in the Arab world.

after the marriage-night when visitors come to congratulate the family. I didn't want my family to impose any conditions on his family. But my brothers insisted on a certain amount of money paid in case of divorce.

Hisham's father was dead—he had been a Nasserite. They were well-off middle-class people and owned a garage near the airport. When we wanted to get married, his uncle was disappointed: You want to marry a Palestinian from the camp? Hisham told him to go and visit the camps. He would see how educated Palestinians are; they read Mahfuz and Einstein. His mother did not mind. She was only worried that he might leave me before the katab al-kitab, *the writing of the wedding contract. It would have been shameful.*

Ghina, 25, a Sunni Palestinian who returned to Lebanon from the Gulf with her parents in the late 1990s, had also refused a prearranged marriage. She was born in Tariq al-Jedideh, a popular Sunni area in Beirut, her family originally coming from a village close to Acca. They were small merchants but had brought cash with them and had been able to open a laundry. They had spent some time in the Shatila camp.

When one of my father's brothers wanted to marry a Lebanese woman, it was a big problem. They wanted him to marry a Palestinian. When my father was supposed to get married, he asked around. My mother did not want to marry him. His family was very conservative and my mother had a strong character. She often is consulted when there are problems in the family. My mother started crying when she heard about the engagement. But her mother told her: 'aayb!--*shame on you. It was not easy. Since I refused a traditional marriage my parents don't receive people asking for me at home.*

My family follows a particular Sufi religious group led by a Shaykh called Sina from Acca. My father's side is very traditional and refused Lebanese citizenship. My mother's side does not care and her brothers and sisters married Lebanese. They will forget Palestine.

I now realize that sharing the same background is very important. I was seeing this person, a Lebanese, but I could not share my Palestinian emotions with him. He never understood my Palestinian passion. Now I am seeing someone who is actively engaged in Palestinian issues. It is important that he is from the same country, from Palestine, and from the same religion.

Intermarriage between Palestinians and Lebanese has not only taken place within but also between confessions, particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut. But relations complicated after the war of the camps.

I'll never be able to like them. It would be impossible for me to marry a Shiite after what they did to us. My parents never would agree. They want me to marry a Palestinian.[14]

Muhammad, a 29 year old Palestinian Sunni from the Bourj al-Barajneh camp, owned a small garage. He married a Shiite girl from the neighborhood but she left him soon after their first child was born.

She said she couldn't stand living in the camp. I wanted to know why she hadn't thought about it earlier. Girls here want to get away from their families, where they're locked in. They want to get married so they can get out. They don't really think about what it means. She wanted to get married quickly and have fun. When she found out that life after marriage was not quite as she had expected, she went back to her parents.

Her family had accepted him. They were from Tariq al-Jedideh, a Sunni working class district of Beirut. What mattered was that he was a Sunni—they did not mind him being a Palestinian. At the same time, his friend, a Lebanese Shiite from Baalbak, had asked for her sister, but they refused. They preferred him as a Sunni Palestinian to someone from Baalbak—people from that area being feared for their tribal ties and grim, tough conservative morals.

Recently a Shaykh from Hizballah asked for me. But I refused, I told my parents that I did not want to live like that. I would have had to veil myself. ... I am a Palestinian and I would never want to become Lebanese.[15]

Six months later, this interviewee accepted a Shiite Lebanese who owned two stores. After she met him three times, the engagement was fixed. Several of her aunts had married Shiite Lebanese, and her brother had been in love with a Shiite girl for a long time, meeting secretly because her family did not accept him. He said it was because of his

[14] Sunni Palestinian, female, 24, accountant, Bourj al-Barajneh.

[15] Sunni Palestinian, female, 22, Bourj al-Barajneh, student of sociology at the Lebanese University.

Palestinian refugee status. However, it became clear soon after that the rejection was based on the difference in social standards between the two families--her own income was double his. On the one hand, being Palestinian could serve as an excuse for other shortcomings such as being relatively poor or unsuccessful. On the other hand, insecurity about the future and working restrictions limited the possibility for Palestinian men without a Lebanese passport to be accepted by potential Lebanese in-laws.

