ONE ACTION, TWO MORAL ORIENTATIONS— THE TENSION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND CARE VOICES IN ISRAELI SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

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Abstract — Two concepts of the highly moral person are analyzed by contrasting two views of moral action, couched in terms of the moral voices of justice and care, in the moral judgments made by Israeli selective conscientious objectors during the war in Lebanon (1982–1985). It is argued that the highly moral person, as typified in Kohlberg, manifests responsible moral action particularly in situations conceptualized as requiring "resistance to temptation," where not acting or objecting to action is justified as right and just. The case of Michael Bernhardt, who claimed that he did not shoot at My Lai, is the example frequently given by Kohlberg. A contrasting view of the highly moral actor and of moral responsibility in situations such as My Lai is offered. These situations are conceptualized as calling for action, where response to people in need is called for. Both modes of action might be viewed as morally appropriate within the same situation and by the same actor. The tension between these two conceptions of moral action appears clearly in the dilemmas described by some of the Israeli soldiers who refused to fight in Lebanon.

INTRODUCTION

The view of the moral actor as a free agent, capable of rising above the circumstances of his or her environment by virtue of moral principles, has been central both to ethical theory and to psychological research on moral development. As described by Kohlberg (1976), the ideal moral actor adopts a "prior to society" or "post-conventional" standpoint, from which he or she "is aware of the values and rights prior to the social attachments and contract" (p. 35). From this vantage point, Kohlberg's thesis implies that the moral actor is able to choose between conflicting rights and duties without any personal and societal constraints. This individualistic outlook is the hallmark of moral autonomy and moral maturity.

Most people are portrayed as "conventional" moral thinkers (stages 3 and 4) in Kohlberg's terms and are susceptible to personal and situational influences upon their actions. Moral actors who manifest "post-conventional" thinking (stages 5 and 6) are rarely found in studies of moral development (Lickona, 1980) and under the pressure of circumstances often tend to "lower" their mode of functioning, either out of a "realistic appraisal of the situation" (Locke, 1983a, p. 166) or simply out of a "calculated restructuring of the informational and the social field" (Milgram, 1974, p. 7). This change of moral perception, particularly the disparity between hypothetical judgment and actual behavior, need not be considered as limiting the explanatory power of the moral theory per se (Broughton, 1978) but, instead, has been ascribed to the unfortunate intervention of non-moral factors such as "ego strength" (Krebs, 1967).

Over the past two decades, experimental evidence of moral autonomy has come from a limited range of action situations where people who are strangers to one another are asked to return questionnaires (Krebs & Rosenwald, 1977), not to cheat on tests (Kohlberg, 1984), or to help others unknown to them (McNamee, 1978). Though Kohlberg and Candee (1984) claimed that "in the clear majority of studies using Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning, there is a correlation between relatively high moral judgment and what is commonly considered to be moral behavior including honesty, resistance to temptation and altruism" (p. 52), the most common type of dilemma situation examined was that of "resistance to temptation." In this type of situation, the right action is conceptualized as *not acting*—i.e., as refraining from acting in one's presumed self interest (not bothering to return the questionnaires, cheating on the test, not helping others). Thus conceived, moral action (i.e., non-action) depends on the ability to resist the temptation to act spontaneously or unreflectively. For right action, in this view, *hesitation* is an inevitable prerequisite.

Consequently, from a developmental standpoint, moral action has been premised on the intervention of reason between the child (tempted to act on his or her impulses) and the society (which demands or holds up an ideal of restraint or consideration for others). Thus, for the child to act morally, he or she must rely on the intervention of reason which "causes man . . . to hesitate in his interaction with the milieu" (Langer, 1969, p. 14). In this view, the more elaborated the form of reasoning, the more central the role of hesitation in moral functioning. Locke (1981), for example, notes that "the more sophisticated our moral understanding, the more difficult it may be to resolve conflicting moral claims" (p. 177).

Obviously "when the (moral) dilemma is prearranged so that only one of the two opposed actions can be judged as right" (Kohlberg & Candee, 1983, p. 62) the moral actor is required to be obsessed with singling out the most just claim of right. This prearrangement negates the possibility of viewing the moral conflict as unresolvable. In this paper, the authors wish to address the tension between moral action premised on detachment (resolving conflicting claims of rights) and moral action grounded in connection (facing conflicts of loyalties).

