

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Anatomy of an airlift: United States military assistance to Israel during the 1973 war

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During the 1973 war the United States flew 12,000 tons of military equipment to Israel, transferring advanced weaponry that it had hitherto withheld. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger had planned to strictly regulate the supply of arms to Israel, intending both to control its strategy during the fighting and heighten its dependence following the war. Yet the exigency of matching the Soviet Union's massive resupply of Egypt and Syria forced the United States to launch an airlift that greatly accelerated the pace and degree of sophistication of military hardware to its client. This article demonstrates that the determination both to outpace the rival superpower and ensure Israel's post-war cooperation created a process of rearmament that for the United States was an unintended consequence.

From 13 October to 12 November 1973 the United States provided Israel with 63,500 tons of arms and military equipment, transferring 12,000 US tons of supplies by air during the Yom Kippur war. This work draws upon the archives of both countries, analyzing a principal aspect of the airlift that most accounts have obfuscated or ignored. The Yom Kippur war forced the United States to depart from a policy of arms transfers that had remained measured even as Israel gained the status of client state. Both President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and (from August 1973) secretary of state, sought to regulate the flow of arms to Israel during the 1973 war and thus control its military moves. They intended to leave Israel with a level of armament that would circumscribe its strategy and, following the cessation of hostilities, increase its dependence on Washington. Yet, as this article

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demonstrates, the airlift greatly accelerated, both during the 1973 clash and in the weeks following that war, a process of armament that for the United States was an unintended consequence. During the 20 days of fighting, the Nixon administration transferred arms to Israel at a faster pace and of more sophisticated types than it had hitherto provided its client, at the same time promising a sustained supply that would ease Israeli concerns regarding post-war diplomacy.

Most of the literature dealing with the Yom Kippur war emphasizes the bureaucratic contest that marked the Nixon administration, attempting to determine whether responsibility for a delay in the airlift lay with the Department of Defense or Kissinger himself. In fact, Kissinger had near-complete charge of the crisis even before the 'Saturday Night Massacre' of 20 October 1973 deepened the President's political paralysis, and this work takes account of the secretary's central role. Thus, while researchers have dealt much with the rivalry between Kissinger and the secretary of defence, James Schlesinger, that preoccupation diverts attention from the broader context of US policy toward Israel. This study avoids recounting 'turf wars', demonstrating that differences in approach notwithstanding, Kissinger, Schlesinger, and other senior officials were partner to a great concern regarding the consequences of a heightened arms supply to that country.

Four periods provide the chronological framework for this study. The first part of this analysis is a review of US military sales to Israel preceding the Yom Kippur war. By that time the United States had become Israel's principal arms supplier, yet it provided a level of armament that always fell short of its client's expectations. The second section focuses on the week beginning with the 6 October 1973 attack on Israel. During that week the United States viewed as sufficient Israel's existing level of armament and only late on 12 October revised the assessment that Israel would, with the arms it had, prevail easily in the fighting. Thus, the first two parts of this article examine US arms policy toward Israel upon the outbreak of the war, Israeli requests for greater military assistance, and the developments that convinced the United States to launch a massive airlift in support of that client.

The third period examined is 13–17 October, commencing with the advent of the airlift and focusing on the turning point in the assistance provided to Israel. The Nixon administration wished to preserve détente but was at the same time determined to place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in the Middle East. Washington considered the Soviet initiation of a large-scale airlift to its clients a clear violation of superpower agreements, and that was a major reason for the greatly increased support the United States granted Israel.

This work explores a fourth phase in US military assistance, extending the analysis to December 1973. The United States had since 1965 viewed Israel's deterrence as a stabilizing factor in the region, but by November 1973 the Nixon administration was concerned that it had 'overarmed' Israel. Yet plans for diplomatic progress after the war forced the administration to augment weapons transfers to that client, without which it would agree to no movement. Thus on 7 December 1973 Kissinger met in Washington with Moshe Dayan, Israel's minister of defence, in order to discuss

another large arms package. Kissinger told Dayan 'it is important that you recover your strength and perhaps even augment it [. . .] essential that you look fierce'.[1]

The record is still incomplete, the US government withholding transcripts of most of the meetings of the WSAG (Washington Special Action Group). Nevertheless, much of the material on the 1973 crisis has been released in the framework of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, augmented by State Department records. In addition, in 2007 Israel declassified files on the Yom Kippur war, including the protocols of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. These documents provide a penetrating view of Israel's perception of the US role in the war and the deep ambivalence with which its prime minister, Golda Meir, perceived US assistance. Put simply, these records reveal that Meir placed part of the blame for the Israeli failure to deter an attack upon US unwillingness to supply all of the arms that Israel had earlier demanded.

A number of secondary sources warrant mention. First, studies by Bar-Siman-Tov, Garthoff, Quandt, Schoenbaum, Spiegel, and Lebow and Stein deal with the 1973 crisis in the contexts of the Cold War, the Arab–Israeli dispute, and the US–Israeli patron–client relationship. Herzog, O'Ballance, and Rabinovich provide overviews of the 1973 war. Bar-Joseph's study of that strategic surprise is authoritative but does not deal with arms transfers. The only work dealing mainly with the airlift is Boyne's *Two O'Clock War*, but it is not based on the archival record.

Second, Kissinger is the subject of a burgeoning literature in which the 1973 war features prominently, including books by journalists such as Isaacson, the Kalb brothers, and Golan. Schulzinger's pioneering study of Kissinger's diplomacy remains an important scholarly source, while several works have recently broken new ground in the analysis of both Kissinger and Nixon. These recent studies have greatly enhanced the view of that period in general and Kissinger's role in particular. Thus, Hanhimäki highlights in a critical manner several principal aspects of Kissinger's management of the 1973 Middle East crisis. Hanhimäki notes that in October 1973 Kissinger abandoned the idealism with which he had 'publicly flirted' when sworn in as secretary of state one month earlier, viewing matters primarily in terms of fierce competition with the Soviet Union. Thus, the secretary was determined to demonstrate that settlement of the Middle East crisis could only be through Washington, extending a hand in friendship to Egypt soon after the war. Hanhimäki bluntly states that Kissinger exhibited a 'disturbing' disregard for formal superpower agreements. Kissinger's crude encouragement of Israel's ceasefire violations, documentary evidence of which the present study also cites, provides ample proof of his attitude.[2]

Suri sheds new light on Kissinger's statecraft in the context of his personal history, noting that while he 'turned his Jewish background into an asset for Israeli and Arab advocates alike', his identity was also 'a liability for those who perceived either unfair bias to Israel [. . .] or excessive deference to anti-Jewish claims'. Suri writes that Kissinger's 'most enduring and complex legacy' was his impact upon the Middle East, where his diplomatic efforts from late 1973 to 1977 brought lasting results. Yet as that author points out and this work places in high relief, the Yom Kippur war forced the

United States to greatly increase its support of Israel, raising the profile of a patron–client relationship that Kissinger would have preferred to remain less prominent.[3]

Both Bundy and Thornton examine the manner in which Nixon and Kissinger together shaped policy, while Dallek's study is the most recent addition to scholarship on these 'partners' in power. Dallek writes that even during the first three days of the war, 'Kissinger took the lead in deciding how Washington should respond'. He attributes to Kissinger persuasion of the President on 9 October to ignore Schlesinger's advice and agree to a large-scale resupply of Israel.[4] In fact, as this work will make clear, on 9 October Kissinger still wished to limit the supply of arms to Israel, while on 13 October Nixon himself made the principal decision to extend a massive airlift to that client.