Intermarriage between Lebanese and Palestinians has occurred at all times and at all levels. Proximity in social, economic and even political terms has surely facilitated relations in the frames of acceptability. However, Palestinians may feel that they have been particularly scrutinized for social and economic compatibility and that existence of a common political or ideological ground with the Lebanese community they intermarried with has greatly eased the match. Inversely, a deterioration of the status of Palestinians in terms social credibility because of political antagonistic developments, and increased neglect to access institutional resources for Palestinians inevitably leading to increased economic deprivation, has for obvious reasons not been conducive for intermarriage.

Intermarriage has surely constituted a means of integration into the Lebanese fabric for Palestinians. Yet, this did not automatically lead to the dilution of Palestinian identities. The Palestinian side of the match has been enhanced, accepted or submerged according to general political circumstances and the respective spouses' social and economic status as well as his or her individual inclination to emphasize or hide the Palestinian background.

Epilogue

The formation of a distinct Palestinian community with a civil image has not taken place in Lebanon after all. Since 1982, Palestinian institutions have only been allowed inside the camps. Those existing outside in civic fields operated illegally. Absence of an active network of such institutions was a central obstacle to the emergence of a distinct Palestinian community—something in any event not fitting, as we have seen, into the basic Lebanese socio-political pattern.

A liberalization of Lebanese politics, an end to patronage and confessionalism, could pave the way to a nationalization of a great percentage of the Palestinian refugees, no longer perceived as a threat to the system. In such circumstances, Palestinians loyal to the state's interests would be seen as contributing to its stability. One factor running against such a development is the intense Palestinian politicization inevitably accompanying conflict in the West Bank and Gaza and between Arabs and Israelis in general. All said, the future status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will be defined by many internal and external factors; that status will remain unclear as long as the Middle East continues to struggle to find a way to settle its conflicts.

Haissam threw himself into an armchair after the last customer left the shoe shop of his Lebanese employer. His eyes were red and he looked exhausted. His wife and two children were waiting for him at home. Haissam's home was Lebanon; he had grown up as a Palestinian during the days of armed struggle. His brothers and cousins had been highly active both inside and outside Lebanon, but now all their hopes had crumbled and it was a struggle to make a living. He did not have a work permit and was glad to have a job. I was telling him about the past days of my research—we had become friends and he liked to listen to my field stories. He interrupted me with a sigh, waving his arms with an uncertain gesture though the air.

You know, when I think of all this, I get very tired. Where are we going, we Palestinians? We have been at home and not at home in this country. Will my children be Palestinians? Lebanese? Canadian? I lost hope in many things over the past years. We have lots of enemies here and never know which way things will turn, what the future will be like. We were expelled from our country and since then have been living in a state of permanent unrest. There is no tranquility in my life because of the uncertainty. Should we go abroad or stay here? Return to Gaza? Will there be another war? Will the Palestinian cause have support or be

betrayed? I don't know and I am tired of asking myself all these questions. I don't even know where I belong. Am I Lebanese? Palestinian? I only know and it bothers me: it's not over, it's not over yet.

Bibliography

Abu Khalil, Asad. The Palestinian-Shiite War in Lebanon: An Examination of its Origins. London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, 1988. pp. 77-89.

- Syria and the Shiites. In: Third World Quarterly. Vol.12, No.2, April 1990.

- Arab Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. The Beirut Review, Vol.1, No.2, Fall 1991. pp. 37-53.39

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim. The Transformation of Palestine. Essays on the origin and development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

Abu-Lughod, Janet. The Demographic Transformation of Palestine. In: Abu-Lughod, 1971.

Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments. Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Adelman, Howard. Palestinian Refugees: Defining the Humanitarian Problem. In: World Refugee Survey, 1983.

- Palestine refugees, economic integration and durable solutions. In: Bramwell, 1988.

Adnan, Etel. Sitt Marie-Rose. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1988.

Akarli, Eugin D. The long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983.

Asad, Talal/Roger Owen (eds.). Sociology of ‚Developing Societies'. The Middle East. London: Macmillan Press, 1969.

Assmann, Aleida and Dietrich Harth (eds.). Mnemosyne. Formen und Funktionen der kulturellen Erinnerung. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1991.

Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986.

- The Arab Predicament. Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Aruri, Naseer H. Pax-Syriana and the Palestinians in Lebanon. In: Hagiopan, 1985.

Avi-Ran, Reuven. The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975. Boulder et al.: Westview Press, 1991.