The conception of the highly moral actor and the right moral action as premised on detachment might be illustrated in the case of Michael Bernhardt,

the only soldier who claimed not to take part in the massacre at My Lai.*
Kohlberg (1984) praises Bernhardt for *not acting*, i.e., not shooting. He views this
"action" (i.e., not shooting) as consistent with his principled moral competence
and judgment reasoning of the My Lai situation. To Kohlberg, Bernhardt
exemplifies moral action; as a moral actor, he is capable of seeing the ultimate
priority of human life and of valuing life irrespective of societal categories
(Vietnamese/Americans) or constraints.

Kohlberg's description of Bernhardt implies that his action is the most just or
most moral course of action; that in the situation he faces, *not shooting* is the
morally principled resolution to the moral dilemma posed. Yet, there are other
ways to think about what constitutes moral action in these circumstances or what
characterizes the highly moral person, acting under these constraints. An
example of such an alternative moral position at My Lai is provided by
Thompson, who rescued nine Vietnamese by threatening Calley (Hersh, 1970).
In contrast to Bernhardt's "passive" fulfillment of moral principles (setting the
highest priority on life, treating persons as ends rather than as means, upholding
moral principles at the cost of disobeying authority, and so forth), Thompson
spontaneously initiated an *active* action of help to the people he was facing, who
were in need. He did so by attending to the parameters of the situation (the
threat posed by Calley) and by inventing an effective response (threatening
Calley so that he would not bother him while he was taking survivors out from
the ditches). Thompson's action implies discerning that Calley might respond to
threat, discovering a way of threatening Calley that was effective, drawing on his
knowledge of Calley, of the situation, and of his relationship with Calley, as well
as knowledge of himself and of what actions he was capable of taking.

The contrast between Bernhardt and Thompson is heightened by the fact that
though considered as a principled moral thinker, Bernhardt was not the first to
report the immoral action to the authorities (Hersh, 1970). Though Bernhardt's
moral reasoning, as assessed by Kohlberg, reflects a capacity for post-
conventional moral judgment (a high level of moral development) this *non-action*
of *not reporting* might be judged as a manifestation of indifference, or lack of
concern for the others around him. This reading is supported by the fact that
the injustice of My Lai was revealed only accidentally after a long period of
silence (Hersh, 1970). Bernhardt seems to be consistent not only in his principles
but also in taking a moral stand of *non-action*. As he explained to Kohlberg:
"When I thought of shooting people I figured: 'Well, I am going to be doing *my
own war*, let them do their own war'" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 549, emphasis added).

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*Kohlberg seems not to differentiate between mature moral thoughts and credibility (see Linn,
1989c). He always refers to Bernhardt as *the only* soldier who did not shoot in My Lai. Although this
claim was stated to Kohlberg by Bernhardt, its validity and credibility have never been questioned by
him. Colonel William G. Eckhardt, J.A.G.C., who was the Chief Prosecutor in the case of the senior
army commander on the ground at the My Lai incident, was asked by the first author about
Kohlberg's claim at a Washington meeting on "Morality in and out of war: Professional conduct on
the battlefield." Eckhardt's response was "Everybody was shooting in My Lai. I do not know that
Bernhardt did not shoot" (personal communication, Jan. 22, 1987). Nevertheless, in this paper, we
refer to Bernhardt's testimony to Kohlberg as credible.

The questions of whether there is more than one moral voice within each person and whether different moral voices may prevail in certain situations are age-old questions. Moral thinkers, as for example the biblical interpreters, also questioned what moral actions were deemed praiseworthy and what characterizes the highly moral or righteous person. Looking for an example of a highly moral actor, they refer to the case of Noah who was ordered by God to build an ark to save his own family and the family of animals before the flood covered the earth to destroy the evil. The bible testifies: "Noah was in his generations a man of righteousness and whole hearted. Noah walked with God" (Genesis 6: 9). Some sages explain this praise as being a righteous man in his generation— meaning his evil generation. Others interpret this characterization of Noah as indirect criticism: had Noah lived in Abraham's time, he would have been insignificant (Slotowitz, 1977). Noah, these sages explain, was content to build an ark to save only himself, and did not intercede on behalf of his generation but let them perish. In contrast, Abraham did intercede on behalf of others. In essence, Abraham questioned the view of himself or his people as the only righteous ones by pleading to God not to destroy the city of Sodom: "Oh, let not the Lord be angry, and I will speak yet but this once. Peradventure ten shall be found there" (Genesis 18: 32). The story of Abraham's action on behalf of Sodom, in contrast to Noah's *non-action* on behalf of those slated to drown in the flood, suggests that the moral actor or highly moral person is one who actively searches for possible moral resolutions within the dilemma situation, rather than simply refraining from taking action that is inconsistent with righteousness of moral principles. The realization of a different mode of moral action implies a change in moral psychology research.