Third, the autobiographies of both Nixon and Kissinger are important resources, although the latter sheds far more light on the 1973 war than did the President. In 2003 Kissinger published *Crisis*, in which his brief narrations accompany transcripts of telephone conversations that he conducted during the Middle East war. This article cites a number of highly important exchanges that do not appear in that book.

Fourth, the biographies and autobiographies of other actors vary in both scope and scholarly value. Schlesinger has written sparingly of the airlift and his relationship with Kissinger. Meir is the subject of an insightful work by Medzini that nevertheless adds little to what is known about her performance during the Yom Kippur war. The autobiographies of Dayan, Abba Eban, the foreign minister, Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador at Washington, and an essay by the Israeli ambassador there, Simcha Dinitz, offer few insights. A partial exception to the limitations of these sources is a book by Victor Israelyan, a former official of the Soviet foreign ministry, on decision making in the Kremlin during the war.

US military assistance to Israel, 1965–73

In March 1965 the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson consented to sell Israel 190 M-48 tanks and in February 1966 48 A-4 Skyhawk jets, marking the first US transfers of offensive arms to that country. The United States sold Israel arms both to balance the Soviet Union's supplies to its Arab clients and secure Israeli acquiescence to arms deals with Jordan intended to prevent that country from buying military hardware from the rival superpower. The Johnson administration admonished Israel to view the 1966 Skyhawk sale as a 'one-time deal' and refused to sell it the more advanced F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber. Nevertheless, by late 1968 both Moscow's massive rearmament of its Arab clients after the 1967 Six Day War and the weight of Congressional support brought that administration to sell Israel 50 F-4 jets.[5]

The Nixon administration replaced the planes Israel lost during the 1969–70 War of Attrition with Egypt and by 1971 viewed it as a strategic asset, that year transferring an additional 36 Phantoms and 113 Skyhawks.[6] From the end of the Six Day War to late 1971 the Soviet Union sold Egypt 450 aircraft, 1,600 tanks, and 1,200 other armoured vehicles. At the same time, the Soviets sold Syria 250 aircraft and 250 tanks.[7]

Both Soviet military assistance to those states and Nixon's desire to avoid a clash with the Israel lobby before a presidential election provided impetus for the February 1972 arms contract with Israel. The Nixon administration agreed to provide 42 Phantoms, 82 Skyhawks, and assistance in building a jet fighter based on the French Mirage. According to Quandt, this deal was supposed to have ended the 'periodic squabbles' that attended the US–Israeli arms relationship.[8]

Meir's visit to Washington in late February 1973 was the occasion for another appeal for arms including 36 F-4 and 30 A-4 jets.[9] The Departments of Defense and State took a dim view of renewed Israeli demands, their objections shaping the views they held of the Arab–Israeli military balance at the outbreak of the 1973 war. Elliot Richardson, secretary of defence from January to May 1973, wrote to Kissinger that 'Israel already has a very substantial military superiority [. . .] I see no justification for additional A-4 and F-4 aircraft'. Richardson urged that the United States support an Israeli arsenal of no more than 100 Phantoms and 200 Skyhawks, a level that Israel would achieve based on existing arms contracts.[10]

At the same time, William Quandt and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council (NSC) called for greater sway over that government. They knew that the President had already decided to sell Israel more arms but urged Nixon and Kissinger to press Meir for concessions to Egypt, with whose national security adviser, Hafiz Ismail, Kissinger had met three days before the Israeli prime minister's February 1973 visit to Washington. The Council's Middle East experts advocated 'reciprocity, whereby our interests and preferences are given a fair hearing'.[11] In fact, Nixon and Kissinger intended to steer Israel toward accord with Egypt but at the same time sell it arms in a carefully considered manner. Thus, in May 1973 the Nixon administration decided to sell Israel 24 Phantoms and 24 Skyhawks, agreeing both to fewer jets and a pace slower than Israel had requested.[12]

6–12 October 1973: holding back

On 5 October 1973 the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reviewed the arms inventories of ten Middle East states. The main components of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) were 109 Phantoms, 192 Skyhawks, and 64 French-manufactured Mirage-III jets. Israel had 400 combat aircraft with which to face 600 Egyptian planes (Soviet MiGs of various marks) and about 350 jets in Syrian hands. Israel had 1,915 tanks, most of them Centurions and M-48 Pattons, ranged against 1,965 Egyptian units and 1,800 tanks in the Syrian army. Israel could field 1,300 artillery pieces of 100 millimetres (mm) or more, while Egypt had almost 1,600 such artillery pieces and Syria 1,000 guns.[13] Thus, Israel's principal rivals had a considerable numerical advantage, but in the US view, Israel enjoyed great superiority in military skills and morale. For those reasons, the Egyptian and Syrian attacks on 6 October 1973 across the ceasefire lines of 1967 elicited grave concern in Washington, but no alarm with regard to Israel's military capability.

At 19:30 on 6 October the WSAG held its first meeting to deal with the ramifications of an Arab–Israeli war. Quandt noted that the questions were whether a major Arab defeat would affect the supply of oil, the manner in which the crisis could be exploited to reduce Soviet influence, and the prospects of peace negotiations were the Arab 'loss of face' to be minimized.[14] The Israelis had by the time of that meeting already requested arms, but none of the participants objected when James Noyes, assistant secretary of defence, observed 'they don't really need it'.[15]

In fact, Kissinger had already decided that the United States would 'lean toward Tel Aviv' in order to ensure influence with Israel in post-war negotiations.[16] Washington's primary goal, noted the secretary, was 'to demonstrate that whoever gets help from the Soviet Union cannot achieve his objective'.[17] Yet at the same time Nixon and Kissinger wanted Israel to achieve a limited victory that would leave it both 'a bit bloodied' and highly dependent upon the United States.[18]

Egypt's 6 October crossing of the Suez Canal and Syrian advances on the Golan Heights placed in bold relief the urgency of Israel's requests. Israel's first calls were for additional F-4 jets and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.[19] On 7 October Dinitz and Mordechai Shalev, minister at the embassy in Washington, asked Kissinger for 200 Sidewinders, obtaining his agreement and within three days the missiles, despite a 'run-around' at the Department of Defense.[20] The IAF lost 6 Phantoms and 28 Skyhawks on the first two days of the war, mostly to ground-to-air missiles.[21] By midday 7 October the Israelis had appealed to President Nixon three times for the transfer of 40 Phantoms. Nixon was preoccupied with the impending (10 October) resignation of his vice-president, Spiro Agnew, while Kissinger told Schlesinger that F-4s were out of the question.[22] The Americans were well aware of the impact that the loss of scores of jets had on Israel's view of its circumstances. Nevertheless, three considerations informed US determination to refrain from a rapid replacement of Israel's major hardware losses.