Ayoub, Mahmoud. Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shiism. The Hague et al.: Mouton Publishers, 1978.

Balta, Paul/Georges Corm (eds.) Colloque internationale. Etudes et Documentations Internationales. Paris, 1990.

Barakat, Halim. Lebanon in Strife. Student Preludes to a Civil War. Austin and London: University of Texas, 1977.

- (ed.). Towards a Viable Lebanon. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988.

Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1969.

Beker, Michel/Roemer van Oordt. The Palestinians in Lebanon: Contradictions of State Formation in Exile. Nederelands Institut voor het Arabisch Cultuurgebied, Occasional Papers No.10, December 1991.

Berg, Eberhard/Martin Fuchs (Hg.). Kultur, Soziale Praxis, Text. Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.

Berouti, Lucien. La crise de l'emploi au Liban. Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1973.

Besson, Yves. UNRWA and its role in Lebanon. Paper presented at the Palestinians in Lebanon Conference, Oxford, 27-30 September, 1996.

Beydoun, Ahmad. The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXI, No.3, Spring 1992. pp. 35-53.

- Le Liban. Itinéraire dans une guerre incivile. Paris: Karthala (CERMOC), 1993.

Binder, Leonard (ed.). Politics in Lebanon. New York et al.: John Wiley, 1966.

El-Bizri, Dalal. Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais. Les interventions à l'Assemblée des élus de la Jama'a Islamiya et du Hizb Allah (1992-1996). Beirut: CERMOC, 1999.

Bocco, Riccardo and Mohammad-Reza Djalili (eds.). Moyen-Orient: Migrations, Démocratisation, Médiations. Genève: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1994.

Bonne, Emmannuelle. Vie publique, patronage et clientèle. Rafic Hariri à Saida. Beyrouth: CERMOC, 1995.

Bourdieu, Pierre. The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society. In: Peristiany, 1965.

- Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

- Le sens pratique. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1980.

- Sozialer Raum und <Klassen>. Lecon sur la lecon. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.

Bramwell, Anna C. (ed.). Refugees in the Age of Total War. London: Unwin Hyman, 1993.

Brand, Laurie A. Palestinians in the Arab World. Institution Building and the Search for State. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

- Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration. Middle East Journal, No.4, 1988.

Braude, Benjamin and Bernard Lewis (eds.). Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Vol.II. The Arabic-Speaking Lands. New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1982.

Brynen, Rex. PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XVIII, No.2, Winter 1989.

- Dynamics of Elite Formation. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 24, No. 3, Spring 1995. pp. 31-43.

Calic, Marie-Janine. Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Herzegovina. Erweiterte Neuausgabe. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1996.

Chambers, Richard. Rural refugees in Africa. What the eye does not see. African Studies Association Symposium on Refugees, 13-14 September 1979, London.

Chéhab, Fouad. Les Discours du Président Chéhab. 1958-64. Beirut: Helio Electronic Press "Cortbawi", 1964.

Chevallier, Dominique (ed.). L'espace social de la ville arabe. Paris, 1979.

Census of Palestine 1931. Alexandria: Whitehead Morris, 1933.

Chrara, Waddah. Transformations d'une manifestation religieuse dans un village du Liban-Sud (Ashura). Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1968.

Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. London: Hutchinson, 1985.

- The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Colloque: Le Liban à l'heure des négociations de paix au Proche-Orient. Actes du Colloque organisé par le CAIL en association avec le Centre d'Etudes et Recherches Internationales (CERI) à Paris les 15 et 16 Décembre 1995.

Corm, Georges G. Current economic and social conditions in Lebanon. In: Barakat, 1988.

- La Politique de Reconstruction de la 2ème République. In: Le Liban à l'heure des négociations de paix au Proche-Orient. Actes du Colloque organisé par le CAIL en association avec le Centre d'Etudes et de Rechereches Internationales (CERI) à Paris les 15 et 16 Décembre 1995.

Dajani, Maha Ahmed. The Institutionalizing of Palestinian Identity in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. Cairo Papers, Vol.9, Mon. 3, Fall 1986.

Daniel, E.Valentine/John Christian Kundsen (eds.). mistrusting refugees. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Deeb, Marius. Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology. Washington: Occasional Papers Series, Georgetown University, November 1986.