The dimensions of attachment and detachment within the dilemma situation in addition to the dimensions of justice and injustice thus become a focus for moral concern. The moral voices of justice and care have been distinguished in terms of this shift in the focus of attention, with the voice of justice identified by the articulation of concerns about equality and reciprocity and the voice of care identified by the articulation of concerns about connection and response (Gilligan, 1982a). These two voices imply different ways of conceptualizing moral action or what actions are worthy of praise or blame (see also Gilligan, 1986a, 1986b; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987).

The fact that biblical interpreters were troubled by the way in which Noah *detaches* himself from the dilemma situation and solves it as an outsider (from the vantage point of Noah's ark) suggests that concerns about detachment have a long history in the Western tradition. Their criticism of Noah as lacking in care, the view of his righteousness as compromised by his willingness to turn away from others, to separate himself from them, indicates that concerns about attachment and care are persistent human concerns.

Contemporary psychological research indicates that both women and men tend to introduce concerns about both justice and care when discussing moral conflicts they have faced. They also tend to focus on one set of concerns or to render either justice or care considerations more pressing or more salient (Brown et al., 1978; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987).

Furthermore, although women and men raise justice and care concerns in discussing moral conflicts and thus identify both as moral concerns, a focus on care concerns was demonstrated almost exclusively by women among educationally advantaged North American adults and adolescents. Adolescent and adult males in this population were more likely to focus on justice considerations in resolving moral conflicts, and thus they best illustrate Kohlberg's conception of morality as justice (honoring rights, fulfilling duties, acting in accordance with the principle of equal respect, etc.).

Within this justice framework, the care focus in women's moral thinking initially appeared as a "different voice" (Gilligan, 1982b), a voice characterized by concerns about connection and disconnection. From this "care perspective," disconnection or detachment creates the conditions for carelessness or neglect as well as for ignorance—for not knowing either what is happening or how to respond. A care voice was characterized not only by a different way of approaching, experiencing, or imagining relationships (as webs of connection rather than as hierarchies of inequality or balanced scales) but also by a different way of experiencing and conceiving oneself in relation to others—as connected and therefore interdependent (attached), rather than as separate and therefore capable of objectivity (and objectification).

A powerful image of a connected sense of self is provided by Martin Luther King (1964) when he says in the letter from Birmingham jail: "We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly" (p. 79). Only the word "caught" suggests the negative valuation commonly placed on relationships of dependence within American society (with its valuing of independence) or the uneasiness about connection or attachment, which from a psychological vantage point appears to be more characteristic of males. The tie between conceptions of self and conceptions of morality (see Gilligan, 1977, 1982b) is grounded in the fact that it is only through connection with others that one is able to see or hear others in their own terms. The difference between taking another's point of view (or speaking another's language) and putting *oneself* in the other person's shoes is the same as the difference between a sense of oneself as connected with others (their words entering one's ears, their images on one's retina, the culture entering via language, etc.) and a sense of oneself as separate and bounded, marked off from others by a psychic membrane which is regarded, ideally, as impermeable (the autonomous self of Kohlberg's principled stages).

One criticism which has been made of the "different voice" approach to moral development is that the language of care pertains to different kinds of relationships characterized by Kohlberg as "personal" or "particular" (i.e., limited by time, place, and context). Care reasoning thus is seen as desirable in the private realm but undesirable or inapplicable in the public sphere. Women's proficiency in care reasoning has been linked, on this basis, with women's exclusion from the public domain, an exclusion also considered responsible for limiting women's moral development. Sichel (1985), echoing these criticisms, asks in effect how moral actors in public life could reason in terms of care. She questions whether a care oriented moral voice could provide an adequate basis