First, Kissinger believed that Israel would win the war within several days, obviating the need for massive rearmament.[23] Second, on 7 October Nixon warned against a stance so pro-Israel that the Arab 'oil states' would break ranks (with the United States).[24] Third, on 8 October Quandt, noting that Israel had added 300 M-60 tanks to the arms it requested, advised Kissinger that 'because of the signal it would give to the Soviets and Arabs, we will not want to make commitments on the larger items. Even after the fighting, we will not want [. . .] to engage in a massive resupply effort. There are grounds for thinking the Soviets may be more restrained than in 1967'.[25]

On the morning of 9 October Dinitz and Mordechai Gur, the Israeli military attaché, apprised Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, deputy assistant for National Security Affairs, of military developments. Dinitz reported that Israel had lost 14 Phantoms and 28 Skyhawks. The ambassador continued, 'we lost something like 500 tanks [. . .] 100 in the north and 400 in the south'. Kissinger was incredulous, replying 'explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians [. . .] Our strategy was to give you until Wednesday evening (10 October), by which time I thought the whole Egyptian army would be wrecked'.[26]

Later that day Quandt warned Kissinger that were the United States to supply Israel too early and with too much weaponry, the result would be an Arab oil boycott.[27] Late on 10 October Kissinger informed Dinitz of Nixon's assurance that the United States would replace all Israeli aircraft and tank losses. But even Nixon refrained from promising an immediate transfer, and Kissinger promised delivery of only five Phantoms, telling the ambassador, 'for the rest, you will work out a schedule'.[28]

On 11 October Kissinger instructed Scowcroft to dispatch six (instead of five) F-4 Phantoms.[29] This was a negligible increment, because by early morning 11 October Israel had lost 52 combat aircraft, of which more than 20 were Phantoms.[30] Despite those circumstances, the United States consented to supply only two Phantoms a day for eight days and a total of more than 16 F-4s only if Israeli losses continued to mount. The Defense Department agreed to release 30 Skyhawks, but this was on condition that Israel load the planes onto its own ships. Schlesinger also informed Dinitz that Israel would receive up to 125 tanks, but only 65 of these would be the advanced M-60. The rest would be older M-48 tanks, the number depending on the capacity of Israeli ships.[31] Moreover, on the morning of 12 October Kissinger assured Nixon 'they [the Israelis] have not yet run short of equipment'. Nixon himself rejected the option of 'massive support' of Israel, noting, 'that will just bring massive open support [of the Arab states] by the Russians'.[32]

The administration's stance notwithstanding, by late evening 12 October three principal considerations brought about a significant shift in the US approach. First, US policy makers realized that Israel was running out of ammunition, forcing it to rein in its advances against Syria and placing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in jeopardy vis-à-vis the Egyptian army. Nixon and Kissinger had on 12 October agreed that Israel must complete within three days an offensive against Syria that would accord with the US prescription for a limited Israeli victory, because after that international pressure would force a ceasefire under conditions unfavourable to post-war US diplomacy.[33] The possibility that Israel would not complete its offensive according to that schedule forced Kissinger to acquiesce to the highly visible Military Air Transport he had hitherto resisted.[34]

Second, Kissinger took a different view of consumables, on one hand, and hardware such as jets and tanks, on the other. He was livid that the Defense Department had hindered the dispatch of ammunition, because the delay threatened to remove from his sway the control of Israel's moves. Kissinger's book *Crisis* does not include the transcript of his 13 October conversation with Schlesinger, in which he explained bluntly his concern that Israel would slow its own military progress, then 'hoard' equipment to later launch an offensive not in keeping with US plans.[35] In another conversation the same day, also omitted from *Crisis*, Kissinger told Alexander Haig, White House chief-of-staff, that 'when we want them [the Israelis] to slack off the stuff will be in there, and they will want to fight again'.[36]

At the same time, Kissinger fended off heavy pressure from Congress to replace immediately Israel's losses in sophisticated weapons, because he did not think that rebuilding its stocks of those arms was necessary for the limited military thrust he

wanted the Israelis to pursue. In the afternoon of 12 October Hubert Humphrey (D, Minnesota), who served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urged the prompt delivery of planes, which the senator understood 'may be strung out over several months'. Kissinger was evasive, telling Humphrey 'whatever we do give them, they come back [. . .] asking for five times as much'.[37] Three hours later, Schlesinger told Kissinger of his conversation with Senator Henry Jackson (D, Washington), who demanded that the Pentagon provide Israel with 50 F-4 Phantoms. Kissinger welcomed Schlesinger's reassurance that arms to Israel would be limited to the 16 Phantoms, 30 Skyhawks, and 125 tanks upon which their offices had already agreed.[38]

Yet by late on 12 October the Soviet Union's support of its Arab clients had brought about a third and overriding reason to arm Israel. According to Israelyan, the Kremlin had on 8 October undertaken an airlift to Egypt and Syria, abandoning the mutual superpower restraint that Kissinger urged upon the Soviets.[39] US intelligence agencies learned that the Soviets were using Antonov-12 and Antonov-22 cargo planes (capacities 22 and 88 US tons respectively) to fly large quantities of arms into Cairo and Damascus.[40] Nevertheless, on 9 October Kissinger rejected Meir's urgent request to meet with Nixon. Meir juxtaposed the Soviet threat with the 'grudging' US supply of a few Phantoms. On 12 October she instructed Dinitz, 'you must convey to Naphtali [the Israeli codename for Kissinger] the facts [. . .] regarding Soviet involvement [. . .] it is a scandal, the manner in which the United States treats our requests'.[41]

In fact, the scale of the Soviet airlift, which Nixon notes had by 12 October reached 700 tons daily, brought about an abrupt change in the President's view. Kissinger and Schlesinger had already agreed on military transports of ammunition to be flown to Israel but limited the operation to ten C-130 Hercules (capacity 22 tons) and three C-5A Galaxy (132 tons) cargo planes. Eban protested ineffectually to Kissinger at these limitations. Only Nixon's intervention made the difference, the President noting that 'we would take just as much heat for sending three planes as sending thirty', and ordering his subordinates 'get them in the air *now* [. . .] send everything that can fly'.[42]