Destremeau, Blandine. Le statut juridique des Palestiniens vivant au Proche-Orient. Washington: Revue d'Etudes Palestiniennes, 1993.

Douayhi, Chawqi. Tripoli et Zghorta, deux villes en quête d'un espace commun. In: Huybrechts/Douayhi, 1999.

Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government and History in Yemen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

Dupuis, Stéphane. Palestiniens au Liban: une précauté source d'instabilité. Les cahiers de l'Orient. No.35, 1994.

Elias, Norbert/John L. Scotson. The Established and the Outsiders. A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems. London, 1965.

Entelis, John P. Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon. Al-Kata'ib 1936-1970. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1974.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Ethnicity & Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives. London et al.: Boulder Press, 1993.

Esman, Milton J./Itamar Rabinovich. Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn. The Palestinians, the Shi'a, and South Lebanon. (Interview 21 November, 1986.) Journal of Palestine Studies, No.2, Winter 1987.

Farah, Tawfic (ed.). Political Behaviour in the Arab States. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation. Lebanon at War. London, 1990.

Flores, Alexander. Die Entwicklung der palästinensischen Nationalbewegung bis 1939. In. Mejcher/Schölch, 1981.

- Nationalismus und Sozialismus im arabischen Osten. Kommunistische Partei und arabische Nationalbewegung in Palästina 1919-1948. Münster: Periferia Verlag, 1980.

Freud, Sigmund. Totem und Tabu. Hamburg: Fischer, 1956 [London, 1949].

Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Anchor Books, 1989.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

- Der Islam als Gesellschaftsordnung. Stuttgart: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992.

Gates, Carolyn L. The Merchant Republic of Lebanon. Rise of an Open Economy. London: I.B.Tauris, 1998.

Geertz, Clifford. Ideology as a Cultural System (1964). In: C. Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Esays. New York: Basic Book, 1973.

- Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology. Basic Books, USA: 1983.

Giannou, Chris. Vie et mort au camp de Chatila. Le drame palestinienne. Paris: Albin Michel, 1993.

Gillis, John. Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994.

Gilmour, David. Dispossessed. The Ordeal of the Palestinians. London, 1980.

Gilsenan, Michael. *Nizam Ma Fi*: Discourses of Order, Disorder and History in a Lebanese Context. In: Spagnolo, 1992.

- Lords of the Lebanese Marches. Violence & Narrative in an Arab Society. London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 1996.

- Nightmares on the brain of the living. Narratives of imagined parts and presences in an anthropology of North Lebanon. Tylor Library, Social Anthropology, Oxford.

Goria, Wade R. Sovereignity and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1985.

Granott, A. The Land System in Palestine. History and Structure. London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1952.

Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn. The Palestinians, the Shia, and South Lebanon. In: Journal of Palestine Studies, No.2, Winter 1987.

Habash, George. A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), Information Department, 1969.

Hagiopan, Elaine C. (ed.) AMAL & The Palestinians. Understanding the battle of the camps. Arab World Issues. Occasional Papers: No. 9. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Massachusetts, 1985.

Haidar, Aziz. The Different Levels of Palestinian Ethnicity. In: Milton/Rabinovich, 1988.

Halbwachs, Maurice. Das kollektive Gedächtnis. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 1985.

Hamzeh, Nizar. Lebanese Islamism. A Guide to the Groups. In: Middle East Quarterly, September, 1997.

- The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics. In: Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.16, No.3, 1993.

- /Hrair Dekmejian. A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.28, May 1996. pp. 217-229.

Hanafi, Sari. Entre deux mondes: les hommes d'affaires palestiniens de la diaspora et la construction de l'entité palestinienne. Les dossiers du cedej. Le Caire, 1997.

Hanf, Theodor. Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies/I.B. Tauris, 1993.

Hansen, A./A. Oliver-Smith (eds.). Involuntary Migration and Resettlement. The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Harb el-Kak, Mona. Politiques Urbaines dans la banlieue-sud de Beyrouth. Beyrouth: CERMOC, 1996.

Harik, Judith. The Public and Social services of the Lebanese Militias. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies (Papers on Lebanon, 14), 1994.

Harrell-Bond, Barbara. Refugees and the International System. The Evolution of Solutions. Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, July 1995.