for resolving public domain moral dilemmas. In response to such questions, we turn to the data on Israeli selective conscientious objectors, data that offer an empirical basis for thinking through these theoretical questions.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Soldiers' decisions to detach themselves from their fighting units, either because they morally object to the aims of the war (*jus ad bellum*), or its conduct (*jus un bello*), are not a routine occurrence throughout the 3,153 years of wars in our recorded history (Durant & Durant, 1968). Yet it is a familiar phenomenon, exemplified by a minority of individuals. This type of action is described as a "purely personal moral protest—though moral selfishness—which is sometimes the only resort of the principled but lonely man" (Walzer, 1968, p. 13). Selective conscientious objection refers particularly to those who object to the use of military power as a right rather than a duty (Melzer, 1975). The case of the Israeli reserve soldiers who refused to take part in military service during the Lebanon war, falls within this last category (Linn, 1986) and serves in this paper as a dramatic example of the emergent tension between the actor's justice and care voices in a real life dilemma situation.

Within the Israeli context, this tension is rooted in the dual lives of the Israeli male citizen, and gains sharper focus during an extreme political and social situation such as war. It is a multi-level tension between the conflict of duties and conflict of loyalties due to the unique connection between the Israeli society and its army. In the democratic state of Israel, the male citizen is both a civilian and a soldier. For men, service in the army is a lifelong civilian obligation and eventually becomes part of his Israeli identity. Upon reaching the age of 18, each Israeli male citizen is obliged to serve three years in the army, and upon release from compulsory service at age 21, up until the mid-50s, he is assigned to spend an average of one month a year in reserve service with his unit. Naturally, in times of emergency, the length and the nature of the service change. Furthermore, the tension of this dual role increases in crisis situations, when the citizen/soldier is obliged to leave his home and employment for the sake of national security.

To analyze and evaluate the moral dilemmas of Israeli soldiers requires some understanding of basic contextual factors—the situation in which the dilemma occurs. In the course of its 40 years of existence, Israeli citizens/soldiers have been involved in five wars. Traditionally the strength of the Israeli army has been ascribed to Israel's "no choice situation" combined with a deep conviction of a "just war," derived from it ultimately being a defensive war (Walzer, 1977). Furthermore, although loyalty to the members of the unit is a familiar universal phenomenon within armies and throughout wars (Hoffman, 1981; Marshal, 1978), within the Israeli context it possesses another dimension: The lifelong connection with friends within a civilian as well as a military context (Gal, 1986) and the central part of the army experience in the formation of the identity of Israeli men. This identity is socially constructed and joins two lines of social and moral development: The morality of obligation and duties and the morality of belonging (attachment) and loyalty.

Prior to the Lebanon war, resistance to military service in Israel was rare and

hardly ever reached public attention (Blatt, Davis, & Klinbaum, 1975). As already noted by Chomski (in Blatt et al., 1975), resistance within the Israeli context is an intellectually and morally complicated action due to the real threat to the country's survival. Thus, detachment from the fighting unit out of moral concern, although not a conventional mode of action in any context, is an extremely hard choice for the individual Israeli, a choice that first appeared on the public scene of Israeli society during the recent (June 1982–June 1985) war with Lebanon (Linn, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988a; Schiff & Yaari, 1984; Shiffer, 1984).

Unlike the former "no choice" wars, the war in Lebanon was initiated (as a short campaign) by Israel in the course of attempts to stop terrorist attacks from this region. The use of military power as a right rather than a duty did not gain favorable national consensus. As the Israeli stay on Lebanese soil was prolonged, the controversy over the objectives and means of the war grew. Yet there was a widespread consensus among the Israeli public that disobedience in the army as a mode of protest is morally wrong. Most of the soldiers who objected to the war chose to fulfill their duty, very often with extraordinary efforts of self sacrifice in attempting to preserve their moral principles in the battlefield (Linn, 1988a). Upon their return from the reserve service they bitterly protested in front of the government offices. However, about 150* reservists disobeyed the command to join their units in Lebanon (mostly when drafted again to this area), on the grounds that it would contradict the dictates of their conscience. They were court-martialed and sentenced to 14–35 days in military prison, some of them two and three times when refusing further drafts.