13–17 October: advent of the airlift

The Soviet Union's airlift to its Arab clients created a challenge that Kissinger had wished to avoid. He was partner to Nixon's concern for 'reputation and resolve' but feared circumstances that would end détente with the Soviet Union.[43] Neither Nixon nor Kissinger desired the exacerbation of a crisis that might present the Soviet Union with new opportunities in the Middle East. Thus, even after Nixon's instructions regarding the airlift, Kissinger sought a way to avoid rearming Israel too rapidly.[44] Moreover, Nixon made clear that the United States was sending arms in order to hasten the end of the war, telling Kissinger he now wanted a superpower-imposed ceasefire 'even though the Israelis will squeal like struck pigs'.[45] On 14 October Kissinger warned Dobrynin that the United States would no longer adhere to its self-imposed limitations regarding an airlift to its client. Yet he also offered Dobrynin a deal, telling him 'we are prepared to stop when you are', and reassuring the Soviet ambassador that 'it [the airlift] will not be that

massive that quickly'.[46] Kissinger emphasized that the United States had imposed 'considerable restraints on heavy equipment', again proposing that both sides suspend their airlifts upon agreement regarding a ceasefire.[47]

On 14 October Egypt launched an offensive in an attempt to reach the strategically important Mitla and Gidi passes. The thrust failed badly, and on the next day a small Israeli force created a bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was prepared neither to force a ceasefire on an unwilling client nor limit the scope of its airlift to Cairo and Damascus. Kissinger told the WSAG that 'Our only interest [. . .] is to run the Soviets into the ground fast'.[48] That day Nixon ordered a 'check [of] the European theater to see if there were some of those smaller planes [Skyhawks] that they [the Israelis] need', instructing Kissinger, 'on these big planes [C-5A transports] you can put those good [M-60] tanks'.[49] In fact, by the time the first US C-5A transport plane arrived in Israel, the Israeli blow to Egyptian forces in the massive armoured clash of 14 October had decided the outcome of the war.[50] Nevertheless, Kissinger was determined that the US airlift 'teach them [the Soviets] that when they cross us, something violent happens'.[51]

On the same day the NSC drew up a detailed report of all Israel's military requests (except aircraft) for examination at that evening's meeting of the WSAG. This list warrants note for two reasons. First, the items that appear there reflect the urgency that Israel conveyed with regard to its principal requirements. Second, US willingness to consider these requests demonstrates that the administration was contemplating a significant departure from the volume, pace, and types of arms supplied to Israel.

First on the list was the TOW anti-tank missile launcher, a weapon that the United States had hitherto not placed in Israeli hands.[52] Schlesinger convinced Kissinger that this weapon be sent to Israel, noting, 'they have never appeared out there so there will be a dramatic effect'.[53] The second item was bridging equipment for use at the Suez Canal, which the IDF would soon put to use. Third, Israel asked for Chaparral surface-to-air vehicle-mounted missiles, of which before the war Israel had none.

Fourth, Israeli requests included 700 M-60 tanks, the most advanced model of US manufacture, of which Israel had only 150 units. As noted above, Kissinger and Schlesinger had wanted to replace only 125 of the tanks that Israeli had by 9 October lost, intending that most of that resupply be of the M-48 mark. Fifth, Israel wanted 750 M-113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), of which it had only 300 units, purchased earlier from the United States. Finally, the list included 25 CH-53 (large transport) and 25 HU-6 'Cobra' (attack) helicopters, neither hitherto introduced to the IAF.[54]

By 14 October Israel had flown 900 tons of equipment from the United States, leaving there 25,000 tons of cargo. The US Air Force estimated that its Military Airlift Command (MAC) would require 7–800 C-141-equivalent (capacity 31.9 tons) sorties in order to transport such a backlog.[55] Yet US officials viewed with growing concern the impact upon relations with the Arab states. On 17 October Nixon, Kissinger, and Quandt received the foreign ministers of Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti foreign minister, asked the Americans, 'we have seen pictures of the planes, of the ships. Is it so essential that you do this?'

Nixon answered that the resupply operation was intended only to 'keep the balance', disingenuously telling the Arab ministers 'we are not going to give Israel an offensive capability'.[56] The next day the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided upon an oil boycott of countries 'unfriendly' to the Arab cause.[57]

By 16 October the Soviets had completed 400 flights to Egypt and Syria, providing their clients with over 5,000 tons of war materiel.[58] Kissinger wanted the US airlift to provide Israel with at least 25 per cent greater support than the Soviets were supplying their clients.[59] At the 17 October WSAG meeting Nixon acknowledged that the sealift the United States had undertaken in addition to the airlift was controversial (because it meant an influx of military hardware to Israel for an extended period). Nevertheless, the administration sharply increased military support for its client in order to demonstrate determination to the Soviet Union and dominance to the Arab states. At the same time, Washington intended that arms to Israel would ensure its compliance after the fighting. Nixon told his subordinates, 'we have to do enough [. . .] to bring Israel kicking and screaming to the [negotiating] table'.[60]

17 October–12 November: from acceleration to termination of the airlift

17 October was a turning point in both the airlift and broader US policy regarding military assistance to Israel. First, that day the US airlift delivered to Israel more tonnage than the Soviet Union supplied its Arab clients.[61] This acceleration prompted William Colby, director of the CIA, to tell Kissinger at that day's WSAG meeting, 'you will see the greatest reserve stocks on record in Israel for the next couple of years'. Kissinger, who had only a few days earlier been greatly concerned to limit the transfer of arms to Israel, brushed him off, replying 'we can assess that after the ceasefire'.[62]

Second, President Nixon was willing to go to great lengths to avert pressure in Congress on the issue of assistance to Israel. He wanted both credit for helping Israel and leverage over its government.[63] Kissinger had on 13 October warned Dinitz that Washington's 'whole foreign policy position depends on our not being represented as having screwed up a crisis [. . .] If [. . .] we are going to be under attack for mismanagement [. . .], we will have to turn on you'. Dinitz promised that no source of pressure emanated from the Israeli embassy, imploring Kissinger, 'I beg of you to believe me'.[64] On 17 October the administration decided that it would on 19 October bring before Congress a $2.2 billion military assistance package for Israel. The Department of Defense recommended that the greater part of it be in the form of credits.[65] Nixon decided that that aid should be extended as a grant.[66]

Yet by 18 October the course of the war heightened the administration's concerns regarding restraint of its client, the setting for post-war diplomacy, and the ability of the regime in Cairo, a dialogue which the United States intended to pursue, to withstand Israel's military progress. The IDF had by 17 October greatly expanded its bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Kissinger understood quickly the strategic implications of the Israeli crossing, telling Scowcroft, 'they [the Egyptians]

are going to disintegrate. They won't be able to get supplies. They'll die of starvation'. Kissinger added: 'I think this is the end of [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat.'[67]

The State Department estimated that IDF armoured strength on the west bank of the Suez Canal had by 19 October reached 200 tanks, noting that 'the smell of victory will not make Israel welcome a ceasefire'.[68] This was a very serious development, for Israel was now in a position to destroy the army of one of the Soviet Union's principal clients. From 16 to 18 October Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet premier, met with Sadat three times in Cairo, attempting unsuccessfully to convince him that the Israeli military threat made exigent a ceasefire-in-place.[69] On 18 October Dobrynin urged Kissinger to fly to Moscow to meet with Leonid Brezhnev (general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in order to arrange a ceasefire. Kissinger agreed, intending that Israel have 72 more hours in which to consolidate (but not exceed) the military positions that suited US plans for the immediate post-war period.