- /Eftihia Voutira. Anthropology and the Study of Refugees. In: Anthropology Today, Vol.8., No.4, 1992.

Helmick, Raymond G. Internal Lebanese Front and Forces. In: Barakat, 1988.

Himadeh, Sa'is B. Economic Organization of Palestine. Beirut: American Press, 1938.

Hof, Frederic C. Galilee Divided. The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1919-1984. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985.

Hottinger, Arnold. Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective. In: Binder, 1966.

Hourani, A. Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society. In: Binder, 1966

Hudson, Michael. The Precarious Republic. Modernization in Lebanon. New York: Random House, 1968.

- The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy. In: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, Nos. 3-4, Spring-Summer 1976, pp.109-122.

- Palestinians in Lebanon: The Common Story. Paper presented at the Palestinians in Lebanon Conference, 27-30 September, 1996

Humphrey, Michael. Islam, Sect and State: The Lebanese Case. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1989.

Huybrechts, Eric/Chawqi Douayhi (eds.). Reconstruction et Réconciliation au Libanon. Beirut: Cahiers du Cermoc, 1999.

Hyamson, Albert M. Palestine under the Mandate 1920-1948. Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press, 1976 (1950).

Irani, George Emile. Need, Not Creed. A Case Study of Catholic Relief in Lebanon. The Beirut Review. Vol.1, No.2. pp. 72-81.

Jabber, Fuad. The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics. In: Quandt et al., 1973.

Jalloul, Faisal. Naqd al-salah al-filistini. Bourj al-Barajneh: ahlan wa thawratan wa mukhayaman. Beirut: jamiyaa al-huquq mahfutha, 1994

Jenkins, Richard. Rethinking Ethnicity: identity, categorization and power. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol.17, No.2, 1994.

Johnson, Michael. Class & Client in Beirut. London and Atlantic Highlands: Ithaca Press, 1986.

Johnson, Nels. Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism. London et al.: Kegan Paul, 1982.

Kalkas, Barbara. The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events. In: Abu-Lughod, 1971.

Kandiyoti, Deniy (ed.). Gendering the Middle East. Emerging Perspectives. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1996.

Karam, Fouad. Témoignages sur les Réfugiés Palestiniens. Les Conférences du Cénacle. IIIème année. No.3-4, March 1949.

Karpat, Kemal H. Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. London: 1968.

Kayyali, Abdul-Wahab Said. Palestine. A Modern History. London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981.

Kazziha, Walid W. Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World. Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism. London and Tonbridge: Charles Knight, 1975.

Kewenig, Walter. Die Koexistenz der Religionsgemeinschaften im Libanon. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965.

Khadduri, Walid (ed.). International Documents on Palestine. (The Cairo Agreement). Beirut, 1969.

Khalaf, Samir. Lebanon's Predicament. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

- Besieged and Silenced: The Muted Anguish of the Lebanese People. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1989.

- Beirut Reclaimed. Reflections on Urban Design and the Restoration of Civility. Beirut: Dar An-Nahar, 1993.

- /Per Kongstad. Hamra of Beirut. A Case of Rapid Urbanization. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973.

Khalidi, Rashid. Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

- The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion. In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No.2, Spring 1984.

- Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Khalildi, Tarif (ed.). Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984.

Khalidi, Walid and Jill Khadduri (eds.). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. An Annotated Bibliography. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, Kuwait: University of Kuwait, 1974.

- Conflict and Violence in Lebanon. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983

Khashan, Hilal/Monte Palmer. The Economic Basis of Civil Conflict in Lebanon: A Survey Analysis of Sunnite Moslems. In: Farah, 1983.

- The Developmental Programs of Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in Lebanon as a Source of Popular Legitimation. In: Islam and Modern Age, 25 (1994). pp. 116-142.

- Palestinian Resettlement. Behind the Debate. Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World, April 1994.

- The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the Moslem Sunni Position. In: International Sociology, Vol.7, No.1. March 1992.

- The Despairing Palestinians. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XVI, No.1, Fall 1992.

Al-Khazen, Farid. Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: Recipe for Conflict. In: Journal of Refugee Studies. Vol.10, No.3, 1997. Also: http://www.aub.edu.lb/

- The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-76. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

Khoury, Elias. We discovered our nation when it nearly was no more. In: Middle East Report, 1990.

Khoury, Philip S./Joseph Kostiner (eds.). Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1990.