From the demographic data of a sample of 36 refusers randomly selected in the first year of the war out of 86 refusers released from prison (Linn, 1985, 1986), it was learned that the average Israeli refuser may be portrayed as an experienced fighter, about 30 years old (very often married with children), a college graduate (seven were Ph.D.s) who decided to refuse the next reserve service call after fighting in Lebanon. When the justification of the action was examined in accordance with Kohlberg's criteria for scoring moral judgments (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) it was found that for a significant number of reservists in the sample (69.4%, χ^2 5.44, $P \leqslant 0.05$), the action of refusal was guided by stage 4, 4/5, and 5 of moral logic (Linn, 1987). The refusers' primary focus on taking an objective and legal view of their own actions and attesting to the individual's right to exclude oneself from morally conflicting situations, is similar to the logic Kohlberg (1984) traced in the case of Bernhardt. The use of language is often identical—exemplifying the stark separation of self (my war, my problem) and other (their war). One Israeli refuser presents it this way:

> I think that in the refusal I succeeded in solving *my own problem about the war.* I am not sure if this way which I chose is the 100% right way, but I am sure that this is the right way for me. This was not my war . . . . *I let them fight their own war* . . . . (emphasis added)

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*This number does not include the many others whose requests not to serve in Lebanon were granted by sympathetic commanders.

Moreover, as was claimed by the refusers, only by not going to Lebanon could
they succeed in preserving their moral integrity. This notion of a single, most
moral solution to the war dilemma was consonant with the consistency of their
reasoning across Kohlberg's different stages and between different dilemma
contexts (Linn, 1985, 1987).

One of the most visible characteristics of this non-action (not going) is the
lonely manner in which the act was constructed and executed. Theoretically, this
is not a surprise. As noted by Walzer (1977) and echoed by Fromm (1981), "In
order to disobey, one must have the courage to be alone" (p. 21). Thirty of the
subjects (83%) were the only refusers in their unit. Some, however, were very
much attached to their unit and painfully decided to replace this attachment
with the adherence to their justice principles, as described by this soldier:

> After two months of fighting with a break of four days, I came back home and
> there was another draft waiting for me. This time to Ansar (a prisoner
> terrorist camp in Lebanon which also included terrorists' youth) . . . I knew it
> reached my "red line," my moral limit . . . I wanted to refuse but I did not
> know how to cope with it—my commanders are actually my friends and I
> knew that they would substitute someone else for me . . . I was terribly
> troubled by the fact that they would let me preserve my principles without
> paying the social price . . . So I decided to go . . . We came in . . . it was just like
> a concentration camp for me: Wire fences, signs and piles of mud . . . all the
> associations came to my mind. I told the commander that I was refusing . . .
> He asked me "What is the difference between manning a checkpoint and
> serving in Ansar?" It was hard to explain to him that this was the edge of my
> moral limits.

For other soldiers, the decision to refuse followed a different path. They
reported loose connections and detachment from the unit—some because they
had no friends in the unit and some because their military role led them to be
transferred from one unit to the other. The large proportion of medics (seven
out of 36) in this sample (Linn, 1989a), is one example of this. The role of these
soldiers required them to be transferred from one unit to another according to
the army's needs. Other refusers who had a unit of their own, did not consider
themselves as attached to it, either due to their extreme ideological stand, or to
the fact that the Lebanon war was the first reserve service with their unit:

> I did not have any special connection with my unit. The Lebanon war was my
> first reserve service with this unit after my regular service . . . As I spent some
> time until the trial staying with the people who were packing to go to
> Lebanon, I began to know the people, and it became extremely hard to refuse
> . . . You feel some kind of commitment . . . I really don't know how to explain
> this feeling . . . You feel that you are surrounded by people . . . Then the
> commander came and tried to inspire me, and you feel that you are swept
> along, pulled by the power of the people, but then I decided that I did not
> want to be swept along by these people and at this stage and I decided to
> remove myself. It is so easy to go along with the whole crowd . . . though these
> people did not want to go to Lebanon, being together gave them some
> unconscious excitement . . . and you really need inner fortitude to resist it.

For others, refusal matched their tendency to adopt detachment or self control as a mode of resolution for personal, moral dilemmas:

> We were facing Syria and I said to myself: "I do not know what I am doing here" and I planned that if there was a sudden attack, I would crawl out of the side of my tank and not take part in the fighting . . . But then I knew that if it happened, I would not have the determination to do so . . . The social pressure in war is sometimes irresistible . . . The decision to refuse was my second hardest decision. The first was my divorce. They were two recent and close decisions and they gave me the feeling that I had the inner strength to do what I felt was right . . . even if the rest of the world did not share my ideas.