Kissinger met with Brezhnev in Moscow on 20 October, by which time Sadat was pressing the Soviets to arrange an immediate ceasefire.[70] While Kissinger was en route to the Soviet Union, Nixon granted him 'full authority' to negotiate, thus denying his top official the room for manoeuvre to be had by pleading the need to consult with Washington.[71] Late on 20 October Nixon instructed Kissinger, through Scowcroft, to work with the Soviets to 'get our clients in line'. Nixon was now completely embroiled in the Watergate affair and hoped that a diplomatic coup in the Middle East would ease his political plight.[72] Kissinger transmitted his shock to Scowcroft, telling him 'our first objective must be a ceasefire. That will be tough enough to get the Israelis to accept. It will be impossible as part of a global deal'.[73] Kissinger ignored Nixon's instructions. On 21 October he and Sisco reached accord with the Soviets on a ceasefire proposal to be submitted to the UN Security Council, the formulation of which granted the Soviet Union no leading role in a post-war settlement.

That day Kissinger sent a secret note to Dinitz from Moscow to inform him of agreement on a ceasefire. In this extraordinary dispatch, declassified in 2003, Kissinger apologized for a four-hour delay in notifying the Israelis, assuring Dinitz that 'we would understand if [the] Israelis felt they required some additional time for military dispositions before cease-fire takes effect'.[74] The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 at 00:50 on 22 October, stipulating that all fire cease within 12 hours.

On the evening of 21 October Meir attempted to reach Nixon with an urgent request for a delay. The magnitude of the US airlift, a detailed discussion of which took place at the 20 October meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, had added to Israel's confidence as it advanced on the southern front. Zvi Tsur, a former IDF chief-of-staff whose position at the Defense Ministry included the supervision of arms transfers, reported that Israel had by 20 October received from the United States 32 F-4s with all of the armament for these jets that his office had requested. The United States had also flown in 10,000 LAW anti-tank missiles and 80 TOW missile launchers. Armour, he noted, was 'a different story', because the Americans had yet to agree to more than 125 tanks. Nevertheless, Tsur told the

committee, Israel still had 1,150 operable tanks, and the arms situation was now 'largely satisfactory'.[75]

Faced with no alternative, the Israeli government accepted the ceasefire just before the Security Council convened, but Meir asked that Kissinger fly from Moscow to Tel Aviv for consultations. On 22 October Kissinger held three meetings with the Israelis, and what he told them has become the subject of controversy. Hanhimäki notes that Kissinger's behaviour in Tel Aviv indicated he had 'little respect for formal agreements'.[76] Thus, in the first meeting, Kissinger told the Israelis: 'You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night [22–23 October] while I'm flying [to Washington].'[77] According to Quandt, 'Kissinger was insistent that Israel move into defensive positions and not violate the cease-fire'.[78] Nevertheless, as Lebow and Stein note, there remains disagreement regarding Kissinger's claim that he was 'very tough with the Israelis'.[79] In fact, the archival record clearly demonstrates that Kissinger was willing to permit Israel to continue operations several hours beyond the time set for the end of hostilities. At the second meeting Dayan pointed out: 'There is no difference between Egypt and Israeli time, so it means 17:00 hours, or eleven hours from the Security Council resolution', then asked, 'What should we do? I'd like not to stop'. Kissinger answered: 'That's in your domestic jurisdiction.'[80] Peter Rodman, special assistant to Kissinger, has observed that 'Henry felt very guilty about the communications failure [from Moscow to Tel Aviv]'.[81] That 'guilt' notwithstanding, Kissinger had countenanced Israel's 'minor' ceasefire violations.

Yet Kissinger did not fly to Tel Aviv to encourage Israel to defy an agreement he had reached with the rival superpower, and the transcripts of a third meeting confirm that he did not realize how close Israel was to a complete encirclement of the Third Army.[82] His main purpose was to provide Israel's leaders, badly shaken, with reassurances that would secure their compliance. First, Kissinger promised that there were no US–Soviet 'side understandings' that would compromise Israel's military and diplomatic positions. Second, he assured the Israelis that the most urgent attention would be given to the prisoner exchange that they desperately wanted. Third, the secretary of state promised that both the arms air and sea lifts would continue after the ceasefire.[83]

That evening Meir told the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that refusal to acquiesce to the ceasefire would have meant risking an end to the US airlift. 'I remember', said the prime minister, 'talk of the extent of our dependence on the United States. But [. . .] let us not forget the source of our weaponry.' Moshe Carmel, a retired major-general and member of the committee, asked Meir whether she was convinced that Kissinger had reached no secret agreement with the Soviet Union regarding an Arab–Israeli settlement. Meir's response provides clear evidence of her faith in Kissinger's basic good will toward Israel. She answered: 'I am convinced he is not lying; in any case, not to us.'[84]

Neither the United Nations nor the United States created a mechanism for supervision of the ceasefire, and neither Egypt nor Israel observed the UN Resolution. Meir admitted to Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador to Israel, that there had been

'heavy fighting', blaming it on 'Egyptian initiatives' but also noting that the IDF had been ordered to 'continue fighting until and unless the Egyptians stop'.[85] Within 24 hours of Egypt's first violation, the IDF had cut off all access routes to the Egyptian Third Army.

Late on 23 October Brezhnev urged Nixon to cooperate in forcing Israeli compliance, declaring: 'Why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you.' Nixon assured him that the United States would not allow a 'historic agreement' such as the superpower-brokered ceasefire to fail.[86] But late that evening, Brezhnev called upon Nixon to dispatch a US contingent to join in forcing an end to the fighting, warning that the Soviet Union would 'consider [. . .] taking appropriate steps unilaterally.[87]' Nixon claims that he authorized Kissinger to order a military alert, and late at night on 24 October Kissinger convened an ad hoc meeting of the WSAG. Nixon was probably drunk and did not attend that meeting, so it was primarily Kissinger who decided upon a Def Con 3 nuclear alert, placing all US military forces in a heightened state of readiness.[88]

On 25 October the Egyptian Third Army attempted to break out of the encirclement, and Israel tightened its siege. Kissinger made clear to Israel that it would not be allowed to destroy the Egyptian army, prompting Dinitz to protest: 'we will not [. . .] release an army that came to destroy us. It has never happened in the history of war'. Kissinger replied: 'Also it has never happened that a small country is producing a world war [. . .] There is a limit beyond which you cannot push the President.'[89] Yet in his exchanges with the Soviets Kissinger denied that the violations of the ceasefire were significant. He called for superpower restraint of both 'Cairo and Tel Aviv', invoked the 1972 'Basic Principles' (of détente) stipulating joint responsibility for preventing nuclear war, and later that day promised Dobrynin that the United States would cancel its nuclear alert.[90] Hostilities ceased on 26 October, the superpower compromise taking the form of UN Resolution 340 (25 October 1973), which called for a UN Emergency Force to monitor the ceasefire formulated in Resolutions 338 and 339.