Khuri, Fuad I. From Village to Suburb. Order and Change in Greater Beirut. University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1975.

Kimmerling, Baruch/Joel S. Migdal. Palestinians. The Making of a People. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Kirisci, Kemal. The PLO and World Politics. A Study of Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause. London: Frances Pinter, 1986.

Klaus, Dorothée. Return, Diaspora, Livelihood – Palestinians in Lebanon. Beiruter Blätter 6-7, 1998-99. pp. 129-139.

Koselleck, Reinhart. Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979.

Kushner, David (ed.). Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period. Political, Social and Economic Transformation. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1986.

Kramer, Martin. (ed.) Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Kramer. M. (ed.). Middle Eastern Lives: The Practice of Biography and Self-Narrative. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1991.

Lemarchand, Philippe/Lamia Radi. Israel/Palestine Demain. Atlas Prospectif. Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996.

Lesch, Ann Mosley. The Palestine Arab National Movement under the Mandate. In: Quandt et al., 1973.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Les Structures élementaires de la parenté. Paris, 1949.

Lewis, Bernhard. Die politische Sprache des Islam. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1991.

Lucacs, Yehuda (ed.). Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1967-1983. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Luhmann, Niklas. Rechtssoziologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980.

- Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1987.

Malkki, Lisa. Purity and exile: transformations in historical-national consciousness among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. Ph.D. Thesis. Harvard University, 1989.

Masalha, Nur. Expulsion of the Palestinians. The Concept of ‚Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought. 1882-1948. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992.

- Israeli Plans to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees 1948-1952. Ramallah: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre Shaml, 1996.

Mansour, Camille. Au-delà du siège des camps palestiniens de Beyrouth. In: Monde Arabe, Maghreb-Machrek. No.109, 1985.

Marx, Emanuel. Changes in the Arab Refugee Camps. The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.8, 1978.

- The Social World of Refugees. A Conceptual Framework. Elizabeth Colson Lecture, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, 7th March, 1990.

- Palestinian Refugee Camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, 1992.

McDowell, David. The Palestinians. The Minority Rights Group Report No 24. London, 1975.

- Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities. Minority Rights Group. London, 1986, updated 1996.

Mejcher, H./ A. Schölch (eds.). Die Palästina-Frage 1917-1948. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 1981.

Mergel, Thomas/Thomas Wellkopp (ed.). Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte. München: C.H.Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997.

Messara, Antoine Nasri. La Structure Sociale du Parlement Libanais. Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1977.

- Le Pacte libanais. Le message d'universalité et ses contraintes. Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1997.

Migdal, Joel S. (ed.). Palestinian Society and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Morris, Benny. 1948 and After. Israel and the Palestinians. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Nakhleh, Khalil/Elia Zureik (eds.). The Sociology of the Palestinians. London: Croom Helm, 1980.

Nasr, Salim. Pour éclairer la guerre civile au Liban. Jalons pour une position des rapports entre confession et société libanaise. In: J. Banberot et al. Liban et Palestine. Promesses et mensonges de l'occident. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1977.

Nasrallah, Fida. Prospects for Lebanon. The Questions of South Lebanon. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Policy Studies, 1992.

- Palestinians in Lebanon. In: Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.10, No.3, 1997.

Al-Natour, Souheil. Les Palestiniens du Liban. La Situation Sociale, Economique et Juridique. Beirut: Dar Al Taqqadoum Al Arabi, 1993.

- The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon. In: Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.10, No.3, 1997.

Norton, Augustus Richard. AMAL and the Shia. University of Texas Press, 1987.

N.n. Junblat and the Palestinian Refugees. The Lebanon Report. Vol.5, No.9, 1994.

Official Gazette (Al-Jarida al-Rasmiya), 4:1994.

Ofterdinger, Ronald (ed.). Palästinensische Flüchtlinge und der Friedensprozeß. Palästinenser im Libanon. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1997.

Oz, Amos. Die Hügel des Libanon. Politische Essays. Frankfurt/Main: edition suhrkamp, 1995.

Peretz, Don. Palestinian Social Stratification: The political implications. In: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.8, No.1, Autumn 1977. pp. 48-74.

- Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Process. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993.

Peristiany, J.G. Honour and Shame. The Values of Mediterranean Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965.