For yet others, the action of refusal came as a surprise—not believing in their ability to act as they did:

> In the case of the refusal, you first feel that you have no option but to act in a certain way. It is a very strong feeling and you cannot sit calmly unless you do it. Only then, one's moral thoughts become clear.

Thus, the ability to perform this type of action as refusal, seems to have been shaped by some contextual factors (such as detachment from the unit) as well as the intervention of non-moral personality factors such as the courage to be alone (Fromm, 1981). The refusers' ability to act in a solitary manner may also explain their manifestation of consistency across contexts and across moral stages. Yet, it remains unclear how these individuals would respond if the task were that of rescuing a friend (or an unknown enemy child) from a minefield rather than non-action. A further question is how such action relates to the non-moral factor of "ego strength" (Krebs, 1967) or what constitutes courage in these two types of conflicting situations: Is the courage to say "No" identical to the courage required for saying "Yes"?

Possibly more than any other action, selective conscientious objection may best serve to illuminate the one-dimensional way in which Kohlberg's theory has been utilized in the examination of real life moral actions. It is no longer a secret that measures of moral reasoning were found to be highly correlated with distinct political orientations (Candee, 1976). Moreover, post-conventional (and detached!) thinking has been found to be more associated with political actions that were oriented toward *rejection* of the adequacy of the system's conventional definitions than other types of real life actions (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983). Within the Israeli context, the refusers' action symbolizes a strong rejection of a traditional and historically respected norm of collective struggles for survival combined with readiness for self-sacrifice for principles of justice.

Examination of the sample of refusers in line with Lyons' (1982) procedure as refined by Gilligan and Attanucci (1988), indicates that 66% of the refusers demonstrated a predominantly justice focus in their reasoning about their refusal, 10% demonstrated a care focus, and 24% elaborated both sets of concerns. The 66% who focused on justice considerations were not necessarily principled moral thinkers according to Kohlberg's developmental criteria.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that even in the group of justice focused refusers, the voice of care can be identified, though it is not the dominant one:

> Prior to the war I was already an outsider in my unit. I had many verbal clashes with the other soldiers in terms of ideology and government policy. I knew that at least at the hypothetical level I was completely detached from the others . . . *but the real problem was the actual detachment*—that you are refusing and going to prison. The same bus that took me to the prison continued with them to Lebanon. *I felt very bad that they would feel cold and I would be warm in prison*, but the dominant feeling was that *I was not part of them anyhow*. (emphasis added to identify care considerations)

Moreover, according to their descriptions of their decisions, the voice of care rather than justice principles motivated 28 out of 36 refusers (78%) to insist on returning to their units upon their release from prison. The morality of justice appears to go hand in hand with the morality of care where genuine dilemmas or unresolvable moral conflict are described:

> After prison I had the option not to return to my unit, but then I decided I should go back: I am still thinking that there are real survival problems for our country and that there might be times where the existence of Israel would be in danger and a strong army is necessary. I feel that I *still have a problem with this and I cannot get rid of the feeling that it is difficult to be freed from this dilemma*. (emphasis added)

Whereas the physical, ideological or personal detachment was seen by the refusers as based on their moral principles (Linn, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d), they nevertheless viewed detachment as unfortunate and in some sense not moral. The desire to be attached to or *included* in the unit both in recognition of a common or shared future and for the sake of their moral integrity in relation to others is reflected in the constant tension between duties and loyalties. For the Israeli soldier, the question of whether to refuse marks the dilemma of his moral development:

> The worst parts of the refusal were going to the commander, going to the unit and coping with the prison . . . I am really attached to the unit, the people, the commander, and the commander persuaded me not to refuse. He did not want to put me in jail . . . The commander is really my friend . . . We went through the same hard times during the Yom Kippur war . . . and other campaigns and suddenly you find yourself on the other side . . . And what happens after prison . . . you come back to serve with the same people and you still believe that if Syria attacks us tomorrow, you should go with them to fight, to protect your country without hesitation . . . How would they accept you?