Kissinger was determined that Israel should allow the Third Army to receive non-military supplies and evacuate its wounded. Nevertheless, he opposed both pressure to cut off the airlift to Israel and the Defense Department's contingency plans for a US resupply of the Egyptian army. Four of Kissinger's conversations of 27 October, only two of which appear in *Crisis*, shed light on his disagreement with that office. At 12:28 that day Haig told Kissinger that Schlesinger wanted the United States to be 'tougher' with Israel. Kissinger exhorted Haig to 'settle down those maniacs at Defense'.[91] At 13:00 Schlesinger reminded Kissinger that it had been 'our help arranging the ceasefire and they [the Egyptians] were captured after that, which compromises [. . .] our position'. Kissinger told the defence secretary: 'We can't land troops [. . .] and resupply the Third Army.' Schlesinger asked: 'Did you indicate to the Israelis that you would cut off their airlift if they did not acquiesce?' Kissinger replied that he had not done so.[92]

At 15:20 on 27 October Kissinger told Scowcroft (who supported a US resupply of the Egyptian forces): 'The name of the game is not saving the Third Army but being the country that delivered [. . .] We do not want to be in the insane position

of supplying the Third Army and taking the other side.'[93] Ten minutes later Kissinger, exasperated at the Defense Department but also at Israel for delaying passage of a convoy to the Third Army, told Haig: 'If the Israelis overdo it we may have to go in and resupply.'[94] In fact, Kissinger authorized no such action.

On 29 October Kissinger told Schlesinger he wanted the airlift to Israel continued until the next week, so that he could 'sell stopping it to the Arabs'.[95] By that time, the volume of the airlift had surpassed 12,000 tons.[96] At the same time, the Israeli government viewed with trepidation its termination, domestic considerations fuelling much of its concern. Zvi Tsur told US Air Force General Maurice Casey, who was in Tel Aviv to assess Israel's losses, that Meir wanted the airlift maintained at least until the arrival of the first ships of the US sealift, viewing as 'absolutely essential' to her political position 'continuous proof of US resupply'.[97]

Meir arrived in Washington on 1 November, telling Kissinger: 'We have had wars before. But this is the first time we've had demonstrations.' Later that day she met with Nixon, Kissinger and Saunders, initiating no detailed discussion of arms but expressing gratitude to the President for the airlift.[98] Nixon conveyed US expectation of its client's future compliance, telling Meir: 'You have to consider whether the policy you have followed – being prepared with the Phantoms and the Skyhawks – can succeed, lacking a settlement.'[99] His administration looked forward to the commencement of a diplomatic process over which the United States would hold sway, and on 7 November Kissinger met in Cairo with Sadat.[100]

Conclusion

The United States extended the airlift to Israel until 12 November 1973. By that date the US Air Force had transferred to Israel by air 27,233 tons of materiel, and the US sealift, by then arrived at the port of Haifa, unloaded 36,206 tons of equipment. Israel lost 32 Phantom jets, requested 80, and received 34 F-4s. Israeli Skyhawk losses totalled 53; Israel requested 80 A-4s, and the United States supplied 54 of these planes. These figures do not include six Phantoms and eight Skyhawks transferred in accordance with the pre-war schedule. The Nixon administration had by mid-November 1973 armed Israel with Chaparral surface-to-air missiles, Maverick and Shrike air-to-ground missiles, C-130 transport planes, and CH-53 helicopters, all items hitherto withheld from Israel.[101]

The military resupply of Israel during and after the Yom Kippur war greatly increased its dependence on the United States, and this is what both Nixon and Kissinger intended. In fact, the levels of the US and Soviet resupply operations to their respective clients became the subject of discord between Israel and the Nixon administration. When Dayan visited Washington on 7 December 1973, he claimed that the United States had shipped 90,000 tons of equipment to Israel, while the Soviet Union had transferred 300,000 tons to Egypt and Syria. Kissinger refuted those numbers, noting that the United States had provided Israel with 102,000 tons of equipment, while the Soviets had supplied Egypt and Syria (together) with

100,009 tons of materiel.[102] Nevertheless, the Israeli view warrants further note, for Israel's inability to acquire all of the arms that it desired was a source of continued frustration. The Israelis asked for 2,000 APCs; the United States approved shipment of 250 M-113s. The Israelis also wanted 1,000 tanks. In early December 1973 Scowcroft informed Kissinger that Israel had lost 369 tanks during the war, received 200 from the United States, and captured 306 Soviet-made units in operating condition, noting, 'their losses have more than been replaced'.[103]

Israel had fought the 1967 Six Day War with an air force almost entirely of French manufacture and an armoured corps of which European-made tanks were still the dominant component. By 1973 US-supplied arms were the main weapons of the IDF. Meir reminded her colleagues that 'for our source [of arms] and relations with the Americans [. . .] we know we must pay a price. No one is waiting to take their place'.[104] In truth, the prime minister herself regarded US support with great ambivalence. The gratitude she expressed to Nixon and Kissinger was certainly ingenuous. Yet ten days earlier Meir had revealed her anguish over the 'real price' that Israel paid for dependence on its patron, a view recorded in very recently released Israeli documents. On 22 October Meir told the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 'it must be said that they [the Americans] themselves are no less responsible for this war [. . .] had we had all of the arms that they are sending us now [. . .] we would have been much better able both to deter before and succeed during this war'.[105]

Israel, having no choice but to respond to Kissinger's prodding, nevertheless conditioned cooperation on the maintenance of its own military superiority.[106] Kissinger was eager to achieve a breakthrough, toward which Israel's January 1974 agreement to withdraw entirely to the east bank of the Suez Canal was but one step. Kissinger knew well that without extensive assurances on security matters, Israel's leaders would agree to no progress on the diplomatic plane. For that reason, during his 7 December meeting with Dayan, he agreed to supply an additional 150 tanks. The secretary presented himself as Israel's protector in the face of 'hostile elements' in the administration.[107] We may accept at face value Kissinger's promise to Dayan that 'we are not using reequipment to put pressure on you. You must have security as you move into negotiations'.[108] Thus, in February 1974 he recommended to Nixon waiver of $500 million in payments that Israel owed the United States and an additional $1 billion in credits for the purchase of arms. Kissinger convinced Nixon that granting the first sum, representing the total cost of the arms resupply to Israel during the 1973 war, would 'deeply please the Israelis and sharply project your generosity and decisiveness'.[109]