- (ed.). Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology. Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, Athens, July, 1963. Paris, The Hague: Mouton, 1968.

Palestine Royal Commission Report. Presented by the Secretary of State for Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. London, July 1937.

Perthes, Volker. Der Libanon nach dem Bürgerkrieg. Vom Ta'if zum gesellschaftlichen Konsens? Ebenhausen: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993.

Peteet, Julie. Socio-Political Integration and Conflict Resolution in the Palestinian Camps in Lebanon. In: Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol.XVI, No.2, 1987

- Gender in Crisis. Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

- Dispossession and Empowerment among Palestinian Refugees. In: Daniel/Knudsen, 1995.

Peters, Joel. The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. The Refugee Working Group. Paper presented at the Palestinians in Lebanon Conference, Oxford, 27-30 September 1996.

Pflitsch, Andreas. Salim al-Hoss. Libanesischer Ministerpräsident. Orient, 40, 1999. pp. 16-26.

Phares, Walid. Lebanese Christian Nationalism. The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

Picard, Elizabeth. De la "Communauté-classe" à la Resistance „Nationale". In: Revue Francaise des Sciences Politiques , 6 (35), December, 1985.

- Liban. Etat de Discorde. Des fondations aux guerres fratricides. Paris: Flammarion, 1988.

Pinner, Walter. How many Arab refugees? A Critical Study on UNRWA's Statistics and Reports. London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1960.

Plascov, Avi. The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-57. London: Frank Cass, 1981.

Polak, Abraham, N. Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. 1250-1900. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1977. (First edition: 1939, London: Asiatic Society.)

Porath, Yehoshua. The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929. London: Frank Cass, 1974.

- The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939. From Riots to Rebellion. London: Frank Cass, 1977.

Quandt, W.B. (ed.) The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. Berkeley, Calif., 1973.

Al-Qutub, Ishaq. The Challenge for Urban Development. Policies: The Case of Refugee Camp-Cities in the Middle East. Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 8, No.2, 1989. pp. 207-228.

Radi, Lamia. La gestion d'appartenances multiples. In: Les Cahiers d'Orient, No.35:3, 1994.

Al-Rayyes, Riad/ Dunia Nahas. Guerillas for Palestine. London: Croom Helm, 1976.

Report: International Mission to Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan and Lebanon. April 10-19, 1994. Working Papers, CERMOC, Amman.

Robinson, Andrew. Gavel Holder of the Refugee Working Group. Constraints and Challenges of the Situation in Lebanon. Palestinians in Lebanon Conference, 1996. Working Papers, CERMOC, Amman.

Rosiny, Stephan. Islamismus bei den Schiiten im Libanon. Religion im Übergang von Tradition zur Moderne. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1996.

Roy, Olivier. Démocraties sans démocrates. Paris: Fayard, 1993.

Rubenberg, C.A,. The Civilian Infrastructure of the PLO: An analysis of the PLO in Lebanon until June 1982. Journal of Palestine Studies 12 (3), Spring 1983. pp. 54-78.

Said, Edward W. Peace and its Discontents. Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Process. New York: Random House, 1996.

Salam, Nawaf A. Between repatriation and resettlement: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Paper presented at the Palestinians in Lebanon Conference, Oxford, 27-30 September, 1996.

- La condition libanaise. Communautés, citoyen, Etat. Beirut: Editions Dar an-Nahar, 1998.

Salem, Elie A. Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon. The Troubled Years 1982-1988. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995.

Salem, Paul. Two years of living dangerously. General Awn and the precarious rise of Lebanon's „Second Republic". In: The Beirut Review. Vol.1., No.1, 1991.

Salibi, Kamal S. Crossroads to Civil War. Lebanon 1958-1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.

- A House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley et al.: California University Press, 1988.

- East Side Story/West Side Story: Contrasting Lebanese Views of the Civil War. Georgetown University, CCAS Report, March 1985.

Samuel, Raphael/Paul Thompson (eds.). The Myths we live by. London and New York: Routledge, 1990.

Sanbar, Elias. Palestine 1948. L'Expulsion. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.

Sayigh, Rosemary. The Palestinian Experience Viewed as Socialisation. Thesis. American University of Beirut, April 1976.

- The Palestinian Identity among Camp Residents. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol.VI. No.3, Spring 1977.