In terms of Kohlberg's theory, many of these refusers qualify as highly moral actors despite the fact that their comrades had to assume extra burdens when serving with fewer people in the unit. The morality of their action was characterized by the extent to which their high degree of hesitation in joining the

group action enabled them to passively preserve their moral integrity in their own constructed justice "ark." But even then, the refusers are not at peace with their consciences until they prove to themselves, and particularly to their society, that their action was motivated by concerns about connection and care as well as by justice reasoning. Many would want to be viewed as moral actors who emphasize the dilemma that is still there, even after the performance of the action (see Gilligan, 1982a)—the one for whom the moral solution is not linear, but rather spiral, the one to whom the morality of the situation is not as clear as a formal logic of moral reasoning might have promised, the one who realizes that his friends in his unit had assumed the burden of his conscience:

> You ask me now at the end of the interview if there is a question regarding the refusers that you should have asked but did not . . . Yes, I believe that you did not touch upon all the hypothetical situations that left us in a dilemma . . . O.K. We have refused, we did not want to participate in these military operations . . . and we thought that if everybody would do the same, things would be much better . . . However, an immediate withdrawal now would be a disaster both for the Palestinians as well as for the Israeli citizens in the border areas. Thus, we have an unsolved dilemma . . . *I think we cannot bear only a morality of conscience . . . there is also a morality of responsibility.* (emphasis added)

For the Israeli refuser, both moralities cannot be exercised and evaluated apart from social relationships, as explained by this soldier:

> I am close to 40 years old and I took part in all the wars since I was 18 years old . . . I could easily be transferred to a unit where I could serve in an office and not on the battlefield . . . I am not going to do so since I feel that it would be an escape to close my eyes and say to myself—I am O.K. I got out . . . This is wrong because in this way *I solve my problem and I let my friends in the unit do the work.* I want to return to my unit upon release from prison since if I continue to serve and remain *part* of the unit. I buy myself the right to criticize and the right to shout. (emphasis added)

CONCLUSION

The development of the mature moral actor might be seen as following two paths, not necessarily mirroring one another: The course of justice and the course of care. These two paths differ not only in their moral categories but also in their emotional components: The hesitation, passivity, and impartiality in the justice path, and spontaneity, activity, and involvement in the care path. These modes of understanding are as ancient as the biblical moral heroes. They seem to stand in different relationships to the emotional dimension of moral action. In the case of Noah, emotions seem not to be a crucial component of the just or righteous action:

> God has many ways of saving Noah. Why then did he trouble Noah with this building (an ark)? So that the generation of the flood would see Noah occupying himself with it for one hundred and twenty years and ask him: "What are you doing?" and Noah would answer them: "God is about to bring a flood on the world." Then perhaps the people would repent. (Pearl, 1970, p. 34)

However, in the case of Abraham, an action guided by the logic of care entails an emotional dimension—a feeling of connection or involvement in the fate of others:

> (Abraham) stands *before* God to plead for the lives of Pagans of another race; Pagans, what is more, who were to become the eternal symbol of human depravity. He neither rejoices at the dawn of the evil, nor adopts an attitude of *indifference*. He feels a sense of kinship with those human beings of Sodom, and a sense of *involvement* in their fate. (Sarna, 1966, p. 143, emphasis added)

Obviously, Abraham is still in a dilemma though the crisis is over. The question that remains, and that seems applicable in the case of selective conscientious objectors in Israel today, is how to maintain or create connections with others in the face of differences with them.

This developmental question is not addressed by Kohlberg's theory. Kohlberg's morality of justice does not provide multiple paths of action possibilities but rather implies one right way—being just, most often by stepping outside the system, that is, by separation and detachment (Linn, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d). But, as already noted by Hare (1981), who refers also to the Israeli–Palestinian relationships as an example of moral conflict, there are true moral dilemmas that have no just solution. Many real dilemmas throughout the life cycle have no just or righteous solution—no most moral or single right path of action. Selective conscientious objection in Israel is one of them. Indeed, "prior to society" evaluations, i.e., the possibility to "get out," is a luxurious outlook that few are capable of achieving, according to current data (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984) and which even if possible is not always considered moral by those who do it.

When analyzing the ways in which individuals resolve real life dilemmas, it is helpful to view morality as developing out of at least two basic human experiences: the experience of attachment and separation, and the experience of equality and inequality (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). Imbalance between these two paths can create moral problems, as illustrated by the behaviour of Noah and Abraham. Noah failed despite his righteousness to perceive the dimension of care, in that he did not even protest God's command to him to save himself, his family, and his principles while leaving others to perish. In this he resembles Bernhardt. As long as the language of moral responsibility refers only to passive fulfillment of one's own principles and does not represent the other dimension of responsiveness in relationships with others, the psychology of moral development continues to promote a flood of data that drown in the name of righteousness the moral conflicts that often occur in real lives.

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