The Nixon administration had before the 1973 war planned to sell Israel arms in keeping with the US interpretation of its client's military superiority and on a schedule that Washington dictated. Soviet supplies to the Arab states, Israel's war losses, and US objectives during the post-war period made impractical the pre-crisis level of arms, and the rate at which the United States resupplied Israel was an unintended consequence of its client's military engagement. The administration attempted no return to the timetable of transfers that had obtained before the 1973 war, and contracts signed less than one year after the war far exceeded the limits that the

United States had before that crisis intended to observe. Thus, in September 1974 Yitzhak Rabin, who had in April replaced Meir as prime minister, visited Washington and obtained US agreement to sell Israel an additional 200 M-60A1 tanks, 50 Phantom jets, 1,000 TOW missile launchers, and several more items that the United States had during the 1973 war declined to supply.[110]

At the same time, Rabin's government stubbornly refused to yield the strategic passes and oilfields of the Sinai peninsula in an interim settlement with Egypt that the administration of President Gerald Ford sought to arrange. In March 1975 Kissinger, serving as secretary of state to Nixon's successor, threatened Israel with a far-reaching 'reassessment' of US policy, including the supply of arms. Israel signed the Sinai II Agreement in September 1975, in exchange for which the Ford administration both 'reaccelerated' standing arms contracts and upgraded the level of warplanes that the United States would sell it. By 1976 Israel had taken delivery of an additional 400 M-60A1 tanks, received F-15 Eagle fighter jets, and placed its initial order for F-16 combat aircraft.[111]

The Soviet Union's arms transfers to the Arab states during the 1973 war had fuelled the Nixon administration's determination to demonstratively outpace that resupply operation. The principal challenge was the airlift, an undertaking that the United States began several days later than the Soviet operation, at a far greater distance from its client, and with the logistical cooperation of no ally except Portugal. In fact, according to State Department figures, the US airlift was by the end of the fighting on 26 October no greater in volume than that of the Soviet Union.[112] Nevertheless, at a meeting on 3 November with the ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, Kissinger expressed satisfaction at the success of the airlift, the outcome of the war, the diminishing of the Soviet role in the Middle East, and his view that détente had been preserved despite the events of the past three weeks.[113]

The airlift to Israel was a clear demonstration of US ability and determination to assist a threatened client and an operation that deeply impressed Sadat, in whose view Israeli military achievements were actually a US defeat of Soviet arms.[114] The Soviet Union had undertaken an airlift that violated the understandings of détente regarding crisis management, and the US airlift was a response to that operation. Kissinger wanted no misunderstanding to jeopardize détente, in this case differences over the acceptable limits to client support. For that reason, he had on 13 October made clear to Scowcroft his great concern regarding the threat that the airlifts posed to superpower accords. Moreover, the secretary of state treated with particular gravity the scope of the Soviet operation, because it forced the United States to greatly exceed, both in quality and quantity, the arms it transferred to Israel. Put simply, Kissinger had manufactured no US–Soviet rearmament contest, viewed this competition as an aggravating development, and for reasons of national prestige and reputation resolved to outdo the rival superpower's performance.

Yet Kissinger's exclusion of the Soviet Union from post-war regional diplomacy was, unlike the advent of the resupply contest, very much part of the secretary's plan. This work is in agreement with that of Hanhimäki, who writes that US consent

to a conference on the Middle East at Geneva on 18 December 1973 was a 'multilateral façade to obfuscate the reality of Kissinger's unilateral diplomacy'.[115] Thus, while the airlift had forced Kissinger to a reluctant, if determined, response to what he perceived as a Soviet violation of détente, his moves in the post-war diplomatic setting were carefully calculated. In that manner, Kissinger's strategy was a premeditated breach of the May 1972 détente agreement, a basic principle of which precluded 'efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other'.[116]

Notes

[1] National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NA II), Record Group (RG) 59 Subject-Numeric File (SNF), 1970–73, DEF 12-5 ISR, Memcon, Dinitz/Kissinger, 8:20, 7 December 1973.
[2] Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 307–17.
[3] Suri, *Henry Kissinger*, 256–61.
[4] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 521–9.
[5] Ben-Zvi, *Johnson*; Levey, 'Skyhawk Sale'; Rodman, 'Breakthrough'.
[6] Arms Trade Registers, 53.
[7] Arms Trade Registers, 43–5, 63–5.
[8] Quandt, *Decade*, 146–7.
[9] Arms Trade Registers, 55.
[10] NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files (NSCF), Middle East (ME), Box 610, Richardson to Kissinger, 27 February 1973.
[11] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, ME, Box 610, Saunders, Quandt to Kissinger, 28 February 1973.
[12] NA II, RG 59, 1970–73, SNF, Box 1749, DEF 15-5 ISR, Embassy in Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 11 May 1973.
[13] NA II, RG 59, 1970–73, SNF, S-5207/ DI-5A, 'Estimated Inventory', 5 October 1973.
[14] NA II, NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, Box H-94, WSAG Meeting, 6 October 1973.
[15] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 478.
[16] 'The October War', The National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv, 16.
[17] NA II, RG 59, Box 328, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1969–77, Memcon, Kissinger/Huang Zhen, 6 October 1973.
[18] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 189.
[19] Arms Trade Registers, 54.
[20] NA II, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, 25, Cat. C 1974, Memcon, Dinitz/Kissinger, 7 October 1973.
[21] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1173, 'Arab–Israeli Situation Report', 8 October 1973.
[22] NA II, NPMP, HAK (Henry A. Kissinger) Telcons, Box 22, Chronological File, Kissinger/Haig, 9:35, Kissinger/Schlesinger, 13:30, 7 October 1973.
[23] NA II, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, 1969–77, Box 328, Memcon, Kissinger/Huang Zhen, 6 October 1973; Kissinger, *Crisis*, 66–71.
[24] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 89; NA II, NPMP, HAK Tel Cons, Box 22, Nixon/Kissinger, 19:08, 8 October 1973.
[25] NPMP, NAII, NSCF, WSAG ME, Box H-093, Memorandum for the Secretary, 8 October 1973.
[26] NA II, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 25, CA Arab–Israeli War, Memcon, Dinitz/Kissinger, 8:20, 9 October 1973. Dinitz's figures were exaggerated.
[27] NA II, NPMP, NSC, Country Files, Box 664, Quandt to Kissinger, 9 October 1973.
[28] NA II, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, POL-ISR-US, Memcon, Dinitz/Kissinger, 18:10, 9 October 1973.