- Sources of Palestinian Nationalism. A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.VI, No. 4., 1977.

- Palestinians in Lebanon: status ambiguity, insecurity and flux. Race&Class, 30:1, 1988.

- Too Many Enemies. The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994.

Sayigh, Yezid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

Sayigh, Yusif A. Economic Implications of UNRWA Operations in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1952.

Scheffler, Thomas. Ethnisch-religiöse Konflikte und gesellschaftliche Integration im Vorderen und Mittleren Orient. Literaturstudie. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1990.

Schenk, Bernadette. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Drusentums liegt im Libanon. Beiruter Blätter, 6-7, 1998-99. pp. 120-128.

Seguin, Jacques. Le Liban-Sud. Espace périphérique, éspace convoité. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989.

Seikaly, May. Haifa. Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918-1939. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1995.

Shami, Seteney. Transnationalism and Refugee Studies: Rethinking Forced Migration and Identity in the Middle East. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 1996.

Shamir, Shimon. West Bank Refugees – Between Camp and Society. In: Migdal, 1980.

Shaw, Stanford J./Ezel Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol.II. Reform, Revolution and Republic. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Shehadi, Nadim/Dana Haffar Mills. Lebanon. A History of Conflict and Consensus. London: I.B.Tauris & Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988.

Shiblak, Abbas. Palestinians in Lebanon and the PLO. In: Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.10, No.3, 1997.

Shryock, Andrew. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination. Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1997.

Seikaly, May. Haifa. Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918-1939. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1995.

Shlaim, Avi. Husni Za'im and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian refugees in Syria. Journal of Palestine Studies, 15:4, 1986.

Signoles, Aude. Les Accords d'Oslo ou l'agonie d'un consensus. Identité national et territoire(s) palestinien(s): quel(s) devenir(s)? Memoire de DEA de relations Internationales Option Option Stratégie. 1996-1997. Working Papers CERMOC, Amman.

Smith, Pamela Ann. Palestine and the Palestinians. 1876-1983. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984.

- The Palestinian Diaspora. Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1986. pp. 90-108.

Spagnolo, J. Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective. Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992.

Stewart, Frank Henderson. Honour. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Swedenburg, Ted. Occupational Hazards: Palestine Ethnography. Cultural Anthropology 4 (1989). pp. 265-272.

- The Palestinian as National Signifier. Anthropological Quarterly 63 (1990). pp. 18-30.

- Memories of Revolt: The 1936-9 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.

The Taif Agreement. The Beirut Review. Vol.1, No.1, 1991. pp. 119-172.

Takkenberg, Alex. The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law. Catholic University of Nijmegen, 1997.

Talhami, Ghada Hashem. Palestine and Egyptian National Identity. New York et al.: Praeger, 1992.

Tamari, Salim. Palestinian Refugee Negotiations. From Madrid to Oslo II. A Final Status Paper. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996.

Thicknesse, S.G. Arab Refugees. A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities. London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949.

Tibawi, A.L. A Modern History of Syia including Lebanon and Palestine. London: Macmillan, 1969.

Tophoven, Rolf. Fedayin - Guerilla ohne Grenzen. Geschichte, soziale Struktur und politische Ziele der palästinensischen Widerstandsorganisationen. Die israelische Konter-Guerilla. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1973.

Tonkin, Elisabeth/Maryon McDonald/Malcolm Chapman (eds.) History and Ethnicity. London: Routledge, 1989.

- Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Turki, Fawaz. Soul in Exile: Lives of a Palestinian Revolutionary. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988.

Tuéni, Ghassan. Une guerre pour les autres. Paris: Editions Jean-Claude Lattès, 1985.

UN Economic Commission for Western Asia. The Demographic Characteristics of the Palestinians in Lebanon. New York, January, 1983.

Wade, Goria. Sovereignity and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1985.

Waines, David. The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance. In: Abu-Lughod, 1971.

Weber, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr J.C.B., 1921.

Wild, Stefan. Zum Selbstverständnis palästinensisch-arabischer Nationalität. In: Mejcher/Schöch, 1981.

Winslow, Charles. Lebanon. War and politics in a fragmented society. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Zolberg, Aristide/Astrid Suhrke/Sergio Aguayo. Escape from Violence. Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Zureik, Elia. Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process. A Final Status Paper. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999

Index