[29] NA II NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 22, Scowcroft/Kissinger, 19:55, 11 October 1973.
[30] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 22, Schlesinger/Kissinger, 19:15, 10 October 1973.
[31] Israel State Archive (ISA), File 7792/3A, Report of the Embassy in Washington, 12 October 1973.
[32] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Nixon/Kissinger, 8:38, 12 October 1973.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Schlesinger/Kissinger, no time indicated, 13 October 1973, HAK Telcons, Box 23, NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Dinitz/Kissinger, 12:32, 13 October 1973; Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 192.
[35] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, 12:49 13 October 1973.
[36] NA II NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Haig/Kissinger, 9:35, 13 October 1973.
[37] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Humphrey/Kissinger, 14:30, 12 October 1973.
[38] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, 12:49, 13 October 1973.
[39] Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin*, 57–8; NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 16:25, 13 October 1973.
[40] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1174, 1973 Middle East War, File 5, Department of State Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation Reports 18 and 22, 10 and 12 October 1973.
[41] ISA, File 7792/3A, Telcon, Dinitz/Meir, 12 October 1973.
[42] Nixon, *Memoirs*, 926–8. Emphasis original.
[43] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 193; NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Scowcroft/Kissinger, 14:25, 13 October 1973.
[44] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Scowcroft/Kissinger, 14:25, 13 October 1973.
[45] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Nixon/Kissinger, 9:04, 14 October 1973.
[46] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 16:25, 13 October 1973.
[47] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 12:36, 14 October 1973.
[48] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 261–2.
[49] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Nixon/Kissinger, 11:10, 14 October 1973.
[50] Quandt, *Decade*, 185.
[51] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, apparently 14 October 1973.
[52] NA II, NPMP, NSC, WSAG ME, Box H-093, Pickering to Kissinger, 14 October 1973.
[53] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, undated but apparently 14 October 1973.
[54] NA II, NPMP, NSC, WSAG ME, Box H-093, Pickering to Kissinger, 14 October 1973; Arms Trade Registers, 52–5.
[55] NA II, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1749, DEF 12-5 ISR, Weiss to Kissinger, 14, 15 October 1973.
[56] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 664, Memcon, Nixon and Arab foreign ministers, 17 October 1973.
[57] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1175, File no. 13, Embassy in Kuwait to Department of State, 18 October 1973.
[58] NA II, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 1174, Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report no. 36, 16 October 1973.
[59] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 261–2, 273–6.
[60] NA II, NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, Box H-092, WSAG Meeting, 17 October 1973.
[61] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 273–276.
[62] NA II, NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, Box H-117, WSAG meeting, 17 October 1973.
[63] Ibid.
[64] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Dinitz/Kissinger, 12:32, 13 October 1973. The rest of the conversation has been censored.
[65] NA II, NPMP, NSC Country Files, Box 610, Stukel to Kissinger, 17 October 1973.
[66] Nixon, *Memoirs*, 931.
[67] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Scowcroft/Kissinger, 22:45, 18 October 1973.

[68] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1173, 1973 Middle East War, File 14, Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report 43, 19 October 1973.
[69] Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin*, 103–6.
[70] Syria hoped to retake the Golan Heights and placed upon the Soviet Union no pressure for a ceasefire. Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 209–10.
[71] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 303.
[72] 'The October War', The National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv, 35.
[73] NA II, NPMP, HAK Office Files (HAKOF), Box 39, Kissinger to Scowcroft, 20 October 1973.
[74] NA II, NPMP, HAKOF, Box 39, Memcon, Brezhnev/Kissinger, 21 October 1973; Embassy in Soviet Union to Department of State, Cable 13148, 21 October 1973.
[75] ISA, File 8163/9, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 20 October 1973.
[76] Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 313.
[77] NA II, RG59, SNF 1970–73, POL-7 US/Kissinger, Memcon, Meir/Kissinger, 22 October 1973.
[78] Quandt, *Decade*, 193.
[79] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 218; Quandt, *Decade*, 193.
[80] NA II, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, POL-7 US/Kissinger, Memcon of Luncheon for Kissinger's Party, 22 October 1973.
[81] In Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 218.
[82] NA II, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, POL-7 US/Kissinger, Memcon, 'Military Briefing', 22 October 1973.
[83] NA II, RG59, SNF 1970–73, POL-7 US/Kissinger, Memcon, Meir/Kissinger, 22 October 1973.
[84] ISA, File 8163/9, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 22 October 1973.
[85] NA II, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 1175, File no. 18, Embassy in Tel Aviv to Washington, 23 October 1973.
[86] NA II, NPMP, HAKOF, Box 69, Nixon to Brezhnev, Hotline Message, 23 October 1973.
[87] NA II, NPMP, HAKOF, Box 69, Brezhnev to Nixon, Hotline, 24 October 1973.
[88] Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 316; Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost*, 246–50.
[89] Kissinger, *Crisis*, 179.
[90] NA II, NPMP, HAKOF, Box 69, Nixon to Brezhnev, Hotline Message, 25 October 1973; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 297.
[91] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Haig/Kissinger, 12:28, 27 October 1973. Kissinger refers to this briefly in *Years of Upheaval*, 602.
[92] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, 13:00 27 October 1973.
[93] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Scowcroft/Kissinger, 15:20, 27 October 1973. Not included in *Crisis*.
[94] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Haig/Kissinger, 15:30, 27 October 1973. Does not appear in *Crisis*.
[95] NA II, NPMP, HAK Telcons, Box 23, Schlesinger/Kissinger, 27 October 1973. Does not appear in *Crisis*.
[96] NA II, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 1176, National Military Command Center, Memorandum for White House Situation Room, 27 October 1973.
[97] NA II, NPMP, NSC, Country Files, Box 610, Embassy in Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 31 October 1973.
[98] NA II Memcons, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Meir/Kissinger; Meir/Nixon/Kissinger, 1 November 1973.
[99] NA II, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Memcon, Meir/Nixon/Kissinger, 1 November 1973.
[100] NA II, NPMP, HAKOF, Box 132, Scowcroft to Nixon, 'Meeting with Sadat', 7 November 1973.
[101] NA II, NPMP, NSC, Country Files, Box 611, Scowcroft to Kissinger, 7 December 1973.

[102] NA II, NPMP, RG 59, SNF, 1970–73, DEF 12-5 ISR Memcon, Dayan/Kissinger, 7 December 1973; NSC, Country Files, Box 611, Saunders to Scowcroft, 7 December 1973.
[103] NA II, NPMP, NSC, Country Files, Box 611, Scowcroft to Kissinger, 7 December 1973.
[104] ISA, File 8163/8, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 9 October 1973.
[105] ISA, File 8163/10, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 22 October 1973.
[106] Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, 158.
[107] NA II, RG 59, SNF, 1970–73, DEF 12-5 ISR, Memcon, Dayan/Kissinger, 7 December 1973.
[108] Ibid.
[109] NA II, NPMP, NSC, Country Files, Box 611, Kissinger's memorandum, 'Financing Arms to Israel', 23 February 1973.
[110] SIPRI Yearbook [s], 1975; 1976; 1977.
[111] Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, 294; SIPRI Yearbook, 1977, 321–2.
[112] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1176, Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report 68, 27 October 1973.
[113] NA II, NPMP, NSCF, Box 1176, 'Secretary's Meeting on Middle East with NATO Ambassadors', 3 November 1973.
[114] Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 260–61.
[115] Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 320.
[116] Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 327.

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